U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

i 

29–414 2019

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–76] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES HEARING 

ON

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FISCAL 

YEAR 2019 BUDGET REQUEST FOR 

SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 6, 2018 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama, Vice Chair 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

A. DONALD MCEACHIN, Virginia 

DAVID SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

MEGAN HANDAL, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ........................................... 3 

Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ........................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Geurts, Hon. James F., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition; LtGen Robert S. Walsh, USMC, Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration, U.S. Marine Corps; and 

VADM William R. Merz, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems, U.S. Navy ...................................................................................... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Geurts, Hon. James F., joint with LtGen Robert S. Walsh and VADM 

William R. Merz ............................................................................................ 37 

Wittman, Hon. Robert J. .................................................................................. 35 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 63 

Mr. McEachin ................................................................................................... 65 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FISCAL YEAR 2019 BUDGET 

REQUEST FOR SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 6, 2018. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:04 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J. Wittman 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. WITTMAN. I am going to call to order the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces. 

And today, we are going meet to discuss the Department of the 

Navy’s fiscal year 2019 budget request. Appearing before us to discuss this important topic are three esteemed Navy witnesses: Honorable James Geurts, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, 

Development, and Acquisition; Vice Admiral William R. Merz, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems; and Lieutenant General Robert S. Walsh, Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration. 

I want to thank all of you for your service as well as for appearing before our subcommittee today on the fiscal year 2019 budget 

request. 

Concurrent with the budget request last month, the Secretary of 

the Navy also released a 30-year shipbuilding plan that addresses 

new capabilities and offers a plan to recapitalize the current force 

structure. While I am pleased that the plan was timely, I am concerned that it does not properly advocate for the Navy the Nation 

needs. In fact, on page 8 of the plan, it references the 2016 Force 

Structure Assessment in a table, clearly identifying a need for 355 

ships. Yet on page 12, the 30-year shipbuilding plan only reaches 

342 ships by 2039. 

And we have had some great conversations about the context of 

that, and understanding Congress’ role, it is still, I think, critical 

to make sure that we are on the same page with the 355 number. 

Critical shortfalls in aircraft carriers, large deck amphibs [amphibious warships], and attack submarines are debilitating to our national security and only serve to embolden our potential adversaries. 

I think that the Navy sometimes misses the strategic imperative 

and national urgency associated with the message our Nation 

needs to send to the world when an inadequate shipbuilding budget 
2 

is proposed. Shipbuilding is a sign of our Nation’s resolve, and a 

weak shipbuilding request is carefully watched by our adversaries. 

We need to significantly improve our Navy shipbuilding to meet 

the President’s objective of a 355-ship Navy. As I spoke of the other 

day, people get sick of hearing it from me, but $26.2 billion and 13 

ships is the floor will be a refrain that you will constantly hear as 

to the needs for this Nation. 

As to the Marine Corps, I am pleased this committee supported 

the authorization of another San Antonio-class amphibious ship in 

the fiscal year 2018 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]. 

While I continue to hold some concerns with respect to conducting 

amphibious operations in a contested environment, I understand 

that the Marine Corps is actively seeking new strategies to overcome these challenges through exercises such as Bold Alligator, 

and I applaud these efforts. 

Lieutenant General Walsh, you and I talked extensively about 

that, and I appreciate the innovation and creativity the Marine 

Corps is showing in looking at how to operate in those contested 

environments to continue do to forcible entry amphibious operations; those things are key. 

Our Marine Corps was created to be an amphibious force; therefore, we must rapidly insert innovation into the amphibious warfare plan to ensure we are successful in future conflict. Additionally, I am concerned about the Navy’s enabling forces, and specifically, the surge sealift forces. Our inability to provide a more responsive surge sealift will place soldiers’ and Marines’ lives at risk 

in a future conflict. 

If you can’t get to the battle in time, you need to fight your way 

in. We have seen the casualties of such a strategy in prior conflict. 

We do have a better way to support the warfighter. I am reminded 

of Winston Churchill, who, at the worst times of World War II, remarked, ‘‘I never worry about action, but only inaction.’’ 

Ladies and gentlemen, we have had 70 years of relative global 

peace with the absence of a major world war. This global peace was 

secured by the blood and sweat of our greatest generation. Our 

Navy’s inability to act and embrace a bold shipbuilding vision will 

embolden our adversaries and risks the global peace that our fathers secured for our future. 

Our witnesses today are here today because they are the best our 

Nation has to create the bold vision that our Nation needs. Gentlemen, it is time to act and establish a sustainable upward trajectory 

for our Navy, and I am confident in your ability to do so. 

I would now like to turn to our ranking member, Joe Courtney, 

for any remarks that he may have. And, Joe, before you begin, I 

want to thank you for your leadership and what you have done 

with us to make sure that this vision for the Navy not only gets 

put in place, but is sustainable. So thanks so much for your leadership. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CONNECTICUT, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. COURTNEY. Right. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you to the witnesses for being here today. I want to particularly congratulate the new Assistant Secretary of the Navy, James 

Geurts. He was confirmed recently, and I can personally attest to 

the energetic start that you have begun with your tenure. We had 

a great visit up to Groton a couple weeks ago to the sub base and 

to the shipyard Electric Boat. So we look forward to working with 

you, and, obviously, Admiral Merz and Lieutenant General Walsh. 

In December 2016, the Department of the Navy produced a new 

Force Structure Assessment which reviewed and validated military 

requirements and determined that the Navy our Nation needs is a 

355-ship Navy. Listening to this clear demand signal and responding to a 2018 budget request that fell far short of this goal, this 

subcommittee ultimately authorized nearly double the number of 

battle force and non-battle force ships in the 2018 defense authorization bill signed into law last December. 

And, again, I want to congratulate my colleague, Mr. Wittman, 

because again, this subcommittee led the way in terms of really 

creating that new goal and standard that was reflected in the 

NDAA. Compared to the budget that we started with last year, the 

President’s fiscal year 2019 budget request for seapower represents 

a move in the right direction. This budget proposes to procure 10 

battle force ships in fiscal year 2019, 8 non-battle force ships, and 

54 battle force ships over the next 5 years, 11 more than was 

planned in the fiscal year 2018 budget. Obviously, that is very positive movement. 

In addition, the budget proposes a series of life extensions for 

ships and submarines to add to our force structure and to get the 

most use out of our existing platforms. However, this is still not a 

plan to achieve a 355-ship Navy, it is a plan to achieve a 335-ship 

Navy in 2048. As the 30-year shipbuilding plan clearly shows, this 

budget does not achieve the minimum Navy force size that the 

Navy says it needs until the 2050s. 

Looking closely at the budget and the shipbuilding plan, it is 

clear that there is substantial meat left on the bone where industrial-based capacity does exist to add further ships and capabilities 

to the fleet. One glaring example of this opportunity is the undersea fleet. While the budget reflects a sustained two-a-year construction rate for Virginia-class submarines, at this rate, the force would 

not achieve the 66-boat level that was called for in the Force Structure Assessment until 2048, 30 years from now. 

And, again, we heard from Admiral Harris just about a week ago 

about the fact that, you know, the demand signal for submarines 

in the Pacific area is barely able to keep up with what is out there, 

about 50 percent, and we are projected to see that dip even further, 

closer to 40 in the entire fleet. So we have got to do better and 

move faster. 

The 30-year shipbuilding plan identifies specific opportunities in 

2022 and 2023, where there is industrial-based capacity for a third 

submarine in each of those years, and within the next 5-year block 

contract where negotiations are occurring right now between the 
4 

Navy and industry. As I said, led by this panel on a bipartisan 

basis, Congress has already demonstrated its strong support for expanding the attack submarine production line. Specifically, we provided the authority needed to go beyond two subs a year in the 

next 5-year block contract. 

I urge the Navy to take advantage of this opportunity, and others 

like it, that provide a great opportunity in the years ahead to add 

on to the plan presented to us here today. Achieving a larger fleet 

will take more than any one budget year, and will take more than 

just building new ships. We need to take a comprehensive approach 

that includes new construction, extension, and modernization of existing ships, repairing our ships on time and without delay, and incorporating new capabilities into the current and future ships 

wherever possible. 

I look forward to discussing how the 2019 budget achieves these 

goals and where we can work together on this panel on a bipartisan basis to improve and expand on it. Thank you, again, to our 

witnesses, and I look forward to your testimony. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Joe, thank you so much, we appreciate it. Now we 

are going to turn to our witnesses, and I understand, Mr. Geurts, 

that you will give the opening statement for all three, so the floor 

is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES F. GEURTS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND 

ACQUISITION; LTGEN ROBERT S. WALSH, USMC, DEPUTY 

COMMANDANT, COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION, 

U.S. MARINE CORPS; AND VADM WILLIAM R. MERZ, USN, 

DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR WARFARE SYSTEMS, U.S. NAVY 

Secretary GEURTS. Thank you, sir. Chairman Wittman, Ranking 

Member Courtney, distinguished members of the subcommittee, 

thanks for the opportunity to appear before you today and discuss 

the Department of the Navy acquisition program. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Mr. Geurts, if I can get you to just real quick just 

to put the microphone in front of you. 

Secretary GEURTS. A little better than that? 

Mr. WITTMAN. Perfect. Perfect. 

Secretary GEURTS. All right. I am joined today by Lieutenant 

General Bob Walsh here, he is a Deputy Commandant for Combat 

Development and Integration, and Vice Admiral Bill Merz, Deputy 

Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems. With your permission, I intend to provide a brief joint statement and submit our 

opening statement for the record. 

First, I would like to thank Congress for your support for the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018. Enactment of this legislation will help 

provide the predictability and stability in funding that is critical to 

our success and will support building the Navy the Nation needs 

and Marine operating concept, the maritime components of the National Defense Strategy [NDS]. 

Coming out of an era of shrinking resources and increasing operations that drove exceedingly difficult choices, we feel your efforts 

for putting us on a course for readiness, recovery, and growing the 

fleet were substantial and significant. Thank you. 
5 

Secondly, I would like to thank this subcommittee specifically for 

your leadership and steadfast support of the Department of the 

Navy shipbuilding, not only support of our fiscal request in 2018, 

but for the increasing resources you added to our request. Our sailors and Marines are better off for the great support they get from 

you. Thank you. 

The 2018 Defense Authorization Act supports the Navy’s requirement for 355 battle force ships. The 2019 President’s budget request builds towards this larger and more lethal force, and reflects 

the continued commitment to produce a 355-ship Navy with the 

correct mix of ships, with increasing values of speed, lethality, 

stealth, information, design margin, and modernization as key attributes to ensure we are providing the warfighting commanders 

capability in an increasingly contested environment. 

It similarly supports the Marine Corps need for a more lethal, resilient force able to contribute to all domain access, sea control, 

power projection, maritime security, and deterrence in any environment. 

As detailed in the 2018 National Security Strategy and National 

Defense Strategy, it is imperative that we continuously adapt to 

the emerging security environment to retain and expand our competitive advantage, and do so with a sense of urgency. This requires the right balance of readiness, capability, and capacity, as 

well as budget stability and predictability. It also requires a constant focus on and partnership with the industrial base. They are 

a key element to our national security. 

Together we can ensure our military’s capability, capacity, and 

readiness, can continue to deliver superior naval power around the 

world, both today and tomorrow. Thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you, and we look forward to answering your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Geurts, General 

Walsh, and Admiral Merz can be found in the Appendix on page 

37.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Deputy Secretary Geurts. Thanks 

again for all of you all joining us today, and thanks for your service. We will begin questions now. I am going to turn to Mr. Conaway to open, and then we will go to Ms. Bordallo. Very good. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentleman, thank you 

for being here. As Rambo as my good colleague from Connecticut 

is about submarines, I feel the same way about carriers. General 

Richardson has said that if we would try to go to a 3- to 4-year increment between carriers, that would get us to a much better position. The budget does not do that. And we are still in the 5-year 

between carriers. Can you speak to us about what is being considered to try to catch up with respect to the carrier demand? 

Secretary GEURTS. Yes, sir. I will start out somewhat with the 

near term, and then I will turn to Admiral Merz for a little bit of 

the longer-term perspective. 

In the near term, as you know, we are producing Ford carriers. 

Our near-term focus is delivering those carriers on time and within 

the budget cap. A near-term opportunity that we are looking at is 

can we combine the buys for CVN 80 and 81, saving money and 

potentially accelerating some of that capability. We are studying 
6 

that now. We are not at the point yet where I am ready to put that 

on the table. We are working with the contractor to sharpen the 

estimates and ensure we really understand what that opportunity 

provides to us. 

I will stay in communication here with the subcommittee as we 

work through that, so that you can understand what those savings 

are, because to capitalize that will take some authority from this 

committee, and we look forward to working with you on that. 

That is on the near term. If—okay, Admiral Merz can address 

the longer term of that. 

Admiral MERZ. Yes, sir. So the carrier procurement profile actually achieves its objective the slowest of all the ship classes in the 

shipbuilding plan. Secretary Geurts outlined the multiyear that we 

are trying to secure, and we are also looking at reducing the centers. 

Within the shipbuilding plan, we lay out the program of record, 

but we also put out a timeline on top of that that shows what it 

would look like on 31⁄2-year centers. A couple of reasons for that, 

one is to demonstrate our commitment to trying to reach that 31⁄2- year centers. I will tell you, that is probably not aggressive enough. 

Right now, on the 4-year centers, we achieve the 12 in the 2060 

timeframe. If we go to the 31⁄2, that still only moves it up to the 

early 2050s. So we are aggressively looking at that. Frankly, we 

just didn’t get there in time for the PRES BUD 2019 [President’s 

budget for fiscal year 2019], but that work is ongoing, and you are 

going to see the fruits of that effort in the next shipbuilding plan 

that we are putting together already started. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. Well, I appreciate that. My other cause 

is auditing—Department of Defense starts with auditing the Navy 

as well. The Marine Corps has done a terrific job of leading the 

way. Can you talk to us about the requested resources, is that 

being fully funded for the auditors and whatever money needs to 

be done to fix the things that are a problem, but to make sure that 

I have got your commitment, Mr. Geurts, leading from the top on 

getting the Navy—Department of Navy and Marine Corps audited? 

Secretary GEURTS. Yeah, absolutely, sir. That is certainly a priority of the Secretary, it is a priority of me. I don’t—I am not aware 

of any resource issues to get there. Obviously, a lot of hard work, 

and it is not just the financial piece of the audit, it is auditing all 

our processes, property accountability and all of that. I am confident that as we work through that, we will find issues, and then 

those issues are opportunities for us to work through, correct 

things, and again, give ourselves and the American people confidence. We have got transparent, credible, and accountable processes. 

Mr. CONAWAY. One thing I would—I am a CPA [certified public 

accountant] by profession, by background; stealing folks from other 

agencies who have already been through this might be particularly 

helpful. I know David Norquist is that exact example. But the more 

people you can get who have done it will get you there quicker, so 

I would encourage you to be aggressively recruiting from folks who 

have already done it. 

In our briefing notes, we talk about truncating the Tomahawk 

program, and can you walk us through briefly the ammunition mis-
7 

sile issue, that we are going to have enough stuff to shoot at people 

that we need to have? 

Admiral MERZ. Yes, sir. I will address the requirements on the 

Tomahawk missile side. So we are addressing our entire family of 

systems and missiles comprehensively, and Tomahawk is a piece of 

that, arguably one of the most important pieces of it; it is the missile we have used the most over the last couple decades. So we are 

in a—we are in the process of transitioning to the next generation 

Tomahawk. So we are tailing off the production, we have what we 

need on the land attack side. The next-generation Tomahawk will 

be both a surface strike and a land attack with the name of the 

maritime strike Tomahawk. 

We are fielding that in the early 2020s. We are looking to accelerate that effort, it will be a multi-domain, multi-mission Tomahawk missile, much improved over its predecessor. 

Mr. CONAWAY. At a same range and payload? 

Admiral MERZ. Same range, same payload. More targets. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you. I yield back. Thank you very much. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Conaway. I do want to just do a 

quick follow-up, Mr. Geurts, with one of Mr. Conaway’s questions. 

How much do you expect the Navy to be able to save in buying two 

aircraft carriers at a time? So if you block-buy 80 and 81, how 

much do you expect, or would you say is a reasonable expectation? 

I know you are trying to get down to the real details, not just the 

shipbuilding costs, but the system costs. But give us an overall expected savings with that in going to buying two aircraft carriers at 

a time? 

Secretary GEURTS. Yes, sir. I would point back historically when 

we have done this previously in the Nimitz class, it was on the 

order of a 10 percent savings, which is a fairly large number on a 

carrier buy. The exact savings for this and why we are studying it, 

we are kind of halfway through the first carrier, so we have got to 

figure out exactly what future savings are available there. 

I think the other thing that is important is both from a—not just 

dollar perspective, but level loading the work force, and if in the 

future we want to press to a closer, you know, time between carrier 

buys, getting costs out of the carrier. And so, if you know you are 

doing two carriers, your return on investment for some of these initiatives, that equation changes, and our hope would be we could 

get costs out so that future carriers would also benefit. 

We are working closely with the contractor to make sure we are 

sharpening the pencils and getting the best deal for the taxpayer 

on that. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Gotcha. So that would be, roughly, if we purchase 

two at a time at $12.5 billion apiece, it would be roughly $2.5 billion of minimal expected savings if we bought two at a time? 

Secretary GEURTS. Yes, sir. It depends on when we implement it. 

I would say somewhere between, certainly over $1 billion, up to 

$2.5 billion, and then if you were to do a follow-on carrier buy and 

we were able to take cost out of the carriers, as we expect, you 

would get follow-on savings to those future carriers. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you. Now, Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Assistant 

Secretary Geurts, and General Walsh, and of course, Vice Admiral 
8 

Merz, I want to thank you all for your service and being here this 

afternoon. 

My question is for the Assistant Secretary Geurts. The fiscal year 

2018 NDAA directed the Secretary of the Navy to complete a business case analysis for depot-level ship repair in the Western Pacific 

region. Admiral Harris, in his 2014 operational needs statement, 

stated, and I quote, ‘‘Dry docking on Guam is a critical component 

of depot-level ship repair. The capability must be maintained and 

regularly exercised so that capability and expertise are available to 

support ships of the 7th Fleet, both in peace and in war,’’ unquote. 

I appreciate that you just recently assumed your responsibilities 

as the Navy’s Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and 

Acquisition, and I hope that you will bring a fresh perspective to 

my concerns regarding the level of ship repair capability in the 

Western Pacific. 

Specifically, I am concerned with mixed messages that I have received. On one hand, there appears to be a significant maintenance 

backlog for our fleet, but when asked here in this committee 

whether current depot-level ship repair is insufficient to meet 

peacetime and contingency requirements in the Pacific, I have been 

told that the Navy does not agree there is insufficient capacity. 

With 60 percent of our naval fleet operating in the Pacific, and 

Hawaii’s depot-level ship repair already—already exceeding capacity, what is the Navy’s plan for depot-level ship repair in the Western Pacific in the event of foreign ports currently used? And these 

are currently used that are not available, and how does the Navy 

plan on funding this plan? 

Secretary GEURTS. Yes, ma’am. Thank you for the question. I 

would say, overall, I would agree with the combatant commander 

that, obviously, having maintenance and repair capability, both in 

peace and in war, is critical and critical in a Pacific area of operation. 

In our previous studies, as I understand them, before I arrived 

in this position, I understand that business case did not support 

having a dedicated dry-dock facility there at Guam, but as you indicated, we are doing another look at that analysis this year to report out per the requirements in the NDAA. 

You have my personal commitment that I will take a look at 

that, and ensure that it is a balanced report, and then we will look 

at all the facts and factors, and provide a recommendation to the 

committee with that report. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, thank you very much for that commitment. 

And how about the funding on the plan? 

Secretary GEURTS. Ma’am, I don’t—I believe the plan is—the report is funded, I—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. Funding will be part of it? 

Secretary GEURTS. Yeah. As part of that report, I would expect 

if we had recommendations, we would include the funding to implement those recommendations as part of that plan, as well as considered in our PB [President’s budget] 2020 budget buildup, and 

compete that amongst all of our other requirements in our 2020 

budget. 
9 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. And I just 

want you to know the people of Guam are concerned about this and 

want to be very secure. 

Secretary GEURTS. Yes, ma’am. And I will look forward actually 

to getting out there personally and getting some eyes on their—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. Good. Good. You will love it when you come. 

Secretary GEURTS [continuing]. Out there and understand the 

situation. 

Mr. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. And I yield back, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo. We will now go to Mr. 

Byrne. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for 

being here today, but just as important, we thank you for your 

service to our country, we appreciate it. Mr. Geurts, you made a 

very important statement in your opening remarks, you said that 

the industrial base is a key element of the Navy’s plan, and I appreciate your saying that because it is so true. 

I want to talk to you about one particular class of ships. Now, 

I am going to call them the small surface combatants, because as 

you know, we are transitioning from the LCS [littoral combat ship] 

to the frigate. So when I say small surface combatant, we are talking about all of them. The plan this year calls for one. 

Now, both shipyards who presently build the LCS have released 

statements that the one requested ship for fiscal year 2019 will 

lead to a gap in production that will negatively impact their yards, 

which will result both in job losses at the yards and increased cost 

to the Navy. 

Last year, Admiral Neagley, who is a program executive officer 

for LCS, testified before this committee that the optimal sustaining 

rate for both shipyards is a total of three ships—not one, three— 

per year, which is where we have authorized and appropriated for 

the last few years. Both the industrial base and the Navy have said 

that one ship is not enough to maintain the industrial base and 

current cost efficiencies. 

Would you agree that one ship will result in a loss of trained 

workforce and increased costs on ships? 

Secretary GEURTS. Yes, sir. And, again, as we discussed yesterday, the industrial base is a critical element of our national security, and we look at that closely across all of our different shipyards. Certainly, one ship a year is not near the optimal rate. 

When we look at the current work out there, we have 18 ships in 

construction, we believe 3 ships in 2018, and 1 ship in 2019. 

And so, I look at we will have four ships over the next 2 years, 

certainly not at the optimal level. I believe it is at the minimum 

sustained level, so that we will not completely lose the workforce 

or the work yard, but I do acknowledge that will probably cause 

some work turn-down in those yards as we build back into frigate 

and execute that down-select. 

Mr. BYRNE. And you and I have discussed, I was involved in 

helping to build up that workforce, the shipyard in Mobile, these 

workers at that level of expertise, and certainly at that level of experience, it takes a very long time to get there. So it is in the interest of the Navy to have—to maintain that level of expertise and the 
10 

shipyard workers, and we are going to have some pretty substantial losses at one ship. 

Now, the problem here is—and I think you and I discussed this 

yesterday. The problem here is that we were supposed to transition 

to the frigate this year. The Navy wasn’t ready. So the present plan 

is transition next year. So we have got two shipyards affected here. 

This is after years of shipyards—numbers of shipyards drop in the 

United States. So you, the Navy, and the Congress, we’ve got to figure out together we can work so that these shipyards don’t crumble 

on us, because without that, you will not have an effective competition for the frigate. I mean, I think we all agree on that. 

So I guess I am asking, is the Navy willing to accept the risk 

that these two yards will be effectively crippled before that frigate 

contract is awarded? 

Secretary GEURTS. Sir, obviously, we are tracking that closely. 

And I would say, in that shipyard and across all our shipyards, the 

amazing quality—we are getting ships out of the shipyards now, to 

your point of having a skilled workforce, with quality and in-service 

scores that we haven’t seen over a long time. And so that is a very 

precious resource, we have to watch that closely. 

I don’t believe that will threaten the competition itself, but obviously, not operating at optimal production rates will cause some 

concerns to workers, and we will have to spin that workforce—that 

workforce will have to spin back up as we make this transition. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, you used the term ‘‘spin back up.’’ And it is not 

‘‘spin back up.’’ It is long periods of time to get large numbers of 

people back to a program, get their level of experience back up to 

the optimal level, it will take years. And whereas some large shipyards might be able to survive that, these two shipyards are small 

shipyards, the one in Marinette, one in Mobile, they may not. And, 

in fact, I think the likelihood is at least one of them won’t survive 

that, and we are already concerned on this committee about loss 

of shipyards. 

So we have already had this discussion; I am not trying to beat 

a dead horse. But I think what you and I have said to one another, 

and I want to say it publicly here, is that we are a team. But we 

have got to have better communication as a team if we ever want 

to get through this. We are going to have to work together, because 

we are not going to get there the way we are going. We are going 

to have to make some change here to get there. 

I am committed—I think everybody on this committee is committed to working with you all to make it happen, but one ship is 

not going to do it, I think that is pretty clear. How we get from 

here to that frigate competition next year is going to take some 

really smart people, hard thinking, but teamwork. 

And I just want to tell you and Admiral Merz, you heard me yesterday, that I am committed to working with you gentlemen, trying 

to find something that makes sense. 

Admiral Merz, did you want to say something in response to 

that? 

Admiral MERZ. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question. And I think you 

are getting to the heart of the matter on one of the central themes 

of the shipbuilding plan. First being, we have to provide a balanced 

Navy. And with that, we are unlikely to ask for ships above our 
11 

requirement. However, the second theme is the industrial base, 

which we have never called out specifically as a key theme to the 

shipbuilding plan. We even used the term, our 12th man, as we go 

forward. 

We went to the effort, within the shipbuilding plan, to capture 

unused capacity in the shipyards. So although I am limited by my 

validated requirement, I think we have set the environment in the 

shipbuilding plan to have the discussion. After that requirement is 

met, how do we work together with Congress to preserve the industrial base? 

This is a very historically based shipbuilding plan. We went back 

to 1955 to track essentially the characteristics of shipbuilding over 

that timeframe, and it was a wild ride for industry, marked by significant boom and bust periods. And every time we went through 

that cycle, we lost shipyards. We are convinced that we will lose 

shipyards again if we go through that cycle. 

So with that said, the shipyards are worth saving. We need to 

work with Congress on the best strategy to do that, while maintaining our balance across the other two key elements of the Navy, 

which is the readiness accounts, operating the ships and sailors out 

there today, which we have had some significant operational challenges, as you know, and then the advanced capability. We cannot 

grow the Navy quickly, but we can certainly turn advanced capability on the Navy we have to make it fight more lethally. 

All those dynamics together, I think working with you, there are 

options for your shipyard. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, Admiral, my time is up, but I think I can speak 

for the committee, and say, we are not going to do anything that 

is going to hurt readiness for the Navy. But I think the committee 

is also committed to making sure we take care of the industrial 

base. So we look forward to working with you. With that, Mr. 

Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Byrne, I appreciate it. We will 

now go to Mr. McEachin. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And this question is 

for you, Mr. Secretary—Assistant Secretary. We talk a lot of about 

using resources wisely, about making investments up front that 

will pay off in the long run. When it comes to shipbuilding, it 

seems to me that digit—here we go—digitation of blueprints, for 

example, and related technologies like 3D modeling and augmented 

reality have the potential to deliver significant efficiencies and cost 

savings during both acquisition and sustainment. 

Can you please speak to the value of digital in shipbuilding. 

Could expanding the use of these technologies help us more swiftly 

reach our goal of 355 battle force ships, and more effectively sustain that force? 

Secretary GEURTS. Yes, sir. Great question. And, you know, as I 

have taken on this new role, some folks have kind of coined my approach as 3D approach, right? So one is decentralize. How do we 

get the bureaucracy to operate at speed. Differentiate. So how do 

we move those things fast that need to go fast; move those things 

that need to be a little bit more precise at a precise speed. And my 

third is digitization. And for the first time—— 

Mr. MCEACHIN. You said that so well. 
12 

Secretary GEURTS. Yeah. For the first time, we have got a nuclear submarine and a nuclear carrier built in the digital environment. And in recent visits I have had with the Secretary down to 

Newport News looking at that aircraft carrier, and what you could 

do, starting with digital, I think is going to be one of the fundamental things that allows us to drive cost out of these programs. 

And what is also very interesting is—you would think it would 

be just—the new generation would be excited about digital, what 

is interesting there is you see, you know, age—you know, folks that 

have been in the shipyard 20–30 years, you hand them these new 

tools, and they are coming up with ways to do things at a tenth 

of the time by using virtual reality to understand where the pipes 

are they need to inspect, or where the welds they need to go look 

at, how do they schedule the work better. 

I think it is going to be one of the founding things we are going 

to pivot on to really drive cost out. Again, I think that the 355 plan 

shows us the way there. It has got some limitations of funding. So 

as we can reduce the cost to product, that will also allow us to accelerate into that plan. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. So are there steps Congress can take, investments we can make, or authorities that we can provide to encourage greater use of these technologies? 

Secretary GEURTS. Sir, I would say, some of the work that Representative Courtney has done on the submarine fleet where we 

have looked at investing, let’s say, in the Columbia program, and 

putting some advanced procurement or economic order quantity 

funds early in the program that lets us explore some of those tools 

early so we can use them in the program, that is very useful. 

Quite frankly, having a shipyard plan that shows serial production and gives the industry confidence that we are going to continue to build, allows them to make investment decisions that bring 

that digital environment in much more quickly than if the government funded it. And then on our side, on the government side, we 

need to do work to understand how do we use those digital tools 

to certify work more quickly, make sure we can sign off on things 

more quickly. 

So I don’t think—I think general support is key to that. I think 

helping us get a serial production flow in the shipbuilding plan is 

key because that will then show industry the return on investment 

for those digital investments early on that will pay off through the 

rest of the program. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, I 

yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. McEachin. We will now go to Mr. 

Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you 

for being here. Secretary Geurts, you have my former chief of staff, 

Joe Casper, is working for you. And I would say, put him to good 

use, knocking bureaucratic heads together. He is good for cutting 

through the baloney, you know, and put him to use. 

Secretary GEURTS. Yes, sir. We are loading him up. 

Mr. HUNTER. Great guy. I want to start by talking about icebreakers. I know the RFR [request for review] went out last week, 

and basically what I would like to do is talk about getting funding 
13 

out of the SCN [Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy] so it is not 

just in there, so that takes away the Navy having other people impede upon its accounts and its shipbuilding. The Coast Guard probably cannot build three to six heavy icebreakers, that is not what 

they do, that is not what they are good at. And they have to go 

through Homeland Security acquisition and procurement, which is 

ridiculous. 

If you talk about weaponizing them, or at least preparing them 

for weaponization, which the Commandant of the Coast Guard has 

talked about, going from double hull to single hull and doing block 

buys. Your comments on any and all of those, or any other way to 

do it quicker and faster? 

Secretary GEURTS. Yes, sir. I think this is a great example of us 

and the Coast Guard working very closely together. We have got 

MOUs [memorandums of understanding], we actually have a joint 

team. So the Coast Guard has lead, we have put that joint team 

together with Navy experts working full-time on that. I think in 

the 2019 PB, the budget has actually been laid into the DHS [Department of Homeland Security] budget. And so for the first time, 

they have got to budget in their portion of the 2019 budget to finish 

out that first icebreaker, so I believe that is on track. 

And then to your point, I think, you know, again, we are going 

to share all our lessons learned, everything we have in the kit bag 

about block buys, or multiyear buys, or how to rig for serial production, assuming success in this first icebreaker, as we have got it 

underway. 

Mr. HUNTER. We set up that joint program office last year for 

this exact thing. But the key was to have the Navy keep control 

in a way, have the Coast Guard build the requirements, and the 

Navy, too, but again, if you leave this in the Coast Guard’s hand, 

they are not as adept at building big ships and bending heavy steel 

as the Navy is. So we want to just make sure that that stays on 

track. 

To surface combatants, one easy way that I see to get the numbers up is to diversify the fleet, keep on building the big items that 

you need, the carriers, the subs, but also, look to, like, the FRCs 

[fast response cutters], the FRCs that are being built in Louisiana, 

weaponizing those, the offshore patrol cutters. There is different 

things out there. When you talk about Marinette and other small 

shipyards, simply transitioning to the—the NSC, the national security cutter, is a great small craft that the Navy could use. In my 

opinion, it would be a better LCS than the LCS. But you have 

things like that where you can stay hot and switch to those quickly, and use more small surface combatants. 

It seems like right now in the Navy, it would be like the Army 

and Marine Corps saying, we are only going to focus on peer 

threats, we are not going to do any—no more force, no more 

MARSOC [Marine Special Operations Command], no more special 

operations, we are just going to build these big things and have 

tanks, and people that know how to fight at the battalion level and 

higher, as opposed to small unit fighting which we do, too. We have 

to do it all. And the Navy is going to have to do it all, and it is 

way cheaper, and you get those numbers up way faster if you use 

the smaller, medium-sized ships that can now be weaponized that 
14 

have digital, and that have great defense systems where you offset 

the actual size of it. So I would ask your comments on those, Admiral and Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary GEURTS. Yes, sure. Maybe I will just talk a little industrial base, and certainly admiral can talk. You know, we talk a lot 

about the larger industrial base. I guess I would also say we are 

doing specific things to preserve the mid-tier industrial base as 

well as the small-business industrial base. So we will have a number of awards this year with small business, building—again, 

smaller vessels, but they will have full-up capability there. So, to 

your point, there is great industrial base across. 

And the other piece that is critical, and we see it particularly on 

the nuke [nuclear] side, but it is critical across everything, is the 

supplier base. And so we are also not just looking at end item, but 

supplier base. So when we think the whole industrial base, we 

think all the way through that: big yards, mid-tier yards, small 

yards, and supplier base. But I will turn to Admiral Merz on the 

kind of requirement—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Typically to diversification? 

Secretary GEURTS. Yes. 

Mr. HUNTER. Looking at the Navy outside the box a little bit and 

say, we can change the way we do things to meet the threats that 

we see in the world. 

Admiral MERZ. Yes, sir. Congressman Hunter, as a native San 

Diegan, I am happy to see you here. I will tell you, there is also— 

there are two things mentioned in the shipbuilding plan that we 

didn’t give a lot of press to because we are working on it pretty 

hard. One is the surface capability evolution plan, it is mentioned 

in the same paragraph as the tactical submarine evolution plan, 

and there is a small paragraph on unmanned systems. These are 

actually connected to your question, as we are trying to expand the 

capability of the ships that fall outside the 355-ship battle force 

Navy, that are enablers or key elements of specific mission sets, 

mine warfare, underwater search. 

So we do have—we have three efforts underway in the unmanned surface vehicle area that are varying sizes. And we are 

also starting to do studies on optionally manned smaller combatants. I think this is all going to start playing out fairly quickly over 

the next couple of shipbuilding plans as we expand the envelope of 

the yard as possible. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you very much. My time is expired. You 

have the Sea Hunter in San Diego, in Point Loma, which is really 

interesting. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hunter. I want to mention, too, 

I think it was very important last year that this committee, as well 

as the full committee, really worked hard on integrating the different elements of title 1, title 10, to make sure that we have a 

solid track on how to make sure we build icebreakers. I think there 

is unanimity across folks here to make sure we get those things 

built. There is $700 million in this year’s President’s budget for 

building icebreakers, and I think that we are well underway with 

this, and Mr. Hunter, thank you for all of your efforts. 

We will now go to Mrs. Davis. 
15 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for your 

service and for being with us to testifying today. I want to ask you 

about the Conventional Prompt Strike [CPS] program. And, as you 

know, prior to fiscal year 2019, it was funded through the defensewide research and development funding, and then going forward 

now in the budget request, the Navy has been assigned the lead 

development efforts in the future. 

Because the CPS has—I am just beginning to understand—has 

potential for miscalculation, what capabilities is this designed to 

replace, and what new capabilities will it achieve? 

Admiral MERZ. Yes, ma’am. So the Conventional Prompt Strike 

is a new capability. The specific capabilities within—in the flight 

profiles, that is all classified, but I am happy to set up a separate 

brief for you that addresses those elements. 

This has been a developmental effort under the Secretary of Defense. The PRES BUD 2019 has directed it to transition to the 

Navy, so we are at the point now where we are intending to 

operationalize it with a platform at sea. Whether it is a submarine 

or surface ship or both, that is the work to be done. 

The funding for 2019 is really targeted just at the transition between Department of Defense down to the Department of the Navy. 

There’s substantial money that comes with that in the follow-on 

years as we move it to an at-sea capability, which is the integration 

cost, the testing cost, but we have been involved with all the demonstrations up to this point. So we are well-suited and well-postured to take this program. 

So the intention right now is to establish a program manager, establish the program structure. So on time it transitions to Navy, 

and we are marching forward. And we do intend to provide a report 

to Congress on how that transition is going to look and what those 

capabilities are. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Thank you. It sounds like you are quite confident that you are at the position for moving forward with that? 

Secretary GEURTS. Yes, ma’am. And as Admiral Merz said, as we 

kind of work through the details of the ‘‘hows,’’ we are happy to 

come brief you in more detail, both on the capability, and then on 

my side on the acquisition, how we are going to set that all up, for 

us to talk in more detail. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. I wonder if you could discuss a little bit 

more, maybe with specific examples of the Navy and Marine Corps 

collaboration with academia and universities? How is that, you 

know, in this very important time for key innovation, what is different? 

Secretary GEURTS. So, ma’am, obviously, my time at Special Operations Command [SOCOM], that was one of our bread and butter 

was at close—getting the operator as close as we can to the academics, to the technologists, to the nontraditional suppliers. 

And so, you know, that is something I am going to help drive 

within the Department of the Navy, both from the basic research 

standpoint where there is always a close tie with academia. But, 

quite frankly, I think there is more opportunity for us in the experimentation and, you know, problem-solving, and then how do we 

rapidly introduce new technology. 
16 

So that will be a theme. I might turn over to General Walsh because they have done some pretty amazing things, I would say, in 

the experimentation realm to bring that practical—get the Marine 

connected directly to the academics to see the problem up front. 

General WALSH. Thank you, sir. Ma’am, I would say—as Mr. 

Geurts said, trying to get the right team together. So as we look 

at a problem, we view the problem one way. But trying to bring 

in academia, our warfare centers, and I would also include industry 

into that, is a key part that there is a lot of people approach the 

problem differently. 

So the way we have kind of looked at a lot of this is lay the problem out there, not look at what capability we are trying to get, lay 

the problem out there for the—and academia has some very 

unique—you go school to school, university, you know, and you find 

unique capabilities that they have. And when we get them focused 

on the issues that we have, like we just did one with ship-to-shore 

maneuver, and got them—we have got them focused on unmanned 

systems. And those sort of things of bringing them in with the 

warfighter. And our Marine Corps warfighting lab is a very unique 

capability we have to connect—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. Are there challenges with sharing in regard to that, 

and having, really, access to the advanced instrumentation? 

General WALSH. I don’t think so. At the levels we typically try 

to work with them at, from a technology standpoint, research, information, trying to build a capability into the operational concept 

we are trying—at that level, I find it very easy and to bring them 

in, and the more we connect them to the warfighter, the more interested they are in helping to solve our problems. 

Secretary GEURTS. Ma’am, just one other piece, again, some of 

my experience from the last 12 years at SOCOM, was as the military over time has gotten smaller, there is a larger percentage of 

the country that doesn’t have the same touch with the military it 

once had, and so, what I found a lot of the time was, there was 

solutions to our problems we didn’t know to ask for, and they had, 

you know, they had other ideas, we didn’t even know we had the 

problem until we talked to them. 

So making that connection, you can really do that without having 

to worry too much about the classification piece, when you talk 

about it at the problem level as opposed to the specific technology 

level. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Davis. We will now go to Mr. 

Gallagher. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all, gentlemen, for being here today. Mr. Geurts, congratulations on this 

position, it is a critical one at a critical time, we are happy to see 

you there. I just would like to follow up on something my colleague, 

Mr. Byrne, said about this notion of spinning back up. For what 

it is worth, in my neck of the woods, there is no such thing. 

I mean, it is not as if that ship worker that gets laid off, if one 

of these shipyards goes under, can go down the street, we just don’t 

have the same level of shipbuilding. So once you lose that guy who 

may have been educated through a partnership we have with 

Northeast Wisconsin Technical College, you are losing him or her 
17 

for good. So spinning back up is not necessarily as easy as flipping 

a switch, for what it is worth. 

I think we all want the same thing, right? We want to, as you 

have laid out, preserve the defense industrial base, we want to 

make sure we have as robust of a competition for the frigate as humanly possible, learning lessons from the past mistakes that we 

have made, and also get to 355 in as expeditious but also sustainable of a manner as possible. And we stand ready to work with you 

on that. 

But I would like to zoom back out, and ask a little bit about— 

and we throw this 355 number around, but we sometimes forget 

that it came from a December 2016 Force Structure Assessment 

[FSA] of the previous administration. And since then, a lot has 

changed, right? We have a new President, we have a new National 

Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, the big move of 

which is to prioritize great power competition or to suggest we need 

to deemphasize counterterrorism, and move towards a re-orientation on great power competition. 

I take my colleague Mr. Hunter’s point that you don’t want to neglect those missions. I just would add if we go with the cutter, then 

we are going from seven to five shipyards and we may have undermined the defense industrial base argument. That is neither here 

nor there. That is an argument for a different day. 

But given this change in our overall orientation, which has been 

met with sort of unanimous applause from the national security 

community, it strikes me as odd that we didn’t look at that—that 

the 30-year shipbuilding plan, the new one, didn’t go back and revisit the assumptions underpinning the 2016 FSA. 

So can you talk about the role that the National Defense Strategy played in crafting the 30-year shipbuilding plan? 

Secretary GEURTS. Yes, sir. I will start quickly and then turn 

over to Admiral Merz. And, again, my comment on spin-up, I take 

your point, and I didn’t—I certainly didn’t mean that was a—you 

know, you can do it over a week, a month, or even a year in many 

cases, which again, is part of why, in our shipbuilding plan, the industrial base played such a prominent role in that plan. 

So, working together, we have got to figure out how to preserve 

critical skills, whether it is at public yards or private yards, so we 

have got the capacity. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Perfect. 

Secretary GEURTS. In terms of the 30-year shipbuilding plan, I 

will turn it over to Admiral Merz, and we can talk about that, recognizing that is a point-in-time living document, and Bill, if you 

want to share a little bit more, kind of what you think going forward. 

Admiral MERZ. Yes, sir. I appreciate the question. Because this 

gets down to the fundamentals of the 355 and what constitutes it, 

which is essentially a requirements-based approach for each type 

of ship, add those all up and you get 355. 

We intend to do another FSA with the new National Defense 

Strategy. There is this series of events that has to happen before 

we do the FSA, starting with the combatant commanders, all the 

way down to the defense planning guidance that leads us to the 

scenarios we need to plan for. 
18 

We have done multiple studies on the architecture of the Navy 

and the size of the Navy. Every single one of them says we have 

to grow. And we have to grow with these fundamental types of 

ships. So we don’t expect much of that to change with the next 

FSA. There may be some changes on the margin. There may be another number that we are shooting for, but it is going to be bigger 

than we are today. So we have to move out and we have to move 

out aggressively as we go forward. 

The small surface combatants, in particular, which is the area of 

concern for your shipyard, there was a lethality aspect of that that 

brought us to the mix between frigates and LCS. So we are definitely going to revisit on the next FSA based on the key elements 

of the National Defense Strategy. This will probably be done sometime over the next year, as soon as we can. We are eager to get 

this new FSA completed. But the undeniable fact is we still need 

to get bigger and still going to be some combination of these ships. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. You referenced sort of the multiple studies that 

have been done, and of the outside studies that we have commissioned, only one seems to have the same explicit focus on great 

power competition that the NDS has, they seem to mirror each 

other in that respect, and that is the CSBA [Center for Strategic 

and Budgetary Assessments] study. And in that, it calls for growing small surface combatants from 52 to 71, I believe, if I am getting that correct. 

Have you given any thoughts to—what role does that—sort of, 

the CSBA worldview play as you guys think about a new FSA. We 

are going crazy with these acronyms, by the way. 

Admiral MERZ. Yes, sir. So the CSBA was one of the three initial 

studies we did. CSBA, the MITRE, and then the Navy FSA as we 

came through it. And the Navy FSA did use the great power competition approach also to determine the proper mix of ships. 

We are very focused on the small surface combatant. I don’t expect that number to go down. I do expect maybe the composition 

to change, just based on lethality aspects driven by the National 

Defense Strategy, but there are a lot of—I am sure you can appreciate competing factors that go into that type of study, and we plan 

to initiate and complete that as soon as we can. 

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, gentlemen. I am out of time. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gallagher. We will now go to Mr. 

Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all 

of our witnesses for your testimony today and for your service to 

the country. So our competitors are steadily pursuing advanced capabilities and technologies, and I, too, believe we have to continue 

to invest in both research and development of advanced technologies and transitioning them as soon as possible to the warfighter. 

But, you know, it seems that both China and Russia continue to 

do just that. Last month, China appeared to mount an electromagnetic railgun onboard a new ship. And last week, Russia announced 

a, quote, ‘‘invincible hypersonic cruise missile.’’ So would you agree 

that hypersonic technology such as electromagnetic railgun have 

the potential to be game changing in the hands of our warfighters, 

helping the United States maintain its edge in this domain? And 
19 

we research these technologies for some time, but at what point 

will the Navy transition them to the warfighter? 

Secretary GEURTS. Yeah, maybe I will have the two gentlemen 

give the perspectives from the service, and then I will provide a 

kind of technology overlay on the how-and-when perspective. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Fair enough. Admiral. 

Admiral MERZ. Yes, sir. Thank you, Congressman. And that just 

reminded me on my negligence to thank the committee on the hard 

work behind the scenes on the Bipartisan Budget Act that is probably going to get us finally on track to be able to pursue a lot of 

these advanced capabilities robustly, and for the greater Congress. 

Hypersonics and railgun are high-interest items for the Navy. 

We intend to do actually a 10-round-per-minute test of the railgun 

later on this year, and we have a series of hypersonic efforts underway. And, again, this is a little bit of a delicate discussion before 

I run off into the classification realm. 

So I am certainly happy to set up a classified brief for you, but 

I do believe they are game changers. This is the family of capabilities that we can get off of what we call the linear capability improvement and get into a geometric improvement with the existing 

platforms that we have today. So we are very excited and enthusiastic to field these capabilities as soon as we can in concert with 

growing the size of the Navy. 

General WALSH. If I could follow up with Admiral Merz. Interesting, his point that he brought up, was the ability to give us stability in the budget, and allowing us to be able to do that, because 

what we are seeing is that stability in the budget is allowing us 

to put the right S&T [science and technology] investments in where 

we need to go. 

We also see it helping industry understand that stability, and 

they are putting the right investment in there. So as we look at 

things like hypersonics, also I would throw in high-velocity projectiles. Potentially game-changing investments and capabilities 

where we make that linear high-velocity learning and increase that 

will leap ahead of the threat, and in many ways, as the Cold War 

was, but we were able to invest our S&T or our industry research 

and development in the areas where we could leap ahead of the 

threat and stay ahead of the threat. 

The money that we are now seeing from a predictable budget 

that you are giving us is allowing us to invest in areas that are 

now starting to move very quickly and are going to give us that advantage into the future. 

Secretary GEURTS. And, sir, maybe as one followup again, coming 

from my heritage at SOCOM. I am all about transition speed and 

taking what is good enough, getting it into the hands of the warfighter. And so as you are seeing now with lasers, I think you will 

see with some of these other areas, we are not going to wait until 

it is perfect before we go get it in an operational environment. We 

are fielding directed energy on a number of our systems in different 

phases. I am happy to run through that with you in more detail. 

But, you know, the way I see it is, we have got to grow both capacity—so we talked a lot about 355, but then how do we lay on 

top of that our ability to rapidly grow capability, a lot like the sub-
20 

marine force has done, so that you get an exponential growth in 

power, which is some combination of both of those. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So let me ask you this, and it dovetails into my 

first question. So the Laser Weapon System, LAWS, onboard USS 

Ponce has been a great success since it was installed in 2014. In 

the fiscal year 2019 budget request, we have an additional opportunity to put the Laser Weapon System demonstrator onboard the 

USS Portland for a shipboard demonstration. However, I understand that this budget was constructed before we knew which ship 

technology this—which ship the technology would be placed on. So 

without additional funds in fiscal year 2019, what risks may befall 

this critical demonstration? Is this going to still be on track? 

Admiral MERZ. No, sir. I think in the laser family, we are actually in pretty good shape. It was designated as an accelerated acquisition program by the Navy Board of Directors, so that means 

the Secretary of the Navy and representatives and the CNO [Chief 

of Naval Operations] both agreed that this is a CNO priority and 

we are moving forward on it. 

Portland was chosen simply because it is much more straightforward integration effort to test the technology. Long term, we are 

looking to bring this onto our combatants, integration is a little bit 

more complex and more expensive. So for testing out the demonstration, Portland is actually a very suitable platform to get this 

to sea first. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Secretary GEURTS. Sir, I would add for other direct energy systems, we are putting both first onshore and then on the DDGs 

[guided-missile destroyers]. So we are going to have a smaller 60- 

kilowatt laser going on the DDGs. We have got optical dazzlers and 

whatnot going on the DDGs. So our whole approach is, I will say, 

a family approach. We are building the technology path, and then 

we are putting together systems as that technology matures, both 

onto the naval components as well as on the Marine Corps components as that technology is ready to go into the field. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Thank you. Just before you go back, I want 

to mention, I was out at Dahlgren and I was there for that first 

multishot test they did on the railgun, it was very—from everything I saw, it was very successful. I am anxious for them to get 

to that 10-multishot test. I just hope we are not going to let this 

technology sit on the shelf. 

If China is advancing this technology, we shouldn’t be just looking at the projectile, but looking at this as a holistic system that 

we put on a ship at some point in the very near future. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. We will now go to Mr. 

Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Admiral Merz, 

when you appeared before the Shipbuilding Caucus, again, you did 

a nice job of sort of explaining the 30-year shipbuilding plan, which 

again, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, I mean, if you do 

the math, it shows 335 by 2048. However, as you pointed out, there 

is sort of an optional sort of path that, I think, was sort of built 

into the system. Maybe you can talk about that a little bit. 
21 

Admiral MERZ. Yes, sir, I would be happy to. A lot of competing 

variables in the shipbuilding plan, and which I tried to frame in 

the brief discussion that we had at the Shipbuilding Caucus as we 

come through this. One of the dynamics we are challenged with is 

just beyond the Future Years Defense Plan [FYDP], is a massive 

period of retirements where I lose essentially 50 attack submarines 

and destroyers over about a 7-year period. 

Now, we are going to aggressively attack that with service life 

extensions to help smooth out that divot, but that will not get us 

to 355 any faster; it just smoothes the ramp. I really want everyone 

to focus on the shipbuilding plan as the opportunity to grow, which 

was the—which was the purpose of identifying the available industrial capacity. And as we take advantage of a steady funding 

stream over time, one of the key elements is incentivizing industry 

to invest also along with us so we can grow that unused capacity 

over time, and then obviously take advantage of it so we can get 

there faster. 

There was also the dynamic of overshoot. Although we want to 

get to 355 as soon as we can, we have to work closely with Congress on what do we do when we get there? If we get there very 

aggressively and stop, then we immediately create another bust period for industry, and with the fragility of the base now, very concerning for the Navy as we come through that. 

So we think we have options to get there much faster. We laid 

out a steady-state profile that took advantage of the resources we 

have, and that is simply projected out at the 2019 level. We do 

know there are going to be additional builds outside the 5-year 

plan when Columbia class comes into serial production, another 

variable we will have to manage. 

But there are a couple ways to do that besides just additional resources. We discussed the audit. Well, one of the objectives of the 

audit is for some acquisition reform so we can get better with the 

money we have. We had to be very, very careful that we don’t get 

complacent, just because the budget is growing, that business as 

usual is going to get us there. We know it is not. We know we are 

going to need more resources. Whether it is $26 billion per year or 

$26 to $30 billion a year, depending on what the challenges are beyond the FYDP, we attempted to capture that, but we do know it 

is looming out there, and we want to start the discussion now so 

it is not a panic today, and we can put strategies in place so we 

are ready for that extra load on the shipbuilding plan. 

So we know it is an unsatisfying ramp. But in the balance of the 

Navy, of our readiness and capability, we felt we have hit the mark 

on what we had to do to set a base profile that we cannot go below 

or we will not grow at all. And we have to protect that and then 

take advantage of any aggressive growth that we might be able to 

support with Congress’ help going forward. 

One final piece to that is the operating cost of the Navy. So what 

you will see in the next shipbuilding plan is an appendix dedicated 

just to: Hey, this is what it is going to take to build a 355-ship 

Navy; this is what it is going to cost to operate that 355-ship Navy. 

And we are going to have to work closely with Congress to make 

sure that paces the delivery of the ships, and that is the personnel, 

that is the maintenance plans, the ordnance, et cetera. 
22 

Does that—— 

Mr. COURTNEY. It does. And, again, just to sort of complete, I 

think, the picture—I mean, literally, you had a visual aid as part 

of the shipbuilding plan which had the colored boxes and the white 

boxes. And, again, the white boxes are really where, again, you 

have these options that I think were specifically identified in terms 

of specific classes. Again, can you kind of just walk us through 

that? 

Admiral MERZ. Yes, sir. 

So it is also important to understand, in that shipbuilding plan 

we are not talking in generalities, we are not talking in sand 

charts. Each one of those colored blocks is on the 30-year shipbuilding plan is, to the best of our ability, identifying a ship we 

need to buy in that year or in that timeframe. The white blocks on 

top of that do identify the capacities. So the goal is to not just fill 

in the white blocks but to create more white blocks that we can fill 

in. I will turn it over to Secretary Geurts. 

Secretary GEURTS. Yeah. That was going to be my point. The 

white blocks are what we know today. That is not where I believe 

we are going to be 3, 4, 5 years down the road as we drive cost 

out of—you know, through serial production, drive cost out. And, 

quite frankly, as we get more efficient at building ships, we should, 

within the industrial base, create more opportunities as we go forward. 

So I look at—again, as Admiral Merz says, I look at that shipbuilding plan as the starting point. It is a framework we can all 

work from and at least start communicating. It will continue to 

move and adapt as I try and drive out cost in the back end of 

things. And as the operational commands here understand what do 

we need in the future, we have got it kind of binned, but there is 

a lot of thought going into what do we do next? We don’t want to 

wait until we have a crisis to be thinking about what is next down 

the road in any of these ship classes. 

Mr. COURTNEY. So does—you know, pinpoint, you know, a couple 

of those white boxes, if I could for a minute, again in 2022 and 

2023, Virginia-class program, there are two white boxes, one—you 

know, one for each year. And so, you know, as we are in the midst 

of block five negotiation, which obviously extends through those 

2022 and 2023, I guess, you know, I am trying to understand what 

is the signal that the Navy wants to send in terms of, you know, 

what—is it in tandem with what this subcommittee did last year, 

which is to authorize, you know, a bigger block buy than 10 subs? 

If you could sort of explain how that sort of, you know, fits into, 

again, the process that is underway right now. 

Secretary GEURTS. Yes, sir. I would say, you know, there are a 

couple of critical things coming in front of us. Columbia is coming 

in front of it. As you know, that is going to—that is our number 

one program, and we have got to make sure we are ready for that. 

I think the good news is we have been working very close. Virginia has paved the way a lot of it. I mean, quite frankly, the authorities this committee and Congress has given us has really 

brought down the risk on that program. I mean we are saving over 

a billion dollars by continuous production there. 
23 

As we look to the potential for filling in those white boxes, a key 

element is how do we both maintain and grow the supplier base 

and as well as facilities at the final assembly yards. But, quite 

frankly, supplier base. So we have had an activity where we look 

at all the suppliers between the Ford carriers, the Columbia, and 

Virginia to understand that supply base. And some of the things 

in 2018, those funds that you had identified, they are critical to get 

those suppliers up and ready and ramped up. We want to make 

sure they are healthy so they will be there and then, two, that they 

will be able to produce at the rates we need them to. 

And then, as we do a better job of synchronizing in maintenance 

availabilities in planning for maintenance and major repair, I think 

that will again give us a better composite picture so we can really 

understand our needs and then show industry, here’s the predictable work that is coming so that they can do what industry does 

well. When they have predictable work that they can plan for, they 

can be very effective and efficient and make the investments now 

that will enable us to execute then. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you to all the witnesses for really creating 

a great record today. 

And, with that, I yield back. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. 

Gentlemen, again, thanks for joining us today. Thanks so much 

for your perspective. I think it is extraordinarily important. As you 

all have pointed out, a tremendously challenging environment for 

us. I think we have our path laid out through both the National 

Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. Food for thought: 

With a 30-year shipbuilding plan, Force Structure Assessment coming out, too, I think is also going to challenge all of us to make sure 

that we are on path to build a 355-ship Navy. 

I do want to drill down a little bit first with you, Lieutenant General Walsh. First of all, thanks so much for your diligence and all 

of your efforts in looking at surge sealift as a component of how the 

Marine Corps will pursue the fight when asked to do so. And I 

really appreciate all that you have done there to really understand 

that and look at that top to bottom. 

We understand that, you know, one of the important elements of 

being able to project power for the Marine Corps is the logistics associated with getting there and sustaining the fight. And I think 

you all have really laid that out well. One of the key components 

there that I think is concerning is surge sealift. You know, we have 

an RRF today, a Ready Reserve Fleet, that is 46 ships that average 

in age 43 years. Old ships, very challenging to maintain. In fact, 

by the end of this year, we will be the only country on the face of 

the Earth that will continue to maintain and operate steam plants 

in ships. 

Now, you know, old technology sometimes has an advantage. I 

would argue, in this case, it does not. So what we have got to look 

at is, how does that limitation straddle us in things like pursuing 

an operations plan [OPLAN]? General Dunford laid out—said that 

the big challenge for executing the Korean Peninsula OPLAN is logistics and surge. So I want to ask you, from the Marine Corps 

standpoint, in looking at your part of that strategy and the mission 
24 

that you will have to prosecute, how does this aging surge sealift 

affect you? 

Secondly, in looking at what is proposed by the Navy in decommissioning one of the two hospital ships, how does that affect you 

in your ability to respond to casualties in the battle situation where 

the Marines are going to be at the tip of the spear? And what risk 

does the Marine Corps take on with this antiquated and insufficient surge sealift force as well as taking away one of the hospital 

ships in a situation that I would argue would create a significant 

increase in casualties without that capacity there? So I want to get 

your perspective on that. 

General WALSH. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, for that question. 

You know, I think if you kind of look back, Admiral Merz talked 

about history and how we went back in the shipbuilding plan and 

looked at history. I think we have been here before with the Ready 

Reserve Force in the past. And I think we had some lessons 

learned from where we were after Desert Storm and how we fixed 

some of those problems going into OIF 1 [Operation Iraqi Freedom]. And the force continues to get old. I think, you know, if you 

look at our requirements, we have a two MEB [Marine expeditionary brigade] amphibious task force requirement which is very 

closely tied to our Maritime Prepositioning Squadron Force that we 

have got in Guam and Diego Garcia. That, along with our two 

MEBs that are from the Maritime Prepositioning Force, that surge 

sealift that you are talking about is—what we are seeing right now, 

is if we look at our contingency plans, our operational plans, that 

we are really kind of getting to that ragged edge of being able to 

support that, that we feel pretty tight with our MPSRON [Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron] supporting our—you know, our 

forward amphibious task force and that capability tied very close 

to that. 

But that assault follow-on capability, that flow-in force, or those 

surge forces that you read about in the NDS, I think that is that 

area where you talked about the age of the force is, I think, what 

we have got ourselves really concerned with. And taking a hard 

look at that within Admiral Merz and also over on the N4 side, I 

think that is going to take a lot of focus from both the Navy and 

the Marine Corps to be able to look at that long-term investment, 

because I think, right now, with the age of the force, right now, we 

are probably at a point where we can meet what we need, but it 

is slowly going to degrade over time. And with the average age of 

the ships that you just said, that probably, by the mid-2020s, we 

are not going to be able to meet the requirements we have got. 

On the side of the hospital ships, you talk about that. Two ships 

isn’t a lot of ships. And that is a capability that I think that the 

Marines, certainly the sailors too that have deployed into Iraq and 

Afghanistan, they have learned a lot about the type of care that we 

are used to and accustomed to get and to survive on the battlefield. 

It is something that our Armed Forces have learned to say that we 

are going to be taken care of. And you could look back over a number of conflicts. And a lot of times, militaries have quit fighting because they didn’t have the proper care to fight. And you could take 

a look at that in the past. 
25 

So those hospital ships of having that capability that we are used 

to is a critical component of that, and I think it probably will take 

a deep look by the Navy and Marine Corps on what that real requirement is. 

And I would ask Admiral Merz if he has got anything to add to 

that. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. Admiral Merz. 

Admiral MERZ. Yes, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks General Walsh. 

So this is an area we need to spend more work on. You know, 

today’s force does meet the 15 million square foot lift requirement. 

However, as you said, it needs to be recapitalized. It needs to be 

aggressively recapitalized. So we exercise three levers to do that. 

We do service life extensions on the existing ships. So you are taking an old ship and trying to get it even older. Buy used, and I appreciate the authority we received to buy the foreign-built ships. 

We are also aggressively looking for U.S.-built ships. However, due 

to market dynamics of previous decades, there are just very few out 

there. And then, of course, the long-term recap plan of building 

new. And we are initiating an effort to see if we can accelerate the 

CHAMP, the common hull platform, that we will ultimately use to 

replace the lift fleet and some other capabilities, such as submarine 

tenders and command ships, and notwithstanding the hospital 

ship. 

We are going to have to do something with the hospital ship. The 

replacement is not ready, so we are evaluating what it would take 

to do a life extension on her. Her sister ship is in good shape. She 

will be around for quite a while. And there may be other opportunities to fill in the sea-based medical support that we need to provide. So we are casting a wide net on how to meet that specific capability. But the other three levers are what we are going to pull 

very firmly to move out on recapitalizing this force. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. I appreciate your perspective on that. 

It is very tempting to only talk about what our Navy and Marine 

Corps need as far as warships. It is not in the headlines to say we 

need support ships and hospital ships. But I would argue, if history 

is any lesson to us, that the support element of the Navy is as critical as the warship component and especially in a contested environment today, which creates a whole other challenge for us, you 

know, making sure that we have a modernized sealift fleet is going 

to be key as well as—and, General Walsh, I think you hit the nail 

on the head. And that is the expectation today for all of our fighters, whether they are soldiers, Marines, sailors, or airmen, is that 

we provide the best for them. What we do to train Navy corpsmen 

and Army medics, so on the battlefield they get the best, survivability rates have gone sky high. We see what happens in exercises 

for those great caregivers on the battlefield. They are pretty doggone efficient in making sure that men and women that are injured 

there survive. Having the conduit, so once we get them out of that 

battle space and make sure we support them on that hospital ship 

I argue is equally as important. It is also a measure of this Nation’s commitment to taking care of them. 
26 

So I would urge you, on the hospital ship side, to do everything 

we can. While that doesn’t make the headlines as far as a shipbuilding number or an aircraft carrier or submarine, I would argue 

it is as, if not more, important as a measure of our Nation’s commitment to the men and women that serve in uniform. It sends a 

signal, not just to them but their families, to say we are going to 

do everything we can. So I would urge you, with all due diligence, 

to make sure we take care of that, as well as the support that they 

need, because it is great to give them great training, but if they 

are out there at the tip of the spear, and, for the first 30 days, they 

have everything they need, but after that, things start to tail off, 

that really becomes an issue. 

And, Mr. Geurts, I know you know that being there in SOCOM. 

And sustainment for that—as you know, our special operators get 

a lot of what they need, but the key to their success is sustainment. 

So I don’t know if you have anything that you want to add. I 

have been lecturing here for too long. So go ahead. 

Secretary GEURTS. Sir, I completely agree with everything you 

said there. And it is something in this year’s shipbuilding plan and 

our budget bill, we will look very closely at. But I completely agree 

with your perspective on the issues. 

General WALSH. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I just want to add to 

that piece is, you know, sometimes—I think Admiral Merz mentioned the sea base. And sometimes I think we look at a specific 

capability of how to replace that like one for one. But some of the 

things that we have looked at is like looking at the ESBs [Expeditionary Sea Base ships], which Congress has been very helpful with 

us in getting the afloat staging bases. And we have got [USS Lewis 

B.] Puller out right now in CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command]. 

But a lot of the modular capabilities to reconfigure packages, medical packages, to be able to go aboard those kinds of ships, there 

are lots of opportunities. When you talk about industrial base and 

continuing to build ships, that it isn’t always build the exact same 

thing; it is, how do you repurpose what you already have? And I 

look at opportunities there in the ESBs along with the ESFs [Expeditionary Fast Transports], our joint high-speed vessels. Tremendous capacity and capability in both those ships to be able to use 

them for a lot of different reasons. And certainly on the medical 

side, it is very clear to bring packages onto there in an expeditionary way to give increased capacity. 

Mr. WITTMAN. I think that is a great point. And that provides a 

lot of flexibility to the force too, to be able to move and to surge 

medical capacity when necessary and do that pretty quickly. So I 

appreciate you looking outside the box from the existing platforms 

to leverage the other assets that are there. 

One element that I did want to get some additional reflection on, 

and then I will go back to our other members if they have any 

other questions, and that is in the shipbuilding plan both for our 

warships and our Ready Reserve Force, there is not an element of 

those plans that addresses attrition. We all know, in the great 

power competition, I suspect that there is going to be some attrition there. We talk about operating in contested space and looking 

at where we are. And, again, if history is any lesson to us, in a 

highly contested environment, we see what happens. So I would 
27 

like to get your reflection on, how do we make sure we properly address attrition in all the elements of shipbuilding both in our warships and our Ready Reserve Force in making sure that we understand what the outcome would be in that situation? 

Secretary GEURTS. Yes, sir. 

And Admiral Merz can cover how we think about it. But I would 

also broaden that thought at least in our thinking is, how do we 

think about resilience and not just in terms of attrition of the thing 

but in terms of cyber protection in all the other forms of resilience 

to include medical and all that. So I think our thinking is resilience 

in the broader sense, not just in the attrition in a kinetic sense. 

I will turn to Admiral Merz to talk about that element specifically. I just want to let you know: We are thinking of resilience 

both from a network, from a cyber, from people perspective, not 

just a platform perspective. 

And, Bill, I don’t know if you want to share on the plan itself. 

Admiral MERZ. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Great point. 

So the battle force ships, the 355 actually do account for attrition. The Ready Reserve Force does not. So, as we come out of this 

era of very compressed requirements, where we would shift the attrition is to more risk. So this will give us the opportunity to reevaluate those assumptions and then re-vet the requirements behind them. So work to be done there. Very insightful question on 

how we approach this. But you are exactly right. This is warfare. 

It is only fair they shoot at us. And there may be some success 

there that we have to account for. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. 

I want to go now to Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. 

By the way, General McDew is bringing that end of it. He is calculating attrition, trying to for the first time ever, which is crazy. 

About 8 years ago—this just kind of blew my mind. I was looking 

at the transcripts going back to this same hearing going back 8 or 

9 years. We would spend a quarter of the hearing talking about 

AAVs [Amphibious Assault Vehicles], or expeditionary fighting vehicles. And I remember when General Dunford—he might have 

been a lieutenant general at that point. I forget which star he 

skipped, at what point. But he came up, and he said: This is the 

Marine Corps’ number one thing. It is the Navy’s number one 

thing, ship to shore. General Neller has put out ‘‘fight to get to the 

fight.’’ How do we do it? That was one of his directives. 

We didn’t talk about it at all today. I just kind of caught that 

as we are sitting here. I have seen the prototypes that MCCDC 

[Marine Corps Combat Development Command] is looking at, and 

I am sure the Navy is looking at stuff too. 

So what is your—we didn’t bring it up. So is it no longer a big 

deal? Have we figured that out so well that we are just good on 

it, or we have admitted that we can’t do it anymore in terms of 

anti-access/area denial? Is that an admittance of ours, or we are 

just working it behind the scenes and it is a secret? 

General WALSH. I will start and then turn it over to Admiral 

Merz. 

We are working it very hard behind the scene. And it is probably 

our highest priority because, as you know better than anybody, 
28 

Congressman, where we have been focused in Iraq and Afghanistan 

and where that is now with the clear guidance we have got in the 

National Defense Strategy to focus on peer competition, that is a 

completely different game than we have been dealing with for a 

long time. 

So, as we look at that, as a force that does—concentrates on the 

threat and a threat that deals with our concepts in a conceptsbased requirement system, dealing with that threat as we look at 

that, and we get questioned all the time, and a lot of it by smart 

congressional professional staff members asking us, how are you 

going to operate in this contested environment? And we have been 

working this problem very hard with the Navy at all levels from 

the Commandant and the CNO on down all the way out into the 

operating forces. A lot of work done on our concepts. Littoral operations in a contested environment, distributed maritime operations, 

expeditionary advanced base operations, all of those, I would say, 

have done multiple war games on how we are going to conduct 

those operations, along with the fleet exercises that Congressman 

Wittman mentioned, Bold Alligator and Dawn Blitz. One of the 

other things that we did out at Camp Pendleton, out in your neck 

of the woods, last year, we conducted a ship-to-shore maneuver 

task force advanced naval technology experiment. Going back to 

that problem-solving, bringing everybody in from industry, the warfare centers, and going, how are we going to get ashore differently 

in the future than we have done in the past? 

We had written concepts, our Marine Corps operating concept. 

We had a video on that that showed a lot of unmanned systems, 

sensing, pulsing, deception to get ashore differently. Different types 

of maneuver than we have ever done in the past. When we did that 

exercise out in Camp Pendleton, probably the first 15 to 20 minutes was all unmanned systems coming ashore in advance, sensing 

the environment, deceiving in the environment, and going where 

the enemy is not. So a lot of effort is going into this. We are spending an awful lot of time with the Navy working this hard. We see 

it as a long-term problem, but we are getting after it very hard to 

determine how we are going to do this differently. It is not going 

to be how we did it at Iwo Jima or Incheon or some of the other 

exercises we have done in the past. This is going to be a completely 

different operation that is really going to rely on the joint force and 

certainly the naval force. I think too many times folks look at the 

amphib [amphibious] force, and how are we going to do this as an 

amphib force? It is not. It is a naval campaign, just like it was in 

other contested environments where we have been in the past 

where we need submarines, we need cruisers and destroyers, we 

need carriers that are out there supporting us. 

So I think that is a key part of we are part of the problem. We 

are helping to solve the problem as part of that. And that is why 

I think we are so focused on the sea control. As General Neller 

says, we have to fight to get to the fight. We bring a lot of capabilities with F–35s on big deck amphibs and a lot of other capabilities, 

and how do we contribute to that naval campaign of getting to the 

fight in the sea control/sea denial mission that we are being tasked 

to do. 
29 

Admiral MERZ. Yes, sir. So this—a lot of effort going on in this 

area. And this is where the details of the shipbuilding plan are 

very important. So, when you look at the amphib line, it appears 

to be one of the lines that is closest to its requirement, which naturally has us focus more on the destroyers and the attack submarines, which are quite a distance from their requirement. The 

problem with the amphib, it is not the correct mix of amphibs that 

we need for the lethality standpoint. So we have put a lot of effort 

into the LX(R) [dock landing ship replacement] on what those capabilities will mean to the Navy and the Marine Corps. And Secretary Geurts will attest that we dug in pretty firmly on surrendering any of those capabilities before we set the—sent it out for 

competition. 

There is also the ship-to-shore connector piece to this, the LCAC 

[Landing Craft Air Cushion] replacement, that, a year ago, I would 

tell you we were in a crisis with that program. But, again, thanks 

to the increased top line, we are able to shore that program up, 

competed very well against—even though it is not an accountable 

ship in a 355, as Chairman Wittman said, we have this whole family of enablers underneath it that have to be tended to, and that 

was one of them. 

And then, of course, I certainly agree with General Walsh on the 

whole unmanned side of that. And then there is the whole mine 

warfare piece to that where the threat is much easier to advance 

ahead of the ability to counter that threat. A lot of work going on 

in there as well. 

General WALSH. If I could just follow up with one point is, you 

know, over the last few years, we focused on readiness. Are the 

shipyards manned correctly for maintenance to get the wholeness 

of the ships we need? Are they coming in on time? Are we pulling 

them out? We focused on the Optimized Fleet Response Plan. 

Doing much better at that. We then focused on capacity. I think 

this shipbuilding plan starts moving us in the right direction in capacity. 

From an amphib side, I would say the next thing that we have 

got to really focus on from our side is along with the other battle 

force ships is capability on those ships. So for us to be able to stand 

in and operate in a contested environment, those ships need to be 

part of that battle force. So we start talking about ability to detect, 

control, engage, self-defense capabilities, strike and missile defense 

capabilities. When you start bringing a fifth-generation capability 

into that amphibious task force, we need the same type of capabilities to be able to operate within that battle force and be able to 

network into the fleet tactical grid just like those other ships do. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Hunter. 

Gentlemen, thanks again. This was a great and exhaustive addressing of the challenges that we face. As you have heard from 

other members, this is a team effort. It is a bipartisan effort, bicameral effort to make sure we get our Navy-Marine Corps team 

where they need to be. The Secretary of Defense I think has laid 

out very eloquently where we are today in the era of great power 

competition. 
30 

And I will close with this, with the words of a former Admiral 

of the Navy, David Farragut, there at the Battle of Mobile Bay: 

Gentlemen, damn the torpedoes; full speed ahead. 

Thank you. With that, we adjourn. 

[Whereupon, at 3:32 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 6, 2018 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 6, 2018 

(35) 

Opening Remarks of the Honorable Robert J. Wittman 

for 

Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request 

for Seapower and Projection Forces 

March 6, 2018 

Today, we meet to Department of the Navy's Fiscal Year 2019 budget 

request. Appearing before us to discuss this important topic are three esteemed 

Navy witnesses: 

Honorable James Geurts 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development & Acquisition; 

Vice Admiral William R. Merz 

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems; and 

Lieutenant General RobertS. Walsh 

Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration. 

I want to thank you all for your service as well as for appearing before this 

subcommittee on the fiscal year 2019 budget request. 

Concurrent with the budget request last month, the Secretary of the Navy 

released a 30-year shipbuilding plan that addresses new capabilities and offers a 

plan to recapitalize the current force structure. While I am pleased that the plan 

was timely, I am concerned that it does not properly advocate for the Navy the 

nation needs. In fact, on page 8 of the plan, it references the 2016 Force Structure 

Assessment in a table, clearly identifying a need for 355 ships. Yet, on page 12, 

the 30-year shipbuilding plan only reaches 342 ships by 2039. Critical shortfalls in 

aircraft carriers, large deck amphibs, and attack submarines are debilitating to our 

national security and only serve to embolden potential adversaries. I think that the 

Navy sometimes misses the strategic imperative and national urgency associated 

with the message our nation sends to the world when an inadequate shipbuilding 

budget is proposed. Shipbuilding is a sign of our nation's resolve, and a weak 

shipbuilding request is carefully watched by our adversaries. We need to 

significantly improve our Navy's shipbuilding to meet the President's objective of 

a 355-ship Navy. 

As to the Marine Corps, I am pleased this committee supported the 

authorization of another San Antonio-class amphibious ship in the FY\8 NOAA. 

While I continue to hold some concerns with respect to conducting amphibious 

operations in a contested environment, I understand that the Marine Corps is 

actively seeking new strategies to overcome this challenge through exercises such 

as BOLD ALLIGATOR. I applaud these efforts. Our Marine Corps was created to 

be an amphibious force, therefore we must rapidly insert innovation into 

amphibious warfare to ensure we are successful in future conflict. 
36 

Additionally, I am concerned about the Navy's enabling forces and 

specifically the surge sealift forces. Our inability to provide a more responsive 

surge sealift will place soldiers and marines lives at risk in future conflict. If you 

can't get to the battle in time, you need to fight your way in. We have seen the 

casualties of such a strategy in prior conflict. We have to do better to support the 

warfighter. 

I am reminded of Winston Churchill who at the worst of times in World War 

II remarked "I never worry about action, but only inaction." Ladies and 

gentlemen, we have had 70 years of relative global peace with the absence of a 

major world war. This global peace was secured by the blood and sweat of our 

greatest generation. Our Navy's inability to act and embrace a bold shipbuilding 

vision will embolden our adversaries and risks the global peace that our fathers 

secured for our future. 

Our witnesses today are here today because they are the best our nation has 

to create the bold vision our nation needs. Gentlemen, it is time to act and 

establish a sustainable, upward trajectory for the Navy. I am confident in your 

ability to do so. 

I would now like to turn to our Ranking Member Joe Courtney, for any 

remarks he may have. 
37 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY 

THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

STATEMENT OF 

THE HONORABLE JAMES F. GEURTS 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR 

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUIS!TlON ASN(RD&A) 

AND 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTS. W ALSII 

DEPUTY COMMANDANT 

COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION & 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND 

AND 

VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM R. MERZ 

DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 

FOR WARFARE SYSTEMS (OPNAV N9) 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES OF THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES CAPABILITIES 

MARCH 6, 2018 

NOT FOR PUBUCATION UNTIL RELEASED BY 

THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SU8COMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 
38 

Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Courtney and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to address the 

Department ofNavy's Seapower and Projection forces capabilities. First [would like to 

thank Congress for your support of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018. Enactment of this 

legislation will help provide the predictability and stability in funding that is critical to our 

success and will support building the Navy the Nation Needs, the maritime component of the 

National Defense Strategy. 

The strategic environment continues to become more sophisticated, uncertain, and 

technologically charged. The proliferation of modern conventional and cyber weapons to a 

broader range of state and non-state entities, along with the erosion of our competitive 

advantage in areas where we have long enjoyed relative superiority, is likely to continue as 

rival states attempt to contest our influence. Competition for natural resources, violent 

extremism, natural disasters, social unrest, cyber-attacks, regional conflict, and the increase 

of advanced weaponry create a range of challenges for a globally responsive force. 

As detailed in the 2018 National Security Strate~:,ry and the 2018 National Defense 

Strategy, in order to retain and expand our competitive advantage, it is imperative that we 

continuously adapt to the emerging security environment and do so with a sense of 

urgency. This requires the right balance of readiness, capability, and capacity, as well as 

budget stability and predictability. Together, we can ensure our military's capability, 

capacity, and readiness can continue to deliver superior naval power around the world, both 

today and tomorrow. 

As part of our enduring commitment to accelerating delivery of advanced 

capabilities to the warfighter, the Department continues its pursuits of accelerated 

acquisition and business process reforms. We are utilizing accelerated acquisition 

authorities Congress provided under the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 National Defense 

Authorization Act including implementation of accelerated acquisition policies for Rapid 

Prototyping. We are actively promoting innovation, government/academia partnerships, 

and the transition ofkcy manufacturing technologies and processes with investments 

focused on affordability and capabilities most beneficial to the warfighter. 

As part of the Joint Force, the maritime dimension of the National Defense Strategy 

is to increase American naval power by building the Navy the Nation Needs (NNN). The 

Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Planfor Construction o.fNaval Vessels for 

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Fiscal Year 2019 is the roadmap to attain a 355-ship fleet, prioritizing three elements that the 

Navy will pursue to grow the force: (I) Steady, sustainable growth and an establishment of 

minimum baseline acquisition profiles that grow the force at a stable, affordable rate. This 

includes the sustainment of the industrial base at a level that supports affordable acquisition, 

predictable and efficient maintenance and modernization, and an appropriately sized 

workforce for more aggressive growth if additional resources become available. (2) 

Aggressive growth that more rapidly attains the same wartighting requirements as increased 

resources and industrial capacity pem1it. (3) Service Life Extensions (SLEs) that evaluate 

the potential additional service life that can be gained through restoration and modernization 

based on capability improvement costs versus unit replacement criteria. By balancing longterm growth profiles with targeted SLEs and aggressive growth options, the Navy will be 

able to stabilize the industrial base and set the foundation for growing the force towards its 

warfighting requirement. 

Similarly, to increase its competitive advantage over pacing threats, the Marine Corps 

will rapidly adapt and modernize in an affordable way, which depends greatly on predictable 

funding. In anticipation of the changing threat, the Marine Corps began implementation of 

the Marine Operating Concept (MOC) in 2016, codifying the long-term vision for how the 

service will operate, fight, and win in the future. This concept identified the need for a more 

lethal, resilient force able to contribute to all domain access, sea control, power projection, 

maritime security and therefore deterrence in any threat environment. The MOC is directly 

in line with the recently published National Defense Strategy which highlights the 

requirement for increased strategic flexibility and freedom of action. The MOC and its 

implementation prepare the Marine Corps to operate as part of the Contact, Blunt, and Surge 

forces identified in the National Defense Strategy, specifically as part of the naval force. 

Marines operate regularly within these three layers today, making the modernization 

priorities highlighted in the FY 2019 President's Budget all the more critical. 

The Fiscal Year 2019 President's Budget Request 

The FY 2019 President's Budget was infonned by the 2018 National Security Strategy 

and the 2018 National Defense Strategy and charts a course to building a larger, more capable 

battle force the nation needs. 

The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act supports Navy's validated NNN 

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40 

requirement for 355 Battle Force ships, which is based upon analysis and acceptable strategic 

and operational risk, to address the evolving and increasingly complex responsibilities. The 

FY 2019 President's Budget request builds towards this larger and more lethal force and 

reflects the continued commitment to produce a 355 ship Navy with the correct mix of ships; 

a commitment that increasingly values speed, lethality, stealth, information, and design 

margin for modernization as key attributes for future platforms- providing warfighting 

commanders capabilities in increasingly contested environments across all phases of warfare. 

When compared to the FY 2018 President's Budget request, the FY 2019 President's 

Budget adds II more Battle Force ships over the Future Year Defense Program for a total of 

54, with three additional ships in FY 2019. The FY 2019 request includes procurement often 

ships in FY 2019: two SSN 774 VIRGINIA Class attack submarines; three DDG 51 

ARLEIGII BURKE Class destroyers; one Littoral Combat Ship (LCS); one Expeditionary 

Sea Base (ESB); two JOHN LEWIS Class fleet oilers (T-AO); and one Towing, Salvage and 

Rescue ship (T-ATS). The FY 2019 President's Budget provides for SLEs on 11 Battle 

Force ships including six Cruisers, four Mine Countermeasure ships, and one Improved Los 

Angeles Class SSN. The FY 2019 President's Budget request also includes funding for SLEs 

on 21 vessels in the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and the Military Sealift Command surge 

fleet. The FY 2019 President's Budget request includes funding for procurement of two used 

commercial auxiliary vessels in FY 2021 and 2022, as authorized in the FY 2018 National 

Defense Authorization Act. 

With sustained funding provided in a timely manner and the execution of qualifying 

SLEs, the FY 2019 President's Budget as described in the NNN shipbuilding plan puts the 

Navy on a path to 326 ships by FY 2023 and 355 ships by the early 2050s. The plan 

promotes a stable and efficient industrial base that encourages industry investment in capital 

improvements, capital expansion, and a properly sized world-class workforce. It is a realistic 

plan that reflects the imperative to remain balanced across investments in readiness and 

advanced capabilities in an era of unpredictable funding levels. By setting conditions for an 

enduring industrial base as a top priority, working together with Congress, the Navy is 

postured to aggressively respond to more investment in any year, which if received in all 

years, combined with SLEs and strong industry response, could attain the warfighting NNN 

target of 355 ships as early as the 2030s- balanced, credible and sustainable. 

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Summary 

The ascendant threats posed by revisionist powers and rogue states require change~ 

we must become more lethal, resilient and as a consequence, a more capable deterrent. The 

Navy-Marine Corps team is re-evaluating our contributions to all domain access, sea control, 

power projection, maritime security, and deterrence knowing that we must consider the 

tactical and operational details of a contingency~ and how our contributions could shape the 

strategic environment to prevent conflict. Modern sensors and precision weapons with 

expanding ranges and lethality are redefining how we assess our posture and relative combat 

power. 

The Department of the Navy continues to increase capacity, lethality, and availability 

with the shipbuilding, aviation, and expeditionary programs. New capabilities are 

continually being delivered to the t1eet and retrofitted on existing platforms to provide 

enhanced lethality and survivability to the warfighter. In addition, the Department is 

aggressively pursuing efforts to accelerate acquisition time lines and schedules and further 

drive aftordability into our programs, in order to deliver capability to our warfighters faster 

and be as effective as possible within our resources. Continued congressional support of the 

Department's plans and budgets will help sustain a viable industrial base, as will timely 

enactment of appropriations, avoiding costly Continuing Resolutions. This request lays the 

ground work for growing wartighting capabilities in the FY 2020 President's Budget, as the 

Department also makes initial investtnents in a larger Navy and Marine Corps. 

We thank you for your continued support of the Navy and Marine Corps and request 

your support of the FY 2019 President's Budget. 

Programmatic details regarding Navy and Marine Corps capabilities are summarized 

in the toll owing section. 

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U.S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

CAPABILITIES 

Ships 

Aircraft Carriers 

The aircraft carrier is the centerpiece of the Navy's Carrier Strike Groups and central 

to Navy core missions of sea control, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance and 

disaster relic[ NIMITZ and FORD Class carriers will be the premier forward-deployed asset 

of choice for crisis response and early decisive striking power in major combat operations for 

the next half-century. The Department has established a steady state FORD Class 

procurement plan designed to deliver each new ship in close alignment with the NIMITZ 

Class ship it replaces. 

We continue to see progress in the testing of new systems aboard USS Gerald R Ford 

(CVN 78). As of this January, CVN 78 has completed six underway events and conducted 

over 700 catapult launches and arrestments with Navy jets, including over a hundred launches 

and recoveries in one day on two separate occasions. These tixed wing operations were 

successfully supported by a number of aviation systems, while others will require continued 

refinement as they continue to support ongoing shipboard testing. The John F Kennedy (CVN 

79) is approximately 40 percent complete with launch planned in late 2019 and delivery in the 

fall of2024. The Navy is pursuing contracting actions necessary to continue fabrication of 

Enterprise (CVN 80) in FY 2018 and preserve the delivery date to achieve significant cost 

reductions. 

The NIMITZ Class Refueling Complex Overhaul (RCOH) is key to both the 

maintenance and modernization of each carrier in support of the second half of its service life. 

USS George Washington (CVN 73) began her mid-life recapitalization in August 2017 with redelivery planned in summer 2021 to accomplish refueling of the ship's reactors, 

modernization, and repair of ship systems and infrastructure. The USS John C Stennis (CVN 

74) RCOH advance planning contract award is scheduled in summer 2018. 

Submarines 

Ballistic Missile Submarines, coupled with the TRIDENT II D-5 Strategic Weapons 

System, represent the most survivable leg of the Nation's strategic arsenal and provide the 

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43 

Nation's most assured nuclear response capability. The COLUMBIA Class program is on 

track to start construction in October 2020 and deliver to pace the retirement of our current 

ballistic missile submarines, deploying for its first patrol in FY 2031. 

The FY 2019 President's Budget supports the funding required to achieve a target of 

83 percent design completion at construction start in FY 2021. In September 2017, the Navy 

awarded General Dynamics Electric Boat a $5.1 B contract for the design completion, 

technology development, and prototype manufacturing for the COLUMBIA Class program. 

The contract leverages the authorities contained within the National Sea-Based Deterrence 

Fund and incentivizes construction readiness, affordability and supplier base capability and 

capacity. The FY 2019 President's Budget request also funds Continuous Production of 

Missile Tubes and will support Advance Construction of long lead time material. Both efforts 

will improve manufacturing efficiencies and vendor learning, maintain critical production 

skills, and reduce costs by leveraging high-volume procurements. 

In addition to the Department of the Navy's budget request, the continued support of 

Congress for Naval Reactors' Department of Energy funding is vital to the Navy mission and 

ensuring the safe, reliable, and enduring operations of the nuclear-powered fleet. The 

President's FY 2019 budget fully funds Naval Reactors' request for the COLUMBIA Class 

SSBN. Recapitalizing this capability is critical to the Navy's readiness, specifically by 

ensuring adherence to the tight refueling and defueling schedule of nuclear-powered aircraft 

carriers and submarines. 

The long-term strategy for our attack submarines and future payload submarine is the 

Tactical Submarine Evolution Plan, or TESP, which features the VIRGINIA Class SSN. The 

VIRGINIA Class program is continuing to deliver submarines within budget and with 

increased capability in each block. The Navy will be building on past success by awarding a 

Block V Multiyear Procurement (MYP) contract for 10 ships in FY 2019. This represents an 

increase from the FY 2018 budget request of one submarine in FY 2021, while also 

introducing the VIRGIN lA Payload Module and Acoustic Superiority. 

In 2016, the Navy established the Integrated Enterprise Plan to provide a framework tor an 

integrated approach to support COLUMBIA, VIRGINIA, and FORD Class construction. This 

long-term government and contractor effort will guide the execution of these nuclear-powered 

platforms affordably, on time, to specifications, in the necessary quantities, and with acceptable 

risk. 

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Large Surface Combatants 

The ARLEIGH BURKE Class (DDG 51) program remains one of the Navy's most 

successful shipbuilding programs with 65 ships delivered to the Fleet. The FY 2018-2022 

MYP maximizes affordability, stabilizes the industrial base, and has the flexibility to add 

additional ships. All ships in this MYP will incorporate Integrated Air and Missile Defense 

and provide additional Ballistic Missile Defense capacity known as Flight III, which 

incorporates the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR). AMDR meets the growing ballistic 

missile threat by improving radar sensitivity and enabling longer range detection of 

increasingly complex threats. The program demonstrated design maturity through its 

successful completion of several stages of developmental testing, its entry into the Production 

and Deployment phase, and FY 2017 Flight Ill awards to both shipbuilders. 

Complementing the DDG 51, the DDG 1000 ZUMWALT class guided missile 

destroyers are an optimally crcwcd, multi-mission surface combatant designed to provide longrange, precise, naval surface fire support. The DDG 1000 ship is nearing completion of 

industrial work in preparation to activate its combat systems in its homeport of San Diego. 

DDG 1001 has successfully completed acceptance trials and is scheduled for delivery in March 

2018 and construction on DDG I 002 is 72 percent complete. After a comprehensive review of 

ZUMWALT Class requirements, the Navy decided in November 2017 to refocus the primary 

mission of the ZUMWALT Class Destroyers to Oftcnsive Surface Strike. This change in 

mission adds lethality and offensive capabilities by providing tires against targets afloat and 

ashore. 

Small Surface Combatants 

The 2016 Force Structure Assessment revalidated the warfighting requirement tor a 

total of 52 small surface combatants, including the LCS and the future, more capable Guided 

Missile Frigate (FFG(X)). The Navy will continue to refine the FFG(X) Conceptual Design 

with industry through FY 2019 to support a full and open competition with a single source 

award in FY 2020. The inventory objective tor LCS is 32 ships and the FY 2019 President's 

budget includes one ship in FY 2019 to ensure that the requirement is met while helping to 

sustain the viability of the industrial base until the FFG(X) award in FY 2020. The FFG(X) 

will expand the competitive field of our shipbuilding industrial base. 

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45 

The Program of Record (PoR) requirements for LCS Mission Packages (MP) have been 

updated. The new MP PoR requires 10 Surface Warfare (SUW), 24 Mine Countermeasures 

(MCM), and 10 Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) for a total of44 deployable MPs. Due to the 

expeditionary and modular nature of the MCM MP this capacity can be fielded by both LCS 

and other Vessels of Opportunity. The Navy plans to leverage the modularity and flexibility of 

elements of the ASW and SUW MPs for the I'FG(X) design, however these elements will not 

be complete MPs nor will they be included in the LCS MM PoR quantity of deployable MPs. 

The LCS MP program continues the development of the SUW, MCM, ASW 

capabilities, delivering individual mission systems incrementally as they become available. 

This past year LCS 4 deployed with the first installation of an over-the-horizon missile 

capability added to the SUW MP. The Surface-to-Surface Missile Module with Longbow 

Helltire will add more lethality to the SUW MP. It is currently in testing with Initial 

Operational Capability (IOC) planned for FY 2019. 

The ASW MP Escort Mission Module (EMM) uses a continuously active Variable 

Depth Sonar, integrated with a Multi-Function Towed Array to provide a revolutionary surface 

ship anti-submarine capability. Development and integration of the EMM, Light Weight Tow, 

and Torpedo Defense Module are ongoing. The ASW EMM and is on track to fully integrate 

with the LCS to support IOC with the ASW MP in FY 2019. 

The Navy has scheduled three MCM systems tor developmental tests (DT) and two tor 

operational assessments (OA) this year, with Milestone C production decisions of the first two 

expected before the end ofFY 2018. The MCM Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) is the tow 

platform for minehunting operations, and is based on the USV already used in the Unmanned 

Influence Sweep System program. The Navy's plan is to conduct MCM MP DT/OA in FY 

2020 and achieve IOC in FY 2021. 

Amphibious Ships 

Amphibious ships operate forward to support allies, rapidly and decisively respond to 

crises, deter potential adversaries, and provide the Nation's best means of projecting 

sustainable power ashore. They also provide the preponderance of our naval response in 

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The operationally available inventory of 

amphibious warships and connectors remains below the 38 ship force structure requirement. 

The Navy is exploring service life extensions of existing ships and the acceleration of the 

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46 

LX(R) program to mitigate this shortfall. 

LilA 6 AMERICA Class ships are flexible, multi-mission platforms with capabilities 

that span the range of military operations, from forward-deployed crisis response to forcible 

entry operations. These ships will provide the modem replacements for the LHA 1 TARAWA 

Class ships and the aging LHD I WASP Class ships. USS America (LHA 6) deployed as the 

centerpiece of AMERICA Amphibious Readiness Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit, while 

USS Tripoli (LHA 7) is on schedule to deliver in December of2018. The Detail Design and 

Construction contract was awarded in June 2017 for LHA 8 and delivery is planned for FY 

2024. LHA 8 will return to well deck design to increase operational flexibility and includes a 

reduced island structure that increases flight deck space to enhance aviation capability. 

The SAN ANTONIO Class (LPD 17) provides the ability to embark, transport, and 

land elements of a landing force by helicopters, tilt rotor aircraft, landing craft, and amphibious 

vehicles. USS Portland (LPD 27) will commission in April20 18 and the USS Fort 

Lauderdale (LPD 28) keel was laid in September 2017, with expected delivery in FY 2021. 

LPD 28's design and construction features will leverage many of the ongoing LX(R) design 

innovations and cost reduction initiatives that are necessary for the program to achieve 

affordability goals while maintaining the high-level capabilities of the LPD 17 class. LPD 29 

was awarded in February and will continue with the LPD 28 design, but add the Enterprise Air 

Surveillance Radar (EASR) among other improvements. 

LX(R) will be a flight upgrade to the LPD 17 Class. The lead ship for the LX(R) is 

currently programmed for FY 2020. Contract actions arc planned for FY 2019 to facilitate 

Detail Design and Construction award in FY 2020. 

Combat Systems 

The Department continues to field the most capable and lethal surface and submarine 

combat systems in the world. The AEGIS Combat System Baseline 9 has been fielded on 

cruisers and destroyers and continues to deliver unprecedented offensive and defensive 

capabilities, including, offensive ASW and simultaneous air and ballistic missile defense on 

destroyers and Air Defense Commander capability on cruisers. AEGIS Baseline I 0 will add 

the AN/SPY 6(V) AMDR providing significant performance improvements over the AN/SPY 

1 D(V) radar and expanding the sensor coverage and enhancing the Navy's ability to perform 

the Integrated Air and Missile Defense mission. The Navy is leveraging the investment in 

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47 

AMDR to produce the EASR that will become the primary Air Search Radar for large deck 

ships and the Guided Missile Frigate. By using a common design and support strategy, we are 

enabling significant life cycle cost reduction for the Navy's surface radars. 

The Ship Self-Defense System provides ships with greater capability to defend against 

anti-ship cruise missile attack and supports a myriad of mission areas on Carrier and large 

deck Amphibious Class Ships. 

The Department continues to aggressively pursue atTordable systems that are 

employable from multiple platforms. Under the Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement 

Program (SEWJP), the Navy is replacing aging analog electronic warfare systems first fielded 

in the early 1970's with new, digital systems. SEWJP Block I and 2 systems are in Full Rate 

Production and continue to be installed across the f1eet. The SEWJP Block 3 program 

completed its Critical Design Review in 2017 and is on track for Milestone C in FY 2018. 

The Navy continues to deliver enhanced surface Undersea Warfare capability through the 

AN/SQQ-89A(V)l5 aboard cruisers, destroyers, and LCS Mission Packages. 

The Submarine community continues to successfully deliver improvements in AntiSubmarine Warfare utilizing bi-annual hardware Technology Insertions on even years and 

software Advanced Processing Builds on odd years. Leveraging commercial off-the-shelf 

(COTS) technologies via the Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (A-RCI) program mitigates 

COTS obsolescence while providing more capability improvement at lower costs. 

Auxiliary Ships, Expeditionary, and Other Vessels 

Support vessels such as the ESB, Expeditionary Transfer Dock (ESD), and the 

Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF) provide additional f1exibility to the Combatant 

Commanders. ESBs are f1exible platforms capable of hosting multiple mission sets with 

airborne, surface, and subsurface assets. The USNS Lewis 8 Puller (ESB 3), the first Af1oat 

Forward Staging Base variant ofthe ESD,joined the U.S. Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulfin the 

Fall of2017. ESB 4 delivered in February 2018 and ESB 5 is scheduled for delivery in May 

2019. The Navy accepted delivery of the 9'11 EPF this past December and the final EPF, EPF 

12, will start fabrication this year. 

The Combat Logistics Force (CLF) consists ofT-AOE fast combat support ships, TAKE dry cargo and ammunition ships, and T-AO f1eet replenishment oilers. CLr ships fulfill 

the vital role of providing underway replenishment of fuel, food, repair parts, ammunition and 

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48 

equipment to forward-deployed ships and embarked aircraft, to enable them to operate for 

extended periods of time at sea. The KAISER Class (T-AO 187) fleet replenishment oilers 

will be replaced with the JOHN LEWIS Class fleet replenishment oilers, designated T-AO 205 

Class. The start of construction for the first T-AO 205 is scheduled for September 2018. 

The Department has begun procurement of a combined towing, salvage, and rescue 

(T-ATS) ship to replace the four T-ATf 166 Class fleet ocean tugs, which reach the end of 

their expected service lives starting in2021, and the four T-ARS 50 Class salvage ships, 

which reach the end of their expected service lives starting in 2025. fabrication is expected 

to begin in early FY 2019. 

In 2016, the Navy and Coast Guard established an Integrated Program Office to 

rebuild the Nation's heavy icebreaking capability. The Navy is supporting the Coast Guard's 

efforts to responsibly and aftordably recapitalize the heavy polar icebreaker ilect. The Coast 

Guard intends to leverage existing designs and mature technologies to mitigate schedule and 

cost risks using a strategy based on robust industry collaboration and competition. The detail 

Design and Construction Request tor Proposal has been released with proposals due at the 

end ofFY 2018. Based on this effort, the Coast Guard expects delivery of the first 

icebreaker as early as 2023. 

Surface Ship Modernization and Service Life Extensions 

The fiscal realities facing the Navy make it imperative that we modernize our inservice ships to achieve their expected service lives and also to extend the service lives 

through modernization of our ships to achieve a 355 ship Navy. The Navy and industry are 

collaborating on innovative approaches to conducting modernization of Cruisers and Dock 

Landing Ships. The FY 2019 President's Budget includes funding for the modernization of 

five destroyers to sustain combat effectiveness, ensure mission relevancy, and achieve the 

full expected service lives of the AEGIS Fleet. The request also continues to execute over 

the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for modernization of seven cruisers to ensure 

long-term capability and capacity for purpose-built Air Defense Commander platforms. The 

remaining four cruisers, which have Ballistic Missile Defense capability, will receive 

modernization to their hull, mechanical and electrical systems to support their operation 

through their engineered service life. 

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Unmanned Undersea Vehicles 

The Navy is expanding its global reach through the development of unmanned 

capabilities to ensure maritime dominance and power projection. This requires persistent 

global presence in all maritime domains, the ability to deny our adversaries safe haven in the 

world's oceans, and the capability to generate kinetic and non-kinetic effects at the time and 

place of our choosing. The Navy executes multiple missions in and from the Undersea 

Domain including Strategic Deterrence; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); 

ASW; Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW); Strike; Naval Special Warfare; and Mine Warfare. The 

Navy is using a Family-of-Systems strategy to develop and employ unmanned undersea 

vehicles to conduct a spectrum of undersea missions that complement and relieve stress on the 

manned force. The Family leverages small and medium-sized commercial vehicles, and is 

developing large and extra-large vehicles. 

Snakehead is the Large Vehicle which is the most critical member of the Family for 

overall Family development and tactical operations. Orca is the Extra Large Vehicle that is 

being designed to launch from a pier or large surface ship and operate for weeks or months at 

a time. 

Ready Reserve Forces (RRF) 

The Navy has coordinated planning options with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and the Department of Transportation's 

Maritime Administration (MARA D) and developed a strategic sealift recapitalization strategy 

that includes a three-phased approach. The strategy includes the SLE of select Surge Sealift 

vessels, acquiring used vessels, and a new construction, common-hulled shipbuilding program. 

The Navy's long-term strategy advocates that new construction common hull vessels be 

assigned to the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) as delivered, ensuring the Fleet has the 

latest capabilities to support employment across the full range of military operations. Existing 

MPF ships would rotate to surge, preserving capability and maintaining the requisite square 

footage to meet USTRANSCOM sealift capacity requirements. 

Naval Aviation 

With the support of Congress, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are implementing our 

"Vision for Naval Aviation 2025". This framework informs our investment priorities across 

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the triad ofwarfighting capability, capacity, and naval aviation wholeness; placing the right 

capability in the hands of the warfighter in the most affordable manner possible. 

Airborne Early Warning Aircraft 

The Navy continues its full support for E-2D. E-2D is the Navy's premier carrierbased Airborne Early Warning and Battle Management Command and Control (C2) system. 

The aircraft provides 'Theater Air and Missile Defense' and 'Naval integrated Fire ControlCounter Air' capabilities. E-2D is capable of synthesizing information from multiple onboard 

and off-board sensors, making complex tactical decisions, and then disseminating actionable 

information to Joint Forces in a distributed, open-architecture environment. 

Maritime Patrol Aircraft 

The P-8A Poseidon recapitalizes the ASW, ASuW and armed ISR capabilities from the 

aging P-3C Orion. The P-8A combines the proven reliability of the commercial 737 airframe 

with avionics that enable integration of modern sensors and robust military communications. 

All squadrons arc scheduled to complete transition by FY 2020. The P-8A program is meeting 

all cost, schedule and performance parameters and has surpassed reliability standards for 

operational availability. 

Fixed Wing Aircraft 

The KC-130J brings increased capability, performance, and survivability with lower 

operating and sustainment costs for the MAGTF. Today, the KC-130J is in high demand as it 

provides tactical air-to-air refueling, assault support, close air support and Multi-sensor 

Imagery Reconnaissance capabilities in support of Special Purpose MAGTFs and deployed 

Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs). Targeted improvements include aircraft survivability 

through advanced electronic countenneasure modernization and obsolescence upgrades to the 

Harvest HAWK ISR/Weapon Mission Kit. The obsolescence upgrade includes compatibility 

with additional Hellfire variants and an improved full motion video data-link. 

Operational Support Aircraft (OSA) 

The C-40A is a military variant of the Boeing 737-700C, a combination 

passenger/cargo aircraft, with military avionics and aircraft survivability equipment. The 

14 
51 

Marine Corps' intends to procure two C-40As in FY 2019 to replace the C-9B fleet it divested 

in April 2017. This procurement enables the time-sensitive movement of personnel and cargo 

for Marine forces and complies with current FAA communication, navigation, surveillance, 

and air traffic management requirements. Missions previously flown by C-9s are either not 

being accomplished or they are being accomplished via tactical aircraft like the CH-53E, MV22 or KC-1301. Using tactical aircraft to conduct OSA missions not only increases their 

utilization rates, but also has a higher cost-per-flight-hour than the C-40A. 

Unmanned Aviation 

The Department has placed a priority on the development and fielding of unmanned 

systems leading to a fully integrated manned and unmanned fleet. Unmanned technology will 

not replace our Sailors and Marines; instead it will unlock their full potential as we integrate 

this technology within our total force. 

MQ-4C (Triton) 

The Department continues steady progress on development and fielding of the MQ-4C 

Triton Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS). Triton will be a core capability of Navy's Maritime 

Patrol and Reconnaissance Force and fill a vital role for the Joint Forces Maritime Component 

Commander by delivering persistent maritime ISR. The system will be a force multiplier tor 

the Coalition and Joint Force, as well as the Fleet Commander, by enhancing situational 

awareness of the operational environment and shortening the sensor-to-shooter kill chain. 

MQ-25 Carrier Based Unmanned Aerial System 

Navy is committed to unmanned carrier aviation. MQ-25 Stingray will deliver the 

Navy's first carrier-based UAS to function primarily as a mission tanker to extend the range, 

reach, and lethality of the carrier air wing with secondary recovery tanking and ISR 

capabilities. MQ-25 will reduce current use ofF/ A-18E/Fs as carrier air wing tankers, freeing 

F/A-18E!Fs to execute strike fighter missions, effectively increasing strike fighter capacity 

within the carrier air wing. MQ-25 is a rapid acquisition program designed to significantly 

reduce its development and delivery timeline. The program has established a short chain of 

command to mitigate risk and expedite programmatic and technical trade decisions. 

15 
52 

RQ-21A Blackjack 

To meet the demand for persistent, multi-role ISR capability, the Navy and Marine 

Corps are building a balanced portfolio of manned and unmanned aircraft focused on missions 

in the maritime environment. This UAS, with the capability lor expeditionary operations via 

deployment aboard amphibious ships, provides persistent ship and land based ISR support for 

expeditionary tactical-level maneuver decisions, unit level force defense, and force protection 

missions. The RQ-21 completed several combat deployments in 2017 and supported both East 

and West coast MEUs. The Blackjack has flown over 1,000 sorties and 5,600 hours in support 

of the MAGTF. 

MAGTF Expeditionary UAS (MUX) 

The MAGTF Expeditionary UAS (MUX) supports the Marine Operating Concept and 

is envisioned to be a multi-mission, long-range (690+ NM), long-endurance (24+ hours), 

platform that will complement MV-22 operations and operate from both sea and expeditionary 

bases. MUX will enable the MAGTF to provide, complement, or expand a Joint Force or 

geographic commander's capabilities during the conduct of campaigns, joint forcible entry 

operations, and crisis response. 

Weapons 

The Department continues to make significant strides in extending the fleet's layered 

defense battle-space while also improving the capabilities of the individual ship defense layers 

in order to pace the increasing anti-ship missile threat. 

Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) provides theater and high value target area defense for the 

Fleet, and with Integrated Fire Control, has more than doubled its range in the counter-air 

mission. SM-6 Block I declared Full Operational Capability in December 2017 and the Navy 

plans to award a MYP contract for up to 625 SM-6 missiles in FY 2019. The MYP will span 

from FY 2019 to FY 2023, is projected to achieve over 10 percent savings vice annual 

procurement, and aligns with the potential SM-3 Block IB MYP in FY 2019. 

The Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) provides another layer to the Navy's 

defended battle-space. ESSM Block 2 is on track to achieve IOC for AEGIS platforms in FY 

2020 and Ship Self-Defense System platforms in the 2022-2023 time frame. 

The inner layer of the Fleet's layered defense is the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) 

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53 

designed to pace the evolving anti-ship cruise missile threat and improve performance against 

complex stream raid engagement scenarios. The RAM Block 2 is on track to receive a Full 

Rate Production Decision in FY 2018. 

The FY 2019 President's Budget includes funding to continue upgrades to the Standard 

Missile-2 (SM-2) inventory with active guidance utilizing accelerated acquisition authorities. 

This investment provides an affordable, integrated fire control capable, area defense missile to 

counter stressing threats. 

Cruise Missile Strategy 

The Department has aligned its Cruise Missile Strategy along warfighter domains to 

pursue maximized lethality while minimizing overall costs to the taxpayer. The first tenet of 

our strategy is to sustain the highly successful, combat proven, Tomahawk cruise missile 

inventory through its anticipated service-life via a mid-life recertification program starting in 

the first quarter ofFY 2019. This recertification program will increase missile service-life by 

an additional 15 years (total of30 years) and enable the Department to support Tomahawk in 

our active inventory through the mid-late 2040s. In concert with our recertification program 

we will integrate modernization and technological upgrades and address existing obsolescence 

issues. In addition, we are developing a Maritime Strike Tomahawk capability to deliver a 

long-range anti-surface warfare capability. 

The Depmiment will field the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) as the airlaunched Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare/Increment I (OASuW/Inc. 1) material solution to 

meet near to mid-term anti-surface warfare threats. LRASM is pioneering accelerated 

acquisition processes. We anticipate LRASM will meet all Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved 

warfighting requirements, and deliver on-time within cost. 

Finally, the Department plans to develop follow-on next generation strike capabilities 

such as the surface and submarine launched Next Generation Land Attack Weapon (NGLAW). 

NOLA W will have both a long-range land strike and maritime ASuW capability that initially 

complements, and then replaces, the highly successful Tomahawk Weapon System. 

17 
54 

United States Marine Corps Expeditionary Warfare 

Expeditionary Warfare 

The principle of Expeditionary Warfare is to operate forward, to exploit the seas as 

maneuver space as a base for global power projection, and to be ready to maneuver to shore 

when so ordered. Our ability to deploy from the sea in austere environments at a time and 

place of our choosing gives us significant tactical, operational and strategic advantages over 

potential adversaries. That ability is provided through the combination of connectors that 

move forces from the sea base to the objective sites and sustain the organic capability of those 

forces to maneuver and fight on the objective. 

The Navy/Marine Corps team provides the Combatant Commanders and our Nation 

the options needed to engage with our partners, to deter our adversaries and, when needed, to 

fight and win. That capability is underpinned by our disciplined, well-trained and motivated 

Sailors and Marines equipped with the "right" amphibious ships, aircraft and weapons in our 

arsenal. Unique to our expeditionary warfare capabilities is the ability to exploit the sea as 

maneuver space and conduct operations in international waters and airspace. Tactically, the 

ability to project multiple elements of a landing force ashore via multiple entry points using 

both vertical and surface means gives us greater flexibility in maneuvering into positions of 

advantage over an adversary. Our service capstone concept, the Marine Corps Operating 

Concept, envisions a future Marine force fighting at and from the sea to gain and maintain sea 

control and enable freedom of maneuver within an Advanced Naval or Joint Task Force as 

directed through the National Defense Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance. 

Connectors 

Ship-to-shore connectors move personnel, equipment and supplies, maneuvering from 

a sea base to the objective. These are critical enablers for any naval force by closing the last 

"tactical mile" with the adversary. Modern aerial connectors, such as the MV-22 Osprey and 

CH-53K King Stallion, extend operational reach and lift capacity, revolutionizing our ability 

to operate from the sea, austere locations, and previously damaged airfields within a 

contested environment. Aerial connectors alone do not suffice; the Navy is in the process of 

modernizing the surface connector fleet by replacing the aging Landing Craft Air Cushion 

(LCAC) and the 50-year-old fleet of Landing Craft Utility (LCU). This system of surface 

18 
55 

and aerial connectors will enable the Joint Force to establish a web of sensor, strike, decoy, 

and sustainment locations based on land and sea that complicates the strategic and 

operational decision-making of our most advanced rivals, thus attacking their AntiAccess/Area Denial (A2AD) strategies. Continued funding of the modernization, 

maintenance, and service life extension programs of our existing fleet of connectors is critical 

to enabling our success in future security environments. 

The FY 2019 President's Budget includes 37 LCAC 100 Class air cushioned vehicles. 

The Ship to Shore Connector program will replace aging LCACs, which have undergone a 

Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and a Post-SLEP Extension program. Additionally, 

the FY 2019 President's Budget includes the procurement of 18 LCU 1700 Class craft, which 

will recapitalize, in part, the aging LCU 1610 Class. Both variants still require additional 

funding for post-delivery and outfitting efforts to provide Fleet craft which arc capable of 

supporting operational tasking. 

These platforms are essential in connecting the combat power and logistics 

sustainment the seabase provides to expeditionary forces operating in the littorals. The 

Department will continue to explore future connector options that will increase our ability to 

exploit the sea as maneuver space by increasing range, speed, capacity, and force 

interopcrability. 

Combat and Tactical Vehicles 

Our Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy (GCTVS) provides a framework 

for portfolio management and enterprise decision support. The Marine Corps is investing 

approximately 29 percent of its modernization resources into GCTV systems within the 

FYDP. The overarching combat and tactical vehicle investment priority is the modernization 

of Assault Amphibian capability through the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) program 

as the means to incrementally replace the legacy Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV). 

The first phase and increment of the ACV program (ACV 1.1) is on schedule for 

Milestone C decision and down-select to a single contractor in June of2018. Thus far, it is 

successfully performing at or above the required performance parameters with both vendors 

demonstrating the capacity to meet objective requirements for ship-to-shore water mobility. 

Both manufacturers have delivered their required number of vehicles and have been going 

through rigorous developmental testing including water mobility and under-vehicle blast 

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56 

protection tests as well as operational testing with the user community. 

The second highest priority for combat and tactical vehicle investment remains the 

replacement of the legacy high mobility, multi-purpose, wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) fleet 

beginning with that portion that is most at risk; those trucks that perfom1 a combat function 

and are typically exposed to enemy fires. In partnership with the Army, the Marine Corps 

has sequenced the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program to ensure affordability in 

conjunction with the execution of the ACV program. This approach enables an affordable, 

incremental, and simultaneous modernization of the two most stressing gaps within the 

GCTV portfolio. 

Marine Air-Ground Task Forces 

The focus of our ground modernization efforts continues to be our combat and tactical 

vehicle portfolio, along with the C2 systems needed to leverage the entire MAGTF once 

ashore. 

Critical to the success ashore of the MAGTF is our ability to coordinate and 

synchronize our distributed C2 sensors and systems. Our modernization priorities in this area 

are the Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) and the Common Aviation Command and 

Control System (CAC2S). These systems will provide modern, interoperable technologies to 

support real-time surveillance, detection and targeting and common C2 suite to enable the 

effective employment of that and other sensors and C2 suites across the MAGTF. 

0/ A TOR ensures the Marine Corps will be in full control of MAGTF airspace. It 

serves as the foundation for Commander, Joint Force Air Component delegation of airspace 

control to the future MAGTF, and provides MAGTF commanders the freedom of action to 

employ organic surface and air tires. 0/ATOR detects the most challenging air threats for the 

MAGTF and will pace the threat for years to come. 

CAC2S provides the tactical situational display, information management, sensor and 

data link interface, and operational facilities for planning and execution of Marine Aviation 

missions within the MAGTF. CAC2S will eliminate the current stove-piped, dissimilar legacy 

systems and will add capability for aviation combat direction and air defense functions by 

providing a single networked system. CAC2S will be the primary C2 system that integrates 

MAGTF aviation operations with Joint, combined, and coalition aviation C2 agencies. 

20 
57 

Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) 

The proliferation and technological progression of readily available UASs to state and 

non-state actors have advanced at an unprecedented pace. The Department is pursuing an 

aggressive plan that delivers the most capable, available C-UAS solutions for the warfighter in 

the near tem1, while simultaneously pursuing advanced technologies to support an enduring CUAS capability. 

Other MAGTF Programs 

Individual Marines are the foundation ofthc Marine Corps, the MAGTF and our 

expeditionary capability. In addition to the major programs described above, this budget 

supports the continued delivery of required wartighting capabilities to our individual Marines 

and our flexible MAGTF structure in a timely and affordable manner. The Marine Corps 

continues to invest in the weapons, individual protective equipment, tactical radios, training 

systems, and information technology necessary to ensure an effective and efficient fighting 

force and keep faith with our commitment to those individual Marines who shoulder the 

burden and privilege of being America's expeditionary force in readiness. 

21 
58 

James F. Geurts 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy 

(Research, Development aud Acquisition) 

12/5/2017 - Present 

On Dec. 5, 2017, Mr. James F. Geurts was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 

Research, Development & Acquisition (ASN (RD&A)), following his confirmation by the 

Senate November 2017. As the Navy's acquisition executive, Mr. Geurts has oversight of an 

annual budget in excess of$60 billion and is responsible for equipping and supporting the finest 

Sailors and Marines in the world with the best platforms, systems and technology as they operate 

around the globe in defense of the Nation. 

Mr. Geurts previously served as the Acquisition Executive, U.S .. Special Operations Command 

(USSOCOM), at MacDill Air Force Base (AFB), Florida, where he was responsible for all 

special operations forces acquisition, technology and logistics. In this position his innovative 

leadership and technological ingenuity provided rapid and affordable acquisition that positively 

impacted the USSOCOM acquisition work force and the special operations forces capability on 

the battlefield. These contributions were recognized by both private and public institutions 

during his tenure to include earning the Presidential Rank Award, USSOCOM Medal, William 

Perry Award and Federal Times Vanguard Award for Executive of the Year. 

Prior to Senior Executive Service, Mr. Geurts began his career as an Air Force officer where he 

served as an acquisition program manager with engineering and program management leadership 

positions in numerous weapon systems including intercontinental ballistic missiles, surveillance 

platforms, tactical tighter aircraft, advanced avionics systems, stealth cruise missiles, training 

systems and manned and unmanned special operations aircraft. 

He has over 30 years of extensive joint acquisition experience and served in all levels of 

acquisition leadership positions including Acquisition Executive, Program Executive Officer and 

Program Manager of Major Defense Acquisition Programs. 

Mr. Geurts is a distinguished 1987 ROTC graduate from Lehigh University where he received a 

Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering. He holds a Master of Science in Electrical 

Engineering from Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB and in National 

Security Resourcing from Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, 

Washington, D.C. Mr. Geurts also attended executive leadership and international studies 

programs at Harvard Kennedy School and George Washington Elliot School. 

Updated: 19 December 2017 
59 

Lieutenant General RobertS. Walsh 

Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and Deputy 

Commandant, Combat Development and Integration 

Lieutenant General Walsh was commissioned a Second Lieutenant from the United States Naval 

Academy in May 1979. After completing The Basic School he was assigned as an infantry 

platoon commander in I st Battalion, 7th Marines. He reported to Pensacola, FL for flight 

training and was designated a Naval Aviator in October 1981. Upon completion of an 

assignment to VT-26 as a Selectively Retained Graduate and the F-4 training syllabus he was 

ordered to VMFA-115 at Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC in November 1983. 

While in VMFA-115 he transitioned to the F/A-18 Hornet, attended the U.S. Navy Fighter 

Weapons School, and made two deployments before assuming duties as a flight instructor at 

TOPGUN in 1987. He returned to MCAS Beaufort in January 1990 and was assigned to 

VMFA-251, making two WESTPAC deployments, and was selected as the I st Marine Aircraft 

Wing Aviator of the Year. 

In July 1993, he reported to the 9th Marine Regiment as the Air Ot1icer. He attended the Air 

Command and Staff College at Maxwell AFB before reporting to Headquarters, U.S. European 

Command, Stuttgart, Germany in 1995 where he served in the Plans and Policy Directorate. 

In 1998, he returned to MCAS Beaufort for a third tour in Marine Aircraft Group 31 where he 

served as the Commanding Officer ofVMFA-115 and deployed to both the European and 

Western Pacific Theaters. 

lie graduated from the National War College in Washington D.C. in June 2002 with a Masters of 

Science in National Security Strategy. From there he reported to Headquarters, U.S. Marine 

Corps, where he served in the Aviation Department. After his Branch head tour, Lieutenant 

General Walsh returned to MCAS Beaufort as the Commanding Otlicer of Marine Aircraft 

Group 31 from June 2004 to May 2006. 

Following command, he returned to Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, as the Assistant Deputy 

Commandant for Aviation. In May 2008, Lieutenant General Walsh became the Commanding 

General of the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing and deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom 09 as the 

Commanding General of the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward). In August 2010 he assumed 

the duties as the Director of Operations, United States Northern Command. In June 2012 he 

became the Deputy Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command. 

In July 2013, Lieutenant General Walsh assumed duties as Director, Expeditionary Warfare 

Division for the Chief of Naval Operations. In August 2015, Lieutenant General Walsh became 

the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command; Commander, Marine 

Corps Forces Strategic Command, and the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and 

Integration. 
60 

Vice Admiral William R. Merz 

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems (OPNA V N9) 

Vice Adm. Bill Merz is a native of San Diego. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 

1986 with a Bachelor of Science in Ocean Engineering and subsequently earned master's 

degrees from The Catholic University of America and the U.S. Naval War College. 

Merz qualified submarines on USS Haddo (SSN 604). He served as engineer officer on USS 

Boise (SSN 764) and as radiological controls officer on USS Proteus (AS 19). He commanded 

the deep sea vessel "Submarine NR-1 ", USS Memphis (SSN 691) and Submarine Development 

Squadron 12. 

His t1ag assignments included commander Task Force 77 and Naval Mine & Anti-Submarine 

Warfare Command in San Diego; commander, Task Force 54 in Bahrain; commander, Task 

Force 74 in Japan; and director, Undersea Warfare Division, Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations (l OPNAV] N97) in the Pentagon. Ashore, he conducted submarine design research in 

Carderock, Maryland, completed two tours in the Pentagon as a budget programmer on both the 

Navy and joint staffs, served as head of the Naval Reactors' "Line Locker" and as chiefofstaff 

for Commander, Submarine Forces Atlantic, Commander, Task Force 144. 

Merz currently serves as the deputy chief of naval operations for warfare systems (OPNAV N9) 

in the Pentagon. In this capacity, he is responsible for the integration of manpower, training, 

sustainment, modernization, research and development and procurement of the U.S. Navy 

warfare systems. 

He has completed nine overseas deployments in support of U.S., Joint and Coalition submarine 

operations in the Pacific Command, European Command, Central Command and Africa 

Command. The crews he served with collectively earned six unit awards, five Battle "E"s and 

the Atlantic Fleet's Battenberg Cup. 

Updated: 25 August 2017 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 6, 2018 

(63) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER 

Mr. HUNTER. Currently, we have 30 amphibious ships and the USMC requirement is 38. Would it be helpful to accelerate production of a large deck amphib ship 

in 2019? Along the same vein, the production line for the LPD is hot and if we wait 

until 2020 for continued production and skip a year of production, what would be 

the implications to the Marine Corps? 

Secretary GEURTS and Admiral MERZ. The President’s FY 2019 Budget (PB19) request reflects the Navy’s balanced approach to responsibly grow the size of the Fleet 

consistent with the National Defense Strategy and the Navy the Nation Needs. If 

additional funding was available within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), 

the Navy would evaluate our overarching shipbuilding requirements, including accelerating LHA 9 to a FY 2021 procurement, with advance procurement (AP) in FY 

2020. By accelerating LHA 9 to FY 2021 and procuring follow-on ships on four-year 

centers, the Navy could take advantage of the efficiencies and related cost avoidance 

inherent in maintaining an active and stable industrial base for the amphibious 

fleet, while mitigating the large deck amphibious ship capability gap in FY 2029. 

In comparison, accelerating LHA 9 to a FY 2019 procurement (or FY 2020 procurement with AP in FY 2019) provides for only marginal acceleration of LHA 9’s delivery date, while introducing inefficiencies that reduce the cost savings that would be 

achieved. The FY 2018 Omnibus Appropriations Act accelerates procurement of the 

LPD Flt II lead ship from FY 2020 to FY 2018. The lead LPD Flt II ship will deliver 

in time to replace LSD 43 prior to decommissioning and maintain the requirement 

for 13 LSD/LPD Flt II ships 

Mr. HUNTER. How does our Navy/Marine Corps team answer General Neller’s directive to prepare to ‘‘fight to get to the fight’’ in high-end littoral warfare? 

Secretary GEURTS, General WALSH, and Admiral MERZ. Within the 2018 National 

Defense Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance (NDS/DPG) framework, the Marine Corps will actively contribute to naval maritime security operations and enhance deployment and employment options for power projection. Tactically distributed, operationally synchronized, and strategically linked scalable Marine AirGround Task Forces (MAGTFs), will operate as contact and blunt forces, ranging 

in size from Special Operations Force and platoon sized detachments, company landing teams, task-sized Special Purpose MAGTFs, and Marine Expeditionary Units 

operating afloat and ashore. In support of Advance Naval Task Force operations— 

persistent, resilient, and versatile forward postured and engaged contact and blunt 

forces will retain the ability to aggregate and interoperate with other globally 

sourced force elements including Marine Expeditionary Brigades, Marine Expeditionary Forces, and other Naval Fleet-Level surge forces capable of conducting crisis/contingency operations, and assume expanded roles and tasks in order to enable 

freedom of action through simultaneous sea control/denial and power projection 

afloat or ashore. Additionally, our posture and pace of modernization must improve. 

Legacy warships, connectors, and associated platforms and vessels must be modernized and operationally sustained, as new platforms are designed and constructed 

with capabilities that improve global coverage, persistent and resilient forward presence, credible crisis/contingency response capability—all through an integrated C2 

network to ensure seabased forces are most ready to engage and succeed at the time 

and place of our choosing despite our adversary’s attempts to deny and defeat our 

actions. As stated by CNO, there are three ways America can increase naval power 

and provide the Navy the Nation Needs (NNN): ‘‘1) Increase number of platforms; 

2) Increase capability of each platform; and 3) Networked platforms.’’ Within the 

context of the NDS, DPG and the NNN, there are key actions critical to achieve an 

integrated and ‘‘balanced’’ next generation maritime expeditionary warfare capability. The Navy and Marine Corps are actively pursuing key capabilities and capacities that will achieve our strategic to tactical force objectives and tasks. Perhaps 

the most critical action is renewed investment in emerging technologies that will deliver the capabilities needed of amphibious forces for decades to come. Therefore, we 

must move forward in evolving and transitioning capabilities across USMC organizations, equipment, and training, thus increasing the agility and lethality of our 

MAGTFs, Naval Task Forces, and the Joint Force in support of global operations. 

Mr. HUNTER. Will there be funds to research and develop a truly amphibious vehicle that is armored and will be able to: 

1. Travel more than 200+ nmi at 40kt? 
64 

2. Carry in excess of 25 long tons or 30 troops? 

3. Fight in High-End Littoral Combat against enemy naval vessels as well as it 

does on land against an armored enemy? 

4. Organically produce 10 MW of electrical power for use in emergencies? 

5. Carry its own Material Handling Equipment (MHE) to move shipping containers off the beach to where they are needed inland? 

6. Reconfigure its payload to switch in minutes between an ambulance, mobile artillery platform, troop carrier, communications hub, AGM–176 missile platform or 

water purification station? 

Secretary GEURTS, General WALSH, and Admiral MERZ. The Office of Naval Research continues to fund research into meeting the challenges of high speed ship 

to shore movement. The specific challenges associated with building a vehicle that 

can meet all the requirements listed are well documented. HWS capabilities also 

continue to be studied by numerous agencies to include the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, naval warfare centers, research institutions, and foreign services. The Marine Corps remains highly interested in the results of this work and remains committed to the best solutions that are timely and affordable. Near term, we are 

searching for ‘‘bridge’’ capabilities such as modifications to current connectors, development of new connectors, and add-on materials that enable current and emerging 

vehicles such as ACV to move to shore faster and from greater distances. 

Mr. HUNTER. General, I would like to ask you about non-traditional ships like the 

Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB), Expeditionary Transfer Dock (ESD), and Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF)s. Can you briefly describe how the Marines are using 

these new ships in the CENTCOM AOR and some of the lessons learned, and are 

they a replacement for Amphibs? 

General WALSH. The competitive global demand for forward deployed MAGTFs exceeds our ability to sea base all of those forces on amphibious warships. In some 

instances we are forced to rely on shore-based MAGTFs that lack the advantages 

resident in shipborne formations. We have also used non-traditional ships from the 

Maritime Prepositioning Force and the auxiliary inventory to deploy Marines in 

support of theater security cooperation missions and other limited threat engagements. Select ‘‘non-traditional’’ platforms have been and are currently providing 

support to special and conventional force operations afloat with policy, doctrine and 

concepts in place. T–ESB 3 is assigned to 5th Fleet and has been tasked to compliment the forward deployed ARG/MEU, serving as an Afloat Forward Staging 

Base (AFSB) to support SOF and Marine Forces. We are learning this model has 

the potential to be duplicated in other geographic areas where combatant warships 

provide protection for the entire at-sea formation. T–ESB 4 recently delivered and 

is completing acceptance trials. T–ESB 5 is under construction Seven T–EPF’s are 

assigned around the globe to Geographic Combatant Commanders and are being 

used for point to point inter-theater lift and contact layer activities. We are gathering the information on operational usage and applying those lessons to enhance 

the capability of future vessels. The EPF in 5th Fleet also has been tasked to complement the forward deployed ARG/MEU. T–ESD 1 and 2 are assigned to the Maritime Prepositioning Force and are being used as at-sea piers in the PACOM area 

of operations supporting sea-based transfer of equipment and sustainment for movement ashore. No less than 38 amphibious warships are required to support high impact contingency response operations. To meet global demand we will continue to 

use both traditional (amphibious warships) and non-traditional (MPF/auxiliary) 

ships. Operational Platform Distinctions: The Navy and industry are building and 

delivering versatile, interoperable warfighting platforms capable of going into 

harm’s way while serving as the cornerstone of America’s ability to extend seapower 

ashore. The capability of these ships is prized by Geographic Combatant Commanders because they can do everything from delivering aid to supporting forcible 

entry. We should continue our investment in the readiness, maintenance and construction of these platforms while we examine best practices to leverage the employment of auxiliary ships- those not built to combatant standards, but capable of enabling distributed sea-based littoral operations. We will continue to investigate enhancement for auxiliary platforms to improve lethality, agility, and resilience. These 

purpose built platforms can better complement amphibious warfare ships with increased surface, vertical and digital interoperability. 

Mr. HUNTER. Currently, we have 30 amph ships and the USMC requirement is 

38. Would it be helpful to accelerate production of a large deck amph ship in 2019? 

Along the same vein, the production line for the LPD is hot and if we wait until 

2020 for continued production and skip a year of production, what would be the implications to the Marine Corps? 

General WALSH. Yes. Current Amphibious Warship Inventory is 32 (9 LH/11 LPD/ 

12 LSD) Congress has generously helped accelerate ship building with passage of 
65 

the Consolidated Appropriations Act. The procurement of LPD 30 will speed a much 

needed capability to the fleet and increase our battle force inventory. LPD 30 in 

FY18, plus the build profile for LPDs’ in the long range shipbuilding strategy, will 

ensure delivery of extremely capable multi-purpose ships to replace the aging LSD 

inventory. The Navy realizes to achieve today’s warfighting requirement in three 

decades, represents an unacceptable pace in the context of the current and predicted 

security environment. By setting the conditions for an enduring industrial base as 

a top priority, we are postured to aggressively respond to more investment in any 

year, which if received in all years could attain the needed naval battleforce target 

of 355 ships as early as the 2030s—balanced, credible and sustainable—by leveraging all available tools for growing the force. In conjunction with pursuing required 

long-term, predictable funding, and in concert with the Secretary of Navy’s business 

reform initiatives, the Navy continues to aggressively pursue acquisition strategies 

to build ships more quickly and more affordably. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. McEACHIN 

Mr. MCEACHIN. Should the equipment and systems on the Future Frigate be able 

to survive engagements in a contested environment? Should the Future Frigate also 

contain equipment and systems able to operate over a long life-cycle with minimal 

need for repair and replacement? And should critical components like the power distribution system be ‘‘hardened’’ in order to operate in a combat environment? 

Secretary GEURTS and Admiral MERZ. The Guided Missile Frigate (FFG(X)) will 

include improved radar, combat systems, weapons, launchers, communications systems and countermeasures, and added capability in the Electromagnetic Maneuver 

Warfare mission area. The FFG(X) will be a multi-mission ship capable of operating 

independently or with aggregated groups of naval forces in contested environments 

in support of Distributed Maritime Operations. It will have the ability to protect 

itself and other surface units with improved air defense capability and will include 

shockhardening and redundancy for survivability. FFG(X) will also be built with 

service life allowances to support life-cycle sensor and lethality upgrades. Because 

FFG(X) is expected to have a service life of 25 + years, the Navy is pursuing systems and equipment that reduce ship life-cycle cost. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. Hybrid Electric Drive systems have been integrated on various 

naval platforms, significantly decreasing fuel consumption while maintaining impressive operating ranges. Additionally, these hybrid drive systems are much quieter than conventional propulsion drives, resulting in a safer platform in contested 

waters. Could you please outline for the committee the benefits that would be 

achieved from including Hybrid Electric Drive propulsion on the Future Frigate Program as compared to current legacy propulsion technologies? 

Secretary GEURTS and Admiral MERZ. With the Conceptual Design phase of the 

Frigate program in progress and a Detail Design and Construction competition 

planned for award in FY20, it would be inappropriate for the Navy to comment on 

advantages or disadvantages of systems that may be included in current proposals 

submitted by industry. The Navy is considering offeror designs that will meet the 

established requirements to include those with Hybrid Electric Drives. The Navy is 

however, evaluating Hybrid Electric Drive (HED) on an Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer (USS TRUXTON), to assess the viability in an operational environment in 

order to inform the Navy’s longer term commitment. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. Should the equipment and systems on the Future Frigate be able 

to survive engagements in a contested environment? Should the Future Frigate also 

contain equipment and systems able to operate over a long life-cycle with minimal 

need for repair and replacement? And should critical components like the power distribution system be ‘‘hardened’’ in order to operate in a combat environment? 

General WALSH. I defer to the Navy as the Future Frigate is their program. 

Mr. MCEACHIN. Hybrid Electric Drive systems have been integrated on various 

naval platforms, significantly decreasing fuel consumption while maintaining impressive operating ranges. Additionally, these hybrid drive systems are much quieter than conventional propulsion drives, resulting in a safer platform in contested 

waters. Could you please outline for the committee the benefits that would be 

achieved from including Hybrid Electric Drive propulsion on the Future Frigate Program as compared to current legacy propulsion technologies? 

General WALSH. I defer to the Navy as the Future Frigate is their program. 

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