U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i 

43–686 2009

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–145] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST ON ARMY 

ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 10, 2008 


Congress.#13
(II) 

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

JOHN WASON, Professional Staff Member 

BEN GLERUM, Staff Assistant 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2008 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, April 10, 2008, Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request on Army Acquisition Programs ...................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, April 10, 2008 ........................................................................................ 43 

THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 2008 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT— 

BUDGET REQUEST ON ARMY ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Abercrombie, Hon. Neil, a Representative from Hawaii, Chairman, Air and 

Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................................. 1 

Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Ranking Member, 

Air and Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................... 6 

WITNESSES 

Francis, Paul L., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 11 

Speakes, Lt. Gen. Stephen M., Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8, U.S. Army .............. 7 

St. Laurent, Janet A., Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, Government Accountability Office ........................................................... 10 

Thompson, Lt. Gen. N. Ross III, Military Deputy to the Acting Assistant 

Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), and Director, 

Acquisition Career Management ........................................................................ 8 

Ugone, Mary L., Deputy Inspector General for Auditing, Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense ................................................................... 15 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Francis, Paul L. ................................................................................................ 90 

Speakes, Lt. Gen. Stephen M. ......................................................................... 47 

St. Laurent, Janet A. ........................................................................................ 67 

Thompson, Lt. Gen. N. Ross III ...................................................................... 56 

Ugone, Mary L. ................................................................................................. 107 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Memorandum for the Record from Mary L. Ugone, June 24, 2008, OIG 

Audit Report No. D–2008–067, ‘‘DoD Procurement for Body Armor,’’ 

March 31, 2008 (Project No. D2007–D00LA–0054.00). Submitted by 

John R. Crane, Assistant Inspector General, Communications and Congressional Liaison, Department of Defense ................................................ 115 

Page

IV 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD—Continued 

Memorandum for Department of Defense, Inspector General, May 27, 

2008, from Lieutenant General N. Ross Thompson III, Response to 

the Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General (IG) Final Report 

No. D–2008–067, DoD Procurement Policy for Body Armor, dated 

March 31, 2008. Submitted by John R. Crane, Assistant Inspector 

General, Communications and Congressional Liaison, Department of 

Defense .......................................................................................................... 117 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Mr. Abercrombie ............................................................................................... 123 

Mr. Ortiz ........................................................................................................... 129 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST ON ARMY ACQUISITION 

PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, April 10, 2008. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:07 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Neil Abercrombie 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. NEIL ABERCROMBIE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM HAWAII, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much for coming today. The 

Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on major Army acquisition programs. In addition, the panel 

will hear from the Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD 

IG) about a recent report on body armor contracting. 

The panel includes Lieutenant General Stephen Speakes, Deputy 

Army Chief of Staff at G–8. General Speakes, thank you for the 

hospitality and for your service and for your always being at the 

ready to answer and observe and create perspective for me. 

Lieutenant General N. Ross Thompson, Military Deputy to the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and 

Technology. And I wonder, do your children say that to you when 

you come home at night? That is something of interest to me. ‘‘Here 

comes the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology.’’ 

Janet St. Laurent, from the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO). Thank you very, very much indeed. Once again, the GAO 

meeting its standards, with the reports coming in. 

Paul Francis, also from the GAO. They put your name on there, 

Paul, I think, so they knew who to blame. Right? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes. Would you like to know what my kids call me? 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Words with somewhat shorter syllables? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Exactly, yes. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And Mary Ugone from the DOD Inspector 

General’s Office. Mary, nice to see you, and thank you for coming 

today. 

In its fiscal year 2009 budget request, the Army has asked for 

$35.1 billion for procurement and development of new equipment, 

and the committee expects the 2009 supplemental budget request 

to include billions more. The charge of this subcommittee is to enVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:50 Feb 06, 2009 Jkt 043686 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-145\43686.TXT HARM2 PsN: MARY
2 

sure that the requested funding is allocated in the most efficient 

and appropriate manner based on its judgment of the Army’s stated needs. 

While the Army’s desire for some systems is a key issue, recognizing that desire is not where this subcommittee’s responsibility 

to soldiers and the American people end, nor is it the admonition 

of Chairman Skelton to us, in terms of what the subcommittee recommends to the committee as a whole. 

Instead, this subcommittee has always taken an approach that 

focuses on ensuring that scarce tax dollars are not wasted on programs that are not performing as planned, are being poorly managed or are simply a lower priority than other needs the Army may 

have. 

Right now, the needs of the Army are many. It is fighting two 

major wars. 

Please forgive me, ladies and gentlemen, if I am stating what 

seems to be the obvious to you. This is, in fact, for the record, and 

it is the basis upon which we make our formal decisions. And while 

many of these things may be well-known to many people in the 

room, not everybody in the country obviously has the same access. 

But, I am sure you all know, the interest is very high. And to 

the degree and extent, by virtue of these hearings, that we can create interest where there should be interest so that people are better informed, that is obviously our goal. So, again, I ask your indulgence if I am saying things either that you have heard before or 

are well-known to you. 

Again, the Army is fighting two major wars; trying to complete 

a comprehensive reorganization program, the modularity program; 

improve the capability of the Reserve forces; grow in size by 74,000 

soldiers; implement the latest base realignment and closure 

(BRAC) round, the base realignment round; repair and upgrade its 

equipment damaged in combat; and fix serious readiness problems 

of some units. 

Now, that is, by anybody’s measure, an extraordinarily deep and 

heavy challenge. And, while doing all that, the Army is expected 

to maintain additional ready troops for other combat missions and 

domestic emergency response. 

Each of these efforts, even in peacetime, would be a major undertaking requiring many billions of dollars. The fact that the Army 

is trying to do all these things at once during two major wars requires this subcommittee and Congress to look at the big picture, 

not just the merits or demerits of any one particular program. 

Finding the proper balance between the many needs of the Army 

is an ongoing challenge but has perhaps never been as difficult as 

the situation the Army now faces. In the American system of government, making choices and finding balance is the primary duty 

of elected officials. 

President Eisenhower said in 1961 just before leaving office—and 

I am repeating a portion of the speech that I read into the record 

when we first began our deliberations with the new Congress. And 

I quote President Eisenhower: ‘‘Each proposal must be weighed in 

the light of a broader consideration—that is, the need to maintain 

balance in and among national programs, balance between the private and the public economy, balance between cost and hoped-for 

3 

advantage, balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable, balance between our essential requirements as 

a Nation and the duties imposed by the Nation upon the individual, balance between actions of the moment and the national 

welfare of the future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress. 

Lack of it eventually finds imbalance and frustration,’’ unquote. 

And in a situation, I would like to say that I hope that that is 

going to be the guiding thesis of our deliberations. And in a situation like the one the Army finds itself in today, leaders in the Army 

and in the Congress have to have clear priorities so that informed 

and wise choices between many different opinions and options are 

possible. 

While the Congress reviews one budget year at a time, choices 

are made in any given year that can have significant implications 

in the future. For example, by the end of the fiscal year 2008, the 

Army will have spent $15 billion on the Future Combat Systems 

(FCS) program, a program with great potential in the future but 

one which has yet to develop and field pieces of operational combat 

equipment up to the mark. 

Initial funding for the FCS began in 2003, so it is reasonable to 

ask what else the Army could have spent that $15 billion on over 

the past 6 years. Perhaps the Army could have started to add combat brigades in 2003 so that troops in Iraq today would not have 

to stay as long or go to Iraq as often. Perhaps the Army could have 

instead invested in more rapid upgrades and current research and 

development (R&D) equipment so that troops in combat today 

would have better versions of tanks and other equipment than is 

currently available. Perhaps the Army could have begun years earlier the ongoing effort to provide more and better equipment to the 

Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. 

My point is not to argue with what has been done where the FCS 

is concerned nor to argue about the efficacy of the FCS, but, rather, 

that choices have consequences. So it is vitally important for this 

subcommittee to take into account the big picture, which requires 

looking beyond advocacy of any individual program, no matter how 

desirable it may seem if looked at in isolation. 

While members of this subcommittee have different priorities, 

they all share the same goal: an Army that is ready and properly 

equipped for all the missions the Nation has asked it to accomplish. 

However, divining what those future missions will be or what those 

future missions might have been in retrospect and how often they 

may happen is a critical first-order question that must be addressed as Congress reviews the Army’s budget request and one 

that is sometimes overlooked in Congress’s zeal to support the 

Armed Forces. 

For example, the Army Chief of Staff foresees an environment, 

and I quote, ‘‘of persistent conflict’’ over the next 20 years that he 

believes will require the U.S. Army forces to be constantly deployed 

in a very large number all over the world, conducting both combat 

missions and other tasks. I want to repeat that. He believes over 

the next 20 years there will be an environment of persistent conflict that will require constant deployment of the United States 

Army. 

4 

While that is one possible future, there are other possible futures 

as well, including one where the United States, as a result of its 

experience in Iraq, chooses to put fewer U.S. troops on the ground 

in hostile countries worldwide, not more. If one assumes this different perspective on the future, or any different perspective on the 

future than one of persistent conflict, then the Army’s budget request may need major adjustments. 

Obviously, a great deal rests upon the Army and the Congress 

getting these assumptions about the future right. If the Army and 

the Congress are wrong—and you notice I say the Army and the 

Congress. I do not put the Army in conflict with the Congress here. 

I think we have a common duty here to act in the best strategic 

interests and national interests of the United States. If the Army 

and the Congress are wrong, the Nation might either spend too little or perhaps too much on the Army and other Armed Forces or 

spend it in the wrong places. Or, even worse, we may spend money 

on the wrong kinds of forces, even if we spend ever more money 

on defense. 

One might say all the military services constantly overstate and 

worst-case the potential threats to the Nation, not out of any effort 

to deceive the American people but, instead, as a result of the constant fight between the armed services for funding inside the Pentagon’s budget. It is probably not too far-fetched to say that the 

worst struggle the Army has at the moment is in the Pentagon, not 

necessarily elsewhere in the world. 

Another view would be that the Congress, in effect, encourages 

leaders of the military to imagine the worst-case scenarios in an 

endless effort to reduce risk to as close to zero as possible, no matter what the cost. 

Regardless of one’s view on the issue, having created and maintained a massive defense establishment, Congress must constantly 

remain on guard, and Congress is responsible to ensure, that the 

demands of maintaining the military industrial complex as first described by President Eisenhower in 1961 do not overwhelm 

Congress’s capacity to make clear judgments between what is truly 

necessary for our defense and what is simply desirable. 

One example of a possible choice between what is desired versus 

what is truly necessary is the Army’s current plan to field, maintain and modernize four different types of Army combat brigades: 

infantry, Stryker, heavy, and Future Combat Systems. The cost of 

maintaining one fleet of vehicles is not small, so it is a question 

whether or not the Army will be able to afford to maintain four different types of brigades, three of which have different combat vehicles over the next decade or, if the Army Chief is to be believed, 

over the next two decades, given the Army’s many other expensive 

initiatives. 

Many of the most expensive elements of the Army’s plan to maintain these four types of brigades are not even in the Army’s current 

five-year budget plan. For example, the full cost of and funding for 

all the FCS spinouts—upgrading Stryker vehicles, procuring the 

next-generation M1 tank and M2 Bradley vehicle, and replacing 

the current wheeled vehicle fleet—are simply not yet known or not 

yet in the budget. 

5 

In addition, the Army also has ambitious plans to continue to 

modernize its fleet of aircraft, helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as major investments in new communications equipment, all of which are set to coincide in the next decade with plans 

to upgrade ground combat vehicles. 

I hope you are beginning to see that we are trying to take a comprehensive look here at what our actual responsibilities are in 

terms of the dollars that are going to be available and the programs that are contemplated. 

As supplemental budgets may decline—and this is another factor 

that we have to take into account. We are dealing with, maybe by 

default, congressional default especially, falling into a pattern of 

budgeting and supplemental budgeting, which causes havoc, I 

think, in our being able to make sensible judgments, especially 

where weapons systems are concerned. And supplemental budgets 

may decline over the next four years. They may not expand, as 

they have been doing to this point. What if they start declining? 

Choices between these different efforts will be forced upon the 

Army and the Congress—again, I am saying Army and the Congress, because both the Pentagon in the person of the administration, regardless of the administration, Democrat or Republican, and 

the Congress, again, regardless of who is in control of the Congress, 

they are all guilty in this open conspiracy against, from my point 

of view, good budget order. 

And if these supplemental budgets decline, we are immediately 

going to be in all kinds of budget trouble, I can tell you, because 

we have gotten used to it, that supplemental budgets cover all sins 

of omission. So it is imperative to begin to consider these issues 

now, rather than to continue to put billions into programs that may 

be desirable but are not realistic or affordable, given the Army’s 

many other needs in coming years. 

We also plan today, as an addendum to—and I feel the necessity 

of addressing this, because we have to constantly deal with the 

media looking for sensation—the findings from a recent Department of Defense Inspector General report that determined there 

were deficiencies in some of the Army contract awards for body 

armor, and states that we cannot be given assurances that body 

armor procured under these deficient contracts have met required 

performance specifications. 

The Army has acknowledged there were some documentation errors but maintains that all body armor has been adequately tested 

and meets required performance specifications. This represents a 

major disagreement between the two parties that gives me some 

cause for concern. We need to understand the facts regarding this 

report as well as the required test procedures used to qualify body 

armor systems. We can then determine a way forward. It is my 

hope the witnesses today will clarify this issue for us and for the 

public and we can get it settled once and for all. 

Before we continue further, I would like to turn to my good 

friend and colleague from New Jersey, the Honorable Jim Saxton. 

6 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

NEW JERSEY, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND FORCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

And to our witnesses, thank you for being here. We appreciate 

your participation. We are very fortunate to have each of you serving our country, and it has been good to get to know you and to 

experience your high levels of dedication. 

Lieutenant General Thompson, nice to see you again. 

Lieutenant General Speakes, I guess the 12 hours we spent last 

Friday going to Fort Bliss wasn’t enough. Here you are, back again 

for more of the same. Thank you for being here. And thanks for 

taking us out to Fort Bliss, by the way. 

And, by the way, Silvestre Reyes, thank you, my great friend, for 

escorting the Chairman and I. We appreciate it very much. It was 

a great trip, and the Chairman and I both agree that we learned 

a great deal. And thanks for your help in getting us to do that. 

To our GAO witnesses, thank you for being here. Mr. Francis, 

Ms. St. Laurent and Ms. Ugone, thank you for your participation. 

We appreciate that as well. I know it was short notice, and I appreciate all of you taking your time to come before our committee to 

discuss the very important issues of DOD’s procurement policy of 

body armor. It was great for you to be here. 

Given the overall national fiscal realities that the Chairman 

mentioned, the challenges of simultaneously funding the global war 

on terror and resetting our current force, the question has been in 

the past, and is still valid today, how do we reduce the risk of developing complex weapons systems, such as the Future Combat 

System, so that we can afford to provide the necessary funding 

without sacrificing the capability of the current force? 

And just because we ask hard questions on the committee does 

not mean that we have a fundamental objection to modernization 

requirements. We ask hard questions because it is our responsibility to provide oversight of DOD programs and ensure taxpayer 

dollars are spent productively. 

Today, we are here to discuss many important Army programs. 

However, there are at least two areas that I would like to mention 

in this statement. The first is in regard to the DOD Inspector General’s report on body armor. 

It should be no surprise to anyone that any time this committee 

learns about potential issues with force protection ramifications, we 

immediately engage. Nothing is more important to us than the 

force protection of our soldiers and Marines. 

I am not an expert, and that is why our witnesses are here 

today. But what I have been told, it appears that the Army and the 

IG had, or have, a difference of opinion in terms of what constitutes proper testing in accordance with the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation. In addition—and I don’t believe the Army questions 

this—the Army failed to provide certain documentation. It is also 

my understanding the Army and the IG are continuing to work this 

issue in terms of the Army providing the proper documentation. 

Here is a problem. Given the sensitivity of this subject, why is 

the dialogue taking place after the final report was released? I 

must say that I don’t understand why that needs to be a question. 

7 

Should it have happened before the report was published? I think 

it probably should have. Surely both organizations have a review 

process. And while I know that hundreds of reports are always in 

play, given the nature of this subject, shouldn’t have both organizations worked out these issues before it was published? Shouldn’t 

this have happened before it found its way into the press and possibly planted doubt in the minds of soldiers and their families that 

we are not providing the best body armor? Which, I believe we are. 

The second area I would like to briefly mention is in reference 

to the Future Combat System. In years past, the House Armed 

Services Committee legislative provisions in funding reductions in 

regards to the Future Combat System were meant to provide better 

oversight of the program and to steer the program in the right direction. 

For example, the committee highlighted three years ago that the 

Army had traded off too much survivability in order to fit the vehicle into a C–130 aircraft. Consequently, the Army has added more 

survivability back into the vehicles, and the current requirement is 

to put three on a C–17. 

In addition, the committee was concerned that the program entered the system development phase too early, with immature technologies and undefined requirements, and thus directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct a go/no-go review of the FCS program 

following its preliminary design review in 2009. 

I believe this congressionally mandated review in 2009 will be a 

critical event for the Army and for the program. I would like to 

hear assurances from both the Army and the GAO witnesses that 

the Army is setting the conditions necessary to complete this review. And, if they have any additional thoughts about the review, 

we would like to hear them. 

Thank you for being here again today, and I look forward to all 

of your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much. 

We are going to proceed to the panel’s testimony, including the 

testimony on the armor. We will go right down the line, if that is 

all right, so that we can handle everything at once rather than separate out the armor, because you were kind of an added starter to 

this, but we will do it that way. 

Because I think there are lots of questions and only a few members here at the moment, and they are senior members—we were 

going to go by order of seniority today anyway. You know, we alternate between least seniority to top seniority in hearings. If you 

could limit your testimony to the five minutes, I would be grateful. 

You have senior members here who are serious-minded individuals, 

and I assure you that the questions will illuminate anything else 

you might not have been able to get into. 

General Speakes, we will start with you. And thank you, again, 

for your many kindnesses, courtesies and always your willingness 

and ability to be an advocate. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. STEPHEN M. SPEAKES, DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF STAFF, G–8, U.S. ARMY 

General SPEAKES. Sir, I thank you. 

8 

Chairman Abercrombie, Ranking Member Saxton and distinguished Members of Congress, on behalf of the United States 

Army, it is General Thompson’s and my great pleasure to represent 

the Army at today’s hearing. As requested, sir, I am going to terminate my remarks with just a couple of key points that I would like 

to make. 

First, you brilliantly summarized the challenges we face. You obviously have a deep understanding of the challenges that we are 

going to address in the immediate moment and in the future. 

Congressman Saxton, you also highlighted the challenges that 

have been identified to us by the GAO. We identified the GAO and 

the DOD IG as key partners in a process that ensures we are accountable to the taxpayer and to you to deliver the best that we 

can. We believe, in that sense of responsible partnership, that we 

are better. And we thank them for their help. 

I would like to also highlight the importance of the recent publication of FM3–0 as a key hallmark in terms of the Army’s affirmation of the role that doctrine plays in helping us to understand the 

operating environment today and in the future. That doctrinal role 

that we have to fight in today’s operating environment and plan for 

the future is never more important than as we look at the modernization programs of our Army. And I would assure you gentlemen that we are looking very carefully at those, that we are trying 

to balance exactly the issues that you illuminated as we weigh investments in the current with the need to also plan responsibly for 

the future. 

We also are aware of the many elements of Army capability. Specifically, I would like to single out our responsibility to provide for 

the Army Guard and Army Reserve. Those are two key components 

of our force that are never more important than they are today. We 

count on them from the sense of homeland defense, in the case of 

the Army Guard. We count on them as a part of our operational 

force. We, therefore, have to properly outfit, equip and train them. 

We take that seriously, and I think you have witnessed, with your 

support, the incredible improvements we have made in support. 

Sir, we look forward to your questions. 

And I will pass this off to Lieutenant General Thompson, asking 

that my statement be admitted for the record. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of General Speakes can be found in the 

Appendix on page 47.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. N. ROSS THOMPSON III, MILITARY 

DEPUTY TO THE ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 

ARMY (ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY), AND 

DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION CAREER MANAGEMENT 

General THOMPSON. Chairman Abercrombie, Congressman 

Saxton and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I want to 

thank you for holding this hearing today because the Army’s acquisition programs are absolutely essential to preparing our soldiers 

for a future persistent conflict. 

9 

Every day, our soldiers make great sacrifices to help win this 

global war on terror and to fulfill our other worldwide commitments. 

I want to thank you, as General Speakes said, for your strong 

and steadfast support of our men and women in uniform. We are 

meeting the equipping demands of our soldiers because of the guidance and the resources that are provided by this committee and the 

Congress. 

I have a longer written statement that I respectfully request be 

made a part of the record for today’s hearing. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Without objection. 

General THOMPSON. We are a high-technology Army, Mr. Chairman, and we have a comprehensive strategy to modernize. Of all 

high-priority programs, force protection is our number-one priority, 

including the joint light tactical vehicles, rotocraft technology, research and development, and lightweight enhanced performance 

systems, to include ammunition and body armor. 

Our Future Combat Systems, as we have discussed in the previous hearings and in one-on-one dialogue with you and your professional staff members and personal staff members, is the foundation of our Army transformation and, really, the cornerstone of the 

Army’s future modular force. 

The FCS program is structured to bring advanced capabilities to 

today’s force as rapidly as possible in a process known as spinouts. 

The first spinout equipment set—you witnessed some of that last 

week at Fort Bliss—is currently in the hands of our soldiers in the 

Army Evaluation Task Force. The FCS program is currently undergoing 75 tests, and each test is a precursor to the fielding of capabilities to our soldiers. 

Just yesterday on the House side and today on the Senate side 

we have demonstrated some of those capabilities here on the Hill 

for those Members of Congress and staffers that were not able to 

go to Fort Bliss or haven’t been out there on a Congressional Delegation (CODEL) in order to see some of those great capabilities 

that are being fielded to soldiers today. 

We have demonstrated the credibility of our cost estimate in FCS 

over time by consistently operating within the budget. One of the 

questions that I know may come up today is the synchronization 

with the Joint Tactical Radio System and the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), and we will discuss that as the 

questions arise. But we are delivering FCS Joint Tactical Radio 

System and Warfighter Information Network-Tactical on a phased 

approach and making sure those programs are all synchronized. 

The Army is continuing to conduct our wartime operations in 

preparing for future commitments. I really do appreciate the quote 

that you made from President Eisenhower about balance. It really 

is all about balance, not just in modernization programs, but balance between the current and the future. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening remarks, and I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Thompson can be found in 

the Appendix on page 56.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much. 

Ms. St. Laurent. 

10 

STATEMENT OF JANET A. ST. LAURENT, MANAGING DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Chairman Abercrombie, Ranking Member 

Saxton and Members of Congress, I am pleased to be here today 

to discuss equipping issues related to the Army’s efforts to restructure and rebuild the force while supporting ongoing operations. 

The Army has established four key initiatives that have significant implications for equipment costs. These initiatives include: establish and equip modular units; expanding the size of the Army; 

resetting equipment damaged or worn beyond repair during operations; and replacing prepositioned equipment. 

My statement today is based on numerous GAO studies and reports that have been published on these topics during the past few 

years, and I would like to focus my comments on two issues: the 

cost of the Army’s plans to implement these initiatives, and actions 

needed to improve their management. 

With regard to cost, our work shows that restructuring and rebuilding the Army will require many billions of dollars for equipment and take many years to complete. However, the total cost of 

these efforts is uncertain. 

Based on our analysis of Army data, it appears that the cost of 

implementing these four initiatives alone is likely to cost at least 

$190 billion from fiscal years 2004 to 2013. These estimated costs 

include $43 billion for new equipment for modular units; $18.5 billion to equip six new additional brigades and additional support 

units; about $118 billion to reset equipment; and at least $10 billion to replace prepositioned equipment. 

However, these cost estimates have some limitations and may 

change as a result of the unknown length of operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. Further, the Army is likely to request additional 

funds for some initiatives beyond 2013. 

Several factors are contributing to the uncertainty about future 

equipment costs and the potential for costs to increase. Although 

the Army’s $43 billion estimate to equip modular units is a significant downpayment, it will not fully equip modular units because it 

was based on some outdated assumptions and conditions and was 

developed in 2004. 

For example, the Army’s estimate was developed before some 

modular unit designs had been finalized. The Army has since 

added requirements for force protection and other equipment. Second, the Army did not fully consider requirements at the time for 

National Guard units, which had longstanding equipment shortages and which the Army now wants to equip similar to active 

units given their important roles in supporting overseas and domestic operations. Third, the Army assumed initially that significant quantities of equipment would be returned from Iraq in good 

enough condition to help equip modular units. This assumption 

may no longer be valid. As a result, the Army now plans to request 

additional funds to meet equipment shortfalls in modular units 

through fiscal year 2017. 

Also, the Army’s equipment reset costs have the potential to 

change, perhaps significantly. Reset costs have grown from about 

$3.3 billion in fiscal year 2004 to more than $17 billion in fiscal 

11 

year 2007. However, the Army has reported that future reset costs 

will depend on the amount of forces committed overseas and the 

amount of equipment destroyed or damaged. The Army has also 

stated it will need reset funds for at least two to three years after 

operations cease. Finally, the Army has estimated that it will need $10 billion to $12 billion to replace prepositioned equipment that it used to support operations and accelerate the creation of additional brigades. 

However, it is not clear whether these costs have been reflected in 

DOD’s funding request to date, and this amount could be modified. 

Turning to management issues, we have identified a need for the 

Army to develop a more integrated plan for equipping that promotes greater transparency in its cost estimates and ensures that 

funding requests are based on sound plans with measurable goals, 

realistic time frames, prioritized resource needs, and performance 

measures to gauge progress. 

The Army currently lacks aspects of such an overall plan. For example, we have reported that the Army lacks a comprehensive plan 

for equipping modular units that clearly shows equipment requirements, the progress made to date, and how additional funding requests will help to address unmet requirements. 

In addition, oversight of the Army’s equipment initiatives has 

been complicated by multiple funding requests that make it difficult to obtain the full picture of Army equipment needs and to 

track how the funds were actually used. 

As a result of these problems, it is very difficult to determine 

progress overall that the Army is making with funds already appropriated. For example, despite a significant amount of funds appropriated to date, our readiness work has shown that DOD is still 

struggling to meet the equipment needs of next-deploying units and 

that nondeployed units continue to have significant equipment 

shortages to the point that senior military leaders have recently expressed concerns about ground units’ ability to perform other missions if required. 

What is needed is an integrated equipment plan that will position the Army, first, to achieve measurable improvements in nearterm readiness. In addition, the Army needs to find a way to better 

identify and report on its equipping needs over the next decade so 

that it can balance requirements for the modular force with other 

longer-term modernization initiatives. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. St. Laurent can be found in the 

Appendix on page 67.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Francis. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL L. FRANCIS, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION 

AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. FRANCIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Saxton and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate your having me here this 

afternoon to participate in the discussion of Army modernization. 

I am going to focus my remarks on the Future Combat Systems. 

And I think I will be giving you, I think, a more somber assessVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:50 Feb 06, 2009 Jkt 043686 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-145\43686.TXT HARM2 PsN: MARY
12 

ment of FCS than the Army would, but I think our differences are 

really more in how the Army is going about it versus what they 

are trying to do. Because on what they are trying to do, I think the 

Army deserves a lot of credit for what they are trying to do. Because, with FCS, they have decided to do what is hard and not 

what is easy. 

It would have been much easier, I think, on to embark on replacements for all the ‘‘big five’’ systems and, kind of, do business 

the way they used to. But they didn’t. They came up with a vision 

on how they want to do things in the future, which cut across their 

own cultural lines. And they had the courage and the leadership 

to do it, and I think they deserve credit and our admiration for 

that. 

With that, and maybe at the risk of being labeled a Luddite, I 

will talk a little bit about, I think, a pretty—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You know how to strike an empathetic note, 

don’t you? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes. You are a fellow Luddite? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Start at the top of the alphabet. I would prefer we did everything with parchment and quill pens. How does 

that strike you? [Laughter.] 

Mr. FRANCIS. You don’t have an iPod yet then? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What is that? [Laughter.] 

Mr. FRANCIS. On FCS, I want to just talk a little bit about where 

we have come. I think, while much progress has been made—and 

we can talk about requirements, technology, design, software; a lot 

has been done—but we need to put this in context. Cost and schedule on the program has doubled. Technology is going to take about 

twice as long as we thought it would. Software code estimates, depending on how you measure them, are going to double or triple. 

Vehicle weights are up by about 50 percent. 

And I think, to me, what that means is things haven’t gone as 

planned. And that is not to say we think they should have gone 

faster or smoother, but I think that accurately reflects the maturity 

of the program. We are in, still, a period of discovery; yet this is 

our basis for predicting how the program is going to finish. I think 

at this point, about halfway through, we still don’t know yet if FCS 

is going to work, and the stakes for it working are quite high. 

I will talk a little bit about some of the specific program challenges. 

Right now, the program is maturing about 44 critical technologies. At this time, many of those are still not mature. The 

Army is developing an unprecedented ad hoc mobile network, 

which I think is largely to be invented at this point. It is developing several small and light combat systems whose performance 

depends on the success of the technology efforts and the success of 

the information network. The Army has defined the unit of analysis as the brigade combat team, that I think is so large they are 

having to make some real breakthroughs in modeling and simulation. 

All of this is proceeding simultaneously. All of these challenges 

are attempted to be met at once and within a schedule that is faster than a single system normally takes. And the Army is doing this 

13 

right now with the lead system integrator, which is innovative, for 

both development and now production. 

The approach that the Army is taking on this I think put decisions phase ahead of where the information is. So let me give you 

an example. In 2003, when we had the Milestone B to begin the 

program, I think the information at that time was more like a 

Milestone A. In 2009, as we approach the go/no-go decision, I think 

we are looking at a decision that is more like a real Milestone B, 

even though at that point we will be about 60 percent through our 

schedule and our costs, our funding. 

Much actual demonstration is going to follow production commitments. So, relative to decisions, I think development is going to finish late but production commitments are going to start early. And 

as tight as the Army’s schedule is, I think your schedule, that of 

the Congress, is even tighter. 

So, for example, at this time in 2010, the spring of 2010, you will 

be just a few months after the go/no-go decision. We will not have 

developed any manned ground vehicle prototypes yet, and we will 

not have gone through critical design review. But you will be asked 

to provide the first year of advanced procurement money for FCS 

core systems. 

The next year, 2011, when we will just be getting to take delivery of the first manned ground vehicles, and possibly still before 

critical design review, you will be asked to provide the second year 

of advanced procurement for FCS. 

And then, in 2012, when the manned ground vehicle prototypes 

are just about halfway through qualification testing and before the 

network demonstration that you have mandated, you will be asked 

to provide the first year’s funding of FCS core systems. So that will 

be your Milestone C. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You mean the system of systems, at that 

point? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes. So the first couple years is advanced production for long-lead items. That third year is actually funding the 

produced and delivered items. So that is—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. For purposes of the record, we know what we 

are talking about when we say ‘‘system of systems.’’ Could you 

elaborate just a moment on that, as to what we mean in relation 

to what you were just providing as an example? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Certainly. The system of systems relates to the fact 

that, while we are buying 14 individual systems, which I think in 

the old days, when we weren’t Luddites, would have been individual acquisition programs, but FCS is being conceived in such a 

way that all of these systems are related to one another and integrated with the network. 

So what the FCS requires is a system comprised of all these individual systems. But when we get into the actual production, we 

will be producing individual vehicles and sensors and so forth. 

In 2013, when DOD makes its Milestone C production decision, Congress will have appropriated about $39 billion and possibly up 

to $47 billion for FCS. So if you are thinking about waiting until 

that production decision, I think that is going to be too late, because we will be very heavily invested, to think about what you can 

do. 

14 

So I see you as really having about two years of oversight leverage, looking at the program, right now. And I think a real key 

point will be next year, 2009, the go/no-go decision. 

And I think there is two things that you will have to look at 

there, if I may. One is there will have to be a demonstration that 

the FCS can work as planned. If there are some questions remaining, significant questions, then I think we need to be looking at 

what alternatives we may have. And they may not be rivals to 

FCS, but different ways of proceeding forward. 

If FCS does show that it can deliver what it needs to deliver, 

then I think we have to take a serious look at the remaining part 

of development. Because, as I said, right now only about 40 percent 

of the schedule and money will be left in 2009, yet the latter half 

of development is often the most expensive and difficult part of an 

acquisition. And so I think our analysis of past programs shows 

about two-thirds of your cost growth occurs in that phase of a program. And both the Institute of Defense Analysis and the Cost 

Analysis Improvement Group I think are estimating that FCS are 

$12 billion to $13 billion more then. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am not trying to trap you in anything. Do 

you know just who is in or what institutional elements are in the 

group? Because that is a Pentagon group, right? 

Do you know, General Speakes, who constitutes the group or 

what institutional entities within the Pentagon constitute the 

group? 

Mr. FRANCIS. The Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG)? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. The Cost Analysis Improvement 

Group works for the DOD head of Program Analysis and Evaluation. And their charter—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. They are an independent group, ostensibly, 

are they not? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am not sure what that means inside the 

Pentagon. Does that mean they have to come in a separate door? 

General THOMPSON. No, sir. I know the head of the Cost Analysis 

Improvement Group, and he usually comes in the same door that 

I do. But they do—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. But you are not allowed to eat together, 

though, right? No, no, that is Members of Congress. I am sorry, I 

forgot. 

General THOMPSON. We do talk to one another, surprising as 

that may be. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Oh, okay. 

General THOMPSON. But, no, seriously, they work for the PA&E, 

the Program Analysis and Evaluation, director in the Pentagon, 

which is designed to provide that independent analysis—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Sort of like your own GAO where cost is concerned? 

General THOMPSON. They are focused on cost of programs. They 

are focused on looking at historical programs, looking at the content that we are trying to—— 

15 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. In any event, their charge is to come up with 

analysis and conclusions independent of a particular service or 

something of that nature, right? 

General THOMPSON. On every program, FCS being a large program, the program office makes an estimate of what it is going to 

cost. And then the Army and the other services have an independent cost organization that grades that paper, if I can put it in 

that parlance, and then the CAIG grades the services paper. 

So it is the reconciliation of those three views on cost. And at the 

end of the day, you know, the CAIG, being positioned at the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) level, has more of a vote in how 

that paper is graded. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. The reason I worry about that a little 

bit, again, for purposes of the record, is that this is not just a pro 

forma operation in there. This is something that is taken seriously. 

And so we need to take into account what they are saying, because, 

certainly, the Secretary of Defense does. Is that correct? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir, he does, as well as the defense acquisition executive, who looks at the cost estimating that is done 

by the CAIG as part of his decision review process. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Would that be Mr. Young? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Thank you. 

Sorry, Mr. Francis. You can conclude now. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Francis can be found in the Appendix on page 90.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Oh, okay. I didn’t mean it literally, necessarily. 

By the way, just for purposes, speaking of Luddites, the current 

context, I think, in which it might be appropriate is because we are 

trying to get rid of the modern alchemists. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Ah. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Food for thought. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

Ms. Ugone, thank you for being here. 

STATEMENT OF MARY L. UGONE, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITING, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Ms. UGONE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Abercrombie and distinguished members of the House 

Armed Services Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today to address our audit 

report on DOD procurement policy for body armor. 

The report is in response to a congressional Member request to 

review DOD procurement of body armor to determine whether officials followed contracting policies. The report addresses the contract documentation supporting the award of 28 Army and 12 Marine Corps contracts with a total value of more than $5.2 billion for 

various body armor components during the period January 2004 to 

December 2006. We also reviewed the contract documentation and 

information provided by the Army supporting the adequacy of first 

16 

article testing. We did not review other testing requirements or 

safety issues. 

Body armor components include the outer tactical vest, deltoid 

and axillary protectors that provide protection to the shoulder area, 

small arms protective inserts that provide ballistic protection to the 

torso, and enhanced side ballistic inserts that provide ballistic protection to the sides of the torso. 

The Federal Acquisition Regulation requires contracting organizations to maintain adequate contract documentation to provide a 

complete acquisition history. This includes documentation to support acquisition planning, market research, source selection planning, and testing and evaluation of the products. 

First article testing is used to test a first article from production 

and verifies the manufacturing process has generated an acceptable item and corrects any defects in the manufacturing process before more items are produced. 

The Marine Corps awarded 12 contracts for inserts and side in- serts, valued at about $248 million. The files for the 12 contracts 

reviewed contained a complete history of the contracts, including 

first article test acceptance. The Army awarded 28 contracts, valued at about $5 billion. Of 

these 28 contracts, we had concerns on the adequacy of first article 

testing on 13 contracts based on our review of the documentation. 

For example, three contracts for vests used 15-inch-by-15-inch 

pieces of material to conduct first article testing rather than the 

complete vest as required by the purchase description. 

Another example is where a contract for deltoid protectors, which 

protects the shoulder area, did not contain specifications to test 

against. However, documentation showed a first article test as completed by relying on the previously mentioned tests of 15-inch-by15-inch pieces of material for a vest instead of testing a protector. 

Another example where we had concerns with first article testing 

was on a contract for inserts where the documentation showed support for only 2 of 24 required first article tests. 

Finally, for side inserts, an example was where 1 contract used 

product samples instead of the contractually required 35 units for 

first article tests. 

As a result of this and other work to date on body armor, we 

plan to initiate an audit of the sustainability and durability of body 

armor used by our Armed Forces. 

This concludes my oral testimony. I will be happy to answer any 

questions that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ugone can be found in the Appendix on page 107.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much, Ms. Ugone. 

General Thompson, I think what I would like to do, without holding you to specifics, is I will take my time that I would have taken 

to ask questions, and I would like to turn it over to you, not so 

much for a response or rejoinder, but if you have any observations 

at this stage. I saw you taking notes, and I would like to give you 

the opportunity to do that at this point, if that is all right. If you 

would rather not, that is okay, too. 

General THOMPSON. No, Mr. Chairman, I would like to do that, 

and I welcome that opportunity. 

17 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Then why don’t you take my time to do 

that, and then we will go to Mr. Saxton, all right? 

General THOMPSON. You brought up in your remarks at the beginning of the hearing the concern that we are having this discussion in the public without reconciling the different view between 

the DOD IG report and the Army. I, too, regret that that reconciliation wasn’t done prior to the report being issued to a Member of 

Congress and then put out in the press. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, I would like to take credit, but I think 

it was Mr. Saxton that made that point specifically. But I certainly 

agree with it. 

General THOMPSON. The meeting at the higher levels of the 

Army between the DOD IG and the Army unfortunately did not 

occur before the report was issued. There is a meeting this afternoon at the conclusion of this hearing, at 5:30 tonight, between the 

Under Secretary of the Army and senior representatives of the 

DOD IG. And then tomorrow afternoon the Secretary of the Army 

and the DOD IG, Lieutenant General Kicklighter, are meeting to 

understand the differences between the report and the Army’s view 

on the testing. 

The Army does stipulate there were items that were missing 

from the contract files. I think the issue boils down—I spent about 

an hour and a half with the professional staff members both on the 

House and the Senate side and a lot of personal staff members the 

other night, explaining where we think the difference is in the interpretation of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). 

The Army has tested all of the body armor, and all of the body 

armor that is issued to the soldiers in the field today has passed 

a rigorous test, and it is the best body armor that is available in 

the world today. And I can say that without qualification. 

The scope of the DOD IG audit—and you can see that in the 

audit report—was on the presolicitation and the solicitation. They 

did not look at the postsolicitation, postcontract, so they did not 

look at the totality of the testing process that goes on with body 

armor. 

And if I can quote here from the Federal Acquisition Regulation, 

because the essence of the difference of opinion comes down to 

what constitutes a first article test. And I am going to quote from 

the First Acquisition Regulation here: ‘‘First article means a 

preproduction model, initial production sample, a test sample, first 

lot, pilot lot, or pilot models. First article testing means testing and 

evaluating the first article for conformance with specified contract 

requirements before or in the initial stage of production.’’ 

We conducted the first article test or preproduction test before 

the contract was awarded. The DOD IG interprets the regulation 

as we should have conducted it after the contract award. But the 

testing was done. We offered the DOD IG the complete documentation on all of the 28 contracts they looked at for first article testing 

and also the lot acceptance testing, because the testing for body 

armor is done by the manufacturer in order to just come to the 

table with a qualified product. We do the first article of 

preproduction testing before we let a contract. We test it before we 

buy it. 

18 

And then after we go into production we do lot acceptance tests. 

And lot acceptance tests are different in size, but every manufacturer of any of the components on the body armor, either the vest 

or the deltoid protectors or the plates, we test the lot samples, and 

any lot that fails the ballistic testing that we put it through is rejected. And there are some cases where they are rejected. And if 

two lots are rejected in a row, the manufacturer has to go back and 

do the complete first article testing over again. 

So the documentation is there. The contract files that they looked 

at were with the contracting officer, which was in the Acquisition 

Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. The rest of the 

contracting file, which included the testing documentation, was 

with the program executive officer and the project manager. 

And so part of the difference of opinion is they looked narrowly 

at the contracting officer file. We do have the testing documentation. And the contracting file, in our view, is the entire file. It is 

not all physically located with the contracting officer. 

There were errors in the file where the contracting officer should 

have put a statement in there that waived the first article testing 

because it had already been done. Those pieces of paper were missing. That has been reconciled. That was an error by the contracting 

organization, and we don’t disagree with that. 

But the testing on the body armor was done, and we have got 

volumes of books—and I brought an example of that to show the 

staffers the other day—where there was at least four or five binders of testing on just one contractor. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, General. I would hate to have to 

contend with you when you actually have time to prepare. Very 

good. 

General THOMPSON. Sir, I will say that there is about almost 700 

programs in the Army. Every week or so, there is one or two that 

consumes about 50 percent of my time. In the last week, since that 

report was issued, this has consumed probably 50 percent of my 

time. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You obviously absorbed a lot. And we can understand why. I appreciate that. And we will go on with the questions, but it is distressing if it turns out to be—and I don’t mean 

to diminish its importance—a paper issue or a process issue, as opposed to a substantive qualitative issue, with regard to whether or 

not something was neglected to be done that was fundamental or 

necessary to the certification of the product. 

But I take it from your answer or your observations that that is 

not the issue, in your point of view. 

General THOMPSON. And one of the professional staffers the 

other night pointed out that maybe it would be good for us to codify 

in a written policy the way we are doing this and the way we are 

interpreting the FAR so that becomes a matter of the record for future DOD IG or other—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Maybe something good will come of all this 

then. Thank you. 

Mr. Saxton. 

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Let me just divide my questions into two areas: one regarding 

the modernization program that the Army is presently preparing to 

19 

field; and, second, the subject of how the Army is working to equip 

or re-equip the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, as 

well as the Army’s plan to pay back Reserve component equipment 

that was taken and left in Iraq. 

Let me start with the modernization program. And let me begin, 

Mr. Chairman, my question by saying that I think Mr. Francis’s 

characterization of the situation was very frank and very objective 

and very fair. This is, in fact, a difficult modernization program to 

put together. 

And, Mr. Chairman, you and I have served here together for a 

long time, along with many other members of the committee. And 

we have observed and helped to resource several very difficult modernization programs. In fact, in some cases, I would call them revolutionary. I would call the FCS program a program with revolutionary objectives and goals. 

We have had other programs that have been similar in nature, 

in terms of their difficulty. When I was elected to Congress, Mr. 

Chairman, in 1984, one of the first weapons systems that I saw, 

which was in the design program at the time, was a C–17. It was 

different because it provided capabilities that no other airlifter had 

ever provided. It was said to be able to take off on a 3,000-foot runway, paved or unpaved. It was said to be able—they were developing the capability to back up on the tarmac and configure itself 

without having to be pushed or towed around. It was to have redundant systems. In case one system suffered a breakage from fire 

or military activity, the other system would work to provide safety 

for the people who were in the airplane. It was a revolutionary system. 

Mr. Chairman, you and I sat here in this room, along with many 

of our other colleagues, and watched as McDonnell Douglas had a 

difficult time putting that system together, engineering it and making it work properly. As a matter of fact, it was probably 5 to 10 

years into the development system when I first learned about it in 

1984, and the first production model came off the line in 1991. And 

it was because it was, as the Army is doing now, trying to produce 

something with capabilities that reach far beyond what we have 

now. 

The other short example that I would like to use, and this involved one of our great colleagues that you and I were very fond 

of, Curt Weldon, who is no longer here. In 1986, Curt Weldon—you 

can feel his presence? Right. 

The V–22. The V–22 was a revolutionary system. It was a fixedwing aircraft that could take off vertically and fly at 300-plus miles 

per hour and carry a heavy load. That was a capability that we had 

never had before, and it was difficult to put it together. As a matter of fact, in 1986 or 1987, I can’t remember which, Mr. Weldon 

and I went to the Pentagon to visit with Secretary Cheney at the 

time, because Secretary Cheney favored canceling the system because it was too difficult. 

We today have that capability, in a revolutionary sense. The FCS 

is difficult, but it provides capabilities that we don’t have today. It 

will have a command vehicle that will be available to small units, 

where soldiers will be inside and be able to see the enemy, be able 

to see our own soldiers, be able to direct fire over a 40-kilometer 

20 

distance with precision fire munitions, and just many other 

networked capabilities that none of our weapons systems today are 

fortunate enough to have. 

And many people who are not familiar with this system, as we 

are because we have looked at it and studied it, people don’t have 

a clue. And why should they, because nobody has made this information available to the public yet. But it is a revolutionary system. 

So let me ask this. Several years ago, this committee wrote language into an authorization bill as to the necessity of making decisions on how we were going to go forward at some point—turned 

out to be 2009—on a go/no-go review of the program. And my question is, how is the Army planning to conduct this successful go/nogo review of this program? And how is the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense involved? 

Generals, would you like to take a crack at that? 

General SPEAKES. Congressman Saxton, what I would like to do 

is ask for clarification. You asked us two questions. One was the 

role of Army modernization focused on FCS. The other element was 

the discussion on Reserve component equipment. Would you like 

me to take on Reserve component equipment first, take care of 

that, and then move on? 

Mr. SAXTON. Actually, I was going to ask that question second. 

General SPEAKES. Okay, sir. I apologize. 

Let me start it off. The reason I am going to start it off is my 

responsibility is to set the conditions for General Thompson to be 

successful. Let me begin by going back in recent history. 

The Army Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army have 

placed more time with us on the subject of Army modernization 

than we have had, probably, with the Army leadership over the 

past several years. It is their personal focus. We are accountable 

to them. 

What they asked us to first of all do is to find an integrated modernization strategy. That has four elements: first, continue to field 

the best equipment to forces in combat; second, to continue to improve our existing or legacy equipment—we can’t let the existing 

platforms that are in combat get behind; third, field FCS spinouts; 

and, fourth, bring the future combat brigade system as a brigade 

entity into the Army. 

Within that, we have the responsibility to set conditions for FCS. 

First, the question is, what is FCS? Because that is very important for us all to understand. First, it is a system that provides a 

network-based capability to operate. We view the network, as Mr. 

Francis said, as absolutely essential to our concept for being successful. 

Second, it is a common platform. The benefits of a common platform are realized by all of us. Instead of stovepipe systems, we now 

have an integrated concept where we have a 70-percent common 

platform with enormous efficiencies that enable us to leverage 

other capabilities. That platform is specifically designed to operate 

in a modern operating environment, not the last decade. 

Third and fourth, unmanned air and ground systems. It is absolutely essential we separate the soldier from the thing that is seeking to cause the soldier harm. We have seen the benefit of robotics 

21 

in all of our operating environments in both Iraq and in Afghanistan. They have proven out as a concept. 

And then, finally, the concept of bringing capability across the 

force in spinouts, so we have an integrated approach that brings 

an integrated set of capabilities. And you saw on Friday what we 

are talking about: the concept of a sensor, the primitive version of 

the network, and then the ability through that network to trigger 

precision fires. That is the illustration of what Spin Out 1 will 

bring to us, and you saw it, as its preliminary form is already taking shape at Fort Bliss. 

So the next obligation I have, then, is to set the fiscal conditions 

for success. The fundamental issue with FCS is we have to make 

it affordable so that we can bring the maturity to the program over 

time by a steady application of fiscal resources. Our plan right now 

says that we have an integrated strategy that provides for FCS is 

never more than a third of our basic research, development and acquisition strategy. So it is a third of our overall investment program in the base budget, now through 2015. We are putting the 

specific trajectory on that program here as we update it through 

fiscal year 2015 in our Project Objective Memorandum (POM) bill 

that is under way now. 

The other element of all this, then, is we have to separate that 

element of it from the volatility of supplemental funding. In other 

words, concerns over funding should not address the basic trajectory of what we are doing right now in our base program. So we 

have set conditions where we are bringing FCS and its complementary systems along the desired rates of maturity to support the development of the program as a part of our base program. And that 

is my responsibility to resource those, as the resourcer of the Army 

who builds the POM, the integrated approach. 

Let me turn now to General Thompson to address the specifics 

of the kinds of technology and the preparation for technology that 

Mr. Francis addressed in his report that General Thompson now is 

addressing. 

General THOMPSON. Sir, just to amplify some of the things that 

General Speakes said, when he is talking about the common platform, he is really talking about the manned ground vehicle part of 

FCS. So when you look at the FCS program, it is a systems of systems. It is not just a vehicle. And that is a part of the 

misperception that is out there. It is eight different manned ground 

vehicles, it is a couple of unmanned aerial vehicles, it is the network, it is the unmanned ground vehicles, and it is a lot of these 

sensors that are out there. So there are major components of FCS. 

Your specific question, I think, was about the 2007 authorization 

language on section 214. Every year since 2003, we have had an 

annual review with the Defense Acquisition Executive—in this 

case, this year, it will be Mr. Young—working at the FCS program. 

Even though Milestone B was in 2003, we have an annual review 

at that level where we look at all aspects of the program. 

As a matter of fact, I will meet next week with General Cartwright, the program manager for this year’s annual review, to lay 

out the timeline of meetings with all concerned organizations inside the Office of Secretary of Defense—the testers, the people that 

22 

look at networks, the people that look at manned ground vehicles, 

the people that do the costing. 

We will do this for this year’s annual review. And we will begin 

to set the conditions for, as you pointed out, the go/no-go decision 

that was put in the authorization language for the 2009 review, 

which the culminating event prior to that review is going to be the 

preliminary design review on the systems of systems on how all 

these things are going to work together. 

So we are working that on an annual basis. We will work that 

for the 2009 review with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

And I am confident that, just like we have done in the last couple 

of years, we will have our disagreements, they will point out some 

things that we could have been doing better, and we go back and 

make adjustments, and we balance the risk across the program. 

One other thing I would like to say, and then I will let General 

Speakes answer the Reserve component equipping question. 

On the complementary systems, there are the 14 major systems 

inside of the FCS program, but we looked at, a number of years 

ago, in 2004, to find then the 58 other modernization programs in 

the Army that had to align themselves and synchronize with FCS. 

We have increased that number. And in the last year, we have 

done a deep dive into 67 of those programs that we label as ‘‘complementary systems’’ to make sure that, operationally and technically—my concern is on the technical acquisition side—that those 

systems all work together, not just work together at the end state, 

but work together over time. 

And we have done those deep dives. And that was part of the realignment of the WIN-T program that was done last year, now broken up into four increments. We have done that deep dive with the 

Joint Tactical Radio System, which has had some concerns, another 

major part of the complementary systems that have to be aligned 

with FCS. And then there are 65 other systems that we have 

looked at, as well. 

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. 

Let me just turn to the second question. 

General Speakes, you know that we are, as you are, very concerned about Army readiness. Could you explain what the Army 

has done to increase the commitment to equipping the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, or re-equipping I guess I 

should say? And I guess I would say, ‘‘comma,’’ can we do it faster? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, I appreciate the chance to address the 

question of the Army’s commitment to properly equip the Army 

Guard and the Army Reserve. Let me recapitulate what has happened over the course of the past several years. 

As we entered into the events of post-9/11, what we quickly realized is that, as a part of the reorganization of the Army and the 

execution of the transformation of the Army in modular designs, we 

created one standard, and that is the modular Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E), or documentation for a standard unit 

across the Army applied to everybody. It wasn’t something that 

was applied differently, Active Guard and Reserve. 

That is important, because, as you know, prior to the start of this 

decade, we had a different way of approaching the organizational 

requirements for Guard and Reserve formations. We believe we 

23 

had more time to get them ready, that they didn’t need to have a 

full set of equipment as a part of their peacetime training requirements. 

Now we see it very differently. We see common application across 

the total force of the modular design. That is very important, because now what we have is one measuring stick to use for everybody. It is the same. 

The second thing we created was an Army campaign plan that 

essentially put the Army as an entity through a phased execution 

of the modular transformation of the Army. We are set now to complete that modular transformation of the Army by reorganizing our 

units in 2013. That is important, because it means the blueprint 

of success is now going to be effective universally across the Army 

by 2013. We are about two-thirds of the way through that transformation right now, as we realign units in accordance with this 

new standard. 

The next thing we did is developed a plan that said that the 

other evil practice of the past that was something we wanted to 

abandon was the concept of cascading equipment. You know the 

deal, which is we took the new stuff, gave it to the active component, and then we took the older stuff that was deemed still serviceable and useful and sent it to the Reserve component. 

That was a very negative practice for a bunch of reasons. We 

now send new equipment to whatever unit is in the transformation 

process or is in the Army force-generation process, getting ready to 

go to war. That is vital, because it means that all are treated 

equally with respect to their access to new equipment. 

The next thing we had to do was address the legacy of the previous generations. We had a disparate share of what we call ‘‘holes 

in the yard’’ or missing equipment in the Guard and Reserve. So 

what we had to do was try to make up that differential. So what 

we are now seeing, thanks to the incredible support we have 

achieved from this committee, among others, is enormous progress 

in terms of our overall ability to equip the Guard. 

We just completed an Army equipping and reuse conference this 

January. What we do is specifically apply known distributions of 

items that have already been authorized and appropriated to the 

Army, which we now can base a specific document flow to enable 

us to project the arrival of equipment at the unit level. Based upon 

that, as we look out for the next two years, we see incredible benefits occurring to our Reserve component. What we saw, for example, is that—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Excuse me, General. I think we are slipping 

a little past the question at this point. 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir. Let me go ahead then and focus it. 

What we are doing then is distributing the capabilities that the 

Army Guard and Army Reserve to execute their missions, and we 

are doing it on an accelerated basis. At this point, 54 percent of our 

equipment is going to the active component, but 46 percent is going 

to the Reserve component. Over 60 percent of the trucks that we 

are distributing right now are going to the Reserve component this 

year and next year. 

So what we believe is, in the next 2 years we will source 93 percent of the equipment that went to replace the theater-provided 

24 

equipment that was left in-theater. So the idea that we have got 

enormous amounts of Guard and Reserve equipment now still over 

in-theater will no longer be in effect, because, thanks to you, we 

have been able to replace it with new equipment, 93 percent in the 

next 2 years. 

So the overall end state then is that we believe we will achieve 

the needs we have to support both an active role in force generation and homeland defense. At this point right now, we see the 

Army Guard at about 79 percent of equipment on hand against 

current organizational designs. That is a substantial improvement 

over where we stood even a year or two ago. 

Mr. SAXTON. Just one follow-up, Mr. Chairman. On medium 

trucks, I understand this is one of the big needs. And I understand 

that the production capacity is pretty much maxed out, however it 

might be possible to increase production, but it would increase 

costs fairly dramatically as well, is that correct? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, at this point for the next 24 months, 

16,000 trucks are going to the Army Guard. We are approaching 

max capacity right now for medium trucks. We have realigned 

some of our priorities with available dollars to go after heavy 

trucks because of the fact we are approaching max production. 

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Gingrey. 

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Reyes will defer to you. I understand you 

have a time problem. 

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, I really appreciate that courtesy. 

And I want to thank Mr. Reyes for his courtesy as well. And gentlemen, I want to direct my question primarily to General Speakes 

and General Thompson. Since the submission of the President’s 

Budget Request, certain media reports indicate the Army may be 

reviewing plans for major changes to Future Combat Systems programs, including the acceleration of some elements and additional 

delays for others. Can you elaborate on this and which systems 

may be cut, how it may change the cost of FCS? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, in general terms, the Army is always looking to accelerate the benefits of capabilities to the force once they 

prove themselves. Right now we have Spin Out 1 in evaluation this 

summer. We will make every effort to deliver it as fast as we can 

within existing processes to the Army. We are also evaluating the 

other capabilities that are a part of FCS. At this point, we do not 

have any definitive plans to do that, but the issues that have been 

identified by the GAO are first and foremost in our mind, that is 

the stability of requirements, the readiness of technology, and 

therefore our ability to pass tough testing before anything goes to 

the soldier. We assure you that nothing will happen without compliance with those processes. 

Dr. GINGREY. General Thompson, did you want to comment on 

that? If not, let me do a follow-up and maybe you can respond to 

this. What was the basis for terminating the Land Warrior Program? And if the demand and positive feedback for Land Warrior 

exists, then why not consider restoring that program? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, we will do a tag team on this one probably. In my previous job as director of Army Program Analysis and 

25 

Evaluation, General Speakes’s previous job as the head of Force 

Development, when we built the program objective memorandum 

for fiscal year 2008 to 2013 we were resource constrained. It gets 

back to the question of balance that Chairman Abercrombie 

brought up at the beginning. We had so many dollars to apply to 

the Army’s investments, their modernization accounts. The Land 

Warrior Program at that time had some negative reports from the 

testing. And because of budget constraints we terminated that program. 

We had enough of the individual systems to outfit one battalion, 

a Stryker battalion, fourth battalion second infantry, the four nine 

infantry, I am sorry. That battalion has been in Iraq, has used that 

capability very successfully. The soldiers love it, the commanders 

love it. We have had the program manager for that program, Lieutenant Colonel Cummings embedded with that unit almost the 

whole time that they have been there. We now have an operational 

needs statement, which is a statement from the operational commander that says I would like to have a brigade’s worth of that capability for the 5/2 Stryker Brigade, which is getting ready to deploy. We have in the supplemental request a request for around 

$100 million for a brigade’s worth of the Land Warrior capability. 

We will continue to evaluate not just the weight reduction, but 

how that system works. And right now we are working as we build 

the program objective memorandum for 10 to 15 for the follow on 

to Land Warrior, which is the incremental capability that we will 

call Ground Soldier System. So in short, you got a battalion’s worth 

that we are using today. We would like to be able to buy a brigade’s worth and continue to learn. And that becomes the learning 

point that we springboard into the Ground Soldier System for the 

future. 

Dr. GINGREY. I am encouraged to hear that. Regarding the Joint 

Cargo Aircraft (JCA), the NDAA for 2008 restricted the program 

from obligating funds until submission of six DOD-initiated studies 

to the Congressional Defense Committee. What is the status of providing those six studies to Congress regarding the JCA? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, at this point, as you know, we have a joint 

effort, us and the Marine Corps—us and the Air Force linked together. We have moved through the submission of the six studies. 

And at this point now we are prepared to move forward. We are 

waiting the actual ability to obligate the money. 

General THOMPSON. Sir, it is my understanding right now that 

both the Army acquisition executive and the Air Force acquisition 

executive have sent a memo to Mr. Young to approve the acquisition program baseline now that studies are done. So I think the actual award of the dollars and moving forward in that program is 

imminent. 

Dr. GINGREY. Real quickly in the remaining few seconds I have 

got, the total acquisition unit costs of $6.6 billion for development 

and procurement of 78 JCA is about $84 million per each. A new 

C–130 J costs approximately $62 million. Given that the JCA is 

one half the capability that the C–130 J can provide, why should 

the taxpayer pay 1.4 times the cost and purchase JCAs? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, the first issue that we have is a common 

basis for calculating. At this point the basic cost of the aircraft 

26 

itself that the Army and Air Force are procuring, which is the same 

aircraft, is about $33 million. We believe that compares with a figure for the C–130 of in the mid–60’s. 

Dr. GINGREY. Did you say, General, $33 million? 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir. The basic cost of the aircraft is 33. 

The additional figure that you have accounts for other items in life 

cycle costing beyond the actual purchase price of the aircraft. 

General THOMPSON. Items, Mr. Congressman, such as the training base, the depot maintenance, the way we sustain the aircraft. 

But it is a joint program. Everything that we are doing in that program is together between the Army and the Air Force. There is a 

common view of the production costs of the aircraft, which is the 

$33 million that General Speakes quotes. 

Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. Chairman, thank you 

again for your hospitality and letting me go ahead. I thank Mr. 

Reyes for that, and I yield back. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. Before we go to Mr. Reyes, General Thompson, I am not quite clear on the answer you gave to Mr. 

Gingrey about the Land Warrior and the Ground Soldier System 

with regard to why it was eliminated from your request for this 

year. 

General SPEAKES. Sir, that is my responsibility overall. Let me 

explain what happened. When we built the 8–13 POM we had a 

limited users test that was just underway. We went informally and 

surveyed soldiers in the field, to include the command sergeant 

major of that outfit who was here in the last couple days demonstrating its capability. The results were very lukewarm. Soldiers 

did not endorse the capability at the time, he among them. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. This is part of the Army Battle Command 

Network? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, they had basic problems with size, weight 

and capability. It was cumbersome, bulky, and ineffective. And so 

soldiers voted and said no. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You are talking about the Land Warrior at 

this stage or the Ground Soldier? Which? 

General SPEAKES. Land Warrior, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. 

General SPEAKES. And so we didn’t have a completed task, but 

we had preliminary results. We sent senior officers off to talk to 

the soldiers on the ground to see what they thought. The results 

were lukewarm. We had a cash squeeze. We had only limited programs we could support as we did the final planning for 8–13. That 

was a program terminated based on two issues: Number one, initial 

results in the local user terminal (LUT), and number two, the issue 

of affordability. We couldn’t keep the program going. As General 

Thompson covered then in execution in combat the program number one changed significantly in terms of the minor issues that soldiers were finding with it. It became much more compatible to soldiers, much more usable. They voted enthusiastically for it. We 

have taken—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What took place to change it from lukewarm 

to enthusiasm? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, first weight. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You made some changes? 

27 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir. Weight in terms of the overall originally about 19 pounds, then down to 12, now down to about 7 

pounds overall. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So you weren’t going ahead until you got 

something that you could use? 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir. 

General THOMPSON. And received the positive endorsement from 

the soldiers that use it. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And by that time your 2008 budget cycle had 

passed in terms of—— 

General THOMPSON. And it was terminated, and therefore didn’t 

show up in the 2009 budget. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. All right. Fine. So now you are looking at a 

supplemental budget, is that correct? 

General SPEAKES. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Now, is the supplemental budget principally 

an equipment question? 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir. It is to specifically outfit one brigade 

combat team worth of equipment. The price that we have asked for 

is $102 million. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. In that context then I am not concerned—not concerned—so now we are moving from—that is the 

Ground Soldier System or Land Warrior? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, that is Land Warrior? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Or are they interchangeable? 

General SPEAKES. No, sir, they are not. This would be the first 

increment. What you have, for example, is legacy radios, for example, not Joint Tactical Radar Systems (JTRS). 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I was going to ask that next. In other words, 

this is the Ground Soldier System then. 

General SPEAKES. This is the precursor to Ground Soldier System, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Land Warrior is now a relic of the past. 

General SPEAKES. Sir, the program that we are asking for support in this supplemental is Land Warrior. It is an intermediate solution to Ground Soldier System. 

General THOMPSON. If it would help, Chairman Abercrombie, I 

would categorize the Land Warrior as the early program. As we do 

with all programs, we continue to improve it, drop the weight, 

make it more operable. This is an improved Land Warrior that is 

in the supplemental request. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You are calling it Ground Soldier. 

General THOMPSON. No, sir. I am calling it improved Land Warrior. And Ground Soldier System will be what we evolve to after 

this brigade set up capability. 

Mr. SAXTON. May I ask one quick question, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Sure. 

General THOMPSON. We are not very good at naming conventions. 

Mr. SAXTON. Generals, would you one of you or both of you describe the evolutionary process that is taking place with—this is 

high-tech equipment, essentially, with high-tech equipment involving soldiers so that everybody can understand how soldiers play an 

important role in developing the configuration of these systems? 

28 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir. As General Thompson was mentioning, this is Army Evaluation Task Force kind of a demonstration. We were forced to take this to soldiers on their way to combat, 

have them evaluate it, and then try to derive Army lessons 

learned. We didn’t get the answers on the right timeline. What the 

Army will do now with Army Evaluation Task Force is move into 

a process by which we cycle programs over to Fort Bliss to a formal 

evaluation is the proper way to evaluate equipment, and not give 

it to soldiers incident to deployment. 

Mr. SAXTON. The soldiers get input during the developmental 

stage of these systems. 

General SPEAKES. Absolutely, sir. And as you saw on Friday, soldiers are going to help us determine, for example, what the basis 

of issue plan is, the specifics of what we call the TTP, or tactics, 

techniques and procedures to operate the equipment are that enable us then to field it right when we actually go through this evaluation. 

General THOMPSON. And Congressman Saxton, if I can just add 

a little bit here, this gets back to sort of the FCS argument. Not 

just are the capabilities transformational, the whole acquisition approach is transformational. And it is hard for the existing processes 

in the Defense Department. And I would submit part of the difference in view between the GAO and the Army is that we are embedding soldiers in this process, constantly evaluating. We are not 

doing things in the traditional way. So the soldier evaluates it, we 

make changes. We are in a constant cycle of making improvements 

to this thing, not that we don’t have a stable acquisition baseline, 

but we are always looking for improving the capability so that 

when we do get it out there the soldiers accept it, it works. And 

that is really transformational in my view. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. All right. But I am still not clear, and I 

want—we got to move on, still not clear what this Ground Soldier 

new start is in the context of the Land Warrior. Is the Ground Soldier, the position that you are now supporting here, part of the 

Land Warrior or not? 

General SPEAKES. No, sir, it is not. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is what you are asking for funding for 

now, though. 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir, it is. This will be incident to the needs 

of war as a concept right now that is not a formal Army program 

that has been evaluated in combat and now—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Then what is the Fourth Stryker Brigade the second infantry division now doing? Is that part of the 

Land Warrior System or is it part of the Ground Soldier System? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, the one battalion of Land Warrior was 

bought with fiscal year 2008 and prior year funds. The brigade’s 

worth of improved Land Warrior capability is in the request for the 

2000—is in the request for the supplemental for 2008 in the main 

supplemental. The Ground Soldier System, which new term—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You guys are messing yourself up with this 

stuff. You know there is an iron rule in politics if you are explaining you are losing. They ought—people ought to be able to grasp 

what you are talking about when you say it. They don’t have to 

know the details, but they got to figure it out. 

29 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. And—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And right now you are in the explanation 

stage and you are losing. 

General THOMPSON. Right. And we do a poor job of naming 

things. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. All right. Now, that said then, say for me you 

got your Army Battle Command Network. Help the soldier with position and all the rest of that, right? And the whole argument behind the Land Warrior System, among other things, as I understand it, is you got multiple capabilities, like you were showing me 

the other day. You got the wearable computer, you have got the 

network radio, right? Now is this connected then, what your Land 

Warrior and/or your Ground Soldier System, how are they connected to the FCS Joint Tactical Radio System and the Warfighter 

Information Network? And does that come in the context of the 

Army Battle Command Network? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, across the Army right now we are operating Army Battle Command Network. What you saw is Spin Out 

number one is the first preliminary elements of what will be the 

FCS-enabled network. What we are asking for the authority to do 

is to continue to take legacy capabilities based upon ABCS, Army 

Battle Command Systems, put them in the hands of soldiers, and 

take them to a war. We then as a part of our 10 POM will go ahead 

and develop and bring into reality Ground Soldier System, which 

will be linked with the future vision of the network, which is JTRSenabled and is supportable and compatible with FCS. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So now they are using your existing systems. 

Are they supposed to be using this JTRS system, this WIN-T system if and when they ever come into being? 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir, but that will be in Ground Soldier 

System. See that is the difference. Right now you are dealing with 

the last of the old. We are validating concepts. We are ensuring we 

got—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Are they working? 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir they are. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. They are working? 

General SPEAKES. Absolutely. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That’s why the soldiers like them. 

General SPEAKES. Absolutely. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Reyes, your patience is now to be rewarded by unlimited time. 

Mr. REYES. What about the Admiral down there? He is waiting 

his turn too. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The Admiral’s middle name is Mr. Patience. 

He is waiting for the next hearing to occur, when he gets the first 

question. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both you 

and Ranking Member Saxton for agreeing to go to El Paso to see 

firsthand the Future Combat System on the ground that is being 

actually utilized by soldiers. I always think that soldiers are the 

best ambassadors, as both of you saw. The Future Combat Systems 

we got a chance to see both indoor sensors, outdoor sensors, the 

30 

robot, the UAV. We even got to see the remote controlled mule that 

is a couple of years down the road. Is that in Spin Out 2? The 

mule? 

General SPEAKES. Spin Out 3, sir, is its formal. 

Mr. REYES. And you saw that it is very capable even at this 

point. You also got to see the connectivity with the simulators 

where they are already training to be able to take the first delivery, I believe General Speakes, it is this summer of the vehicles 

coming in? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, yes. The actual Manned Ground Vehicle 

(MGV) you are going to see here in Washington, D.C., in June for 

the Army birthday, the first prototype. 

Mr. REYES. And then in Fort Bliss this summer as well? So we 

are a lot closer on this system, Mr. Chairman, than people had 

thought. And I guess the most impressive thing is the fact that soldiers have always told us, and I have been out there multiple times 

with different members, including Chairman Murtha, and the most 

important, impressive thing is the capabilities that these systems 

bring to our soldiers in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Mr. Saxton and I were together when we visited Fallujah at the 

height in September a couple years ago, at the height of the fighting. And we were there with Chairman Hunter. And we spoke to 

some of the Marines that had had to go down the alleys and were 

taking casualties that way both by Improvised Explosive Devices 

(IEDs), and also by snipers. The robots, and I asked them later 

when I went back there, the robots would have been lifesavers for 

them. And I think we saw in that demonstration in the building 

that the robot with its infrared (IR) capability can see into even 

those hiding places where the insurgents were taking the major 

casualties on our troops. 

So I believe that the Future Combat Systems and just the Spin 

Out products that we were able to see and the way that it is evolving, and I know you and I, Mr. Chairman, had a discussion about 

the software. And that is really one of the—probably the only question that I will ask both General Speakes and General Thompson 

to address, because we want to make sure that any questions that 

the Chairman has is answered. I was telling him that the simulator is already connected with software where the command vehicle, the officer in charge on the small unit scale, and I will have 

to depend on you for the definition of small unit, I know that there 

is at least five other vehicles that are connected to the command 

vehicle, and he is able to direct them as he will be able to later 

this summer with the FCS capabilities to plan the operations. And 

at the same time, when they dismount they will be able to count 

on the sensors, the outdoor sensors that will be force multipliers 

that will all be connected back to the command vehicle so that 

there is a view of the battlefield by the officer in charge in that vehicle where he can direct the multiple vehicles, the ground forces 

that have dismounted, and also see the threat that is coming at 

him both by the cameras and also by the sensors. So I am a very 

ardent supporter of the Future Combat Systems because I have actually seen them, seen the soldiers using it. And they have told me, 

like they told Chairman Abercrombie, Chairman Murtha and 

Ranking Member Saxton, that these tools, these systems will save 

31 

lives in the future. And it is the way forward as we talk about the 

asymmetrical challenges that we think we are going to be facing 

with the global war on terror. 

So again, thank you both for going, and I will continue to ask 

other members to go, because I think there is no substitute for 

them seeing the soldiers who come from the what I call X Box 360 

generation, they take to these robotics and capability of controlling 

these multiple systems with the X box like ducks take to water. 

So I just would like General Speakes and maybe General Thompson to talk about the software and where we are with it and anything else that maybe will clear it up for the chairman. 

General SPEAKES. Sir, I would be delighted to do that. What we 

saw in the simulator at Fort Bliss on Friday was very important. 

It was about four-fifths of software build one. What was significant 

about that is we are on the path now to a totally new way of building a battle command architecture. Army Battle Command System 

or ABCS, which was referred to by Chairman Abercrombie, was the 

way we fought the war up until now. The problem is it is a set of 

stovepipes that have been loosely linked. What that means is intel, 

fire support, and maneuver, for example, all operate by different 

code and they are linked in a very awkward way. What it means 

is we don’t have a universal operating picture. The COP, or common operating picture, is what every commander desires so that he 

has all staff officer synchronized. What you saw on Friday was the 

first of that synchronization, albeit in a primitive fashion. So now 

what we are doing is we are harmonizing all the elements of the 

staff into a common view so that the enemy, the fire support, the 

friendly situation is all brought into one picture. And that has 

enormous application for efficiency and effectiveness and avoidance 

of fratricide that are very, very important. Now the issue that has 

been raised by the GAO is are we actually on a path to build the 

code to do this on the right timelines to meet the requirements? 

That is a sophisticated answer. I will ask General Thompson to 

help me on that. 

General THOMPSON. Sir, in the overall picture on software, one 

of the things that the GAO points out is there is roughly 90 million 

lines of code in FCS. Well, the first point is FCS is a system of systems, so it is somewhat of an unfair comparison in our view to compare that to an individual system, an individual aircraft system in 

this case. But the equivalent source lines of code, the new code that 

we are writing that is unique to the FCS program has actually 

gone down since we started this program. Right now we are at 

about 16.7 million equivalent source lines of code. Most of the code 

that we are using in the FCS program is commercial off the shelf 

code or operating system code that we are integrating with the 

FCS. 

So it is not something we are starting from scratch to develop 

ourselves. We are using what is out there already that works in 

making sure that we incorporate it and include it with the FCSdeveloped software. That is the commercial best practice. And that 

is a key strategic point. We are just about through with the block 

one of the software build for about 5.1 million lines of the 16.7 million. We have got a software block two. We are managing the risk 

32 

in the software build by the test process that we have got right 

now. 

There is another software block of code after that. And then we 

will finish up. And so every couple of years we put ourselves on a 

developmental path to develop the software. We test it, we test it 

with soldiers. When it proves out we go to the next software block. 

So I am very confident in the acquisition approach that we have 

got. And that gets looked at by the experts and the DOD IG. As 

I pointed out to Congressman Saxton, that is part of the annual review process and will be part of the 2009 review process. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You can follow-up if you 

want to. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes, just quickly on that, I am concerned. As 

I said, I am concerned about alchemy more than anything else. One 

of the reasons I am as suspicious as I am or reluctant as I am to 

fling myself into the Internet pool is that there are two people, not 

one, it used to be one, there are two people, I thought they were 

working for me. It turns out they are under contract. They are in 

my office virtually every week—maybe that is not right, maybe 

every 10 days—because the equipment in my office doesn’t work. 

The computers don’t work. They crash. The copiers don’t work. The 

fax machine doesn’t work. These are commercial enterprises. When 

we were down there at Fort Bliss, yes, I was at the simulation, I 

saw it, there was a roomful of computers, a roomful of activity 

going on there. 

If I understood you correctly, what you are saying is you are taking pieces of commercial off the shelf code as embodied in one form 

or another of a modular instrument and you are combining them 

with freshly done code or contracted code from another outfit, another commercial outfit, and you are rigging this all together to 

come up with your Joint Tactical Radio System and your 

Warfighter Information Network. Is that right? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, inside of the FCS program itself we are 

doing what I described on using and leveraging the commercially 

developed software that meets our needs. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Are you sure? The reason I am asking this is 

someone who is one of your contractors came to my office the other 

day and told me essentially that we were ready to go. That my concerns about the Joint Tactical Radio System and the Warfighter Information System, in fact he was so adamant that he was—I guess 

he put me in the Luddite category—he was condescending enough 

to tell me that this was already done and why I didn’t understand 

that was a little bit beyond his imagination. Now, is that true then 

that you are essentially ready, that my concerns about whether or 

not you have accomplished what you need to do with the JTRS system and the WIN-T is essentially already accomplished? And you 

are ready to go I guess to start manufacturing soon? I didn’t see 

that at Fort Bliss. 

General THOMPSON. The WIN-T program, Congressman, was 

evaluated last year and broken into four increments of capability 

that will be delivered over time. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That’s right. From what this guy was telling 

me, one of these subcontractors, that is essentially all over. Now 

is he taking a flight of fancy? 

33 

General THOMPSON. I don’t know who that individual was. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You are paying him several hundred million 

dollars, so he was quite content to take the money. I am just trying 

to get it straight here, you know, because it is serious business. Is 

this ready to go or not? If you are telling me you are taking commercial code as embodied in existing systems from I don’t know, 

Sony, Samsung, whatever, that I can go down and buy it at WalMart, and then you are going to put this together with something 

that is supposed to protect soldiers, I want to know whether that 

in fact is going to work. I am suspicious of that. It sounds like alchemy to me. 

General THOMPSON. Sir, it will work when it is designed to work. 

We put—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How fast is that? Are you close to doing that? 

I don’t think so. 

General THOMPSON. In block one of the software build, yes, we 

are. We have done the iterative testing. We are just about finished 

with the block one. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How many blocks to go? Three more, right? 

General THOMPSON. There are three more blocks to go. And so 

when we need the code developed, it will be not just developed, but 

it will be integrated and tested and deliver the capability or it 

won’t get to the next phase. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So we are not going to go into production then 

before that is done? 

General SPEAKES. Correct, sir. And that is the value of what you 

saw out there, that whatever you saw soldiers doing, when you saw 

that picture being moved, that was on this essentially three-quarters of the first build. We will have the complete—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. First build. You mean you are integrating the 

vehicles in the network. 

General SPEAKES. Exactly. Yes, sir. And so the great news about 

this is none of this is going anywhere until soldiers operate it and 

we get a chance to see it increment by increment. That is a part 

of the issue—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. If that is the case then wouldn’t it 

make sense in terms of the vehicle then, because I was in the 

Bradley, wouldn’t it make sense then to go with a modified Bradley 

that you also have on the drawing boards before you get to the— 

and go ahead and start building that before you get to the infantry 

fighting vehicle? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, what we showed you out at Fort Bliss was 

the illustration of the Manned Ground Vehicle that will be the common chassis for the FCS. And then what we explained is that 70 

percent commonality enables us to take not just to develop the cannon you will see this summer, but then the other elements of it, 

the infantry vehicle, the recon vehicle—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I understand that, General, but do you not already have on the boards right now funding for an upgraded Bradley? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, we are investing in continued research 

and development to essentially maintain the survivability and viability of the tank and Bradley as we bring FCS on. So the research 

34 

and development you see in our current 2009 budget does that. It 

is not designed to take us all way through the future. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I didn’t say that. I understand, General. Occasionally we do, in fact, understand up here. I am asking you in the 

context of, you know, block one, and then three blocks coming of 

code and all the rest of it that goes into the vehicle I saw in the 

drawing, but I was in a Bradley, and barely, with the equipment 

that you have now to start using the things that you already have 

now. I am trying to help you here. And we have choices that we 

need to make. And what I am asking is does it make sense to push 

for funding for an upgraded Bradley? I am saying upgraded, I may 

not have this exactly correct in the nomenclature, but and that 

Bradley can accommodate some—it is a legacy vehicle, I understand that, but from what I understand the people who drive it are 

damn glad to have it. I mean it is a good vehicle, is it not? Has 

it not served honorably and well for the United States Army to this 

point? 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir, it has. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And all I am saying is that pending the day 

when the new vehicle comes off from being a drawing to being a 

prototype to going to low production rate to being integrated with 

the off the shelf code, which apparently has taken on iconic proportions right now, pending that, do you want to stay just with the 

Bradley you have now or would the new and improved version of 

the Bradley that I understand you are ready to move on in terms 

of manufacture, is that something you could use? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, the key element of this, before I turn it 

over to General Thompson, is what you saw put into the Bradley 

was the Internal Communications System (ICS). That ICS gives exactly what you are asking, which is it takes this primitive version 

of the new network and brings it into our existing legacy platforms. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is the kind of thing your soldiers are 

now using, are they not? 

General SPEAKES. Exactly. They are using it right now at Fort 

Bliss to essentially validate we can do this. You are exactly right, 

sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Good. Mr. Francis, I have a couple things I 

would to ask you and then I am going to go to Mr. Sestak. If you 

can just confirm this for me so I make sure I have my facts lined 

up. In fiscal year 2003, when the FCS program was initiated by the 

Army, the target date for fielding the first brigade for the 18 FCS 

element programs was December of 2010. Is that right? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Since 2003 the Army has eliminated 4, 

I believe I got this right from your statement, eliminated 4 of the 

original planned 18 system elements, is that right? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Two of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 

and two of the ground robots? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I think one of those—yeah, I think that’s correct, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Of the original 18 system elements, 2 

will be fielded by the 2010 date. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes. 

35 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The remainder won’t be ready until 2014 in 

the case of the four elements. 

Mr. FRANCIS. I believe that is about the right schedule, yes. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Or 2015 for the remaining eight. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. If everything goes right. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Correct. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Overall the first brigade has been delayed five 

years then. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am not asking these questions because I am 

trying to go so there, I am trying to figure out when things get put 

down the line in terms of choices we got to make now where the 

funding goes. That’s what I am trying to get straight. So again, in 

2003, the Army said it would field 15 FCS brigades by 2020. Is it 

correct, do I have it correct that the figure is now 2029? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I believe that’s correct. The production rates have 

been lowered and stretched out. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Provided everything goes right. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Correct. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Now this is important to me. Now, the cost 

estimate for all development costs and the 15 brigades 5 years ago 

was about $90 billion, a little over $90 billion. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Right? Now the Army cost estimate now is $161 billion. Right? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Now, this doesn’t include all the funding for 

the Spin Outs. Is that your understanding? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes, that is correct. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. And now the independent estimates we 

talked to, that is why I went over this group thing from the Pentagon, there is at least two, right? One is—one of the think tank 

group. 

Mr. FRANCIS. The Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA). 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Who funds them? Do you know? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I believe they are an FFR—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. They aren’t one of these Washington groups 

that you don’t know where the money comes from? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I think it is DOD-funded. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So they contract with an outside agency? 

Mr. FRANCIS. No, actually this was—IDA was mandated by— 

well, DOD was mandated by law to have an independent estimate 

done, and they contracted—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So they chose these folks? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Do you know anything about them? 

Mr. FRANCIS. We have had a number of dealings with them. 

They are generally very senior analysts who have been in and out 

of the defense industry. And I do find them independent. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Nonetheless they are a private entity? 

Mr. FRANCIS. They are. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Then the other group, the cost group 

is an internal entity of the Pentagon? 

36 

Mr. FRANCIS. Correct. Works for the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense and reports to him. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And who expects them to give him or her an 

objective report regardless of their service affiliations previously or 

extent. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Correct. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. The reason I go into that, for the 

record, you have seen those. Now those two entities have come up 

with figures that are significantly higher, is that correct? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The outside figure I have is over 200 billion. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes. That was the Cost Analysis Improvement 

Group’s number. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Do you disagree with any of those questions? 

Rather than repeat them all, I am sure you heard them, I should 

have asked you to listen at the same time. Not that you wouldn’t 

be listening, General. 

General SPEAKES. Sir, we were certainly listening. The first point 

is that the technical discussion about the change in cost has to be 

balanced against the change in program content. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I understand all that. I am just asking am I 

accurate so far? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, you are accurate, but the inferences are 

not accurate. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You may be drawing inferences. I am not. 

General SPEAKES. No, sir. But the issue here is when you say 

they went from 90 to 160 billion, for example, we need to account 

for the change in scope of the program. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I quite agree. I understand. 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. In fact, I would say again trying to look at the 

basis the best I can understand, I know they are taking into account inflation. They think they are. But I don’t think they are taking into account the depression we are now entering into, thanks 

to the great fiscal stewardship that we have had over the last 

seven years. So it may get even more difficult. Thank you. Ms. St. 

Laurent, to think you were inches from a clean getaway. I was 

struck by your—if I can quote from the summary from your work. 

Although I have read the rest of it, but the summary I thought was 

pretty trenchant. And I want to quote a couple things back to you 

because I want to make sure I understand the information. And 

you may draw inferences from this, General Speakes. 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What we are dealing with here, or what you 

were dealing with with the modular restructuring, and I take that 

very, very seriously. This is not easy to do. And I am sure General 

Speakes will agree with this. That moving from the division concept to the brigade concept such as was done—is underway here is 

not an easy task organizationally. I am sure you agree with that. 

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Yes, very much. It is a major change in the 

way the Army is structured. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Not only that, but that means a major change 

in thinking and it can mean changes right down to where they put 

the furniture. 

37 

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Correct. It has personnel, equipping, facilities, 

and other implications. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Right. All of which costs money. Okay. Now, 

if I have you correctly, you found that the funding plan to grow the 

Army by 74,000 personnel, let’s suppose we can actually do that, 

we got to take into account bonuses and recruitment expenditures 

and all kinds of things, so you don’t really need to count that in. 

I am thinking about that. Okay. I am trying to figure out how 

much we are going to spend. Is $70 billion approximately what was 

set aside or is going to be asked for to grow the Army by that 

70,000? 

Ms. ST. LAURENT. That was the initial estimate. The Army I believe has revised it to about a $72 billion estimate right now. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Does that take into account—I wasn’t 

clear from reading what you said, forgive me if you said it in there, 

but as I got to my second or third hour of reading I might have 

missed it. Does that take into account the transition from 

modularity? That transition is already taking place without the 

74,000. 

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Right. The $70 billion estimate is to add 6 additional brigades and some support units. And the equipment costs 

associated with that are about $18 billion. The rest of the $70 billion is for personnel and other costs. But on top of the expansion 

costs for adding the additional brigades, the Army is proceeding 

with its overall effort to restructure. And that effort is expected to 

call, just for the equipment alone, $43 billion or so. And again in 

our estimation, that $43 billion estimate is somewhat understated, 

in fact, probably quite a bit understated because it was developed 

so long ago. And when we look at beyond 2013 our analysis shows 

that Army units are going to continue to have fairly significant 

shortfalls in some of the key equipment items. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So are you saying that if they are successful, 

if the Army is successful in moving toward this acquisition of more 

personnel that this estimate will probably have to go up? 

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Yes. Even without considering the expansion 

efforts—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Of the 70. 

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Right—of the existing brigades prior to expansion, our analysis shows that it is going to cost significantly more 

to equip modular units. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Do you have an educated guess as to 

what that might be if you added the 74,000? 

Ms. ST. LAURENT. It is very difficult to do because the Army has 

not really updated its estimate at all since the 2004 time frame. 

We have requested—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You mean the estimate of the cost of the 

equipment? 

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Yes. We have recommended that they do that. 

The Army’s perspective now is that modular equipping is just part 

of the overall modernization effort of the Army. And what they 

plan to do is request equipment item by item in their subsequent 

budgets. And that will help them address subsequent shortfalls, 

but they don’t have any overall estimate of what it is going to take 

to equip these units. And of course, that has readiness implicaVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:50 Feb 06, 2009 Jkt 043686 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-145\43686.TXT HARM2 PsN: MARY
38 

tions. And what we are seeing at this point is money is flowing in 

toward procurement to buy additional equipment, but we have not 

yet seen any significant enhancements in the readiness, particularly the nondeployed forces. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Is that a fair assessment, General Speakes? 

You see where I am going. I am trying to be helpful here. My guess 

is that we need to start figuring that there is more money that is 

going to be needed in the context of moving to modularity, in the 

context of modularity and increasing the personnel at the same 

time. In some respects—in other words, you are going to be hurt 

if you are successful? 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Or it will be more difficult for you if you are 

successful. 

General SPEAKES. Yes. Exactly right. Ms. St. Laurent is exactly 

right. We have two different ways of looking right now at this challenge that we are facing. One is to grow the Army. Seventy billion 

dollars given to the Army, it was a fully burdened cost. It is fully 

resourced. We have a plan now that not only creates 6 infantry brigades, but also creates 13 support units, brigade size across the 

Guard and Reserve. That is a substantial capability that is on the 

books now, resourced appropriately, and is proceeding on plan. 

The other element then that she identifies is the challenge we 

have of continuing the transformation of the Army over time so 

that by 2013 we have taken 300 brigade-sized units, Active Guard 

and Reserve, combat all the way to service support, and brought 

them to a new organization. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I agree with you, General. I am sorry just because we have got the vote. What about the money then? Where 

are you in trying to come up with another figure? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, at this point what we have worked very 

hard is the issue of holes in the yard. And the holes in the yard 

challenge is basic because we are moving to a level now of equipping where we want to make sure everybody has got the stuff they 

are supposed to have. And we will continue the modernization 

issue over time. So at this point what we believe is that the Army 

Guard is owed about $9.9 billion after we have applied current 

plans through 13. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So the 70 goes to 80? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, what we have to do is we have got to 

apply about $10 billion to the Army Guard, about $2.4 billion to 

the Army Reserve, about $10 billion to Army Pre-Positioned Stocks 

(APS), and about $10 billion to the active. That comes to a total 

of $33 billion beyond our current program. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So it is $100 billion you need. 

General SPEAKES. Sir, this is right now in addition to our existing resource plan. So what I am saying—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. $100 billion. 

General SPEAKES. No, sir. You have a Unfunded Report (UFR) right now of $33 billion to fill the holes in the yard at the end of 

2013. That does not count any supplemental finding in 2009. It 

only counts the planned supplemental funding in 2008. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. To take care of your immediate needs. 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir. 

39 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. But you don’t have the 74,000 yet? 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir. We have already got that. That is in 

our base program. In other words, we are counting right now that 

you gave us all the money we need—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So you are telling me the $70 billion is okay. 

Why did you ask for 70 if you only needed 33? 

General SPEAKES. No, sir. I am trying to draw a distinction. The $70 billion accounts for the growth of the Army, that delta, that 

new capability we are bringing on, 6 brigade combat teams and 13 

support brigades. Seventy billion dollars total burden cost in our 

program resourced and fully funded. No problem. The next issue 

then is you got the whole rest of the Army. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. 

General SPEAKES. What I outlined to you is the remaining bill 

that is beyond our existing program to put the right equipment in 

the force. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Then that is $100 billion. 

General SPEAKES. No, sir. That is $33 billion in addition to what 

you have already got planned. See the $70 billion you already 

talked about is already in the plan, you have already given it to 

us. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yeah, I understand that. I am just asking 

what the overall cost is going to be. I know we have already given. 

I understand that part. So it is $100 billion all together. 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Now, where does preposition stocks come into 

this? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, that was $10 billion of the costs that I outlined. In other words, when I showed you the $33 billion shortfall, 

I said about $10 billion in APS that has not yet been resourced. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So $10 billion will cover all that? 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir, it will. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You think so. 

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Mr. Chairman, if I could try to go over our 

overall numbers and talk about what has already been requested 

and appropriated and what is from here on forward. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. 

Ms. ST. LAURENT. And in our testimony we talk about a figure of about $190 billion for these four initiatives. Of that amount, the 

Department of the Army has probably already requested about $80 

billion. So that means there are still $100 billion or more of expenditure through fiscal—or of requested moneys through fiscal 

year 2013. And beyond that there is likely to be significant additional requirements for equipment. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Would you say the last sentence? I was distracted for a moment. I beg your pardon. 

Ms. ST. LAURENT. Certainly. There is about $110 billion more to 

come in terms of fiscal year 2009 to 2013. And beyond that point 

there is likely to be additional billions of dollars requested by the 

Army to support the modular force. What we can’t do is estimate 

the amounts beyond fiscal year 2013 at this point based on the 

data we have seen. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Would you agree that that is in the ballpark, 

General? 

40 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir. She has identified a total requirement. I have applied planned resources against it. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You say you have applied planned resources. 

You mean you can accommodate that kind of money? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, what I can accommodate is everything less $33 billion. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So we should add $33 billion—so you accom- modate approximately $150 billion in your planning? 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So we still got to find $33 billion then. Okay. 

Now we are getting somewhere. 

General SPEAKES. Or not fill the Army by 2013, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Do you suppose we will have any other difficulties before 2013 that you have to address? 

General SPEAKES. Potentially, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. Anybody want to make any final remarks? Because I am not sure we can bring any other Members 

back after the vote. And inasmuch as I would like to obey the rules, 

one Member can’t do it. 

Ms. UGONE. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. 

Ms. UGONE. I would like to just address, and unfortunately Mr. 

Saxton has left, I would like to mention that we did afford 109 days 

when we first alerted the Army to this issue. We met with the Program Executive Officer (PEO) soldier twice. They provided information from their files. We considered them. And in fact, we scrubbed 

our draft report results and reduced the number of issues we had 

from 15 to 13. So I just wanted to address that issue. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So you think the situation—could you folks 

get together and continue to talk on this issue so that we can—— 

Ms. UGONE. Frankly, the Army did agree with most of our recommendations. And I think dialogue, continued dialogue is good. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. In a short order? 

Ms. UGONE. I don’t see a real issue on this. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Could I ask you, I guess it is formally 

here, but could I ask you that when you finish up your talks and 

what you were talking about, General Thompson, in terms of your 

using that that you will let me know what the ultimate score is so 

we can then put something out that will hopefully relieve people’s 

anxiety? In other words, as I said at the beginning, this is something that many people know about here and are familiar with and 

conversant with, but what happens is it gets translated to the public and to the republic in a manner that generally comes out oh, 

our soldiers are in danger and they are not being taken care of the 

way they should. 

I don’t think that is really the issue here, but it becomes one unless we are able to clear it up, which I would like to do. And I think 

we can as a result of what has been said here today. I appreciate 

the work that you all do. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 123.] 

Ms. UGONE. Thank you. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you all very, very much. I think I will 

conclude the hearing rather than hold you to this any further. Once 

41 

again, it has been very, very good, very, very enlightening for me. 

And I am grateful to all of you. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 10, 2008 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 10, 2008 

(47) 


43686.001
48 


43686.002
49 


43686.003
50 


43686.004
51 


43686.005
52 


43686.006
53 


43686.007
54 


43686.008
55 


43686.009
56 


43686.010
57 


43686.011
58 


43686.012
59 


43686.013
60 


43686.014
61 


43686.015
62 


43686.016
63 


43686.017
64 


43686.018
65 


43686.019
66 


43686.020
67 


43686.021
68 


43686.022
69 


43686.023
70 


43686.024
71 


43686.025
72 


43686.026
73 


43686.027
74 


43686.028
75 


43686.029
76 


43686.030
77 


43686.031
78 


43686.032
79 


43686.033
80 


43686.034
81 


43686.035
82 


43686.036
83 


43686.037
84 


43686.038
85 


43686.039
86 


43686.040
87 


43686.041
88 


43686.042
89 


43686.043
90 


43686.044
91 


43686.045
92 


43686.046
93 


43686.047
94 


43686.048
95 


43686.049
96 


43686.050
97 


43686.051
98 


43686.052
99 


43686.053
100 


43686.054
101 


43686.055
102 


43686.056
103 


43686.057
104 


43686.058
105 


43686.059
106 


43686.060
107 


43686.061
108 


43686.062
109 


43686.063
110 


43686.064
111 


43686.065
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 10, 2008 

(115) 


43686.066
116 


43686.067
117 


43686.068
118 


43686.069
119 


43686.070
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE 

RECORD 

APRIL 10, 2008 

(123) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Lieutenant General Thompson and Lieutenant General 

Speakes, in the fiscal year 2005 Joint Cargo Aircraft Analysis of Alternatives, the 

Army estimated the 25 year life-cycle cost for 56 C–130J aircraft would be $6,803.6 

million, or $121.5 million per aircraft. The Army estimates in fiscal year 2007 that 

the 25 year life-cycle of 54 C–27 aircraft will be $7,085.7 million, or $131.2 million 

per aircraft. Given the life-cycle cost disparity between the two platforms and the 

greater capability of the C–130J, why did the Army choose the higher priced C–27 

over the C–130J, and what specific scenarios would the C–130J aircraft not be able 

to meet Army airlift requirements? 

General SPEAKES and General THOMPSON. The Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) enables 

the Army to meet its inherent core logistics functions as described by Joint Publication 3–17. The Army needs a replacement aircraft for the aging C–23 Sherpa’s that 

conduct the Army’s time-sensitive and mission critical resupply mission. For this 

mission, the C–27J is an appropriate size while the C–130J has significant excess 

cargo-carrying capability to address this Service-unique mission. Due in part to its 

smaller size, the C–27J can land at airfields and landing strips for which the C– 

130J is not built. This ability to land near Army Brigade Combat Teams in the field 

is an essential characteristic for the JCA. 

The disparity between the life cycle cost figures as described in the fiscal year 

2005 (FY05) JCA Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) for the C–130J and the 2007 cost 

estimates for the C–27J were based on assumptions that do not provide a true comparison. To compare the cost estimates, one needs to insure that the same base assumptions are used in the calculations. At the time of the JCA AoA, FY05, the cost 

estimate for 56 C–27J was $4,703.30, or $84.0 million per aircraft. Using the same 

assumptions, the C–130J came in at the $6,803.60 figure above, or $121.5 million 

per aircraft. Both estimates were calculated in budget year dollars 2005 ($BY05). 

These figures included Research Development Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E), 

Procurement (PROC), Military Personnel (MILPER), Military Construction 

(MILCON), and Operations Maintenance Appropriations (OMA). 

Using the United States Air Force 2008 Rand study for a point of comparison, the 

Life Cycle Cost Estimate for C–130J, and C–130J–30 are $188 million and $195 million per aircraft, $BY08, based on 15,000 operational hours. This analysis only considers PROC and OMA. The 2007 C–27J cost position of $131.2 million per aircraft, 

$BY07 and based on 15,000 operational hours includes RDTE, PROC, MILPER, 

MILCON, and OMA. 

Along with bringing greater size and cargo-carrying capability than is required for 

this mission, the C–130J brings with it a significantly higher per unit cost. The C– 

27J costs approximately $33 million per aircraft, while an equivalently equipped C– 

130J cost is in excess of $60 million per aircraft. In addition, it is not surprising 

that a four-engine C–130 has a higher per flight hour maintenance requirement 

than a two-engine C–27J. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Lieutenant General Thompson and Lieutenant General 

Speakes, what is the Army’s long term acquisition strategy for body armor? And, 

will the current request for proposals address the theater’s primary concern of providing a lighter-weight system without sacrificing survivability performance? 

General SPEAKES and General THOMPSON. The long term acquisition strategy for 

body armor is to continue the research and development of materials that will 

achieve better ballistic protection while reducing the overall weight of the system. 

As improved material technologies become available, the U.S. Army will rapidly 

transition the technology into body armor production. The current request for proposal for the next generation body armor solicitation closed on February 7, 2008, 

and source selection is ongoing. At this time, current materials technology is challenged to achieve significant weight savings for the same or better level of performance. The current Enhanced Small Arms Protective Insert worn with the Improved 

Outer Tactical Vest protects against the current threat and provides an increased 

area of coverage over the current Outer Tactical Vest with a weight reduction of 

greater than three pounds. 

124 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Lieutenant General Thompson and Lieutenant General 

Speakes, what is the Army’s procurement strategy for the Improved Outer Tactical 

Vest (IOTV)? I understand two vendors were producing the vest but now are idle. 

Do you plan to award a bridge contract? 

General SPEAKES and General THOMPSON. The U.S. Army’s procurement strategy 

is to procure the Army Acquisition Objective (AAO) to replace the 966,000 Outer 

Tactical Vests (OTVs) currently in the field. Procurement of the IOTV began in June 

2007 for an initial Theater requirement of 230,000 vests. The IOTV production contracts were awarded to Point Blank Body Armor (PBBA), Oakland Park, Florida, 

and Specialty Defense Systems, Jefferson City, Tennessee (which was later acquired 

by BAE Systems). These companies are the only two sources that have passed U.S. 

Army first article tests and have sufficient production capacity to meet the Army’s 

monthly production requirements. A contract will be awarded in 3rd quarter Fiscal 

Year 2008 to procure 150,000 IOTV’s as a bridge to a Full and Open competitive 

solicitation for the remaining U.S. Army requirement. The competitive solicitation 

will procure the remaining 586,000 IOTVs to complete the AAO, and contract 

awards for this IOTV solicitation are anticipated by August 30, 2008. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Lieutenant General Thompson and Lieutenant General 

Speakes, please outline the Army’s procurement strategy for small arms? Please 

comment on the results from the recent extreme dust chamber tests conducted at 

Aberdeen Proving Ground on the M4 Carbine? Are you planning to replace the M4 

Carbine? 

General SPEAKES and General THOMPSON. The Army is a requirements-based 

force and as such, the Army’s small arms procurement strategy is designed to meet 

the materiel requirements generated by our proponent Schools and Centers within 

the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. In the small arms arena, the U.S. 

Army Infantry Center at Ft. Benning, Georgia, serves as the proponent for all small 

arms for the Army. They recently completed their latest Small Arms Capability 

Based Assessment (CBA) to evaluate: current capability gaps; the methods to reduce 

or eliminate those gaps; and lastly, whether a new requirements document is necessary to close any capability gaps. While ongoing procurement programs are addressing many of the gaps identified, the changing face of warfare and the advancement in technologies has created opportunities to provide capabilities such as 

counter-defilade target engagement (the ability to engage and destroy targets behind cover such as walls, berms, vehicles, etc.) never possible in the past. 

The small arms procurement strategy remains based on proponent-generated material requirements and during wartime, the Operational Need Statements (ONS) 

that come from the field, validated by the chain of command, and ultimately approved by the Army leadership for specific limited requirements. These ONS are 

also submitted to the formal requirements process with the proponent evaluating 

the ONS for applicability across the force. The ONS generated in Operations in 

Southwest Asia were also reviewed as part of the CBA that the U.S. Army Infantry 

Center recently completed. 

The current small arms procurement strategy focuses on: meeting the expanding 

requirements for machine guns for convoy protection and individual and crew-served 

weapons to meet the expansion of the Army; and increasing the fielding of the latest 

version of weapons to the whole Army. For instance, the Army and industry are developing a lighter weight .50 caliber machine gun (XM312) with increased safety 

features such as the Quick Change Barrel that eliminates the need to set head 

space and timing with each barrel change; and a lightweight 7.62mm Machine Gun 

(M240E6) which reduces the weight of the weapon by five pounds through the incorporation of a titanium receiver and a metal polymer pistol grip and trigger assembly. We have been developing a counter-defilade capability, which will meet the 

highest priority materiel gap identified by the CBA. A new sniper weapon began 

fielding this year and a new 40mm Grenade Launcher will begin fielding later in 

the year. Next year, a new shotgun integrated with the carbine will begin fielding. 

The procurement strategy is a living document that constantly adjusts to meet the 

needs of the Army. 

The extreme dust test conducted last year highlighted the quality of the weapons 

tested with all of the weapons performing 98.4 percent of the time or better in a 

laboratory environment designed to push the weapons beyond their limits at a significantly accelerated pace. The test also confirmed that the maintenance regimen 

directed by the Army makes a significant impact on the reduction of malfunctions. 

The Army has taken the results of this test to analyze the data for possible engineering changes to further improve the Army’s basic carbine, as we have continuously done since before the current carbine, the M4, was introduced into the force. 

In addition, on the basis of engineering data that the Army already had, an ongoing 

125 

magazine program will begin fielding the new improved ammunition magazines in 

the 1st quarter Fiscal Year 2009. 

The Army currently does not have plans to replace the M4 carbine. The U.S. 

Army Infantry Center’s CBA found no capability gaps that require a new materiel 

solution for the Soldier’s basic carbine and rifle. Further, the reports from the field 

commanders and senior non-commissioned officers constantly praise the M4 with 

their only request being that they want more of them. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Lieutenant General Thompson and Lieutenant General 

Speakes, the Air Force appears to be attempting to procure a new handgun. Does 

the Army plan to replace the M9mm? Does the Army support the Air Force initiative to procure a new modular handgun system? 

General SPEAKES and General THOMPSON. The Army has determined there is no 

immediate need to replace the current 9mm handgun. The current 9mm pistol 

meets the Army requirements. Although improvements can be made, a new handgun is a lower priority than other small arms needs such as our desire to defeat 

defilade targets. Replacing a pistol for another pistol without significant improvements in operational capabilities and other attributes (sustainment) is of little 

value. 

Finally, the Army supports the Air Force initiative to procure a new handgun. As 

the Executive Agent for small arms, the Army has participated in the development 

of the Air Force handgun capability requirement documentation. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Lieutenant General Thompson and Lieutenant General 

Speakes, what is the Army’s strategy for long term MRAP vehicle procurement and 

do you expect a change in current requirements? When does the Army plan to transition MRAP to an official program of record? 

General SPEAKES and General THOMPSON. It is too soon to assess the MRAP in 

the current fight. As Commanders in the field provide operational assessments of 

MRAPs, we will adjust the MRAP and Tactical Wheeled Vehicle strategy accordingly to further define MRAPs role in the future Army. 

Most recently, a Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated an interim requirement for 12,000 MRAP vehicles. The theater has requested a two-thirds fleet 

mix of MRAPs and a one-third fleet mix of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) based on initial feedback from commanders that MRAP may not 

be suited to all missions because of its large size: HMMWVs are smaller and more 

maneuverable in densely populated areas. Theater commanders will complete their 

evaluation of the MRAP’s performance and will provide feedback at a later date. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Lieutenant General Thompson, do all models and types of 

fielded body armor components meet first article test requirements? 

General THOMPSON. Unless waived by the contracting officer in cases where supplies identical or similar to those called for in the schedule have been previously 

furnished by the contractor and have been accepted by the Government, the Army 

conducts First Article Tests (FAT) for all models and types of fielded body armor 

components to ensure performance requirements are met before being accepted by 

the U.S. Army. The U.S. Army also conducts Lot Acceptance Tests and surveillance 

tests throughout the production and fielding cycle to confirm continued compliance. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Lieutenant General Thompson, do you agree with all the recommendations in the IG’s report? For those recommendations you do agree with, 

what is the plan for their implementation? 

General THOMPSON. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) affords contracting 

officers with discretion when deciding whether to require first article testing (FAT) 

for a given acquisition. FAR 9.302 provides that before requiring FAT, the contracting officer shall consider the impact on cost or time of delivery, risk to the Government of foregoing such testing, and the availability of other, less costly, methods 

of ensuring the desired results. Pre-award testing techniques exist under the FAR 

that can be used in appropriate circumstances in lieu of FAT. Such pre-award testing can provide sufficient assurances that the contractor can furnish a product that 

conforms to all contract requirements for acceptance. Techniques for pre-award testing include: (i) the use of qualification requirements under FAR Subpart 9.2; and 

(ii) the inclusion of testing requirements as a solicitation evaluation factor or subfactor in negotiated procurements under FAR Part 15. Based on the concerns in the 

Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) report, the Army is revising its 

internal procedures so that contracting officers ensure solicitation and contract documents precisely and consistently describe the testing approach being utilized and 

avoid terminology and procedures that are inapplicable to the selected approach. Implementing policy is currently under development. 

We concur with the DODIG recommendation to provide adequate documentation 

to support all contractual actions. The program office will assist contracting officers 

in their efforts to document all contractual actions and obtain all required docuVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:50 Feb 06, 2009 Jkt 043686 PO 00000 Frm 00129 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-145\43686.TXT HARM2 PsN: MARY
126 

mentation that may be generated and kept on file by other organizations (e.g., Army 

Test and Evaluation Center). 

We also concur with the DODIG recommendation to identify the steps that will 

be initiated to ensure that policies and procedures applicable to the use of non-DOD 

contracts are enforced. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(Policy and Procurement) issued policy alert 08–26 on April 28, 2008, which re-emphasizes the requirements associated with the use of non-DOD contracts and federal 

supply schedules, to include seeking discounts for orders and documenting contract 

files on market research efforts conducted. To provide oversight and periodic assessment of appropriate procedural application, these requirements will be added as inspection elements in conjunction with the Army’s Contracting Operations Review 

Program by June 30, 2008. Based on the October 11, 2007, Army Audit Agency report, Proper Use of Non-DOD Contracts, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) is revising the Army’s July 12, 2005, 

policy on the use of non-DOD contracts. The revised policy will be distributed on 

or after June 2008 as a Secretary of the Army Directive to re-emphasize the requirements related to the use of non-DOD contracts. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Lieutenant General Thompson, under objective 1, the IG report also suggested other Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) deficiencies, according to the IG report: some contracts did not request a quantity discount or document 

why one was not requested; some contracts lacked market research; and some contracts contained internal control weaknesses, among others. Do you agree with the 

IG on these issues? In cases where you agree, how do these deficiencies affect the 

performance of the body armor? 

General THOMPSON. While we have acknowledged and are addressing the report’s 

concern with various practices observed in the Army contracts reviewed by the 

DODIG, we are pleased that the DODIG did not call into question the effectiveness 

or safety of the various body armor components in use throughout the DOD. We 

concur with the DODIG recommendation to provide adequate documentation to support all contractual actions. We also concur with the DODIG’s recommendation to 

identify the steps that will be initiated to ensure that policies and procedures applicable to the use of non-DOD contracts are enforced. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) issued policy alert 08–26 on 

April 28, 2008, which re-emphasizes the requirements associated with the use of 

non-DOD contracts and federal supply schedules, to include seeking discounts for 

orders and documenting contract files on market research efforts conducted. To provide oversight and periodic assessment of appropriate procedural application, these 

requirements will be added as inspection elements in conjunction with the Army’s 

Contracting Operations Review Program by June 30, 2008. Based on the October 

11, 2007, Army Audit Agency report, Proper Use of Non-DOD Contracts, the Office 

of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) is revising 

the Army’s July 12, 2005 policy on the use of non-DOD contracts. The revised policy 

will be distributed on or after June 2008 as a Secretary of the Army Directive to 

re-emphasize the requirements related to the use of non-DOD contracts. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Lieutenant General Thompson, on page 16, DODIG recommends that PEO Soldier direct testing and evaluation of first articles for contract 

conformance before production on all (emphasis added) contracts. Do you believe 

this would be a good change? Why or why not? What changes would need to be 

made to the FAR, if any, to make FAT testing mandatory for all contracts after contract award as suggested by the DODIG? 

General THOMPSON. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) affords contracting 

officers with discretion when deciding whether to require first article testing (FAT) 

for a given acquisition. The FAR 9.302 provides that before requiring FAT, the contracting officer shall consider the impact on cost or time of delivery, risk to the Government of foregoing such testing, and the availability of other, less costly, methods 

of ensuring the desired results. Preaward testing techniques exist under the FAR 

that can be used in appropriate circumstances in lieu of FAT. Such preaward testing 

can provide sufficient assurances that the contractor can furnish a product that conforms to all contract requirements for acceptance. Techniques for preaward testing 

include (i) the use of qualification requirements under FAR Subpart 9.2 and (ii) the 

inclusion of testing requirements as a solicitation evaluation factor or subfactor in 

negotiated procurements under FAR Part 15. Based on the concerns in the DODIG 

report, the Army is revising its internal procedures so that contracting officers ensure solicitation and contract documents precisely and consistently describe the testing approach being utilized and avoid terminology and procedures that are inapplicable to the selected approach. Implementing policy is currently under development. 

The FAR currently provides adequate authority to require preaward and post-award 

testing, thus we do not believe a change is necessary. 

127 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Lieutenant General Thompson, on some contracts, the DODIG 

stated that the Army used test results on the preliminary design models (PDMs) 

submitted under the solicitation to authorize production. What is your understanding of the FAR as it relates to PDMs and whether testing PDMs can satisfy 

FAT requirements? What assurances do you have that the initial production samples provided after contract measure up to or surpass the performance of PDMs provided before the contract? Has a manufacturer’s PDMs ever passed a pre-contract 

test but failed a post-contract FAT? Do you have examples of such a situation? If 

such a situation occurs, how would the Army proceed and what modifications would 

the Army be responsible for? Please explain the impact, if any, of the FAT being 

conducted pre-award or post-award? 

General THOMPSON. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) affords contracting 

officers with discretion when deciding whether to require first article testing (FAT) 

for a given acquisition. The FAR 9.302 provides that before requiring FAT, the contracting officer shall consider the impact on cost or time of delivery, risk to the Government of foregoing such testing, and the availability of other, less costly, methods 

of ensuring the desired results. Preaward testing techniques exist under the FAR 

that can be used in appropriate circumstances in lieu of FAT. Such preaward testing 

can provide sufficient assurances that the contractor can furnish a product that conforms to all contract requirements for acceptance. Techniques for preaward testing 

include (i) the use of qualification requirements under FAR Subpart 9.2 and (ii) the 

inclusion of testing requirements as a solicitation evaluation factor or subfactor in 

negotiated procurements under FAR Part 15. 

The test protocols are the same for preaward testing and post-award FAT, so 

there is no impact on testing and there have been no instances where PDMs have 

passed preaward testing and subsequently failed post-award FAT. Only new producers or new designs are required to undergo FAT regardless of any preaward testing conducted. 

The Army conducts robust post-award surveillance testing, continuous lot sampling and Lot Acceptance Testing (LAT) to verify consistency of production items in 

meeting the performance specifications. FAR 52.209–3 and 52.209–4 discuss the 

Government’s rights when a product fails FAT and is disapproved. The cost of any 

repeat FAT is borne by the contractor, and the Government retains equitable adjustment and default rights under the contract. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. 1. The Army assessed it needed $52.5 billion ($43.6 billion of 

which is allocated to equipment) to complete its restructuring to a modular force by 

2011. In 2007 Army officials extended the timeline for fully equipping the modular 

force from 2011 to 2019, but have not re-estimated the costs to accommodate this 

change. 

Æ What is the Army’s current cost estimate for fully equipping modular units 

to authorized levels of equipment? 

Æ To what extent is the Army’s estimate reflected in the Department of Defense’s Future Years Defense Program? 

Æ Why was the timeline for equipping modular units revised from 2011 to 2019? 

To what extent will modular units be equipped by then? 

2. GAO could not determine the extent to which the Army Prepositioned Stocks 

(APS) reconstitution strategy is reflected in current defense budget requests and 

cost estimates for restoring the prepositioned equipment sets to a posture that fully 

supports the Department of Defense’s strategy. 

Æ What is the Army’s cost estimate for implementing APS Strategy 2015 approved in November 2007? 

Æ How can the Army be assured that the funding requested for APS is used 

for APS requirements if APS funds are not tracked separately from other 

equipment-related funds? 

3. The Secretary of Defense announced an initiative to expand the Army, 74,200 

military personnel, in order to meet increasing strategic demands and to help reduce stress on the force. The Army is now considering accelerating the implementation timeline from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2010. Army officials stated that 

they expect to include acceleration costs in another emergency supplemental request 

for funds to prosecute Global War on Terror. 

Æ What are the estimated costs for accelerating the implementation timeline for 

expanding the force and what is driving the costs? 

Æ What are the equipment costs for expanding the force and to what extent are 

they likely to change? 

128 

General SPEAKES and General THOMPSON. [The information referred to was not 

available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Ms. Ugone, the report states that your first objective was to 

review ‘‘the procurement history of body armor.’’ Please explain what the specific 

audit objectives were with regard to this procurement history? In other words, what 

specific questions did you set out to address? 

Ms. UGONE. To answer the first audit objective, ‘‘review the procurement history 

of body armor,’’ we set out to address the following: 

• Did contracting officials award Army and Marine Corps contracts and orders 

for body armor components between January 2004 and December 2006 in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, Public Laws, and the United States Code? 

• Specifically, did the contracting documentation for these body armor components from the presolicitation and solicitation and evaluation phases support 

compliance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, Public Laws, and the United States Code? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Ms. Ugone, given the findings from the report, would you recommend recalling body armor components procured and fielded under the 13 contracts found to be deficient? 

Ms. UGONE. As stated in the scope limitation section of the report, the scope was 

limited to reviewing the presolicitation and solicitation and evaluation phases of the 

acquisition process for specific contracts. We also reviewed contracting files as necessary to determine whether First Article Testing was completed in accordance with 

the Federal Acquisition Regulation and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. Since we did not evaluate other testing requirements or safety issues such 

as ballistics testing, we do not have a basis for recommending the recall of this body 

armor. I should note that the Army has assured us many times that the armor procured under these contracts has passed all testing and no evidence of deaths could 

be attributed to defective body armor. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Ms. Ugone, please elaborate on your findings presented in Appendix C regarding the Army’s safety of use message. How did you reach your conclusions? And, in your opinion, is the safety of use message putting military personnel at risk? 

Ms. UGONE. Our second audit objective was to determine the effect the Army’s 

ban on personally procured body armor had on the safety of our Service members. 

To respond to this request, we reviewed the circumstances leading to the Army’s 

ban, and determined whether the Army had enough body armor in inventory to protect its soldiers. 

The safety of use message informed soldiers that commercially available body 

armor was not tested to the same military specifications for ballistic protection. As 

a result, the message directed the replacement of all commercially available body 

armor immediately with Army approved and issued body armor. We did not validate 

whether commercially bought body armor met military specifications for ballistic 

protection; however, we reviewed whether the Army had available stocks of body 

armor on hand to sustain the replacement. According to Army officials, sufficient 

stocks of Army issued body armor were available for Service members at the time 

of the ban. We reviewed the Army’s recorded inventory against the U.S. Central 

Command theater requirements for body armor to determine that reported quantities were sufficient to issue one suit of body armor to each Service member and 

DOD civilian in the U.S. Central Command theater. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Ms. Ugone, in your report, you concluded that ‘‘specific information concerning testing and approval of first article was not included in 13 out 

of 28 Army contracts and orders reviewed.’’ What is required by the federal acquisition regulations regarding testing and approval of first articles and the timing of 

the first article tests (FAT)? Which phase of the acquisition process do you consider 

FAT to fall under? 

Ms. UGONE. The Federal Acquisition Regulation allows contracting officials to use 

their judgment as to when to require First Article Testing, which is defined by the 

Federal Acquisition Regulation as ‘‘testing and evaluating the first article for conformance with specified contract requirements before or in the initial stage of production.’’ Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 9.3, ‘‘First Article Testing and Approval,’’ also states that testing and approval may be appropriate when the product 

is described by a performance specification (i.e. body armor components). 

Additionally, the Purchase Description for each body armor component, which is 

part of the contract, states, ‘‘when a first article is required, it shall be inspected 

under the appropriate provisions of Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.209.’’ Because 

the body armor testing was conducted at an Independent National Institute of JusVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:50 Feb 06, 2009 Jkt 043686 PO 00000 Frm 00132 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-145\43686.TXT HARM2 PsN: MARY
129 

tice certified ballistics laboratory and not by each contractor, the contracting officer 

was required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation to insert clause 52.209–4, ‘‘First 

Article Approval—Government Testing,’’ in the contract. The clause states: 

‘‘The Contractor shall deliver ll unit(s) of Lot/Item ll within ll calendar 

days from the date of this contract to the Government . . . for first article 

tests.’’ 

Based on the above text from the Federal Acquisition Regulation, we concluded 

that First Article Testing should be conducted after contract award (i.e. during the 

contract administration phase of the acquisition). 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Ms. Ugone, would you consider first article tests of preliminary 

design models to be in compliance with FAR requirements for first article tests of 

initial production for body armor? Why or why not? 

Ms. UGONE. As stated in our report, Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 

14.202–4 states that preliminary design models will be used to determine only the 

responsiveness of the bid and will not be used to determine a bidder’s ability to 

produce the required item. For specific contracts that we reviewed and found deficient, evidence showed that when preliminary design models were evaluated during 

the solicitation and evaluation phase of the acquisition as part of the First Article 

Test, only ballistic requirements were tested. No evidence was presented to validate 

that a full First Article Test was performed on the identified contracts. Therefore, 

First Article Tests performed on preliminary design models were not in compliance 

with Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements, specifically for body armor components we reviewed and found deficient. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Ms. Ugone, did you examine documentation or other evidence 

outside of the Army contract files, or was their review limited to the information 

presented in the contract files? 

Ms. UGONE. The congressional request was for my office to determine whether 

proper policies were followed with regard to the procurement history for body armor. 

The Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 4.801(b) states, ‘‘the documentation in 

Government Contract files shall be sufficient to constitute a complete history of the 

transaction for the purpose of furnishing essential facts in the event of congressional 

inquiries.’’ We reviewed contract files, conducted extensive interviews with program 

and contracting officials, and obtained information from the Program Executive Office Soldier that was not originally in the contract files. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ 

Mr. ORTIZ. Lieutenant General Thompson and Lieutenant General Speakes, the 

Department of the Army has approved a requirement for nine additional MEDEVAC 

companies in the Army. What is the procurement plan to resource the additional 

companies, specifically the Army Reserve and National Guard, with UH60Ms? 

General SPEAKES and General THOMPSON. The Army is committed to providing 

the best Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) aircraft to evacuate our wounded Soldiers, Marines, Sailors and Airmen from the battlefields. This commitment to procure HH–60M aircraft is part of our overall plan to field and modernize the Army 

National Guard (ARNG) and United States Army Reserve (USAR) concurrently with 

the Active Army. Indeed, the first unit equipped with the new HH–60M will be an 

ARNG unit from Vermont and Massachusetts, C Company, 1–126th (C/1–126th), 

which will receive its aircraft this fall. 

The next ARNG MEDEVAC companies from Arkansas, Florida, Montana and 

South Dakota are scheduled to receive the HH–60M MEDEVAC. C/1–111th (Florida 

and Arkansas ARNG) will start receiving HH–60M aircraft in late Spring 2009 and 

C/1–189th (South Dakota and Montana ARNG) will receive them in the Summer 

2011. 

The USAR has a plan to build three new MEDEVAC units and plans to field detachments at four locations including Johnstown, Pennsylvania; Fort Knox, Kentucky; Kingsville, Texas; and Fort Carson, Colorado. The third USAR MEDEVAC 

unit is a HH–60L unit at Clearwater, Florida, and these are the Army’s most capable integrated MEDEVAC aircraft, up until HH–60Ms are fielded. The Fiscal Year 

2008 (FY08) Global War on Terror request would resource 21 of the required 24 

HH–60M aircraft for the USAR. The USAR units will begin receiving the HH–60M 

aircraft in Spring 2010 and continuing through Winter 2010. 

130 

Units beyond these fieldings receive UH–60A cascaded aircraft from the Active 

component. As you know, we have instituted a recapitalization initiative at Corpus 

Christi Army Depot to convert UH–60A aircraft to the more capable UH–60L configuration. The Army is in the final stages of validating this ‘‘A to L Recapitalization’’ initiative and once we confirm the process and expected long term savings, we 

will ensure the ARNG and USAR units receive these recapitalized aircraft. 

Æ