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47–298 PDF 2009

S. HRG. 110–720

THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 17 AND SEPTEMBER 25, 2008

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

(

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia, 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

MICHAEL V. KOSTIW, Republican Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

THE ORIGINS OF AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES: PART I OF THE COMMITTEE’S INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY (A.M. 

SESSION) 

JUNE 17, 2008

Page

Shiffrin, Richard L., Former Deputy General Counsel for Intelligence, Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 17

Baumgartner, Lt. Col. Daniel J., Jr., USAF (Ret.), Former Chief of Staff, 

Joint Personnel Recovery Agency ....................................................................... 17

Ogrisseg, Jerald F., Former Chief, Psychology Services, 336th Training 

Group, United States Air Force Survival School ............................................... 21

Beaver, LTC Diane E., USA (Ret.), Former Staff Judge Advocate, Joint Task 

Force 170/JTF Guantanamo Bay ........................................................................ 64

Dalton, RADM Jane G., USN (Ret.), Former Legal Advisor to the Chairman, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff ............................................................................................. 66

Mora, Alberto J., Former General Counsel, United States Navy ........................ 67

THE ORIGINS OF AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES: PART I OF THE COMMITTEE’S INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY (P.M. 

SESSION) 

JUNE 17, 2008

Haynes, William J., II, Former General Counsel, Department of Defense ........ 110

THE AUTHORIZATION OF SURVIVAL, EVASION, RESISTANCE, AND ESCAPE (SERE) 

TECHNIQUES FOR INTERROGATIONS IN IRAQ: PART II OF THE COMMITTEE’S INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF THE DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY

SEPTEMBER 25, 2008

Moulton, Col. John R., II, USAF (Ret.), Former Commander, Joint Personnel 

Recovery Agency ................................................................................................... 169

Kleinman, Col. Steven M., USAFR, Former Director of Intelligence, Personnel 

Recovery Academy, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency ...................................... 174

Annex A (documents released during June 17, 2008, hearing) ........................... 202

Annex B (documents released during September 25, 2008, hearing) .................. 266

(III) 

(1)

THE ORIGINS OF AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES: PART I OF THE COMMITTEE’S INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT 

OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY (A.M. SESSION) 

TUESDAY, JUNE 17, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SD–

106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Pryor, Webb, McCaskill, 

Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, Graham, Dole, 

Cornyn, Thune, and Martinez. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan, professional 

staff member; Ilona R. Cohen, counsel; Mark R. Jacobson, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, 

general counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and Michael J. 

Noblet, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican 

staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; 

David G. Collins, research assistant; David M. Morriss, minority 

counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Jessica L. Kingston, 

Ali Z. Pasha, Benjamin L. Rubin, Brian F. Sebold, and Breon N. 

Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Jay Maroney, assistant 

to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, 

assistant to Senator Reed; Bonni Berge and Darcie Tokioka, assistants to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill 

Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator 

Webb; Peg Gustafson, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff, 

assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski and Nathan 

Reese, assistants to Senator Inhofe; Mark J. Winter, assistant to 

Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator 

Chambliss; Jennifer Olson, assistant to Senator Graham; Lindsey 

2

Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; David Hanke, assistant to Senator 

Cornyn; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and Erskine 

W. Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning everybody. 

Today’s hearing will focus on the origins of aggressive interrogation techniques used against detainees in U.S. custody. We have 

three panels of witnesses today, and I want to thank them for their 

willingness to voluntarily appear before the committee. 

Intelligence saves lives. Knowing where an insurgent has buried 

an improvised explosive device (IED) can keep a vehicle carrying 

marines in Iraq from being blown up. Knowing that an al Qaeda 

associate visited an Internet cafe in Kabul could be the key piece 

of information that unravels a terrorist plot targeting our embassy. 

But, how do we get people who know the information to share it 

with us? Does degrading them or treating them harshly increase 

the chances that they’ll be willing to help? 

Just a couple of weeks ago, I visited our troops in Afghanistan. 

While I was there, I spoke to a senior intelligence officer who told 

me that treating detainees harshly is actually an impediment, a 

roadblock, to use that officer’s word, to getting intelligence from 

them. Here’s why. He said that al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists are 

taught to expect Americans to abuse them; they’re recruited based 

on false propaganda that says that the United States is out to destroy Islam. Treating detainees harshly only reinforces their distorted view and increases their resistance to cooperate. The abuse 

at Abu Ghraib was a potent recruiting tool for al Qaeda and handed al Qaeda a propaganda weapon that they could use to peddle 

their violent ideology. 

So, how did it come about that American military personnel 

stripped detainees naked, put them in stress positions, used dogs 

to scare them, put leashes around their necks to humiliate them, 

hooded them, deprived them of sleep, and blasted music at them? 

Were these actions the result of a ‘‘few bad apples’’ acting on their 

own? It would be a lot easier to accept if it were, but that’s not the 

case. The truth is that senior officials in the U.S. Government 

sought information on aggressive techniques, twisted the law to 

create the appearance of their legality, and authorized their use 

against detainees. In the process, they damaged our ability to collect intelligence that could save lives. 

Today’s hearing will explore how it came about that the techniques called survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) 

training, which are used to teach American soldiers to resist abusive interrogations by enemies that refuse to follow the Geneva 

Conventions, were turned on their head and sanctioned by Department of Defense (DOD) officials for use offensively against detainees. Those techniques included use of stress positions, keeping detainees naked, use of dogs, and hooding during interrogation. 

Some brief background on SERE training. The United States 

military has five SERE schools to teach certain military personnel, 

whose missions create a high risk that they might be captured, the 

skills needed to survive in hostile enemy territory, evade capture, 

and escape, should they be captured. The resistance portion of 

3

SERE training exposes students to physical and psychological pressures designed to simulate abusive conditions to which they might 

be subject if taken prisoner by enemies that may abuse them. 

The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) is DOD’s agency 

that oversees SERE training. JPRA’s Instructor Guide states that 

a purpose of using physical pressures in training is ‘‘stress inoculation,’’ building soldiers’ immunities so that they, should they be 

captured and be subject to harsh treatment, are better able to resist. 

The techniques used in SERE training can include things like 

stripping students of their clothing, placing them in stress positions, putting hoods over their heads, disrupting their sleep, treating them like animals, subjecting them to loud music and flashing 

lights, and exposing them to extreme temperatures. It can also include face and body slaps, and until recently, for some sailors who 

attended the Navy’s SERE school, it included waterboarding, which 

is mock drowning. 

The SERE schools obviously take extreme care to avoid injuring 

our own soldiers. Troops are medically screened to make sure that 

they’re fit for the SERE course. Prior to the training, each student’s 

physical limitations are carefully documented to reduce the chance 

that the SERE training and the use of SERE techniques will cause 

injury. 

There are explicit limitations on the duration and intensity of 

physical pressures. For example, when waterboarding was permitted at the Navy SERE school, the instructor manual stated that 

a maximum of 2 pints of water could be used on a student who was 

being waterboarded, and, if a cloth was used to cover a student’s 

face, it could stay in place a maximum of 20 seconds. 

SERE training techniques are legitimate and important training 

tools. They prepare our forces, who might fall into the hands of an 

abusive enemy, to survive by getting them ready for what might 

confront them. 

Strict controls are also in place during SERE training to reduce 

the risk of psychological harm to students. Psychologists are 

present throughout SERE training to intervene, should the need 

arise, and to talk to students during and after the training to help 

them cope with associated stress. 

Those who play the part of interrogators in the SERE school 

drama are not real interrogators, nor are they qualified to be. As 

the Deputy Commander for the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) 

put it, ‘‘The expertise of JPRA lies in training personnel how to respond and resist interrogations, not in how to conduct interrogations.’’ Now, that is a fundamental, important distinction. 

Some might say that if our personnel go through it in SERE 

school, what’s wrong with doing it to detainees? Well, our personnel are students, and they can call off the training at any time. 

SERE techniques are based on abusive tactics used by our enemies. 

If we use those same techniques offensively against detainees, it 

says to the world that they have America’s stamp of approval. That 

puts our troops at greater risk of being abused if they’re captured. 

It also weakens our moral authority and harms our efforts to attract allies to our side in the fight against terrorism. 

4

So, how did SERE techniques come to be considered by DOD for 

detainee interrogation? In July 2002, Richard Shiffrin, a Deputy 

General Counsel in DOD and a witness at today’s hearing, called 

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Baumgartner, also a witness today and 

then-Chief of Staff at JPRA, which is the agency that oversees the 

SERE training, and asked for information on SERE techniques. In 

response to Mr. Shiffrin’s request, Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner 

drafted a two-page memo and compiled several documents, including excerpts from SERE instructor lesson plans that he attached to 

his memo, saying that JPRA would ‘‘continue to offer exploitation 

assistance to those government organizations charged with the 

mission of gleaning intelligence from enemy detainees.’’ The memo 

was hand-delivered to the General Counsel’s Office on July 25, 

2002 (Appendix A). 

Again, it’s critical to remember that these techniques are not 

used in SERE school to obtain intelligence, they are to prepare our 

soldiers to resist abusive interrogation. 

The next day, Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner drafted a second 

memo, which included three attachments (Appendix A). One of 

those attachments listed physical and psychological pressures used 

in SERE training, including sensory deprivation, sleep disruption, 

stress positions, waterboarding, and slapping. It also made reference to a section of the JPRA instructor manual that talks about 

coercive pressures, like keeping the lights on at all times and treating a person like an animal. Another attachment, written by Dr. 

Ogrisseg, also a witness today, assessed the long-term psychological effects of SERE training on students, and the effects of the 

waterboard. (Appendix A) 

This morning, the committee will have a chance to ask Mr. 

Shiffrin, Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner, and Dr. Ogrisseg about 

these matters. 

On August 1, 2002, a week after Lieutenant Colonel 

Baumgartner sent his memo to the DOD General Counsel, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) issued 

two legal opinions. One, commonly known as the first Bybee Memo, 

was addressed to the then-White House counsel, Alberto Gonzales, 

and provided OLC’s opinion on standards of conduct in interrogation required under the federal torture statute. The memo concluded that, ‘‘For an act to constitute torture as defined in the statute, it must inflict pain that is difficult to endure; physical pain 

amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain 

accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death. For purely mental pain 

or suffering to amount to torture under the federal torture statute, 

it must result in significant psychological harm of significant duration; e.g., lasting for months or even years.’’ 

The other OLC opinion, issued the same day and known as the 

second Bybee Memo, responded to a Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA) request and addressed the legality of specific interrogation 

tactics. While the interrogation tactics reviewed by the OLC in the 

second Bybee Memo remain classified, General Hayden, in public 

testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 

February, said that the waterboard was one of the techniques that 

the CIA used with detainees. Stephen Bradbury, the current AsVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
5

sistant Attorney General for the OLC, testified before the House 

Judiciary Committee earlier this year that ‘‘CIA’s use of waterboarding procedure was adapted from the SERE training program.’’ 

During the time the DOD General Counsel’s Office was seeking 

information from JPRA, JPRA staff, responding to a request from 

Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), were finalizing plans to conduct training for interrogation staff from U.S. Southern Command’s 

(SOUTHCOM) Joint Task Force 170 at GTMO. During the week of 

September 16, 2002, a group from GTMO, including interrogators 

and behavioral scientists, traveled to Fort Bragg, NC, and attended 

training conducted by instructors from the JPRA SERE school. 

None of the three JPRA personnel who provided the training was 

a trained interrogator. 

On September 25, just days after the GTMO staff returned from 

that training, a delegation of senior administration lawyers, including Jim Haynes, General Counsel for DOD; John Rizzo, acting CIA 

General Counsel; David Addington, counsel to the Vice President; 

and Michael Chertoff, head of the Criminal Division of the DOJ, 

visited GTMO. An after-action report produced by military lawyers 

after the visit noted that one purpose of the trip was to receive 

briefings on intelligence techniques. (Appendix A) 

On October 2, 2002, a week after John Rizzo, the acting CIA 

General Counsel, visited GTMO, a second senior CIA lawyer, Jonathan Fredman, who was chief counsel to the CIA’s 

Counterterrorism Center, went to GTMO, attended a meeting of 

GTMO staff, and discussed a memo proposing the use of aggressive 

interrogation techniques. That memo had been drafted by a psychologist and psychiatrist from GTMO who, a couple of weeks earlier, had attended that training, given at Fort Bragg by instructors 

from the SERE school. 

While the memo remains classified, minutes from the meeting 

where it was discussed are not. Those minutes clearly show that 

the focus of the discussion was aggressive techniques for use 

against detainees. (Appendix A) 

When the GTMO chief of staff suggested at the meeting that 

GTMO ‘‘can’t do sleep deprivation,’’ Lieutenant Colonel Beaver, 

GTMO’s senior lawyer, responded, ‘‘Yes, we can, with approval.’’ 

Lieutenant Colonel Beaver added that GTMO, ‘‘may need to curb 

the harsher operations while the International Committee of the 

Red Cross (ICRC) is around.’’ 

Mr. Fredman, the senior CIA lawyer, suggested that it’s ‘‘very effective to identify detainee phobias, and to use them,’’ and described to the group the so-called wet-towel technique, which we 

know as waterboarding. Mr. Fredman said, ‘‘It can feel like you’re 

drowning. The lymphatic system will react as if you’re suffocating, 

but your body will not cease to function.’’ Mr. Fredman presented 

the following disturbing perspective on legal obligations under our 

anti-torture laws, saying, ‘‘It is basically subject to perception. If 

the detainee dies, you’re doing it wrong.’’ If the detainee dies, 

you’re doing it wrong? How on Earth did we get to the point where 

a senior U.S. Government lawyer would say that whether or not an 

interrogation technique is torture is ‘‘subject to perception,’’ and 

that if ‘‘the detainee dies, you’re doing it wrong?’’ 

6

The GTMO senior Judge Advocate General (JAG) Officer Lieutenant Colonel Beaver’s response was, ‘‘We’ll need documentation 

to protect us.’’ 

Nine days after that October 2, 2002, meeting, General 

Dunlavey, the Commander of Joint Task Force 170 at GTMO, sent 

a memo to SOUTHCOM requesting authority to use interrogation 

techniques, which the memo divided into three categories of progressively more aggressive techniques. Category 1 was the least aggressive; category 2 more so, and included the use of stress positions, exploitation of detainee fears, such as fear of dogs, removal 

of clothing, hooding, deprivation of light and sound; and category 

3 techniques included techniques like the so-called ‘‘wet-towel 

treatment,’’ or waterboard, that was the most aggressive. (Appendix A) 

A legal analysis by GTMO’s staff judge advocate, Lieutenant 

Colonel Diane Beaver, justifying the legality of the techniques, was 

sent with that request. (Appendix A) 

On October 25, 2002, General James Hill, the SOUTHCOM Commander, forwarded General Dunlavey’s request to the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Nine days later, the Joint Staff solicited the view of the military Services on the GTMO request. (Appendix A) 

Now, that was October 25. The military Services reacted strongly 

against using many of the techniques in the GTMO request. In 

early November 2002, in a series of memos, the Services identified 

serious legal concerns with the techniques, and they called urgently 

for additional analysis. 

The Air Force cited, ‘‘serious concerns regarding the legality of 

many of the proposed techniques,’’ and stated that ‘‘the techniques 

described may be subject to challenge as failing to meet the requirements outlined in the military order to treat detainees humanely.’’ The Air Force also called for an in-depth legal review of 

the request. 

The chief legal advisor to the Criminal Investigative Task Force 

(CITF) at GTMO wrote that category 3 techniques and certain category 2 techniques may, ‘‘subject servicemembers to punitive articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),’’ and called, 

‘‘the utility and legality of applying certain techniques in the request, questionable,’’ and stated that he could not advocate, ‘‘any 

action, interrogation or otherwise, that is predicated upon the principle that all is well if the ends justify the means and others are 

now aware of how we conduct our business.’’ 

The chief of the Army’s International and Operational Law Division wrote that techniques like stress positions, deprivation of light 

and auditory stimuli, and use of phobias to induce stress, ‘‘crosses 

the line of humane treatment,’’ and ‘‘would likely be considered 

maltreatment under the UCMJ, and may violate the torture statute.’’ The Army labeled the request legally insufficient and called 

for additional review. 

The Navy response recommended a more detailed interagency 

legal and policy review of the request, in their words. 

The Marine Corps expressed strong reservations, stating that 

‘‘several of the category 2 and category 3 techniques arguably violate Federal law and would expose our servicemembers to possible 

7

prosecution.’’ The Marine Corps said the request was not ‘‘legally 

sufficient,’’ and, like the other Services, called for ‘‘a more thorough 

legal and policy review.’’ 

Now, while it has been known for some time that military lawyers voiced strong objections to interrogation techniques in early 

2003 during the DOD Detaining Working Group process, these November 2002 warnings from the military Services were expressed 

before the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) authorized the use of 

aggressive techniques, and were not publicly known until now. 

When the Joint Staff received the military Services’ concerns, 

Rear Admiral Jane Dalton, then-legal advisor to the Chairman of 

the JCS, began her own legal review of the proposed interrogation 

techniques, but that review was never completed. Today, we’ll have 

the opportunity to ask Rear Admiral Dalton about that. 

Notwithstanding concerns raised by the military Services, DOD 

General Counsel Jim Haynes sent a memo to Secretary Donald 

Rumsfeld on November 27, 2002, recommending that he approve 

all but 3 of the 18 techniques in the GTMO request. (Appendix A) 

Techniques like stress positions, removal of clothing, use of phobias, such as fear of dogs, and deprivation of light and auditory 

stimuli were all recommended for approval. 

Five days later, on December 2, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld signed 

Mr. Haynes’ recommendation, adding the handwritten note, ‘‘I 

stand for 8 to 10 hours a day, why is standing limited to 4 hours?’’ 

(Appendix A). 

When Secretary Rumsfeld approved the use of abusive techniques against detainees, he unleashed a virus which ultimately infected interrogation operations conducted by the U.S. military in 

Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Discussions about reverse-engineering SERE techniques for use 

in interrogations at GTMO had already prompted strong objections 

by the DOD’s CITF at GTMO. CITF Deputy Commander Mark 

Fallon said that the SERE techniques were ‘‘developed to better 

prepare U.S. military personnel to resist interrogations, and not as 

a means of obtaining reliable information,’’ and that, ‘‘CITF was 

troubled with the rationale that techniques used to harden resistance to interrogations would be the basis for the utilization of techniques to obtain information.’’ 

In the week following the Secretary’s December 2, 2002, authorization, senior staff at GTMO set to work drafting a standard operating procedure (SOP) specifically for the use of SERE techniques 

in interrogations. The first page of one draft of that SOP stated 

that, ‘‘The premise behind this is that the interrogation tactics 

used at U.S. military SERE schools are appropriate for use in realworld interrogations. These tactics and techniques are used at 

SERE school to break SERE detainees. The same tactics and techniques can be used to break real detainees during interrogation.’’ 

The draft described how to slap, strip, and place detainees in stress 

positions. It also described hooding, manhandling, and walling detainees. (Appendix A) 

When they saw the draft SOP, the CITF and Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) personnel again raised a red flag. A draft of 

their comments on the SOP said that the use of aggressive techniques only, ‘‘ends up fueling hostility and strengthening a detainVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
8

ee’s will to resist,’’ but those objections did not stop GTMO from 

taking the next step: training interrogators on how to use techniques offensively. 

On December 30, 2002, two instructors from the Navy SERE 

school arrived at GTMO. The following day, in a session with approximately 24 interrogation personnel, the two demonstrated how 

to administer stress positions and various slaps, just like they do 

in SERE school. 

Around this time, General Hill, the Commander of SOUTHCOM, 

spoke to General Miller and discussed the fact that a debate was 

occurring over the Secretary’s approval of the techniques. In fact, 

CITF’s concerns had made their way up to then-Navy General 

Counsel Alberto Mora, and a battle over interrogation techniques 

was being waged at senior levels in the Pentagon. 

On January 3, 2003, 3 days after they conducted the training, 

the SERE instructors met with Major General Miller, and, according to some who attended, General Miller stated he did not want 

his interrogators using the techniques that the Navy SERE instructors had demonstrated. That conversation took place after the 

training had already occurred, and not all of the interrogators who 

attended the training got the message. 

Now, 2 weeks earlier, on December 20, 2002, Alberto Mora, who 

is a witness here today, had met with DOD General Counsel Jim 

Haynes. In a memo describing that meeting, Mr. Mora said that he 

told Mr. Haynes that he thought that interrogation techniques that 

had been authorized by the SECDEF on December 2, 2002, ‘‘could 

rise to the level of torture,’’ and he asked them, ‘‘What did deprivation of light and auditory stimuli mean? Could a detainee be locked 

in a completely dark cell? For how long? A month? Longer? What 

exactly did the authority to exploit phobias permit? Could a detainee be held in a coffin? Could phobias be applied until madness 

set in?’’ (Appendix A) 

On January 9, Alberto Mora met with Jim Haynes again. This 

is 2003, now. According to his memo, Mora expressed frustration 

that the Secretary’s authorization had not been revoked, and told 

Haynes that the policies could threaten Secretary Rumsfeld’s tenure and even damage the presidency. 

On January 15, 2003, having gotten no word that the Secretary’s 

authority would be withdrawn, Mora delivered a draft memo to 

Haynes’s office stating that, ‘‘The majority of the proposed category 

2 and all of the category 3 techniques were violative of domestic 

and international legal norms, and that they constituted, at a minimum, cruel and unusual treatment, and, at worst, torture.’’ 

In a phone call, Mora told Haynes that he would be signing that 

memo later that day unless he heard definitively that the use of 

the techniques was being suspended. In a meeting that same day, 

Haynes returned the draft memo and told Mora that the Secretary 

would rescind the techniques, which the Secretary did that day, 

January 15, 2003. 

At the same time that the Secretary did that, he directed the establishment of a working group to review interrogation techniques. 

What happened next has already become well known. For the 

next few months, the judgments of senior military and civilian lawyers critical of legal arguments supporting aggressive interrogation 

9

techniques were rejected in favor of a legal opinion from the OLC’s 

John Yoo. The Yoo opinion, the final version of which was dated 

March 14, 2003, was requested by Jim Haynes and repeated much 

of what the first Bybee Memo had said 6 months earlier. Mr. Mora, 

who was one of the working group participants, said that soon after 

the working group was established it became evident that the 

group’s report ‘‘would contain profound mistakes in its legal analysis, in large measure because of its reliance on the flawed OLC 

memo.’’ 

In a meeting with Yoo, Mora asked whether the law allowed the 

President to go so far as to order torture, and Yoo responded, ‘‘Yes.’’ 

The August 1, 2002, Bybee memo, again, had said that to violate 

the federal anti-torture statute, physical pain that resulted from an 

act would have to be ‘‘equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment 

of bodily function, or even death.’’ John Yoo’s March 14, 2003, 

memo stated that criminal laws, such as the federal anti-torture 

statute, would not even apply to certain military interrogations, 

and that interrogators could not be prosecuted by the Justice Department for using interrogation methods that would otherwise violate the law. 

One CIA lawyer reporter called the Bybee memo of August 2002 

a ‘‘golden shield.’’ Combining it with the Yoo memo of March 2003, 

the Justice Department had attempted to create a shield to make 

it difficult or impossible to hold anyone accountable for their conduct. 

Ultimately, the working group report, finalized in April 2003, included a number of aggressive techniques that were legal, according to John Yoo’s analysis. The full story of where the working 

group got those techniques remains classified. However, the list 

itself reflects the influence of SERE. Removal of clothing, prolonged 

standing, sleep deprivation, dietary manipulation, hooding, increasing anxiety through the use of a detainee’s aversions, like dogs, and 

face and stomach slaps were all recommended. Top military lawyers and Service general counsels had objected to these techniques 

as the report was being drafted. Those who had objected, like Navy 

General Counsel Alberto Mora, were simply excluded from the 

process, not even told that a final report had been issued. 

On April 16, 2003, less than 2 weeks after the working group 

completed its report, the SECDEF authorized the use of 24 specific 

interrogation techniques for use at GTMO. While the authorization 

included such techniques as dietary manipulation, environmental 

manipulation, and sleep adjustment, it was silent on most of the 

techniques in the working group report. However, the Secretary’s 

memo said that, ‘‘If, in your view, you require additional interrogation techniques for a particular detainee, you should provide me, 

via the Chairman of the JCS, a written request describing the proposed technique, recommending safeguards, and the rationale for 

applying it with an identified detainee.’’ (Appendix A) 

Now, how did SERE techniques make their way to Afghanistan 

and Iraq? Shortly after the Secretary approved Jim Haynes’s recommendation, on December 2, 2002, the techniques and the fact 

that the Secretary had authorized them became known to interrogators in Afghanistan. A copy of the Secretary’s memo was sent 

10

from GTMO to Afghanistan. The officer in charge of the intelligence section at Baghram Air Field in Afghanistan has said that, 

in January 2003, she saw, in Afghanistan, a PowerPoint presentation listing the aggressive techniques authorized by the Secretary 

on December 2, 2002. Documents and interviews also indicate that 

the influence of the Secretary’s approval of aggressive interrogation 

techniques survived their January 15, 2003, rescission. 

On January 24, 2003, 9 days after Secretary Rumsfeld’s rescission, the staff judge advocate for Combined Joint Task Force 

(CJTF)–180, Central Command’s conventional forces in Afghanistan, produced an interrogation techniques memo. While that 

memo remains classified, the unclassified version of a report by 

Major General George Fay stated that the CJTF–180 memo, ‘‘recommended removal of clothing,’’ a technique that had been in the 

Secretary’s December 2, 2002, authorization, and discussed exploiting Arab fear of dogs, another technique approved by the Secretary 

on December 2, 2002. 

From Afghanistan, the techniques made their way to Iraq. According to the DOD Inspector General (IG), at the beginning of the 

Iraq war, the special mission unit forces in Iraq ‘‘used a January 

2003 SOP which had been developed for operations in Afghanistan.’’ According to the DOD IG, the Afghanistan SOP had been 

‘‘influenced by the counter-resistance memorandum that the 

SECDEF approved on December 2, 2002, and incorporated techniques designed for detainees who were identified as unlawful combatants. Subsequent battlefield interrogation SOPs included techniques such as yelling, loud music, and light control, environmental 

manipulation, sleep deprivation adjustment, stress positions, 20-

hour interrogations, and controlled fear, muzzled dogs.’’ 

Special mission unit techniques eventually made their way into 

SOPs issued for all U.S. forces in Iraq. The interrogation officer in 

charge at Abu Ghraib obtained a copy of the special mission unit 

interrogation policy and submitted it virtually unchanged to her 

chain of command as proposed policy for the conventional forces in 

Iraq, led at the time by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez. 

On September 14, 2003, General Sanchez issued the first CJTF–

7 interrogation SOP. That policy authorized interrogators in Iraq 

to use stress positions, environmental manipulation, sleep management, and military working dogs to exploit detainees’ fears in interrogations. 

In the report of his investigation into Abu Ghraib, Major General 

George Fay said that interrogation techniques developed for GTMO 

became ‘‘confused and were implemented at Abu Ghraib.’’ Major 

General Fay said that removal of clothing, while not included in 

CJTF–7’s procedures, was imported to Abu Ghraib, and could be 

traced ‘‘through Afghanistan and GTMO,’’ and contributed to an 

environment at Abu Ghraib that appeared to ‘‘condone depravity 

and degradation rather than humane treatment of detainees.’’ 

Following a September 9, 2004, committee hearing on his report, 

I asked Major General Fay whether the policy approved by the 

SECDEF on December 2, 2002, contributed to the use of aggressive 

interrogation techniques at Abu Ghraib, and he responded, ‘‘Yes.’’ 

Not only did SERE training techniques make their way to Iraq, 

but instructors from JPRA’s SERE school followed. The DOD IG reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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ported that, in September 2003, at the request of the commander 

of the Special Mission Unit Task Force, JPRA deployed a team to 

Iraq to provide assistance to interrogation operations. During that 

trip, SERE instructors were authorized to participate in the interrogation of detainees in U.S. military custody. Accounts of that trip 

will be explored at a later time, and I’ll be sending a letter to DOD 

asking that those accounts and other documents relating to JPRA’s 

interrogation-related activities be declassified. 

Major General James Soligan, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. 

JFCOM, which is the JPRA’s higher headquarters, issued a memorandum referencing JPRA’s support to interrogation operations. 

Soligan wrote that, ‘‘Recent requests from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Combatant Commands have solicited 

JPRA support based on knowledge and information gained through 

the debriefing of former U.S. Prisoners of War (POWs) and detainees and their application to U.S. strategic debriefing and interrogation techniques. These requests, which can be characterized as offensive support,’’ he said, ‘‘go beyond the chartered responsibilities 

of JPRA. The use of resistance to interrogation knowledge for offensive purposes lies outside the roles and responsibilities of JPRA.’’ 

(Appendix A) 

Lieutenant General Robert Wagner, the deputy commander of 

JFCOM, has likewise said that, ‘‘Relative to interrogation capability, the expertise of JPRA lies in training personnel how to respond and resist interrogations, not in how to conduct interrogations. Requests for JPRA interrogation support were both inconsistent with the unit’s charter and might create conditions which 

task JPRA to engage in offensive operational activities outside of 

JPRA’s defensive mission.’’ (Appendix A) 

The DOD IG’s report, completed in August 2006, said that the 

techniques in Iraq and Afghanistan had derived, in part, from 

JPRA and SERE. 

Many have questioned why we should care about the rights of 

detainees. On May 10, 2007, General David Petraeus answered 

that question in a letter to his troops. This is what General 

Petraeus wrote, ‘‘Our values and the laws governing warfare teach 

us to respect human dignity, maintain our integrity, and do what 

is right. Adherence to our values distinguishes us from our enemy. 

This fight depends on securing the population, which must understand that we, not our enemies, occupy the moral high ground.’’ 

He continued, ‘‘I fully appreciate the emotions that one experiences in Iraq. I also know firsthand the bonds between members 

of the brotherhood of the close fight. Seeing a fellow trooper killed 

by a barbaric enemy can spark frustration, anger, and a desire for 

immediate revenge. As hard as it might be, however, we must not 

let these emotions lead us, or our comrades in arms to commit 

hasty, illegal actions. In the event that we witness or hear of such 

actions, we must not let our bonds prevent us from speaking up. 

Some might argue that we would be more effective if we sanctioned 

torture or other expedient methods to obtain information from the 

enemy. They would be wrong. Beyond the basic fact that such actions are illegal, history shows that they are also frequently neither 

useful nor necessary.’’ 

12

He concludes, ‘‘We are, indeed, warriors. We train to kill our enemies. We are engaged in combat. We must pursue the enemy relentlessly, and we must be violent at times. What sets us apart 

from our enemies in this fight, however, is how we behave. In everything we do, we must observe the standards and values that dictate that we treat noncombatants and detainees with dignity and 

respect. While we are warriors, we are also all human beings.’’ 

Senator Warner has asked Senator Graham to be the acting 

ranking member today. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER 

Senator WARNER. That’s correct, Mr. Chairman. Senator Graham 

is a full colonel in the JAG Corps of the United States Military Reserve. I collaborated with him and Senator McCain when we did 

the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), and I’ve asked, and Senator 

McCain joined in this, that he represent our side as the ranking, 

here this morning and throughout the context of these hearings. 

I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that we have to look at this 

situation in the context of the aftermath of September 11, when 

this country was struggling to come to a full recognition about our 

vulnerability to attacks such as we experienced on that fateful day. 

I think men and women in uniform, as well as in the civilian community, did everything we could to try and preserve and protect 

our great Nation, a nation that is founded under the rule of law; 

and there should be no deviation from that. 

I also, Mr. Chairman, draw your attention to the letter that you 

received, and the committee, from the counsel for one of the witnesses today, and in your reply you said, ‘‘On those rare occasions 

when a witness believed that he or she should not answer a question without divulging classified information, the witness has so informed the committee.’’ Could the Chair advise the committee how 

we will avail ourselves of such classified information that the witnesses may possess, at the same time protecting them? 

Chairman LEVIN. Of course, we would request, if it’s appropriate, 

that information be declassified, but we cannot receive classified information at this hearing. 

Senator WARNER. Absolutely. I see. 

Let’s also reflect on the fact that in April 2004 through 2006 this 

committee, recognizing there were problems in this area, conducted 

17 hearings and briefings with regard to detainee abuse, military 

commissions, and the new Army Field Manual. That was largely 

out of the Abu Ghraib. You and I worked together on that, Mr. 

Chairman, and that led to the DTA. So, I think this committee has 

a long record, both under Republican control and Democratic control, to examine this matter. 

Chairman LEVIN. It is an important tradition, and I’m glad that 

you made reference to it, that this committee conduct this kind of 

oversight hearing. It is our responsibility, and I am grateful for 

your reference to that effort on our part. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, to the witnesses, for testifying before us today. 

Let me begin by saying I have made it clear a long time ago that 

I believed administration lawyers used bizarre legal theories to jusVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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tify harsh interrogation techniques. I’ve also been troubled by the 

fact that they implemented these procedures over the strenuous objections of military lawyers and many others with expertise in 

these areas. 

I think our military community, particularly our legal community, Mr. Chairman, has been saying, ‘‘What about the shoe on the 

other foot?’’ I don’t doubt for one moment what al Qaeda will do 

to anyone they capture wearing our uniform. That’s not the issue. 

We know what they do. As a matter of fact, I saw a video last night 

of a Taliban group, showing a 14-year-old about to slit the throat 

of one of their captives. Obviously, the video did not go to conclusion, but that is a bit about who we’re fighting. The question is, 

how do we beat these people? Do we behave like them, or do we 

behave differently? Do we marginalize them, or do we empower 

them? I would argue that anytime that we can be associated with 

techniques that go down their road, we’re empowering them and 

marginalizing ourselves. In this regard, what we’re trying to do 

here today is important. 

Now, the guidance that was provided during this period of time, 

I think, will go down in history as some of the most irresponsible 

and shortsighted legal analysis ever provided to our Nation’s military and intelligence communities. I do not believe the members of 

the administration who played a major role in developing interrogation policy were motivated by anything other than a desire to 

protect our Nation. I know that to be true, that the men and 

women in question felt America was under attack—and we were—

and they were motivated to protect the Nation. That, to me, is 

clear, and in that regard, their service is to be appreciated. 

However, if the administration had adhered to the letter and 

spirit of the law, our treaty obligations, and adequately consulted 

with Congress, I do not believe we would be here today. 

It is important that we all understand and agree that the high 

ground in this war against Islamic extremism is the moral high 

ground. The high ground is often a military term used where the 

advantage to those occupying the high ground is clear, and those 

below are in a very precarious situation. In this war, there is no 

capital to conquer, no air force to shoot down, no navy to sink. The 

high ground in this war against radical Islamic extremism is the 

moral high ground. 

We’re not going to conquer this enemy on a battlefield. There will 

be no surrender with a white flag. It is truly a battle of ideas and 

values. The issues we’re going to discuss today represent a lost opportunity in this war. 

I’d like to briefly outline where we were in the aftermath of the 

tragic events of September 11, and where we are today, in terms 

of the interrogation, detention, and trial of enemy combatants for 

war crimes. 

Let’s face the cold, hard facts. On September 10, 2001, America 

was unprepared. We were not ready to fight an enemy that claimed 

no country and wore no uniform. We weren’t ready to capture, detain, and interrogate terror suspects who represent no nation-state 

and indiscriminately kill civilians and soldiers alike. 

After we invaded Iraq, we underestimated the threat of an insurgency, and we were slow to adapt to the situation on the ground. 

14

We were ill-equipped to manage Abu Ghraib, and perplexed by 

what to do with unlawful combatants in Afghanistan. 

I don’t offer our lack of preparation for this long war against radical Islam as an excuse, but, rather, as the context in which a series of extraordinarily poor decisions were made at the Pentagon, 

DOJ, and the White House with respect to detainees. 

To the great regret of many of us, the administration pursued a 

go-it-alone strategy when it came to the treatment and detention 

of unlawful enemy combatants. Under the rubric of the Commander in Chief’s inherent authority in a time of war and armed 

with the authorization to use military force, which Congress passed 

in the days after September 11, the administration implemented 

policies that were drafted, implemented, revised, rescinded, and reissued in an endless loop. 

Interrogation techniques which were supposed to be limited to 

GTMO may have migrated to Iraq and Afghanistan. The chaos was 

created by administration lawyers’ decision to ignore the advice of 

our senior military leaders and military lawyers, and depart from 

decades of adherence to the Army Field Manual, the UCMJ, and 

the Geneva Conventions. It’s hard to fathom that our Nation and 

the world would have to hear the United States discuss documents 

like the Torture Memo. 

Eventually, the departure from the time-honored standards of 

the Geneva Convention—and they are well known in respect to 

rules of restraint—were replaced with a new set of untested procedures which became dangerously and disastrously confused. The alleged detainee abuse was the unfortunate result. 

Now, this, at Abu Ghraib, was not just a few bad apples. Clearly, 

they were people acting on their own inappropriately in a very perverse fashion regarding detainees. But, I think it is best to say that 

Abu Ghraib was a result of system failure. 

Mr. Haynes, who will come before the committee today, wrote in 

an official document that waterboarding ‘‘may be legally available’’ 

to the military; never mind the fact that it is clearly prohibited 

under the UCMJ. 

As a personal aside, Mr. Chairman, one of the great concerns I’ve 

had about this whole process is the legal exposure that you place 

men and women in uniform if they go down this road. The UCMJ 

could not be more clear when it comes to the guidelines and guidance provided to those in uniform regarding detainees. 

We have a very clear policy of nonabuse. Why? General Petraeus 

said it better than I could. We’re trying to be different than our 

enemy, and I regret the fact that some of our military members 

were giving advice that would expose them to prosecution if they 

had followed that advice. 

The final report of the working group on interrogation, convened 

by Mr. Haynes, reiterated an OLC opinion that, ‘‘In order to respect the President’s inherent constitutional authority to manage a 

military campaign, the prohibition against torture must be construed as inapplicable to interrogations undertaken pursuant to the 

Commander in Chief authority.’’ 

I would just add that these treaties that we’re talking about, the 

Convention Against Torture (CAT), signed by Ronald Reagan, has 

served this country and the world well. Would we sit on the sideVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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lines if some executive in another country said, ‘‘I have the inherent authority, because my nation is at risk, to set this treaty 

aside’’? Would we object if some airman were in the hands of a nation-state and the executive of that nation said, ‘‘Even though I 

signed up to the Geneva Convention, I believe I have the inherent 

authority to protect my people, to set it aside, in this case’’? If we 

go down that road, the law means nothing. 

Regarding detention and prosecution of detainees, we follow a 

similar pattern. I’ve fought for years with the administration to ensure the policies, implemented for determining who is an enemy 

combatant and who should be tried for violation of war crimes, follow the Law of War. Here again, the administration tried to play 

cute with the law on evidence obtained by coercive means and access to classified evidence, just to name two areas. 

I remember very vividly the initial Military Commissions Act 

(MCA) would allow the military jury to receive classified information never shared with the accused. It could be shared with the defense attorney, but not provided to the accused, on the theory that 

it would compromise national security. My belief has always been, 

what would we do in a trial in some foreign land, with a CIA agent 

or a military member of our Special Forces or a downed airman, 

where the trial went forward and the jury, or the equivalent thereof, was provided information regarding the innocence or guilt of the 

American in question, and they were never allowed to see what 

they were charged with or to be able to confront the evidence—

what would we do? I think we would object. 

Congress was late in exercising its authority in these matters, 

but the key point is that we eventually did. The passage of the 

McCain Amendment ensured that this Nation would not engage in 

interrogation techniques that constituted cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment. The Bush administration fought Senator 

McCain on the prohibition, but Congress passed it overwhelmingly. 

The McCain Amendment started putting us back on the road to upholding the best traditions of our Nation and restoring our standing in the world. 

In the same bill, the DTA, the Army Field Manual became the 

standard for all DOD interrogations. With the passage of the MCA, 

we have ensured that all of our interrogators are fully compliant 

with the CAT, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and 

the War Crimes Statute. The MCA put in place procedures that our 

Nation could be proud of when it comes to prosecuting detainees 

for war crimes. 

I deeply regret that—the Supreme Court ruling providing a constitutional right of habeas corpus to noncitizen terror suspects. I 

think this is a very bad decision for America. I think the American 

people are going to be deeply disturbed to learn that the mastermind of September 11, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, has the same 

constitutional rights as they do. As Chief Justice Roberts argued in 

his dissenting opinion, ‘‘So, who has won? Not the detainees. The 

Court’s analysis leaves them with only the prospect of future litigation to determine the content of their new habeas right, followed 

by further litigation to resolve their particular cases, followed by 

further litigation before the DC Circuit, where they could have 

started, had they invoked the DTA procedure. Not Congress, whose 

16

attempt to determine through democratic means how best to balance the security of the American people with the detainee’s liberty 

interests has been unceremoniously brushed aside. Not the Great 

Writ, whose majesty is hardly enhanced by the extension to a jurisdictional quirky outpost with no tangible benefit to anyone. Not the 

rule of law, unless by that it is meant the rule of lawyers, who will 

now arguably have a greater role than military and intelligence officials in shaping policy for alien enemy combatants. Certainly not 

the American people, who today lose a bit more control over the 

conduct of this Nation’s foreign policy to unelected, politically unaccountable judges.’’ 

Unfortunately, the administration did not want to give the detainees an inch. Congress eventually gave them a few hundred 

yards, and now the Supreme Court has given them miles. We have 

gone from one extreme to the other. 

As long as these investigations go on, I’m confident that we will 

continue to find mistakes and uncover more poor policy decisions. 

But, the overriding question is, have we learned from our mistakes? Are we all moving forward on a solid basis? The answer, in 

my opinion, is yes. The fact that the legal and policy decisions 

made from 2002 to 2005 were based on inadequate legal analysis, 

used to justify harsh treatment of detainees, is not new news to 

me. I don’t think it is new news to anyone on the committee or 

anyone who has followed or reviewed any of the 15 different DOD 

investigations that had been launched in the last 5 years or the numerous hearings held in the House and Senate. This committee 

alone has had 17 separate briefings and hearings on detainee 

abuses. 

Senator Warner is to be commended to making the difficult decision to have the committee fully investigate the Abu Ghraib scandal so that the American people and the world would know that 

when this country makes mistakes, it doesn’t hide from them or 

cover them up. 

So, respectfully, Mr. Chairman, we’re not breaking new ground 

here. The abuses, the inconsistencies, the pattern of poor judgment 

in these matters are well-documented. The fact is that we have 

come a long way in the past 5 years. Secretary Rumsfeld is gone. 

Wolfowitz, Cambone, and Feith are all gone. John Yoo and Jim 

Haynes are gone. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses 

today. I hope that we can continue to try to find a way to protect 

our Nation that recognizes, even though that we’re at war, we must 

operate within the bounds of the laws and the treaties that make 

our Nation strong. 

As do you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the willingness to cooperate. I think the country has been well-served by these hearings, 

and that we have learned from our mistakes and we have made adjustments accordingly. In that regard, Congress has fulfilled it obligations under the Constitution and made us a stronger nation. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Graham. Your 

experience as a military lawyer is an invaluable resource for this 

committee and for the country. We’re very, very grateful for you 

and for it. 

Our first panel today consists of Richard Shiffrin, who is the 

former Deputy General Counsel for Intelligence at DOD; retired 

17

Lieutenant Colonel Dan Baumgartner, who is the former chief of 

staff of the JPRA; and Dr. Jerry Ogrisseg, former chief of psychology services at the U.S. Air Force Survival School. 

I think, Mr. Shiffrin, that you are going to go first, followed by 

Mr. Baumgartner, and then Dr. Ogrisseg. If you have opening 

statements, we would welcome them at this time. 

Mr. Shiffrin? 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. SHIFFRIN, FORMER DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL FOR INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I do not 

have an opening statement. I am here to answer questions of the 

committee and will do my best to recall events that occurred 5 or 

6 years ago. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Shiffrin. 

Next, we would call upon retired Lieutenant Colonel Dan 

Baumgartner. 

STATEMENT OF LT. COL. DANIEL J. BAUMGARTNER, JR., USAF 

(RET.), FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF, JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY AGENCY 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have an 

opening statement. 

Chairman Levin, Senator Graham, and distinguished members of 

the committee, thank you for providing me the opportunity at this 

hearing to answer the questions the committee may have relative 

to interrogation techniques for use with detainees in U.S. custody. 

I am currently the acting director and senior analyst, personnel recovery policy, in the Defense Prisoner of War Missing Personnel Office, Personnel Recovery Policy Directorate OSD. 

I served on Active Duty as an officer in the United States Air 

Force from 1979 to 2003, and from 1990 I was assigned to the Air 

Force Survival School. From then until my retirement ceremony in 

March 2004, I’ve served in a variety of capacities involving the 

DOD Personnel Recovery Mission. My final assignment, from 1998 

until May 2003, was as the Chief of Staff to the JPRA. 

The JPRA is the United States JFCOM’s office of primary responsibility for the DOD Personnel Recovery Mission. 

Personnel Recovery Mission involves a sum of military, civil, and 

diplomatic efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of captured, detained, isolated, or missing United 

States personnel who become separated from their organization 

while participating in a U.S.-sponsored military activity or mission 

outside of the United States, and who are, or may be, in a situation 

where they may be isolated, beleaguered, detained, captured, or 

having to evade, resist, or escape. 

In accordance with the committee’s specific request, I’ve provided 

written testimony about my recollection of any assistance to interrogators provided by JPRA personnel. The JPRA commander at the 

time, and my boss, Colonel Randy Moulton, had prohibited JPRA 

personnel from becoming involved in actual interrogations of detainees, and, as far as I know, JPRA personnel did not participate 

in detainee interrogations at any time prior to my retirement. 

18

In late 2001 or possibly early 2002, intelligence came to JPRA’s 

attention that might apply to detainee questioning. We shared the 

information with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), because 

their strategic debriefers would most likely be called upon for detainee questioning. DIA accepted our offer to provide briefings to 

a couple of their deploying groups. I, myself, did not provide any 

briefings to DIA personally, but I believe the DIA groups received 

briefings centered on resistance techniques, questioning techniques, 

and general information, how exploitation works. 

I was also personally provided a 30-minute briefing to the CITF, 

located at Fort Belvoir, which worked under the Under Secretary 

of the Army. This briefing occurred in 2002. I provided information 

on resistance techniques, questioning techniques, and general information on how exploitation works, and also JPRA’s mission and 

role in the Department. We also briefed one other agency. 

In addition to this assistance in approximately mid-2002, Army 

Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Morgan Banks, the Director of Psychological Services at Fort Bragg, NC, requested that JPRA personnel 

travel to Fort Bragg, NC, to provide briefings to Army psychologists and other mental-health personnel. That briefing occurred in 

September 2002. I coordinated the support, in terms of scheduling 

and obligating the JPRA to respond to Dr. Banks’ request. 

The briefings were designed to assist the Army in training Army 

psychologists and other mental health personnel on what it would 

mean to be assigned to duty at GTMO. To my best recollection, the 

course had instruction in exploitation, oversight, and treatment of 

detainees and staff in a captivity environment, and what the professional ethical issues might be for clinical psychologists operating 

in a captivity environment. 

I also provided written testimony of my recollections of my communications with the Office of the General Counsel of DOD. Although I have no personal recollection, I understand, from a review 

of the documents, that in December 2001 JPRA provided the Office 

of the General Counsel information involving the exploitation process and historical information on captivity and lessons learned. 

That request came from Mr. Richard Shiffrin. 

I do recall that in July 2002, Mr. Shiffrin requested information 

from the JPRA about interrogation techniques used against a 

United States POW. In response to this request, I provided some 

papers on exploitation interrogation and lesson plans used to train 

our U.S. personnel on the psychological aspects of detention, exploitation threats and pressures, methods of interrogation, and resistance to interrogations. 

After a follow-up request for the use of physical pressures, I provided that additional information, which consisted of the use of 

physical pressures in our personnel recovery training, with information compiled from JPRA experts, and one paper from the Air 

Force SERE school psychologist, Captain and Dr. Jerry Ogrisseg, 

on the effects of resistance training. 

I followed up with one or two more phone calls to make sure I 

had provided the information requested to the Office of the General 

Counsel. I do not recall any further communications with the Office 

of General Counsel about these issues after the summer of 2002. 

19

I thank the committee for allowing me to provide an opening 

statement, and look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Colonel Baumgartner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. COL. DANIEL J. BAUMGARTNER, JR., USAF (RET.) 

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the committee. 

On 27 May 2008, I was requested to voluntarily testify at today’s hearing to discuss 

issues relating to the committee’s inquiry into the treatment of detainees in U.S. 

custody. I was informed the hearing would explore the development, consideration, 

and approval of interrogation techniques for use with detainees in U.S. custody. My 

testimony today is in response to that request. 

In August and September 2007, I was questioned by committee staff members 

with respect to my knowledge, while at my final military assignment as the Chief 

of Staff, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), of the matters addressed in the 

committee’s May 27, 2008 letter. In accordance with the committee’s specific request, my written testimony today addresses my recollection of: (a) my communications with the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) of the Department of Defense 

(DOD) relative to [interrogation] techniques for use with detainees in U.S. custody; 

(b) my communication with JPRA personnel and the then-Chief of Psychology Services at the Department of the Air Force’s Air Education and Training Command 

that resulted from requests made by the OGC [relative to interrogation techniques 

for use with detainees in U.S. custody]; (c) and my knowledge of any assistance to 

interrogators provided by JPRA personnel, [relative to interrogation techniques for 

use with detainees in U.S. custody]. 

Before I address these specific questions, it is helpful to provide some background 

information about my military career from 1979 until my retirement in May 2003 

(my final day of duty was March 19, 2003). 

I graduated from the United States Air Force (USAF) Academy in 1979 and spent 

my first 11 years in the Air Force flying T–37, C–130, and T–38 aircraft. In 1990 

I was assigned to the USAF Survival School. From then until my retirement ceremony in March 2003, I served in a variety of capacities involving the personnel recovery mission. My final assignment was as Chief of Staff to the JPRA at their 

headquarters at Fort Belvoir, VA, from the fall 1998 until my last day of Active 

Duty on March 19, 2003. As the Chief of Staff, I was the manager of internal processes, overseer of internal staff work as the chief ‘‘staff officer,’’ and staff director. 

While I was aware of many things involving the JPRA, I was not privy to everything. JPRA directors had the authority and ability to go directly to the commander 

and deputy commander. 

The JPRA is the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Office of Primary Responsibility 

for the DOD personnel recovery mission and executes the Commander, United 

States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), Executive Agent duties with respect to 

the personnel recovery mission. The JPRA shapes the planning, preparation, and 

execution of personnel recovery for the DOD to enable commanders, individuals, recovery forces, and supporting organizations to effectively execute their personnel recovery responsibilities. 

‘‘Personnel recovery’’ is the sum of military, civil, and diplomatic efforts to prepare 

for and execute the recovery and reintegration of captured, detained, isolated, or 

missing personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas. ‘‘Personnel’’ for purposes of the personal recovery mission include United States military 

members, DOD civilian employees, or contractor service employees who are separated from their organization while participating in a U.S. sponsored military activity or mission outside the U.S., and are, or may be, in a situation where they may 

be isolated, beleaguered, detained, captured or having to evade, resist, or escape. 

a. My communications with the OGC of the DOD relative to [interrogation] techniques: 

My recollection of my first communication with OGC relative to techniques was 

with Richard Shiffrin in July 2002. However, during my two interviews with committee staff members last year I was shown documents that indicated I had some 

communication with Mr. Shiffrin related to this matter in approximately December 

2001. Although I do not specifically recall Mr. Shiffrin’s request to the JPRA for information in late 2001, my previous interviews with committee staff members and 

review of documents connected with Mr. Shiffrin’s December 2001 request have confirmed to me the JPRA, at that time, provided Mr. Shiffrin information related to 

this committee’s inquiry. From what I reviewed last year with committee staff members, the information involved the exploitation process and historical information on 

captivity and lessons learned. But, until today, I have never met Mr. Shiffrin. 

20

With respect to Mr. Shiffrin’s July 2002 request, he contacted the JPRA and 

asked for information on interrogation resistance techniques used against U.S. prisoners of war. I asked my Commander, Colonel Moulton, for approval to support the 

request, which he granted. I then passed the request for support to our higher headquarters through USJFCOM J3 for approval. After USJFCOM approved supporting 

the request, I asked our resident JPRA experts for assistance in obtaining the information Mr. Shiffrin requested. My response memorandum to Mr. Shiffrin included 

a couple of papers on exploitation, and interrogation and lesson plans used to train 

our U.S. personnel (i.e., potential isolated personnel) in the psychological aspects of 

detention, exploitation-threats and pressures, methods of interrogation, and resistance to interrogations. After having the package delivered I believe there were some 

phone calls between Mr. Shiffrin and me to clarify parts of the package (I don’t recall what the specific questions were, but essentially they involved follow-up questions about the material I sent). 

A few days later I received another phone call from Mr. Shiffrin requesting information on the use of physical pressures, which, after notifying Colonel Moulton, I 

provided. The information on the use of physical pressures in our personal recovery 

training consisted of a memorandum with information compiled from JPRA experts 

and one paper from an Air Force Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape school 

psychologist, Captain (Dr.) Jerry Ogrisseg, on the effects of resistance training. I followed-up with one or two phone calls to make sure I had provided the information 

Mr. Shiffrin requested. I do not recall any further communications with Mr. Shiffrin 

or other DOD, OGC personnel about these issues after the July 2002 requests for 

information. 

b. My communication with JPRA personnel and the then-Chief of Psychology Services at the Department of the Air Force’s Air Education and Training Command 

that resulted from requests made by the OGC 

As noted, in response to Mr. Shiffrin’s requests for information I spoke with the 

then-Chief of Psychology Services at the Department of the Air Force’s Air Education and Training Command, Dr. Jerry Ogrisseg, about information his office had 

on the psychological effects on trainees of resistance training. That communication 

resulted in our compiling and sending to Mr. Shriffrin the second memorandum 

noted above with some attachments. 

c. My knowledge of any assistance to interrogators provided by JPRA personnel 

The JPRA commander prohibited JPRA personnel from becoming involved in actual interrogations of detainees. As far as I know, JPRA personnel did not participate in detainee interviews at any time prior to my retirement. 

In late 2001 (or possibly early 2002), intelligence came to the JPRA’s attention 

that might apply to detainee questioning. We shared that information with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) because their strategic debriefers would most likely 

be called upon for detainee questioning. DIA accepted our help to provide briefings 

to a couple of their deploying groups. I myself did not provide any briefings to DIA, 

but I believe the DIA groups received less than a day’s worth of briefings, centered 

on resistance techniques, questioning techniques, and general information on how 

exploitation works. 

I also provided a more limited briefing (about 30 minutes) to the Criminal Investigation Task Force located at Fort Belvoir, which worked under the Army. JPRA 

also briefed one other agency. These organizations were also briefed on resistance 

techniques, questioning techniques, and general information on how exploitation 

works. 

Army Lieutenant Colonel (Dr.) Morgan Banks, the Director of Psychological Services, at Fort Bragg, NC, also asked the JPRA for support. I recall the request was 

to travel to Fort Bragg to provide briefings to Army psychologists and other mental 

health personnel, which occurred in September 2002. I coordinated the support in 

terms of scheduling and obligating the organization to respond to Dr. Banks’ request. The briefings were designed to assist the Army in training Army Psychologists and other mental health personnel on what it would mean to be assigned to 

duty at Guantanamo Bay. To my best recollection, the course had instruction in exploitation, oversight and treatment of detainees and staff in a captivity environment, and what the professional ethical issues might be for clinical psychologists operating in a captivity environment. 

I thank the committee for allowing me to provide this written testimony in response to the committee’s request and look forward to answering your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Ogrisseg? Or, Dr. Ogrisseg, excuse me. 

21

STATEMENT OF JERALD F. OGRISSEG, FORMER CHIEF, PSYCHOLOGY SERVICES, 336TH TRAINING GROUP, UNITED 

STATES AIR FORCE SURVIVAL SCHOOL 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for allowing me to appear before you today. Before testifying, I want to 

provide some background information about me. 

I received my bachelor’s of science degree from The Ohio State 

University, and my master’s and Ph.D. degrees in clinical psychology from Bowling Green State University in Ohio. I joined the 

Air Force in 1995, and I went through residency training in psychology at Wilford Hall Medical Center in San Antonio, TX. I then 

served as a clinical psychologist in Air Force behavioral health clinics at Lackland Air Force Base and Onizuka Air Station in California. In those positions, I provided a wide range of basic psychological services. 

I then served as the SERE psychologist for the United States Air 

Force Survival School at Fairchild Air Force Base in Washington 

from February 4, 1999, to July 28, 2002. There, I was the commander’s representative for all psychological aspects of training. 

My primary purpose was to safeguard the integrity of the training 

by providing risk management oversight of training activities and 

to conduct research to address questions of training effectiveness 

and training risk. 

I separated from Active Duty service at the grade of major in 

2002 to accept a civilian position with the JPRA. I serve, currently, 

as the SERE research psychologist for the JPRA, where I’ve been 

assigned since July 29, 2002. In that capacity, my job is to conduct 

research, conduct operational release handling of recovered, returned, and repatriated U.S. personnel, and to recommend policies 

in these areas. I also provide expert knowledge in human decisionmaking, behavioral adaptation, learning in stressful environments, 

learned helplessness, and learning to enhance human resiliency. I 

chair an international research panel on survival psychology 

through the Human Resources and Performances Group of the 

Technical Cooperation Program, which includes fellow survival psychologists from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today, and I 

look forward to answering any questions you have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Ogrisseg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. JERALD OGRISSEG

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for allowing me to appear before you today. My testimony will address my July 2002 communications 

with the Chief of Staff of the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) relating to 

interrogations and resistance training techniques, my July 24, 2002 memorandum 

‘‘Psychological Effects of Resistance Training,’’ and the role of Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) psychologists, and the use of physical and psychological pressures in resistance training for U.S. soldiers. 

First, I want to provide some personal background information. I received my 

Bachelor’s of Science degree from The Ohio State University and my Masters and 

Ph.D. degrees in clinical psychology from Bowling Green State University in Ohio. 

I joined the Air Force in 1995. I went through residency training in psychology at 

Wilford Hall Medical Center in San Antonio, TX. I then served as a clinical psychologist in Air Force Behavioral Health clinics at Lackland Air Force Base and at 

22

Onizuka Air Station. In those positions, I provided a wide range of basic psychological services. I then served as the SERE Psychologist for the United States Air 

Force Survival School at Fairchild Air Force Base, WA, from 4 February 1999 to 

28 July 2002. There I was the Commander’s representative for all psychological aspects of training. My primary purpose was to safeguard the integrity of training by 

providing risk management oversight of training activities, and to conduct research 

to address questions of training effectiveness and training risk. I separated from active duty service at the grade of major in 2002 to accept a civilian position with the 

JPRA. I serve currently as the SERE Research Psychologist for the JPRA where I 

have been assigned since 29 July 2002. In that capacity, my job is to conduct research, operational release handling of recovered, returned, and repatriated U.S. 

personnel, recommend policies in these areas, and provide expert knowledge in 

human decisionmaking, behavioral adaptation, learning in stressful environments, 

learned helplessness, and learning to enhance human resiliency. I also Chair an 

international research panel on Survival Psychology through the Human Resources 

and Performance Group of the Technical Cooperation Program which includes fellow 

survival psychologists from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, 

and the United States. This panel was recognized by each of those countries with 

a team achievement award for creating and demonstrating the effectiveness of a selection program for Resistance Training instructors which served to select appropriate people to become instructors and thereby mitigate training risks. 

Mr. Chairman, with regards to my July 2002 communications with then Lt. Col. 

Dan Baumgartner, the then Chief of Staff of JPRA, my recollection is that Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner called me directly, probably on the same day that I generated my 24 July 2002 memorandum that I referenced earlier. He indicated that 

he was getting asked ‘‘from above’’ about the psychological effects of resistance 

training. I had no idea who was asking Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner ‘‘from 

above’’ and did not ask him to clarify who was asking. I recall reminding Lieutenant 

Colonel Baumgartner in general terms about program evaluation data I’d presented 

in May of 2002 at the SERE Psychology Conference. These data, which were collected on Air Force survival students at different points of time during training, indicated that training significantly improves students confidence in their ability to 

adhere to the Code of Conduct. 

Then, I recall Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner asking me if I thought training 

was harmful to students. This question and my responses to it formed the basis of 

my 24 July 2002 memorandum to Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner, which is the 

best record of the conversation that we had. In general terms, I indicated that a 

very small percentage of students (4.3 percent) had adverse psychological reactions 

to our training, but we (the survival psychology staff) were able to remotivate almost all of those having adverse reactions (96.8 percent) to complete training. Thus, 

less than .2 percent of the roughly 14,000 students were unable to complete training 

due to psychological problems which arose during training. The exact numbers I 

cited in the memorandum were retrieved from the annual risk reports we kept. In 

order to ensure that our program was safe and effective, I also told Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner that students received three debriefings during training, two of 

which were conducted by the Psychology Services staff, and that the other was a 

detailed, thorough operational debriefing. These debriefings normalized the students’ performance and reactions during training, and reinforced the training objectives to increase their skill and confidence. As an additional point on this question, 

I indicated that very few complaints were made following training. These indicators 

combined led me to conclude that long-term negative effects of training are likely 

minimal. I did caveat, however, that we did not routinely survey students in the 

years following training to confirm this conclusion. 

Finally, as indicated in my 24 July 2002 memorandum, Lieutenant Colonel 

Baumgartner asked me if I’d ever seen the waterboard used, and what I thought 

of it. I told him that I had seen it used while observing Navy training the previous 

year, and that I would never recommend using it in training. He asked me why and 

if I thought it was physically dangerous. I responded that I didn’t see anyone getting physically injured when I observed it, and as stated in my memorandum, the 

Navy was applying it to medically screened trainees with medical personnel immediately available to monitor and intervene if necessary. However, that wasn’t the 

point, as psychologically the waterboard produced capitulation and compliance with 

instructor demands 100 percent of the time. During debriefings following training, 

students who had experienced the waterboard expressed extreme avoidance attitudes such as a likelihood to further comply with any demands made of them if 

brought near the waterboard again. I told Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner that 

waterboarding was completely inconsistent with the stress inoculation paradigm of 

training that we used, and was more indicative of a practice that produces learned 

23

helplessness—a training result we tried strenuously to avoid. The final area I recall 

Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner asking me about were my thoughts on using the 

waterboard against the enemy. I asked responded by asking, ‘‘wouldn’t that be illegal?’’ He replied that some people were asking from above about the utility of using 

this technique against the enemy for the same reasons I wouldn’t use it in training. 

I replied that I wouldn’t go down that path because, aside from being illegal, it was 

a completely different arena that we in the Survival School didn’t know anything 

about. When we concluded the talk, Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner asked if I 

would write him a memo reflecting what we’d just discussed regarding the psychological effects of training so he could include it with other materials he was sending 

up. He also asked if I would comment on both the physical and psychological effects 

of the waterboard. I replied that I would, and drafted the memo. 

Mr. Chairman, with regards to the role of SERE psychologists, as I mentioned 

earlier, the intent is to provide expert knowledge and research to advise the commander in order to prevent in-role behavioral drift or role creep within the training, 

prevent moral disengagement of staff while providing training, and maintain the effectiveness of training within a stress inoculation-based approach. These aims are 

accomplished through: psychologically screening instructors; training instructors 

and out-of-role supervisors on indicators of behavioral drift and moral disengagement, and associated preventative actions; immediately conducting incident reviews 

following any adverse training events; and advising on administrative or retraining 

actions when indicated. 

Mr. Chairman, physical and psychological pressures are used in resistance training for several reasons. Historically, coercive pressures have been used against U.S. 

soldiers in numerous captivity situations. Including simulated physical and psychological stresses to our training adds more realism and effectiveness to the training. 

Additionally, in the realm of the training science world, simulated physical and psychological stresses would be recognized during the task analysis as some of the conditions under which the resistance skills must be applied. The overall goal is to instill good habits in trainees and the ability to think clearly and solve problems during repeated exposure to stressful situations to ensure that performance does not 

degrade under stress. 

In SERE resistance training, physical and psychological pressures consist of contact with a student, as well as use of threats and ploys that are designed to test 

the students’ resistance. The pressures are designed to cause some physical and 

emotional discomfort. These pressures are definitely not designed to cause injury or 

anything other than minor, temporary irritation. All pressures are reviewed by medical and psychological staff before they are used to ensure that a good margin of 

physical and psychological safety exists when they are used, and to limit their use 

on personnel with pre-existing medical and psychological concerns. Additionally, 

when physical pressures are used, the use is continuously monitored by multiple 

levels of out of role school personnel to ensure that the pressures are used within 

established limits. The psychological purpose of physical and psychological pressures 

at the Air Force Survival School was always to enhance student decisionmaking, resistance, confidence, resiliency, and stress inoculation, and not to break the will of 

the students or to teach them helplessness. 

In conclusion Mr. Chairman, let me emphasize again that the purpose of our 

training of U.S. military personnel is to increase their level of confidence that they 

can survive captivity and interrogation situations, comply with the Code of Conduct, 

and return with the least amount of physical and psychological damage. Our basic 

concept for this training is that if a servicemember has met the types of interrogation conditions even once before, they will begin to be familiar with them and thus 

more able to cope with an otherwise extremely stressful and confusing situation. Although there are many sacrifices and harrowing circumstances that our soldiers, 

marines, sailors, and airmen are called to task to face, I can think of none more 

amazing and confusing than being held captive by your enemy. I believe we have 

a moral obligation to provide our personnel this training. Through our training, we 

prepare our Nation’s best for the worst, so that if they fall into the hands of the 

enemy, they can see that situation through the lens of an experience that they’ve 

already dealt with successfully—providing them with hope and courage to survive 

and return with honor. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Chairman LEVIN. Let’s start with an 8-minute round. 

Let me start with you first, Mr. Shiffrin. When you were the 

Deputy General Counsel for Intelligence for the DOD, I understand 

24

you had some discussions with the DOD General Counsel, Jim 

Haynes, about interrogations in the spring or summer of 2002. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. That’s correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you talk about SERE during those discussions? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. My recollection, Mr. Chairman, is that, at some 

point in the spring—late spring, early summer—I had some discussions with Jim Haynes about where expertise might lie, within the 

DOD, on interrogation. The sense that I and others had was that 

DOD had been out of this business for a long, long time, at least 

since the Vietnam war, and that there wasn’t a skilled cadre of investigators/interrogators outside of the law enforcement context, 

the Air Force Office of Special Investigations and Naval Criminal 

Investigative Service or Army Criminal Investigation Division 

(CID). I think those folks, at least Army CID, were already being 

used for their expertise in trying to develop effective interrogation 

methods. 

I don’t know whether Mr. Haynes suggested trying to contact the 

SERE JPRA folks or whether I—and I was aware of JPRA through 

some of my other work—said, ‘‘Well, maybe the folks at JPRA have 

some information. There has to be some scholarly professional literature on the subject, and perhaps they have some.’’ 

Chairman LEVIN. Is that what he said? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. No, I think I said——

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN.—at least that part, about finding historical scholarly, professional journals, medical journals, psychological journals 

that may be in existence. I assumed that this stuff was still actively being investigated, analyzed, pursued by professionals. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was it after those discussions with Mr. Haynes 

that you talked to Colonel Baumgartner? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I don’t remember who I contacted at Fort Belvoir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you talk with Colonel Baumgartner after 

you had discussions with Haynes? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I talked to someone at Fort Belvoir in JPRA, yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. You don’t know that it was Colonel 

Baumgartner. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. The name—it could have been. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I’m not suggesting it wasn’t. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you—

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I think I talked to two people. 

Chairman LEVIN. You’re saying that you can’t remember whether 

or not those requests that you had, or the conversations with folks 

at JPRA, were based on Jim Haynes’s request to you. You don’t remember that. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. Oh, no, I think they were initiated by that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Oh. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. As to whether specifically he said, ‘‘Contact 

JPRA,’’ I don’t know. He may have said, ‘‘Can you think of anyone 

who might have information on this subject?’’ 

Chairman LEVIN. Gotcha. Was this effort because there was 

some frustration with the lack of intelligence that was coming up? 

25

Mr. SHIFFRIN. That’s the sense I got, not just from that discussion, but in previous meetings I was at, that I attended, generally, 

of our office, where there was discussion about progress or lack of 

progress in exploitation of detainees. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, Colonel Baumgartner, in your written 

testimony you say that Mr. Shiffrin called and asked you, in July 

2002, for information on the use of physical pressures in SERE 

training. Is that correct? Your written testimony says that. 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. In response, you sent to Mr. Shiffrin a list of 

physical pressures, including stress positions, walling, degradation, 

sensory deprivation, and waterboarding. You also sent him a memo 

from Dr. Ogrisseg about the psychological effects of that training. 

Is that correct? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, if you look at tab 2, was that your memo 

that you sent to the General Counsel’s office? (Appendix A) 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was, attached to that memo, some attachments, the ones that appear at tabs 3 and 4? [Pause.] 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Well, there are actually three tabs, but 

these two were——

Chairman LEVIN. Those two were two of the attachments——

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is that correct? The first attachment, in number 4 was the Ogrisseg memo that you had obtained from Dr. 

Ogrisseg. Is that correct? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, sir. Number 4 was from Dr. 

Ogrisseg. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Now, tab 3 is a memo entitled ‘‘Physical Pressures Used in Resistance Training and Against American 

Prisoners and Detainees,’’ is that correct? That’s tab 3? (Appendix 

A) 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, it’s a talking paper. 

Chairman LEVIN. But, is that the title of it? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right, let me just turn to Dr. Ogrisseg, here. 

In your prepared testimony, Dr. Ogrisseg, this is what you’ve 

said, that—with regards to that July 2002 communication with 

Colonel Baumgartner, who was then chief of staff for JPRA, it was 

your recollection that Colonel Baumgartner called you directly, 

probably on the same day that you generated that July 24, 2002, 

memorandum; he indicated he was getting asked, ‘‘from above,’’ 

about the psychological effects of resistance training. You didn’t 

know who was asking Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner from 

above, and did not ask him to clarify who was asking. You recalled 

reminding Colonel Baumgartner, in general terms, about the program evaluation data that you had presented at the SERE Psychology Conference, and you also indicated, on page 4 of your written testimony, that you told Colonel Baumgartner that 

‘‘waterboarding was completely inconsistent with the stress inoculation paradigm of training that we use; it was more indicative of 

a practice that produces learned helplessness, a training result 

that we tried strenuously to avoid. The final area I recall Colonel 

26

Baumgartner asking about were my thoughts on the use of the 

waterboard against the enemy.’’ You responded by saying, 

‘‘Wouldn’t that be illegal?’’ He replied that ‘‘Some people were asking, from above, about the utility of using this technique against 

the enemy, for the same reasons I wouldn’t use it in training.’’ ‘‘I 

replied, ‘I wouldn’t go down that path, because, aside from being 

illegal, it was completely different arena that we in survival school 

didn’t know anything about.’ ’’ Is that your written testimony? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Yes, that is. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is that accurate? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Colonel Baumgartner, do you remember that? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, sir, I do. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, if you look at tab 4, Dr. Ogrisseg, you 

agree that is your memo? (Appendix A) 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Yes, Mr. Chairman, that is my memo. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Now, as I understand it, the purpose 

of SERE training is stress inoculation, or to build up immunities 

of American military personnel so that, if they should be captured 

and subject to illegal and abusive treatment, they’d be better prepared to resist. During that training, that SERE training, there are 

numerous safety measures in place to reduce the likelihood that 

our people will be injured. Is that correct? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Are the physical and psychological pressures, 

which are designed for use in SERE school for training students, 

intended to be used against detainees to obtain intelligence? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. No, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Why not? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Those techniques are derived from what has historically happened to our personnel who have been detained by the 

enemy. From those, we derived some learning objectives and some 

situations to put students through so that we can test their decisionmaking-building, and also use some of those strategies to increase their resistance and the confidence that they would be able 

to survive if they are subjected to them. It’s not the same at all as 

something that would be applied in an interrogation setting. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, during the resistance phase of training, 

where SERE school instructors play the role of interrogators, is 

there a way—a phrase that you give to students which they could 

use to make the training stop? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Are SERE instructors trained interrogators? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. No, they are not, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you know why you were being asked for the 

information by Colonel Baumgartner? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. I assumed it was related to questioning, just as 

the title says, the psychological effects of resistance training. 

Chairman LEVIN. But, do you know why he was asking you? Did 

he say anything about higher-ups? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. He did. As I said in my written statement, he said 

that he was being asked from above about that matter. But, I did 

not question him further as to who was asking him, or why. 

27

Chairman LEVIN. Do you remember saying that, Colonel 

Baumgartner? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Who was ‘‘above’’? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. The Office of General Counsel. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Did you know, Dr. Ogrisseg, that 

they were considering using these techniques against detainees 

when you sent this information? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. The only hint of that, that I got, was the question 

from Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner, that someone was asking 

about it. I certainly never would have assumed, based on my 

memo, which clearly pertains to medically screened, medically 

monitored trainees, that there would be inferences about this that 

would be used to try to promote these types of procedures in realworld detainee handling. 

Chairman LEVIN. So, you did not believe, when you sent this 

memo, that—what you said about the lack of psychological harm, 

given the controls there, that these techniques would be used 

against detainees? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. That’s correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, thank you. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Shiffrin—is that right? Am I saying your 

name right? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. Yes, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. It was my understanding that Mr. 

Haynes was expressing some concern that we were not getting good 

intelligence based on rapport-building techniques, and that we had 

to do something new and different. Is that correct? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I’m not sure, specifically, Senator. My recollection 

is, over a period of time, weeks or months, I was privy to—or attended meetings where the discussion was progress, or lack of 

progress, in the exploitation of detainees. I remember attending at 

least two or three meetings with Major General Dunlavey, for example, when he would come up. He came up once every month or 

two, briefed the Secretary, briefed the Deputy Secretary, and 

briefed the General Counsel, in separate meetings. I, along with 

five or six other members of our office, attended those meetings. 

During those meetings, there was often discussion about what was 

working, what wasn’t working, at GTMO. There was a general 

sense that we ought to be more effective, but, for some reason, 

were not. 

Senator GRAHAM. So basically, this was driven by a desire to get 

better information from the detainees at GTMO, and the feeling 

was that, ‘‘We’re not getting enough, something else needs to be 

tried.’’ Is that the general proposition here? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. Something else needed to be tried. My sense was 

that maybe we’re not smart about this, and that’s why my first request to JPRA was for all historical materials they had that—of 

what worked and what didn’t work. In fact, I have a specific recollection of being told, by the person I spoke to on the phone, that 

we have this information, we have a library, but—it’s at Fairchild 

Air Force Base, near Spokane—and it was going to take some time 

to get it. I, of course—the way our office ran, it—Jim Haynes asked 

28

me to look in to this, and, a few hours later or the next day, said, 

‘‘Well, what have you got?’’ and I said, ‘‘I’ve found where some material lies, but it’s 3,000 miles away and it’s going to take more 

than a day to get here,’’ and he said, ‘‘that’s not good enough.’’ I 

probably called back to Fort Belvoir and said, ‘‘Gee, I’m under pressure to get this material here as quickly as possible.’’ I think, within 4 or 5 days, two members, is my recollection, drove up from Fort 

Belvoir with several boxes of materials. I think they occupied 2 or 

3 board feet on my shelf in my small office. I went through them. 

Ninety-eight percent of it was from the 1950s, post-Korean-War 

studies, professional journals, articles, analysis of the experience of 

our servicemen in Korea. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Colonel Baumgartner? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do the techniques we’re talking about work? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. In what frame of reference, sir? 

Senator GRAHAM. Getting intelligence? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. I’m not an intelligence officer, sir, I don’t 

know. But, they work in our training process, to demonstrate to 

students how to resist somebody getting intelligence from you. 

That’s what they’re for. 

Senator GRAHAM. So, you don’t have an opinion as to whether or 

not they yield good information. 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. I don’t, sir. I wasn’t there. 

Senator GRAHAM. Doctor, do you have an opinion about——

Dr. OGRISSEG. Senator, my expertise comes in the realm of training, and I certainly know that these techniques are effective in getting our trainees to learn the skills and develop the confidence that 

we need to in order to survive and return with honor from captivity. 

Senator GRAHAM. Based on your studies of this subject matter, 

is it fair to say that you can get almost anybody to say anything 

if you’re hard enough on them over time? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. I would say that that’s true, but that’s also the 

problem. You could get them to say anything. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thanks. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me first thank you and the staff of the committee for an extraordinary exercise in governmental oversight, congressional oversight, of a very important topic with an exhaustive and, I think, 

important investigation that you’ve done. I want to thank you and 

Senator Graham for your outstanding opening statements. 

This is one of those cases where hindsight is always the clearest 

kind of sight, but, nonetheless, it’s important to look back so that 

we can learn from what’s happened in the past. 

I would start by echoing what Senator Levin said at the beginning of his remarks, which is that the members of this committee 

know that intelligence gathered from detainees is critical to our 

success, our safety, and the safety of our troops and our allies in 

the war against—with Islamic terrorists. We’ve had more than one 

commander, particularly from Iraq or Afghanistan, tell us that inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
29

formation gained from detainees is the most significant form of intelligence, still, that we obtain in order to confront the enemy that 

we’re facing in Iraq and Afghanistan and throughout the world. So, 

this is an important matter. 

But, obviously, we’re a nation, as my colleagues have said, and 

I need belabor it, that is a nation of law; and therefore, to me, the 

standard that we have to hold up in our attempts to obtain information from detainees is, is it legal, and is it effective? In other 

words, does it produce information that is helpful, or does it have 

other effects, and might it produce, as Dr. Ogrisseg said in response to Senator Graham, information that’s not truthful, or, in 

the larger context, as we’ve seen after Abu Ghraib, might it affect 

our standing, generally, in our effectiveness of the war on terrorism? 

I remember, once, being with Senator McCain and Senator 

Graham, meeting at Camp Bucca in Iraq—which is a large detention center—meeting a former member of al Qaeda in Iraq who 

said that one of the reasons he was motivated to join al Qaeda in 

Iraq was what he heard had happened at Abu Ghraib. So, this is 

important stuff. 

What I find in this story, that the investigation of the committee 

has revealed in hindsight, is, looking back, some people who acted 

in ways, I assume well-motivated, that look now like they were 

wrong, and some people who said some things which, in hindsight, 

are jarring and unacceptable. The comment, ‘‘If the detainees die, 

you’re doing it wrong,’’ with regard to waterboarding is not, obviously, what any of us want to hear from anybody working for the 

United States Government. Even Secretary Rumsfeld’s statement, 

which—it’s hard to read with certain clarity, but it certainly has 

an edge to it that seems to be unacceptable, about how long the detainees could be forced to stand, him saying, ‘‘I stand, what, 8 to 

10 hours a day. Why are they only forced to stand 4 hours a day?’’ 

That’s not really what this is about. 

But, there are heroes that emerged from this. Chairman Levin’s 

statement of the record of the investigation shows that. The lawyers for the military Services spoke up quite clearly—I think—I 

presume both from a context of law and of effectiveness of the interrogation of detainees. Mr. Mora is obviously, in hindsight, a 

hero, here, who acted in the best traditions of American law and 

military. 

I want to go to my questions now, and begin—because there’s a 

lot to learn with—in hindsight. 

Mr. Shiffrin, at the beginning, in your brief answer to Chairman 

Levin’s first question, you began to answer a question that I had, 

which was, why in the world would we have gone to the people 

training—the SERE group training—preparing our military for the 

kind of harsh interrogation techniques that the enemy might impose on them, to find out what we might do? My own question to 

myself was, why weren’t we prepared, ourselves? I want to ask you 

to deal with that again. In other words, the Pentagon is a vast operation—we have a lot of military lawyers, we have a lot of people 

with previous or present prosecutorial experience, interrogation experience, we have a lot of psychologists—I take it from what you’re 

saying that we really weren’t ready to deal with these detainees. 

30

I wanted to ask you to comment on that, as to why you went to 

the folks at SERE to ask for their help. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. As I stated, Senator, my recollection is, the primary motivation for my initial inquiry was to find the font of wisdom on the subject, that there had to be some place where we had 

all the learning on this, because we hadn’t been able to find people 

within the Pentagon and within the Services who were experienced 

in conducting interrogations outside of the criminal justice area. 

The second—I can’t deny that there was probably some discussion, at some point, about reverse-engineering SERE techniques. I 

don’t know where it came from, but it seemed to me that that was 

another part of this. When I answered the earlier question, I guess 

from Senator Graham, I said that, ‘‘Well, the first tranche was this 

historical stuff from the 1950s.’’ I think Mr. Haynes came back to 

me and said, ‘‘No, no, this isn’t what I’m looking for.’’ In fact, I 

think at the end that stuff sat on my shelf for several months, and 

I don’t know if anyone else looked at it besides me—but, I remember, at the time of my leaving the General Counsel’s Office, I called 

down to Fort Belvoir and said, ‘‘You guys better come and get this 

back, because a lot of it is original material.’’ 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me ask you this question. Did you ever 

call, or, as far as you know, did anybody in the General Counsel’s 

Office at the Pentagon ever call, for instance, the interrogation experts at the DIA or the Army’s interrogation school? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. Not to my knowledge. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. How about any of the folks—I know, later 

on, people in criminal investigations within the Pentagon got involved in the discussion, particularly through the military Services, 

but did anybody in the General Counsel’s Office ever think to call 

people in criminal intelligence about interrogation tactics that 

worked? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I do recall Army CID being involved. I can’t give 

you a precise timeframe, but I recall, fairly early on, some participation by Army CID. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. How about reaching out to prosecutors in 

the civilian sector who do a lot of interrogating, or police officers 

who have developed techniques? Now, obviously, criminal defendants in U.S. courts have more constitutional protections than detainees, at least prior to the decision of the Supreme Court last 

week, but did anyone at General Counsel’s Office at the Pentagon 

ever reach out to law enforcement in the United States? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. Not to my knowledge. I think that would have 

been inconsistent with the way the Pentagon acted under Secretary 

Rumsfeld. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Dr. Ogrisseg, one last question, because my 

time really is running. At any point, did anyone ask you, or did you 

understand that the questions you were being asked from Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner, who was, in turn, responding to the 

General Counsel’s Office, about your judgment as a mental health 

professional about the effectiveness of the techniques that you were 

listing—not to train our people, but to elicit evidence from detainees? 

31

Dr. OGRISSEG. Mr. Senator, the only questions that I was really 

asked about this pertained to the memo that I had written in 2002 

which is part of the record here, and at some point——

Senator LIEBERMAN. So, in that memo you did not feel that you 

had to make a judgment or offer your professional judgment about 

how effective these techniques might be in eliciting testimony 

from—or information from the detainees. 

Dr. OGRISSEG. No, I felt like, in the discussion with Lieutenant 

Colonel Baumgartner, that I indicated, one of my ethical issues as 

a psychologist, since I’m not a legal practitioner, not a judge, not 

a lawyer, but with regards to ethics within my field—that one of 

the main things is, you don’t practice outside of your bounds of 

competence. That would have been outside of the bounds of my 

competence to have gone there, because I was someone who is in 

the training business and understood the training population. So, 

when I said this is something that we at the Air Force Survival 

School don’t know about, I was giving my opinion there, and also 

giving my opinion about the waterboard with respect to training. 

I don’t believe that it should be used anywhere, that was my stance 

that I was taking at that time. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Understood. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Shiffrin, my questions follow up on the questions that Senator Lieberman just asked you. I’m trying to get a better understanding of why DOD did not seek assistance from the FBI, for example, which has probably the most extensive experience in interrogating hostile detainees of perhaps anyone in the Federal Government. Obviously, we know, later, that there was disagreement 

between DOD and the FBI on the proper approach to use with detainees. 

You talked about the great frustration within the Department 

about the lack of information that was being secured or obtained 

from the detainees, and you also said, in response to questions 

from Senator Levin, that the Department had been out of the business of interrogation for some time. It seems to me that it was 

more logical for the Department to go to the FBI for assistance 

than to try to figure out how the SERE techniques could be re-engineered to be used for interrogation, since that’s not at all what the 

purpose of the SERE techniques were. Could you give us more understanding of your perception of why the Department, under Secretary Rumsfeld, would be reluctant to turn to the FBI for assistance? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. Assuming the correctness of your premise—and 

that is, they did not go to the FBI; I have no personal knowledge 

as to whether they did or didn’t, but it seems like they didn’t—my 

answer is somewhat my personal observation in my limited dealings with the Secretary, and that was, the Secretary was very jealous of other agencies, and specifically with respect to DOD’s inherent capabilities. I can remember one incident that came up two or 

three times, somewhat unrelated, and that was the CIA’s ability to 

get things done in Afghanistan, and the Secretary was quite upset 

32

that the CIA was more effective in Afghanistan than we were, in 

some cases, especially at the onset of hostilities or before hostilities. Of course, it was understandable; the CIA had been there 

for 25 years, and the military hadn’t set foot in Afghanistan for 25 

years. But, that was never a satisfactory answer to him. In fact, 

he ended up building a capability that mirrored the CIA. 

I think it would have been unthinkable to say to the Secretary 

that, ‘‘the people who were really good at this are law enforcement; 

we should talk to the FBI, talk to the Drug Enforcement Agency, 

talk to other law enforcement agencies that have been conducting 

interrogations for their entire careers.’’ Now, I just don’t think he 

would have accepted that answer. 

Senator COLLINS. I suspect that you’re correct, based on the discussions that we had with the Secretary’s office when we were trying to do intelligence reform, which the Secretary was very resistant to and wanted, instead, to build up a duplicative capability 

within DOD. 

But, how about the Army Field Manual, which had been the 

guidance for the Army, at least, in conducting interrogations? Was 

there discussion within DOD of why that was inadequate in dealing with these detainees? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I was not privy to that. 

Senator COLLINS. Colonel, are you aware of any discussions 

about why the Army Field Manual’s guidance on interrogation was 

not adequate? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. No, Senator, I’m not. 

Senator COLLINS. Let me ask you another question based on the 

SERE training. Prior to 2002, are you aware of any time in which 

the interrogation techniques based on SERE training were ever 

employed successfully by military interrogators or by members of 

other U.S. Government agencies? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Let me answer the question this way. 

What the committee is calling ‘‘SERE techniques’’ with regards to 

interrogation, they’re not just SERE techniques; they’re used by police, they’re used by priests, they’re used by your mom and dad. I 

mean, good-cop/bad-cop. We didn’t invent that, but we use it in 

training. So, a lot of these interrogation techniques are nothing 

more than interview techniques. In some of them, it’s a friendly 

interviewer; and some of them, the interviewer is not so friendly. 

We’ve taken what we have found, as Dr. Ogrisseg said, and internalized those to our training, because we know they work against 

us, and they have in the past; that’s why we do lessons-learned on 

every detention, POW, peacetime governmental situation that we 

come across, so we can train our folks more effectively. When you 

start looking at what other folks were doing, we really didn’t investigate how we do enemy POW or detention operations, because 

they’re just not applicable to our training. 

Senator COLLINS. But the SERE training was never intended to 

teach interrogation techniques, correct? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. No, we don’t teach interrogation techniques to our students. 

Senator COLLINS. It’s resistance and survival correct? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, we teach our instructors interviewing techniques, we teach them how to use physical pressures 

33

so that we can teach students how to resist a determined adversary. They learn those, not to employ them as offensive capabilities, but to teach students how to employ the techniques we’re trying to teach them on how to resist enemy captivity. 

Senator COLLINS. But, the irony here is that the SERE training 

is intended to help our troops resist inappropriate interrogation 

methods——

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator COLLINS.—inhumane methods. 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator COLLINS. So, by the very nature of the SERE training, 

we’re trying to help our troops resist and survive interrogation 

techniques that are not sanctioned, that are inhumane or outside 

the pale. That’s why I think it’s so troubling to many of us that 

those techniques were investigated for use by our interrogators, 

when, in fact, the whole purpose of SERE training is to teach our 

troops how to survive when they’re being questioned by people who 

do not obey the international standards of humane treatment. Is 

that an accurate statement? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, Senator, I believe it is. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

Senator Akaka, I believe, is next in line. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Shiffrin, I’m very interested in the circumstances surrounding your initial request to the Colonel. Prior to your July 

2002 request, how familiar were you with the training conducted 

at the JPRA? More specifically, to what extent were you aware of 

the specifics of the resistance phase of SERE training and that 

these techniques were designed to simulate the conditions employed by enemies who did not abide by the Geneva Convention? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. Not familiar at all, Senator. I only knew of JPRA 

through another program. I had no detailed knowledge of SERE. I 

knew about SERE, but no more than you could get from reading 

a paragraph on it. 

Senator AKAKA. Colonel, it is my understanding from your advance testimony, that you were assigned to the USAF Survival 

School in a variety of capacities from 1990 until your retirement in 

2003, and that in your last assignment, as chief of staff, you had 

broad oversight and knowledge of internal processes. My question 

is, prior to the July request regarding interrogation resistance techniques used against U.S. POWs, to your knowledge had the JPRA 

ever been contacted by the DOD’s Office of General Counsel regarding this type of information? In other words, to what extent did 

this seem to you to be an unusual request at that time? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Sir, there was contact between JPRA and 

the Office of General Counsel prior to July 2002. As I said in my 

opening statement, in interviews with the committee staffers, I 

came to realize that they had actually requested the historical material back in December 2001. So, that was the first contact. 

The next contact was in early July, when they asked us for information on exploitation interrogation, and I cleared that with the 

U.S. JFCOM Headquarters and my commander, to provide the information. 

34

Senator AKAKA. At that time, what was your understanding of 

the purpose of the request? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. I don’t want to speculate or put any 

thoughts in anybody’s minds on that, but we used it for training. 

The only other purpose you could use it for is if you were to use 

it in a different environment. We weren’t part of that decision process. We were tasked by higher headquarters for information, and 

we provided the information. 

Senator AKAKA. Colonel, you assert that the September 2002 

Fort Bragg briefings were to assist the Army in training Army psychologists and other mental health personnel on what it meant to 

be assigned to duty at GTMO, including instruction in exploitation 

oversight and treatment of detainees and staff in a captivity environment. To your knowledge, were aggressive interrogation techniques demonstrated at this briefing? Also, to what extent were 

you aware of the potential for the information of the JPRA briefing 

to be used as a model for the types of interrogation techniques recommended in the JTF GTMO SERE interrogation SOP? (Appendix 

A) 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Senator, I know that the interrogation 

techniques were brief. They talked about exploitation. I’m pretty 

sure—I don’t know for a fact, but I know that they talked about 

how you oversee—when you have folks in detention, whether you’re 

training or in another venue, we have to be very careful how we 

handle our students, how they’re moved, how they’re detained, how 

they’re restrained, if restraint is deemed necessary as part of the 

training. Some of these things that you find in the training environment are certainly issues that would have to be dealt with in 

an offensive detention environment. 

As far as actual techniques being demonstrated, I have no knowledge of that. I know they were going to get briefed, and I hope that 

answers your question. 

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Ogrisseg, one of my deepest concerns in reviewing the material available prior to this hearing was what appears to me to be the deliberate decision by this administration to 

use the techniques developed to assist our Armed Forces members 

to survive forms of mistreatment and torture perpetuated by 

enemy combatants who do not adhere to the Geneva Convention to 

develop our Nation’s own SOPs with regards to treatment of detainees, yet it is not even clear whether use of aggressive interrogation techniques is the most effective method of gathering information. My question, Doctor, is, how effective is the resistance training given our own military members? Isn’t it likely that enemy 

combatants have been given similar resistance training, making 

these methods less viable than other options, such as rapport-building? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Senator, I can certainly answer that question with 

regards to how effective our training is, because we’ve studied it. 

One of the purposes of my job is to do program evaluations of this 

type of training, to ensure that our students come through feeling 

confident that they’re able to handle these situations, and therefore, we use some of the techniques that we do to actually enhance 

their confidence. Much like a lot of other fields that want people 

to make decisions, in very difficult spots, we put them into cirVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
35

cumstances that model what people have experienced in the past. 

Firefighters use physical pressures. They teach people skills, and 

then they put them in burning buildings so that during training 

they develop those learned skills and make them less vulnerable to 

being degraded by stress. In our training, we both approximate 

some of the things that have been done to people in the past, but 

we also ensure that they’re structured in a way, so that the students can succeed. We have surveyed how confident they are when 

they go through these experiences untrained, versus how confident 

they are afterwards, and they’re significantly greater. We know 

that they definitely take in the skill sets, because we have ways 

of assessing which skill sets that they’re applying. So, I’m very confident that we know our students are getting what they need from 

training. 

Senator AKAKA. Colonel, in your advance testimony, you note 

that while you were aware of many things involving the JPRA, you 

were not privy to everything. You also note that JPRA directors 

had the authority and ability to go directly to the commander and 

deputy commander as well. My question to you, Colonel, is, why 

would decisions have been made without the input of the chief of 

staff’s input or knowledge? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Senator, the chief of staff at a military 

organization is not like a chief of staff for, say, a political organization. You’re not the gatekeeper for everything. ‘‘Staff director’’ is 

probably known as managing the formats, managing staff packages, being the chief staff officer for the commander, making sure 

things are done correctly, and making sure the directors play well 

with each other in the day-to-day conduct of your business. So each 

director has the ability to go to the commander without going 

through the chief of staff, if they so choose. The commander will 

sometimes reach out for especially sensitive issues, like personnel 

issues or things of that nature, and go directly to the director, and 

not use the chief of staff, because of the sensitivity of the issue. So 

usually everything goes right through the office, not always. But 

there is a tremendous volume of things that went through the office. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Akaka. 

Senator Bill Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ogrisseg, I want to follow up. In your training, you spoke 

about waterboarding. Do you also use sleep deprivation in your 

training? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Senator, in Air Force training we’ve never used 

waterboarding. Never. In my statement, I was talking about the 

training that was done at the Navy school in San Diego. So we’ve 

never done it, and would never do it for the reasons that I outlined 

there, that it’s detrimental to a stress-inoculation approach to this 

training. We want them to come through more resistant to stress. 

We do, however, use some sleep deprivation within the training. 

Our students get tired and fatigued, because in real situations in 

the past, historically, they’ve been interrogated while they are tired 

and fatigued. 

36

Senator BILL NELSON. I want to get to your testimony, with regard to waterboarding and training. In your testimony, and I quote 

you, ‘‘I told him’’—Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner—‘‘that I had 

seen waterboarding used while observing Navy training during the 

previous year’’——

Dr. OGRISSEG. Yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON.—‘‘and I would never recommend it being 

used in training’’——

Dr. OGRISSEG. Yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So, you’ve seen it. You further say, ‘‘The 

waterboard produced capitulation and compliance with instructor 

demands 100 percent of the time,’’ and you finish up by saying that 

the waterboard expressed extreme avoidance attitudes, such as a 

likelihood to further comply with any demands made of them if 

brought near the waterboard again. So why don’t you give us some 

further observations about that. 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Senator, when I observed the Navy training, I not 

only watched when folks were being put on the waterboard, but 

also went to observe when they were being debriefed, following 

training. I’m not exactly sure how many, but with three or four of 

these students that I saw that experienced the waterboard, I heard 

their comments about that pressure. The gist of the comments is, 

as I stated there, ‘‘If they had brought me near that thing again, 

I would have complied with anything that they told me to do, and 

done anything to avoid it.’’ 

Senator BILL NELSON. It’s to prepare our troops for captivity. 

Now, the Chairman, in his opening comments, said that this technique is limited to 20 seconds. Our Navy students, primarily 

SEALs, they would know that they were not going to be killed in 

this operation, that it was a training exercise. So, it’s to prepare 

them for it. So, your observations of that are that, at the end of 

the day, whatever the captor wants the captee to do as a result of 

waterboarding, the captee is going to do? Is that your observation? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. What my observation was, was that certainly they 

would comply with what was wanted. As far as the information 

that they gave, I have no way of knowing whether or not that was 

true or not. 

Senator BILL NELSON. You said earlier, to someone’s question, 

that there was a way for the trainee to stop the interrogation technique. Tell us about that. 

Dr. OGRISSEG. In all of the school programs that I have seen, 

there is a term that can be used for them to say, ‘‘Hey, I need to 

talk to someone,’’ get them out of role and an opportunity to bring 

them back online. With the waterboard, when I saw it in 2001, 

there was essentially not a similar mechanism for that, that would 

allow them before being placed in that pressure, to avert it. Even 

with the specialists that you’re talking about the SEALs going 

through, it doesn’t take very long, with that device, to instill a very 

real fear of drowning and death for anyone who’s going through it, 

even if they know what the rules of engagement are for using it 

during training. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. 

Now, let’s talk about lack of sleep. In chapter 5 of the ‘‘Code of 

Conduct and the Psychology of Captivity,’’ it says, ‘‘Lack of sleep 

37

for prolonged periods may result in anxiety, irritability, memory 

problems, confusions, hallucinations, paranoia, disorientation, and, 

ultimately, death.’’ What’s your observation of that, as you saw it 

in this SERE training? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Certainly people were not pushed to the point of 

anything approximating death within our training, but most of the 

other reactions that you’re talking about are typical reactions to 

being put into an experience like this. Obviously our goal is to have 

them experience that first with the good guys, and have a chance 

to apply the strategies that they’ve been taught to counteract those. 

Senator BILL NELSON. On the basis of what you saw in the SERE 

training, do you have a feeling about how accurate the information 

received using the technique of sleep deprivation is? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Senator, are you talking about how good they 

learn the material? 

Senator BILL NELSON. No. 

Dr. OGRISSEG. I’m not sure I understand the question, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Information that would be gathered from 

a detainee as a result of taking them through sleep deprivation, is 

that reliable information? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Senator, you’re talking about interrogation, and 

I’m talking about training, which is where my specialty area lies. 

I’m not sure that I’m qualified—— 

Senator BILL NELSON. You don’t have any observation, having 

seen the people deprived of sleep during training, as to whether or 

not the information they would give is good or not? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. I’m not sure that I’m qualified to assess that for 

real-world detainee-handling circumstance, because, in training, 

the skill sets that we want them to apply are to resist the attempts 

that the captor is making in exploiting them. So, they’re actively 

applying skill sets that hopefully will degrade the quality of information that the captor gets. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, maybe I need to ask this 

of some of the further witnesses, but let me ask one more question. 

Under the Army Field Manual, the standard by which we are 

trying to put into law, the standard by which you can interrogate 

detainees, it says this, ‘‘Use of separation must not preclude the detainee getting 4 hours of continuous sleep every 24 hours.’’ That’s 

the standard in the Army Field Manual, for detainees. 

Now, we know, and it has been reported publicly, that al Qahtani 

was interrogated sometime in late 2002 at GTMO, where he was 

deprived of sleep by interrogating him for 18 to 20 hours a day for 

48 of 54 days. So, what would be your opinion of his mental capacity when interrogated for that long? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Senator, I have no familiarity with the subject 

that you’re talking about. I was not there, and I don’t feel qualified 

to offer an opinion on that. 

Senator BILL NELSON. When you were doing the training for the 

Air Force, did you go through sleep deprivation, yourself? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. I certainly did. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. Then, on the basis of your sleep 

deprivation, what is your answer to my question? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. I did not go through anything as prolonged as 

what you have described there. 

38

Senator BILL NELSON. How much time? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. It certainly varies within the courses, but certainly in the range of 4 to 12 hours. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Of sleep deprivation within a 24-hour period? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. You don’t have any opinion as to my question? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. You’re asking me to try to——

Senator BILL NELSON. I’m asking your opinion. 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Yes, sir. You are, but you’re also asking me to 

generalize, from my own experience, to that——

Senator BILL NELSON. That’s what I’m asking. 

Dr. OGRISSEG.—to that of—an al Qaeda member, and I don’t 

know what the circumstances were prior to that experience that 

you described. I don’t know specifically what was done to him. So 

as an ethical obligation as a psychologist, I don’t feel that I can answer that question. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I disagree with you. I think you have an 

opinion, but so be it. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

That reminds me, your reference to Qahtani, that there were portions of my statement that I left out because it was obviously a 

long statement; and so, my entire statement will be made part of 

the record, including the paragraphs relating to Mr. Qahtani. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Levin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Today’s hearing will focus on the origins of aggressive interrogation techniques 

used against detainees in U.S. custody. We have three panels of witnesses today and 

I want to thank them for their willingness to voluntarily appear before the committee. 

Intelligence saves lives. Knowing where an insurgent has buried an improvised 

explosive device can keep a vehicle carrying marines in Iraq from being blown up. 

Knowing that an al Qaeda associate visited an internet cafe ́ in Kabul could be the 

key piece of information that unravels a terrorist plot targeting our embassy. Intelligence saves lives. 

But how do we get the people who know the information to share it with us? Does 

degrading them or treating them harshly increase the chances that they’ll be willing 

to help? Just a couple of weeks ago I visited our troops in Afghanistan. While I was 

there I spoke to a senior intelligence officer who told me that treating detainees 

harshly is actually an impediment—a ‘‘roadblock’’ to use that officer’s word—to getting intelligence from them. 

Here’s why, he said—al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists are taught to expect Americans to abuse them. They’re recruited based on false propaganda that says the 

United States is out to destroy Islam. Treating detainees harshly only reinforces 

their distorted view and increases their resistance to cooperate. The abuse at Abu 

Ghraib was a potent recruiting tool for al Qaeda and handed al Qaeda a propaganda 

weapon they could use to peddle their violent ideology. 

So, how did it come about that American military personnel stripped detainees 

naked, put them in stress positions, used dogs to scare them, put leashes around 

their necks to humiliate them, hooded them, deprived them of sleep, and blasted 

music at them. Were these actions the result of ‘‘a few bad apples’’ acting on their 

own? It would be a lot easier to accept if it were. But that’s not the case. The truth 

is that senior officials in the United States Government sought information on aggressive techniques, twisted the law to create the appearance of their legality, and 

authorized their use against detainees. In the process, they damaged our ability to 

collect intelligence that could save lives. 

39

Today’s hearing will explore part of the story: how it came about that techniques, 

called Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training, which are used 

to teach American soldiers to resist abusive interrogations by enemies that refuse 

to follow the Geneva Conventions, were turned on their head and sanctioned by Department of Defense (DOD) officials for use offensively against detainees. Those 

techniques included use of stress positions, keeping detainees naked, use of dogs, 

and hooding during interrogations. 

Some brief background on SERE training. The U.S. military has five SERE 

schools to teach certain military personnel—whose missions create a high risk that 

they might be captured—the skills needed to survive in hostile enemy territory, 

evade capture, and escape should they be captured. The resistance portion of SERE 

training exposes students to physical and psychological pressures designed to simulate abusive conditions to which they might be subject if taken prisoner by enemies 

that may abuse them. The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) is the DOD 

agency that oversees SERE training. JPRA’s instructor guide states that a purpose 

of using physical pressures in the training is ‘‘stress inoculation,’’ building soldiers’ 

immunities so that should they be captured and subject to harsh treatment, they 

will be better prepared to resist. The techniques used in SERE resistance training 

can include things like stripping students of their clothing, placing them in stress 

positions, putting hoods over their heads, disrupting their sleep, treating them like 

animals, subjecting them to loud music and flashing lights, and exposing them to 

extreme temperatures. It can also include face and body slaps and until recently, 

for some sailors who attended the Navy’s SERE school, it included waterboarding—

mock drowning. 

The SERE schools obviously take extreme care to avoid injuring our own soldiers. 

Troops are medically screened to make sure they’re fit for the SERE course. Prior 

to the training, each student’s physical limitations are carefully documented to reduce the chance that the SERE training and the use of SERE techniques will cause 

injury. There are explicit limitations on the duration and intensity of physical pressures. For example, when waterboarding was permitted at the Navy SERE school, 

the instructor manual stated that a maximum of 2 pints of water could be used on 

a student who was being waterboarded and, if a cloth was used to cover a student’s 

face, it could stay in place a maximum of 20 seconds. 

SERE resistance training techniques are legitimate and important training tools. 

They prepare our forces who might fall into the hands of an abusive enemy to survive by getting them ready for what might confront them. 

Strict controls are also in place during SERE resistance training to reduce the 

risk of psychological harm to students. Psychologists are present throughout SERE 

training to intervene should the need arise and to talk to students during and after 

the training to help them cope with associated stress. 

Those who play the part of interrogators in the SERE school drama are not real 

interrogators—nor are they qualified to be. As the Deputy Commander for the Joint 

Forces Command (JFCOM) put it ‘‘the expertise of JPRA lies in training personnel 

how to respond and resist interrogations—not in how to conduct interrogations.’’ 

That distinction is a fundamental one. 

Some might say that if our personnel go through it in SERE school, what’s wrong 

with doing it to detainees. Well, our personnel are students and can call off the 

training at any time. SERE techniques are based on abusive tactics used by our enemies. If we use those same techniques offensively against detainees, it says to the 

world that they have America’s stamp of approval. That puts our troops at greater 

risk of being abused if they’re captured. It also weakens our moral authority and 

harms our efforts to attract allies to our side in the fight against terrorism. 

So, how did SERE techniques come to be considered by DOD for detainee interrogations. In July 2002, Richard Shiffrin, a Deputy General Counsel in the DOD and 

a witness at today’s hearing, called Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Baumgartner, also 

a witness today and then the Chief of Staff at JPRA—the agency that oversees the 

SERE training—and asked for information on SERE techniques. 

In response to Mr. Shiffrin’s request, Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner drafted a 

two-page memo, and compiled several documents, including excerpts from SERE instructor lesson plans, that he attached to his memo saying JPRA would ‘‘continue 

to offer exploitation assistance to those government organizations charged with the 

mission of gleaning intelligence from enemy detainees.’’ The memo was hand delivered to the General Counsel’s office on July 25, 2002. Again, it is critical to remember here; these techniques are not used in SERE school to obtain intelligence, they 

are to prepare our soldiers to resist abusive interrogations. 

The next day, Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner drafted a second memo, which included three attachments. One of those attachments listed physical and psychological pressures used in SERE resistance training including sensory deprivation, 

40

sleep disruption, stress positions, waterboarding, and slapping. It also made reference to a section of the JPRA instructor manual that talks about ‘‘coercive pressures’’ like keeping the lights at all times, and treating a person like an animal. 

Another attachment, written by Dr. Ogrisseg, also a witness today, assessed the 

long-term psychological effects of SERE resistance training on students and the effects of the waterboard. 

This morning, the committee will have the chance to ask Mr. Shiffrin, Lieutenant 

Colonel Baumgartner, and Dr. Ogrisseg about these matters. 

On August 1, 2002, a week after Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner sent his memos 

to the DOD General Counsel, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Office of Legal 

Counsel (OLC) issued two legal opinions. One, commonly known as the first Bybee 

memo, was addressed to then-White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales and provided 

OLC’s opinion on standards of conduct in interrogation required under the Federal 

torture statute. That memo concluded:

For an act to constitute torture as defined in the Federal torture statute, 

it must inflict pain that is difficult to endure. Physical pain amounting to 

torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious 

physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or 

even death. For purely mental pain or suffering to amount to torture under 

the Federal torture statute, it must result in significant psychological harm 

of significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years.

The other OLC opinion, issued the same day and known commonly as the second 

Bybee memo, responded to a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) request, and addressed the legality of specific interrogation tactics. 

While the interrogation tactics reviewed by the OLC in the second Bybee memo 

remain classified, General Hayden, in public testimony before the Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence in February of this year, said that the waterboard was 

one of the techniques that the CIA used with detainees. Steven Bradbury, the current Assistant Attorney General of the OLC, testified before the House Judiciary 

Committee earlier this year that the ‘‘CIA’s use of the waterboarding procedure was 

adapted from the SERE training program.’’

During the time the DOD General Counsel’s office was seeking information from 

JPRA, JPRA staff, responding to a request from Guantanamo (GTMO), was finalizing plans to conduct training for interrogation staff from U.S. Southern Command’s (SOUTCHOM) Joint Task Force 170 at GTMO. During the week of September 16, 2002, a group from GTMO, including interrogators and behavioral scientists, travelled to Fort Bragg, NC, and attended training conducted by instructors 

from the JPRA SERE school. None of the three JPRA personnel who provided the 

training was a trained interrogator. 

On September 25, 2002, just days after GTMO staff returned from that training, 

a delegation of senior administration lawyers, including Jim Haynes, General Counsel to the DOD, John Rizzo, acting CIA General Counsel, David Addington, Counsel 

to the Vice President, and Michael Chertoff head of the Criminal Division at the 

DOJ, visited GTMO. An after action report produced by a military lawyer after the 

visit noted, that one purpose of the trip was to receive briefings on ‘‘intel techniques.’’

On October 2, 2002, a week after John Rizzo, the acting CIA General Counsel visited GTMO, a second senior CIA lawyer, Jonathan Fredman, who was chief counsel 

to the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, went to GTMO, attended a meeting of GTMO 

staff and discussed a memo proposing the use of aggressive interrogation techniques. That memo had been drafted by a psychologist and psychiatrist from GTMO 

who, a couple of weeks earlier, had attended the training given at Fort Bragg by 

instructors from the JPRA SERE school. 

While the memo remains classified, minutes from the meeting where it was discussed are not. Those minutes clearly show that the focus of the discussion was aggressive techniques for use against detainees. 

When the GTMO Chief of Staff suggested at the meeting that GTMO ‘‘can’t do 

sleep deprivation,’’ Lieutenant Colonel Beaver, GTMO’s senior lawyer, responded 

‘‘Yes we can—with approval.’’ Lieutenant Colonel Beaver added that GTMO ‘‘may 

need to curb the harsher operations while International Committee of the Red Cross 

is around.’’

Mr. Fredman, the senior CIA lawyer, suggested it’s ‘‘very effective to identify detainee phobias and use them’’ and described for the group the so-called ‘‘wet towel’’ 

technique, which we know as waterboarding. Mr. Fredman said ‘‘it can feel like 

you’re drowning. The lymphatic system will react as if you’re suffocating, but your 

body will not cease to function.’’

41

Mr. Fredman presented the following disturbing perspective of our legal obligations under anti-torture laws, saying ‘‘It is basically subject to perception. If the detainee dies you’re doing it wrong.’’

If the detainee dies, you’re doing it wrong? How on Earth did we get to the point 

where a senior United States Government lawyer would say that whether or not an 

interrogation technique is torture is ‘‘subject to perception’’ and that ‘‘if the detainee 

dies you’re doing it wrong.’’ What was GTMO’s senior JAG officer, Lieutenant Colonel Beaver’s response? ‘‘We will need documentation to protect us.’’

Nine days after that October 2, 2002, meeting, General Dunlavey, the Commander 

of Joint Task Force 170 at GTMO, sent a memo to U.S. SOUTHCOM requesting 

authority to use interrogation techniques which the memo divided into three categories of progressively more aggressive techniques. Category I was the least aggressive. Category II was more so and included the use of stress positions, exploitation of detainee fears (such as fear of dogs), removal of clothing, hooding, deprivation of light and sound. Category III techniques included techniques like the socalled wet towel treatment, or ‘‘waterboard,’’ that were the most aggressive. A legal 

analysis by GTMO’s Staff Judge Advocate, Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver justifying the legality of the techniques, was sent with the request. 

On October 25, 2002, General James Hill, the U.S. SOUTHCOM Commander forwarded General Dunlavey’s request to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Days later, the Joint Staff solicited the views of the military Services on the GTMO 

request. 

The military Services reacted strongly against using many of the techniques in 

the GTMO request. In early November 2002, in a series of memos, the Services 

identified serious legal concerns with the techniques and they called urgently for additional analysis.

• The Air Force cited ‘‘serious concerns regarding the legality of many of 

the proposed techniques’’ and stated that ‘‘the techniques described may be 

subject to challenge as failing to meet the requirements outlined in the 

military order to treat detainees humanely.’’ The Air Force also called for 

an in depth legal review of the request. 

• The Chief Legal Advisor to the Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF) 

at GTMO wrote that Category III techniques and certain Category II techniques ‘‘may subject servicemembers to punitive articles of the Uniform 

Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),’’ called ‘‘the utility and legality of applying certain techniques’’ in the request ‘‘questionable,’’ and stated that he 

could not ‘‘advocate any action, interrogation or otherwise, that is predicated upon the principle that all is well if the ends justify the means and 

others are not aware of how we conduct our business.’’

• The Chief of the Army’s International and Operational Law Division 

wrote that techniques like stress positions, deprivation of light and auditory 

stimuli, and use of phobias to induce stress ‘‘crosses the line of ‘humane’ 

treatment,’’ would ‘‘likely be considered maltreatment’’ under the UCMJ, 

and ‘‘may violate the torture statute.’’ The Army labeled the request ‘‘legally insufficient’’ and called for additional review. 

• The Navy response recommended a ‘‘more detailed interagency legal and 

policy review’’ of the request. 

• The Marine Corps expressed strong reservations, stating that ‘‘several of 

the Category II and III techniques arguably violate Federal law, and would 

expose our servicemembers to possible prosecution.’’ The Marine Corps said 

the request was not ‘‘legally sufficient,’’ and like the other Services, called 

for ‘‘a more thorough legal and policy review.’’

While it has been known for some time that military lawyers voiced strong objections to interrogation techniques in early 2003 during the DOD Detainee Working 

Group process, these November 2002 warnings from the military Services—expressed before the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) authorized the use of aggressive 

techniques—were not publicly known before now. 

When the Joint Staff received the military Services’ concerns, Rear Admiral Jane 

Dalton, then-Legal Advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, began her 

own legal review of the proposed interrogation techniques, but that review was 

never completed. Today we’ll have the opportunity to ask RADM Dalton about that. 

Notwithstanding concerns raised by the military Services, DOD General Counsel 

Jim Haynes sent a memo to SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld on November 27, 2002, recommending that he approve all but 3 of the 18 techniques in the GTMO request. 

Techniques like stress positions, removal of clothing, use of phobias (such as fear 

of dogs), and deprivation of light and auditory stimuli were all recommended for approval. 

42

Five days later, on December 2, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld signed Mr. Haynes’s 

recommendation, adding the handwritten note ‘‘I stand for 8–10 hours a day. Why 

is standing limited to 4 hours?’’ When Secretary Rumsfeld approved the use of the 

use of abusive techniques against detainees, he unleashed a virus which ultimately 

infected interrogation operations conducted by the U.S. military in Afghanistan and 

Iraq. 

Discussions about ‘‘reverse engineering’’ SERE techniques for use in interrogations at GTMO had already prompted strong objections by the DOD’s CITF at 

GTMO. CITF Deputy Commander Mark Fallon said that SERE techniques were 

‘‘developed to better prepare U.S. military personnel to resist interrogations and not 

as a means of obtaining reliable information’’ and that ‘‘CITF was troubled with the 

rationale that techniques used to harden resistance to interrogations would be the 

basis for the utilization of techniques to obtain information.’’

The dispute over the use of aggressive techniques came to a head with the military’s plan for interrogating Mohammed al-Khatani. Both CITF and FBI strongly 

opposed the military’s plan and CITF took their concerns up the Army Chain of 

Command and even to the DOD General Counsel’s office; but over CITF’s objections, 

the military’s plan was approved. The Khatani interrogation began on November 23, 

2002, just over a week before the Secretary signed the Haynes memo. 

SOUTHCOM Commander General James Hill described the Khatani interrogation 

in a June 3, 2004, press briefing. He said: ‘‘The staff at Guantanamo working with 

behavioral scientists, having gone up to our SERE school and developed a list of 

techniques which our lawyers decided and looked at, said were OK.’’ General Hill 

said ‘‘we began to use a few of those techniques . . . on this individual . . .’’

Key documents relating to Khatani’s interrogation remain classified. Published accounts, however, indicate that Khatani was deprived of adequate sleep for weeks on 

end, stripped naked, subjected to loud music, a dog was used to scare him, and a 

leash was placed around his neck as he was forced to perform dog tricks. 

On May 13, 2008, the Pentagon announced in a written statement that the Convening Authority for military commissions had ‘‘dismissed without prejudice the 

sworn charges against Mohamed al Khatani.’’ The statement does not indicate the 

role his treatment played in that decision. 

In the week following the Secretary’s December 2, 2002, authorization, senior staff 

at GTMO set to work drafting a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) specifically 

for the use of SERE techniques in interrogations. The first page of one draft of that 

SOP stated that ‘‘The premise behind this is that the interrogation tactics used at 

U.S. military SERE schools are appropriate for use in real-world interrogations. 

These tactics and techniques are used at SERE school to ‘break’ SERE detainees. 

The same tactics and techniques can be used to break real detainees during interrogation.’’ The draft described how to slap, strip, and place detainees in stress positions. It also described ‘‘hooding,’’ ‘‘manhandling,’’ and ‘‘walling’’ detainees. 

When they saw the draft SOP, CITF and FBI personnel again raised a red flag. 

A draft of their comments on the SOP said the use of aggressive techniques only 

‘‘ends up fueling hostility and strengthening a detainee’s will to resist.’’ But those 

objections did not stop GTMO from taking the next step—training interrogators on 

how to use the techniques offensively. 

On December 30, 2002, two instructors from the Navy SERE school arrived at 

GTMO. The following day, in a session with approximately 24 interrogation personnel, the two demonstrated how to administer stress positions, and various 

slaps—just like they do it in SERE school. 

Around this time, General Hill, the Commander of the U.S. SOUTHCOM spoke 

to General Miller and discussed the fact that a debate was occurring over the Secretary’s approval of the techniques. In fact, CITF’s concerns had made their way up 

to then-Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora and a battle over interrogation techniques was being waged at senior levels in the Pentagon. 

On January 3, 2003, 3 days after they conducted the training, the SERE instructors met with Major General Miller. According to some who attended, General Miller stated that he did not want his interrogators using the techniques that the Navy 

SERE instructors had demonstrated. That conversation took place after the training 

had already occurred and not all the interrogators who attended the training got 

the message. 

Two weeks earlier, on December 20, 2002, Alberto Mora had met with DOD General Counsel Jim Haynes. In a memo describing the meeting, Mr. Mora says he told 

Mr. Haynes that he thought interrogation techniques that had been authorized by 

the SECDEF on December 2, 2002, ‘‘could rise to the level of torture’’ and asked 

him, ‘‘What did ‘deprivation of light and auditory stimuli’ mean? Could a detainee 

be locked in a completely dark cell? For how long? A month? Longer? What exactly 

43

did the authority to exploit phobias permit? Could a detainee be held in a coffin? 

Could phobias be applied until madness set in?’’

On January 9, 2003, Alberto Mora met with Jim Haynes again. According to his 

memo, Mora expressed frustration that the Secretary’s authorization had not been 

revoked and told Haynes that the policies could threaten Secretary Rumsfeld’s tenure and even damage the presidency. 

On January 15, 2003, having gotten no word that the Secretary’s authority would 

be withdrawn, Mora delivered a draft memo to Haynes’s office stating that ‘‘the majority of the proposed category II and all of the category III techniques were violative of domestic and international legal norms in that they constituted, at the minimum, cruel and unusual treatment and, at worst, torture.’’ In a phone call, Mora 

told Haynes he would be signing his memo later that day unless he heard definitively that the use of the techniques was being suspended. In a meeting that same 

day, Haynes returned the draft memo and told Mora that the Secretary would rescind the techniques. 

On January 15, 2003, the Secretary rescinded his December 2, 2002, authorization. At the same time, he directed the establishment of a ‘‘Working Group’’ to review interrogation techniques. What happened next has already become well known. 

For the next few months the judgments of senior military and civilian lawyers critical of legal arguments supporting aggressive interrogation techniques were rejected 

in favor of a legal opinion from OLC’s John Yoo. The Yoo opinion, the final version 

of which was dated March 14, 2003, was requested by Jim Haynes, and repeated 

much of what the first Bybee memo had said 6 months earlier. 

Mr. Mora, who was one of the Working Group participants, said that soon after 

the Working Group was established, it became evident the group’s report ‘‘would 

contain profound mistakes in its legal analysis, in large measure because of its reliance on the flawed OLC memo.’’ In a meeting with Yoo, Mora asked whether the 

law allowed the President to go so far as to order torture. Yoo responded ‘‘Yes.’’

The August 1, 2002, Bybee memo, again, had said that to violate the Federal antitorture statute, physical pain that resulted from an act would have to be ‘‘equivalent 

in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, 

impairment of bodily function, or even death.’’ John Yoo’s March 14, 2003 memo 

stated that criminal laws, such as the Federal anti-torture statute, would not even 

apply to certain military interrogations and that interrogators could not be prosecuted by the Justice Department for using interrogation methods that would otherwise violate the law. One CIA lawyer reportedly called the Bybee memo of August 

2002 a ‘‘golden shield.’’ Combining it with the Yoo memo of March 2003, the Justice 

Department had attempted to create a shield to make it difficult or impossible to 

hold anyone accountable for their conduct. 

Ultimately the Working Group report, finalized in April 2003, included a number 

of aggressive techniques that were legal according to John Yoo’s analysis. The full 

story of where the Working Group got those techniques remains classified. However, 

the list itself reflects the influence of SERE. Removal of clothing, prolonged standing, sleep deprivation, dietary manipulation, hooding, increasing anxiety through 

the use of a detainee’s aversions like dogs, and face and stomach slaps were all recommended. Top military lawyers and service General Counsels had objected to these 

techniques as the report was being drafted. Those who had objected, like Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora, were simply excluded from the process and not even told 

that a final report had been issued. 

On April 16, 2003, less than 2 weeks after the Working Group completed its report, the SECDEF authorized the use of 24 specific interrogation techniques for use 

at GTMO. While the authorization included such techniques as dietary manipulation, environmental manipulation, and sleep adjustment, it was silent on most of 

the techniques in the Working Group report. 

However, the Secretary’s memo said that ‘‘If, in your view, you require additional 

interrogation techniques for a particular detainee, you should provide me, via the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a written request describing the proposed 

technique, recommended safeguards, and the rationale for applying it with an identified detainee.’’

Just a few months later, one such request arrived at the Pentagon. The detainee 

was Mohamedou Ould Slahi. While several documents relating to the Slahi interrogation plan remain classified, the recent report from the DOJ Inspector General (IG) 

includes newly declassified information suggesting the plan included hooding Slahi 

and subjecting him to sensory deprivation and ‘‘sleep adjustment.’’ The IG’s report 

says that an FBI agent who saw a draft of the interrogation plan said it was similar 

to Khatani’s interrogation plan. Secretary Rumsfeld approved the Slahi plan on August 13, 2003. 

44

How did SERE techniques make their way to Afghanistan and Iraq? Shortly after 

the Secretary approved Jim Haynes’s recommendation on December 2, 2002, the 

techniques—and the fact the Secretary had authorized them—became known to interrogators in Afghanistan. A copy of the Secretary’s memo was sent from GTMO 

to Afghanistan. The Officer in Charge of the Intelligence Section at Bagram Airfield, 

in Afghanistan has said that in January 2003 she saw—in Afghanistan—a power 

point presentation listing the aggressive techniques authorized by the Secretary on 

December 2, 2002. 

Documents and interviews also indicate that the influence of the Secretary’s approval of aggressive interrogation techniques survived their January 15, 2003 rescission. 

On January 24, 2003—9 days after Rumsfeld’s rescission—the Staff Judge Advocate for CJTF–180, CENTCOM’s conventional forces in Afghanistan, produced an 

‘‘Interrogation techniques’’ memo. While that memo remains classified, the unclassified version of a report by Major General George Fay stated that the CJTF–180 

memo ‘‘recommended removal of clothing—a technique that had been in the Secretary’s December 2 authorization’’ and discussed ‘‘exploiting the Arab fear of dogs’’ 

another technique approved by the Secretary on December 2, 2002. 

From Afghanistan, the techniques made their way to Iraq. According to the DOD 

IG, at the beginning of the Iraq war, the special mission unit forces in Iraq ‘‘used 

a January 2003 Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) which had been developed for 

operations in Afghanistan.’’ According to the DOD IG, the Afghanistan SOP had 

been:

‘‘influenced by the counterresistance memorandum that the Secretary of 

Defense approved on December 2, 2002 and incorporated techniques designed for detainees who were identified as unlawful combatants. Subsequent battlefield interrogation SOPs included techniques such as yelling, 

loud music, and light control, environmental manipulation, sleep deprivation/adjustment, stress positions, 20-hour interrogations, and controlled fear 

(muzzled dogs) . . .’’

Special mission unit techniques eventually made their way into SOPs issued for 

all U.S. forces in Iraq. The Interrogation Officer in Charge at Abu Ghraib obtained 

a copy of the special mission unit interrogation policy and submitted it, virtually unchanged, to her chain of command as proposed policy for the conventional forces in 

Iraq, led at the time by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez. 

On September 14, 2003, Lieutenant General Sanchez issued the first Combined 

Joint Task Force 7 interrogation SOP. That SOP authorized interrogators in Iraq 

to use stress positions, environmental manipulation, sleep management, and military working dogs to exploit detainees’ fears in interrogations. 

In the report of his investigation into Abu Ghraib, Major General George Fay said 

that interrogation techniques developed for GTMO became ‘‘confused’’ and were implemented at Abu Ghraib. Major General Fay said that removal of clothing, while 

not included in CJTF–7’s SOP, was ‘‘imported’’ to Abu Ghraib, could be ‘‘traced 

through Afghanistan and GTMO,’’ and contributed to an environment at Abu Ghraib 

that appeared ‘‘to condone depravity and degradation rather than humane treatment of detainees.’’ Following a September 9, 2004, Committee hearing on his report, I asked Major General Fay whether the policy approved by the SECDEF on 

December 2, 2002, contributed to the use of aggressive interrogation techniques at 

Abu Ghraib, and he responded ‘‘Yes.’’

Not only did SERE resistance training techniques make their way to Iraq, but instructors from the JPRA SERE school followed. The DOD IG reported that in September 2003, at the request of the Commander of the Special Mission Unit Task 

Force, JPRA deployed a team to Iraq to provide assistance to interrogation operations. During that trip, SERE instructors were authorized to participate in the interrogation of detainees in U.S. military custody. Accounts of that trip will be explored at a later time. 

I will be sending a letter to DOD asking that those accounts and other documents 

relating to JPRA’s interrogation-related activities be declassified. 

Major General James Soligan, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. JFCOM, which is the 

JPRA’s higher headquarters, issued a memorandum referencing JPRA’s support to 

interrogation operations. Soligan wrote that:

‘‘Recent requests from OSD and the Combatant Commands have solicited 

JPRA support based on knowledge and information gained through the debriefing of former U.S. POWs and detainees and their application to U.S. 

Strategic debriefing and interrogation techniques. These requests, which 

can be characterized as ‘offensive’ support, go beyond the chartered responVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
45

sibilities of JPRA. The use of resistance to interrogation knowledge for ‘offensive’ purposes lies outside the roles and responsibilities of JPRA.’’

Lieutenant General Robert Wagner, the Deputy Commander of JFCOM, has likewise said that ‘‘Relative to interrogation capability, the expertise of JPRA lies in 

training personnel how to respond and resist interrogations—not in how to conduct 

interrogations. Requests for JPRA ‘interrogation support’ were both inconsistent 

with the unit’s charter and might create conditions which tasked JPRA to engage 

in offensive operational activities outside of JPRA’s defensive mission.’’

The DOD IG report completed in August 2006 said techniques in Iraq and Afghanistan had derived, in part from JPRA and SERE. 

Many have questioned why we should care about the rights of detainees. On May 

10, 2007, General David Petraeus answered that question in a letter to his troops. 

General Petraeus wrote:

‘‘Our values and the laws governing warfare teach us to respect human 

dignity, maintain our integrity, and do what is right. Adherence to our values distinguishes us from our enemy. This fight depends on securing the 

population, which must understand that we—not our enemies—occupy the 

moral high ground. 

I fully appreciate the emotions that one experiences in Iraq. I also know 

firsthand the bonds between members of the ‘brotherhood of the close fight.’ 

Seeing a fellow trooper killed by a barbaric enemy can spark frustration, 

anger, and a desire for immediate revenge. As hard as it might be, however, 

we must not let these emotions lead us—or our comrades in arms—to commit hasty, illegal actions. In the event that we witness or hear of such actions, we must not let our bonds prevent us from speaking up. Some may 

argue that we would be more effective if we sanctioned torture or other expedient methods to obtain information from the enemy. They would be 

wrong. Beyond the basic fact that such actions are illegal, history shows 

that they also are frequently neither useful nor necessary. 

We are, indeed, warriors. We train to kill our enemies. We are engaged 

in combat, we must pursue the enemy relentlessly, and we must be violent 

at times. What sets us apart from our enemies in this fight, however, is 

how we behave. In everything we do, we must observe the standards and 

values that dictate that we treat noncombatants and detainees with dignity 

and respect. While we are warriors, we are also all human beings.’’

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Ben Nelson. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, let me 

add my appreciation to you for calling this important hearing. 

Dr. Ogrisseg, the purpose of the training for our troops is to help 

them be able to survive, under the most extraordinary of circumstances, these techniques. Is it designed to keep them from telling secrets or giving up information that would be harmful, as 

well? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Yes, Senator, it is. 

Senator BEN NELSON. That may work, under certain circumstances, but, at least based on the four or five U.S. Navy troops 

who were subjected to waterboarding, it probably wouldn’t keep 

them from telling anything that the captor wanted them to tell. Is 

that accurate, based on what they said, ‘‘Bring the board next to 

me again, I’ll tell them whatever they want to know’’? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Based on what they said, I can determine, certainly that they were going to talk. I don’t necessarily know what 

they would say once they started talking. But, certainly this would 

get them talking. What they were indicating was they would do 

whatever they could to stay off of that situation. 

Senator BEN NELSON. As somebody involved in the training, you 

probably have an opinion as to whether or not they would give up 

anything, once they started talking, to keep from having the board 

used against them? 

46

Dr. OGRISSEG. Sir, I would like to believe that the folks going 

through the training would be equipped enough to sustain that; but 

based on the limited amount of time that we have with them, I 

think this is more like the resistance training metaphor. The resistance training metaphor is much like resistance training with 

weights. 

Senator BEN NELSON. It’s not foolproof. 

Dr. OGRISSEG. It’s not foolproof. This is like putting a 400-pound 

bar on them when they are only prepared to lift one that’s maybe 

a couple hundred pounds. 

Senator BEN NELSON. But, it’s also safe to say that—if they’ll say 

anything to avoid having the board brought to them again, that 

they could give misinformation just as easily. They’d answer any 

question, potentially, that is presented to them, whether it’s accurate information or not. Is that accurate? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Yes, Senator, that’s true. 

Senator BEN NELSON. But, the purpose is really not so much to 

keep them from giving up secrets, it’s for their survival. Is that 

fair? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. It’s both. Information is one way that our forces 

could be exploited, but obviously we want them to survive and return with honor. So, it’s both survival and resistance. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner, did you 

have any concerns with providing the SERE techniques to the interrogators? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. No, sir, I did not. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Did you know what they were going to use 

them for, the purpose? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. I knew, when we provided information on 

resistance or interrogation techniques, that somebody way above 

my paygrade was going to make a decision what was appropriate 

and what was inappropriate. We were never part of those discussions. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Shiffrin, did you have any legal opinion at the time that this request was made for the kind of information by Mr. Haynes that went beyond the studies and the research 

information on techniques? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I didn’t, Senator. My sole effort, as I recall, was 

to merely find out what information was out there. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Nobody asked you what your opinion was 

under the UCMJ or Geneva Conventions or any other base for providing against torture? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. Correct. I don’t remember ever being part of any 

discussion of specific techniques. 

Senator BEN NELSON. But did you wonder, in your own mind, 

whether this information being passed on might not be in compliance with such laws? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. Honestly, Senator, I don’t recall having that concern at the time, but, again, some of the techniques—and I think 

it was mentioned here—are relatively benign techniques. They’re 

effective interrogation techniques. Some don’t work, and maybe 

people were going to look at them and say, ‘‘Let’s not use these.’’ 

But, the colonel mentioned ‘‘good-cop/bad-cop,’’ and that’s been 

around for centuries. 

47

Senator BEN NELSON. But, the waterboarding is not in that category. Is that accurate to say? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. Yes. I never heard of waterboarding until I think 

I had retired from DOD and found out it had been used. I did not, 

at any time, participate in any discussion of specific harsh techniques. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I think that’s everything that I have, Mr. 

Chairman. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. I believe Senator Pryor is next. 

Senator Pryor. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have just a few questions for Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner, 

and that is, just for clarification—I know you’ve been asked about 

this in different contexts, but just for clarification in my mind, did 

JPRA ever advocate using the SERE techniques in an offensive 

manner against detainees? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. No, Senator, we did not. What we did 

was, we provided the information, asked by higher headquarters, 

on exploitation, which, because of the nature of our training, we 

have experts in exploitation, we have folks that have studied interrogation and interview techniques. We offered up what information 

we had. 

Senator PRYOR. Would you, today, recommend these techniques 

with detainees? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. I’m really not qualified to answer that, 

Senator. What we do as an administration in questioning detainees 

is something that has to be discussed by legal counsel and administration officials far above my paygrade. 

Senator PRYOR. Where did the techniques that you all do in your 

SERE training—where did those techniques originate? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Sir, those originated through studying 

lessons-learned of past conflicts and how our folks have been held 

by an adversary. 

Senator PRYOR. So, for example, World War II, Vietnam, Korea. 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. World War II, Korea, Vietnam, the Cold 

War, the Iranian hostage crisis, for example. We even study other 

detention situations, civilian detention situations that have lessons 

that might be useful for our training. 

Senator PRYOR. So, in your mind, since other nations or entities 

are using those against U.S. forces, does that justify our use of 

these techniques? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Sir, I—once again, I’m not qualified to 

render an opinion on that. I’m not a legal expert. 

Senator PRYOR. But, do you have a personal opinion on it? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. I have a personal opinion that a country 

needs to sit down and decide that ahead of time, before you launch. 

Senator PRYOR. I know you mentioned the legal opinion, but isn’t 

there also a moral dimension to this, as well? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. We certainly go to great lengths in our 

training to look at the moral/ethical considerations behind how we 

treat our students and how the training is structured so they get 

the best learning out of it. Now, in a detention situation, that’s not 

my realm of expertise. 

48

Senator PRYOR. Is it your understanding that some of the techniques that you use in the SERE training do violate the Army 

Field Manual, U.S. law, and the Geneva Conventions? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. One, sir, I don’t think we conduct training that’s going to violate U.S. law. 

Senator PRYOR. But——

Colonel BAUMGARTNER.—I’m not going to torture students. 

Senator PRYOR. No, I understand that. But you’re simulating 

techniques that may be used against them. 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. We are trying to create, in that student’s 

mind, a hostile environment, where they have to practice, like Dr. 

Ogrisseg said, the strategies that they’re offered in training before 

they get the opportunity to practice it for real both in training and 

then downstream, if they happen to be taken captive. 

Senator PRYOR. But, some of the activities you’re trying to simulate would violate the Army Field Manual——

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. We are simulating an enemy that is not 

complying with the Geneva Conventions——

Senator PRYOR. Right. 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER.—that’s true. 

Senator PRYOR. When did you find out that someone somewhere 

was trying to take what you all are doing in the SERE program 

and actually use it offensively with detainees? When did you discover that? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Sir, the request for the information, like 

Dr. Ogrisseg said, it wasn’t for training, therefore it had to be for 

our decisionmakers to make a decision on what DOD, or what the 

Government, was going to use, in terms of techniques. 

Senator PRYOR. Yes. What I’m asking is, did you know about it? 

Did you know, at the time, when you were providing information, 

that someone somewhere was working on a new policy on how we 

were going to treat detainees? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. I didn’t know that for a fact, Senator, 

but, like I said, I had an idea that they were probably going to look 

at, as a matter of policy, what was appropriate for the United 

States to use. 

Senator PRYOR. Did you ever offer any opinion about what you 

felt would or would not be appropriate? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. No, Senator, we were not part of that decisionmaking process at all. 

Senator PRYOR. So, in other words, your testimony is, you just 

provided the information? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. We provided the information, and then, 

after that, we were not in that loop anymore. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Chairman, that’s all I have. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Pryor. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Colonel Baumgartner, did anyone outside of the DOD ever ask 

you for the information that you sent to the General Counsel’s Office, which is a list of physical pressures in the memo from Dr. 

Ogrisseg? 

49

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. We had support requests from, like I 

said, the DIA. We also had a support request from another agency 

that——

Senator REED. What’s the other agency? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. I think that discussion might go into 

classified, sir. 

Senator REED. Did you send them the information? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, sir, we did. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

I just want to follow up in the line of questioning, very briefly, 

that Senator Pryor, in your response, confirmed my experience, 

after 12 years in the Army, which is—the basic premise of SERE 

training is that our enemies will not follow the Geneva Convention—some of them—that they will not follow any rules of international conduct. I’ll just ask you—and I’ll start with you, Colonel—if that’s the premise, that all of these techniques are, per se, 

violative of the Geneva Convention, or certainly if they’re—without 

some modifications or some sort of changes, what was the logic of 

trying to incorporate them in our interrogation practices? 

Colonel, do you have any thoughts? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. I’m really not qualified to answer that, 

sir. We received a request for information from the Office of General Counsel. We had that information, based on our training, 

based on the research of conducting this training for 53 years. So 

we provided the information. 

After that point, it’s not up to Dan Baumgartner what they do 

with it. 

Senator REED. No, but, sir, first of all, I think you’ve said before, 

that the premise is that our adversaries would likely not follow the 

Geneva Conventions, the rules of war. Is that correct? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. I think it depends on the adversary. 

I think with our current adversaries, that’s probably true. 

Senator REED. But you were training, not against adversaries 

that you were training against the real possibility that our adversaries would not follow——

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Absolutely, sir. 

Senator REED. That’s correct. 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Absolutely. 

Senator REED. The thrust of the training was to prepare these 

individuals for the worst case, not for the best case. 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Right, sir. 

Senator REED. Which leads, again, to the conclusion that these 

techniques are probably, per se, violative of the Geneva Convention. Now, did it ever cross your mind, when you were sending this 

information over to the General Counsel’s Office, why they needed 

it? Did you ever officially raise the question, why do they need 

this? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. When you’re tasked by the OSD at a 

level that we are, if they needed the information—and, quite frankly, I had no idea what they were going to do with it, what they 

were going to use, what they would decide not to use, and what the 

country would use that information, or the administration would 

use that information, for, in terms of making a decision. So, when 

I’m tasked by higher headquarters to provide information they can 

50

legitimately have, I can’t really turn around and tell the flag officer 

and the senior executive service guys no. 

Senator REED. No one is suggesting that you were not complying 

with a legitimate request, but did it—again, the question is not so 

much what you did—but, did anyone in your organization ask the 

question, even around the water cooler, what the heck’s going on? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. We discussed detention operations—of 

course we did—because we have experts in exploitation, we have 

experts in interrogation methods and questioning, and everything 

that surrounds SERE training. So, of course it was of professional 

interest to us what—how the United States was going to deal with 

this particular question. 

Senator REED. Do you think, on your expertise, that it would be 

a challenge to incorporate these techniques and comply with the 

Geneva Conventions? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. I really never came to any conclusions. 

There was a lot of discussion, but not a lot of conclusions. 

Senator REED. Right. 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. This is just a very difficult question. 

Senator REED. Right. 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Because when you go to war, you have to 

figure out how you’re going to conduct detainee treatment. 

Senator REED. Right. 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Usually it’s really best if you do that 

ahead of time, before you get in the middle of things. 

Senator REED. Let me, Mr. Shiffrin, ask you the same question 

with respect to—the premise of this type of training was that our 

adversaries—not all of them, but at least some of them—would not 

follow Geneva Convention, would not follow the CAT, would not follow any rules of civilized conduct. Is that a fair judgment? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. My personal view, yes. I don’t think it was something I thought about at the time. 

Senator REED. Okay. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. But, I understand that’s what’s—but, the—as I 

understand the training, it’s pretty wide-ranging. 

If I may just offer one point, a lot of the discussion that I was 

privy to was not the idea of harsh treatment, but being able to offer 

carrots. There’s a lot of people who felt that if we offer some inducement to detainees—cable TV, an extra pillow——

Senator REED. Yes, but those inducements didn’t seem to appear 

in the category 1, 2, and 3 recommendations. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. No, I’m just saying that, from an abstract point of 

view, a discussion about what might be effective or not, when you 

say, ‘‘Let’s find out everything there is out there on the subject,’’ 

I assume that some of it would be, ‘‘Well, you could offer inducements.’’ 

Senator REED. That assumption might be debatable. But, given 

what we’ve seen, in terms of the recommendations, there weren’t 

many inducements. But, gentlemen, thank you for your testimony 

this morning. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

51

Mr. Shiffrin, would you tell us again what your position was at 

this time, and who you reported to? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I took the position of Deputy General Counsel for 

Intelligence in DOD in December 1997. I left the DOJ, where I was 

at OLC. I had that position until I was demoted, or transferred, at 

the end of the 2002. I then became the Acting General Counsel at 

DIA for my last 6 months at the DOD, and I retired, July of—

Senator SESSIONS. Let me just ask you a couple of things. Were 

you aware that these techniques that were eventually approved 

and then modified for GTMO interrogations—that was based on a 

request from the commanding general or the commanders, somebody at GTMO, right? Were you there then, when that came up? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I had no knowledge of that. I had no knowledge 

of any of the techniques or what was being used, methodology, at 

GTMO. 

Senator SESSIONS. Okay. 

What I’d like to say is, on behalf of the military and the men and 

women who try to serve our country, this is what I understood happened. There were three incidences of this so-called waterboarding, 

according to the Director of the CIA. None of them were done at 

GTMO, and none of them were done by the FBI. What I understand is that the military was working to deal with a small, but 

valuable, group of individuals who had, they believed, critical information. One was the so-called 20th hijacker that had met 

Mohamed Atta in the United States and was eventually captured. 

He did not go on the flight to attack the Capitol or the White 

House, he was captured in Iraq—or Afghanistan—and brought 

back over here. During that time, the interrogators asked for authority to interrogate aggressively. 

Are any of you familiar with this, personally? They asked for it, 

and it went up to the chief counsel, and they went through all the 

lawyers and reviewed it, and they approved not all that they requested. Mr. Haynes approved some of those techniques, and he denied some of those techniques. Then, after that, other JAG officers 

objected, and they expressed concern that those that were approved 

went too far, and a working group was formed. The SECDEF listened to that group, and discussed it all openly among JAG officers 

at the Navy, Air Force, and Army, and they cut back on those. 

But, I would point out to my colleagues that this was all before—

isn’t it, Mr. Shiffrin?—the Hamdan case, that ruled on Common 

Article 3. That was 2 years later, was it not? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. Senator, I confess, I don’t remember the date of 

the Hamdan case. 

Senator SESSIONS. It was several years later, probably 2 or 3 

years later that this case came out. So, they were operating under 

a piece of legislation passed by the United States Congress and 

supported by our Judiciary Committee members, Senators Leahy, 

Biden, and Kennedy, and Senator Levin and others who were 

present in Congress at that time. It defined ‘‘torture,’’ and it prohibited torture, but it didn’t just prohibit isolation, or it didn’t prohibit stress techniques; it said that you could not subject someone 

to ‘‘severe physical or mental pain or suffering.’’ So, that was an 

operable statute, was it not, all along? Do any of you know that? 

[No response.] 

52

So, that’s essentially what they are wrestling with. 

Now, Mr. Goldsmith was OLC, was he not, Mr. Shiffrin? Is that 

what his title was in the DOJ? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. He was the assistant attorney general——

Senator SESSIONS. Of Legal Counsel. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN.—OLC, yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. Right, Legal Counsel. So, he was not happy 

with some of these techniques that were used, and he wrote a book 

about it, ‘‘The Terror Presidency,’’ and this is what he said in his 

book. He’s been widely renowned here as a critic of the Bush administration, but he said this, as to the lawyers and trying to do 

the right thing: ‘‘Many people believe the Bush administration had 

been indifferent to these legal constraints in the fight against terrorism. In my experience, the opposite is true; the administration 

has paid scrupulous attention to the law.’’ He goes on to add: 

‘‘Many people think the Bush administration has been indifferent 

to wartime legal constraints, but the opposite is true; the administration has been strangled by law, and, since September 11, 2001, 

this war has been lawyered to death.’’ 

So, all I would say to my distinguished chairman, who’s conducted an extensive investigation into all of these matters, I would 

just say, truthfully, whether these legal opinions were correct, 

whether the Supreme Court later changed the law—and they did 

change the law in several important aspects, and it’s unfair to hold 

the military accountable if the current law—if you’re complying 

with the current law and it’s later changed. So, we have a situation 

in which the people on the ground felt they were dealing with some 

high-value targets, and DOD approved certain techniques that they 

felt did not violate the terrorism statute that prohibits severe pain 

being inflicted. It didn’t say you couldn’t stress an individual or 

other things like that. 

So if we went too far on some of those areas—I hope we didn’t, 

but if we did, then I think, in the process of the Supreme Court 

and all these hearings and all—for goodness sakes, we certainly 

are doing much better in that regard. But, it is not the kind of 

rogue activity that has been suggested. There was no doubt about 

it, our military felt that this country was threatened after September 11, and they were able to apprehend some of the key players in that, and they desperately wanted intelligence, to make sure 

that if there was another cell group out there planning a similar 

attack, they could be stopped. I believe they consulted the legal 

system, all the way up to the DOJ. Hopefully, in the future, we can 

create a policy that we can all agree on, but I just don’t think we 

ought to disrespect our men and women in uniform who have done 

their best to serve their country at a time when this Nation saw 

itself under real threat. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Mr. Chairman, with the utmost respect for 

my friend from Alabama, I think that we disrespect the men and 

women in uniform if we don’t have this hearing. I think that this 

hearing is incredibly important for those men and women, and for 

53

the rule of law that they stand for, and for the kind of democracy 

that we want to be, and that we want the rest of the world to be. 

Mr. Shiffrin, I know that you are a lawyer, and I would like to 

ask you, did you review the legal memorandum, that was written 

by Lieutenant Colonel Beaver, that issued the opinion that these 

aggressive techniques of interrogation were, in fact, legal under 

Federal law? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. No. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So, have you ever read it? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. No. Not to my recollection. 

Senator MCCASKILL. If you were reading a legal document, as a 

trained lawyer, and you came across the phrase ‘‘immunity in advance,’’ would it cause you to pause? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. Yes, Senator. In my former life, I was a prosecutor, and——

Senator MCCASKILL. Me, too. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN.—and that is something to be scrupulously avoided, 

at least my training was——

Senator MCCASKILL. ‘‘Immunity in advance’’—I want to make 

sure that we get on the record what ‘‘immunity in advance’’ actually contemplates. If I were a police officer, or I were an officer of 

the court, and I said to someone, ‘‘Now, if you go drive the getaway 

car for the armed robbery, and, afterwards, if you tell us all about 

it, we’ll make sure that you’re not prosecuted for the armed robbery,’’ that would, in fact, be ‘‘immunity in advance,’’ wouldn’t it? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. That would be one example, yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. What you’d really be doing, as an officer of 

the court, or as an officer sworn to uphold the UCMJ, is, you would 

be saying, ahead of time, ‘‘It’s okay if you break the law.’’ 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. You’re saying that. Whether it’s legally effective or 

not is another question. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That’s another whole line of questioning. 

I’m talking about that phrase and whether or not any lawyer who 

would read that phrase would go, ‘‘What planet are we on? There 

is no such thing as ’immunity in advance.’ That would be a crime.’’ 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I can say, from my personal experience, I never 

used—or made sure that it was never used, giving someone immunity in advance. 

Senator MCCASKILL. In fact, as I just said, if someone actually 

visits with someone about committing a crime, and says, ‘‘Don’t 

worry about it. You can commit a crime, and I’m going to give you 

immunity,’’ wouldn’t they, under our principles of law in this country, be guilty of a crime? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. They could be, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That’s what I am trying to figure out here. 

This legal memorandum, that was the basis for our SECDEF saying, ‘‘It’s okay to hood someone when they’re naked and sic dogs 

on them,’’ contained a legal theory called ‘‘immunity in advance,’’ 

and no one—I assume that you never had a discussion with your 

boss, who got this memo, about this. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. That’s correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. He is a trained lawyer. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. That’s correct. 

54

Senator MCCASKILL. Has he had experience as a prosecutor? Has 

he had any experience in a criminal courtroom? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I don’t recall. 

Senator MCCASKILL. It’s just mind-boggling to me that that 

phrase would be written, and that no one would hear the raging 

sirens and flashing red lights that that phrase would, in fact, embrace under the rule of law in the United States of America. It’s 

hard for me to understand. 

Let me ask you, what are the names of the people that gave you 

the impression that we needed to have different, or more aggressive, interrogation techniques? Who told you that? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I don’t think that’s what I said. My recollection is 

that, in discussion or meetings with a number of people, people in 

the General Counsel’s Office—I mentioned meetings when General 

Dunlavey would report—there was the discussion about the 

progress, or sometimes the lack of progress, in obtaining useful, actionable intelligence out of detainees. The meetings were usually 

chaired by Jim Haynes. There could have been any—three, four, 

five, six other lawyers there. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Could you give me the names of the other 

lawyers that were there, where you would have gotten this impression that we needed to do something different than we were doing, 

in terms of our interrogation techniques? Besides Jim Haynes, who 

was in the room? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. Again, the way I characterized it was that there 

was some frustration with the quantity and quality of information 

being obtained. I didn’t say that we needed to change techniques. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. Lawyers who were participating, there was Deputy General Counsel for Legal Counsel, Witt Cobb; I believe that 

the Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs, Charles 

Allen, was probably in some of these meetings; there was a marine 

major or lieutenant colonel who worked in the Legal Counsel Office, Bill Leitzau. Again, I can’t attribute any particular statement 

to any of them, but those were the—there was a lawyer who’s now 

my successor, in intelligence, Eliana Davidson, who was responsible for the detainee operations matters. I think those were the 

lawyers who at least would have been present at the time these 

discussions took place. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Were you ever present in a meeting with 

Mr. Haynes at, near, or after the time he recommended to Secretary Rumsfeld that he approve most of these interrogation techniques? Some of them that he didn’t approve, in category III, but 

he certainly approved hooding naked people and siccing dogs on 

them. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. If you gave me the date—I, of course, met with 

Mr. Haynes every day. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I can give you the date. The date would 

have been—he recommended the approval of these interrogation 

techniques that had been deemed legal in the same memorandum 

that talked about ‘‘immunity in advance,’’ on November 27, 2002. 

The recommendations were approved on December 2, 2002. 

55

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I don’t remember having—or being part of a discussion on them. I have a vague recollection of hearing that the 

memorandum had been approved. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So you were aware the memorandum existed. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I—yes, but it could have—I could have been aware 

in the beginning of January, or later. In other words, I don’t have 

a recollection or contemporaneous knowledge of it. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think you’re probably a really good lawyer, 

and I think you probably care deeply about your country. I’m trying 

not to be—well, we’re trying to figure out here who decided that 

we were going to go down this road, and when did it get decided? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. It wasn’t me, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I understand that. But, you were much closer to it than any of us were, and we’re trying to figure out, did this 

come from Dick Cheney to Donald Rumsfeld? Mr. Addington is still 

at the White House. Did this come from Gonzales’s shop? Did 

this—Michael Chertoff was down at the meeting in GTMO talking 

about this. There are still people involved in the periphery of this 

that are in positions of responsibility today in our Government, so 

our frustration is, we would like to hold someone responsible. It’s 

like trying to catch shadows here, because no one is willing to say 

where this came from, this move towards imploding the traditions 

of our country, in terms of the example we set for the world. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. The only other explanation I can offer, Senator, is 

that the General Counsel’s Office often operated in a sort of compartmentalized fashion, that it was not unusual for me to get a request from Jim Haynes to, for example, see what information I 

could find out about interrogation and JPRA and SERE, and I’d 

find out, just accidentally, 2 weeks later, that someone else was 

doing the same thing; or that it was going to be used at GTMO, 

I might find out 6 months later, and never have any knowledge—

never be part of any discussion that, ‘‘Oh, this is what we want to 

do with it.’’ The question was, ‘‘Can you find out if there’s any material that is available on effective interrogation?’’ ‘‘Yes, sir, I can.’’ 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Martinez is next. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

I believe that context is terribly important in this very difficult 

subject which we’re treating. I know that many well-intended people were dealing under incredibly stressful circumstances, and the 

need to obtain actionable intelligence so that our country could be 

protected was, I know, uppermost in their mind. Obviously, mistakes that have harmed our Nation were probably made in excesses that were, as I think one of our next witnesses will discuss, 

were simply cruel, are not a part of what America is about. 

So, with that, I don’t have any questions of the current panel, 

Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

We’ll just have a brief second round. 

Mr. Shiffrin, Colonel Baumgartner testified that you asked for a 

list of physical pressures relative to interrogation. That’s his testimony today. 

56

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I don’t recall that, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. You deny it? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I don’t recall it. I note that the memo that you referred to in the book is not directed to me, it’s directed to the General Counsel. 

Chairman LEVIN. I understand, but I’m asking you whether the 

testimony was that you had requested from him that list. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I don’t believe I ever used the term ‘‘physical pressures.’’ I believe the only thing I ever asked for, after the initial 

tranche, was how-to briefings, manuals, anything like that. I would 

never say—I don’t think I ever said ‘‘I need something on physical 

pressure,’’ because I had no——

Chairman LEVIN. Colonel, do you stick to your testimony? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. Senator, may I add one thing? 

Chairman LEVIN. Sure. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. The memo refers to a follow-on question resulting 

from a meeting with JPRA and the General Counsel, OSD General 

Counsel. That would be Mr. Haynes. I’ve never met, in person, 

Colonel Baumgartner before. I did not attend the meeting with 

Colonel Baumgartner. So, to the extent these memos are responsive 

to requests at a meeting, I didn’t attend that meeting. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. I think Colonel Baumgartner was referring to a phone conversation. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. He did. But the memo itself says, ‘‘This is followon questions from a meeting.’’ 

Chairman LEVIN. I think, though, his testimony relates to a 

phone conversation. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I understand. 

Chairman LEVIN. You deny that you used the term ‘‘physical 

pressures,’’ and he sticks with his testimony, so there’s clearly a 

difference there. 

Did he ask you for a list of ‘‘carrots’’? You talked about ‘‘carrots.’’ 

You were never asked for a list of ‘‘carrots,’’ were you? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. No. By Mr. Haynes or—

Chairman LEVIN. Yes, by anybody. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. The only discussion I specifically recall having was 

with Major General Dunlavey. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

Now, when you—Colonel, you’ve testified here in a very forthcoming way, that the use of these tactics in an offensive way was 

not what this program was designed to do. It was not designed to 

use the tactics in the SERE program against detainees. Is that correct? Offensively? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Mr. Chairman, I believe I said that we 

developed these tactics for use in training. That’s their purpose and 

to export them is the decision of folks above my paygrade. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. But, you’re aware of the fact that the 

export of those is not the way the program is designed. Is that correct? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you know who Major General James 

Soligan is? He’s the Chief of Staff of the JFCOM. 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, sir. 

57

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. He was—that is the JPRA’s higher headquarters, is that correct? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. The memorandum that I referred to in my 

opening statement, where he says, ‘‘The use of resistance to interrogation knowledge for offensive purposes lies outside of the roles 

and responsibilities of JPRA,’’ did you hear me quote from his 

memo on that? (Appendix A) 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree with that? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Sir, I wasn’t privy——

Chairman LEVIN. No, but do you agree that it’s outside the responsibility of the JPRA? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. So, used to——

Chairman LEVIN. ‘‘The use of resistance to interrogation knowledge for offensive purposes lies outside the roles and responsibilities of JPRA.’’ 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. I would say that, like my commander’s 

philosophy was when I was still Active Duty, use of our guys in an 

offensive manner was not what we were all about; we were about 

training. 

Chairman LEVIN. Right. Now, when that was misused in that 

way, which it obviously has been, from everyone’s testimony here 

and from the material that I presented, has anyone, to your knowledge, been held accountable for the misuse of that program? It’s 

not intended to be used offensively. It was. Do you know of anybody that’s been held accountable for the misuse of that program? 

That’s my question. 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Sir, I have no recollection of any of that, 

no. 

Chairman LEVIN. Are you aware of the fact that the SERE training techniques made their way to Iraq in the way I describe it; 

also, instructors from the JPRA SERE school went to Iraq; that the 

IG reported that, in September 2003, at the request of the Commander of the Special Mission Unit Task Force, the JPRA deployed 

a team to Iraq to provide assistance to interrogation operations? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Sir, I was retired by then. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. I understand. But, assistance to interrogation operations is not the purpose of——

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Sir, I have no knowledge of that. 

Chairman LEVIN. I know, but you would—you do have an opinion 

as to whether that is the purpose of the program. 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Sir, I was not part of that decisionmaking process, and I don’t have a comment on that. 

Chairman LEVIN. You don’t know whether or not assistance to 

interrogation operations, being present at interrogations, is part of 

the program? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Sir, I was not part of the decisionmaking 

process that led to the decision to send those folks, whether they 

went or not, so I——

Chairman LEVIN. I’m aware of that fact. Do you disagree with 

General Soligan on the question of whether or not ‘‘the use of resistance to interrogation knowledge for offensive purposes lies outVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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side the roles and responsibilities of JPRA’’? Do you disagree with 

him? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. No, sir, I didn’t say that. If that’s what 

General Soligan says, then I don’t have a problem with that, because they were under his control, certainly not mine. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. The Deputy Commander of JFCOM, 

Lieutenant General Wagner, when he said, ‘‘relative to interrogation capability, the expertise of JPRA lies in training personnel 

how to respond and resist interrogations, not in how to conduct interrogations,’’ do you agree with that? (Appendix A) 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree that what he said, following the 

request for JPRA ‘‘interrogation support were both inconsistent 

with the unit’s charter and might create conditions which tasked 

JPRA to engage in offensive operational activities outside of JPRA’s 

defensive mission’’? Do you agree with that? (Appendix A) 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Sir, that’s consistent with what we had 

in place for policy when I was still Active Duty. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Again, I want to ask you—I know you 

weren’t there, but, do you know of anybody that has been held accountable when the charter of JPRA and its purpose was violated 

and it was misused? I’m just asking you, do you know of anybody? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. I have no knowledge, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. One of the problems here is that the SECDEF 

just said the other day when he fired two top officials in the Air 

Force, Secretary Gates said that during his tenure, ‘‘I’ve emphasized to all Services that accountability must reach all the way up 

the chain of command, and that the military as a whole must be 

willing to admit mistakes when they’ve made them. That’s the only 

way to fix it, and it’s the only way to ensure that they don’t reoccur 

in the future. When systemic problems are found, I believe that accountability must reach beyond noncommissioned officers and even 

colonels.’’ It sure as heck hasn’t in this situation yet, at least that 

anybody knows of, unless any of the other witnesses know of anybody here that’s been held accountable for the violation of JPRA’s 

mandate, purpose, and mission. We don’t know of any. That goes 

to the heart of the problem here. 

Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Earlier in the testimony today, a question was asked about, 

whether information that you gathered from the JPRA and SERE 

interrogation methods were shared with any other U.S. Government department or agency? Your response was ‘‘the DIA,’’ which 

was clear, and another recipient, of which—it’s a classified nature. 

But, the question I wish to push further on that. The information 

you gathered, in what form did you convey that information to 

those two entities? Was it a written memorandum? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Sir, there was some written information, 

and they requested briefings. 

Senator WARNER. All right. So, there is in existence a document 

that’s in writing as to what went to these two recipients, is that 

correct? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, sir, I believe there is. 

59

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, do we have that among our 

files? [Pause.] 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator, I believe that there is no documentation in our possession of that; however, there is testimony in our 

possession, I believe, that is classified. 

Senator WARNER. Is it the desire of the committee, then, to have 

those documents? 

Chairman LEVIN. If there are such documents—of course, we’ve 

asked for documents. By the way—how many of them came over 

last week? 

Senator WARNER. It seems to me that the record——

Chairman LEVIN. 38,000 documents were presented to us this 

week by DOD. 

We’re not sure what’s in those documents, but they sure are 

about a year late. But, putting that aside, I really—we can’t answer what is in those documents. We have not identified a document yet which contains that information, but I, again, would reiterate that we do have testimony——

Senator WARNER. Testimony——

Chairman LEVIN.—our staff has obtained that is classified. 

Senator WARNER. I’m aware of that. Then going beyond documents, did the SERE organization of JPRA provide individuals to 

go and perform training? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Senator, I believe they sent a team to do 

briefings, instruction. I don’t know that they conducted training. 

Senator WARNER. ‘‘Instruction’’ is pretty close to ‘‘training.’’ I 

think they’re interchangeable words. 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER.—a really good expression. I really want 

to use it, but I won’t. 

Instruction and training are really different. Instruction really 

implies imparting academic knowledge. Whereas training, in our 

context, implies skill sets. 

Senator WARNER. Okay. Then what was done? Just instruction 

and not skill sets? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. I didn’t attend the training, but the 

one—some of the e-mail stuff that I’ve seen, which is all on a classified net, was basically instruction in exploitation interrogations, 

very similar to what we provided DIA and CITF. 

Senator WARNER. Was that sharing an issue that your organization sought higher authority to approve? For instance, did it go up 

to the SECDEF? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. It didn’t go to the SECDEF, sir, but it 

did go up to the flag level and JFCOM. 

Senator WARNER. Wait a minute. I spent 5 years in the building. 

I never knew what a flag level was. There are flags all over. It 

went from where to where? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. It went from JPRA headquarters to the 

JFCOM, J–3, and, I think, into the chief of staff’s office. 

Senator WARNER. Chief of staff of? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. JFCOM. 

Senator WARNER. Now, I’m referring to a document, 26 July 

2002, DOD memorandum for the OSD General Counsel, and it 

says, paragraph 1, unclassified, ‘‘The purpose of this memorandum 

is to answer follow-on questions resulting from the meeting beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
60

tween JPRA and OSDGC on 25 July 2002.’’ Are you familiar with 

that meeting? (Appendix A) 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Sir, I believe I’m talking about telephone 

conversations. As Mr. Shiffrin said, I have never met Mr. Shiffrin 

before today, but we did have a few conversations to try to figure 

out what information they wanted so that we could support their 

request. 

Senator WARNER. So, the meeting consisted of a telephone conversation? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Two or three, sir. 

Senator WARNER. Two or three telephone conversations. 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Yes, sir. 

Senator WARNER. But, there was no gathering in a room or exchange of documents. 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. No, sir, not that I recall. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know you’re anxious to get the next panel. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I’ll be real brief. 

Dr. Ogrisseg, I wanted to ask you whether the training we’re giving our military personnel to resist interrogation techniques alters, 

or has altered over time, in other words, are we training people differently today, because we’re facing Islamic terrorists, than we 

were, for instance, when we were facing the Soviet Union or the 

Vietcong? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Yes, Senator, the training has changed. We obviously want the training to be relevant. So, in order to do that, 

we’ve had to make sure that we are covering the spectrum of different types of ways that someone could be detained, either by terrorist elements factions that we’re at war with, or even with other 

governments that we’re not at war with. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Does the goal that we assume our enemy interrogators will have alter the methods and the means of responding? In other words, it seems to me that, in a lot of cases in previous conflicts, the aim—unfortunately, we know about Senator 

McCain’s experience, the primary aim of the torture he endured 

was to compel him to sign a confession of some kind for propaganda purposes, not for the purpose of eliciting information, as was 

the case that the Pentagon was seeking here. Unfortunately, 

there’s some reason to believe that—the current enemy’s likely 

course is to put a captive on television and kill them. So, does the 

goal alter the training—the goal of the interrogators? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. It does. The way that people have been processed 

and detained before, in some instances, was focused on information, but that’s just one way that someone can be exploited by an 

enemy. The situation that you described with a terrorist network, 

their goal may be to make a statement, in that instance, for whatever purpose they think they’re going to serve. So you have to address that. You cannot, within the training, necessarily determine 

which goals, which actions that the students are going to take, because they have to make those decisions themselves. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. The enemy we’re facing now, the Islamist 

extremists, obviously have a unique—both a cultural background, 

61

but also a theological extremism about them. As Colonel 

Baumgartner said, when you were asked for this information about 

SERE techniques by the General Counsel’s Office in the Pentagon, 

since you knew they were not involved in training, it was natural 

to assume that they may have been asking for it to employ against 

detainees that we had in the war on terrorism. Was there any information that you conveyed that was based on the unique cultural 

background of the Islamist terrorists? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Senator, are you asking me that question, or are 

you asking——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Either one of you who cares to answer. 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. No, sir, not that I’m aware of. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So, let me ask you this question. One form 

of harsh interrogation that you haven’t been asked about is the use 

of dogs. In some of the material I’ve read from somewhere comes 

the suggestion that Muslims or Arabs have some special phobia or 

fear of dogs. I don’t know whether there’s any premise for that. Did 

you, at any point, deal with that in the submission you made to 

the General Counsel’s Office? 

Colonel BAUMGARTNER. No, Senator, we had nothing to do with 

that. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. 

Mr. Shiffrin, let me ask this question. In trying to find additional 

information to assist in improving the interrogation of the detainees in the war on terrorism, did you ever reach out for tactics or 

information that were based on unique cultural characteristics or 

phobias or fears of the kinds of people we were likely to be detaining in the war on Islamist terrorism? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. No, Senator. My request was just, ‘‘Send me everything you have. Whatever you have in existence in your library, 

please send to me.’’ 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I was never specific on techniques, on the nature 

of the interrogator, or anything else. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Do you remember, in any of the material 

that came by you, whether any of it dealt with what somebody 

might have thought were unique phobias or vulnerabilities of people we’d be detaining in the war on terrorism? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. No. No. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. Everything I got was historical, from the 1950s. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Obviously that was a totally different 

enemy. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. Correct. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Just on that question, I think—Mr. Shiffrin, earlier today in a 

response to a question from Senator Lieberman, you said that one 

of the purposes of seeking information from JPRA was likely to ‘‘reverse-engineer,’’ SERE techniques. 

Did you just say that? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I did. 

Chairman LEVIN. Today. Then you said, 2 minutes ago, that you 

didn’t ask about techniques. 

62

Mr. SHIFFRIN. Any specific techniques. I never inquired of any 

specific techniques—the efficacy, the wisdom, or anything else. 

Chairman LEVIN. But, just 10 seconds ago, I just asked you this 

question. In response to Senator Lieberman, you said that one of 

the purposes of seeking information from JPRA was likely to ‘‘reverse-engineer SERE techniques.’’ 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. That——

Chairman LEVIN. You said yes, you did say that. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I said that——

Chairman LEVIN. That was an hour ago, not——

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I said it to Senator Lieberman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Right. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. My primary purpose, as I understood it, was to 

find all the information we had, and——

Chairman LEVIN. I understand. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN.—I also intuited that there might be some possibility of reverse-engineering an effective SERE technique. Just logical. 

Chairman LEVIN. I see. You believe that might have been one of 

the purposes. 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

Just, Dr. Ogrisseg, one other question for you. In an article, or 

a book, that you wrote, the book called, ‘‘Code of Conduct and the 

Psychology of Captivity: Training, Coping, and Reintegration of 

Military Life,’’ you said that, ‘‘The use of physical torture has historically yielded poor information and, paradoxically, serves to enhance resistance.’’ 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. ‘‘Furthermore, the practices serves to decrease 

the legitimacy of the offending organization or country. Physical 

torture, in most instances, has produced false confessions or inaccurate or reliable information.’’ Is that true? Did you write that? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Yes, I did, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is that your belief? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. On the page that came immediately thereafter, 

on page 99, this is what you said about sleep deprivation: ‘‘Sleep 

deprivation has often been used by captors to enhance dependency 

and malleability of behavior. Lack of sleep for prolonged periods 

may result in anxiety, irritability, blurred vision, memory problems, confusion, slurred speech, hallucinations, paranoia, disorientation, and, ultimately, death. However, sleep deprivation, 

even for one night, has recently been revealed in brain scans to affect the areas of the brain used for language, attention, working 

memory function, suggesting that even minor disruptions in sleep 

can degrade the captive’s ability to cope effectively with challenges 

faced in captivity.’’ Is that still your opinion? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Mr. Chairman, I don’t believe that I wrote that 

section. 

Chairman LEVIN. I see. 

Dr. OGRISSEG. There were multiple authors on that chapter. If I 

may comment back to the question I was being asked to answer 

earlier, when you were trying to define what 18 hours or 17 hours 

63

of sleep deprivation is, well, if you’re talking about—without knowing anything more, getting up at 5 a.m. and going to bed at 10 or 

11 o’clock at night, I think most people do that every day, so that’s 

why I was saying I need more context. 

Chairman LEVIN. Sure. No, that’s okay. But, you said ‘‘lack of 

sleep for prolonged periods may result.’’ 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. So, you stay with that statement, if it’s ‘‘prolonged periods of sleep deprivation.’’ 

Dr. OGRISSEG. I don’t believe that I wrote that section in that 

chapter, but I would agree with that. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. When you went through SERE training, or witnessed SERE training the sleep deprivation you talked 

about there, that our people were trained to be inoculated against 

were shorter periods than that. You said 4 hours, perhaps? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Mr. Chairman, I don’t know that we actually inoculate them to that during our——

Chairman LEVIN. To sleep deprivation. 

Dr. OGRISSEG. We don’t have enough time to, and I’m not sure 

that you could inoculate them——

Chairman LEVIN. To sleep deprivation. 

Dr. OGRISSEG.—to sleep deprivation, that’s right. However, we 

certainly recognize that that’s a condition that they face, and we 

try to simulate that during the training. 

Chairman LEVIN. How do you simulate it? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. We simulate that by keeping them up. Certainly 

they are doing some of the things that——

Chairman LEVIN. Keeping them up for how long? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. Sometimes overnight. We don’t have an infinite 

amount of time. 

Chairman LEVIN. How many hours, though, about? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. It varies by training program, but in the range of 

about 4 to 10 hours or so. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, thank you. 

Any other questions? Any other questions? [No response.] 

Thank you. We thank this panel very much, and you’re excused. 

[Pause.] 

Our next panel is made up of Alberto Mora, former general counsel of the Department of the Navy; retired Rear Admiral Jane Dalton, former legal advisor to the Chairman of the JCS; and retired 

Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver, former Staff Judge Advocate at 

the JTF GTMO. 

We thank our witnesses for their presence. I believe we have an 

opening statement for the record from each of you, and then, what 

we’ll do is, we’ll start, I think, with Lieutenant Colonel Beaver, followed by Rear Admiral Dalton, and then Mr. Mora. 

So, if you would proceed, Colonel Beaver. 

Colonel BEAVER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

64

STATEMENT OF LTC DIANE E. BEAVER, USA (RET.), FORMER 

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE, JOINT TASK FORCE 170/JTF GUANTANAMO BAY 

Colonel BEAVER. Mr. Chairman and committee members, I appear today voluntarily, in my private capacity. Although I am currently an employee of DOD, I do not speak today on its behalf. I 

am here to testify truthfully and completely regarding my knowledge of the development and implementation of interrogation policies and practices at GTMO from June 2002 to June 2003. 

As the staff judge advocate for the detention facility at GTMO, 

I wrote a legal opinion in October 2002. In it I concluded that certain aggressive interrogation techniques, if appropriately reviewed, 

controlled, and monitored, were lawful. 

Since DOD publicly released my opinion in June 2004, it has received considerable attention and scrutiny. I have been vilified by 

some because of it, and discounted and forgotten by many others. 

Regardless, I accept full responsibility for my legal opinion. It was 

based on my own independent research and analysis, it represents 

the best work I could do under the constraints and circumstances 

I faced at the time. 

No one improperly influenced me to write this opinion, or, to my 

knowledge, even attempted to do so. I tried to consult experts and 

superiors on the content of the opinion prior to issuing it, but received no feedback. I do not say that to shift blame. As I said, the 

blame for any error in that opinion is mine, and mine alone. 

I cannot, however, accept responsibility for what happened to my 

legal opinion after I properly submitted it to my chain of command. 

I fully expected that it would be carefully reviewed by legal and 

policy experts at the highest levels before a decision was reached. 

I did not expect that my opinion, as a lieutenant colonel in the 

Army Advocate General’s Corps, would become the final word on 

interrogation policies and practices within DOD. For me, such a result was simply not foreseeable. Perhaps I was somewhat naive, 

but I did not expect to be the only lawyer issuing a written opinion 

on this monumentally important issue. 

In hindsight, I cannot help but conclude that others chose not to 

write on this issue to avoid being linked to it. That was not an option for me. My commander was responsible for detention and interrogation operations for the most dangerous group of terrorists 

the world has ever seen. The specter of another catastrophic attack 

on the American people loomed large in our thoughts and haunted 

our dreams. We knew that accurate, actionable intelligence was 

necessary to prevent another such attack. We did our jobs, knowing 

that if we failed, the American people would pay a price. 

I have repeatedly been asked whether I was pressured to write 

my October 2002 legal opinion. I felt a great deal of pressure, as 

did all of us at the facility. I felt the pressure of knowing that thousands of innocent lives might be lost if we got it wrong. I knew that 

many honest, decent Americans would condemn our actions if we 

did not balance our efforts to protect them with due respect to the 

rule of law. 

I believed, at the time, and still do, that such a balance could be 

reached if the interrogations were strictly reviewed, controlled, and 

monitored. My legal opinion was not a blank check authorizing unVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
65

limited interrogations. Throughout the opinion, I emphasized the 

need for medical, psychiatric, and legal reviews to be conducted 

prior to the approval of these interrogation plans. My judge advocates and I were intent on monitoring the interrogations and would 

stop any excessive or abusive behavior if we saw it. 

What I accomplished in my legal opinion has largely gone unnoticed. My command did not conduct interrogations independently 

without the notice or approval of higher authorities. Individual interrogators were not given the opportunity to improvise techniques 

without command approval or control. In short, the interrogation 

techniques discussed in my legal opinion would not have been conducted in an abusive or unlawful manner if the approval and control procedures I had outlined were followed. In this way, what 

happened at GTMO stands in stark contrast to the anarchy that 

occurred at Abu Ghraib. 

I close this statement as I began it, by accepting responsibility. 

I reached my legal conclusions after careful analysis and, at all 

times, acted in good faith. I discussed my ideas openly with my colleagues and encouraged full debate. Some of my critics chose not 

to participate in these discussions. Had they, their concerns and 

reservations would have received fair consideration. 

That my colleagues and I openly discussed these issues should 

not be surprising. The American people, including many legal experts, were having similar conversations at homes, schools, and 

workplaces across the Nation. 

If my legal opinion was wrong, then I regret the error very much. 

I am a proud professional. I feel very keenly any failure on my part 

to be precise and accurate in the advice I render. I freely accept 

sincere dissent and criticism. But, there is something very important that I will never have to regret; at a time of great stress and 

danger, I tried to do everything in my lawful power to protect the 

American people. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Colonel Beaver follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LTC DIANE E. BEAVER, USA (RET.) 

Mr. Chairmen and committee members, I appear today voluntarily and in my private capacity. Although I am currently an employee of the Department of Defense, 

I do not speak today on its behalf. I am here to testify truthfully and completely 

regarding my knowledge of the development and implementation of interrogation 

policies and practices at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, from June 2002 to June 2003. 

As the Staff Judge Advocate for the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, I wrote 

a legal opinion in October 2002. In it, I concluded that certain aggressive interrogation techniques, if appropriately reviewed, controlled, and monitored, were lawful. 

Since the Department of Defense publicly released my opinion in 2004, it has received considerable attention and scrutiny. I have been vilified by some because of 

it, and discounted and forgotten by many others. Regardless, I accept full responsibility for my legal opinion. It was based on my own independent research and analysis. It represents the best work I could do under the constraints and circumstances 

I faced at the time. No one improperly influenced me to write this opinion or—to 

my knowledge—even attempted to do so. I tried to consult experts and superiors on 

the content of the opinion prior to issuing it, but received no feedback. I do not say 

that to shift blame. As I said, the blame for any error in that opinion is mine and 

mine alone. 

I cannot, however, accept responsibility for what happened to my legal opinion 

after I properly submitted it to my chain of command. I fully expected that it would 

be carefully reviewed by legal and policy experts at the highest levels before a decision was reached. I did not expect that my opinion, as a Lieutenant Colonel in the 

Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps, would become the final word on interrogaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
66

tion policies and practices within the Department of Defense. For me, such a result 

was simply not foreseeable. Perhaps I was somewhat naı ́ve, but I did not expect to 

be the only lawyer issuing a written opinion on this monumentally important issue. 

In hindsight, I cannot help but conclude that others chose not to write on this issue 

to avoid being linked to it. That was not an option for me. My commander was responsible for detention and interrogation operations for the most dangerous group 

of terrorists the world has ever seen. The specter of another catastrophic attack on 

the American people loomed large in our thoughts, and haunted our dreams. We 

knew that accurate, actionable intelligence was necessary to prevent another such 

attack. We did our jobs knowing that if we failed, the American people would pay 

a terrible price. 

I have repeatedly been asked whether I was pressured to write my October 2002 

legal opinion. I felt a great deal of pressure, as did all of us at the detention facility. 

I felt the pressure of knowing that thousands of innocent lives might be lost if we 

got it wrong. I knew that many honest, decent Americans would condemn our actions if we did not balance our efforts to protect them with due respect for the rule 

of law. I believed at the time, and still do, that such a balance could be reached—

if the interrogations were strictly reviewed, controlled, and monitored. My legal 

opinion was not a ‘‘blank check’’ authorizing unlimited interrogations. Throughout 

the opinion, I emphasized the need for medical, psychiatric, and legal reviews to be 

conducted prior to the approval of each and every interrogation plan. My judge advocates and I were intent on monitoring each interrogation, and would stop any excessive or abusive behavior if we saw it. What I accomplished in my legal opinion 

has largely gone unnoticed. My command did not conduct interrogations independently, without the notice or approval of higher authorities. Individual interrogators 

were not given the opportunity to improvise techniques without command approval 

or control. In short, the interrogation techniques discussed in my legal opinion 

would not have been conducted in an abusive or unlawful manner, if the approval 

and control procedures I outlined were followed. In this way, what happened at 

Guantanamo Bay stands in stark contrast to the anarchy that occurred at Abu 

Ghareb. 

I close this statement as I began it, by accepting responsibility. I reached my legal 

conclusions after careful analysis and at all times acted in good faith. I discussed 

my ideas openly with my colleagues and encouraged full debate. Some of my critics 

chose not to participate in these discussions. Had they, their concerns and reservations would have received fair consideration. That my colleagues and I openly discussed these issues should not be surprising. The American people, including many 

legal experts, were having similar conversations at homes, schools, and work places 

across the Nation. 

If my legal opinion was wrong, then I regret the error very much. I am a proud 

professional. I feel very keenly any failure on my part to be precise and accurate 

in the advice I render. I freely accept sincere dissent and criticism. But there is 

something very important I will never have to regret. At a time of great stress and 

danger, I tried to do everything in my lawful power to protect the American people. 

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Colonel Beaver. 

Admiral Dalton? 

STATEMENT OF RADM JANE G. DALTON, USN (RET.), FORMER 

LEGAL ADVISOR TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Admiral DALTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished 

members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today to discuss the matter of detainee 

interrogation policy. 

From June 2000 until June 2003, it was my privilege to serve as 

Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the JCS. During that time, I 

drew upon my years of service as a career military lawyer, studying and applying the laws of war to advise the Chairman and other 

senior DOD officials on legal issues posed by the extraordinary security challenges confronting our Nation following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 

Those challenges called on lawyers at DOD, as never before, to 

provide legal advice to enable our Nation’s leaders to aggressively 

67

meet the unprecedented threat to our national security without 

compromising our adherence to the rule of law and the United 

States international treaty obligations. 

That we undertook this task at a time of war and amidst a continuous stream of credible intelligence pointing to a substantial 

and resilient terrorist threat made our work as lawyers all the 

more difficult. 

Through it all, I did my best to provide clear, unvarnished legal 

advice without fear or favor of how my advice would be received. 

Working within the structure of the military chain of command and 

the statutory organization of DOD, I also took those actions I 

deemed appropriate to follow up on issues that arose concerning 

the treatment of detainees. 

I understand the importance of congressional oversight of the executive branch and our constitutional system, and I appreciate the 

sensitivity of the matters under review. I have faith that the committee will fulfill its oversight role with wisdom, perspective, and 

fairness. 

Thank you, again, for the opportunity to contribute to today’s 

hearing, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Dalton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY RADM JANE G. DALTON, USN (RET.) 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today to discuss the matter of detainee 

interrogation policy. 

From June 2000 until June 2003, it was my privilege to serve as Legal Counsel 

to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During that time, I drew upon on my 

years of service as a career military lawyer studying and applying the laws of war 

to advise the Chairman and other senior Department of Defense officials on legal 

issues posed by the extraordinary security challenges confronting our Nation following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 

Those challenges called on lawyers at the Department, as never before, to provide 

legal advice to enable our Nation’s leaders to aggressively meet the unprecedented 

threat to homeland security without compromising our adherence lo the rule of law 

and the United States’ international treaty obligations. That we undertook this task 

at a time of war, and amidst a continuous stream of credible intelligence pointing 

to a substantial and resilient terrorist threat, made our work as lawyers all the 

more difficult. 

Through it all, I did my best to provide clear, unvarnished legal advice without 

fear or favor of how my advice would be received. Working within the structure of 

a military chain of command and the statutory organization of the Department of 

Defense, I also look those actions I deemed appropriate to follow up on issues that 

arose concerning the treatment of detainees. 

I understand the importance of congressional oversight of the executive branch in 

our constitutional system, and I appreciate the sensitivity of the matters under review. I hope that the committee will fulfill its oversight role with wisdom, perspective, and fairness. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to contribute to today’s hearing, and I look 

forward to answering your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Admiral. 

Mr. Mora? 

STATEMENT OF ALBERTO J. MORA, FORMER GENERAL 

COUNSEL, UNITED STATES NAVY 

Mr. MORA. Chairman Levin and members of the committee, it is 

a privilege to appear before you today. 

These hearings are critical to better understanding both of our 

Nation’s interrogation practices and, of even greater importance, of 

68

the consequences to our Nation if we were to continue to employ 

cruelty in the interrogation of detainees. 

Permit me first, however, to thank the members and staff for 

their many courtesies to me during my tenure as general counsel 

of the Department of the Navy. Throughout my time in public service, I witnessed the committee unfailingly live up to its reputation 

for civility, diligence, professionalism, and nonpartisanship as it attended to the legislative affairs of our Nation’s defense. 

Mr. Chairman, our Nation’s policy decision to use so-called 

‘‘harsh interrogation techniques’’ during the war on terror was a 

mistake of massive proportions. It damaged, and continues to damage, our Nation. This policy, which may aptly be labeled a policy 

of cruelty, violated our founding values, our constitutional system, 

the fabric of our laws, our overarching foreign policy interests, and 

our national security. The net effect of this policy of cruelty has 

been to weaken our defenses, not to strengthen them. 

Before examining the damage, it may be useful to draw some 

basic legal distinctions. 

The choice of the adjectives harsh or enhanced to describe these 

interrogation techniques is euphemistic and misleading. The legally 

correct adjective is cruel. Many of the counterresistance techniques 

authorized for use at GTMO in December 2002, constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment that could, depending on their application, easily rise to the level of torture. 

Many Americans are unaware that there is a distinction between 

cruelty and torture, cruelty being the less severe level of abuse. 

This has tended to obscure important elements of the interrogation 

debate. For example, the public may be largely unaware that the 

government could evasively, if truthfully, claim, and did claim, that 

it was not torturing, even as it was simultaneously applying cruelty. Yet, Americans should know that there is little or no moral 

distinction between cruelty and torture, for cruelty can be as effective as torture in savaging human flesh and spirit and in violating 

human dignity. Our efforts should be focused not merely on banning torture, but on banning cruelty. 

Except in egregious cases, it is difficult for outsiders to gauge the 

precise legal category of abuse inflicted on any detainee, because it 

hinges on the specific facts, including the techniques used and the 

medical and psychological impact. In general, however, it is beyond 

dispute that interrogation constituting cruel treatment was conducted, and certainly the admission that waterboarding, a classic 

and reviled method of torture, was applied to some detainees, creates the presumption that those detainees were tortured. 

The United States was founded on a principle that every person, 

not just a citizen, possesses inalienable rights that no government 

may violate, including our own. Among these rights is, unquestionably, the right to be free from cruel punishment or treatment, as 

is evidenced by the clear language of the 8th amendment and the 

constitutional jurisprudence of the 5th and 14th amendments. If we 

can apply the policy of cruelty to detainees, it is only because our 

founders were wrong about the scope of our inalienable rights. For 

this reason, cruel interrogations necessarily corrupt our founding 

values and corrode our constitutional structure and the fabric of 

our legal system. 

69

Because the international legal system, the legal system of many 

countries, and the international human rights system are all largely designed to protect human dignity, the decision of the United 

States to adopt cruelty has had a devastating foreign policy consequence. The cruel treatment of detainees is a criminal act for 

most, and perhaps all, of our traditional allies. As these nations 

came to recognize the true dimensions of our policy, political fissures between us and them began to emerge, because none of them 

would follow our lead into the swamp of legalized abuse. These fissures deepened into chasms as awareness grew about the effect of 

our policies on fundamental human rights, on the Geneva Conventions, on the Nuremberg precedents and on the incidence of prisoner abuse worldwide. Respect in political support abroad for the 

United States decreased sharply and rapidly. 

These adverse foreign policy consequences inevitably came to 

damage our national security strategy and our operational effectiveness in the war on terror. Our ability to build and sustain the 

broad alliance required to fight the war was compromised. International cooperation, including in the military intelligence and law 

enforcement arenas, diminished as foreign officials became concerned that assisting the United States in detainee matters could 

constitute aiding and abetting criminal conduct in their own countries. As the difficulties of Prime Ministers Blair, Howard, and 

Aznar demonstrated, seemingly every foreign politician who sought 

to ally his country with the U.S. effort on the war incurred a political penalty. 

All of these factors contributed to the difficulties our Nation has 

experienced in forging the strongest possible coalition to fight the 

war, but the damage to our national security also occurred down 

at the tactical or operational level. I’ll cite four examples I heard 

about during my tenure. 

First, some U.S. flag-rank officers maintained that the first and 

second identifiable causes of U.S. combat deaths in Iraq, as judged 

by their effectiveness in recruiting insurgent fighters into combat, 

are, respectively, the symbols of Abu Ghraib and GTMO. There are 

others who are convinced that the proximate cause of Abu Ghraib 

was the legal advice authorizing abusive treatment of detainees 

that issued from the DOJ’s OLC in 2002. 

Second, some allied nations reportedly hesitated to participate in 

combat operations if there was the possibility that captured individuals could be abused by U.S. forces. 

Third, some allied nations have refused to train with us in joint 

detainee capture and handling operations because of concerns 

about U.S. detainee policies. 

Fourth, senior North Atlantic Treaty Organization officers in Afghanistan are reported to have left the room when issues of detainee treatment were raised by U.S. officials, out of fear that they 

could become complicit in any abuse. 

Mr. Chairman, Albert Camus cautioned nations fighting for their 

values against selecting those weapons whose very use would destroy those values. In this war on terror, the United States is fighting for our values, and cruelty is such a weapon. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mora follows:]

70

1 ‘‘Statement for the Record: Office Of General Counsel Involvement in Interrogation Issues,’’ 

(July 7, 2004)(May be accessed at www.newyorker.com/images/pdfs/moramemo.pdf). 2The speech was given at the ABA’s Center for Human Rights Fourth Annual House of Delegates Luncheon. The text is located at www.abavideonews.org/ABA496/media/pdf/navycounsel—

OMKall.pdf. 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ALBERTO J. MORA

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, it is a pleasure 

and an honor to appear before you today and to have been asked to testify on the 

treatment of detainees in U.S. custody. I regard these hearings as critical both to 

a better understanding of the interrogation policies and practices adopted by our 

Government since September 11 and—perhaps of even greater importance—to a better understanding of the costs and consequences to our Nation if we were to continue to employ cruelty in the interrogation of detainees. 

Two prefatory comments are in order. 

First, I wish to thank the members and the committee staff for their many courtesies to me during my tenure as General Counsel of the Department of the Navy. 

Both during my confirmation process and while serving as Navy General Counsel, 

I witnessed the committee unfailingly live up to its well-earned reputation for civility, diligence, professionalism, and non-partisanship as it attended to the legislative 

affairs of our Nation’s defense. 

Second, in my brief testimony today I intend not to recount my record on interrogation while serving as Navy General Counsel, but to summarize briefly my views 

on the policy consequences of the use of cruelty as a weapon of war. My official conduct on this issue is already a matter of record inasmuch as I prepared and submitted a comprehensive account of these matters to the Navy Inspector General in 

2004, following the Abu Ghraib scandal. This memorandum is in the public domain 

and may be accessed on the Web.1 Similarly, I wish to note that I have spoken at 

greater length in various venues on the issues I will touch on today, and I draw 

the committee’s attention to my speech to the American Bar Association in February 

of this year.2 I ask that both of these documents be included as part of the record 

of these proceedings. 

Mr. Chairman, our Nation’s policy decision to use so-called ‘‘harsh’’ interrogation 

techniques during the war on terror was a mistake of massive proportions. It damaged and continues to damage our Nation in ways that appear never to have been 

considered or imagined by its architects and supporters, whose policy focus seems 

to have been narrowly confined to the four corners of the interrogation room. This 

interrogation policy—which may aptly be labeled a ‘‘policy of cruelty’’—violated our 

founding values, our constitutional system and the fabric of our laws, our over-arching foreign policy interests, and our national security. The net effect of this policy 

of cruelty has been to weaken our defenses, not to strengthen them, and has been 

greatly contrary to our national interest. 

Before turning to this damage, it may be useful to draw some of the basic legal 

distinctions pertinent to interrogation. The choice of the adjectives ‘‘harsh’’ or ‘‘enhanced’’ to describe these interrogation techniques is euphemistic and misleading. 

The more precise legal term is ‘‘cruel.’’ Many of the ‘‘counter-resistance techniques’’ 

authorized for use at Guantanamo in December 2002 constitute ‘‘cruel, inhuman, or 

degrading’’ treatment that could, depending on their application, easily cross the 

threshold of torture. 

Many Americans are unaware that there is a legal distinction between cruelty 

and torture, cruelty being the less severe level of abuse. This has tended to obscure 

important elements of the interrogation debate from the public’s attention. For example, the public may be largely unaware that the government could evasively if 

truthfully claim (and did claim) that it was not ‘‘torturing’’ even as it was simultaneously interrogating detainees cruelly. Yet there is little or no moral distinction between cruelty and torture, for cruelty can be as effective as torture in savaging 

human flesh and spirit and in violating human dignity. Our efforts should be focused not merely on banning torture, but on banning cruelty. 

Except in egregious cases, gauging the precise legal category of abuse inflicted on 

a detainee is difficult because it depends on specific facts, including the techniques 

used and the medical and psychological impact. In general, however, it is beyond 

dispute that techniques constituting cruel treatment were authorized and applied. 

Tragically, credible reporting also makes it appear probable that some detainees 

were tortured. Certainly, the admission that waterboarding—a classic and reviled 

method of torture—was applied to some detainees creates the presumption that 

those detainees so interrogated were tortured. 

71

The United States was founded on the principle that every person—not just each 

citizen—possesses certain inalienable rights that no government, including our own, 

may violate. Among these rights is unquestionably the right to be free from cruel 

punishment or treatment, as is evidenced in part by the clear language of the eighth 

amendment and the constitutional jurisprudence of the 5th and 14th amendments. 

If we can apply the policy of cruelty to detainees, it is only because our Founders 

were wrong about the scope of inalienable rights. With the adoption of this policy 

our founding values necessarily begin to be redefined and our constitutional structure and the fabric of our legal system start to erode. 

Because the international legal system, the legal system of many countries, and 

the international human rights system are all largely designed to protect human 

dignity, the decision of the United States to adopt cruelty has had devastating foreign policy consequences. For most, perhaps all, of our traditional allies, the cruel 

treatment of detainees is a criminal act. As these nations came to recognize the dimensions of our policy of cruelty, political fissures between us and them began to 

emerge because none of them would follow our lead into the swamp of legalized 

abuse, as we should not have wished them to. These fissures only deepened as 

awareness grew about the effect of our policies on fundamental human rights principles, on the Geneva Conventions, on the Nuremberg precedents, and on the incidence of prisoner abuse worldwide. Respect and political support for the United 

States and its polices decreased sharply abroad. 

These adverse foreign policy consequences would inevitably damage our national 

security strategy and our operational effectiveness in the war on terror. Our ability 

to build and sustain the broad alliance required to fight the war was compromised. 

International cooperation, including in the military, intelligence, and law enforcements arenas, diminished as foreign officials became concerned that assisting the 

U.S. in detainee matters could constitute aiding and abetting criminal conduct in 

their own countries. As the difficulties of Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Jose 

Maria Aznar demonstrated, seemingly every European politician who sought to ally 

his country with the U.S. effort on the war on terror incurred a political penalty. 

All of these factors contributed to the difficulties our Nation has experienced in 

forging the strongest possible coalition in the war on terror. But the damage to our 

national security also occurred down at the tactical or operational level. I’ll cite four 

examples: 

First, there are serving U.S. flag-rank officers who maintain that the first and 

second identifiable causes of U.S. combat deaths in Iraq—as judged by their effectiveness in recruiting insurgent fighters into combat—are, respectively the symbols 

of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. There are other senior officers who are convinced 

that the proximate cause of Abu Ghraib was the legal advice authorizing abusive 

treatment of detainees that issued from the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal 

Counsel in 2002. 

Second, allied nations reportedly hesitated on occasion to participate in combat 

operations if there was the possibility that, as a result, individuals captured during 

the operation could be abused by U.S. or other forces. 

Third, allied nations have refused on occasion to train with us in joint detainee 

capture and handling operations because of concerns about U.S. detainee policies. 

Fourth, senior North Atlantic Treaty Organization officers in Afghanistan have 

been reported to have left the room when issues of detainee treatment have been 

raised by U.S. officials out of fear that they may become complicit in detainee abuse. 

Mr. Chairman, Albert Camus cautioned nations fighting for their values against 

selecting those weapons whose very use would destroy those values. In this war on 

terror, the United States is fighting for our values, and cruelty is such a weapon. 

I thank you and the committee for your laudatory focus on this issue and for the 

invitation to appear today.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Mora. 

Colonel Beaver, let me start with you. In September 2002, behavioral scientists and interrogators from GTMO attended training at 

Fort Bragg, NC, and on September 25, 2002, less than a week after 

they got back from training, Jim Haynes, David Addington, John 

Rizzo, and Michael Chertoff traveled to GTMO, where you were the 

senior JAG officer. A week later, on October 2, Jonathan Fredman, 

the Chief Counsel of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, came 

down to GTMO and attended a meeting with you, where SERE 

techniques were discussed. That’s October 2. 

72

Now, tab 7 in your book are the minutes from that meeting. On 

page 3 of the minutes, Mr. Fredman is quoted as saying that the 

anti-torture statutes are vaguely written and that, ‘‘It is basically 

subject to perception. If the detainee dies, you’re doing it wrong.’’ 

According to the minutes, you said, ‘‘We’ll need documentation to 

protect us.’’ If the aggressive techniques were legal, why would you 

need protection? (Appendix A) 

Colonel BEAVER. This e-mail was not written by me, so I can’t 

account for its accuracy, except that of—somebody from the CITF 

wrote it. But, separate from that, regarding Jonathan Fredman 

participating in a meeting that I held, I had held a number of 

meetings to discuss interrogation techniques once the military intelligence personnel wanted to do more aggressive techniques. So, 

I thought it was in the best interests of all concerned that everyone 

participate in meetings, including the law enforcement community, 

to understand where everybody was coming from. CITF was invited, and did participate. 

I don’t remember what Mr. Fredman said, nor do I remember 

what I said, specifically. But, certainly when—in terms of requesting additional techniques, I can only think that what I was referring to was—these techniques were not contained in the Army 

Field Manual, and they were not contained in an approved manual 

of some sort that was recognized by the Services. So, in terms of 

obtaining command approval, I believe I was referring to just that, 

that these techniques, whatever was going to be recommended by 

the Military Intelligence Community, would need to be approved by 

the appropriate authority, because they are—weren’t already techniques that were trained and taught at Fort Huachuca, and contained in the Army Field Manual. 

Chairman LEVIN. What was the reference to protection? You 

said, ‘‘If the’’—why would you need—first of all, did you say, ‘‘We’ll 

need documentation to protect us’’? What were you referring to? 

Legal opinion? 

Colonel BEAVER. Again, this is not my e-mail so I can’t say with 

certainty I said that. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. What about Mr. Fredman’s statement? Do you remember him saying, ‘‘If the detainee dies, you’re 

doing it wrong’’? 

Colonel BEAVER. I do not recall anything he—it’s 6 years ago, so 

I just honestly cannot recall what was specifically said. What I 

thought was valuable, in terms of his contribution, was bringing in 

other views so that others, besides myself, in terms of my colleagues in that room, could listen to another person essentially discuss the Torture Convention and so forth, and that you could have 

an open discussion about this. So, I recall that we did have a good 

discussion, and that it was collegial, and that everyone participated. That’s basically what I recall from that meeting. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, on page 4 of those minutes, you are 

quoted as asking, ‘‘Does SERE employ the wet-towel technique?’’ 

Do you remember discussing the SERE techniques? (Appendix A) 

Colonel BEAVER. I remember the J–2 at the time, Lieutenant 

Colonel Jerry Phifer, had brought up the wet-towel technique. I 

had never seen waterboarding. I still haven’t, as of today. I’ve 

never seen any kind of wet-towel technique. So, that was one of the 

73

things that the DIA personnel and military intelligence personnel 

wanted to request. I believe I was asking about that because I had 

not ever seen that, myself. 

Chairman LEVIN. Your reference to, ‘‘Does SERE employ the wettowel’’——

Colonel BEAVER. Right. 

Chairman LEVIN.—‘‘technique?’’—is that an accurate reference? 

Colonel BEAVER. I can say I probably did. I don’t remember, specifically. But, I know that that was one of the techniques that the 

interrogators had raised as something that they might wish to employ. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you remember discussion about SERE techniques being used? 

Colonel BEAVER. What I remember about SERE being discussed 

was the fact that if something was going to be approved by a higher command, which I thought, in this case, would be General Hill—

I had, really, no idea it would go higher than General Hill—that 

you would then have to have an SOP, you would have to have people trained, you would have to do all the kinds of things to ensure 

that techniques were used properly and they would not go beyond 

what was lawful. So because SERE already had SOPs on many of 

these types of techniques, I know I certainly thought if something 

got approved—again, a technique that SERE used—that that could 

be a good starting point for an SOP. So it made sense, if somebody 

were already doing it, is all I’m saying. So, we could not employ 

these techniques without the proper training and controls. 

Chairman LEVIN. Were you aware of the fact that the SERE program was to be used defensively and not offensively against detainees? Were you aware of that? 

Colonel BEAVER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. So, why would you be talking about SERE 

techniques in terms of interrogations, since its purpose was not the 

interrogation purpose? 

Colonel BEAVER. Right. From my intelligence colleagues who 

were looking to do, basically—or who said, including General 

Dunlavey, who was insistent that the detainees were showing signs 

of being counter-resistance trained, they were looking for additional 

techniques. Because the President had determined that the Geneva 

Conventions did not apply, that they were not to be treated as 

POWs, then, in the world of, I guess, what—I’m just—this is my 

own words, or makes sense to me—if you know there might be 

something out there that’s within the military community that 

might be found to be legal—it wasn’t determined yet, but might be 

found to be legal—then they would look to that, because they already understood that things that were illegal, of course, like torture, was illegal. Of course they weren’t going to ask for something 

like that. So you look to something that’s already being done, that 

you can either ‘‘cut-and-paste’’ from and learn something from, as 

opposed to creating something new that’s never been done. 

So, I have to assume, because most people know of SERE or 

have—some, even at GTMO, had been trained—that that was a 

natural sort of jump to—maybe some of the SERE techniques, not 

all of them, would be permissible and would be effective. So they 

reached out to SERE, and the only people who had psychologists 

74

were the SERE people. So our psychologists, who weren’t trained 

in that, except in human behavior—also, I think, it was a natural 

leap for them to think, ‘‘Perhaps my colleagues at the SERE school, 

in behavioral psychology, might be helpful to me.’’ 

Chairman LEVIN. You call a ‘‘natural leap,’’ though—but, you 

were aware that, as a matter of fact, it was exactly the reverse purpose. 

Colonel BEAVER. No, I understand what you’re saying, Senator 

Levin. I’m just——

Chairman LEVIN. But, were you aware of it at the time, when 

you talked about SERE techniques——

Colonel BEAVER. Well——

Chairman LEVIN. Well, wait a minute. 

Colonel BEAVER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN.—that the purpose of those techniques being 

used was to inoculate our troops, and that these were students that 

were being trained to be prepared for the application of those Geneva-violative techniques against them? Were you aware of all 

that? Yet, you call that a ‘‘natural leap,’’ when——

Colonel BEAVER. Well, I——

Chairman LEVIN.—the purpose was exactly the opposite purpose 

of what that program is intended to provide? 

Colonel BEAVER. Sir, later I became aware of much of this. At the 

time, General Dunlavey did not include me in these conversations. 

The people he sent to the SERE school at North Carolina—was not 

in any conversation I was involved in. So, I’m just posturing what 

I think my colleagues thought about when they’re thinking, ‘‘If—

again, an interrogation technique that might be useful, that SERE 

employs, go to the SERE school and check it out for ourselves.’’ I’m 

just, again, saying that on behalf of my colleagues. 

Chairman LEVIN. Were you surprised that neither the DOD General Counsel nor any of the staff there produced a written legal 

analysis for General Dunlavey’s request? 

Colonel BEAVER. I can only speak from the military chain of command, up to Jane Dalton—Rear Admiral, sorry, retired, Jane Dalton. I tried to get help from Colonel Manny Superville, the staff 

judge advocate at SOUTHCOM, and he was silent on my request. 

In fact, I reached him at the golf course on Columbus Day weekend, which was a 4-day holiday for SOUTHCOM, and spoke to him, 

and said, ‘‘I’m sending up this draft. I really need your help.’’ There 

was no response. 

At some point—and I can’t say what date—I talked to Captain 

Dalton and asked for her help, and she told me that I needed to 

speak to Colonel Superville, which, of course, I said I did and he 

wouldn’t help. So, I basically understood I was on my own, as it 

were, regarding the military. 

I really had no idea, until 2004, when Mr. Haynes released my 

legal opinion at a June 22, 2004, press conference, of many of the 

other things that had occurred since I had retired from Active 

Duty. So, I reached out within my military community and no 

help—and also, once I submitted my opinion, with the request from 

General Dunlavey, to SOUTHCOM, I never received a phone call, 

I never received an e-mail, I never received anything from Colonel 

Superville or his staff asking me anything, like, ‘‘are you a lunatic? 

75

what were you thinking?’’ or, ‘‘great opinion,’’ or—I received nothing from him; and, until it came back down from the SECDEF, I 

had no idea what was going on. I fully expected General Hill to 

make that policy decision. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you expect there would be different additional legal analysis and that your——

Colonel BEAVER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN.—opinion——

Colonel BEAVER. I certainly——

Chairman LEVIN.—wait a minute—that your opinion would not 

be the one that would be relied upon? 

Colonel BEAVER. No, sir. In fact, one of the reasons——

Chairman LEVIN. ‘‘No, sir,’’ you——

Colonel BEAVER. Oh, sorry. 

Chairman LEVIN. My question was—— 

Colonel BEAVER. I’m sorry. 

Chairman LEVIN.—were you surprised that your opinion became 

the opinion that was relied upon? Did——

Colonel BEAVER. Shocked. 

Chairman LEVIN.—you expect—shocked, okay. Why were you 

shocked? 

Colonel BEAVER. Because one of the reasons I had explained to 

Colonel Superville that I needed his input was because—and people 

that are in the moment, or the people that are participating on the 

island in the interrogations, don’t always have the best perspective, 

and so, to get it off the island was my goal, to get it to General 

Hill, where people had all the resources at their command; they 

could call military justice experts, whatever—anyone they needed 

to. To make, if you want to say, a calm, rational, objective decision, 

I thought, was the best thing possible. So, I fully expected General 

Hill’s staff to write up something and then also perhaps approve 

a very narrow set of interrogation practices; and, again, was very 

surprised when that did not happen. 

Chairman LEVIN. General Hill was the SOUTHCOM Commander. 

Colonel BEAVER. Yes, he was. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, thank you. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Dalton, did you ever see Lieutenant Colonel Beaver’s 

memo? 

Admiral DALTON. Yes, Senator, I did. 

Senator GRAHAM. Did you ever get a request from her to give her 

your opinion? 

Admiral DALTON. Senator, I don’t recall the telephone conversation that Colonel Beaver related. 

Senator GRAHAM. So, when you saw it, what did you think? 

Admiral DALTON. When I saw the memo, I believed that there 

were some serious deficiencies in it. 

Senator GRAHAM. Who did you tell? 

Admiral DALTON. The first thing as I recall, I discussed the 

memo with my staff. I don’t recall that, at that time, I discussed 

the memo with anyone else. 

76

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Mora, did you ever—do you recall seeing 

Lieutenant Colonel Beaver’s memo? 

Mr. MORA. Yes, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. What did you think? 

Mr. MORA. Sir, I thought it was an inadequate treatment of very 

sensitive and very difficult issues. 

Senator GRAHAM. What did you do? 

Mr. MORA. I immediately took it to Mr. Haynes and pointed out 

that fact to him. 

Senator GRAHAM. Lieutenant Colonel Beaver, I understand—I 

think I understand, better than I’ve ever understood, the role you 

played in this. Bottom line, no one made you write this memo. That 

was your own work product, correct? 

Colonel BEAVER. Yes. Based on Lieutenant Colonel Dunlavey’s 

request to send up interrogation techniques to General Hill, it 

would not have been appropriate for me to simply say ‘‘no legal objection’’ or ‘‘no comment.’’ 

Senator GRAHAM. But, there was no pressure for you to reach the 

conclusion——

Colonel BEAVER. No. There was no pressure. It was generated by 

me and my staff at the request of the Military Intelligence Task 

Force. 

Senator GRAHAM. You felt you were hung out a bit? 

Colonel BEAVER. I have no animosity, but I understood, at the 

time, I was hung out by the SOUTHCOM Staff Judge Advocate——

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Colonel BEAVER.—certainly. 

Senator GRAHAM. Fair enough. During this debate about what 

kind of techniques may be employed in the future, it was all to try 

to get better information. That’s correct? 

Colonel BEAVER. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. All right. Was waterboarding mentioned? 

Colonel BEAVER. The discussion—maybe in two parts I can answer this. One, there was a Navy doctor who just happened to be 

assigned on the hospital staff, who was deployed there for 6 

months, and he had been at the Navy SERE school for—I could be 

wrong—2-years assignment. He relayed to myself, as well as members of the intelligence community at GTMO, that he had observed—and, again, I could be wrong, if it was 2,000 or 3,000 sailor 

servicemembers who had been through that school and had endured waterboarding. He described it to me and said that, out of 

that number, only two failed—and I’m using his words—failed to 

give it up, and that was that—there were two SEALs who were 

used to controlled drowning. He said everyone else gave it up. So, 

I became aware of that for the first time, as well as members of 

the intelligence—and I say ‘‘community,’’ because there were many 

different people there from different commands, as well as DIA. So 

what Jerry Phifer and a few of the others discussed was not the—

literally the board, but putting a wet towel on your face to make 

you——

Senator GRAHAM. So, bottom line, it’s fair to say that someone 

was contemplating potentially using this technique. 

77

Colonel BEAVER. If it could be done legally, and in terms of the 

medical review of the detainee and those kinds of things, in a very 

controlled, supervised setting, yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Sure. Okay. 

Colonel BEAVER. But only—and part of this is that you don’t 

jump to one thing first. Much of it that I learned from the professionals, is that you build, you use what works. 

Senator GRAHAM. Sure. 

Colonel BEAVER. That could be just interviewing, and so, it’s not 

just a matter of, I think, an impression of ‘‘everyone gets the 

waterboard.’’ 

Senator GRAHAM. If I asked you the question, ‘‘Does the UCMJ 

prohibit waterboarding?’’ What would you say? 

Colonel BEAVER. I think that’s a difficult answer, and that’s what 

I struggled with in my opinion. I’m not a military justice expert, 

and I tried to raise——

Senator GRAHAM. What is your legal background? 

Colonel BEAVER. I’m a jack-of-all-trades, basically. I’ve done a little bit of everything—administrative law, criminal law, I’ve been a 

prosecutor, intel law. I’ve deployed with Special Operations Command in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm psychological operations. So, just really, a number of—I’ve been a——

Senator GRAHAM. So, when you called Admiral Dalton, what 

were you trying to get from her? 

Colonel BEAVER. Because Manny wouldn’t help me, I was trying 

to get help from her staff in dealing with some of these difficult 

issues. 

Senator GRAHAM. Admiral Dalton, why didn’t you come in and 

help? 

Admiral DALTON. As I indicated, sir, I don’t recall that specific 

conversation. 

Senator GRAHAM. Once you saw the memo and you had concerns 

about it, why didn’t you do what Mr. Mora did? 

Admiral DALTON. What I did, Senator, when I received the 

memo, was—I recognized that there were policy and legal issues involved, and I decided that what I needed to do at my level was to 

conduct a further legal and policy review, as General Hill’s memo 

had requested. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. 

Admiral DALTON. So I asked my staff to begin doing legal research, and we began setting up a legal and policy review. 

Senator GRAHAM. What were your conclusions? 

Admiral DALTON. Of the legal and policy review, that—I did not 

actually conclude that process at that time. 

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Mora, how long did it take you to understand this was the wrong road to go down? 

Mr. MORA. Sir, as soon as I heard the rumor that abuse was 

going on in GTMO, I acted, every single day, until the rescission 

of those interrogation authorizations were made by Secretary 

Rumsfeld, approximately 3 weeks later. But, when I saw the December 2nd Rumsfeld memo, and then reviewed Lieutenant Colonel 

Beaver’s legal memorandum, when I saw that the memorandum 

was completely unbounded concerning the limit of abuse that could 

78

be applied to the detainees, I knew instantaneously, sir, that this 

was a flawed policy decision based upon inadequate legal analysis. 

Senator GRAHAM. Is it fair to say, some of the senior judge advocates shared that view? 

Mr. MORA. Sir, every judge advocate I’ve ever spoken to on this 

issue shares that view. 

Senator GRAHAM. Given what you know about the way we’re 

doing business now, do you think we’re in the right place? 

Mr. MORA. Senator, I’m not current on what the actual policies 

and practices are today. My impression is that the military is in 

the right place. I have doubts about the intelligence community, 

however. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. All right. 

Nothing further. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Pryor. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Lieutenant Colonel Beaver, let me start with you, if I may. Just 

for clarification, you did not attend that September 2002 conference 

up at Fort Bragg. 

Colonel BEAVER. No, I did not. 

Senator PRYOR. You really don’t know, really, the purpose of that 

conference? For example, you don’t know if it was recommended 

there that we use these SERE techniques in an offensive manner. 

You don’t know anything about that, right? 

Colonel BEAVER. I think what I knew at the time was that the 

psychological—or, we called them the ‘‘Biscuits,’’ the Behavioral 

Science Team (BSCT), which was a psychiatrist and, I believe, a 

psychologist, would gain benefit by talking to their counterparts at 

the SERE school, and that also the—I think the military intelligence contingent that went was there on a so-called factfinding 

mission. 

Senator PRYOR. Is it your view that the purpose of that factfinding mission was to try to take some of the techniques, et cetera, 

from SERE and begin to use them offensively against detainees? 

Colonel BEAVER. To see if any of the techniques were—should be 

considered to be used, yes. 

Senator PRYOR. Yes, that’s an important question. In other 

words, your understanding at the time was, part of the purpose, at 

least, of that conference was to see if you could apply the SERE 

techniques to the detainees at GTMO. 

Colonel BEAVER. I believe, based on what General Dunlavey told 

us at a staff meeting after the fact, I mean after the participants 

had gone there, that his purpose was to find out what could be 

used, because he was looking at sending up a request for additional 

techniques. So, yes. 

Senator PRYOR. Okay. That’s interesting. Let me ask this. In 

your opening statement, you said, ‘‘In short, the interrogation techniques discussed in my legal opinion would not have been conducted in an abusive or unlawful manner if the approval and control procedures I outlined were followed.’’ So, are you saying that 

waterboarding should—is justified, as long as there’s the proper 

controls there? 

Colonel BEAVER. No, what I meant was—I didn’t approve anything; I wrote a legal opinion. So, whatever the commander—well, 

79

as it turned out, the SECDEF approved, it would be applied in a 

manner to prevent it from being used abusively. So, the SECDEF 

never approved waterboarding, so it was never anything that was 

considered. But, I did not—I was not the approval authority. So, 

I think what I was trying to refer to was that an aggressive interrogation had to have a legal review; there had to be a full—the 

medical team, everyone had to be involved before you could apply 

a plan, because it has to have a purpose. It can’t be sadistic; it has 

to be for a governmental purpose. This isn’t about just doing something because you can; it’s about eliciting intelligence. 

Senator PRYOR. Okay. 

Colonel BEAVER. So, if we had a plan in place that had been reviewed and approved by the commander, and—again, assuming 

whatever had been approved by, in this case, the SECDEF—then 

you would have a lawful interrogation plan, conducted lawfully, not 

abusively. 

Senator PRYOR. Okay. Let me ask—you’ve referred to this legal 

opinion. Are you referring to the October 11, 2002, opinion signed 

off on by General Phifer? (Appendix A) 

Colonel BEAVER. Jerry Phifer is a Lieutenant Colonel. 

Senator PRYOR. I’m sorry. 

Colonel BEAVER. J–2. 

Senator PRYOR. Colonel Phifer, yes. Is that the memo——

Colonel BEAVER. That’s my legal opinion, yes, sir. 

Senator PRYOR. Okay. So, in other words, you drafted that. 

Colonel BEAVER. Yes. Ultimately, I had some subordinates that 

helped me, but I signed off on the final. 

Senator PRYOR. All right. Let me ask, if I can—at tab 7, there’s 

a memo that we’ve referred to already. It’s tab 7, it’s a 5-page 

memo, and I’m going to go right to page 2 of 5. At the beginning 

of the memo, it says, ‘‘The following notes were taken during the 

aforementioned meeting at 13:40 on October 2, 2002. All questions 

and comments have been paraphrased.’’ (Appendix A) 

Colonel BEAVER. Yes, sir, that was done by the CITF personnel. 

Senator PRYOR. You referred to this with Senator Levin, and that 

it is a paraphrase, and you don’t know how accurate it is. Some of 

this, you don’t recall. Is that right? 

Colonel BEAVER. Not from 6 years ago, no, sir. 

Senator PRYOR. When did you first see this memo? 

Colonel BEAVER. I think, March, before I spoke to the Senate 

staff. 

Senator PRYOR. Okay, so in the last year, sometime this year? 

Colonel BEAVER. This past March. 

Senator PRYOR. Okay. You’ve reviewed this memo, right? 

Colonel BEAVER. I’ve seen it, yes, sir. 

Senator PRYOR. Do you have any questions about the accuracy of 

your statements in there? 

Colonel BEAVER. There’s no way for me to know if my statements 

are accurate, because it’s 6 years ago, and there’s no way for me 

to recollect what I exactly said or how the CITF personnel chose 

to phrase a particular issue or the importance they put on it. So, 

I don’t ascribe any malintent towards them, but I’m just saying 

there’s no way for me to say what they are saying is accurate. 

80

Senator PRYOR. Let me ask about an impression I have, and that 

is on page 3, for example. You come across in this as being eager 

to have these techniques used. Colonel Cummings says, ‘‘We can’t 

do sleep deprivation.’’ You say, ‘‘Yes, we can, with approval.’’ Then, 

I think this next statement is attributed to you, although it’s not 

clear. It says, ‘‘Disrupting the normal camp operation is vital. We 

need to create an environment of controlled chaos.’’ We could go 

down through some of the statements in here. But, at that time, 

do you remember, were you trying to get to the answer that we 

could use these SERE techniques against the detainees? 

Colonel BEAVER. I can say that my counterparts in the CITF 

were very unhappy with this line of discussion. I offered them, always, to participate. I offered them to write their own legal opinion, which they never did. They wrote a policy piece, which—I understood the policy concerns already, but I never received any legal 

objections based in the law. So, I know that they were all very unhappy with me at that point. 

Senator PRYOR. Unhappy with your conclusions? 

Colonel BEAVER. With me having discussions at all about aggressive interrogation techniques. 

Senator PRYOR. In other words, they did not like this policy direction? 

Colonel BEAVER. No, they wanted the law enforcement techniques only, and so you had the clash of law enforcement and intelligence interrogators, which—they saw their role as being the one 

that should be taken. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me ask this. There’s a conversation in here 

about sleep deprivation, and you’re quoted as saying—again, I 

know this is——

Colonel BEAVER. Right, I understand. 

Senator PRYOR.—paraphrased—you’re paraphrased as saying——

Colonel BEAVER. Yes. 

Senator PRYOR.—‘‘True, but officially it is not happening. It is 

not being reported officially. The ICRC is a serious concern,’’ which 

is the Red Cross. 

Colonel BEAVER. Yes. 

Senator PRYOR. So, it sounds to me like, in addition to advocating this, you maybe were trying to cover this up, as well. 

Colonel BEAVER. No, sir. I was the liaison to the ICRC, and I 

worked very well with them. I believe—and, again, it’s hard to reconstruct something 6 years later—if you have someone in active 

interrogation, and then the ICRC visits and wants to see that person, you can’t stop your interrogation to take them out, and disrupt 

what you’re trying to do. So at different times, the ICRC would be 

down there; and so, they would be there for 6 weeks and leave. So, 

I can only, the hazard that what I was referring to is, if you’re 

going to do a more intense interrogation that would last a longer 

period of time, you had to make sure that you had the time to do 

it, and that you weren’t disrupted. 

Senator PRYOR. Did—and when you say ‘‘disrupted’’—in other 

words, you would rather not have the ICRC——

Colonel BEAVER. No, they had access to the—they talked to all 

the detainees. But, if you’re in the middle of an interrogation and 

81

they want access to a particular detainee, you can’t disrupt your 

interrogation to have them be interviewed by the ICRC. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me ask this, because I’m just about out of 

time. In response to one of Senator Graham’s questions, you said 

that you were not that familiar with UCMJ? 

Colonel BEAVER. No, I said I wasn’t a military law expert. We 

have experts in the Army who do this for a living, and my hope 

was that, when my opinion went up to General Hill, that my concerns about military personnel being involved with these aggressive techniques would be appropriately addressed by people who do 

this full time. We call it Trial Counsel Assistance Program. But, 

anyway, the people that look at these issues and would have the 

time and the resources to address those issues. But, I was very concerned about the military. 

Senator PRYOR. This will be my last question, Mr. Chairman; 

thank you for your patience—but, in your legal analysis at the 

time, did you look at the UCMJ? 

Colonel BEAVER. Yes. 

Senator PRYOR. Did you look at U.S. Law? 

Colonel BEAVER. Yes, sir. 

Senator PRYOR. Did you look at the U.S. Constitution? 

Colonel BEAVER. Yes, sir. 

Senator PRYOR. Did you look at the Geneva Conventions? Did 

you look at the Army Field Manual? 

Colonel BEAVER. Yes, sir. 

Senator PRYOR. Do you have memos or documents with your 

legal analysis based on your review of all those materials? Have 

you provided those to the committee? 

Colonel BEAVER. Whatever was retrieved from GTMO, the committee would have. I was not—6 years later—I didn’t take things 

with me. It was classified. So, whatever I used came from human 

rights courts opinions, all sorts of things. But, that would have 

been what the—if DOD had it, DOD would have provided it. But, 

the legal opinion was what my analysis provided on those issues. 

Senator PRYOR. In other words, at GTMO, did you keep a file 

with all your legal research in it? 

Colonel BEAVER. I don’t know if someone would have kept it, 6 

years later. 

Senator PRYOR. But, did you have one? 

Colonel BEAVER. At the time, yes, it was on a shared Secret 

Internet Protocol Router Network, a secured network. 

Senator PRYOR. You don’t know if that’s been provided to the 

committee? 

Colonel BEAVER. I would have no idea. I left GTMO in 2003. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

Colonel BEAVER. But, I provided the basis for it in the opinion, 

so you would have seen citations to the various things that I looked 

at. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Pryor. 

Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank this panel for their contribution to this very serious 

issue. 

82

I’d like to address my questions to Admiral Dalton. First, may 

I congratulate you on a very distinguished career in the United 

States Navy, and to have, as a consequence of your professional 

abilities, recognized and were given the first flag rank in the long 

history of the Navy JAG Corps. Am I not correct? 

Admiral DALTON. Yes, sir. For a woman, yes, sir. 

Senator WARNER. That’s a great commendation to you. 

Admiral DALTON. Thank you. 

Senator WARNER. I listened very carefully to your testimony 

today, and I’d like to start off by referring to the Vanity Fair article, which I presume you’ve read more than once. On page 13 of 

the 17 pages it says, ‘‘At the level of the Joint Chiefs, the memo 

should have been subject to a detailed review, including close legal 

scrutiny by Myers’s own counsel, Captain Jane Dalton. But, that 

never happened. It seems that Jim Haynes short-circuited the approval process. Albert Mora, the General Counsel of the Navy, says 

he remembered Dalton telling him, ‘Jim pulled us away. We never 

had a chance to complete the assessment.’ ’’ 

Now, having spent some wonderful years myself in that building 

at the Department of the Navy, I have always found, historically, 

going back to the times of George Washington, we have civilian 

control of the military. That’s the way it should be. It has functioned, and functioned well, throughout the history of our country. 

But, within that structure, there’s a certain amount of independence that’s accorded the chiefs of the various military branches—

Chief of Naval Operations, so forth. Then, when we structured the 

JCS organization and the Chairman was designated, he was the 

focal point of the chiefs, and his responsibility is the chief military 

advisor to the SECDEF and the President. 

What interests me is the degree to which the chiefs at that time 

exercised their independence. This committee—and I was privileged to be a part of the committee and very active in writing Goldwater-Nichols, and that was the law at the time this situation occurred, and that gave an avenue by which members of the JCS—

indeed, the Chairman—if they had disagreements with certain policy matters, could address them directly to SECDEF and, if necessary, to the President. You’re familiar with that procedure. Have 

I stated it correctly? 

Admiral DALTON. Yes, sir. 

Senator WARNER. Was any consideration given at that time by 

the senior military, either the Chairman or members of the tank, 

to exercise the rights under Goldwater-Nichols to bring to the attention of higher authority their concerns about this policy change? 

Admiral DALTON. Senator, I’m not sure what policy change——

Senator WARNER. The use of more aggressive techniques for the 

detainees at GTMO, the memorandum that we’ve been discussing 

here in some detail. 

Admiral DALTON. Yes, sir. At the—well——

Senator WARNER. In other words, this article—and I think you’ve 

confirmed it’s correct—you stopped your analysis, which you were 

doing for the Chairman—at that time, Richard Myers, am I correct? 

Admiral DALTON. Yes, Senator. 

83

Senator WARNER. All right. Now, to me, that was a variance in 

normal procedures, and the Chairman was entitled to the benefit 

of your professional expertise and knowledge in your own independent legal analysis. He had, I think, a duty as chief, to go into 

the tank and discuss it. Was it ever discussed in the tank? 

Admiral DALTON. Senator, let me just clarify. When the memo 

came in from General Hill asking for the enhanced techniques on—

the memo was distributed to the Services, and the Services, as has 

already been mentioned, provided their inputs. 

Senator WARNER. Correct. 

Admiral DALTON. They asked for—they—the Services——

Senator WARNER. Now, the ‘‘they’’ being the Services ‘‘asked for’’? 

I want to define who ‘‘they’’ is. 

Admiral DALTON. I’m sorry. Yes, sir. The Services sent in responses to the Joint Staff tasker asking for inputs on the General 

Hill memo. All of the Services expressed concerns about the techniques that were listed in the memo. They also expressed their understanding and appreciation for the need for intelligence, and good 

intelligence. 

Senator WARNER. Correct. 

Admiral DALTON. Then my recollection is that all four of them 

suggested that there needed to be further legal and policy review, 

as General Hill had suggested in his memo. 

Senator WARNER. Correct. 

Admiral DALTON. So, the next step, then, was to proceed with a 

larger general and policy review, which is what I intended to do. 

Senator WARNER. Correct. Not only intended, but you initiated. 

Admiral DALTON. I initiated—yes, that’s right, Senator. When I 

learned that Mr. Haynes did not want that broadbased legal and 

policy review to take place, then I stood down from the plans. 

Senator WARNER. Let’s now clarify exactly how you were told to 

stand down. Was it in writing, or was it verbal? 

Admiral DALTON. It was not in writing, Senator, and the best of 

my recollection as to how this occurred is that the Chairman called 

me aside and indicated to me that Mr. Haynes did not want this 

broadbased review to take place, and that I should not continue to 

interact with—the Chairman’s words were not this detailed; it was 

a very brief meeting, where he called me aside and said, ‘‘Mr. 

Haynes does not want this process to proceed.’’ 

However, that did not mean that I then stopped doing all legal 

analysis or all legal review. I continued to engage with Mr. 

Haynes’s office. This is the piece that I think has not necessarily 

been clear, is that when I stopped the analysis that would have included the Services and the DIA and Fort Huachuca and all of 

those various agencies, nevertheless, I continued to work with Mr. 

Haynes’s office and with the Chairman, in terms of reviewing and 

analyzing General Hill’s request. 

So, at that time, there was no perceived need to go to the chiefs 

and complain about anything, or to the President and complain, or 

the Secretary, because the process was still proceeding, in that I 

understood that this was a very sensitive issue, that Mr. Haynes 

wanted this to be held very close-hold, and I believed that his prerogative as the chief legal officer of the Department was to have 

84

his office take the lead; I would provide support to the Chairman 

and work with Mr. Haynes’s office. 

Senator WARNER. When he created the final product, what was 

your professional analysis, at that time, and advice to the Chairman? 

Admiral DALTON. Sir, based on the discussions and the interaction that I had had with Mr. Haynes’s office, with GTMO, with 

SOUTHCOM, I believed that the techniques that the Secretary approved, in the context in which they were discussed and in which 

he approved them, could, in fact, be conducted humanely, in accordance with the President’s——

Senator WARNER. Humanely? Is that the word you used? 

Admiral DALTON.—yes, Senator, humanely—in accordance with 

the President’s direction that the detainees were to be treated humanely. 

Senator WARNER. Did you feel they were consistent with international and domestic law and other laws of the United States? 

Admiral DALTON. If they were conducted consistent with the discussions that we had had, in terms of the oversight, the supervision by the commander, with, in fact, supervision by the staff 

judge advocate, and, again, in the context in which they were discussed. 

Let me explain, if I may, that the removal of clothing was not 

nudity. There was never a discussion that that would involve nudity. The use of military working dogs was not to have working 

dogs in an interrogation booth, unmuzzled and snarling at detainees. That’s not what the Secretary approved. The use of stress techniques was limited to standing for 4 hours. So, when you put all 

of these factors together with the oversight, with the fact that the 

President had mandated that the detainees be treated humanely, 

then I believe that, in fact, they could be conducted—those techniques could be conducted consistent with both international and 

domestic law. 

Senator WARNER. It’s noted in this article that General Myers 

made a point that, ‘‘My initials are not on the document.’’ Does 

that indicate that he had some reservations about this? Did he express some of those reservations with you? It says, ‘‘Normally, he 

would have initialed a memo to indicate approval, but there was 

no confirmation that Myers had seen the memo or formally signed 

off on it.’’ 

I can’t digest this that quickly. Can you clarify that at all? 

Admiral DALTON. Just one second, sir, please. [Pause.] 

Senator WARNER. What’s this? Who handed me this? What am 

I supposed to do? What does it say? 

Would you finish? I’m sorry. 

Admiral DALTON. Excuse me, Senator. 

Senator, in the days leading up to Mr. Haynes’s memo of November 27, which was then approved by the Secretary on December 2, 

there were meetings at the SECDEF level, involving General 

Myers, involving Mr. Haynes, and myself. In those meetings, we 

discussed the various techniques, the safeguards that would be applied. My understanding and my recollection is that General Myers 

was satisfied with the techniques that the Secretary approved. 

Senator WARNER. All right, thank you. My time is up. 

85

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Dalton, as you’ve indicated in your testimony, when you 

received the request—when General Myers received the request, 

the Joint Staff solicited the opinion of Service JAGs. You say they 

raised concerns, but these are very significant concerns. The Army 

JAG said that the stress positions, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, and use of phobias to induce stress crosses the line of 

humane treatment. 

The Chief Legal Advisor of the CITF at GTMO said that certain 

techniques may subject servicemembers to punitive articles of the 

UCMJ. 

The Air Force said that the techniques may fail to meet requirements ‘‘to treat detainees humanely.’’ 

The Marine Corps said several techniques arguably violate Federal law and would expose our servicemembers to possible prosecution. 

Admiral DALTON. Yes, sir. 

Senator REED. That was an accurate summary? 

Admiral DALTON. Yes, Senator. 

Senator REED. Did you make General Myers aware of all those 

concerns? 

Admiral DALTON. Senator, my recollection is that the decisionmakers were aware that there had been concerns——

Senator REED. No, I’m asking you specifically, as the counsel to 

the Chairman of the JCS, did you make him fully aware of the various serious concerns that were raised by uniformed officers of the 

United States military? 

Admiral DALTON. Senator, I don’t recall the specific conversations that I had with the Chairman, but, it is my recollection that 

he was aware of these concerns and that I made him aware of 

those concerns, yes, sir. 

Senator REED. Did he make Mr. Haynes aware of those concerns? 

Admiral DALTON. I don’t know, sir. Senator, in the conversations 

that we had and the meetings that we had, my recollection is that 

those concerns were taken into account and addressed as a part of 

the overall context of the conversations. I don’t recall that anyone 

specifically pulled out memos and showed the memos, but that we 

were aware that there were concerns, and those concerns were addressed in our discussion of the safeguards and the way that the 

techniques would be implemented. 

Senator REED. You just said that you continued discussions with 

Mr. Haynes, although you were told—and I think you made it very 

clear, you were essentially told, through General Myers, to stop 

any formal legal analysis to reach a formal conclusion. Is that correct? 

Admiral DALTON. I was told to stop the broadbased legal review 

and policy review that would have involved the Services and the 

other agencies, like Fort Huachuca and DIA. I was told to stop the 

broadbased analysis. 

Senator REED. But, you were told—or, not dissuaded by General 

Myers, to continue to evaluate all of these options in conjunction 

with Mr. Haynes. 

86

Admiral DALTON. I’m sorry, sir, I didn’t understand—General 

Myers did not prevent me from continuing the discussions with Mr. 

Haynes, sir. 

Senator REED. So, were you privy to all discussions with Mr. 

Haynes on these topics? 

Admiral DALTON. I’m sure I was not, sir. 

Senator REED. So, selectively, you participated. You participated 

not in every discussion, but in ‘‘several discussions’’ is fair. 

Admiral DALTON. Yes, Senator, I—yes, sir. 

Senator REED. Did you raise these concerns? Not in citing formal 

memoranda, but raise specific concerns, the violation of UCMJ? 

Admiral DALTON. Senator, I don’t—again, I have a hard time recalling the specifics of any particular conversation in a particular 

meeting. I believe these concerns were known and addressed, and 

as I said before, in the context of the meetings and the conversations that we had, we recognized that there were issues related to 

UCMJ concerns, there were issues related to Federal- and domestic-law concerns, as well as international law. 

Senator REED. You were satisfied these concerns were fully addressed by Mr. Haynes, or by someone. 

Admiral DALTON. I was satisfied—yes, Senator, I was satisfied 

that in the context of the discussions we had, those concerns were 

addressed. 

Senator REED. You mentioned the fact that—and, I think, in response to Senator Warner—that General Myers signed off on the 

techniques. 

Admiral DALTON. Yes, sir, he’s—I’m sorry, he—as stated in——

Senator REED. He failed to object. 

Admiral DALTON.—as stated in Mr. Haynes’s memo, he agreed 

that the approval of those techniques could be conducted consistent——

Senator REED. Right. 

Admiral DALTON.—with——

Senator REED. You read Mr. Haynes’s memo? 

Admiral DALTON. Yes, Senator. 

Senator REED. At the time it was released? Contemporaneous 

with the release? 

Admiral DALTON. Shortly after the release. 

Senator REED. Did you have any questions about the legal sufficiency of this memorandum? 

Admiral DALTON. I specifically did—I was not asked to opine, 

and I don’t recall that I opined on the details, but I—there was one 

phrase in the memorandum which said that, arguably, all of the 

techniques would be legal or authorized, including the three that 

were not authorized. I was not asked to opine on the memo, but 

I did not necessarily believe that that was correct. 

Senator REED. Did you feel you had an obligation to General 

Myers, since he was referenced in this memo, as concurring or at 

least giving some non-objection to advise him that there were elements here that you thought had serious legal problems? 

Admiral DALTON. Sir, I wasn’t aware of the memo until after Mr. 

Haynes had initiated it and the Secretary had signed it. It was 

shortly——

87

Senator REED. If the memorandum had legal conclusions that 

you significantly disagreed with, didn’t you feel an obligation to at 

least make General Myers aware of this? 

Admiral DALTON. After the fact, Senator? 

Senator REED. Sure. 

Admiral DALTON. Since the Secretary had not authorized those 

techniques, I didn’t feel that it was necessary to go into a lot of detail with the Chairman about whether or not every word in the 

memorandum was correct. The Secretary authorized less than the 

full category of techniques, and that’s what I was satisfied with 

and what General Myers was satisfied with. 

Senator REED. The memorandum essentially said that all these 

techniques are legal, the category 3 techniques, but, as a matter of 

policy, we’re not going to have a blanket approval. (Appendix A) 

Admiral DALTON. Right. Yes, Senator. 

Senator REED. Leaving it up to—leaving the issue that these are 

legal techniques—at least the official opinion endorsed by the 

SECDEF is, these are legal techniques, correct? 

Admiral DALTON. I would not——

Senator REED. What did——

Admiral DALTON. I’m sorry. 

Senator REED. No, I—go ahead. Excuse me. 

Admiral DALTON. Senator, I would not say that that was the 

legal opinion endorsed by the SECDEF. The SECDEF was approving the use of particular techniques. As to whether or not other 

techniques might or might not be legal, if the combatant commander wanted to use those techniques, he would then have to 

come up and ask, and there could then be a separate and additional review. It was not necessary to reach that question, given 

that the Secretary approved the ones that he did. 

Senator REED. But, the only reason that this is not a blanket approval is a matter of policy, not of law. As I read this, category 3 

techniques may be legally available, but, as a matter of policy—

that’s what this—what it says, essentially. You didn’t think—you 

thought that was an appropriate legal analysis? 

Admiral DALTON. No, sir, I did not think that was an appropriate 

legal analysis. I did not think it was necessary to engage on that 

subject, since the Secretary had already approved the techniques, 

and that was what we were providing to the combatant commander. 

Senator REED. You are aware of Lieutenant Colonel Beaver’s 

memorandum, is that correct? 

Admiral DALTON. I am, Senator. 

Senator REED. You read it? 

Admiral DALTON. I did, sir. 

Senator REED. In her memorandum, she said, ‘‘Regarding UCMJ, 

the proposal to grab, poke in the chest, push lightly, and place a 

wet towel or hood over the detainee’s head would constitute a perse violation of Article 128 assault.’’ One of the techniques that you 

approved was pushing or poking lightly. Do you disagree with her 

analysis? 

Admiral DALTON. I disagree with that analysis, yes. 

Senator REED. How about Article 93 of the UCMJ, which forbids 

maltreatment of anyone under the control of military personnel? 

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Admiral DALTON. Senator, I did not view light pushing and poking with a finger to be maltreatment. 

Senator REED. All right. You would also disagree with Colonel 

Beaver in her suggestion that, because of the potential violation of 

UCMJ, there would have to be some type of immunity or—you disagree with that? 

Admiral DALTON. That’s correct, sir. I don’t believe that’s correct. 

Senator REED. Mr. Mora, what’s your view with respect to Article 

128 and Article 93 of the UCMJ? 

Mr. MORA. Senator, I’m not a specialist in that area. I never focused on those specific matters. My concern with the memorandum 

is that it did not include a bright line of abuse which could not be 

transgressed. For example, you look at Lieutenant Colonel Beaver’s 

memorandum, and nowhere does it say that, ‘‘You may engage in 

these tactics just until you reach the point where it reaches cruel, 

inhuman, and degrading treatment, and you may go no further.’’ 

Because there was no such boundary anywhere in the memorandum, it was all subject to abuse. 

Senator REED. Colonel Dalton, I have a final question. Part of 

your rationale for agreeing with the conclusion is the fact that you 

object—and you’ve indicated certain objection to techniques that 

may or may not have been approved legally by Mr. Haynes. But, 

you keep citing the ‘‘conditions.’’ Where, in any of these materials, 

are there those conditions, as Mr. Mora refers to, that would give 

specific guidance? I don’t think the SECDEF signed a memorandum that talked about the conditions. Are you aware of those 

conditions that he approved? 

Admiral DALTON. Senator, the conditions were in several different contexts. In the Colonel Phifer memo that came up, it specifically said—that was attached to General Hill’s memo, Colonel 

Phifer’s memo was the one that listed the techniques—and that 

one made it clear that the use of the techniques, at least the category 3 techniques——

Senator REED. The Phifer memo said the techniques were needed. Where is there a direction of the SECDEF that these are mandatory as part of the use of these techniques? 

Admiral DALTON. The only thing in writing from the SECDEF 

was his approval of Mr. Haynes’s memo. There were meetings leading up to the Secretary’s approval of the memo, and the context of 

the conversation was—and of the discussions—were one particular 

detainee, the particularly high-value detainee who had resisted. It 

was in the context of the discussions. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator McCaskill? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let me start by saying how proud, as an 

American, I am of you, Mr. Mora. Courage comes in all forms, and 

you showed great courage. 

Let me cut to the chase here and see if we can reach some agreement. 

Ms. Dalton and Ms. Beaver, do you both believe that putting a 

group of detainees together completely naked, hooded, and siccing 

dogs on them is legal under the UCMJ or anything else that our 

military should be paying attention to? Do you think that’s legal? 

89

Admiral DALTON. Senator, I don’t believe that’s legal, and that 

was never approved by the SECDEF. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. Ms. Beaver, do you think that’s legal? 

Colonel BEAVER. No, ma’am, and it never occurred at GTMO. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. All right. I’m reading this legal 

memo, and I’m reading the memo by Mr. Feith. Now, I have to tell 

you—you’re both trained lawyers, correct? 

Colonel BEAVER. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. You both know that words matter a lot in 

the law. The difference of one word can make a huge impact on a 

legal analysis, and that’s what you’re trained, as a lawyer, to understand. Is that correct? 

Ms. Beaver? 

Colonel BEAVER. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Admiral Dalton? 

Admiral DALTON. Yes, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. All right. I’m looking at this memo. It says, 

removal of clothing, under category 2, and it says, under category 

2, using detainee phobias, such as fear of dogs. (Appendix A) Now, 

I’m trying to figure out, as a lawyer, how removal of clothing and 

using fear of dogs does not envision naked people—and, by the 

way, the hood is in there, too—naked people having dogs sicced on 

them. How does it not occur to either of you, that that might be 

envisioned? 

Colonel BEAVER. Because, ma’am, in the discussions that the 

staff had, when you develop a plan, a professional plan of interrogation, there are limits and there are conditions, and there’s command approval. If somebody said, ‘‘Let’s sic the dogs on them,’’ that 

would have never happened. That’s just not professional. That indicates something——

Senator MCCASKILL. But, it did happen. 

Colonel BEAVER. It did not happen, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Dogs were used with naked people. 

Colonel BEAVER. In the context that you’re saying it, I’m not 

aware that that ever happened at GTMO. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I’m not talking about GTMO. I’m talking 

about within our military, it happened. 

Colonel BEAVER. My experience is GTMO, and so, I can’t comment on how it came to be that this happened in Iraq. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Ms. Dalton, can you comment on how it 

happened? 

Admiral DALTON. No, Senator. Those techniques that we’re talking about were approved for GTMO, and GTMO only. They did not 

involve nudity, they did not involve siccing snarling dogs——

Senator MCCASKILL. You say it doesn’t involve nudity. It says 

‘‘removal of’’——

Colonel FRIEND. Can I ask that the witness be allowed to finish 

her answer before the question comes again? 

Senator MCCASKILL. I apologize. Go ahead, Ms. Dalton. 

Admiral DALTON. Senator, as I was saying, the techniques approved by the Secretary did not involve nudity, they did not involve 

siccing snarling dogs on detainees. 

Senator MCCASKILL. All right. ‘‘Removal of clothing.’’ Now, when 

you were discussing the safeguards, Ms. Dalton, in these discusVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
90

sions you had about safeguards, did anybody talk about putting in 

the word ‘‘all’’? ‘‘Not allowed’’? Did anybody talk about that phrase, 

that removal of clothing—if I saw ‘‘removal of clothing,’’ and I was 

trying to get information out of a detainee, there’s nothing there 

that says ‘‘removal of some clothing.’’ It says ‘‘removal of clothing.’’ 

How would anyone know, from that guidance, that nudity was not 

allowed? 

Admiral DALTON. Senator, that was one of the specific questions 

that was addressed in discussions with GTMO, with General Miller, and with others concerning these techniques. I specifically recall that we had discussions about that particular issue—the people I spoke with—and my recollection is that it was General Miller—said it did not involve nudity. 

Colonel BEAVER. Right. 

Senator MCCASKILL. It doesn’t say that. There’s nothing in this, 

as a legal analysis, as a lawyer, that would tell you that nudity is 

prohibited. It says ‘‘removal of clothing.’’ It doesn’t say ‘‘removal of 

some clothing.’’ It just says ‘‘removal of clothing.’’ So, I don’t understand how that is a safeguard. 

Let me ask you about this concept I talked about with the last 

panel, advance immunity. Are you aware of any concept in the law, 

Ms. Dalton, concerning immunity in advance? 

Admiral DALTON. I’m not. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Did you read that phrase in Lieutenant 

Colonel Beaver’s legal opinion? 

Admiral DALTON. I did. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Did it jump out at you? 

Admiral DALTON. Yes, Senator, it did. It was one of the issues 

in the legal memo that I thought was not accurate or correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Did it concern you that a legal opinion that 

people were relying on contained a concept that, on its face, would 

be illegal, which it would be, to give somebody immunity in advance? 

Admiral DALTON. Senator, that’s my understanding of why both 

Colonel Beaver and General Hill asked for additional legal and policy review. That’s why I believe that there needed to be additional 

legal and policy review at the Joint Chiefs or at the OSD General 

Counsel level. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. Your opinion—and, by the way, Lieutenant Colonel Beaver, I feel for you today. This is hard, and I 

think you’re a good American, and I think that you were asked to 

do something. I don’t really understand how it happened. My job 

is to figure that out and try to make sure it never happens again. 

I’m reading from your legal memo, where you say, ‘‘I agree’’—you 

say, ‘‘The proposed strategies do not violate applicable Federal 

law.’’ Do you still stand by that opinion? 

Colonel BEAVER. At the time I wrote that opinion, the law was 

such that I believed that the law allowed a lot. I’m not talking 

about policy. I’m talking about the law at that time, with the Geneva Conventions not applying. If you would look at European Court 

of Human Rights (ECHR) opinion, when you mention ‘‘hoods,’’ frequently even the ECHR would tell you that—I’m not advocating 

anything, I’m telling you hoods are allowed in interrogation. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. 

91

Colonel BEAVER. So, even in decisions by the ECHR, which I 

looked at—for example, hooding, by itself, is allowed and is not 

cruel, and it also is not torture. So, I tried to weigh all of these 

things, but I understood that I was at the bottom of the bottom of 

the food chain, and that I might not have all the facts, and I might 

not be aware of all the issues. I didn’t think of many of the things 

that I later saw in the opinion—the 50-page opinion written by the 

DOJ. So, I was confident that if this got off the island, and then 

it went to a command that was in the continental United States, 

like SOUTHCOM, where it could be looked at by people who were 

not directly involved in the interrogation of—in the instance of this 

high-value detainee, that we thought might have knowledge about 

another attack against the United States—that the right policy decision would be made. 

On the military justice point, I did not artfully craft that section, 

and that’s the only part of my opinion I regret, because I was trying to highlight my extreme concern for the military personnel 

under the command of Major General Miller, that if techniques 

weren’t lawful, that military police personnel, in particular, could 

find themselves maybe—be prosecuted later. So I did not draft that 

very well, and I admit that. But, for me, it was a red flag to people 

like Captain Dalton, at the time, to say, ‘‘I’m very concerned about 

the military personnel. Please take a look at this.’’ Unfortunately, 

Colonel Superville never responded, so I never got any feedback 

until——

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Colonel BEAVER. —the SECDEF’s memo——

Senator MCCASKILL. No, I get what happened here. You felt you 

were at the bottom, and you needed to move it off the island, and 

somebody, I think you said, in a calm and rational way, was going 

to look at it. The scary thing for me is that you put your name on 

it as the lawyer——

Colonel BEAVER. Absolutely. 

Senator MCCASKILL. —who was asked to give a legal opinion, 

and then, of course everyone wanted to glob on your opinion, because—why should they have to take the heat if you’d already done 

it for them? Here’s what I want to—if I can, before—I know my 

time’s up, but let me just finish this point. In your statement, you 

have said, in interviews with the staff, that you didn’t feel pressure 

from anyone. 

Colonel BEAVER. I did not, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. I’m trying to figure this out. You said 

in your memo, ‘‘The proposed strategy is not violative of applicable 

Federal law,’’ but the whole phrase is, ‘‘agree that proposed strategies do not violate Federal law.’’ Who were you agreeing with? 

Colonel BEAVER. I’m not sure. It was my opinion. I don’t recall 

that phrase. I’m sorry. I just——

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes. Well, that’s what you said. You wrote, 

‘‘I have reviewed the memorandum, and I agree that the proposed 

strategies do not violate applicable’’——

Colonel BEAVER. Oh, that’s just my——

Senator MCCASKILL. —‘‘Federal law.’’ 

Colonel BEAVER. —personal opinion. Perhaps I just didn’t write 

that artfully. But, I—my opinion is that it doesn’t violate the law. 

92

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. 

Colonel BEAVER. That’s with—I had built-in conditions. I had 

built-in safeguards with legal opinion, medical involvement, and so 

forth. So it was not a blank check. It was from—what was from my 

view. If we did this professionally—there was a legitimate government purpose, there were safeguards—then there wouldn’t be 

abuses. Because interrogation is always a gray area, you—unlike 

what Mr. Mora says with—there weren’t these specific conditions—

you can’t come up with all the conditions of an interrogation that, 

ahead of time, you can say, ‘‘When it comes to 4 days,’’ I don’t 

know—anyway, and so, I knew that if you would do these reviews 

and have these safeguards in place for these interrogations, that 

the law would be met. I felt very strongly about that, and I believed in my colleagues from the intelligence community, that we 

would not allow the law to be violated or detainees to be harmed. 

I still believe that today, and that’s why I believe there was no violation of the law at GTMO, despite what others may believe. 

Detainees were beaten to death at Bagram, Afghanistan. That 

happened in December, before the SECDEF even had time to get 

out something, and those detainees were beaten to death. So, it’s 

more than just what I said. 

Senator MCCASKILL. It’s a sad day in this hearing room when we 

say, ‘‘Well, it’s not that bad. At least they weren’t beaten to death.’’ 

Colonel BEAVER. No, I didn’t say that, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, it——

Colonel BEAVER. They did not——

Senator MCCASKILL. —sounded that way. 

Colonel BEAVER. —the law was not violated at GTMO. Detainees 

were not abused. They were treated humanely within the bounds 

of the law. 

Senator MCCASKILL. We’re—what we’re trying to do—and I—my 

time’s up, and I’ll wait for my next round, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 

Colonel Beaver, it’s my understanding that the Schmidt-Furlow 

report found that, in October 2002, a military working dog was 

used as part of an interrogation of a high-value target, and the dog 

was brought into the room, directed to growl, bark, and show the 

teeth at the detainee. Is that correct? 

Colonel BEAVER. I only heard that later. I was not aware of it 

at the time. My understanding of the use of the dogs, because they 

were bomb dogs, they were not protection dogs, were that, by roaming the perimeter——

Senator GRAHAM. When did you leave GTMO? 

Colonel BEAVER. June 2003, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. So, were you there in October 2002? 

Colonel BEAVER. Yes, sir, I was there. I said, at the time, I was 

not aware that that happened. I found out about it later. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you doubt that it happened? 

Colonel BEAVER. If an investigator found that it happened, I’m 

not disputing that, I’m just saying I was not aware of it at the 

time. 

93

Senator GRAHAM. So when you said this didn’t happen at GTMO, 

you’re not right. 

Colonel BEAVER. What I said was approved by the commander 

and what was authorized by the commander did not happen. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, who did this? 

Colonel BEAVER. I don’t——

Senator GRAHAM. Did somebody make it up on their own? 

Colonel BEAVER. I don’t know, sir. I didn’t do the——

Senator GRAHAM. The report found that it was part of an interrogation plan. 

Colonel BEAVER. The interrogation plan that was written did not 

authorize the use of dogs in that manner. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. The report also found that a detainee—

the same detainee was strip-searched in front of female personnel. 

Is that correct? 

Colonel BEAVER. I heard that that happened, yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Do you know who authorized that? 

Colonel BEAVER. I do not know. 

Senator GRAHAM. So, based on this independent investigation, we 

know, at least on one occasion, dogs were used as part of an interrogation technique at GTMO, and a person was stripped naked, a 

man stripped naked in front of female personnel at GTMO. Is that 

correct? 

Colonel BEAVER. Sir, I’ve heard that that’s what the SchmidtFurlow investigation found. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Colonel BEAVER. I’ve not seen it for myself. I’m just saying I take 

your word for it that that’s what was found in the investigation. 

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Mora, wrap this up. It’s my understanding 

that when you saw the interrogation techniques being proposed, 

you felt a need to speak up, and you did. You felt a need to continue to speak up, and you did. Is that correct? 

Mr. MORA. That’s right, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. You had a lot of military lawyers speaking up 

to you that this is not right, what they’re proposing, this creates 

problems. That’s correct? 

Mr. MORA. That’s also correct, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. I think we had 35 techniques at one time, and 

some of your criticism was listened to and the techniques were 

ratcheted down, in terms of number. Is that correct? 

Mr. MORA. I’m not sure about how it ended up, Senator. But, if 

you’re referring to the working group report——

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. This is important for later on. We had a 

list of techniques that Rumsfeld signed off on. Then you had 

pushback, and you were part of the pushback. Then they re-evaluated these techniques, and, Admiral Dalton, a new group came out. 

That’s where the Joint Chiefs and others said, ‘‘We need to look at 

this thing again,’’ and they did. 

Admiral DALTON. Yes, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. As I understand it, you were never involved in 

any final approval of the new techniques. You were sort of shut 

out. Is that true? 

Mr. MORA. That’s correct. We were all engaged in the working—

so-called working group process, and it was—the working group 

94

was generating a draft that was to be issued on behalf of all the 

Services. To my knowledge, I thought that the draft was never finalized, although I learned later, after Abu Ghraib, that, in fact, 

the draft was finalized. So, yes, I was not part of the final approval 

that led to the final working group report. 

Senator GRAHAM. Colonel Beaver, do you ever recall General Miller going from GTMO to Iraq as the invitation of General Sanchez? 

Colonel BEAVER. Yes, sir. After I left GTMO, he asked me to 

travel with him to Iraq at end of August, beginning of September 

2003. 

Senator GRAHAM. Now, as I understand his testimony, he went 

there to—sent—General Sanchez, said, ‘‘We need to get better intelligence. We need to know more about these IEDs. Come over 

here and help us.’’ Is that the nature of the visit? 

Colonel BEAVER. Yes. They had a number of problems, from the 

use of their classified network systems to just basic interrogation, 

and also General Karpinski was having difficulties just in detaining Iraqis, separate from interrogation, so some military police experts were brought along. 

Senator GRAHAM. Was there any information provided by General Miller or yourself to people in Iraq that Arabs are afraid of 

dogs, and one way to get information is to use dogs or to humiliate 

them by taking their clothes off in front of women? 

Colonel BEAVER. I don’t recall being in a conversation that that 

was discussed at all. 

Senator GRAHAM. What did you tell the people in Iraq to do? 

Colonel BEAVER. I had conversations with a number of the lawyers—Colonel Warren on down—about a number of—if you want to 

say, a number of different issues, not just interrogation, but even 

detention. I was appalled at how detainees were being held at a 

Corps holding area that Karpinski was in charge of, and the conditions were so severe and so disgusting that it was hard to believe 

that Americans were detaining people in that manner. General 

Miller was so disgusted, he called up General Sanchez to get this 

corrected as soon as possible. 

Senator GRAHAM. But, do you—thank you—do you think it’s an 

accident that the techniques that we’re talking about in GTMO, on 

at least one occasion—and that’s the use of dogs in interrogation 

and the stripping down of a detainee in front of female personnel—

wound up migrating to Iraq? 

Colonel BEAVER. I can say I was certainly surprised when I saw 

Captain Wood in Iraq, who had been the MI commander at Bagram 

when the two detainees were beaten to death. I was shocked to see 

her there, quite frankly. So, I know there were people that went 

from Afghanistan to Iraq. She showed me an SOP that she had 

written that contained techniques and that she said the lawyers 

had approved. So I went up the legal chain of Mark Warren’s to 

see who had approved these, because I knew, in a Geneva setting, 

it was potentially a problem, and I brought that to the attention 

of Colonel Warren. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Mora, you’ve heard that what happened at 

GTMO did not constitute abuse of detainees. Do you agree with 

that? 

95

Mr. MORA. Sir, I think abuse occurred, and potentially even torture of some detainees. 

Chairman LEVIN. In terms of what was authorized by the Secretary, do you believe that that constituted abuse? In other words, 

what he has said was okay, those category 2 and some of the category 3 techniques that he approved on December 2, in your judgment were those abuses permissible under Geneva or under other 

law? 

Mr. MORA. Senator, it depends upon how those techniques would 

be applied. 

Chairman LEVIN. How about nakedness, nudity? Would that be 

permitted? 

Mr. MORA. I think it would not be permitted. 

Chairman LEVIN. How about use of dogs to induce stress? 

Mr. MORA. It would not be permitted under Geneva. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

Now, Admiral Dalton, I think you said that part of the reason 

that you understood to—that was the reason why you were told to 

stop your legal review was because Mr. Haynes did not want the 

Services’ critical comments disseminated. Is that correct? 

Admiral DALTON. Senator, I don’t recall if those were my exact 

words. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was that one of the reasons? 

Admiral DALTON. I believe that—I understood that Mr. Haynes 

did not want broadbased discussions of this topic and of these 

issues, and dissemination of various memos and memoranda and 

that sort of thing. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Now, did you see the memorandum 

from the various Services objecting to these techniques? Did you 

read those memoranda? 

Admiral DALTON. Yes, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. Those memoranda came before the decision of 

the SECDEF on December 2, is that correct? 

Admiral DALTON. That’s correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think it’s very important—and this is really 

what is one of the things that is new here this morning—is that 

the protests, the objections of the military, the JAG officers in the 

Services, came both before and after the December 2, 2002, memorandum. Is that correct? In other words, when that task force was 

appointed, later on there were some objections. Mr. Mora was involved in those. But, prior to December 2, prior to the SECDEF 

signing that category 2 and some category 3 techniques were going 

to be authorized, the military JAG officers and the military lawyers 

objected strongly to the recommendation that came from GTMO. Is 

that correct? 

Admiral DALTON. Senator, the memos were not all written by 

JAG officers, they came from the staff planners, generally with 

input from some of the JAG officers——

Chairman LEVIN. Fine. It came from the Services. 

Admiral DALTON. From the Services, yes, Senator. While they 

raised serious concerns about the use of, particularly, the category 

3 techniques, they also identified the need for valuable intelligence 

and suggested that there should be further legal and policy review. 

96

Chairman LEVIN. Of course. That legal and policy review, you 

were undertaking until you were stopped. Is that correct? 

Admiral DALTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. So, that didn’t occur, the way they recommended. 

Admiral DALTON. The broadbased legal and policy review, such 

as the one that took place later, January to April 2003, did not 

occur. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s what you were told you were supposed 

to do, until you were stopped. 

Admiral DALTON. Senator, that’s what I took upon myself to do. 

Chairman LEVIN. Weren’t you asked to give a legal analysis by 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs? 

Admiral DALTON. Senator, that was a part of my job. I didn’t 

have to be asked; I understood that there was a requirement for 

a legal and policy review, and I initiated such. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Now, let’s take a look at some of 

those objections from the Army. 

Army interposes significant policy and practical concerns regarding most of category 2—not just category 3—category 2 and all of 

category 3 techniques proposed. The International Operational Law 

Division of the Army, the chief, said that the stress positions, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, and use of phobias to induce 

stress ‘‘crosses the line of humane treatment and will likely be considered maltreatment under the UCMJ, and may violate the Torture Statute.’’ (Appendix A) 

Did that trouble you when you read that? Were you troubled 

when you read that? 

Admiral DALTON. Yes, Senator, I recognized that there were concerns, absolutely. 

Chairman LEVIN. I’m asking you whether you were troubled. Is 

the answer yes? 

Admiral DALTON. I’m not sure——

Chairman LEVIN. Were you troubled that there was a request to 

authorize the treatment of detainees, which, in the judgment of 

lawyers and the judgment of the military, said, their judgment, 

that case of, now, the Chief of the Army’s International Operational 

Law Division—stress positions, deprivation of light, use of phobias 

to induce stress crosses the line of humane treatment, would likely 

be considered maltreatment under the UCMJ—were you troubled 

that you were being requested that the SECDEF was being requested to approve something which, in the judgment of that Chief 

of the Army’s International Operational Division, would do that? 

Was that troubling to you? Did it cause you concern? 

Admiral DALTON. Senator, those comments were made by the 

Army—in this case, the International Law Division—without a 

complete analysis being done. It was the initial response from the 

Service that occurred—that came to the Joint Staff within 2 to 4 

days after the initial tasker went to them. 

Chairman LEVIN. Right. 

Admiral DALTON. It certainly was of concern. My own office had 

concerns. I had concerns when we saw the request come in. However, I felt that we owed it to the combatant commander to do a 

97

full and complete review, and not to simply turn around and deny 

the request. 

Chairman LEVIN. Of course. 

Admiral DALTON. The initial responses from the Services indicated that there were concerns, and that’s what I took them for, 

as concerns. 

Chairman LEVIN. You were stopped right in the middle of that 

review, is that correct? 

Admiral DALTON. I was stopped from conducting——

Chairman LEVIN. The review you were conducting—you were 

stopped in the middle of the review you were conducting. 

Admiral DALTON. —of coordinating with the Services and engaging other agencies to come in, that’s——

Chairman LEVIN. That’s the review you were conducting. 

Admiral DALTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. You were stopped in the middle. Or was it the 

beginning, or was it two-thirds through it? You were stopped during that review from finishing it, isn’t that correct? 

Admiral DALTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Why is that so hard, to say yes, if you were? 

Admiral DALTON. Because I want to be very clear that what I 

was stopped from doing was engaging in a broad and open discussion with all of the Services. That does not mean that I completely 

divorced myself from the process. I continued to work with Mr. 

Haynes and his office. My staff continued to work with Mr. Haynes 

and his office. 

Chairman LEVIN. You were stopped from doing what you thought 

was appropriate, what you should be doing. How’s that? 

Admiral DALTON. I was stopped from conducting the broadbased 

review that I had intended to conduct, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. Which you thought was an appropriate review. 

Admiral DALTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

Now, in terms of the dog that was there, I think it was you, Admiral, that said the purpose of the dog—what was the purpose of 

the request for the use of a dog? I think it was you, Admiral, who 

said it wasn’t to scare, it was something else. Or was that you, 

Colonel Beaver? 

Colonel BEAVER. From the perspective at GTMO, it was explained to me that the purpose of the dog, it could be used as perimeter security, which would be fine, and that if that unsettled 

the detainee, then it would work a dual purpose, because part of 

interrogation is to keep you unsettled, when you play the mental 

chess game. So, when I asked about the dog, because I am a former 

military police officer before I was an attorney, I know that you 

don’t take dogs into a detention cell or any other kind of cell or 

whatever. I was assured that that would not happen. I found out, 

after I left GTMO, during the Schmidt-Furlow investigation, that 

it had happened on one occasion. I was unaware of that at the 

time. 

Chairman LEVIN. Colonel, was the purpose of that dog to induce 

stress on the part of detainees? 

Colonel BEAVER. If the detainee was actually afraid of a dog—by 

patrolling the perimeter, if that kept the detainee off balance or 

98

unsettled, then that was the purpose of it. I can’t say with certainty that he was afraid of a dog. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was the purpose of the dog being brought there 

to induce stress? 

Colonel BEAVER. I would say——

Chairman LEVIN. It’s a very direct question. 

Colonel BEAVER. —my understanding—yes, I would say, from my 

understanding, yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. How about the words of the request, ‘‘Using detainees’ individual phobias, such as fear of dogs, to induce stress.’’ 

That was the request that you approved. 

Colonel BEAVER. Right. 

Chairman LEVIN. So, it wasn’t ‘‘if’’ the——

Colonel BEAVER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. —detainee did something, or if the perimeter 

walk did something. That was the purpose stated in the request 

that you approved. 

Colonel BEAVER. I’m not disagreeing, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Sounded like you were. 

Colonel BEAVER. Oh. Sorry. I’m not disagreeing. 

Chairman LEVIN. Last question this round. 

Admiral Dalton, was it clear to you that Mr. Haynes was aware 

of the fact that the Services had real problems with this request 

before he recommended to the SECDEF that that be signed? 

Admiral DALTON. Senator, it’s my recollection that my staff 

briefed his staff on the issues that were brought to—in the memos 

from the Services, and that he was aware of those concerns. Now, 

again, those concerns were addressed very early on in the process 

without the benefit of knowing what the safeguards would be, what 

the oversight would be, and so, I cannot say what the Services’ 

opinions would have been, had they had the same knowledge that 

Mr. Haynes and the rest of us had, after the process had gone 

through. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, that wasn’t my question, was it, ‘‘what 

their opinions would have been if’’? My question was, ‘‘was Mr. 

Haynes aware of the opinions of the Services at that time?’’ That’s 

my question. 

Admiral DALTON. Senator, I believe that he was aware that the 

Services had concerns, yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was aware of those letters? 

Did you brief his staff on those letters? 

Admiral DALTON. My staff briefed his staff. 

Chairman LEVIN. On those letters. 

Admiral DALTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Before you wrote your legal opinion stating 

that all of these techniques—the techniques that we’ve referenced—all of 1, all of 2, and some of 3—were legal under the 

Federal law, you attended a meeting that’s been discussed here, 

where there was a strategy meeting on counterresistance, Lieutenant Colonel Beaver, and there were a number of people at that 

meeting, including the CIA lawyer and the chief of interrogation 

control, Dave Becker. Do you remember that meeting? 

99

Colonel BEAVER. These meetings were mine. I started them in, 

I think it was late August, when I became aware that the military 

intelligence personnel wanted—were considering requesting additional techniques, so I thought it best if I held the meetings, brainstorming sessions, for lack of a better way to describe it, and invited everyone, including the law enforcement agencies, that there 

would be a more open discussion, as opposed to just the military 

intelligence people. So, that was a regularly scheduled meeting that 

Mr. Fredman, who just happened to come down to the island that 

day, was there for. So, it wasn’t held for him, it was a meeting that 

I had—I scheduled those meetings and invited everyone. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. So, the CIA lawyer was just invited 

in for that meeting that was already planned. 

Colonel BEAVER. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. 

Colonel BEAVER. That’s how I recall it. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. I want to go through some of the 

notes about this meeting, and I know that you didn’t write these 

notes. I just need to know whether you think that this recollection 

of what was said is flat wrong and just absolutely not true. It’s important to know whether you deny that these things were said in 

front of you or that you said these things. 

Colonel BEAVER. Okay. 

Senator MCCASKILL. The first thing is attributed to you, ‘‘We 

need to curb the harsher operations when the Red Cross is around. 

It’s better not to expose them to any controversial techniques. We 

must have support of the DOD.’’ (Appendix A) 

Colonel BEAVER. Mr. Pryor, I think when you were absent, asked 

a similar question, and what I can say is, I do not recall, of course, 

6 years later, anything that I actually said in that meeting. What 

I do—because I, as a liaison to the ICRC, and I have great respect 

for what they do—what I believe that I think I would have said is 

that when you are conducting an interrogation, if the ICRC is on 

the island and they want to see a particular detainee, you can’t disrupt the interrogation for that purpose. So that automatically, if 

you want to say, can cause some controversy. So, I——

Senator MCCASKILL. That’s not what this says. This says you 

need to curb——

Colonel BEAVER. But, I didn’t write it. All I can say is, 

ma’am——

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. 

Colonel BEAVER. —I don’t know what actually happened or what 

was actually said. I’m just saying I don’t think I would have said 

something in that manner, because I worked with the ICRC very 

closely, and we had an excellent relationship, and I have great respect for what they do. But, they came in 6-week cycles. They 

might be there for 6 weeks and then gone for 6 weeks. So, I don’t 

know, all I can guess is, I might have been referring to—when 

they’re not there, you would be doing your more aggressive interrogation, because then there wouldn’t be any problems, and then, 

when they come back, if they wanted to see that particular detainee, they were allowed to see the detainee. They had access to 

all the detainees. 

100

Senator MCCASKILL. Why would there be a problem of them ever 

seeing the detainee? 

Colonel BEAVER. When you’re conducting an interrogation, you 

can’t disrupt it for just the purpose of an ICRC visit. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Whether it’s harsh or not? 

Colonel BEAVER. Correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Then why would you delineate ‘‘harsh’’ in 

your statement just now? Why would it make a difference whether 

it was harsh? 

Colonel BEAVER. I’m just using it in context of this conversation. 

But, yes, there were many times when detainees were undergoing—like, they had just arrived on the island, and the ICRC was 

told they would not have access to them for 2 weeks while we processed them. 

Senator MCCASKILL. All right. 

Colonel BEAVER. So, there were many engagements like that, 

where we explained why they could or could not see a detainee. 

Senator MCCASKILL. The notes—I want to make sure the record’s 

clear who wrote these notes. These notes were written by the CITF 

of DOD. 

Colonel BEAVER. That’s correct, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. 

Colonel BEAVER. They’re the executive agent of the Secretary of 

the Army. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. So, these are criminal investigators 

that are used to contemporaneously taking notes and making sure 

that they’re reliable, because they must rely on them in a criminal 

investigation. 

Colonel BEAVER. Again, all I’m saying is, I didn’t write them, 

and, 6 years later, I cannot recall what I said in a meeting. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Part of their professional training, in fact, 

is the ability to take notes contemporaneously with an event so 

they can recall, later, for purposes of the investigation, what happened. Is that correct? 

Colonel BEAVER. I don’t dispute that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. Now, let me ask you about something 

else that was said there. 

Mr. Fredman, the CIA attorney, said, ‘‘The DOJ has provided 

much guidance on this issue. The CIA is not held to the same rules 

as the military. In the past, when the ICRC has made a big deal 

about certain detainees, the DOD has, ‘moved them away from the 

attention of the ICRC.’ Upon questioning from the ICRC about 

their whereabouts, the DOD’s response has repeatedly been that 

the detainees merited no status under the Geneva Conventions. 

The CIA has employed aggressive techniques on less than a handful of suspects since September 11.’’ (Appendix A) 

Do you recall that—those words being said by the lawyer from 

the CIA, that there was a habit of moving these detainees if the 

ICRC started asking questions? 

Colonel BEAVER. Again, I would say, I don’t recall, with any kind 

of specificity, what was said at that meeting. I know how we handled these issues. In fact, Qahtani, which the law enforcement folks 

had custody of him at the brig before JTF–170 did, and the FBI 

and the CITF agents did not allow the ICRC to speak to him. He 

101

was seen through the—the ICRC was allowed, if they wished, to go 

in and see him in the brig, that he was alive and well. That was 

in the July-August timeframe. So, this was one of the detainees, 

this particular gentleman, ISN–63, that had been of interest to the 

law enforcement community, as well as the intelligence community, 

and there had been many discussions. So, again, I can’t attribute 

anything to what Mr. Fredman said about the CIA, but I knew that 

DOD had different rules regarding the ICRC and how we operated 

on a DOD installation. 

Senator MCCASKILL. All right. Going further in the notes that 

were taken by law enforcement contemporaneous with this meeting, the chief interrogation control person, Mr. Becker, ‘‘Videotapes 

are subject to too much scrutiny in court. We don’t want the law 

enforcement authority (LEA) people in aggressive sessions anyway.’’ 

Lieutenant Colonel Beaver, LEA’s choice not to participate in 

these types of interrogations is more ethical and moral, as opposed 

to legal. 

Then, this line from Mr. Fredman, ‘‘The videotaping of even totally legal techniques will look ugly.’’ 

Now, that phrase is particularly troubling to me, because inherent is that phrase that videotaping even the totally legal ones 

would look bad; for God’s sakes, let’s don’t tape the ones that are 

illegal. 

Colonel BEAVER. For people who have never participated in a police interrogation, I would just say that it would make anyone uncomfortable. So without a context, without understanding the situation, again, I’m not trying to be in Mr. Fredman’s mind. I’m saying I understand, probably, what he is saying is, is that even when 

you have a legal police custodial interrogation, that people can be 

uncomfortable. I would just say, videotaping is not necessary unless your military intelligence people need it, for whatever purpose, 

because we had closed-circuit TVs where the people could watch 

the interrogations 24/7, and so, it wasn’t necessary to videotape it 

unless there was an intelligence purpose. So, my only point is that 

even when again, if you’ve never witnessed a police interrogation 

for hours and hours when you’re interviewing a suspect, it can be 

very uncomfortable. It’s not pleasant. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I will tell you, Lieutenant Colonel Beaver, 

I have witnessed——

Colonel BEAVER. I’m not saying you personally. 

Colonel FRIEND. I must object to this line of questioning, ma’am, 

with all due respect, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. Excuse me. Excuse me. 

Colonel FRIEND. Mr. Chairman——

Chairman LEVIN. Excuse me. 

Colonel FRIEND. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Can you, first of all, identify yourself? 

Colonel FRIEND. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I’m Lieutenant Colonel 

James Friend. I’m the defense counsel for Lieutenant Colonel Beaver. 

My objection, sir, if I may. 

102

Chairman LEVIN. Yes, I’ll tell you what, can you consult with 

your client, there, and then either you or her speak into the microphone—one or the other? You need to speak into the microphone. 

Colonel FRIEND. I would like to object to my client being asked 

about what someone else said, and the inference is it’s attributed 

to her. I think that’s an unfair——

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Let me just—your objection is noted. 

Okay. Senator? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes, I was asking you, Lieutenant Colonel 

Beaver, if these things were said in front of you; in your capacity 

as the staff judge advocate, if this—if you recall—these were notes 

taken by CITF within DOD, contemporaneous with this meeting, 

attributing some statements to you and some statements to Mr. 

Fredman. I was asking, do you recall those statements being made. 

I was not saying—and I think I was very clear—that Mr. Fredman 

said this, not Lieutenant Colonel Beaver. Do you recall those statements being made in front of you in your capacity as the staff 

judge advocate at GTMO? 

Colonel BEAVER. Ma’am, the meeting was for non-attribution 

purposes, so that people could speak their minds and that opinions 

not be held against someone in an adverse way. It was a brainstorming session. People spoke up and had different opinions. I 

don’t recall what was said 6 years ago. But, the purpose of the session was to allow people to speak freely and address their concerns, 

whether it be the law enforcement community, the Intelligence 

Community, the lawyers, the military police, and so that we would 

get a genuine discussion of the issues. So, if you restrict what can 

be said, then you’re going to have people doing things, perhaps, in 

darkness, and you won’t know about it. So, I wanted people to have 

a good collegial discussion. As I recall, we had a good collegial discussion. But, I cannot recall precisely what was said by a particular person or whether law enforcement—and the law enforcement people were particularly hostile towards me, and were very 

unhappy with me that I was even having these conversations. But, 

I still thought it was best to do it in the light of day and include 

everyone than to just limit it to military intelligence personnel. 

But, I’m sorry, I really cannot recall with any certainty what was 

said 6 years ago. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think it’s important that the law enforcement personnel were included in these meetings, and I’m sure they 

have witnessed, as I have, many, many, many interrogations. I’m 

sure that’s why they thought it was important to take notes. 

Let me close my questioning by reading into the record, Mr. 

Chairman, what one of those law enforcement task force—the Deputy Commander of the CITF said in an e-mail within a month of 

this meeting, in looking at the notes from the meeting: ‘‘This looks 

like the kind of stuff congressional hearings are made.’’ Quotes 

from Lieutenant Colonel Beaver regarding things that are not 

being reported give the appearance of impropriety. Other comments, like ‘It’s basically subject to perception. If the detainee dies, 

you’re doing it wrong,’ and ‘any of the techniques that lie in the 

harshest end of spectrum must be performed by a highly trained 

individual. Medical personnel should be present to treat any possible accidents,’ seem to stretch beyond the bounds of legal proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
103

priety. Talk of ‘wet-towel treatment,’ which results in the lymphatic 

reacting as if you are suffocating, would, in my opinion, shock the 

conscience of any legal body looking at using the results of the interrogations or possibly even in the interrogators. Someone needs 

to be considering how history will look back at this.’’ (Appendix A) 

Colonel BEAVER. Mr. Chairman, I just—please, one comment—I 

invited the CITF, law enforcement, if they had concerns, to put 

them in writing and put them through to General Miller so that 

they could be considered. They did not. I also said that if they had 

any concerns about violations of the law, that was never—not a 

single FBI agent or CITF person ever, ever, ever, except on one occasion, where they said Dave Becker put tape on a detainee’s 

mouth, ever came to me and said, ‘‘There’s a violation of the law.’’ 

They had policy arguments and ethical arguments, but they never 

came to me and said, ‘‘Right now there is something going on. I 

think it’s a violation of the law.’’ This has all been years later, 

through e-mails and hearsay. So, if they felt that way at the time, 

they could have given me the same courtesy that I gave them. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I couldn’t agree with you more. 

Colonel BEAVER. It did not happen. They went to Mr. Mora. 

That’s fine. I didn’t know about that. But, at the time, I would 

have looked at anything seriously, and they knew that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I couldn’t agree with you more, and that’s 

why I called Mr. Mora a hero. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

If you could look at tab 11, Colonel Beaver, I think you’ll find 

there a letter from the CITF giving an assessment of the JTF–170 

counterresistance strategies. 

Colonel BEAVER. It was never shared with me, Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. But, they shared it in writing. 

Colonel BEAVER. Not with——

Chairman LEVIN. You didn’t mean to imply that they never put 

in writing their objections, did you? 

Colonel BEAVER. In terms of meetings I had and discussions I 

had, they did not provide me anything in writing with specific interrogation techniques of that nature. I understood that they were 

discussing it with the Army Office of the General Counsel, and 

also, I didn’t know Mr. Mora, but I knew higher headquarters, and 

I was told by an attorney at the Office of the Army General Counsel that their objections were policy-based, and not legal-based. 

But, I never——

Chairman LEVIN. Let me read you this from that, if you could 

take a look at that exhibit. (Appendix A) 

Colonel BEAVER. Sure. 

Chairman LEVIN. ‘‘CITF personnel who are aware of the use or 

abuse of certain techniques may be exposed to liability under the 

UCMJ.’’ Sounds legal to me. This is what they provided to the 

SECDEF. This is what they provided to Admiral Dalton. Admiral 

Dalton says she saw this. I mean, this is—this is the——

Colonel BEAVER. I never saw it. 

Chairman LEVIN. I know you didn’t see it. I’m not asking you if 

you saw it. 

Colonel BEAVER. Right. 

104

Chairman LEVIN. I’m saying that you didn’t mean to imply, in 

your testimony, that they never set out their objections to what you 

were recommending, in writing. It’s just that you say you never 

saw them. Is that correct? 

Colonel BEAVER. We lived and worked together there, and I’m 

just saying they didn’t afford me the same opportunity that I afforded them, which I gave them——

Chairman LEVIN. I’m just asking you a very direct question. 

You’re not suggesting that they didn’t put their strong——

Colonel BEAVER. I don’t—sorry, sir. 

No, I’m sorry. 

Chairman LEVIN. You didn’t mean to suggest that, did you? 

You just didn’t—weren’t aware of it. 

Colonel BEAVER. Until today, this is the first time I’ve seen this 

memo. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s fine. 

Colonel BEAVER. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. It’s just that you were not brought into that 

loop. You had already sent your opinion on. The Joint Chiefs had 

asked for an opinion in Washington, ‘‘What do they think about 

your opinion?’’ They then asked the Services, what did they think? 

This is a response from one of the Services as to what——

Colonel BEAVER. Okay. 

Chairman LEVIN. —they thought of your opinion. 

Colonel BEAVER. This is after the discussions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Whether they should——

Colonel BEAVER. —the discussions. 

Chairman LEVIN. It’s after what? 

Colonel BEAVER. This—no, sorry. I’m sorry, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. It’s after what? 

Colonel BEAVER. I thought you were done. No, this is after discussions that we had on the island. 

Chairman LEVIN. It’s dated November 4, 2002, which is a month, 

to the day prior to the SECDEF signing his memo. Is that correct? 

Colonel BEAVER. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

Now, Colonel Beaver, after the SECDEF approved the techniques, on December 2, did you work with the senior staff at 

GTMO to develop the SOP at tab 16? If you could take a look at 

tab 16. (Appendix A) 

Colonel BEAVER. No, I did not, sir. That was done by some of the 

folks at the interrogation cell. But, I had nothing to do with that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Were you familiar with this document? 

Colonel BEAVER. I recall seeing it when the staff showed it to me. 

I might have recalled seeing it at the time at GTMO, but I know 

that some of the personnel at GTMO, the intelligence side, in preparation, should the Secretary approve something, they were preparing an SOP so that they wouldn’t be behind the timeline. But, 

that was not at the direction of General Miller or certainly myself. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you have communications with them about 

the SOPs to implement the Secretary’s December 2, 2002, decision? 

Colonel BEAVER. Right, I certainly told them that anything that 

they did, they needed to have a military doctrine, a SOP, so that 

it was clear to everybody concerned what the right and left limits 

105

were, and what the chain of command was, who to report things 

to. So, yes, I’m aware of that. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. You never saw any of the drafts, 

though. 

Colonel BEAVER. I can’t say with certainty I saw this draft or not 

at the time. I’ve certainly seen it since. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

Colonel BEAVER. I know who Ted Moss is, but I——

Chairman LEVIN. Is it possible you saw this draft at the time? 

Colonel BEAVER. I could have, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. If you could read on page 80—I think 

it’s page 2——

Colonel BEAVER. Okay. 

Chairman LEVIN. —where it says, ‘‘The basis for this document 

is the standard operating’’—it’s about halfway down. Do you see 

that? ‘‘The basis for this document is the SOP used at the U.S. 

Navy SERE School in Brunswick, Maine, as defined by reference 

(a).’’ Do you see that reference? 

Colonel BEAVER. On page 2? 

Chairman LEVIN. The heading of the page is ‘‘JTF’’—well, that’s 

the first page. 

Colonel BEAVER. Oh, oh, I’m sorry. 

Chairman LEVIN. No, I said page 2, so I misled you. 

Colonel BEAVER. Right, I see where you’re referring to. 

Chairman LEVIN. See where it says ‘‘JTF GTMO SERE’’——

Colonel BEAVER. Right. 

Chairman LEVIN. ‘‘SERE standard’’——

Colonel BEAVER. Right. 

Chairman LEVIN. —‘‘operating procedure’’? 

Colonel BEAVER. I don’t recall. 

Chairman LEVIN. Then you see ‘‘JTF GTMO SERE interrogation’’——

Colonel BEAVER. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. SOP? Then you see ‘‘Guidelines for employing 

SERE,’’ crossed out——

Colonel BEAVER. Right. 

Chairman LEVIN. —‘‘management techniques during detainee interrogations.’’ It’s that page I’m asking you to look at. 

Colonel BEAVER. Right. 

Chairman LEVIN. Then, if you would look at the ‘‘purpose,’’ would 

you follow me? ‘‘This SOP document promulgates procedures to be 

followed by JTF GTMO personnel engaged in interrogation operations on detained persons.’’ 

Colonel BEAVER. Right. 

Chairman LEVIN. ‘‘The premise behind this is that the interrogation tactics used at U.S. military SERE schools are appropriate for 

use in real-world interrogations. These tactics and techniques are 

used at SERE school to break SERE detainees. The same tactics 

and techniques can be used to break real detainees during interrogation operations. The basis for this document is the SOP used at 

the U.S. Navy SERE School in Brunswick, ME, and is defined by 

reference (a).’’ Did you follow all that? 

Colonel BEAVER. Yes, sir. 

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Chairman LEVIN. Is it possible you saw this when you were at 

GTMO? 

Colonel BEAVER. I can’t say. I know it certainly never left the intelligence sector, or—what were they called then? I think they 

were—it was the ICE. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you——

Colonel BEAVER. It’s nothing that came to the attention of General Miller for approval. It was a beginning draft, as I recall, that 

Ted Moss took, on his own initiative, to start drafting. But, I don’t 

think it ever received any serious consideration. But, that’s my just 

basic recollection. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you participate in drafting at all? 

Colonel BEAVER. No, sir, not this. 

Chairman LEVIN. But, did you participate in any of the SOP 

drafts to implement that order of the SECDEF? 

Colonel BEAVER. I gave them a—as part of the SOP, the legal 

brief, or the legal piece of it, the—I don’t know what to call it. But, 

they had a list of things that were in there from my legal briefing 

in their SOP. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right, and you gave your approval of that. 

Colonel BEAVER. It’s not this SOP. 

Chairman LEVIN. In other SOPs, did you give your——

Colonel BEAVER. It was a different SOP, as I recall, that actually 

listed the actual procedures that were approved, and all of the nuts 

and bolts that go into preparing an interrogation plan, who has to 

approve it, at what level. 

Chairman LEVIN. Right. 

Colonel BEAVER. —and all the way up to General Miller. So 

that’s the SOP, I think, that I recall. 

Chairman LEVIN. Were the SERE techniques in that particular 

document that you saw? 

Colonel BEAVER. No. 

Chairman LEVIN. Were they based on the SERE techniques? 

Colonel BEAVER. It was based on the SECDEF’s memo. 

Chairman LEVIN. Which incorporated category 2—certain——

Colonel BEAVER. But——

Chairman LEVIN. —category 3—is that right? 

Colonel BEAVER. It wasn’t——

Chairman LEVIN. Were they specified in the SOP? 

Colonel BEAVER. Right, but it wasn’t specified as SERE; it was 

specified as, ‘‘This is what’s authorized.’’ The SECDEF’s memo. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

Colonel BEAVER. Then, here’s who has to approve what, as I recall. 

Chairman LEVIN. Gotcha. 

Finally, Admiral Dalton, have you ever, before this event, been 

told to stop analyzing a request or issue that came up for your review? 

Admiral DALTON. Senator, there was a previous occasion where 

I was directed that I could not attend interagency meetings and 

participate in an interagency discussion of the issues. But, again, 

like this time, I was——

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Chairman LEVIN. Let me just ask my question again. Had you 

ever before been told to stop analyzing a request that came up for 

your review? 

Admiral DALTON. Senator, no. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you know whether the Joint Staff has ever 

been asked to stop analyzing a request that came up for their review? 

Admiral DALTON. I don’t know, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. You don’t know that—or, you don’t know 

whether——

Admiral DALTON. I don’t know whether that has occurred. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

Now—do you have any more questions of this panel? All right. 

There’s a vote on. The panel is excused. Thank you, all. 

No, I want to ask you, Mr. Mora—I’m sorry. There are two questions I must ask you. 

First of all, you heard my description in my opening statement 

of your activities which came in January, I believe, after the 

SECDEF entered his order, and your efforts to get that rescinded 

were recounted in my opening statement. 

Mr. MORA. Yes, Senator, I heard that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was that accurate? 

Mr. MORA. That’s accurate. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Now, when the Secretary approved, on December 2, the recommendation for aggressive interrogation techniques for GTMO, he 

was handed a handwritten note which said, ‘‘Why is standing limited to 4 hours? I stand for 8 to 10 hours a day.’’ What impact 

might that note have on military personnel who read it? 

Mr. MORA. Senator, when I first saw that note, I was shocked 

that any such note would appear on this kind of document, and I 

was reacting as a litigator to seeing a client’s comment of this nature on a document. I felt, at the time, that, even though it may 

have been intended jocularly, and Secretary Rumsfeld has that 

style, in this kind of document such a handwritten notation might 

be interpreted as a wink and a nod to go beyond the limits of the 

document. 

Chairman LEVIN. You said, in your opening statement, that, ‘‘Allied nations have hesitated to participate in combat operations, 

given the possibility that individuals captured during the operation 

could be abused by U.S. or other forces.’’ Now, if our allies aren’t 

willing to support combat operations, that would put more U.S. 

forces in harm’s way. Would that be true? 

Mr. MORA. That’s correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is that something where you have specific examples, or was that your fear? 

Mr. MORA. Senator, I have one specific example that was relayed 

to me, but I would prefer to discuss that in a closed session rather 

than an open hearing. 

Chairman LEVIN. You had an opinion of the so-called ‘‘Yoo 

memo,’’ which had been commissioned by Mr. Haynes. How would 

you say that—you had meetings with Mr. Yoo, I believe, about that 

memo. How would you describe his defense of his memo? 

108

Mr. MORA. I only had one meeting with Mr. Yoo, Senator, and 

I thought the memo was a travesty of the applicable law, and a 

very dangerous memo, because it led the DOD into what we see 

here and what the working group ultimately would issue. 

Chairman LEVIN. You were not told about the working group’s 

final product, you were left out, according to my opening statement, 

which you said was accurate. How did the Yoo memo influence that 

final working group report? 

Mr. MORA. The Yoo memo essentially created the contours and 

content for the working group report. So, it was dispositive of all 

the legal issues that were addressed within the Yoo memo. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Looking forward, Mr. Mora, I think we now understand why we needed to bring some certainty to this whole area, 

because, like you say, it’s very hard to interpret this, these policies 

and procedures. They do migrate, they do get people confused. People get overzealous sometimes, they don’t know what the boundaries are. Do you think it’s a good thing that we passed the DTA, 

the McCain language, outlawing cruel, inhumane, and degrading 

treatment? That was necessary, given the history of all this? 

Mr. MORA. Absolutely necessary, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you all very much. You’re all excused. 

We will be back after this vote. Let’s say—is it 2:40 now? We’ll 

begin at 3 o’clock. The next panel will be at 3 o’clock. 

[Whereupon, at 2:40 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

(109)

TO CONTINUE TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON 

THE ORIGINS OF AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES: PART I OF THE COMMITTEE’S INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT 

OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY (P.M. SESSION) 

TUESDAY, JUNE 17, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:09 p.m. in room SD–

106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Pryor, Webb, McCaskill, 

Warner, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, Graham, Dole, 

Cornyn, Thune, and Martinez. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan, professional 

staff member; Ilona R. Cohen, counsel; Mark R. Jacobson, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, 

general counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and Michael J. 

Noblet, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican 

staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; 

David G. Collins, research assistant; David M. Morriss, minority 

counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Jessica L. Kingston, 

Ali Z. Pasha, Benjamin L. Rubin, Brian F. Sebold, and Breon N. 

Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Jay Maroney, assistant 

to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, 

assistant to Senator Reed; Bonni Berge and Darcie Tokioka, assistants to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill 

Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator 

Webb; Peg Gustafson, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff, 

assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski and Nathan 

Reese, assistants to Senator Inhofe; Mark J. Winter, assistant to 

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Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator 

Chambliss; Jennifer Olson, assistant to Senator Graham; Lindsey 

Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; David Hanke, assistant to Senator 

Cornyn; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and Erskine 

W. Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. The committee will come back into session. 

Our third and final panel is Jim Haynes, who is the former general counsel of the Department of Defense (DOD). 

We welcome you, Mr. Haynes. If you have an opening statement, 

we’d be happy to hear from you now. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. HAYNES II, FORMER GENERAL 

COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. HAYNES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I don’t have a formal opening statement, except to observe that 

this hearing today is part of a process that’s been going on for some 

time now and will continue for many years to come, I’m sure. How 

our country deals with this unprecedented threat is the subject of 

discussion among Members of Congress, the executive and the judiciary, the media, and many politically active citizens. This is as it 

should be. 

Ultimately, however, the end of these discussions can only come 

with history’s larger judgment of how well our leaders in the various branches of government performed in work—in the work of 

protecting Americans after an attack, and, of course, how well the 

country remains equipped to deal with this threat in the future. 

So, I just want to say, I think this hearing today can serve a 

larger purpose and a most useful purpose. We all rightly fear another assault on our country, one perhaps even more horrific than 

the last. We know that America’s enemies, while thwarted, are unrelenting. Indeed, some of those who have been released from 

Guantanamo (GTMO) have already shown their recidivism, committing acts of terrorism that have left innocent people maimed or 

killed. 

So, along with members of this committee and many other Americans, I look forward, in the years ahead, to watching our Nation’s 

leaders advance the cause of America’s security and freedom. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I’d like to acknowledge my appreciation 

of all the members of the previous two panels for their service, 

their good faith, their hard work in trying to deal with a very difficult issue. 

I’m ready for your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Haynes. 

In July 2002, your deputy general counsel, Mr. Shiffrin, contacted the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), and asked for 

information about survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) 

techniques. Did you ask Mr. Shiffrin to obtain information on 

SERE techniques? 

Mr. HAYNES. Mr. Chairman, the summer of 2002 was 6 years 

ago, and my memory is not perfect. My memory is not perfect even 

in more recent times, but 6 years ago is surely the case. 

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What I remember in the summer of 2002 is a government-wide 

concern about the possibility of another terrorist attack as the anniversary of September 11 approached. I also remember a widespread belief that the people that the United States had captured 

in the war on terror were not producing as much information as 

we believed they had. Similarly, there was widespread frustration 

that the existing doctrine was inadequate and that the country’s 

capabilities were inadequate to the task. So, as the chief legal officer of DOD, I was interested in that and concerned about it. 

I remember inquiring generally about where the sources of information and expertise in the government might be, as a senior leader of DOD and a potential advisor on different matters. Richard 

Shiffrin would have been the person I would have asked for that 

kind of information. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Do you remember asking Mr. Shiffrin to 

obtain information specifically on SERE techniques? 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t remember that, specifically. What I do remember is what I’ve said, asking generally about that, and I do 

also remember, sometime in the late summer—and this is a recollection somewhat refreshed from a recent review of some documents—that I did get some information from the JPRA. 

Chairman LEVIN. But, you don’t remember requesting it. 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t remember requesting, but I do remember 

being interested in it, and I would have requested it through Richard. 

Chairman LEVIN. If you requested it. 

Mr. HAYNES. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. But, again, just to be very precise, you don’t remember requesting information on SERE techniques. 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t remember that, specifically, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Now, you met regularly with a small 

group of senior administration lawyers, including Mr. Gonzales, the 

President’s counsel, Mr. Addington, the Vice President’s counsel, 

Mr. Rizzo, the acting CIA general counsel, and the Department of 

Justice (DOJ) Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) attorneys, Mr. Yoo and 

Patrick Philbin, to discuss legal matters relating to the war. Did 

this request to Mr. Shiffrin for the information that you’ve described you did request, did that come from that group? Was it a 

result of discussions with that group? 

Mr. HAYNES. Senator, again, 6 years ago is a long time. I had 

probably 10 meetings a day during the course of my time as general counsel. I met with many people, many groups. I met with 

subsets of that group, I met with larger sets of lawyers. There were 

interagency meetings of all types throughout my tenure as general 

counsel. So, to key into one particular meeting with a particular 

group of people with a specific request is very difficult for me to 

do. 

Chairman LEVIN. I wasn’t asking you for that. Do you remember 

whether your request to Mr. Shiffrin was the result of discussions 

with that group? 

Mr. HAYNES. No, sir, I don’t. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, tab 2 (see Annex A), if you’ll take a look 

at it, is a July 26, 2002, memo from Lieutenant Colonel 

Baumgartner to your office, and it relates to a JPRA memorandum 

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dated July 25 and about SERE training programs. Do you remember seeing——

Mr. HAYNES. Sir, I’m sorry to interrupt—this says December—or, 

July 26. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Did I miss—did I say July 25? 

Mr. HAYNES. I thought you did. 

Chairman LEVIN. The reference was to a July 25 JPRA memorandum. You see that? Where it says ‘‘reference’’? 

Mr. HAYNES. Oh, yes——

Chairman LEVIN. Third line down. 

Mr. HAYNES.—I do, yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you remember seeing this memo at the 

time? 

Mr. HAYNES. No, sir, I don’t remember it at the time, but I’ve 

seen it before; and I’ve seen it a long time ago, not just recently. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right, but you don’t remember seeing that 

at the time it was sent. 

Mr. HAYNES. No, sir, I don’t. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is it possible you did see it then? 

Mr. HAYNES. It’s possible I did see it. The addressee is the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense General Counsel, which is not my precise title, or was not my precise title, but if it was so addressed, 

I would have seen it, probably. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, tab 3 (see Annex A) is an attachment to 

the July 26 memo, if you could take a look at that. It’s a list of 

physical and psychological pressures used in SERE training, including stress positions, walling, degradation, sensory deprivation, 

exposure to bright flashing lights, sleep disruption, and water 

boarding. Did you see this document at the time? 

Mr. HAYNES. Was this an attachment to the other one, sir? 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes. 

Mr. HAYNES. If I had seen the other one, if it was attached, I 

would have seen it. 

Chairman LEVIN. But, do you remember specifically whether you 

saw this attachment at the time? 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t remember specifically when I saw this. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Now, there’s another attachment to 

Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner’s July 26 memo. 

Mr. HAYNES. Is that number 4? 

Chairman LEVIN. Tab 4 (see Annex A), on the long-term effects 

of resistance training on SERE school students, and it was written 

by Dr. Ogrisseg, who was a witness on our first panel, as you 

heard, and it includes a psychological assessment of the techniques 

used at the Air Force SERE School and one technique used at the 

Navy SERE School—water boarding. Did you ask Mr. Shiffrin to 

obtain information on the psychological effects of SERE resistance 

training? 

Mr. HAYNES. I may have. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you see Dr. Ogrisseg’s memo at the time? 

Mr. HAYNES. We’re now—this is an attachment to the other——

Chairman LEVIN. Yes. 

Mr. HAYNES.—one, you said? If I had seen the first one and it 

was attached, I——

113

Chairman LEVIN. But, do you remember specifically whether you 

saw this memo at the time, this attachment? 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t specifically remember when I saw this. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Now, do you remember receiving 

this—what would you have done with this information when you 

got it? Do you remember doing something with this information? 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t remember doing something with this information. What I remember, Senator—and I’m sorry about——

Chairman LEVIN. It’s all right. If you don’t remember, that’s 

okay. 

Mr. HAYNES. My recollection—what I recall was the environment 

that I described earlier. 

Chairman LEVIN. I understand. 

Mr. HAYNES. I’ve forgotten what prompted my interest, other 

than the general concerns; there may have been some other catalyst. I can’t be more specific. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you ever discuss SERE techniques with 

Messrs. Gonzales, Addington, Rizzo, Yoo, or any other senior lawyers with whom you met regularly? 

Mr. HAYNES. I believe I did discuss SERE techniques with other 

people in the administration. 

Chairman LEVIN. Prior to the December 2 memo signed by the 

Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)? 

Mr. HAYNES. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would that have happened on more than one 

occasion? 

Mr. HAYNES. I can’t remember. 

Chairman LEVIN. What was the gist of those conversations? 

Mr. HAYNES. I think that—first off, my memory is not great, but 

if I were to discuss anything further, I think I would have to talk 

about classified information. 

Chairman LEVIN. But, would you remember it better if this were 

a classified setting? 

Mr. HAYNES. I wouldn’t be able to discuss it. 

Chairman LEVIN. I understand that, but you say your memory’s 

not great, and then you say you want to talk in classified setting. 

Mr. HAYNES. No, sir. I don’t know what the transcript might say, 

but what I’m trying to respond to is, did I ever discuss SERE techniques with others in the administration? The answer is yes. 

Maybe that’s the answer to your question. 

Chairman LEVIN. No, you answered that clearly. The other one 

was, what was the gist of those conversations? 

Mr. HAYNES. I could not tell you the gist of those conversations 

without going into classified information. 

Chairman LEVIN. But, you do remember them. 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t remember them any more clearly than what 

I’ve just said, that I have seen information of this nature before. 

I don’t know precisely when, and I cannot discuss it further without getting into classified information. 

Chairman LEVIN. You say you don’t remember it any more clearly than what you’ve said. Therefore, going into classified session 

isn’t going to give us any more information than what you’ve said, 

which is, you had conversations, but your memory is bad. That’s all 

you’ve said. 

114

Mr. HAYNES. Correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s all you remember. 

Mr. HAYNES. Correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. I don’t know what going into classified session 

would add to it then. 

Mr. HAYNES. Okay. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Graham? 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Haynes. I appreciate 6 years 

ago is a very long time. Try to put this in context of this puzzle, 

so to speak, at least from my point of view. The goal was to get 

better information from people at GTMO. That was the desire of 

this whole project. We were afraid we were going to be attacked 

again. We weren’t getting the information we hoped to obtain, so 

we were going to try to come up with a new program to get better 

information. That was sort of the task at hand? 

Mr. HAYNES. I think the goal was broader than—the goal was 

not GTMO. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. The goal was to get better information. 

Mr. HAYNES. The goal was to understand what capabilities the 

country had to elicit information from terrorists who had attacked, 

and might attack, the country. 

Senator GRAHAM. Now, I totally understand that. I’m not saying 

that’s a bad goal. I just want to know—there’s a reason for everything. The reason this project and all this talk about interrogation 

techniques and what we can and can’t do was a result of trying to 

get better information from high-value targets. 

Mr. HAYNES. That would be an objective of people who were involved in interrogation, yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. So, you and others were tasked with the 

job of trying to come up with new programs, that were not on the 

books at that time, that would allow you to get better information. 

Is that not what started all this? 

Mr. HAYNES. No, sir, I wasn’t tasked with such a project. I was 

the senior lawyer in DOD, and one of the missions that our department had was the detention and questioning of terrorists captured 

in the war on terror. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Mr. HAYNES. As the senior lawyer, I had to be—or felt I needed 

to be—aware of what my client was up to. I was also a senior member of the administration involved in interagency activities. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. There’s nothing wrong with doing this. 

I’m not trying to say anybody did anything wrong. It makes perfect 

sense that we’re going to try—if we don’t have adequate information, then let’s look for a way to get better information. The Bybee 

memo—are you familiar with the Bybee memo, the legal analysis 

about the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and other statutes 

and treaties? 

Mr. HAYNES. I believe I am, yes, sir. I think that there have been 

a lot of labels and names associated with——

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. 

Mr. HAYNES.—a memo that I understand to be in August of——

Senator GRAHAM. Were you aware that it was the opinion of the 

DOJ OLC that unless there was major organ failure involved, it 

would not be a violation of CAT? 

115

Mr. HAYNES. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. So, there is a line of legal reasoning that 

you’re aware of that was pretty aggressive when it came to existing 

laws, in terms of—I would argue that something short of major 

organ failure not being torture is a pretty aggressive point of view. 

Now, were you aware of that before Secretary Rumsfeld approved 

the interrogation techniques? 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t know when I became aware of that, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, fair enough. Now, these interrogation——

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t remember that. 

Senator GRAHAM. I understand. These interrogation techniques 

that Secretary Rumsfeld initially signed off on, the three categories—I think that there were 35, is that correct? 

Mr. HAYNES. No, sir, I think there’s a lot of confusion out there, 

and perhaps in this room. When you talk about 35 techniques, 

what I think about is a product of the working group, which operated from January 2003 until sometime in the end of March 2003. 

When you talk about what Secretary Rumsfeld approved for the interrogation of Mohammad al Qahtani, the 20th hijacker, you’re 

talking about a decision in November 2002. There were not 35 

techniques, that I know of, associated with that analysis in 2002. 

Senator GRAHAM. No, I understand. That’s a good point. The interrogation of the 20th hijacker, al Qahtani, if I have his name 

right, Qahtani. We know who we’re talking about. 

Mr. HAYNES. I think it’s al Qahtani. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Mr. HAYNES. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. That involved the use of dogs and having him 

stripped naked in front of female personnel. Was that correct? 

That’s what this report found? 

Mr. HAYNES. Which report are you referring to? 

Senator GRAHAM. The Schmidt-Furlow report. 

Mr. HAYNES. Okay. Senator, let me try to untangle that, because 

I think there’s some conflation there. 

I sat through the earlier testimony of the earlier panels, and, 

frankly, was enlightened from some things I don’t think I ever 

knew and some things that I had forgotten. But, the immediate 

previous panel went into great detail about what was approved by 

SECDEF in December 2002 for use with al Qahtani, the 20th hijacker. Two of the items in category 2, as I recall—and I don’t 

know if those documents are in here that I can look at or not; if 

it’s important, you can point them to me—involved clothing and 

use of phobias. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Mr. HAYNES. Admiral Dalton and Colonel Beaver testified at 

great length before this panel about what was approved by the 

SECDEF and what was not approved by the SECDEF. I think they 

were very clear that the very widely-held understanding among 

people who were knowledgeable about what was approved in each 

of those two categories is not as you’ve described it. The use of dogs 

was not intended to be, or authorized to be, dogs in an interrogation room with the detainee; it was to be muzzled dogs walking perimeter. 

116

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. The report found that it was a muzzled 

dog in a room. 

Mr. HAYNES. Let me get to that in a minute. The other thing 

that was authorized and widely understood by people knowledgeable about the decision was that ‘‘removal of clothing’’ was not nudity. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Mr. HAYNES. So, that’s what was approved. Now, let me——

Senator GRAHAM. I have—okay. 

Mr. HAYNES. Sir, but I haven’t responded to your question. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Mr. HAYNES. You then jumped to say that it involved use of dogs 

in a room and naked people. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Mr. HAYNES. What I think you’re referring to—and I have looked 

at it since this exchange that you had—was an investigation by a 

Lieutenant General Schmidt——

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Mr. HAYNES.—in conjunction with a General or Admiral Furlow, 

years after the fact——

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Mr. HAYNES.—looking into some belatedly disclosed e-mails that 

came to light at the headquarters level, 2 years after the fact. General Schmidt investigated some 24,000 interrogations conducted between early 2002 and early 2005, when he issued his report, and 

identified less than a handful of problematic interrogations, two of 

which you’ve identified. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Mr. HAYNES. One was when somebody walked into a room with 

a dog. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Mr. HAYNES. I have the pages here of his report. 

Senator GRAHAM. Your testimony is that they were never authorized. If it happened, it was unauthorized. 

Mr. HAYNES. That is. But, I’d just refer you to pages 15 and 19 

of that report. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. But, that’s my point. You agree that if 

it did happen, it was never authorized by you or Secretary Rumsfeld in the fashion described. 

Mr. HAYNES. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, fair enough. Now, these techniques that 

we’re talking about, that were approved in December and later 

modified, mirror the SERE program in an uncanny way. 

Mr. HAYNES. I can’t speak to that, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Where did they come from? Somebody somewhere had to sit down and make a list of—these are the three categories, these are the things that you can use in different combinations. Somebody somewhere had to sit down and write this stuff 

down. Who was that somebody, and where did they get this information from? 

Mr. HAYNES. I think the last panel spoke to that, and I would 

just refer you to the people who were involved closer to GTMO 

than I was. 

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I’d also say, unless—I don’t know if you can point me to something else, I’ve not seen any other documents or any other categorization of interrogation techniques like that which came up 

from GTMO—1, 2, and 3—with those particular groupings. There 

are a couple—as I recall, of itemizations in that list that fall in 

some categories, like the Army Field Manual. 

Senator GRAHAM. Who made up the list? Who made up the list? 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t have firsthand knowledge of who made up 

the list, but Colonel Beaver testified as to how it came about. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Mr. HAYNES. I think there’s also, if I may, Senator, some documentation that DOD has provided to the committee that—I can 

refer you to the Bates stamp—that talked about how they came up 

with their list. The Bates stamp numbers are 008771 and 008779. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, right. I know my time’s up, but this list 

that somebody came up with, your client approved, right? Secretary 

Rumsfeld. 

Mr. HAYNES. Secretary Rumsfeld approved a subset of the list 

that was proposed by GTMO and by General Hill. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, and you had knowledge of that list. 

Mr. HAYNES. Oh, yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. You have just said, Mr. Haynes, that you 

were the senior lawyer for DOD, correct? 

Mr. HAYNES. Yes, ma’am, that’s correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So you had a lot of lawyers under you? 

Mr. HAYNES. I’ll put it this way, there are over 10,000 lawyers 

in DOD. 

Senator MCCASKILL. A year and a half ago, that would have 

shocked me. It doesn’t surprise me today. I’m not sure that’s a good 

thing. 

You have 10,000 lawyers there, and you had received information 

about this request for more aggressive interrogation techniques. 

You had received legal input about this prior to you presenting this 

document for approval by Secretary Rumsfeld, correct? You had received the information from the various lawyers in the Services 

and other lawyers, Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF). You 

had received information from a number of lawyers that were asking questions about these techniques, legal questions about these 

techniques. 

Mr. HAYNES. Let me try to make sure I understand your question. This is, again, 6 years ago, so my memory is not perfect, but 

I do not recall seeing the memoranda that I think were referenced 

in the earlier panel’s testimony. That’s not to say I wasn’t aware 

that there was a lot of anxiety about how DOD would question terrorists. That concern was present from the moment the war began, 

and it remains a very interesting and difficult issue. It tends to be 

fueled by two different approaches. It tends to be fueled, on the one 

hand, by law enforcement-minded people, people of good faith, intelligent, with great intentions, who come at a problem with a lawenforcement mind; and, from the other perspective, people interested in the collection of intelligence during the conduct of warfare, 

118

who are less concerned about preserving a record for ultimate 

criminal trial. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay, let me go down that path. I don’t 

mean to interrupt you, but I don’t have a lot of time, and I have 

to go preside, so I apologize if I appear to be rude. 

You have said that you relied on the legal analysis of Lieutenant 

Colonel Beaver. Is that correct? 

Mr. HAYNES. I read her opinion, and I made my own decision, 

based on my own analysis, which would have included considering 

her memorandum. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Did you have a legal analysis that you performed? Do you have any legal memorandum that you prepared 

that would have augmented her legal opinion? 

Mr. HAYNES. My decision and advice is reflected in the memo 

that you have, which is a one-page memorandum. 

Senator MCCASKILL. The one-page memorandum that does not 

cite any legal precedent whatsoever. 

Mr. HAYNES. That’s correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. In fact, it doesn’t even talk about legal 

precedent or Geneva or Constitution or the laws against cruel and 

unusual punishment. 

Mr. HAYNES. That’s correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Is there any legal document that you relied 

on that you can refer to today, other than the memo written by 

Lieutenant Colonel Beaver? 

Mr. HAYNES. There was the package that came up with it. But, 

let me——

Senator MCCASKILL. Wait, wait, wait. There was no legal opinion 

in that package, other than her legal opinion. Was there any other 

legal opinion you relied on? Of those 10,000 lawyers in DOD, was 

there any legal opinion, written legal opinion, written analysis that 

lawyers do, based on law and precedent, that you relied on, other 

than Lieutenant Colonel Beaver’s legal opinion? 

Mr. HAYNES. I’d like to respond to your question——

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. 

Mr. HAYNES.—Senator. Because it’s important that you understand how DOD works. 

DOD has 2.5 million employees, $700+ billion budget, worldwide 

operations, and I was the chief legal officer of DOD. When I would 

put my initials on a document that was passing on its way to the 

SECDEF, that was an indication that I had reviewed it and I found 

it legally sufficient. I didn’t have time, and it wasn’t my practice—

in fact, that memorandum that you have is one of the longer reflections of something that I would have done personally. I typed that 

memo myself. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. 

Mr. HAYNES. So, if I may, Senator, the package is important, because it reflects not only where it comes from, who’s empowered if 

it’s approved to do what’s in there, but also an understanding of 

the pattern and practice and standard operating procedures (SOPs) 

and judgment employed by the people who are proposing it and 

sent it down. Because the Secretary has even less time than the 

general counsel does. Same thing with the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The Chairman doesn’t write long memoranda; 

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he initials things. So, the fact that there’s not a detailed legal 

memorandum associated with that was not unusual. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I’m not saying it was unusual, sir. I am just 

trying to get to the bottom of whether or not the legal analysis that 

you were supposed to be performing as your job, whether you relied—we have a lot of lawyers that were experts in military law, 

that have been saying, ‘‘Red light, red light, problem, problem.’’ 

The only analysis I can find in all of the material I’ve reviewed, 

and I’ve reviewed a lot of it, that really legally try to lay down a 

premise supporting this was, in fact, Lieutenant Colonel Beaver’s 

analysis. I am trying to get you to acknowledge that that is, in fact, 

what you used. 

Mr. HAYNES. There was that. There was also the endorsement by 

General Dunlavey, the Commander of Joint Task Force (JTF) 180, 

I think—or 170—at the time, who expressed his opinion. He didn’t 

write his opinion as a——

Senator MCCASKILL. I think he referred to her opinion, didn’t he? 

Mr. HAYNES. You can look at it. I don’t have it in front of me. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think he did. I think what he said in his 

is——

Mr. HAYNES. May I——

Senator MCCASKILL.—‘‘I’m relying on Lieutenant Colonel Beaver’s opinion.’’ 

Mr. HAYNES. May I finish? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes, you may. 

Mr. HAYNES. I think he also said, ‘‘I believe these are legal.’’ General Hill, who was the next layer of command, made a similar assertion. He made the assertion, as I recall—and I don’t know if it’s 

in these documents or not—that he believed all of category 1 and 

category 2 were legal, and he had some questions about category 

3. So, those three layers coming up, together with my understanding of the package, my discussions with my staff and Captain 

Dalton and her staff, to the extent that there was one—there was 

a very close working relationship between our two offices—led me 

to make the conclusion that I did. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. I don’t believe——

Mr. HAYNES.—and it’s my decision. 

Senator MCCASKILL.—General Hill was a lawyer. Is he? 

Mr. HAYNES. No, he’s not. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I don’t believe Major Dunlavey was a lawyer. Is he? 

Mr. HAYNES. He’s a judge. 

Senator MCCASKILL. He’s a judge. Okay. 

Mr. HAYNES. General Hill has a lawyer. Now, I also heard the 

earlier—or had a lawyer. He was the combatant commander; he 

had a legal staff—a staff judge advocate (SJA) with a legal staff, 

and he wrote the memorandum, as is reflected in your files, and 

you can read it. But, I heard the exchange on the earlier panel 

about——

Senator MCCASKILL. Immunity in advance? 

Mr. HAYNES. No, Lieutenant Colonel Beaver’s difficulties with 

the SJA at the next-higher level, which was news to me. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. A minute ago, you talked about the 

two approaches, and you said there’s the people from law enforceVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00123 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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ment, and then there’s the people that are in a time of war and 

they’re trying to get intelligence. The idea of getting intelligence is 

getting reliable information. It appears to me that the most experienced people in our country at getting reliable information from 

people who are wanting to harm other people are, in fact, law enforcement. That’s what they do. 

They understand interrogation techniques much better, and 

that’s what their profession embraces, is interrogation techniques. 

I can assure you that there are many instances of tough, tough interrogation techniques within the framework of criminal interrogations within the constitutional framework of our country, but, nonetheless, we have to get really solid, good information in order to 

keep people from dying, in order to keep people from being hurt, 

on a constant, ongoing basis. I’m trying to figure out why there 

should be two sets of laws associated with that—if the goal is to 

get good information, why there would be two different sets of 

rules. 

Mr. HAYNES. That’s a very interesting proposition with a lot of 

pieces, and let me try to address that. 

First, let me tell you that I have only the highest regard for the 

law enforcement community. I agree with you that they’re skilled, 

professional, well-intentioned people, who do great work in a particular environment. By the way, there were lots of law enforcement people at GTMO who were equally frustrated, including the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). So, I don’t mean, for a 

minute, in trying to describe the environment that the country 

faced at the time—and still faces, frankly—as favoring one over another; I’m just describing the existence of a set of conflicting philosophical approaches that are fueled by very different purposes. 

The law enforcement community, to be sure, as you say, is there 

to protect us. It’s there to enforce the laws and to protect us, and, 

ultimately, to develop a record to prosecute and punish wrongdoers. 

Because of our constitutional system and our fantastic system of 

criminal justice in our country, we have a very generous set of procedural underpinnings that the law enforcement community has to 

be mindful of in the way it interrogates people. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I’m not talking about that, sir. I’m talking 

about what works. I’m talking about what’s effective. I’m talking 

about how you get good information. What has been talked about 

over and over and over again in the Senate, in this room, in other 

rooms like this throughout this Capitol, it’s not just a matter of 

legal analysis, it’s also what works. 

Mr. HAYNES. Oh, I agree. 

Senator MCCASKILL. People will tell you what you want to hear. 

If you’re torturing them, they’ll tell you what you want to hear. 

It’s not an effective way to get good information, and law enforcement knows that. Frankly, I wish I didn’t have to go preside, but 

I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HAYNES. But, Senator, I need to respond to that, because nobody has advocated torture, period. I don’t advocate torture. I don’t 

question your appreciation that effective interrogation is what 

we’re after. I agree with that. I’m not an interrogator. I’m not an 

intelligence officer. I’m not an FBI person. I’m a lawyer. My job in 

this exercise that we’re probably going to get into at this point is 

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to talk about, what does the law permit, and what does the law 

prohibit? It’s important to understand those two conflicting approaches from the experts, of which I am not. In appreciating how 

I can respond to your question, did I know that there were people 

who had problems with the approaches? Absolutely, and I believe, 

and I believed at the time, that it sprang from those things, because I saw it repeatedly, and I see it now. 

The effectiveness of interrogation approaches is something that 

we all want. But, in my experience as an observer, a reluctant observer over the last 6 years, as general counsel in doing some of 

these kinds of things that I had no idea I was going to get into 

when I took the job, is that it is case-by-case, person-by-person, situation-by-situation, and type-of-information by type-of-information, 

as to what is the best and what is the most appropriate approach. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Haynes, how are you? I appreciate your being here today. 

We can all remember, right after September 11, everyone was expecting something else to happen, and I think we have documentation now that there were a lot of plans out there that we successfully were able to stop, to thwart, in one way or another—the Fort 

Dix plot, the JFK Airport plot, the liquid explosives plot. The 

media had quite a few things for the Washington Post, ‘‘The U.S. 

has thwarted the dirty bomb terrorist plot a year after’’—this is the 

one that was in the L.A. Times by Josh Meyer—signals high risk 

on new attacks, terrorism alerts, and all of that. 

Now, I would assume that a number of things led to and prompted the use of new techniques, and I assume that that’s part of what 

led to the new techniques. Would you tell us, how does DOD 

change techniques, and where do the new techniques come from? 

Mr. HAYNES. I’ll try to answer that, Senator, but let me respond 

to your opening. 

You’re absolutely right that the context is very important. You’ve 

listed a number of incidents that I had forgotten about, frankly. 

But, at the time that this particular proposal that we’re talking 

about today came up, the fall of 2002, DOD had discovered, months 

after he had arrived, that a person named Mohammad al Qahtani 

was likely the 20th hijacker that would have been the pilot on the 

plane that went down in Pennsylvania. 

Now, in the fall of 2002, we had just passed the anniversary of 

September 11, and our intelligence people tell us that anniversary 

dates are important to the al Qaeda. The Bali bombings, which 

killed hundreds of innocent people, happened on October 12, 2002. 

The DC snipers, which terrorized this city, had just been captured, 

and people weren’t certain where they were from, whether they 

were associated with the external threat or whether they were 

what they turned out to be. The anthrax cases of a year earlier had 

still not been solved. Zawahiri, who was Osama bin Laden’s number two, issued a video threat on October 8, 2002, saying, ‘‘God 

willing, we will continue targeting the keys to the American economy.’’ Early in the summer of 2002, there were deadly attacks in 

Pakistan and Tunisia. There was a capture earlier that year of an 

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America citizen who was suspected of being involved in a dirty 

bomb plot. Plenty of other still-classified threat information. 

One of the things that the Intelligence Community was concerned about was that al Qahtani, who is the person who came into 

Orlando Airport in August 2001, a month before September 11, to 

be met by Mohamed Atta, the pilot—the ring leader of the September 11 attacks, and had been turned away, whether he had a 

companion on that plane, because other hijackers had come into 

the country in pairs, and there were people roaming around the 

country, and whether al Qahtani had information about other 

plots. So, there was a high degree of urgency to deal with this. 

Now, your question, how do they come up with other interrogation techniques? Again, I would refer, in this case, to the previous 

panel that talked about that, and to the Bates stamped documents 

that I told you. But, the bottom-line understanding that I have, 

Senator, is that the Intelligence Community didn’t know how to 

deal with this, nor did the law enforcement community know how 

to deal with this. For al Qahtani himself, nobody had been able to 

get him to talk. He claimed to be a——

Senator INHOFE. I think that’s very significant. So, we’re dealing 

with something here that no one had dealt with before. This was 

all new to us. 

Now, on the resistance portion of the SERE program, do other 

countries train their people—what about Israel, Great Britain, and 

some of the others—do they train them—have a similar type of program? 

Mr. HAYNES. Senator, I suspect that they do, because they’re a 

sophisticated—they have sophisticated militaries, but I am not an 

expert in that. 

Senator INHOFE. Are you familiar with the Manchester document 

that was found in Manchester, England? 

Mr. HAYNES. I am. I’ve seen it. It’s widely reported and available, 

and it talks about, among other things, training for al Qaeda members who may be captured, how to resist interrogation and what 

things they should claim, such as torture; whenever they’re questioned, they should claim that they’re being tortured. 

Senator INHOFE. Now, how does an interrogator—maybe you 

don’t know this, because it may not have been a—but, I’m wondering how an interrogator determines whether or not resistance 

techniques are being used by a detainee. 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t know. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay, that’s fine. 

Mr. HAYNES. I assume that they don’t talk, for one thing, if they 

know they have information. 

Senator INHOFE. In a Frontline interview with Mark Jacobson, 

you answered several questions, probing questions about the Field 

Manual 34–52, and the new techniques that Secretary Rumsfeld 

approved. Did you agree with all of the new techniques that were 

approved by Secretary Rumsfeld in, I think it was, December 2002? 

Mr. HAYNES. Oh, yes, sir, the ones that he approved in December 

2002, I did agree with. 

Senator INHOFE. All right. In the same interview, you talk about 

tiers and percentages relating to the different interrogation techniques, and detainees that they were used against, respectively. 

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Can you explain to the committee which of these tiers, and what 

percentage of detainees they were used against, that resulted from 

the 2002 memo? 

Mr. HAYNES. Senator, I’m not sure I know what you’re talking 

about. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. I’m talking about the tiers and the percentages of detainees that had used these. Let me rephrase that. 

What rules and regulations or guidance was in place with regards to the use of these techniques at that time? 

Mr. HAYNES. I believe, before the Secretary approved the techniques listed in that proposal from Southern Command 

(SOUTHCOM), what the Command was using was existing doctrine, which was the old Army Field Manual and then whatever 

the law enforcement community used. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. We hear a lot about the category 3 techniques. Were these ever used at GTMO, or do you know? Category 

3? 

Mr. HAYNES. Okay, if you’re referring to the proposal from 

GTMO in the fall of 2002, there were, I believe, four category 3 

techniques. Only one of those was approved by the Secretary, and 

I’m told that that was not used at all. 

So, if they did what they were authorized to do, none of the category 3 techniques would have been used. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. Mr. Haynes, let me just tell you, one of the 

concerns I have, and several of us have, about all the hearings that 

we’ve had are how they can be used politically. I saw a 1-hour—

it’s supposedly a documentary—I understand that this documentary is going to be shown sometime prior to the election. It was 

called ‘‘Taxi to the Dark Side.’’ You watch this for an hour, you get 

the impression that the leadership of the country was encouraging 

torture, that our troops—it’s a real slam at them—are using it on 

a regular basis. I remember so vividly, the last scene of this movie 

was someone being hung up by his arms, with his shirt off, being 

stabbed with electric probes in the chest, and screaming, and all 

of that. Now, that was actually just a Hollywood set, just like a 

Rambo movie, but you’re led to believe that this is something that 

is going on. 

So, I want you to know that a lot of us are very much concerned 

that there is a lot of political use of this that I don’t really think 

is very appropriate. 

I would like to have you comment on the abuses at Abu Ghraib. 

Was this sort of thing happening everywhere, to your knowledge? 

In your former capacity as DOD General Counsel, were the techniques that were used at Abu Ghraib in any way encouraged, approved, endorsed by Secretary Rumsfeld or anyone else in DOD, to 

your knowledge? 

Mr. HAYNES. There are a few things in that to—first off, to my 

knowledge, no, they were—they were not endorsed or approved or 

even reviewed by anyone above the Central Command 

(CENTCOM) level. But, I think it’s also very important to point out 

that what most people think about when they think about Abu 

Ghraib is the abuses that occurred that were not even interrogation at all. I should add that these incidents have been investigated 

to a degree probably greater than any other incident in DOD hisVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00127 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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tory, so there is a lot of data about what did happen and what 

didn’t happen. I think it’s consistently determined that the photographs that were so widely broadcast in 2003, and even to this day, 

reflect nothing that was approved interrogation. It was just flat-out 

abuse by people who were not being supervised. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much. That’s my feelings exactly, but I would also add that prior to the time we had our very 

first hearing on Abu Ghraib, the Army had started conducting its 

own investigation, and it had already taken some steps to disciplinary action. That was my memory. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Haynes. 

Mr. HAYNES. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Haynes, you’re aware of the memorandum that were prepared by the Judge Advocate General (JAG) officers in the Service 

branches which expressed significant concerns about most, if not 

all, of these techniques? 

Mr. HAYNES. Senator, you’re referring to something that’s——

Senator REED. I’m referring to memorandums that the Chairman 

of the JCS solicited through Admiral Dalton. 

Mr. HAYNES. Let me, if I may, try to get some clarity. 

You’re referring to a group of memoranda that I do not recall 

seeing at the time. I believe I was shown a couple of them when 

I appeared before your committee in closed session about a month 

ago, and that’s the first time I recall seeing those memoranda. But, 

as I was trying to describe to Senator McCaskill, I don’t want anyone to walk away from my statement about that to suggest that I 

don’t—or didn’t know that there were concerns about how DOD 

should interrogate prisoners. That’s what I was—you probably 

missed it, but we had a long exchange about this chronic debate 

about how to interrogate. 

Senator REED. I’m less concerned about this chronic debate, but 

the senior counsel for the Chairman of the JCS deliberately tasked 

the representatives of the Services to comment on the specific 

memorandum that Colonel Beaver prepared that was the substance, the foundation of your recommendations, that they prepared written statements expressing significant concerns about all 

of these techniques. This is the opinion of at least four uniformed 

officers and some law enforcement personnel who’ve spent their careers in the uniform of the United States, both as lawyers and as 

military personnel. You were aware of those, but you weren’t curious enough to ask them to be given to you so you could read? 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t know that I was aware of those——

Senator REED. You either——

Mr. HAYNES.—specifically, as——

Senator REED.—were or you were not. 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t recall being aware of any particular memoranda——

Senator REED. No, but let me—so, you’re trying to make a judgment about, a very sophisticated legal judgment about, the Geneva 

Convention, Law of Torture, UCMJ, and you’re aware of a debate 

going on within the Services, which express significant concerns, 

125

but you have no—forget legal obligation—no intellectual curiosity 

to ask people specifically, ‘‘What’s the problem?’’ 

Mr. HAYNES. Oh, Senator——

Senator REED. Is that just——

Mr. HAYNES.—I have lots of curiosity, and I take my responsibilities, and took my responsibilities, very seriously. This was a very 

serious issue. 

Senator REED. All right. 

Mr. HAYNES. Absolutely, there were a lot of factors involved, very 

important questions, including the safety of the country and the urgency of the circumstances to try to get information from this individual, who we knew——

Senator REED. No, no. 

Mr. HAYNES.—was to be a hijacker on the 20th plane, who continued to claim he was a falconer. 

Senator REED. Your fundamental responsibility was to render a 

legal opinion to the SECDEF. 

Mr. HAYNES. It was, and it——

Senator REED. His responsibilities included many of the things 

you referred to, the overall danger of the country. In fact, you could 

certainly have given him an opinion that, in your view, that there 

were certain matters which would not be consistent, and he could 

have overruled you. But, your obligation, I think, was to give him 

the best legal opinion. So, let’s just stick to that. 

The other factor here is, where in your memorandum is there a 

reference to, ‘‘This is restricted to the Qahtani case only’’? 

Mr. HAYNES. You can read my memorandum. 

Senator REED. I did, and there’s no such reference. In fact, category 1 and category 2 are given a blanket approval by the Secretary, at the discretion of General Hill, at the time. The only reservation in category 3 is not that it’s illegal—you claim they’re all 

legal—it’s just, as a matter of policy, we won’t do a blanket. There’s 

nothing here referencing Qahtani. 

You’re continually referencing, that the only thing you were concerned about was Qahtani, is not substantiated by the memo. Oh, 

and by the way, everyone can kibbitz about good lawyering, but if 

the case was Qahtani, I would think your memo would have said, 

‘‘In the case of Qahtani, you can do this, this, and this.’’ 

Mr. HAYNES. Senator, I was there, and that was the catalyst, and 

that was the purpose, and that was what everyone——

Senator REED. But, that’s not the opinion you rendered. 

Mr. HAYNES.—that’s what every Senator, we don’t do these 

things in a vacuum. You missed my exchange with——

Senator REED. Excuse me, Mr. Haynes, but I think you did it in 

a vacuum. You knew there was debate going on among the military 

legal officers, great concerns, yet you did not ask for their written 

memorandum. In fact, under Admiral Dalton’s testimony, you communicated, through General Myers, that she should cease her formal analysis in response to these concerns. Is that accurate? 

Mr. HAYNES. I have the highest regard for Admiral Dalton, and 

I’m sure whatever she said is accurate, to the best of her recollection. I don’t have perfect recollection of that time, but I accept her 

word. There’s no question about it. 

Senator REED. But——

126

Mr. HAYNES. Let me finish, Senator, because you say I acted in 

a vacuum; that’s absolutely not true. I looked at this, hard. You 

know DOD. You’re a West Point graduate, you’re a Harvardtrained lawyer, you’re a fantastic Senator; I have the highest regard for you. But, you know how that place works. There are thousands and thousands and thousands of decisions made every day. 

This was one. It was an important one, but it was one, and it came 

in the context that I described a moment ago, with an extraordinary degree of urgency. My client—my boss, the SECDEF, needed a recommendation. It had been sitting in the headquarters for 

a month, when he—the SECDEF said, ‘‘I need a recommendation’’—to his senior advisors—me, the Chairman of the JCS, the 

Deputy SECDEF, the Under Secretary for Policy, and others who 

met with him every day—‘‘I need a recommendation.’’ I took it. I 

looked at it. I looked at the package. I looked at the circumstances. 

I made a legal judgment. I consulted with Captain Dalton during 

that time. Her testimony reminds me of the care with which we 

dealt with it, and I rendered my opinion. 

Senator REED. But, it doesn’t remind you of whether or not you 

told her to cease her formal analysis. 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t remember that, specifically. But, Senator, let 

me say, it makes sense to me, even in this remote time, because 

there are 10,000 lawyers in DOD. There has been a portrayal of 

this event in the press, and in today’s hearing by some people, as 

if the military lawyers all objected and the civilians or somebody 

just ignored them. There were military lawyers whose job it was 

to advise those people in that chain of command—the commander 

at GTMO, the commander of SOUTHCOM, the Chairman’s lawyer, 

and then me, for the SECDEF. The testimony earlier mentioned 

that CENTCOM—or the SOUTHCOM lawyer was perhaps not as 

involved as he might have been, but the other three people in the 

chain of command whose job it was to advise those leaders looked 

at it carefully, looked at it under the circumstances. There is a paucity of law that was applicable at the time, and my job, as the lawyer, is not just to say no, but to say, ‘‘Where is the area of discretion available to the client?’’—in this case, the SECDEF. That was 

my determination, and I stand by it. 

Senator REED. What did you rely upon? What legal analysis, specifically? Not your just thinking internally about these great issues, 

but——

Mr. HAYNES. I’ll try to go through it with you right now. The 

U.S. Constitution, we believed, under the Eisentrager case, did not 

apply at GTMO. The President had already determined that the 

Geneva Conventions did not apply to the al Qaeda detainees or the 

Taliban detainees. The CAT would apply, but it’s a non-self-executing treaty. The implementation of that was the statute passed 

by the Congress of the United States and signed by the President, 

so the prohibition against torture reflected in that statute applied. 

Article 16 of the CAT prohibiting—or imposing on the United 

States and undertaking to prohibit cruel, inhumane, and degrading 

treatment, was applicable. The President’s order to treat detainees 

humanely was a restriction. The application—and the Uniform 

Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), to some degree, would apply, as 

well—and the application of those strictures to this circumstance 

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under the operating procedures that all of the decisionmakers and 

advisors understood to be applicable led me to believe that the Secretary had the discretion to authorize the techniques that we recommended. 

Senator REED. If the UCMJ applied, do you agree with Colonel 

Beaver’s analysis that it would be a per-se violation of Article 128 

to engage in the poking and light pushing? 

Mr. HAYNES. I did not think so. 

Senator REED. Did you make that—any clarification why she 

didn’t agree with you? 

Mr. HAYNES. I didn’t write a memorandum to that effect. I——

Senator REED. Did you write any memoranda to this effect? 

Mr. HAYNES. I wrote the memorandum that you have in front of 

you, and that was actually more expansive than the General Counsel of the DOD usually does in decisionmaking for packages going 

to the SECDEF. 

Senator REED. How did you communicate this decision to 

SOUTHCOM and to GTMO? Did you send them a copy of the 

memorandum? 

Mr. HAYNES. I did not. I think it’s important also to note, Senator—and I’m sure you’ll appreciate this—as the lawyer, I was not 

the decisionmaker. I was an advisor. The SECDEF made the decision, based, in part, on my advice, as well as the Chairman of the 

JCS’s advice. The normal transmittal of a decision of that nature 

would be through the Joint Staff, and I would assume that’s how 

it was passed. 

Senator REED. So, once the Secretary signed off in it, you had no 

followup on this at all. You don’t know how it was communicated. 

Mr. HAYNES. I would think it was communicated in the normal 

fashion. 

Senator REED. Was this memorandum sent down to——

Mr. HAYNES. I—Senator, I don’t—I mean——

Senator REED. You don’t know. 

Mr. HAYNES.—I don’t—that’s——

Senator REED. Admiral Dalton——

Mr. HAYNES.—not part of my job to do. 

Senator REED.—went to great length to say that her recommendation to you, her concurrence was based upon the conditions that would govern the use of these techniques. How were 

these conditions communicated by the SECDEF, and where are 

they reflected in your memo? 

Mr. HAYNES. They’re not in my memo. But, as I told you, most 

decision documents that would go to the SECDEF would—I 

wouldn’t write, nor would most of the other staff people who would 

sign a—on a block, would not write extensive——

Senator REED. But, if those——

Mr. HAYNES.—‘‘Don’t do this’’——

Senator REED.—conditions were——

Mr. HAYNES.—‘‘don’t do that.’’ 

Senator REED. If those conditions were central to the legality of 

your advice, wouldn’t you have a legal obligation to make the Secretary aware of them? This goes to a more fundamental——

Mr. HAYNES. Can I——

Senator REED. Did you——

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Mr. HAYNES.—answer, or——

Senator REED. Did you tell the Secretary how difficult and close 

a call this was and how that there was significant adverse conclusions by subordinates, and that his—if you follow Admiral Dalton’s 

logic, that his concurrence would require significant conditions that 

he also must approve, or at least be aware of? 

Mr. HAYNES. Senator, you’re assuming something that’s not so. 

You’re assuming that there were no understood conditions. 

Senator REED. But, understood by who? 

Mr. HAYNES. Understood by everybody involved in the process. 

People who were knowledgeable about the proposal and how it 

would be applied all understood what was meant by the proposal. 

Captain Dalton talked at length about that in the earlier panel, 

and I don’t know if you were here to hear that——

Senator REED. I was here. 

Mr. HAYNES.—to listen to it. But——

Senator REED. Could you list the conditions——

Mr. HAYNES.—as—sir, as well as——

Senator REED.—that were applicable? Could you list the conditions that an interrogator had to follow? 

Mr. HAYNES. Could I list them? 

Senator REED. Yes. Everyone understood them. 

They were clear to the interrogators, clear to everyone else. 

Mr. HAYNES. Senator, you’ve probably got access to more documents than I——

Senator REED. No, no, I’m asking you——

Mr. HAYNES. Let me finish. 

Senator REED.—Can you list the conditions? 

Mr. HAYNES. If I may——

Senator REED. No, I’d like you to answer the question. 

Mr. HAYNES. If you’d let me finish, I’d say you have more documents than I’ve ever seen on this, and you will have, in the documents that you have, the SOPs, the people assigned to monitor. 

You had testimony earlier. There were interrogation plans that 

were supposed to be designed for each individual detainee who was 

to be interrogated. That would involve a psychological review. 

There had to be medical care associated with it. There had to be 

a legal review. There had to be substantial command monitoring. 

There was a step process that they were supposed to go through. 

They were supposed to stop if anything came up. There were all 

sorts of conditions, and not to mention, Senator——

Senator REED. Where in this memorandum is the reference to 

those conditions? 

Mr. HAYNES. Sir, not to mention the training and the quality of 

the soldiers that I think these questions malign. 

Senator REED. I object strenuously to that. You did a disservice 

to the soldiers of this Nation. You empowered them to violate basic 

conditions which every soldier respects, the UCMJ, the Geneva 

Conventions. Here’s what soldiers do. You said the Geneva Conventions don’t apply, and they honestly asked, ‘‘What does apply?’’ The 

only thing you sent them was, ‘‘These techniques apply.’’ No conditions, nothing. So, don’t go around with this attitude of you’re protecting the integrity of the military. You degraded the integrity of 

the United States military. 

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I have finished my questions. 

Mr. HAYNES. Senator, I object to that, and I disagree with that. 

I would also point out that the President of the United States, with 

the advice of the entire Cabinet, made the determination about the 

applicability of the Geneva Conventions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Haynes, and thank you for 

your service. You’ve served your country in uniform. I know your 

son is in ROTC now, and seeking to be a military officer, and I 

know you love and respect the military, and I know that you care 

about getting this matter right. 

But, I would just ask you this question, because, despite what 

the accusations have been made here today, and criticisms and second-guessings, I think the evidence shows that it was intensely 

legal studied all throughout this process. I believe Mr. Goldsmith, 

who thought that President Bush was too aggressive in some of 

these matters, and, after he left the DOJ, wrote a book—and I’ll 

ask you if you agree with him—‘‘Many people believe the Bush administration had been indifferent to these legal constraints in the 

fight against terrorism. In my experience the opposite is true; the 

administration has paid scrupulous attention to law.’’ 

Do you think you paid scrupulous attention to law in trying to 

get this right? 

Mr. HAYNES. Every time I acted, I understood the enormous responsibilities of my job, and I tried to do that. 

Senator SESSIONS. He also wrote, ‘‘Many people think the Bush 

administration has been indifferent to wartime legal constraints, 

but the opposite is true; the administration has been strangled by 

law, and, since September 11, 2001, this law has been lawyered to 

death.’’ Is there some truth in that, in your opinion? 

Mr. HAYNES. Oh, yes, sir, I think so. 

Senator SESSIONS. With regard to these techniques that were discussed and approved, did you say that Major General—two-star 

General Dunlavey, who headed the GTMO JTF, was a judge? 

Mr. HAYNES. He’s a judge in civilian life. 

Senator SESSIONS. So, this is a lawyer and a judge, and he has 

the advice of a JAG attorney on his staff, and they concluded that 

they had a high-value individual there who claimed to be a falconer, but who had met with Mohammad Atta and been rearrested 

in—was it Iraq or Afghanistan? 

Mr. HAYNES. I think he was captured in Afghanistan. 

Senator SESSIONS. In Afghanistan. The normal interrogation 

techniques had not worked, and they submitted a request to do enhanced techniques. Is that right? 

Mr. HAYNES. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. That came up through General Hill, and he’s 

the SOUTHCOM Commander, a four-star general. 

Mr. HAYNES. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. You evaluated the categories and the requested techniques, and you had to make a recommendation to the 

SECDEF. You were his lawyer, and you had to recommend that. 

Mr. HAYNES. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Now, you had other things on your plate at 

this time, too, did you not? 

130

Mr. HAYNES. I did. 

Senator SESSIONS. But, did you rubberstamp what they asked 

you, or did you pare back in any way the requests that they had 

made? 

Mr. HAYNES. Did not rubberstamp. Indeed, I recommended that 

only a subset of the requested techniques be applied. 

Senator SESSIONS. You say a ‘‘subset,’’ but you rejected the category 4 techniques and the category 3 techniques, so it all—I think, 

all of those—is that correct? 

Mr. HAYNES. There were three category 3 techniques that I recommended not be used. 

Senator SESSIONS. So, that was your recommendation to the 

SECDEF, and he approved that. 

Mr. HAYNES. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Now, after that, is it not so that other JAG 

officers raised questions about this and the wisdom of some of 

these techniques, and a working group came together? 

Mr. HAYNES. Sir, that requires some explanation. As I’ve said in 

response to some other questions, the difficulty of these issues 

never abated. After the Secretary approved, in other words, there 

was a difficult decision leading up to the one that the Secretary 

made, and then, after that decision, that continued, including in 

my own—I mean, these are not easy questions. This is not something that I did, as you say, as a rubber stamp or did lightly. I continued to stew on that, frankly. I talked with people, and I heard 

from Mr. Mora, made sure that I alerted the Secretary. I had daily 

meetings with the Secretary and the Chairman, and so forth, and 

I made sure they were aware of this continuing concern. 

Over time, I went back, from time to time, to the Secretary and 

ultimately convinced him that we needed to take another look at 

what he had recommended, or what he had approved—what I had 

recommended, what he had approved—and convinced him that he 

should rescind his approval, which he did on January 12, as I recall. I believe it was a Sunday, because I got a call from General 

Hill. That decision was memorialized on January 15. 

In preparing that rescission document for the Secretary, I recommended that he instruct me to set up a working group to look 

at this more thoroughly, which I did. I don’t want to take up all 

of your time, but the point is that there was a very, very thorough, 

broad-gauged, multidisciplined look at how we, DOD, should deal 

with this problem, going forward. 

Senator SESSIONS. Do you think you were aware of the tensions 

between too much aggressiveness and the need to get information 

and the legality and the treaties and the law and the policies of 

the United States? Do you feel like you were wrestling with all 

those issues as you made these decisions in a fair and objective 

way? 

Mr. HAYNES. Sir, let me point out again, the decision to employ 

particular techniques was not mine to make, but, in the course of 

trying to come up with recommendations for the Secretary, all of 

those things that you’ve described were in the mix, so to speak. 

Senator SESSIONS. You concluded they were lawful. 

Mr. HAYNES. Yes, sir, but the ‘‘they’’ that you’re talking about 

now, when you’re talking about the working group, is a different 

131

set of interrogation techniques that the SECDEF approved in April 

2003. 

Senator SESSIONS. Okay. Let’s get that straight. So, after the 

first approval, or disapproval, of a number of the requested techniques, and you approved a certain number, you continued to look 

at that, and you recommended to the SECDEF that some of those 

not be approved in the future and to be taken off the approved list, 

and you restricted further the request of the GTMO Task Force for 

approval of techniques. 

Mr. HAYNES. Yes, sir, that’s generally correct. There were other 

people involved in that, but that was my view. 

Senator SESSIONS. Take a moment and explain what you meant 

when you and Senator Reed discussed the question of medical review being—the people being interrogated being monitored for 

medical review or psychological review, that there be a command 

review, and—of these conditions; and what role of approval did 

General Hill, the four-star Commander of SOUTHCOM—what role 

did he play in having to approve the utilization of extraordinary 

techniques? 

Mr. HAYNES. There is a document that lays that out what was 

embodied with the SECDEF’s decision in April 2003, that lays out 

those approval levels. Some things could be delegated—some decisions about interrogation approaches could be delegated below General Hill, but some decisions needed to be approved by the combatant commander—General Hill, in that case. 

Senator SESSIONS. What requirements did they have on them 

with regard to observing the physical condition of a individual 

being interrogated or did they have to watch out for their health? 

Mr. HAYNES. Oh, yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. What requirements were placed on that? 

Mr. HAYNES. That was a fundamental requirement. There is an 

obligation to safeguard the people who had been captured, and to 

keep them healthy and safe and secure. So, there was the fundamental humane-treatment requirement that the President had demanded of the Armed Forces from the beginning of the war, but, 

even during the interrogations, of course, there was particular attention required of those people who were involved in the interrogations, including medical care and psychological care, as well as 

the interrogator and legal oversight. 

Senator SESSIONS. Failure to do that would have been in violation of military standards. 

Mr. HAYNES. Of the direct order. 

Senator SESSIONS. Now, just to wrap that up, there was the 

Bybee memo by the DOJ, not DOD, and that memo has been criticized, and that’s the one that was withdrawn, is that not correct, 

as going too far? 

Mr. HAYNES. I believe you’re referring to a memorandum interpreting the United States Code provision on torture, prohibiting 

torture. If I recall correctly, that memorandum—that legal opinion 

was rescinded by the DOJ in the middle part of 2004 and replaced 

with a different opinion at the end of 2004. 

Senator SESSIONS. Let me just point out, category 2 techniques 

in your—that you approved—stress position; maximum 4 hours 

standing; falsified documents—presumably, you could present falVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00135 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
132

sified documents to encourage discussion or admissions; isolation 

for up to 30 days only—Federal prisoners are often kept in isolation longer than that; nonstandard interrogation environments, 

hooding, 20-hour interrogation periods, and so forth. But, the torture statute that Congress passed in 1994, 92 to 8, prohibits severe 

physical or mental pain or suffering—‘‘severe.’’ I just don’t think 

the things that are mentioned in there are in violation of the congressional definition of torture. I think that’s what Attorney General Ashcroft said at a Judiciary Committee lunch, ‘‘I didn’t define 

‘torture,’ Senators, you defined it.’’ So, Congress defined ‘‘torture,’’ 

did it not? 

Mr. HAYNES. Yes, sir, and they used the words that you described. 

Senator SESSIONS. Severe physical pain or suffering. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just would conclude and say, I’m not 

sure we got it right. I know President Bush was concerned about 

America. I know he was determined to get better intelligence, as 

we all were. I’m not sure we’ve yet figured it out precisely. But, I 

object strenuously to the suggestion that DOD went out with a policy of reckless disregard for law and were systematically abusing 

prisoners. Indeed, those in Abu Ghraib who were not part of an interrogation, but were really abused prisoners—those people—many 

of them went to jail. They were tried and convicted in the military 

court-martial. So, I just want to emphasize that it’s never been our 

policy to torture people, and then, the definition of what’s permissible, I guess we can all agree or disagree. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. As we conclude, here—at least my part of it 

will be concluded—I’d like to go through some scenarios, here, and 

make sure I understand what your testimony is. 

According to the FBI, in the October-November timeframe 2002, 

before the Rumsfeld memo was approved, FBI agents indicated 

they witnessed interrogation techniques against the 20th hijacker 

that included making him pray to an idol shrine; abusive conduct, 

including having a dog used in interrogation. That’s what the 

Schmidt-Furlow report revealed. Is it your testimony that Secretary Rumsfeld—neither Secretary Rumsfeld nor yourself ever approved any such techniques for the 20th hijacker? 

Mr. HAYNES. I tell you today that, to my knowledge, the 

SECDEF had no knowledge of that, nor did I. 

Senator GRAHAM. That’s all I’m asking. 

Mr. HAYNES. I think that’s what General Schmidt concluded in 

his report. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. That’s all I’m asking. I just wanted to 

get that right. 

All right. Now, the General Counsel for the Navy came to you 

with concerns before the memo was signed in December, is that 

correct? Or after? 

Mr. HAYNES. After. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Did he threaten that, ‘‘If you do not revisit this, I will draft up a memo, and I will go public about this?’’ 

133

Mr. HAYNES. I think I heard him say that today, and I’ve seen 

accounts of that. I don’t remember that exchange. I remember him 

coming in at least twice, very passionately and understandably concerned, because he had been hearing things. In each case—my 

recollection—in each case, I listened to him, I reported up the 

chain, and I asked Captain Dalton to look into it, to see whether 

there was anything untoward going on. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Right. So, it’s your testimony that he’s 

saying today, and other days, that he had to threaten the release 

of his opinion about these interrogation techniques to the public at 

large, and it would look bad for the administration, that he felt 

compelled to go on the record, so to speak, about this, that had 

nothing to do with you revisiting the December memo? 

Mr. HAYNES. There’s an assumption in that question that I’m not 

rejecting, I’m not accepting it. I don’t remember that particular 

edge to the discussions. 

Senator GRAHAM.—Mr. Haynes, from December to January, I believe it is—when was the memo repealed and replaced? 

Mr. HAYNES. There are two significant dates: January 12, when 

there was an oral rescission and January 15, when there was a 

writing. 

Senator GRAHAM. I got you. From December 2, I think was when 

he approved this memo until January 12, what happened in that 

intervening period to make you recommend to him, ‘‘We need to 

take this thing off the table’’? 

Mr. HAYNES. I think I said, earlier today, that all through this 

period, I had my own misgivings. So, it’s hard to identify a single 

thing. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right, your testimony is that certainly you 

don’t recall that it was the threat that Mr. Mora made about going 

public if nothing was done. 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t recall him doing that. I do recall him being 

very passionate about his objection to what was approved. But I 

want to be——

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Yes, please. 

Mr. HAYNES.—I want to be responsive. 

Senator GRAHAM. That’s a pretty quick turnaround, from December 2 to January 12. Something had to happen that was fairly 

earthshattering, I would think to create a policy for DOD and have 

it rescinded 6 weeks later. 

Mr. HAYNES. No, sir, because—I’ve tried to impart the chronic 

and very intense passion about how one goes about doing this. It’s 

one of the reasons that I felt very strongly that the Secretary ought 

to get this working group with all the players involved, because 

there were so many competing concerns. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, that’s right. Now, did the working group 

that was formed ever review the final product that was later approved? 

Mr. HAYNES. You and I have had a discussion about this in another context, where I think we were talking past each other. So, 

I can tell you great detail about that, but let me just tell you what 

my recollection was, briefly. The answer was——

Senator GRAHAM. No, we’re not going to do it that way. I’m tired 

of doing it that way. Here’s what we’re going to do. 

134

Mr. HAYNES. Okay. 

Senator GRAHAM. We’re going to get to the bottom of this. 

Mr. HAYNES. Okay. 

Senator GRAHAM. The point of the matter is that other people 

have testified that they were assembled as part of a working group, 

giving input; a memo was issued that they never saw, and they 

didn’t find out about it until a year later. Are they correct when 

they say that? 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t have firsthand knowledge about that. My 

understanding then was that they saw the final report. 

Senator GRAHAM. If there’s so much passion about this, and 

everybody’s so upset, you can’t verify the fact that the working 

group got to look at the final product? 

Mr. HAYNES. I thought they did. I thought they did. 

Senator GRAHAM. They say they didn’t. 

Mr. HAYNES. I wrote a letter that explained my view of that. 

Senator GRAHAM. Where did all the passion go? 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t know how to answer that, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Where did your passion go? 

Mr. HAYNES. My passion was to try to get the Secretary some 

good counsel. What this working group did, which I think was a 

great exercise of government, frankly——

Senator GRAHAM. Their point of view is that they were assembled to give input; and they read about, in the paper, what the 

final product was. Now, that’s what they’ve testified, under oath, 

that these guys and gals had no clue about what the final product 

was. They were brought in to be part of a working group, and they 

read in the paper, a year later, that you found out a new way of 

doing this, and they looked at it and still had concerns. 

Mr. HAYNES. I wasn’t running the working group. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Mr. HAYNES. But, I will tell you that the entire leadership of 

DOD felt like that the work of the working group led to a very good 

result. When I say that, I’m talking about, not just the Secretary, 

not just the Chairman of the Chiefs and the Service Secretaries 

who advised——

Senator GRAHAM. With all due respect, Mr. Haynes—and I know 

you had a very difficult job, and a lot of this is uncertain. I’m just 

worried about the process. The process here, to me, is clear. Just 

my two cents worth is that the working group was formed because 

you got criticism from Mora, and you had to deal with that criticism, and you did rescind the memo. To your credit—to your credit, 

you did that. But, the working group never really got to see the 

final product, and I’m not so sure that’s much of a working group. 

Now, let’s go back to the December 2nd memo. One of the techniques, the category 3 techniques that were never used, was water 

boarding. Is that correct? Water boarding was a category 3 technique? 

Mr. HAYNES. I think it was described as a cloth with water 

dripped on it, not—I’ve never really understood—what that technique was, but it was listed and it was not approved. 

Senator GRAHAM. I understand. Now, do you think that’s legal? 

Would that violate the UCMJ? Would it violate the UCMJ for one 

135

of our—a couple of our military personnel to grab somebody, hold 

them down, put a cloth over their face, and simulate drowning? 

Mr. HAYNES. As we sit here today, absolutely yes, it would be illegal. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Mr. HAYNES. At the time? I don’t know. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Mr. HAYNES. But, the law is very clear now. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. You don’t think it was clear then that 

waterboarding a prisoner was a violation of Article 90—Article 128 

in—the Maltreatment of Prisoner Article? 

Mr. HAYNES. I didn’t reach that question, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Thank you for your service. I know you 

were dealt a difficult hand. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this hearing. 

I guess the thing that I’m left with is that there certainly was 

an attitude that we may be attacked again, and people were rightly 

concerned. The law took on the view of being an impediment to our 

safety, not our strength. I think what got us to this problem—got 

us in this mess was that a lot of people saw the laws that regulated 

conduct made us more at risk, not safe. I guess we’ve learned—if 

we’ve learned anything from this, that the rule of law in this war 

is a strength, not a weakness. Now I think we have it right, and 

I appreciate those who were trying to do this early on after September 11. 

But, it is clear to me, Mr. Chairman, the memo was never limited to one person. It is clear to me that these techniques do encompass techniques that we were defending against, and it became an 

offensive weapon. It is clear to me they migrated all over the military. It is clear to me that we created confusion for those serving 

this country, and it was a—one of the great tragedies of—after September 11, that we allowed our enemy to take advantage of this 

situation, because they surely have. In an effort to make us safe 

and to conquer our enemy, I think, for a period of time, we could 

not have done more to help them by creating this confusion and 

this mess. In that regard, these hearings have been helpful. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

Mr. Haynes, I want to go back now to October 2002. This is when 

the GTMO request was forwarded by General Hill to the JCS. On 

October 30, General Myers, Chairman of the JCS, circulated that 

request from GTMO to the military Services for comment. I want 

to go through those military Services comments with you. 

Tab 12 (see Annex A), that’s a November 7, 2002, memorandum 

from the Army. Paragraph 2, the memorandum says, ‘‘The Army 

interposes significant legal, policy, and practical concerns regarding 

most of category 2 and all of category 3 techniques.’’ Were you 

aware that the Army had concerns with those techniques? 

Mr. HAYNES. Senator, I think I’ve testified to this—I don’t recall 

seeing this memorandum before. I’m not even sure this is one I’ve 

seen before, but you——

Chairman LEVIN. I mean at the time. Were you aware, at the 

time——

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t recall seeing——

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

136

Mr. HAYNES.—memorandum, and I don’t recall specific objections 

of this nature. 

Chairman LEVIN. The next page on that tab 12 is a memo from 

the chief of the Army’s International Operational Law Division. It 

says, ‘‘Stress positions, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, 

the use of phobias to induce stress crosses the line of humane 

treatment and would likely be considered maltreatment under the 

UCMJ, and may violate the torture statute.’’ Were you aware of the 

Army’s International Operational Law Division, that they had concerns with these techniques? 

Mr. HAYNES. You—I’m sorry, I was—I lost you. Is this the 

third—there are three——

Chairman LEVIN. Memo from the chief of the Army’s International Operational Law Division. 

Mr. HAYNES. Is that the one that has ‘‘IO’’ at the top? 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes, it’s tab 12 (see Annex A). 

Mr. HAYNES. All right, the third one at tab 12. I’m sorry, and 

your question is, was I aware of this——

Chairman LEVIN. Were you aware of that? 

Mr. HAYNES.—memorandum? I don’t recall seeing this memorandum. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Tab 11 (see Annex A) is a memo from 

the chief legal advisor to the CITF at GTMO. It says category 3 

techniques and certain category 2 techniques, ‘‘may subject 

servicemembers to punitive articles of the UCMJ,’’ called the ‘‘utility and legality of applying certain techniques questionable.’’ That’s 

tab 11. Were you aware that the CITF had concerns with those 

techniques? 

Mr. HAYNES. This is the——

Chairman LEVIN. Tab 11 (see Annex A). 

Mr. HAYNES. This is the unsigned thing at tab 11, with—is that 

the three-page document? 

Chairman LEVIN. Tab 11. 

Mr. HAYNES. I——

Chairman LEVIN. The memo from——

Mr. HAYNES. I’m at tab 11, but you’ve read a bunch of things 

that I can’t find, so—so, am I looking at the right document? 

Chairman LEVIN. You’re looking at the right document. 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t recall seeing this document——

Chairman LEVIN. All right, thank you. 

Next, tab 10 (see Annex A)—it’s the Air Force’s memo. It says, 

‘‘The Air Force has serious concerns regarding the legality of the 

proposed techniques’’—that’s in quotes—states that the techniques 

described may be subject to challenges failing to meet the requirements outlined in the military order to treat detainees humanely. 

Were you aware that the Air Force had those concerns with those 

techniques? 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t recall seeing this memorandum, either. 

Chairman LEVIN. Were you aware of their concerns? 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t recall specific concerns. I’ve told the panel, 

sir, with all due respect, I knew there were concerns. I don’t recall 

these, and I don’t recall seeing these memoranda. 

Chairman LEVIN. Tab 14 (see Annex A) is the Marine Corps response—mind you, they’re responding, now, to a request of the JCS 

137

to comment on a recommendation for treatment—relative to treatment of detainees. Each one of the Services now responding. Tab 

14 is the Marine Corps. It says, in the third full paragraph, ‘‘Several of the category 2 and 3 techniques arguably violate Federal 

law, would expose our servicemembers to possible retribution’’—

were you aware of the Marine Corps’ concerns with those techniques? 

Mr. HAYNES. Sir, I think I’ve answered that before. I can’t even 

read this document, but I don’t remember seeing it. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Now, when the GTMO request got to 

your office, do you recall Eliana Davidson, who worked in your office, telling you that she thought the request needed further assessment? 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t recall that, specifically. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you know who Eliana Davidson is? 

Mr. HAYNES. Oh, absolutely. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. You don’t recall her telling you that there was 

further assessment needed. 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t recall that, specifically, but there was a long 

period of time, and we did some further assessing, so maybe she 

said that at the beginning, and maybe we did it. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Now, before the SECDEF signed an 

order approving these—all of category 2 and some of category 3 

techniques—the Services’ lawyers let your office know that they 

had serious problems with that request. You vaguely remember 

that there may have been something, but apparently you never 

took the time to ask for those documents. Yet, when you were 

asked, ‘‘Did you pay scrupulous attention to the law?’’ you studiously ignored the memos from the lawyers of the Services that 

came to your office. You studiously ignored them. 

Mr. HAYNES. I disagree with that characterization. 

Chairman LEVIN. Then you cut off the review, which had been 

requested, and that Admiral Dalton was carrying out. Now, I don’t 

know how anybody can testify that you paid attention to the law 

when you ignored the lawyers in the Services who brought to your 

office these concerns, and then, when there was a review going on 

by an attorney for the JCS, you sent the word, which you don’t 

doubt, that you wanted that review stopped. That is not studious 

attention to the law. 

It’s quite the opposite. It is stymying consideration of one of the 

most significant legal decisions which this country has made, and 

that is how to treat detainees. The errors that result in those opinions have caused this country tremendous security damage. 

So, now I’m going to ask you this question. 

Mr. HAYNES. May I respond to your comments? Because I 

don’t——

Chairman LEVIN. Yes. 

Mr. HAYNES.—I don’t——

Chairman LEVIN. I know—I’m going to ask you a question, and 

then you’re more than free to do it. 

Mr. HAYNES. Okay.

138

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree that you cut off the Dalton review 

in the middle? 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t remember doing that. 

Chairman LEVIN. How often have you ever cut off review—how 

many times has this happened? 

Mr. HAYNES. Senator——

Chairman LEVIN. She says it’s never happened. 

Mr. HAYNES. Senator, what I heard her say was that we restricted the number of people involved. That’s——

Chairman LEVIN. No. 

Mr. HAYNES. That’s what I heard her say. 

Chairman LEVIN. No. She said that she stopped the broad review. That’s what she said. 

Mr. HAYNES. She said she stopped——

Chairman LEVIN. It had never happened before or after, as far 

as she knew. This is the one time that that had ever happened, as 

far as she knows, and this is the one time where you intervened—

and you don’t doubt this, apparently—to stop that review. 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t remember it. 

Chairman LEVIN. That is not paying attention to the law. 

Mr. HAYNES. Senator——

Chairman LEVIN. That is stymying a review of the law to make 

sure that what we are doing comports with the law. 

Mr. HAYNES. Senator, I don’t agree with that characterization. 

There are plenty of examples of restricting people who have a need 

to know, for security and speed reasons. 

Chairman LEVIN. Of course. That’s not what she was testifying 

here. She was testifying to a review which was taking place. 

Mr. HAYNES. A broad review. 

Chairman LEVIN. A broad review which——

Mr. HAYNES. A broad review. 

Chairman LEVIN.—was taking place for the JCS, at their request. She says she never had had that kind of a request stopped 

in the middle before. She never knows of it happening afterward. 

Then you say—then you have, to me, the audacity to say that all 

of this is caused because there’s two groups that are in conflict—

two groups in conflict—one are the law enforcement people and the 

other are the people who want information from interrogation, ignoring the third group, which you ignored in November 2002. It’s 

the third group, you ignored. That third group were the lawyers for 

the military. The military Services, to your office while this was 

under review, sent those memos, raising all kinds of red flags, and 

you ignored them, you don’t remember seeing them. Then, when 

that broad review was taking place by Admiral Dalton, stymied 

that review. 

Now, how can you say that there’s only two groups here that are 

involved, and this is tension between two groups—on the one hand, 

the law enforcement folks; on the other hand, the people who are 

doing the interrogation, who want information—when there’s that 

third group that sent to your office—and we have testimony today 

that your office was definitely sent those memos, and your staff 

had discussions about those memos with the people who sent you 

those memos—how do you ignore that third group of those Services 

139

and their lawyers who raised those red flags? How do you ignore 

that? Why aren’t they in your equation? 

Mr. HAYNES. Okay. Senator, let me just make, at the outset, my 

vigorous disagreement with your characterization. Just so——

Chairman LEVIN. How do you ignore the presence of those lawyers? 

Mr. HAYNES.—just so we understand, Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. I’m sure. 

Mr. HAYNES.—I disagree with your——

Chairman LEVIN. We understand. 

Mr. HAYNES.—characterization. I——

Chairman LEVIN. Now my question. 

Mr. HAYNES.—did not——

Chairman LEVIN. Now my question. 

Mr. HAYNES. I did not ignore concerns. I addressed the concerns 

that—of the legality. There has to be a decisionmaker. That was 

the job of the General Counsel of the DOD. When you have multiple different perspectives and opinions, when you have a short period of time, when you have a novel situation, I made a decision. 

I did not ignore anything. It was my practice to be as open as I 

possibly could. 

Now, there are physical constraints to that. There is other—

there’s time, there’s classification, there’s volume, there’s a certain 

amount of redundancy when one sees different perspectives replayed from time to time. I’ve never denied that there were disagreements, including legal disagreements, about——

Chairman LEVIN. What you have denied is seeing them, asking 

for them——

Mr. HAYNES. Well——

Chairman LEVIN.—remembering them. That’s——

Mr. HAYNES. Senator, if——

Chairman LEVIN.—what’s——

Mr. HAYNES.—I may finish, I——

Chairman LEVIN. You may finish, but——

Mr. HAYNES. I——

Chairman LEVIN.—I ask that you——

Mr. HAYNES. I have——

Chairman LEVIN.—answer those questions. 

Mr. HAYNES. I told you that I don’t recall seeing these things. So, 

for you to say that I ignored them——

Chairman LEVIN. You did ignore them. 

Mr. HAYNES. If I——

Chairman LEVIN. You didn’t ask for them. 

Mr. HAYNES.—didn’t see them—if I didn’t see them, I didn’t ignore them. 

Chairman LEVIN. You mean—well, you knew there were concerns. 

Mr. HAYNES. I——

Chairman LEVIN. Why not ask to see the memos that contained 

those concerns? 

Mr. HAYNES. I told you, I didn’t know that they existed. I don’t 

recall——

Chairman LEVIN. You didn’t know those memos——

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t——

140

Chairman LEVIN.—existed? 

Mr. HAYNES. Senator, I don’t recall seeing them, and I don’t recall knowing about the memoranda. I knew—I recall—listen, this 

is 6 years ago. We had—I probably saw millions and millions and 

millions of pages of information over the 7 years that I served in 

that job. So, for you to suggest that because I didn’t see every single piece of paper that a lawyer might have expressed a view on 

an issue is ignoring it, I think, is an unfair characterization. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think it’s very fair. I think it’s right on target. 

You indicated, a few moments ago, you had misgivings, yourself, 

through this period. 

Mr. HAYNES. Sure. 

Chairman LEVIN. What did——

Mr. HAYNES. I did. 

Chairman LEVIN. I’ve never heard you——

Mr. HAYNES. I still do. 

Chairman LEVIN.—never heard you express that before. 

Mr. HAYNES. I still do. I think this is a——

Chairman LEVIN. Have you ever——

Mr. HAYNES.—very——

Chairman LEVIN.—expressed that, before today——

Mr. HAYNES. Oh, sure. 

Chairman LEVIN.—publicly——

Mr. HAYNES. Absolutely. 

Chairman LEVIN.—publicly, that you had misgivings about that 

opinion? 

Mr. HAYNES. Oh—well, I don’t—I don’t know. But, I——

Chairman LEVIN. I don’t either. 

Mr. HAYNES. But, I tell you, this is a very hard question. 

Chairman LEVIN. It is very hard. It’s a very hard question which 

has a——

Mr. HAYNES. But, it’s more than just a legal issue——

Chairman LEVIN.—very critically important answer. I just want 

to—I just want to be—you said there’s two groups—and then I’m 

going to turn this over to Senator Sessions—there’s two groups, you 

said, out there that cause this tension. You haven’t answered my 

question about that third group, the military Services, who told 

your office, in memo after memo after memo, all four Services—

they wanted much more analysis, they had great concerns about 

this. It may open up their troops and their men and women to legal 

action, including criminal action. That came to your office, concerns 

of the military Services that their people may be subject to criminal 

action——

Mr. HAYNES. Sir——

Chairman LEVIN.—and you say that, ‘‘Gee, I don’t remember if 

I saw those. I don’t. 

Mr. HAYNES. Mr. Chairman, I don’t. 

Chairman LEVIN.—‘‘remember. Gosh’’—that’s the third group, 

and you have not answered the question. 

Mr. HAYNES. Mr. Chairman——

Chairman LEVIN. Is there not that third group which you should 

have consulted and considered? 

Mr. HAYNES. Mr. Chairman, I think that’s also a misperception 

of the reality that I experienced, because if you think that the two 

141

extraordinarily gifted women lawyers that were up here before, Admiral Dalton and Colonel Beaver, are not military lawyers who expressed views, then I don’t know what they are. 

Chairman LEVIN. I’m not talking about their views here now. I’m 

not talking about their views here today. 

Mr. HAYNES. I’m talking about——

Chairman LEVIN. I’m saying that——

Mr. HAYNES.—their views then. 

Chairman LEVIN. Admiral Dalton was in the middle of a review, 

which you squelched. 

Mr. HAYNES. No—sir, I talked with her at—she testified that——

Chairman LEVIN. I heard her. 

Mr. HAYNES.—she talked at length. 

Chairman LEVIN. You stopped that review in the middle, and she 

balked when I said ‘‘the middle.’’ I said, ‘‘Well, was it two-thirds or 

one-third?’’ She finally acknowledged it was stopped in the middle. 

It’s the only time she’s ever heard that. 

Mr. HAYNES. Again, I’ve told you what my views are on that. I 

think that there was substantial discussion between me and her, 

and evidently with our staffs, as well. I mean—and there was a 

limited amount of time and a high degree of urgency and a—and 

an uncertain set of rules because of the—because of the conflict 

that we’re in—alien enemy combatants outside the United States 

not covered by the Geneva Conventions, with potentially nationthreatening information. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Sessions? 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Mr. Haynes, I know these hearings are difficult and Senators 

care deeply about these issues. I think it’s healthy in our country 

that they do. But, I do think you deserve fairness. 

I’m looking at Exhibit 11 (see Annex A), which was the Air Force 

memorandum concerning these matters. The Chairman quoted 

where it said that the problems and liabilities might occur if all 

these techniques are used. But, if you go back up to the top—first 

of all, let me ask you, was that directed to you? 

Mr. HAYNES. This is Exhibit 11, which is the three-page unsigned document——

Senator SESSIONS. From the Air Force—Air Force document. 

Mr. HAYNES. My tab 11 is——

Senator SESSIONS. Are you not——

Mr. HAYNES.—is CITF. 

Senator SESSIONS. Maybe it’s 10 (see Annex A). Excuse me, 10. 

I’m incorrect. So, it raised questions about these techniques, but—

all right, but was it directed to you? 

Mr. HAYNES. No, sir, this is directed to the United Nations and 

Multilateral Affairs Decision, J–5 of the JCS, Commander Lippold. 

Senator SESSIONS. That’s not you. It wasn’t directed to you. Is 

that right? 

Mr. HAYNES. Yes, you’re right. 

Senator SESSIONS. Then, look at the first paragraph, ‘‘General 

Comment. The Air Force has serious concerns regarding the legality of many of the proposed techniques, particularly those under 

category 3. Some of these techniques could be construed as torture 

142

as that crime is defined by 18 U.S.C. 2340. One of the proposed 

techniques is the use of scenarios designed to convinced a detainee 

that death may—or severely painful consequences are imminent for 

him or his family.’’ Now, did you approve that technique when you 

recommended to the attorney general your recommendation as to 

what, within the request, should be approved, or did you disapprove that? 

Mr. HAYNES. I did not recommend that. I’m glad you pointed that 

out, Senator. Having not seen these before, and not being able to 

read it while I was being asked questions, I didn’t see that the concern highlighted here is that which was not recommended, nor approved. 

Senator SESSIONS. In fact, this memorandum was directed to the 

request from CENTCOM, General Hill’s office, originating from 

GTMO, not your memorandum. Isn’t that correct? 

Mr. HAYNES. Yes, sir, that’s correct. 

Senator SESSIONS. So, it wasn’t your decision that they are complaining about here, but the request from GTMO, which you didn’t 

approve. 

Now, look at the next one you were asked about, on Exhibit 13 

(see Annex A). It originally starts out—it’s a Memorandum for 

Legal Counsel to Chairman of JCS, but that was struck through. 

That’s not you, either, is it? 

Mr. HAYNES. Again, I think we have—we’re looking at something 

different. 

Senator SESSIONS. Okay. Well, maybe it’s 12 (see Annex A). 

Mr. HAYNES. Oh, this is——

Senator SESSIONS. Excuse me, 12. 

Mr. HAYNES. Okay. 

Senator SESSIONS. All right. Do you see that? So, this memorandum that the Chairman asked you about, that he said you’re 

supposed to know about, it wasn’t directed to you, either, was it? 

Mr. HAYNES. No, sir, it’s addressed to the J–5 UNMA, attention 

Commander Lippold. 

Senator SESSIONS. Their criticism, is it not, in paragraph 1, 

states that ‘‘The Army has reviewed the request of the Commander 

U.S. SOUTHCOM’’—that’s General Hill, four-star general—‘‘for 

further legal review by the DOD and the DOJ of the proposal to 

employ counter-resistance techniques in the intelligence interrogation of enemy combatants detained at GTMO Naval Base Station.’’ 

So, that again was a reference to the request that was sent to 

you, an expression of concern. It was not directed to you, so we 

shouldn’t presume that you saw it. Number two, it didn’t refer to 

your decision, which rejected many of the requests that came from 

GTMO. Is that right? 

Mr. HAYNES. That’s right, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS. Looking at, I guess, number 12—or within 

that—2 pages further on is the memorandum for the Office of the 

Army General Counsel. Now, you’re not the Army General Counsel, 

are you? 

Mr. HAYNES. I was not, at the time. 

Senator SESSIONS. You were counsel for the DOD. This memorandum says, from John Ley, whoever that is, ‘‘I have reviewed the 

proposed request’’—that’s General Hill’s request—‘‘for approval of 

143

counter-resistance strategies. I concur in proposed category 1 techniques, but have significant concerns—legal, policy, and practical—

regarding most of category 2 and all of category 3 techniques.’’ Is 

that correct? 

Mr. HAYNES. That’s what it says. 

Senator SESSIONS. That was not sent to you, not directed to you. 

Mr. HAYNES. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. With regard to Exhibit 14 (see Annex A), this 

would be a memorandum—I think you were asked about this one—

it was a memorandum for the Director of J–5, the JCS. Would that 

be a memorandum directed to you or to somebody else in the DOD? 

Mr. HAYNES. It would be to somebody else. 

Senator SESSIONS. So, if the routing had been appropriate, it 

wouldn’t have come to you, is that right? 

Mr. HAYNES. It might have—it might have gotten up to my office 

eventually. I just don’t recall seeing it. 

Senator SESSIONS. It wasn’t directed to you. 

Mr. HAYNES. Correct. 

Senator SESSIONS. —what office—who is that from, do you see, 

there, what department? Is that an Army——

Mr. HAYNES. This says the one I’m looking at is Captain, 

U.S.——

Senator SESSIONS. That’s the Marine——

Mr. HAYNES.—this is Captain, U.S. Navy, the one I’m looking at. 

Is that——

Senator SESSIONS. No, no. 

Mr. HAYNES. You’re at a different one? 

Senator SESSIONS. We’re still on the wrong page. You and Senator Levin couldn’t get on the same page, and neither can you and 

I. 

Mr. HAYNES. I’m looking at 13. 

Senator SESSIONS. I’m looking at, I guess, 14. 

Mr. HAYNES. 14. This is the one that’s very blurry. 

Senator SESSIONS. Yes, it’s blurry. 

Mr. HAYNES. It does say ‘‘U.S. Marine Corps Reserve’’ at the bottom. 

Senator SESSIONS. Yes. That’s—it says ‘‘Memorandum for the Director J–5, the Joint Staff,’’ not directed to you, either. 

Mr. HAYNES. Yes, sir, that’s right. 

Senator SESSIONS. The first paragraph says, ‘‘We concur with the 

general proposition of developing a more robust interrogation plan.’’ 

Then it goes on to say, ‘‘We’re concerned, however, with the measures proposed in the subject documents, especially category 3,’’ 

which you rejected all but one of those techniques. 

Mr. HAYNES. Like——

Senator SESSIONS.—so, there again, referring to the proposal 

from GTMO, not from your and the—your recommendation to the 

Secretary that he put in the policy document. 

Mr. HAYNES. Yes, sir, that’s correct. 

Senator SESSIONS. One question—there was some suggestion 

about this issue, and I’ll just ask you directly. When you visited 

GTMO in September 2002, did you or any of the senior administration lawyers suggest to Major General Dunlavey that he request 

144

harsh techniques, based on the SERE program, when you talked 

with him? 

Mr. HAYNES. I sure don’t recall doing anything like that, and I 

can’t imagine I would have. The purpose of that visit, as I recall, 

was to visit three different detention facilities in a single day. 

Senator SESSIONS. I just would say I—this is a difficult, difficult 

thing. You were under great pressure. The American people wanted intelligence. We had great criticism of our failure to have good 

intelligence. People were afraid this country was going to be attacked again. They felt this 20th hijacker, particularly, had information that could perhaps prevent another attack. I hope that—

and believe—that you tried your best to strike the right balance. 

Some can question that, and maybe in the future we’ll see it a different way. But, at this point, I believe you did your best to serve 

your country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

It’s been said that this matter has been investigated over and 

over again, at least the part of it that relates to how these techniques got to Afghanistan and Iraq. The focus of our investigation, 

of course, is not that; it’s where they all began, not where they 

ended up. 

But, in terms of those investigations, just again for the record, 

General Fay stated in his report that a January 24, 2003, memo, 

called an ‘‘Interrogation Techniques Memo’’—and this was 9 days 

after the rescission by Secretary Rumsfeld—that memo, according 

to General Fay in an unclassified statement, recommended removal 

of clothing, a technique that had been in the Secretary’s December 

2 authorization, in General Fay’s words, and it discussed, ‘‘exploiting the Arab fear of dogs,’’ another techniques which was approved 

by the Secretary on December 2, I point out. 

Now, from Afghanistan, how did they get to Iraq? This is another 

report. It’s been stated that this trail of these techniques from 

GTMO to Afghanistan and then Iraq have been investigated. Yes, 

they have been, and here’s what the DOD Inspector General (IG) 

said, that at the beginning of the Iraq war, the Special Mission 

Unit forces in Iraq, ‘‘used a January 2003 SOP which had been developed for operations in Afghanistan.’’ Here’s what the DOD IG 

said about the Afghanistan SOP, that that had been ‘‘influenced by 

the counter-resistance memorandum that the SECDEF approved 

on December 2, 2002, and incorporated techniques designed for detainees who were identified as unlawful combatants. Subsequent 

battlefield interrogation standard operation procedures included 

techniques such as yelling, loud music, light control, environmental 

manipulation, sleep deprivation adjustment, stress positions, 20-

hour interrogations, and controlled fear, muzzled dogs.’’ 

Then, General Fay, again in his report, said that the removal of 

clothing was imported to Abu Ghraib, and it could be traced 

through Afghanistan and GTMO and contributed to an environment at Abu Ghraib that appeared to ‘‘condone depravity and degradation rather than humane treatment of detainees.’’ 

Again, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, that when I asked 

General Fay at a hearing whether the policy approved by SECDEF 

145

on December 2, 2002, contributed to the use of aggressive interrogation techniques at Abu Ghraib, he responded simply, ‘‘Yes.’’ 

So, yes, there’s been a number of investigations of the events in 

2003 and 2004, but what this focuses on today—number one, that 

shows the connection, those investigations, between what happened 

at GTMO between the December 2, 2002, decision of the SECDEF 

and what happened a year later or so in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Now, my question—just a couple of more questions and then I’ll 

be done, Mr. Haynes. Did you ever discuss the SERE techniques 

with Major General Dunlavey? 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t recall. I may have. I don’t recall. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Now, there is a memo of Mr. Bybee 

from the OLC, which was dated August 1, 2002, that provided 

guidance on interrogations prior to your recommendation to the 

Secretary. That was an OLC memo. Did you read it? 

Mr. HAYNES. I have read it. 

Chairman LEVIN. No, at the time. Had you read it before you 

made your recommendation to the Secretary? 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t know when I first read the memorandum. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you rely on that memo in your recommendation to the Secretary? 

Mr. HAYNES. Senator, since I don’t remember when I read that, 

I have told you what I relied on. But that——

Chairman LEVIN. Was that included in what you told us? 

Mr. HAYNES. I don’t think so. I think——

Chairman LEVIN. I don’t either. 

Mr. HAYNES.—what I told you is what I—is the thought process 

that I remember employing in determining that the request that 

I—the subset of the request that I recommended be approved was 

legal. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you tell our staff that it’s likely that you 

did read it before November 27? 

Mr. HAYNES. I may have. I just don’t remember when I first read 

it. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, this is an OLC legal memo which would 

be binding on the entire Government, right? 

Mr. HAYNES. Would be authoritative——

Chairman LEVIN. For you. As General Counsel at the DOD. 

Mr. HAYNES. Sure. Yes, sir. If it expressed an opinion on the law 

for the executive branch, that would be authoritative within the executive branch. 

Chairman LEVIN. So, why would you not have read that before 

recommending a decision to the SECDEF? 

Mr. HAYNES. I——

Chairman LEVIN. It was dated before that. 

Mr. HAYNES. For one thing, that one is addressed to somebody 

else. 

Chairman LEVIN. So, you may not have known about it. 

Mr. HAYNES. I just don’t remember, Senator, when I read it. I 

just don’t remember. I may have. I just don’t remember. It’s 6 

years ago. There were a lot of things going on, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Even though you may not have read it, were 

you aware of the contents of it when you made the recommendation 

to the Secretary to sign his December 2, 2002, order? 

146

Mr. HAYNES. Chairman, I just—I told you, I just don’t remember. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Sessions, are you all set? 

Senator SESSIONS. Attorney General Casey, in his confirmation, 

pointed out a Bybee memo, which apparently attempted to set forth 

the full power of the executive branch during a time of war in dealing with prisoners. As he said, not only was—it was a mistake; it 

was worse, because it was unnecessary. I think that’s—was unwise 

for us to try to anticipate and set the Bybee memo to anticipate all 

kinds of possible scenarios, and then to approve or disapprove 

them. You’re much better off going case-by-case by carefully considering all the circumstances in a fact-based circumstance. While I 

think it did set some constitutional limits, I have doubts about its 

wisdom. I guess it’s fair to say the DOD, as a matter of policy, did 

not feel, with regard to these interrogations, that it was appropriate to use every single power you may have, because some of the 

things that you prohibited were policy decisions, as well as legal 

decisions, were they not? 

Mr. HAYNES. Yes, but let me remind everyone that the lawyers 

don’t decide what gets used. We give advice, and that’s what I did. 

Senator SESSIONS. So, your advice was what? 

Mr. HAYNES. My advice was—well, it depends on what the question was, but in the case of the—I guess it was the December 2 decision by the Secretary, based on my recommendation that was—

that was shared with the Chairman of the JCS, the Deputy 

SECDEF, and the Under Secretary for Policy—was that only a subset of those techniques requested by GTMO be approved, and implicitly—and I’m sure I said so explicitly—that those that we recommended, that I recommended, were legal—as did Colonel Beaver 

and as did Admiral Dalton—that they were legal. 

Now, the next go-round, which was as a result not only of the 

working group—and this is where I—I just wish that exercise had 

a better appreciation by Chairman Levin and some others, because 

it was very valuable to the leadership of the DOD—that second 

round that resulted in Secretary Rumsfeld’s decision in April of 

2003 about what techniques should employ—should be employed, 

was also——

Senator SESSIONS. Where he restricted some he had previously 

approved. 

Mr. HAYNES. He restricted, or outright did not authorize at all, 

a different of, I believe, 24 techniques, with extraordinary safeguards and approval levels. Far short of what the DOJ advised the 

law would allow. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. To go beyond that would require approval of 

the Secretary, is that correct? 

Mr. HAYNES. Yes, sir. That’s my recollection of what the documents say, and it—I think that’s what it says. 

Senator SESSIONS. One more question, Mr. Haynes. With regard 

to Secretary Rumsfeld, on either of those occasions did he impose 

a personal action to approve a technique that you didn’t recommend, to your recollection? 

Mr. HAYNES. I’m not sure I can tell you about that kind of thing, 

I think I’m restricted in what deliberative and attorney-client comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00150 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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munications I’ve had. So, I probably should not answer that question. But, there’s not a sinister answer. 

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Haynes, we thank you. 

What today’s hearing is focused on is the SERE techniques which 

were incorporated into interrogation documents which were never 

intended to be incorporated into interrogation rules. Those SERE 

procedures were properly designed to help our men and women 

survive, should they be exposed to the actions that violated Geneva 

of our enemies. They were never intended to be taught to interrogators, used by interrogators against our enemies. That testimony 

was very, very clear in the panels that we had today. Yet, we found 

those techniques, including stripping detainees, including the use 

of dogs to induce stress—we found those techniques—not only were 

they adopted at GTMO and used in special instances, but then they 

moved over to Afghanistan and Iraq in ways that the various investigations have disclosed. 

We’ve paid a huge price, as a country, for what was unleashed 

when that December 2, 2002, order of the SECDEF was signed. 

When it was rescinded, 6 weeks later, and then a different document was put in its place a couple of months after that, by then 

what had spread to Afghanistan and Iraq was what we, I’m afraid, 

saw in those tragic pictures at Abu Ghraib, because, while they 

were not the interrogators that were photographed, they were the 

guards, and those guards, according to our own—the investigations 

that have been shared with this country, were influenced by the 

techniques which were the interrogation techniques which had 

been shipped over to Afghanistan and then Iraq. So, we paid a very 

large price for what happened. 

We will continue this investigation by asking people who have 

been named in this investigation as being present in meetings 

where SERE techniques have been discussed, whether or not they 

were present at those meetings in GTMO, what was discussed. We 

will, of course, continue our effort to find out what happened to 

those Services’ documents, those Services’ recommendations, those 

Services’ red flags that were shared with the SECDEF’s legal counsel. They may not have been addressed there. They were not addressed to the Legal Counsel, but the testimony today indicated 

that, as a matter of fact, they were shared with the General Counsel, excuse me, of the SECDEF. That’s what the testimony was 

today. 

The General Counsel—or, the former General Counsel, Mr. 

Haynes, isn’t sure that he saw them. He heard about concerns, 

does not remember whether he saw the documents or asked for the 

documents. That is a—to put it mildly, a very disappointing kind 

of a response to what is an extraordinarily serious question, which 

is, how do you deal with detainees? The legal response here was 

inadequate, and—to put it, I think—to understate it. But, we will 

continue to get into the various questions that I have just indicated, and others. 

It’s been a long day, I know, for our witnesses. We thank all of 

our witnesses. We thank you, Mr. Haynes, for being here voluntarily. We thank our colleagues for participating in this. 

We will stand adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

OGRISSEG MEMO

1. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Ogrisseg, given the differences between training conducted 

at survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) school and real world interrogations, would the conclusion in your July 24, 2002, memo to Lieutenant Colonel 

Baumgartner be that you felt reasonably certain that SERE resistance training does 

not cause long-term psychological harm apply if resistance training techniques were 

used against detainees? 

Dr. OGRISSEG. The conclusion in my July 24, 2002, memo to Lieutenant Colonel 

Baumgartner was very specific to medically and psychologically screened personnel 

with medical and psychological staff monitoring the training and immediately available to intervene if necessary. There are a number of important differences between 

SERE school and real world interrogations that would limit my conclusions to the 

SERE school training populations. I will review those differences that I am aware 

of below: 

1. Previous level of functioning and demographic factors. 

Military SERE training students are screened multiple times prior to participating in training to ensure that they are physically and psychologically healthy. 

They get screened prior to entering the service to ensure that they don’t have certain disorders. Students are required to get screened by military doctors at their 

home bases prior to traveling for SERE training to ensure that they meet the physical and psychological standards for participating in training. Most SERE schools 

also mandate that students complete screening questionnaires after they arrive at 

SERE school as a final safety check and for additional help or interventions if needed, to include being restricted from experiencing particular training procedures. Furthermore, the students arrive with their medical records in hand or available electronically to document their entire medical history, and indications of prior psychological diagnoses since their original military-entry physicals. These procedures are 

used not only to screen people out of participating in training, but also for identifying people who could be provided preventative interventions in order to increase 

their probably of success in training. 

Obviously, no such screening can take place with detainees. In the SERE training 

environment nearly 100 percent of the trainees graduate. However, in nearly every 

instance in my experience when students did not graduate (outside of those who 

were injured during field survival training) we subsequently found out that they 

had pre-existing psychological conditions which were not reported on the screening 

forms. 

Detainees frequently arrive in interrogation facilities with substantial injuries 

they sustained during battle prior to their capture. Numerous studies of American 

prisoners of war (POWs) indicate that being physically injured increases the likelihood of developing psychological disorders. Furthermore, from extensive studies of 

allied World War II and Korean War POWs, severe nutritional deprivation increases 

the likelihood of developing psychological disorders. These factors are not present 

in SERE training. 

Students may arrive to the resistance training facility with minor injuries such 

as minor bumps and bruises from spending several days in the field. However, if 

they have acquired any significant injuries, or arrive with histories of previous injuries that the medical staff deems significant, they will be medically restricted from 

selected training situations if necessary to avoid further injury. Likewise, to gain 

a sense of what food deprivation is like and to motivate them to work as teams to 

take care of their own nutritional needs, they certainly aren’t provided with three 

square meals per day as they would be in garrison. However, they are never close 

to deprivation that would cause nutritional disorders. 

Aside from physical and mental health status, SERE training student populations 

may be different from detainee populations in other important ways. For example, 

previous successful coping with tough realistic training that many in our military 

populations have experienced likely makes them more resilient to start with. Differences at the behavioral and hormonal levels between how special forces and non 

special forces personnel respond to SERE training have been published numerous 

times in peer reviewed professional journals. Similarly, studies of POWs from World 

War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam have consistently found differences in followup mental health status based the POWs’ age and military rank at time of capture, 

with older and higher ranking personnel faring better. I would assume that SERE 

training students are more homogeneous along these dimensions than are enemy 

detainees. 

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2. Purpose of the experience. 

SERE resistance training instruction is provided to increase the survivability, enhance the resistance capabilities of the students, and increase their confidence in 

their abilities to resist and survive. To achieve all of these goals, SERE students 

need to experience a very challenging environment and learn how to succeed in it. 

Students learn to be more confident because of the challenge, not in spite of it. Aggressive, coercive training approaches are a realistic part of this challenging training environment because they’ve been used by nearly all of our adversaries in past 

conflicts. Under these circumstances of simulated captivity, students learn to reset 

their mental schema of what success means. In this context, the aggressive, coercive 

training approaches serve to increase resistance. As part of the overall process however, students, like nearly all previous American POWs, will make mistakes. One 

of the chief aims of training is to learn how to bounce back from mistakes after they 

occur and continue to apply resistance and survival skills. The operating instructions and rules of engagement for training are all geared towards reinforcing these 

student-centered goals. 

Real world interrogation and detention facilities exist to elicit information from 

the enemy that will be used to shape future and ongoing military operations and 

provide our troops with tactical, operational, and strategic advantages. As such, the 

detention environment is another form of the conflict between adversaries. Unlike 

in SERE training where the goal is not to defeat the student, the real world interrogator wants to win. As in the SERE training situation, the subject of the interrogation will make mistakes. Regardless of whether aggressive, coercive interrogations 

methods are used or not, the aim is certainly not to have the subject or detainee 

bounce back from these mistakes and continue to resist, but rather to have them 

continue to provide valid information to the allies. The goal of the interrogator 

would seem to be to alter the detainee’s mental schema about the ‘‘mistakes’’ in a 

manner that would lower the barriers to cooperation with the interrogator. In any 

event, the mistakes made by a cooperating detainee and the effect on his/her confidence is not a significant concern or cause for corrective action by a real world interrogator like it is for a resistance training instructor. 

3. Risk management oversight functions. 

Within the SERE training environment, there are multiple levels of oversight 

mechanisms in place to reinforce the purpose of the training and the training objectives, and to prevent harmful behavioral drift. These include detailed operating instructions, and multiple levels of out-of-role personnel, including out-of-role instructors, command staff, and SERE psychologists. The primary purpose of the oversight 

mechanisms is to watch the instructors to ensure they are complying with the operating instructions. The secondary purpose is to watch the students for indications 

that they are not coping well with training tasks, provide corrective interventions 

with them long before they become overwhelmed, and if need be, remotivate students who have become overwhelmed to enable them to succeed. 

Comparable oversight mechanisms to prevent behavioral drift should exist within 

a real world detention facility. In this environment, it is still necessary to have detailed operating instructions and have personnel monitoring the operations who are 

removed from direct interaction with detainees. However, rather than being geared 

towards training aims, the operating instructions would be geared towards standards and procedures that effectively elicit information while upholding our obligations to Federal laws and international conventions. The oversight personnel would 

monitor and control for drift away from these standards in order to ensure effective 

detention operations and to protect the national integrity. Unlike the training environment, remotivating detainees to succeed is not an oversight responsibility or concern. While it is U.S. policy to have physical and mental health services available 

to detainees, it is not ethical to have these services provided by practitioners serving 

other roles within the detention environment. 

4. Propensity for moral disengagement. 

Moral disengagement is a term that refers to the attitude changes that allow 

someone to violate their internal moral standards and act in more aggressive and 

reprehensible ways. As part of the risk management oversight role, SERE psychologists train the resistance training staff on attitudinal and behavioral signs of moral 

disengagement, monitor the instructors for signs of moral disengagement, and then 

intervene if necessary to bring instructors back in line within the spirit of training 

operational instructions. 

A significant barrier to moral disengagement is removed in the transition from 

SERE training to real world detention operations. While moral disengagement can 

still occur in a SERE resistance training setting (which is why the oversight mechaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00153 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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nisms are in place), the instructors are still dealing with their own country personnel. When dealing with non-country personnel, as in the case of detainee handling, there is greater risk of dehumanization of these personnel, and thus a greater 

likelihood of worse treatment that exceeds the limits of operational instructions. 

5. Psychological and operational debriefings. 

As I described in my July 24, 2002 memo to Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner, 

SERE training students receive several training debriefs that serve to reinforce 

training objectives and decrease the students’ risk of developing psychological disorders by normalizing the students’ training experiences and reactions. 

These debriefings are obviously not available to real world detainees like they are 

to our students. 

6. ‘‘Voluntary’’ nature of training. 

SERE training, to an extent, is a voluntary experience. Students can withdraw 

from training. It is not entirely voluntary, in that completing training is a job requirement for many military specialties. Failing to complete training can result in 

administrative consequences, disqualification from worldwide deployment, and possibly retraining into a different career specialty if students aren’t ultimately able 

to complete training. Nonetheless, students may terminate the training experience 

if they desire to. 

Being a detainee, like being incarcerated in the criminal prison system, is not voluntary. Detainees cannot choose to withdraw from their detention. 

7. Limited duration of the experience. 

The SERE training experience is of limited duration and has defined starting and 

ending points. While the actual duration of training events may vary depending 

upon how long it takes for students to accomplish the training objectives, the variance in duration is usually a matter of minutes or hours. At a minimum, trainees 

arrive on a certain date and know that they will depart on a specified date. 

Detainees do not know when their detention will end. Some detentions last only 

over a span of hours, while others can last for years. While long-term psychological 

harm can occur from relatively brief distressing experiences, the likelihood of psychological harm is generally increased by more lengthy and uncertain detentions. 

8. Adjustment to the experience and follow-on support. 

Numerous studies of POWs and hostages indicate that captivity does increase the 

likelihood of long-term psychological dysfunction. As a SERE psychologist, I’ve 

worked with a number of people who have returned from captivity, and analyzed 

the circumstances and coping strategies of a numerous other returnees that my colleagues have worked with. As a result of my experience in this area, I do not assume that people return from captivity broken or psychologically damaged. Indeed, 

a majority of personnel returning from harsh captivity circumstances exhibit no 

long-term psychological disorders. 

What is clear to me is that captivity causes captives to have to adjust. Some returnees adjust in maladaptive ways. Other returnees exhibit what has been termed 

‘‘post-traumatic growth’’, indicating that the manner in which they adjusted to their 

experience (not the experience itself) enhanced their lives in significant ways. For 

example, Terry Waite, after his return from nearly 5 years of being held hostage 

by the Islamic Jihad, the first 4 years of which was in total solitary confinement, 

indicated that he learned to enjoy solitude in a manner which he could never do 

prior to his kidnapping. 

The simulated captivity experience we put people through in SERE training 

causes students to have to adjust as well. Unlike real world detention, SERE training is structured in a way to enhance and reinforce positive adjustments and coping 

styles that have helped past POWs and hostages to survive and return with honor. 

Finally, the operational and psychological debriefing processes used in SERE 

training help students adjust by understanding and normalizing their responses to 

training dilemmas rather than pathologizing them. The reintegration processes we 

have in place for our personnel returned from captivity perform the same functions, 

helping returnees successfully manage their re-emergence into everyday life, and 

aiding future trainees to learn from their experiences. In addition we help them develop action plans for how to handle future situations the returnee may find challenging. Obviously, we cannot assume that enemy detainees have comparable reintegration programs to aid their adjustment, thus increasing the likelihood of them 

developing long-term problems.

2. Senator LEVIN. Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner, when you received Mr. 

Shiffrin’s request for information, why did you call Dr. Ogrisseg at the Air Force 

151

SERE school and not the senior psychologist at the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA)? 

Lieutenant Colonel BAUMGARTNER. Having been stationed at the Air Force SERE 

School from 1900 to mid-1993 I knew that SERE psychologists had done research 

on various aspects of SERE training because of the large annual student population 

the school afforded. Additionally, when stationed at the Pentagon on the Air Staff 

from mid-1993 to fall 1996, I answered several congressional inquiries with regard 

to SERE training and my investigation for the inquiries indicated some research 

had been completed at the SERE school. Having had a close familiarity with JPRA 

and its predecessor organizations, I was unaware of any such research specifically 

by JPRA.

OCTOBER 2, 2002 MEETING MINUTES

3. Senator LEVIN. Lieutenant Colonel Beaver, do you know who wrote the October 

2, 2002, meeting minutes? 

Lieutenant Colonel BEAVER. I do not but I assume it was someone from the Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF) because the e-mail addresses containing the 

minutes referred to in this question were to and from CITF personnel.

4. Senator LEVIN. Lieutenant Colonel Beaver, Jonathan Fredman attended the 

October 2, 2002, meeting with you and other Guantanamo (GTMO) personnel and 

discussed interrogations. Prior to that meeting, had you discussed interrogations 

with anyone else from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)? If so, please indicate 

the person with whom you had discussions and describe those discussions. 

Lieutenant Colonel BEAVER. No.

MEMO FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY INSPECTOR GENERAL

5. Senator LEVIN. Mr. Mora, you said in your July 7, 2004, memo that you spoke 

with Jim Haynes on January 15, 2003, to tell him that you intended to sign out 

a memo objecting to the use of techniques unless you ‘‘heard definitively that the 

use of the interrogation had been or was being suspended.’’ Did Mr. Haynes give 

you any indication during your conversations with him that the techniques had already been orally rescinded? 

Mr. MORA. On January 15, 2003, Mr. Haynes indicated to me initially that Secretary Rumsfeld was ‘‘considering’’ rescinding the interrogation techniques he had 

previously authorized for use in Guantanamo. As I was weighing whether to sign 

or not sign out my memo in light of the Secretary’s promise to ‘‘consider’’ the withdrawal of the interrogation techniques, Mr. Haynes interjected that he would inquire further and get back to me. A few hours later that same day he called me 

to say that the Secretary had ‘‘rescinded’’ his authorization of the techniques. At no 

time did Mr. Haynes give me any indication that the techniques had been previously rescinded. Had this been the case, Mr. Haynes could have simply informed 

me of the fact upon our first conversation that day.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL’S PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETINGS

6. Senator LEVIN. Mr. Haynes, did you attend any meetings of the National Security Council’s Principals Committee in 2002 or 2003 where detainee interrogations 

were discussed? If so,

a. When and where did those meetings take place?

Mr. HAYNES. During 2002–2003, I attended a number of Principals Committee 

meetings. While it is very difficult to remember with clarity meetings from many 

years ago, I recall attending one meeting with the Principals Committee of the National Security Council in that time period in which I recall interrogations were discussed, and I think that was in early 2003. Principals Committee meetings often 

covered many topics, but I think I remember one meeting in this time period touching on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) plans to convene a working group to address the challenges posed by the Qatani matter as discussed in part during the 

June 17, 2008 hearing. In my experience, Principals Committee meetings took place 

in the Situation Room in the West Wing of the White House.

b. Who else attended those meetings?

Mr. HAYNES. I do not have a specific memory of everyone who attended, but such 

meetings normally would have included the Principals of the National Security 

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Council, and occasionally supporting staff from the National Security Council staff 

and the attending agencies.

c. Was there any discussion at those meetings of specific interrogation 

techniques used or proposed for use in detainee interrogations?

Mr. HAYNES. My memory is not perfect, but I think the discussion of interrogations primarily concerned a brief description of the challenge presented by an uncooperative suspected 20th hijacker from the September 11 attacks, the history of interrogation efforts at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, Cuba, to date, and the DOD’s 

plans to use a working group representing many different perspectives to develop 

recommendations for the way ahead.

d. Was there any discussion about using techniques derived from military 

SERE training in detainee interrogations?

Mr. HAYNES. See answer to question 6c above.

e. Was there a briefing for the Principals on legal issues associated with 

detainee interrogations? If so, who provided that briefing?

Mr. HAYNES. See answer to question 6c above.

f. Did any of the Principals or their advisors express concern with any 

of the interrogation techniques or legal guidance discussed? If so, please 

identify the person who raised the concern and describe their concerns.

Mr. HAYNES. See answer to question 6c above.

DETAINEE WORKING GROUP

7. Senator LEVIN. Mr. Haynes, on January 15, 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld directed 

you to set up a working group to assess the legal, policy, and operational issues relating to interrogations. On April 4, 2003, the working group recommended a number of aggressive techniques, but omitted stress positions and deprivation of light 

and auditory stimuli, because they ‘‘lacked sufficient information’’ to fully evaluate 

them. On November 27, 2002, you had recommended that the Secretary approve 

those two techniques for use at GTMO. What information had you based your November 27, 2002, recommendation on? 

Mr. HAYNES. Again, recognizing that these events occurred almost 6 years ago, 

I have trouble remembering such details. That being said, I based my November 27, 

2002 recommendation on a number of things including among other things: the proposal forwarded by U.S. Southern Command; the legal opinions and recommendations of Lieutenant Colonel Beaver, Major General Dunlavey, and General Hill; my 

discussions with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, General Myers, Under Secretary Feith 

and then-Captain Dalton; a high degree of confidence in the integrity, motivations, 

and judgment of the men and women of the Armed Forces at Southern Command 

who would implement any proposal approved by the Secretary of Defense; the law 

applicable at the time; and my own experience and judgment.

8. Senator LEVIN. Mr. Haynes, did you make that information available to the 

working group? 

Mr. HAYNES. The working group was provided broad access to materials to conduct its review.

GENERAL HILL MEMO

9. Senator LEVIN. Mr. Haynes, in General James T. Hill’s October 25, 2002 memorandum on counter-resistance techniques sent to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, U.S. Southern Command Commander, he requested that ‘‘Department of Justice (DOJ) lawyers review the third category of techniques.’’ Did you or anyone in 

your office request a DOJ legal review of the third category of JTF–170’s proposed 

counter-resistance techniques? If not, why not? If so, how did the DOJ respond? 

Mr. HAYNES. Lawyers within the DOD, not the DOJ, normally review requests 

from DOD commanders. I recommended against three of the four requested category 

III techniques. The only category III technique that I recommended be approved was 

the ‘‘use of mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the 

chest with the finger, and light pushing.’’ I felt confident that, if done humanely and 

with the appropriate safeguards and command supervision, this technique was lawful. Accordingly, further DOJ review would have been unnecessary. 

153

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY

RENDITION POLICIES

10. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, at your judicial confirmation hearing in 2003, 

when asked whether you knew details surrounding the ‘‘extraordinary rendition’’ of 

Maher Arar, a Canadian and Syrian citizen, you responded that you had no knowledge of his transfer. You also advised the Judiciary Committee to direct related 

questions to the Department of Homeland Security and the DOJ, implying that the 

DOD had no role in operations involving Mr. Arar. Since that time, numerous reports have confirmed that Mr. Arar was tortured and held in abhorrent conditions 

in Syria. When did you first become aware of the rendition of Mr. Arar? 

Mr. HAYNES. I do not recall when I first became aware of Mr. Arar’s alleged rendition.

11. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, would you please describe in detail your 

knowledge of, and activities relating to, U.S. rendition policies during your tenure 

at the DOD? 

Mr. HAYNES. While I am not permitted to discuss classified information in this 

setting, I would point out that it is my understanding that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has been provided extensive information on classified programs involving apprehension and treatment of detained terrorists in the war on 

terror.

12. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, would you please describe in detail your 

knowledge of the DOD’s renditions of terrorist suspects, foreign citizens, or other individuals for purposes of interrogation or detention? 

Mr. HAYNES. While I am not permitted to discuss classified information in this 

setting, I would point out that it is my understanding that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has been provided extensive information on classified programs involving apprehension and treatment of detained terrorists in the war on 

terror.

13. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, you were also asked in 2003 about presidential findings authorizing foreign renditions of terrorist suspects, but you declined 

to comment at that time. Would you please describe your knowledge of such findings? 

Mr. HAYNES. While I am not permitted to discuss classified information in this 

setting, I would point out that it is my understanding that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has been provided extensive information on classified programs involving apprehension and treatment of detained terrorists in the war on 

terror.

CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE

14. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, in response to written questions during your 

confirmation proceedings in 2003, you said that the DOD ‘‘takes its compliance with 

U.S. obligations very seriously, including the Convention Against Torture (CAT).’’ 

Article 16 of this Convention, which you testified has always been applicable in the 

administration’s fight against terrorism, binds the United States to ‘‘undertake . . . 

to prevent’’ cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. In order to prevent cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment under our CAT obligations, policies that clearly and 

unambiguously define boundaries are necessary. Do you think that the DOD fulfilled its CAT obligations when it issued policies that safeguarded detainees’ dignity 

only by the ‘‘understanding’’ that tacit limits of those policies would be respected? 

Mr. HAYNES. I believe that the DOD’s policies were consistent with the U.S. Government’s obligations under the CAT.

15. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, when asked about interrogation practices that 

you approved, you said at last week’s hearing that it was ‘‘widely understood by people knowledgeable about the decision’’ what was meant by the practices you said 

might be permissible. Do you have any documents—training manuals, memoranda, 

etc.—that would support the claim that these details were ‘‘widely understood’’ by 

the individuals who would be applying them? 

Mr. HAYNES. I am no longer an employee of the DOD, and I do not have any such 

documents. I believe, however, that the committee has available to it ample materials which show that Southern Command intended to employ safeguards such as, 

among other things, legal, medical, behavioral science, and intelligence review of inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00157 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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terrogation plans as well as local training of interrogators in approved methods of 

interrogation.

16. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, on what do you base your belief that interrogators ‘‘understood’’ the precise limits of these approved techniques? 

Mr. HAYNES. I was not assigned to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. I cannot opine as to 

what any particular interrogator understood. I do believe the members of our uniformed services are highly professional, competent and ethical and can be entrusted 

to supervise and execute the most sensitive of missions. Military commands routinely establish standard operating procedures to execute complex missions that are 

supervised by leaders within the command at multiple levels. I had no reason to 

believe that this would not take place when the command at Guantanamo implemented the approved subset of the techniques it had requested. Notwithstanding 

questions about a few incidents out of thousands of interrogations, I continue to believe that they did so.

17. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, did you ever ask to see or approve the operating procedures that were developed to implement the policies you recommended? 

Mr. HAYNES. I assume this question refers to the recommendation of late November 2002, discussed in part during the June 17, 2008 hearing. I do not recall asking 

to see such operating procedures at that time. This would not be something normally done at the General Counsel’s level. I also would not have been the appropriate person to approve any such procedures.

INTERROGATION RECOMMENDATIONS

18. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, in the packet of memoranda containing the 

analysis by Lieutenant Colonel Beaver upon which you based your interrogation recommendations to Secretary Rumsfeld, there was a memo by General Hill stating 

that he was ‘‘uncertain whether all the techniques in the third category are legal.’’ 

He was ‘‘particularly troubled’’ by some of the techniques. Yet in your recommendation to Secretary Rumsfeld, you expressed the opinion that those tactics may be 

legal while providing no additional rationale on which to base that view. We now 

know that not only General Hill, but also many others raised serious concerns that 

you failed to act on. Four different opinions solicited by General Myers and Admiral 

Dalton contradicted your conclusions. In fact, the Office of Army’s General Counsel 

indicated that it would need a ‘‘more detailed’’ explanation of the techniques to 

begin to assess their legality. Mr. Mora testified that every Judge Advocate General 

he’d spoken to believed Lieutenant Colonel Beaver’s analysis was deficient. Yet, you 

not only cut off the review of her analysis, you never even asked to see what assessments had been gathered to date. You claim that stopping the more extensive review was based on ‘‘a sense of urgency.’’ Yet it appears you did not convey your recommendation memo to Secretary Rumsfeld until 3 weeks after the Services’ views 

were communicated. Is this correct? 

Mr. HAYNES. There are a number of implicit assumptions within this question 

that are incorrect. For example, I did not need to reach a definitive legal conclusion 

that all of the category III techniques were legal. Such a conclusion was unnecessary because I recommended against the approval of three of the four category III 

techniques. It is not an unusual practice to defer answering legal questions that are 

premature. I also disagree with the characterization that I failed to act on serious 

concerns raised by others. Indeed, in retrospect, it appears that the three techniques 

that I recommended against approving were the techniques that raised the most 

concerns in the memoranda you cite. Moreover, I recall there was a sense by the 

DOD leadership that this decision was taking too long. There was a sense throughout the Government that another attack might be imminent and that information 

known by Qatani—the person believed to be the 20th hijacker in the September 11 

attacks—might help to thwart such an attack. I do not recall at this time seeing 

the ‘‘four different opinions’’ to which you refer before I made my recommendation 

to the Secretary.

ADMIRAL DALTON’S LEGAL REVIEW

19. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, who or what, specifically, gave you the impression that there was not enough time to complete the review that Admiral Dalton 

had begun? 

Mr. HAYNES. See responses to question 18 above and 30 below.

155

20. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, did anyone request or authorize, or was anyone else otherwise involved in, your decision to halt Admiral Dalton’s review of the 

legality of the proposed interrogation practices? 

Mr. HAYNES. I do not recall at this time specifically stopping such a review, but 

do not dispute that I did so if Admiral Dalton remembers this. See responses to 

question 12 above and question 24 below. In any case, since the Secretary of Defense made his decision to approve a subset of the requested techniques, a review 

antecedent to such a decision would become unnecessary. Moreover, weeks later a 

much broader and more inclusive review was chartered by the Secretary of Defense.

21. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, is there any other reason why you stopped the 

review? 

Mr. HAYNES. I do not recall at this time specifically stopping such a review, but 

do not dispute that I did so if Admiral Dalton remembers this. Many decisions within DOD are made without an in-depth review by the Joint Staff because such review 

is unnecessary, inappropriate, or too time consuming. I recall that there was a sense 

by the DOD leadership that this decision was taking too long. There was a sense 

throughout the Government that another attack might be imminent and that information known by certain detainees might help to thwart such an attack. There had 

been a number of terrorist-related attacks and significant intelligence reports during 

the timeframe of this decision, which heightened the sense of urgency. I had decided 

to recommend against three of the four category III techniques including the techniques that in retrospect raised the most concerns. Accordingly, if such a Joint Staff 

review was not completed, that would not be extraordinary under the circumstances.

DISMISSAL OF THE REVIEW OF TOP MILITARY LAWYERS

22. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, at your confirmation hearings in 2003, you acknowledged that your responsibilities as General Counsel of the DOD included acting as the ‘‘final legal authority’’ for the Department. You were the last stop for 

legal advice that would reach the Secretary of Defense. Given that there were differences in opinion about whether the use of certain tactics would violate both civilian and military law, even as between the opinions you acknowledge that you read 

(those of Lieutenant Colonel Beaver and Generals Hill and Dunlavey), do you think 

it would have been wise to seek and scrutinize the competing views before sending 

your recommendation on permissible techniques to Secretary Rumsfeld? 

Mr. HAYNES. I believed I understood in general the concerns inherent in this decision and appropriately balanced those concerns in conferring with Deputy Secretary 

Wolfowitz, Chairman Myers, Under Secretary Feith, and then-Captain (now retired 

Rear Admiral) Dalton in making my recommendation to the Secretary. During my 

time in DOD, I believe I did take into consideration competing points of view on 

issues including this one.

23. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, given the immense responsibility you bore in 

acting as the final legal authority for decisions affecting the entire DOD, do you see 

why many people find it so troubling that you apparently dismissed the reservations 

of Army Generals and top military lawyers on an important matter without explaining your rationale to them or to your superiors? 

Mr. HAYNES. It is erroneous to say that I dismissed the reservations of others. 

I understand that people have differences of opinion. I understand how those who 

have the benefit of hindsight and who disagree with policy judgments that were 

made by the administration can be ‘‘troubled’’ by and continue to disagree with some 

decisions. There are thousands of lawyers within the DOD. The views of these lawyers are not uniform. They also have differences of opinion. It was my practice, 

given the constraints of time, resources, and the need-to-know, to listen and appropriately take into consideration the views of civilian and military lawyers within 

DOD as well as the views of commanders.

DOCUMENTATION OF CONTACTS

24. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, at last week’s hearing, you said that your office and Admiral Dalton’s office enjoyed a ‘‘close working relationship.’’ Yet you 

claim to be unaware of the memoranda on interrogation that she, on General 

Myers’s direction, solicited from the Services. Do you have any documentation of the 

contacts made between your office and Admiral Dalton’s regarding interrogation policy? 

156

Mr. HAYNES. I am no longer employed by the DOD and do not have such documentation nor do I know which documents on these matters, if any, may be available. I would refer you to the Department.

25. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, please indicate what documents—including 

memoranda, letters, phone records, and e-mails—you believe exist. 

Mr. HAYNES. See answer to question 24 above.

HAYNES MEMO

26. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, your memo from November 27, 2002, states 

that you believed that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, and 

General Myers joined your recommendation on permissible interrogation techniques. 

Yet General Myers never initialed your memorandum or, it seems, saw it at all. 

Why did you believe that he had, and do you continue to stand by that claim? 

Mr. HAYNES. General Myers is an honorable man. I have the highest respect for 

his integrity and his service to our country over decades, including during these recent years. I am honored to have served with him, and I continue to consider him 

a friend. I stand by my statements regarding his role in the process.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE WHITE HOUSE

27. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, during your testimony last Tuesday, you acknowledged that the following legal restrictions were applicable during the time periods discussed at the hearing:

• The categorical Federal prohibition on torture inside or outside the 

United States under 8 U.S.C. 2340–2340A. 

• The requirement in Article 16 of the CAT that the United States undertake to prohibit cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. 

• The Uniform Code of Military Justice’s (UCMJ) prohibition on U.S. 

Armed Forces engaging in cruelty, oppression, or maltreatment of prisoners 

(art. 93); assaulting prisoners (art. 128); or communicating a threat to 

wrongfully injure a detainee (art. 134). 

• The 2001 Presidential Order that all detainees be treated ‘‘humanely.’’

Yet, if you had read the November 4, 2002, memorandum on interrogation from 

Air Force Headquarters, you would have been informed that several of the tactics 

you approved—even some in Category II—clearly violated the President’s policy on 

detainees. Virtually every legal analyst who has considered the issue has found that 

many of the techniques you approved violate all of the legal restrictions listed above. 

Did you ever seek approval from the White House to effect a deviation from its stated policy on humane treatment of detainees? Why or why not? 

Mr. HAYNES. Many elements of this question are inaccurate. For example, the Air 

Force memorandum to which you refer apparently represents the view of one lawyer 

who had provided a preliminary analysis and was not addressed to me. Second, I 

did not approve any techniques; I, along with other advisors, recommended that certain techniques be approved by the Secretary. Third, I believe that all of the techniques that I recommended be approved were lawful if conducted with the safeguards to be applied by U.S. Southern Command and the joint task force at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, Cuba and consistent with the President’s directive. Accordingly, the Department did not seek a deviation from the President’s policy.

28. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, did you ever seek or receive any legal advice 

from the White House or from any other executive department, such as the DOJ, 

that the prohibitions on torture in the UCMJ, the CAT, or the criminal code may 

not apply to U.S. personnel in certain circumstances? If so, would you please describe any such contacts in detail? 

Mr. HAYNES. The testimonial guidelines from the DOD do not permit me to discuss specific deliberative communications or the predecisional advice, recommendations, or other positions taken by individuals or entities. With the exception of the 

specific disclosures authorized by the Department’s guidance to me, the Department 

has not waived deliberative process or attorney-client privileges. I became aware of 

legal opinions from the DOJ from time to time, although I cannot recall specifically 

when I became aware of those opinions. In early 2003, I sought an opinion from the 

Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) regarding the legal standards governing military interrogations of alien unlawful combatants held outside the United States for the use 

of the DOD working group. That opinion was provided to me on March 14, 2003 

and previously has been released publicly.

157

29. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, you testified that the law enforcement community did not know how to deal with the impasse it had encountered in interrogating 

Mohammad Al-Qatani. Before turning to the JPRA and its SERE training program 

for recommendations on interrogation, did you consult with actual law enforcement 

officials or with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)? 

Mr. HAYNES. Without accepting your characterization of my testimony or other assumptions inherent within this question, I nevertheless would point out that the 

FBI and other law enforcement entities were well-represented al Guantanamo Bay 

Naval Station, Cuba, during the period in which Mr. Qatani was detained and questioned. 

It is my understanding that numerous interrogation efforts over many months in 

2002 by the FBI and other law enforcement professionals, as well as numerous interrogation efforts by intelligence professionals using then-existing doctrine, were 

uniformly unsuccessful in eliciting truthful information from Qatani, the intended 

20th hijacker in the September 11 attacks on the United States. 

Indeed, it is my understanding that agents of the FBI questioned Qatani at some 

substantial length—without success—before JTF–170 requested permission to use 

more aggressive techniques.

CONSIDERATION OF MORE AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES

30. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, would you please provide details of how the 

decision was made to consider more aggressive techniques than those which were 

initially used against Mr. Al-Qatani and others? 

Mr. HAYNES. Please see the transcript of the Senate Armed Services Committee 

hearing conducted on June 17, 2008. 

I can only answer with regard to my own recollection, understanding, and belief. 

During the 2001 and 2002 timeframe, many individuals throughout the Government 

were engaging in efforts to collect information that might be useful during the war 

on terror including lessons learned or new ideas relating to detainee operations and 

interrogations. This was a new kind of conflict against a new kind of enemy that 

presented complex and novel questions. 

During the summer and fall of 2002, as the country approached the 1-year anniversary of the September 11 attack, there were increasing indications from the 

world scene and intelligence reports that additional attacks on America might be 

imminent. There was a sense in Government, across all branches, that U.S. agencies 

like the DOJ (i.e., the FBI), the CIA and the DOD, in practice and as reflected in 

policy decisions made in prior administrations, had been overly cautious and constrained, and that those choices had contributed to the failure to prevent the treacherous and deadly attack against America on September 11, 2001. This critique had 

been widely discussed and was not an uncommon sentiment throughout the country, 

including in Congress. 

As I have explained, my understanding is that Mr. Qatani had been interrogated 

for some time using more traditional law enforcement oriented or Army field manual interrogation techniques. My understanding is that, consistent with the training 

he received from al Qaeda, Mr. Qatani resisted providing useful information in response to those techniques. My understanding is that, despite his status as the intended 20th highjacker on the flights that struck America on September 11, 2001, 

Mr. Qatani maintained that he was an ‘‘innocent falconer.’’ My understanding is 

that those on the ground at Guantanamo, who were responsible for collecting intelligence from the detainees, were frustrated by Mr. Qatani’s duplicity and lack of cooperation. 

In this context, I understand that the command from Guantanamo generated a 

list of additional techniques that they requested be approved for use at Guantanamo 

Bay, Cuba. This request was reviewed by command lawyers and command personnel, in accordance with normal procedure. The local legal review conditioned its 

approval of the requested techniques upon the existence of certain conditions including legal, medical, behavioral science, and intelligence review as well as local training of interrogators in approved methods of interrogation. These additional techniques were to be implemented and supervised by the local command and, so I and 

others understood, would be implemented in accordance with those restrictions. This 

list of requested techniques was forwarded to the Secretary for consideration. Ultimately, based upon my and others’ recommendations, the Secretary approved a subset of those requested techniques for use at Guantanamo Bay.

158

SPECIAL HANDLING OF MEMOS

31. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Haynes, Professor Philippe Sands, who testified at a 

recent Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, has written that the November 27, 

2002, Haynes memorandum on interrogation techniques received special handling. 

Professor Sands’s research shows that the memo was missing a buck slip that would 

have shown the memo’s circulation path, as is done in normal practice. Further, the 

legal review by the DOD and the DOJ that had been requested by General Hill in 

his October 25, 2002, memo to the Chairman was never documented. Did your 

memo receive special handling by you or by others? Please explain. 

Mr. HAYNES. I am not familiar with this specific critique by Mr. Sands. I do not 

believe my November 27, 2002 memo was handled in a way that was inappropriate.

32. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Mora, based on your experience in military legal practice, did this memo receive special handling, and, if so, what does that suggest about 

the motivations of those involved? 

Mr. MORA. I am not sufficiently knowledgeable of DOD or Joint Staff document 

handling procedures or protocols to state with assurance that the November 27, 

2002, Haynes memorandum on interrogation received special or unusual handling. 

I am aware that the Joint Staff did not complete its review of General Hill’s request, 

including the legal review of the request, but I do not have enough knowledge of 

Joint Staff procedures to say whether the intervention by Secretary Rumsfeld’s staff 

to assume control of the issue was unusual or usual. Accordingly, I am unable to 

extrapolate a view on the motivations of those involved based on this fact alone.

ARMY FIELD MANUAL STANDARDS

33. Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Mora, do you believe that the Army Field Manual 

(AFM) standards on interrogation should apply to all U.S. interrogations? 

Mr. MORA. The baseline AFM standard on interrogations is the standard that 

should apply to all interrogations conducted directly or indirectly by all agencies of 

the United States Government or anyone acting on its behalf. Simply stated, the 

United States does not apply torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment to 

anyone in its direct or indirect custody or control. Violation of this treatment standard should constitute a criminal act under Federal statutes. 

Whether the AFM (as opposed to its standards) is applied to non-DOD agencies 

is a separate issue. Because the AFM is complex and geared to the military, it is 

my view that non-DOD agencies, particularly in the intelligence and law enforcement communities, should adopt separate manuals that embody the AFM standard 

without reference to DOD-specific procedures. However, if (for political or other reasons) the choice is between applying the AFM to all agencies, on the one hand, or 

only to DOD, on the other, then I would opt for applying it across the board to all 

agencies. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNCIL MEMO

34. Senator CLINTON. Mr. Shiffrin, when did you recall first seeing the August 1, 

2002, OLC memorandum from Jay Bybee to Attorney General Gonzales regarding 

the legality of interrogation methods? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I never saw nor knew of the existence of this memorandum during 

my service at the DOD. The only OLC memorandum on the subject of interrogation 

I recall seeing was a draft opinion authored by Deputy Assistant Attorney General 

John Yoo shared with a DOD lawyers working group early in 2003. I also recall attending at least one meeting of that working group at which John Yoo was present.

35. Senator CLINTON. Mr. Shiffrin, did you discuss the memo with other lawyers 

in the General Counsel’s office at the DOD? 

Mr. SHIFFRIN. I never discussed the Jay Bybee memorandum with other lawyers 

in the DOD General Counsel’s office, nor do I recall discussing the draft John Yoo 

memorandum with those lawyers.

36. Senator CLINTON. Mr. Haynes, do you recall when you received the August 

1, 2002, OLC memorandum from Jay Bybee to Attorney General Gonzales regarding 

the legality of interrogation methods? 

159

Mr. HAYNES. I do not recall precisely when I received a copy of the August 1, 2002 

opinion interpreting 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A. Too much time has passed and I have 

now seen the memo in so many contexts that I can no longer be certain when I saw 

it for the first time. I cannot even recall whether I simply read the opinion al some 

point or whether I received a copy of the opinion and, if so, who transmitted the 

copy. I did, eventually, get a copy of that opinion, but I do not remember when I 

first got it.

37. Senator CLINTON. Mr. Haynes, do you recall who first sent you a copy of that 

memorandum? 

Mr. HAYNES. Please see the answer to question 36 above.

CONVERSATION ON WATERBOARDING

38. Senator CLINTON. Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner, in his testimony Dr. 

Ogrisseg recalls a conversation with you in which you said that individuals from 

above were asking about the utility of using the technique of waterboarding against 

the enemy. Do you recall having a conversation with Dr. Ogrisseg specifically about 

the use of waterboarding? 

Lieutenant Colonel BAUMGARTNER. I do recall a conversation on the use of physical pressures in an offensive interrogation setting, as opposed to SERE training, 

but I do not recall the specific pressures we discussed.

39. Senator CLINTON. Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner, do you recall which individuals from above you were referencing in that conversation? 

Lieutenant Colonel BAUMGARTNER. I was referring generally to the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) Office of the General Counsel. As I testified, Mr. Shiffrin 

had contacted our office about obtaining information.

JULY 26, 2002, MEMO

40. Senator CLINTON. Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner, in a July 26, 2002, memorandum you wrote that the purpose of the memorandum was to ‘‘answer follow-on 

questions’’ that resulted ‘‘from the meeting between JPRA and OSD Office of General Counsel (OGC) on 25 July 02.’’ What can you tell us about this meeting and 

the questions it produced? 

Lieutenant Colonel BAUMGARTNER. I recall answering this question during my testimony. I was responded to OSD OGC requests for information as a result of a few 

phone conversations with Mr. Schifrin earlier in July. These led to the two memos 

written at request of OSD OGC that were supplied to OGC at the end of July. Until 

the June 2008 hearing I had never met Mr. Shiffrin.

SEPTEMBER 29, 2004, MEMO

41. Senator CLINTON. Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner, when did you first see the 

memorandum dated September 29, 2004, from Major General James N. Soligan regarding JPRA Mission Guidance? 

Lieutenant Colonel BAUMGARTNER. I believe I saw the memo the first time when 

my lawyer and I went over documents supplied to us from OGC that the staffers 

wanted to discuss during their interviews. As I testified, I had retired from my position at JPRA in the spring 2003.

42. Senator CLINTON. Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner, do you have any knowledge about the circumstances that led to the drafting of this memorandum? 

Lieutenant Colonel BAUMGARTNER. No.

43. Senator CLINTON. Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner, prior to your retirement, 

had any concerns been communicated to you from within the Air Force or any other 

component of DOD about the use of SERE techniques for offensive purposes in connection with DOD interrogations? 

Lieutenant Colonel BAUMGARTNER. The use of physical pressures or other techniques to interview detainees was discussed at length. Some individuals had positive views and some had negative views. These matters were of professional interest 

since many of the same techniques were used to train our SERE students.

160

COUNTER-RESISTANCE STRATEGY MEETING

44. Senator CLINTON. Lieutenant Colonel Beaver, can you please describe the 

chain of events that led to the creation of the October 2, 2002, counter-resistance 

strategy meeting? 

Lieutenant Colonel BEAVER. I organized meetings to discuss interrogation issues 

and invited members from JTF–170 and CITF to participate in the discussions. I 

held the meetings because I thought it was important to have an exchange of ideas 

from all concerned and not just members of the Intelligence Community. I established a ‘‘non-attribution policy’’ to ensure that personnel could express their opinions without fear of retribution. I started holding these ad hoc meetings in August 

2002 when the intelligence personnel first approached me about the use of additional interrogation techniques.

45. Senator CLINTON. Lieutenant Colonel Beaver, whose idea was it to hold the 

meeting? 

Lieutenant Colonel BEAVER. See answer to question 44.

46. Senator CLINTON. Lieutenant Colonel Beaver, who organized the meeting? 

Lieutenant Colonel BEAVER. I organized the meeting.

47. Lieutenant Colonel Beaver, who invited officials from intelligence agencies to 

the meeting? 

Lieutenant Colonel BEAVER. I don’t recall exactly how this happened but I invited 

personnel from JTF–170 and CITF. I encouraged these organizations to bring anyone who could provide substantive input on interrogation matters. Mr. Fredman just 

happened to be at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba visiting his personnel the day this meeting was scheduled. I invited him to attend. I thought the involvement of many different personnel with different backgrounds would lead to the best discussion of the 

issues—legal and policy. These were brain storming sessions and the ideas expressed were not to be attributed to the individual but just the group’s discussion 

on that particular day. Without the establishment of a non-attribution policy it was 

unlikely that personnel would have felt comfortable expressing opinions about this 

controversial topic.

48. Senator CLINTON. Lieutenant Colonel Beaver, how many similar meetings 

were held, and when? 

Lieutenant Colonel BEAVER. I don’t recall but I believe I held approximately three 

such meetings during the period August to October 2002.

49. Senator CLINTON. Lieutenant Colonel Beaver, the minutes of the counterresistance strategy meeting on October 2, 2002, include a passage in which John 

Fredman is quoted as saying, ‘‘In the past when the International Committee of the 

Red Cross (ICRC) has made a big deal about certain detainees, the DOD has moved 

them away from the attention of ICRC.’’ Are you familiar with any cases where this 

has happened, and if so, can you describe the circumstances? 

Lieutenant Colonel BEAVER. I do not know. Regarding Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 

the ICRC had access to interview detainees privately. The ICRC did not have a permanent presence on Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. ICRC personnel usually were at Guantanamo for 6-week periods and would leave for 6–8 weeks. When the ICRC returned 

to Guantanamo for a scheduled visit, its personnel were provided an updated list 

of detainees, as necessary, by the Commander, Military Police, so that the ICRC 

could schedule its interviews with detainees. There were times when the Commander, JTF–170 and later, JTF GTMO denied the ICRC access to a particular detainee for a limited period of time for reasons of operational security. These reasons 

were discussed with the ICRC personnel by the Commander, JTF–170 and JTF 

GTMO. Sometimes, these situations were documented by memorandum. These situations were rare.

DISCUSSION OF INTERROGATION METHODS

50. Senator CLINTON. Mr. Haynes, when did you become aware that CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency personnel were meeting with officers at GTMO in October 

2002 to discuss interrogation methods? 

Mr. HAYNES. I do not recall exactly when I first learned this information. I would 

point out, however, that it was very widely known, including among Members and 

staff of Congress, that all manner of attention and resources were being devoted to 

the difficult challenge of eliciting information from those detained at Guantanamo 

161

Bay Naval Station, Cuba, throughout 2002. It also was known that many representatives of many agencies were present at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, Cuba, and 

were actively participating in discussions regarding matters pertaining to detainees, 

including interrogation.

51. Senator CLINTON. Mr. Haynes, were you aware of those meetings at the time 

they were taking place? 

Mr. HAYNES. Please see the answer to question 50 above.

ARMED FORCES MEMOS

52. Senator CLINTON. Mr. Haynes, you testified that you had not seen the memoranda from the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps raising concerns about 

the proposed counter-resistance interrogation techniques until a month before the 

hearing. However, were you aware at any point earlier than that that those memoranda had been written? 

Mr. HAYNES. As I testified to at the June 17 hearing, I do not remember seeing 

the memoranda from the various Service lawyers concerning the JTF–170 request 

for additional interrogation techniques in the fall of 2002. The first time I recall seeing these memoranda was at my voluntary interview with the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 25, 2008. Six years later, I am not sure whether I even 

knew such memoranda existed prior to that time, although I cannot rule out that 

I may have been told the memoranda existed at the time. I do not believe I was 

provided with copies of these memos before the April Senate Armed Services Committee interview, and I do not recall seeing them again until the June 17 Senate 

Armed Services Committee hearing. I would note that the memoranda were not addressed to me and that internal Joint Staff staffing memoranda were frequently retained within the Joint Staff.

53. Senator CLINTON. Mr. Haynes, outside of your conversations with former General Counsel Mora, were you aware at any point earlier than that that any of the 

four Services held the views expressed in that memorandum? 

Mr. HAYNES. I would not characterize the ‘‘Services’’ as holding a view expressed 

in any particular memorandum. Individual lawyers from the Services apparently expressed some preliminary views in memoranda that were part of the Joint Staff 

staffing process and were not addressed to me. It is very difficult to recall with precision the timing of what I knew about any specific topic given the length of time 

that has passed, the number of issues I dealt with as General Counsel, and information concerning these topics that I have learned after the fact. I did know that there 

were concerns regarding what techniques were appropriate for detainee interrogations. It is not surprising that there would be differences of opinion on such an 

issue. I took these general concerns into consideration. I believe others did as well. 

Some of the proposed additional techniques that were ultimately approved were not 

particularly controversial. I recommended against the use of the three category III 

techniques that would have raised the most concerns. I recommended approval of 

other techniques that were less controversial, but that nevertheless with which 

some people take issue. In doing so, I attempted to strike a balance and accommodate competing points of view while always adhering to applicable legal standards.

[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

(163)

THE AUTHORIZATION OF SURVIVAL, EVASION, RESISTANCE, AND ESCAPE (SERE) 

TECHNIQUES FOR INTERROGATIONS IN 

IRAQ: PART II OF THE COMMITTEE’S INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF THE DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room SD–

106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Dole, and Thune. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan, professional 

staff member; Ilona R. Cohen, counsel; Mark R. Jacobson, professional staff member; and Peter K. Levine, general counsel. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican 

staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; and 

David M. Morriss, minority counsel. 

Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston, Brian F. Sebold, 

and Breon N. Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Jay Maroney, assistant 

to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; 

Caroline Tess, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Gordon I. Peterson, 

assistant to Senator Webb; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator 

Collins; Andi Fouberg and Jason Van Beek, assistants to Senator 

Thune. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. 

In June 2008, this committee held a hearing on the origins of aggressive interrogation techniques used against detainees in U.S. 

custody at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Abu Ghraib, and elsewhere. 

At that hearing, the committee heard how techniques such as 

stress positions, forced nudity, and sleep deprivation used in military survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training to 

teach U.S. personnel to resist abusive interrogations, and based in 

part on Chinese communist techniques used during the Korean 

War to elicit false confessions, were turned on their head and auVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00167 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
164

thorized at senior levels of our government for use in interrogations 

of detainees in U.S. custody. 

Today’s hearing will cover one way that those techniques made 

their way to Iraq. While some have claimed that detainee abuses 

at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere were simply the result of a few bad 

apples acting on their own, at our June hearing we heard that as 

far back as December 2001 senior Department of Defense (DOD) officials, including General Counsel William ‘‘Jim’’ Haynes’ office, 

sought out information from the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency 

(JPRA), the DOD agency responsible for overseeing SERE training. 

We heard how, when he later received a request from GTMO to use 

techniques similar to those used in SERE training, Mr. Haynes ignored strong concerns, from the military Services themselves, that 

some of the techniques were illegal. He cut short an effort by the 

legal counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct a legal and policy review of the techniques, and he recommended that the Secretary of Defense approve most of them for 

use against detainees. 

In December 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld approved Mr. Haynes’ 

recommendation, sending the message that stripping detainees, 

placing them in stress positions, and using dogs to intimidate them 

was acceptable. Policies authorizing some of those same abusive 

techniques in Afghanistan and Iraq followed the Secretary’s decision. 

This morning, we’ll hear how one military commander in Iraq 

sought and obtained interrogation support from JPRA, the agency 

whose expertise is in teaching soldiers to resist abusive interrogations conducted by our enemies. We’ll hear from Colonel Steven 

Kleinman, the former Director of Intelligence at JPRA’s Personnel 

Recovery Academy, and we’ll hear from retired Colonel John 

Moulton II, former Commander of JPRA. Both witnesses have been 

cooperative with the committee’s inquiry. We thank them for their 

appearance here today, and we thank them for their service to our 

Nation. 

Some new information and recently declassified documents provide further insight into the extent to which SERE training techniques influenced detainee interrogations conducted by U.S. personnel and the role of senior officials in approving policies authorizing the use of those techniques against detainees. 

At our June 17 hearing, we heard that the DOD General Counsel’s Office, led by Jim Haynes, sought advice from JPRA as far 

back as December 2001. Specifically, in mid-December 2001, Deputy General Counsel for Intelligence Richard Shiffrin solicited information from JPRA on detainee exploitation. JPRA chief of staff, 

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Baumgartner, responded to Mr. 

Shiffrin’s call with a six-page fax. An unclassified fax cover sheet 

addressed to Mr. Shiffrin and dated December 17, 2001, states that 

the document provided JPRA’s ‘‘spin on exploitation,’’ and that if 

the General Counsel’s Office needed ‘‘experts to facilitate this process, the JPRA stood ready to assist.’’ That December 2001 call from 

Mr. Shiffrin appears to have been JPRA’s first foray into what are 

called offensive interrogation operations, but other efforts soon followed. 

165

On April 16, 2002, Dr. Bruce Jessen, who was then the senior 

SERE psychologist at JPRA, circulated a draft exploitation plan to 

the JPRA Commander, Colonel Randy Moulton, and other senior 

officials at the agency. E-mails exchanged between Dr. Jessen and 

Colonel Moulton suggest that JPRA intended to seek approval of 

the exploitation plan. 

Also in the spring of 2002, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 

sought approval from the National Security Council (NSC) to begin 

an interrogation program for high-level al Qaeda detainees. In a 

written response to questions dated September 12, 2008, which I 

sent to her in July 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who 

was then the National Security Advisor to the President, stated 

that in 2002 and 2003 there were meetings at the White House 

where specific CIA interrogation techniques were discussed. 

I also asked Secretary Rice whether she attended meetings 

where SERE training was discussed. Secretary Rice responded that 

she recalled being told that U.S. military personnel were subjected 

in training to ‘‘physical and psychological interrogation techniques,’’ 

and her legal advisor at the time, John Bellinger, said in his September 12, 2008, written answers to my questions that he was 

present in meetings at the White House or the Eisenhower Executive Office Building next door, ‘‘at which SERE training was discussed.’’ 

Secretary Rice also wrote, in her September 12 response that 

John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the Department 

of Justice’s (DOJ) Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) provided legal advice at several meetings that she attended, and that the DOJ’s advice on the program ‘‘was being coordinated by Counsel to the 

President Alberto Gonzales.’’ She wrote that CIA’s interrogation 

program was reviewed by NSC principals, and that Secretary of 

Defense Rumsfeld participated in that review. 

Secretary Rice said that when CIA sought approval of the interrogation program, she asked Director of Central Intelligence 

George Tenet to brief the NSC principals, and asked Attorney General John Ashcroft to ‘‘personally advise NSC principals whether 

the program was lawful.’’ 

Mr. Bellinger, her legal advisor, wrote us that he asked CIA lawyers to seek legal advice, not only from the OLC, but also from the 

criminal division of DOJ, which was headed at that time by Michael Chertoff. 

The meetings referred to by Secretary Rice and Mr. Bellinger 

were not meetings between some low-level bureaucrats. These are 

the most senior officials in the United States Government, advisors 

to the President, meeting in the White House. 

Mr. Bellinger said that some of the legal analyses of proposed interrogation techniques that were prepared by DOJ referred to the 

‘‘psychological effects of military resistance training,’’ and that during that 2002–2003 timeframe he ‘‘expressed concern that the proposed CIA interrogation techniques comply with applicable U.S. 

law, including our international obligations.’’ 

At our June 17 hearing, the committee heard that, in July 2002, 

prompted by a request from DOD General Counsel Jim Haynes, 

Deputy General Counsel for Intelligence Richard Shiffrin called 

JPRA and asked for a list of physical and psychological pressures 

166

used in SERE training. In response to that request, on July 26, 

2002, JPRA provided a list of techniques that included stress positions, water boarding, slapping, sleep disruption, and sensory deprivation. The JPRA list also made reference to a section of the 

JPRA manual that talks about ‘‘coercive pressures’’ including treating a person like an animal. Mr. Shiffrin testified that part of the 

reason that the General Counsel’s Office sought the information 

was its interest in reverse-engineering the techniques for use offensively in detainee interrogations. 

At that hearing a few months ago, we also heard that in October 

2002, Major General Michael Dunlavey, the Commander at GTMO, 

requested authority to use some of the same SERE training techniques that had been on the list which JPRA provided to Mr. 

Haynes’ office in July. 

The military Services registered serious concerns about the legality of some of the techniques in Major General Dunlavey’s request. 

Rear Admiral Jane Dalton, who was the legal counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified that she initiated a broadbased legal and policy review of the request, but, at Mr. Haynes’ 

request, her review was cut short by General Richard Myers, the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at that time. 

Mr. Haynes subsequently recommended that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approve most of the techniques in Major 

General Dunlavey’s request. Again, on December 2, 2002, Secretary 

Rumsfeld approved Mr. Haynes’ recommendation authorizing the 

use of aggressive interrogation techniques at GTMO, including 

stress positions, instilling fear through the use of dogs, and removal of clothing. 

At the June 17 hearing, we heard from then-Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora about concerns that he raised in December 2002 

and January 2003 with Mr. Haynes about interrogations at GTMO. 

We learned, from John Bellinger, the NSC Advisor, in his September 12 response to my questions, that on several occasions Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce Swartz raised concerns with 

him about allegations of detainee abuse at GTMO. Mr. Bellinger 

wrote to me that he, in turn, raised these concerns ‘‘on several occasions with DOD officials.’’ 

In her September 12 response, Secretary Rice wrote that Mr. 

Bellinger also advised her ‘‘on a regular basis regarding concerns 

and issues relating to DOD detention practices and policies at 

GTMO.’’ She wrote that, as a result, she convened ‘‘a series of 

meetings of NSC principals in 2002 and 2003 to discuss various 

issues and concerns relating to detainees in the custody of DOD.’’

At our last hearing, I described how aggressive techniques authorized by the Secretary of Defense for use at GTMO made their 

way to Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of these same techniques were 

authorized by senior military commanders. 

For instance, on September 14, 2003, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force7 in Iraq, authorized the use of dogs, stress positions, and other aggressive techniques in interrogations. In the summer of 2003, the 

commander of a special mission unit task force in Iraq went further. He contacted JPRA for help with interrogations. Again, 

JPRA’s expertise is in training soldiers to resist abusive interrogaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00170 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
167

tions by enemies that refuse to follow the Geneva Conventions. In 

response to the commander’s request and with explicit approval 

from the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), JPRA’s higher 

headquarters, JPRA sent an interrogation support team to Iraq. 

Colonel Kleinman, who is here with us this morning, was the team 

leader during that visit. 

Here’s some of what we know about the Iraq trip from unclassified or declassified sources: 

The task force’s request for JPRA ‘‘interrogator support’’ was submitted through official channels, and was approved by JFCOM on 

August 27, 2003. JPRA put together a three-person team to support the request. 

On September 4, 2003, just as the JPRA team was arriving in 

Iraq, Lieutenant General Robert Wagner, the Deputy Commander 

of JFCOM, which is JPRA’s senior command, sent an e-mail to 

Colonel Moulton, the JPRA Commander, about the trip, asking, 

‘‘What in JPRA’s charter places JPRA in the business of intelligence collection?’’ 

Again, just a week earlier, JFCOM had approved the trip. Colonel Moulton replied to Lieutenant General Wagner’s e-mail that 

‘‘there is nothing in our charter or elsewhere that points us toward 

the offensive side of captivity conduct,’’ and that JPRA was ‘‘well 

aware of the problems associated with crossing the Rubicon into intelligence collection (or anything close).’’ 

A second e-mail from Colonel Moulton, however, sent on September 9, 2003, to the JFCOM Director of Operations stated that 

‘‘recent history, to include discussions and training with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), U.S. Special Operations Command 

(SOCOM), and CIA shows that no DOD entity has a firm grasp on 

any comprehensive approach to strategic debriefing/interrogation. 

Our subject-matter experts and certain SERE psychologists currently have the most knowledge and depth within DOD on the captivity environment and exploitation.’’ 

While Colonel Moulton’s e-mail said that JPRA was ‘‘not looking 

to expand our involvement to active participation,’’ he noted that 

JPRA’s ‘‘potential participation is predicated solely on the request 

of the combatant commander.’’ 

A recently declassified summary of a 2005 interview with Colonel 

Moulton, and Colonel Moulton’s prepared statement for today’s 

hearing, both describe conversations which he had with Colonel 

Kleinman while the JPRA team was in Iraq. Colonel Moulton acknowledges telling Colonel Kleinman that the JPRA team was authorized to participate in interrogations using SERE training techniques. Colonel Moulton said he granted that authority only after 

seeking approval from JFCOM. 

Colonel Kleinman has said he objected to the use of SERE training techniques during the trip, and that he told Colonel Moulton 

both that those techniques were inconsistent with the Geneva Conventions and that granting authority for the team to use them was 

an illegal order. 

This morning, we will hear both Colonel Moulton’s and Colonel 

Kleinman’s account of those conversations and events that occurred 

during that trip. 

168

Toward the end of their trip, members of the JPRA team produced a draft concept of operations (CONOP) for the interrogation 

of detainees. E-mails from Captain Daniel Donovan, JFCOM Staff 

Judge Advocate, reveal some of what the CONOP proposed and 

what JPRA thought was acceptable. 

Captain Donovan, in a September 26, 2003, e-mail to Colonel 

Moulton and others at JPRA, raised a concern that techniques proposed in the CONOP would ‘‘not be legal under the Geneva Conventions.’’ A few days later, in an e-mail to JFCOM leadership, 

Captain Donovan reiterated his concern that a ‘‘number of the interrogation techniques suggested by JPRA in their draft CONOP 

are highly aggressive, such as the water board, and it probably 

goes without saying that if JPRA is to include such techniques in 

a CONOP they prepare for an operational unit in another area of 

responsibility, that they need to be damn sure they’re appropriate 

in both a legal and policy sense.’’ 

Captain Donovan added, ‘‘JPRA got its list of techniques from a 

DOD General Counsel working group report dated March 6, 2003, 

so I’m sure that they felt that their list might have already been 

‘blessed by Pentagon lawyers.’ ’’ 

The working group referred to by Captain Donovan’s e-mail had 

been established at Secretary Rumsfeld’s direction in January 

2003. As the committee heard at our June 17 hearing, over the 

strong objections of senior military lawyers, the working group relied on a March 14, 2003, legal opinion from DOJ’s OLC written 

by John Yoo. The working group’s final report, issued on April 4, 

2003, recommended several aggressive techniques, including removal of clothing, prolonged standing, sleep deprivation, dietary 

manipulation, hooding, increased anxiety through the use of a detainee’s aversions, like dogs, and face and stomach slaps. While the 

final working group report did not mention SERE, many of the 

techniques it recommended were strikingly similar to techniques 

used in JPRA’s SERE training. 

Captain Donovan’s e-mail said that the techniques which were 

approved by Secretary Rumsfeld for use at GTMO in April 2003 

were not the same as those in the working group report, and said 

that what the Secretary had approved was more restrictive. As we 

heard at our June 17 hearing, Secretary Rumsfeld’s April 2003 

memo to the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), GTMO’s 

higher headquarters, was silent on most of the techniques in the 

working group’s report. The Secretary’s memo said that if techniques beyond the 24 that he specifically authorized were required, 

SOUTHCOM should ‘‘provide a written request describing the proposed technique, recommending safeguards and the rationale for 

applying it with an identified detainee.’’ We heard at our last hearing that one such request arrived at the Pentagon just a few 

months later and was approved by the Secretary. 

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s original December 2, 2002, authorization of aggressive interrogation techniques, including stress 

positions, use of dogs, and removing detainees’ clothing, and his 

working group’s April 2003 recommendation of many other additional aggressive techniques conveyed the message that senior officials felt that the physical pressures and degrading tactics were appropriate for use during interrogations of detainees in U.S. military 

169

custody. Many of the aggressive techniques that the Secretary approved in December 2002, including the three that I just mentioned—stripping detainees, putting them in stress positions, and 

using dogs to intimidate them—were used against detainees at Abu 

Ghraib. 

However, even the public disclosure of abuses at Abu Ghraib apparently did not eliminate interest in using SERE specialists to 

provide advice on interrogations. The DOD Inspector General (IG) 

said in its 2006 report that it was only after a request to send a 

JPRA team to Afghanistan in 2004 that JFCOM finally issued 

guidance that the use of SERE for offensive purposes lies outside 

the roles and responsibilities of JPRA. 

I see that there are no other Senators here for an opening statement so I’m going to call first on Colonel Moulton. 

If you would provide us with your statement. Again, thank you 

so much for being with us and for your cooperation with this committee. 

STATEMENT OF COL. JOHN R. MOULTON II, USAF (RET.), 

FORMER COMMANDER, JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY 

AGENCY 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to appear before your committee today. The issue of treatment of detainees in U.S. custody is a critically important matter, 

and I’m pleased to provide information and testimony relative to 

the questions raised in the memo to me, dated September 12. 

In accordance with the committee’s specific request, I have written testimony addressing my recollections of the events cited in 

that memo. 

I do want to take this opportunity to say that I’ve read some of 

Colonel Kleinman’s previous testimony and some of the papers he 

had written, and I feel that we are pretty much of one mind when 

it comes to the treatment of detainees in U.S. custody. I commend 

his service and contribution to this important effort. 

I’d like to provide a brief background on my service to the United 

States, focusing particularly on my time and efforts at JPRA. 

I graduated from the United States Air Force Academy in 1978 

and spent the first 10 years of my career flying operational jobs 

with WC–130s and rescue HC–130s. From 1989 to 2000, I served 

in various command and staff positions, twice at the Air Staff. I 

was a research fellow at Georgetown University, where I taught 

American defense policy. I was also a legislative liaison for SOCOM 

and held the positions of director of operations and commander for 

operational squadrons. 

In July 2000, I was assigned as the Deputy Commander of JPRA, 

and assumed command in March 2001. I served as commander 

until September 2004, and retired in December of that year. 

JPRA’s mission is to shape personnel recovery for DOD interagency and partner nations to enable commanders, forces, and individuals to effectively accomplish their personnel recovery responsibilities. As part of that mission, JPRA provides training to DOD 

personnel on critical tasks essential to SERE. JPRA’s mission has 

never been to conduct interrogations of captured personnel, nor 

170

were the JPRA personnel that I commanded trained to do that mission. 

Commanding the professional men and women of JPRA was, 

without a doubt, the most rewarding assignment of my career. The 

value of the myriad services performed by that agency is unparalleled and is only superceded by the commitment of the men and 

women working there. 

Upon assuming command, I had three primary goals for my command tenure. The first of those was to restructure the organization 

to mirror that of other joint organizations. This restructuring included placing uniformed personnel in charge of directorates which 

had previously been headed by government civilians. I determined 

this restructuring to be critical to the accountability associated 

with our many varied missions. 

My second priority was to create the Personnel Recovery Academy using our training facilities at Fairchild Air Force Base as the 

nucleus for that. I also wanted to create a uniformed command position equivalent to that of squadron commander to oversee their 

programs and to report directly to me. 

Due to the geographic separation and the different missions from 

the JPRA headquarters, I determined it was necessary to have fulltime oversight by a uniformed officer. That change had nothing to 

do with any old perceptions I had of the personnel working at Fairchild Air Force Base. I believed it would provide them with more 

unit identity and cohesion. 

My third priority was to create a core captivity curriculum that 

would bring all the Service survival schools together with one 

standardized approach to SERE training. 

After the events of September 11, 2001, JPRA refocused its attention on the training curriculum and personnel recovery planning 

essential to support the warfighter in a new and ambiguous operating environment. With operations in Afghanistan and, later, Iraq, 

we immediately became focused on developing new area survival 

and evasion charts, ‘‘pointy-talkies,’’ which are cards that help us 

communicate with indigenous, mostly illiterate personnel, and also 

to develop a survival crib sheet for deploying soldiers, sailors, and 

airmen who had not previously had SERE training. 

Permission was especially difficult during this time, because we 

were faced, for the first time in history, with a conflict where our 

Armed Forces were in an operational environment where they 

could find themselves detained as either prisoners of war (POWs), 

peacetime governmental detainees, or hostages. Each of these situations requires the detainee to comport himself differently, and 

there are different legal ramifications with each scenario and how 

U.S. personnel are trained to interact with their captors. 

Synthesizing these requirements into something that junior 

servicemembers focused on their primary mission could easily understand and retain was our most critical task. The requirement 

resulted in a significant increase in deployment operations tempo 

for JPRA to ensure that all forces were trained properly. 

As Commander of JPRA, I reported directly to the Commander 

of JFCOM. On a day-to-day basis, I worked through the chief of 

staff or the director of operations, the J–3. 

171

As had been my direction when I had assumed command of 

JPRA, all requests for support would be forwarded through 

JFCOM, who would then task JPRA after their review and approval. The JFCOM J–3 had an officer and a J–35 who was directly 

responsible for dealing with the requests from other combatant 

commands and Services that the JPRA support. 

While JPRA routinely provided support teams in theater to conduct SERE training and also supported other DOD organizations 

with subject-matter experts on captivity psychology and counter-resistance, prior to September 2003 I’m not aware of any other direct 

support to interrogation operations in the field. 

Throughout my tenure, I had discussions with JFCOM leadership about our mission and my reservations about extending support to interrogation operations. I believe there is a consensus 

among JFCOM leadership and my staff that JPRA as an organization was limited by its authorities. There was also a common agreement that the only personnel within DOD with subject-matter expertise on captivity psychology and counter-resistance were the 

training instructors assigned to JPRA in the Service SERE schools. 

The dilemma we faced was how to provide support in these 

areas, while not extending past JPRA’s charter. My recommendation to senior leadership at JFCOM, as early as February 2002, 

was to provide support requests by having individual Service subject-matter experts. This approach was endorsed by JFCOM and 

followed throughout my tenure and command. 

I believe now, as I did during these events, that JPRA should not 

be in the business of conducting interrogations or interrogator 

training. Our personnel were not trained interrogators, and JPRA 

is not organized, trained, and equipped to perform that mission. 

However, the unique knowledge and expertise of the JPRA professionals did provide invaluable support for DOD’s intelligence collection efforts. At the time, the confluence of events, especially the infusion of unlawful combatants into the conflict, the lack of clear 

guidance on their legal status in written operating procedures, and 

the lack of knowledge within the Intelligence Community about the 

psychology of captivity required tough decisions to be made. I believe that JPRA’s efforts expanded the knowledge of captivity psychology, which led to improvements in the collection of actual 

human intelligence. 

I appreciate the opportunity to speak today, and look forward to 

answering any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Colonel Moulton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT COL. JOHN R. MOULTON II (RET.), USAF 

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for allowing 

me to appear before your committee today. The issue of treatment of detainees in 

U.S. custody is a critically important matter and I am pleased to provide information and testimony relative to the questions raised in your memo to me dated September 12, 2008. 

In accordance with the committee’s specific request, my written testimony today 

addresses my recollections of: (1) Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) support 

to the Special Mission Unit Task Force (SMU TF) operations, including the September 2003 assistance visit to the SMU TF; (2) the purpose of the September 2003 

visit; (3) any discussions I had with the SMU TF Commander relative to that visit; 

(4) any discussions I had with the JPRA Team Chief during that visit; (5) authorities granted to the JPRA team during that visit; and (6) any discussions I had with 

172

the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) relative to the September 2003 visit to 

the SMU TF and other JPRA assistance to interrogation operations. 

Before I address these specific questions, I would like to provide a brief background on my service in the United States Air Force, particularly focusing on my 

time and efforts at JPRA. I graduated from the United States Air Force Academy 

in 1978 and spent the first 10 years of my career in various operational positions 

as a navigator in weather WC–130s and search and rescue HC–130s. From 1989 to 

2000, I served in various command and staff positions to include two assignments 

to Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, National Defense Fellow at Georgetown University, 

legislative liaison for the U.S. Special Operations Command, and Director of Operations and Commander of Operational squadrons. In July 2000, I was assigned as 

the Deputy Commander of JPRA and assumed command in March 2001. I served 

as the Commander of JPRA until September 2004 and retired from Active Duty in 

December 2004. 

JPRA’s mission is to shape Personnel Recovery (PR) for the DOD, interagency, 

and partner nations and to enable commanders, forces, and individuals, to effectively accomplish their Personnel Recovery responsibilities. As part of that mission 

JPRA provides training to DOD personnel on critical tasks essential to survive, 

evade, resist, and escape captivity. JPRA’s mission has never been to conduct interrogations of captured personnel nor were the JPRA personnel that I commanded 

trained to do that mission. 

Commanding the professional men and women of JPRA was without a doubt the 

most rewarding assignment of my career. The value of the myriad services performed by that agency in support of the Department of Defense (DOD) is dwarfed 

only by the commitment of the men and women working there. Upon assuming command I had three primary goals for my command tenure. First I wanted to restructure the organization to mirror that of other joint commands. This restructuring included placing uniformed personnel in charge of directorates, most of which were 

previously headed by government civilians. I determined this restructuring to be 

critical to the accountability associated with our many varied missions. My second 

priority was to create a Personnel Recovery Academy (PRA) using our training facilities at Fairchild Air Force Base (AFB), WA, as the nucleus and to create a uniformed command position equivalent to that of a squadron commander to oversee 

their programs and report directly to me. Due to geographic separation and difference in mission from the JPRA headquarters, I determined it was necessary to 

have full-time oversight by a uniformed officer. This change had nothing to do with 

any ill perceptions of the personnel working at Fairchild AFB, but rather I believed 

it would provide them with more unit identity and cohesion. My third priority was 

to create a core captivity curriculum that would bring all the service survival 

schools together with one standardized approach to survival, evasion, resistance, 

and escape (SERE) training. 

After the events of September 11, 2001, JPRA refocused its attention on the training curriculum and personnel recovery planning essential to support the warfighter 

in new and ambiguous operating environments. With operations in Afghanistan 

(and again later for Iraq) we immediately became focused on developing new area 

survival and evasion charts, ‘‘pointy-talkies’’ (cards that allowed DOD personnel to 

communicate with indigenous personnel), and trying to develop a survival crib sheet 

for deploying soldiers, sailors, and airmen who had not previously received any 

SERE training. 

JPRA’s mission was especially difficult during this time because we were faced 

for the first time in the history of the United States with a conflict where our Armed 

Forces were in an operational environment where they could find themselves detained as prisoners of war, peacetime governmental detainees, or hostages. Each of 

these situations requires the detainee to comport himself differently. There are different legal ramifications with each scenario and how U.S. personnel are trained to 

interact with their captors is also different. Synthesizing these requirements into 

something junior servicemembers—focused on their primary missions—could easily 

understand and retain was our most critical task. This requirement resulted in a 

significant increase deployment operations tempo for JPRA to ensure all forces were 

trained properly. 

As the JPRA Commander, I reported directly to Commander, JFCOM. On a daily 

basis, I worked with the Command primarily through the Chief of Staff and the Director of Operations (J–3). As had been my direction to JPRA staff upon assuming 

command, all requests for JPRA assistance were required to be forwarded through 

JFCOM who would then task JPRA after their review and approval. The JFCOM 

J–3 had an officer in the J–35 who was directly responsible for dealing with the requests from other combatant commanders and the Services for JPRA support. 

173

While JPRA routinely provided support teams in theater to conduct SERE training and also supported other DOD organizations with subject matter experts (SMEs) 

on captivity psychology and counterresistance prior to September 2003, I am not 

aware of any other direct support to interrogation operations in the field. Throughout my tenure, I had discussions with JFCOM leadership about our mission and my 

reservations about extending support to interrogation operations, I believe there was 

consensus among JFCOM leadership and my staff that JPRA as an organization 

that was limited by its authorities. There was also common agreement that the only 

personnel within DOD with subject matter expertise on captivity psychology and 

counter-resistance were the training instructors assigned to JPRA and the Service 

SERE schools. The dilemma we faced was how to provide support on these areas 

while not extending past JPRA’s charter. My recommendation to senior leadership 

at JFCOM as early as February 2002 was to support requests by having individuals 

serve as SMEs. This approach was endorsed by JFCOM and followed throughout my 

tenure in command. 

The request for support from the SMU TF came in late July or early August 2003 

when I received a call from the TF Commander. We had served together off and 

on during our careers. The purpose of his call was to enlist JPRA’s assistance in 

identifying resistance techniques being used by some of the high value target detainees they were capturing. I relayed to the TF commander that if he wanted assistance he would have to request SME support through the proper channels. In this 

case the request went through the U.S. Central Command chain of command, to the 

Joint Staff, and then down through JFCOM to JPRA. 

After receiving the call from the SMU TF Commander, I notified the JFCOM J–

3. In the follow-up e-mail to the J–3, dated September 9, 2003. I reiterated and 

clarified my intent not to pursue an expansive JPRA role (to avoid the risk of mission creep). When the request for support came down from JFCOM, we identified 

a three person team to deploy. I specifically asked by name for Lieutenant Colonel 

Kleinman to lead the group so I would have an experienced, uniformed officer on 

the ground. JFCOM leadership was briefed and after their approval the team departed. 

At some point during the trip, I was called by Lieutenant Colonel Kleinman on 

my secure phone at my personal residence. Lieutenant Colonel Kleinman relayed 

that the SMU TF wanted training on counterresistance measures, something we 

had not planned for. I asked Lieutenant Colonel Kleinman what the legal status of 

the detainees was and what techniques the TF wanted to see demonstrated. I was 

told that the detainees were designated unlawful combatants and that the techniques being requested were ones used by JPRA personnel during SERE training. 

Lieutenant Colonel Kleinman did mention he had some reservations and I asked 

him to talk with the TF legal adviser. I then discussed the request with JFCOM 

senior leadership. The decision was made to have Lieutenant Colonel Kleinman 

check again with the SMU TF legal advisor and support, if the request for training 

was given the okay. 

Later, I received another request from Lieutenant Colonel Kleinman. He said the 

TF was now asking for the JPRA instructors to demonstrate the counterresistance 

techniques with a detainee. Again Lieutenant Colonel Kleinman expressed his concern. I again contacted JFCOM leadership and relayed the request and Lieutenant 

Colonel Kleinman’s concerns. The JFCOM decision was to permit the demonstrations to proceed, but only after coordinating with the TF legal adviser. I relayed this 

to Lieutenant Colonel Kleinman who again voiced his concern. I relayed the directions from JFCOM and said something to the effect that he was there on the ground 

and if he thought it was going beyond what he felt comfortable with that he could 

make the call on whether to proceed. 

At some point during the demonstration, Lieutenant Colonel Kleinman did intercede and stopped it. Shortly thereafter, the JPRA personnel were sent back home. 

I called the TF commander back to inquire about the support provided by my team 

and he indicated the team had delivered to his expectations and that he was satisfied with the support he got. I asked for and got after action reports from all the 

team members. While recollections differed, I got the sense from these reports that 

the TF Director of Intelligence (J–2) desired more participation from the deployed 

personnel than they were prepared to provide and the mission was terminated. I 

had no further contact with the TF commander on this matter after I got his feedback. 

I do not recall providing a formal debriefing to JFCOM leadership, but the trip 

was covered in my weekly classified updates to JFCOM Commander. The after action reports were forwarded to JFCOM through secure channels to the J–35. 

I believe now, as I did during these events, that JPRA should not be in the business of conducting interrogations or interrogator training. Our personnel were not 

174

trained interrogators and JPRA is not organized, manned, or equipped to perform 

that mission. However, the unique knowledge and expertise of JPRA professionals 

did provide invaluable support to DOD’s intelligence collection efforts. At the time, 

the confluence of events, especially the infusion of unlawful combatants into the conflict, the lack of clear guidance on their legal status and written operating procedures, and the lack of knowledge within the Intelligence Community about the psychology of captivity required tough decisions to be made. I believe that JPRA’s efforts expanded the knowledge of captivity psychology which led to improvements in 

the collection of actionable human intelligence. I appreciate the opportunity to speak 

with you today and look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Colonel. We’ll put your 

entire statement in the record. I noted that you shortened it. 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. If there’s no objection, we’ll put the entire 

statement in the record. 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Colonel Kleinman? 

STATEMENT OF COL. STEVEN M. KLEINMAN, USAFR, FORMER 

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, PERSONNEL RECOVERY 

ACADEMY, JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY AGENCY 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Mr. Chairman, it’s a pleasure and certainly 

an honor to appear before you today, and I thank you for the invitation. 

The military resume ́ that I submitted along with my written 

statement, I offer up as the bona fides for a career that was involved with human intelligence, interrogation, special survival 

training, and special operations, and I hope that supports the credibility of the statements and observations that I make today. 

Clearly, of particular interest to the committee are the events 

that transpired in conjunction with the deployment of the JPRA 

team in September 2003 to Iraq, but I must admit that the problematic event was just symptomatic of much larger issues that 

transcend any single command. But, I think, in sifting through the 

answer to a single question, we might uncover some very surprising and useful truths. The question is: Why did the special operations community feel that it was necessary and appropriate to 

request interrogation support from a command that you’ve pointed 

out has a mission of not interrogation, but providing resistance to 

interrogation training? 

To adequately address that question, I need to detail several contributing events that began after the horrific attacks on September 

11 and our invasion of Iraq in 2003. 

The Armed Forces and intelligence services of this country were 

shifting their focus from a conventional strategic threat to one defined as asymmetric and operational. But, much about that new 

threat was unavailable through our strength in technical intelligence. Surprising to most, that gap was filled by the interrogation 

of detainees. We are now literally face to face with an enemy that 

most described as unlike any we’d ever encountered. A stereotyped 

caricature of this enemy soon emerged and it did not take long for 

us to decide that special treatment, including the so-called enhanced interrogation methods, were required, even though those 

were prohibited by the standards of conduct that we previously adhered to. 

175

From the beginning, there was incredible pressure placed on interrogators to elicit actionable information—information that operators can act upon within a 24- to 48-hour cycle—from almost 

every individual that we took into custody. Some of these detainees 

were complicit, and some were innocent. Some were truly knowledgeable, and some were truly clueless. Nonetheless, we erred in 

simply pressing interrogation and interrogators beyond the edge of 

the envelope. As a result, interrogation was no longer an intelligence collection method; rather, in many cases it had morphed 

into a form of punishment for those who would not cooperate. 

We sent very young, very inexperienced interrogators to collect 

this intelligence. We asked them to do that in an asymmetric 

battlespace, even though they were trained for a Cold War tactical 

model. We matched them against detainees about whom we know 

so little. So, we should not be surprised that the results were less 

than optimal. 

When this proved ineffective in producing the type of actionable 

intelligence that senior leaders required, other viable strategies, 

such as those I hope to be able to outline today, were ignored or 

rejected as irrelevant in this new battlespace in the 21st century. 

Instead, we opted to do more of the same, only now we have 

ratcheted up the pressure, and in some cases to an alarming degree. 

We had the choice of getting smarter or getting tougher. Unfortunately, we chose the latter. Nonetheless, the intelligence shortfall 

continued, and operational commanders demanded more intelligence. 

The resourceful special operations community, to which I’m assigned right now, then sought solutions outside the Intelligence 

Community. With clear memories of their experiences during intensive resistance to interrogation exercises that are a key part of 

SERE training, their search led them to the cadre of very talented 

survival instructors who demonstrated exceptional skill in conducting interrogations using the high pressure, often threatening 

tactic deployed by countries that were not signatories to the Geneva Convention. These special operators were understandably impressed by the ability of these instructors to compel compliance 

with both force and subterfuge. 

To the nonintelligence officer, the transfer of SERE methods 

from the training environment to real-world operations seemed a 

logical option. However, several critical factors were overlooked. 

First, many of the methods used in SERE training are based on 

what was once known as a communist interrogation model; a system designed to physically and psychologically debilitate a person, 

a detainee, as a means of gaining compliance. Second, the model’s 

primary objective was to compel a prisoner to generate propaganda, 

not provide intelligence. Third, it was expressly designed to mirror 

a program whose methods were considered in the west as violations 

of the Geneva Convention. 

The problems with employing SERE techniques in the interrogation of detainees did not stop there. I want to emphasize, Mr. 

Chairman, that the survival instructors are some of the most dedicated professionals in the Armed Forces. Their tireless work is in 

support of a single mission, and that is to help others return with 

176

honor. But, I’d be remiss if I did not make abundantly clear that 

they are not interrogators. While there’s much in common between 

interrogation and teaching resistance to interrogation, there are 

very profound differences. Survival instructors, for example, operate in the domestic environment with students who share a language and a culture. In contrast, interrogators operate worldwide, 

interacting with foreign nationals, often across a very substantial 

cultural and linguistic divide. If questions arise about a student’s 

veracity in the course of role play, the survival instructor need only 

call the student’s unit of assignment to verify the information. 

Clearly, that’s not an option for an interrogator for whom detecting 

deception is a critical skill. 

While resistance to interrogation role play is limited in duration, 

frequency, and scope, interrogations of custodial detainees may last 

hours and continue over a span of months. 

Finally, the survival instructor’s focus is on the performance of 

the student, not collecting information. An interrogator must doggedly pursue and record every detail of intelligence information detainees possess. With little expertise in interrogation operations at 

the senior level—and it should be noted that the CIA did not get 

involved in interrogation until after September 11—the legal, operational, and moral factors that should govern the employment of 

SERE methods went largely unrecognized. There were very few internal safeguards that should have maintained a clear separation 

between these two activities. 

It is this lack of expertise at the senior level that provides the 

final piece of the puzzle. As an experienced interrogator and a 

former director of the Air Force Combat Interrogation Course, I am 

acutely aware of how the laws of armed conflict apply to interrogation of detainees. Therefore, I was stunned upon my return from 

Iraq at the number of senior officers who challenged my on-theground assessment of the unlawful interrogation methods with the 

argument that psychologically and physically punishing interrogations are precisely what they would expect had they found themselves captured. In a sense, they deferred the standards to the 

enemy. 

In summary, the following are the key factors contributing to our 

current state of affairs: 

Number one, our approach to interrogation has failed to keep 

pace with our understanding of the operational environment or 

with knowledge of the behavioral sciences. In addition, interrogation continues to be viewed as a simple task that we can assign to 

our most junior military personnel. 

Number two, pressed to find a solution to the critical intelligence 

shortfall, special operators followed their professional instincts. 

They could not wait for the intelligence community to catch up. 

Number three, the lack of expertise at the senior level in managing and conducting interrogation was a single point of failure 

that facilitated the introduction of SERE techniques into the repertoire of allowable interrogation methods. As a result, adversaries 

and allies alike have accused this Nation of gross violations of the 

Geneva Convention and of violating the basic human rights of 

those in detention. The geostrategic consequences are likely to last 

decades. 

177

Mr. Chairman, I’m hopeful that we might leverage our collective 

wisdom, expertise, and sense of justice to finally take steps necessary to revisit and refine our policies on the handling and interrogation of detainees in a manner that reflects the best of America’s core values. Having had the honor of interviewing a number 

of World War II-era interrogators who set the standard for both 

operational effectiveness and propriety, I can tell you this; members of that great generation are watching us carefully. We walk 

in their shadows. Let us give them one more reason to be proud 

of their country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Colonel Kleinman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY COL. STEVEN M. KLEINMAN, USAFR 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today. 

The military resume ́ submitted to the committee along with my written statement 

recounts a career invested in human intelligence, interrogation, special survival 

training, and special operations. I offer that as bona fides for the observations and 

recommendations I will provide today. 

Of particular interest to the committee are the actions that transpired in conjunction with the deployment of the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) team to 

Baghdad in September 2003. That problematic event was, in my view, symptomatic 

of much larger issues that transcend any single command. However, in sifting 

through the answer to a single question, we might uncover some surprising truths:

Why did the special operations community find it necessary—and appropriate—to request interrogation support from an organization whose mission was, and is, to teach resistance to interrogation?

To adequately address this question, I need to outline a series of contributing 

events that began shortly after the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001, and the 

invasion of Iraq in March 2003. At that time, the Nation’s Armed Forces and intelligence services were struggling to shift the focus from a conventional and strategic 

threat to one defined as asymmetric and operational. Much about this new adversary, however, could not be gathered through our edge in technical intelligence. In 

a surprise to many, this critical gap was filled by the interrogation of detainees. 

We were literally face-to-face with an enemy described as unlike any we had previously encountered. A stereotyped caricature of our adversary soon emerged and it 

did not take long for us to determine that he required special treatment, including 

so-called enhanced interrogation techniques that were prohibited under the standards of conduct we hewed to in the past. 

From the beginning, there was incredible pressure on interrogators to elicit actionable intelligence from practically every individual we took into custody. Some of 

these detainees were complicit, others innocent; some were knowledgeable, some 

truly clueless. In far too many cases, we simply erred in pressing interrogation and 

interrogators beyond the edge of the envelope. As a result, interrogation was no 

longer an intelligence collection method; rather, it had morphed into a form of punishment for those who wouldn’t cooperate. 

We sent very young and inexperienced interrogators to collect intelligence. We 

tasked them to do so in an asymmetric battlespace using a Cold War tactical interrogation model. We matched them against detainees about whom we seemed to 

know so little. Should we have then been surprised with less than optimal results? 

When this approach proved ineffective in producing the type of actionable intelligence required by senior leaders, other viable strategies—such as those I’ll describe in a moment—were ignored or rejected as irrelevant in the ‘‘unique’’ battleground of the new century. We instead opted for more of the same, except the pressure would be ratcheted up . . . in some cases to an alarming degree. When presented with the choice of getting smarter or getting tougher, we chose the latter. 

Nonetheless, the intelligence shortfall continued and left commanders demanding 

more. 

I’d like to briefly segue to a relevant event that took place this summer. I was 

privileged to join 14 of America’s most accomplished intelligence and law enforcement professionals in an intensive discussion of best practices in interrogation. Representing the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, we collectively represented 350 years of operational exVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00181 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
178

perience in conducting thousands of interrogations and debriefings. Our respective 

professional experiences led us to a single, emphatic conclusion: the most effective 

method for consistently eliciting accurate and comprehensive information from even 

the most defiant individuals—to include terrorists and insurgents—was through a 

patient, systematic, and culturally enlightened effort to build an operationally useful 

relationship. Similarly, we shared the belief that coercive tactics that relied on psychological, emotional, and/or physical pressures were, in the long run, not only ineffective but also counterproductive. 

Ironically, this long-overdue conclave was hosted not by the U.S. Intelligence 

Community, but by Human Rights First, a remarkable organization with a vision 

that our recommendations might constructively inform government policy. 

Independent from that affair, the resourceful special operations community sought 

solutions outside the Intelligence Community. With clear memories of their experiences during intensive resistance to interrogation exercises that are a key element 

of survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training, their search led them 

to the cadre of talented survival instructors who had demonstrated exceptional skill 

in conducting interrogations using the high-pressure, often threatening tactics employed by countries that are not signatories to the Geneva Convention. The special 

operators were understandably impressed with the ability of these instructors to 

compel compliance with both force and subterfuge. 

To the nonintelligence officer, the transfer of SERE methods from the training environment to real-world operations seemed a logical option. Several critical factors, 

however, were overlooked. First, many of the methods used in SERE training are 

based on what was once known as the Communist Interrogation Model, a system 

designed to physically and psychologically debilitate a detainee as a means of gaining compliance. Second, that model’s primary objective was to compel a prisoner to 

generate propaganda not intelligence. Third, it was expressly designed to mirror a 

program that employed methods of interrogation considered by the West to be violations of the Geneva Conventions. 

The problems with employing SERE techniques in the interrogation of detainees 

do not stop there. I want to emphasize that survival instructors are some of the 

most dedicated professionals in Armed Forces. Their tireless work supports a noble 

mission: to prepare others to return with honor. I would be remiss, though, if I did 

not make one point abundantly clear: survival instructors are not interrogators. 

While interrogation and teaching resistance to interrogation have much in common, 

they are nonetheless profoundly different activities.

• Survival instructors operate in a domestic training environment and 

share both a language and culture with the students they teach. In contrast, interrogators are involved in worldwide operations and interact with 

foreign nationals across an often substantial cultural and linguistic divide. 

• If questions arise about the student’s veracity during role-play, a survival 

instructor need only call the student’s unit of assignment to verify the information. Clearly, this is not an option for an interrogator for whom detecting 

deception is a critical skill. 

• While interrogation role-play is limited in duration, frequency, and scope, 

interrogations of custodial detainees may last hours and continue over a 

span of months. 

• The survival instructor’s focus is not on information but the performance 

of the student while the interrogator must doggedly pursue—and record—

every detail of intelligence information a detainee possesses.

With little expertise in interrogation operations at the senior levels—and it must 

be noted that the Central Intelligence Agency only became involved in interrogation 

after September 11—the legal, operational, and even moral concerns about the employment of SERE methods went largely unrecognized. There were few internal 

safeguards that should have maintained a clear separation between these two activities. 

It is this lack of expertise that provides the final piece of the puzzle. As an experienced interrogator and former director of the Air Force Combat Interrogation 

Course, I am acutely aware of how the laws of armed conflict apply to the interrogation of detainees. I was therefore stunned upon my return from Iraq at the number 

of times senior officers challenged my on-the-ground assessment of unlawful interrogation methods with the argument that psychologically and physically punishing interrogations are acceptable because that is how they would expect to be treated if 

179

1The Lexington Principles on the Rights of Detainees, a project of the Washington and Lee 

University School of Law, sets forth an excellent examination of the international legal standards with respect to the treatment of detainees. The Lexington Principles was produced by an 

association of legal scholars, military officers, and representatives of a cross-section of related 

disciplines who seek to implement the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation that America engage 

the international community on issues that include minimum standards for prisoner detention 

and treatment. Additional information may be found at <http://law.wlu.edu/lexingtonprinciples/

>. 

captured by the enemy. In other words, they deferred to the adversary in setting 

standards of conduct.1

In summary, the following are the key factors contributing to our current state:

1. Our approach to interrogation has not kept pace with our understanding of the operational environment nor with current knowledge in the 

behavioral sciences. In addition, interrogation continues to be viewed as a 

relatively simple task that can be assigned to our most junior military personnel. 

2. Pressed to find a solution to a critical intelligence shortfall, special operators followed their professional instincts. They could not wait for the intelligence community to respond. 

3. A lack of expertise at the senior levels in managing and conducting interrogation operations was a single point of failure that facilitated the introduction of SERE techniques into the repertoire of allowable interrogation 

methods.

As a result, adversaries and allies alike have accused this nation of gross violations of the Geneva Conventions and of violating the basic human rights of detainees in our custody. The geostrategic consequences are likely to last decades. 

Mr. Chairman, I am hopeful we might leverage our collective wisdom, expertise, 

and sense of justice to finally take the steps necessary to revisit and refine our policies on the handling and interrogation of detainees in a manner that reflects the 

best of America’s core values. 

Having interviewed a number of World War II-era interrogators who set the 

standard for both operational effectiveness and propriety, I can tell you this: members of that Greatest Generation are watching us carefully; we walk in their shadow. Let us give them one more reason to be proud of their country.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Colonel, very much. 

Colonel Kleinman, let me start with you. You went to Iraq with 

a team of two others, so there were three of you in the JPRA team. 

Is that correct? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. That’s correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. When you got there, that was during the week 

of September 4, 2003? Does that sound right? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. When you got there, you raised concerns, as I 

understand it, about the interrogation tactics which were being employed against detainees in our custody, and called Colonel 

Moulton. Is that correct, Colonel Kleinman? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Not exactly, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Oh. Well then, what happened? 

Colonel MOULTON. I observed a number of what I thought were 

abuses, and during at least one interrogation, I intervened and 

stopped it. This is before I fed it back to Colonel Moulton, because 

I didn’t think there were systemic problems. I did talk to the Captain who was in charge of the J–2X, which is a position responsible 

for overseeing interrogation and human intelligence operations and 

counterintelligence. His quote was, ‘‘Your judgment is my judgment.’’ So, I stopped the interrogation. I did brief the task force 

commander of what I did and why. He had absolutely no reservations about that action. 

Chairman LEVIN. The task force commander was whom? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. I’ve been briefed, sir. I’m not sure if I’m——

180

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Let me ask you this question. You 

witnessed an interrogation that you thought was abusive? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Can you describe what you saw? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir. Very simply. I walked into an interrogation room all painted in black with a spotlight on the detainee. 

Behind the detainee was a military guard with an iron bar, literally the caricature or stereotype of the old gangster movies, slapping it in his hand. The interrogator was sitting in a chair. The interpreter was to his left. The detainee was on his knees. A question 

was asked by the interrogator and interpreted. The response came 

back, and upon interpretation the detainee would be slapped across 

the face. That continued with every question and every response. 

I asked my colleagues how long this had been going on, specifically 

the slapping. They said approximately 30 minutes. They didn’t 

seem to think there was a problem, because in SERE training 

there’s a facial slap. But, it’s conducted in a very specific way to 

a very specific part of the face so that it causes more shock than 

pain. This was not conducted in that fashion. 

Chairman LEVIN. Who was conducting it? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. One of the interrogators who was assigned to 

the task force. Not one of the JPRA members. 

Chairman LEVIN. Were the other two JPRA members in the 

room? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir, they were sitting in chairs behind 

the detainee, 2 or 3 yards away. They weren’t involved, other than 

observing at the time I was there. They made no comment. 

Chairman LEVIN. Following that incident is when you first called 

Colonel Moulton. Is that correct? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. No, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. When did you call Colonel Moulton? How long 

after you witnessed that? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Thinking that it was an individual problem 

that we could handle at the task force level, that JPRA’s interests 

weren’t really involved there, it must have been a week before I 

talked to Colonel Moulton, maybe even longer. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. That time, I was observing the activities at 

this interrogation facility and reporting back to the task force commander with my assessment of where the problems lied and where 

the possible solutions were. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was there another incident that you witnessed 

which you considered abusive? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir. There was one case. A plan was laid 

out on butcher paper for another detainee that involved extensive 

stress positions, followed by interrogation, followed by short periods 

of sleep, 45 minutes, I think. The idea was that maybe they would 

give them 4 hours of sleep over a 24-hour period, but it wouldn’t 

be continuous, it would be in little 45-minute increments. It was 

literally specific. This time to this time, they’d be in stress position. 

This time to this time, they would be allowed to sleep. This time 

to this time, they would be interrogated. I stopped that, also. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was it at that point you first called Colonel 

Moulton? 

181

Colonel KLEINMAN. No, I think it was shortly after that point 

that a disagreement arose between myself and the two other members of the team. They felt that I had no authority to have stopped 

any of the interrogations. 

Chairman LEVIN. This is your JPRA team that you’re talking 

about? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. You had stopped the interrogation. You were 

arguing with them as to whether you had the authority to do so? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. That’s correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. It was at that point you called the Colonel? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, at that point. 

Chairman LEVIN. When you called, what was the conversation? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. I want to provide as accurate information as 

possible, so let me reflect on this. It was about the point when I 

saw other challenges, how things weren’t going to get better, and 

that my two JPRA colleagues were pushing to get more involved. 

I told them that they should, precisely as advisors. For instance, 

how to handle prisoners when they first come in, how to go through 

pocket litter, et cetera, the things that I thought JPRA had a 

strength that they could offer. But, it was when they started making recommendations about the treatment of a detainee that would 

be essentially a replication of what we do during our role-play exercises, which sometimes are very intensive, but are supervised by a 

psychologist, by medical personnel, by seasoned individuals. That’s 

when I called. 

Chairman LEVIN. Those were the techniques that you considered 

abusive when applied to detainees? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir. I can enumerate what those were. 

Chairman LEVIN. Please. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Stripped naked——

Chairman LEVIN. Well, now, did you see that? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Ultimately, I did, sir. This was after, I believe, I talked with Colonel Moulton. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right, that comes afterward, the stripping 

naked. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Let’s go back, now, to the call that you had 

with Colonel Moulton. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. All right. I talked to the task force commander. I expressed my concerns that the SERE methods for interrogation were unlawful, they violated the Geneva Convention and 

national law. The task force commander had, again, absolutely no 

reservation about that. He said, ‘‘Well, of course. Survival training 

is conducted by people who volunteer under very controlled measures. This is a whole different field out here.’’ I said, ‘‘Well, my colleagues and others at the task force are expecting us to use these 

other methods.’’ So, I told him that I was going to call Colonel 

Moulton, and I think, actually, this officer had discussions with 

Colonel Moulton beforehand. 

Chairman LEVIN. Following that conversation, you called Colonel 

Moulton? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir. 

182

Chairman LEVIN. Would you now tell us what that conversation 

was? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir. I explained that we were being 

asked to use the full range of SERE methods in the interrogation 

of detainees, and I told him that it was my view that those were 

violations of the Geneva Convention, they weren’t authorized, and 

we should not do them. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you describe what you had seen? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir. I told him that I had stopped interrogations, and the approaches that had been used I thought were 

unlawful. 

Chairman LEVIN. What was his response? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. I believe, at that time, he said that he was 

going to check other sources to make sure that we were clear on 

what we could and could not do. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was there anything else in that conversation 

that you remember? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. I was directed to call him again 24 hours 

later. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you do that? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir, I did. 

Chairman LEVIN. Tell us about that second conversation. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. The second was very short. I was told, ‘‘We 

are cleared hot to use SERE methods.’’ In the flying community, especially, when you’re cleared hot, weapons-free, you can act on orders to fire weapons, no further direction necessary. 

So, I asked him specifically if he could enumerate those approaches, which he did. Maybe he wondered why I was asking. I 

just wanted to make sure we were clear that we were talking about 

belly slap, walling, we went into the entire list, the isolation, that 

sort of thing. 

I explained to him that, in my opinion, not as a member of JPRA, 

but as an experienced interrogator, that this was a violation of Geneva Conventions. I might add, the task force Judge Advocate General (JAG) that I talked to agreed with me 100 percent, and apparently he briefed the task force commander, but when it was time 

for him to brief the interrogators, it kind of fell back to the ‘‘it depends’’ mode. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you explain to your headquarters that you 

had stopped the interrogation, you had considered them illegal? 

They knew that when you called Colonel Moulton, you had explained to him what you had done? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir. In addition, one of my team members had a satellite telephone, and he had made calls to another 

individual at JPRA who’s pretty much our point of contact, and 

briefed them on what I had done, as well. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was stripping one of those methods? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Subsequent to the conversation I had with 

Colonel Moulton, yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Not what you saw, but, in terms of the list of 

JPRA approved tactics? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Well, I won’t testify to that, sir. Only because 

it’s been years now, and it was an intensive phone call. 

183

Chairman LEVIN. No, no. I’m looking at the list of JPRA methods—body slaps, stripping, immersion in water. Are those the 

JPRA techniques that you went through with Colonel Moulton? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir. I’m not sure if we went through the 

entire list, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. But, you talked about specific techniques? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Right. 

Chairman LEVIN. After that second phone call, did you witness 

another incident involving your two JPRA colleagues? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I did. 

Chairman LEVIN. Will you describe that incident? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir. After the phone call with Colonel 

Moulton——

Chairman LEVIN. That would be the second phone call? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir. I related to them my discussion with 

Colonel Moulton. 

Chairman LEVIN. ‘‘Them’’ being? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. The two members of the JPRA team. I explained the difference of opinion that I had with Colonel Moulton, 

that I told him that I thought it was an unlawful order, and I 

wasn’t going to have any involvement with it, and I didn’t think 

that they should, either. 

One was a contractor, and one was a civilian. The military line 

of authority was very unclear at the time. But, they decided that 

there was going to be one effort to demonstrate the way you handled an interrogation. So, there was an individual that was suspected of being a terrorist. How it unfolded is, I said, ‘‘Well, let’s 

take control and show them how to do one in a methodical fashion.’’ 

My plan was for this person, who hadn’t provided any information, 

‘‘Why don’t we create a false release sort of scenario. We’ll make 

him think that we’re letting him go, almost kind of a reset button. 

We’ll bring him back in here, and we’ll approach him in a much 

more mature, much more systematic fashion, and not threatening, 

we’ll just be very purposeful. Will we use ploys and stratagems? 

Absolutely. But, we didn’t need to use any of the survival methods.’’ 

Chairman LEVIN. The ‘‘survival methods’’ being those SERE 

methods, the aggressive physical methods, the stripping and things 

like that. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s not what you were proposing. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. That’s correct, I was not proposing that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. The other two members took charge of the interrogation. 

Chairman LEVIN. Where was the interrogation? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. It was at the same interrogation center that 

was associated with the task force. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was that detainee driven to that place? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. He was driven away, then brought back. 

Chairman LEVIN. He was driven. Was this a cell of some kind? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Actually, where it took place was a bunker 

that was about a story into the ground; cement, cold, dark. I think 

it was either an ammo bunker or even a defensive position. 

184

Chairman LEVIN. But, he was driven away first, and then 

brought back? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. What was the purpose of that? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. The idea was to make him think that he was 

being released and then picked up by different people. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. What happened in that bunker then? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. What happened in that bunker was something I’d seen hundreds of times. It’s the way we go about some 

of the survival training. 

Chairman LEVIN. You’ve seen it hundreds of times in your survival training of our own people under the very controlled environment that you’ve described. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s not what this environment was, I take 

it. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. This was an uncontrolled environment by any 

measure. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, and against a detainee? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, would you describe what you saw? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. He was literally carried, by two of the 

guards, into the bunker, struggling against them. He was taken 

down there. My two JPRA colleagues took over from that point. 

They ripped his disdasha off, not cut, they ripped it off. 

Chairman LEVIN. His what? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. The traditional Middle Eastern wear, a long, 

almost dresslike garment. They ripped it off his body, ripped off his 

underwear, and took his shoes. They had hooded him already. Then 

they shackled him by the wrists and ankles and screamed at him 

in his ear the entire time in English about essentially what a poor 

specimen of human that he was. Then, the orders were given that 

he was to stand in that position for 12 hours. No matter how much 

he asked for help, no matter how much he pleaded, unless he 

passed out, the guards were not to respond to any requests for 

help. It wasn’t until after 12 hours that we’d start to interrogate. 

He was left in that position, in a cement room about, maybe, 6 foot 

by 6 foot. Small enough that, had he lost consciousness and fallen 

over in any direction, he would have clearly hit his head on a wall. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. So, he was stripped naked and left 

standing. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s when you left? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. That’s when I left. 

Chairman LEVIN. What did you say to your JPRA colleagues? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. I told them that this is unlawful. I went into 

detail about the operational effectiveness, trying to gain their support in that way. But, I just told them, ‘‘This is unlawful,’’ and we 

ended up putting a stop to it right there. There was no reason to 

continue, at that point. 

Chairman LEVIN. You put a stop to that? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was there another conversation, then, you had 

with Colonel Moulton? 

185

Colonel KLEINMAN. No, sir. At that point, my discussions were almost daily with the task force commander, telling him what we 

could not do and giving him my assessment of what his options 

were. At that point, what happened for the remainder of our time 

out there is, my two colleagues pretty much stayed inside a room. 

They did provide survival training to some of the Rangers there, 

refresher training, getting back to their strength, what they do incredibly well. 

Chairman LEVIN. This is the survival training that they were 

trained to do? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes. Both these individuals were career survival instructors. 

Chairman LEVIN. You said one was a contractor and one was a 

civilian. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir. One was a government civilian, a 

full-time employee with the Department of the Air Force, and the 

other was a contractor. 

Chairman LEVIN. Colonel Moulton, does your memory of these 

phone calls differ in any significant way from Colonel Kleinman’s? 

Colonel MOULTON. Pretty close. First off, our team was sent in 

to help identify resistance techniques being employed by detained 

unlawful combatants (DUCs). The first call, as I recall, Colonel 

Kleinman said that the task force had wanted us to demonstrate 

to the task force interrogators some of the counter-resistance techniques that we had employed in our survival school. That was one 

that I took up the chain to JFCOM, and they came back and said, 

‘‘You’re authorized to do that.’’ The second call I got from Colonel 

Kleinman, I believe, was the one where he said that they now 

wanted participation. That’s the one that I asked two questions. I 

wanted to know the legal status. I said, ‘‘Are these DUCs?’’ The response was yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. After the second call, you then made this inquiry that you’re now talking about? That you wanted to know two 

things? 

Colonel MOULTON. This is during the second call. 

Chairman LEVIN. You asked him? 

Colonel MOULTON. Right. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Colonel Kleinman? 

Colonel MOULTON. Right. I wanted to know if these were POWs, 

or if they were DUCs. I wanted to know if any of the techniques 

were over and beyond what we had done in our survival training. 

He said, basically, that he was told they were DUCs, from my 

recollection, and that they weren’t going over and above what we 

did in our survival schools. 

I took that message back to JFCOM. We talked about the charter 

responsibilities. I had that conversation, as I recall, with the senior 

leadership. At that time, they said, ‘‘All right, let them all do it 

once or twice,’’ but I think it was just one time, ‘‘Demonstrate, one 

time, with the actual detainees, and then that’s it,’’ because my 

senior leadership, as well as I, were concerned about us getting involved in the offensive side of the interrogation business. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did they tell you that it was beyond your charter to get involved in offensive activity? 

Colonel MOULTON. I told them it was beyond our charter. 

186

Chairman LEVIN. Who was it, in the senior leadership, that you 

talked to? 

Colonel MOULTON. I believe it was either Admiral Bird or General Wagner. I know I talked to both of them. I’m not sure which 

one was with which conversation. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you tell them what Colonel Kleinman had 

observed, that he considered it illegal and he had stopped it? 

Colonel MOULTON. No, and that’s probably the only significant 

disagreement I had with Colonel Kleinman. I do remember he said 

he thought it was not covered under the Geneva Convention. I did 

not hear the words ‘‘illegal order.’’ In fact, I specifically remember 

receiving one of the after-action reports from one of the other members that mentioned ‘‘illegal order,’’ and obviously, something like 

that hit me pretty hard. So, I talked to Colonel Kleinman about it. 

He was adamant that he thought it was against the Geneva Convention. 

Chairman LEVIN. Were you told that enemy combatants are not 

protected by the Geneva Convention? Is that what you were told? 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir, that was the assumption that we 

were under. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you assume it or were you told that by 

somebody? 

Colonel MOULTON. We were told that. That’s my recollection, I 

don’t remember where. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you remember who told you that? 

Colonel MOULTON. No, sir. There were several discussions, both 

publicly and within DOD channels about: What is the legal status 

of these terrorists that we’re fighting? Are they POWs? Are they 

DUCs? In fact, before I sent the team over, I talked to the task 

force commander and asked him what the legal status was. I was 

told that they were DUCs and not covered under the Geneva Conventions. 

Chairman LEVIN. That was people in Iraq. You were told that 

people in Iraq who were not POWs, not wearing uniforms, but were 

illegal combatants were not covered by Geneva Conventions, even 

though they were in Iraq? 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir, that’s correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. You don’t remember who told you that? 

Colonel MOULTON. I believe it was the task force commander. Sir, 

one other thing I failed to mention was, when I did talk to the 

JFCOM leadership they always said that it really has to go 

through Central Command’s (CENTCOM) legal office or the people 

on the ground. I’m pretty positive I relayed that to Colonel 

Kleinman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Who was supposed to go through CENTCOM? 

Was that something that Colonel Kleinman was supposed to do? 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir. He was supposed to take the legal 

advice from the legal authorities within CENTCOM. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you remember that, Colonel? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir, I did. I talked to the task force JAG. 

Chairman LEVIN. What was his reaction to what you saw? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. His reaction was that what I did was the 

right thing, that it was unlawful to use those methods. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you inform Colonel Moulton of that? 

187

Colonel KLEINMAN. At that point, I informed the task force commander. I don’t know that we had another discussion after that. 

The problem was, that’s what the JAG officer told me, that’s what 

he also told me in the presence of the task force psychologist. But, 

when it was time to brief the interrogators, he briefed it that way, 

then when the question arose, it was, ‘‘Well, it depends.’’ There was 

not any clarity anymore. 

Chairman LEVIN. Colonel Moulton, the bottom line is that you 

checked with your command, and you were told that the team was 

authorized to use the SERE physical pressures, but not go beyond 

those. 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir, predicated on the legal advice they 

got from the CENTCOM legal representative. 

Chairman LEVIN. Well, the legal advice they got was that it was 

not proper. 

Colonel MOULTON. Senator, the first time I heard anything about 

an ‘‘illegal order’’ was in the after-action report from one of the 

other members. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. But, your recollection, Colonel Kleinman, 

is that you told Colonel Moulton that you thought it was an illegal 

order. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir, I told him that the methods were 

unlawful, and therefore, the order to execute them would be unlawful. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Now, Mr. Chairman, I might want to add, we 

were talking over a secure line halfway around the world. I don’t 

at all question Colonel Moulton’s view of what happened or his 

judgment based on the context from which he was operating. I 

thought I was very clear about it, and if he doesn’t recall it that 

way, I think it’s just a matter of he didn’t hear it. 

Chairman LEVIN. You just have either different recollections or 

you didn’t hear something. 

Colonel MOULTON. No, in both phone calls, Colonel Kleinman 

specifically said he thought that the actions being taken were not 

in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Of course, at that time, 

we were under the assumption, from the information that we had 

gotten from the task force, that these were DUCs, and the Geneva 

Convention did not apply. But, I do not remember the words ‘‘illegal order.’’ 

Chairman LEVIN. Well, if Geneva applies in Iraq, that would be 

an illegal order, right? 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir. But, I did not hear those specific 

words. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

Colonel Kleinman, I understand that it is permissible that your 

JPRA colleagues’ names be part of the record. As I understand it, 

their names are Terrence Russell and Lenny Miller. Is that correct? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. That’s correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. I just want to clarify the point, in the phone 

calls, as to whether or not you told Colonel Moulton that you had 

stopped the interrogation that you had witnessed, the first one. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, I did explain that I had done that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you remember that, Colonel Moulton? 

188

Colonel MOULTON. I don’t remember if that came from the conversation with Colonel Kleinman or one of the people back at Fairchild. At some point, I was told that he had stopped and intervened, but I think it was after the phone calls. I can’t remember 

exactly when. 

Chairman LEVIN. Colonel Kleinman, you’ve mentioned these two 

JPRA employees. Were either of them trained interrogators? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. No, Mr. Chairman. They both had very impressive backgrounds as survival instructors. Both were retired, I 

believe, master sergeants in the United States Air Force, where 

their entire careers were spent. They were never interrogators. To 

the best of my knowledge, up to the point that we appeared in Iraq, 

they had never actually seen what I would describe as a real-world 

interrogation. 

Chairman LEVIN. Colonel Kleinman, you mentioned the task 

force psychologist. Did the task force SERE psychologist have a 

view on the appropriateness of using SERE techniques in detainee 

interrogations? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir, he did. 

Chairman LEVIN. Who was that, if it’s appropriate to name him, 

and what was his or her view? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. His view was that it was absolutely inappropriate. It was designed for a very specific purpose, being resistant 

to interrogation. It was not designed to be used against detainees 

as a method of interrogation. 

Chairman LEVIN. Were you aware of that, Colonel Moulton? 

Colonel MOULTON. No, sir. Senator Levin, if I may add one 

thing? 

Chairman LEVIN. Please. 

Colonel MOULTON. The only conversations I had with the team 

were through Colonel Kleinman, and the only contact I had with 

the task force was through the commander there. Once I found out 

that there was an intervention, that there might be some type of 

an issue, I called back and talked to the task force commander who 

told me that he was very satisfied with the support he was receiving and everything was going fine, which was a little bit different 

when the team got back, but that was the message that was conveyed to me. That’s probably why I wasn’t more excited about this. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did the task force commander tell you, Colonel 

Moulton, that the Geneva Conventions did not apply? 

Colonel MOULTON. Sir, I don’t know if he specifically told me 

that. I specifically asked him the legal status of the detainees and 

whether or not they were allowed to do these things. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Mr. Chairman, I did have that conversation 

with the task force commander specifically. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Colonel Kleinman? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. I explained to him, the Brigadier General, 

that it was my view that these tactics were unlawful and were a 

violation of the Geneva Convention and national law. He didn’t 

hesitate for a moment, saying very clearly, which I’ve heard from 

others’, ‘‘SERE methods have a purpose, they have a real important 

purpose under controlled conditions for training volunteers.’’ He 

emphasized that. He didn’t have any argument about that. 

189

Chairman LEVIN. Are we talking about the same task force commander? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, we are, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Who is it? Has he been named here already? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. No, he has not been named. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you remember the name? 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir, I do. 

Chairman LEVIN. Who was that? 

Colonel MOULTON. It’s General Koenig. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is that the same person? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. So, everyone at the task force thought these 

SERE techniques should not be used against detainees. Who on the 

ground, if anybody, was authorizing these, or did that authority 

come from headquarters? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Initially, there was no real clear authority 

given to either employ SERE methods or not. Their understanding 

was, JPRA was out there to demonstrate the use of these SERE 

methods. When I went back to the task force commander with concerns it seemed to fall into a void. I would brief the task force commander very clearly, and he very clearly agreed with my assessment of it, but there were never any orders issued. When I’d go 

over to the interrogation center, their senior interrogator never got 

any guidance about that except from me. 

Chairman LEVIN. You stopped them? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Well then, who gave them the order to proceed 

after you had stopped them? Where did that come from? On the 

ground, everyone seems to be opposed to it. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. I don’t know, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Everyone who’s been identified so far has been 

opposed to it. You said the commander agreed with you. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Right. 

Chairman LEVIN. I don’t know who disagreed with him, but he’s 

the commander. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. So, the commander agrees with you, you stop 

them, you say they’re illegal, you say they violate Geneva, and 

somehow they start again. Then you stop the second one, or the 

one that you saw in that bunker that you described. We don’t know 

what happened after that, do we, whether or not the techniques 

were used after that? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. I don’t know. 

Chairman LEVIN. You said that you talked to the task force legal 

advisor. Do you remember his name or her name? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. No, I don’t recall. No. 

Chairman LEVIN. Colonel Moulton, do you remember his or her 

name? 

Colonel MOULTON. No, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is it accurate that other task force personnel 

were not pleased with your decision to stop the use of those tactics? 

Is that true? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. That’s very accurate, Mr. Chairman. 

190

Chairman LEVIN. Now, while you were still in Iraq, you prepared 

a draft CONOP for the interrogation of detainees, and your staff 

sent this CONOP to Captain Dan Donovan, who was the JFCOM 

staff judge advocate. You did that, according to our information, on 

September 22, 2003. 

According to e-mails from Captain Donovan, JPRA based the 

CONOP on a draft report on interrogation techniques that had 

been written by the DOD Detainee Working Group. So, DOD had 

a working group. According to Captain Donovan, this CONOP included highly aggressive interrogation techniques, including the 

water board. I think you also mentioned the draft working group 

report. Where did JPRA get a copy of that draft DOD working 

group report? Do you know, Colonel Kleinman? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Let me clarify that, Mr. Chairman. I did not 

draft that. That tasking to draft a CONOP came direct from one 

of the staff officers. 

Chairman LEVIN. Are you familiar with this? 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. We were given direction that we should capture our experience out there and begin drafting a CONOP, with 

the idea that perhaps JPRA was moving down towards an expansion of the charter. So, I passed that order on to Terry Russell to 

prepare that. I told him I wasn’t going to draft it myself because 

I absolutely disagreed with that type of expansion of the use of 

SERE methods, and so, my contribution would be nothing but contrary. But, the commander asked for a CONOP, and he’d been, I 

believe, asked for one in turn, so I directed Mr. Russell to prepare 

it. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is that your recollection, too, Colonel Moulton? 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir. I think the genesis of that was, from 

the after-action reports, the fact that there was no standardized 

process involved there. If something like that was going to happen 

again, we wanted to make sure that there was some kind of a comprehensive process. 

With respect to the SERE techniques that was, I believe, a cutand-paste out of the guide. Our concern was more about working 

with the SERE psychologist to make sure that whoever was doing 

this understood that there is a very involved comprehensive process of properly handling detainees. 

Just this last week, I reviewed an after-action report. I noticed, 

from General Wagner’s statement, he said one wasn’t forwarded 

until 2005. But, we did forward one up to JFCOM afterwards. Unfortunately, it’s classified. But, if you look at the recommendations 

that came out of that after-action report, it really addressed many 

of the issues that Colonel Kleinman is talking about, and also may 

have prevented the types of things that happened at Abu Ghraib 

and other places. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. There was a draft CONOP report. Is 

that correct? You didn’t do it, but someone in your party did it. Is 

that right? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was the CONOP written before the after-action reports, do you know? 

191

Colonel KLEINMAN. Our after-action reports from our trip to 

Iraq? 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir, it was. 

Chairman LEVIN. The draft? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes. It was completed and transmitted before 

we left Iraq. 

Chairman LEVIN. Captain Donovan said that the CONOP included highly aggressive interrogation techniques, including the 

water board. He specifically made reference, however, to that working group at DOD. I think I’ve asked you, Colonel Kleinman, and 

you said you don’t know where they got that. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. That’s correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. Colonel Moulton, do you know? 

Colonel MOULTON. No, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Are either of you familiar with that working 

group at DOD? 

Colonel MOULTON. Sir, I’m very familiar with the working group. 

Chairman LEVIN. The working group I’m referring to is a group 

of senior lawyers. Is that the same working group? 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. You’re familiar with the product of that working group? 

Colonel MOULTON. Parts of it. I was told the draft that was included in our CONOP came from that working group. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you see that draft? 

Colonel MOULTON. I didn’t read the whole thing, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you have a copy of it? Was it available to 

you? 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir. That was what was forwarded to 

Captain Donovan. 

Chairman LEVIN. By you? 

Colonel MOULTON. Well, I don’t know if it was me specifically, 

but I chop everything before it goes up to JFCOM so, I would have 

signed the package. 

Chairman LEVIN. You would have signed the package that contained that draft of that working group of senior lawyers at DOD? 

Colonel MOULTON. No, sir. The SERE resistance techniques were 

taken from whatever the working group put together. 

Chairman LEVIN. I’m talking about a specific draft of that working group. They came up with a draft. 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. You had access to it and forwarded that draft 

to your commander? 

Colonel MOULTON. No, sir, I don’t think it was the entire draft, 

I think it was just resistance-technique portions of that draft. I’m 

not sure. I just think that’s what it was. 

Chairman LEVIN. Anyway, there was reference to that working 

group’s draft? 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did JPRA play any role in the working group? 

Colonel MOULTON. No, sir. I believe some of the techniques were 

probably part of the documentation that was sent to Mr. Shiffrin 

192

at an earlier time, but we did not actively participate in the working group. 

Chairman LEVIN. Colonel Moulton, shortly after the JPRA team 

left for Iraq in September, you sent an e-mail to JPRA’s liaison office at CENTCOM that discussed a possible trip by you and a couple other JPRA employees to visit various CENTCOM interrogation 

facilities. You said, ‘‘I can support, and have already presented, the 

concept to JFCOM. We just need the invite.’’ Did you ever get the 

invitation from CENTCOM? 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir, I believe we did. 

Chairman LEVIN. In his report, the DOD IG said that there was 

a planned JPRA trip to Afghanistan in May 2004. 

Colonel MOULTON. I believe that’s correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. Who requested the JPRA support in Afghanistan? 

Colonel MOULTON. That was CENTCOM, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you know what they wanted JPRA to do in 

Afghanistan? 

Colonel MOULTON. They wanted us to go and take a look at the 

entire process of interrogation, from the constabulary process all 

the way through the interrogation process. A lot of that had to do 

with the outcome in the after-action that came out of the trip that 

Colonel Kleinman’s folks took. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was the trip canceled? 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Why was that canceled? 

Colonel MOULTON. I’m not sure exactly why. I believe Admiral 

Giambastiani decided not to go further with it. 

Chairman LEVIN. When would that have been? 

Colonel MOULTON. I’m not positive. I’d say it was probably within 

a week of when the departure was supposed to be. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Just excuse me a minute. [Pause.] 

What was Admiral Giambastiani’s position? 

Colonel MOULTON. Sir, he was the Commander of JFCOM. 

Chairman LEVIN. Let me go back to the visit to Iraq. Colonel 

Moulton, why did you think that the task force in Iraq wanted a 

JPRA team to go to Iraq? 

Colonel MOULTON. Sir, the request that came from the commander specifically said he was having problems with interrogation, and he had heard that our people were able to identify resistance techniques being used by detainees. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did he make reference to JPRA interrogators? 

Colonel MOULTON. I don’t believe so, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was there a complaint that you registered at 

the time, or did you tell JFCOM that your folks should not be used 

as interrogators? 

Colonel MOULTON. I don’t recall that, but that would have been 

my position. 

Chairman LEVIN. But, you don’t remember telling them that you 

didn’t want them used as interrogators? 

Colonel MOULTON. I don’t remember that, no, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. But, that was your position? 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir, absolutely. 

193

Chairman LEVIN. Dr. Bruce Jessen, who was the senior SERE 

psychologist at JPRA, sent you an e-mail on April 16, 2002 (see 

Annex B); and attached to that e-mail was a draft exploitation 

plan. Do you know what prompted Dr. Jessen to draft that plan? 

Colonel MOULTON. Sir, I just don’t have the information. 

Chairman LEVIN. We’re going back to 2002 now. This was way 

before Iraq. Your reply, dated April 17, 2002, said that he should 

put together a briefing to take up for approval. Take up to whom? 

Colonel MOULTON. That would have been to JFCOM. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did that briefing ever occur? 

Colonel MOULTON. Sir, I don’t believe so. I don’t remember Dr. 

Jessen going up with me for any briefings. It may have happened. 

I just don’t recall that, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you remember whether or not the exploitation plan was ever implemented? 

Colonel MOULTON. Sir, I don’t remember. 

Chairman LEVIN. Colonel Moulton, a September 9, 2003, e-mail 

from you to Rear Admiral Bird, who is the Director of Operations 

at JFCOM says, ‘‘A recent history, to include discussions and training with Defense Human Intelligence Service (DHS), SOCOM, and 

CIA, shows that no DOD entity has a firm grasp on any comprehensive approach to strategic debriefing/interrogation. Our subject matter experts and certain Service SERE psychologists currently have the most knowledge and depth within DOD on the captivity environment and exploitation.’’ 

What are the discussions and training with DHS, SOCOM, and 

CIA that your e-mail makes reference to? 

Colonel MOULTON. Sir, initially, the training we were providing 

was to help those organizations actually do their own resistance or 

survival training. The feedback I was getting from my SERE psychologist was that those folks were not familiar with the captivity 

environment, the psychology of captivity, and they noted that they 

didn’t have any standardized methodology for doing any kind of 

strategic debriefing. 

Chairman LEVIN. Colonel Moulton, the committee has heard 

today, and on June 17, about several JPRA offensive activities. 

This is a list of what we’ve heard: JPRA’s December 2001 response 

to a request from the DOD General Counsel’s Office for information 

on exploitation; briefings by JPRA for deploying DIA personnel; 

JPRA’s July 2002 response to a request from DOD General Counsel’s Office for information on physical and psychological pressures 

used in SERE training; the August 2002 JPRA training for GTMO 

personnel at Fort Bragg; September 2003 deployment of the JPRA 

interrogation assistance team to Iraq. 

The JFCOM staff judge advocate’s account of her interview with 

you says that you never deployed a support team without approval 

from the JFCOM J–3, the Director of Operations. 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir, that’s correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. I just mentioned all those activities. Who at 

JFCOM did you speak to about JPRA’s offensive operations? 

Colonel MOULTON. Sir, it would have been the J–3. That’s where 

all the tasking went through. 

Chairman LEVIN. Who was that? 

194

Colonel MOULTON. Depending on the timeframe, it would have 

been either Brigadier General Moore or Rear Admiral Bird. 

Chairman LEVIN. Was that General Thomas Moore? 

Colonel MOULTON. We called him Tango. I think it might be, yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. You talked to the JFCOM Director of Operations? 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you talk to the chief of staff, General 

James Soligan? 

Colonel MOULTON. Sir, I probably did, but I’d talk to those gentleman on a daily basis. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would you have talked about all or some of 

those items that I just specified? 

Colonel MOULTON. I would have talked about every one of those. 

Chairman LEVIN. What about General Wagner, the Deputy Commander? 

Colonel MOULTON. No, sir. I think the first time I got involved 

with General Wagner was when Colonel Kleinman’s phone call 

came in, I think it was on a Friday evening. I couldn’t get ahold 

of Admiral Bird or General Soligan, the Chief of Staff, so I went 

up the chain and spoke with General Wagner. 

Chairman LEVIN. About that conversation? 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. What about the commander, Admiral 

Giambastiani? 

Colonel MOULTON. No, sir, I think the only time we got Admiral 

Giambastiani involved was when we briefed him on that 2004 trip. 

Chairman LEVIN. Other than that one time with General Wagner, they never gave their approval of offensive operations? 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir, they did. Prior to every deployment 

we briefed exactly what we were going to do. Our folks were over 

there assessing, providing observations and feedback, but the only 

time they actually got involved was in Colonel Kleinman’s trip. 

Chairman LEVIN. In terms of active participation in offensive operations, other than pure observation, that was approved by any of 

those folks? 

Colonel MOULTON. The observation and training was. Everything 

we did was approved by JFCOM. 

Chairman LEVIN. So, the list of what I told you, that was approved, but none of those included the use of those specific techniques against detainees. Is that correct? 

Colonel MOULTON. The training may have. 

Chairman LEVIN. Against detainees? 

Colonel MOULTON. No, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. In September 2003, Captain Donovan, 

the JFCOM staff judge advocate, found out about JPRA’s offensive 

activities, the actual use of those activities against detainees, and 

he raised concerns about them. Colonel Moulton, prior to that, did 

anyone else at JFCOM express concern about those activities? 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir. Every time I brought it up to the 

leadership, we always had the discussion about whether or not this 

was within the charter of JPRA. From the very beginning, my staff, 

the JFCOM staff all said it was outside. However, because there 

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dent with JPRA and the SERE schools, we decided to go ahead and 

provide support as subject matter experts, but not as JPRA personnel. 

Chairman LEVIN. So, it was outside of your charter? 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir. I think the easiest way to explain it 

is if I went to Colonel Kleinman and we needed a Russian speaker, 

even though he’s intelligence. 

Chairman LEVIN. I understand. This list of things that were requested were outside of the charter. 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. In a February 2005 statement to the DOD IG, 

Lieutenant General Wagner, who is the Deputy Commander at 

JFCOM, said that, ‘‘relative to interrogation capability, the expertise of JPRA lies in training personnel how to respond to and resist 

interrogations, not in how to conduct interrogations.’’ Do you agree 

with Lieutenant General Wagner’s statement? 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. On September 29, 2004, Major General 

Soligan, JFCOM’s Chief of Staff, wrote a memorandum for you saying that requests for JPRA offensive support for the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense and combatant commands went ‘‘beyond the 

chartered responsibility of JPRA.’’ In his February 2005 statement, 

Lieutenant General Wagner said that requests for JPRA interrogation support were ‘‘both inconsistent with the unit’s charter and 

might create conditions which task JPRA to engage in offensive 

operational activities outside of JPRA’s defensive mission.’’ 

In a September 8, 2003, e-mail to Lieutenant General Wagner, 

you said, ‘‘There is nothing in JPRA’s charter or elsewhere that 

points us toward the offensive side of captivity conduct.’’ 

Those are a list of offensive activities in which JPRA engaged in. 

I read you that list. 

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. You said that they had been approved, despite 

the fact that there’s nothing in the charter or elsewhere that provides for JPRA doing that. Do you know of anyone who’s been held 

accountable for those violations of JPRA’s charter? 

Colonel MOULTON. Sir, as I put in my written statement, we all 

had concerns with that, and that’s why we only went to support 

with subject matter experts, not representatives from JPRA. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. But, do you know of anybody that’s 

been held accountable for the decision to go outside of JPRA’s charter? 

Colonel MOULTON. No, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Colonel Moulton, describe for us the protections which are in place for our soldiers that go through SERE 

training. 

Colonel MOULTON. Sir, it’s very comprehensive. It starts with the 

SERE psychologist to monitor them. Obviously, there are some psychological ramifications to this kind of training. We have medical 

doctors on board. We have several instructors that are just reviewing the entire operation. It’s a very methodical and closely supervised activity. 

Chairman LEVIN. Can our personnel end it when they give a signal of some kind? 

196

Colonel MOULTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Colonel Kleinman, do you want to add anything to that, in terms of protections given in the SERE program 

to our people who are being trained? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, it’s an exceptionally 

professional program. I was certified as an instructor in the course; 

one of the few officers privileged to do so. It began with a psychological test to weed out those who have a high propensity for acting 

out. On a regular basis, I’d be interviewed by either the psychologist or the technicians to see how my life is going, to make sure 

that I didn’t come in one day when I was supposed to use a more 

aggressive approach after getting a Dear John letter the day before. It’s very specific about training. You’re taught to use the physical pressures; you receive them, so you know what it feels like; 

you’re observed all the time; and you’re constantly checked and rechecked. There are no gaps in the way it’s conducted. 

The psychologists have a dual role. Not only are they watching 

the psychological health of the students, but they’re also monitoring, just as closely, the instructor staff to make sure that somebody who is pushing somebody against a wall is doing it because 

it’s consistent with the learning objective, rather than because of 

anger. So, it’s very specific. 

Chairman LEVIN. Colonel Kleinman, were these safeguards in 

place at the task force interrogation facility in Iraq that you’ve described? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. None of those were in place, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Colonel Moulton, when you heard Colonel 

Kleinman’s description of what he observed in Iraq and how these 

techniques, which were supposed to be used for a totally different 

purpose, were used against detainees, what was your reaction to 

what you heard here this morning? 

Colonel MOULTON. Well, obviously I’m disappointed at what happened there. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is it beyond disappointment? These techniques 

were supposed to be used to help people resist abuse, and were 

used by our enemies in order to force confessions. The Communist 

Chinese didn’t care if the confession was true; they wanted the confession. They wanted the propaganda value of the confession.When 

you heard that these techniques, the way Colonel Kleinman described them, were used for a purpose which they were never intended to be used, were you just disappointed? 

Colonel MOULTON. No, sir. I’m sorry, it’s much worse than that. 

What’s sad about this is I think it was done, initially, with good 

intentions. I think we understood that, on what we’d call the defensive side, we have a focal point, which is JPRA. There is no focal 

point within DOD on the offensive side, and that’s one of the messages that we were trying to bring up over and over again, which 

lead to all the problems we had, whether it was at the task force 

over in Iraq, GTMO, or Abu Ghraib. That was a very serious concern for us. 

So, yes, I’m more than disappointed. I feel terrible that that’s 

where it went. However, at the time, we were acting on good intentions. Initially, when we got involved, it was just to help them identify those detainees who were using resistance techniques. 

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Colonel KLEINMAN. May I add to that comment, Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman LEVIN. Sure. 

Colonel KLEINMAN. I agree 100 percent with Colonel Moulton’s 

characterization of the need for an overriding authority, a responsible party to oversee standards of training, standards of selection, 

and standards of conduct for interrogation, which did not, and 

frankly, still do not exist today. One of the aspects of JPRA that 

I was most impressed with, coming to that agency after being an 

interrogator, was their purposeful very professional approach to 

what they did. We didn’t have those standards of conduct. We 

didn’t have psychologists monitoring our activities, informing us 

how we did what we did. 

I think JPRA, in its model, offered a great deal to the United 

States Intelligence Community. Had they followed through and 

said, ‘‘Well, let’s adapt the JPRA model,’’ in terms of systems management, program management, and professionalism, it’s my professional judgment that some of the difficulty we had today, Abu 

Ghraib and elsewhere, would have been avoided. 

Chairman LEVIN. What’s the price that we’ve paid for Abu 

Ghraib? Do you have an opinion on that? 

Colonel MOULTON. I think it’s pretty severe, as far as international opinion. That hurt us gravely. It also may have some 

ramifications for our own detainees in the future. It’s definitely severe. 

Chairman LEVIN. Let me thank both of our witnesses here. 

The abuses of detainees at Abu Ghraib, as we’ve learned from 

these hearings, was not simply the result of a few soldiers acting 

on their own interrogation. Techniques similar to those used in 

SERE resistance training, such as stripping detainees of their 

clothes, placing them in stress positions, and use of dogs appeared 

in Iraq only after they had been approved for use in Afghanistan 

and at GTMO. 

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s December 2002 authorization 

and subsequent interrogation policies, plans, and techniques approved by senior military and civilian officials, some of which we’ve 

heard about this morning, conveyed a very clear message to the 

troops; that physical pressure and degradation were appropriate 

treatment for detainees in U.S. military custody, and the abuses 

that resulted from these decisions have damaged our efforts to win 

the support of the people of the world and our allies to our side in 

the war in which we are fighting. 

I hope that by shedding light on what occurred and how it occurred, this hearing and the previous hearing and our committee’s 

inquiry will help us to begin to repair that damage and to make 

sure that our men and women never are involved in these kinds 

of activities again. 

For reasons which you both have given, severe damage has been 

done to our security, and to the view of our country by the rest of 

the world, whose support we need in the war that we’re waging. 

The future threat to our troops, as Colonel Moulton just mentioned, 

could also be severe. We have to begin to repair this damage. Your 

testimony, because of its openness, and you, Colonel Kleinman, in 

terms of your behavior at the time, will help us to show the kind 

of openness that we can be proud of in this country. Hopefully the 

198

rest of the world will understand and appreciate that, at least 

when we make these kind of horrific mistakes, we own up to them, 

we acknowledge them, and we seek to repair them. 

Your presence here this morning, and your cooperation with this 

committee is helpful. In that regard, we thank you both, we thank 

you both for your service to our country and we stand adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

INTERROGATION

1. Senator LEVIN. Colonel Moulton, a September 9, 2003, e-mail from you to Rear 

Admiral John Bird who was the Director of Operations at Joint Forces Command 

(JFCOM), says: 

‘‘. . . Recent history (to include discussions and training with the Defense Human 

Intelligence Service, United States Special Operations Command, and the Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA)) shows that no Department of Defense (DOD) entity has 

a firm grasp on any comprehensive approach to strategic debriefing/interrogation. 

Our subject matter experts (and certain Service Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and 

Escape (SERE) psychologist) currently have the most knowledge and depth within 

DOD on the captivity environment and exploitation.’’

You testified to the committee that ‘‘initially the training we were providing was 

to help those organizations actually do their own resistance or survival training. . .’’ 

Is training for those organizations to do their own resistance or survival training 

what you were referring to in your e-mail? 

Colonel MOULTON. In my testimony, the training I was referring to was specifically resistance to interrogation and basic survival training that we were providing 

to personnel from other government agencies. In the course of this training, as we 

came into contact with organizational psychologists, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) personnel became aware that these other agencies generally were unfamiliar with the differences between persons being treated in a clinical environment 

and the human responses encountered in captivity. What JPRA has learned over the 

years or supporting repatriations and conducting SERE training is that individuals 

in a captivity situation often react in a manner that is counter-intuitive to what 

would be expected from a person undergoing other types of stress. My comments in 

the e-mail regarding the lack of a ‘‘comprehensive approach’’ were specifically addressing the lack of knowledge in the psychology of captivity and its important role 

in the debriefing/interrogation process. I still firmly believe that a better understanding and promulgation of this knowledge early on in the development of interrogation policy could have prevented much of the later mishandling of detainees encountered.

2. Senator LEVIN. Colonel Moulton, please list each instance in which the JPRA 

or personnel employed by JPRA provided support relating to the interrogation of detainees in U.S. custody during your command. For each instance please indicate to 

whom the support was provided and describe the support, including whether it included providing information or instruction on physical or psychological pressures 

used in military resistance training. 

Colonel MOULTON. During the tenure of my command, JPRA provided support relating to the interrogation of detainees in U.S. custody only one time. This support 

was provided to a special mission unit task force and occurred in Iraq in September 

2003. The specific circumstances of this support were the subject of my testimony 

on September 25, 2008, and my earlier written statement. In summary, the JPRA 

support involved a three-person team of subject matter experts. The request for support was validated in advance by Central Command and the team’s deployment was 

approved by JFCOM. The team leader was an experienced intelligence officer and 

the accompanying two team members were both trained, highly experienced SERE 

instructors. The support included guidance on captivity psychology and instruction/

demonstration of counter-resistance techniques employed by JPRA cadre during 

SERE training. The team’s support was approved by the local commander in consultation with the commander’s judge advocate and coordinated in advance with 

JPRA’s higher headquarters, JFCOM. 

199

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

MITCHELL AND JESSEN

3. Senator AKAKA. Colonel Kleinman, you have indicated having professional 

knowledge of, and work experiences with, Mr. James Mitchell, the retired military 

psychologist described in journalist Jane Mayer’s new book, The Dark Side. Described as the CIA team leader that took over the interrogation of terrorism detainee Abu Zubayda, he had no background in Middle East culture, Islam, and had 

never even conducted an interrogation before. 

In your opinion, why would the CIA hire James Mitchell, an ex-military psychologist that specialized in tortuous practices and their effect on the human mind, as 

leader of a team meant to extract information from Zubayda unless there was clear 

intent to take a path that would lead away from adherence to the Geneva Conventions? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. In my professional view, there have been a number of illfounded and erroneous assumptions made about the role of the CIA in the interrogation of detainees and this question probes deep into the underlying cause-and-effect. 

First, in the discourse over whether the CIA should be authorized to employ socalled enhanced interrogation techniques due to the unique nature of their mission, 

it is important to highlight the fact that prior to the attacks of September 11, the 

Agency was not specifically charged with an interrogation mission nor had it assumed one; it therefore did not possess an organic capability to conduct such activities. In the aftermath of that horrific event, the Agency not only became heavily involved in interrogation operations, they also progressively exerted a curiously unchallenged prerogative to control, conduct, and/or manage the interrogation of many 

high value detainees. 

Second, to execute this mission, the Agency followed two paths:

a. They sought out volunteers from within the Agency to conduct interrogations of these critical intelligence sources. Unfortunately, few of these individuals possessed any prior experience or training in interrogation or 

even, in some cases, in field intelligence collection. 

b. They also sought interrogation expertise from outside the Agency in 

the form of contractors. Through an inexplicable decisionmaking process, 

the Agency did not seek such professional support from the available cadre 

of highly experienced interrogators (e.g.. from the military intelligence and/

or law enforcement communities); rather, they quickly turned to two former 

military SERE psychologists (Drs. Mitchell and Jessen) who collectively 

possessed neither operational experience nor training in intelligence interrogation. The rationale behind this choice appears to be the fact that these 

two individuals were acknowledged subject matter experts in resistance to 

interrogation, a well-deserved reputation based on their education, military 

training, and impressive contributions to the Nation’s SERE training programs.

The decision to pursue this second course highlights a major competency shortfall: 

the CIA lacked the substantive corporate knowledge of interrogation to render a 

meaningful distinction between: (1) the conduct of interrogation for intelligence purposes; and (2) a resistance to interrogation program designed to mirror the strategies and methods conducted by selected foreign (primarily hostile) nations. Of critical importance is the fact that many of those strategies and methods, if employed 

against U.S. personnel, would be viewed by American authorities as violations of the 

Geneva Convention guidelines on the treatment of prisoners/detainees. In addition, 

this approach had historically been primarily focused on compelling individuals to 

produce propaganda rather than intelligence. 

This melding of cultures—between Geneva Convention-bound interrogation operations and resistance to interrogation training that systematically involved practices 

in violation of these Conventions—created an atmosphere where significant errors 

in judgment were almost certain to occur. When an individual has spent a considerable portion of his career—as Drs. Mitchell and Jessen have—designing, supervising, and participating in realistic training scenarios where slapping, poking, isolation, white noise, forced nudity, and overt threats of physical abuse for noncompliant behavior were integral elements of the paradigm, it would seem problematic if 

that same individual were given responsibility for setting the standards of conduct 

for the interrogation of foreign nationals that would be consistent with applicable 

U.S. and international law. 

Beyond the framework of any individual’s value set or familiarity with legal 

guidelines, the longstanding SERE experience would very likely leave one illVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:00 Feb 12, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00203 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\47298.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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equipped to recognize the distinctive contextual differences between activities that 

are acceptable (and necessary) within a resistance to interrogation training environment and that involving the real-world interrogation of foreign nationals. What 

must not be overlooked is that many, if not all, of the physical pressures to which 

U.S. military personnel are subjected on a short-term basis during resistance training would clearly cross the legal, moral, and operational definitions of unacceptable 

coercive practices—even torture—if employed in the longer term against foreign detainees in U.S. custody. 

In sum, I can only speculate as to the rationale behind the selection of Drs. Mitchell and Jessen for this role. I would like to emphasize that both of these individuals 

served honorably in defense of this Nation through their respective decades-long 

military careers. Their individual and collaborative contributions to SERE training 

remain both distinctive and irreplaceable. While I have profound disagreement with 

their perspectives on what constitutes an effective model of interrogation, I am confident that their intentions upon accepting the contractual positions with the CIA 

were to continue to serve their country. What they did not understand—and, more 

importantly, what the leadership at the CIA did not appear to understand—are the 

many critical differences between the American way of interrogation and the systematic application of SERE-related techniques.

4. Senator AKAKA. Colonel Kleinman, James Mitchell and his partner, John Bruce 

Jessen, have released a statement defending their involvement in CIA interrogations that reads: ‘‘We are proud of the work we have done for our country. The advice we have provided and the actions we have taken have been legal and ethical. 

We resolutely oppose torture. Under no circumstances have we ever endorsed, nor 

would we endorse, the use of interrogation methods designed to do physical or psychological harm.’’

From your direct knowledge of working with James Mitchell, do you consider this 

to be a truthful statement? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Continuing on the theme of my previous answer, I would submit that it is very likely that Dr. Mitchell believed he answered that question truthfully. My qualification rests on the fact that, as previously noted, the totality of his 

professional experience and knowledge of interrogation prior to his service with the 

CIA was limited to SERE training programs where the application of various degrees of physical, emotional, and psychological stress were de rigueur. The focus on 

such training is exclusively to aid others to return with honor, for the SERE instructors playing the role of the interrogator during such training, the implications of the 

laws of armed conflict and/or the role of the Geneva Conventions are of little relevance. Intelligence interrogations conducted in real-world settings with foreign nationals 

present an entirely different set of legal, moral, and operational considerations. As 

a clinical psychologist with a specialization in SERE and operational psychology, Dr. 

Mitchell is, in my view, not well-prepared to draw meaningful distinctions as to 

what is considered acceptable conduct in the interrogation of persons held in U.S. 

custody. It is very possible—even probable—that his experiential background would 

materially influence his standard for acceptable conduct and behaviors. As a career 

intelligence officer and interrogator (who has also completed an assignment as a resistance to interrogation instructor), I have serious reservations about the ability of 

anyone with extensive experience in resistance to interrogation training—who therefore has witnessed and orchestrated literally thousands of facial slaps, hours of isolation, application of white noise, and both physical and verbal abuse—to render 

meaningful judgments as to what constitutes torture or coercion in another, seemingly familiar yet critically different context.

5. Senator AKAKA. Colonel Kleinman, what is your overall impression of James 

Mitchell, especially since you considered the CIA’s reliance on him for interrogations 

‘‘surreal’’? 

Colonel KLEINMAN. Dr. Mitchell has dedicated a substantial portion of his professional career to the noble cause of SERE training. The fundamental mission of 

SERE training, as referenced above, is to prepare U.S. military personnel to successfully navigate the most extreme and threatening circumstances of capture by a hostile power and to return with honor. Dr. Mitchell has invested his considerable talents and intellect in the continued and invaluable refinement of the relevant tactics, 

techniques, and procedures. 

On several occasions, I have had the opportunity to discuss with him the philosophical underpinnings of his perceived model of interrogation (as well as longer engagements with SERE professionals who count themselves among the proponents 

Dr. Mitchell’s perspectives). The model he espoused focused on a systematic effort 

201

to undermine an individual’s emotional, psychological, and physical ability to resist 

as a central tenant. An essential outcome of this process is the establishment of a 

considerable level of dependence on the part of the detainee toward his/her interrogator. 

Beyond my substantial operational experience as an interrogator, I have also conducted extensive research into the craft, to include the interview and observation 

of hundreds of interrogators of various skill levels. My conclusions—which have 

been supported by dozens of this Nation’s most gifted and accomplished interrogators—suggest that the systematic application of psychological, emotional, and/or 

physical stress with the objective of overcoming resistance and/or to create some degree of dependence is not only ineffective, but also largely counterproductive. Under 

the protocol that has been championed by Dr. Mitchell, the ability to explore the 

full range of the detainee’s knowledgeability (which requires a significant degree of 

fostered cooperation as opposed to forced compliance) is severely obstructed. In addition, the personal and environmental pressures that are integral to Dr. Mitchell’s 

approach have been shown to undermine an individual’s ability to accurately recall 

detailed information, which is a fundamental objective of any interrogation. Further, 

the model does not appear to incorporate any emphasis on, or even concern with, 

the critically important need to adapt to organic cultural tendencies present within 

the detainee’s demographic. 

In the period following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Nation’s premier 

intelligence organization, with longstanding primacy in the area of human intelligence (i.e., the CIA), when faced with the requirement to expeditiously develop a 

strategic- and operational-level interrogation capability: (1) found it necessary to 

build that program from external, contracted resources; and (2) selected an individual with no previous training or operational experience in the actual conduct of 

interrogation for intelligence purposes. This appears to be a bizarre and unexpected 

set of circumstances where fact (e.g., interrogation is a critical intelligence methodology, American resistance to interrogation programs are arguably the world standard for excellence) was mixed with fantasy (e.g., practical exercises involving SERE 

instructors in the role of a foreign interrogator and U.S. military personnel in the 

role of the detainee mirrors lawful and effective interrogation methods employed by 

intelligence officers to obtain useful information from foreign detainees in U.S. custody) led to the observations accurately captured by Jane Mayer in her book. The 

Dark Side. It was—and remains—surreal.

INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES

6. Senator AKAKA. Colonel Moulton, during the last hearing conducted by this 

committee into the background of detainee interrogations, testimony was given that 

each of the military Services had raised legal and ethical concerns over the decision 

to approve SERE-style interrogation techniques. 

What was your knowledge of the intra-Department conflicts over the application 

of SERE school interrogation methods to detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, and 

did you have any contact with senior leaders from any of these Services that highlighted their concerns? 

Colonel MOULTON. During my tenure as JPRA commander, I did not participate 

in any Service-level discussions regarding interrogation policy, nor, to the best of my 

knowledge, did any personnel under my command. To the best of my knowledge, I 

did not have any particularized knowledge at the time of intra-Department conflicts 

over the application of SERE school interrogation methods to detainees held at 

Guantanamo Bay, nor did I have any contact with senior leaders from any of the 

Services that highlighted their concerns. JPRA did provide background information 

on SERE resistance training in response to a request for information from the DOD 

Office of the General Counsel in 2002. JPRA had no further requests from the Office 

of the General Counsel or other DOD authorities for information on the SERE resistance training and did not participate in any internal deliberations with DOD or 

the Services on interrogation policy.

[Annexes A and B follow:] 

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ANNEX A


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[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

Æ


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