(dramatic military music) - [Narrator] The campaigns that led to the fight for the Red October Factory begin with the German invasion of Soviet Russia in 1941 known as Operation Barbarossa. After initial successes, the German advance was halted at the gates of Moscow. The next year, the German high command developed a new plan called Case Blue, which had, as its goal, the seizure of the valuable Russian oil fields in the Caucasus Region. Once again, the German campaign began with great advances. However, the Caucasus offensive soon ground to a halt. And, by mid-September, Stalingrad had become the new major objective for the attacking German forces in southern Russia. On 13 September, 1942, the German Sixth Army under General Friedrich Paulus began its assault on the city itself, which was defended by Lieutenant General Vasily Chuikov, 62nd Army. Within two weeks, the Germans had cleared much of the south and central portions of the city. Although the Soviets stubbornly clung to a few small enclaves. Nonetheless, Paulus considered the center and south fighting to be over and began the fight to take the northern factory district. After a surprisingly rapid and successful assault on the tractor factory on 14 and 15 October, the Germans opened their attack on the Barricade factory on the following day. The attack was more difficult. Taking almost a week for the Germans to clear most of the factory. By 23 October, the Germans could now turn their attention to the Red October Factory. Stalingrad derived its value from the symbolic importance to both sides because of its name. It wasn't strategically or operationally important except as a crossing point for the Volga River. Nor was it easily defended, given that it was on the west side of the river. The nature of operations in Stalingrad, and particularly the Red October factory complex, shaped the environment extensively. Its terrain reduced unit frontages and depths to the point that two divisions fought over a one square kilometer area for over a month. The 100th Jager Division was the command originally assigned the objective of capturing the Red October Factory. By the time Seydlitz's 51st Army Corps was ready to make the attack in the third week of October, however, that division was too worn down to accomplish the task. Anticipating the problem, Paulus had already ordered General Richard von Schwerin's 79th Infantry Division to begin shifting forces from its positions near Klatskaya on the Don River west of Stalingrad to an assembly area behind the 100th Jager Division. Schwerin's division was to assume responsibility of the northern half of the 100th Division's sector. It also became the designated assault force for the Red October Factory. In terms of land area, the Red October Factory was only slightly smaller than the other two major industrial complexes in north Stalingrad. The area was roughly 1100 meters long by 800 meters wide. The buildings were also generally smaller in the Red October area, but they tended to be more densely packed. Key locations within or near the complex included the Green Belt, the Bannyi Ravine, the Worker's Village, the Strongpoint School, the Red October Fuel Depot, the Volga River, the Finger Ravine, the Settlement, the Slag Heaps, and the Ladder Building, which was the factory main administration building. The major industrial buildings or halls within the factory complex were numbered by the Germans as depicted. As later events would reveal, the main Soviet defensive position within the factory was hall four. Also known by the Soviets as the Martenovskii Shop. Most of the fighting in the Red October Factory would center around this building for the next three weeks. By the time the 79th Infantry Division made its initial attack on the Red October Factory, the structures and grounds had already experienced a huge amount of destruction from artillery fire and aerial attacks. Almost all the buildings were heavily damaged and rubble was everywhere. The twisted steel of elevated catwalks, piles of stone and rubble, stacks of bricks, shell holes, and Soviet fighting positions were strewn throughout the grounds. The area was an ideal location for defenders and a nightmare for those attacking into it. The Soviet defense of the Red October Factory illustrates aspects of current United States Army doctrine which discuss the role of defensive tasks. According to FM 3-0, there are three primary defensive tasks. Area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde. Major General Stepan S. Gur'ev's 39th Guards Rifle Division defended the Red October Factory using today's concept of the area defense to retain what was considered decisive terrain and to deny that vital area to the enemy. Gur'ev defense was also an effort to attrit the German forces as a prelude to a later Soviet counteroffensive in November. FM 3-0 states that units in defensive positions accomplish their missions independently or in combination by defeating the enemy with fires, absorbing the strength of the attack within the position, or destroying the enemy with a local or major counterattack. Gur'ev's command would employ all of these aspects at the Red October Factory. The division was composed of three guards rifle regiments plus division troops. At the time of the initial attack on 23 October, the division's artillery was located on the east bank of the Volga. The division strength in the city itself stood about 3,000 men. Initially, most elements of the division were forward defending along the main rail line west of the factory. If the Germans were successful in pushing Gur'ev's forces back from that line, they would fall back to prepare defenses in the halls of the Red October Factory. There, the 112th Regiment was responsible for defending the Worker's Village where a school had been built into a formidable strongpoint, as well as halls eight, 8a, nine, and 10. The 39th Division's 120th Guards Rifle Regiment commanded by Major A.I. Goryachev was responsible for halls three through seven and hall 12. The regiment's primary defense position was hall four, the Martenovskii Shop, which was typically defended by between 100 and 400 men depending on recent casualties. The 117th Regiment was responsible for halls one and two and the small settlement east of there. It also formed the division reserve and primary counterattack force. Similar to guidance provided in our own FM 3-0, Soviet commanders in the 39th Guards Rifle Division integrated obstacles, counterattacks, and planned fires into the defense in order to isolate and overwhelm the enemy. In addition to the division's artillery on the other side of the river, the Soviet infantrymen were equipped mainly with the Mosin-Nagant model rifle and the famous PPSh submachine gun. But possessed a liberal number of light and medium machine guns to support their fire plan, as well. They also possessed hand grenades and the ever present Molotov cocktail. Assigned to attach to the units of the 39th Guards Division were a number of heavier weapons integrated into Gur'ev's area of defense. These included a number of 50, 82, and 120 millimeter mortars. 7.62 millimeter, .303 caliber, and 51 millimeter light, medium, and heavy machine guns. And 45 and 57 millimeter antitank guns spread throughout the position. On arrival at Stalingrad, the 79th Infantry Division consisted of only two infantry regiments. Plus the standard complement of other division troops. The division's 226th Infantry was detailed on a temporary mission elsewhere. So, Seydlitz attached the 100th Division's 54th Jager Regiment to Schwerin's command for the initial assault on the factory. That regiment, however, had been ground down in the earlier fighting in the city. Before the fight for hall four concluded in November, several other German units, as well as the 369th Croatian Infantry Regiment and a pioneer battalion, would later be attached to the division for operations in the Red October area. At the time of the initial attack, the division possessed about 4,500 assault troops mostly concentrated in the battalions of the division's two infantry regiments. The 54th Jager Regiment possessed, at best, about 1,000 assault troops. The 79th Division's infantrymen were originally equipped largely with the Mauser 98 rifle. As the division came into the line in Stalingrad, a large number of the assault troops were reequipped with the MP 40 submachine gun based on the experience of city fighting thus far. Generally speaking, the older rifles were used by those troops employed in an overwatch or support role. While the primary assault troops received the submachine guns. The attackers also possessed the excellent MG 42 machine gun. In addition to plentiful Potato Masher grenades and explosives. Furthermore, for the attack, the assault troops would be supported by Panzerkampfwagen Mark III and Mark IV tanks from the 24th Panzer Division, as well as the Sturmgeschutz III assault guns of the 244th and 245th Assault Gun Battalions. The 51st Army Corps attack plan was for the 100th Jager Division to conduct holding attacks to the south of the 79th Division. To the north, the 14th Panzer Division would attack to seize the bread factory and the ravine south of the Barricade Factory. While the 305th Infantry Division would attack to seize the rest of the Barricade. The 79th Division's attack plan for 23 October was to be conducted in three phases. The objective for the first phase was to attack and seize the railroad just to the east of the main line of resistance. This was the Soviet's initial defense line. There, the 79th Division would halt for a massive Stuka and artillery attack on the factory before moving into the complex. The second objective was the Red October factory itself. Specific halls were assigned to each assault regiment. The final objective for the division was the banks of the Volga River. The division would attack with all three regiments on line. The 212th Infantry Kampf Group would attack on the division's right. It was given the mission to capture halls eight, nine, and 10 within the factory complex. On the left, the now battalion sized 54th Jager Regiment was reinforced with seven tanks from the 24th Panzer Division to bolster its strength. It was assigned the task of seizing the Ladder Building and halls one and two at the north end of the factory. In the center, the 208th Infantry Kampf Group was the 79th Infantry Division's main effort. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Richard Wolf, the regiment was reinforced with a company from the 244th Assault Gun Battalion, a pioneer company, and a heavy rocket launcher battalion. It was assigned to capture halls three through seven and 12. German and Soviet fires created numerous obstacles to tactical movement in the form of craters and rubble. The German 79th Division also faced significant dilemmas in terms of balancing tactical surprise against effective fire support in relatively small, heavily damaged, and well fortified physical areas. US Army doctrine says that field artillery fires facilitate an attacking unit's maneuver by destroying, degrading, or neutralizing selected enemy forces and positions. Lacking precision munitions, the German 79th Division relied upon massed fires to destroy, neutralize, and suppress Soviet forces in the area of the Martenovskii Shop. However, neither it nor the higher German echelons were ever able to effectively isolate the 39th Guards Rifle Division from its own fire support or effectively interdict the sustainment support concentrated on the east bank of the Volga. For the attack, Wolf reorganized the 208th Infantry into two attack wedges. Each based on the regiment's first and second battalions. The first battalion would attack on the left with the second on its right. Each wedge was further divided into two waves. Each wave was further organized into three groups. The assault group was reinforced with engineers and armed largely with MP 40 submachine guns, grenades, and satchel charges. Its mission was to attack through the Soviet defenses and penetrate to unhinge enemy positions. The covering group was equipped with light machine guns, rifles, grenades, and light mortars. Its mission was to provide protective and covering fires for the assault group and screen the flanks. The clearing group was equipped similarly to the covering group. Its mission was to reduce bypassed resistance nests and bring up supplies. The organization of the second wave was identical to that of the first. The second wave would pass through the first as needed to continue the attack. At which the first wave would then assume the reserve role. When the 79th Infantry Division arrived in Stalingrad on 19 October, Schwerin was unaware of its new mission. Wolf himself later stated that... - [Richard] We only received our new combat orders when we arrived in Stalingrad. The 79th Infantry Division had been earmarked to take the gigantic Red October metallurgical works from the Soviets, advance down to the Volga, and assume defensive positions at the riverbank. - [Narrator] When they learned of the mission and the plan to attack the Red October on the following day at a coordination meeting with Seydlitz, Schwerin and all his regimental commanders objected that there was not enough time to conduct an adequate reconnaissance and plan for a successful attack. The Luftwaffe representatives at the meeting insisted that the ground attack go forward due to the preplanned airstrikes. But Seydlitz relented and rescheduled the attack for 23 October. Gaining and refining combat information about the enemy is critical to developing the intelligence necessary for developing viable courses of action. Collecting information is a continuous activity during the plan, prepare, and execute cycle. The type of attack a commander can conduct is largely a function of the intelligence and time available. Lieutenant Colonel Wolf's insistence on the delay so that he could conduct a reconnaissance before attacking the Red October factory changed the nature of his operation from a movement to contact to a hasty attack and likely resulted in lower casualties and greater tactical success than his unit would have suffered if it had attacked on the original timeline. Wolf did not waste the time given to him for preparations. He immediately sent out reconnaissance parties to figure out the best attack routes. The major shock to both he and Eikler was the presence of a long train of railroad cars parked at the division front. Barring the way along the rail line. The German frontline was too close to the railroad for aerial attacks against the massive obstacle. Moreover, the 6th Army would not allow a rearward movement so that the Luftwaffe could pulverize the cars and make holes through which the 244th Assault Guns and other heavy vehicles could move through. Instead, Wolf developed an alternative plan using his assault guns and artillery in direct fire mode, along with engineer demolition teams, to blast a few holes through the obstacle at key street crossings. Another concern for Wolf developed when he discussed the attack with Colonel Arman Weber, commander of the 54th Jager Regiment on his regiment's left. - [Richard] When I visited the commander of this regiment in order to discuss the situation with him, Weber said to me, "You can't expect much anymore from my troops. And these long days, we've been completely exhausted and bled dry. The fighting spirit is gone. Just wait until your troops have fought here for 14 days. You will be no different. - [Narrator] The Jager commander's comment about the lack of his men's fighting spirit would begin to bear itself out almost immediately when the attack began. Soviet and German forces each face significant challenges with movement and maneuver during the fighting in and around the Red October Factory. The heavily damaged buildings, cratered landscape, and rubble obstacles hindered movement for both sides, but favored the interior lines inherent in the Soviet positions. The effectiveness of fires in support of German tactical movement was ultimately less effective facilitating maneuver, because it added to the rubble and obstacles troops had to overcome while closing with Soviet forces in the Martenovskii Shop. German Army and Luftwaffe fires were never sufficiently coordinated at appropriate echelons to interdict Russian movement across the Volga. And, therefore, unable to effectively isolate the 39th Guards Rifle Division. While each side could achieve limited surprise and momentum during their attacks and counterattacks at the lowest tactical levels, the difficult terrain and advantages it provided benefited the defender in terms of retaining areas occupied in the factory complex. As planned, the German assault began at 0700 on 23 October with the usual wave of Stuka divebombing attacks followed by an hour long artillery, mortar, and naval warfare bombardment against the Soviet defenses. The division's kampf groups, or battle groups, attacked at 0810. The weakened 54th Jager Regiment immediately stalled against the positions of the Soviet 895th Rifle Regiment defending at a railroad bridge. On the Jager's immediate right, however, Wolf's 208th Kampf Group and Eikler's 212th farther south assaulted the Soviet's first line of defense along the rail line. Wolf's plan to penetrate the long row of rail cars proceeded surprisingly well and, within an hour, his infantry had overrun the Soviet positions and the engineers were busy blasting holes through the cars. By 0930, both regiments had successfully crossed the railroad and continued in impressive drive against relatively light opposition. The attack had apparently caught the Soviets by surprise, but they would soon recover. By 1030, elements of both the 208th and 212th Kampf Groups had made their way through the communal gardens known as the Green Belt west of the factory and had reached the factory's internal rail line. Due to the rapid advance, Schwerin approved Wolf's request to proceed into the factory without the preplanned airstrikes and artillery preparation. Even so, Wolf had good communications with the Luftwaffe strike commander above. The kampf group commander was able to direct the Stukas and the supporting artillery to lay down blocking fires north and east of the factory to prevent Soviet reinforcement. The ground assault proceeded without pause and both regiments quickly gained access to the factory grounds. But, by then, the Soviet resistance began to stiffen. To complicate matters for the German attack, the Soviet defenders were able to bring significant direct fire to bear from the Bannyi Ravine to the south into the 212th Kampf Group's right flank. Colonel Eikler's Second Battalion ran into heavy resistance in the Worker's Village in the same area. Particularly from a school which had been turned into a strongpoint. Soviet forward observers high up on Mamayev Kurgan brought in effective indirect fires onto the attacking troops, as well. By 1035, the Second Battalion, 208th Infantry had seized hall 5a and the First Battalion was attacking halls three and four. Elements of the First Battalion, 212th Infantry moved into hall 5a while others prepared to attack hall eight. At the same time, the Second Battalion attacked the school strongpoint and the Worker's Village to the south. The attacks continued throughout the day and, one by one, the factory halls fell to the German assault troops. By 1600, the 212th had captured halls five, part of eight, and nine. And the 208th had captured halls three, 5a, six, and part of seven. And the element of Wolf's First Battalion had even penetrated into the northwest end of the Marenovskii Shop, hall four. About 1615, two assault companies of the Second Battalion, 208th Infantry were actually able to reach the banks of the Volga east of hall seven as fighting centered on hall 10. Elements of the 212th were also able to reach the same area. Wolf sent in his regimental reserve company to bolster the troops at the Volga in order to widen the penetration there. But the company was unab;e to reach the bluffs. After breaching the Soviet first echelon defense along the rail line and discovering that the enemy resistance was light, Lieutenant Colonel Wolf exercised initiative when he requested to shift the planned air and artillery bombardment so he could continue the attack without pausing to take advantage of actual conditions on the ground. Successful application of the mission command philosophy requires commanders who are prepared to support the initiative of their subordinates. The 79th Division and the Luftwaffe were able to change their scheme of fire and close air support to accommodate Wolf's quick advance into the factory complex. Thus, Wolf's deviation from the plan allowed the attack to maintain its momentum. The two assault companies of the 2nd Battalion, 208th Infantry also exercised initiative when they advanced to the Volga River. While most of their task force was focused on building 10, both units exploited the opportunity, on their own initiative, to advance to the river. Eventually, the troops at the river had to be pulled back to the vicinity of hall seven because they were too few in number to hold the position against the heavy flanking fire they were receiving. By dusk, the 79th Division had driven a significant wedge into the Red October Factory. Soon after nightfall, all key factory buildings were in German hands except halls one, two, part of eight, 8a, and most of four. The fortress-like school was also still under Soviet control. As was much of the Worker's Village to the south. On the division left, the 54th Jager Regiment's failure to take even its first objective, the bridge, ensured the development of a long flank with gaps, which the 79th Infantry Division found difficult to secure due to the losses sustained during the day's fighting. During the day, the 1st Battalion, 208th had succeeded in securing a foothold in the western portion of hall four. Because of the 54th Jager's failure to advance, however, Wolf was forced to withdraw the battalion from the Martenovskii Shop that evening in order to help secure the division's left flank between the factory and the Jagers. Therefore, the next day, the 208th Infantry would have to attack into hall four again. During the day's fighting, the 79th Infantry Division had suffered 83 men killed and 364 wounded for a total of 447 casualties that day. These were troops which could not be easily or quickly replaced. To bolster the division, Seydlitz attached 369th Croatian Regiment to Schwerin's command that night to help make up some of the losses. Like the 54th Jagers, however, the 369th was, at best, only a battalion in actual strength at this point. The fighting on 23 October heavily attrited the 39th Guards Rifle Division, as well. That division was in worse shape and had suffered 60% losses, including Goryachev, the commander of the 120th Guards Riflemen Regiment. The political importance of Stalingrad and the ideological determination by both the attackers and defenders played a significant factor in their willingness to sustain heavy casualties during this large scale combat operation. The Germans, lacking room to maneuver, were often forced to conduct frontal assaults at close range. While the Soviets fighting in a relatively shallow area of operations with their backs to the river, suffered high casualties, as well. Chuikov, the 62nd Army commander, had no reserves available. And noted that his army now faced the threat of enemy forces penetrating through to the Volga and the sector north of the Bannyi Ravine. That night, Chuikov reprised Stalingrad front commander Eremenko of the situation and asked for all available indirect fire support for his command to help defeat the German follow on attack that was sure to come the following day. Hall four, the Martenovskii Shop, constituted the main Soviet defense position within the Red October Factory. It was generally located about the center of the factory area and was the largest structure within the complex. Actually several closely packed buildings, the structure was about 400 meters long and about 160 meters wide at its widest part. The east end of the building was about 300 meters from the Volga River. The key location and features outside the Martenovskii Shop included elevated frame catwalks, a large number of tall smokestacks, the hall four administration building, a large stone and rubble pile at the northeast corner, stacks of bricks between the northwest entrance and hall 12, the locomotive repair shop, hall three, a large drainage culvert leading from the building to the Finger Ravine, and a huge slag heap between the hall and the Worker's Settlement. Although tactics had changed since the fighting at the Red October Factory, the area provides an opportunity to analyze urban terrain from the standpoint of current doctrine. Outside hall four, the ground was littered with the rubble and debris of buildings, shredded trees and bushes, collapsed smokestacks, destroyed trucks, rail cars, and factory equipment, and the metal products from the factory. The ground was pulverized with shell and bomb craters. To the northwest, the building was very narrow. Only about 40 meters across. And had one large entrance and a collapsed corner on the very end of the building from which the defenders could shoot out towards the hall 12 warehouse complex. The openings were initially used by the Germans as the primary entrances into the structure. To the north and west of the hall, were stacks of brick and a large stone pile. Both of which the Germans would use as assault positions for attacking into the building. The massive structure itself was constructed of a mixture of cream colored brick, steel girders, and sheet metal walls. There were relatively clear fields of fire toward the northeast, but initially few, if any, good positions for defenders on that side due to the hall's closed heat doors, which had been blocked off. Thus providing no openings to fire through. The Soviets could and did, however, have a few defensive positions outside the hall in the factory administration building and in the rubble and twisted metal frames of the partially collapsed elevated catwalks. Soviet snipers would also use the multiple smokestacks alongside the structure for elevated shooting positions. There was another large entrance on the southeast side through which an attacking force could again entry, as well. As the building continued to sustain damage from indirect fire and aerial attacks, other openings in the walls appeared over time that provided additional access and also opened up better fields of fire for the defenders within. In the rear of the building was a huge slag heap composed of the useless afterwaste of the Marten furnaces. The mound was used as a fallback position and reserve assembly area by the Soviets, as was the burned out settlement nearby. All of these conditions made movement very difficult for attackers and defenders both. But also provided cover and concealment for both, as well. Key locations inside the Martenovskii Shop included a series of Marten furnaces alongside the northeast wall, a large water trough in the long northwestern end of the building, concrete catwalks, a rolling mill, and an entrance into the large drainage culvert at the south end of the building. Subsurface areas complicate fires, friendly control measures, and force protection. They can be utilized as avenues of approach as well as lines of communication. They can be used as protective storage areas and they can be exploited by small units for attacks against the enemy's rear and flanks. The Soviets approached the Martenovskii Shop from the Volga River via the Finger Ravine. Then through a smaller narrow gully and into a large underground drainage culvert which emerged inside the building. The ravine and culvert provided a covered and concealed route for reinforcements moving into the hall. The interior areas of hall four were an attacker's nightmare. Large amount of brick, concrete, steel, and other rubble from the repeated aerial bombings and artillery shells littered the entire floor. Wrecked steel manufacturing machinery, parts of partially completed projects, and large steel ingots also served as obstacles to an attacker and as cover and concealment for the defenders. Much of the large, twisted steel framing, girders, and roofing from the building's rooftop lay collapsed into the building's interior. Adding to an attacker's difficulty. The roof itself was almost completely blown off or burned by the repeated attacks of the Luftwaffe and German artillery barrages. Concrete catwalks and the metal framing in the roof, at least were still in place, also served as platforms for the ever present Soviet snipers. The defenders could also climb inside the now called Marten furnaces as hiding places and for protection. The ovens not only provided shelter from the attacking German troops. Their heavy steel construction provided protection from artillery and aerial bombs. A direct hit was required to destroy these heavy steel ovens. It is likely, however, that the concussion from near misses from large bombs or artillery rounds wounded or otherwise disabled many of the defenders regardless. In addition to the furnaces, there was a large water drainage trough which ran the width of the building and provided the Soviets a ready made defensive position inside. At 1855 on the evening of 23 October, Seydlitz orders Schwerin to continue the attack the next day. The division plan was for Eikler's 212th Infantry to hold what ground it had gained the day before and clear out the rest of hall eight and hall 8a and the Worker's Village to the south. Otherwise, the kampf group would assume a defensive posture to help defeat any Soviet counterattacks launched against the main objective, the Martenovskii Shop, while it was under assault by Wolf's 208th Infantry. Weber's 54th Jager Regiment was relieved from the 79th Division that evening and attached to the 14th Panzer Division next door. Operating with that command, the 54th Jagers would attack generally southeastward to help the Panzer division clear the worker's villages between the Red October and the Barricade Factories and prevent Soviet reinforcement from that direction. For the 24 October attack, Wolf's 208th Infantry, once again the main effort, was reinforced by a company of the 179th Pioneer Battalion, which would hold hall three when the regiment attacked to seize hall four. Wolf's plan for the 208th Infantry was for the 2nd Battalion to attack from halls three, six, and seven to seize hall four. From there, it would also provide fire support for the 1st Battalion's attack on halls one and two. Once halls one, two, and four were under German control, the division would push on to clear the rest of the factory complex down to the Volga. Operations for 24 October begin at 0300 when the 212th Infantry began efforts to clear out the resistance remaining in halls eight and 8a. By mid-morning, the buildings had been captured, but both were soon lost to counterattacks by the 112th Guards Rifle Regiment. At about the same time, the 208th's assault began on the Martenovskii Shop. Advancing from halls three, six, and seven, the 2nd Battalion, which was the 208th Infantry's main effort, attempted to quickly advance into the huge Martenovskii Shop. But it was initially held up by heavy small arms fire from the 120th Guards Rifle Regiment. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion began to advance on halls one and two against surprisingly weak resistance. The troops of the 1st Battalion advanced from its line west of hall four and proceeded to clear a series of smaller buildings in the northwest corner of the factory. Then, advancing from one pile of rubble to another and through myriad shell craters, the battalion successfully reached halls one and two after a moderately stiff fight. But were able to capture only the southern half of both structures. Other elements of the 1st battalion continued the advance east and briefly penetrated once again to the Volga River. But a counterattack by the 39th Division's reserve, the 117th Guards Rifle Regiment, successfully erased that penetration by dusk. US Army doctrine emphasizes that defensive plan's retain and reserve, regardless of the defensive task assigned. The counterattack is one of the key actions of urban defense. As the attacker moves into the depth of the urban area, the attacker's forces may become fatigued, suffer from attrition, and become increasingly disorganized. As the offensive force reaches the culmination point where it can no longer continue to attack with the available forces, the defensive commander executes a planned and coordinated counterattack. The counterattack regains the initiative and makes the enemy fight in multiple directions. Infiltration using superior knowledge of the terrain and the skillful use of stay behind forces permits attacking the enemy throughout the depth of its formations. In planning the defense, commanders anticipate that the enemy will attempt to isolate the urban area. Commanders defeat this effort by allocating sufficient defending forces outside the urban area to prevent its isolation. The Soviets maintained lines of communications across the Volga to prevent isolation of the forces defending the Red October Factory complex. They were also able to provide forces to repeatedly conduct effective counterattacks to reverse German tactical gains in the vicinity of the Martenovskii Shop. And prevent German isolation of the Red October Factory. The main attack on the Martenovskii Shop initially ran into stiff resistance. Unable to enter hall four, the 2nd Battalion's assault troops advanced positions near and against the northwest wall of the structure. Eventually entering through the northwestern end of the building, the Germans fought their way slowly into the hall. The battle inside was fierce and slow. Fighting at very close range with submachine guns, grenades, and satchel charges, the German infantry and engineers gradually force their way farther into the building. Moving from one pile of rubble to another for protection. While the Soviet defenders tenaciously fought back with submachine guns, hand grenades, and Molotov cocktails. The lead combat group eventually fought its way to about 50 meters short of the drainage trough by sundown and made preparations to defend there for the night. To the division's north, the 54th Jager Regiment advanced only about 100 meters on its front. But still failed to take the railroad bridge. Once again that evening, the 79th Division's left flank facing the Soviet 193rd Rifle Division was thinly held and, in some places, nonexistent. The Soviet defenders, however, were either too weak to exploit the gaps or failed to detect them. Seydlitz's plan for the 79th Division's 25 October attack was essentially the same as the day before. And Schwerin's focus was now on completing the seizure of the Martenovskii Shop. That mission remained assigned to Wolf's 208th Infantry, but, like the rest of the division, the casualties of the last two days of combat had severely depleted the regiment. In order to help Wolf accomplish the task, Schwerin provided him a small kampf group assembled from the elements of the 212th Infantry and attached it to the 208th to give it enough combat power for the assault. When the 54th Jager Regiment was transferred to the 14th Panzer Division on 24 October, the 369th Croatian Infantry Regiment replaced the jagers in the 79th Division's order of battle. Schwerin assigned the Croatians the mission of defending halls nine and 10. This action allowed Eikler's 212th to compress its defenses in order to squeeze out enough troops to help man the ad hoc combat group. Wolf's plan was simple. Continue to push men and weapons into hall four to kill or capture the remaining defenders inside or force them into retreat from the structure. Moving more men into the hall that morning, Wolf's 2nd Battalion attacked and gradually forced its way almost to the middle of the building. Once there, however, a large number of Soviet soldiers came pouring out of the drainage culvert and the Marten furnaces where they had been hiding. Apparently, the 120th Guards Rifle Regiment had been reinforced with men from the division reserve during the night. The counterattack surprised the German assault troops who desperately fought back against the now swelling tide of Russian soldiers. Grudgingly, the German troops fought their way back to the portals at the northwest end of the building through which they had come the day before and were eventually forced back into hall three and to positions behind the stacks of bricks to the west. By dark, the Russians held the entire Martenovskii Shop once again. Fighting continued on 26 October, but no significant attacks were undertaken by either side. That evening, Schwerin's 3rd Regiment, the 226th infantry, arrived back under the division's control and relieved the 54th Jager Regiment of its positions near the bridge. The 79th Infantry Division once again assumed responsibility for that sector. Schwerin immediately issued the new regiment orders for an attack on the morning of the 27 of October. The 226th initial mission was to enhance the isolation of the Martenovskii Shop by completing the capture of halls one and two, as well as eliminate the bulge between the 79th Division and the 14th Panzer Division. As planned, the 226th Infantry attacked at dawn on 27 October and immediately ran into stiff opposition at both locations. Despite support from the 1st Battalion, 208th, it took the regiment all day to complete the capture of the two halls. However, it also successfully erased the bothersome salient in the German lines, as well. In the process, the 226th Infantry suffered 23 killed in action and 69 wounded in action. But it was now in position to make the next attack against the Martenovskii Shop. On 28 October, the 226th Infantry relieved the 208th infantry responsibility for hall one in preparation for the attack while Stuka divebombers, rockets, and artillery hammered the Martenovskii Shop all day. That night, a battalion of the 226th Infantry, advancing from hall two, attacked into the main hall. This time, some of the troops were armed with flamethrowers. The flame assault took the Soviet defenders completely by surprise. And the German troops were able to penetrate deep into hall four. However, the Soviet guardsmen were able to use the rubble and knowledge of the interior to circle to the left and right flanks of the assault force and eventually drove the troops of the 226th out of the structure. This attack cost the Germans an additional 12 killed and 52 wounded and no advantage was gained. On the 29, Shwerin ordered the entire 226th Infantry to attack hall four once again. This time, the battalions approached the structure from halls one and two. The regiment was able to gain another foothold in the building, but this achievement, like the others, was short lived. The troops were soon driven out once again. This time with 19 killed and 96 wounded. This attack concluded efforts against the Martenovskii Shop for the next five days. The 226th Infantry was now already too weak to continue the attacks against the hall. The 39th Guards Rifle Division was not in good shape, either. According to Chuikov, all three regiments of the division had been reduced to about 80 men each by the 30 of October. Therefore, Chuikov requested permission from Yeryomenko to bring over the 45th Rifle Division from its island defense mission in the Volga. It would take time to assemble this fresh division from its disperse locations. So, the elements were sent over piecemeal. Still, these reinforcements for the 39th Guards Division arrived just in time. From the 30 of October to three November, as the 45th Rifle Division made its way to the west bank of the Volga, the 79th Infantry Division consolidated its positions and prepared for the next assault to take the Martenovskii Shop. That attack was scheduled to take place on four November by Wolf's reinforced 208th Infantry. In the meantime, on one November, the remnants of the 24th Panzer Division went into the line on the 79th Division's immediate right and took over the southern defenses of the Red October Factory to shorten the 79th's sector. Two days later, on three November, the 369th Croatian Regiment was moved to take over the defense of halls one and two while the 208th Infantry was reinforced with troops from Schwerin's other two regiments for the upcoming assault on hall four. This time, Wolf planned to have his men attack from hall three into the Martenovskii Shop from the south, fight their way through the hall, and make contact with German elements on the north side. The attack was scheduled to begin at dusk. After additional heavy artillery and aerial bombing attacks, Wolf's men jumped off on the assault, but quickly ran into fire. Nevertheless, the troops fought their way into the building and conducted a very close quarters battle with the 120th Guards Rifle regiment. Now reinforced with men from the 45th Division's 253rd Regiment. Fighting in and near the Martenovskii Shop all night, the Germans were able to make their way, once again, deep into the hall, but, in the end, the reinforcements from the 45th Rifle Division coming into the building from the tunnel tipped the scales. By dawn five November, Wolf had ordered his men out of the hall. Even if his men had taken the structure, they likely could not have held it with the remaining force. The 79th Infantry Division was now exhausted. It did not have the men to mount another attack. The 39th Guards Division, in contrast, was in better shape now that the troops of the 45th Division were on hand. The high expenditure of resources by both sides and the culmination of the German 6th Army before Stalingrad was captured highlights the importance of planning. Due to the complexity of urban environments, commanders must carefully arrange their forces and operations according to purpose, time, and space to accomplish the mission. The application of the tenets of unified land operations should inform both plans and the conduct of all operations to include those conducted in and around urban areas. Successfully synchronizing and converging effects across the breadth and depth of their assigned areas of operation during large scale combat operations requires that each echelon has a shared understanding of their roles and responsibilities. What would be the final effort to seize the Martenovskii Shop would now take place on 11 November with the beginning of Operation HUBERTUS. HUBERTUS was what would amount to Paulus's final effort to seize the remaining areas of the Red October and Barricade Factories still under Soviet control. The operation would, in theory, finally enable the 6th Army to wrest control of Stalingrad from Chuikov's 62nd Army. The main element of this effort was six understrength pioneer battalions detached from divisions well outside of Stalingrad which had been ordered to the city to reinforce the 6th Army. Part of the 79th Infantry Division's role in HUBERTUS would consist of a joint attack between the 24th Panzer Division's kampf group shield and the 2nd Battalion, 208th Infantry against hall 10. Half of which had been recaptured by the 112th Guards Rifle Regiment the day before. The main effort, however, was the division's own 179th Pioneer Battalion, which was designated to spearhead the attack on hall four. To increase its manpower, the battalion was reinforced with the 3rd Company, 40th Pioneer Battalion from the 24th Panzer Division. The battalion would then be backed up by almost 1,000 or so remaining troops of Wolf's 208th Infantry and other troops that would form the covering group and 191 men from the 369th Croatian Regiment in support. The 179th Pioneers commander, Captain Helmut Veltz, organized the assault group into four combat wedges of about 30 men each or about 120 total divided into two waves. Wedges two and three would penetrate into the northwest end of the Martenovskii Shop and advance inside the building. Clearing the long, narrow hall there. In addition to clearing the hall, those two wedges were to hold the Soviets' attention while wedges one and four advanced along the outside of the hall in an effort to enter the building farther down and get in behind the defenders. The wedges would be followed by the 208th Infantry's covering group, which would add weight to the attack and hold all ground gained by the pioneers. The pioneers were armed with submachine guns, grenades, satchel charges, and flamethrowers to fight their way into the hall. The attack was to commence at 0355 with a massive artillery barrage. The fight for the Red October Factory offers excellent examples of combined arms warfare in urban terrain. In this battle's early phase, the Germans used close air support and artillery to suppress and neutralize Soviet positions in the factory area. They also used armor to make breaches in the rail car obstacle forward of the Red October Factory. In the following battles for the factory's buildings, the German Army assaulted Red Army positions with teams composed of infantry and engineers formed into waves. US Army doctrine emphasizes the use of small tactical combined arms teams in urban offensive operations. These teams rely on a flexible mix of infantry, armor, aviation, engineers, and artillery capable of both precision fires and suppression. In the final assault on the Martenovskii Shop, synchronized fires suppressed Soviet positions after which waves of infantry and pioneers armed with satchel charges and flamethrowers advanced into the building. German intelligence indicated the Martenovskii Shop was now manned by 130 men of the 120th Guards Rifle Regiment, 205 men from the 2nd Battalion, 253rd Rifle Regiment, and 60 men from the 39th Guards Antitank Company for a total of about 400 defenders. Captain Veltz began moving his troops into position before midnight. And, by about 0250, all four wedges were in their assault positions. Wedge one was located in hall three. Wedge two was at the south end of the brick stacks. Wedge three was positioned at the north end of the stacks. Wedge four was located at a stone pile near the brick stacks. At 0340, the assault positions unexpectedly came under heavy Soviet artillery bombardment. Five men in the first wave of wedge three were killed or wounded by the fire, as was another five in the second wave of wedge two. 15 minutes later, the German barrage began. The artillery bombardment was very short. The fire from a battery of large 210 millimeter mortars designed to prevent the Soviet reinforcement into the penetration area lasted much longer. The mortar fire was linear and placed about the center of the main hall area. Meanwhile, German antiaircraft guns raked the remaining steel girders of the roof and the smokestacks to kill or distract the plethora of Russian snipers in the complex. Jumping off from the stack of bricks to the west of the hall four entrances, wedge two was able to reach the northwestern entrance and fight its way inside under heavy fire. It managed to advance into the structure for only about 30 yards before it was stopped by the tangle of wreckage in the building and the heavy Soviet small arms fire. To the left, the already weakened wedge three also successfully bounded into the walls near the entrance at the narrow western end of the building, but, there, the sergeant leading the group was struck by small arms fire. Nevertheless, that wedge pushed into the hall and made it about as far as wedge two before it too was halted by obstacles and fire. Advancing from hall three, wedge one moved past the locomotive shed and was about to turn east towards its intended entrance before it was suddenly fired on by a dug in, well hidden machine gun nest near where the wedge commander planned to enter the building. Another gun opened up shortly thereafter and the wedge commander ordered his troops into a large shell hole. There, the wedge set up a defense position to provide covering and suppressive fire for the other wedges. Wedge four jumped off from the pile of stones and was able to move along the northwest face of the outside wall for about 100 meters before it was met with a hail of machine gun and small arms fire from holes in the building. The wedge was forced back to the stone pile. Now stranded inside the building with no outside support coming into the enemy rear as planned, the commanders of wedges two and three decide to pull their troops out of the Martenovskii Shop to prevent their annihilation. Within a few minutes, wedge three had made it back to the stack of bricks while wedge two opted to head for hall three closely followed by wedge one as they passed by. Once again, the assault was a failure and cost the 179th Pioneers 54 men of the 120 who began the mission. The 79th Division was no longer able to seriously consider capturing the Martenovskii Shop. And no further attacks against the building took place during the remainder of the battle for Stalingrad. Operation HUBERTUS concluded on 18 November, 1942, but it was obvious before then that the effort had failed. The 62nd Army still held parts of the Red October and Barricade Factory complexes. Throughout the battle, Choikov's tough Soviet soldiers had held out against everything that the 6th Army could send against them, but just barely. Still, Choikov's efforts in the city provided enough time for the Stavka to resource and organize a major counterattack against Army Group B. This operation, Codenamed Uranus, was launched in the early morning hours of 19 November, 1942. Within three days, the 6th Army was surrounded. Although there was a brief effort by Army Group Dawn in December to rescue Paulus and his command, that operation failed. On two February, 1943, Paulus was forced to surrender about 250,000 troops. Additionally, numerous tanks, artillery pieces, and other equipment were removed from the German order of battle. Stalingrad had begun as a secondary objective for the German Army as part of Case Blue. The 6th Army was to seize the city in order to secure the northern flank of the German forces while Army Group A conducted the main effort to capture the oil fields and the refineries in the Caucasus. In fact, taking the oil rich Caucasus proved to be too difficult of a task. And Stalingrad began to evolve as a more important objective for the Germans. Eventually, Hitler and other German leaders became obsessed with capturing the massive urban complex. The 6th Army strained every effort to seize the city. Pouring troops into the fight and leaving its flanks vulnerable to the Soviet counterstroke. By hanging onto the last pieces of Soviet-controlled terrain in Stalingrad, Chuikov's forces drew the Wehrmacht and its allies into a trap. And one of the most decisive Axis defeats of the war. When viewed through the lens of the current operating environment, the Battle of Stalingrad provides current military professionals a superb case study for analyzing military operations in urban terrain. Although technology and tactics have changed the contemporary battlefield, one can still learn a great deal by examining the operations of the two opponents who contended in the city. Using current US Army doctrine to compare and contrast those operations, one can develop extremely useful insights and a greater understanding of the brutal and resource intensive nature of city fighting. (dramatic military music)