DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2009 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE 

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

ROBERT E. ‘‘BUD’’ CRAMER, JR., Alabama 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

PAUL JUOLA, GREG LANKLER, SARAH YOUNG, PAUL TERRY, KRIS MALLARD, LINDA PAGELSEN, 

ADAM HARRIS, ANN REESE, TIM PRINCE, BROOKE BOYER, MATT WASHINGTON, B G WRIGHT, 

CHRIS WHITE, CELES HUGHES, and ADRIENNE RAMSAY, Staff Assistants 

SHERRY L. YOUNG, Administrative Aide 

PART 4 

Page 

Army Posture ............................................................................ 1 

Army Acquisition Programs ................................................. 99 

Navy Posture ............................................................................ 145 

Navy / Marine Corps Acquisition Programs ...................... 279 

Biological Countermeasures and Threats ......................... 325 

Statements for the Record .................................................... 439 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with HEARING
PART 4—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2009 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with HEARING
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2009 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE 

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

ROBERT E. ‘‘BUD’’ CRAMER, JR., Alabama 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

PAUL JUOLA, GREG LANKLER, SARAH YOUNG, PAUL TERRY, KRIS MALLARD, LINDA PAGELSEN, 

ADAM HARRIS, ANN REESE, TIM PRINCE, BROOKE BOYER, MATT WASHINGTON, B G WRIGHT, 

CHRIS WHITE, CELES HUGHES, and ADRIENNE RAMSAY, Staff Assistants 

SHERRY L. YOUNG, Administrative Aide 

PART 4 

Page 

Army Posture ............................................................................ 1 

Army Acquisition Programs ................................................. 99 

Navy Posture ............................................................................ 145 

Navy / Marine Corps Acquisition Programs ...................... 279 

Biological Countermeasures and Threats ......................... 325 

Statements for the Record .................................................... 439 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

46–476 WASHINGTON : 2009 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with HEARING
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin, Chairman 

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

JOSE ́ E. SERRANO, New York 

ROSA L. DELAURO, Connecticut 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts 

ED PASTOR, Arizona 

DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina 

CHET EDWARDS, Texas 

ROBERT E. ‘‘BUD’’ CRAMER, JR., Alabama 

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California 

SAM FARR, California 

JESSE L. JACKSON, JR., Illinois 

CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

ADAM SCHIFF, California 

MICHAEL HONDA, California 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas 

JERRY LEWIS, California 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

RALPH REGULA, Ohio 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia 

JAMES T. WALSH, New York 

DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio 

JOE KNOLLENBERG, Michigan 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

ZACH WAMP, Tennessee 

TOM LATHAM, Iowa 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

JOHN E. PETERSON, Pennsylvania 

VIRGIL H. GOODE, JR., Virginia 

RAY LAHOOD, Illinois 

DAVE WELDON, Florida 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas 

MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois 

ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida 

DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 

KEN CALVERT, California 

JO BONNER, Alabama 

ROB NABORS, Clerk and Staff Director 

(II)


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with HEARING
(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2009 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 2008. 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 ARMY POSTURE 

WITNESSES 

HON. PETE GEREN, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 

GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES 

ARMY 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. We will come to order. This is another open hearing that we have had in a series of open hearings that we have had 

this year. I just want everybody to know that. I don’t know who 

the hell is running the Pentagon, because you have got them all 

over here, for crying out loud. And General Melcher—— 

General CASEY. They don’t let us out alone, Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. And General Melcher, who has spies every place. 

He doesn’t miss a trick. Anything that happens, he knows and he 

has cause to make sure that we know that he has been around, 

that he understands what is going on. But we want to welcome 

Secretary Geren, former Member of Congress, who does such a 

good job as Secretary of the Army, and General Casey, one of our 

premiere commanders in the history of the Army. We welcome you 

to the Committee and look forward to your testimony. Mr. Young. 

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I do have a very long opening statement, but I am going to just say welcome to our distinguished witnesses today. But I would like to explain, Mr. Chairman, the fact 

that there are many hearings taking place and most of our members on this subcommittee are senior members, meaning they are 

either chairman or ranking member on other subcommittees that 

are meeting today. So at least for a while, you are going to have 

to put up with just a few of us. But welcome. We look forward to 

your testimony. 

Secretary GEREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congressman 

Young. We have a full statement that we have submitted for the 

record and I would like to just offer some summary comments. 

Mr. MURTHA. Without objection. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—The Fiscal Year 2009 Army Posture Statement 

for the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army 

is printed at the end of this hearing.] 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
2 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF SECRETARY GEREN

Secretary GEREN. It is an honor for General Casey and me to appear before you and talk about our Nation’s Army. It is an Army 

that has been built by partnership between the Army and this Congress and it is a partnership that is older than this country and 

a partnership that is affirmed by our Constitution. The President’s 

budget for 2009 is before the Congress, $141 billion for the Army. 

As is always the case, the Army budget is mostly about people and 

operations and maintenance to support people. Our 2009 budget, 

two-thirds of it, our personnel, operations and maintenance to support those people. 

Creighton Abrams told us people aren’t in the Army, people are 

the Army. And this budget reflects that reality. Today, we are an 

Army long at war. We are in our 7th year in Afghanistan, and 

shortly we will have been 5 years in Iraq. It is the third longest 

war in American history, behind the Revolutionary War and the 

Vietnam War, and it is the longest war we have ever fought with 

an all volunteer force. 

Our Army is stretched by the demands of this long war, but it 

remains an extraordinary Army. It is the best led, best trained and 

best equipped Army we have ever put in the field with Army families standing tall with their soldier loved ones, soldiers that re-enlist and families that re-enlist with them, an Army of volunteers, 

volunteer soldiers and volunteer families. 

SOLDIERS DEPLOYED

Mr. Chairman, we have 250,000 soldiers deployed to 80 countries 

around the world as we sit here today with over 140,000 deployed 

to Iraq and Afghanistan. And our 140,000 in harm’s way are our 

top priority. We never take our eye off of that ball, and this budget 

and our supplementals ensure that we provide those soldiers what 

they need when they need it. And today and over the last 6 years, 

our reserve component, our Guard and Reserves, continue to carry 

a very heavy burden for our nation. Since 9/11 we have activated 

184,000 reservists and 268,000 guardsmen in support of the global 

war on terror, and they have answered the call to respond to domestic crises here at home time and again. 

ARMY FAMILIES

And as you well know, we are one Army today. The active component cannot go to war without the National Guard and Reserve. 

And the challenge before us is to continue the transformation of 

the Reserve component into an operational reserve and this budget 

helps further that goal. And the strength of our Army, Active 

Guard and Reserves comes from the strength of Army families. Our 

Army families are standing with their soldier loved ones, and we 

owe them a quality of life that is equal to the quality of their service. 

Over half of our soldiers today are married. The other day when 

we testified in front of Senator Inouye’s Committee, he said the 

unit he was in in World War II, 4 percent married, 96 percent single. Today, over half are married. It is a very different Army. When 

a married soldier deploys, he or she leaves behind a single parent 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
3 

household and all the challenges of that family dynamic. When a 

single parent deploys, he or she leaves a child in the care of others. 

And today nearly half, 48 percent of all of our soldiers who deploy 

have a child age 2 or younger. 

FAMILY PROGRAMS

In the 2009 budget, we are doubling funding for family programs. 

We are adding 26 new child-development centers to the 35 that 

Congress gave us last year, thanks to the leadership of this Committee. And over the past year, with your strong support, we have 

expanded the availability and reduced the cost of child care for 

Army families. We have asked much of volunteer spouses who 

carry the burden of family support programs. And that burden 

grows heavier with each deployment. 

With this budget we provide them help and full-time support in 

family readiness support systems and other full-time support for 

those spouses. In late 1990s, Congress launched the privatized 

housing initiative, something that the military didn’t embrace fully. 

Congress led the way and today that is one of the most successful 

initiatives we have in the Army, providing quality of life for our 

soldiers. We have replaced housing with homes and housing with 

great neighborhoods in the residential communities initiative. 

MEDICAL PROGRAMS

In 2008, you gave us resources to hire needed medical personnel 

and to do research in the signature wounds of this war, TBI and 

PTSD. And we have stood up 35 warrior transition units around 

the country to serve our wounded, ill and injured. And we continue 

to make progress on that front. And we will continue to grow our 

knowledge and prove our care for those that have mental challenges that come from the wounds of this war. 

ACQUISITION

In our budget, we also look to the future. We never want to send 

our soldiers to a fair fight and the budget continues our investment 

in the programs of tomorrow, future combat systems which will not 

only shape the future of our Army, but it is spinning out technologies in today’s fight. The Army reconnaissance helicopters, the 

UAVs, light utility helicopter and the joint cargo aircraft, we thank 

you all for your support in the past. It is an important part of the 

future of this Army. 

Mr. Chairman, we are a Nation long at war and we are an Army 

out of balance. But our Army remains strong, it remains resilient. 

Those who look to find the hollow Army that we experienced in the 

1970s will not find it in this Army. Every year, 170,000 men and 

women join our Army. Every year 120,000 proudly re-enlist. They 

are proud of who they are and they are proud of what they are 

doing. Mr. Chairman, members of this Committee, thank you for 

your support of those soldiers in uniform and the support of those 

families. With the partnership we have with this committee and 

with this Congress, we are a strong Army. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
4 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL CASEY

General CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congressman Young, 

members of the Committee, it is my first appearance before this 

Committee as the chief of staff. So I welcome the opportunity to 

provide some context for the 2009 budget. I do have a long opening 

statement, but I really would just like to leave five points with you 

here. Let me just hit those five points and I will say a few words 

about each one. 

ARMY BALANCE

First of all, as we think through this 2009 budget and the 

supplementals that accompany it, we have to do so with an eye on 

the futuristic strategic environment, which I see as one of persistent conflict and one in which uncertainty is the only certainty. 

Second, I worked hard to define the right words to describe the 

Army. And what I will tell you, today’s Army is out of balance and 

out of balance is not broken or hollow. The Army is an extremely 

resilient, competent, professional combat-seasoned force. But we all 

know that we can’t do the things that we know we need to do right 

now. 

Third, we have a plan, which with your help can put the Army 

back in balance over the next 3 or 4 years. And it is centered on 

4 imperatives. Sustain, repair, reset and transform. And I will talk 

about those in a second. Fourth, as we work to put the Army back 

in balance, we cannot take our eye off the future. And to ensure 

that we have a versatile, agile, campaign capable Army to deal 

with the uncertainties of the future environment. 

PERSISTANT CONFLICT

And lastly, I just want to make sure everyone understands that 

the Army is not standing still and we are moving out on the most 

ambitious transformation program all the while that we are fighting today’s battles and I will give you a little status report on 

where we have come over the last few years. So let me just say a 

few words about each of those. First of all, as I said, I see the future as one of persistent conflict. And I define persistent conflict as 

a period of protracted confrontation among State, nonstate and individual actors who are increasingly willing to use violence to accomplish their political and ideological objectives. And against that 

background, the global trends that I see are pushing things in the 

wrong direction. I think it is going to exacerbate and prolong that 

period of confrontation. What am I talking about? Globalization. 

Globalization is going to have positive and negative effects, clearly 

it is enhancing the quality of life all over the world, but the distribution of those effects are uneven and if you look south of the 

equator, primarily and South America, Africa, Middle East, South 

Asia, Southeast Asia. What you see are the beginnings of a have 

and have not culture that can be exploited by the different terrorist 

groups. Technology is another double edged sword. The same technology that is bringing knowledge to anyone with a computer and 

hookup is being used by terrorists it export terror around the globe. 

Demographics, some of the populations of these developing countries where the terrorist groups have their roots are expected to 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
5 

double in the next couple of decades. And the two that concern me 

most, weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorist and 

safe havens where they can plan and export with impunity because 

local governments can’t or won’t take care of them. 

ARMY BALANCE

So as I said, against that backdrop, I see a future where the only 

certainty is uncertainty. Second, we are out of balance. And what 

do I mean by that? We are consumed by the current and we are 

deploying to support the current conflict in a way that is just not 

sustainable for us over the long term. And we need to continue to 

work to do that. And as a result, we can’t do other things as rapidly as we would like. Our soldiers and family support systems are 

being strained, our Guard and Reserve are performing magnificently, but in a way that they were neither designed or resourced 

for. 

So we have a lot of work to do to put ourselves back in balance, 

and that is my third point. Sustain, prepare, reset and transform, 

our four imperatives. Sustain, we must support and sustain our 

soldiers and families. They are the heart and soul of this Army. 

And they are our ultimate asymmetric advantage over any enemy 

that we face and we must continue to support and retain them so 

this force can remain as viable as it is in the future. Prepare. We 

cannot back off our commitment to send soldiers into combat with 

the best equipment, training and manning. And we are absolutely 

committed to working with you to do that we have made great 

strides in this regard thanks to your help, but we cannot slack off 

for a minute on that. 

RESET

Third is reset and reset applies to both our soldiers and to our 

equipment. And reset is another area with your help we can make 

great strides. $17 billion in the 2007 supplemental reserved the 

downward spiral we are in. But we need to continue to reinvest in 

our reset if we are going to sustain a versatile force for the future. 

In my view, the money that you are giving us for reset is the difference between a hollow force and a versatile force for the future. 

TRANSFORMATION

And lastly, transform. And as I said, we can’t take our eye off 

the future and our transformation is a holistic effort. We need to 

transform how we train, fight, modernize, and support our soldiers 

and families. We are looking broadly across the Army at transforming ourselves and all those efforts. Number four, I said you 

can’t take your eye off the future, and we have recently published 

a new capstone doctrinal manual, Field Manual 3 (FM–3), Operations. And it is the first major doctrinal publication since September 11th, and it is designed to put us on a track to take advantage of the lessons that we have learned in the last 7 years at war 

and to build the type of Army we are going to need for the future. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
6 

STABILITY OPERATIONS

A couple of points in this. It describes the future security environment that I talked to you about briefly in my opening statement. Most importantly, I think it raises stability operations to the 

level of offense and defense. And there is—it is designed around an 

operational concept that says Army formations will simultaneously 

apply offense, defense and stability operations to seize the initiative and achieve decisive results, it is a big step for us. 

Third, it elevates the commander’s role in battle command and 

in solving the complex security problems we are going to face in the 

21st century. Fourth, it elevates information operations and recognizes the importance of information in winning 21st century wars. 

MODULAR CONVERSION

And lastly, it reinforces that despite all this futuristic talk and 

discussion, the soldier remains the centerpiece of our formations. 

And lastly, just on my fifth point, we are not standing still. I know 

you have been—we have been talking to you over the past several 

years about what we are doing with modular organizations. We are 

70 percent of the way through modular conversions. That is the 

largest organizational transformation of the Army since World War 

II. We are about 60 percent of the way through what we call rebalancing, taking soldiers who had cold war skills that weren’t as necessary as some of the skills we need for the 21st century and converting them. 

GROW THE ARMY

So that process has gone forward. We have accelerated the 

growth of the Army that you see in this year’s budget from fiscal 

year 2012 to fiscal year 2010. We have reset over 120,000 pieces 

of equipment. Our Army medical action plan and soldier and family 

action plan are greatly increasing what we are doing for our 

wounded warriors and our families. And our depots, your depots 

have been recognized by industry with 12 shingo awards for effectiveness and efficiency. 

SERGEANT GREG WILLIAMS

So, yes, the Army is stretched. Yes, we are deploying at 

unsustainable rates. But, yes, we are also not standing still, but 

moving forward with your help. And I will close, Mr. Chairman, 

with the story about the quality of the soldiers that I see around 

our Army. I was in Alaska before Christmas, and I was asked to 

present a distinguished service cross to Sergeant Greg Williams. 

Sergeant Williams was on a patrol in Baghdad in October 12, 2006 

with his squad. They were ambushed from three directions, and the 

ambush was kicked off by four explosively-formed penetrators all 

aimed at this one vehicle. The blast knocked him out. It set the vehicle on fire. He woke up with a broken eardrum, his legs were on 

fire. He put his fire out. He grabbed the aid bag, ran off the track, 

began treating his fellow soldiers. He realized the lieutenant was 

still in the burning vehicle. 

He ran back on the burning vehicle, grabbed the lieutenant, 

dragged him to safety and began treating him. He recognized that 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
7 

because they were still taking fire no one was on the 50 caliber machine gun on the Stryker. He ran back in the burning vehicle, 

which, by the way, contained about 30 pounds of TNT, and explosive detonating cord, got on the 50 caliber machine gun, brought 

it to bear on the enemy and broke the ambush. 

That is the kind of soldier that we have in today’s Army. They 

are men and women that you can all be proud of. So I would just 

say that I thank you for your support and what you have done for 

the Army here over the past several years. We are on our way to 

putting ourselves back in balance. This 2009 budget, the rest of the 

2008 supplemental and the 2009 supplemental that will accompany 

it, will take further steps on a continuous road to progress. Mr. 

Chairman, thanks very much. 

TIMELY FUNDING

Mr. MURTHA. When Mr. Young was chairman, we put a lot of 

money into reset because we knew there was an immediate problem. We realized it was absolutely essential to get the equipment 

rehabilitated and we got it out as quickly as we could. We are trying to convince our leadership to get the supplemental—this supplemental out sooner rather than later and I think they are amenable to that. It is just a matter of timing and getting the—other 

than the defense part of the supplemental ready. 

FIFTEEN-MONTH TOURS

The thing I worry about the most, the thing that—Mr. Young 

and I go to the hospitals all the time. I saw four young soldiers yesterday, one woman who was a gunner, and she couldn’t stand up 

because she had a head injury, but she was very enthusiastic. 

Three others, one had lost a leg, one was in a wheelchair and the 

other was with them. But I am inspired by them. Every time I go 

to the hospital, I am inspired by their ability to overcome all the 

difficulties they put up with in combat. But this 15-month tour, 

this morning I had breakfast with a group of people, this fellow 

said he lost his son on a 15-month deployment. The 15th month he 

lost his son. But he was upbeat about it. He said his son was a 

PFC and he was a hero to him. And I think that is the way most 

of the families feel, that these young folks who are doing their 

work, it takes a lot of courage and dedication and it is inspiring 

to me to see them. But also I saw a woman in the hallway not long 

ago. She stopped me. Her husband is in the Army and she had a 

son in the Army that was killed in Iraq, and she had a son in the 

Army who committed suicide. These 15-month deployments are too 

long. General, when can we see that being reduced? When can we 

see it is so hard on the family, so that this extra 3 months, what 

is your goal in these deployments? 

General CASEY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. We recognize this, and 

in fact, we have sent a team under a brigadier general to visit each 

of the brigade units deploying from 15 months. They tell us three 

things, just as you said, 15 months is too long, 12 months home is 

too short and you need to show us a little daylight here about how 

this is going to get better over time. 

So our goal is that when the force levels in Iraq get down to 15 

brigade combat teams in July as is programmed, we at that time 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
8 

will be able to shift back to 12-month tours. And I fully expect that 

we will be able to accomplish that. The next thing we have to do 

is increase our dwell time at home and that will increase as we 

continue to grow this force over the next several years. 

MILITARY FUNDING

Mr. MURTHA. One of the things that I have stressed, and I have 

talked to both of you privately about this, as this war winds down, 

whoever is elected President, there is going to be less money available for the military because the public is demanding that—there 

is more money spent on infrastructure, we have bridges that are 

deficient, all of these problems that domestically are going to be 

competing with the military. So I think we have to speed up the 

program that we are talking about for the future of—any of the 

systems as you are working on them. We think last year we started 

changing direction of some of the programs like the Navy, we put 

a few more ships in. We will put more ships in this year. We are 

looking at trying to get this thing moving as quickly as we can before the money runs out. 

So I think it is imperative that you keep looking, you keep studying what we can offset some of these things with. And I hope you 

would come forward to the Committee before we pass our base bill. 

And we intend to offer the supplemental with the base bill this 

year. So I am hopeful that—the 2009 bill I am talking about. We 

are hopeful that you will give us some suggestions before May 

when we mark up the bill, at least that is when I anticipate marking up the bill. I don’t know if we will get a bill this year. I don’t 

know if the bill will be signed into law this year. 

Just because of the political situation, the new President going 

to be elected and so forth. So we are going to do everything we can 

to get it passed. A continuing resolution is the worst thing we could 

do because it just completely ties our hands in doing anything that 

is visionary and focuses on the future. But I would predict it is 

going to be very hard to pass legislation—not only domestic legislation, but a defense bill this year. But we are going to go forward. 

We are going to get it over to the other body and do the best we 

can in this Committee. But my advice is think about what you said, 

the future, but think about what we can do to readjust the requirements and recommendations you are making so we get an opportunity to digest them before we mark up our bill. 

General CASEY. We will do that. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Young. 

ARMY BUDGET REQUEST

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. General 

Casey, your comments on the Army being unbalanced and we are 

needing to fix this by 2011 is very timely. Chairman Murtha and 

I have been talking about this for months, the fact that we need 

to look ahead and we need to be able to rebuild whatever—rebuild, 

reset, recapitalize, whatever, or rebalance our military after we are 

basically finished with Iraq and Afghanistan. But you talk about 

a $265 billion a year to accomplish this. How did you arrive at the 

$265 billion? What would you do with that $265 billion? 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
9 

General CASEY. I am not familiar with the $265 billion number, 

Congressman. It is not a number that I have used. If you look at 

what our base program is and the supplementals that accompany 

that base program over the last year or so, it basically comes out 

to about the number that you just mentioned. And that is just a 

fact. To fight the war and to continue to sustain the force over time 

and to prepare for the future, that is about what it takes. 

Now, I think you know in the supplementals, about 70 percent 

of the supplemental is spent in the theater on people and operations. And so that part of that $265 is really the cost of the war. 

The other 30 percent of that is reset and procurement for things 

like force protection and MRAPs and those kinds of things. So that 

number you mentioned is about the number that is based on supplemental that we need here over the next several years to fight 

the war and to continue to prepare for the future. 

RESET AND GROWTH

Mr. YOUNG. Do you have an indication of how much of that is 

for replacing or resetting equipment? How much it of is growth and 

the end strength of the Army? Do you have a breakdown for that? 

General CASEY. I can tell you that these numbers I am going to 

give you are spread over a period of time. But we started off before 

our modular conversions here with about $56 billion—my predecessor Pete Schoomaker used to call them holes in the yard. And 

the modular conversions, which converted our brigade combat 

teams and our brigades to the types of organizations we need in 

the 21st century, and also to sustain the war effort added about— 

again, this is over 5 or 6 years—$100 billion or so of equipment requirements. 

And by and large, we have funded the bulk of that through base 

and supplemental funding, primarily base funding, over the last 

several years. I mean, this really started in 2004. So we are making progress in the direction that we need to be going. It is just 

going to take us a few more years to finish it up. 

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES

Mr. YOUNG. I understand it is not going to be done overnight, 

and we are talking about a major rebalancing. When you mentioned MRAPs, General—and just a short time ago we were pushing really hard to get as many MRAPs as we could into the theater 

and we appropriated a lot of money for MRAPs and then the Marines recently came out with a position statement announcing they 

were going to reduce their MRAP requirement by about 40 percent. 

Does the Army have a similar—I think General Odierno was 

quoted in a USA Today story, said the Army’s requirement for 

10,000 MRAPs would probably drop. Is that accurate? 

Secretary GEREN. Right now we are funded for 10,000 MRAPs. 

Our estimate right now, we have a range that we will need will be 

somewhere between 10 and 15,000. The JROC just recently approved 12,000 for the Army. We are still fine tuning the final number. But we are not going to drop below where we are now. The 

theater is looking at what the proper ratio—I think initially there 

was a thought that we would replace all up-armored HUMVEEs 

with MRAPs. A year ago General Odierno talked about replacing 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
10 

all 19,000 or 17,000 at the time with MRAPs. I think what we have 

learned since then is that there remains a role for the up-armored 

HUMVEE. It is lighter, it offers some tactical advantages over the 

MRAP in certain situations. 

So we are still trying to work out what the proper ratio is. Is it 

two-thirds MRAP, one-third up-armored HUMVEEs? But we are 

going to have in theater by the end of the year about 10,000 and 

by early February we will have another 1,500. The MRAPs have 

performed very well. We have had 48 MRAPs that have been hit 

with IEDs or EFPs. We have only had one KIA as a result. So they 

are an important part of the Army presence in Iraq and we are 

going to be moving the RG–31s into Afghanistan. And as we look 

to the future, we are trying to assess what the role is long term. 

But the Army will not drop below the 10,000 that we already have 

programmed, and we will likely go above that probably closer to 12. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I appreciate the information you gave on the 

success of the MRAP. And it is still, as you said, of the 48 IEDs 

or roadside bombs, only one casualty, which is a pretty good record. 

Secretary GEREN. And the soldier that was killed was actually on 

top—he was a gunner. So we have not lost a single soldier that actually was in the protection of the MRAP body itself. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, that is a good news story. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Young and I are going to have to go vote. We 

have less than a minute left. So, Mr. Moran. 

ADMIRAL FALLON STATEMENT

Mr. MORAN. It’s just a motion to adjourn that we are going to 

have all day long, Mr. Chairman. That is all it is. It is just a motion to adjourn. You just called on me, right? General Casey, Admiral Fallon was just forced to resign. He was head of the U.S. Central Command. So I got a copy of the quote that led to that resignation. He said that—and I am quoting—this constant drumbeat of 

conflict with Iran is not helpful and not useful. 

I expect that there will be no war and that is what we ought to 

be working for. We ought to try to do our utmost to create different 

conditions. ‘‘What America needs,’’ Fallon said, ‘‘is a combination of 

strength and willingness to engage.’’ Do you agree with Admiral 

Fallon? 

General CASEY. Of course, Congressman, I have known Admiral 

Fallon and his wife, Mary, for years. 

Mr. MORAN. I know that. That is why I asked. 

General CASEY. He really worked hard to do what is right for 

this country. 

Mr. MORAN. He is a great American. 

General CASEY. He is a great American. And both he and his 

wife Mary have given a lot to this country. Now, you are asking 

me if I agree with the statement that you just read. I mean, that 

is very much in the policy realm, far beyond my current job as the 

Chief Staff of the Army. 

Mr. MORAN. You know, Admiral Fallon and you are four-star 

generals and it doesn’t seem to me this is all that controversial a 

statement, frankly. It should be consistent with American foreign 

policy as well as our military policy which ought to be integrated, 

I think. But I was interested to see how you would respond. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
11 

IRAN

General CASEY. Well, I would give you my personal view here 

since you have asked for it on our dealings with Iran and I will say 

first Iran is clearly being unhelpful in our efforts in Iraq and they 

are supporting sectarian groups who are using equipment supplied 

by Iran to target our soldiers. And I have a problem with that. 

Now, that said, we need to continue our efforts to get them to stop 

doing that, and I do believe, as I think your quote said, it will take 

both primarily diplomatic, but also strength on our part to ensure 

that they stop undermining our efforts there and providing material that is killing our soldiers. 

OUTSOURCING REPORT

Mr. MORAN. But our mission vis-a-vis Iran is primarily a diplomatic one at this point more than a working toward any kind of 

military confrontation. But I don’t want to put words in your 

mouth and I understand you have that statement now on the 

record. I appreciate that, General. General, this subcommittee has 

been beside itself because of the outsourcing of much of this conflict 

in Iraq, it is nice to see you, Mr. Secretary. It is nice to have a 

friend, a Secretary of the Army. But that doesn’t mean I am going 

to be any lighter on you, of course, as you would expect. We have 

determined not only because we have basically been badgering the 

witnesses now for 3 years, that there are about 140,000 contractors 

in Iraq. About the same number of uniform personnel. 

Now, you were required—the DoD is required to come up with 

an interim report that is due this year in October. That has to provide us with the number of contracts, the number of contractor personnel, the dollar value of contracts, the use of competitive procedures, the number of contractors providing security services and a 

number of areas of significant concern. Have you put in place a 

structure for—to acquire that information that you can give it to 

us in an understandable fashion? 

Secretary GEREN. We have devoted a great deal of time over the 

last several months focusing on the whole contractor issue in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. And our latest estimate on the number of contractors in Iraq actually is considerably up over the number that 

you quoted. We have around 190,000 contractors. 

Mr. MORAN. You have 190,000. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to 

underscore that there are now 190,000 contractors in Iraq. Thank 

you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me ask you. Would you break that down—is 

that worldwide 190,000 or just in Iraq. 

Secretary GEREN. That is Iraq. 

Mr. MORAN. It is almost twice the numbers we had last year. 

Secretary GEREN. I believe that is Iraq alone, but it may include 

Afghanistan, which is a much smaller number. 

Mr. MURTHA. Please break it down for the record because the 

contractors cost a lot more per individual. So the Committee 

needs—I cut back on contracting money last year and the Senate 

wouldn’t go along as much as I wanted to—at least the Committee 

recommended to the Senate. So this really worries me that we are 

doing so much with contractors and I would like to know generally 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
12 

what—specifically what we are doing? In other words, some categories of how they are working. I understand food services, I understand some of these different areas, but break it down for us. 

You are talking about more contractors than you are talking about 

troops on the ground. 

Secretary GEREN. We do. And we will break it out for you. Many 

of them are in troop support, they are food service, laundry, transportation and many of the basic support services that before we 

downsized the military as much as we did in the 1990s many of 

those functions we kept in house, but now we do contract them out. 

Many of those are lower paid contract employees in the food service 

industry. Some are high paid. The security contractors tend to be 

higher paid. But when you are comparing the cost of the contractor 

to a soldier, those contractors obviously are employed for a limited 

term. They don’t have the full range of benefits of a soldier, nor do 

they have the extended employment. But Dr. Gansler did—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Secretary, draftees are employed for a limited 

amount of time also. 

Mr. MORAN. And they don’t get paid a lot either. 

Mr. MURTHA. They don’t get paid near as much. I think we really 

need to get our handle on this contracting thing because we get the 

impression there are less troops but then we are increasing the 

number of contractors which is why I need to see the categories to. 

Secretary GEREN. I will provide that to you, as well as third 

party nationals and how many Iraqi nationals, we will provide that 

full information. 

Mr. MURTHA. Also, are these sole source contracts? We need to 

see how many times we have competed and who were competing— 

who were competing for the contracts. 

[The information follows:] 

There are approximately 163,591 Department of Defense contractor personnel in 

Iraq and 36,520 in Afghanistan for a total of 200,111. The services being provided 

in support of our mission in Iraq and Afghanistan include the following categories: 

base support (43 percent), construction (28 percent), security (7 percent), transportation (4 percent), communication support (4 percent), translator/interpreter (5 percent), and others (9 percent). 

In fiscal year 2007, the Joint Contracting Command—Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC–I/A) 

executed 2,477 contract actions (which included the issuance of task and delivery 

orders, purchase orders, modifications, and contract awards) totaling $7.5 billion. Of 

the total contract actions 2,269, or 92 percent, were competed using full and open 

competition for a total of $7.3 billion. A total of 208 contract actions, or 8 percent, 

were not competed, totaling $157 million. Of those 208 contract actions, 32 were 

based on ‘‘only one responsible source’’ authority, and 104 cited the ‘‘unusual and 

compelling urgency’’ exception to full and open competition which is used when the 

agency’s need for the supplies or services is of such an ‘‘unusual and compelling urgency’’ that the Government would be seriously injured, unless the agency is permitted to limit the number of sources. 

RECYCLED WATER

Mr. MORAN. That means we have got about 350,000, about a 

third of a million Americans there in Iraq. And oftentimes, they 

don’t distinguish the difference between a contractor and a uniform 

person who is acting under orders and conducting themselves with 

discipline. I want to ask you about the fact that Kellogg Brown & 

Root/Halliburton has been providing our soldiers with recycled 

sewer water and it has caused disease according to investigations 

that have been conducted. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
13 

Do you have an ability either of you, General and Mr. Secretary, 

to call those people before you and dress them down? Tell them 

that this is unacceptable, that we don’t pay for sewer water that 

is going to cause disease among our soldiers? Do you have any way 

of holding these guys accountable? 

Secretary GEREN. We do. And the report that you referred to was 

done by the Department of Defense. That matter has been corrected. That was back in 2004, unacceptable. They understand that 

and we rarely check the quality of the water. One of the things we 

have learned over the last year is we were not where we needed 

to be as far as providing contract oversight. 

As a result of the task force we started last summer, we have 

hired a considerable number of additional contract officer representatives to manage these contracts, make sure we are getting 

what we ask for. We are doing a better job of supervising all of the 

contract operations in theater, got more personnel, more oversight 

and more accountability. 

DINING FACILITIES

Mr. MORAN. Well, let me ask you because, you know, I know it 

may seem to be a small matter. But the Army requested more than 

a billion dollars and then another billion dollars, $987 million. So 

basically, $2 billion in supplemental funds for subsistence for DoD 

civilians in the global war on terrorism. Ice, food and water for authorized DoD civilians and contractors. Now, they eat in DoD facilities. A reasonable estimate would be that the per person cost is 

$14,000 per person to eat in DoD mess facilities. 

Now, I think it might be useful to find out how many civilians 

are fed in Army messes in Iraq. Does the Army track who is eating 

in these mess halls? Do we track the contractors that are eating 

there, or do we charge back the cost of the food that they consume? 

You know, when you are talking about almost 200,000 people, 

these kinds of things become pretty darn expensive. And I think— 

I was told by somebody that had just got back from Iraq, and in 

fact, I saw some of this, we were—there was a long line in the 

morning when we were going into the green zone. 

And then I saw other people coming around the line and going 

in another entry gate who looked like civilians. You couldn’t distinguish them and I asked who are those people who don’t have to 

wait in this long line? And they said, oh, they are from Halliburton. 

They run the place. So they don’t have to, you know—they take 

that for granted, that nobody is going to delay them and they take 

for granted that they can eat in the Army mess and they can use 

these other amenities and we are paying for it, and then paying 

them through the nose for the contract services that they are supposed to be providing. 

We only find out after the fact, maybe 3 years after the fact the 

kind of service, the quality of services or lack of quality that they 

are actually providing. Do you have any way of accounting how this 

money is being used or how many of them are using Army messes 

and do you charge back to the contract for that cost? 

Secretary GEREN. Let me get you the detailed information on the 

mess hall issue. We have looked into that in great detail over the 

last couple of years and I will provide that for the record. Let me 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
14 

just real quickly make one other correction. I am afraid I misunderstood. Most of those contract employees we talk about are not 

American nationals. And so it is close to half are from the region. 

You don’t have all of those civilian contractors subsisting on our 

subsistence system. 

[The information follows:] 

Department of Defense (DoD) employees are authorized logistics (such as food, 

water, billeting, etc.) and security support privileges when deployed with the Armed 

Forces. Logistic and security support for contractors authorized to accompany the 

force are addressed in the contract and are priced and negotiated before the contract 

is awarded. It costs approximately $23.00 daily per person for food. This does not 

include related transportation, storage, or labor costs, but does include six liters of 

water per day. Meals being provided in support of our mission in Iraq and Afghanistan are prepared by Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) under the LOGCAP III contract. KBR is required to keep records of the number of meals served and the government is authorized to audit such records. 

DoD also has implemented the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational 

Tracker (SPOT) system to account for and provide visibility of all DoD contract personnel within the contingency operations battlespace. The Joint Asset Movement 

Management System (JAMMS), a component of SPOT, will also enhance visibility. 

The JAMMS will be able to scan the contractor personnel’s Letter of Authorization 

to identify any additional authorizations, privileges or government support that contractor personnel are entitled to under the contract. 

LABOR COST

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Secretary, that is the last and then we will 

move to the next question. But that is the last thing I wanted to 

get to. Because the other thing we have here is that they are hiring 

people, people from the Philippines, wherever they can get cheap 

labor because they make a higher profit margin, the cheaper the 

labor they bring in. And a lot of these contractors are not making 

the effort to provide employment in a country where you have got 

almost 65 percent unemployment, real unemployment and yet they 

are bringing in all these workers from other parts of the world who 

are willing to perform the labor at the cheapest rate possible and 

the—it matters not to the contractors that you see all these Iraqis 

looking for work and, of course, a lot of these young kids we are 

not members of al Qaeda and Iraq, but they are looking for to 

make a few hundred bucks by planting an IED or something because they have no other means of subsistence. 

Are we aware of the problem of bringing in all these foreign 

workers that cause even further resentment on the part of the 

Iraqis who don’t have any jobs? 

OVERSIGHT OF CONTRACTORS

Secretary GEREN. We oversee those contracts. We do employ 

many Iraqi nationals in our subsistence programs over there. And 

I will get you the full detail and the breakdown, how many come 

from out of country and how many come from in country. When 

you look over all at the performance of the contractors it has overall been good, taking these type of services to remote areas and 

building the support systems from scratch. But it is not to say 

there haven’t been some terrible abuses. We have had people go to 

jail. There will be more people to go to jail there have been problems. 

But overall, they have provided good quality support to our soldiers for the most part. The soldiers are satisfied with the food supVerDate Nov 24 2008 04:48 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
15 

port, the other type of creature comforts that are able to be provided in a very office tier environment. But it is not to say on the 

margins we haven’t had some serious problems, and we are more 

aggressively trying to root those out and long term it is a big challenge for us. The size of the Army we have today, we had Dr. 

Gansler, who did a thorough analysis for us and helped us look to 

the future in the area of contracting. He was the Under Secretary 

for Acquisition under President Clinton. A distinguished academic 

in this area. 

And he said with the size of our military today, when we consider ourselves as an expeditionary Army, we have no choice but 

to go to war one half khaki, one half contractor, and one half uniform military. That is what is takes to deploy our Army today with 

the size of Army that we are. As we try to move more people from 

tail to tooth. And more people into operational positions. We relied 

more heavily on contractors. So we have really accepted that as the 

future and we are trying to do a better job of preparing the contracting oversight within the Army. 

I will tell you one quick thing and then I will stop. But we saw 

in the 1990s and into this last decade, the number of contract personnel in the Army, both civilian and military, declined dramatically. Then we saw this major ramp up in the need of contracting. 

We didn’t have the full-time personnel in positions to properly 

manage it. We didn’t and a lot of probabilities we have today are 

a result of that. 

We had people leaving the Army because there was no future in 

the contracting field. We have instituted reforms now. Tomorrow at 

Fort Belvoir, we are going to stand up the Army Contracting Command, a two-star command. We are going to have two one-stars 

under it. We are going to have seven contracting brigades. Commanded by colonels. 

So we are going to start rebuilding that bench and rebuilding the 

professionalism in the contracting workforce not only in the military but in the civilian workforce. It is not only a military problem 

across our government. We have really lost a huge percentage of 

our contracting workforce at a time when the demand went up precipitously. And so we have got a lot of work to do in that area. But 

we are moving in the right direction. We will provide better oversight. 

[The information follows:] 

According to a recent U.S. Central Command quarterly contractor census, there 

are 163,591 total DoD contractor personnel in Iraq. Of this total, 31,325 are U.S. 

citizens; 56,368 are third country nationals; and 75,898 are local national Iraqis who 

make up a majority of our contracted workforce. 

According to a recent U.S. Central Command quarterly co there are 163,591 

total DoD contractor personnel in Iraq. Of this U.S. citizens; 56,368 are third country nationals; and 75,898 are 1 Iraqis who make up a majority of our contracted 

workforce. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Granger. 

QUALITY OF RECRUITS

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. Back home the folks, when I go home 

every weekend, always ask about you and send their best and are 

very appreciative of what you are doing. Tammy Schultz, who studVerDate Nov 24 2008 04:48 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
16 

ies ground forces for the center for new American security—I think 

you know that is a think tank that works with security and studies 

defense policies and he stated in January that Army recruiters 

were signing up—signing up the required troops each year but to 

grow the force, they are doing this by allowing less qualified recruits with lower test scores, raising the maximum enlisted age 

and making other concessions to depth and quality. 

I would like you to address that and say is that true. And if so, 

of course what that—I would say General Casey would probably be 

the one. I don’t know whichever one will answer that. But have we 

lowered our standards and how do we answer that question? 

General CASEY. I will start off here and then let the Secretary 

add a few words. As I indicated with the story about Sergeant Greg 

Williams, we are getting very committed, very capable men and 

women into the Armed Forces. Now, as you look at the standards, 

our own metrics by which we measure quality, primarily high 

school diploma graduates, the top three mental categories and the 

bottom—the fourth mental category, the lowest. And in two of 

those three, we are meeting our standards. We are meeting them 

in the top three mental categories and in a very low percentage in 

the bottom mental category. 

We are taking in now less than 90 percent high school diploma 

graduates. And that is a degradation that I believe is acceptable to 

increase the size of the force. Now, that is the only degradation and 

we are committed not go below 80 percent which is where we were 

in 2006. So I believe that we are—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Will the gentlewoman yield? 

Ms. GRANGER. Yes. 

Mr. MURTHA. I think I saw figures down to 79 percent. 

General CASEY. We were at 79 in 2007, that is correct. 

Mr. MURTHA. And also that the waivers were twice as many with 

drug-related and—felony and misdemeanors. 

General CASEY. Waivers is a different story. I don’t know if you 

want to talk about that one. 

Secretary GEREN. I can speak to the waiver issue. And we have 

seen an increase in waivers. We have gone—I think they have tripled in over the last 6 years. But the waiver process has actually 

been a great success. It is a very labor-intensive process. If we 

could choose a whole Army that way with that kind of scrutiny, we 

would have a better Army. But it is too labor intensive to do that. 

The waiver process is a 10-step process. When a candidate comes 

up that needs a waiver for whatever reason, it goes through 10 

steps in the approval process finally with a general officer signing 

off on that waiver candidate. And we found—we did a study of the 

17,000 we brought in under waivers from 2003 through 2006. They 

actually scored higher on the aptitude tests. They had higher promotion rates, they had higher retention rates, and actually had 

higher awards for valor. 

But again it is too labor intensive. You can’t recruit an entire 

Army that way. But it is a program that has brought good quality 

soldiers into the Army. But we are concerned about those issues. 

Recruiting an Army in the middle of a war is hard. We have never 

done this before. We have always had a draft to be able to fall back 

on. But intangibles are as important as these objective metrics in 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
17 

telling you whether or not you have got somebody that wants to 

serve in the military. The fact that 170,000 young men and women 

are raising their right hand and joining the Army, I mean, you consider Active Guard and Reserve. We have 170,000 men and women 

join our Army every year, the size of the entire Marine Corps and 

it tells you a lot about a young person that going to join the Army 

in the middle of a war knowing full well he or she is going into 

combat. 

It tells you something about the heart and sense of mission. So 

we feel good about the men and women that are joining. Their performance has been excellent. We have got some long-term issues 

and you as a teacher appreciate some of these challenges. As a Nation, high school diploma grads are shrinking. In certain parts of 

the country, we have a very low percentage of high school diploma 

grads. We have got an increasing problem with obesity. Only three 

out of 10 young people made all of our objective criteria for joining 

the United States Army. Three out of 10. That is a national problem. 

So we take from that top 30 percent, and we as a Nation and 

we as an Army are trying to reach out and try to figure out how 

we get the rest of those 70 percent to be better qualified to join the 

Army, better qualified to be a better citizen and contributing citizens. But it is a tough environment. But we do have young men 

and women who are willing to join in the middle of a war and they 

are fine young people. 

Ms. GRANGER. I completely agree, they are fine young people. 

And I have had exactly the same experience as the chairman. I 

have lost 22 from my district in Iraq and I visited personally or 

spoken to every—the parents of all of those. And without a single 

exception they said how proud they were and that they are—it has 

all been sons, that their sons or husbands were doing exactly what 

they wanted to do and were trained to do and were very proud of 

what we are doing. 

So you are doing a wonderful job, and I have had that experience 

in every base that I have visited. But it is a tough one to keep 

those standards up. I agree exactly with what you said, and I remember as a high school teacher having students who really didn’t 

know what they were going to do, where they were going to go and 

hadn’t had a lot of discipline and went in the service and were completely different people in a very short period of time. Better 

spouse, better parent, better employees, better citizens. 

MENTAL HEALTH

Let me ask you something, Mr. Secretary. We talked about this 

before and that is mental health issues with those who are serving 

and those who have served and how do we make sure that they get 

the health care that they need. And we had a hearing here on this 

committee that was disturbing because some of the plans were hiring mental health care professionals and how many that we were 

going to need to deal with, you know, when you come back from 

combat or these long deployments, which was literally impossible 

because they don’t exist, all those mental health care professionals. 

So what are we doing for those who are currently deployed and 

engaged in combat actions and then for those who have served that 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
18 

may have problems that may come back that may not show up for 

some time? 

Secretary GEREN. The issues that you raise in that are addressed 

on a very broad front in the military. And major challenges. The 

shortage of mental health professionals, it is a problem across the 

country and it is a problem in the military. It is a problem that 

is particularly acute for the Army because so many of our installations are in rural areas. You have a higher percentage of mental 

health workers in large urban areas than you do in the Killeen, 

Texases or the Lawton, Oklahomas or the Fayetteville, North Carolinas. So it is a problem for the country and it is a problem for the 

Army because of where we are located. 

This Committee has been a great help to us in providing us additional resources to try to attract mental health professionals into 

the Army. We are—— 

FUNDING FOR MENTAL HEALTH

Mr. MURTHA. Let me interrupt the gentleman. We put $900 million last year in the subcommittee. And I suggested to them that 

they should hire a cadre of mental health professionals all over the 

country. And they are doing that. They are going to hire not necessarily—not like contractors—we are talking about folks that are 

contracting for this particular reason because they are available. I 

think one agency said they had 50,000 health psychological—psychiatrists and so forth and they are working their way through 

that. So it will be a competitive process. 

So I think if this works the way I hope it will work, we will have 

the people available in the rural areas which will be able to take 

care of them. Because you and I see the same problem. 

So consequently, those people come home and they have no place 

to go. They have nobody to talk to and they have a hard time adjusting. Well, I think the combination of what we have done is 

going to make a big difference for the National Guard as well as 

the Reserve or anybody that gets out on a discharge. I think we 

are making some progress in there and I appreciate what you are 

asking for. 

MENTAL ILLNESS STIGMA

Secretary GEREN. This Committee—you have really led the way in that regard for us out of that—$300 million of that is going into 

research. We have $261 million of it that has gone into actual care 

in the Army system. I would like to mention one other initiative 

that I think has made great progress in this area for the Army, 

and I think it will end up benefiting the whole country. One of the 

biggest challenges in mental health area is to get people who need 

it to come forward and get it. And it is a stigma, it is a stigma in 

private life and it is even more of a stigma in the Army. 

The middle of last year we started a program to teach every single soldier, all one million soldiers and make this same training 

available to families, teach them how to spot the symptoms of post 

traumatic stress, traumatic brain injuries, how to identify those 

problems and where to go and what to do about it, and we have 

now taught that program to about 900,000 soldiers, still working 

to get the last 100,000. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
19 

Every new soldier that comes in, we call it a chain-teach program. But it is a program where they actually have face-to-face 

teaching. And it has already shown results that—we do these mental health tests every year. We just finished the fifth one, MHAT– 

5, and it showed that the stigma is going down. More people feel 

comfortable coming forward in dealing with mental health issues. 

Secretary GEREN. That will be one of our biggest issues, because 

mental health issues addressed early are so much easier to treat 

than mental health issues that become acute. 

So we are working to address the stress. We are hiring more personnel. We are developing innovative programs. We are trying to 

train all the leaders in the Army to be better at spotting mental 

health issues before they become problems. 

But it is a challenge for us, and it is a challenge that the military 

has always struggled with in wartime. The experience people are 

having is not something that you get anyplace else other than war, 

and they bring a lot of mental and emotional problems with them. 

And those also spill over and affect the families. And so we are 

working to try to address it with the soldier and with the families. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Okay. 

Another thing that we are working on—and as good a job as anybody I have seen. They are sensitive to the stigma that is involved 

in PTSD. Commanders understand, and they reach out to the soldiers and say, ‘‘Look, don’t worry about being afraid. Don’t worry 

about it.’’ I was really impressed by the counseling, the screening 

and so forth. 

We are going to go vote, and we will be right back. 

[Recess.] 

QUALITY OF RECRUITS

Mr. MURTHA. Before I go to Mrs. Kaptur, I just want to make 

sure—I heard so often from the Army about high school graduates. 

I voted against a volunteer Army; I voted for a draft. I think everybody ought to have a chance to serve. Less than 1 percent of people 

in this country are making sacrifices, including the families. I 

mean, the families are making sacrifices with the troops. So I was 

for a draft, because I think everybody ought to be involved. 

But the point is, the Army used to come over here and say, ‘‘We 

have to have high school graduates. That is the reason we have a 

volunteer Army that is doing so well.’’ Now you are saying you accept—I mean, I know what happens. I know that you can’t get 

them, so you have to rationalize in your own mind. 

But I hope we are not going down the road we went after Vietnam, where we had to dump thousands of troops out because they 

weren’t physically fit and they weren’t qualified. And I remember 

going to the leaders, and I was Chairman, I said, ‘‘These guys cannot handle the job, and you had better get rid of them, and they 

did.’’ And you were probably a captain or a major, at the time. 

General CASEY. Or a lieutenant. 

Mr. MURTHA. And you got rid of a lot of people. You remember 

that. Charlie Horner remembers it. 

General CASEY. Charlie was a captain, yeah. [Laughter.] 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
20 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kaptur. 

COST OF ELECTRIC POWER

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I always enjoy listening 

to what you say. 

Welcome, Mr. Secretary. Welcome, General. Thank you very 

much for being here today. 

Let me ask for the record, Mr. Secretary, could you provide the 

amount of funds that the Department of Army spent in the year 

2007 on power, an aggregate number for all the utility expenses at 

your various bases, and then for your fuel costs in 2007. Could you 

have your accounting people provide that to the record? 

Secretary GEREN. We will certainly provide that. 

Ms. KAPTUR. And could you let me know, compared to 2006 and 

your projections for 2008, are those numbers likely to go up or 

down? And I am looking at your domestic as well as global costs. 

Secretary GEREN. We will provide you that. 

[The information follows:] 

The Army spent $617 million on electric power purchased from utility suppliers 

in fiscal year (FY) 2007. In addition to purchasing electricity, the Army operates 

three plants that generate electricity. The cost to fuel those plants in FY07 was $24 

million. 

Despite the fact that the Army met the reduction goal in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 by increasing efficiency and reducing energy use per 

unit area by 8.4 percent from the 2003 baseline to 2007, the total cost for energy 

utilities at Army installations increased from $753 million to $1.099 billion over the 

same period. In addition to energy utilities, we spent $1.539 billion on fuel for vehicles in FY07, of which $1.421 billion was used in tactical vehicles. 

Due to increases this year in the cost of fuel and other energy commodities such 

as electricity and natural gas, total costs for 2008 are likely to go up both domestically and globally. 

RESERVE COMPONENT HEALTH CARE

Ms. KAPTUR. All right, thank you. 

I wanted to ask your help, Mr. Secretary and General Casey, if 

you could, on the issue that Congresswoman Granger referenced, 

and that is the health of our soldiers. And I would invite you, as 

I did the medical witness panel that we had about 2 weeks ago, to 

look at the health concerns of the 983rd Combat Engineering Unit 

in my district, whose commanding officer sits in Chicago. 

This unit was deployed to Iraq. It sustained at least one loss and 

several injuries. And what is happening to those soldiers is that, 

as they come home for care, because it is in a more suburban or 

rural area and they come from all around—they come from deep 

in the rural counties of Ohio; I think we have even got a couple 

Hoosiers in there up in Michigan—what they come home to is a 

place, a unit, a building with trucks and equipment, but no medical 

care around there. 

There is a clinic, a VA clinic, in the city of Toledo. There is a VA 

hospital up in Ann Arbor, Michigan. There is a state nursing home 

2 hours away, hour and a half east, that is partly VA-run and partly State-run. And most of the psychiatric issues that come to rest 

often go to the chaplain at the nursing home or a group of VA people who aren’t trained for that necessarily in the city of Toledo. 

But, for the most part, these people are not served properly. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
21 

What I am looking for is a model. If you could use this area, 

which has no big base like Fort Bliss, we don’t have a mother hospital—we are trying to link our VA system to our medical college 

now. It has never been done that way. But these poor soldiers, 

many of whom came up to me and told me they had problems, 

some with traumatic brain injury, plus PTSD—it is all disorganized. The care is disorganized. 

I think it would be very helpful, at the same time as we work 

at the national level, to find some prototypes at the local level, 

where the pieces don’t fit together, and then ask ourselves, how to 

we fix this? Because if we can fix this, then how do we use that 

model in other places? 

So I would really invite you to come, to take a look. These are 

really good soldiers. It is a reserve unit. You know, again, it is not 

regular, it is not active duty. There has just got to be a better way 

to do this. There has to be a better way to pool those dollars and 

make this work for those soldiers. 

We have tried to work with the State of Ohio—General Wayt, the 

head of our guard in Ohio, a wonderful person. We have tried to 

work with some of our hospitals in the State of Ohio, who are the 

best in psychiatric care. They have said to me, ‘‘Marcy, the worst 

experience of our careers has been in trying to work with the Department of Defense.’’ I said, ‘‘It is the biggest bureaucracy in the 

world.’’ And they said, ‘‘Boy, you don’t say.’’ I said, ‘‘Don’t give up. 

Don’t give up. We are going to get this done.’’ 

And so I just suggest to you, come down to where we live. Turn 

the hour-glass upside down, come down to where we live and are 

trying to care for these folks coming home. So, I invite you. 

And I don’t want to get anybody in the 983rd in trouble. That 

is not my purpose here today. It is a great unit. All their soldiers 

need is care. 

General CASEY. No, Congresswoman, you are identifying something that we are seeing in a lot of different places with our 

guardsmen and reservists as they come home. And, as you suggest, 

with the dispersed nature of how these folks live and where they 

are based, it is a much more difficult problem. 

And I would like to take you up on your offer, because I think— 

we are working hard on this. The Secretary and I have issued a 

family covenant that recognizes the five greatest needs of our families, both active and reserve component. But we acknowledge that 

it is a much more difficult challenge in effectively implementing 

that with the Guard and Reserve. 

And even though we are working toward an integrated family 

support network—we have an actual program where, ultimately, 

you will be able to plug in a zip code and get the different kinds 

of services that are available to you there. 

But I would like to take you up on that. Let’s get some folks together and take a look at this and maybe, as you suggest, use this 

as a way to look at rurally based units and figure out how we can 

do better at providing them the care and services they need to recover from extended deployments. 

Ms. KAPTUR. You know, General, thank you for that. 

You just reminded me, in the middle of all of this, then the Veterans Department sends in a veterans center, and I meet the guy. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
22 

I said, ‘‘Where did you come from?’’ He said, ‘‘Oh, they just sent me 

up here from Cincinnati.’’ I said, ‘‘Well, where is your office?’’ He 

goes, ‘‘I live out of my car.’’ He says, ‘‘I go from place to place.’’ 

I thought, okay, so there is another stream of money coming in 

here. But it is really not very well-organized at the local level, and 

so I would appreciate your assessment. 

Right across the street from this particular facility is a Guard 

tactical fighter squadron for F–16s, a huge complex. No medical 

care there. When we welcome our MP units back home from Iraq, 

they come to that base because they fly them in, you know, and 

then they are just scattered all over the place. 

I need your experience and would value how we get the VA and 

the DOD and our local people to work together with our State. You 

know, how do we structure this differently for this set of returning 

vets? 

For the record, I was going to ask the Secretary, can you also 

provide for me, for the years 2006, 2007 and your projections for 

2008, how many psychiatrists were on the payroll for the DOD hospital system or any contracted services and how many psychiatric 

nurses? Is it going up? Is it going down? Is it staying the same? 

I am very interested in those numbers. 

[The information follows:] 

I am only able to address the number of psychiatrists and psychiatric nurses employed by the Army. The overall number of Army psychiatrists has remained relatively constant over the last three years while the number of psychiatric nurses 

has been steadily increasing. In addition to filling positions in our military treatment facilities, about 20 psychiatrists and 20 psychiatric nurses deploy with each 

Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom rotation. 

In 2006, the Army employed 181 psychiatrists and 161 psychiatric nurses. This 

consisted of 127 military and 54 civilian psychiatrists and 96 military and 65 civilian psychiatric nurses. 

In 2007, the Army employed 171 psychiatrists and 179 psychiatric nurses. This 

consisted of 120 military and 51 civilian psychiatrists and 94 military and 85 civilian psychiatric nurses. 

Currently, the Army employs 178 psychiatrists and 196 psychiatric nurses. This 

consists of 125 military and 53 civilian psychiatrists and 87 military and 109 civilian psychiatric nurses. 

In June 2007, the Army Medical Department initiated contracting efforts to hire 

an additional 64 psychiatrists and 31 psychiatric nurses to fill recognized shortages 

that created gaps in service delivery. As of March 21, 2008, we have been able to 

contract for 25 psychiatrists and 13 psychiatric nurses to meet this need. In addition, to meet emerging behavioral health workload requirements generated by the 

Global War on Terror, the Army has committed to growing military behavioral 

health specialties including 24 additional military psychiatrists and 15 additional 

military psychiatric nurses beginning in 2008 and 2009. 

FOOD FOR IRAQIS AND AFGHANIS

And, finally, my last question is, for the people of Iraq or Afghanistan, for the soldiers that are out there in the field, are we feeding 

the Iraqi people in any way? Are we literally handing out meals to 

the Iraqi people at any place? Or are they food self-sufficient in 

both Afghanistan and in Iraq? 

General CASEY. From my experience, we have only on occasion 

had to provide food, and that was usually after a major military 

operation—in Iraq. I can’t speak to Afghanistan. But my impression is that we don’t have any kind of a military program that routinely feeds Afghanis and Iraqis. But I am a little dated. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
23 

Ms. KAPTUR. Is sustenance an issue, with everything that is 

going on there? Is this an issue for the Iraqis? 

General CASEY. I will tell you, Iraq is the land between two rivers. It has some of the most fertile land that I have ever seen. And 

they do fairly well at feeding themselves. 

[The information follows:] 

It is not generally the mission of U.S. Armed Forces to feel civilian populations. 

Department of State officials typically provide this function using pre-configured humanitarian rations that they procure separately from military rations. The Department of Defense (DoD) feeds any host nation detainees in its custody and on isolated 

occasions has fed military members of Iraq and Afghanistan who were training with 

U.S. forces. However, the DoD is not and has not been engaged in any significant 

feeding of the general populace of either country. 

Meals being provided in support of our mission in Iraq and Afghanistan are prepared by Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) under the LOGCAP III contract. Current 

information indicates that there is no known instance of Iraqi or Afghanistan civilians being fed by KBR, unless they are being deployed to support a mission by U.S. 

or Coalition Forces or are direct employees of either KBR or one of its subcontractors. Today, KBR and its subcontractors employ over 7,200 local nationals to accomplish the LOGCAP mission. Currently there is no existing policy which requires the 

feeding of Iraqi or Afghan civilians other than detainees. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Kingston. 

BUDGET PROCESS

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, General, it is good to see you. 

I have a question on the supplemental budget. I am very frustrated with these emergency supplementals because there is nothing emergency in the nature of so many of them. Certainly, there 

is an urgency, but it appears to me that we have gotten in a habit 

of doing very, very large supplemental budgets as a way of getting 

around normal budget procedures. 

And I wanted to hear your comments on that and see what could 

be left out of a supplemental that should be in the regular order, 

normal budget process. 

Secretary GEREN. Well, in this budget, we are working to try to 

migrate the costs that are predictable into the base budget. This 

2009 budget has 43,000 soldier end-strength moved from the supplemental into the budget for the first time. So where we see these 

as ongoing costs or expenses, we are working to migrate them. 

There are other areas that we know that we are going to have. 

The MRAPs are going to be part of the inventory for a long time. 

Looking to migrate some of the support costs there. 

But from the Army perspective, we are trying to look down the 

road and anticipate a future in which there will be increasing pressure on these supplementals. And where we do have predictable 

and ongoing costs, we are looking to try to migrate them into the 

base budget. 

But the way we are operating today, there is no way that we 

could provide the support to the soldiers within the base budget. 

But it is a long-term issue that we are working to address. 

COST OF WAR IN IRAQ

Mr. KINGSTON. There was an article the other day that came out 

that said that the cost in Iraq is $12 billion a month. And then 

there was a subtitle that says, GAO I think says, it is $7 billion 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
24 

to $6 billion a month. So probably somewhere between $6 billion 

and $12 billion for the costs in Iraq, and I am not sure what was 

included in that. 

Do you know how much Iraq is costing the Army a month? Do 

you have a number like that? 

Secretary GEREN. We have used the estimate in the O&M area 

and personnel of—well, let me get that for the record. I don’t want 

to—I am afraid I will get it wrong, so I will get back with you. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, your portion of that probably is the lion’s 

share anyhow, I would imagine. 

Secretary GEREN. It is. 

Mr. KINGSTON. And then would you have it broken down as to 

what you would anticipate and what would be in the regular budget request versus in the supplemental? 

I mean, just to kind of play with some numbers, let’s just say the Army’s portion of that is $5 billion a month, and maybe $2 billion 

in equipment, $3 billion in personnel. I don’t know how it would 

easily break down. But you know that if we stay in Iraq, you are 

going to have a continued expense of that $5 billion at some level, 

right? 

And is that in the Pentagon budget request, or is that kind of 

held for the supplemental? 

Secretary GEREN. Largely in the supplemental. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, isn’t it time to stop doing that? 

Secretary GEREN. Last year—— 

Mr. KINGSTON. And one other the question. Is that an OMB call 

or a Pentagon call? 

Secretary GEREN. That would be an administration call. 

Mr. KINGSTON. So it is OMB. 

Secretary GEREN. Yes. 

Last year, the President’s budget and the supplemental were forwarded through the Congress at the same time. You know, obviously they won’t be this year. 

But how the supplemental is actually managed through the Congress and whether it is handled differently than the regular budget 

request for funding is a congressional decision rather than an OMB 

decision or administration decision. 

Mr. KINGSTON. So if Congress decides to take that supplemental 

and put some of it into the general budget, then the Pentagon is 

okay with that? 

I am not asking you to speak on policy there. But I think one 

of the problems that most members have is we know, or we tend 

to know—we will be voting on the budget today, and we will tend 

to have some general breakdowns of what it is for Medicare, what 

it is for education, what it is for defense, whatever. But then when 

it comes to a supplemental, we don’t pay as much attention to it, 

because it usually has the word ‘‘emergency’’ in it, and it always 

does have a few genuine emergencies in it. But it seems to me that 

we are really not watching the fiscal dollars here as much as we 

should. 

And when you think about the great challenges that you have on 

reset and some of the other things that you had already pointed 

out, if it wasn’t for the Chairman and Mr. Young and some great 

allies here, you would not have that. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
25 

But it also seems to me a little bit maybe disingenuous on the 

part of the administration to count on friends in Congress to take 

care of the resets through the supplemental process when you 

know, as you have testified, General, that it is a huge expenditure 

and a huge challenge. And it seems like whatever budget is submitted, therefore, is, sort of, not really the real picture. 

You know, it is so important that the supplemental is no longer 

just an add-on for emergencies but it is part of the bread and butter of what you need to operate. Is that right, or have I grown cynical? 

General CASEY. No, you are right. In fact, in response to Con- gressman Young’s question, I said that we need around $100 billion 

a year in addition to the base program to take care of the costs of 

the war and the supplemental. So, yes, I mean, there are significant costs to us that are not in the base program. 

The only thing I would say—and some of them are costs that we 

can’t know 18 to 20 months in advance. You know, for example, the 

numbers of brigades that are in Iraq, that will change, that will affect costs. Probably not immediately, but over time it will gradually 

affect costs. 

[The information follows:] 

The cost of the war in Iraq averaged $7 billion per month for the Army last fiscal year. This cost equated roughly to $1 billion for military personnel, $4 billion for 

operation and maintenance, and $2 billion for procurement. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will yield. 

Mr. MURTHA. I think what the gentleman is saying is so important. If you remember, last year the subcommittee asked Secretary 

Gates to put it in, the supplemental, the supplemental in the base 

bill. He nodded his head because he agreed with us. That didn’t 

mean he could do it. 

But there is no question they can’t plan, we can’t plan, when 

they just put a supplemental out which is supposedly emergency 

funding. We know very well what it is going to cost, within reason. 

It used to be supplementals were a few billion and we dealt with 

them very expeditiously. Now, they have become part of the process. 

We have to get back to budgeting. And if you don’t count 

supplementals, you don’t do any legitimate budgeting. For instance, 

a little item like re-enlistment bonuses and re-enlistment pay went 

from $157 million to over $1 billion, a 537 percent increase. Those 

are the kinds of things that—reset, put all the reset in the supplemental. 

So you are absolutely right. We have to get back so we can get 

this thing under control, so they can plan and we can know what 

the costs are. 

Mr. Bishop. 

EQUIPMENT READINESS

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think the Chairman and Mr. Kingston are really on to something. I recall when the subcommittee organized last year, one of 

the things that the Chairman indicated was that it was very, very 

important for us to try to get control of this budgeting process so 

that we could get away from putting so much stuff in the 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
26 

supplementals so we could actually plan for the war, and that it 

was actually publicly disclosed. 

I want to go to another subject. You know, we understand that 

the equipment readiness is really a function of both procuring 

equipment in desired quantities and maintaining that equipment 

in acceptable operational status. And, of course, the combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have resulted in high usage rates 

under very demanding environmental conditions, which has resulted in the loss of significant—excuse me—under difficult conditions, and a lot of it has been destroyed as a result of combat. 

What are the most serious equipment shortfalls, in terms of 

equipment on hand and equipment maintenance, ground combat 

vehicles, support vehicles, aviation and communications? And what 

is the Army doing to reduce the equipment shortfalls and to speed 

the repair of equipment? 

And, of course, with the 15-month deployments, who takes care 

of the equipment that is left back home? Is that equipment that is 

left back home state-of-the-art, or is it mostly obsolete equipment? 

And if it is, what are we going to do about it? 

And how are you inventorying the equipment left back home and 

equipment that is being destroyed? I know at one point you had— 

I think Dimensions International was contracted, they were doing 

some of the work. I think that company has now been bought by 

Honeywell. But they were inventorying stay-at-home equipment. 

And it is my understanding a lot of that equipment is obsolete, so 

that when units come back, when they are in that dwell time, they 

really can’t train on that equipment when they are back at home 

station. 

And the other question with regard to the inventory process is 

whether or not you all have implemented the RFID bar code technology for utilization in conducting the inventories and keeping up 

with the equipment. 

Secretary GEREN. I don’t know the answer to your—I know we 

do use bar code. I don’t know how widely we do use it. I will have 

to get back to you for the record on that question. 

If we have used up equipment at a rate because of the war, not 

only in equipment that is destroyed in combat but equipment that 

is just being worn out at four and five times the rate that we 

planned—so we are certainly stressing the system, not only to 

produce it but to keep it fixed and keep it operational. We use the 

reset budgets in the supplemental that you all have given us. The 

depots are operating at about twice the capacity that they were in 

peacetime. So that is a big part of our effort to keep the equipment 

ready and available to soldiers. 

Every unit that we send into combat has the equipment that 

they need. All of our nondeployed units have some challenges when 

it comes to having the right equipment. 

[The information follows:] 

The Army has no immediate plans to implement RFID technology (passive/active) for conducting inventories. However, the Army uses RFID technology to track 

the location of equipment while in-transit. By October 1, 2008, we will have fielded 

handheld devices to operators of the Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced system 

(PBSUE). 

PBUSE is the Army’s web-based, state-of-the art, combat service support property accountability system for garrisons, program managers, and tactical environVerDate Nov 24 2008 04:48 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
27 

ments. PBUSE’s enterprise asset database has improved asset visibility and accountability by providing ‘‘any time, any place’’ data access for property accountability users. For example, for the commander, it provides a real time view of assets 

and allows the commander to access the system for queries without having to depend on the PBO and multiple sources to gather, prepare and present the information. These handheld devices are capable of reading printed barcodes and unique 

item identifiers placed on supplies and equipment. 

EQUIPMENT FOR TRAINING

Mr. MURTHA. Will the Secretary yield? 

I mean, let’s go back here. When they are in the United States, 

they are not training on the same equipment that they, when they 

go to war, that they have once they go overseas. I mean, we have 

been through this over and over and over again. We know the 

shortages. I know that there is only one armored Humvee in some 

bases. I know there are all kinds of shortages where they don’t 

have the equipment to train on in the United States that they are 

going to go to war with. 

So, you know, we need to hear the facts so that we can try to 

help correct this thing. 

Secretary GEREN. I hope I didn’t say anything that would contradict what you just said. Our nondeployed troops do not have 

their equipment fill. We train using, in some cases, shared equipment. And there are some items of equipment, up-armored 

Humvees and now MRAPs, that they train in-theater on those. We 

don’t have them back here on the training base. 

So, because of the equipment shortfalls, we share among units. 

As a unit gets closer to deployment, they have more of their equipment filled. And some of it, they pick it up in theater. And some 

of it is left behind in theater that they fall in on. 

READINESS IMBALANCE

Mr. MURTHA. Well, I think that falls in line with what General 

Casey said earlier: imbalance. For instance, if we wanted to deploy, 

we not only would not be able to deploy because we don’t have the 

equipment, we wouldn’t be able to sustain the deployment at all. 

I am talking about deploying outside of Iraq or Afghanistan. That 

is the thing that concerns me the most, because it is so uncertain. 

Our intelligence wasn’t right with the wall coming down. Our intelligence wasn’t right in Iraq. Our intelligence is not right over 50 

percent of the time. I used to have, in my district, the guy, Phil 

the Groundhog, that predicted the weather. He is more accurate 

than the intelligence agencies are. [Laughter.] 

But you can see why we are so concerned about the future of the 

Army, because we know the circumstances, and we have been trying to fix it. 

General CASEY. If I could, just to piggyback on what the Chairman said, and I did talk about it a little bit earlier, but you already 

have invested in fixing the equipment problem. We are not finished 

yet, but, as you know, it takes about 2 years from the time you give 

us the money until that equipment is in the hands of a soldier. And 

so that process has started, but it needs to continue here for the 

next several years until we can get ourselves back in balance. 

The other thing I just mentioned is that we have made huge 

strides on equipment accountability. And we have both in theater 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
28 

and at home. And we have put our Army Materiel Command in 

charge of the stay-behind equipment that you talked about several 

years ago. And we are getting much more efficient in getting that 

equipment to the right place and, if it needs to be refurbished 

while the unit is gone, getting it into a depot to get it fixed up. 

So I think we are doing much better on property accountability 

and on the management of the stay-behind equipment. 

EQUIPMENT FOR HOME STATION TRAINING

Mr. BISHOP. The visit that I made to see some of that stay-athome equipment and the refurbishing, none of the refurbishing was 

up-armoring. Well, if so, it was very little of it. So that what they 

were actually refurbishing back on base, as I understand it, was 

not the same equipment that is up-armored that is being used in 

theater. 

And, of course, you know, that is a concern, because whenever 

they come back to train, with the parts of the units that are in 

dwell time, you know, they won’t be able to actually work on what 

they will have to deal with if they have to go back to theater or 

deploy someplace else. 

Secretary GEREN. There are certain important parts of the equipment set that we don’t have back here in the training base. And 

the training takes place with that real equipment in theater. 

MRAP is a great example, where every MRAP we can produce we 

are putting in theater, so there is not an opportunity for soldiers 

to train on MRAPs in the United States. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mrs. Kaptur, we are going to finish up before this 

vote ends, so if you have any additional questions. 

Secretary GEREN. No, but I was just agreeing with your point. 

We are working to fill those, but there are certain types of equipment that we have not been able to fill all the need in theater. And 

that requires us to do work-arounds through shared equipment and 

training in theater to make sure that the soldiers get the training 

that they need on that type of equipment. 

COST OF RESET

Mr. BISHOP. What is your current estimate of the total reset requirement for fiscal year 2008 for operation and maintenance and 

procurement funds? Does the fiscal year 2008 wartime supplemental funding request, as amended in October, fully fund the 

Army’s reset requirements for 2008? What is your estimate for the 

reset requirement for 2009? And how has the surge affected the 

reset? 

Secretary GEREN. The funding that we have in 2008 does cover 

our estimate of the reset costs for this year. We are still working 

on the estimates for the 2009 reset number. I would estimate that 

it would be somewhere in the same range. 

But we are spending about $18 billion, $17 billion to $18 billion 

a year on reset. You all gave us that in 2007. We have asked for 

that in 2008. 

In the supplemental that you all passed in December, you gave 

us $10 billion of the $18 billion that we needed, and we are still 

waiting on the $7-plus billion. And if we get past Memorial Day, 

that is going to start causing us a problem in purchasing long-lead 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
29 

items. So that is an area, when considering the 2008 supplemental, 

that the need is about to become urgent. The money is in the request, but only $10 billion out of $18 billion has been approved by 

Congress. And that, very soon, will be a problem for us. 

Mr. BISHOP. If there is a pause in the drawdown of the Army 

units in Iraq, how will that impact reset? 

Secretary GEREN. Well, the longer the equipment stays in theater, the less demand we have on the depots here at home. And 

we have tried to anticipate, as the surge does draw down, anticipate that equipment coming home, making sure we have the capacity in the depots in order to handle it, as well as the funding to 

handle it. 

But the projections that we are developing for 2009 take into 

consideration the surge drawing down. 

Mr. MURTHA. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

We have talked about this. We want to look to the future. We 

want to make sure we balance out reset with the future. 

Mr. Kingston, do you have any more questions? 

Mr. KINGSTON. I might submit some. 

Mr. MURTHA. Okay. 

Do you have any discussion, Ms. Kaptur? 

LONG TERM CARE

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

Very quickly, General Casey, there are two young men from my 

district who are terribly wounded, Army. One is Matthew Keil, KE-I-L. I understand he is somewhere outside of Fort Bliss, Texas, 

now in some type of care facility. And also Matthew Drake, who— 

no, wait, that is wrong. Matthew Keil is somewhere in Colorado in 

some type of private facility. I might be getting this wrong. I am 

not sure where they are. That is one of my questions. Matthew—— 

General CASEY. That is okay. We will get the details from your 

staff. 

Ms. KAPTUR. And they are both terribly wounded. 

My question really is, is the family satisfied with what the military did? Because one of these young men, Matthew Drake, is not 

in a military facility. He needs 24-hour-a-day care, and he became 

suicidal, and he cannot handle some of his limbs. 

And so my question is, what went wrong? Did anything go 

wrong? Are we doing everything we can for these young men? 

Okay, so those two. And then—— 

General CASEY. We will have somebody get with your staff and 

get their names, and we will follow up with you. 

ATTEMPTED SUICIDE RATE

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you very much. 

And then I would like to know what the attempted suicide rate 

is for people in service 2006, 2007, 2008, and also upon discharge, 

wherever they are, out there in the system, what do you see happening to folks once they come home, as you track those numbers? 

[The information follows:] 

Suicide attempts are among the most difficult events in mental health on which 

to obtain statistics because there is a spectrum of suicidal behavior that ranges from 

thinking about suicide, to non-life threatening gestures (i.e. superficial lacerations), 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
30 

to more serious attempts and to actual death. Researchers define what constitutes 

an ‘‘attempt’’ differently, which leads to significant reported variations in suicide attempt rates, even within the same population. 

In 2007, the Army standardized the reporting of suicide attempts by clarifying the 

definition of an attempted suicide as an event which causes a person to be hospitalized for the behavior. Our older data (2006) is not directly comparable with data 

from 2007 and beyond because it includes attempts that did not result in hospitalization. At the end of 2008, we will be able to more directly compare 2007 and 

2008 data on attempted suicides. 

The Army does not track the behavioral health status of Soldiers once they are 

discharged. We do not have any record of suicide attempts by former Soldiers following their separation from service. 

My second question, very quickly, relates to contracting. Kellogg 

Brown & Root is doing all of the food, ice and water that is being 

served in Iraq. And do they make the decisions on the subcontracts? 

Mr. MURTHA. We asked about those questions, Ms. Kaptur. We 

want a detailed list of the parameters of the contracting, how they 

handle it, where the different money is spent and so forth. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Chairman, did they ask about Agility, the companies Agility and Supreme, whether they are a prime contractor 

and where they are headquartered? Those are two separate companies. 

General CASEY. Agility, and what was the second one? 

Ms. KAPTUR. Agility and Supreme. 

General CASEY. Supreme. 

Ms. KAPTUR. And are they a prime contractor, and where are 

they headquartered? 

General CASEY. We will. 

Ms. Kaptur. Okay. 

[The information follows:] 

Agility (formerly Public Warehousing Company) is a prime contractor, 

headquartered in Kuwait. Supreme Food Services, Inc., is a prime contractor, 

headquartered in Switzerland. Agility and Supreme are the two prime contractors 

for food in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. Agility serves Iraq and Kuwait; Supreme 

serves Afghanistan. 

CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

Secretary GEREN. If I could correct the record, I was in error earlier, Mr. Chairman. That 196,000 contractors is the entire theater: 

155,000 in Iraq and 30,000 in Afghanistan. I would just like to 

stand corrected. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you very much. 

If you will get those questions back for the record. 

Secretary GEREN. We certainly will. 

Mr. MURTHA. The Committee now adjourns until 1:30. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto follow:] 

STABILITY OPERATIONS

Questions. The Army recently released the latest updated version of its operations 

manual—the first update since 9/11. The manual, for the first time puts stability 

operations—or nation building—on the same level as combat. The Army states that 

this reflects the past six years of fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda Afghanistan 

and insurgents in Iraq, as well relief efforts after hurricanes Katrina and Rita. It 

requires Army leaders to think and act flexibly, with the understanding that operations may require initiatives that do not require combat. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
31 

What does this change mean for the troops in the field? What, if anything, will 

be done differently? 

Answer. Soldiers in operational units can expect their leader to be better prepared 

for the diverse set of missions they will be asked to execute. Commanders and their 

staffs will approach their missions more aware of the non-combat ways and means 

to success and plan accordingly. As Soldiers receive professional military education 

throughout their careers, they can now expect to see concepts regarding non-combat 

approaches integrated into the curriculum. This will infuse an understanding of the 

full spectrum of conflict throughout the force and enhance the capabilities of our 

Soldiers to operate across the spectrum of conflict. 

Question. How will this be reflected in soldier training? 

Answer. Training for Army forces deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom currently prepares them to perform stability operations 

tasks (in addition to offense and defense tasks), to apply lethal and non-lethal capabilities, and to respond to exigencies arising from mission circumstances. Training 

and mission rehearsal/readiness exercises for deploying units are focused on the 

mission they will perform when deployed and on the operational conditions they will 

face when deployed. 

The Army is developing, and will soon publish, standardized lists of mission essential tasks based on the operational construct described in Field Manual (FM) 3– 

0, Operations. These standardized lists will formally establish the offense, defense, 

and stability tasks on which units are expected to train before shifting, when required, to a specific directed mission. 

The Army has revised, and will soon publish, FM 7–0, Training the Force. This 

training doctrine will reinforce the precepts in FM 3–0. In particular, FM 7–0 will 

emphasize that units must prepare to conduct full spectrum operations (a mix of 

offense, defense, and stability operations) for any assigned mission. Additionally, the 

Army is working to identify and distinguish levels of training capability for stability 

operations that are possible, desired, required, and critical to ensure continuing 

readiness of Army forces for stability operations in the future. 

Question. As you know, you serve side by side with other Services. To the best 

of your knowledge, have they adopted a similar strategy? 

Answer. The other Services have adopted similar or complementary stability operations strategies. In August 2007, the Air Force published their Irregular Warfare 

doctrine and revised their Foreign Internal Defense (FID) doctrine to address the 

requirement to support friendly foreign governments prosecute their own counter insurgency campaigns. This tenet of stability operations is also in Army doctrine. The 

Marine Corps teamed with Army doctrinaires to write and publish the current Army 

counter insurgency doctrine. As a result, the guiding principles of both services stability operations doctrine are nearly identical. Finally, Joint doctrine, to which all 

Services adhere, addresses stability operations in the same manner as each of the 

other Services. 

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

Question. When Secretary Gates testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee he stated that growing costs of the Army’s Future Combat System, makes 

it ‘‘hard for to see how that program can be completed in it entirety’’. He went on 

to say that ‘‘in light of what are inevitably going to be pressures on the defense 

budget in the future, I think that that one is one we will have to look at carefully’’. 

Is it the Army’s intent to continue FCS as it is currently defined, or can we expect 

major changes to the program? 

Answer. The Army is committed to funding and delivering the very best capabilities to the Soldier. Continued investment in FCS is essential to providing these critical capabilities our Soldiers need today and in the future. Investments in FCS have 

produced technologies that are making a difference in combat today and will continue to make a difference tomorrow. The Army continues to adapt and mature the 

brigade’s requirements to reflect lessons learned from Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as our own results from the Army Evaluation Task Force. 

As Soldiers adapt to these new technologies and the enemy adapts new strategies, 

we anticipate that our requirements will continue to mature. 

Question. How are we to balance the competing pressures of Growing the Force 

and resetting/recapitalizing equipment with the funding demands of FCS? Are there 

any other tradeoffs to be made? 

Answer. FCS is part of a comprehensive modernization strategy—a strategy that 

takes a balanced approach between the current and future force. FCS is less than 

three percent of the current budget. FCS is projected to be a third of the Army’s 

base investment program at its peak in fiscal year 2015, which is in turn about oneVerDate Nov 24 2008 04:48 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
32 

fourth of the Army’s base budget. The Army requires adequate resources to meet 

current commitments and prepare for future threats; we must do both to sustain 

dominant landpower. 

Question. As you know, FCS was downsized about two years ago from 18 to 14 

systems. There are now rumors that yet another major restructuring of the FCS 

program is in the works. 

Is another restructuring in the works? 

Answer. Future Combat Systems will remain the cornerstone of Army modernization. The Army is currently building the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for 

fiscal years 2010–2015. Through this process, the Army will review requirements 

from the Soldier, Global War on Terror, and current programs of record, striking 

a balance within the available resources. The Army will formally deliver its POM 

requirements to the Office of Secretary of Defense by mid-July 2008. 

Question. Has the Army begun to look at any alternatives to FCS, such as upgrades to legacy systems? If not, why? 

Answer. We have examined the feasibility of upgrading current platforms, and we 

have found that current platform upgrades are vital to current operations but are 

not a suitable alternative to FCS. Current platforms are severely challenged to accept newer technologies due to space, weight and power constraints resulting from 

incremental modernization over time. Continued investment in current platform upgrades, however, ensures the viability of future technology insertions to include FCS 

Spin-outs. 

FCS is the right solution for the future which impacts the entire Army. Five years 

of requests from combatant commanders confirms what the Army needs: increased 

lethality, survivability, battle command on the move, battlefield awareness, and 

sustainment. FCS best fills these needs. Further, FCS technologies are validated in 

the hands of combat experienced Soldiers from the Army Evaluation Task Force, 

Fort Bliss, Texas. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Young. 

Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow.] 

REPORTED READINESS

Question. Virtually all of the Army’s major combat units are either currently deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, recovering from such a deployment, or preparing for 

another such deployment. Because of this, essentially all non-deployed major combat 

units report low readiness scores. 

Many defense policy experts and some military officials have expressed concern 

that with so much of the U.S.’s ground forces committed to existing operations, it 

would be very difficult for the U.S. to respond to a new crisis. At the same time, 

the very high level of commitment to existing operations features prominently in 

justifications for increasing the size of the Army and Marine Corps. 

Gentlemen, the Committee understands that units deploying to Afghanistan and 

Iraq are reported to be well equipped and well trained. However, in a similar hearing last year at this time we were told that the Army was almost totally focused 

on the Iraq and Afghanistan missions and that generating equipped, trained and 

ready forces for any other contingency would be very challenging. 

Other than the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, what is the threat that you are 

preparing the Army to deter or defeat? 

Answer. In addition to preparing forces for counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army must also prepare for contingencies that require forces to operate across the full range of military missions. Current operational requirements for 

forces and limited periods between deployments necessitate a focus on counterinsurgency to the detriment of preparing for the full range of military missions. The 

Army is consumed with meeting the demands of the current fight and is unable to 

provide for other contingencies as rapidly as we would like. With your support we 

will continue to rebuild readiness, achieve balance, and restore strategic depth for 

future challenges. 

Question. Does the Army currently have a strategic reserve? 

Answer. Yes, the strategic reserves are those formations which are not deployed 

or next to deploy. The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model synchronizes the 

planning, prioritization, and resourcing for sustainable force generation, to include 

adding depth for strategic needs. 

Question. Given the state of the Army’s combat units today, how well prepared 

would the U.S. be to respond to any new military crisis that might occur? 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
33 

Answer. We are a combat-seasoned force with the best current forces in the world. 

We would respond with our sister services to other crises, but not as rapidly as we 

would like. 

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS (FCS) 

Question. The Army capstone acquisition program is the Future Combat Systems. 

It is 14 systems including eight manned ground vehicles, unattended ground systems, the Non-Line of Sight Launch System, two unmanned aerial systems, plus the 

soldier and high speed wireless communications. The FCS request for fiscal year 2009 is $3.6 billion (RDTE = $3,272M; Procure- ment = $331M). Procurement funds are requested to spin out maturing technology 

to the current force brigade combat teams. 

The FCS program will field a total of 15 brigades, by fielding one brigade a year 

starting in 2015. FCS brigades will comprise 15 of the Army’s total of 76 combat 

brigades. The Army’s will add a new set of complex vehicles to an already burdened 

system that currently supports Abrams Tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, Strykers 

and Paladin Artillery. General Casey, will FCS, when fielded, only add to the 

Army’s logistical complexity? 

Answer. FCS is being built to enable more efficient logistics support in the future. 

We have intentionally designed the FCS systems to realize 70 percent commonality 

between systems to reduce the number of unique components that will require support by the logistics systems. The FCS systems are also being designed with three 

to four times the reliability of the current force systems, thus helping to reduce the 

logistics burden through fewer parts required, fewer mechanics to install them, and 

fewer mechanics to install them, and fewer trucks to carry them. The FCS network 

fully integrates the logistics software applications with battle command to allow Soldiers logistical decision support concurrently with battle command. This network enabled logistics capability will require smaller stockages of spare parts to achieve required readiness. 

Question. FCS is expected to cost a total of $160 to 200 billion. Can the Army 

afford FCS? 

Answer. The Army can afford FCS. FCS is currently less than three percent of 

the Army’s base budget. At its peak, in fiscal year 2015, FCS is projected to be less 

than a third of the Army’s investment account. As the investment account is about 

a quarter of the total budget, FCS procurement cost is unlikely to exceed eight percent of the Army’s budget in any year. 

Continued investment in FCS is essential to deliver the capabilities the Army 

needs. Investments in FCS have produced technologies that are making a difference 

in combat today. These include advanced vehicle armor being used to protect Soldiers in High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles; precursor FCS Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicles; and robotics being used to locate and defeat Improvised Explosive 

Devices. We are leveraging the FCS investment to provide capabilities to the current force through Spin-outs, but we need to get these capabilities to our Soldiers 

faster. 

Question. Can the Army accelerate the FCS program, given additional resources? 

Answer. Yes. Currently the Army plans to begin fielding the Future Combat Systems Brigade Combat Team in 2015 with the first-half of a brigade. Thereafter, a 

brigade will be delivered each year until 15 brigades have been fielded. The delivery 

rate of brigade combat teams is governed by available funding. Additionally, the delivered quantity of the spin out maturing technologies we deliver through spin outs 

and the congressionally mandated fielding of Non-Line of Sight-Cannon is directly 

correlated to funding. 

MODULARITY

Question. The Army is in the process of converting to the modular brigade structure, while fighting a war, with approximately half of the active component brigades 

deployed to the combat theaters. In fiscal year 2006, the Army had 51 brigade combat teams. By the end of fiscal year 2008 the Army plans to have 69 brigade combat 

teams. 

What are the key differences between a modular brigade combat team and the 

previous brigade structure? 

Are modular brigades smaller than the previous brigades? 

Answer. Modular Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) are larger than previous brigades because structure that had been previously task-organized from the division 

base is now organic, enabling modular BCTs to train as they will fight. Key differences between previous brigade structure and modular BCTs are: (1) modular 

BCTs are designed with organic combined arms battalions and organic combat supVerDate Nov 24 2008 04:48 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
34 

port and combat service support; (2) the number of maneuver companies in each brigade increases from 10 to 11; (3) modular BCTs include a reconnaissance squadron 

to provide a more robust suite of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities; (4) battalion and brigade staffs are more robust and include organic psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs, and public affairs capabilities; and (5) command posts are satellite based, more robust, and linked to national assets. Any modular BCT can be attached to any division, corps, or joint headquarters without extensive augmentation or reorganization to any operation across the spectrum of operations. 

Question. Please discuss the utility of adding an infantry battalion to each of the 

modular brigades. The idea is to increase combat power without requiring a significant increase in command and logistical functions. Does this make sense and is the 

Army exploring such an idea? 

Answer. The Army continually assesses the utility of the modular force designs 

and applies changes based on lessons learned and operational experience. The Army 

must balance the strategic risk of preserving the All-Volunteer Force in persistent 

conflict, the operational risk of providing sufficient capacity to support joint force 

rotational requirements, and the tactical risk of maintaining sufficient capability 

within the brigade combat team (BCT) to conduct successful full spectrum operations. The current BCT design includes one reconnaissance and surveillance squadron with three troops and two maneuver combined arms battalions with four companies each. 

Question. What is the impact of modularity on equipment requirements? If additional equipment is needed, is that equipment fully funded? 

Answer. The transformation of our force has driven up the requirements for 

equipping. From 2005 to 2013, we plan to provide $174.9 billion in equipment 

through the base budget ($41 billion for the Reserve Component (RC): $29.4 billion 

to ARNG and about $11.6 billion for Army Reserve, and $133.9 billion for the active 

component) to meet these increased requirements. Premodularity equipment shortfalls require supplemental appropriations to help close the gap between requirements and existing equipment and modernization shortfalls. We need continued 

Congressional support for this plan. Without it, we will be unable to fully meet 

equipment requirements across all of our components. 

The Army had significant equipping challenges prior to 9/11. Particularly noteworthy were the equipment shortages and lack of modernization in the RC. Because 

of the need to integrate the RC to meet the demand of persistent conflict, the Army 

has adopted a new total force operating strategy that resources units based on their 

deployment window, regardless of component. The previous incremental ‘‘tiered’’ 

resourcing strategy, which resulted in the active and most RC units, who deployed 

later, being equipped last, and with the least modernized equipment. Additional 

funding gained through supplemental spending will fill shortages and modernize 

outdated equipment in the force and fund payback plans for diverted RC equipment. 

The Equipping Strategy is linked to the time-phased transformation of the Army 

into the modular force. 

Question. Has the Army been able to meet the schedule for forming modular brigade combat teams? What have been the key challenges in terms of personnel and 

equipment? 

Answer. Yes and we are on track to complete personnel growth by 2010 and modular brigade combat team (BCT) growth by the end of FY 2011. The most significant 

challenges to meeting this timeline are manning and equipping. 

Our most significant personnel challenges are providing sufficient captains and 

majors in the logistics, military intelligence, and aviation specialties. Our equipping 

strategy minimizes risk to the current force and maintains momentum in equipment 

modernization. Our three most significant equipping challenges are battle command 

systems, trucks, and night vision devices. 

GROW-THE-ARMY BRIGADES

Question. Currently, and over the next several years, the Army is adding endstrength and equipment in order to form six new infantry brigades. 

When will the Grow-the-Army brigades be available for combat deployment? 

Answer. The Grow the Army (GTA) brigade combat teams. (BCTs) will be available for deployment approximately one year after they activate. The Army will activate one additional BCT in each year from 2008–2010 and three BCTs in 2011. By 

the end of FY11, all GTA BCTs will be available for deployment. 

Question. What is the status of manning, equipping and training the Grow-theArmy Brigades? 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
35 

Answer. The Army is on track to complete personnel growth by 2010, BCT growth 

by 2011 and equipment growth for the BCTs by 2015. To monitor our progress in 

meeting these goals, the Army conducts a monthly Force Validation Committee 

process to synchronize resourcing functions for select units that will deploy or convert within a given window. 

Question. Is the necessary equipment for the Grow-the-Army Brigades fully funded? 

Answer. The Army’s current program from 2008–2013 provides a total of $68.6 billion to include $17.0 billion in procurement to support the original Grow the 

Army 2012 brigade combat team (BCT) timeline. The Army has approved an accelerated Grow the Army timeline that will have all BCTs in the force by 2011, and 

will require an additional $2.6 billion in funding for personnel and training. 

Question. Will all the new brigades be light infantry brigades? 

Answer. The Grow the Army (GTA) initiative was based on increasing rotational 

depth and filling global operational demands as quickly as possible. The growth of 

six Active Component (AC) Infantry BCTs was the optimal way to accomplish the 

rapid growth with a structure suitable to meeting current operational demands in 

an era of persistent conflict. This decision is subject to review based on the results 

of Total Army Analysis and the Quadrennial Defense Review. This process will analyze existing requirements, current operational demand, and projected future demand to ensure we have the appropriate mix of Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker BCTs 

within the force and across the Active Component and Army National Guard. 

EQUIPMENT ON HAND READINESS

Question. The Committee understands that equipment readiness is a function of 

both procuring equipment in the desired quantities, and maintaining that equipment in an acceptable operational status. Combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in high usage rates under very demanding environmental conditions, additionally, some equipment is damaged or destroyed as a result of direct 

combat. 

What are the Army’s most serious equipment shortfalls in terms of equipment on 

hand and equipment maintenance: in ground combat vehicles; support vehicles; in 

aviation; in communications? 

Answer. The Army’s most serious equipment shortfalls are in tactical wheeled vehicles. The current shortfalls are due to converting to the modular force, growing 

the Army, and requirements in Theater. The Army has no significant shortfall in 

ground combat vehicles. For aviation, the only significant shortage is the OH–58D 

Kiowa Warrior. This system is no longer being produced and will be replaced by the 

Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter beginning in fiscal year 2011. For communications, the Army’s most significant shortage is in Warfighter Information NetworkTactical telecommunications hubs, as well as battlefield communications suites 

which provide long-haul communications and command and control. The Army is 

meeting all requirements for deployed forces and has an equipping strategy to eliminate these shortfalls over time. 

Equipment maintenance funded by reset dollars has enabled deployed forces to 

maintain equipment readiness levels greater than 90% for ground equipment and 

greater than 75% for aviation equipment for the last five years. 

RESET FUNDING

Question. For fiscal year 2008, the supplemental request that came up with the budget included for Reset $7.8 billion in Operation and Maintenance and $5.8 billion in procurement funding for a total of almost $14 billion. That budget request 

was updated in October. In December Congress provided a bridge fund to ensure 

continued support for our deployed forces and to avoid breaks in funding for key 

procurement programs supporting Reset. 

What is your current estimate of the total Reset requirement for fiscal year 2008 

for Operation and Maintenance and Procurement funds? Answer. For fiscal year 2008, the Army’s total revised reset requirement is $16.9 billion. This includes $7.8 billion in Operation and Maintenance and $9.1 billion in 

procurement funding. In the fall of 2007, the Army amended its initial request and 

increased the procurement request from $5.8 billion to $10.5 billion. This additional 

procurement funding was requested to replace battle losses, worn-out theater provided equipment, and replenish Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS). 

In the 2008 bridge funding, the Army received $10.7 billion. This included all of 

the $7.8 billion requested in Operation and Maintenance funding and only $2.9 billion in procurement funding. A procurement shortfall of $7.6 billion remained from 

the amended request. This was reduced to $6.2 billion through contracting effiVerDate Nov 24 2008 04:48 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
36 

ciencies, program termination, and fact of life changes. The remaining procurement 

dollars are required by May 26, 2008 to preclude delays in the reset and recapitalization of Abrams Tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs). 

Question. What is your estimate of the Reset requirement for fiscal year 2009? 

Answer. The Army’s request for reset funding will be included in the fiscal year 

2009 Supplemental request, which has not yet been released by The Office of the 

Secretary of Defense. 

PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT SETS

Question. The Army drew upon prepositioned equipment sets to sustain initial 

combat operations in Iraq. Some equipment was repaired and replaced in 

prepositioned sets only to be dawn out again for the surge. 

What is the readiness posture of Army prepositioned sets today? 

Answer. The readiness posture of the Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) available 

equipment sets for APS–4 are at 88%–95% of fill. The APS reconstitution plan will 

ensure all the other APS equipment sets will have a readiness posture of 95–100% 

of fill. 

(1) APS–4 in Korea and Japan is available; it is comprised of a heavy brigade 

combat team (BCT) (95%) and a tailored sustainment brigade (88%). APS–4 will be 

completed by 4th Qtr FY08. 

(2) APS–3 Afloat has a Port Opening Package capability in Guam at 90% of fill. 

This set consists of a temporary afloat set of 20 units (12 port openings and eight 

medical units/teams) loaded aboard the USNS Pomeroy. The full sustainment brigade set will be completed in FY11. 

(3) APS–5 is issued and is planned for reconstitution when no longer required for 

ongoing operations in accordance with APS Strategy 2015. 

Question. What is the time line to have all the prepositioned sets returned to their 

desired readiness? 

Answer. The Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) were used to support Operation 

Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and to accelerate the build 

of the brigade combat teams (BCTs). The Army has developed an APS reconstitution 

timeline to support the approved APS Strategy 2015, the FY10–15 Program Objective Memorandum (based on equipment availability) and Army resource 

prioritization. 

• Current Year: 

• APS–5: Infantry Brigade Combat Team 

• Near Term: 

• APS–5: Heavy Brigade Combat Team #1 

• APS–3: Infantry Brigade Combat Team #1, Sustainment Brigade #1 

• APS–2: Heavy Brigade Combat Team 

• APS–5: Infantry Battalion 

• Mid Term to 2014: 

• APS–3: Infantry Brigade Combat Team #2, Sustainment Brigade #2 

• APS–5: Fires Brigade, Sustainment Brigades #1 and #2 

Question. Does the Army intend to add MRAP vehicles to pre-positioned equipment sets? 

Answer. Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles will be incorporated 

into APS–5 and APS–3 when no longer required for operational use (variant type 

TBD). MRAP availability will be based on the results of the U.S. Army Training and 

Doctrine Command’s Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy. 

Question. Given the deployment capability of U.S. Forces and the uncertain nature of conventional and unconventional threats, are prepositioned sets a wise investment? Would it be a wiser course of action to take the equipment from the prepositioned sets and use it to outfit modular brigades and the new Grow-the-Army 

brigades? 

Answer. Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) is a strategic asset that has proven its 

value in every recent major contingency. APS provides the strategic responsiveness 

to deploy globally to any contingency operation. The Global War on Terrorism 

(GWOT) has demonstrated that the APS program is flexible, responsive, and critical 

to the Army’s ability to deploy forces in support of the Combatant Commander requirements and adapt to changing strategic requirements. APS was used to support 

both OIF and OEF. Diverting the APS equipment to support the building of modular BCTs and Grow the Army effort limits the ability to rapidly reinforce forward 

units by air movement. Current operational plans and future planning scenarios include requirements that use APS sets. The Army complies with the National DeVerDate Nov 24 2008 04:48 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
37 

fense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2007 to identify any APS sets utilized and the 

plans to reconstitute those APS sets annually. 

Question. In November 2007, the Army announced a new Army Prepositioned 

Stocks Strategy 2015. Please outline the new strategy, and what are the funding 

requirements for fiscal year 2009? 

Answer. Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) Strategy 2015’s equipment sets provide 

a balanced suite of global capabilities which will foster the Army’s rapid deployment 

to both combat and Steady State Security Posture operations. The end-state for APS 

Strategy 2015, illustrated in the attached diagram, consists of five APS sets. APS– 

1 consists of Operational Project stocks to support both Homeland Defense and 

Combatant Commands. APS–2 consists of one heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) 

set to support European Command’s, African Command’s (AFRICOM), and Central 

Command’s (CENTCOM) areas of responsibility (AORs). APS–3 consists of two Infantry BCT sets with Up-Armored HMMWV (UAH) and/or Mine Resistant Ambush 

Protected (MRAP) vehicle wheel augmentation sets, two sustainment brigade sets 

and two ammunition ships, which are multi-apportioned to support Pacific Command’s, AFRICOM’s, and CENTCOM’s AORs. APS–4 consists of one HBCT, one 

sustainment brigade set, and Army watercraft to support Pacific Command’s 

(PACOM) AOR. APS–5 consists of one HBCT set with UAH and/or MRAP wheel 

augmentation, one fires brigade set, two sustainment brigade sets, and Army 

watercraft stationed at the Kuwaiti Naval Base. APS–5 also includes an infantry 

battalion set with a forward support company, with UAH/or MRAP wheeled augmentation sets in Afghanistan to support CENTCOM’s AOR. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
38 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 109 here 46476A.001
39 

• APS–2—($13 million), funds operations to maintain limited equipment and 

ammunition at Livorno, Italy and Medical Supplies at Pirmasens, Germany to 

include support to War Reserve Stocks for Allies—Israel. 

• APS–3—($157 million), funds operations to maintain equipment for the port 

opening package and funds lease operations of one large, medium speed roll-on, 

roll-off (LMSR) for the port opening package, three LMSRs in reduced operating 

status–10, and two ammunition container ships. Also funds personnel to begin 

the reset of equipment and secondary items for APS upload that will occur in 

FY10. It does not pay for the two remaining LMSRs we downloaded and placed 

in reduced operating status—30. 

• APS–4—($59 million), funds maintenance and operations to maintain the full 

unit sets and operational projects in Korea, Japan, and Hawaii. Operational 

projects will be filled using FY08 and FY09 Supplemental funds. 

• APS–5—($57 million), funds reset of the prepare-to-deploy-order (PTDO) in- fantry BCT and planned reset of the heavy BCT. Funds the $12 million annual 

Oman access fee. 

• War reserves secondary items—($102 million), funds the purchase of items 

with expiration dates (mostly medical) that need to be replaced in APS–4 and 

operational projects. Also funds the purchase of APS–2 authorized stockage 

level/primary load list/unit basic load stocks. Buys upgrades in medical sets currently on-hand in Korea. 

With the continued support of the Congress, the Army will be able to return 

equipment to prepositioned stocks by 2015. 

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLES

Question. As the threat from Improvised Explosive Devices and Explosively 

Formed Penetrators grew, the limit of how much armor could be applied to the 

HMMWV was reached. The DoD identified the MRAP-type trucks to provide greater 

force protection. The Army seemed skeptical at first about acquiring MRAPs in large 

numbers. General, what is the current Army acquisition objective for MRAPs? 

Answer. The current Army acquisition objective for MRAPs is 10,000 systems 

(based on the September 2007 interim requirement). A new interim requirement for 

12,000 MRAPs is currently in staffing. The final requirement is dependent on many 

factors, including future actions taken by the enemy. 

Question. When do you expect to reach your acquisition goal? 

Answer. The current plan is to procure the 10,000 systems by October 2008 and 

field them by December 2008. If a new interim requirement of 12,000 is adopted, 

it is anticipated that these systems could be produced by February 2009 and fielded 

by April 2009. 

Question. What is the proper mix of HMMWVs and MRAPS? 

Answer. A mix of approximately two-thirds MRAPs to one-third Up-Armored 

HMMWVs per brigade appears about right. However, it is premature to tell which 

variant of MRAP is superior or to provide definitive feedback on performance, final 

numbers, and/or category mixes. 

Question. Is the Army MRAP requirement fully funded? 

Answer. The Army has been funded for 10,000 systems. The Joint Program Office 

is adequately funded to procure 12,000 systems for the Army. 

Question. What are your plans for the MRAP vehicles once the war in Iraq is 

over? 

Answer. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command is conducting tactical 

wheeled vehicle analyses that include: (1) mission roles and profiles; and (2) threats 

and capabilities of the various fleets including the MRAP, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and HMMWV. The initial results of those analyses will influence programmed 

objective memorandum decisions; the Force Mix Brief to Congress; and the Combat 

and Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy due to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 

July 2008. The Army’s Tactical Wheeled Vehicle strategy is an ongoing effort to ensure our Soldiers receive the best capabilities available in ground wheeled vehicles 

to meet current and emerging threats. 

CONTRACTORS AND READINESS

Question. The Department of Defense has made a major effort to outsource support functions in order to allow soldiers to remain focused on core military skills 

and duties. The proliferation of contractors performing support functions ranges 

from the dining facility to aircraft maintenance. Contractors are working side-byside with military forces at home station and in the combat theaters. 

How important are contractor services to military readiness at home station, and 

at forward deployed locations? 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
40 

Answer. Contractor services are an essential part of military readiness. In 1955, 

the Executive Branch determined that the government should not compete with its 

citizens. Therefore, federal agencies generally obtain commercial services from the 

public sector. After the Vietnam War, the Department of Defense’s force structure 

was drastically reduced and after becoming an All Volunteer force in 1973, the 

Army increased the number of support contractors. The Department of the Army focused on rebuilding its military war fighting core functions and relied more on contractors to provide administrative, logistics, and other support functions. 

In the early 1990s, the Army reduced military and civilian personnel to take advantage of the peace dividend with the end of the Cold War. These personnel cuts 

significantly reduced the number of government civilians and Soldiers performing 

operational, administrative, and logistics support functions for the Army. As a result, these functions were obtained via contracts which enabled the Army to reduce 

the number of officers and enlisted personnel performing administrative functions. 

Today, Army operations require a mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel 

to deliver global logistical support and capabilities to meet the needs of our war 

fighters both at home station and forward deployed. 

Question. What is the commander’s role in defining contractor duties; in supervising contractors; and in disciplining contractors? 

Answer. Primary oversight of contractor performance and conduct falls to the cognizant contracting officer, and is generally dictated by the terms of the government 

contract. 

Contract employees are required to comply with all guidance, instructions, and 

general orders issued by the Theater Commander, as incorporated by the government’s contract, including those relating to force protection security, health, safety, 

or relations and interaction with local nationals. 

Commanders may refer contractor criminal misconduct to DoD/Department of 

Justice under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), and if jurisdiction is declined, may then consider the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 2, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in coordination with DoD. 

Question. Training scenarios at the National Training Center and at other locations include role players who represent the Iraqi population. Do Army training scenarios include role players for contractors, such as contractor security personnel? 

Answer. Army maneuver Combat Training Centers (CTCs) primarily use personnel assigned to their opposing force cadre to replicate the various contractors in 

theater, including private security contractors. In many instances the centers use 

Arabic-speaking personnel to role-play contractors working on US Field Operating 

Bases, since US forces in theater are in day-to-day contact with Arabic contractors. 

Army maneuver CTCs are working to integrate scenarios, which include actual personnel from contracted companies. 

Every Army maneuver CTC also challenges deploying forces to work through 

Rules of Engagement and Escalation of Force scenarios that involve private security 

contractors in Situational Training Exercises or scripted situations during their Mission Rehearsal Exercise. Training of unit contracting officials at CTCs occurs, but 

is limited due to constrained resources (time, expertise and dollars) that are focused 

on other mission-essential training tasks and capabilities. 

At maneuver CTCs, unit officials are trained on the basics of the contracting process from start to finish, and specifically on how to manage Commander Emergency 

Relief Program contracts to completion in coordination with role players for ‘‘local 

contractors,’’ Provincial Reconstruction Team members, and representatives of the 

US Agency for International Development. With the Battle Command Training Program, division and corps staff officers discuss best contracting practices with actual 

subject matter expert from theatre. Additionally, a Joint Personnel Recovery Activity workshop is given, which discusses the accounting and recovery of contractors 

on the battlefield. 

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. A key principle of the U.S. Armed Forces is to attract and retain competent personal to assure readiness and operational effectiveness. While the services 

have generally met their aggregate recruiting and retention goals, the GAO reports 

that the Army has experienced shortages in mission-critical occupational specialties 

such as health care, human intelligence collection, and explosive ordnance disposal. 

There is growing concern within the department as to how the Army can meet current operational demands with what appear to be chronic shortages in these occupational specialties. In addition, there is growing concern that recruitment standards 

have been relaxed to meet numbers. 

Please describe the standards by which candidates are measured. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
41 

Do you expect these standards to be relaxed further to achieve the aggressive recruitment goals? 

Answer. The Army adjusted to the DoD standards in August 2005, in line with 

the rest of the services, of 60% Test Score Category (TSC) I-IIIA and 4% TSC IV. 

Previously, Army had an internal goal of at least 67% TSC I-IIIA, and no more than 

2% TSC IV. The Armed Forces Qualification Score (AFQT) average score has ranged 

between 56.5% and 57% since FY04, so adjusting to DoD standards has not affected 

the quality of the force. 

Applicants are measured based on the percentile in which they score on the 

AFQT. TSC I-IIIA includes those applicants who score in the top half (50th percentile or higher). TSC IIIB includes those who score between the 31st and 49th 

percentile. TSC IV includes those who score between the 10th and the 30th percentile, of which the Army typically only enlists those in the 21st percentile or higher. The lowest category is TSC V (9th percentile or lower). By law, the military does 

not enlist TSC V applicants. 

The recruiting environment remains challenging and the Army remains focused 

on recruiting a quality force in line with DoD quality mark standards. 

Question. Recruiting and retention goals are often relayed to Congress in the aggregate, providing little or no visibility into how each occupational specialty is 

staffed. Will you provide the Committee with details on recruiting and retention by 

MOS? 

Answer. The Army monitors the strength of each MOS carefully to ensure each 

required skill is properly manned and maintained. Due to several factors, including 

high entrance standards, high volume requirements, and undesirable duties, recruiting and retention is more difficult for some MOSs. To compensate, the Army uses 

priorities and incentives, both monetary and non-monetary, to shape the recruiting 

and retention efforts by MOS. 

The active Army is meeting its year-to-date goals for overall recruiting and is generally doing well at the MOS level. However, there are a few MOSs that are below 

their targets, including: Patriot Fire Control Operator/Maintainer (81%), Microwave 

System Operator (49%), Military Intelligence Systems Maintainer (74%), and Psychological Operations Specialist (76%). As the year progresses, the recruiting force 

places special emphasis on these MOSs to ensure that each critical skill is manned 

to the required levels. One way the Army does this is through the quarterly Multicomponent Enlisted Incentives Review Board, which aligns incentives and priorities 

with the needs of each MOS. For example, Microwave System Operator now receives 

the highest enlistment bonus available to assist in achieving its annual target. 

As the Army continues to transform and grow, the Army Retention Program will 

continue to adjust, encouraging the right Soldiers with the right skills to reenlist 

to meet the manning requirements of a growing Army. In a time of war and sustained operational demand, retention is a significant indicator of the quality of our 

leaders and the commitment of our Soldiers. Currently, the Army is meeting or exceeding its objectives in each category (initials, mid-careerist and careerists). 

Through targeted reenlistment incentives, the Army is addressing specialties that 

are currently short due to rapid growth and transformation. The incentives for each 

specialty are adjusted semi-annually using the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Review Board. Shortages in critical skills such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 

Specialist, Human Intelligence Collector, Motor Transport Operator and some others 

are continually targeted for some of our most robust incentives. 

DWELL TIME

Question. One essential element in maintaining troop morale during wartime is 

to provide some guarantees that there will be time to rest between deployments to 

combat zones. This rest is officially called ‘dwell time’. At one point dwell time for 

the U.S. Army was a ratio of 1:2, 12 months in combat, 24 months at home. Due 

to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Army dwell time has evolved to a 1:1 ratio. 

However, on April 11, 2007, Secretary Gates announced a new policy that active 

Army units now in the Central Command area of responsibility and those headed 

there will deploy for not more than 15 months and will return home to home stations for not less than 12 months. 

Gentleman, there have been numerous articles regarding DoD consistently cutting 

‘dwell time’ for our combat units, do you expect that ‘dwell-time’ standards will be 

further relaxed or changed? 

Answer. The Secretary of Defense’s current policy is that Soldiers will receive a 

minimum of 12 months dwell in between deployments. The Army hopes to gradually 

increase dwell time beyond 12 months. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
42 

Question. Gentleman, the Army dwell time ratio at one point was 1:2, then 1:1, 

and now it’s 15 months in theater and 12 months off, the Marines’ dwell time is 

seven months in theater and seven months off. Has there been any evaluation as 

to whose system is better? 

Answer. As I understand the Marine Corps force deployment model, it is very 

similar to ours. Both the Army and the Marine Corps are rotating their combat 

forces at slightly less than a 1:1 deployment to dwell ratio. Army combat units currently spend up to 15 months overseas, with at least 12 months to reset and prepare. In other words, Soldiers are deployed 15 months out of 27 months. Marines 

deploy for seven month rotations with only six months back or, for two cycles, 14 

months for seven month rotations with only six months back or, for two cycles, 14 

months deployed out of 26 months. 

Question. It is our understanding that during dwell time, in addition to resting 

and spending time with family, soldiers are also supposed to go through training. 

However, with dwell being cut short, what steps are in place to make sure our soldiers receive the proper training? 

Answer. Before deploying, unit commanders in all Army components (Active, Reserve, and Guard) are required to prepare their unit for the tasks essential to successful accomplishment of the unit’s directed mission. Additionally, unit commanders ensure personnel have accomplished pre-deployment training required by 

the gaining combatant commander, as specified in training guidance of the appropriate Army Command that is providing forces to the gaining combatant commander. When necessary, deployment is delayed until these requirements are met. 

To assist unit leaders in accomplishing training required of their directed mission, 

the Army provides a mission rehearsal exercise to all deploying brigade combat 

teams at Army maneuver combat training centers or, by exception, at their home 

station. These exercises require unit personnel to perform mission essential tasks 

in realistic situations, under conditions approximating the operating environment of 

their directed mission, against an unpredictable opposing force, under the watchful 

eye of subject matter experts. A similar computer-driven mission readiness exercise 

is provided to deploy headquarters by the Army’s Battle Command Training Program. 

Question. Is the training that the soldiers are receiving limited to the Global War 

on Terrorism (GWOT)? 

Answer. Currently, dwell time is insufficient to allow most Army units redeploying to Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom to train on 

any operational theme other than their directed mission. Units exclusively prepare 

to conduct offensive, defensive and stability in an irregular war, or counterinsurgency, campaign for the operational environment they will encounter in the Central 

Command area of operations. 

As dwell time increases, units will be able to devote increasing amounts of training time to the core tasks they were designed to perform in major combat operations 

as well as irregular warfare. This strategy increases our readiness for unforeseen 

contingencies. 

Question. How much did last year’s ‘‘surge’’ effect ‘dwell time’ for soldiers? 

Answer. Deployment lengths and dwell times are a function of available supply 

and global combatant commander demands. The CENTCOM commander demands 

over half the available brigade combat teams (BCTs) in the Army’s inventory. To 

enable the combatant commands, in particular the warfighting commanders in OIF, 

to employ necessary combat and enabling capabilities, the Army took an additional 

force management risk during 2007 and 2008. Any reduction in surge forces levels 

will allow a return to more sustainable deployment lengths. We continue to examine 

ways to reduce that further. The Army’s short-term goal is to give active component 

Soldiers at least the same amount of time home as they are deployed (1:1 ratio) and 

to have reserve component forces mobilized for 12 months every four years (1:4 

ratio). The Army’s long-term sustainable goal is to allow active component units and 

Soldiers three times the amount of time home as they are deployed (1:3 ratio), or 

27 months home for every nine months deployed. The Army’s long-term goal for the 

reserve component is 12 months mobilized for every five years not mobilized (1:5 

ratio). The recent approval of the Army’s accelerated Grow the Army plan is designed to more rapidly improve the deployment to dwell ratio for units. Army initiatives could bring the Army back into balance beginning in 2011. 

Question. Gentlemen, when dwell time is cut short what is done to help the families of deployed soldiers? 

Answer. The Army is committed to a deliberate reset of our people following each 

deployment. During periods of dwell time, Soldiers and Families face a number of 

demands that compete for their time. The Deployment Cycle Support (DCS) program provides a roadmap for commanders, units, and installations before, during 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
43 

and after deployments. The DCS directive applies to both Active and Reserve Component Soldiers and Families. Execution of the directive’s checklist ensures that 

critical redeployment and pre-deployment tasks are completed and that Soldiers and 

Families are provided support resources when issues are identified. 

The Army provides a host of support services to Families during dwell time. Military Family Life consultants provide reunion and reintegration support to Soldiers 

and their Families to reduce deployment stress. New Parent Support Program home 

visitors perform visits to support the needs and training of parents with children 

aged three and younger, and to identify Families at risk and reduce incidents of 

child neglect or abuse. The Family Advocacy program provides education and prevention services that help Families cope with challenges before, during, and after 

deployment. Other programs include Virtual Family Readiness Groups, Employment 

Readiness Program, Army Integrated Family Support Network, and Army Family 

Team Building Training Program. 

Child and Youth Services programs assist Families by providing extended hours, 

around-the-clock, and hourly child care; respite/reintegration care; reduced program 

fees for deployed parents; outreach and support services; and communication with 

deployed parents. Operation Military Child Care and Operation Military Kids support geographically dispersed Families by helping Soldiers locate Army-sponsored, 

community-based child care at reduced rates and providing outreach services, such 

as tutoring, skills classes, transportation, support groups, mobile technology labs, 

camps, etc. 

GROWTH IN CONTRACTOR PROVIDED SERVICES

Question. The Army’s obligations on service contracts rose from $3.8 billion in fiscal year 1997 to $22.9 billion in fiscal year 2007 (per 2009 President’s Budget). This 

is a growth of $19.1 billion, or 500% over 10 years (inflation accounted for 17% of 

this growth). 

Over the same period, the Army’s obligations for civilian pay rose $2.4 billion, or 

51% (pay raise accounted for 30% of this growth). Who in the Army has oversight 

for ‘‘contract services’’? 

Answer. The oversight of services acquisition is the shared responsibility of requiring activities, contracting activities, and the Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) (ASA (ALT)). 

The ASA (ALT) retains responsibility over the acquisition of services and has delegated authority to review and approve service acquisitions with a total planned 

value of $500 million or more to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy 

& Procurement) (DASA P&P). Prior to approving any acquisition of services with 

a total planned value of $1 billion or more, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) must be notified. 

Acquisition of services with a total planned value of $500 are reviewed by the 

Army Service Strategy Panel, chaired by the DASA P&P. Since April 2003, 28 Army 

service acquisitions valued at above $500 million have been reviewed under these 

procedures. These acquisitions represent a total estimated value of over $249 billion. 

Contracting Officer’s Representatives (CORs) provide the day-to-day oversight of 

the contractor’s performance. CORs help ensure the government obtains quality 

services, on time, and at the level and prices specified in the contract. 

As of February 23, 2006, the Secretary of the Army requires Headquarters, Department of the Army principals and senior commanders at Army Command, Army 

Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units to be responsible for the 

approval for requirements for contracted services. The Assistant Secretary of the 

Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) reports these requirements directly to the 

Secretary of the Army. 

Question. How are Army commanders at the various levels of command trained 

to manage contracting out for services? 

Answer. The Army has a wide range of schools that its officers attend throughout 

their career and before they enter into command positions. 

• Command & General Staff School, Command & General Staff College 

• School for Command Preparation, Command & General Staff College 

• Garrison Precommand Course, Army Management Staff College 

• General Officer Senior Command Course, Army Management Staff College 

The Command & General Staff School provides a core course entitled F–106, Military Contracting and Ethics. This course covers why and how the Army uses contracting to effectively support military operations; considerations and effective planning for contracting support; types of contracts—what and how they provide support 

to include their capabilities and limitations, authorities and responsibilities for identifying requirements, drafting statements of work, and overseeing contractor perVerDate Nov 24 2008 04:48 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
44 

formance; role of the contracting officer’s representative; and obligations and restrictions concerning oversight of contractor personnel. 

In addition, exercise training venues, such as the Combat Training Centers, are 

incorporating realistic contracting training scenarios into operational training. 

Question. How does the work that contractors perform differ from the work that 

civilian employees perform? 

Answer. The Army uses the manpower mix criteria in Department of Defense Instruction 1100.22 to determine what functions are military essential, inherently governmental, exempt from private-sector performance, or available for contractor performance. In general terms, contractors perform commercially available functions 

and government civilians perform inherently governmental functions. The area in 

between, functions exempt from private-sector performance, is a less distinct area. 

An example of a function exempt from private-sector performance is the ‘‘contracting’’ function. Managers and leaders need to be able to exempt the ‘‘contracting’’ 

function from private-sector performance even though it is commercially available. 

When performed as a ‘‘contract specialist’’ this function is commercial but closely related to inherently governmental functions. At the same time the government needs 

to have a career path to more senior levels where this function performs inherently 

governmental duties as a ‘‘contracting officer’’. In order to develop government ‘‘contracting officers’’ we must have government ‘‘contract specialists’’. 

MENTAL HEALTH ADVISORY TEAM (MHAT) 

Question. The U.S. Army Surgeon General chartered the Operation Iraqi Freedom 

(OIF) Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) in July 2003. Its mission was to assess 

OIF-related mental health issues and to provide recommendations to OIF medical 

and line commands. MHAT–V was also deployed to Afghanistan for the first time. 

The MHAT conducted group interviews and surveys of soldiers. Many of the soldiers 

who participated had been engaged in combat. This was the fifth assessment of soldiers via surveys in OIF and first time for OEF soldiers in this manner regarding 

behavioral issues during active combat. On May 6, 2008, DoD released the fifth 

MHAT study since 2003. MHAT–V was conducted in August and October of 2007 

and assessed more than 2,279 soldiers and for the first time 889 soldiers from Afghanistan. Units were specifically targeted for this survey because they experienced 

the highest level of combat exposure. 

Gentlemen, according to the Mental Health Advisory Team report, soldiers who 

deployed longer (greater than six months) or had deployed multiple times were more 

likely to screen positive for a mental health issue. What steps are taken to assure 

that these soldiers get the proper attention? 

Answer. The Walter Reed Army Institute of Research continues behavioral health 

research prevalence and intervention studies aimed at reducing mental health problems of Soldiers across the deployment cycle (e.g., Battlemind psychological debriefing, and expressive writing). Operationally, the Task Force 62 Medical Brigade conducts continuous and ongoing prevention activities throughout the deployment cycle 

in Theater. Depending on OPTEMPO and identified need, Combat Stress Control 

units will deliver customize services to units based on assessed needs and requests 

by the unit commander. 

MHAT–V Soldier Survey data further underscores the importance of the 6–12 

month in-Theater timeframe for when Soldiers are most susceptible to behavioral 

health problems. Task Force 62 Behavioral Health personnel are focusing outreach 

for units that have been in-Theater more than 6 months. 

Finally, Army Leadership has mandated that all Soldiers receive post-deployment 

Battlemind training upon return from operational deployment. 

Question. The 2007 adjusted rate of suicides per 100,000 soldiers was 17.3 soldiers, lower than the 19.9 rate reported in 2005, however higher than the Army average of 11.6 per 100,000 soldiers. Does the Army have proper resources to provide 

counseling to soldiers? When soldiers need counseling who provides this counseling? 

Answer. Yes, the Army has proper resources to provide counseling to the deployed 

force. When required, counseling is provided by forward deployed behavioral health 

providers. There are approximately 200 mental health providers and technicians 

(150 Army and 50 Air Force) deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom; and 

approximately 30 mental health providers and technicians (7 Army, 21 Air Force, 

and 2 Navy) deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. 

In a typical month, over 1,800 new service members are seen in behavioral health 

clinics, and over 3,000 command consultations are conducted regarding the morale 

and mental health of the fighting force. On average, over 5,000 behavioral health 

appointments occur per month. There are four restoration centers that provide 3– 

5 day inpatient treatment programs, with a ‘‘return to duty’’ rate of 93%. The corVerDate Nov 24 2008 04:48 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
45 

ollary outpatient ‘‘return to duty’’ rate is 99%. Less than one-half percent of the 

fighting force is evacuated annually for psychiatric reasons. 

Question. The Mental Health Advisory Team found that both soldiers and Marines 

reported at relatively high rates—62 and 66 percent, respectively—that they knew 

someone seriously injured or killed, or that a member of their unit had become a 

casualty. What mental health assistance is available to our soldiers who are still 

in combat? 

Answer. There are approximately 200 mental health providers and technicians 

(150 Army and 50 Air Force) deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); 

and approximately 30 mental health providers and technicians (7 Army, 21 Air 

Force and 2 Navy) supporting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Each brigade 

combat team (BCT) has a behavioral health section assigned directly to them, also 

known as organic assets, and operates in the BCT area of responsibility. In addition, 

OIF has the equivalent of four deployed combat and operational stress control 

(COSC) detachments conducting area-wide behavioral health and COSC services. 

OEF has organic BCT behavioral health assets and the equivalent of one COSC detachment. 

Both organic behavioral health assets (division) and echelons above division (Task 

Force 62 Medical Brigade) provide services to units and Soldiers after critical incidents such as firefights and improvised explosive device attacks. Also, chaplains are 

indispensable parts of the team taking care of Soldiers after combat losses. 

Question. According to the Mental Health Advisory Team, approximately 10 percent of soldiers reported mistreating non-combatants or damaging their property 

when it was not necessary and less than half of soldiers would report a member 

of their unit for unethical behavior. Is there any concern that with lower standards 

these incidents could become worse? 

Answer. No, there is minimal concern that these incidents will become worse. 

MHAT V found that unethical behaviors did not change significantly relative to 

2006. Battlefield ethics issues have been incorporated into the AMEDD combat and 

operational stress control (COSC) and into the Battlemind psychological debriefing 

program developed by Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. In addition, Army 

generated a new COSC concept, known as ‘‘remind’’ that addresses threat of dangerousness to others and the risk of unlawful behaviors. This concept is being fielded actively through behavioral health channels and will be published in existing 

COSC doctrine. 

Question. Please explain what the Army has done to address the Mental Health 

Advisory Team findings? Can you provide a list to the committee regarding what 

recommendations were followed and which recommendations were not? 

Answer. MHAT V reviewed all MHAT findings and reported the results for each. 

The review is included in the MHAT V report dated February 14, 2008. The review 

addresses a total of 46 recommendations including four redeployment recommendations, 19 deployment recommendations, four post-deployment recommendations, and 

19 sustainment recommendations. A complete list of recommendations with the status of each is enclosed. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
46 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 135 46476A.002
47 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 136 46476A.003
48 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 137 46476A.004
49 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 138 46476A.005
50 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 139 46476A.006
51 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 140 46476A.007
52 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 141 46476A.008
53 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 142 46476A.009
54 

Question. What is the cost of a Mental Health Advisory Team and how many more 

reports do you think there will be? 

Answer. The expected annual MHAT missions will continue as long as combat operations exist in support of the Global War on Terror. We have significantly reduced 

the costs for these assessments in both personnel requirements and expenses. 

MHAT 1 required a 12–member team that remained engaged in the assessment and 

reporting process for approximately six months. MHAT V was accomplished with a 

four-member team that produced a final report in about two months. Future 

MHATs are expected to continue to use this smaller, more financially efficient configuration. Regardless of the team’s size, it will require extensive planning and support. 

TRAINING IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Question. General Casey reports in the media seem to suggest a transition, 

change even some disarray in the way the Army adapts to the mission of training 

the security forces of another country . . . Iraqi security forces in particular. From 

about 2006, the Army devoted considerable resources and personnel to stablishing 

a training capability at Fort Riley in Kansas. Now the Army seems to be walking 

away from that plan and is transferring the mission to Fort Polk, Louisiana, or even 

assigning the mission to the Army Special Forces. 

General Casey, in the Army’s counter insurgency doctrine, is training the security 

forces of the host country to fight the insurgents an Army core function? 

Answer. Field Manual (FM) 3–24 (Counterinsurgency) clearly articulates the requirement for developing host nation security forces and recognizes that U.S. forces 

help host nation military, paramilitary, and police forces conduct counterinsurgency 

(COIN) operations, including area security and local security operations. U.S. forces 

provide advice and help find, disperse, capture, and defeat insurgent forces. Concurrently, they emphasize training host nation forces to perform essential defense functions. These are the central tasks of Foreign Internal Defense, a core Army Special 

Operations Forces task. 

In the Army’s capstone manual, FM 3–0 (Operations), Army forces combine the 

three core U.S. military missions of offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force. Within the 

core mission of stability operations, one of the primary tasks is civil security. In situations where host nation capability for civil security is inadequate, Army forces 

provide most civil security while developing host nation capabilities. As soon as the 

host nation security forces can safely perform this task, Army forces transition civil 

security responsibilities to them. 

The Army is drafting a new FM 3–07 (Stability Operations) to expand on the discussions of security assistance from FM 3–0 and FM 3–24 and to better reflect our 

known requirements for security force assistance. FM 3–70 recognizes that security 

assistance involves more than just training, equipping, and rebuilding, and advising 

host nation forces. This effort requires a broader interagency approach beyond the 

military instrument of national power. 

Question. Does the Amy need to establish an advisory corps? 

Answer. Future requirements to train and advise foreign security forces can be 

addressed with a combination of special operations forces, small scale specialized 

forces, US embassy military groups, and full spectrum modular forces. The Army 

must be ready to train and advise foreign security forces through both pre-conflict 

security cooperation activities, such as ongoing efforts in Colombia and Saudi Arabia, and post conflict conditions, such as our current efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The type of training and advising required will span the ministerial level through 

the institutional Army and from national Army headquarters to small tactical units. 

The ministerial level requires Joint, possibly interagency solution that the Army can 

contribute to, while foreign Army institutions will require assistance from the 

Army’s institutions such as Training and Doctrine Command. Foreign Army headquarters can be trained and advised by similar US Army headquarters, and at the 

tactical level, Army modular forces are ideally suited to train and advise. 

For all these forces, the key consideration is expertise in their core function— 

something not necessarily resident in an advisory corps. For example, US Army infantry, medical, or engineer companies are experts at conducting their wartime 

function and can therefore train and advise foreign infantry, medical, or engineer 

companies. However, before Army forces conduct a training or advising mission, 

they must prepare for the unique aspects the mission entails. To that end, the Army 

is creating an enduring advising training capability. This institution will exist at 

Fort Polk and will have the capability to prepare individuals or units to serve as 

trainers and advisors from the tactical to ministerial level. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
55 

Question. The Committee understands that in September of 2007 the Army evaluated the program to train the trainers at Fort Riley and found serious shortcomings 

in the training and in the soldiers that were being assigned as trainers. General 

Casey can you elaborate on the problems with the training program at Fort Riley 

and what is being done to fix it? 

Answer. The 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (1/1 ID) runs the training program 

at Fort Riley, and although they have faced many challenges, they are doing an excellent job. 

The 1/1 ID is currently assigned 824 of 825 authorized Soldiers. Fifty-five are 

transition team (TT) veterans filling critical cadre positions, with an additional 17 

contracted instructors. There are also 75 full time and 153 part time contracted roleplayers supporting the training program. 

The training program at Fort Riley continues to improve. Transition teams conduct the majority of their training from Forward Operating Base (FOB) ‘‘Army 

Strong’’, which replicates a FOB in Iraq. The 1/1 ID has four language labs with 

instructors and has also been fielded the latest Army simulators, including the 

HMMWV Egress Assistance Trainer, the Reconfigurable Vehicle Simulator, and a 

medical skills trainer. Additionally, selected TTs deploy to the Combat Training 

Centers to train with brigade combat teams, and the Army is studying how to expand this further. 

New doctrinal publications are being developed and written for transition teams. 

The 1/1 ID published a Combat Advisor’s Handbook. The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance published the 2nd edition of their TT Handbook, 

and the Air Land Sea Application Center is developing Multi-Service Techniques, 

Tactics, and Procedures on Training Security Force Advisor Teams. 

The Army has taken several steps to improve the overall selection of TT Soldiers, 

encouraging volunteering for TT duty, and providing for career enhancement. As of 

April 1, 2008, all TT Soldiers are placed on permanent change of station to Kuwait, 

providing incentives such as follow on assignment options and a cost of living allowance. Soldiers now receive a skill identifier for completing the training at Fort Riley 

and serving on TTs. Selection boards are provided instructions to favorably consider 

TT duty. Finally, some Branches currently consider it a key and developmental assignment, and the Army is studying how to expand this to other TT Soldiers as appropriate. 

Question. Is it true that senior Army commanders wanted minimum of 33 percent 

of the instructors at Fort Riley to have prior service as an advisor, but in fact only 

6 percent had prior experience as an advisor? 

Answer. Yes, when the Army moves this mission from Fort Riley to Fort Polk, 

30 percent of the instructors returning from Training Team (TT) missions are to be 

assigned to TT instructor requirements. However, several factors influence obtaining this goal. Some personnel have their choice of assignment upon completion of 

their tour of duty and simply choose not to return as an instructor. Many of the 

team members are from the other services or the Reserve Component and are not 

available as instructors. Current analysis indicates the goal of 30 percent of the TT 

instructors having TT experience is achievable by the time the TT mission relocates 

to Fort Polk in the third quarter of fiscal year 2009. 

Question. The Committee understands that many officers in the Army fear that 

advisor duty is an assignment that is considerably less career enhancing than is a 

tour of duty with a combat unit. What is the Army doing to ensure that those who 

take assignments as advisors are treated fairly and have an equal opportunity for 

career advancement? 

Answer. The Army is acutely aware of the unique benefits derived by officers 

serving in combat advisory positions in Transition Teams (TTs) and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) of various compositions that prepare host nation forces 

to shoulder the responsibility for internal security and civil stability and restore 

critical infrastructure. We have adjusted our guidance for active and Reserve Component promotions, commands, and professional military education selection boards 

to highlight the criticality of these TT/PRT assignments. We stress that ‘‘special attention should be paid to officers serving on Transition Teams in the current environment and foreseeable future. The invaluable experience these officers are receiving in these tough assignments will posture them for success in future leadership 

positions in the operational environment . . . The board should understand the 

challenging nature and demands of these jobs and provide appropriate consideration 

in the overall evaluation of each officer’s record.’’ 

In addition, the Army is modifying its officer professional development and career 

management guidance to add these TT/PRT assignments to its list of jobs considered key to the development of the officer and contributing directly to an enhanced 

ability to serve at higher levels of rank and responsibility. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
56 

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE FOR CONTRACT SERVICES

Question. The Committee continues to try to understand what is financed with the 

Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funding. One use for O&M is for ‘‘contractual 

services.’’ The following table shows actual and requested funds: 

Army O&M—Dollars in billions 

1997 

Actual* 

2007 

Actual 2009 

Request: 

Federal personnel compensation ............................................................................... 6.0 5.4 5.5 

Service via contract ................................................................................................... 4.5 22.9 9.9 

Advisory and assistance services ..................................................................... .4 3.0 .5 

Contracts with the private sector .................................................................... 3.9 3.1 1.3 

Maintenance of facilities .................................................................................. .1 10.1 5.6 

Maintenance of equipment ............................................................................... .1 6.3 2.5 

* FY 1997 is shown in FY 2008 dollars 

The committee added $24 million to the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) 

and the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) in FY 2008 to improve 

contract management oversight. Has the Army seen any improvements in contract 

management as a result of this additional finding? 

Answer. The DCAA and the DCMC are responsive to the Army’s requests for serv- ices. The $24 million in additional fiscal year 2008 funds for the DCAA and DCMC 

for improvements in contract management and oversight is welcomed and attests 

to the importance of these functions. While it will take time to assess the impact 

of this additional funding, the Army is taking immediate steps focused on training 

Army leadership regarding their responsibilities and role in contract oversight. Current Army actions include assessing opportunities to improve contingency contracting training at the Combined Training Centers and expanding the mission of 

the Battle Command Training Program to include acquisition professionals to train 

brigade, division, and corps organizations. 

FUEL EFFICIENCY

Question. The Army O&M account finances tank and aircraft operations, to include the cost of fuel. The FY 2008 budget is underfunded because fuel costs have 

been higher than anticipated. However, ‘‘fuel efficiency’’ is not a factor in the contracting process for engines or equipment. 

What is the unfunded requirement for fuel in fiscial year 2008? 

Answer. The current FY 2008 unfunded requirement (UFR) for fuel is $468 million. The rise in oil prices from $91.14 at the time of the budget estimate submission 

to the current Defense Logistics Agency price of $127.58 per barrel created the UFR. 

The UFR is part of the revised FY 2008 supplemental appropriation request. 

Question. What was budgeted for fuel in fiscal year 2009 and what do you now 

expect the costs to be? 

Answer. The Army budgeted $825 million for fuel in FY 2009 based on an estimate of $115.5 per barrel. DoD has not identified a price increase in fuel for FY 

2009. 

Question. Going forward, should the Army consider ‘‘fuel efficiency’’ in the contracting process for engines? 

Answer. Yes, the Army definitely should consider fuel effbiency in the contracting 

process for engines. Engines that are more efficient provide enhanced operational 

range allowing units to extend operational areas while consuming less fuel. Additionally, it is a good economical decision, since more efficient engines means less 

operational support costs for fuel. When considering life cycle costs of the equipment 

and the rising cost of fuel, fuel efficiency is an excellent investment for the Army. 

SUBSISTENCE COSTS

Question. The Army requested $1.065 billion and $.987 billion in supplemental 

funds for subsistence for DoD civilians in GWOT in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 respectively to finance: ‘‘ice, food and water for authorized DoD civilians and contractors’’. DoD estimate that there are about 5,000 ‘‘authorized DoD civilians’’ and 

140,000 contractors deployed to OIF and OIF. 

The Army’s most current 2008 supplemental request includes $987 million for 

food, water and ice for ‘‘authorized DoD civilians’’. 

How many civilians are fed in Army messes in and around Iraq and Afghanistan? 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
57 

Answer. There is no source of information to determine the total number of civilians being fed. For the first five months of FY08, the Army estimates that it is feeding an average of 84,000 civilians, or 58 percent of the DoD estimate of 145,000 civilians and contractors. There are several factors to consider. First most civilians 

live in built-up locations where commercial meals are readily available from U.S. 

vendors. Second, a large number of contractors are local nationals, third-country nationals or employees of sub-contractors operating in and around Iraq and Afghanistan. Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR) reports 47,000 such employees as of April 4, 

2008. Many of these employees supplement their diets on the local economy and do 

not eat full time in Army messes. 

Question. How does the Army track who is eating in the mess halls? 

Answer. When an individual enters an Army dining facility supporting OIF and 

OEF, their eligibility to dine is confirmed and they are counted before being served. 

Dining facilities at fixed locations rely on a manual procedure wherein the number 

of diners, with civilians counted separately from military personnel, is visually identified and the count is entered on a manual headcount form. It is not feasible to 

collect and record meal headcounts at remote forward operating bases. As a result, 

a full and accurate headcount for OIF and OEF diners is not available. 

Question. How does Army track contractors eating in the messes and charge back 

the cost of the food that they consume? Is that always done? 

Answer. When a contract includes a requirement to feed civilians in OIF and OEF 

that must dine in military/government dining operations, contracting procedures require that the cost of contractor personnel be reduced by the costs of feeding. The 

large KBR contract was executed this way; however, it is not known if absolutely 

every contract has been properly executed pertaining to feeding costs. We believe 

that the largest contracts are being executed properly. 

Question. How many prime contractors provide food, water and ice to the Army 

messes in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait? 

Answer. There are two prime contractors for food in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait. Agility (formerly Public Warehousing Company) headquartered in Kuwait; and 

Supreme Food Services, Inc., headquartered in Switzerland. Agility and Supreme 

are the two prime contractors for food in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. Agility 

serves Iraq and Kuwait; Supreme serves Afghanistan. Most water for food preparation and drinking in Iraq comes from water bottling plants under a contract with 

Oasis International Waters, Inc. In Kuwait, Defense Supply Center Philadelphia 

provides bottled water sourced from various subcontractors within that country. 

Water sourcing in Afghanistan resembles Kuwait except that the subcontractors are 

obtained by Supreme Food Service. Ice throughout Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait 

come from a network of subcontractors under KBR. 

Question. How does a local company become a subcontrator for ice, food and/or 

water? 

Answer. The government’s relationship is with the prime contractor, and in the 

case of food, we do not dictate a process to select subcontractors. The government 

does dictate requirements for quality and sanitation, of course. In some cases there 

are subcontractors to subcontractors outside the direct purview of the government. 

Question. Why would the Army airlift ice, food and/or water into Afghanistan? 

• Is there a risk of spoilage and contamination when subsistence is transported 

some distance? 

• How are airlift costs factored into the contract cost? 

Answer. The Army does not airlift ice or water into Afghanistan; however, there 

are occasions when airlift is used to move foods by air. Airlift is used when adverse 

security conditions or natural conditions like weather or natural disaster make road 

passage impossible or too slow to meet feeding requirements. Airlift is always the 

last choice for transportation. 

Question. We know that the Kellogg Brown and Root Company is one of the prime 

contractors for dining facilities in and around Iraq and Afghanistan. 

• Does KBR make the decisions on subcontractors to supply food, ice and water? 

Answer. KBR operates dining facilities but makes no decisions on subcontractors 

to supply food and water. Food decisions are made by Defense Supply Center Philadelphia and water decisions by the Army element of U.S. CENTCOM. KBR does 

make decisions on subcontractors to provide base camp services, including ice, in 

their large LOGCAP contract. 

Question. Is ‘‘Agility’’ a prime contractor? Where is it headquartered? 

Answer. Agility (formerly Public Warehousing Company) is a prime contractor, 

headquartered in Kuwait. 

Question. Is ‘‘Supreme’’ a prime contractor? Where is it headquartered? 

Answer. Supreme is a prime contractor, headquartered in Switzerland. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
58 

Question. How effective are the major defense contactors in Iraq and Afghanistan 

in hiring local subcontractors? 

Answer. The major defense contractors are very experienced and effective in hiring local subcontractors. Local subcontractors are their best sources for responsive 

service and reasonable costs. 

Question. Should we have a contracting team dedicated to reviewing what would 

be the best valve for the government by contracting with local vendors deemed capable of handling major end items vs. having the major defense contractors let all the 

local contracts? 

Answer. The Army has this agreement with Defense Supply Center Philadelphia. 

The Afghanistan First Program is a good example that started with bottled water. 

Current initiatives to involve local vendors include ice and fresh fruits and vegetables. 

Question. Can you tell us how local subcontractors are monitored? 

Answer. The Army uses contracting officer representatives (COTRs) to provide 

oversight for DCMA on LOGCAP and other prime contracts, but does not directly 

monitor the prime contractor’s subcontractors. In cases where a subcontractor is one 

of several providing a product or service directly to the Army, the Army again uses 

its COTRs to monitor performance. 

Question. How much is the Army requesting for (DLA purchased) food for civilians 

eating in messes: • in Iraq? • in Afghanistan? • in Kuwait? 

Answer. The amount requested for all three countries combined for FY07 was $.965 billion; for FY08 $.675 billion. The Army’s request does not compute the three 

countries separately. The $.675 billion request for FY08 is from the amended Army 

request, which is smaller than the original requested amount of $.987 billion. 

Question. How many prime contractors supply food to the messes: • in Iraq? • in Afghanistan? • in Kuwait? 

Answer. There are two prime contractors for food in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait. Agility (formerly Public Warehousing Company) headquartered in Kuwait; and 

Supreme Food Services, Inc., headquartered in Switzerland. Agility and Supreme 

are the two prime contractors for food in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. Agility 

serves Iraq and Kuwait; Supreme serves Afghanistan. Most water for food preparation and drinking in Iraq comes from water bottling plants under a contract with 

Oasis International Waters, Inc. In Kuwait, Defense Supply Center Philadelphia 

provides bottled water sourced from various subcontractors within that country. 

Water sourcing in Afghanistan resembles Kuwait except that the subcontractors are 

obtained by Supreme Food Service. Ice throughout Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait 

come from a network of subcontractors under KBR. 

Question. How much is the Army requesting for (DLA purchased) water for civilians eating in messes: 

• in Iraq? 

• in Afghanistan? 

• in Kuwait? 

Answer. The Army computes requirements using a meal cost factor that includes 

bottled water for meals. The daily bottled water requirement of six liters is 10.4 percent of meal cost including water. The water only request, therefore, is $.100 billion 

for FY07 and $.070 billion for FY08. 

Question. How many prime contractors supply water to the messes: 

• in Iraq? 

• in Afghanistan? 

• in Kuwait? 

Answer. There is a single prime contractor for water in Iraq; however there are 

multiple subcontractors for ice everywhere and for water in Afghanistan and Kuwait. 

Question. How much is the Army requesting for (DLA purchased) ice for civilians 

eating in messes: 

• in Iraq? 

• in Afghanistan? 

• in Kuwait? 

Answer. The Army does not source ice from DLA. Virtually all ice is provided by 

KBR subcontractors under the large LOGCAP contract. Ice is included with many 

other life support services (housing, utilities, etc.) in a single per day base camp 

operational cost factor; therefore, the specific cost of ice cannot be determined. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
59 

Question. How many prime contractors supply ice to the messes: 

• in Iraq? 

• in Afghanistan? 

• in Kuwait? 

Answer. KBR is the prime contractor supplying ice using multiple subcontractors. 

‘‘BENEFITS’’ TO CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

There continues to be a heavy reliance on contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The DoD did a head count last summer and estimate that DoD employed 138,000 

contractors (at the time the count was done). The Army manages and funds the 

logistical support contracts in theater and therefore funds the cost of dining facilities there. 

Question. When contracts are drawn up, do they include products or services that 

the Government must provide the contractor? 

• For example, if you have a team of contractors going into Baghdad to supervise 

the building of a school, are they eligible to eat free of charge at the Government 

mess in the Green Zone? 

Answer. The DoD civilian employees are authorized logistic and security support 

privileges when deployed with the Armed Forces. Support for Contractors Authorized to Accompany the Force (CAAF) will be written into the terms and conditions 

of the contract. Logistic and security requirements are addressed in the contract and 

are priced and negotiated before the contract is awarded. It costs approximately 

$23.00 for food per person per day. This does not included transportation, storage 

or labor costs, but does include six liters of water per day. 

Question. How does Army track contractors eating in the messes and charge back 

the cost of the food that they consume? 

• Is that always done? 

Answer. The DoD has implemented the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) system to account for and provide visibility of all DoD contract personnel within the contingency operations battle space. The primary purpose 

of the Joint Asset Movement Management System (JAMMS) (which is a component 

of SPOT) is to track assets. JAMMS has the capability of accepting a scan of a contractor personnel’s letter of authorization (LOA). The LOA allows persons residing 

with U.S. forces to be afforded Contractor Authorized to Accompany the Force status, which provides them access to mess facilities and protected status in accordance 

with international conventions. 

JOINT CONTRACTING COMMAND—IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN

Question. JCC–I/A is a relatively new command. Initially created by a November 

2004, U.S. Central Command Fragmentary Order [FRAGO] covered only the Combined Joint Operations Area [CJOA] Iraq. It officially opened its doors on Jan. 29, 

2005. However, a subsequent July 2005 FRAGO expanded the organization’s responsibility to include CJOA Afghanistan. Their fiscal year 2006 workload through June 

included awarding 19,500 contract actions worth $3.4 billion. They have 235 folks 

in the command—including mostly GIs, with DoD civilians, local nationals and contractors. 

How does the Army interact with this organization? 

Answer. The Office of the Assistant Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Policy & Procurement—Iraq/Afghanistan (OADASA (P&P–I/A) provides contingency 

policy expertise for procurement operations and rear support to the Head of the 

Contracting Activity at the Joint Contracting Command—Iraq/Afghanistan on all 

procurement policy issues. Subject matter experts develop and analyze contingency 

contracting policy, in conjunction with the other services, Director for Defense Policy 

and Procurement, and in interagency issues. OADASA (P&P–I/A) is the principal 

advisor to the ASA (ALT) on procurement matters related to Iraq/Afghanistan and 

provides support for HQDA, reconstruction efforts with DoD, HQDA, and interagency partners, and recruiting and deploying military and civilian personnel to 

Iraq. 

The JCC–I/A also interacts with the Iraq Transition Assistance Office, which assists executive departments and agencies in concluding large infrastructure projects 

in Iraq and facilitates Iraq’s transition to self sufficiency, and it maintains an effective diplomatic presence in Iraq with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Gulf Region 

Division, Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq, Multinational Force— 

Iraq, and Multinational Corps—Iraq. The JCC–I/A also interfaces with the Embassy 

in Afghanistan. 

Question. From your perspective, has it improved operations? 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
60 

Answer. As a major subordinate command of Multi-Nationl Force—Iraq, which 

manages contracting operations for both, Iraq and Afghanistan, JCC–I/A has implemented improvements and received recognition. The Chief Acquisition Officers 

Council recently recognized the JCC–I/A with the 2007 Contract Management 

Award. The award recognized JCC–I/A’s innovative use of ‘‘Effects Based Contracting’’ during construction of the Rule of Law Center, a protective enclave for 

Iraqi justice system personnel and facilities in Bagdad. The JCC–I/A contracting officers delivered an initial operations capable, 900 detainee prison and judicial complex in 26 days. The ADASA (P&P) assists JCC–I/A in developing and implementing 

annual long range contracting support plans, which encompasses contracting agency 

transitions, funds reconciliation, disposition and reporting. 

JCC–I/A is providing more Iraqi firms an opportunity to obtain reconstruction 

contracts, which facilitates job growth and strengthens the Iraq economy. Iraqi 

firms have now received more than $1 billion in reconstruction contracts. 

NDAA INSTITUTES CONTRACTING REFORM

Question. The FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 110–181, 

contained a number of provisions related to contracting oversight improvement, including Section 863: CG Reviews/Reports on Contracting. This provision stated that 

every 12 months, the Comptroller General shall review contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan, beginning with an interim report due October 1, 2008. This report shall include: 

• # of contracts, contractor personnel 

• $ value of contract 

• Use of competitive procedures 

• # of contractors performing security services 

• Areas of significant concern 

What sort of system does the Army have in place now that will enable it to comply with the direction provided in this Act? 

Answer. A Memorandum of Understanding between DoD, Department of State 

(DoS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development required by § 861 of Public Law 110–181 has not yet been signed. However, the agreed upon common databases as repositories of information on contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan are the 

Federal Procurement Data System—Next Generation (FPDS–NG) and Synchronized 

Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT). The current release of SPOT pulls 

the consolidated data directly from FPDS–NG. 

The Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan does not currently input contracting data directly into FPDS–NG, but collects it in a local database and feeds 

data for input into a stand-alone system. The Director, Defense Procurement, Acquisition Policy, and Strategic Sourcing is taking steps to ensure that the required data 

is available in FPDS–NG. Other systems currently in use that collect contract data 

in theater include the Joint Contingency Contracting System, US CENTCOM Contractor Census, and CENTCOM data report. 

Question. How difficult will it be for the Army to provide this type of information 

on contracting? 

Answer. Currently, the basic contract data is provided by extracting data from the 

existing local databases and then manually inputting the data into the Federal Procurement Data System—Next Generation (FPDS–NG). Although it is a cumbersome 

process, it has proved to be successful in providing a consolidated source for this 

basic data. However, the inclusion of real time data into the FPDS–NG would provide a more seamless collection of real time data. 

Question. Does the Army have one central repository for all of its contracts in Iraq 

and Afghanistan? 

Answer. All original contract files and contract documents are required to be 

maintained by the contracting office, which is standard contracting procedure. However, copies of contracts and modifications and other relevant information is also 

provided to and maintained by the organizations that are assigned contract administration responsibilities. There are central repositories for contracting data. The 

FPDS–NG currently collects contract data from all Army contracting commands 

with the exception of those located in Iraq and Afghanistan, which has been collected separately due to operational concerns. The Director, Defense Procurement, 

Acquisition Policy, and Strategic Sourcing is taking steps to ensure that that required data is available in FPDS–NG. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha. The 

Fiscal Year 2009 Army Posture Statement follows:] 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
61 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 178 46476A.010
62 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 179 46476A.011
63 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 180 46476A.012
64 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 181 46476A.013
65 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 182 46476A.014
66 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 183 46476A.015
67 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 184 46476A.016
68 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 185 46476A.017
69 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 186 46476A.018
70 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 187 46476A.019
71 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 188 46476A.020
72 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 189 46476A.021
73 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 190 46476A.022
74 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 191 46476A.023
75 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 192 46476A.024
76 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 193 46476A.025
77 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 194 46476A.026
78 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 195 46476A.027
79 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 196 46476A.028
80 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 197 46476A.029
81 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 198 46476A.030
82 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 199 46476A.031
83 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 200 46476A.032
84 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 201 46476A.033
85 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 202 46476A.034
86 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 203 46476A.035
87 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 204 46476A.036
88 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 205 46476A.037
89 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 206 46476A.038
90 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 207 46476A.039
91 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 208 46476A.040
92 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 209 46476A.041
93 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 210 46476A.042
94 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 211 46476A.043
95 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 212 46476A.044
96 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 213 46476A.045
97 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 214 46476A.046
98 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset graphic 215/400 46476A.047
(99) 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 2007. 

ARMY ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 

WITNESSES 

DEAN G. POPPS, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR 

ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY 

LTG N. ROSS THOMPSON III, MILITARY DEPUTY, ACTING ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. BISHOP [presiding]. The Committee will be in order. I would 

like to recognize the ranking member, Mr. Tiahrt, for a motion. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I move that those portions of the hearing today which involve classified material be held 

in executive session because of the classification of the material to 

be discussed. 

Mr. BISHOP. So ordered. Thank you, Mr. Tiahrt. 

Mr. TIAHRT. My pleasure. 

Mr. BISHOP. This afternoon, the Committee will hold a closed 

hearing on Army acquisition. We are pleased to welcome Mr. Dean 

Popps, the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics and Technology and Lieutenant General N. Ross Thompson, III, who is the Military Deputy to the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army For Acquisition, Logistics and Technology. 

These gentlemen are well qualified to discuss Army acquisition and 

to answer the questions of the Committee. 

Secretary Popps and General Thompson, thank you for being 

here this afternoon. We are here to talk about the acquisition of 

Army equipment, and the Committee is very concerned about the 

readiness of the Army in terms of equipping our forces. Systems 

are becoming ever more complicated, and too often in developmental programs a desire to begin production overruns technology 

maturity and then we are faced with delays and restructures. 

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

The Future Combat Systems (FCS) program remains the core of 

the Army acquisition, and the FCS calls for a total program cost 

of over $160 billion. The request for fiscal year 2009 calls for 3.6 

billion. Ideally the system will field the latest in high technology 

and a fleet of vehicles that have mostly common vehicle systems. 

Still the FCS will upon completion comprise only 15 of 76 total 

Army combat brigades. And one of the challenges that is facing the 

Future Combat Systems is how to efficiently spin out the maturing 

technology to the existing fleets of Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting 

vehicles and Strykers. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
100 

So as U.S. participation in the war in Iraq winds down, funding 

for the Department of Defense will become extremely tight and the 

ability of the Army to maintain funding for the Future Combat 

Systems will prove to be very challenging for us. 

ARMY AVIATION

The request for Army aviation totals a little over $5 billion, including $439 million for 28 armed reconnaissance helicopters, 

money for 63 Black Hawks, 264 million for 7 joint cargo aircraft, 

and a little over a billion for Chinooks. The Armed Reconnaissance 

Helicopter program seems to be back on track after a slip of a year, 

and the program is producing 12 aircraft with fiscal year 2008 

funding and the fiscal 2009 budget calls for 28. 

Requested funding for the weapons and tracked combat vehicles 

totals $3.7 billion, including $175 million for 119 Stryker vehicles 

and $1,181 million for the M1A2 tank and Bradley upgrades. 

Questions from the members of the Committee will likely address 

these programs and many others, and I think we can look forward 

to a very interesting and useful question-and-answer session. 

Mr. Secretary, I understand that you will be the only one making 

a statement. You may proceed with your summarized statement 

and of course your entire statement will be placed in the record. 

Welcome, and you may proceed, Mr. Popps, with your comments. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY POPPS

Mr. POPPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Ranking Member, Congressman Tiahrt, Congressman Moran, Congressman 

Cramer. Good afternoon to all of you. And the remainder of the distinguished members of the Committee coming in and out, thanks 

for the opportunity to be here today and to help discuss the fiscal 

year 2009 President’s budget and Army acquisition programs. 

As you said previously, sir, the Principal Military Deputy to our 

Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, General N. Ross Thompson 

III, is sitting to my left and here today. And I respectfully request 

that our joint statement be part of the record for today’s hearing. 

As our predecessors, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of 

Staff of the Army, did very eloquently earlier today, let me thank 

all of you on behalf of all of us for everything that you do for the 

men and women in uniform. And although we are very prideful 

that our soldiers have the very best technologically and are advanced and capable and physically fit and can win any fight, that 

would not be possible without your strong support. So we thank 

each and every one of you profoundly. 

Mr. Chairman, I took the reins as the Army Acquisition Executive and the Acting Assistant Secretary for Acquisition on 3 January of this year, 60 days ago. My predecessor, the Honorable 

Claude Bolton, retired at that time and he had a very distinguished career of 6 years and many of you were very familiar with 

him and had very good and close relationships with him. So I want 

to make that part of the record and let you know that I have 

served for 60 days, and I assume I am going to continue to serve 

here unless the President or the Secretary of Defense has another 

nominee through the end of the administration. I have served as 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
101 

the Principal Deputy through 2004; however, much of my work has 

been involved in working with the Corps of Engineers and Iraq reconstruction issues. 

I want to thank you for your patience with me today as the new 

guy. This is why General Thompson and I have a very good relationship. Our doors are open. We meet 4, 5, 6 times a day, and 

right now what we are doing is we are doing a lot of troop leading 

as we have complex executions and many milestones and other 

issues that are up on the table for Army acquisition. 

So I am here today to have a very candid conversation with you. 

I promise to tell you everything I possibly can. I want to talk openly and candidly. Because I think there is a very interesting dynamic going on here, just as you said in your opening remarks, and 

that is the marvelous legacy systems that are in theater right now 

that are performing so well and that, yes, have to be reset and recapitalized and how they are transitioning in a linear fashion with 

the insertion of additional technologies and ending up hopefully in 

the future with the Future Combat Systems. So it is an aggressive 

path and together we will have to forge a way ahead. 

General Thompson may want to have a few opening remarks. 

After that, I would be glad to answer your questions. Thank you. 

General THOMPSON. Chairman Bishop and Congressman Tiahrt 

and Congressman Moran and Congressman Cramer and Congressman Rothman, I am just glad to be here today and I don’t have 

a prepared statement that I wish to read. I just want to thank you 

for your support in the past. I am glad to be teamed up with Mr. 

Popps. Over the last 60 days, we established a very good working 

relationship, and I am confident that all the 23,000 members of the 

acquisition workforce in the Army will continue to be good stewards of the taxpayers dollars, and we are prepared to answer your 

questions today. 

[The joint statement of Mr. Popps and General Thompson follows:] 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
102 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 408 here 46476B.001
103 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 409 here 46476B.002
104 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 410 here 46476B.003
105 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 411 here 46476B.004
106 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 412 here 46476B.005
107 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 413 here 46476B.006
108 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 414 here 46476B.007
109 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 415 here 46476B.008
110 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 416 here 46476B.009
111 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. Before we start questioning, I certainly 

want to ask Mr. Tiahrt if he would like to make some opening remarks. 

REMARKS OF MR. TIAHRT

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just got a few 

things I would like to say. And I don’t have any prepared remarks, 

so I am going to talk from the heart. Both of you are fine gentlemen. You have had fine careers with the government, and I respect 

you greatly. But I have to tell you we have a procurement system 

that is broke. It has absolutely been a travesty in what has been 

happening. 

FOREIGN SUPPLIERS

We should have noticed this when the replacement for the presidential helicopter purchased by the Navy went to a foreign supplier. We should have known it when the Light Utility Helicopter 

went to a foreign supplier. And now with the air refueling tanker 

going to a foreign supplier, it is as plain as the nose on our face. 

Our system is broke and we have all these legacy systems that the 

chairman brought up that are currently in theater and they are 

performing very well. But if any of those replacement systems for 

those legacy systems came up today, it would go to a foreign supplier. If we were going to replace Air Force One today, we couldn’t 

win it because it would go to a foreign supplier. 

ILLEGAL SUBSIDIES

Why would it go to a foreign supplier instead of having American 

jobs? It would go there because we don’t account for illegal subsidies. This very company that is providing the Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) is currently in court defending itself against illegal 

subsidies that USTR is bringing against it. And by you buying a 

product from it, you are giving them a better case. And when the 

Air Force buys a product from them, you give the EADS Company, 

the foreign suppliers, a better case for these illegal subsidies. We 

have one branch of the government saying it is illegal and another 

branch saying we don’t care, we are getting a good bargain. And 

we are selling out American jobs to do it. 

LEGAL SUBSIDIES

So our system is broke. Another thing that we don’t give any consideration for is legal subsidies. They get their health care paid for 

by the Federal Government. They get their workmen’s compensation paid for by the Federal Government. They get other benefits 

for their employees like vacation paid for by the Federal Government. You require every American supplier by your cost and accounting standards to put those costs in the price. There is no way 

to get around it. 

BUY AMERICAN ACT

Another thing that you don’t account for is the way you waive 

regulations on the Buy American Act. You have a memorandum of 

agreement within the Pentagon where you say those are our allies 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
112 

and we are not going to let them have to put up with all of this 

paperwork. But an American supplier, by golly, the cost and accounting standards say you better comply and you better account 

for every nickel you spend complying with those regulations. Three 

things that I just gave you that are unlevel playing ground for our 

suppliers, for our American workers. An unlevel playing ground. 

They can’t win. We can’t win. We just can’t win in this kind of circumstances. And the last thing that we should be doing, and it is 

going to take legislation because I know you guys don’t account for 

it, when you lose American jobs you lose American revenue. And 

American workers pay Federal income tax. A French worker 

doesn’t seem to pay any income tax in America. I know there is 

good legal reasons why they wouldn’t. But we never take that into 

consideration. And on the aerial refuel tanker, it is so egregious 

that it is more than 10 percent of the total cost of the contract. So 

a $35 billion contract, when you take into account the lost jobs just 

believing the contractors, then you are going to see $3.8 billion in 

lost revenue. So what does your $35 billion contract cost the Federal Government? It costs us $38.8 billion. And we never take that 

into consideration. 

We are losing American jobs and the Department of Defense is 

responsible for it in part. So as we come to our questions—and 

thank you for the indulgence, Mr. Chairman—when we come to our 

questions I have got some very specific questions about the Light 

Utility Helicopter (LUH) contract and where I think we have gone 

wrong. 

Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. 

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Tiahrt. Gentlemen, let me ask you 

some questions about, first, the Future Combat Systems. The Future Combat Systems program will field 15 FCS brigade combat 

teams. 61 brigades will remain non-FCS. What will be the benefit 

to the 61 non-FCS brigades of the FCS developed technology? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. The intent of the FCS program is 

to field 15 brigades. But the thing that we are doing with the FCS 

is taking the technologies that are available today and we will spin 

them out, in our terminology, to the current brigades, the other brigades that are out there. So we have got the program structured 

right now with three different spinouts to take the technology that 

is being developed under FCS and put it with the current force 

units. Those spinouts will begin to field in the 2009–2010 time 

frame for the first spinout. The second spinout is 2 years after that 

and the third spinout is subsequent to that. So what that enables 

us to do, especially with the communications infrastructure and the 

network infrastructure is be able to have the other 61 brigades 

interoperate with the FCS brigades when the FCS brigades are 

fielded in full. And we are also looking right now very aggressively 

at how do we accelerate even more of the technologies that are 

being developed under the FCS into the rest of the Army. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
113 

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS FUNDING

Mr. BISHOP. Could you field the FCS faster if more funding were 

available? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir, we could. The way I would answer 

that, though, and that is part of what we are looking at internally 

because that question has been asked by Chairman Murtha, who 

is not here today or at least not right at this moment. And so we 

are looking at how we would do that based on both the technology 

readiness and also the production base availability. 

Mr. BISHOP. Will the FCS capabilities be fielded to Army units 

beyond the brigade combat teams? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir, they will. Right now the focus is on 

the brigade combat teams, but the network capabilities in FCS 

clearly have to be part of the rest of the Army because it is not 

just the 76 brigade combat teams. There is about 230 other types 

of brigades in the Army that are the support brigades that also 

need to be able to interoperate with the brigade combat team. So 

it is mostly the network technologies that we are looking at. And 

also one of the major things that we have done with FCS over the 

last couple of years is the armor protection and the survivability 

protection as a result of the threats in theater have been largely 

funded—the technology funded by the FCS program, but it has 

been that level of funding in the FCS program that allowed those 

technologies that have allowed us to improve the up-armored High 

Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) now on the 

sixth improvement to the armored protection on those, and really 

the fundamental underpinning for the protection we put on the 

MRAP vehicles as well. 

EQUIPMENT UPGRADES

Mr. BISHOP. Let me ask you then, would it be advisable or do you 

think it would be a good idea for the Army to take a pause in upgrading the older combat vehicles such as the tanks and the Bradleys and focus more of the available funding on the Future Combat 

Systems? 

General THOMPSON. I don’t think a pause is kind of the way I 

would put it. There is a need to continually upgrade all of the systems that are out there. But it is how much investment and how 

much capability do you think you need before you go to the next 

generation. From a philosophical perspective—and I say this not 

just before this Committee, I say it a lot—there is always going to 

be probably three or at best two different generations of technology 

in ground combat systems, wheeled vehicles, and helicopters. It is 

unaffordable to try to put the latest generation of anything out 

there across the entire Army. The Army is just too big, with too 

many demands, and the pace of technology is too great. 

But in HMMWVs right now, for example, we are on the fifth 

major upgrade to the HMMWVs. On tanks we are on our fourth 

major upgrade of the tank. We are on our fourth major upgrade of 

the Bradley. We have got similar upgrades in our aviation platforms, and those upgrades need to continue to happen so that they 

can interoperate based on the battlefield demands that are out 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
114 

there today. But it is a question of the right level of investment in 

today’s forces before we go to the future with FCS. 

RESET

Mr. POPPS. Mr. Chairman, if I can kind of amplify an important 

point that was brought up about reset and recap, there is no question that due to the battle damage, battle loss, and so forth, a certain amount of these legacy systems that are going to be either in 

theater or here in depots organically are going to be reset. And so 

that is an important point. A lot of this stuff has to be reset just 

to work. Don’t confuse that with a full recapitalization, which could 

go down three or four levels, which could include the insertion of 

a million or $2 million worth of new technology on, say, each one 

of these platforms. 

So those are the choices as we proceed together as the Committee and the Army about what are we trying to do here, how 

much reset and how much full recap? If you tilt—I am sorry, sir. 

FCS SPIN OUT STRATEGY

Mr. BISHOP. In that regard, I guess I was curious to know whether or not in making those choices you think it would be a viable 

plan to spin out the FCS communications, situational awareness, 

UAVs and sensor technology to the existing armored combat vehicle fleets and then defer the development and production of a new 

fleet of ground vehicles. Would that be an appropriate choice? 

Mr. POPPS. I will let General Thompson give a more amplified 

answer. But I think the answer is where we can spin out and 

where it makes sense, we are doing so and want to do so. Because 

that helps the fight now and it helps those legacy systems be better 

than they are. If the question then becomes do you pause and try 

to do more on that side and not proceed with manned ground vehicles, I think as a department we say, no, we wouldn’t want to 

pause because the future is with the manned ground vehicles. The 

future is with the joint tactical light vehicles, the JTLV, and others. So I think that is our preferences. 

Mr. BISHOP. General Thompson? 

General THOMPSON. The spinouts, like I said, Mr. Chairman, are 

being looked at on what we can put in the current force today. The 

FCS program in simple terms has got manned ground vehicles, it 

has got unmanned ground vehicles, it has unmanned air vehicles, 

and it has got the network. So those are the four big parts of FCS, 

if I can parse it that way. Clearly we want to put as much of the 

technology that is available and that can interoperate with the current brigade combat teams that are out there, but the key thing 

for us is the future operational concept, the way that we see 

warfighting in the future, and General Casey mentioned this morning the FM 3–0, which is the doctrinal template, putting stability 

operations on an equal footing with offense and defense. 

We see the current environment out there that we have in Iraq 

and Afghanistan today to be the way that warfare is going to face 

us for the next 20 years. And for us to be able to fight in that kind 

of an environment, you want to put the best capability out there 

from a materiel perspective. So if you paused and delayed the materiel solutions that are reflected in the FCS program, you would 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
115 

not have the ability to fight that operational concept and that 

would put our soldiers at a disadvantage. 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Tiahrt. 

ILLEGAL SUBSIDIES

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We talked or I talked 

briefly about the illegal subsidies and the waived regulations that 

give an unfair advantage to the European competitors. Part of 

those regulations that the Pentagon has waived for these NATO allies of ours, these 21 countries that are mentioned in the memorandum of understanding within the Pentagon, they include the 

regulations on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and they also waive 

the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations, or ITAR. 

Now, this company that you bought this helicopter from, the 

Light Utility Helicopter, has been seen and has been reported in 

the open news that they have been to the Iranian air show. Now, 

part of our government is trying to put an embargo on Iran. The 

very same company that you bought this helicopter from is not 

complying with us as an ally or helping us as an ally. They are 

over there showing them videos about their navy helicopter and 

trying to sell helicopters to the Iranian Government. They have 

been in Venezuela trying to sell stuff to Hugo Chavez. We know 

this for a fact. They have also been in China trying to sell military 

products in China. And we caught them bribing the Saudi Arabians 

and forced them to back down on a plane deal with the Saudi Arabians, the very same company that you are buying this helicopter 

from. 

Did you ever think to check with the CIA or the DIA and say 

what are these guys doing in illegal trafficking of arms or what are 

they doing with Foreign Corrupt Practices Act? Because I think it 

is very clear that this company would have been disqualified had 

you done just a little bit of research in this procurement. 

But instead we offloaded these American jobs to Europe because 

they are our allies, and they are cutting us down from behind. 

They are circling around, flanking us, and they are selling stuff to 

our enemies or at least they are trying to do it and we know they 

are trying to do it and we have caught them trying to do it, and 

yet we are more than willing to ignore that, to ignore that they are 

getting illegal subsidies and go ahead and buy from them. Why 

aren’t you taking into consideration these two regulations that are 

waived and the corrupt practices that go with them? 

Mr. POPPS. My answer to you, sir, is that—and I know you had 

a former life as an acquisition professional. When you look at our 

lane, we are a very narrow lane. And we are subject to the Federal 

Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the Defense Federal Regulation 

(DFAR), all of the policies that have been sent down by the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense. And it is very difficult for us to move 

outside of those boxes. Sometimes we can speed a train up or we 

can make a train slower. 

WAIVERS TO ACQUISITION REGULATIONS

Mr. TIAHRT. I know you have a very narrow set of requirements 

that you have to live with, and the Federal Acquisition Regulations 

are very clear. But this is a memorandum of understanding within 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
116 

the Department of Defense that waives these very regulations that 

allows this company to get away with it. It is not the intent of Congress, it is not the intent of the American worker or the American 

people. It is—you know, it was somebody in the Pentagon at some 

point that said we have got to expand our industrial defense base 

and we are going to use our allies in Europe to do it even if it costs 

us jobs because we think it is good policy. And the truth is these 

guys are undercutting us from behind. 

Now, in this contract you also have a manufacturing plan that 

says this LUH is going to be built—supposedly eventually finally 

assembled in Mississippi but also there were parts going to be 

manufactured all over the United States. And the proposed content 

for American work was 65 percent. But that included logistic support, that included training, that included procedural trainers, engineering services, other various aircraft kits that go with it. It 

doesn’t include the manufacturing of the airplane or the helicopter 

itself. You have counted everybody else, including, it seemed like, 

the dockworker that unloaded this foreign made helicopter off a 

foreign ship and the teamster that hauled it to the military base. 

It seems like everybody else is included except the people that 

make the fuselage itself or the helicopter itself. I know for a fact 

that Spirit AeroSystems in Wichita, Kansas, was to get the manufacturing of the Light Utility Helicopter, but EADS said, well, we 

have got a production line set up now and it is going pretty good, 

so we are going to keep that work back in France. 

The ICE Systems in Manhattan, Kansas, makes electronic systems and wire harnesses. They were in the proposal that was selected by the Army. It was part of the manufacturing plan. And 

EADS said, well, you know, we are doing this work in Europe now 

and we think we are going to do pretty well. We are just going to 

keep it in Europe. 

And the floorboards were made by another company. It is not 

Grumman, but it is another company. Kaman, Manufacturing, 

which is nationwide. They are in Connecticut mostly. But they 

were going to do the floorboards and the firewall in Wichita, Kansas. That work too was pulled back to France. 

I mean, do you take in consideration the manufacturing plant 

and hold them accountable for their promises that are a basis of 

the judgment to select that product? I mean, it may not be a requirement. But when you have a PCO and a buying team looking 

at this, they are saying, you know, we have all these American 

jobs, this looks like a pretty good deal, but it gets sucked back to 

Europe. 

How do we account for that? How do we hold them accountable 

for what they are proposing? 

Mr. POPPS. I don’t know of any contractual way that we can hold 

them accountable for that. 

General THOMPSON. They are accountable for the 65 percent of 

the components being manufactured in the U.S., and they are adhering to that, which is in the contract. 

U.S. MANUFACTURING CONTENT

Mr. TIAHRT. Excuse me, General. And I apologize, Ross, for reinterrupting here. But that includes things that are outside the 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
117 

manufacturing process. When you talk about logistic support, logistic support is not an EADS thing. That is somebody that has to be 

close to the action, right? 

General THOMPSON. Right. 

Mr. TIAHRT. So by definition, it is going to be close—the domestic 

helicopter is going to be close to the base of the operator. Training 

the same way, American pilots, the trainer has got to be here. Procedural trainer, probably going to be here. I mean, the things that 

are included in this U.S. content of 65 percent, they are not the 

manufacturing. I mean, it ought to be 65 percent of the American 

manufacturing. And I don’t know that you have any contractual requirement, as I recall, to actually say, well, you are now at 64 percent and we are going to fine you. I mean, I don’t know that you 

have any mechanism to hold them accountable. Do you? 

General THOMPSON. I have not looked at the details of the contract. But based on the discussion we are having here, we will go 

back and look at that. But the 65 percent ties back to statute. I 

do know that of the 345 aircraft that we plan on buying, the first 

40 were manufactured overseas. The other 305 are to be primarily 

assembled and manufactured in Mississippi. The first aircraft manufactured in Mississippi has been approved by the FAA, so the first 

one manufactured here has been done. So they have lived up to 

that part of the contractual arrangement. 

[The information follows:] 

Per Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 225.872–1, the 

restrictions of the Buy American Act and the Balance of Payments Program do not 

apply to end products produced by qualifying countries. The EADS–NA is a registered Dutch corporation from the Netherlands, a qualifying country, as is Germany where the aircraft was initially produced. Although EADS–NA is exempt from 

the Buy American Act and is therefore not contractually bound to meet its requirements, they have instituted a self-imposed goal of 65 percent aggregate U.S. content. The EADS–NA is working towards this goal by setting up a duplicate production line in the United States using American labor, services, and suppliers. The duplication of this production line is on schedule. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Chairman, I can go on a long time, but I know 

other people want to ask questions. So thank you for your indulgence. 

Mr. POPPS. And, Congressman, if I might, just to add a thought, 

there are some things that bound us with these 19 and 21 countries that include treaties that there is just not anything we can 

circumvent. And I am thinking of the BAA and the TAA. 

Mr. TIAHRT. You are right, and we need to change some of those 

agreements. 

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Moran. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple of weeks 

ago, Pete Geren directed the Army’s existing contract agency to be 

replaced by a new command and that new command is designed to 

have broad authority over the acquisition of a great many of the 

military’s purchases. The Army is required to hire about 1,400 additional contracting personnel because its acquisition workforce is 

simply too small and poorly prepared to deal especially with the 

war in Iraq. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
118 

But 5 years into the war we are being told that it is going to take 

2 to 3 years to hire the personnel and another 5 to 10 years before 

they are properly trained and have enough experience to handle 

the contracting job that they are being set up to handle. The Army 

command is going to be situated at the (Army Materiel Command) 

AMC at Fort Belvoir. 

Why does it have to take so long to hire these people? It seems 

to me that there is a critical need to do this as fast as possible, 

and I don’t know why it is going to take 5 to 10 years before they 

are trained. I understand they will be more experienced 5 to 10 

years later, but why the holdup? It seems to me we ought to be out 

of Iraq by the time these contracting personnel are prepared to 

oversee the contracts being let to Iraq. 

Go ahead, General. Either one of you can respond if you would 

like. 

General THOMPSON. Your numbers are accurate. We are going to 

stand up the Army Contracting Command. As a matter of fact tomorrow will be the standup of that provisional command to address 

some of the issues pointed out both by the Gansler Commission 

and the work that Ms. Condon and I testified before this Committee just a few months ago about what we were doing to look not 

just with the Gansler Commission but also to look internally. 

The demand for contracting professionals across the Federal Government has never been higher than it is today. And so part of the 

reality is there is a shortage of, last time I looked at the numbers, 

of almost 2,000 contracting professionals just in the National Capital Region. We do think it is probably going to take us 2 to 3 years 

to be able to recruit those numbers, I think 5 to 10 years for them 

to be trained. That is obviously to get them a lot of experience. But 

we think once we bring the individuals on board, because of the defense acquisition workforce requirements that are mandated in 

law, to get somebody to a Level II certification to be able to do contracting takes some training and 2 years of experience. So once I 

bring somebody on board, 2 years after they are a part of our acquisition contracting workforce, we think they will be sufficiently 

trained to be able to do expeditionary contracting and, as Congressman Tiahrt knows, that in the contracting world in particular you 

get a warrant based on your level of expertise and based on the 

level of confidence that your superiors in contracting have in your 

abilities. So your warrant is tied to a certain dollar threshold and 

certain complexity of contract actions. 

So my short answer would be, yes, it is going to take us 2 to 3 

years to be able to bring on 1,400 more people. Part of that is a 

reflection that as we are bringing them on you have also got a lot 

of the current acquisition workforce that is getting ready to retire 

and will retire. So it is not a static situation. So I am going to have 

to bring on more than 1,400 in order to grow it by 1,400. And then 

I think in about 2 years after you bring any one individual on, they 

will be to a point because we have aggressively looked at where we 

are going to train them and how we are going to do that where 

they can be able to do contracting for us. 

Mr. POPPS. And, sir, a context for you. This was a long, slow decline that is going to take an equal amount of slope to come back 

up. To give you a perspective, 15, 16 years ago, the acquisition in 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
119 

contracting workforce in the Army was approximately 160,000 people. 15, 17 years later it is now at 42,000 people, with half of those 

people eligible for retirement and, since 9/11, anywhere from six to 

seven times the workload with regard to contract actions. So it has 

been a long slow decline that I assume was part of the peace dividend and then following 9/11, great increase in loads and in contract actions, both in modifications and new contract actions, and 

that is where we are today. 

ACQUISITION MILITARY OFFICERS

In addition, I think General Thompson should tell you a little bit 

more about inside the military what is being done to stand up two 

or three or four more general officer billets and also to really create 

an earlier accession point for acquisition military officers. It is really considered much more of a career field than somebody would 

want to be in and stay in because there is rewards for higher rank 

and so forth. 

Mr. MORAN. General Thompson. 

General THOMPSON. And I appreciate that opportunity. I mean, 

one of the things we have done since last August is we have grown 

the number of contracting brigades from 4 to 7. We have grown the 

number of contracting battalions that we had planned on having 

from 8 to 11, and the number of military contracting teams have 

grown by over 50 to now 171. 

The Army Contracting Command that stands up tomorrow will 

be headed initially by a two-star equivalent SES, Mr. Jeff Parsons, 

who is an absolutely outstanding contracting officer. He is a career 

Air Force officer, retired as a colonel with 26 years of contracting 

expertise in the Air Force. We don’t have a contracting general officer at the two-star level today to be able to head up that command. 

We will in the future. 

You know, one of the things that the authorization committees 

have asked us is what legislative proposals we are putting forward, 

and right now we have gone through all of that vetting inside the 

Army and the Army, provided Secretary Geren agrees with the paperwork that is sitting in his office right now, at least at the staff 

level, endorses the need to have five more general officers to be 

able to do contracting. We have given instructions to recent promotion boards both at the general officer level and at the colonel 

level to pick the right people at the senior level to be able to manage contracting, and then creating the other opportunities gives 

you a viable career path, I think, to be able to bring in quality military and also quality civilians because this is a recognized career 

field that has got a lot of potential. So the only way you bring in 

good people at the bottom and keep them there is to give them a 

growth path so they can see that there is opportunities at the top. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Ms. Kaptur. 

ARMY CONTRACTOR WORKFORCE

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, welcome. I 

am wondering if you have the following information. 

On the contracted services that we fund through Army, from information we were given the amount of those contracted services 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
120 

has gone up 500 percent since the start of the war. We have now, 

I think one of you stated or earlier this morning, there were 

190,000 contracted employees inside of Iraq. Is that a correct number? 

Mr. POPPS. We will stand by what Secretary Geren told you initially, ma’am. But I caution you to keep the bends straight in 

terms of which contractors and—there is a lot of different segments 

there. 

Ms. KAPTUR. That goes to my next question, which is of those 

190,000, what are they doing? And how many of them are foreign 

nationals and from which countries? They said 50 percent of them 

were foreign nationals, and I was very interested in having for the 

record the information on what those—if you could break those up 

into categories for me so I can really understand what—like, what 

would you guess the number one category is of contracted employees inside of Iraq? 

Mr. POPPS. Iraqis. 

General THOMPSON. Iraqis. Well over 50 percent. And I will pull 

the information out of one of the notes that I have got here and 

maybe I can answer that question for you and not take it for the 

record. But it is broken up between U.S. military—I mean U.S. citizens, which is the smallest percentage, third-country nationals in 

Iraq, and then the vast majority, over 50 percent, are Iraqis. 

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. If you were to take the largest category 

of, let’s just say, the Iraqis, what are they doing? The largest category of—— 

Mr. POPPS. Reconstruction. 

Ms. KAPTUR. So they are involved in reconstruction projects. 

Mr. POPPS. Reconstruction, yes, ma’am. Capacity building. There 

are currently—— 

Ms. KAPTUR. They are doing that under which companies? 

Mr. POPPS. It depends, ma’am. It could be under Iraqi companies. 

I know that we have made a huge turn in the last 3 or 4 years 

trying to find Iraqi companies to do the work. In some cases Iraqi 

companies will employ Iraqis and they will employ third-party nationals. 

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. And then what about—construction is 

first and what is category 2? Would you just guess? 

Mr. POPPS. Capacity building, all kind of services, yes, ma’am, 

providing water, food, catering, whatever the life support system is 

there, base support services. So what has really happened is there 

has been a very concerted move to get away from American companies, putting Americans in theater to do high priced things under 

American contracts. And what has happened is the value of most 

of the dollars that has been spent, have been spent, and have been 

increased by 10, 20, 30 percent because of the ability to use the 

local economy. Now that wasn’t true early on because it was hard 

to identify in 2003 and 2004 just who the local economy was and 

who you could work with. But by 2005, 2006, and 2007, that economy has matured and it has enabled people seeking contractors 

and subcontractors to go out and contract directly with the Iraqis. 

For instance, the Joint Contract Command for Iraq and Afghanistan, if it has a water project or a power project or a primary 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
121 

health care clinic project or something, and they are free to deal 

directly with Iraqi contractors. 

CORRUPTION IN CONTRACTING

Ms. KAPTUR. You know, it is interesting because when we were 

over in Iraq about a year ago, we met with our Department of 

State officials and AID officials who were pulling their hair out 

over the corruption involving contracts that they were monitoring, 

working with Iraqi instrumentalities. So I am very interested in 

getting the architecture, so I can begin to ascertain more factual 

information about how many people you are stating for us from 

which countries? And then which tasks are they performing and 

the amount of money attendant to those? So then we can look at 

those different categories and begin to answer—get answers to our 

questions—— 

Mr. POPPS. With one caveat. It is hard for the Army to give you 

the complete answer because the theater is so complex and that answer and all of those statistics really are tracked at the Department of Defense OSD level who is responsible for that. So we will 

try to give you what we have on Army contracts and people that 

we know are on Army contracts. But just respectfully I submit it 

is a much larger topic that Army doesn’t track. 

CONTRACTS FOR FUEL

Ms. KAPTUR. Now, are you involved in any oil contracting, acquisition of oil for any purpose inside of Iraq? 

Mr. POPPS. Not that I know of, other than perhaps for Army purposes. I mean, fuel is purchased under the LOGCAP contract for 

the forward operating bases and so forth. But other than operational needs—I mean, are we in business with the oil people or 

something? 

Ms. KAPTUR. Yes. 

Mr. POPPS. No. No, ma’am. Not that I know of, no. 

Ms. KAPTUR. So all of the Army fuel comes from Kuwait or someplace else? 

Mr. POPPS. It comes from wherever it is contracted for. Generally 

under the LOGCAP contract. I would assume—is there another 

fuel contract? 

General THOMPSON. Yes. I mean, there may be some things 

bought under the LOGCAP contract. But for the Defense Department (DoD), the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Defense Energy Support Center has got the global responsibilities for DoD to 

purchase fuel in all parts of the world. So they are the enterprise 

DoD contractors for fuel. And so DLA lets all of those major contracts. There may be some local contracts where something is needed right away. But for the most part that is done by DLA. I mean, 

that is something that has been done for many, many years. 

Mr. POPPS. But no one is doing their own deals. This is all centrally managed. 

General THOMPSON. Ma’am, if I can—— 

Ms. KAPTUR. On oil? 

Mr. POPPS. Yes, ma’am. 

General THOMPSON. Your specific question about the breakout of 

the contracting workforce in Iraq, this is end of fourth quarter 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
122 

2007, so this data is about 5 months old. But there are 17 percent 

of the contractors in Iraq that were U.S. citizens, 30 percent were 

third-country nationals, and 53 percent were host country nationals, Iraqis. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Okay. And I would appreciate for the record how 

many individuals that is out of the 190,000. 

General THOMPSON. And I have got those numbers both for Iraq 

and Afghanistan. And then what we will do is what you asked this 

morning to the Secretary and the Chief, is break those out into 

what categories those contractors are working in. 

[The information follows:] 

According to a recent U. S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Quarterly Contractor 

Census, there are 163,591 total contractor personnel on Department of Defense 

(DoD) contracts in Iraq. Of this total 31,325 are U.S. Citizens, 56,368 are Third 

Country Nationals, and 75,898 are Local National Iraqis who make up a majority 

of our contracted workforce. 

CORRUPTION IN CONTRACTING

Ms. KAPTUR. Yes. And one of our biggest problems with the government of Iraq is corruption. So you see where I am going with 

the contracts that we are signing with Iraqi companies. I want to 

better inform myself and ask—and follow some of these contracts, 

quite frankly. 

Mr. POPPS. And, ma’am, one thing you will take comfort in is 

again our contracting agencies deal over there with the Iraqis. 

They do not deal in cash. And that I think is part of the frustrations that the Iraqis might have with us. So you see, we treat everything like an acquisition program. And if we are going to purchase services for a water station and so forth, those vendors are 

paid by check, they are paid where everything is accountable for. 

So there is a great misconception somehow that we are running 

around on the economy using cash and so forth. That is not the 

case. We do business there the same way we do business here. No 

contractor here would be accepting a cash payment from the 

United States, and the same thing doesn’t occur there. It does not 

occur there. 

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS (FCS)

Mr. BISHOP. The gentlelady’s time has expired. Let me just go 

back to Future Combat Systems again. The Government Accountability Office released two reports on March 7th of this year on the 

Future Combat Systems. One is entitled, quote, ‘‘2009 Is a Critical 

Juncture for the Army’s Future Combat Systems’’, and the other is 

titled, quote,‘‘Significant Challenges Ahead in Developing and Demonstrating Future Combat Systems Network and Software’’. The 

GAO found that the knowledge demonstrated thus far is well short 

of a program halfway through its development schedule and its 

budget. A demonstration of capabilities falls late in the schedule by 

our commitment to production, especially spinouts comes early. 

Complimentary programs, including Joint Tactical Radio System 

(JTRS) and the Warfighter Information Network Tactical (WIN–T) 

are not synchronized with the FCS and they are having their own 

challenges. The requirement for software lines of code has been reestimated from 63 million to 95 million lines. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
123 

The GAO recommends the Army identify viable alternatives to 

FCS. Does the Army have any viable alternatives to FCS? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, I have looked at the GAO report and I 

would answer it this way. First off, I have great respect for what 

GAO does, and I mean that sincerely, and I know that David Walker was up on the Hill yesterday and he leaves this week after his 

tenure as the Comptroller General, and I think he as an individual 

has really taken that agency to another level and I am really 

pleased to see what he has been able to do to bring all of the country’s awareness to a higher level and things like human capital 

planning and coming to grips with our entitlement programs, et 

cetera. So that is my personal public statement on behalf of the 

GAO because I really mean that sincerely. 

We have four full-time GAO employees embedded in the FCS 

program, and we welcome their insights and I mean that sincerely, 

too. Having another set of eyes, auditor eyes for the most part in 

this case, pointing out things that we need to address inside of that 

program or any program is good. The Defense Department response back to that GAO report had input from the Army, and 

most of the responses back said we concur with what GAO is saying. 

We have a yearly DoD level review on the FCS program chaired 

by the Defense Acquisition Executive. We will have one again this 

summer and then next year again when we get to the preliminary 

design and review stage for the manned ground vehicles for FCS. 

All of the issues that are raised by GAO, not just in this year’s report, but since 2004 they have done an annual report on the FCS 

program. There is consistency in their comments, but all of the 

things that they raise as concerns get looked at in these very detailed reviews, whether it be testing, whether it be requirement 

synchronization, or software development. And so I am confident 

that the process inside the Defense Department addresses these 

things in a way that balances cost, schedule and risk. 

To the specific report on software, there was a comparison made 

between the FCS program, which is designed to put together an entire brigade combat team of capability and make sure it works together when it is fielded, and it compared to two individual airplane programs. That is an apples and oranges comparison, in my 

view. You know, 20 million lines of code versus 90 million lines of 

code. About 75 to 80 percent of the lines of code accounted for in 

the FCS program are either commercial code that has already been 

written or government code that has already been written. It is not 

new code we are developing for FCS. And so that is a factoid that 

sort of changes the perspective, in my view, on the complexity of 

what we are trying to do. Well over 20 million lines of code accounted for in that 90 million is the Linux operating system. And 

so that is a commercially developed operating system, just like the 

Windows operating system for Microsoft. And so we are using the 

Linux operating system and then integrating other software things 

with it. 

So while I understand, you know, the GAO concerns, we are addressing them. I am confident that we have a review process both 

internal to the Army and DoD that will address those on an annual 

basis. The FCS program in my view is very well managed— it is 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
124 

very complex. But it is not so complex that we are not managing 

our way through it in a very systematic way, balance and risk. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. Do you have anything to add, Mr. 

Popps? 

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS TESTING

Mr. POPPS. Mr. Chairman, just that we shouldn’t forget that this 

is among the most tested of programs. So the GAO implication that 

somehow we need more testing or not, it hasn’t been enough and 

so forth, this is among—I think there is currently 75 tests ongoing. 

General THOMPSON. And those 75 tests that are ongoing are an 

indication that we have reached the peak of the research and development, the funding for research and development will now 

start to come down, and the production funding for FCS will start 

to go up. And there is a crossover point that we are soon to reach. 

The fact that you have got 75 major tests ongoing in FCS right now 

is an indication that we are getting ready to move from research 

and development into testing, into low rate production, and then 

into production. 

Mr. BISHOP. The GAO kind of keeps us informed of whether or 

not we are—we have efficiencies and sort of helping quality control, 

isn’t it? Make sure that you are doing what you need to be doing 

when you need to do it? 

Mr. POPPS. It does. And I ask you again to remember that we 

have four GAO employees embedded within the program. 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Tiahrt. 

UH–72 HELICOPTERS

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a—EADS has 

their helicopter headquarters in Germany and there is a concept 

now that we have talked about here in America called corporate inversion, and it is a tax scheme in which U.S. companies put their 

headquarters in foreign countries so they don’t have to pay Federal 

income taxes. But there is an inverted methodology to this where 

foreign companies get a U.S. front company and then they suck all 

the profits back to the European nation or of the foreign country 

so they don’t have to pay any Federal income taxes. 

Do you have any mechanism in place to assure that the money 

that is made, the profit that is made off of this program is converted to Federal income taxes at the appropriate rate? 

Mr. POPPS. I know of no such check that we have to assure ourselves of that. 

Mr. TIAHRT. So this is another gap in our procurement policy? 

Mr. POPPS. It is. 

Mr. TIAHRT. All right. Getting more specific to the helicopter, my 

understanding is that we—well, I am on the Interior subcommittee 

and they were talking to us—the Forest Service was talking to us 

about a fire in California, southern California near a Marine—or 

a military base. And I think it was called the Witch fire. And at 

that time, it had several UH–72 I think you called them Lakotas. 

Maybe we should call them Kaisers—— 

Mr. POPPS. Lakota. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Since they are a German company. UH–72 Lakota, 

or Kaiser as it could be called. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
125 

General THOMPSON. We name our helicopters, Congressman, 

after Indian tribes. 

Mr. TIAHRT. I know. I was trying to think of a good tribal German name that you could use, but none just pops into mind. So 

Kaiser will have to do. The Lakota. My understanding is that during this fire, that the UH–72 was grounded because it was too hot 

in the cockpit operating in southern California for pilots to be in 

the cockpit comfortably. It just simply got too hot in the cockpit. 

And it wasn’t because of the fire. It was because of the ambient 

temperature outside of the cockpit and the extra temperature generated by the jet engine itself of the helicopter. So just in the simple operation of the UH–72, it became too uncomfortable for pilots 

to operate it. And I also understand that there was nothing in the 

specifications to maintain a temperature for pilots within the cockpit. So nothing was going to be done about that. But you guys have 

come up with a fix, as I understand it, to put an air conditioner 

on it. So now the air conditioner causes you to trade cargo weight 

for air conditioner weight. So what compensation was given to you 

by the manufacturer for this—what appears to be an inability to 

meet specifications? 

General THOMPSON. Well, you are right in your facts that we did 

not have an air conditioning system in that utility helicopter. We 

do now. They are not all integrated yet, but we have now got the 

funding in place to be able to put the air conditioning systems in 

all of the aircraft. 

Mr. TIAHRT. So you are paying for their inability to meet spec? 

General THOMPSON. They met the requirement they had to meet 

when they initially built them. The helicopters that have air conditioning systems in them are—are attack helicopters because they 

are closed cockpits. The utility helicopters, and I have to go back 

and get the exact variance, not all of the utility helicopters have 

air conditioning systems as part of them because they have an ability to open the windows and have the ventilation inside of the aircraft. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Wouldn’t it be a requirement, though, for a pilot to 

be able to fly a helicopter and here we have an actual circumstance 

in which they were unable to do that? It seems like the ability to 

fly a helicopter is pretty essential when you buy a helicopter. So 

I don’t know how this wasn’t a violation of spec. I don’t know why 

we are paying for this air conditioning. For some reason we ought 

to have helicopters that we can actually fly. 

Mr. BISHOP. Can I get a point of clarification? Are you saying 

that the helicopter did or didn’t have the specification for air conditioning originally? 

General THOMPSON. I will go back and check. But the requirement around which the contract instrument was built did not require them to put an air conditioner in that helicopter. Based on 

those lessons learned, we have now adjusted the requirement and 

we are putting air conditioning system those helicopters. 

[The information follows:] 

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved LUH (UH–72A 

Lakota) Capabilities Development Document (CDD) did not contain a requirement 

or specification for an air conditioning system or internal cooling requirement for 

the aircraft; therefore, the original Statement of Work (SOW) as part of the Request 

for Proposal (RFP) did not have specifications on cockpit or cabin cooling requireVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:40 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00125 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
126 

ments. Based on the foregoing, none of the offerors proposed an aircraft with an air 

conditioning system as part of their LUH configuration. 

Mr. TIAHRT. And we are paying for it? 

Mr. BISHOP. We have a 15-minute vote, and I think we have got 

a little less than 10 minutes now. So I am going to go to Ms. Kaptur, if you don’t mind, Mr. Tiahrt. I think she has one remaining 

question and I have a remaining question. And I think we will 

close it out at that time. 

FUEL USAGE FOR OVERLAND VEHICLES

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me another 

question. And I will be very brief and just ask in the same way as 

I have asked for summary information on contracting. And we are 

always happy to provide you backup if you don’t understand the request completely. 

I also am very interested in your different classes of overland vehicles and Bradley fighting, Abrams tank, your medium tactical vehicle, trucks, MRAPs, Humvees. And I am very interested in knowing from you how you look upon the power systems that drive those 

into the future, how you are thinking about those in terms of saving energy, the new energy systems that are being included. For 

example, I know that is true in the thinking about a Future Combat System. But I am interested in how you are looking at the 

fleets that you purchase in terms of designing new fuel systems, 

new power systems. 

Do you have the ability, General, to provide that to us and give 

us the numbers of vehicles you currently have in that class, how 

many you intend to purchase, and how that—I am interested in the 

power train. That is all I care about. And how—— 

Mr. POPPS. And the fuel source? 

Ms. KAPTUR. Absolutely. Is there a way for you to summarize 

that for me? And then attach numbers to those so I can better 

order my own thinking around for your overland transportation, 

how you are thinking about the Army of the future and how—— 

Mr. POPPS. Not only will we try to do that for you, General 

Thompson has something to say to you. But I would like to bring 

over some of the more senior members of the Army Science Board 

to talk to you in your office about that, because they are doing a 

great deal of work on fuel cells, battery energy and sort of third, 

fourth, fifth generation stuff that you might find very interesting. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Yes. 

General THOMPSON. But holistically, ma’am, you have got tactical 

power and you have got installation power. And what I have asked 

the Army to do, not just the acquisition community, but also the 

requirements community, we need to get our arms around the 

many, many initiatives that are going on right now. DoD has got 

a number of initiatives ongoing to get after energy efficiency in the 

systems that we build. But what I am trying to do is get my arms 

around our need for power and energy, both tactically and installation wise, and how do we maximize the strategy so that I don’t 

need as much of a demand on fossil fuel sources in the future. 

My previous job at the Tank Automotive Command, a tremendous amount of research in the hybrid electric. Hybrid electric is 

the foundation for the power train in the Future Combat System. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
127 

Much work partnered with the automobile industry up in the Detroit area around fuel cells and the potential that fuel cells hold for 

the country. 

So we will take that for the record and come back with a comprehensive answer because it is just too complicated to answer 

here. 

[The information follows:] 

The Hybrid Electric Vehicle Experimentation and Assessment (HEVEA) effort 

that began in fiscal year (FY) 2006 focuses on the applicability of hybrid electric to 

Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (TWV) mobility for future systems. Ongoing experimentation measures hybrid vehicle performance and fuel consumption over a variety of 

military standard driving courses. The goal is to create physics-based models to use 

with realistic driving scenarios as a tool to predict hybrid electric drive cycle performance and fuel economy supporting future hybrid/conventional acquisition decisions. The HEVEA program is currently positioned to support the Joint Lightweight 

Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) acquisition decision and will continue through FY 2009. The 

HEVEA effort has also established HEV test methodology for military application 

using accepted industry practices and Department of Energy processes. 

The Power and Energy Systems Integration Laboratory (SIL) integrates and evaluates hybrid electric architectures including power generation, energy distribution 

and control and thermal management. The SIL enables power and energy components to be evaluated, for example varying battery technology, and demonstrated in 

realistic scenarios and architectures. These evaluations inform acquisition system 

programs and component technology developers. 

The goal of the assured fuels initiative is to reduce reliance on fuels derived solely 

from crude oil by qualifying and then implementing use of domestically produced 

alternative fuels at United States installations. The objectives of this initiative are 

to expand the Army technical database on alternative fuels, engage in specifications 

development of alternative fuels, and to qualify/certify alternative jet/diesel fuels for 

use in Army tactical/combat equipment and systems. Current efforts are focused on 

qualifying ‘‘synfuel blends,’’ blends of up to 50 percent by volume Fischer-Tropsch 

(FT) synthetic fuel with JP–8, for use in Army tactical/combat ground vehicles. 

Qualification of synfuel blends will be accomplished through performance evaluations in selected engines and limited testing and demonstration of synfuel blends 

in equipment and systems. This effort aligns with the synfuel blends program of the 

Air Force and similar plans by the Navy. Synfuel blends qualification has not yet 

started for Army-unique aviation platforms. 

The Fuel Efficiency Demonstrator (FED) focuses on demonstrating the viability of 

significant decreases in fuel consumption, without sacrificing the performance or capability, of tactical vehicles. This would be accomplished by integrating potentially 

high-payoff fuel efficient technologies and advanced lightweight materials in new 

and innovative designs. The FED effort began in FY 2008 and is scheduled to continue through FY 2013. Successful technologies may be incorporated in future procurements for the JLTV. 

The high power, high energy density lithium-ion battery effort investigates manufacturing process improvements in the areas of automated electrolyte filling, cell 

winding, bussing, closing, electrical formation, and battery packaging. This FY 2004 

through FY 2009 effort is also seeking to implement built-in quality control procedure inherent at the production line to insure cell consistency and improved yield. 

Finally the effort seeks to improve the affordability of high power and energy density battery packs for HEVs. 

Within the Army, we have basically two classes of vehicles—tracked and wheeled. 

As a rule, we buy complete systems from contractors that use commercially available engines to meet our performance specifications. These engines meet current 

fuel efficiency and emission standards at the time of the contract award. We try to 

keep the same engine in the vehicle over the life of the contract for commonality 

purposes. The Army does not develop engines for its ground vehicle systems with 

the exception of the Abrams engine. Future Army vehicle requirements document 

will have fuel efficiency as a key performance parameter (KPP). 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
128 

VEHICLE MATRIX 

System Commercial engine On-hand thru 

2008 Programmed in FYDP Fuel efficiency (KPP) 

Abrams ............ No—Gov’t developed engine w/ 

Textron Lycoming AGT 1500.

5,827 Only modernization of existing 

models.

No 

Bradley ............ Yes—Cummins .............................. 6,421 653 ................................................. No 

Stryker ............. Yes—Caterpillar ............................ 2,443 1,132 .............................................. No 

HMMWV ............ Yes—GM ........................................ 121,000 27,244 ............................................ No 

FMTV ................ Yes—Caterpillar ............................ 34,326 20,502 ............................................ No 

HEMTT ............. Yes—Detroit Diesel Caterpillar ..... 13,978 3,469 .............................................. No 

PLS .................. Yes—Detroit Diesel Caterpillar ..... 3,965 1,580 .............................................. No 

HET .................. Yes—Detroit Diesel Caterpillar ..... 3,218 1,157 .............................................. No 

M915 ............... Yes—Detroit Diesel ....................... 7,766 541 ................................................. No 

MRAP ............... Yes—Caterpillar International 

Cummins.

12,000* 0 ..................................................... No 

*planned. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I thank you, gentlemen. This morning my chief 

question was on power, and both at installations—I don’t know if 

you were here this morning. I don’t think you were. 

General THOMPSON. I was. 

Ms. KAPTUR. You were. Okay—as well as the vehicular side. I 

thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much for allowing me those questions in the record. 

General THOMPSON. That is a great question, ma’am. 

UNFUNDED ITEMS LIST

Mr. BISHOP. I have got a question on the unfunded items list. 

General Casey recently provided to the congressional defense committees a list of items that are currently unfunded that the Army 

would accelerate if additional funding were available. Under cover 

letter, General Casey states that the list focuses on funding Army 

National Guard shortfalls of dual use items. 

General Thompson, could you explain what is a dual use item 

and whether or not the Army regularly procures hardware with 

dual use applications in mind? And the list that was provided to 

the Committee is in alphabetical order. Could you provide a list 

that is in order of priority? And, finally, tell us why it is that all 

the unfunded items are with the National Guard. 

General THOMPSON. Dual use are things that can be used from 

an operational perspective to meet a warfighting capability and 

also can be used for homeland defense. For example, trucks, engineering equipment, some of our radio systems are obviously used 

in a warfighting scenario, but also can be used in homeland defense. That is my definition of how I describe dual use. 

The list that was provided, it is not all shortages in the National 

Guard, and it is in alphabetical order and not priority order. We 

have acquisition objectives, how many of the different types of 

things that we need to fill out our units we would like to buy. And 

so that list is the reflection that you have got a viable program 

today where, if more money was available, you could buy some of 

those. And that is what is in that unfinanced requirements list. 

But it is not all National Guard equipment. 

Mr. BISHOP. Could you provide for the Committee, could you just 

organize that list in terms of your priorities so that the highest priVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:40 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00128 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
129 

ority is first on the list so that if we do have additional funding 

we can try to fund it in accordance with the priorities? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, the Army G–3 and trade-offs are involved in setting the priorities. The acquisition community doesn’t 

do that. We will take that one back and look at that list and see 

if there is a need to prioritize it. But that is not something that 

we would do. The G–3 would. 

Mr. BISHOP. Could you pass it on to the appropriate folks and let 

them know that the Committee is interested in having a priorities 

list? 

Mr. POPPS. Yes, sir. We will take that on. 

[The information follows:] 

The Army’s most critical unfunded requirements (UFRs) for FY09 focus on Army 

National Guard (ARNG) equipment shortages for dual-use items. This UFR list was 

approximately $3.94 billion. 

The original ARNG equipment UFR list has been modified by the Army to account 

for substitutions for seven unexecutable lines on the original list. The result is a 

slight decrease in the UFR, which is now identified to be $3.93 billion. The adjusted 

ARNG equipment prioritized UFR list is enclosed. 

All lines on the current UFR list will have a positive impact on ARNG readiness. 

The acquisition of this equipment will enable the ARNG to train to a higher level 

of proficiency to meet both state and federal missions while simultaneously supporting current overseas missions. The most critical of the dual-use items are trucks 

(High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and Heavy Expanded 

Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTTs)). The ARNG’s on-hand quantity of trucks is at 

a critical all time low. The receipt of trucks will have an immediate impact on readiness and mission effectiveness. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
130 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 464 here 46476B.010
131 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Popps and General Thompson, for 

your testimonies. It has been very helpful. 

At this time the Committee stands adjourned until 10:30 a.m. tomorrow morning. 

[CLERK NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow:] 

ARMED RECONNAISSANCE HELICOPTER (ARH) 

Question. The Army has lost, in Iraq and Afghanistan, a significant number of 

Kiowa Warrior helicopters, the current Armed Reconnaissance helicopter. The new 

helicopter, the replacement for the Kiowa Warrior, is finally in production after suffering approximately a one year slip. Twelve ARH will be built with fiscal year 2008 

funding. The fiscal year 2009 ARH program calls for the production of 28 helicopters. 

Today, what is the shortfall in Army armed reconnaissance helicopter fleet, that 

is, how many of the older Kiowa Warrior reconnaissance helicopters is the Army 

short? 

Answer. Current force structure requires 368 Kiowa Warriors in the fleet; Army 

has 335 aircraft today. We are short 33 aircraft. There is currently no production 

line capability for Kiowa Warriors for replacement aircraft. The Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) is the planned replacement for Kiowa Warrior reconnaissance helicopter. 

Question. What is the status of production of the 12 funded ARH aircraft? 

Answer. The Army intends to seek the Defense Acquisition Executive’s approval 

to procure 10 aircraft at a Restructure Defense Acquisition Board in July 2008. 

These aircraft will support the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation planned for 

June 2010. The fiscal year 2008 appropriations bill language provided for procurement of 12 ARH, however, $174.6 million appropriated for ARH only funds 10 aircraft. 

Question. Has the Army taken delivery of any of the 12 ARH funded in fiscal year 

2008? 

Answer. No, deliveries for the first 10 ARHs are planned from November 2009 to 

June 2010. 

Question. When will we see the new ARH operating in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. Initial Operational Capability for ARH is scheduled for January 2012. 

This will be the first ARH squadron ready for deployment into an operational theater. 

Question. The Army has requested funding for 28 ARH in the fiscal year 2009 request. Is the program on track to build those 28 aircraft, and over what time frame 

will those 28 aircraft be delivered to the Army? 

Answer. Yes, the fiscal year 2009 request will allow the Army to proceed with production of the 28 ARHs. The scheduled deliveries will occur from July 2010 through 

June 2011. 

Question. The U.S. Special Forces fly an armed reconnaissance helicopter different 

than the aircraft the Army is buying. Why not fly the same small, armed reconnaissance helicopter as U.S. Army Special Forces? 

Answer. The Army source selection process resulted in the selection of the aircraft 

that best met the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved Capability Development Document. 

Question. The ARH was originally proposed as an off-the-shelf commercial helicopter with integration of the necessary military hardware. Integration of military 

hardware has proven to be very difficult. What was the initial planned unit cost for 

the ARH, and what is the unit cost now? 

Answer. The initial Average Procurement Unit Cost in base year 2005 dollars was 

$7.582 million. Based on the current program office estimate, the current Average 

Procurement Unit Cost is $8.859 million in base year 2005 dollars. 

LIGHT UTILITY HELICOPTER (LUH) 

Question. The Army’s new light utility helicopter, called the UH–72A, Lakota, is 

intended to provide general aviation support for continental United States based 

aviation units of the active and reserve components. As UH–72A aircraft become 

available for missions such as MEDEVAC, the UH–60s will be freed up for combat 

unit assignments. 

How many aircraft are currently on order, and how many have been delivered? 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
132 

Answer. To date, 85 UH–72A Lakota aircraft are on contract and 24 aircraft have 

been delivered. 

Question. The fiscal year 2009 request is for $224.5 million to buy 36 aircraft. 

When will these aircraft be delivered? 

Answer. These 36 LUH aircraft are scheduled for delivery during fiscal year 2010. 

Question. What is the total acquisition objective? How many will go to the active 

Army and how many to the reserve component? 

Answer. The total LUH acquisition objective is for 345 aircraft. This is an increase 

of 23 aircraft from the original acquisition objective of 322 aircraft. The active Army 

will receive 145 aircraft and the reserve component will receive 200 aircraft. 

Question. So far all the UH–72A helicopters have been assembled in Germany. 

When will assembly operations transition to facilities in the United States? 

Answer. Currently, seven of the 24 aircraft that have been delivered to the Army 

are ‘‘made in the US’’ aircraft. Of the total Army Acquisition Objective (AAO) 345 

aircraft, 305 will be made in the US and 40 will be made in Germany. However, 

from the beginning of the program, a portion of each UH–72A has been accomplished at the new American Eurocopter Facility in Columbus, Mississippi to include assembly, customization, paint, testing, and delivery. The EADS is in the 

process of duplicating the entire German Eurocopter EC145 production line at 

American Eurocopter in Columbus, Mississippi. The plan for transitioning LUH production is a phased, event-driven approach consisting of overlapping Light Assembly 

Line (LAL), Full Assembly Line (FAL), and Production Line (PL) phases. The FAL 

operations are underway and PL operations will begin in April 2009. It is important 

to note that the phased, event-driven production transition and the phase-in of US 

sourcing is on track and is not impacting on the Army’s required delivery schedule. 

Production is now increasing to four aircraft per month and all deliveries have been 

ahead of schedule. 

Question. Which units have received UH–72A helicopters thus far and what is the 

near term fielding plan? 

Answer. The UH–72A Lakota has been fielded to the National Training Center 

(NTC) MEDEVAC at Fort Irwin, California; the Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC) Flight Detachment at Fort Eustis, Virginia; and the Joint Readiness 

Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The Army National Guard is scheduled to 

receive their first aircraft in June 2008 at Tupelo, Mississippi. 

Question. The UH–72A has had some difficulties with too much heat in the cockpit due to the large glass bubble area and a lack of ventilation or air conditioning. 

The Committee has been informed that in some instances flights have been curtailed or limited due to potentially over heating critical flight instruments. What is 

the status of developing and fielding a solution for cockpit over heating? 

Answer. The cockpit and cabin heat issue identified during the Initial Operational 

Test (IOT) has been resolved. All aircraft will have an approved ventilation kit and 

Environmental Control Units (ECUs) that will be installed on all MEDEVAC and 

VIP versions of the aircraft. All aircraft fielded now have the ventilation kits installed and ECUs are in the process of being installed on the National Training 

Center MEDEVAC and TRADOC aircrafts and will be completed by mid-May 2008. 

Question. While using UH–72A helicopters for MEDEVAC operations at field locations such as the National Training Center (NTC) problems have been encountered 

with sand ingestion into the engine causing unexpected wear. What has been done 

to solve the sand ingestion problem, and why was the Army seemingly caught off 

guard with encountering sand in places such as the National Training Center? 

Answer. The EADS-North America and American Eurocopter began development 

of an Engine Inlet Barrier Filter (EIBF) as a result of customer input from commercial operations in similar environments. The Army anticipated some long-term effects of the harsh desert environment of the National Training Center, but the Army 

did not think the environment would affect the aircraft as quickly as it did. The 

confirming results of the Initial Operational Test (IOT) at the National Training 

Center expedited the final development of the EIBF that is now being installed on 

an aircraft destined for the NTC. This aircraft is scheduled to be evaluated at NTC 

in late May 2008. After the evaluation, all the fielded NTC aircraft will be retrofitted as well as future aircraft fielded to NTC. 

Question. Is the UH–72A performing in a manner that is sufficiently acceptable 

for the Army to continue with procurement of the aircraft? 

Answer. The UH–72A performance is exceeding all expectations. Monthly aircraft 

deliveries have been ahead of schedule, the fleet operational readiness rate has exceeded 90 percent, proving the success of full Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) 

and all cost, schedule, and performance metrics have been met. The UH–72A Lakota 

is critically needed to replace the aging UH–1 and OH–58 aircraft that remain in 

the active Army and the reserve components. The UH–72A is needed by the Army 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
133 

National Guard to perform critical Homeland Security Missions and will allow UH– 

60 Blackhawk aircraft to be shifted to tactical units in support of the warfighter. 

The UH–72A Lakota program is a sterling example of a Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 

(COTS) acquisition for a military application and remains a cornerstone of the 

Army’s aviation transformation. 

JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT (JCA) 

Question. The Joint Cargo Aircraft or JCA is planned to satisfy the near battlefield cargo mission with greater speed and range than helicopters, freeing up helicopters for other missions, and replacing aging C–23s and some of the Army’s C– 

12s. 

The Army has five JCA on order and the 2009 request for $264 million will fund 

procurement of another seven aircraft. The Committee is informed that the Army 

plans to procure a total of 54 Joint Cargo Aircraft. As the program matures and 

deliveries begin, do you anticipate a growing requirement for JCA? 

Answer. Yes. At present, the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is identifying a requirement for a limited number of JCA. The SOCOM submitted an Unfunded requirement (UFR) for two JCA in the FY09 budget. The program office is 

not aware of any other emerging JCA quantity requirements. 

Question. Is the first JCA on track for a November 2008 delivery? 

Answer. Yes, the JCA is on-track for an on-time delivery. 

Question. The JCA is a joint Army and Air Force project. How are the Army and 

Air Force versions of the JCA different? 

Answer. Both services are procuring the same version of the C–27J (Joint Cargo 

Aircraft). 

CH–47 CHINOOK HELICOPTER

Question. The fiscal year 2009 budget request includes funding for 16 new-build 

Chinook helicopters, and conversion of 23 older CH–47D to CH–47F. 

Will the 16 new-build helicopters replace aircraft that are being retired or are you 

expanding the Army helicopter fleet? 

Answer. The Army requirement is 513 Chinooks, which includes 452 CH–47F and 

61 MH–47G aircraft. The current inventory is 458 Chinooks. These shortages are 

in active and Army National Guard units. The 16 new-build aircraft will allow the 

Army to alleviate a portion of the current aircraft shortage. 

Question. The budget request includes funding to convert 23 CH–47Ds to become 

CH–47Fs. What are the key difference or upgrades, and how much of the old aircraft is salvaged to become part of the CH–47F? 

Answer. The CH–47F Chinook is a major improvement over the CH–47D. The 

CH–47F upgrade includes new machined airframes, a digital cockpit, enhanced air 

transportability, reduced airframe vibration, an upgraded aircraft survivability 

equipment suite and a digital automated flight control system. The major dynamic 

components (e.g., gearboxes, transmissions, blades, hubs) are harvested when the 

CH–47D aircraft are inducted for conversion to the CH–47F. These components are 

then recapitalized, to bring them to a like-new condition, and installed on the CH– 

47F aircraft on the production line. 

Question. The Chinook helicopter has been around for over 30 years. Should the 

Army be looking for opportunities to leap ahead in helicopter technology, lift, speed 

and all weather performance? 

Answer. The Chinook has been a workhorse for the Army for the past 40 years. 

The CH–47F meets or exceeds all the current Army requirements and is anticipated 

to be the heavy lift helicopter for the Army for the next 20 years. The Army and 

Air Force are jointly developing a requirements document for a Joint Heavy Lift aircraft. That aircraft will be likely be a super short or vertical take off and landing 

capable aircraft that will lift over 20 tons. That requirement is still in the early 

stages of development and any resultant development program would not begin 

fielding aircraft until the 2020 timeframe. Even if a Joint Heavy Lift aircraft is developed and fielded, the Army will continue to have a requirement for a Chinooksized aircraft and the CH–47F will fill that requirement. 

Question. The Army had decided to produce all the new CH–47Fs with the Common Avionics Architecture System of cockpit instrument display. This was the system developed for Army Special Forces, and it was to be the standard for all Army 

helicopters. The Committee is informed that the Special Forces design has proven 

to be unnecessarily complicated for the rest of the Army and that a redesign is needed. What is the status of the cockpit display redesign and is that effort fully funded? 

Answer. The cockpit has performed exceptionally well and there is no indication 

that the cockpit is overly complicated or in need of a redesign. The cockpit was 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
134 

flown by representative Army pilots during operational testing and determined by 

the Army and Office of the Secretary of Defense independent evaluators to be operationally effective and suitable. The Common Avionics Architecture System (CAAS) 

equipped aircraft met or exceeded all operational requirements. To date, the Army 

has fielded two operational CH–47F units and flown over 4,000 hours with the 

CAAS cockpit. Users at every level have been pleased with the performance and capability of the CAAS cockpit. 

STRYKER

Question. The budget request for fiscal year 2009 proposes $1.1 billion for procurement of 119 Stryker vehicles, including 40 Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance vehicles; and 79 Mobile Gun Systems. 

The Army had scheduling problems last year in that the unit selected for field 

testing of the Stryker Mobile Gun System was deployed in the surge. Has the necessary user testing been accomplished and is the program approved to move ahead? 

Answer. Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) on the Stryker Mobile 

Gun System (MGS) was successfully completed in November 2007. Funding for the 

Stryker MGS to move forward is pending our compliance with Section 117 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181). The 

U.S. Army is in the process of fulfilling that requirement at this time. 

Question. What is the status of executing the Stryker funding for the current fiscal year, 2008? 

Answer. The Stryker program expects to execute the majority of funding for fiscal 

year 2008 between June–July 2008. The strategy involves using the cost advantage 

gained through vehicle contract efficiencies by combining program base funding and 

supplemental funding contract awards within a 60 day period. With the fiscal year 

2008 main supplemental expected in June 2008, this provides a window of opportunity from June 2008 through August 2008 that will allow a potential cost savings 

of up to $45 million on planned Stryker vehicle procurement. An additional $860 

million in survivability enhancements will also be obligated upon receipt of the main 

supplemental. 

Question. The Committee is informed that the Army intends to replace many of 

the M113 series vehicles, the work horse ‘‘Armored Personnel Carriers’’ that are 

Viet Nam War vintage, with Strykers and that replacing M113 MEDEVAC vehicles 

is a priority. Does the Army have the necessary funding to procure the requisite 

number of Stryker MEDEVAC vehicles to replace the M113s? 

Answer. The Fiscal Year 2009 (FY09) President’s Budget does not provide funding 

for any Stryker Medical Evacuation Vehicles (MEV) to replace M113 ambulances. 

It provides necessary funding to complete Mobile Gun System (MGS) and Nuclear 

Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV) requirements for the base 

Stryker program which includes 7 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, the Ready to 

Fight Fleet, Equipping Force Pool, and other Training and Doctrine Command and 

testing requirements. Additionally, it provides funding for procurement of 15 

NBCRVs to begin FOX vehicle replacement. 

However, the FY08 Global War on Terrorism request provides funding for 231 

MEVs to replace M113 Ambulances. Additional funding will be needed to procure 

670 more Stryker MEVs to replace the remaining M113 Ambulances in Heavy Brigade Combat Teams. 

Question. Does the Army plan to add additional Stryker brigades to the Army? 

Answer. The Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), like all of the Army’s BCTs, 

are performing superbly in Iraq. Stryker Brigades provide our combatant commanders a unique combat capability that ranges across the full spectrum of military 

operations. Stryker Brigade Combat Teams fit into the Army Force Generation 

Model the same way as Heavy and Infantry Brigade Combat teams do. Each of our 

Brigade Combat Teams (Infantry, Heavy, and Stryker) is capable of full spectrum 

operations. The Army’s current plan is to build seven Stryker Brigade Combat 

teams; six in the active component and one in the National Guard (Pennsylvania). 

The Army recently received additional authority to build 6 new BCTs. The Army 

continuously reassesses the mix of BCTs—Stryker, Heavy, or Infantry—with analysis underway that will consider the existing requirements, current operational demand, and our assessment of the future capabilities needed to meet the strategy. 

Additional maneuver BCTs of any type—Stryker, Heavy, or Infantry—will likely reduce the Army’s stress and begin to rebuild strategic depth and flexibility. 

LAND WARRIOR

Question. According to the description in the Army’s Weapon System handbook for 

fiscal years 2007 to 2008, Land Warrior is a first-generation, integrated, modular 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
135 

fighting system that uses state-of-the-art computer, communications, and geo-location technologies to link dismounted Soldiers to the digital battlefield. The Army 

equipped the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, of the 

2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington with Land Warrior to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the system during that battalion’s tour in Iraq. By all accounts, Land Warrior performed well. 

Basically, Land Warrior is a digital data sharing and communications device that 

solders wear as part of their battle uniform. Please expand on that limited description. What does Land Warrior do for the soldier? How heavy is it? 

Answer. Land Warrior is a 10 lb modular, integrated Soldier leader system. It enhances the lethality, battle-command capability, survivability, mobility, and sustainability of dismounted combat Soldiers, enabling them to engage and defeat enemy 

targets while minimizing friendly casualties. Land Warrior facilitates command, 

control, and sharing of battlefield information and integrates Soldier leaders into 

the Army Battle Command System network. 

There are several components that make up the system. They include a wearable, 

ruggedized computer; a Soldier Control Unit performing the same functions much 

like a mouse we use on our personal computers; a radio that transmits both voice 

and data; a navigation system that provides Global Positioning System (GPS) location as well as dead reckoning when not receiving a GPS signal when the Soldier 

is inside a building or in dense vegetation; there is a Helmet Mounted Display that 

shows map data, still satellite imagery, and the location of the Soldier and his fellow 

Land Warrior in relation to the map or imagery; the system incorporates a Close 

Combat Optic, Thermal Weapons Sight, Daylight Video Sight, and a Multi-Function 

Laser and interfaces with the M4 carbine and the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon. 

The system is powered by a rechargeable lithium-ion battery. 

Question. General Thompson, what has been the feedback on the use of Land 

Warrior in combat in Iraq? 

Answer. The feedback from the field has been positive. It has made the unit, 4th 

Battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment, equipped with the Land Warrior System 

more effective. Small unit leaders such as Platoon Leaders have indicated that the 

situational awareness provided by the system is a combat multiplier. 

It gives these leaders the ability to plan and conduct operations in terrain that 

they have never been in before, because of the situational awareness that it provides. The confidence they have to conduct operations in such conditions is increased 

because they know where they are. They know where their other friendly elements 

are, and they know where the enemy is. They can quickly adapt to changes in the 

situation or the terrain as they take place. 

It improves their mobility with the capability to identify obstacles when encountered and quickly transmit that information over the network so that it is displayed 

on other Land Warrior systems and Combat Platforms, such as the Stryker, and the 

obstacle can be breached or bypassed more rapidly. 

It has improved their lethality with the ability to mass fires on a target. Again, 

this is a direct result of the information that is quickly transmitted over the network about enemy locations. 

The Land Warrior system has proven to be a combat multiplier by increasing battle command, lethality, and improving mobility. Improvements in these areas have 

increased Soldier’s survivability. 

Question. The Land Warrior program has been cancelled, with no funding requested for the program in 2008 or 2009. Based on positive feedback from soldiers 

in Iraq, might the Army consider resurrecting the Land Warrior Program? 

Answer. There is certainly a need for a Land Warrior like system. The capability 

that the Land Warrior provides has been proven and there is a very strong basis 

of support by the 4th Battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment using the system in 

Iraq today. The strategy is to move forward with this capability. 

The concept would be that the next thing we need to do is equip a Brigade Combat Team. The Brigade Combat Team would train with the equipment as a part of 

their pre-deployment training and also as a part of our process of preparing forces 

and certifying them for deployment. They would then deploy with this capability. 

We have a request in the fiscal year 2008 Supplemental Adjustment for $102 million. That amount is approximately what it takes to equip one Brigade Combat 

Team with this capability. 

Question. Does the Army plan to equip additional units that are bound for Iraq 

with the available sets of Land Warrior? 

Answer. We have requested $102 million in the fiscal year 2008 Supplemental Adjustment. That amount is approximately what it takes to equip one Brigade Combat 

Team with this capability. This request is a direct result of an approved operational 

need that has been identified. This funding will allow us to build, equip, train, and 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
136 

certify the unit prior to their deployment early next year. We will continue to evaluate additional requests for the equipment based on operational needs. 

Question. Is Land Warrior fully compatible with FCS? 

Answer. The Land Warrior system was designed to connect to the Army Battle 

Command System using the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade-and-Below 

(FBCB2) network and the tactical internet enabled by the Enhanced Position Locating Reporting System (EPLRS). We are leveraging this same technology in the early 

phases of Future Combat System (FCS) and during the experiments that are now 

being conducted at Fort Bliss, Texas involving the first spinouts from the FCS program. Later this year some Land Warrior systems that are currently deployed in 

Iraq will take part in these experiments once they are returned from theatre. The 

Land Warrior system will be interoperable using the same interfaces that other FCS 

non-spinout combat platforms will use to connect to the network. 

HIGH MOBILITY MULTIPURPOSE WHEELED VEHICLE (HMMWV) 

Question. The budget request includes nearly $1 billion to procure 5,065 

HMMWVs. The procurement would be a mix of armored HMMWVs and armor-ready 

HMMWVs. 

With the fielding of MRAP vehicles to accomplish many of the functions requiring 

an armored tactical wheeled vehicle, and with so many up-armored HMMWVs already purchased, why does the Army need so many additional armored HMMWVs? 

Answer. The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles are not a replacement for the Up-Armored HMMWVs (UAHs). The MRAP Vehicles augment the 

UAH fleet in theater. There is still a fleet requirement within the Army for UAHs, 

both in and out of theater, and will be for the foreseeable future. Additionally, the 

washout rate for an UAH in theater is approximately 3.5 years and battle losses 

are approximately 125 vehicles per month. 

Question. The total program for the HMMWV calls for 170,944 vehicles. Will that 

number be reduced as more MRAPs are fielded? 

Answer. The current HMMWV Objective Table of Organization and Equipment 

(OTOE) is 166,154 vehicles and the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment 

(MTOE) is 140,709 vehicles. The Army anticipates that the HMMWV requirements 

in theater will decrease as more Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles 

are fielded. We do not, however, anticipate reductions in HMMWV requirements 

outside of theater because the MRAP does not have the capabilities required to fill 

the vast majority of HMMWV mission sets. The ongoing Tactical Wheeled Vehicle 

(TWV) and Program Decision Memorandum II/Combat and Tactical Vehicle (PDM 

II/CTV) studies will identify those mission sets and roles the MRAP can fill across 

the TWV and Combat Tactical Vehicle fleets. 

Question. Please explain for the Committee the characteristics of new model 

HMMWVs, the XM1211; XM1212; XM1213 and XM1214? 

Answer. The XM series (ECV2) is an improved version of the HMMWV designed 

to achieve the objective capabilities defined within the current HMMWV Operational Requirements Document (ORD) requirements. It is not a new start system. 

It is being developed as an option to gain back the performance, protection and payload the current HMMWV lost as a result of adding armor (Fragmentation Kits 

(FK)). The current HMMWV has a Gross Vehicle Weight (GVW) of 12,100 pounds 

(lbs), but it currently weighs approximately 15,400 lbs with armor, Objective Gunner’s Protection Kit, and additional installed equipment. This is an additional 3,300 

lbs of GVW with no payload remaining. The XM series will have FK5 equivalent 

integrated armor, a GVW of 17,000 lbs, and have a payload of 1,800 lbs. 

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES (MRAP) 

Question. As the threat from Improvised Explosive Devices and Explosively 

Formed Penetrators grew, the limit of how much armor could be applied to the 

HMMWV was reached. The DoD identified the MRAP-type trucks to provide greater 

force protection. 

General, what is the current Army acquisition objective for MRAPs? 

Answer. The current Army Acquisition Objective (AAO) for MRAPs is 10,000 systems (based on the September 2007 interim requirement). A new interim requirement for MRAPs of 12,000 systems is currently in staffing. The final requirement 

is dependent on many factors, including future actions taken by the enemy. 

Question. How many MRAPs does the Army have currently fielded in Iraq; and 

how many in Afghanistan? 

Answer. As of 10 March, 1,434 MRAPs have been fielded to Iraq and 8 to Afghanistan. Additional MRAPs are fielded weekly. 

Question. When do you expect to reach your acquisition goal? 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
137 

Answer. The current plan is to procure the 10,000 systems by October 2008 and 

field them by December 2008. If a new interim requirement of 12,000 is adopted, 

it is anticipated that these systems could be produced by February 2009 and fielded 

by April 2009. 

Question. Do the MRAPs as currently fielded protect against Explosively Formed 

Penetrators? Will additional armor be added to the MRAPs? 

Answer. The MRAP family of vehicles provides Warfighters multi-mission platforms capable of mitigating Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), underbody mines 

and small arms fire threats which are currently the greatest casualty producers in 

the Global War on Terror. In almost 50 IED and Direct Fire events, there have been 

a few minor injuries and unfortunately one fatality. In a classified session, we can 

provide you the details of the incidents. 

Question. How have the MRAPs been received by soldiers, and how have the 

MRAPs performed in terms of mobility and utility; and how have they performed 

when they have been attacked by various threat weapons? 

Answer. The majority of MRAPs have been operational for a relatively short period of time (approximately 90 days), so the initial feedback is just beginning to filter in. It is clear that MRAPs are providing significant increase in Soldier Mounted 

Protection and saving lives. We have tracked almost 50 incidents and experienced 

one fatality. 

MNC–I Commander: ‘‘MRAP fielding has provided a decidedly positive impact on 

crew survivability.’’ 

2–502nd IN: Soldiers are very confident operating in this vehicle because of the 

known improvements in armor protection; this leads to more aggressive operations 

along routes less traveled. 

Question. What is the proper mix of HMMWVs and MRAPs? 

Answer. Theater is evaluating the operational mix of MRAPs. The final mix is 

still to be determined. 

Question. Is the Army MRAP requirement fully funded? 

Answer. The Army has been funded for 10,000 systems. The Joint Program Office 

reports sufficient funding to procure up to 12,000 systems. 

Question. What are your plans for the MRAP vehicles once the war in Iraq is 

over? 

Answer. The Army continues to work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

and the Joint Staff to meet Joint Force Theater Commanders’ requirements for 

MRAP vehicles. 

The Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy is an ongoing effort to ensure our 

Soldiers receive the best capabilities available in ground wheeled vehicles to meet 

emerging threats. 

The MRAP is being integrated into the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle base strategy to 

balance Performance, Payload, and Protection. We are taking steps to identify their 

long term role. One example is approximately 1,000 MRAPs are planned to fill new 

Route Clearing capabilities in Engineer and Explosive Ordnance units. 

FAMILY OF MEDIUM TACTICAL VEHICLES (FMTV) 

Question. The Congress appropriated just over $3 billion for FMTV trucks in fiscal 

year 2007. The DoD Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2008 provided $1.8 billion for 

FMTVs. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 included, in the bridge fund, 

$146 million. Another $2.7 billion is under consideration in the main fiscal year 

2008 supplemental. The fiscal year 2009 request proposes $290.5 million for 3,171 

trucks and 2,743 trailers. 

General Thompson please update this Committee on the status of execution of the 

fiscal year 2007 and 2008 funds that have been appropriated for FMTV. 

Answer. Of the Fiscal Year 2007 (FY07) $3,089 million appropriated amount, 31 

percent has been executed. The remaining will be executed in April 2008. Of the 

FY08 $1,986 million appropriated amount, one percent has been executed. The remaining will be executed in June 2008. 

Question. Is the FMTV program experiencing production delays? 

Answer. No. 

Question. Is all appropriated and requested funding executable or will the Army 

attempt to reprogram funds out of the FMTV program? 

Answer. Yes. All appropriated and final Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) requested funds for the FMTV Program are executable. 

Question. What is the status of the FMTV contract in terms of planned extensions 

or new competitions? 

Answer. The Army plans to award a one year sole source contract with one year 

option to the current manufacturer in fiscal year 2008 (FY08). In FY09, the Army 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
138 

will award a three year competitive requirements type contract. To avoid a break 

in production, the Army will award a sole source contract to the current manufacturer to allow for the new contractor to ramp-up its production. 

SINGLE CHANNEL GROUND AND AIRBORNE RADIO SYSTEM (SINCGARS) 

Question. Congress provided nearly $650 million for SINCGARS radios in fiscal year 2007. The fiscal year 2008 Defense Appropriations Act provided $149.6 million 

for SINCGARS. The fiscal year 2008 supplemental funding request proposed $2,248 

million for SINCGARS. However, the Congressional Defense Committees have recently expressed concerns that the Army may be continuing with dated technology 

and that opportunities may exist to satisfy communications requirements with more 

modern and enhanced capabilities. 

To what extent are SINCGARS radios Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) compliant? 

Answer. The SINCGARS is interoperable with JTRS. The SINCGARS Waveform 

is one of the JTRS core waveforms and is a Key Performance Parameter. 

Question. Could the Army greatly increase the utility of tactical radios by procuring radios that have multi-band capability and can operate both military and 

wave forms commonly used by first responders to enhance cooperation between National Guard units and first responders? Are such radios available? 

Answer. The Army has already procured in excess of 70,000 PRC–148 Multiband 

Inter/Intra Team Radios (MBITRs) which can interoperate with State and Federal 

first responders. The PRC–148 MBITR has the APCO–25 waveform and operates in 

the spectrum of land mobile radios (LMRs) used by state and federal agencies. Additionally, the Army has procured over 65,000 LMRs which are APCO 25 compliant. 

Question. The Army Science board recently reported that the Army should move 

away from SINCGARS to procure software-defined, Joint Tactical Radio System 

(JTRS) capable radios. Do you concur? 

Answer. SINCGARS for what it does is the best radio for full spectrum operations 

until JTRS is available. While both the Harris PRC–152 and Thales PRC–148 are 

Joint Tactical Radio System compliant multiband radios they cannot meet the specifications of the JTRS Operational Requirements Document (ORD). For instance they 

cannot cross-band, can only operate on one channel at a time, and the HARRIS 

VRC–110 will not physically fit in some of our Combat Platforms (i.e. Stryker, 

Abrams and Bradley). 

Question. Is it time for the Army to prepare a new Operational Requirements Document (ORD) and proceed with a new competition for tactical radios? 

Answer. The Army has reviewed the SINCGARS ORD and determined it still 

meets the requirement for a combat net radio capable of full spectrum combat operations. The Army is in the process of competing the next SINCGARS procurement 

to the specifications of the ORD. 

ABRAMS TANKS

Question. The Abrams tank has been around for about 30 years. The budget re- quest for fiscal year 2009 proposes nearly $700 million for Abrams tank modifications and upgrades. 

Does it make good economic sense to continue to upgrade a fleet of vehicles that 

dates back 30 years? 

Answer. Yes. The Army is equipping and modularizing 30 Heavy Brigade Combat 

Teams (HBCTs) plus Grow the Army (GTA) (1 HBCT + 3 Combined Arms Battalions (CABs)), which includes the Abrams Main Battle Tank. The Abrams Tank is 

one of the Army’s highest priority recapitalization combat vehicle programs. Although the Abrams Tank has been in the force for 30 years, it continues to be the 

premier main battle tank and will continue to play a key role in the front line fighting force through 2050, complementing the Future Combat Systems (FCS) BCT. The 

Army’s vision is to maintain the viability and combat effectiveness of the Abrams 

Tank through 2050. Therefore, it is necessary to continue updating the Abrams fleet 

to ensure it provides combat overmatch while remaining survivable, lethal, and sustainable. As such, the Army intends to continue future critical RDT&E investments 

in the Abrams Tank. When FCS begins fielding to the Active Component (AC) in 

the fiscal year 2017 time frame, the M1A2 SEP will begin cascading to the Army 

National Guard (ARNG) and the M1A1 fleet will be cascaded out of the force. 

Question. How will the Abrams tank fleet benefit from the advances in technology 

that come from Future Combat Systems research and development? 

Answer. The planned Future Combat Systems (FCS) technology insertions to the 

Abrams Tank will enable the Abrams Tank to maintain combat overmatch and fight 

alongside FCS within the future battle command structure, while operating within 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
139 

a common logistic structure. The following are examples of planned FCS technology 

insertions to the Abrams Tank: FCS Full Battle Command; System Computing 

(hardware and software); Sensors; Network Transport Layer and Network Architecture; Active Protective System (APS); Armor; and Line Replaceable Modules. 

Question. The Committee is aware that the Army will have essentially two 

Abrams tank fleets. Some tank-units will have M1A1 Abrams, and the rest will 

have the more capable M1A2 System Enhancement version. Please explain the key 

differences between the two types of tanks and the Army’s plan for allocation to active and guard units? 

Answer. The key difference between the M1A1 SA and the M1A2 SEP v2 tank 

is that the ‘‘M1A1 SA is an Analog based system’’ and the ‘‘M1A2 SEP v2 is a Digital based system.’’ Although both the M1A1 SA and M1A2 SEP v2 are equipped 

with a 1553 data bus, the M1A1 SA analog based system is not capable leveraging 

the full capacity of the 1553 data bus. The M1A2 SEP v2 is capable of leveraging 

the full capacity of the 1553 data bus. Another key difference between the two systems is that unlike the M1A2 SEP v2, the M1A1 SA has no Commander’s Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV). The CITV on the M1A2 SEP v2 allows the tank 

commander to employ the ‘‘hunter/killer target handoff’’ capability between himself 

and the gunner. 

The Army’s allocation to the Active and National Guard units are provided below: 

Heavy Brigade Combat Teams M1A2 SEP v2 M1A1 SA 

Active ................................................................ 16 2 Modularity Endstate 

ARNG ................................................................ 1 6 

Pre Positioned Stock ........................................ 2 1 

Equipping Force Pool ....................................... 1 1 

ARNG HBCT ...................................................... .................... 1 Grow the Army Initiative 

ARNG Combined Arms Battalion ...................... .................... 3 

When FCS begins fielding in the FY17 time frame, the M1A2 SEP v2 fleet will 

begin cascading to the ARNG and the M1A1 SA fleet will be cascaded out of the 

force. 

Question. The fiscal year 2009 (FY09) funding request includes $351 million to upgrade M1A1s to the M1A2 SEP version. For the current fiscal year, 2008, the base 

appropriation requested no funding for the Abrams Upgrade program, but the Army 

requested $1.3 billion in supplemental funding of which $225 million was provided 

in the bridge appropriation. What is the long term plan for Abrams upgrades and 

will the Army continue to depend on large supplemental appropriations to fund the 

program? 

Answer. No. The Army has fully funded, in the base budget, the remaining Upgrades from FY09 through FY12 via the M1A2 SEP Upgrade MYP. 

BRADLEY INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE (BFV) 

Question. The Bradley program recapitalizes earlier variants of the Bradley to A2 

Operation Desert Storm variants, and to A3 variants. 

What are the key differences between the two variants of the Bradley fighting vehicle? 

Answer. The key differences between the M2/M3A3 and ODS SA are the lack of 

a Commander’s Independent Viewer (CIV) on the ODS SA, and the level of digital 

capability between the two variants. The CIV allows the commander to employ the 

‘‘hunter/killer target handoff’’ capability between himself and the gunner, allowing 

greater situational awareness and lethality for the crew. Also, while both variants 

have a digital backbone (1553 data bus), several of the ODS–SA turret sub-systems 

still communicate via analog channels. The M2/M3A3 is a fully digitized system. 

Question. How are the two variants allocated between active component brigade 

combat teams, and Army Guard brigade combat teams? 

Answer. The Active Army is allocated 16 M2/M3A3 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams 

(HBCTs) and two (2) ODS–SA HBCTs. The National Guard is allocated one (1) 

M2A3 HBCT and six (6) ODS SA HBCTs. Army Pre-Positioned Stock (APS) is allocated two (2) M2/M3A3 HBCTs and one (1) ODS–SA HBCT. The Equipping Force 

Pool is allocated one (1) M2/M3A3 HBCT and one (1) ODS–SA HBCT. This allocation meets the approved HBCT Modularity Endstate of 20 M2/M3A3 HBCTs and 10 

ODSSA HBCTs. For the Grow the Army Initiative (GTA), one (1) ODS–SA HBCT 

and three (3) ODS–SA Combined Arms Battalions (CABs) have been allocated. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
140 

Fielding of the ODS–SA will begin in FY09. Finally, as FCS units are fielded, the 

A3 fleet will be cascaded to the Guard and the ODS SA fleet will be cascaded out 

of the force. 

Heavy Brigade Combat Teams M2A3 ODS–SA 

Active ................................................................ 16 2 Modularity Endstate 

Guard ................................................................ 1 6 

Pre Positioned Stock ........................................ 2 1 

Equipping Force Pool ....................................... 1 1 

Guard HBCT ...................................................... .................... 1 Grow the Army Initiative 

Guard Combined Arms Battalion ..................... .................... 3 

Question. For fiscal year 2008 the Army requested $140 million in the base re- quest, plus a total additional amount of $1.6 billion between the bridge and main 

supplementals. For fiscal year 2009 the budget request proposes $180 million in the 

base request. Will the Army again depend on a large supplemental funding amount 

to support the Bradley program? 

Answer. No, not as large as the FY 08 supplemental (about 75 percent less). The 

FY09 supplemental request is for $394.8 million, which procures 94 M2/M3A3s. 

ARMY PRE-POSITIONED SETS (APS) 

Question. The Army drew upon pre-positioned equipment sets to sustain initial 

combat operations in Iraq. Some equipment was repaired and replaced in pre-positioned sets only to be dawn out again for the surge. 

What is the readiness posture of Army pre-positioned sets (APS) today? 

Answer. The APS equipment is a proven enabler of the Army’s ability to rapidly 

project forces into an area of operations. Currently, most of the Army Prepositioned 

Stocks are employed in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). However, 

the remaining APS equipment continues to be in a high state of readiness and the 

Army has unit sets afloat that support port opening operations as well. The Army 

has an APS Strategy 2015 which articulates the afloat and ashore equipment required to meet the future responsiveness needs of the Combatant Commanders. APS 

capabilities will be reconstituted to provide the maximum level of strategic flexibility and operational agility. 

Question. What is the time line to have all the pre-positioned sets returned to 

their desired readiness? 

Answer. Reconstitution of APS is already underway and the Army has an executable timeline to reset its APS sets according to the APS Strategy 2015. The current 

approved timeline will reconstitute all of the Army APS sets by the end of FY15, 

contingent on available resources and operational requirements. 

Question. Does the Army intend to add MRAP vehicles to pre-positioned equipment sets? 

Answer. Future Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) APS fielding will be 

based on the results of Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) Tactical 

Wheeled Vehicle Strategy and the ability to meet all Army priorities. The current 

priority of fill for MRAP is for units deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom/ 

Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) and not APS. As of April 6, 2008, the 

Army has received 22 percent of its scheduled MRAP fieldings. As this fleet matures 

in the Area of Responsibility (AOR), the Army will review the vehicles’ performance 

over time. In accordance with the APS Strategy 2015, APS sets will have Wheeled 

Augmentation Sets comprised of armored wheeled vehicles which are currently uparmored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs). 

Question. Given the deployment capability of U.S. Forces and the uncertain nature of conventional and unconventional threats, are pre-positioned sets a wise investment? Would it be a wiser course of action to take the equipment from the prepositioned sets and use it to outfit modular brigades and the new Grow-the-Army 

brigades? 

Answer. The last four years have demonstrated that the APS program is flexible, 

responsive, and critical to the Army’s ability to deploy forces in support of Combatant Command (COCOM) requirements and adapt to changing strategic requirements. Army Prepositioned Stocks are a proven valuable strategic asset of the U.S. 

and enable the nation to rapidly project power in order to deter the actions of any 

adversary. Diverting the APS equipment to support the building of modular Brigade 

Combat Teams and Grow the Army effort limits the ability to rapidly reinforce forVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:40 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00140 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
141 

ward units by air movement. The Army remains committed to maintaining an APS 

pool of equipment in order to meet current contingency planning requirements. 

Question. In November 2007, the Army announced a new Army Pre-positioned 

Stocks Strategy 2015. Please outline the new strategy, and what are the funding 

requirements for fiscal year 2009? 

Answer. APS Strategy 2015’s equipment sets provide a balanced suite of global 

capabilities which will foster the Army’s rapid deployment to both combat and 

Steady State Security Posture (SSSP) operations. The end-state for APS Strategy 

2015, illustrated in the attached diagram, consists of five APS sets. APS–1 consists 

of Operational Project stocks to support both Homeland Defense and Combatant 

Commands. APS–2 consists of one Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) set to support European Command (EUCOM), African (AFRICOM) and Central Command’s 

(CENTCOM) areas of responsibility (AOR). APS–3 consists of two Infantry Brigade 

Combat Team (IBCT) sets with up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 

Vehicle (HMMWV) and/or Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) wheel 

augmentation sets, two Sustainment Brigade sets and two ammunition ships which 

are multi-apportioned to support PACOM, AFRICOM and CENTCOM’s AORs. APS– 

4 consists of one HBCT, one Sustainment Brigade set and Army watercraft to support Pacific Command’s (PACOM) AOR. APS–5 consists of one HBCT set with an 

up-armored HMMWV and/or MRAP wheel augmentation, one Fires Brigade set, two 

Sustainment Brigade sets, and Army watercraft stationed at Kuwaiti Naval Base. 

APS–5 also includes an Infantry Battalion set with a Forward Support Company 

(FSC) with an up-armored HMMWV and/or MRAP wheeled augmentation set in Afghanistan to support CENTCOM’s AOR. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
142 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 528/600 here 46476B.011
143 

Revised chart removed ‘‘rotational units’’ in APS–2 & 4, changed ASF-V to ASFIII, 

HBCT symbols have been updated. 

To meet the timelines of the APS 2015 Strategy, the Army requested $317.5 million Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) and $102.2 million Army Working 

Capital Funds (AWCF) funds in the FY09 Base Budget for APS. We are only funded 

for the operations we need. All funding requests were adjusted to show issue of sets 

or current status of Ship Leases. The FY09 Budget provides the following support: 

• APS–1—($31.5 million) Funds operations at Army Sustainment Command to 

manage APS and maintenance and storage of Operational Projects IPDS, LAMS, 

Force Provider, Water Support Systems, and Bailey Bridges at Sierra Army Depot. 

• APS–2—($13.4 million) Funds operations to maintain limited equipment and 

ammunition at Livorno Italy and Medical Supplies at Pirmesans, GE to include support to War Reserve Stocks for Allies—Israel. 

• APS–3—($156.7 million) Funds operations to maintain equipment for the Port 

Opening Package and funds lease operations of 1 LMSR for the Port Opening Package, three LMSRs in Reduced Operating Status—10, two ammunition container 

ships. Funds personnel to begin the reset of equipment and secondary items for APS 

upload that will occur in FY10. It does not pay for the two remaining LMSRs we 

downloaded and placed in Reduced Operating Status—30. 

• APS–4—($58.5 million) Funds maintenance and operations to maintain the full 

unit sets and operational projects in Korea, Japan and Hawaii. OPROJs will be 

filled using FY08 and FY09 Supplemental funds. 

• APS–5—($57.4 million) Funds reset of the PTDO IBCT and planned reset of the 

HBCT. Funds the $12M annual Oman Access Fee. 

• WRSI—($102.2 million) Funds buys of potency and dated items (mostly Medical) that need to be replaced in APS–4 and Operational Projects. Funds buy of 

APS–2 ASL/PLL/UBL stocks. Buys upgrades in Medical sets currently on-hand in 

Korea. 

With the continued support of the Congress to fully resource the Administration’s 

budget requests for Army equipment, the Army will be able to return equipment to 

pre-positioned stocks by 2015. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
(145) 

THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 2008. 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NAVY POSTURE 

WITNESSES 

DONALD C. WINTER, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 

ADMIRAL GARY ROUGHEAD, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 

GENERAL JAMES T. CONWAY, COMMANDANT, MARINE CORPS 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. MURTHA

Mr. MURTHA. The committee will come to order. 

Let me welcome the three of you to the committee, and compliments on the way you handled the LCS. You got industry’s attention. And what we talked about before the hearing is so important to try to work it out so that we can buy one of them, the quantity. And I don’t know how hard it is to fit in your budget, but we 

do the best we can do, but your recommendations make it easier 

for us. 

We look forward to hearing your comments about whatever you 

want to talk about. We are concerned about the Navy because we 

have got so far behind in shipbuilding, so we would be interested 

to hear how you are going to proceed. And I expect to overcome or 

get to 313 ships. 

Mr. Young. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am going to forgo an opening 

statement, but I want to tell a quick story that I think will make 

everybody in the room feel good. 

A young soldier donated bone marrow to save the life of a patient 

through the bone marrow program that we created here. The soldier, after he recovered from that bone marrow extraction, was deployed fairly quickly to Iraq, and he was assigned to a demolition 

team, to a group of marines. He called us the other night and said, 

you know, he said, I was out on patrol, he said, we hit a real really 

scary, difficult situation. He said, I have never, ever seen anybody 

respond as quickly, as efficiently, as effectively as those Marines. 

And he said that his life’s goal now is to finish out his time in the 

Army and become a Marine. He couldn’t get beyond telling us how 

those Marines reacted and how just how great they were. He is 

singing your praises, sir. 

General CONWAY. Thank you. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF SECRETARY WINTER

Mr. WINTER. Chairman Murtha, Congressman Young, Members 

of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today. I am here to present the Department of the Navy’s plan 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
146 

to support our Sailors and Marines in their mission to defend our 

Nation against current and future challenges. The President’s fiscal 

year 2009 budget will assist the Navy and the Marine Corps in accomplishing their complementary and reinforcing missions, while 

building capabilities necessary to meet future threats. 

One of the primary responsibilities of our government is to provide for the Nation’s defense. Those responsibilities include the 

critical requirements to organize, train and equip our Naval forces. 

For the vast majority of citizens, the only cost imposed on us is financial. America is able to provide for the national defense with 

such a minimal impact on the citizenry because we are blessed to 

have among us a generation of people, patriots all, who volunteer 

to serve. They are the ones who bear many hardships, accept many 

risks and go in harm’s way. 

The pay and benefit funding levels in our 2009 budget reflect the 

compensation levels necessary to continue to attract and retain 

quality personnel in the Navy and the Marine Corps. Furthermore, 

although we are doing well in our overall recruiting and retention 

numbers, I emphasize the need for special pays and bonuses to 

meet critical subspecialty needs such as our requirements for 

nurses, physicians and GWOT-stretched communities, such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel. 

It is because of the hard work of our Sailors and Marines that 

we are making progress, fostering maritime security, defeating terrorist networks, progressing towards a stable Iraq, supporting the 

Afghan Government, countering piracy and proliferation of deadly 

technology, rendering humanitarian assistance and strengthening 

partnerships around the world. 

Our Sailors and Marines have responded when called and superbly perform their many missions in our Nation’s defense. It is 

truly an honor and a privilege to work with them and to support 

them as their Secretary. 

The Department of the Navy’s fiscal year 2009 budget meets the 

challenge of resourcing the Navy and Marine Corps team across a 

range of missions from partnership building to combat operations. 

It invests in our ability to operate, sustain and develop forces that 

are engaged in the Global War on Terror while preparing the force 

for the challenges and threats of the future. 

We are requesting a total of $149 billion, a 7 percent increase 

over the fiscal year 2008 baseline. This increase is driven by factors 

such as rising oil costs and a critical comprehensive growth of the 

Marine Corps. 

Our fiscal year 2009 budget reflects three key priorities which 

are consistent with those of previous years. They are, first of all, 

to prevail in the Global War on Terror; secondly, take care of our 

Sailors, Marines, their families, and particularly the wounded; and 

lastly, prepare for future challenges across the full spectrum of operations. 

To help meet our first priority, prevail in the GWOT, we are 

adapting our force for current and future missions to include growing the Marine Corps, shaping the force by recruiting and retaining 

the right people, and addressing critical readiness needs. Among 

our most critical readiness needs is the ability to train our Sailors 

and Marines for the threats that they may encounter. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
147 

Unfortunately, our Navy has encountered increasing encroachments in our ability to conduct critical training. We recognize that 

there are on occasion impacts on the citizenry at large associated 

with such training, but these are necessary costs that are critical 

to the defense of our Nation. We take extensive precautions to minimize the impact of our training. 

We owe it to the American people, and we owe it to those who 

serve to acknowledge that as in all things in life, there are competing interests and trade-offs, and that we treat the risks of sonar 

operation at sea or the impact of jet noise the way we treat all public policy issues, balancing risks and costs against legitimate national security interests. I commit to you today that I will continue 

to keep you apprised of legal challenges and their implications for 

readiness that we face over the course of the coming year. 

Mr. Chairman, if in the future we are unable to properly train 

our Sailors and Marines, we will have failed to do our duty to them 

and to the American people. 

Another critical issue I would like to highlight concerns doing 

right by those who go in harm’s way. As Secretary of Defense 

Gates has stated, apart from the war itself, we have no higher priority than to take care of our wounded. Our wounded warriors and 

their families deserve the highest-priority care, respect and treatment for their sacrifices. Our 2009 budget honors our commitment 

to ensure that our Sailors and Marines receive the appropriate 

care, training and financial support that they need. 

Finally, to meet the challenges of the future, the 2009 budget 

provides for a balanced fleet of ships, aircraft and expeditionary capabilities with the fighting power and versatility to carry out bluegreen- and brownwater missions wherever called upon. Furthermore, I would like to note that consistent with our commitment to 

ensure affordability and timely delivery of capabilities, we have 

launched an acquisition improvement initiative to provide better 

integration of requirements and acquisition decision processes; improve governance and insight into the development, establishment 

and execution of acquisition programs; and formalize the framework to engage senior Naval leadership. 

Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the strong support this Committee and the Congress at large has given our Navy and Marine 

Corps team. I want to thank you on their behalf. Our Navy and 

Marine Corps is a strong, capable and dedicated team. I appreciate 

the opportunity to represent them today, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The statement of Secretary Winter follows:] 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
148 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 609 46476C.001
149 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 610 46476C.002
150 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 611 46476C.003
151 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 612 46476C.004
152 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 613 46476C.005
153 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 614 46476C.006
154 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 615 46476C.007
155 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 616 46476C.008
156 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 617 46476C.009
157 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 618 46476C.010
158 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 619 46476C.011
159 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 620 46476C.012
160 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 621 46476C.013
161 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 622 46476C.014
162 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 623 46476C.015
163 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 624 46476C.016
164 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 625 46476C.017
165 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 626 46476C.018
166 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 627 46476C.019
167 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 628 46476C.020
168 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 629 46476C.021
169 

Mr. MURTHA. Admiral Roughead. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Chairman Murtha, Congressman Young, 

distinguished Members of the Committee, on behalf of our 600,000 

Sailors, civilians and families, I appear before you today. 

Together with Secretary Winter and General Conway, I am privileged to be a part of the leadership team that is committed to our 

Nation’s safety, security and prosperity. Today our Navy stands 

ready with the agility, the flexibility and the confidence to do what 

no other navy in the world can do. Four weeks ago we successfully 

and temporarily converted a portion of our sea-based Ballistic Missile Defense program to engage a failing satellite. 

Sea-based Ballistic Missile Defense is here, it is real, and it 

works. But that is only part of what your Navy does for the Nation. 

We are exercising our new maritime strategy every day, a strategy 

that is far more than just a glossy brochure. Our carriers are projecting power in the Arabian Gulf, our destroyers are demonstrating our resolve in the Mediterranean, an amphibious ship is 

engaged in piracy operations on the east coast of Africa, and another is delivering humanitarian assistance to the west coast of Africa. Our frigates are intercepting drug traffickers in the Caribbean 

Sea, our Riverine forces are patrolling vital infrastructure on the 

Euphrates River in Iraq, and our submarines patrol silently around 

the globe. 

We have 118 ships and over 58,000 people on deployment out 

and about doing the work of the Nation. But as you so well know, 

our operations come at a cost to our people, our current readiness 

and the future Fleet, and those are my three priorities. Our people, 

our Sailors, our Marines and their families know they have your 

support. We must continue to invest in their futures and in the 

young men and women of America who will follow in their wake. 

In the context of this generational war, it is imperative that we 

continue to care for our wounded warriors and support the health 

care needs of all of our Sailors and Navy civilians. Likewise, your 

support for the critical skills reenlistment bonuses has enabled us 

to retain the Sailors that we need. 

Supporting our future force cannot be done without readiness to 

fight today. To this end, quality shore installations, responsive 

depot-level maintenance facilities and unfettered ability to train responsively are necessities. Where area access and shore support is 

denied, the Commandant and I have been moving forward together 

with the sea-basing alternative. These elements are essential to 

support our Fleet Response Plan, which has enabled us to meet requirements and will sustain us through the requested temporary 

carrier force level adjustment. 

Of my three focus areas, building tomorrow’s Navy to be a balanced, appropriately sized force is the most immediate imperative 

and challenge. Fiscal realities, however, have led us to assume 

more risk in shipbuilding, ship operations and weapons. Achieving 

the 313-ship floor at current funding levels will require us to improve processes, collaborate with industry and make difficult decisions in the near term. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
170 

I am pleased that the first two DDG 1000 contracts have been 

awarded. Our surface combatants are an essential element of our 

force, and it is important that we do not deplete the combatant line 

as we build toward 313 ships. 

I remain strongly committed to funding those programs that provide critical capabilities to our forces. There is no substitute for the 

Littoral Combat Ship in closing the littoral capability gap. Current 

F/A–18 Hornets are needed to assuage a 2016 strikefighter shortfall. Surface combatant superiority will be maintained through 

DDG–51 modernization. Multimission maritime aircraft will recapitalize our maritime patrol antisubmarine warfare capabilities, and 

sea-based Ballistic Missile Defense will ensure future theater and 

national defense and enable access for our Joint Forces. 

These critical programs for our future Fleet require appropriate 

disciplined investment now. The 2009 budget and its associated 

force structure plans will meet our current challenges with a moderate degree of risk. Clearly we have many challenges of which 

building tomorrow’s Fleet is the greatest, but with these challenges 

it is our opportunity to have a balanced and global Fleet which will 

defend the Nation and assure our prosperity for generations to 

come. 

On behalf of our Sailors, our Navy civilians and our families, 

thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you and for 

all the support for our Navy today and our Navy of tomorrow. I 

look forward to your questions. 

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you. 

[The statement of Admiral Roughead follows:] 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
171 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 634 here 46476C.022
172 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 635 here 46476C.023
173 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 636 here 46476C.024
174 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 637 here 46476C.025
175 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 638 here 46476C.026
176 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 639 here 46476C.027
177 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 640 here 46476C.028
178 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 641 here 46476C.029
179 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 642 here 46476C.030
180 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 643 here 46476C.031
181 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 644 here 46476C.032
182 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 645 here 46476C.033
183 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 646 here 46476C.034
184 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 647 here 46476C.035
185 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 648 here 46476C.036
186 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 649 here 46476C.037
187 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 650 here 46476C.038
188 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 651 here 46476C.039
189 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 652 here 46476C.040
190 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 653 here 46476C.041
191 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 654 here 46476C.042
192 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 655 here 46476C.043
193 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 656 here 46476C.044
194 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 657 here 46476C.045
195 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 658 here 46476C.046
196 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 659 here 46476C.047
197 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 660 here 46476C.048
198 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 661 here 46476C.049
199 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 662 here 46476C.050
200 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 663 here 46476C.051
201 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 664 here 46476C.052
202 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 665 here 46476C.053
203 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 666 here 46476C.054
204 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 667 here 46476C.055
205 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 668 here 46476C.056
206 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 669 here 46476C.057
207 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 670 here 46476C.058
208 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 671 here 46476C.059
209 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 672 here 46476C.060
210 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL CONWAY

General CONWAY. Chairman Murtha, Congressman Young and 

distinguished Members of the Committee, I pledge to always provide you with forthright and honest assessments of your Marine 

Corps. I bear that in mind as I come to report to you on the posture 

today of our Service. 

In your written statement, I provided you a list of priorities that 

would enable your Corps to best serve our Nation’s security interests both today and in the uncertain future. But, in brief, our 

young warriors in combat are my number one priority. Those magnificent patriots have been extremely effective in disrupting insurgents and the al Qaeda in the al-Anbar Province. 

In the spirit of jointness, I must note that it is not just Marines; 

rather Marines, Sailors and Soldiers are composite over time that 

has brought success in the al-Anbar. Your Marines are still supporting the surge in Iraq where we have already shifted from population to protection to transitioning security responsibilities to Iraqi 

security forces, and they are actively stepping up to the task. 

In answer to the most recent call from the Secretary of Defense, 

we are also deploying more than 3,400 Marines to Afghanistan. 

Your Marines will assist a joint force in either gaining or maintaining momentum there. We fall in on our expeditionary ethos of living hard and fighting well as part of an air-ground team. This deployment will keep us at surge levels well into October. 

I have just returned from a visit to Iraq and Afghanistan, and, 

ladies and gentlemen, I am pleased to report to you that your Marines are demonstrating an amazing resiliency in the face of multiple deployments to dangerous lands. In spite of one-to-one deployment-to-dwell regimen that has virtually no chance of getting better until the fall, the factors that we track monthly to determine 

the health of the force, and those include desertion and UA rates, 

suicide, divorce, child or spousal abuse and reenlistment rates, are 

all as good or better than they were in 2001. 

We do have a significant issue with our families. Simply put, 

they are proud of their contributions to this war, but they are tired. 

We owe it to those families to put our family service programs onto 

a wartime footing. For too long our programs have been borne on 

the backs of volunteers, perhaps acceptable during peacetime, but 

untenable during a protracted conflict. The Congress has been exceptionally supportive, enabling us to make good on promises to do 

more. 

Of course, we look well beyond today in our obligation to the Nation, and we have learned lessons of trying to build the force as we 

fight. In our response to a clear need, we are growing the Corps 

to 202,000 Marines. We do this without lowering our standards, 

and we are ahead of our goals. During the last fiscal year, we needed to bring aboard 5,000 additional recruits. We actually grew 

7,000 additional Marines, 96.2 percent of them high school graduates. 

But more than just manpower, this growth requires training, infrastructure and equipment to meet the needs of our Nation. You 

have helped us meet those requirements with steady support and 

encouragement, and for that we certainly thank you. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
211 

The Marine Corps retains the mission to provide the multi-capable force for our Nation, a two-fisted fighter, if you will, able to destroy enemy formations with our air-ground team in a major contingency, but also able to fall back on our hard-earned irregular 

warfare skills honed over decades of conflict. By far the most complex of our congressionally mandated missions, amphibious operations require deliberate training and long-term resourcing to 

achieve a high level of proficiency. The operational expertise, special equipment sets and amphibious lift are not capabilities that we 

can rapidly provide in the face of a threat. 

Finally, on behalf of your Marines, I extend great appreciation 

for your support thus far, and I thank you in advance for those efforts on behalf of your brave Service men and women in harm’s 

way. I assure you that the Marine Corps appreciates the increasing 

competition for the Nation’s discretionary resources and will continue to provide a tangible return on every dollar spent. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to comment. 

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you very much. 

[The statement of General Conway follows:] 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
212 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 677 here 46476C.061
213 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 678 here 46476C.062
214 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 679 here 46476C.063
215 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 680 here 46476C.064
216 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 681 here 46476C.065
217 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 682 here 46476C.066
218 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 683 here 46476C.067
219 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 684 here 46476C.068
220 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 685 here 46476C.069
221 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 686 here 46476C.070
222 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 687 here 46476C.071
223 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 688 here 46476C.072
224 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 689 here 46476C.073
225 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 690 here 46476C.074
226 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 691 here 46476C.075
227 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 692 here 46476C.076
228 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 693 here 46476C.077
229 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 694 here 46476C.078
230 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 695 here 46476C.079
231 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 696 here 46476C.080
232 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 697 here 46476C.081
233 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 698 here 46476C.082
234 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 699 here 46476C.083
235 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 700 here 46476C.084
236 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 701 here 46476C.085
237 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 702 here 46476C.086
238 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 703 here 46476C.087
239 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 704 here 46476C.088
240 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 705 here 46476C.089
241 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 706 here 46476C.090
242 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 707 here 46476C.091
243 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 708 here 46476C.092
244 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 709 here 46476C.093
245 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 710 here 46476C.094
246 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 711 here 46476C.095
247 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 712 here 46476C.096
248 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 713 here 46476C.097
249 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 714 here 46476C.098
250 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 715 here 46476C.099
251 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 716 here 46476C.100
252 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 717 here 46476C.101
253 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 718 here 46476C.102
254 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 719 here 46476C.103
255 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 720 here 46476C.104
256 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 721 here 46476C.105
257 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 722 here 46476C.106
258 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 723 here 46476C.107
259 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 724 here 46476C.108
260 

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS INFRASTRUCTURE

Mr. MURTHA. Let me start out by saying that, you know, it is one 

thing to talk about how we support the families. We have put $400 

million, this subcommittee did, last year. The Defense Department 

cut that back to $240 million. I mean, that doesn’t look like it is 

supporting the families the way we think they should be supported. 

They have inadequate facilities in many places, they have inadequate counseling in many places. We do the best we can between 

this subcommittee and the members of this subcommittee, we try 

to make sure—we know how important the families are to the 

members themselves that are serving overseas. And it is discouraging when the Iraqis aren’t stepping up putting their money in, 

the Europeans are not stepping up putting their money in. And the 

United States taxpayer keeps putting more money into these—$343 

million a day. 

But infrastructure is something we are going to try to do a little 

bit more for, medical infrastructure, this year. We are going to 

transfer money to the Military Construction Subcommittee; also for 

just regular infrastructure. But the shortages that we see and that 

you are talking about have to be taken care of. But we hope we 

will be able to get started in that direction this year. We see a 

change in direction. We want to look past Iraq into the future because there is nobody more than the Navy that prevents a war. 

You can deploy quickly, you can deploy to an area where they understand the might and military impact of the United States. And 

with the equipment the shape that it is in, it is going to be more 

difficult. 

For instance, I don’t even need to ask you if we can get to 313 

ships at the numbers that the administration is sending over because it can’t be done. And so we are going to add some ships, or 

at least we are going to recommend to the subcommittee that we 

will add some ships, to what you folks have been able to—what 

OMB has been able to let you recommend to the committee. 

MARINE CORPS TRAINING

But let me ask you a question, Commandant. How long does it 

take you to train somebody for amphibious warfare? What would 

you say if you stop training from the current type training you are 

doing and you start training for amphibious warfare, the conventional-type operations? 

General CONWAY. Sir, the issue is training certainly. But the 

larger issue is trainers, for years, and my coming up through the 

Corps, we always had this cadre of people who are very well experienced in amphibious operations, kind of the old hands who had 

been ship’s company and had done multiple operations or exercises. 

Those folks are steadily leaving us. And we are not creating that 

cadre of trainers behind them. So that is my larger concern. 

It has been four years now since we have done major amphibious 

exercises. I think it will be at least four years before we can gain 

back some of that level of expertise and get to a level of comfort 

to the point where that once again becomes a core competency. And 

I may be optimistic thinking that it is a one-for-one exchange. It 

may be worse than that. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
261 

CG(X) CRUISER

Mr. MURTHA. This is a problem that we have when we are training for this type of warfare and yet looking ahead trying to get 

past. So one of the things that I worry about, repairing equipment, 

nobody has done more than this Committee trying to put in enough 

money for reset and rehabilitation. While I am looking ahead, I am 

thinking to myself, if we don’t start buying new equipment, if we 

don’t start getting past this and buying the new equipment, we will 

never get to the point where we need to get where we have less 

maintenance costs, less fuel costs. 

The Army came to this Committee about the FCS. Well, I have 

always been worried about FCS because it is $160 billion, and I 

don’t see how we will get there. Well, they are trying to come up 

with a way they can cut back on some of the reset and get to the 

newer equipment, which reduces maintenance costs, reduces fuel 

costs. One of the proposals we have had is jump right over the destroyers and go to the cruisers which would be nuclear power. Yet 

it is impossible to get there, from what I understand, just because 

of the ship—the need to have an industrial base. In fact, we 

wouldn’t have any ships in some of the shipyards. Is that a possibility at all? 

Mr. WINTER. Mr. Chairman, there are several aspects associated 

with the ongoing DDG 1000 program. First of all, it is a very different ship than what we envision for the cruiser. It is the one 

mechanism of providing naval surface fire support to the Marines. 

And it is an ongoing activity that is very, I think, well planned and 

well established and critical to maintain in terms of ensuring that 

the industrial base is able to continue to evolve. At the same time, 

we need to make sure that we set the right groundwork for the 

cruiser development in the future. 

We are still going through the analysis of alternatives associated 

with the CG(X) program. I think the process is a good one. I think 

the right questions are being asked. We also need to make sure 

that we take the time to answer those questions before we just run 

right into the development of that program, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. I hear two stories. One is that the nuclear-powered 

cruiser will save us a lot of money in fuel costs, and yet the upfront costs are so much, it would take 25 or 30 years to make up 

for that initial cost. Is that accurate? 

Mr. WINTER. Well, sir, I think there is still a question as to what 

the break-even point would be. That is highly dependent on the 

cost of oil, and numbers have been bandied about from everything 

from $100-a-barrel oil, which is basically where we are right now, 

to $300 a barrel of oil, depending upon what you see is the future. 

And I can get estimates all over the map. Depending on who I talk 

to, you will get estimates all over the map. Depending on who I 

talk to, you will get different break-even points. 

The other issue is that in the commercial world, I could go out 

in my old life and borrow money to be able to accommodate a cost 

savings in the future. We can’t quite do that here. And so the additional costs associated with nuclear power for any of our surface 

combatants would come at the expense of other top line. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
262 

One other point I would make is that we know how to deal with 

nuclear power. We have got a tremendous track record, and, in 

fact, at this point in time, roughly half of the reactors operational 

in the United States are operated by the Navy. At the same time, 

I will tell you it takes a while to configure a reactor plant for a vessel, and it does provide some significant constraints. It is a lot easier to put a nuclear reactor in a large ship like a carrier than it is 

to be able to do it in a more volumetrically challenged vessel like 

a destroyer or a cruiser. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Young. 

NAVY SONAR TRAINING

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Chairman Murtha in his statement and one of his questions emphasized the importance of the Navy, and there is no doubt the importance of the Navy not only to Navy and the Sailors, but the Marines onboard the ships. And the mission of those ships is extremely important. But protecting those ships so they can perform 

the mission and protecting the crews onboard the ships is important. 

Brings me to the subject of training. We have seen in recent 

times where we lost the training areas in Vieques, for example; we 

have lost bombing ranges for one reason or another. And now we 

are about to lose training areas for sonar; sonar which is very, very 

important to protecting the ships to do their mission and to protect 

the troops onboard. 

You had an appeal to the Federal appeals court recently. Your 

appeal was rejected. I assume that you are not going to give up 

without a little more of a fight, considering the importance of sonar 

training to the protection of our Navy. 

Mr. WINTER. Sir, I fully anticipate that we will be submitting a 

brief shortly for the Supreme Court to appeal the matter at hand 

associated with the southern California operating area. 

Mr. YOUNG. Who will handle that? Will the Navy handle that, or 

will the executive branch—— 

Mr. WINTER. Department of Justice has the official responsibility 

for the actual matters. We have a dedicated team within the Department of the Navy within the General Counsel Office, supported 

by the JAG Corps and the operational Navy staff, providing the 

technical support to that activity. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Secretary, what will be the impact if you lose 

that appeal? 

Mr. WINTER. I think that the impact could be very significant in 

terms of providing a series of constraints on our ability to train. 

Sonar is, I believe you know, and I would like to make sure everyone else does understand—is a phenomenology that in Iraq’s, if you 

will, environment, sonar operation depends upon where you are, 

what the water column looks like, what the seabed looks like. And 

training of the Fleet needs to occur in areas that mimic, if you will, 

the operating areas that we expect to be encountering in our future. Without the ability to fully engage in that training, I think 

we would be hard pressed to argue that our Fleet was prepared to 

deal with the future threat. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
263 

I would also note that the training activities that we engage in 

take place over extended periods of time. It is not just a matter of 

turning on a sonar, getting a quick reading and deciding that you 

have got something worked. The engagement between the submarine force and the surface force that is trying to deal with it 

takes place over a long period of time. The interruption of that 

training, even if a whale or other marine mammal is seen at a 

great distance, can have a significant impact on the integrity of 

that training exercise. 

And so we have a lot of concerns. We believe we have put forth 

a very good program right now. We have a series of 29 mitigation 

measures that we have operationally employed now for several 

years, and these measures call for surveillance of the test area, 

continuing observation, looking for marine mammals, and a very 

studied approach of reducing power, and, if necessary, turning off 

the exercise if a marine mammal gets too close. That approach, 

that set of mitigation measures, has proven to be very effective, 

and we have not had a single documented case of injury or death 

to a marine mammal since those measures have been put into 

place. To further build upon those and to keep on constraining the 

test regime further and further, which seems to be an approach desired by some out there, I think would hurt us significantly. And 

I ask CNO to comment. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The challenges that are being posed by new 

designs of submarines are significant. They are becoming quieter, 

they are getting smaller, they do not have to come up and recharge 

their batteries as often as submarines in the past have had to do. 

They are difficult targets. And they are also proliferating at a significant rate. 

We estimate that in the next two decades the submarine inventory in the world will increase by 50 percent, and that poses a challenge to the sea lanes of the world. We must be able to practice. 

We must be able to train. But we also have to be able to train in 

those areas that allow us to not only practice our antisubmarine 

warfare skill, because an adversary is going to throw everything 

they can at us—they are going to throw their submarines at us, 

they are going to attack us with cruise missiles, with airplanes, 

with other ships, and that is why we have to be in areas where we 

can bring all of those types of challenges to our Sailors so that they 

know what it is going to be like, and that they are properly prepared, that they know how to use their equipment, and that they 

are going to win. 

Mr. YOUNG. Recently Captain Carney took me to visit where you 

train sea mammals to do some pretty exciting and pretty important 

missions for the Navy. And some of the scientists that we met 

with—and I asked the question, what is the effect of sonar on the 

whales or the other sea mammals? Their response, and they 

seemed to be in agreement, was that if it is uncomfortable for the 

whale to be in the area where the sonar is being exercised, he 

leaves. That seemed like a pretty simple answer to me. And, you 

know, these were scientists. I assume that they know what they 

are talking about. But I certainly hope that you succeed, and that 

we are not denied, because as the Admiral just mentioned this, 

how serious this threat could be, and we all know about the ChiVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:40 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00263 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
264 

nese submarine that recently trailed some of our Navy vessels undetected. So I hope that you are successful in that appeal to the 

Supreme Court. 

AFGHANISTAN TROOP DEPLOYMENT

Mr. Chair, if I could ask a general question about the Afghanistan deployment. NATO has said that we need about 7,000 additional troops in NATO. You are going to send 3,400 marines, which 

is going to, according to your own statement, stretch you really 

thin. What do we know about whether or not NATO is going to actually step up and provide the additional 3,500 to 4,000 additional 

troops that we feel that we need there? 

General CONWAY. Sir, I can only say, it is my perspective that 

that is not a closed chapter yet. I know that the Secretary and the 

Chairman attend frequent quarterly discussions with our NATO 

partners and allies, and it is the topic virtually on every occasion. 

So they continue to encourage them, if they can’t provide maneuver 

battalions, provide police trainers, provide PRTs or provide soft 

kinds of power that the Afghan Government needs to become more 

effective in what it does for the people. So they continue to pound 

their drum, sir. I think I can fairly well assure you. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, it seems like NATO is not really stepping up 

as they should. Hopefully we can find some way to impress upon 

them the importance of not being undermanned there and so that 

we can have a successful conclusion. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

CONTINUING RESOLUTION

Mr. MURTHA. One of the things I just wanted you to send for the 

record, I want to know what a CR would mean to you, because I 

am not sure we are going to have a bill this year just because of 

the problems that we have in both bodies. So send me a document 

that shows what would happen if we had a CR rather than a base 

bill this year. We will have a 2008 supplemental, but I am not sure 

we will have anything but a CR to get us through the rest of the 

year. 

[The information follows:] 

The Department of the Navy carries out programs that will need to be executed 

at the beginning of FY 2009 that would require adequate Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) apportionment should the Congress implement CRA. These include 

Military Personnel bonus payments, mobilization costs, food service contracts, operations contracts for communications, equipment maintenance, facilities sustainment 

and restoration, as well as logistics support. Special consideration would also be required for multiple procurement contracts scheduled to fully execute at the beginning of the fiscal year. 

Operating under a CR impedes our ability to honor commitments and award annual contracts. While the actual impact of operating under a CR is dependant upon 

both the level of funding authorized and the length of time approved, generally continuing resolutions are disruptive to operations. Without adequate funding while 

under a CR, the Department of the Navy may suffer readiness degradation of both 

deployed and non-deployed Navy and Marine Corps forces. The ability to continue 

the current pace of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will be met, but preparing 

for the next rotation of forces or other contingencies may be jeopardized. The Navy 

may have to reduce air operations, ship operations, and combat support and delay 

ship depot maintenance. Also, environmental restoration requirements, and annual 

Base Operating Support contracts may not be issued along with Navy Service Wide 

Transportation contracts. Lastly, active military pay accounts for both the Navy and 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
265 

Marine Corps would likely be insolvent soon into the CRA period without additional 

authority to continue bonus and mobilization payments. 

NAVY CONTRACTORS IN THEATER

Second is I would like to have the number of contractors that the 

Navy has by category. I need to know whether security people, 

whether there are service people, foreign nationals and so forth. 

The Army is going to send me the same kind of list. So I would 

appreciate it if you would send us that list so we can find out. I 

was disappointed to hear that Secretary of the Army had 190,000 

contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. And I asked him the categories so we could see exactly what he is talking about. I know 

we need contractors. Do you have something? 

Mr. WINTER. Sir, just as a point of clarification, if I could ask, 

you are talking about contractors in theater? 

Mr. MURTHA. In theater, yes. 

Mr. WINTER. In theater. Thank you, sir. I would be happy to provide that. 

[The information follows:] 

FY 2008 Type of contractor Total contractors 

Service ........................................................................................................................................................... 31 

Security ......................................................................................................................................................... 0 

Foreign .......................................................................................................................................................... 7 

Logistics Support .......................................................................................................................................... 72 

Maintenance Support .................................................................................................................................... 113 

Sustainment Support .................................................................................................................................... 34 

Training Support ........................................................................................................................................... 96 

Staff Support ................................................................................................................................................ 19 

Performance Based ....................................................................................................................................... 131 

Comm Svcs Support ..................................................................................................................................... 52 

Spectrum Management ................................................................................................................................. 2 

Total ..................................................................................................................................................... 557 

Information provided by U.S. Fleet Forces Command, as the Navy Global Force 

Manager. These FY 2008 estimates do not include Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). LOGCAP is a U.S. Army initiative for peacetime planning for the 

use of civilian contractors in wartime and other contingencies. These contractors 

will perform selected services to support U.S. forces in support of Department of Defense (DoD) missions. Use of contractors in a theater of operations allows the release of military units for other missions or to fill support shortfalls. This program 

provides the Army with additional means to adequately support the current and 

programmed forces. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Moran. 

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That was a provocative 

question there. 

I have got a couple of questions, but first I want to make a little 

observation, particularly to you, General Conway. So my nephew 

Kevin pulls a Jack Murtha, and he drops out of college so he can 

join the Marines, so he can fight in Iraq. So he finishes up Parris 

Island, and he is all set. You know, he is a football player-type guy, 

he is really gung-ho. And the Marine Corps says, sorry, you have 

to go into financial management training. We need all you smart 

guys to be going into financial management. He says, financial 

management? I want to go fight in Iraq. He says, well—he says, 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
266 

why financial management? They said, well, the Congress is saying 

that we don’t have enough control over our spending, so we need 

to get more people in financial management. So I blamed it on 

Norm Dicks. 

I do want to ask you about—oh, about recruiting and retention, 

because there aren’t a lot of Jack Murthas around, quite frankly, 

and as a result you are having to spend about $300 million on bonuses; $60,000 for specialty needs. How are you doing on meeting 

those specialty occupational categories that you so desperately 

need? 

General CONWAY. Sir, we have been doing very well. We have 

been very pleased with our ability at a time in the country where 

the propensity on the part of all three major ethnic groups is not 

to join the military. We have been pleased with the ability of our 

recruiters to get out and to get into the schools and bring in the 

numbers that we need. As I mentioned in my opening statement, 

we thought we could keep the standards high and do about 5,000 

a year after adding about 300 recruiters to the field and some use 

of bonuses, but not large numbers of bonuses, let’s say, for enlistment. We apply bonuses more for reenlistment really than we do 

for initial entry. We have been able to manage all the fields pretty 

effectively. 

And to your sort of vignette, sir, our recruiters tell us if they had 

all just infantry MOSs, they could close out by about the 10th of 

every month. That is the threat of great young Americans out there 

that want to fight for their country, if that is what the country is 

doing. We have a program, by the way, that tries to get every Marine into the fight. So if your nephew will be patient with us, there 

is every possibility or maybe probability we will get him where he 

wants to go. 

Mr. MURTHA. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. MORAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. Can you do without these bonuses? I joined, my 

three brothers joined, my dad and his brother joined. Can we do 

without these bonuses? Can’t we rely on patriotism to get these 

guys in? 

General CONWAY. Sir, if I had to separate out the Services, and 

I don’t like to do that because there is, I think, a necessary inflection, that is what we do. We don’t offer a $40,000 college loan or 

a small business loan when you get out. The bonus that an average 

Marine takes is probably on the order of $3,000 to $5,000. And 

what we sell is the fact that you are going to be a United States 

Marine. You are going to go fight for your country, and you are 

going to be a Marine for life. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, Kevin didn’t get a penny. And he 

doesn’t know of any—his father could have used it. Okay. I have 

got another question here. 

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

This is a little more serious, so we are going to ask Secretary 

Winter about the Joint Strike Fighter. Investment now approaches 

about a trillion dollars, awful lot of planes, and we are told that 

the total acquisition cost increased by more than $23 billion because of higher procurement costs. The GAO states that $288 bilVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:40 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00266 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
267 

lion for acquisition is unreliable because it is insufficiently documented. And then the GAO found that three independent defense 

offices separately concluded that program cost estimates are understated by as much as $38 billion, and that the schedule is going 

to slip from at least a year to more than 2 years. 

You know, if we are spending nearly $1 trillion on the development and procurement of an aircraft, we have got to make sure 

that it meets our needs. And you really have to wonder what is 

such a substantial challenge that is going to face us in the near future for dominance of the airspace? We have got it. Nobody has any 

interest in trying to contest us for dominance of the airspace. And 

the GAO tells us that 90 percent of the acquisition program is still 

ahead of us. I mean, we are talking about an enormous amount of 

money. 

Why do we need to be investing so much in an aircraft that really seems to be more about winning the last war, the Cold War, 

than dealing with the current threats to America’s security by people and groups that are never going to have any jet fighters, even 

bombers, to contest air sovereignty? Do you want to handle that? 

Mr. WINTER. I will take a crack at it, Congressman. 

First of all, I will suggest that the JSF program, the F–35 program, is designed to provide us with a broad spectrum of air support capabilities that deal with the current engagement as well as 

any of the engagements that we are looking at in the future. The 

value of tactical air is something that has been proven time and 

time again, and for the most part, it relates to being able to control 

the air, but also to be able to project power from the air to the 

ground in support of ground forces or naval forces that are within 

the area of responsibility. 

JSF is an overlay program, if you will. It has three separate components. It supports the STOVL, the short takeoff and vertical 

landing capability, that is critical to the Marine Corps right now 

for our big deck amphibs. We really have only one class of aircraft 

that is capable of flying off of them. That is the Harrier. That is 

a very old aircraft. It is in great need of replacement, and it is the 

core of our ability to provide support to our embarked Marines and 

any future amphibious operation that they engage in. 

Similarly, the future for the Navy, the carrier variant is the 

mechanism of providing future capabilities that will span the spectrum of threats that we have to deal with for naval aviation, to be 

able to project power from the sea or to be able to deal with threats 

at the sea. A lot of the program is still ahead of us because we are 

still in the process of development. 

We have established a program here of fly before you buy. We 

are going through a detailed evaluation and development activity 

to ensure that we have what we need. We are not going to place 

orders for any of these aircraft for production purposes until such 

time as we have had sufficient flight test evaluation. That is coming up here very shortly. We expect to see the STOVL first flight 

coming up here this year, later this year, and I think that that will 

be a good milestone at which point we will be able to evaluate 

where we are in terms of the overall development process and 

where we think we will be in terms of the future cost estimates. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
268 

Mr. MORAN. It is a great answer. That is what you are supposed 

to tell us. But, you know, the Navy and Marine Corps are absolutely essential, are always going to be absolutely essential, but we 

are getting to the point where this is kind of a zero-sum game. 

When you put a trillion dollars into the F–35, you are taking it 

from someplace else. And I really question 2,500 jet fighters at a 

trillion dollars is the best possible use of an enormous amount of 

resources that might otherwise go into other needs to address the 

real current kind of threat we face. But that is just a comment, and 

I appreciate the answer. There is nothing wrong with the answer, 

but I am not sure there isn’t wrong with some of the policies. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

CHINESE NAVY BUILDUP

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, good morning. Thank you for your service, and those 

of you that look after in Iraq and Afghanistan and around the 

world, and certainly to those who serve in the Navy doing in their 

military occupations things they weren’t trained to do specifically, 

guarding those convoys and at time probably prisoners, all sorts of 

things that are pretty key and important to us. 

One of the ways to discuss posture, which is sort of the focus of 

this hearing, is to talk about what other nations are doing. And I 

think quite a lot we focus on the build-up of what is happening in 

China. I think maybe less attention is focused on Russia. You are 

familiar, Admiral, with—you know the incident in late 2006 of the 

Navy—Chinese Navy apparently stalking the Kitty Hawk and putting up a submarine within firing distance without supposedly 

being detected. I assume that sub was a diesel. Do they have nuclear subs? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir, they do. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I assume it was a diesel sub. 

Then we read last November of a Chinese Song-class submarine 

tracking the Kitty Hawk in the Taiwan Straits. It was monitored 

by an antisubmarine aircraft watching the sub, and, of course, it 

was described in the paper as, I quote, the first direct military confrontation between the two nations’ naval forces since 1996. 

Besides the obvious build-up of concern about the obvious buildup of Chinese forces, what can you tell us about these incidents as 

they relate to the—sort of the tactics and strategies that you are 

looking at? How do we posture ourselves, given these and other 

types of incidents? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. And I was the Pacific Fleet Commander at the time, and on the last incident that you mentioned, 

I questioned the credibility of that news report. 

But what we have done in recent years is we have looked at the 

posture that we must have, particularly in the Pacific, because the 

Pacific is a very important region for us from a security standpoint, 

the allies that we have there, but also economically, and it contributes directly to our prosperity. We have shifted our carrier force so 

now we are biased more toward the Pacific. We have done the same 

thing with our submarines. We have forward home-ported some of 

our submarines in Guam so that we have more presence, greater 

response in the Pacific area. We continue to exercise with our allies 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
269 

and partners in that region, and antisubmarine warfare is extremely important. That is why the training is so important. 

But it is also key to recall that in some cases countries are able 

to export some of these systems, and so to simply look at one particular flag and see that as a potential threat, I think it has to be 

broadened out. Where are some of these systems, advanced systems, finding their way? And that is important to do as well. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But by all reports, you know, obviously we 

have repositioned ourselves. But, you know, I assume some people 

must be alarmed by the talk of the Chinese, you know, producing, 

you know, a goal of 200 submarines. I am not sure what the figure 

was in terms of surface vessels. And they do a pretty good job of— 

for their own technological development. And what they don’t get 

there I assume they steal from us or get from other sources. 

I mean, in terms of sort of sounding the alarm here, you know, 

while we talk about the size of the fleet, and we know how expensive it is to bring new ships on line, are you concerned about their 

build-up? I know we always go with the old issue of, you know, 

overwhelming force, and we are—you know, our capabilities are 

better. But the Chinese are no slouches. And, there is often talk 

of 2015. But Chinese aren’t waiting to 2015. How do you gauge 

where the Chinese are going, and how closely are we keeping an 

eye on their development of new technology as well as the vehicles 

that carry them? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, we watch naval developments around 

the world, and clearly China is the navy that is increasing in capability and capacity faster than any other navy on the globe. There 

is no question in my mind, and I have had the opportunity to meet 

with their leadership, with my counterpart, on a couple of occasions, that there is no question that they are developing what we 

refer to as a bluewater navy, a navy that can range farther from 

their shores. They also have a much longer view than others have. 

Their objective is to become a significant regional navy. 

There is no question that the issue of Taiwan is always first and 

foremost in their mind, but as you look at the development of the 

Navy, it is also a navy that is focused on the sea lanes of communication and being able to assure the flows that fuel their growing 

economy. So they are doing that. 

But in addition to the hardware, it is also important that we look 

at the people, and my first contacts with the PLA Navy, the leadership tended to have gotten into their positions through political 

means. The leadership in the PLA Navy today came up through 

operational paths. They understand what it is like to operate a 

navy at sea, and they see this vision of their navy as a significant 

regional navy and, I believe, expanding out and becoming global as 

time goes on. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The view is, at least from my reading, is 

that there—what it may have been described as somewhat political 

once, you would never call it amateurish, is that they are doing— 

you know, they are sort of concentrating their development of their 

military in a very highly professional manner. I mean, it may not 

be mirroring our Special Forces or, you know, your SEALs, but in 

reality they are emulating the best of what is out there, and we 

need to be prepared for it. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
270 

UNMANNED COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES

Just on one system here, could you comment about the drone 

combat squadron, who is—the whole issue of your seeking, I think, 

a competitive prototyping in preparation of fielding a first squadron 

of unmanned combat aerial vehicles. Are those carrier-based? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. That is part of a—kind of what I 

would call a family of unmanned vehicles beginning with—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You have things going off carriers now? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. No, sir, we are not flying unmanned vehicles 

off of our carriers. We are flying unmanned vehicles off of some of 

our ships, but the article that you reference is moving to an air 

combat vehicle, one that can provide striking power off the carriers, 

and it is part of a stepped and phased development. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. That is in some ways pretty revolutionary 

given the fact that, you know, obviously the whole issue of a man 

behind the controls, not that there aren’t men behind these controls, but one could view that as somewhat of a major departure. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, I think, sir—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Perhaps a positive departure. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The significant thing is being able to operate those airplanes, combat airplanes, off of an aircraft carrier in 

an unmanned way. Our other unmanned programs address other 

needs that we have in maritime surveillance. But this is something 

that is fairly complex; landing on an aircraft carrier, taking off can 

get pretty sporty, and we have never done it with an unmanned vehicle before. It has a little longer view than some of the other unmanned programs that we have. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Frelinghuysen, did you get a bonus when you 

went into the Army? 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I sure didn’t. 

Mr. MURTHA. Look where he has ended up, huh? 

Mr. MORAN. This is a random sample. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am glad you are leaving. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kaptur. 

INTERNATIONAL SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome. Thank you for 

coming today. 

Admiral Roughead, I would like to ask you a question about the 

structure of the Chinese shipbuilding industry. To what extent does 

the Government of China subsidize the manufacturing of and construction of ships there? And have you looked at that issue? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I have not done the economic analysis, but 

my sense is it is heavily subsidized. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Is it really not an arm of the state and—of their 

government? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I would say that they are state industries 

with a view toward becoming a dominant shipbuilding industry in 

the world. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I agree with that. And the question I have, coming 

from a maritime community that has suffered greatly over the 

years with the loss of both hardware as well as the people who 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
271 

make the ships, though we are not a deepwater port, what do we 

do in your budget to capture every single dollar we can, knowing 

that they are the primary producers in the world today, correct? 

The work that was being done in Korea is now moving up to China. 

I think if you look at the shifting nature of shipbuilding in the 

world, what do we do with your budget and every element of it, 

leasing, the leasing you are now doing, phasing that out? How can 

we possibly compete with these private companies in our country 

against a subsidized industry like that? How do we use your budget to restore shipbuilding capacity in this country and all the 

componentry that goes into it? How do we do that? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, ma’am. I would say that my focus is on 

building warships, and the quality, the sophistication of the ships 

we build is unmatched by any nation in the world. But it is important that we get to the capacity issue, and that is why getting to 

the 313-ship fleet is so important to me as the CNO. 

LEASING OF FOREIGN BUILT SHIPS

Ms. KAPTUR. Well, you also have many smaller vessels, Admiral. 

You have vessels that carry ammunition, and you are leasing those 

vessels now. They weren’t built here. And I don’t see the Department as fully conscious of the threat that is out there, particularly 

from China, in using every tool we have in order to restore our 

waning capability on the seas for all types of vessels. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Mr. Secretary, do you want to take that? 

Mr. WINTER. If I could, ma’am, first of all, in terms of the leased 

vessels, we are reducing our dependency on those leased vessels. 

We are down from 22 leased vessels to 17 at this point in time. 

These are short-term leases, under five years, and they really represent an opportunity, if you will, to surge and to be able to bring 

into support roles vessels that are not currently being manufactured for which we do not have a good economic argument for manufacturing the full-time ownership of. 

We are putting a lot of effort into investing in those capabilities 

that provide the U.S. shipbuilding industry with the ability to 

produce ships at lower cost, and this comes by way of everything 

from contractual arrangements with the individual yards to install 

a lot of technology which is available elsewhere outside the United 

States for the most part. That does assist us in terms of our surface 

combatants. And in cases where that technology can be applied to 

yards that support multiple applications—and unfortunately there 

is only one of those yards right now, major yards, that is a Nassco 

facility in San Diego which builds both Jones Act ships as well as 

logistics support ships for us—there is value that they are able to 

accrue both to their commercial endeavors as well as to their activities for the Navy. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Well, Mr. Secretary, do you monitor where the subcontracts go? For example, if a ship is taken to China, and the 

front half is whacked off and something is welded on the back, do 

you monitor your subcontracts to do everything possible to make 

sure that everything is done in this country rather than shipped 

somewhere else? 

Mr. WINTER. On all of our ships, most definitely, ma’am. 

Ms. KAPTUR. What about the electronics? 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
272 

Mr. WINTER. The electronics is the same thing. All of the modifications to our ships are all done, they are all managed and appropriately assessed by the Navy organizations that have the responsibility for management. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Are they made in this country, sir? 

Mr. WINTER. Excuse me? 

Ms. KAPTUR. Are they made in this country? 

Mr. WINTER. Every ship in the Navy register, all of our combatants are. 

Ms. KAPTUR. All of the vessels under your command are made in 

this country, every single component? 

Mr. WINTER. Outside, not every single component, ma’am, but 

the vast majority of them are. The vast majority of the components 

are. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Well, I would appreciate a letter from you, from 

your Department, that summarizes for me where you think the 

challenges are to retain that production capacity in this country. 

Mr. WINTER. I would be pleased to do that, ma’am. 

[The information follows:] 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
273 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 755 here 46476C.109
274 

MARINE CORPS TROOP DEPLOYMENT

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. I wanted to ask General Conway, thank 

you very, very much for your service. 

What percent of the Marines under your command are serving 

a third tour or more in combat in Iraq? Do you know that number? 

General CONWAY. No, ma’am, I don’t. I take surveys every time 

I hold a town hall, and of the audiences there routinely, 60 to 70 

percent will have deployed. I will ask for a second and a third time 

or even a fourth time, and a fifth time I will ask for a show of 

hands. So I will say, increasingly we have three-time deployers, but 

I would have to get the exact percentage for you. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I would be very interested, and in the trend, General. I am very interested in the trend if that is increasing, which 

I think it is. 

[The information follows:] 

The current number of Marines per deployment are: 

One Deployment: 93,511 

Two Deployments: 32,996 

Three Deployments: 3,683 

Four or More Deployments: 154 

General CONWAY. But the one thing, ma’am, I would explain to 

you is that unlike the other Services, we will serve about a threeyear tour in the operational forces. And then we will have our Marines and our officers go to what we call a B billet, and it will be 

there for about three years, and then they will come back to the 

operating forces. So we don’t have some of the people that spend 

seven, eight, nine years in the operating forces consecutively to roll 

up some of these large numbers. 

Now, some of those folks are starting to come back because we 

have been at this so long. This summer we are going to see some 

people come back, I think, that maybe left the operating forces in 

2004, 2005, and we will have to see what the impact is on that for 

our retention. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Chairman, my time has probably expired, but 

I did want to ask the General if he could— 

Mr. MURTHA. I wanted to end this before the votes because there 

is a series of votes. So we will go to Mr. Rothman. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Could I ask the General to provide for the record, 

Mr. Chairman, the issue of urban warfare training in U.S. cities by 

the Reserves, the Marine Reserves is an issue that has hit our community directly, and it was very troublesome what happened. I 

would like to know from you whether this is happening in Active 

forces anywhere in our country, if urban warfare training is occurring in U.S. cities, and what are the conditions for that, or whether 

it is just happening on the Reserve side. 

General CONWAY. No, ma’am. It happens with the Active forces. 

It has been happening since the mid-1980s almost without interruption or without any incident. So I was a little bit surprised to 

see the one happen as it did in Ohio. 

[The information follows:] 

LtGen Bergman, Commander Marine Forces Reserve personally met with Congresswoman Kaptur to discuss the Toledo, OH issue and answer her questions. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
275 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Rothman. 

MARINE CORPS MISSION TRAINING

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your very distinguished service to our 

country. The Marine Corps has many officers who have never been 

deployed on a Navy ship, I have been told. Is that true? 

General CONWAY. Increasingly, sir, that is true. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Does that disturb you? 

General CONWAY. Immensely. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And with regards to that issue, as well as the lack 

of training for amphibious landings, does this new budget address 

that; and if so, how, please? 

General CONWAY. Sir, it does indirectly. And it transcends just 

amphibious operations. We are not doing live-fire maneuver exercises anymore. We are not going to cold-weather training. We are 

not going to jungle training. The part of the budget that assists us 

in managing that and making it better is in growing the force. 

There are two reasons we wanted to grow the Marine Corps. One 

was to be able to facilitate our deployment-to-dwell. Second was to 

be able to provide relief in the process so we could spend more time 

with the families and more time doing training. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And training for these other things? 

General CONWAY. Yes, sir, exactly. If we can get this deploymentto-dwell something more akin to seven months deployed, 14 months 

home, we can sustain that. We think we can do the training, and 

we think the families will be much happier. 

HEALTH OF THE MARINE CORPS

Mr. ROTHMAN. Very good. I only have a few minutes. 

There is this new issue of Foreign Policy magazine, the March– 

April 2008 issue, which apparently contains a survey which was 

conducted jointly with the Center for a New American Security 

where they asked 3,400 officers holding the rank of major or lieutenant commander and across all the services, Active Duty and retired general officers and field grade officers, about their views of 

the health of the military. And here are some troubling findings. 

They said that 60 percent of the U.S. military see the U.S. military as weaker today than it was 5 years ago; 60 percent. And with 

regards to the Marine Corps in particular, the majority of the responses indicated that on a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being no concern 

about readiness effectiveness and 10 being extreme concern, the 

majority of the responses indicated a 7, indicating great concern 

about the health of the Marine Corps. 

Would any of you gentlemen wish to address this? 

General CONWAY. Well, since you left off with the Marine Corps, 

sir, I will start and say that I think I would probably be about a 

6 or a 7 myself. 

Now, in terms of the capability of the force, we are much more 

capable than we were five years ago. We have more Marines, we 

have more equipment, we have combat training. And I would be 

much more comfortable sending that force into a fight than I was 

leading the force into a fight in 2003. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
276 

But the concern I think these people are representing is that our 

core competencies, which go well beyond counterinsurgency, are not 

being trained to, not being conducted these days, to make sure that 

we can go anywhere and do anything for this country. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And that will be addressed to your satisfaction in 

your budget? 

General CONWAY. Sir, the budget will help, but what we actually 

need over time will be, again, more time spent at home. You can 

do that through growing the force. You can do that through reducing the requirement. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Right. 

General CONWAY. If the requirement is reduced, and we are able 

to manage these deployment requirements more effectively with a 

larger force, then we will be back to doing those things, and we will 

be in much better shape as a result. 

CHINESE NAVY BUILDUP

Mr. ROTHMAN. And to the CNO, with regards to China, two questions. One was, if I wrote this down correctly, you questioned the 

credibility of the news report? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Now, I am a lawyer by training. Are you refuting 

the accuracy of the news report? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The reference to the encounter in the Straits 

of Taiwan, I would refute that. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Okay. Good. And with regard to the buildup of 

the Chinese submarine force, it seems like a considerable effort on 

their part. And I heard what you said, that this is their effort to 

protect their energy supplies, and they are doing this to be a regional power, but you did say with probability that they wish to become a global sea power as well. Does your budget that you are 

submitting to us address the challenges of this growing submarine 

fleet from the Chinese? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Our budget, sir, represents the balance that 

we must have in the Fleet and the capabilities that we have. It 

does address our ability to operate as a global Navy and prevail. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you very much. I have to say it is hard for 

me to believe that you are a 6 or a 7, Commandant. You are not 

working out, huh? 

The Committee is adjourned until 1:30. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow:] 

SEABASING

Question. The Maritime Pre-position Force (Future) (MPF(F)) is the backbone of 

entirely seabased operations. The Navy envisions this capability as a fleet of 14 

ships that will provide pre-positioned equipment for a fly-in force, provide at-sea arrival and assembly of this equipment, direct support of the assault chelon of the 

task force, indefinite sustainment of the landing force and at-sea reconstitution and 

redeployment of the landing force. The initial procurement of the ships that comprise the MPF(F) was scheduled to occur in fiscal year 2009 but the Navy has 

slipped procurements to at least fiscal year 2010 and has removed some of the ships 

(Auxiliary Dry Cargo Carrier) for its outyear budgets along with no plans for procurement. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
277 

Admiral Roughead, the plan for acquiring the ships that will comprise the Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future) have changed drastically since last year. Can 

you summarize the Navy’s rationale for this change and the plan for eventually acquiring these ships? 

Answer. MPF(F) was initially envisioned to provide a pre-positioned lift capability 

for a first responder, brigade-size force, which would reduce reliance on facilities in 

the theater and minimize vulnerabilities ashore early in a campaign. Within the last 

year, the Navy/Marine Corps team has continued to refine the role of MPF(F). Accordingly, the Navy has delayed procurement of MPF(F) platforms to further analyze operational requirements and concepts of employment. The Navy plans to deliver MPF(F) while balancing overall warfighting requirements, costs, and industrial 

base realities. The Navy remains on track to deliver the Full Operational Capability 

for MPF(F) in FY 2022. 

Question. General Conway, as the use of the Maritime Pre-Positioning Force, how 

will this impact the Marine Corps and were you included in the decision process 

to delay ship acquisition? 

Answer. The Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) program is a critically essential element of the nation’s warfighting capability, and shipbuilding programmatic 

delays should be avoided to ensure this vital national capability becomes available 

as soon as possible. 

The Marine Corps requires three Marine Expeditionary Brigade’s (MEB) worth of 

expeditionary warfighting capability and lift. We have already accepted risk in our 

amphibious lift capacity by agreeing to fiscally constrain shipping availability for 

each of our two assault echelon (AE) MEBs from 17 to 15 ships. The Fiscal Year 

2009 30-year shipbuilding plan does not provide the exact mix of required LHA/ 

LHD’s, LPD’s, and LSD–41/49 equivalents, which further amplifies the risk we’re 

taking in our amphibious forcible entry capabilities. 

The Marine Corps intends to fight any major contingency operation as a Marine 

Expeditionary Force, which consists of three MEB operational maneuver elements. 

The first two of those MEBs are intended to be employed from the amphibious AE 

shipping described above, and the third MEB maneuver unit will operate from 

MPF(F) to reinforce and support the amphibious AE units. 

The 30 operationally available amphibious ships required for 2.0 MEB AE, coupled with MPF(F)’s 1.0 MEB-level reinforcing and support, and the Assault FollowOn Echelon (lifted by Military Sealift Command black-bottom shipping) provide the 

3.0 MEB necessary to enable a seabased, MEF-level warfighting capability. 

The Marine Corps continues to be an integral part of the decision process within 

the Department of the Navy for programming and budgeting of resources. We understand that budget and program realities force us to make tough choices. In the 

case of MPF(F) and the rest of our amphibious lift, we continue to work budget and 

program issues within the Department of the Navy. 

RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD

Question. The Reliable Replacement Warhead was originally envisioned to ensure 

the aging stockpile could meet its long-term mission by improving the long-term reliability, longevity, and, certification of the existing weapons and associated components. However, the design effort led by the Department of Energy has seemingly 

led to the development of a whole new program. Last year the Committee markup 

removed all funding for Reliable Replacement Warhead program. The budget request for fiscal year 2009 contains funding to commence work on phase 3 engineering development portion of the program despite the fact that all fiscal year 2008 

funding for the Department of the Energy was removed from the program. 

Secretary Winter, the fiscal year 2009 budget request contains funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program to commence phase 3 efforts in 2009 despite 

the fact that there is no Department of Energy funding for the program in fiscal 

year 2009. Is it prudent for the Department of Defense to get so far ahead of the 

Department of Energy on this effort? 

Answer. No Navy effort on the Replacement Warhead is planned unless approved 

and funded by Congress and coordinated with the Department of Energy (National 

Nuclear Security Administration). FY 2009 funding can be used to restart the Phase 

2A effort if Congress concurs. It is important that the Phase 2A study or a similar 

one be resumed in order to properly inform the next Nuclear Posture Review. If not, 

the Navy proposes to continue work on advanced fuse technologies and safety architectures that have multi-platform/multi-service applications. 

Question. Secretary Winter, is it the Navy’s intention to support further development of a new nuclear weapon with this funding? 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
278 

Answer. No. The Navy placed FY 2008 funding on hold when Congress zeroed 

funding for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in the FY 2008 

Energy and Water Authorization Bill. No Navy effort on the Reliable Replacement 

Warhead is planned unless approved and funded by Congress and coordinated with 

NNSA. 

Question. Secretary Winter, in the context of the new nuclear weapons strategy 

has the Department of Defense articulated a need for a new nuclear weapon? 

Answer. In February of 2007, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved 

the program to pursue a replacement warhead to augment the existing Navy strategic deterrent capabilities. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
(279) 

THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 2008. 

NAVY/MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 

WITNESSES 

JOHN THACKRAH, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR 

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION 

VICE ADMIRAL BARRY McCULLOUGH, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES F. AMOS, DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF 

THE MARINE CORPS (COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION) 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MORAN [presiding]. The Committee will come to order. And 

I want to recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Young, for a motion. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I move that those portions of the 

hearing today which involve classified material be held in executive 

session because of the classification of the material to be discussed. 

Mr. MORAN. So ordered. Thank you, Mr. Young. 

This afternoon the committee will hold a closed hearing on Navy 

and Marine Corps Acquisition. 

We are very pleased to welcome Mr. John Thackrah, who is the 

Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research Development 

and Acquisition; Vice Admiral Barry McCullough, Deputy Chief of 

Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources; 

and Lieutenant General James Amos, Deputy Commandant of the 

Marine Corps for Combat Development and Integration. 

These gentlemen are very well qualified to discuss Department 

of the Navy acquisition and to answer the questions of the committee. 

Secretary Thackrah and Admiral McCullough and General Amos, 

we thank you for being here this afternoon. We are here to talk 

about the acquisition of Navy and Marine Corps equipment. The 

Committee is very much concerned about the readiness of the Department in terms of equipping the force. Systems are becoming 

ever more complicated and too often in developmental programs 

the desire to begin production overruns technological maturity and 

we are faced with delays and restructures. 

One only need flip the pages of the budget request to find several 

programs where this reality has overcome good intentions. As in 

years past, shipbuilding is the centerpiece of the Navy’s acquisition 

program. Also as in years past, the Navy’s request is insufficient 

to reach and maintain your stated requirement of 313 ships. The 

committee is very much interested in hearing how you plan on 

reaching your required ship count when the administration, time 

and again, fails to provide the necessary resources to do so. 

We were very pleasantly surprised to see the budget increase almost $2.5 billion for Navy and Marine Corps aviation programs in 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
280 

light of the looming tactical aircraft shortfall. This is certainly a 

step in the right direction. 

So, gentlemen, we look forward to your testimony and to a spirited and informative question-and-answer session. 

Mr. MORAN. Before we hear your testimony I want to call on our 

very distinguished Ranking Member, our friend Mr. Young, for his 

comments. 

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I 

want to share and join you in welcoming our very distinguished 

witnesses to the table today. I agree with the Chairman’s statement on the 313-ship Navy. 

Many years back, I was one of the original Ronald Reagan supporters of the 600-ship Navy, but something happened between 

then and now and we are struggling to keep up with 313. I think 

you are going to have to accelerate your program even beyond what 

the budget request indicates in order to do that. 

I am also concerned about the fighter shortfall. As you retire 

your F–18s in favor of the Joint Strike Fighter, which has a few 

challenges of its own—and specifically the Marine Corps, General, 

I understand that once your Harriers are gone—and you might 

comment on the status of the Harriers—but when your Harriers 

are gone and before you get the Joint Strike Fighters you are without, the Marine Corps is without any kind of a jet aircraft. 

We would like to hear some comments about that. But other 

than that, Mr. Chairman, we have a lot to do, so I yield back. 

Mr. MORAN. All right. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. MORAN. And thank you for making this hearing, and Mr. 

Frelinghuysen and Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. Secretary, we understand that you will be the only one making a statement so you can proceed with your summarized statement, if you wouldn’t mind, and your entire statement will now be 

placed in the record. Thank you. Mr. Secretary. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF SECRETARY THACKRAH

Mr. THACKRAH. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Young and distinguished members of this 

Committee, it is an honor and a privilege for Vice Admiral 

McCullough, Lieutenant General Amos and me to appear before 

you today to discuss the Navy and Marine Corps’ acquisition programs. With your permission, I would like to submit my written 

testimony for the record. 

Mr. MORAN. So ordered. 

Mr. THACKRAH. As the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 

Research, Development and Acquisition since November 2007, I 

serve as the Navy senior acquisition executive. Despite my acting 

status I fully accept the authority, responsibility and accountability 

for all Navy and Marine Corps acquisition functions and programs. 

The development of this budget has not been easy. Tough decisions had to be made to balance risk and be responsible stewards 

of the tax dollars entrusted to us. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
281 

I would like to briefly highlight part of my written testimony. Our fiscal year 2009 budget procurement requests $41.1 billion. 

Specific requirements include $14.1 billion in funding for seven 

new-construction ships and $14.7 billion to procure the 206 aircraft 

to meet our long-term consolidation and recapitalization efforts. 

Noteworthy is for the first time in a long while, Navy’s budget does 

not fund any lead ships, and our request is for over 200 aircraft. 

With congressional support for our GWOT efforts, the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected, or MRAP, vehicle is making vital contributions in protecting our Marines and Sailors from improvised 

explosive devices. 

The Department of the Navy is the lead Service for the joint 

MRAP vehicle program. Since competitive awards began in February of 2007 and principally as a result of the commitment to 

streamline every acquisition action, the MRAP team has been able 

to produce over 6,000 vehicles and has fielded, in the hands of the 

user, more than 2,700 to two theaters of operations in service. In addition, our budget request includes $19.3 billion for total 

RDT&E to transform our force with next-generation platforms into 

mature technologies for our procurement programs. S&T funding of 

$1.8 billion is also requested, which equals a real growth of 6 percent from the fiscal year 2008 level, to ensure a robust base of options for the threats today and in the future. To provide a balanced 

fleet of ships, aircraft and expeditionary capabilities, we have to 

control our costs. 

Under Secretary Winter’s leadership, the Department launched 

an Acquisition Improvement Initiative to insert discipline across 

the Department, without altering the existing Department of Defense processes. The initiative includes an acquisition governance 

which engages Navy and Marine Corps leadership in a set of gate 

reviews on all programs for agreement on definitive sets of requirements throughout the acquisition review process. 

We have also reinvigorated our acquisition workforce investment. 

Finally, to bolster our acquisition leadership, the Navy has selected a three-star admiral to serve as my principal deputy. 

In closing, we have the most powerful naval forces in the world 

and we are looking ahead to build on the strength in order to prevent future wars. Our partnership with Congress and the Navy 

and Marine Corps is necessary to sustain our position in this uncertain world and to maintain the safety of our Sailors and Marines. 

I believe our budget request strikes a proper balance to meet 

present and future challenges, follows on a long-term path of program stability, and meets the requirements of this partnership. 

I thank you for the opportunity to testify today and welcome any 

questions you may have. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you very much Mr. Assistant Secretary. 

[The joint statement of Secretary Thackrah, Vice Admiral 

McCullough, and Lt. General Amos follows:] 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
282 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1009 46476D.001
283 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1010 46476D.002
284 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1011 46476D.003
285 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1012 46476D.004
286 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1013 46476D.005
287 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1014 46476D.006
288 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1015 46476D.007
289 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1016 46476D.008
290 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1017 46476D.009
291 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1018 46476D.010
292 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1019 46476D.011
293 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1020 46476D.012
294 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1021 46476D.013
295 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1022 46476D.014
296 

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLE

Mr. MORAN. We appreciate your coming to testify and respond to 

questions. I have just a couple I would like to ask. 

But first I think I will ask General Amos about the MRAPs. 

When lives are directly affected, when we know we can save lives 

with a particular piece of equipment, money is really no object; so 

it is a very distant secondary consideration. But there is some concern about, for example, the flexibility of MRAPs. In an urban area 

or from the Marine Corps’ perspective, even in a muddy area, there 

is limited flexibility. It just doesn’t operate as well as we would 

like. But the concern arises, What are we going to do with these 

after the war is concluded? 

Do you have plans for—since we are shipping as many as we can 

as fast as we can to the theater in Iraq—what are we going to do 

with them once there is some political reconciliation and we start 

to pull out of Iraq? 

General AMOS. Right now I think the number is 1,101 that are 

in the Green Zone that belong to the Marines today. That includes 

38 that we are shipping into Afghanistan. So we are going to use 

the ones—and our number, total buy for us, is 2,225, as you know 

when we talked the last time. 

Mr. MORAN. It is 2,225? 

General AMOS. Yes, sir. And we have got a little over 1,100 in 

theater right now. And as we continue to buy toward the end of 

the summer, we will continue to put more in theater in the Green 

Zone. Yet to be seen how many we are going to put in Afghanistan, 

because we just don’t know. We have got the early forces, the 24th 

MEU, on the ground today, and eventually will flow 3,400 Marines 

and Sailors in there. So we are not quite sure. But we do know 

that—we anticipate there is going to be a requirement on the major 

roads. 

And you are absolutely right, Congressman Moran, this is a 

worthwhile investment and it is a great vehicle. It is not an offroad vehicle. And it is not a vehicle to use in many of the little 

mud-walled, very tightly dense-packed urban areas that we operate 

in. So it has an application. 

Since we met the last time, since I came in here and testified the 

last time and I was asked about—and I believe it was Congressman Bishop who asked me about are we going to put these on 

MPF, our Maritime Preposition Ships, and the answer is we probably are. We are working on that. I told you at the time that I 

wasn’t sure how they would fit weight-wise. 

A couple of things have happened since then. Number one, there 

is a recapitalization effort about to take place where we are going 

to be able to get rid of some of our legacy MPF ships, get some 

LMSRs and be able to put more stuff. So I think we are going to 

put some on MPF. We are not sure how many yet. The total requirement, known requirement right now that we have in the Marine Corps, enduring requirement, is for a little over 400 of them 

for the future. And that is for EOD, route clearance missions, and 

that kind of thing. 

So there is a difference, I know, between that and the 2,225, but 

there is an unknown Congressman Moran. And what I want you 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
297 

to understand is—or believe—that we are going to take good care 

of these things. We are probably going to end up forward-basing a 

bunch of them in the CENTCOM AOR. If you think about missions 

that we might do in Africa, that might be a perfect vehicle for some 

of those kinds of environment. So there is a question. We are not 

quite sure. But we are going to take care of them. We are more 

than likely going to preposition. We are probably going to cocoon 

a bunch of them. And then we will have some on MPS. We are just 

not quite sure yet. 

PRESIDENTIAL HELICOPTER PROGRAM

Mr. MORAN. Thanks, General. 

I only have one more area for questioning before turning it over 

to Mr. Young. But this is to Secretary Thackrah. The Presidential 

helicopter program has experienced well-publicized cost growth 

over the last year, caused by a combination of technical problems 

and requirement changes. The current request before the committee for this program is over $1 billion, but contains no schedule 

details beyond this fiscal year. 

This marks the second consecutive year that the Navy has requested a large amount of funding for a program with no schedule 

details provided as justification. So you are asking the Congress to 

take quite a leap of faith to appropriate over $1 billion to a program with no long-term plan nor much of a short-term plan. 

When will the Navy provide an executable program schedule? 

What is the root cause of all of the problems and turmoil on this 

program? 

Now, it appears that the Department is really just throwing good 

money after bad in the hopes that things might get better. So we 

would like to know what assurances you can provide this subcommittee that the Presidential helicopter program is in fact on 

track finally, and will actually field aircraft on the schedule required by the White House. Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. THACKRAH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question. The 

Presidential helicopter program is, as you are aware, segregated 

into two increments. Increment one of this program currently has 

aircraft in flight test and is moving along according to the schedule 

that has been advertised. Increment two of this program is currently on stop-work and is pending incremental funding and decisions on the way ahead from the White House. Meetings have been 

ongoing relative to the status of this program. We are expecting decisions imminently on the final definition of increment two and 

where we will be going forward. 

The cost overruns that you refer to are well advertised. They are 

real. We have requested additional funds. That was largely due, as 

we have testified before, to a misunderstanding, if you will, of requirements between the Department of the Navy and the supplier. 

We have since sorted all of that out, and we now have high confidence that clearly that understanding is in place, it is understood. 

We now need to get the final definition and decision on the final 

stages of increment two. 

Mr. MORAN. Okay. It has been kind of a frustrating experience; 

but I mean, we will take you at your word. It is not you, but I have 

to say once more, you know, we will assume those assurances. And 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
298 

we don’t necessarily blame you, but it has been a problematic program. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman would you yield? Who is the supplier? 

Mr. THACKRAH. This is Lockheed Martin. 

Mr. MORAN. Don’t say Northrop Grumman. 

Mr. THACKRAH. No, sir, this is Lockheed Martin. 

Mr. DICKS. Lockheed Martin. And the helicopter comes from 

Italy? 

Mr. THACKRAH. The base helicopter is an Augusta Westland aircraft based on their commercial EH–101 aircraft. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Dicks. Mr. Young. 

LPD–17 AMPHIBIOUS TRANSPORT DOCK

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

General AMOS, the number one unfunded requirement for the 

second year in a row for the Marine Corps is an additional LPD– 

17. We have already appropriated for nine of these ships, but the 

fiscal year 2009 budget includes $104 million for closeout costs. 

This doesn’t appear to be compatible with what you consider your 

needs to be. What do you have to say about that? 

General AMOS. Sir, I appreciate the opportunity to comment on 

that. And that is truly our number one unfunded priority. As the 

Commandant says, we need the ship, we need 11 of them. The program of record was 11 ships, it wasn’t nine. Right now we are 

going to spend $103 million in 2009 to essentially close the line 

down. 

I was down there with the Commandant and the other threestars in New Orleans about 3 or 4 weeks ago for an off-site. Walked 

on board the ships, went on board the GREEN BAY, had a tour 

of the shipyard, got to see the keel laid. It is quite an operation. 

I am very enthusiastic about the ship, but we need to continue 

with the requirement, Congressman, and so nine is not enough. It 

is not going to get us what we need. So we need the tenth LPD. 

We need to commit to it and then we need to move on and build 

the 11th LPD as well. 

Mr. YOUNG. If we took the $104 million of the budget request for 

closeout and then we applied that to another LPD–17, how much 

more would we need? 

General AMOS. Sir, I am going to let Admiral McCullough answer, but it is not going to be enough for advance procurement, but 

it would put some seed money down. So it is probably better off 

that Admiral McCullough answers that from a money perspective. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir, Congressman, I appreciate the 

question. The cost of an LPD–17 is $1.7 billion. So if we took the 

$103 million and applied it to that cost, we would need roughly another $1.6 billion, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Could these LPD–17 hulls be used for any other 

kind of ship? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. We are investigating that right 

now, use of an LPD–17 hull as a replacement for our afloat command ships. The MOUNT WHITNEY, which is deployed in European theater and the BLUE RIDGE which is deployed in the Pacific theater. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
299 

Mr. YOUNG. Where is the disconnect? If the Marines feel strongly 

that they need the LPD–17s, but the administration asks for 

money to close out the line, there is a disconnect here somewhere; 

that if the Marines feel like they need the ships, we probably ought 

to be doing something about that rather than closing the line. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. In the 30-year shipbuilding 

plan, the Commandant specified a requirement for 33 amphibious 

ships in the assault echelon: 11 aviation capable, 11 LPD–17s, and 

11 LSDs, 41 or 49 class. The CNO, Admiral Roughead, concurs 

with General Conway’s determination, so we agree with the Marines’ requirement. 

That said, given the amount of money we had in the 2009 program and the demands across the entire Navy, both in shipbuilding 

and other programs, we could not fit one in the 2009 budget. We 

have done some work to try to extend the estimated service lives 

of some LHA–1 and LPD–4 class ships to alleviate some of this 

concern. I grant you that those ships will not, coupled with the 

ones we have, meet the entire amphibious lift requirement in the 

assault echelon at 2.0–MEBs. But given the amount of money and 

the priorities of the Navy, that is the best we could do in fiscal year 

2009. We will revisit this in the POM 10 program, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. If we all were to agree that we should provide the 

advanced funding for additional LPD–17s, either in 2009 or 2010, 

our research has indicated that it would probably take about $260 

million to do that. Is that an accurate figure? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Congressman, I believe that is close; yes, 

sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Okay. I think we need to think about this a lot and 

try to make things happen right. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you very much Mr. Young. Mr. Vice Chairman Dicks. 

MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT

Mr. DICKS. Thank you very much. I wanted to ask a question. 

Where are we? How are we doing on the—I understand we have 

problems with the P–3s and that—does that mean—are we going 

to try to accelerate the Poseidon program? PA—what is it, PA–8? 

Mr. THACKRAH. P–8A, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. P–8A, better known as MMA? 

Mr. THACKRAH. Yes, sir, that’s correct. Mr. Dicks, thank you for 

that question. The P–3 aircraft is an aging aircraft. We have 

been—— 

Mr. DICKS. Built by Lockheed Martin, isn’t that correct? 

Mr. THACKRAH. That’s correct, sir. We have put 39 of those aircraft down, sir, as a result of some analysis that has been done on 

the fatigue life characteristics of the wings on that airplane. This 

does not indicate at all that there is a current safety flight issue. 

It is an analysis that has been done, based on fatigue testing, to 

say that we need to be paying particular attention and preparing 

to replace certain sections of the wings of those aircraft to assure 

that they are safe to fly. 

The pullout of those aircraft out of the fleet has prompted us to 

look at various ways to maintain its capability within the fleet operations, and multiple ideas are being considered. One of those, obVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:40 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00299 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
300 

viously, is the procurement of replacement wing components and 

the rebuild of those wings on the P–3. The other of course is, as 

you mentioned, the acceleration of at least one of the A capabilities 

provided by the P–8A MMA aircraft. We are in the process of doing 

that analysis as we speak, and will be evaluating that as part of 

our FY 2010 budget development process. 

Mr. DICKS. Admiral Roughead included $100 million as a top priority on his unfunded priority list to accelerate the P–8A production. How would that funding be used if it were provided? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. There are a couple of sets of funding. There is $100 million that you referred to in RDT&E. 

There is $364 million in fiscal year 2008 to work on the wing box 

problem in zone 5 that Mr. Thackrah addressed, as well as a need 

of about $312 million in fiscal year 2009. 

Mr. DICKS. This is all in the existing plan? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. The 300 numbers I gave you on the exist- ing P–3s. The $100 million in RDT&E that the CNO referred to is 

to accelerate the initial operational capability of the P–8A Poseidon 

from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2012, approximately 15 months. 

Mr. DICKS. And for my colleagues, this is a 737 being done at 

Renton, Washington? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. It is a militarized variant of the 

737 baseline aircraft, but there are a lot of differences in the two 

aircraft. 

Mr. DICKS. How is the program doing? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. The program is doing very well, sir. We 

have the ability to accelerate it given the extra funds. That would 

allow us to deploy three squadrons at IOC in fiscal year 2012 if we 

receive them. 

Mr. DICKS. And they are using an inline production method; isn’t 

that the way they characterize it? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. That is correct. 

Mr. DICKS. Why don’t you explain that, because it is relevant 

also to the tanker decision; because Boeing wanted to do an inline 

approach on the 767, was downgraded for it. Explain the inline 

method that is used on the 737. 

Mr. THACKRAH. Mr. Dicks, thank you for that question. Boeing 

at the Renton plant in Renton, Washington as you mentioned, 

transitioned, once their sales requirements demanded it, to have a 

moving line for producing the 737 aircraft, not unsimilar to the 

way most auto manufacturers make cars. Most of Boeing’s larger 

commercial aircraft are made in batch-line setups, for example, up 

at their Everett, Washington facility. But in Renton they went to 

a moving line that allowed them to process 30 aircraft a month 

through that assembly line. 

Mr. DICKS. Per month? 

Mr. THACKRAH. Per month. 

Mr. DICKS. And they can militarize that airplane, as I understand it, but they have to always—they have got all kinds of regulations, like ITAR, that means you have got to worry about foreign 

nationals and making sure they are not working at the same place 

that a—and we waive all this for people—I mean for other countries. We waive this regulation. They don’t have to meet this regulation, but we have to meet it; isn’t that right? 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
301 

Mr. THACKRAH. For the assembly of this aircraft, sir, certainly 

Boeing will have to comply with the ITAR requirements. Yes, sir, 

that’s correct. 

Mr. DICKS. But how do you feel about this program—I mean, the 

MMA replacement? Do you think it is moving well now? I understand there was some hiccup a couple years ago when they first 

started this, but they have got this thing turned around. That is 

what a development program usually is about. 

Mr. THACKRAH. Sir, this program is on track, meeting schedule, 

and within the budget allocated. 

Mr. DICKS. Is Boeing doing a good job as the integrator? 

Mr. THACKRAH. Yes, sir. 

TANKER AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS

Mr. DICKS. Here is one issue and, General, I am going to leave 

this up to you to help me on this a little bit. We are under—we 

have been told, and people should realize that the Navy and the 

Marine Corps use these tankers just like the Air Force does; isn’t 

that correct? 

General AMOS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. And one of the things we are told—and I would like 

you to find out if this is accurate—that the 767 competitor would 

have refueled the Osprey, the V–22, but that the Northrop Grumman larger airplane, because of speed concerns, can’t refuel the Osprey. This would be a big thing to the Marine Corps, wouldn’t it? 

General AMOS. Sir, we would want a tank off this airplane and 

the Osprey. Now, I don’t know that any Ospreys have gone up and 

tanked behind a KC–135. 

Mr. DICKS. Well, you can’t do that. But the 767 we are told 

would be able to do it? 

General AMOS. And I can’t speak to that, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. I thought it would be something you would want to 

think about and evaluate. 

General AMOS. Sir, I will. I will take that back and—seriously, 

because I will tell you what, we have got airplanes now, we have 

sold a V–22 on its worldwide deployability. And we do that with 

its great range as a result of in-flight refueling. 

Mr. DICKS. But the fact that if our new tanker, because of its size 

and speed, couldn’t refuel you, that would be a serious detriment, 

wouldn’t it? 

General AMOS. Sir, it would be something we would be very interested in. 

Mr. DICKS. I think you need to check into this, General, and I 

will be eager to hear your answer. 

General AMOS. Sir, I will. We will get back to you on that. 

[The information follows:] 

The Marine Corps supports the need for a new strategic tanker to support our 

tactical jet fleet and we look forward to the possible operational flexibility the KC– 

X will provide if it can refuel the MV–22. If the KC–X cannot refuel the MV–22, 

the effect on the Marine Corps will be minimal as we are capable of globally selfdeploying the V–22 using our own KC–130 aerial refueler aircraft. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA [presiding]. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
302 

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Amos, just following up on the MRAP, there seems to be, 

obviously, a focus on what their use might be in future wars. And 

I am not asking you to do an advertisement for MRAP, but from 

what I hear from soldiers and marines, they are damn lucky; they 

feel that those MRAPs have saved lives. 

I wasn’t here for the Army’s testimony yesterday, but I do understand that of the IED attacks on MRAPs I think we have lost, I 

think, one soldier. But you would agree, despite what we hear 

about issues of weight and flexibility, that on the battlefield our 

marines and soldiers like them? 

General AMOS. Sir, they do. They love them. And I can personally testify. I stood in front of two staff sergeants, Marine staff sergeants and a Navy corpsman, and you may have seen that picture 

of the Humvee—or, excuse me, the MRAP that had the motor 

blown out, the whole front end blown off. And I stood in front of 

them, in front of that vehicle, and all three of them walked away 

and they are here today. And so they love it. We love the vehicle. 

It just has restrictions. In other words, there are places we just 

can’t take it. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. They are damn heavy. I forget how much 

they weigh. 

General AMOS. Sir, they are very heavy. And they are really not 

an off-road vehicle. So if you start thinking about mobility off highways and you are out over terrain, then what kind of vehicles do 

we—we are buying vehicles like tanks, we are buying vehicles 

like—we have our Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs), we are going to 

buy the Marine personnel carrier that off road will be able to stay 

up with mechanized vehicles of forces advancing rapidly, and this 

can’t. But there is a place for it in our inventory, there absolutely 

is. 

And because it is so new—remember, we just really started getting large numbers of them in there this past fall. We are still 

learning where it can go and where it can’t go. And that is the reason why we lowered the numbers 3,700 to 2,225, was once we got 

enough in there and we began to actually use them for operations, 

we began to realize that there are spots that you just can’t take 

it. But we love the vehicle and the Marines love it. 

LPD–17 PROGRAM

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Okay. Thank you for your response. 

Admiral McCullough, last year I quizzed your predecessor, and 

this is sort of apropos of Congressman Young’s questions about the 

LPD–17, the condition of the San Antonio. That was the lead ship. 

And it was a little bit unclear, but that ship suffered some pretty 

massive cost overruns. It had some problems with its sea trial. 

Where is the San Antonio today? And as we are rolling out other 

ships and moving ahead with various buys, how would you characterize it? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. She is working with the Fleet right now 

and they are doing amphibious operational testing with that ship 

pretty much today as we speak. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
303 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So the ship is complete or incomplete? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. It is complete, sir. LPD–18, as you know, 

was delivered with some outstanding work. That is in the process 

of being corrected. LPD–19 was delivered complete. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So whatever the problems were, those problems have been addressed? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. We have worked those issues 

with the contractors, and the ships are being delivered ready for 

us to use. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, I think I know the answer. General 

Amos, you are looking for a buy of 10, right? And what do they give 

you? You know, they obviously give you a huge ability to deliver, 

but maybe you could expand on it. 

General AMOS. When you say—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The LPD–17s, why do you need, for instance, 10? 

General AMOS. Sir, first of all, we are looking for the 10th one. 

We are actually looking for the 11th one as well, as I stated earlier. 

This ship will have the ability to—and I don’t have the numbers 

in front of me, I can get them to you—increase the capacity, the 

capacity to put vehicles and have things like operating rooms, 

berthing for Marines, spots to put airplanes on the back end of it, 

spots to put LCACs in the well deck of the thing, has significant 

greater capability than the current legacy ships that we have 

today. 

It also has a stability capability where it can actually stabilize 

itself weight-wise. It is a ballast and it is a readjustment of fuel, 

and it has a capacity that some of the older ships, quite frankly, 

don’t have. So what you end up with is a new LPD–17 variant, a 

ship that, quite honestly, you can put an awful lot on. 

What we are finding, because everything is getting heavier, if we 

go back to some of our legacy ships, some of those actually end up 

with stability and center-of-gravity issues, so that you get to a 

point where you can’t put anything more on it. There may be room 

to put something on it, but you can’t put it on it because of stability. 

So with a newer ship you don’t have to worry about that. So you 

end up with a greater capability, a greater square cubed capability 

on the ships, and we get on with the construction of the program 

of record. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And that is obviously endorsed by the Navy 

as well; I mean the same reasons, the same abilities? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir; I agree with exactly what General Amos said. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Moran. 

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to ask you because of your position in acquisition and development, a question 

about JIEDDO. On too many occasions I have heard from defense 

contractors in my district that JIEDDO has a single-minded focus 

on supporting, really exclusively, new programs and technologies 

developed for the Army. And many of these companies have prodVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:40 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00303 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
304 

ucts with tailor-made applications to thwart IED attacks, but they 

are not given serious consideration by JIEDDO because they support primarily the Marine Corps. 

So I would like to ask you, do you see any kind of bias in the 

Marine Corps funding for the Army as opposed to project approaches that might help the Marine Corps? Because the Marine 

Corps is getting very little of this JIEDDO money, and that was 

not the intention. The intention was to spread it out over all of the 

services. 

General AMOS. Sir, let me open up on that because I worked with 

JIEDDO over the last year and a half, and then perhaps the Secretary can pile on. My sense was, to begin with, what you have described was, that was my sense coming into the job 20 months ago, 

was—— 

Mr. MORAN. You had heard the same thing? 

General AMOS. I did. I heard it. I can’t sit in front of this Subcommittee and say I saw this, this and this, but it was challenging. 

I will tell you that I saw the changes take place 10 months ago. 

General Miggs and I, before he left, had a very good relationship. 

I have known him for a long time. We sat down and said, Let’s 

make sure—and I basically confronted JIEDDO with just exactly 

what you said. I said, Look, there are two of us on the ground in 

this. You may have more forces on the ground, but we have got a 

lot of Marines on the ground as well, so we need to share the 

wealth here. And I will be honest with you; I came away with, over 

the next probably ensuing 10 months, believing that we are getting 

our fair share of this thing. He was very forthright. 

We put a Marine, by the way, a colonel, as his chief of staff. That 

began to help explain how Marines do business a little bit differently than the Army on the ground. I am pretty comfortable 

with where we are right now, Congressman Moran, with JIEDDO. 

I shared your frustrations about 18 months ago when I first got 

here, but I am not that way now. 

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Mr. MORAN. I have one other question. And I tend to sound like 

a Johnny one-note on acquisition workforce, but the Chairman has 

asked me to pursue this. 

Mr. Thackrah, you mentioned your acquisition workforce investment, but you were very unspecific. How much have you put into 

improving your acquisition workforce? How many new employees? 

What are you specifically doing? Because you know; this has been 

a whack-a-mole kind of thing. We keep asking, you know, What are 

you doing here? And we get assurance. And then it turns out that 

people are drawn from another area. 

The workforce acquisition, the acquisition workforce really 

doesn’t seem to get the kind of investment that it desperately 

needs, especially in the Army and Navy. So if you would address 

that specifically. How many people additionally are you bringing on 

and how much money are you putting into that? 

Mr. THACKRAH. Congressman Moran, thank you for that question. There are several specific things that we are doing to address 

acquisition workforce. First of all, the budget, the fiscal year 2009 

budget that is in front of you, has an additional $30 million in it 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
305 

specifically for the hiring of systems engineers. This was directed 

and mandated as we suggested it to Secretary Winter. He concurred. And the additional funds are in our budget request. 

Secondly, also in the fiscal year 2009 budget, is funding for an 

additional 100 acquisition interns annually. Typically, heretofore 

our acquisition intern program has hired 300 young college graduates per year. This budget that is in front of you is asking for 400 

per year, so we are raising that level. 

Beyond that, sir, we have a significant ongoing study looking at 

our working capital-funded resources across our warfare centers to 

evaluate what skillsets we are developing and maintaining and targeting them towards three specific areas, which are contracting 

professionals, program management and systems engineering. 

What we are saying by highlighting those three specific areas—because they are the three key areas that we have, we believe, that 

will assure us acquisition success—is that that may be at the expense of some other skillsets that are of a lower priority in those 

working capital-funded activities. These initiatives are some of the 

things that we have that are very specific and ongoing, sir. 

Mr. MORAN. I am glad to hear that. I am not overwhelmingly impressed that you are getting 100 more interns, but that is a step 

in the right direction. I do hear—and this is the Navy—that some 

of the experienced acquisition people are not particularly well respected and they would rather bring in new people. But there are 

some folks with a whole lot of experience that just don’t seem to 

be particularly appreciated in the Navy acquisition pipeline. 

But I mean that is—I don’t have any numbers to show that that 

is widespread. They are just anecdotal examples. But, again, I 

would hope that this is going to be a priority for obvious reasons. 

Mr. THACKRAH. Sir, thank you for that comment. And I would 

say that not only within the acquisition community which I lead, 

but Admiral Roughead, upon his recent arrival, has put a significant priority on the civilian workforce within his organization. And 

he too is looking at not only civilian but Navy Captains, some of 

the acquisition professionals that have achieved the rank of Captain and then either they hastily retire or are hastily retired. 

He is asking his staff to look at completely reviewing that and 

finding out ways that we can incentivize Navy Captains to stay 

longer that are acquisition professionals so that we can take advantage of that talent that we have grown over the years that they 

have been in those jobs. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, good for you. That is just the kind of thing I 

hear. Once somebody turns 50, they got no use for you, they want 

to bring in somebody new. And it is the people with experience in 

acquisition that we need to keep. But I am glad you are on to that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kaptur. 

CAPABILITIES OF FOREIGN NAVIES

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen. 

Let me begin with Admiral McCullough. With a 313-ship Navy 

prospectively, what would be the country that would then follow 

ours and then the country after that that would have the next largest Navy? And on what rating scale would you rate those nations 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
306 

today? In other words if the United States has 313, then who is 

next? Where does Russia fit, where does China fit, and the way you 

look at the future? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. I had some folks pull up data for me. The 

next highest Navy with respect to ships are the Chinese, 164 ships. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Today? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Today, yes, ma’am. 

Ms. KAPTUR. And how do the quality of those ships compare to 

ours? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. As you know, China has embarked on a 

military buildup. Some of their ships that have been delivered are 

very capable ships, and some of their ships in inventory, as you 

might imagine, were built on a former Soviet design and are not 

quite as capable. But the material they are delivering today is 

quite capable. 

I would say the operational effectiveness of their force and the 

capability of their developing noncommissioned officer corps and 

their higher-level officers is increasing at a rate greater than we 

thought it would. So they are becoming capable. If you look at their 

proficiencies as compared to ours, I would say it is not on the same 

par. 

Ms. KAPTUR. If you look at the numbers of persons in their Navy 

versus ours, do you know? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. I will have to get that for you ma’am. I 

don’t know. 

[The information follows:] 

The United States Navy’s FY 2008 authorized end strength is 329,098. Conversely, our intelligence estimate of the number of people in China’ People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is approximately 255,000, while the Military Maritime 

Fleet of Russia numbers approximately 150,000. 

Ms. KAPTUR. And who is after them? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. The next would be the Russian Navy. It 

has got 108 ships currently. And as you just saw, the Kuznetsov 

Battle Group had a deployment to the Mediterranean out of the 

North Sea Fleet. She was met in the Mediterranean by a Slava 

cruiser that had come from the Black Sea Fleet. And that ship 

transited with the Kuznetsov Battle Group out into the Atlantic 

Ocean and went to a port visit. And I think it was Lisbon, I am 

not sure. 

The Kuznetsov group then transited back to the north and returned home. And her out-of-area deployment was approximately 

62 days. The cruiser went back to her home in the Black Sea Fleet; 

and I want to say she was out of home port about 25 days, but I 

would have to get the exact number. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you. I appreciate this information. I am sure 

every Member knows this already, but I would be very grateful for 

just a little chart that your Department might be able to produce 

for me that shows me the relative strengths of our respective navies, not just in numbers, but in terms of capabilities. Is there a 

way to do that that is understandable to a layperson? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes ma’am, I am sure there is. We will 

do that. 

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. I would appreciate that very very much. 

[The information follows:] 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
307 

Ship categories Russian Navy United States Navy 

Surface Combatants (carriers to frigates) .................................................................. 34 117 

Amphibious Ships ........................................................................................................ 21 31 

Strategic Submarines (Ballistic missiles) ................................................................... 15 14 

Attack Submarines (Nuclear and diesel powered) ...................................................... 48 56 

Logistic Ships (Larger tankers) ................................................................................... 14 31 

C2/Support (Intelligence and larger rescue vessels) .................................................. 32 1 17 

Minehunters ................................................................................................................. 0 14 

Total .................................................................................................................... 164 2 280 

1 U.S. Navy C2/Support number only includes T–ARS, AS, T–AGOS, T–ATF and LCC ships. 

2 Total U.S. Navy ship count reflected as of 31 March 2008. 

The Russian Navy Order of Battle (OOB) presented here is distributed across four 

geographically widely separated fleets—Northern, Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and Pacific. The Caspian Flotilla units located in the completely landlocked Caspian Sea 

are not included. The presented OOB must be understood in the context of the Russian Navy’s primary mission: to defend Russia while operating in adjacent seas out 

to about 1,200 nautical miles from the Russian coast. Because of significant differences in geography, history, training, and mission, the size and capability of the 

Russian Navy cannot be directly compared with that of the U.S. Navy. 

The ship categories included in this listing generally mirror those used by the 

U.S. Navy in its description of the desired 313-ship navy. United States Navy ships 

listed are on active duty. These totals do not include USN ships in reserve or mothball status. SSGNs are listed under Attack Submarines category. 

Only the larger and more open sea worthy logistics and other support vessels, 

comparable in function to those included in the U.S. Navy 313-ship listing, are included. The Russian Navy has many more auxiliary vessels of various functions. 

Virtually all Russian Navy deployments beyond home waters in the last two years 

have been conducted to project presence, making port calls, and engaging in bilateral and multilateral naval exercise and operational activity. 

Due to the highly disparate geographic circumstances and differences in mission 

scope between the Russian Navy and the U.S. Navy, in contrast to the Cold War 

days of the Soviet Union, meaningful direct comparisons are extremely difficult to 

make. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Then I would like to ask you, Admiral, in terms of 

strategic technologies as you look at the Chinese, the Russians, and 

anybody else that is out there, what worries you the most as we 

look at intellectual property, as we look at advancements in everything from missile launchers to vessel construction? Where do you 

see our greatest weaknesses? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Trying to keep this in an unclassified environment, the Chinese have built a quite capable access denial 

force, both with ballistic missiles and their submarine capability. 

That concerns us. We work hard to try to counter that. 

But when I look at high-end technology right now, I would say 

we look to the Western Pacific and what the Chinese are doing. 

Ms. KAPTUR. In terms of the Russians, and maybe this is—in 

terms of the Russians, we seem to be moving apart rather than— 

our foreign policy is taking us in a direction that I don’t really care 

for in terms of the Russians. But do you see any opportunities for 

cooperation on any level with the Russians at this point to begin 

to stem some of the rising animosity? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. That is pretty much out of my lane 

ma’am. 

I will take that for the record and get back to you. 

[The information follows:] 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
308 

The United States Navy and Russian Federation Navy (RFN) have a robust agenda of activities that provides valuable interaction between senior officials, staff-officers, and operational units. These efforts are designed to build trust, transparency 

and cooperation between our two navies. Some examples include: 

Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR (OAE)—NATO’s ongoing Maritime Security and 

Counterterrorism operation in the Mediterranean. U.S. Navy and RFN units are active participants. 

Exercise FRUKUS—An annual multi-lateral naval exercise between France, Russia, UK, and US focused on improving interoperability at sea. In 2007, the U.S. 

hosted in and around Norfolk, VA. In August 2008, Russia will host in and around 

Vladivostok. 

Exercise NORTHERN/PACIFIC EAGLE—An annual bilateral exercise focused on 

cooperation on Maritime Interdictions Operations (MIO), Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Search and Rescue (SAR), and tactical interoperability. The exercise rotates annually between the North Atlantic (NORTHERN EAGLE) and North Pacific 

(PACIFIC EAGLE). This year, Exercise NORTHERN EAGLE will take place in July 

2008 off the coast of Norway and conclude with a U.S. ship visit to Severomorsk 

in conjunction with Russian Navy Day. 

Port Visits—The U.S. Navy and RFN routinely conduct reciprocal port visits in 

Russia and the United States, respectively. The 2008 U.S. Navy RFN ship visit plan 

includes U.S. Navy ship visits to Russian ports in the Black Sea, Berents Sea, and 

North Pacific; as well as Russian ship visits to a U.S. Pacific port. 

Naval War College Exercises—The U.S. Naval War College (NWC) and Kuznetsov 

Naval Academy (KNA) conduct an annual bilateral war game and command post 

exercise focused on cooperative planning in support of multinational Humanitarian 

Assistance / Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations. Last year’s exercise was hosted by 

Russia in St. Petersburg, and the 2008 event will be in Newport, RI. 

INCSEA/Staff Talks—U.S. Navy and RFN staff officers meet annually to review 

the status of the 1972 Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Agreement, plan inputs into the 

annual bilateral military workplan, and openly discuss issues of mutual interest or 

concern. Russia hosted the talks in 2007 in Kaliningrad, and the U.S. will host in 

2008 in Naples, Italy. 

NCIS-FSB Cooperation—The Naval Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS) has an 

active Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with its Russian counterpart agency 

(FSB) to enable information sharing and cooperation on providing Anti-Terrorism/ 

Force Protection (AT/FP) to U.S. and Russian assets during ship visits. Senior leaders from each agency also regularly participate in joint leadership conferences. 

Submarine Rescue and Escape MOU—U.S. Navy and RFN subject matter experts 

are working on an MOU that institutionalizes cooperation on submarine rescue and 

escape procedures and practices. Experts from both navies also meet regularly in 

the NATO Submarine Escape and Rescue Working Group (SMWERG). 

Black Sea Partnership Cruise (BSPC)—An annual multi-lateral partnership cruise 

hosted by the staff of Commander, Naval Forces Europe aboard a U.S. Navy ship 

in the Black Sea. Last year, the U.S. invited all the Black Sea (+Azerbaijan) littoral 

nations to embark Junior Officers and Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) on the 

USS Mount Whitney for a week of academic seminars focused on general maritime 

safety and security, oil spill mitigation, helicopter interoperability, NCO development, and maritime operations. Although Russia was invited and did not participate 

last year, we are actively encouraging their participation in this year’s partnership 

cruise. 

ELECTRICAL POWER FOR NAVY FACILITIES

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. And I have a final question. In terms of 

the Navy, can you get me numbers on how much power the Navy 

purchased in the form—for its facilities, for electricity, whatever 

powers your systems, and fuel for 2007 and 2008, and what is your 

projection for 2009? How much are you spending and what plans 

are in place to transition to more—for less reliance on petroleum? 

How are you looking at that issue over the next 20 years? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. That is for the facilities, ma’am? 

Ms. KAPTUR. For anything you buy related to power production 

or consumption. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes ma’am, but for facilities? 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
309 

Ms. KAPTUR. Facilities as well. How independently powered are 

your facilities? How are your vehicles or ships powered? How are 

you looking at the power trains that are used in them? And with 

fuel efficiency and new power systems as a priority, how does your 

Department look at that? Is this something that somebody is in 

charge of? Is everybody power-conscious over there? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, ma’am, we are very power-conscious, 

because it drives cost. Now, the bases—I will get you the answer 

for the bases. But for our ships and aircraft we always look at the 

best way to power these devices. Now, jet airplanes, we haven’t figured out a better way to power them other than fossil fuel. But we 

do look at the efficiency of the engines that we put in our airplanes. 

For ships, we explore alternate propulsion forms every time we 

work on a new class of ships. And the Naval Sea Systems Command has done a detailed study on that, everything from direct energy conversion from nuclear reactors direct, to drive, to fuel cells, 

to photovoltaic and nuclear propulsion. So every time we build a 

ship, we look really hard at what the power density or the energy 

density requirements are for that particular ship class and what 

the current state of technology is and what we can incorporate in 

those ships. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I know my time is up and I thank you, Admiral. 

I would be real interested for your research, how many dollars of 

your research budget are devoted toward energy independence 

projects? 

[The information follows:] 

The following table itemizes U.S. Navy purchased power and fuel: 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
FY 2007 (actual) FY 2008 (est)—Note 1 FY 2009 (est)—No

Total units Total cost ($M) Total units Total cost ($M) Total units Tot

Shore: 

Electricity (MWH) ........................................................................................................................................ 7,494,877 658.13 7,427,415 688.56 7,380,856 

Natural Gas (MBTU) ................................................................................................................................... 8,365,420 75.63 10,305,939 72.00 10,842,661 

Fuel (MB) .................................................................................................................................................... 2.07 184.93 2.08 227.82 1.96 

Transportation Fuel (MB) Note 2 ............................................................................................................... 0.34 30.81 0.24 28.90 0.24 

Afloat: 

Fuel (MB) .................................................................................................................................................... 26.86 2,524.00 21.02 1,928.00 20.79 

Key: MWH = Mega Watt Hour MBTU = Million British Thermal Units MB = Million Barrels Note 1: Total Cost based off budgeted rate established in 2006. Note 2: Transportation fuel includes 498,868 gallons of Alternative Fuel in FY 2007, an estimated 548,755 gallons in FY 2008, and an estimated 603,630 gallons in FY 2009. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
311 

The Department of the Navy Energy Board, under the Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of the Navy Installations and Facilities, provides overall program guidance for facility energy conservation and renewable energy resources. Commander Navy Installations Command and Commander Naval Facilities Command execute the Navy’s 

shore facilities energy strategy. 

The Navy is extremely power conscious, and aggressively purses the conservation 

requirements of Energy Policy Act 2005 (EPAct05), Energy Independence and Security Act 2007 (EISA07), and Executive Order 13423. In FY 2006 and FY 2007, Navy 

reduced energy consumption by 12 percent from FY 2003 baseline required by 

EPAct05 and EISA07. 

The Navy constantly reviews facilities to reduce power consumption requirements 

and reliance on fossil fuels as a fuel source. Currently the Navy is: • Investing heavily in Energy Savings Performance Contracts and private sector 

Energy Service Companies that clearly demonstrate consumption savings. • Incorporating Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) green 

building, sustainable design, and energy efficiency principles into new construction 

and major renovation. • Evaluating use of commercial power and energy conservation products. 

Highlights of the Navy’s Energy Program include: 

• Managing a world class 270 MW geothermal power plant at Naval Air Weapons 

Station China Lake and awarded a second geothermal plant at Fallon, NV, which 

is projected to come online in 2010. A 30 MW plant is projected to come online at 

El Centro by 2012. • Operating two of the largest Federal photovoltaic projects in the U.S. and two 

wind-farms at San Clemente Island and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, respectively, to 

provide electrical power. • Constructing a bio-diesel production facility to utilize cooking oil as fuel. • Aggressively investigating wave power and ocean thermal power. • Installation of over 6,000 ground source heat pumps. 

With few exceptions, however, Navy installations are not independently powered, 

but receive power from commercial available power grids. Critical facilities have 

back-up generators and the Navy has the ability to deploy mobile utility systems 

should the need arise. Expanded use of renewable energy sources reduce Navy’s reliance on commercially provided power. 

Fossil fuels continue to be used as the major fuel source for vehicles. The Navy 

continuously evaluates current fuel infrastructure and vehicle fleet size/composition 

with the goal of replacing petroleum vehicles with neighborhood electric vehicles, 

hybrids, and alternative fuel vehicles. The ESIAct07 requires federal agency fleets 

to reduce petroleum consumption and increase alternative fuel consumption so that 

by October 1, 2015, and for each ensuing year, each federal agency achieves at least 

a 20 percent reduction in annual petroleum consumption and a 10 percent increase 

in annual alternative fuel consumption. Navy is currently on track and fully intends 

to continue to comply with ESIAct07 through alternative fuel vehicles and petroleum conservation initiatives. Current Navy policy is that all new vehicles procured 

must be alternative fuel capable, if commercially available. 

The Navy is coordinating with, and leveraging the efforts of the Department of 

Energy and other Department of Defense components to develop alternative energy 

sources, provide assured energy distribution, and reduce energy demand and our dependence on foreign oil. The Navy’s energy security research investments focus on 

the Navy-Marine Corps unique aspects of energy efficiency and alternative energy 

with projects that range from basic science on advanced organic photovoltaic films 

for Marine Corps applications; to the evaluation of stern flaps for ships to reduce 

fuel consumption under the Ship Energy Conservation Program; and to prototype 

demonstrations of ocean energy harvesting concepts for shore-based facility power. 

The Navy’s energy security research projects in alternative energy sources focuses 

on achieving the effective use of alternative logistics—bio-based and synthetic—fuels 

in Naval power systems, and their effects on the combustion process and military 

equipment (engines, and fuel handling and distribution systems); developing renewable energy technology such as photovoltaics for Marine Corps applications and 

ocean energy harvesting concepts for facility power and remote in-situ sensors; and 

direct thermal-to-electric conversion for platform power. 

Research in energy efficiency and reduced fuel consumption includes projects to 

develop high-efficiency fuel cells to replace internal combustion engines for ship auxiliary power, unmanned vehicles, and portable power sources for the Marine Corps; 

studies on advanced fuel efficient aircraft engines; and evaluation of variable speed 

drive pumps and stern flaps for ships. 

In the FY 2009 President’s Budget request, the portion of the Navy’s research 

budget focused solely on ‘‘energy independence’’ is approximately $70 million. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
312 

The Office of Naval Research (ONR) energy security investment plan (see chart 

below) identifies the primary focus of science and technology funds—Alternative 

Fuels, Fuel Cells, Direct Thermal-to-Electric & Thermal Energy Harvesting, 

Photovoltaics, and Ocean and Mechanical Energy Harvesting. In addition, the ONR 

investments under the Navy’s Power and Energy Science and Technology focus area 

will improve the power conversion and energy efficiency of the next generation of 

electrical systems targeted for future naval platforms; and the investments in the 

Navy’s Platform Mobility Science and Technology focus area will improve the performance characteristics of ships, aircraft and vehicles to provide enhanced platform 

mobility while increasing energy efficiency. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
313 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1063 46476D.015
314 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes ma’am. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

REALISTIC COST ESTIMATES

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Secretary, the acquisition question Mr. Moran 

asked, every time that you put an RFP out, you know very well 

those ships are going to cost more than the company comes in. The 

company comes in, and you make change orders, and then in the 

end we have to pay the bill. 

Now, we have encouraged the Navy to be more realistic, have 

more design work before they go and put an RFP out. We hope that 

you will do this. This is partly maybe acquisition, but it is also the 

fault of the Navy because you want to build a ship, you want to 

do it as quickly as possible, you want to do it in a certain year— 

and I don’t know what other reason—but we can’t afford to continue paying the bill. We can’t plan when we have no ability to— 

we have got supplementals, money is going to be cut back. We have 

got a real problem here. 

You have got to be more realistic in these proposals. For instance, you take the LCS. You told us when you came before the 

committee it was going to cost $188 million apiece. They are substantially more, as you know. That does not include the modules. 

The modules apparently are fairly well on target, but the rest of 

them aren’t. 

So I hope that you will have more design work done before you 

go to an RFP, so that we can have a more realistic proposal and 

make a decision based on the actual cost of these ships. You will 

never get the 313, the requests that are being made by the administration. You are going to need our help, and we are trying to help 

you. 

But when we put—we are embarrassed sometimes when we put 

ships in and then something comes up like the LCS with these big 

cost overruns. I don’t say the first ship isn’t always going to have 

some exception. But if you have a better design and you are further 

along, I think you will have less of a problem. At least that is what 

I see. 

So I would hope that you would be more careful about that. And 

the contracting out, I don’t know how much you do in the acquisition part of it, and I have asked the Secretary of the Navy to give 

me a breakdown of contracting out, the categories of contracting 

out, so we get some handle on how much money is being spent; 

since we are reducing the size of the Navy by 28,000 how many 

contractors we hired in the meantime. So I am sure he will be talking to the acquisition part. 

We obviously need professionals in that program. And as far as 

this IED program, I have never been happy. They have too much 

bureaucracy. They don’t seem to get anything out in the field. They 

come and brief us and then—I have never seen the results I would 

like to see from whatever we call them. What do they call that? 

The bureaucracy over there is unbelievable. I mean, we got nothing but complaints about—no consideration from anybody that has 

got ideas. And they keep increasing the number of people and they 

don’t come up. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
315 

So your experience is different than what I have heard, the experience the Marine Corps has had, that they are taking care of people. I don’t see that happening. But at any rate, I appreciate the 

problem you folks have. We are trying to help you. We can’t help 

you if we don’t get reasonable estimates about these ships. And the 

reason I was so anxious to get back here is because I wanted to 

hear what you saw. And then we want to help you get to the 313 

ships that you are trying to build. 

Mr. Visclosky, do you have any questions? 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. No. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Young. 

ATTACK SUBMARINES

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Secretary, let us talk about the fast attack submarine for just a minute. The stated requirement by the Navy is 

48 of the SSNs. But as we look at the decommissioning rate and 

we look at the build rate, we are pretty much convinced that you 

are going to end up with about 40 rather than 48 fast attack submarines. What happens—in the absences of those 8 submarines 

what happens? What do we do to fill the gap? 

Mr. THACKRAH. Mr. Young, I am going to ask Admiral 

McCullough to help me with that one. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. First of all, when we added the 

second submarine starting in fiscal year 2011, the minimum number of submarines that we actually go to is 41. 

Now, to mitigate the difference between 41 submarines that you 

physically have and the 48 requirement, we have looked at several 

things. One is to reduce the build time of the submarines that we 

are building to 60 months. That buys us back a couple of submarines. 

Now, the second thing we have looked at is to extend the lives 

of—I believe it was 16 submarines. And that buys us back some of 

the gap. 

And the third one was how we were going to operationally deploy 

the submarines. And that was to increase some of the deployments 

to 7 months. With those mitigating factors, we think we can meet 

the forward presence requirements of our submarine force while we 

are in the seven submarine delta of 41 to 48, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Admiral, is this plan reflected in the budget request? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. The second submarine in fiscal 

year 2011 is in the budget request; yes, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. When do you think that—with this plan that you 

have just described, when do you think we close the gap? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. I think that the gap in forward presence 

in force structure is closed in about fiscal year 2033. The gap 

starts, if my notes are right, in about fiscal year 2022. 

Mr. YOUNG. Fiscal year 2033? I don’t know if you and I are going 

to be here, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MORAN. Oh, sure you will, sure you will. 

Mr. YOUNG. We have had a lot of emphasis today, because this 

is Navy and Marine Corps day. And Ms. Kaptur brought up some 

interesting points. 

And earlier this morning with the CNO and the Secretary, we 

discussed some other issues relative to that. But to close the gap 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
316 

in 2033, it looks to me like we are going to have what could be a 

serious gap should there be a threat, especially with the growing 

activity that you mentioned in response to Ms. Kaptur with the 

Russians. 

Mr. MURTHA. Especially, Mr. Chairman, especially if they push 

it out every year like they have been and they say, Oh, next year 

we are going to put more, next year we are going to put more. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, as the Chairman has said so many times, we 

would like to help. I don’t think we are comfortable with having a 

gap for that long with submarines. So if there is something that 

we need to do, to consider to help close this gap a lot quicker, you 

need to tell us; because I don’t feel comfortable with—if you need 

48, but you are only going to have 40, I don’t feel comfortable until 

you get your 48. 

Mr. DICKS. Just a couple years ago it was 56, as I remember. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Sir, there was a joint staff study done in 

1999 that said the requirement was 55. 

Mr. DICKS. Close. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir, that is very close. That was before we reallocated the attack submarine force to put 60 percent of 

it in the Pacific and home-ported three of the attack submarines 

in Guam. And that makes up the delta between the 48 and the 55. 

Now, when I talk about the delta being as low as 41 to 48, it is 

not a delta between 41 and 48 for that whole time period. The actual delta between 41 and 48 I believe is two years. And I believe 

that is in 2028 and 2029. So it is sort of a valley that comes back. 

And that is the extent of it. 

Mr. YOUNG. As the Chairman said, we want to help. So you let 

us know what we can do to help. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. You can’t keep doing these studies to prove what 

you want to prove in order to get down to the budget levels. I hope 

that is not what generated this study. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. No, sir. Not at all. We understand the 

gap between the physical number of submarines and the requirement. And that is why we took the mitigative actions that we are 

taking to relieve that gap. 

Mr. MURTHA. The mitigative action, huh? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. It was the best word I could 

come up with. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Kingston. 

SUBMARINE BASING

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, as you may know, BRAC recommended moving 

submarines from Groton to King’s Bay. And there is a big capacity 

for additional growth in Kings Bay. Are you looking at any plans 

to move anything to Kings Bay? 

Mr. THACKRAH. Sir, I am not aware of any other movement of activities to Kings Bay, but I will take that one for the record and 

come back to you. 

Mr. DICKS. We are moving a few things out of Kings Bay out 

west where the problems are. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Actually we have done plenty of that. The next 

question may be of interest to you, Mr. Dicks, anyhow. But we 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
317 

have the space, we have people who are ready and willing to take 

on additional missions and do some great things. If you could get 

back to me and we could, you know, look at that, that would be 

very good. 

Mr. THACKRAH. I would be more than happy to, sir. 

[The information follows:] 

The Navy regularly evaluates and assesses the global force posture and strategic 

laydown of our afloat forces and infrastructure. Before making recommendations for 

homeport shifts, the Navy allows adequate time to assure all considerations including national security requirements, total costs, programmatic implications, impact 

on sailors and their families as well as the current and future strategic environment 

have been fully evaluated. 

Currently, and for the immediate future, NSB Kings Bay, GA is primarily an 

SSBN and SSGN base. The strategic placement of SSBNs and SSGNs remains 

largely driven by the need for them to efficiently maintain presence in their respective deployment areas in accordance with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 

2006. Additionally, the SSBNs and the SSGNs are limited to one specialized location 

on each coast based on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I. 

AIRCRAFT TANKER PROGRAM

Mr. KINGSTON. And my next question, and the reason why it 

might be of interest to Mr. Dicks, this question was actually raised 

to me by the appropriator who does not like the recent decision of 

the Air Force on the tankers and said that Marine One helicopters 

have had lots of problems ever since they moved the contractor and 

said, Look at what happened to Marine One and now we are about 

to do the same thing with the tanker program. Are you familiar 

with that, Mr. Dicks? 

Mr. DICKS. Well, Mr. Tiahrt is the expert on that. We discussed 

this earlier and there is a lot of concern about this approach. And, 

one, I think one of the major concerns—and I always applaud the 

Navy for protecting their industrial base, is that for some reason 

the Air Force doesn’t—isn’t as concerned about industrial base as 

the Navy has been. As they have protected their carriers, their submarines, their nuclear power equipment for both. I mean this has 

been very well done. 

And so what I worry about is—and then also—the authorizers 

have created regulations now that make it more attractive if you 

are an offshore company to bid on a contract in the United States 

against a U.S. company because we have to follow the Berry 

amendment, the Italian rules, ITAR, and these things. And they 

are waiting in many cases for the Europeans. And we have created 

an unlevel playing field and we don’t even take into account a subsidy when the WTO is bringing—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Kingston’s time has run out. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Chair, I do have one other thing I wanted to 

ask Mr. Dicks. Is that memorandum of understanding on which 

countries are allowed under Buy American, is that an Air Force or 

is that a DOD? 

Mr. DICKS. DOD, they just did it. And it is a regulation. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, with that—— 

Mr. DICKS. It could be changed. 

Mr. KINGSTON [continuing]. My time has expired, so there is no 

reason for you guys to answer the question now that Mr. Dicks—— 

Mr. DICKS. I would be happy to yield back. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
318 

Mr. KINGSTON. That is okay. That is just a question I wanted to 

raise. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks has a question. 

CVN–21 AIRCRAFT CARRIER

Mr. DICKS. Yes. Well, actually, aircraft carriers do have something to do with tankers. Tell us about your aircraft carrier program. You are bumping up on the $10.5 billion ceiling. That is a 

lot of money, by the way. And you know, when you are doing a lot 

of new things on this carrier, and you know with—so give us an 

update on the new carrier. This is the first of a new line of carriers, 

isn’t that correct? 

Mr. THACKRAH. That is correct. This is the Gerald R. Ford class 

of aircraft carriers. We call it CVN–21. The design for the ship, sir, 

is well along. I can provide you like, as part of the record, if you 

would like, the percent complete on this design. And we will be 

working with the contractor throughout this summer finalizing the 

construction contract for that ship. 

As you stated, sir, there are some significant new technologies 

that are a part of this ship; that of the electromagnetic aircraft 

launch systems and advanced arresting gear systems that are all 

a part of that new ship, largely to make it more efficient, reduce 

manning and so forth. 

Mr. DICKS. Are you worried about this $10.5 billion ceiling that 

the authorizers put on you that—if you keep adding technology, 

can you do it and stay under that ceiling? 

Mr. THACKRAH. Sir, at this point we are not adding more technologies to that ship. The basic configuration of that ship is well 

defined. As I mentioned, it is well along in design and at this point 

we don’t predict that we will have any issues with that ceiling. 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, let me warn you though, Mr. Secretary, in 

the B–1—and I told this story and Members heard me say this. We 

made a deal with Caspar Weinberger, $20.5 billion for 100 aircraft, 

the B–1s. So what happened? It didn’t have what it needed in order 

to go to war. I mean, be very careful when you say—I am not saying you should increase the cost of it, that is for sure. But be very 

careful when you make an agreement that you can live with a certain level because there is all kinds of technology that comes along 

that changes the plans. 

V–22 DEFENSIVE WEAPON SYSTEM

Mr. DICKS. General—I just wondered if I could just do one more, 

Mr. Chairman. I have waited very—just on the V–22, the defensive 

system that we are now going to put on it, tell us about that. 

General AMOS. Sir, are you referring to the gun? 

Mr. DICKS. Yeah. I thought maybe it was an anti—— 

General AMOS. It comes already with an antimissile. It is what 

we call an ESM system. We have got similar systems on our helicopters flying around Iraq right now. We have them on the C–130s. 

It is a countermissile that pops out flares, it has sensors on it. 

Mr. DICKS. We already have that kind of system. 

General AMOS. Yeah. It has that, sir. What it doesn’t have and 

what we are looking at is kind of the next generation of capabilities 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
319 

for IR missiles and these kind of things. In other words, when 

somebody is looking at you with an IR source—and we want to look 

at this, and there are capabilities that are out there. But we are 

looking at them. 

Mr. MURTHA. I hate to interrupt. Mr. Visclosky. 

RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much. Sorry for my late arrival. 

And, gentlemen, I appreciate your attendance. I was not able to attend the shipbuilding hearing. And just for the record, I want to 

add my voice to the concerns that hopefully were expressed about 

change orders and trying to, if you would, bring some balance to 

the needs of the Navy and making sure that we construct these 

ships in an expeditious and economical fashion as possible, and 

could not make the hearing. I do want to express my very strong 

interest in the issue and hopefully the progress will be made. 

Secondly, there are questions for the record. But, again, as 

Chairman of the Energy and Water Subcommittee, we have jurisdiction, obviously, over NNSA and would want some very specific 

answers to the questions raised about the reliable replacement 

warhead. And I would point out that in my time here, Mr. Secretary, that in fiscal year 2009 for your budget request there is 

funding for the reliable replacement warhead program to commence phase III efforts in 2009, despite the fact that we eliminated 

all funding in the Department of Energy for this program in 2008. 

And the question I would have: Is it prudent for the Department 

of Defense to get out in front of the Department of Energy, since 

they don’t have one penny for this program in their budget this 

year? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. I am going to have to take most of that 

for the record. Right now I know we are doing upgrades on the current warhead system. And this is a redundant capability. Sir, what 

I would say is General Chilton from STRATCOM is—— 

[The information follows:] 

No effort on Reliable Replacement Warhead by the Navy is planned unless approved and funded by Congress and coordinated with the Department of Energy’s 

National Nuclear Security Administration. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Put the mike up a little bit. 

Mr. MURTHA. Could you tell us how it works? I am not sure 

that—as many times as I have heard Mr. Visclosky explain this, 

tell us the coordination, how you handle the coordination between 

the warheads, the Department of Energy and yourself. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Sir, that is not in my portfolio. And I 

would be remiss to be discussing that. That is really not under 

what I do. 

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you. Mr. Visclosky. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I appreciate that. And, again, this is the chance 

I have to show up. I want to make sure that my very strong interest in this is expressed. 

And essentially, Mr. Chairman, there is a proposal for a replacement warhead and the concern that we have expressed on Energy 

and Water is that until—and we have very specific language in the 

omnibus—you have an overarching policy for this Nation, not a 

particular administration or a particular Congress as to what the 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
320 

needs are. So that we know what the inventory should look like, 

so then we know what the size of the weapons complex should be. 

The problem is, because money for the complex and the warheads itself does not come out of DOD but DOE, they are the customer. There is a proposal for a warhead but there is not a commensurate urgency at DOE, Department of Energy, as far as what 

the rational size of that complex should be. 

Mr. DICKS. Which missiles would this go on? 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. It is—I think I want to say it is the 80—— 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Trident D5s. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Yes. But at this point, remember, it is not which 

missile. That is the problem. People are thinking about this individually. The issue is, what is your overall strategy, and not for the 

Bush administration or even any incoming administration, but our 

Nation’s policy so we know what the needs are. And then what are 

the warheads you need and then what is the complex? 

And my concern, Mr. Chairman, is in last year’s budget, there 

was emphasis on having maybe a reliable replacement warhead online by about 2012, 2014. But the rationalization of the size of the 

complex was 2013 and the only concession by DOE this year was 

to take out 2030. As you know and which was expressed here, 2030 

is forever. And when you start building a new warhead in place 

with the existing complex, and you create a new constituency with 

new challenges, you are never going to downsize the complex to 

whatever size it should be. And I do not know what it is, but that 

should be determined by the strategy before we go off spending 

more money on the warhead before we know what the ultimate 

strategy is. 

And I just want to again—this exact isn’t the exact forum. On 

the other hand, the Navy is the customer right now, and—— 

Mr. MURTHA. I think what he is saying is so important. I mean 

the Navy obviously has to tell DOE what it wants and why it 

wants it. Somebody has to address the threat. Who makes that decision? Who says to DOE, This is what we want? 

Mr. DICKS. I think I can help here. It is Admiral Donald, who 

is the four-star who replaced Admiral Rickover. You know, not directly. He is the new Rickover. He does this with these dualhatted—working for the Department of Energy and the United 

States Navy. So he is the guy that gets into all this nuclear stuff. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. This is an issue for DOD. This is an issue for the 

Intelligence Community. This is an issue for the State Department. 

This is an issue for DOE. And as a group of scientists expressed 

about a year and a half ago—we had Sam Nunn, former Secretary 

Perry testified before our Committee, as well as General Cartwright a year ago—is what is the overarching national policy? And 

then back up; what are the needs? 

And my concern here specifically is you have a budget request 

for DOD to proceed for the discrete design when you have no 

money in DOD to match up with it. And so we do have a series 

of questions, and I realize our time is limited. But I just wanted 

to make sure people understood I am very concerned about this 

issue. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. I understand and you know we 

are on a D5 life extension program to continue the viability of that 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
321 

weapon. Mr. Chairman, if I could, on behalf of Admiral Donald, he 

has nothing to do with weapons. It is nuclear reactors. 

Mr. DICKS. It is just reactors? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes. 

Mr. MURTHA. I thank the gentlemen. The Committee will adjourn until after the recess. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Obey and the answers thereto follow:] 

SHIPBOARD CONTROL SYSTEMS

Mr. Thackrah and Vice Admiral McCullough: 

What steps is the Navy taking in the development of the 313 ship Navy to increase commonality of equipment across the Fleet? 

Question. With the existing shipbuilding plan, how many unique surface ship machinery control systems is the Navy currently supporting? 

Answer. There are 13 unique machinery control systems in the Surface Fleet 

today. 

Question. What are the plans for converting proprietary legacy hydraulic control 

systems to more modem technology that uses standard equipment? 

Answer. Today there is no formal program to convert legacy hydraulic systems on 

in-service ships. The Navy monitors the supportability of shipboard hydraulic system components and will consider alterations to more modem technology when necessary. The Navy is designing new classes of ships, such as DDG 1000 and CVN 

78, with significant reductions in the use of hydraulic systems where feasible to reduce life-cycle maintenance costs. 

Question. How are these efforts prioritized and funded? 

Answer. The Department continues to strive to achieve commonality at ship, system, and material levels. The Department is analyzing and implementing where 

possible greater modularity, open architecture, commercial technology, and common 

equipment and specifications. 

Priority in these efforts is established by the systems engineering approach that 

permits tradeoffs of all available technologies, including more modern control systems, and provides a recommendation that is technically sound and economically attractive based in system acquisition and sustainment cost. Funding of these efforts 

for new construction ships is funded in the SCN line. Funding for in-service ships 

is established based on Fleet priorities to upgrade existing obsolete or unsupportable 

ship systems and leveraging existing technologies. Funding for in-service control 

systems is funded in OM,N and OPN. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Obey. Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow:] 

F–35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

Question. The F–35 Joint Strike Fighter tactical aircraft represents the future of 

tactical aircraft for the Department of the Navy, with 680 aircraft scheduled to be 

procured. Fiscal year 2008 represents the first year of Navy procurement for the F– 

35. The program has recently experienced some testing problems with the engine 

for the Marine Corps’ Short Take Off and Vertical Launch (STOVL) variant. The 

problem with the engine will slip the first flight of the Marine Corps’ variant and 

will likely slip the contract award for the fiscal year 2008 aircraft into fiscal year 

2009. The engine problem underscores the concerns with having a single engine 

supplier for an aircraft that will make up such a significant portion of the Nation’s 

tactical aircraft. 

Secretary Thackrah, the engine for the Marine Corps’ variant of the Joint Strike 

Fighter has recently experienced some testing issues causing an engine failure. This 

incident will delay the first flight of this variant of the aircraft. Has the root cause 

of the engine failure been determined? How long will first flight be delayed as a result of this failure? 

Answer. Yes, the engine failure is believed to be the result of high cycle fatigue 

failure of the third stage low pressure turbine blade. The failure is consistent with 

prior findings. Both Pratt and Whitney and PEO JSF understand the causes of the 

failures and are conducting tests to confirm the root cause, which will be completed 

in April 2008. The engine failure will delay BF–1 first flight by 30 days. PEO JSF 

is confident that BF–1 will achieve the CTOL flight clearance following the root 

cause testing that will be completed in April 2008. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
322 

Question. Secretary Thackrah, the Committee understands that in addition to delaying the flight test, the actual Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing portions of 

flight testing will be even further delayed. Do you plan on awarding the initial production contract for the Marine Corps’ variant of the aircraft before this capability 

has been demonstrated? 

Answer. The acquisition strategy for the procurement of Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) II STOVL aircraft has always been to contract for these aircraft after 

the BF–1 STOVL aircraft had flown in the conventional take off and landing 

(CTOL) mode. The test plan will gradually expand the BF–1 flight test envelope to 

include STOVL operations by late in the calendar year. 

Question. Secretary Thackrah, do you expect this problem to carry over to the 

other variants of the Joint Strike Fighter? 

Answer. No, development is on-track. Fifteen SDD aircraft are currently in production flow. Manufacturing quality is excellent, though production line activities 

for SDD jets have taken longer and cost more than planned, in part due to late supplier deliveries. Delays in SDD test article deliveries due to production line inefficiencies are not impacting the LRIP delivery schedule. DoD is closely monitoring 

program progress on technical issues and risk mitigation. No known technical issues 

preclude achievement of Service IOCs. 

Question. Secretary Thackrah, in light of this issue with the Joint Strike Fighter, 

has the Department of the Navy considered extending the production run of the F/ 

A–18E/F Super Hornet aircraft to alleviate the tactical aircraft shortfall that you 

are experiencing? 

Answer: A plan to address the Strike Fighter Shortfall is being vetted through 

the POM–10 budget process. Should additional aircraft be required, a Multi-Year 

Procurement (MYP) acquisition strategy will be considered by the Navy. Multi Year 

Procurement has offered substantial savings in the past. 

Question. Secretary Thackrah, in light of this engine failure, has the Department 

of the Navy considered complying with Congressional direction to fund the development of an alternate engine for this platform? 

Answer. This type of incident is not wholly unexpected in a developmental program. Additional consideration of the alternate propulsion system should not be 

based on this incident. All three 2007 Congressionally-directed engine studies are 

supportive of competition in general, but do not obviate the Department’s initial 

findings that the expected savings from competition do not outweigh the investment 

costs. All of the studies do identify non-financial benefits of a two-engine competitive 

program, such as better engine performance, improved contractor responsiveness, a 

more robust industrial base, increased engine reliability, and improved operational 

readiness. However, affordability is also a factor that the Department must consider. 

Question. Secretary Thackrah, in your opinion, does this failure not reinforce the 

need for having an alternate propulsion engine for this platform since it will make 

up such a large percentage of the Nation’s tactical aircraft fleet amongst the Navy, 

Marine Corps, and Air Force? 

Answer. This type of incident is not wholly unexpected in a developmental program. The engine failure is believed to be the result of high cycle fatigue failure of 

the third stage low pressure turbine blade. The failure is consistent with prior findings. Both Pratt and Whitney and PEO JSF understand the causes of the failures, 

and are conducting tests to confirm the root cause, which will be completed in April 

2008. The engine failure will delay BF–1 first flight by approximately 30 days. BF– 

1 first flight will be in conventional takeoff and landing mode. There will be a gradual expansion of the flight test envelope to include STOVL operations. Additional 

consideration of the alternate propulsion system should not be based on this incident. 

Question. Secretary Thackrah, the F–35 program was recently restructured by reducing some test aircraft and events to increase management reserve for the development program. This has resulted in an aggressive and compressed test schedule 

that even if executed perfectly will result in over 250 aircraft being under contract 

prior to conduction the final operational testing for the aircraft. Is this a prudent 

course of action? 

Answer. The Joint Strike Fighter Mid Course Risk Reduction plan reduces total 

development flight test aircraft from 15 to 13. The deleted aircraft are both mission 

systems aircraft (one CTOL variant and one CV variant). Deletion of these two test 

assets is consistent with a refined and optimized flight test plan that capitalizes on 

unprecedented investments in program ground and flying lab infrastructure for mission systems verification. The Department assessed the risks of this approach, and 

believes they are both acceptable and manageable, and mitigation options are available if needed. The Department’s F–35 acquisition strategy includes an appropriate 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
323 

amount of concurrency and the most effective balance of technical risk, financial resources and the Services’ operational needs. 

DDG–1000 COMBAT SYSTEM

Question. The combat system of the Virginia Class submarine has been extremely 

successful in that it is built on open architecture concepts that can be quickly upgraded to take advantage of technology advancement as the ship ages. The Navy 

calls this concept ‘‘Acoustic Rapid COTS (commercial-off-the-shelf) Insertion 

(ARCI)’’. The Navy claims the DDG–1000 program is being patterned after the Virginia program in its construction phase. It would be extremely forward-thinking to 

also model the combat system after the Virginia Class to ensure the combat system 

stays current throughout the life of the ship. 

Secretary Thackrah, the combat system of the Virginia Class submarine program 

has been successful largely due to the concept of Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion. 

Is the DDG–1000 combat system being designed along the same lines such that the 

combat system can be upgraded without major ship modifications? 

Answer. Yes, the DDG 1000 is an open architecture compliant combat system designed to decouple hardware and software developments so improvements can be 

economically incorporated as they develop without major ship modifications. The 

DDG 1000 also isolates the combat system sensors and weapon systems from the 

Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) so that introduction of future sensors/ 

weapon systems do not significantly impact the core combat system hardware or 

software. 

Question. Secretary Thackrah, one of the big advantages of the Virginia Class program is that the combat system can be upgraded fairly easily (relative to legacy submarine and surface ship programs). In fact, as submarines are delivered to the fleet, 

they come with the most current version of the combat system rather than the combat system that was available when construction began. Can the same be said for 

the DDG–1000 ships? How easy will it be to modernize and update the combat system of the DDG–1000 given that electronics become obsolete every two to four 

years? How frequently will modernization occur for this class ship? 

Answer. DDG 1000 has made substantial investments in Open Architecture which 

provides the ability to isolate the hardware from the software programs and install 

technology updates as needed. DDG 1000 plans to follow similar COTS refresh cycles (hardware upgrades approximately every 4 years) in order to introduce the latest COTS processors and middleware. The DDG 1000 program is working to identify 

the most cost effective timeframe for a COTS technology upgrade that will not impact the shipbuilders’ ability to complete construction and testing. Since the DDG 

1000 employs a Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) that is comprised of a 

homogenous set of COTS processors that meet Open Systems standards, this will 

enable efforts to modernize the combat system electronics. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
(325) 

THURSDAY, APRIL 24, 2008. 

BIOLOGICAL COUNTERMEASURES AND THREATS 

WITNESSES 

Panel I 

DARRELL GALLOWAY, DIRECTOR, JOINT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

OFFICE, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY 

MAJOR GENERAL STEPHEN REEVES, USA, JOINT PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE 

TONY TETHER, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH 

PROJECTS AGENCY 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. The committee will come to order. 

I want to welcome this panel and the committee. We have been 

working on this issue for a long time, trying to get some semblance 

of some coordination between HSS and DOD to make sure we knew 

what was going on, see if we could play a part in the funding part 

of it. 

I have had a concern for several years that we wouldn’t be able 

to produce the amount of vaccine we needed in case we had a pandemic. HHS is farther along than I realized, but I think the key 

if something did happen, for instance, I think you told me over 20 

million people died in World War I from the Spanish flu then. 

So we know there are programs of vaccination. We know there 

are programs that the Defense Department does with anthrax. We 

know there are programs that HSS does. But I think this is a 

unique idea, where we do research and the private drug companies 

participate; and I would be interested to hear, though, what your 

feeling is, how much we need to be involved from the Defense Department standpoint so the subcommittee can hear what the threat 

is. 

The thing that worries me the most is the fact that we started 

a synthetic fuel program in the Carter administration, and it 

turned out that we didn’t have a customer, and oil prices dropped 

from $30 to $10 a barrel. So, of course, the program fell flat. And 

here I don’t know that we will have that problem, but obviously 

somebody has to be a customer. DOD can be a small part of the 

customer. 

But I am interested to hear and the committee is interested to 

hear exactly what we need to be able to produce in case something 

like this happens. So we welcome you to the committee, and I ask 

Mr. Young if he has any comments. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
326 

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much; and I want to 

add my welcome to our distinguished panel of guests. 

We are here today to review the efforts of the Department to protect our soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen and airwomen from 

biological attacks. In this case, protection has multiple meanings, 

including detecting and identifying the biological threat, preventing 

it from doing harm by using the best protective equipment and vaccines, and treating those affected by it with proper therapeutics. So 

we are anxious to hear today what it is that we are doing, and we 

want to be supportive in any way that we can to make sure that 

these protections are available to our warriors. 

Thank you very much. 

ADDITIONAL REMARKS OF MR. MURTHA

Mr. MURTHA. One last thing I will mention is when I was in Kuwait about 10 days before the war started, they thought there was 

going to be a biological threat, but they were well-prepared for 

that. They had the protective gear they needed. They were not concerned. They felt the heat and the wind would dissipate the threat. 

So the troops were convinced that they would be able to work their 

way through it. 

Now, of course, it didn’t happen. But the point was we were prepared in case something did happen. So that is what I hope this 

hearing will be able to conclude. 

So if you will go forward with summarizing your testimony, then 

we will put your comments in the record. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL REEVES

General REEVES. Mr. Chairman and Congressman Young and 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Department of Defense, the Army 

as the Executive Agent, and as the Joint Program Executive Officer 

for Chemical and Biological Defense regarding the biological 

threats and biological medical countermeasures. 

The rapid pace of biological technology development and its proliferation through the information age and the globalization of technology and expertise has broadened the threat context. This makes 

uncertainty a defining characteristic of the present and future environment. 

The Department of Defense mitigates that threat from biological 

threats using what we call a ‘‘defense in depth’’ strategy. Essentially, this strategy provides multiple capabilities, a layered approach that reduces the risk if a biological threat compromises or 

circumvents any one capability. 

Layers in the defense include personal protection—both physical 

and medical protection—collective protection, biological agent detection, along with warning analysis and reporting, medical surveillance and consequence management, including decontamination 

and post-exposure medical treatments. 

Pre-exposure treatments, including vaccines, provide our first 

level of defense. These significantly conserve combat power, as opposed to post-exposure treatments. Pre-exposure treatments take 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
327 

the aces off the table, threats such as anthrax and smallpox, forcing potential adversaries to use comparatively less effective biological agents. 

However, we clearly can’t anticipate every threat. Additional mutual supporting layers of defense provide the capabilities to detect, 

warn, protect, analyze and deal with the consequences as needed. 

Even with that progress, challenges remain. Specialized testing 

facilities to evaluate our detection systems against biological agents 

and biopharmaceutical research development and manufacturing 

continues to be a lengthy, costly and risky process. Specifically, 

medical biologic countermeasures manufacturing poses a challenge 

due to the need for highly trained and skilled personnel in meeting 

rigorous FDA manufacturing standards. To address this challenge, 

we use multiple commercial contract manufacturing organizations 

that specialize in flexible manufacturing. This approach also reduces the risk of a single point of failure. These contracts are rated 

contracts under the defense priorities and allocation system, giving 

the Department of Defense manufacturing priority in the event of 

a national emergency. 

Additionally, we work with the Department of Health and 

Human Services to fund common pharmaceutical stockpiles for routine military use and for military and civil emergencies. 

The potential threat from the ongoing biological revolution also 

requires developing broad spectrum countermeasures, including 

new detection capabilities and medical systems. Addressing these 

concerns, the Chemical and Biological Defense Program initiated 

the Transformational Medical Technology Initiative to rapidly identify and develop medical countermeasures to these new threats; 

and Dr. Galloway will speak to that in some detail. 

Additionally, we are working with our partners in the Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Office and in the Department of 

Health and Human Services to investigate alternative biopharmaceutical manufacturing concepts that are flexible enough to produce 

a variety of medical products and are rapidly expandable to support surge production requirements while meeting FDA requirements and adhering to biosurety regulations. 

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Young and distinguished members 

of the committee, thank you for allowing me to testify today. Your 

continued support of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program 

is crucial for our military and for our Nation to succeed in defeating the biological threat. We sincerely appreciate your support in 

providing our Armed Forces the resources necessary to develop and 

field a balanced biological countermeasures capability. Together 

with your guidance and assistance, we will continue to support ongoing operations, improve our current capabilities and bring future 

technologies forward to protect our military and the Nation against 

the biological threat. 

Sir, that concludes my statement. 

[The statement of General Reeves follows:] 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
328 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1409 46476E.001
329 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1410 46476E.002
330 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1411 46476E.003
331 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1412 46476E.004
332 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1413 46476E.005
333 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1414 46476E.006
334 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1415 46476E.007
335 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1416 46476E.008
336 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1417 46476E.009
337 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1418 46476E.010
338 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1419 46476E.011
339 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1420 46476E.012
340 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1421 46476E.013
341 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1422 46476E.014
342 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1423 46476E.015
343 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1424 46476E.016
344 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1425 46476E.017
345 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1426 46476E.018
346 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1427 46476E.019
347 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1428 46476E.020
348 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1429 46476E.021
349 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1430 46476E.022
350 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1431 46476E.023
351 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1432 46476E.024
352 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1433 46476E.025
353 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1434 46476E.026
354 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1435 46476E.027
355 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1436 46476E.028
356 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF DR. TETHER

Mr. TETHER. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank 

you very much for having me here today to discuss medical countermeasures against biological attack. 

If we are attacked with a brand new pathogen, one we can’t have 

stockpiled against, it is unlikely we could use today’s technology to 

produce enough of the new drug fast enough. DARPA has been 

working on technology to break out of this strategic conundrum. 

We started several years ago by challenging the ‘‘one drug, one 

bug’’ paradigm, by moving towards ‘‘one drug, many bugs’’ or the 

broad-spectrum type of antibiotics that we have today that could be 

used against many bugs. We are extending this from drug design 

to production, trying to go from ‘‘one production line, one drug’’ to 

‘‘one production line, many drugs’’. 

An industrial base for this capability would blunt the effect of 

any BW attack, thereby making it less valuable to the attacker and 

less likely in the first place. 

We are exploring two approaches to accelerating drug manufacturing. 

One is a facility that manufactures drugs but can manufacture 

many different types and can be reconfigured quickly and efficiently. DARPA has a study determining the efficacy of building a 

facility that combines flexible bioreactors with new technologies to 

produce large protein biologics faster and cheaper than today. This 

study is trying to make a business case for doing this, but it is not 

yet complete. We will be complete probably in the next 2 months. 

Another approach is adapting the organisms widely used for industrial processes today so they can make highly purified drugs in 

extremely large quantities. Our Accelerated Manufacturing of 

Pharmaceuticals program is pursuing this vision, creating technology to rapidly and inexpensively manufacture millions of doses 

of biologics in weeks, instead of the years required today. 

We are working with both bacteria and fungus where there is 

considerable industrial experience using them to produce smaller, 

less complicated proteins for things like laundry detergents and 

bio-enzymes for environmental cleanup, bugs that basically eat 

dirt. 

As an example, we are looking at using tobacco plants to make 

these biologics. The tobacco we are using is grown hydroponically 

under very tightly controlled conditions. Special bacteria are then 

used to infect the leaves, bacteria that cause the leaves to produce 

the protein that we want. A 10 by 10 foot tray of such tobacco 

should yield the protein for 1 million vaccine doses, the equivalent 

of 3 million chicken eggs if done in that way. 

In November, tobacco demonstrated that within a month it could 

produce over 800,000 doses of a crude influenza vaccine that was 

protective in an animal model, in this case, ferrets. Tobacco has 

also produced an avian flu vaccine that could not be made in eggs 

because it kills the eggs. 

We will be testing these various technologies to see whether they 

are speedy and flexible. The performers know they have to produce 

a protein, but they don’t know which one in advance. In the actual 

test, they will be told a specific protein but given only 3 months 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
357 

to produce it in a specified quantity. We feel this approach keeps 

them focused on being able to produce a wide variety of biologics, 

in quantity and very quickly. 

But let me hasten to add that, while this is great progress, we 

are still a long way from FDA approval. At a minimum, we must 

demonstrate that these vaccines are as pure and effective as those 

produced conventionally in order to receive FDA approval at the 

end of the day. 

But, in summary, we are proud and excited about our work and 

think it holds great promise to make BW attacks against us less 

harmful and, accordingly, less likely. 

Thank you all very much for your support of DARPA over the 

years. Thank you. 

[The statement of Dr. Tether follows:] 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
358 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1440 here 46476E.029
359 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1441 here 46476E.030
360 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1442 here 46476E.031
361 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1443 here 46476E.032
362 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1444 here 46476E.033
363 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1445 here 46476E.034
364 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1446 here 46476E.035
365 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF DR. GALLOWAY

Dr. GALLOWAY. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished 

members of the committee. I am honored today to testify before 

your committee and appreciate the opportunity to describe for you 

some of the important and innovative work that is being managed 

by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) on behalf of the 

Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) Chemical Defense Biological Program. 

I would like to add that I also appreciate the opportunity to appear before you in this panel with two associates, Major General 

Steve Reeves of the Joint Program Executive Office, with whom we 

work on a continuing basis, as well as Dr. Tony Tether, the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 

where we have a continuing collaborative relationship. 

DTRA is the joint service agency that has responsibility for consolidating many of those DoD elements that have a role in responding to the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. This would 

include, of course, chemical and biological agents. 

As the Director of DTRA’s Chemical and Biological Technologies 

Directorate, I am responsible for managing the Science and Technology (S&T) portfolio within the Chemical Biological Defense Program. It is within the context of our close coordination with the 

Joint Requirements Office for Chemical and Biological Defense as 

well as the Joint Program Executive Office that our office is sometimes referred to as the Joint Science and Technology Office. 

Our overall mission within the S&T effort encompasses both 

physical as well as medical countermeasures, as General Reeves 

mentioned earlier. This covers everything from diagnostics to detection to decontamination and so on. But our role is not only to discover and validate technical solutions against the threat of chemical and biological agents but to provide detailed knowledge and information that is going to be required by decisionmakers that may 

have to deal with any such incident. But my remarks today will 

principally concentrate on the establishment of a relatively recent 

program in medical countermeasure development. 

The Department of Defense has been increasingly concerned 

about dealing with the threat of an unknown genetically modified 

pathogen or other emerging pathogens. It is true that the rapid 

pace of technological development in genetics and molecular biology 

has provided unprecedented progress in medical science. It offers 

much hope. But, at the same time, we recognize the increased potential for our adversaries to develop new weapons. 

About 2 years ago, a new program was designed to develop broad 

spectrum therapeutic countermeasures within the Department of 

Defense; and I would like to talk a little bit about that this morning. This program has been referred to by General Reeves a moment ago as the Transformational Medical Technology Initiative, or 

TMTI for short. The long-range goal of this program is to develop 

an end-to-end integrated capability to respond to and rapidly develop medical countermeasures against an unknown biological 

threat. 

TMTI differs from traditional programs in three ways. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
366 

First, its focus is the rapid development of broad spectrum medical countermeasures effective against entire classes of biothreat 

agents, instead of the usual or customary one drug, one bug approach. 

Secondly, it is an unprecedented aggressive consortium of academic, industrial and DoD partners which concentrates and integrates the emerging and best technologies available across the 

world against a subset of pathogens which has been largely ignored 

by the pharmaceutical industry. It is the strength of TMTI that it 

concentrates and bears down with these emerging technologies. 

The outreach of the program is international. It is significant in 

scope. 

Third, TMTI represents a new paradigm for medical countermeasure development within the Department of Defense, where essentially we are bringing the S&T portion of the effort in line with, 

from the beginning, the advanced developer in the process in an effort to shorten the overall process of drug development as much as 

possible. In this context, we worked very closely with General 

Steve Reeves’ organization. We both oversee this process. 

At this point in time, I can report that the program has identified at least a dozen potential investigational new drug candidates 

that are in our current portfolio. Two of these have recently initiated discussions with the FDA. Several of these candidate drugs 

represent novel approaches in technologies, and all would be significant medical achievements. We are very excited about the program and the potential of these new technologies. 

Of course, in order to have an integrated capability for countermeasure development, the manufacturing component is essential. 

In collaboration with DARPA and the accelerated manufacture of 

pharmaceuticals (AMP) program, we are presently evaluating five 

manufacturing technology platforms; and, at this point in time, 

several of these look quite promising. We are very encouraged by 

the early results. 

I wish to take a moment to point out that we are working very 

closely with our interagency partners, and this entire effort is a collaborative effort at many levels as we work jointly to protect our 

Nation and our forces against these types of threats. 

Once again, I appreciate the opportunity to meet with the committee; and I look forward to your guidance and support as we 

work together to protect our military and the Nation against these 

threats. That concludes my statement. 

[The statement of Dr. Galloway follows:] 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
367 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 1452 here 46476E.036
368 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 1453 here 46476E.037
369 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 1454 here 46476E.038
370 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 1455 here 46476E.039
371 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 1456 here 46476E.040
372 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 1457 here 46476E.041
373 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 1458 here 46476E.042
374 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 1459 here 46476E.043
375 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 1460 here 46476E.044
376 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 1461 here 46476E.045
377 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 1462 here 46476E.046
378 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 1463 here 46476E.047
379 

VACCINE PRODUCTION RATE

Mr. MURTHA. Let me say I am impressed by the direction we are 

going. As I understand it, there is over $2 billion authorized for 

this program. I think we need to know if there is anything we can 

do to speed up the programs, anything this subcommittee can do. 

Now, one of the things I asked General Reeves, they were slow 

in obligating money from either DTRA or DARPA, but he thinks 

there was too much money maybe available initially and there 

weren’t enough plans. It sounds like you have got a good plan, a 

public/private plan, and it sounds like the public is deeply involved 

in this and HHS is deeply involved in it. 

Of course, the Defense Department is a very small proportion of 

the vaccines we need. But I always found the Department of Defense is ahead of the game, or at least tries to get ahead of the 

game, and could produce much faster than the other agencies in 

some cases. 

But tell us what the real threat is and what we see as the goal. 

What are we trying to do here? I know what the threat is, but how 

do we alleviate the threat? How to reduce the threat? 

Mr. TETHER. Well, I mean, I believe we can find the technique. 

We are learning very—I think we have learned a lot on if a new 

drug—a new bug comes along, to be able to discover what kind of 

vaccine or therapeutic can be used against it. We have gotten that 

part down. They used to take a long time, but I think we now know 

how they do that. 

Mr. MURTHA. Give us an idea what you mean by a long time. 

Mr. TETHER. It used to be, actually, years. 

Mr. MURTHA. Years? 

Mr. TETHER. Yeah, years. If a new bug came out, to actually find 

a vaccine against, it would take years. We believe we now have 

that down to possibly weeks. 

Mr. MURTHA. So if you had a flu epidemic similar to what happened in 1918 where 20 million people died, what would be the result of your work that you have done so far? 

Mr. TETHER. Well, we could probably learn what the vaccine was 

against that flu very quickly, but there is still the problem, and the 

real problem is—we have got that part of the problem I think well 

in hand or at least in hand. People may disagree how well we have 

it in hand. 

But after you have it, this manufacturing, in the quantities to 

get it to the people—I mean, we are talking about not just getting 

the one or two doses of the vaccine. We are talking about getting 

millions and millions of doses of vaccine. And that is the issue right 

now. 

Mr. MURTHA. Now, how do we help you solve that problem? 

Mr. TETHER. Well, I guess, you know, we are trying hard. We 

have talked about techniques that we are looking at. 

Mr. MURTHA. Is there anything we can do money-wise to help the 

situation? 

What I am asking is, there is plenty of money authorized; and 

it sounds like money is not obligated, because you at this point 

haven’t come to a conclusion that they can spend it appropriately. 

And I agree with that. We shouldn’t be just throwing money at the 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
380 

problem. But is there anything we can do to help you reduce the 

time it takes to get these manufacturing installations up and running? 

Mr. TETHER. From my viewpoint, I think we are more idea 

starved than we are money starved. I mean, we are funding every 

idea that we can find. I mean, we are not funding people with— 

we are funding everything that we can think of funding. 

The only time from our viewpoint, DARPA’s viewpoint, that I am 

not sure how to solve it is when you get into this business you end 

up having to go into animal and human testing; and that means 

you have to go and create internal review boards, independent review boards. And that takes time. 

Now, even after that, because of the way we contract, say, 

through the Army, when we go to them, it even takes more time 

for them to look at what comes out to end up with the contract. 

And sometimes we have had examples where it can take as long 

as 6 months to a year after we at DARPA have approved the work 

to go on because of this process. 

Now, the process is there for a good reason. It is to avoid abuse, 

if you will, of people. So the reason for the process is good. 

I won’t speak for General Reeves. Maybe he just needs more people to help him. 

Mr. MURTHA. Here is what we are trying to get at. If it takes you 

a year and you have an epidemic, obviously, it is too late. What we 

are trying to decide is, is there an amount of money that we could 

help the Department with that they could speed up the process and 

be prepared to produce the vaccines in a timely manner? 

For instance, I hear what you are saying. I like the concept. But 

what can we do to help? Is it just we can’t do anything until the 

ideas come forward? 

Mr. TETHER. Unfortunately, I think that is correct. I mean, I 

know it is frustrating. It is frustrating for us. 

Mr. MURTHA. No. Well, I understand. DARPA has been in the 

forefront in trying to fund these programs. 

What do you think, General Reeves? 

General REEVES. Sir, I would tell you, as it stands today, the various options that are on the table are in policy review; and the 

funding options are being looked at. There certainly is, in my view, 

benefit in going forward rapidly with a business case analysis and 

an analysis of alternatives to look at how do we meet the manufacturing and surge requirements. And given the potential multibillion dollar size of any kind of facility, I think it is appropriate that 

we do the up-front work first to assure ourselves that we are proceeding down the correct path. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Young. 

INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Galloway, you mentioned just briefly the collaboration with 

other entities to work on this very serious issue, and I assume that 

you are talking about maybe the Department of Homeland Security? Health and Human Services? Are you working with them at 

all? 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
381 

Dr. GALLOWAY. Yes, sir. We are working with DHHS most certainly, Department of Homeland Security. We talk with the Food 

and Drug Administration (FDA). We are meeting with the folks at 

the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority 

(BARDA). We have occasionally met with the folks from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). So we have a pretty good cross-section of representation across the different Federal agencies on this 

effort. 

Mr. YOUNG. Is there an established working group or a coordinating group or is it loosely structured? Or is it structured? 

Dr. GALLOWAY. There is some structure to it. I have a number 

of the key individuals from those organizations that serve on various review boards and selection groups from our organization. 

They have a very good view and knowledge of what we are doing 

and how we are approaching it. We do meet on a regular basis with 

all of those organizations; and, if anything, I would characterize 

the situation as the level of conversation and collaboration is increasing. 

Mr. YOUNG. Let me ask you about some of the entities that you 

did not mention. 

For example, after some of the terrorist attacks leading up to 

September 11, 2001, the University of South Florida established a 

center for studying biological threats and the response to biological 

threats; and they have an ongoing program. And I would expect 

that a lot of other universities or research organizations are doing 

the same thing. Are you coordinating with them? 

Dr. GALLOWAY. Yes, sir. We actually interface with a number of 

particular academic organizations that do have programs. So our 

office does communicate with those. There are some congressional 

funds that have found their way to these projects. So we do coordinate that. We are familiar with those. Yes, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I think that is a very good idea. Because I, 

frankly, have observed the program at the University of South 

Florida; and I am really impressed with how far they have come. 

And if you haven’t been to visit their center there, I would highly 

recommend that you do that, because I think they have a lot to 

teach us. 

Dr. GALLOWAY. I have heard quite positive things. I have not 

been there personally, but I know that they do communicate with 

our staff. We are aware of their efforts. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I want to echo what the chairman said. Whatever we can do to help on this issue, because it is important to our 

troops in the field from a military or a terrorist standpoint. It is 

important to us at home because we know that terrorists have been 

trying to develop the ability to use biological warfare against us, 

whether it is in a place like the Capitol of the United States or 

whether it is on a street someplace or what it might be. So what 

you are doing is very, very important; and we want to be there to 

help any way we can. 

And, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

TIMELINESS OF VACCINES

Mr. MURTHA. I want to go back to the amount of time it takes 

before something breaks out and the time it takes to get to the vacVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:40 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00381 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
382 

cine that would protect people. What are we talking about? Is it a 

year? Is that what I heard you say? 

Mr. TETHER. It used to be. 

Mr. MURTHA. Now it is how long? 

Mr. TETHER. Weeks. 

Mr. MURTHA. Take Type A flu. 

Mr. TETHER. I don’t know. I would guess that we could probably 

come up with a vaccine—what would you say? 

General REEVES. Sir, the answer very much depends on whether 

or not it is a known bacteria or virus. If we have—— 

Mr. DICKS. I am having a hard time hearing you. 

General REEVES. I beg your pardon. It very much depends on 

whether it is a known threat. In other words, if it is an outbreak 

of a disease for which we already have developed a vaccine or a 

therapeutic, then that is a much shorter transition time than if it 

is an emerging threat that has been genetically modified or has 

mutated in nature, which takes a rather considerable amount of 

time not only to identify but then to turn around and develop the 

manufacturing processes and the delivery mechanisms to provide 

countermeasures. 

Mr. MURTHA. We have a facility that does research and then 

translates that into the manufacturing. Do we have that process in 

place at this point? 

Mr. TETHER. We most certainly have a program to do just that; 

and, as I was saying, we worked hard on the front part of finding 

the vaccine. And we do believe that—especially we know what the 

bug is, to come up with that. It is after that, after you know what 

the vaccine is, is to then be able to make it in quantity that seems 

to be the remaining major issue. 

Mr. MURTHA. Is that where you have the private manufacturer 

in place? 

Mr. TETHER. Correct. That is the program we were talking about, 

advanced manufacturing of pharmaceutical, where we have two 

studies going on. Well, one is a study to take existing new capability to create a facility and the other is to look at other more 

novel techniques of being able to make things fast, like using bacteria to infect tobacco, as an example. 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, we are still—the possibility was not having 

the correct vaccine for over a year? I mean, is that a distinct possibility? 

Mr. TETHER. That is a distinct possibility, depending upon if the 

bug is brand new and we have never seen it before, it will take us 

a while to figure it out. But that is short compared to the amount 

of time to make it. I want to really—— 

Mr. MURTHA. I understand what you are saying. 

Let me say how I got involved. Joe McDade, who used to be on 

this committee and in Congress for 35 years—he is here. He 2 or 

3 years ago mentioned this to me, and we have not had a chance 

to have a hearing until now. 

But you have got to find a way to tell us how you can help to 

reduce the time it takes to produce the vaccine when we have a 

real threat nationwide or worldwide. Because I am worried we 

manufacture much of this vaccine overseas and they won’t sell it 

to us because they are going to have a threat themselves. We need 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
383 

some guidance from HHS, which is going to be the second panel, 

or you folks about what we can do in order to speed up the process. 

Mr. Dicks. 

EVOLUTION OF DIFFERENT VACCINE TYPES

Mr. DICKS. Dr. Tether, maybe you can help us. There was a process where the Department of Homeland Security was supposed to 

go over to HHS to develop certain packages or programs to deal 

with these issues, and that thing kind of broke down. At least it 

did a couple of years ago. Has that changed now? 

Mr. TETHER. You know, Mr. Dicks, I really don’t know. I think 

you really need to ask the second panel. 

Mr. DICKS. The second panel. You are not aware of that? 

Mr. TETHER. No, I am not. 

Mr. DICKS. So when you were talking about developing these vaccines, the manufacturing is the problem, right? What you are saying is we can develop the vaccines, especially if we have previously 

identified this flu? 

Mr. TETHER. Correct. 

Mr. DICKS. But then the problem is getting it manufactured? 

Mr. TETHER. That is correct. 

Mr. DICKS. And a lot of the companies have come in with innovative ideas. That is where DARPA is supposed to be the lead in trying to develop new approaches to this. Are we getting many innovative ideas from the private sector on these issues? 

Mr. TETHER. Oh, yes. In fact, Darrell spoke of some. 

Dr. GALLOWAY. Certainly. I will be happy to give you some 

thoughts on that. 

At this point in time, we have been receiving a very robust response from the industrial sector and the academic sectors. We are 

presently engaged in some projects that are extremely innovative 

and novel and that show absolutely a stunning process. Key among 

these type of technologies are high-throughput robotic systems that 

allow us to literally produce large numbers of possibilities and 

screen them rapidly. With the benefit of the rapid pace in the areas 

of genomics and bioinformatics, we are seeing approaches in testing 

evaluation as well as ‘de noro’ drug development that are really unprecedented. A lot of good ideas are out there, and we are seeing 

these. 

In fact, to come back to a question raised earlier, how could the 

committee help, right now, we have a number of very promising 

projects in the queue that we would like to engage. An issue for 

us in this program is just stable funding. Just simply put, we really 

are going to be able to deliver on the identification of a number of 

what we call IND candidates, investigational new drug candidates. 

The issue will be being able to follow all the way through to see 

that they get through clinical trials and so on. But the portfolio is 

very good right now. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me interrupt and just mention what the staff 

mentioned to me before we started that we have taken money out 

of this program because it wasn’t obligated. You need to tell us. 

You need to come to the committee staff and tell them, look, we 

have got things going. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
384 

I agree with you. Stable funding is a key. But when we have all 

these different people coming to see us from the Defense Department, you need to tell us that, okay, if you take money, here is 

what happens. So we are aware of it now, and you need to make 

the staff aware of the problems. 

Mr. DICKS. Are the people coming in—we have a company out in 

Seattle that is talking about developing a pre-vaccine. Would that 

be useful? 

Dr. GALLOWAY. Absolutely. What we are finding is that a lot of 

the innovation that is out there are in these small biotech companies. They are quite hungry, but they are extremely sharp. They 

have some extremely promising technologies. 

But I would like to add, and I think it is a significant point, that 

we have actually managed to bring two of the big pharma corporations into our portfolio. That is Novartis and GlaxoSmithKline. 

That is a significant achievement within the Department of Defense programs. Big pharma is showing increased interest in what 

we are doing. They are watching very closely; and, in fact, in some 

respects they are a bit of a challenge. Because in a couple of cases 

they bought up a couple of these small companies we have been 

dealing with, and then suddenly they are gone. So we must be 

doing something right if big pharma is paying this much attention. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Lewis. 

VACCINE MANUFACTURING CAPACITY

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Tony, you and I got to know each other about the time that Joe 

McDade was most active in the defense arena. And over the years, 

I have watched DARPA with great care; and I must say I am very, 

very impressed with the help they give the Department of Defense 

in a variety of mixed ways. 

This issue I have never heard discussed in our committee before. 

But a little over a couple of years ago, when I happened for a short 

time to be the chairman of the full committee, I began spending 

time in other subcommittees where I never served, including HHS. 

The testimony from CDC relative to avian flu really got my attention. Judy Gerberding is a fabulous person, but the information 

she provided about our inability to respond if there was an avian 

flu that metastasized and suddenly affected human beings and 

began to move—the amount of time it might take to get an effective vaccine was one thing, and that was really serious at the time. 

A reduction in the time to identify the vaccine is encouraging, I 

must say, but manufacturing at any volume is way beyond our capacity. 

Dr. Gerberding suggested to me that we probably would be dependent upon France if the avian flu started moving in that direction; And if it started moving in Europe, they sure as hell wouldn’t 

be sharing it with us very fast. And it seems to me that it is a serious, serious priority there. I don’t know about the rest of the country. 

I hear from Mr. Dicks for the first time that there is a small company up in Washington that is working on this, and Florida has 

people working on it as well. I thought all of the pharmaceutical 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
385 

companies in the world existed in New Jersey and not anywhere 

else. But, as a matter of fact, I will bet you—— 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Where they belong. 

Mr. LEWIS. I would bet you that those companies do have considerable interest in this subject area. And we are way beyond the 

point we can wait. It has been 21⁄2 years since we had that conversation in HHS, and we have not made any serious progress in 

terms of manufacturing capacity, let alone have any knowledge of 

our decreasing time to identify what kind of vaccine would be needed. 

Norm, we can get the vaccine quickly to take care of your throat. 

It is these other problems that really, really could be serious. If we 

have the need to respond to hundreds of millions of doses, for example, because of an outbreak that is the result of some overaction 

on the part of our enemies, we have got to have capacity. 

So tell me what we are doing in terms of that capacity. I think 

it is nuts for us not to be talking to CDC, to be talking to big 

pharma, the small guys around. 

I am not surprised. Dr. Galloway said that big pharma is even 

buying up some of these companies. When we are dealing with 

major problems in the Department of Defense, we always had the 

ability to find small companies innovating, coming up with great 

ideas to help us solve big problems. And what happens? Big companies buy them up, and maybe the project goes forward, and maybe 

it doesn’t. 

So I, frankly, want to see us reaching to small companies, the 

universities around the country. This should be a very, very serious—not just defense challenge. And there are other budgets besides the defense budget to do this, and your advice and counsel 

about that would be helpful as well. 

Mr. TETHER. As I said, Congressman Lewis, we have all been 

working hard on the first part, find the vaccine; and little companies and all that are very good at that. 

Now let’s say you found the vaccine. I don’t want you all to think 

we have that problem licked, by the way. Don’t go thinking there 

might be money there. Because we are still working hard on that. 

It is coming up with the vaccine against something you haven’t 

seen that is going to take a long time. But after you have it, making it in the millions and millions of doses that are needed is really 

a major issue; and little companies aren’t geared up to do that. 

They are geared up to come up with the vaccine, but then it goes 

to the next step of how you are going to make it. 

Mr. LEWIS. Tony, it has been 21⁄2 years ago since we identified 

that problem. We said we have to be doing something about that. 

But nothing is done that I know of that involves our increasing or 

providing incentive to develop manufacturing and the ability that 

involves millions of production very quickly. 

Mr. TETHER. We at DARPA have really turned towards that 

problem and the program that we talked about earlier, AMP, that 

was also mentioned by Darrell. We really went out and looked for 

the craziest ideas we could think of. 

For example—this didn’t work out by the way, but it was a neat 

idea at the time—if you look at the way Tide is made, Tide has 

these huge fermenters where they actually use bacteria that comes 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
386 

up with the stuff that eats your dirt. And we thought that is the 

issue. What if we could take that big fermenter and have them 

make Tide on Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays and 

then on Fridays they make vaccine. If we could have made that 

work, then we would have had an industrial capability that there 

was for another purpose and is sort of like a craft. Like we have 

on aircraft, where we buy from the airlines, you know, the ability 

to go take their planes. Then we could take over that plant. 

So we had been looking at these ideas trying to look at current 

industrial capability to see if we could take that current industrial 

capability and then use it to make in quantities these drugs and 

vaccines that have been discovered through other processes. Some 

of it hasn’t worked. 

This tobacco thing looks really exciting. Who would have thought 

that you take tobacco and you infect it with a bacteria to make a 

protein and then that protein obviously is what is your vaccine. 

Who would have thought that? 

I mean, these are—now, to get this through the FDA processes 

is still some time. But those are the kinds of things that we have 

been looking at to try to overcome this. 

On the other hand, we can go and put together a facility. This 

study that we have ongoing is we could put together a facility, but 

then it becomes a government-owned facility. It is not useful for 

anything else. It is unfortunate. We could make it useful for maybe 

making commercial drugs. But, short of that, you end up with a facility that could satisfy this surge problem, but—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Here is what we are trying to do. We are trying 

to help you reduce the time that Mr. Lewis found 21⁄2 years ago. 

You have looked at all these things. There has been no major disaster happen in the meantime. We want to help figure out a way 

to reduce—you are doing the research. That takes time. But we 

have got to have a process where we manufacture the vaccine once 

we discover it. And I think the ideas are one thing, but we have 

to come up with a way to do it now. 

As I understand it, the civilian side, the drug companies are willing to put money into this as long as we buy the product. And I 

think that is the key, isn’t it, to buy the product? 

Mr. TETHER. They do need a market; and that would, I think— 

BioShield tried to do that. 

Mr. MURTHA. When you say a government—ammunition product—we used to do ammunition plants, all kinds of things we used 

to own and we have sold them off since that time, most of them. 

But the point is, I don’t know how much time we have. But we 

have been 21⁄2 years, and we are still not there, and if a flu epidemic broke out we would have to depend on somebody else to 

produce the damn stuff. 

Mr. TETHER. Yep. That’s not a good situation to be in. 

General REEVES. Let me suggest one model that we looked at 

which is potentially private which is the public/private relationship. As you suggested, it involves private enterprise investing in 

the model. But in the larger sense there is a trend in the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry, something called contract manufacturing operations; and these are stand-alone facilities whose sole 

function is to take developed technology and put it into full-scale 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
387 

manufacturing and then ultimately do what is known as fill and 

finish, put the bulk content into a vial or some usable way of giving 

it to an individual. That kind of a model, I believe, has a great deal 

of potential for the future for both HHS as well as the Department 

of Defense. 

Mr. MURTHA. We talked about you have to work with the staff, 

telling them how you are going to do this, what we need to do to 

help. There is plenty of money authorized. And what Dr. Galloway 

says is, you know, you need a stable program. Well, you have got 

to tell us what that stable program is and how much money it 

would take so we have some idea of how we solve his problem. We 

want to help. 

Mr. DICKS. Would the chairman yield just briefly? 

Mr. MURTHA. Sure. 

Mr. DICKS. Isn’t it true that BioShield has been a flop? Isn’t that 

basically true? I mean, the first one they did was Vac-Gen. It was 

$800 million for anthrax, and they came up with nothing. 

That is what I was talking about earlier. When you have this relationship between the Department of Homeland Security, when 

they are supposed to be doing threat assessments on these various 

possibilities and then HHS doesn’t do anything. That is what we 

were told at the Homeland Security Committee. I think maybe the 

next panel has to answer this. Unless somebody here knows about 

it. Isn’t it true that BioShield, after we spent billions, has produced 

almost nothing? 

Mr. TETHER. Anybody want to answer that? 

Next question. 

Mr. DICKS. I think I know what the answer is. That is why we 

are worried about this, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. We want to move this thing. So you have got to tell 

us what you need in order to move it. 

Mr. Visclosky. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I am fine, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Moran. 

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

Mr. MORAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for having this 

hearing. It is great to hear people who are thinking out of the box. 

This is the kind of area where we need a lot of that thinking. 

And particularly DARPA, it is wonderful things you are coming 

up with in this area, but in so many others. Getting the 

brainwaves to be able to move prosthetic devices, that is the kind 

of stuff that DARPA came up with. It is terrific. So, Tony, you are 

doing a great job; and it is good to see you with your colleagues. 

And it is not surprising our friend, Mr. McDade, urged that we 

have this kind of hearing. So I know—thank you. It is just that I 

talk so loud. I don’t want to be obnoxious here, you know. I don’t 

want to—thank you, Mr. Dicks. You are my mentor. 

Now, let me ask you about at Virginia Tech; and this goes to 

DTRA, particularly. They developed this very substantial computer 

model because they understand that, if you were to have a natural 

disaster or terrorist event, one of the things you have got to figure 

out is how do people behave, how do they react in large population 

centers? 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
388 

For example, if there is a dirty bomb, what happens with the 

transportation infrastructure that is available? You know, what do 

stores do, commercial enterprises, social institutions and so on? 

And DTRA is figuring this out so that we are prepared, not just 

with the people we have direct control over but large population 

centers. 

But my question is, when we get this kind of information, are we 

coordinating with the Department of Homeland Security? Because 

it is really a Homeland Security matter more than Defense. You 

know, our military can’t really intervene and organize things and 

direct things and so on. It is going to have to be the local responders, police, fire, EMT and the like. They need to have the benefit 

of this information. So how are we transferring this information, 

Dr. Galloway, to the people on the ground that are the first ones 

that are going to be asked to respond? 

Dr. GALLOWAY. Well, in this particular case, I am aware that 

DTRA is involved in a project down there, but it is one of those 

areas that doesn’t happen to be in my lane, that I can’t really give 

you—so I will take it on the record and see to it that you get an 

answer. 

Mr. MORAN. Good. 

[The information follows:] 

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s (DTRA) Comprehensive National Incident 

Management System (CNIMS) is designed to create a ‘‘simfrastructure,’’ or simulated infrastructure, which can be used to model the effects of a pandemic incident 

on a population. The model mimics human interaction, allowing for the use of numerous variables such as treatment or quarantine options. The study affects overall 

response planning and emergency preparedness, because analysts can then examine 

how the disease spread throughout the simulation. In short, CNIMS provides leaders in the United States military with essential operational information about the 

populations that may be affected by a possible crisis, such as an influenza epidemic. 

This prototype application provides previously unavailable detail and performance 

in scalable agent-based epidemiological models that will be used by DoD planners 

and policy makers for analysis of optimal responses to a crisis situation. 

Thus far, studies have been run on Alabama’s National Guard, Fort Lewis, Washington, and Fort Hood, Texas. In response to a Combatant Command request, DTRA 

analysts are planning to conduct studies of major metropolitan areas in the United 

States. These studies will result in more detailed contingency plans in specific locations and greater understanding on the impact of the resident military populations. 

The understanding of the phenomenology underlying pandemics and other catastrophic events, natural and man-made, will be fundamentally improved by the use 

of high-performance computing-based decision and policy informatics. Our intent is 

to make this advanced capability directly available to subject matter experts and decision makers—providing for greater situational awareness and higher fidelity 

course-of-action analysis/development and is a key part of our on-going commitment 

to develop the best possible tools needed for crisis management at the national level. 

A comprehensive and unified national response to such an event would require 

the sharing of situational awareness and the full mobilization of national and international expertise and capabilities. DTRA’s relationship with USNORTHCOM is the 

liaison to the Department of Homeland Security (which includes the United States 

Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Transportation Security Administration and Customs and Border Protection) and our linkage to ensure effective interagency synchronization across the USG. Additionally DTRA has 

entered into a Interagency Agreement with the Department of Health and Human 

Services (HHS). This is in support of the HHS modeling hub and it extends DTRA 

capabilities to provide onsite HHS support for CBRNE exercises, operations and 

overall coordination. 

Further development of CNIMS technology will support the analysis of a range 

of problems such as urban evacuation, epidemiological events, population risk-exposure estimation, logistical planning, site evacuations, interdependent infrastructure 

failures and nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological threats. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
389 

BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS MODELING

Mr. MORAN. That is a principal concern. Because we have the 

money and the chairman makes clear—he is probably the only 

chairman of all of the Appropriation Committees that actually ask 

witnesses how much money do you need. It is because he is the 

only one that can produce any money. Everybody else, we are lucky 

if we can stay on a continual resolution, even Interior. So we are 

developing things in Defense that are really needed in other areas 

of governmental responsibility. 

I wonder if Dr. Tether or General Reeves have any comment 

about this. If there is a biological warfare attack, have we studied 

what is the likely reaction of large population centers and how we 

deal with them? And if we do have this kind of information, how 

are you transferring it to the local responders? 

General REEVES. Sir, I can answer the first half of your question. 

The program you referred to that is working with DTRA also 

works with the Department of Defense model called the joint effects model. And we in fact work very closely with DTRA in 

leveraging that research so that we can provide our commanders 

in the field the various modeling and analysis tools that are necessary. 

Now, that model is designed for tactical forces and forces that 

might be operating in urban environments. To date, we have not 

transitioned that to any first responders. So the answer to your 

second question or the second half of your question would be we 

haven’t done anything. 

SMALL BIOTECH COMPANY INNOVATION

Mr. MORAN. Okay. Well, I mean, I prefer that you be honest 

about it. But you understand it is something that you are going to 

have to deal with at some point. We have got to transfer that information. 

One of the things that concerns me, we have been talking about 

big pharma; and that in and of itself is a problem, because some 

of the best ideas can come from these small biotech firms, you 

know, a handful of really bright people who really don’t want to 

work for some large corporation. You know, they come out of MIT 

or any number of institutions and they come up with great ideas, 

but it is almost impossible to start up any kind of drug firm today. 

The huge sums of investment capital that are needed, it makes it 

really prohibitive for small biotech firms to get into the production 

of vaccines or other preventive measures. And, as you suggested, 

you come up with a great idea, Novartis or somebody is going to 

buy you up and then you are gone. 

But I am afraid that, because we rely almost exclusively on these 

large institutional corporations, a lot of the best ideas don’t make 

it. And one of the things DARPA I know does, you develop these 

things and then you try to spin them off, get some commercial offthe-shelf technology out there, but it is so difficult to come up with 

investment capital to get it going. 

Can you address that at all? Or should it be a concern? 

Dr. GALLOWAY. It is a concern. A couple of thoughts that come 

to mind are that you are correct, that, by and large, the biotech inVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:40 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00389 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
390 

dustry has got a lot of ideas, a lot of innovation, but most of them 

probably never figure to get to the manufacturing stage. They are 

just not set up for that scale of things and probably have a strategy 

that thinks along the lines of being either bought out or getting to 

that bridge if and when they ever reach it. 

The manufacturing capability and the experience certainly lies 

principally in some of the big pharmaceutical operations or some 

of the organizations set up just for manufacturing. However, it is 

also true that there is incentive, for example, in the program where 

we are investigating broad spectrum therapeutics, the development 

of and the identification of such measures. 

You know, a lot of these things are all driven by a marketing and 

profit motive, if you will. There has to be incentive for these companies to take on projects of this magnitude. But in the development 

of broad spectrum therapeutics, there could be a lot of incentive. 

We think this is one of the reasons why a lot of these companies 

are looking at us. 

Because while we are looking for certain applications for our 

needs as we see it in DoD or it gets to biothreat agent, if some of 

these things are as broad spectrum as they appear to be, they could 

have much broader utility and application and therefore a market. 

And so I think that is partly why we are getting an increasing 

amount of interest that is coming on board. 

For example, we are looking at an interesting drug candidate 

that seems to be effective against the methicillin-resistant staphylococcus auras. That is not a biothreat agent that is in our lane. 

But it is of clear utility and application. And so we would take 

something like that and make sure that that was handed off to National Institutes of Health (NIH) or somewhere to try to find application for that. 

Mr. MURTHA. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

What we are going to do now is move to the second panel, and 

some problems that were brought to my attention is the FDA approval. It takes so long to get through the process, 4 or 5 years. 

And what Mr. Lewis is talking about, we are just scratching the 

surface here. And we will see the second panel, and then we will 

start with you in the second panel. We know your interest in it, 

but that is the panel that is going to be as involved as anybody 

else. So let’s have the second panel. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
(391) 

WITNESSES 

Panel II 

DR. MICHAEL E. KILPATRICK, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, FORCE HEALTH 

PROTECTION AND READINESS PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS 

ROBIN ROBINSON, PH.D., DIRECTOR, BIOMEDICAL ADVANCED RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (BARDA), OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF DR. KILPATRICK

Dr. KILPATRICK. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the 

subcommittee, Michael Kilpatrick, Deputy Director, Force Health 

Protection in the Department of Defense. Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today on behalf of the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense of Health Affairs in the Military Health System. 

As you know, the mission of the Military Health System is to 

provide health services in support of our Nation’s military mission 

any time anywhere, and that includes proper preparations for responding to biological threats. DoD recognizes that anthrax and 

smallpox are lethal biological threats. As a result, since March of 

1998 more than 1.9 million service members have received more 

than 7.4 million doses of anthrax vaccine and more than 1.5 million 

service members have been immunized against smallpox since December 2002. 

On April 1, 2008, DoD began using the newly licensed 

ACAM2000 smallpox vaccine. To educate our health care providers, 

our service members, their families and other beneficiaries around 

the world on biological threat protection, we provide detailed vaccine information at the time of the vaccinations and we use on-line 

educational briefings, brochures and training videos. In addition, 

we use live interactive Web casts in support of vaccination programs. DoD also tracks suspected reactions to these vaccines. The 

Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center collects severe adverse 

event information from vaccinations as part of its mission to provide continuous surveillance for the Military Health System. 

The Vaccine Health Care Center Network provides educational 

assistance to individuals who are concerned about their vaccinations and assist individuals who experience a rare adverse event. 

With every anthrax and smallpox vaccination, the service member 

is provided an educational brochure that details the possible adverse events and provides contact information for clinical services. 

An interagency agreement between DoD and the Department of 

Health and Human Services establishes a framework to coordinate 

mutual support in the event of a shortfall in critical medical material when responding to or recovering from a public health or medVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:40 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00391 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
392 

ical consequences of a domestic catastrophic incident or an incident 

of national significance. 

For example, in 2006, in concert with the Implementation Plan 

for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, Health Affairs 

issued policies and guidance on preparation and response to a pandemic caused by bird flu virus. It is DoD’s policy to provide military 

personnel with safe and effective vaccines, antidotes and treatments that will eliminate or minimize the effects of potential 

health threats. 

Mr. Chairman, protecting and preserving the health of our servicemen and women is one of our highest priorities, second only to 

the military mission. 

I will be pleased to answer your questions. 

[The statement of Dr. Kilpatrick follows:] 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
393 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphicfolio 1496 here 46476E.048
394 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphicfolio 1497 here 46476E.049
395 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphicfolio 1498 here 46476E.050
396 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphicfolio 1499 here 46476E.051
397 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphicfolio 1500 here 46476E.052
398 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphicfolio 1501 here 46476E.053
399 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphicfolio 1502 here 46476E.054
400 

Mr. MURTHA. Doctor. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF DR. ROBINSON

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you. Chairman Murtha and distinguished 

members of the Committee, I appreciate this opportunity today to 

testify on behalf of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 

Services, where I serve as the newly appointed Deputy Assistant 

Secretary and Director for the Biomedical Advanced Research and 

Development Authority, or BARDA. BARDA is responsible for the 

development and acquisition and coordination of medical— 

Mr. MURTHA. Tell the Committee where you served before. 

Mr. ROBINSON. I will come right to that, yes, sir. Before the coordination of American countermeasures for chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear threats, pandemic influenza and emerging diseases for the civilian population, prior to becoming the Board of Director I served for the last 31⁄2 years as the Deputy Director for Influenza and Emerging Disease Program, where we implemented 

strategic plans and policies for medical countermeasures outlined 

in the President’s National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza. 

First, allow me to thank you for your kind and generous support 

of our efforts to prepare the Nation for pandemic influenza and 

other hazards. I look forward to working with you in my new role 

as we strive to build upon the successes of the Pandemic Influenza 

Preparedness Program and renew the focus of our Nation’s medical 

countermeasures portfolio for chemical, biological, radiological and 

nuclear threats. 

HHS concurs with our Department of Defense colleagues on the 

critical role that medical countermeasures play in our normal national preparedness against threats, against these threats and pandemic influenza, and the need for domestic manufacturing facilities 

capable of producing these products. We see medical countermeasure development and acquisition as only one component of our 

overall preparedness efforts towards an all hazards preparedness. 

The policy of shared responsibility for preparedness empowers 

many stakeholders, including the entire HHS Department, our 

partners in the international community, other Federal interagencies like the Department of Defense, State, local and tribal territorial governments, the private sector and ultimately individual 

people. 

The central framework to support medical countermeasures initiatives in the Federal Government is the HHS Public Health 

Emergency Medical Countermeasure Enterprise. This enterprise is 

a coordinated interagency group that is led by the Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Response at HHS, Admiral 

Vanderwagen, and includes the Centers for Disease Control, Dr. 

Gerberding, the FDA with Dr. von Eschenbach, and the NIH with 

Dr. Zerhouni, and partners for the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security and Veteran Affairs. 

I would like to give you a few examples of where HHS is coordinating and acting with our cousins at the Department of Defense 

relative to medical countermeasure programs. HHS has achieved a 

significant level of preparedness against a number of CBRN 

threats. HHS and DoD subject matter experts are on the CBRN 

threats committees to serve as interagency threat determinations 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
401 

and product requirements setting panels to inform U.S. Government policymakers. HHS and DoD share joint stockpiles of AVA 

vaccine for anthrax and ACAM2000 vaccine for smallpox and 

aligned research and development programs for many medical 

countermeasures to CBRN threats by serving on interagency 

project teams. 

With regard to pandemic influenza, great strides have been made 

over the past 3 years towards pandemic preparedness, including 

the developments and acquisition and domestic manufacturing infrastructure building of vaccines, antivirals, diagnostics and other 

pharmaceuticals. The development of an H5N1 vaccine resulted in 

the licensure last year representing the licensure of the first pandemic like noninfluenza vaccine and the number one medical 

breakthrough in 2007. HHS and DoD coordinate stockpiling of this 

vaccine, the clinical instability studies and, similarly for the 

antiviral stockpiles, use contracts to give the best price for the taxpayers. 

BARDA and DoD just sponsored this week a symposium of Federal Government R&D activities for rapid diagnostics to detect 

novel influenza viruses. These joint analyses allow us the opportunity to reference one another’s portfolios that reduce duplication 

but allow synergistic approaches like stockpiling to proceed. 

These represent prime examples of this integrative all hazards 

approach that the Enterprise affords. Utilization of the Enterprise 

and product portfolio approaches will continue at HHS and DoD 

with other stakeholders to prepare the Nation for pandemic influenza and CBRN threats. 

Using some of these specific examples of accomplishments in the 

pandemic influenza program and the successes in CBRN, I am beginning to redefine how we at HHS with our Federal partners can 

coordinate our respective programs to develop and acquire these 

products for the establishment and maintenance of medical countermeasure stockpiles as well as expand domestic manufacturing 

search capacities for these products. The Enterprise began a collaborative process that brings together Federal partners for decisionmaking throughout the life cycles of medical countermeasures. 

We are expanding that process for coordination, to include the discussions on the strategy behind the development of priorities and 

portfolios. 

HHS and DoD are strategic partners with complementary missions to provide integrated systematic approaches to the development and purchase of necessary vaccines, drugs, therapeutics and 

diagnostics for public health medical emergencies. 

In closing, sir, I thank you again for this opportunity to discuss 

our coordinated efforts toward national preparedness and look forward to many more visits with you to deliver news of progress and 

find ways to make our Nation better prepared. Thank you. I will 

be happy to answer questions. 

[The statement of Dr. Robinson follows:] 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
402 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 1508 here 46476E.055
403 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 1509 here 46476E.056
404 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 1510 here 46476E.057
405 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 1511 here 46476E.058
406 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 1512 here 46476E.059
407 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 1513 here 46476E.060
408 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 1514 here 46476E.061
409 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 1515 here 46476E.062
410 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 1516 here 46476E.063
411 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 1517 here 46476E.064
412 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 1518 here 46476E.065
413 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic 1519 here 46476E.066
414 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

PROTECTION OF THE ARMED FORCES

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest 

of full transparency both Mr. Rothman and I come from New Jersey, which we are very proud of our pharmaceutical base. Whether 

you are a large pharma or a small pharma stable funding is important. That is one of the issues here. It is not a question of big companies taking over small companies. That is part of a capitalistic 

system. But nobody is going to make these types of investments if 

they have to wait on HHS to come up with requests for proposals. 

With all due respect, it has been pretty damn slow, maybe in some 

areas been expedited. But my questions actually go to Dr. Kilpatrick. 

Thank you both for what you do. This is the Defense Appropriations Committee, and I want to be somewhat selfish and ask particularly what we are doing for our armed services for those in uniforms, in uniform relative to anthrax, smallpox or radiological, nuclear. What are we doing in terms of protecting our soldiers? I 

know it is a big question, but I would like to sort of get a general 

overview of what we are doing. 

Some of us remember the refusal of some people in the military 

to go ahead with the anthrax immunization. Where do we stand 

relative to a comprehensive program for those in the military 

where we actually have a known quantity of people that we are 

dealing with? Obviously, all volunteers; Guard, Reserve. Where do 

we stand? How would you characterize it? 

Dr. KILPATRICK. I think we stand in very good stead with this. 

We have really focused the program on continuing to educate people. Not just a brochure in the hand right before the shot goes in 

the arm, but to really answer questions and sit down with people 

and to really discuss with them what is understood about the 

threat. We try to look at this on a priority basis, saying what is 

the risk. And certainly when people are deployed in a setting where 

we can’t control the environment, where we can’t really control 

what is happening in the environment, then clearly those are areas 

where a vaccine is the most secure protection we can give somebody. 

As General Reeves discussed, if you are in the detect to treat environment, in a deployed setting, it is not satisfactory to have an 

un-vaccinated population. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. As long as the information isn’t secret or 

confidential, where do we stand relative to anthrax? 

Dr. KILPATRICK. As far as the vaccination program? 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Right. 

Dr. KILPATRICK. We are doing very well. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What does that mean? Does that mean anthrax isn’t just a battlefield potential situation, obviously it could 

happen here domestically? 

Dr. KILPATRICK. It could happen domestically. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Where do we stand relative to those that 

have been immunized? 

Dr. KILPATRICK. Our program is to vaccinate all people going into 

theater. That is the greatest point of risk. But we are continuing 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
415 

to keep people’s vaccinations up to date as they return. So if they 

go to theater, get their series of shots, and come out of the theater—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Is this mandated? 

Dr. KILPATRICK. It is voluntary for them to keep up. It is mandated when they go to theater. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It is voluntary to keep up? 

Dr. KILPATRICK. To keep up when they come back, yes. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. We have an Appropriations Committee that 

has been pretty generous towards investments in national pandemic, you know, avian flu. What portion of that is allocated and 

directed towards our armed services? 

Dr. KILPATRICK. Toward the armed services, again, we have 

worked very closely with HHS. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. We are familiar that there has been a 

stockpile. So let us be selfish here for a minute. What stockpile is 

for the military? 

Dr. KILPATRICK. Well, the stockpile for the military is really focused at where our people would be most at threat. And we feel, 

again, that is going to be in a deployed setting in areas where flu 

may start the pandemic. And that is where our surveillance programs are going on. And so we have prepositioned and forward deployed stockpiles of both vaccine and antivirals that we could use 

to get to people in that area. The national stockpile is what we 

would work in coordination with HHS if that were an event nationally. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So it is there, it hasn’t been utilized? 

Dr. KILPATRICK. No, we have not used the vaccine that is licensed. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And how about the award of the next generation of modified, you know the smallpox virus, what could potentially be something which is not the normal situation? Where do 

we stand relative to that in our military? 

Dr. KILPATRICK. Are you talking about the ACAM vaccine? 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Yes, the smallpox virus. 

Dr. KILPATRICK. Right. And I think, again, the ACAM vaccine is 

what DOD is using. And that is—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So all soldiers have that? 

Dr. KILPATRICK. That is, again, for people going to theater, is 

where it is required. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It is required? 

Dr. KILPATRICK. Yes. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And what relative to radiological and nuclear, what exists out there for our soldiers? 

Dr. KILPATRICK. Again, from the radiological standpoint there are 

programs out there to monitor, to surveil for essentially laser or 

other radiological type exposures the troops may get. All of the 

equipment that we would use, has been evaluated and tested to 

make sure that the people operating it, the operators, are safe. And 

so, again, there is a surveillance program looking at that. 

From a nuclear standpoint, it is going to be looking at where are 

we with detection capability, and that is where those detectors are 

present. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
416 

PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIAL BASE

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And lastly, maybe a general question to you 

both. The whole issue of the industrial base, I mean I sort of get 

the feeling that DARPA is sort of setting up or perhaps has always 

had its own shop. But, I mean, we have a pretty good industrial 

pharmaceutical base. Where is HHS in terms of some of these requests for proposals? Could you clarify a little more? 

Mr. ROBINSON. The industrial—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Every Member of Congress is obviously approached by large and small companies in their district, all with 

some new something which they view as an imperative. And then 

there is a huge amount of frustration that your operation over 

there is sort of going into sort of a state of semi-paralysis. That 

may be an understatement. 

Mr. ROBINSON. I would believe it is, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. How would you characterize it? 

Mr. ROBINSON. I would characterize it—I will take the two sides 

of the house, the pandemic influenza and then our CBRN. First, 

the pandemic influenza, where I have served for over 3 years as 

the head of that program. Where with NIH looking at the discovery 

in the early development and where we have been responsible for 

the advanced development where we see things that are going into 

the clinic, that they have been shown to be safe, then to move those 

forward toward licensure of the products so that we then can acquire those products and put them into a national stockpile. We 

have done very well with that, in fact. For our pre-pandemic vaccine stockpiles we are two-thirds of the way with that 40 million 

goal. However, we have been able to, with our programs for advanced development, be able to have a technological breakthrough. 

Not only the H5N1 vaccine was actually licensed last year, but we 

have new adjuvant. These are immunostimulatory molecules that 

when combined with the vaccine can actually make the vaccine go 

20, 25-fold more people than normally. And so that is a real breakthrough so that we can have sustained facilities here that cannot 

overbuild. And that is really important for the influenza industry 

because there is a market already for seasonal vaccine and that 

with these adjuvants and other types of molecules we actually can 

be prepared for a pandemic so that 300 million people then can get 

the vaccine in a matter of months, not years. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I just think some members of the committee, maybe all members of the committee, there has not been 

sort of a sense of urgency. 

Mr. ROBINSON. No. I am sorry that perception is there. But on 

the pandemic influenza we have awarded 27 contracts to grants for 

advanced development for over $3.7 billion. And we have increased 

the manufacturing base of this country, not foreign country, but 

this country, over two and a half-fold of what it was 2 years ago 

when Dr. Gerberding testified. And where we will be in 2012 is 

that we will be able to not only supply the United States with what 

it needs for a pandemic, all 300 million plus, but also the United 

States to be an exporting hub. And that is one of our driving forces 

for the U.S. 

Mr. MURTHA. What year is that? 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
417 

Mr. ROBINSON. 2012, sir. Right now if we had a pandemic this 

year we would be able to immunize upwards of about 200 million 

with our adjuvants which will be going toward licensure application next year. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, on this point, does this cover bird flu, 

too? Do you have a vaccine for bird flu? 

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes. The H5N1 vaccine, that is for the avian influenza that we know is our biggest threat at this point of becoming a pandemic virus. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Visclosky. Ms. Kaptur. 

AGRICULTURE RESEARCH

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen. 

From the previous panel I just wanted to place two questions on 

the record and maybe they could get back to me. 

I am very interested in the tobacco research that was referenced 

in the written testimony, and I am very curious about what you are 

doing to genetically manipulate the tobacco leaf or the tobacco for 

the production of proteins and nutraceuticals perhaps. This is 

something that as a member of the Agriculture Committee I have 

a longstanding interest in, even though I don’t represent any tobacco growers. I just think it is a magnificent plan and its potential 

is unmet. So I would be very interested to know what you are 

doing along those lines. 

And then secondly in terms of ricin, I don’t know enough about 

the sources of ricin, but I know the castor bean is one of them. And 

I don’t know if it is the only one globally. But if it is, I would like 

to know the research that is going on to isolate the ricin from the 

castor bean, and if you are doing research on that, and to what extent one could make that particular seed, to phase it out in its current form globally, since there are so few seed companies that exist 

anymore, and what the potential is to completely take the dangerous part of the germ plasm out and to make it available as an 

extraordinary oilseed for the sake of the world. 

So I am just very interested in those two areas. Anything you 

could get to me on that would be greatly appreciated. Not this 

panel, but the one sitting in back of you. They are looking. Am I 

clear? 

Dr. GALLOWAY. Indeed. I will take your questions as an action 

right away if I can answer them. 

[The information follows:] 

Ms. KAPTUR. I am very interested in the tobacco research that was referenced in 

the written testimony, and I am very curious about what you are doing to genetically manipulate the tobacco leaf or the tobacco for the production of proteins and 

nutraceuticals perhaps. This is something that as a member of the Agriculture Committee I have a longstanding interest in, even though I don’t represent any tobacco 

growers. I just think it is a magnificent plan and its potential is unmet. So I would 

be very interested to know what you are doing along those lines. 

And then secondly in terms of ricin, I don’t know enough about the sources of 

ricin, but I know the castor bean is one of them. And, I don’t know if it is the only 

one globally. But if it is, I would like to know the research that is going on to isolate 

the ricin from the castor bean, and if you are doing research on that, and to what 

extent one could make that particular seed, to phase it out in its current form globally, since there are so few seed companies that exist anymore, and what the potential is to completely take the dangerous part of the germ plasm out and to make 

it available as an extraordinary oilseed for the sake of the world. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
418 

So I am just very interested in those two areas. Anything you could get to me 

on that would be greatly appreciated. Not this panel, but the one sitting in back 

of you. They are looking. Am I clear? 

Dr. GALLOWAY. Indeed. I will take your questions as an action right away if I can 

answer them. 

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is managing research, under the 

Accelerated Manufacture of Pharmaceuticals (AMP) program, to develop large scale 

protein expression platforms. The program’s aim is to develop a system for large 

scale production of U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved prophylactic 

(e.g., vaccines) or therapeutic proteins. One such platform is the tobacco plant. 

The AMP program was originated by DARPA and has been structured as a 3- 

phase progressive demonstration of capability. Phases I and II are funded by 

DARPA, and managed by DTRA, in conjunction with the Science and Technology 

component of the DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP). It is 

planned that AMP Phase III will be both managed and funded by the CBDP’s 

Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative (TMTI) program. Under the AMP 

program, tobacco was one of five manufacturing ‘‘platforms’’ that are being evaluated and considered. 

The tobacco platform employs non-genetically modified tobacco plants grown in a 

climatically controlled environment. After the plants have matured, they are subjected to a process that includes submerging them in a solution containing bacteria 

that has been modified to contain the protein of pharmaceutical interest. After the 

process, the plants are grown for approximately one week, to permit expression of 

the relevant proteins and then are harvested. The relevant proteins are then extracted. Under this program different species of tobacco plants are being evaluated 

for suitability. Evaluation of the plants includes optimization of protein production, 

as well as the cost of producing relevant protein. 

Ricin, considered an important biological threat agent, is found only in castor 

beans (Ricinus communis). The castor bean is dangerous as a biological agent due 

to its extreme toxicity, the worldwide availability of the castor bean and the toxin 

is relatively simple to purify from castor-oil manufacturing waste. The seed pulp left 

over from pressing the castor oil contains, on average, about 5% by weight of ricin. 

However, despite ricin’s importance as a biological weapon, it also may have medical 

use. These include the treatment of cancer and as an adjuvant for mucosal vaccines. 

Although ricin is only found in castor beans, a similar toxin to ricin, abrin, is 

found in seeds of a plant called the rosary pea or jequirity (Abrus precatorius). 

Abrin, however, is not known to have been used as a biological weapon. 

Under the CBDP, DTRA currently has on-going research programs to develop prophylactic agents (i.e., vaccines) against ricin. A ricin vaccine candidate is presently 

planned to undergo early safety (phase I) trials. Additionally, we are managing research aimed at identifying small molecule inhibitors for use as anti-ricin therapeutic agents. However, our effort is focused on the conduct of medical countermeasures to important biological and chemical threat agents. It is not directed toward modification of castor bean plants or other agriculturally related projects. 

Therefore, we are unable to definitively comment whether efforts are underway to 

produce seeds not containing ricin. 

LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF VACCINES

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

I have two major questions. One is I am very interested in longterm consequences of immunization on several levels. The rising 

autism in this country is one of my concerns, and no one seems to 

be able to understand why this is happening. I am wondering from 

the immunization of our soldiers and the numbers of immunizations that you have been responsible for, what are the long-term 

consequences of those? Do you have any time series studies regarding the types of immunizations, and then do you do profiles down 

the road, do you study what happens to these soldiers, to their families, to their children? 

Dr. KILPATRICK. There aren’t any epidemiological studies that 

are designed to look at that in specific as far as long-term outcome 

of vaccines. We do have a Millennium Cohort Study going on that 

is a 22-year study looking at service members’ health, and it would 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
419 

include what kind of vaccines they have received. All of that is part 

of their medical record. It would look at their health outcome over, 

as I said, the 20-year period. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Doctor, do you study their children? 

Dr. KILPATRICK. That study is really focused on the service members that ask questions about their children, but it doesn’t have 

studies on their children, no. 

Ms. KAPTUR. So you are telling me that of the immunization of 

our Armed Forces that there are no long-term studies done of the 

consequences across generations? 

Dr. KILPATRICK. To design a study to answer specifically the vaccine effect is a part of multiple other issues that may be part of 

that exposure of that person. And then subsequently to children 

would be a study that would be extremely difficult to design. I don’t 

think we have ever done that with any vaccine long-term. We have 

safety studies and we certainly have studies looking at vaccines in 

a shorter term, but I think when you take a look at a 20-year effect, those are obviously complex studies that would take tremendous power and design to be able to sort out multiple factors that 

may contribute to either spouse or children medical health outcomes. 

VACCINATIONS OF SERVICE MEMBERS

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. Well, we have spent since 2001 $40 billion 

on biodefense, and it would seem to me that—what immunizations 

are our soldiers getting on a regular basis now? 

Dr. KILPATRICK. On a regular basis, they are getting much as the 

American public gets: diphtheria, tetanus, making sure that they 

are up to date with polio, making sure their measles and mumps 

are up to date. And then the seasonal flu vaccine is given to people 

on a regular basis. So that is the compilation. In some threat areas, 

a meningococcal vaccine could be used much as we are doing at college campuses when there is an outbreak of meningitis. 

Ms. KAPTUR. What about those deployed to Iraq, initially and 

now, are they getting different vaccines? 

Dr. KILPATRICK. It is really the same vaccines; smallpox and the 

anthrax are the two vaccines that are theater specific. 

Ms. KAPTUR. So they are continuing to get those, the anthrax 

even now? 

Dr. KILPATRICK. Yes, going to theater, yes. 

Ms. KAPTUR. And back in the 1990s our soldiers never got anthrax, did they? Did they get them back in the first Persian Gulf 

War? 

Dr. KILPATRICK. In the Gulf War, Persian Gulf War, there were 

some individuals, and I think the number is around 5,000, who did 

receive anthrax vaccines, yes. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Okay. Have we ever done any studies on long-term 

consequences on those soldiers? 

Dr. KILPATRICK. Not those specific soldiers. We did not have the 

accurate recordkeeping you would like to see in place. Some people’s records indicated they got vaccine A and others there was no 

such indication done. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
420 

VACCINE STOCKPILE

Ms. KAPTUR. Finally, could you answer this question? If you were 

with Katie Couric on Evening News and you were asked, the American people have spent $400 billion on biodefense since 2001, tell 

the American people what they have gotten for their money, what 

would you say? 

Mr. ROBINSON. From the biodefense area I think that we have 

enough smallpox vaccine for all of us and twice over in fact. For 

anthrax vaccine we are reaching our goals of 75. We are working 

toward that. We are about a third of the way through that. For 

other red nuke agents—— 

Ms. KAPTUR. Seventy-five million people? 

Mr. ROBINSON. That is correct. For the red nuclear threats we 

have in our stockpiles at the strategic national stockpile agents for 

a number of different things; Prussian blue, potassium iodide, 

DTPA. That would be the amount that would be required for that 

kind of threat. There are other things that we are moving as we 

go forward toward reaching our goals over the next several years. 

Mr. BISHOP. Will the gentlelady yield? 

Ms. KAPTUR. I would be pleased to yield to the gentleman. 

Mr. BISHOP. Did I understand you to say that you are one-third 

of the goal of 75 million? 

Mr. ROBINSON. We have about 28.5 million doses. 

Mr. BISHOP. So you don’t have 75 million, you have one-third? 

Mr. ROBINSON. That is correct. The key there is that 25 million 

people is what we want to protect. 

Ms. KAPTUR. And in your opinion what do you think are the most 

serious current threats facing our Nation from a biodefense standpoint? 

Mr. ROBINSON. From our observations and also with our threat 

determinations the ones that I have already listed are still on the 

table that we have to be very concerned about. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Smallpox, anthrax? 

Mr. ROBINSON. Smallpox and anthrax are at the top of the list. 

Botulinum. 

Ms. KAPTUR. What about ricin? 

Mr. ROBINSON. Ricin is one of the threats that is on the top and 

that there are antitoxins available for that. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Rothman. 

FUTURE THREATS

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am wondering if you 

gentlemen from both panels could walk me through, please, the detection and prevention aspects of this whole business. I think General Reeves said that we have taken off the table anthrax and 

smallpox, and that is quite a big statement. But how are we surveying the battlefields or the other places around the world where 

we might anticipate these things emanating from? So if you could 

give me that scenario, gentlemen, that would be great. 

Dr. KILPATRICK. I think General Reeves is the best to answer. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And obviously it is related to, and I know this is 

an open hearing, but related to where we are guessing or our 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
421 

knowledge base as to where these threats are coming from. What 

countries are producing the scientists, where are they going and 

where is this information going? 

General REEVES. I understand, sir. The direct answer is twofold. 

We do it through both medical surveillance, as well as through active detection on the battlefield, and I am speaking now to the Department of Defense forces. Medical surveillance obviously is going 

to look for infection in our troop populations. In terms of our biodetectors we actually physically put detectors on the battlefield to 

try to identify what the specific threats are. The larger issue of 

those areas that we might be going into, but yet we have no access 

to, is going to be based on intelligence. And either what we have 

been able to derive through intelligence and identify what we know 

they may be working on in terms of a potential capability, or it 

may be what we know are diseases that are already endemic in 

that particular part of the world. 

The particular challenge to our intelligence community for the biological threat is that the same facilities that can be used for good 

to make vaccines, those same large fermenters that you need to 

make vaccines, can be used for evil. They can be used to make a 

biological threat. So it is a very challenging area to be able to identify exactly what is going on, which is unlike the chemical or the 

nuclear threat, which has a good series of indicators associated 

with it. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. I am assuming then that you can vouch for a robust, active and conscientious program on the part of our intelligence folks to be aggressively looking out for these things? 

General REEVES. Absolutely, sir. And I will tell you that my office and Dr. Galloway’s office works very closely with the intelligence community. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And are we working with the Department of 

Homeland Security on discovering these various biological and 

chemical—I’m sorry? 

Mr. DICKS. Threat assessments. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Outside of the U.S. borders and at the U.S. borders? 

General REEVES. Yes, sir, we are. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. With Homeland Security? 

General REEVES. Yes, sir, we are. We work very closely with the 

Department of Homeland Security. They identify a prioritized list 

of threat agents, both chemical and biological. We develop our list 

based on guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and our intelligence community. And we actually compare those lists to see 

where there is commonality in what we need to do to develop countermeasures or identification techniques. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And why are anthrax and smallpox off the table? 

In what sense did you mean that? 

General REEVES. In the military we have the advantage of being 

able to anticipate the threat and therefore vaccinate our soldiers, 

sailors, airmen, and marines. And so in the sense of saying that it 

helps take the aces off the table, what I was trying to convey was 

the idea that since we have the luxury, and I put that in quotes, 

of being able to prepare our Armed Forces, unlike a civilian popuVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:40 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00421 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
422 

lation, that we can anticipate that and therefore reduce those specific threats. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And a question if I may for Dr. Tether, who I believe said something on the order now we can discover a vaccine 

for new bugs quickly, you said that with some great pride and almost as eureka, we discovered this and we can do it now in a matter of weeks. In this open hearing what can you tell us to give us 

confidence as to the nature of this breakthrough that should give 

us confidence? 

Dr. TETHER. Well, it is not just one breakthrough. It is a bunch 

of many things that have gone on over the last 10 years we have 

been working on the problem. What I would rather do is why don’t 

I take it for the record. And I could actually be more precise to you 

as to exactly what are the things that we have done and why that 

statement is true. 

[The information follows:] 

I appreciate the opportunity to clarify my remarks to the Committee regarding 

the development of new vaccines and how DARPA is working to change the entire 

paradigm of defense against biological threats. 

We face a daunting problem in developing defenses against biological attack. 

Strategies that attempt to use today’s technologies and methods to meet future, potential biological warfare threats are seriously and inherently flawed technically, 

and would be prohibitively expensive. First, it is nearly impossible to predict what 

threats might emerge two decades into the future, particularly with the emergency 

of ‘‘synthetic biology,’’ which has now demonstrated the synthesis of an entire bacterial genome from raw chemicals alone. Second, from the moment a new pathogen 

is first identified—either a weapons agent or a naturally emerging pathogen—today’s technology and methods require at least 15 years to discover, develop, and 

manufacture large quantities of an effective therapy. It would be untenable and exorbitantly costly to attempt to ‘‘cover the bases’’ by performing the extensive research and development required to deal with a wide range of potential threats, and 

then stockpile, maintain, and indefinitely renew population-significant quantities of 

vaccines or other therapeutics just in case one or more of those specific threats 

might emerge. 

Over the past 10 years, DARPA has supported research to change this paradigm 

by creating technologies to shrink the time from first pathogen emergence to the 

production of millions of doses of effective vaccines/therapeutics to sixteen weeks or 

less—in sharp contrast to the 15 years or more that it takes today. To achieve this 

goal, DARPA has divided the required research into the technical areas depicted in 

the development timeline in Figure 1: 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
423 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1541 46476E.067
424 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1542 46476E.068
425 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1543 46476E.069
426 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Okay. And is it appropriate to, or can you talk 

about the sources of the scientific knowledge? I am assuming it is 

Russia, North Korea, but you tell me. Where is the knowledge base 

coming from, or is it so easily disseminated on the Internet that 

now it is everywhere, to create these sources of threats; biological, 

chemical or radiological to us? 

General REEVES. Well, staying with the biological threat for just 

a moment, sir. Of course we have the traditional threats of naturally occurring disease. We have certain emerging threats. And you 

heard a moment ago talking about pandemic flu, SARS, drug resistant tuberculosis. We have enhanced threats where people can 

do what is referred to as bioprospecting. They go out and look for 

particularly virulent strains of some particular threat. And then we 

have what you heard Dr. Galloway speaking of earlier, which are 

the so-called advance threats. And these are the genetically engineered or genetically modified threats. And what I would simply 

use as a matter of illustration is that the kinds of things that were 

done in genetic engineering only a few years ago by postgraduate 

doctoral students are today being done in colleges and high schools. 

The rapid advance of biotechnology and the development of genetic, 

the tools of genetic engineering, are very widespread through both 

our university system as well as through the Internet. And that 

concerns us greatly for the future. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And, again, please assure me, unless you can’t 

honestly, that the Department of Homeland Security is aware of 

the ubiquitousness, if there is such a word, of the potential threat 

here in the United States for that kind of bad conduct? 

General REEVES. They are, sir. And we do work closely with the 

Department of Homeland Security across all of our programs, not 

only pharmaceutical, but also in detection and protection programs 

to share common technology. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. My chairman is smiling. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

CONTINUITY OF VACCINE STOCKPILE

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The committee understands that JAC has recently canceled the future procurements, 

and back to anthrax, of the FDA approved anthrax vaccine and 

that you plan to rely solely on HHS for procurement of the vaccine 

doses that are needed for future vaccinations of our military personnel. Since DoD has successfully managed this contract in the 

past for assuring a continued supply of vaccine, what assurances 

do you have from HHS that they will maintain your supply chain, 

that they will give DoD first priority for vaccine doses in the stockpile and assure that there won’t be an interruption in the supply 

for DoD if HHS were to draw down its vaccine stockpile during an 

emergency? And what assurances has HHS provided DoD that it 

will acquire the additional doses of thorax to replace the doses that 

are provided to DoD, as well as the other doses that have expiring 

shelflives? And the final part of that is when will HHS have a new 

contract for increasing the number of FDA-licensed vaccine doses 

to reach that 75 million goal? 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
427 

Dr. KILPATRICK. Well, I can start, and I will let Dr. Robinson finish the answer, because it really was a joint agreement as we went 

into this saying that this just logically makes sense instead of trying to run two different contracts and being in competition. We 

asked how do we work this together and how do we do it concurrently. I think all the issues that you raised were parts of that 

agreement that was clearly spelled out. I think that as we look at 

how we manage that, we are both very confident that DoD’s needs 

will always be met, that there won’t be any issue on that. And I 

think it comes from the production of— 

Mr. BISHOP. Let me interrupt you just a second. Mr. Frelinghuysen suggested, with probably good reason, that HHS is a little 

bit slow in its performance. 

Dr. KILPATRICK. Well, again, I think this is an agreement where 

the two organizations have really spelled out all the details so that 

DoD is very confident that our supply will continue to be met. I 

know HHS has continued to work on what they are looking at in 

the stockpile. But the efficiencies of scale and the contracting and 

I think moving this forward as we are looking at the potential for 

even new vaccines being developed in the future, I think that is 

really where this agreement is headed, not just for today, but looking into production capabilities in the future. 

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you, Dr. Kilpatrick. I want to echo what 

he said, and what he said is absolutely true in that the different 

elements that you presented to us were in that agreement, and 

that HHS is moving forward with the next one this year to procure 

more of the vaccine. And as head of the pan flu program we moved 

it expeditiously and we will move forward with BARDA expeditiously on all our threats, not just pan flu. 

Mr. BISHOP. When is the 75 million going to be reached? 

Mr. ROBINSON. We see that as not only—we are buying what capacity is there right now. 

Mr. BISHOP. I am sorry? 

Mr. ROBINSON. We are buying what capacity that they can make 

right now, and will continue to do that. We have the advanced development of new products coming on. We will be awarding contracts for the RPA. 

Mr. BISHOP. Let me repeat myself. When will the 75 million be 

reached? That is as in the date or an expected date? 

Mr. ROBINSON. We would like for the record to give you the 

timelines on that in specific numbers over the next several years, 

how much we would actually get for each year, if we could do that, 

sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Lewis, do you have anything additional? 

Mr. LEWIS. No. 

UNFUNDED PRIORITIES

Mr. MURTHA. Let me make a couple comments here, that having 

the staff from HHS is so important. I understand last year it was 

$870 million which got lost in between the supplemental domestic 

spending, and so forth. I think you need to tell both our staffs what 

that $870 million would have done. I think it looks to me like the 

cell research is the key to moving this thing forward faster, beVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:40 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00427 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
428 

cause if you can produce the research using cells rather than eggs 

you reduce the time it takes in the research. 

And third, the manufacturing, which is the customer. So I think 

we need to hear from you how we solve these problems or what we 

can do to help in defense. I don’t know that we can do anything, 

but I think you can see the concern of the committee about us trying to help. But the key thing is what will the $870 million, and 

my staff says $1.2 billion may have been needed to stabilize this 

thing. We don’t want to wait until there is a damn epidemic and 

then rush around and spend a lot of money and not solve the problem. A lot of people die in the meantime. As some people say, the 

valley of death means between research and manufacturing. So we 

need you to tell the staff so we get some conception of if we can 

help. We may not be able to help, but we need to have an idea of 

what we can do. 

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, if you would yield on that. I talk with 

my colleague to my right from New Jersey about a lot of things. 

He doesn’t discuss his big pharmaceutical companies with me too 

often. But I do understand from both of my colleagues from New 

Jersey there is not a heck of a lot of profit made by these companies by way of vaccine production, but nonetheless they do have capacity. Further, it is suggested that if we do have a challenge relative to being able to produce huge volumes in X and Y, it is likely 

a relatively minor investment relative to an existing capacity, 

wherever it might exist, but it would be much more logical as long 

as the government had access, much more logical than creating a 

huge facility somewhere where we might have part-time employees 

turn on the lights once in a while and wait for the emergency to 

occur. 

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes, sir. First, I want to thank you, because even 

though avian influenza and pandemic influenza is not on the airways every moment like it was a year ago, your urgency is shared 

by us, and I mean me personally. Relative to the $870 million, that 

money was to go for advanced development of the cell-based vaccines to get those towards licensure of the products over the next 

2 years. Also for recombinant vaccines, which would be able to 

produce the product in about half the time that cell or egg-based 

would, so that was one of the things. For advanced development of 

new antiviral drugs that—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Go over that again. The $870 million would reduce—what would it do? 

Mr. ROBINSON. The second element of that would be for recombinant vaccine development where they could actually produce the 

vaccine in one-half the time that we see with the standard eggbased and the new cell-based vaccine. 

In a pandemic—let me just walk you through this, in a pandemic 

we see that egg and cell-based facilities would be able to provide 

the vaccine at 20 to 23 weeks after the onset of a pandemic. We 

have walked through this, we have compressed it as much as we 

possibly can, and that is really what the manufactures and we 

know that it can happen. The recombinant vaccines, however, provided an opportunity to break that down to about 12 weeks. And 

so at HHS we are moving forward with, in fact we awarded contracts this year, to advance development of those types of vaccines, 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
429 

such as recombinant proteins, recombinant DNA that would be 

able to have vaccines in half the time that we would expect for egg 

and cell-based. 

Mr. MURTHA. But yet back so we understand. The $870 million 

would in 2 years reduce the time it takes to do the research towards cell-based versus eggs and consequently reduce the time it 

takes to produce and get through the system faster? 

Mr. ROBINSON. For the cell-based it actually gives us the entire 

manufacturing capacity that we need to produce the 600 million 

doses that we would need for a pandemic. In addition to that, we 

would have recombinant vaccines that would be able to come online 

much sooner during a pandemic, about half the time. 

Mr. MURTHA. What would the shelflife be for the $600 million 

doses? 

Mr. ROBINSON. For the 600 million doses right now what we have 

seen is influenza vaccines normally have not been allowed to go 

much longer than a year. And what we are seeing right now is that 

as we keep our vaccines in bulk form, not in the final vials but in 

bulk, we are seeing 2 and 3 years and going forward that these 

vaccines are stable. 

Mr. MURTHA. And how long does it take—all right, you do the 

research. How long does it take to get through the FDA system? 

Mr. ROBINSON. That still takes anywhere to go from the time 

that you file an IND, to go into the clinic and try to demonstrate 

safety and efficacy until the time that you are licensed, the best 

that we can do is about 4 to 5 years. 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, see, this is why this is urgent. I mean, we 

cannot afford—— 

Mr. ROBINSON. And we have a way of ameliorating that timeline, 

and that is the Department has an authorization called emergency 

usage authorization. If we see a product that has been shown to 

be safe and it has some efficacy but it hasn’t been licensed yet, the 

Secretary can make a declaration that that product could be used. 

Mr. MURTHA. But it is going to take some time to do that in 

order to do it safe. 

Mr. ROBINSON. No, we have those actually programmed such 

that for pandemic influenza that the minute that it occurs that 

that specific product would be mobilized and could be made and 

then moved out and be given to an individual. 

Mr. MURTHA. Give this committee an idea of what we are talking 

about. Give us an idea. You got the cell-based research. How long 

does it take to get it to the market, to get it produced, researched 

and produced into the market? 

Mr. ROBINSON. For cell-based 20 to 23 weeks from the time a 

pandemic occurs. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEWIS. Excuse me, could I follow on that? 

Mr. MURTHA. Sure. 

Mr. LEWIS. I am presuming the timeline you just suggested included approval by the FDA? 

Mr. ROBINSON. In the cell and egg-based where we are moving 

toward is if they are not already a licensed vaccine, because influenza vaccines are licensed, then we would use the emergency use 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
430 

authorizations which we will already have in place as we go forward, so that part would not be any problem. 

Mr. LEWIS. Is there full cooperation with the FDA for a process 

like this? 

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes, sir, they are part of the process, absolutely. 

Mr. LEWIS. And did that involve essentially setting aside clinical 

trials or what? 

Mr. ROBINSON. For the pandemic vaccine there would not be clinical trials because the vaccines would be so similar to the ones that 

are already licensed that we would be able to use those under 

emergency usage authorization. 

Mr. LEWIS. We are talking about threats that are much different 

than the well-established threats here potentially. And so what we 

are really trying to do is have you help us with developing processes for responding that will be sensible in terms of review by organizations like the FDA, but at the same time be able to be timely. We don’t want this to be a population control program. It is— 

well, I would be very interested in having DARPA help us and you 

all help us know where there are major problems in facilitating 

these timelines. If you are not getting cooperation from the private 

sector, for example, in a timely and responsive way we would like 

to know that. If there are hangups with territory in an FDA location, we would like to know that. The interplay between the universities. I would think major universities around the country are 

doing research in a variety of mix of these areas, and what we 

don’t know about all that and the way we are coordinating those 

research efforts, I don’t know anything about them, but we sure 

should. 

Anyway, I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me tell you, we want to help you solve this 

problem. That is the key. Mr. Dicks, do you have a question? 

ANTHRAX VACCINE

Mr. DICKS. Yes. Dr. Robinson, when was BARDA created? 

Mr. ROBINSON. In 2006, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Now, as I understand it, I want to correct the record 

here, the number—how many threat assessments have come over 

from the Department of Homeland Security to HHS? 

Mr. ROBINSON. It is my recollection that there are 13. Yes, 13. 

Mr. DICKS. And they have all been, whatever you do, you approve them or agree with them or concur in them, that has all been 

done, isn’t that correct? 

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. That is good. Now, there was a problem with the first 

anthrax contract that went out to a company, Vaxgen. It is like 

$800 million, and we got nothing. 

Mr. ROBINSON. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Did we spend all the money? 

Mr. ROBINSON. No, sir. $1.5 million was all that was spent on 

that contract. 

Mr. DICKS. $1.5 million, that is good. Now, understanding you 

have developed several different anthrax approaches, is that not 

correct? 

Mr. ROBINSON. That is correct, sir. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
431 

Mr. DICKS. Can you tell us about that? These are contracts that 

have just been let. They are smaller. 

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes, sir. One of the ways to go about this is with 

the advanced development. There are small broad agency announcements where we have awarded these contracts on a number 

of different types of mixed generation anthrax vaccines. What we 

see is those going forward, and we know not all of them are going 

to make it, but by advancing development paradigm we can take 

those that look really promising and move those toward licensure 

and then those will become eligible, because we want multiple 

products there in the stockpile for that threat. 

Mr. DICKS. Now, I asked you about the bird flu vaccine. You said 

that—is there some new strain of bird flu that we don’t have a vaccine for? 

Mr. ROBINSON. No, sir. What happens is as normal human influenza does is it genetically changes slightly. And what we have seen 

is that is exactly what happens. In HHS we monitor this through 

CDC and the World Health Organization. And our stockpiles actually reflect to the year, actually to several months ago, what is actually out there and circulating as the biggest threats. And we will 

continue that monitoring of different avian influenza virus, not 

only H5N1 but H7 and H9 viruses also. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Rothman has a question. 

SECURITY THREATS

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wonder if this question is for the Chair or for the panel. I understand and appreciate 

all the testimony about naturally occurring diseases and things like 

that. But being this is the Defense Subcommittee I am concerned 

about and we are concerned about adequate funding to address security threats to the United States. How do we assure ourselves, 

Mr. Chairman, that the intelligence community, A, has the incentive and, B, have the resources to be looking for these things, these 

problems and source of problems overseas? That old expression, an 

ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, I think is applicable. 

So I don’t know whether this panel can testify to that or not. 

Mr. MURTHA. I don’t think that this is as much intelligence. I 

think we are really talking about the possibility of a flu epidemic 

rather than anthrax. Anthrax of course, as we all well know, is not 

contagious. So it is a different situation. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. If the gentleman will yield. The genetically altered threats that the General was talking about and Dr. Galloway 

apparently are the most frightening because there is so much unknown there and we don’t have adequate ways to address the unknown. So it would seem that that would be the biggest threat to 

our Nation. 

Mr. MURTHA. Do you think you are getting adequate intelligence? 

Are they paying attention to this? Is this something we have any 

access to? 

General REEVES. We do, sir. But clearly given the very nature of 

being able to genetically modify an organism the potentials are almost endless. And so part of what Dr. Galloway and the chem-biodefense program is doing is looking at those techniques that we can 

use generically to identify virulence in a threat so that we can very 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
432 

quickly recognize what that genetic modification is, how do we 

produce countermeasure and—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Did you say before the hearing started it takes up 

to a year sometimes to determine this? 

General REEVES. It certainly could, sir. 

EMERGENCY USAGE OF VACCINES

Mr. MURTHA. Okay. I have one last question. How many times 

have we used the emergency usage authorization? 

Mr. ROBINSON. To my knowledge, sir, we have used it at least 

a couple of times already. And we have preset documents that are 

ready to go on different threats going forward. 

Mr. MURTHA. No adverse effect to the public? 

Mr. ROBINSON. For those that we know, we only would put those 

that have a good safety record going forward, that we feel confident 

that they would not have severe adverse effects. 

Mr. DICKS. For the military or is it for the civilians? Is it for military or civilians? 

Mr. ROBINSON. We know for civilians we do have that authorization to do that, the EUAs yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. You can do it for civilians as well as the military? 

Mr. ROBINSON. That is correct. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you. During the first panel I 

mentioned some of the work that was being done at the University 

of South Florida when the subject of bird flu came up, called to my 

attention. They did a tremendous amount of research and work, 

not only nationally but internationally, on the issue of bird flu. And 

if you haven’t talked to them you might want to do that, because 

I think they might have a lot to offer. 

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you very much. The committee is adjourned. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Rothman and the 

answers thereto follow:] 

Question. Dr. Galloway: The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 

which reported out January 31, 2008, emphasized in their findings the need for federal readiness to respond to national emergencies such as use of weapons of mass 

destruction. What current programs are underway at the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency to provide medical response for emergency treatment of victims, in the event 

of another terrorist attack? 

Answer. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) conducts science and technology research directed at improving medical response in treating victims of terrorist threat agents by developing new prophylaxis and therapeutics for chemical, 

biological and radiological agents. Our research takes these potential medical products to the point of readiness to file for an Investigational New Drug (IND) application with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Further development that seeks 

to result in gaining an FDA license for these products falls within the domain of 

the Joint Program Executive Office for Chem-Bio Defense. Although the efforts are 

oriented primarily at capabilities of interest to the war fighter, the products and 

methods ensuing from this research have applicability to the public sector as well. 

To this aim, DTRA attempts to coordinate, at multiple levels, with Department of 

Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) offices to avoid duplication and to ensure that appropriate threats are addressed by our research programs. 

Countermeasures Against Biological Agents 

Research focuses on developing pre- and post-exposure medical countermeasures 

effective against biological warfare (BW) threat agents. These activities focus on preventing disease, or reducing the lethal and functional incapacitating effects of an 

agent. The projects managed by DTRA range from basic research to more mature 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
433 

research efforts. Basic studies are focused on characterizing pathogenic mechanisms, 

host immune responses to pathogens, and identification of therapeutic and vaccine 

targets. Applied and advanced studies are aimed at designing and evaluating novel 

therapeutics and the generation and testing of novel vaccine candidates. 

THERAPEUTICS

Therapeutics against bacterial agents 

The objective of the task area is to develop therapeutic modalities that reduce the 

lethal and functional incapacitating effects of bacterial BW threat agents. Specific 

agents of current interest include Yersinia pestis, Francisella tularensis, 

Burkholderia mallei, Burkholderia pseudomallei, and Bacillus anthracis. DTRA 

funded research supports the testing and evaluation of conventional antimicrobials 

in order to provide actionable information regarding prophylaxis or treatment options to healthcare providers in the event of an attack. Research in this area also 

includes the development of next generation antimicrobials capable of providing 

novel treatment options in the event of an attack or outbreak with an antibiotic resistant strain. 

Therapeutics against toxin agents 

DTRA also conducts efforts aimed at the development of first in class therapeutic 

modalities against toxins. The anticipated effects of the use of this therapeutics are 

the amelioration of the lethal and functional incapacitating effects of specific toxin 

agents. Currently, primary focus is directed toward discovery and therapeutic development efforts directed at botulinum neurotoxins (BoNT) serotypes A–G, ricin, and 

staphylococcal enterotoxin. 

Therapeutics against viral agents 

Research is also currently being conducted in the development of therapeutic modalities targeted against aerosolized viral BW threat agents. Resources are currently 

primarily applied toward development of therapeutics against filovirus (i.e., 

Marburg and Ebola virus), alphavirus, and orthopox virus infection. DTRA funded 

research is supporting the development of ST–246, a novel smallpox antiviral, that 

could be used in the event of a variola (smallpox) attack. ST–246 is safe in humans 

and is 100% protective in primates that have been infected with the virus. Efforts 

are also directed at developing novel antiviral therapies against CDC category A 

and B viral biothreat agents, especially viral encephalitis and hemorrhagic fever viruses. Efforts that support FDA licensure of these products are paramount to deploying timely and effective medical countermeasures. 

VACCINES

Vaccines against bacterial agents 

The program objective is to develop vaccines that protect individuals against predicted battlefield doses of aerosolized Category A and B bacterial biothreat agents. 

The program conducts basic research to identify mechanisms of bacterial pathogenesis and host immune responses. Studies are aimed at identifying protective antigenic epitopes against Category A and B bacterial agents that may be incorporated 

into an effective vaccine candidate. Applied research involves testing vaccine candidates in tissue culture and small animal models for immunogenicity/potency. If results are promising, the candidates are further tested for their ability to protect laboratory animals against challenges with the corresponding bacterial pathogen. Vaccine formulations include recombinant proteins, and the use of novel platforms to 

express target antigens. Past successes include efficacious vaccines against Bacillus 

anthracis and Yersinia pestis (i.e., anthrax and plague). The program is currently 

working on vaccines against Burkholderia sp., Brucella sp. and Francisella 

tularensis. The program also is aimed at identifying protective antigenic epitopes 

against bacterial biothreat agents that could be incorporated into a multi-agent vaccine platform, and the development of alternative delivery methods. The program’s 

emphasis is the down-selection of identified vaccine candidates for further, advanced 

development. 

Vaccines against viral agents 

As for viral agents, the long-term objective is to develop vaccines that protect individuals against predicted battlefield doses of aerosolized Category A and B viral biothreat agents. Basic studies are aimed at understanding mechanisms of viral pathogenesis and host response, in order to identify protective antigens that may be incorporated into vaccine formulations. Currently, the major thrusts in this area are 

the generation of vaccines that protect against the filoviruses (e.g., Ebola and 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
434 

Marburg) and alphaviruses [e.g., Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (VEE), Western 

Equine Encephalitis virus (WEE) and Eastern Equine Encephalitis virus (EEE)]. 

The program’s goal is to develop a vaccine against each viral agent, either as a single or preferably multi-agent (e.g., VEE/EEE/WEE) formulation. The vaccine platforms currently being tested include inactive viruses, naked DNA, non-replicating 

viral vectors, and virus-like particles. Again, the focus is the down-selection of vaccine candidates for further advanced development. 

Vaccines against toxins 

DTRA is also generating vaccines against Category A and B toxin threats. A safe 

and efficacious vaccine against Botulinum neurotoxin (serotypes A/B) was generated 

and transitioned to the advanced developer in 1999. Likewise, a vaccine against 

Staphylococcal enterotoxin B was also developed and is scheduled for an upcoming 

phase I clinical trial. Currently, the program is evaluating a vaccine against Ricin, 

which should enter phase I clinical trials in FY09/10. 

Countermeasures Against Chemical Agents 

An important area of DTRA’s research portfolio includes projects aimed at developing medical countermeasures to chemical agents, including non-traditional agents. 

Some DTRA efforts are directed at elucidating the mechanisms of chemical agent 

etiology with the anticipation that identify new targets for next-generation therapeutics. However, a priority is given to testing and development of prophylactic, 

therapeutic and adjuncts to chemical agents. In addition to development of modalities of treatment for chemical agents, projects include developing state-of-the-art 

laboratory/fieldable methods that detect exposure to chemical agents, such as nerve 

agents and vesicants, in clinical samples. 

Significant efforts are aimed at developing catalytic BioScavenger or other than 

butyrylcholinesterase BioScavenger prophylactics that provide protection against all 

organophosphorous nerve agents. Additionally, medical therapeutics are being developed for the protection of the nervous system against nerve agent threats. Some of 

the medical countermeasures being developed here include neuroprotectants, 

anticonvulsants, and improved cholinesterase reactivators. DTRA also manages 

projects aimed at developing therapeutic strategies to prevent or minimize injuries 

caused by vesicant agents, namely sulfur mustard. Emphasis is placed on all major 

routes of exposure to include the integument and ocular tissues as well as the respiratory and systemic systems. 

Countermeasures Against Radiological and Nuclear Exposure 

Currently, no licensed non-toxic pharmaceutical agents or diagnostic capabilities 

are suitable for use in military operational environments for penetrating ionizing radiation. An aminothiol compound, amifostine, is FDA approved for use in patients 

receiving chemotherapy or radiation therapy, but amifostine’s performance degrading toxic side effects prohibit its use in healthy patients. Other pharmacologic 

agents are available to physicians off-label, such as hematopoietic cytokines 

(NeupogenTM) for treating bone marrow injury. Additionally, antibiotics are commonly used to treat the infectious sequelae of radiological injuries, but they must 

be selected appropriately to effectively treat exogenous and endogenous systemic infections while not affecting beneficial intestinal normal microfluora. 

DTRA’s research efforts in this area are aimed at preventing or mitigating radiation-induced injury. The focus of DTRA’s efforts, therefore, is to develop broad-spectrum medical radioprotectants against Acute Radiation Syndrome (ARS) and Delayed Effects of Acute Radiation Exposure (DEARE), leading to chronic radiation 

damage (e.g., fibrosis and mutagenesis). These radioprotectants are envisioned to be 

used prophylactically and/or therapeutically (i.e., post-irradiation exposure). The development of radioprotectants (prophylaxis or pretreatment) is unique to DoD strategy, and, as such, DoD is the only governmental agency developing medical countermeasures to prevent against ionizing radiation before exposure. 

Specifically, countermeasures under development focus on the effective treatment 

of respiratory and gastrointestinal systems following radiological exposures. These 

studies are designed to support FDA requirements for approval. The approaches include medical countermeasures such as anti-oxidants, anti-apoptotic agents, 

decorporation agents, and lung/GI rescue of cellular components against ARS and 

DEARE. Although novel approaches are sought, more mature, promising product 

candidates at later stages of development that clearly demonstrate viability for use 

in this area are emphasized. Additionally, chromosomal biomarkers aimed at development of biodosimetry technology for diagnosis of patients following radiological exposure is conducted. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
435 

Diagnostic Technology 

DTRA also manages programs directed at developing new diagnostic technologies. 

The ultimate goal in this area is to field complete diagnostic systems (e.g., test platform assays and reagents) that will confirm health threats and rapidly diagnose exposure to, or disease caused by, biological warfare agents. The current program provides support for established programs, including the Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System, Next Generation Diagnostic System, as well as the 

Critical Reagents Program. In these regards, guidelines have been established and 

standardized for assessing nucleic acid assays and immunoassays, de novo clinical 

sequencing, and host response biomarkers that provide a decision point for transition from the tech-base to advanced development, leading, eventually, to FDA approval. 

Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative 

The Transformational Medical Technology Initiative (TMTI) is a unique program 

designed to provide an enterprise capability directly geared to support a coordinated, rapid, and effective medical response to all victims in the event of another 

terrorist attack. The overarching goal of TMTI is to provide a sustainable capability 

to rapidly respond to traditional, emerging and genetically modified biological 

threats. TMTI is aimed at protecting the warfighter from biological threats through 

three key performance enablers, which provide proof-of-process and include: 

• Providing broad spectrum medical countermeasures against intracellular 

bacterial pathogens and hemorrhagic fever viruses 

• Developing platform technologies to identify and counter unknown agents 

• Obtaining genetic sequences of threats to enable rapid identification of 

agents and accelerate the development of essential therapeutics. 

The science of countermeasures has long revolved around the notion of prophylaxis or treatment targeting a single organism; TMTI has engaged early research 

to create platforms that support the enterprise by targeting broad spectrum regions 

that will result in broad spectrum therapeutics. The knowledge of the prevalence 

of these regions and the effective blockers will enable rapid response to events and 

threats in the future. The development of these platforms, including threat identification, drug discovery and development, and accelerated manufacture, will speed 

the response necessary for effective consequence management. All of these will be 

done in concert with Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Rothman. 

Questions submitted by Mr. Young and the answers thereto follow:] 

Question. General Reeves. 

Until the development and deployment of the next generation of detectors, the 

possibility exists of being attacked with an unknown biological agent. The use of 

broad-spectrum therapeutics may help to counter the uncertainty of the exact virus 

or strain of virus being used as a weapon. For example, Ribavirin is the preferred 

treatment for certain hemorrhagic fever viral infections, but it is worthless against 

Ebola and Marburg infections. A broad-spectrum therapeutic could work against all 

of them. In fact, in a bioterrorist attack, a broad-spectrum therapeutic could conceivably be used before the actual pathogen had been identified. 

How effective are broad-spectrum therapeutics? What are their drawbacks? Can 

these help alleviate some of the uncertainty? 

Answer. Although we would be delighted to find, develop, and field a true broadspectrum therapeutic that will work against all threat classes, this is highly unlikely, given what we know of pathogenesis and host immune pathways. Our working concept of broad-spectrum therapeutics involves countermeasures that will cross 

at least two threat classes (e.g., a countermeasure that interferes with viral capsid 

formation, a mechanism used by many viral classes). The Transformational Medical 

Technologies Initiative (TMTI) program supports several efforts in this direction. It 

also addresses rapid identification of unknown, newly emergent, or bioengineered 

agents. The Chemical Biological Medical Systems (CBMS) program also addresses 

threats with broad-spectrum agents; for example, our botulinum toxin vaccine will 

protect against two types of botulinum toxin. 

At present, the only truly broad-spectrum therapeutics we have are antibiotics 

with a wide spectrum of action. We have no specific therapeutics other than supportive therapy against threat classes such as the weaponizable viral hemorrhagic 

fevers (e.g., Ebola, Marburg, etc.) or certain intracellular bacteria (e.g., 

Burkholderia, tularaemia, etc.). Clinicians regularly institute broad-spectrum antibiotic therapy before the results of culture and sensitivity are known when patients 

present with what are believed to be bacterial infections. This has been part of daily 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
436 

medical practice for decades. This practice has long proven effective. The drawbacks 

of any therapeutic are the side effects of the medication, as well as the uncertainty 

that may result if we partly treat an infection before we have clearly classified it. 

In theory, broad-spectrum therapeutics not yet developed would share the same 

drawbacks. 

It is not quite accurate to say the Ribavirin is the preferred treatment for certain 

hemorrhagic fever viral infections. Ribavirin is approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) only against hepatitis C. It has indeed been proven effective 

against several other viruses, such as Lassa, including some human experience. But 

it is not approved for these indications. Ribavirin is not effective against Marburg 

and Ebola viruses. Ribavirin is used by the Department of Defense (DoD) as the preferred treatment for Korean hemorrhagic fever. It is used, under an Investigational 

New Drug protocol, which involves informed consent, at the 121 Army Hospital in 

Korea to treat the one to five patients attended to every year. In this case, Ribavirin 

is the preferred DoD treatment. 

Question. Similarly, a major disadvantage with vaccine development for specific 

virus strains is that it could be rendered worthless by a single genetic modification 

to the virus. Because of that fact, there exists the possibility that the military could 

stockpile large amounts of vaccines and therapeutics that could be rendered useless. 

Does the enemy have the sophistication to genetically alter a virus? Is this something we should be more worried about? 

Answer. Let me say first that there is no indication that any terrorist organization has the capability to, or is attempting to, genetically alter viruses. However, 

any nation with an advanced biotechnology industry or capability could conceivably 

genetically alter a virus, potentially rendering vaccines and countermeasures useless. While no nation publicly acknowledges having either an offensive biological 

weapons (BW) program or stockpile, a number of countries, some of which have advanced biotechnology capabilities, are assessed to have some BW capability. This is 

why development of broad-spectrum therapeutics is important to the overall chemical and biological defense program. 

Question. Your recent Senate testimony refers to the use of smallpox vaccine as 

a real achievement in additional readiness for the warfighter. It is my understanding that currently some 20% of our men and women in uniform cannot be vaccinated for a variety of reasons, including contraindications such as eczema, autoimmune diseases, or heart disease. Is there a gap in coverage, in your view? Is the 

Department looking at ways to deal with this? Could options include procurement 

of a therapeutic drug for those who are not vaccinated and become exposed to smallpox? 

Answer. Actually, about 9% of those screened for smallpox vaccination have been 

found medically ineligible. The 9% that were not vaccinated were due to medical exemptions based upon our stringent screening guidelines to identify individuals who 

may be at a higher risk of incurring smallpox vaccine related adverse events. The 

Department of Defense (DoD) leadership balances the benefit of protection against 

a biological attack using smallpox with careful consideration of the potential risks 

of vaccination. If the risk of attack increases, DoD can identify the individuals that 

were exempted from vaccination and reconsider administering the vaccine or remove 

those people from the high threat area. There are no absolute exemptions to smallpox vaccination in a postexposure event. If the smallpox threat materializes, these 

people would be protected by individual or collective protection capabilities that we 

have fielded. 

Additionally, the DoD continues to explore postexposure treatment options, including procurement of therapeutic drugs and the use of a smallpox vaccine that utilizes a weakened form of the viral strain used in the vaccine. If there was a smallpox therapeutic licensed by the Food and Drug Administration for that indication, 

procurement of such a drug would indeed be an option. There are no such drugs 

today, but the government technology base includes researchers who have participated in studies involving two possible candidates, ST–246 and Cidofovir. These 

technology base efforts may mature into advanced development programs, if the results of research efforts attain appropriate technological readiness levels. 

Question. Dr. Kilpatrick. Last year, we heard about a toddler suffering from complications of a smallpox vaccination given to his soldier father. I’m told the child 

is alive and well today after a near fatal experience. Has the Department conducted 

an analysis of this situation, and if so what lessons learned have been gained as 

a result? How does the Department plan to prevent similar situations in the future? 

Answer. The Department of Defense (DoD) investigated the circumstances leading 

to the case and has made changes to the program. The Service member received a 

smallpox vaccine training brief and the smallpox and anthrax tri-fold brochures. In 

addition, he completed the standardized screening form before vaccination, as reVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:40 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046476 PO 00000 Frm 00436 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A476P2.XXX A476P2

jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
437 

quired. The screening health care provider cleared the individual for vaccination 

after reviewing his personal medical history. Although the Service member annotated the screening form to indicate a prior history of eczema and/or atopic dermatitis, the provider cleared him after the consultation with senior physicians at the 

mobilization site. 

The Service member initially reported the adverse event while consulting the Vaccine Healthcare Center, as directed in the pre-vaccination training brief. He reported that his scab separated naturally around day 21, but he continued to take 

the added precaution of keeping the vaccination site covered while in contact with 

family. He reported extensive contact with the child, including sleeping in the same 

bed, wrestling, and bathing. 

The actions taken by DoD to reduce the possibility of a similar case included: 

• Redoubling efforts to ensure quality health care provider training at all vaccine 

administration sites. • Updating educational products, including online videos, live Web casts, and inperson or downloadable presentations. • Holding training sessions at various DoD installations on a rotating basis 

while interacting with as many health care providers as possible. 

Since May 2007, DoD has trained over 500 health care providers involved with 

the DoD smallpox vaccination program. The message that is consistently relayed to 

health care providers is that individuals with contraindicating conditions should be 

excluded from the smallpox vaccination programs. 

In addition, DoD has released an updated clinical policy that includes a change 

in its recommended vaccination site care instructions. Because of this case and the 

potential for micro-shedding of the vaccinia virus following scab separation, the updated policy now directs Service members to continue active site care for 30 days 

after vaccination and until the site is entirely healed. This exceeds the Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention’s recommendation of maintaining the precaution 

until the scab ‘‘falls off on its own (2 to 3 weeks).’’ 

The DoD vaccinated over 180,000 Service members in the year following this incident with no additional serious cases of contact transmission. Since the program 

began in 2002, DoD has screened over 1.7 million people and vaccinated over 1.5 

million people. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Young. 

Questions submitted by Mr. Hobson and the answers thereto follow.] 

INDUSTRIAL BASE/DARPA–UPMC STUDY

Question. General Reeves. What is the current status of our national industrial 

base for developing and manufacturing medical countermeasures and for providing 

surge capacity during crises? Should the DARPA-UPMC (University of Pittsburgh 

Medical Center) study be continued and expanded to find solutions to these issues? 

Answer. Department of Defense (DoD) production strategies address requirements 

for surge capability and industrial base concerns through the use of rated contracts 

with Contract Manufacturing Organizations. Typically, Contract Manufacturing Organizations have multiple manufacturing suites that could be used in the event of 

an emergency to support surge capacity. To address the need for surge capability 

and to ensure availability of product, we have issued Defense Priorities and Allocations System Delivery Order rated contracts for biological countermeasures. This 

rating affords DoD products production priority over unrated orders, including commercial orders. In the event of an emergency, the Defense Production Act would also 

mandate industry to use its resources to fulfill the needs of national defense on a 

priority basis. This Act could be used to require pharmaceutical manufacturers to 

produce biodefense medical countermeasures rather than products normally manufactured in their facilities. There are other production options to prepare for an 

emergency situation that would negate the requirement for surge capacity such as 

producing and storing frozen bulk material that could subsequently be put into 

smaller packages for distribution in the event of an emergency. 

If the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency–University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (DARPA–UPMC) study is continued, it is important that the Government maintain the long-term financial commitment required to sustain the production facility. It is also critical that the assumptions supporting that study be validated, particularly the projection of the number of new advanced development programs starting for both DoD and the Department of Health and Human Services, 

since the number of countermeasures in production in that facility impacts 

sustainment of the facility. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
438 

DRUGS TO TREAT RADIATION EXPOSURE

Question. I am concerned about the military’s commitment to research and development of drugs necessary to treat radiation exposure for our troops. While Homeland Security has a responsibility to address this threat domestically, I believe there 

is a very real threat of the use of a dirty bomb or other crude nuclear device against 

our deployed troops in a tactical situation. What programs are currently underway 

to utilize near-market mature drugs that may provide lifesaving treatment for varying levels of radiation exposure? If the DOD is researching such drugs, what are 

their plans to bring them quickly into service as part of a standard deployment kit? 

Answer. The Department of Defense (DoD) is fully committed to the development 

of life-saving medical radiation countermeasures that will enable warfighters to survive otherwise-lethal radiation injuries. Exposure to radiation results in a complex 

disease state, termed acute radiation syndrome. The DoD and the Department of 

Health and Human Services (HHS) are working together closely to develop a suite 

of medical radiation countermeasures to treat acute radiation syndrome. To minimize the cost, schedule, and program risks of these development efforts, both the 

DoD and the HHS have preferentially selected candidate countermeasures which 

have already completed substantial development. For example, the DoD’s lead medical radiation countermeasure, ProchymalTM, had successfully completed six Phase 

1 or Phase 2 safety studies and initiated a Phase 3 clinical study for a separate indication before being selected by the DoD as a candidate medical radiation countermeasure. Due to the previously completed developmental work performed by the 

contractor, Osiris Therapeutics, Inc., the DoD will be able to field a product years 

sooner than originally estimated. 

Similarly, HHS solicitation for a medical radiation countermeasure considers only 

those candidates for which an Investigational New Drug application has been accepted by the Food and Drug Administration. Acceptance of an Investigational New 

Drug application is a substantial milestone in the drug development pathway and 

is the prerequisite for commencing clinical studies. In coordination with contractor 

efforts to develop and obtain Food and Drug Administration approval for medical 

radiation countermeasures, the Joint Program executive Officer for Chemical and 

Biological Defense coordinates with the Military Services and medical logistics organizations to develop fielding and sustainment plans for medical countermeasures. 

The DoD is leveraging near-market candidate medical radiation countermeasures, 

collaborating closely with HHS parallel efforts, and incorporating fielding and 

sustainment planning early in the development lifecycle to deliver medical radiation 

countermeasures to warfighters as soon as possible. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Hobson.] 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARING
(439) 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1574 here 46476E.070
440 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1575 here 46476E.071
441 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1576 here 46476E.072
442 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1577 here 46476E.073
443 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1578 here 46476E.074
444 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1579 here 46476E.075
445 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1580 here 46476E.076
446 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1581 here 46476E.077
447 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1582 here 46476E.078
448 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1583 here 46476E.079
449 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1584 here 46476E.080
450 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1585 here 46476E.081
451 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1586 here 46476E.082
452 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1587 here 46476E.083
453 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1588 here 46476E.084
454 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1589 here 46476E.085
455 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1590 here 46476E.086
456 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1591 here 46476E.087
457 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1592 here 46476E.088
458 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 1593/1800 here 46476E.089
(i) 

W I T N E S S E S 

Page 

Amos, Lieutenant General J.F ............................................................................... 279 

Bye, Dr. Raymond, Jr .............................................................................................. 451 

Casey, General G.W., Jr .......................................................................................... 1 

Conway, General J.T ............................................................................................... 145 

Galloway, Darrell ..................................................................................................... 325 

Geren, Pete ............................................................................................................... 1 

Johnson, Susan ........................................................................................................ 455 

Kilpatrick, Dr. M.E .................................................................................................. 391 

Lee, R.E .................................................................................................................... 440 

McCullough, Vice Admiral Barry ........................................................................... 279 

Panosian, Claire ....................................................................................................... 445 

Peluso, Karen ........................................................................................................... 455 

Popps, D.G ................................................................................................................ 99 

Reeves, Major General Stephen ............................................................................. 325 

Robinson, Robin ....................................................................................................... 391 

Roughead, Admiral Gary ........................................................................................ 145 

Tether, Tony ............................................................................................................. 325 

Thackrah, John ........................................................................................................ 279 

Thompson, Lieutenant General N.R., III ............................................................... 99 

Winter, D.C .............................................................................................................. 145 

Æ 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with HEARING