2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

5-19-2010

Carl Mayer v. Bill Belichick

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 09-2237

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Carl Mayer v. Bill Belichick" (2010). 2010 Decisions. Paper 1240.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/1240
PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 09-2237

 

CARL J. MAYER,

Appellant

v.

BILL BELICHICK; THE NEW ENGLAND PATRIOTS;

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 3-07-cr-04671)

District Judge: Hon. Garrett E. Brown, Jr.

 

Argued April 14, 2010

BEFORE: FISHER, and COWEN, Circuit Judges

and PRATTER*, District Judge

(Filed: May 19, 2010)

 

*Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter, United States District Judge for

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
2

Bruce I. Afran, Esq. (Argued)

10 Braeburn Drive

Princeton, NJ 08540

Carl J. Mayer, Esq. (Argued)

Mayer Law Group

66 Witherspoon Street, Suite 414

Princeton, NJ 08540

Counsel for Appellant

Daniel L. Goldberg, Esq. (Argued)

Charles L. Solomont, Esq.

Bingham McCutchen

One Federal Street

Boston, MA 02110

David Kistler, Esq.

Stephen M. Orlofsky, Esq.

Blank Rome

301 Carnegie Center, Third Floor

Princeton, NJ 08540

Counsel for Appellees Bill 

Belichick and New England Patriot 

Football Club

Paul M. Eckles, Esq.

Shepard Goldfein, Esq. (Argued)

Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom

4 Times Square

New York, NY 10036

Counsel for Appellee National 

Football League

 

OPINION

 

COWEN, Circuit Judge
3

Plaintiff Carl J. Mayer appeals from the order of the

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey

granting the respective motions to dismiss filed by Defendants

Bill Belichick and the New England Patriots (“Patriots”) as well

as by Defendant National Football League (“NFL”). We will

affirm. 

I.

This highly unusual case was filed by a disappointed

football fan and season ticket-holder in response to the so-called

“Spygate” scandal. This scandal arose when it was discovered

that the Patriots were surreptitiously videotaping the signals of

their opponents. 

Mayer, a New Jersey resident and New York Jets season

ticket-holder, initially filed his complaint on September 7, 2007. 

He named as Defendants the Patriots, headquartered in

Massachusetts, as well as the team’s head coach, Belichick, a

Massachusetts resident. Mayer eventually filed an amended

complaint on August 19, 2008, which added the NFL, with its

headquarters in New York, as a Defendant. 

We, like the District Court before us, must look to the

amended complaint, accepting its well-pleaded factual

allegations as true for purposes of this appeal. The “Preliminary

Statement of the Case” section of this extensive pleading

provided a fair description of the gist of Mayer’s case, at least

against the Patriots and Belichick:

2. This case is brought by a New York Jets season

ticket-holder on behalf of all similarly situated

New York Jets season ticket-holders and other

New York Jets ticket-holders against the

Defendant New England Patriots and their coach,

Defendant Bill Belichick. The core of this action

is that the Defendants, during a game with the New

York Jets on September 9, 2007, instructed an

agent of the Defendants to surreptitiously

videotape the New York Jets coaches and players
4

on the field with the purpose of illegally recording,

capturing and stealing the New York Jets signals

and visual coaching instructions. The Defendants

were in fact subsequently found by the National

Football League (“NFL”) to have improperly

engaged in such conduct. This violated the

contractual expectations and rights of New York

Jets ticket-holders who fully anticipated and

contracted for a ticket to observe an honest match

played in compliance with all laws, regulations and

NFL rules.

3. Plaintiffs contend that in purchasing tickets to

watch the New York Jets that, as a matter of

contract, the tickets imply that each game will be

played in accordance with NFL rules and

regulations as well as all applicable federal and

state laws. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants

tortuously [sic] interfered with their contractual

relations with the New York Jets in purchasing the

tickets. They further claim that Defendants

violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and

the New Jersey Deceptive Business Practices Act. 

Plaintiffs also claim that the Defendants violated

federal and state racketeering laws by using the

National Football League as an enterprise to carry

out their illegal scheme. Because the Defendants

have been found in other games to have illegally

used video equipment, this action seeks damages

for New York Jets ticket-holders for all games

played in Giants stadium between the New York

Jets and the New England Patriots since Bill

Belichick became head coach in 2000.

(A18-A19.) Mayer then described at some length the alleged

misconduct at issue here. His account, in turn, relied heavily on

press accounts of the Spygate scandal as well as “on information

and belief” allegations. 

At their most fundamental level, the various claims
5

alleged here arose out of the repeated and surreptitious violations

of a specific NFL rule. This rule provides that “‘no video

recording devices of any kind are permitted to be in use in the

coaches’ booth, on the field, or in the locker room during the

game’” and that “all video for coaching purposes must be shot

from locations ‘enclosed on all sides with a roof overhead.’” 

(A22.) In a September 6, 2007 memorandum, Ray Anderson,

the NFL’s executive vice president of football operations, stated

that “‘[v]ideotaping of any type, including but not limited to

taping of an opponent’s offensive or defensive signals, is

prohibited on the sidelines, in the coaches’ booth, in the locker

room, or at any other locations accessible to club staff members

during the game.’” (Id.)

On September 9, 2007, the Jets and the Patriots played the

season opener in Giants Stadium, East Rutherford, New Jersey. 

Mayer possessed tickets and parking passes to this game, and the

Patriots ultimately won, 38-14. ESPN.com then reported that the

NFL was investigating accusations that an employee of the

Patriots was actually videotaping the signals given by Jets

coaches at this game. Specifically, NFL security reportedly

confiscated a video camera and videotape from an employee

during the course of the game, and this employee was accused of

aiming his camera at the Jets’ defensive coaches while they were

sending signals out to the team’s players on the field. 

This was not the first time a public accusation of cheating

or dishonesty had been made against the Patriots. A man

wearing a Patriots credential was found carrying a video camera

on the sidelines at the home field of the Green Bay Packers in

November 2006. Admittedly, “[t]eams are allowed to have a

limited number of their own videographers on the sideline

during the game, but they must have a credential that authorizes

them to shoot video, and wear a yellow vest.” (A21.) However,

this particular individual evidently lacked the proper credential

and attire and was accordingly escorted out of the stadium by

Packers security. 

With respect to the 2007 incident, the Patriots denied that

there was any violation of the NFL’s rules. A Patriots
6

cornerback named Ellis Hobbs told the press that he was

unwilling to believe that his team had cheated and that he was

standing by the team and its coaches. However, he also admitted

that, “[i]f it’s true, obviously, we’re in the wrong.” (Id.) 

Belichick apologized to everyone affected following the

confiscation of the videotape. But, at a weekly press conference

on September 12, 2007, he refused to take questions from

reporters about the NFL investigation and stormed out of the

room.

On September 13, 2007, “the NFL found the Defendants

guilty of violating all applicable NFL rules by engaging in a

surreptitious videotaping program.” (A22.) It imposed the

following sanctions: (1) the Patriots were fined $250,000.00; (2)

Belichick was personally fined $500,000.00; and (3) the Patriots

would be stripped of any first-round draft pick for the next year

if the team reached the playoffs in the 2007-2008 season and, if

not so successful, the team would otherwise lose its second- and

third-round picks. Roger Goodell, the commissioner of the NFL,

characterized the whole episode as “‘a calculated and deliberate

attempt to avoid longstanding rules designed to encourage fair

play and promote honest competition on the playing field.’” 

(Id.) He further justified the penalties imposed on the team on

the grounds that “‘Coach Belichick not only serves as the head

coach but also has substantial control over all aspects of New

England’s football operations” and therefore “‘his actions and

decisions are properly attributed to the club.’” (Id.) 

The owner of the Patriots, Robert Kraft, refused to

comment on the NFL’s sanctions, and the New York Jets issued

a statement supporting the commissioner and his findings. On

September 13, 2007, Belichick stated the following: “‘Once

again, I apologize to the Kraft family and every person directly

or indirectly associated with the New England Patriots for the

embarrassment, distraction and penalty my mistake caused. I

also apologize to Patriots fans and would like to thank them for

their support during the past few days and throughout my

career.’” (A23.) However, he then “bizarrely . . . attempted to

deny responsibility, stating: ‘We have never used sideline video

to obtain a competitive advantage while the game was in
7

progress. . .[.] With tonight’s resolution, I will not be offering

any further comments on this matter. We are moving on with

our preparations for Sunday’s game.’” (Id.) But, at least

according to Mayer, Jets ticket-holders have refused to “move

on.” (Id.) 

The Patriots and Belichick deployed their surreptitious

videotaping program during all eight games played against the

Jets in Giants Stadium from 2000 through 2007. Beginning in

2000 when Belichick became head coach, they commenced an

ongoing scheme to acquire the signals of their adversaries and

then match such signals to the plays on the field, in alleged

violation of the “NFL rules that are part of the ticketholders’

contractual and/or quasi contractual rights.” (A24.) On the

other hand, Jets fans collectively spent more than $61 million on

tickets to watch these purportedly honest and competitive games

between the two teams.

In 2000, Matt Walsh, an employee in the team’s

videography department, was hired by the team to videotape the

signals of opponents. Relying specifically on statements made

by Walsh to the New York Times and United States Senator

Arlen Specter, Mayer made a series of allegations with respect to

this Patriots employee. Walsh claimed that he received his

videotaping instructions directly from Ernie Adams, Belichick’s

own special assistant. The purpose of the videotaping program

was to capture signals for use in games against the same

opponent later in the season, and the program was later

expanded to include teams that the Patriots could encounter in

the playoffs. The first instance of taping occurred in a 2000 preseason game against the Tampa Bay Buccaneers. When the two

teams played again in the regular season opener, the Patriots

appeared to use the acquired signals. Walsh specifically asserted

“that this was the first time he had seen quarterback Drew

Bledsoe operate a ‘no huddle’ [offense] ‘when not in a twominute or hurry situation’” and that, when he asked an unnamed

quarterback if the taped signals were helpful, the player replied

that, “‘probably 75 per cent of the time, Tampa Bay ran the

defense we thought they were going to run.’” (A24-A25.) 

Although Walsh left the videotaping program after the 2002
8

Super Bowl, “he [as a Patriots season ticket-holder] witnessed

Patriots employee Steve Scarnecchia continue the same taping

practices in multiple games in the 2003, 2004, and 2005

seasons.” (A25.) Walsh was further instructed by the Patriots

organization to conceal his actions and misrepresent his

activities if challenged on the field by: (1) intentionally breaking

the red operating light on the video camera, (2) telling any

person questioning “the use of a third video camera on the field”

that he was filming tight shots or highlights, and (3) “if asked

why he was not filming action on the field, he was to say he was

filming the down marker.” (Id.) Finally, at the 2002 American

Football Conference championship game against the Pittsburgh

Steelers, Walsh was instructed not to wear a team logo while

filming. 

Walsh’s attorney, Michael Levy, likewise released a

statement describing the team’s method “of securing and tying

coaching signals to plays.” (A26.) As reported in the New York

Post, the lawyer provided the following description of a

videotape made during an October 7, 2001 game against the

Miami Dolphins:

“[It] contains shots of Miami’s offensive coaches

signaling Miami’s offensive players, followed by a

shot from the end-zone camera of Miami’s

offensive play, followed by a shot of Miami’s

offensive coaches signaling Miami’s offensive

players for the next play, then edited to be

followed by a shot of the subsequent Miami

offensive play,” Levy told ESPN.com. “And that

pattern repeats throughout the entire tape, with

occasional cuts to the scoreboard.’”

 

(Id. (citation omitted).) 

Citing again to the New York Post, Mayer further alleged

that the NFL wrongfully destroyed the illicit videotapes

themselves: 

Other tapes produced to the NFL (and later
9

destroyed by order of Commissioner Roger

Goodell, see infra) include defensive signals from

Miami coaches in a game on Sept. 24, 2000,

signals from Bills coaches from a Nov. 11, 2001

game, signals from Browns coaches from a game

on Dec. 9, 2001, two tapes of signals from Steelers

coaches from the 2001 AFC Championship game

on Jan. 27, 2002, and signals from Chargers

coaches from a game Sept. 29, 2002. 

(Id. (citation omitted).) Walsh provided at least eight videotapes

to the NFL, while the Patriots likewise furnished at least six

tapes to the league. The commissioner claimed that he ordered

the destruction of the videotapes to prevent their use by the

Patriots, even though the NFL allegedly had a legal duty to

preserve these items pursuant, inter alia, to the Sarbanes-Oxley

Act and the NFL’s own antitrust exemption. 

Mayer then made various class action allegations in his

amended complaint. According to the pleading, he intended to

seek the certification of both a national class and a state subclass. The proposed national class would consist of “[a]ll New

York Jets season ticket-holders and other ticket-holders who

purchased tickets to games between the New York Jets and the

New England Patriots in Giants stadium since Bill Belichick

became the head coach of the New England Patriots in 2000.” 

(A27.) The subclass would encompass “[a]ll individuals that are

residents of the State of New Jersey and that purchased tickets to

watch the New York Jets play the New England Patriots between

2000 and 2007 in Giants stadium.” (Id.) The officers, directors,

employees, legal representatives, successors, and assigns of

Defendants were expressly excluded from both proposed classes. 

Mayer additionally advanced various allegations with respect to

the specific class action requirements of numerosity, typicality,

adequacy, and predominance and superiority. 

Mayer ultimately alleged nine separate counts in his

amended complaint. He asserted, in order, the following causes

of action against the Patriots and Belichick: (1) tortious

interference with contractual relations; (2) common law fraud;
10

(3) violations of the New Jersey Deceptive Business Practices

Act; (4) violations of New Jersey’s racketeering statute; (5)

violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act (“RICO”); (6) the infringement of the rights

of ticket-holders as third-party beneficiaries; (7) breach of

implied contract or quasi-contract; and (8) violations of the New

Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“NJCFA”). Finally, he advanced a

breach of contract claim against the NFL on account of its

destruction of the videotapes. 

Mayer sought an extensive range of relief in his amended

complaint, asking for: (1) a declaratory judgment; (2) equitable

relief in the form of a preliminary and permanent injunction

prohibiting any videotaping in violation of NFL rules and both

state and federal law; (3) the award of statutory damages in the

form of (a) “actual damages sustained by the customers in the

amount of [$61,600,000.00] for the amount paid by New York

Jets ticket-holders to watch eight fraudulent games between the

New England Patriots and the New York Jets between 2000 and

2007” as well as (b) “treble damages pursuant to [RICO and the

NJCFA] for a total amount of compensatory damages of

$184,800,000.00;” (4) the award of punitive damages; (5) the

award of attorneys’ fees and other costs; and (6) the award of

restitution, disgorgement, and all other relief allowed under the

NJCFA as to the New Jersey sub-class. (A42.) Mayer further

expressly asked for a jury trial.

After they were served with the amended complaint, the

Patriots and Belichick filed a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). The NFL subsequently filed its own motion to dismiss

as well. The Patriots and Belichick included with their motion a

copy of a Jets ticket stub from an August 17, 2007 game against

the Minnesota Vikings. This stub stated, inter alia, that “[t]his

ticket only grants entry into the stadium and a spectator seat for

the specified NFL game.” (SA4.) It added that “[a]dmission

may be refused or ticket holder ejected in the sole discretion of

the New York Jets LLC or New Jersey Sports & Exposition

Authority, subject to refund (or without refund if the ticket

holder is disorderly or fails to comply with these ticket terms or
11

any security measures).” (Id.) The District Court also received a

brief from the Jets as amicus curiae, supporting the respective

motions to dismiss. The District Court ultimately granted the

motions to dismiss in an order entered on March 23, 2009,

providing its reasons for doing so in an accompanying

memorandum opinion. It specifically explained that the various

causes of action must be dismissed as a matter of law because

Mayer failed to allege any actionable injury.

III.

It is undisputed that the District Court possessed federal

question, diversity, and supplemental jurisdiction over this

matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, and 1367. This

Court likewise has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We exercise de novo review of a District Court’s

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for a failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. See, e.g., Phillips v. County of

Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008). We must accept

all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe the

complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately

determine whether plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any

reasonable reading of the complaint. See, e.g., id. at 233. In

order to withstand a motion to dismiss, “a complaint’s ‘[f]actual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.’” Id. at 232 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 & n.3 (2007)). This “requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). On the contrary, a court is not

required to accept legal conclusions alleged in the complaint. 

See, e.g., Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). 

The pleading must contain sufficient factual allegations so as to

state a facially plausible claim for relief. See, e.g., Gelman v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir.

2009). A claim possesses such plausibility “‘when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.’” Id. at 190 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
12

S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a

court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the

complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly

authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon

these documents. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.

White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). 

IV.

The District Court, while noting that Mayer alleged

numerous theories of liability in this case, appropriately turned to

the following dispositive question: namely, whether or not he

stated an actionable injury (or, in other words, a legally protected

right or interest) arising out of the alleged “dishonest”

videotaping program undertaken by the Patriots and the NFL

team’s head coach. It does appear that the various (and

numerous) decisions cited by the District Court and the parties

on appeal are distinguishable from the highly unusual (and even

unique) circumstances present here. Simply put, no one in the

past has ever brought a legal action quite like this one. 

However, past cases do, at the very least, provide this Court with

certain general legal principles especially relevant to the present

matter. Taking into account these principles, the numerous

arguments of the parties on appeal, the record on appeal, and the

District Court’s own ruling, we ultimately conclude that the

District Court was correct to hold that Mayer failed to set forth a

legally cognizable right, interest, or injury here. At best, he

possessed nothing more than a contractual right to a seat from

which to watch an NFL game between the Jets and the Patriots,

and this right was clearly honored. More specifically, we predict

that the New Jersey Supreme Court would reach the exact same

legal conclusion if it were confronted with this appeal. See, e.g.,

Holmes v. Kimco Realty Corp., 598 F.3d 115, 118 (3d Cir.

2010). 

Initially, we consider how tickets to sporting and other

entertainment events have been treated in the past. As the

District Court recognized, New Jersey has generally followed a
 A license, for our purposes, is generally defined as “[a]

1

permission, usu. revocable, to commit some act that would

otherwise be unlawful; esp., an agreement (not amounting to a

lease or profit a prendre) that it is lawful for the licensee to enter

the licensor’s land to do some act that would otherwise be illegal,

such as hunting game.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1002 (9th ed.

2009). 

 It appears that the plaintiff was actually a show business 2

competitor of the defendants. See Garifine v. Monmouth Park

Jockey Club, 148 A.2d 1, 4 (N.J. 1959). 

13

so-called “license” approach. In Shubert v. Nixon Amusement 1

Co., 83 A. 369 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1912), the old New Jersey Supreme

Court considered a tort action filed by a plaintiff who, together

with his friends, was ejected from a theater even though they had

already taken their seats, id. at 369. In considering this action, 2

the court turned to prior case law, especially the Court of

Exchequer’s leading decision in Wood v. Leadbitter, (1845) 153

Eng. Rep. 351 (Exch.). Relying, inter alia, on this English

decision, the Shubert court repeatedly indicated that a ticket

provides a patron with nothing more than a revocable license. 

Shubert, 83 A. at 369-71. For instance, it quoted, with approval,

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s finding “that ‘a theater ticket

is to be regarded as a mere license, for the revocation of which

before the holder has actually been given his seat, and has taken

it, the only remedy is in assumpsit for a breach of contract.’” Id.

at 370 (quoting Horney v. Nixon, 61 A. 1088, 1090 (Pa. 1905) ). 

While referring in passing to the “natural justice or injustice” of

the defendant’s actions, the New Jersey Supreme Court

ultimately ruled that the well-established “license” rule barred

the plaintiff’s tort action even though he had already taken his

seat in the theater before being asked to leave. Id. at 371.

It appears that this “license” approach has, for some time,

been followed throughout the United States and in other

common law jurisdictions throughout the world. For example,

the United States Supreme Court, in a decision written by Justice

Holmes considering the exclusion from a race track of a ticketholder suspected of drugging a horse, cited with approval both
 Specifically, the Shubert court stated, inter alia, that: 3

The position of the defendants is that the sale

of the tickets gave rise only to a personal license,

14

Leadbitter as well as Shubert itself. Marrone v. Wash. Jockey

Club of D.C., 227 U.S. 633, 635 (1913). In turn, the current

New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the “license” rule in another

case dealing with the exclusion and expulsion of a ticket-holding

patron from a race track. In Garifine v. Monmouth Park Jockey

Club, 148 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1959), the race track excluded and

expelled a patron, who had been charged but acquitted of being a

bookmaker, as an undesirable, id. at 2. The plaintiff argued,

inter alia, “that notwithstanding the holding of the former

Supreme Court in [Shubert], the operator of a licensed race track

should not have the common-law right to exclude or expel a

patron without reasonable cause.” Id. After a thorough

discussion, including summaries of both Leadbitter and Shubert,

New Jersey’s highest court rejected this attack on the “commonlaw right of race track operators to exclude suspected

undesirables.” Id. at 6. It noted, inter alia, that the plaintiff’s

complaint “does not question the defendant’s good faith or

sound purposes nor does it present any countervailing

circumstances or any urgent considerations of justice or policy”

indicating the need to depart from the general rule. Id. 

 Although it did not use the specific term “license,” the

ticket stub provided by the Patriots nevertheless appears

consistent with this traditional approach. For example, it

unambiguously stated that “[t]his ticket only grants entry into the

stadium and a spectator seat for the specified NFL game.” 

(SA4.) The stub further made clear that the Jets and the owners

of the stadium retain sole discretion to refuse admission or to

eject a ticket-holder. Admittedly, the Shubert court in particular

made repeated references to the existence of a claim for breach

of contract. See Shubert, 83 A. at 369-71. However, it appears

that the court was only referring to the patron’s right to obtain a

refund of the ticket price (and related expenses) because the

venue exercised its right to deny entry or expel the patron.3
revocable at any time, and whose revocation would

confer no right of action, except for the money paid,

with such incidental damages as would arise from

the expense and inconvenience of going to the

theater to no purpose. . . .

. . . . 

. . . . It was held that plaintiff might recover in

contract the price of his ticket and all legal damages

sustained by the breach of the contract implied by

the sale and delivery of the ticket . . . .

Shubert, 83 A. at 369-70.

15

Given that Mayer was never barred or expelled from any game at

Giants Stadium, much more is needed to establish a cognizable

right, interest, or injury than these kinds of inapposite

statements. 

On the other hand, it is also true that the whole traditional

approach, generally permitting patrons to be excluded or

expelled without cause, has been subjected to rather serious

attack. Even as early as 1959, the Garifine court acknowledged

some of this criticism, noting, inter alia, that the Court of

Appeal of England and Wales actually rejected the prior holding

in Leadbitter. Garifine, 148 A.2d at 3 (citing Hurst v. Picture

Theatres, [1915] 1 K.B. 1 (A.C. 1914)). More recently, the New

Jersey Supreme Court vigorously attacked the whole notion of

an unfettered right to exclude or expel in a case involving a

casino’s decision to exclude a patron from its blackjack tables

because of his card counting strategy. In Uston v. Resorts Int’l

Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370 (N.J. 1982), the court ultimately held

that the state’s gaming statute gives the Casino Control

Commission exclusive authority to set the rules and methods of

licensed casino games and that the casino was thereby statutorily

precluded from excluding the gambler. Id. at 371. However, the

Uston court then attacked at some length the “current majority

American rule” that an amusement place owner has “an absolute

right arbitrarily to eject or exclude any person consistent with
16

state and federal civil rights laws.” Id. at 374 (citation omitted). 

For a variety of reasons (including speculation that the rule was

developed and maintained as a way to protect segregationist

activities), the court adamantly rejected the majority rule in favor

of an approach recognizing the patron’s right to “reasonable

access.” Id. at 373-75.

The status of the “license” rule in New Jersey with

respect to the right of an amusement place owner to bar or

exclude a patron still appears unsettled. In yet another race track

case, the New Jersey Supreme Court expressly characterized the

discussion in Uston regarding the rule as dicta. Marzocca v.

Ferone, 461 A.2d 1133, 1137 (N.J. 1983). In Marzocca, the

court concluded that this dicta did not apply to the exclusion of a

horse owner and his horse from the track’s races, and it therefore

refrained from deciding whether the casino decision overruled

Garifine sub silentio. Id. at 1134, 1137. On the other hand, the

Marzocca court did further “limit the common law doctrine by

proscribing exclusions that violate public policy.” Id. at 1137. 

After noting that the plaintiff disclaimed the existence of any

express or implied contract with the race track, the New Jersey

Supreme Court ultimately found that no such public policy

concerns were implicated. Id. at 1137-38. 

We nevertheless conclude that neither the Uston ruling

nor similar decisions have any real relevance here. As already

noted, we are not concerned in this case with a patron excluded

or ejected from the premises. In fact, it was the notion of a

person’s right to “reasonable access” that served as the

fundamental basis for the reasoning of the court in Uston. We

therefore need not (and do not) have to predict how the New

Jersey Supreme Court would treat an ejection case like Shubert

at this time. However, the various general principles stated in

such cases as Shubert, Uston, and Marzocca still guide our

consideration of more recent case law arising out of the specific

sports context. 

Courts across the country have recently struggled to deal

with litigation arising out of the often complicated ticket

arrangements between teams and their fans. Season ticket-
17

holders accordingly have sued teams, with varying degrees of

success, claiming that some action (e.g., moving the team itself

to another city) violated either their renewal rights or other rights

related to their status as season ticket-holders. See, e.g.,

Oshinsky v. N.Y. Football Giants, Inc., Civil Action No. 09-cv1186 (PGS), 2009 WL 4120237, *4-*10 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2009);

Brotherson v. Prof’l Basketball Club, LLC, 604 F. Supp. 2d

1276, 1283-96 (D. Wash. 2009); Charpentier v. L.A. Rams

Football Co., 75 Cal. App. 4th 301, 308-16 (1999); Miami

Dolphins, Ltd. v. Genden & Bach, P.A., 545 So.2d 294, 295-96

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam); Skalbania v. Simmons,

443 N.E.2d 352, 356-63 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Wichita State

Univ. Intercollegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Marrs, 28 P.3d 401, 402-

04 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (per curiam); Yarde Metals, Inc. v. New

England Patriots Ltd. P’ship, 834 N.E.2d 1233, 1235-38 (Mass.

App. Ct. 2005); Strauss v. Long Island Sports, Inc., 401

N.Y.S.2d 233, 235-38 (App. Div. 1978); Bickett v. Buffalo Bills,

Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 245, 247-48 (Sup. Ct. 1983); Beder v.

Cleveland Browns, Inc., 717 N.E.2d 716, 719-23 (Ohio Ct. App.

1998); Stern v. Cleveland Browns Football Club, Inc., No. 95-L196, 1996 WL 761163, at *5-*6 (Ohio Ct. App. December 20,

1996) . Similarly, other courts have addressed the closely related

question of whether such alleged renewal rights may be sold by

the bankruptcy trustee. See, e.g., Abele v. Phoenix Suns Ltd.

P’ship (In re Harrell), 73 F.3d 218, 219-20 (9th Cir. 1996) (per

curiam); Grossman v. Boston Red Sox Baseball Club Ltd. P’ship

(In re Platt), 292 B.R. 12, 17-18 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2003); In re

Liebman, 208 B.R. 38, 39-41 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997); In re I.D.

Craig Serv. Corp., 138 B.R. 490, 493-502 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.

1992). 

Nevertheless, the existing “season ticket” case law

ultimately does not really help Mayer. Several of these cases

have actually indicated that there may be different and distinct

kinds of rights or interests implicated in the season ticket

context. For instance, the bankruptcy court in Craig stated “that

the conclusion does not follow that, because each single ticket is

a revocable license, [the team] can either deny Trustee’s request

to transfer his season ticket status or refuse to recognize that

status in his transferees.” Craig, 138 B.R. at 494. On the
18

contrary, the Craig court expressly recognized that “[t]he game

tickets themselves and the right to renew the season tickets are

two separate and distinct interests of this estate.” Id. We are not

concerned here with the relatively more straight-forward issue of

renewal rights. Reduced to its essence, the current appeal before

us is concerned with the alleged existence of a very specific but

very different and unusual right: namely, the right of a ticketholder to see an “honest” game played in compliance with the

fundamental rules of the NFL itself (which was then allegedly

denied to Mayer and his fellow ticket-holders because of the

secret and illicit videotaping program undertaken by the Patriots

and Belichick). 

Although the factual circumstances and claims before this

Court appear to be rather unique, several courts have addressed

relatively similar theories of liability with respect to the related

issues of alleged poor performance and rule violations. The

District Court itself cited to some of these decisions, and it

specifically focused on two of them: Bowers v. Federation

Internationale de l’Automobile, 489 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 2007),

and Castillo v. Tyson, 701 N.Y.S.2d 423 (App. Div. 2000)

(mem. decision). Both of these rulings provide clear support for

the District Court’s dismissal of Mayer’s complaint.

The Bowers litigation arose out of a Formula One car race

in Indianapolis, where fourteen of the original twenty cars did

not participate because a serious tire flaw made their tires

dangerous to use at full speed on one part of the track. Bowers,

489 F.3d at 319. The entire heated affair was dubbed

“Indygate.” Id. at 320. Disappointed fans sued, seeking the

expenses they had incurred to attend the race, and alleging, inter

alia, that the Formula One racing rules require at least twelve

cars to participate in any race. Id. at 320-21. The Seventh

Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the various

claims advanced by the plaintiffs. Id. at 320-25.

Of particular significance here, the appellate court

initially stated that any breach of contract claim “arguably should

fail because IMS [the race track hosting the event] promised

only to admit the plaintiffs to the race grounds on the days of the
19

grand prix.” Id. at 321. It went on to state the following:

While we are unaware of any Indiana case

addressing the nature of a contract formed by the

sale of an admission ticket, cf. [Skalbania, 443

N.E.2d at 352] (addressing a class certification

question in a breach of contract action by season

ticket holders against a hockey franchise, but

explicitly reserving the merits), most states agree

that the seller contracts only to admit the plaintiff

to its property at a given time. The plaintiff buys

the ticket, of course, in order to see an event that is

scheduled to occur on the ticket-seller’s grounds,

but the seller does not contract to provide the

spectacle, only to license the plaintiff to enter and

“view whatever event transpire[s].” [Castillo, 701

N.Y.S.2d at 423]. 

Id. (other citations omitted). Noting that one certainly could

contract to provide a spectacle, the Bowers court questioned why

an exhibitor like the race track here would do so given its lack of

control over the performers and their scheduled performances. 

Id. Furthermore, a patron “could reasonably decide to do

without a contractual right to the spectacle itself, trusting that the

exhibitor will work with the performers to ensure that the

spectacle goes off lest both develop a bad reputation that could

damage their future business.” Id. The Seventh Circuit then

noted that Formula One racing has struggled to take root in the

United States, that the effects of Indygate on the sport’s

reputation was a serious concern for everyone involved, and that

there was speculation that the sport might never hold a race at

the track again. Id.

Acting out of an abundance of caution because of the

absence of Indiana case law on point, the Seventh Circuit

ultimately purportedly rested its ruling on other grounds. Id. at

321-25. It thereby assumed that the plaintiffs did in fact possess

a contractual right to a “regulation Formula One race” as well as

a right “to have the race stewards properly interpret the

applicable regulations on the spot.” Id. at 321 But, among other
20

things, the appellate court found that a six-car race was not

actually prohibited or otherwise nonsensical under the Formula

One rules. Id. at 322. Accordingly, there was no reason to

claim, “as the plaintiffs in all seriousness do, that no race

occurred.” Id. Furthermore, the court further discussed the

limited scope of the underlying ticket or license. It therefore

noted that a sporting contest is not invalidated merely because of

a player’s poor effort. Id. Insofar as plaintiffs themselves

received a “regulation race,” “they admit that they had no

additional right to a race that was exciting or drivers that

competed well.” Id. (citations omitted). In discussing the

promissory estoppel claim, the court likewise observed that

numerous factors, ranging from a driver’s sudden illness to an

accident shipping a car to the track, could prevent a full

complement of cars from racing at a particular location on a

particular day. Id. at 324.

Quoted by the Bowers court, the New York Appellate

Division in Castillo confronted a seemingly unique situation of

its own. The plaintiffs sought a refund of the money they paid to

see a boxing match after one of the boxers, Mike Tyson, was

disqualified for biting his opponent’s ear. Castillo, 701

N.Y.S.2d at 424. Invoking (like Mayer himself) a long list of

legal theories, the plaintiffs “claim that they were entitled to

view a ‘legitimate heavyweight title fight’ fought ‘in accordance

with the applicable rules and regulations’ of the governing

boxing commission.” Id. But the Appellate Division upheld the

trial court’s dismissal of the complaint Id. at 424-25. Among

other things, it noted that there was nothing in any contract

promising a fight that did not end in a disqualification. Id. at

424. On the contrary, the rules themselves “provide for

disqualification and it is a possibility that a fight fan can

reasonably expect.” Id. In specifically rejecting the unjust

enrichment claim, the Appellate Division reasoned “that

plaintiffs received what they paid for, namely, ‘the right to view

whatever event transpired.’” Id. at 425.

As highlighted by the District Court itself as well as both

the Seventh Circuit and the New York Appellate Division,

numerous other decisions provide yet further support for this
 Other courts have made similar statements as to the 4

absence of a cause of action arising out of bad performance or,

more generally, the subjective expectations of the ticket-holders.

See, e.g., Brotherson, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 1296 (“Plaintiffs may

have enjoyed Sonics games less as it became more likely that the

team would leave Seattle at the end of the season, but that is at best

the sort of mental injury that the [Washington consumer protection

statute] does not recognize.”); Charpentier, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 314

(rejecting claim of breach of covenant of good faith and fair

dealing because “plaintiff did not buy the right to watch a good

team or to have enlightened (in his opinion) management decisions

made” (citation omitted)); Strauss, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 235-38 (finding

class action was not appropriate where season ticket-holder filed

suit against New York Nets because the team traded Julius Erving

to the Philadelphia 76ers); Bickett, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 248

(“Obviously, ‘diminished quality’ lies in the eyes of the

beholder.”); Beder, 717 N.E.2d at 725 (“That the Browns

performed poorly after the announced move to Baltimore cannot

serve as a basis from which to find that the Browns breached their

contract with season ticket holders. To allow recovery under such

a theory would enable any ticket holder not satisfied with the

performance of whatever entertainment the ticket procured to seek

a refund for such a subjective and unreasonable response.”

(citations omitted)); Stern, 1996 WL 761163, at *6 (“Additionally,

to the extent that appellant sought a refund for his 1995 tickets

based on the poor performance by the team after the November 6,

1996 announcement [of its relocation], we refuse to recognize such

a cause of action.”).

21

reasoning. For instance, the Seventh Circuit stated the

following, admittedly in a case involving a debt collection

arrangement: “That the Chicago Cubs turn out to be the doormat

of the National League would not entitle the ticket holder to a

refund for the remaining games, any more than the star tenor’s

laryngitis entitles the opera goer to a refund when the understudy

takes over the role.” Seko Air Freight, Inc. v. Transworld Sys.,

Inc., 22 F.3d 773, 774 (7th Cir. 1994). On the contrary, the fan’s

remedy would be to “head south for Comiskey Park and the

White Sox.” Id. We believe that the New Jersey Supreme 4
22

Court would follow the reasoning adopted by both the District

Court as well as by the overwhelming weight of the case law. 

The District Court, in turn, properly applied this

reasoning in the present circumstances. Mayer possessed either

a license or, at best, a contractual right to enter Giants Stadium

and to have a seat from which to watch a professional football

game. In the clear language of the ticket stub, “[t]his ticket only

grants entry into the stadium and a spectator seat for the

specified NFL game.” (SA4.) Mayer actually was allowed to

enter the stadium and witnessed the “specified NFL game[s]”

between the Jets and Patriots. He thereby suffered no cognizable

injury to a legally protected right or interest. 

Accordingly, we need not, and do not decide, whether a

ticket-holder possesses nothing more than a license to enter and

view whatever event, if any, happens to transpire. Here, Mayer

undeniably saw football games played by two NFL teams. This

therefore is not a case where, for example, the game or games

were cancelled, strike replacement players were used, or the

professional football teams themselves did something

nonsensical or absurd, such as deciding to play basketball. See,

e.g., Bowers, 489 F.3d at 322 (“But, while a six-car race under

the Regulations may be less rich, interesting or challenging than

a twelve-car race, it is not prohibited or nonsensical under the

rules (like a soccer match between three teams or a basketball

team getting a first down).”); Miami Dolphins, 545 So.2d at 295-

96 (upholding enforcement of fee abatement provision in club

seat license agreement because Miami Dolphins used

replacement players during strike); Skalbania, 443 N.E.2d at

354-63 (affirming certification of season ticket-holder class

where Indiana Racers did not finish season because of team’s

business collapse); Bickett, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 882-84 (rejecting

claims arising out of cancellation of games by Buffalo Bills due

to strike).

Furthermore, we do recognize that Mayer alleged that he

was the victim, not of mere poor performance by a team or its

players, but of a team’s ongoing acts of dishonesty or cheating in

violation of the express rules of the game. Nevertheless, there
23

are any number of often complicated rules and standards

applicable to a variety of sports, including professional football. 

It appears uncontested that players often commit intentional rule

infractions in order to obtain an advantage over the course of the

game. For instance, a football player may purposefully commit

pass interference or a “delay of game.” Such infractions, if not

called by the referees, may even change the outcome of the game

itself. There are also rules governing the off-field conduct of the

football team, such as salary “caps” and the prohibition against

“tampering” with the employer-employee relationships between

another team and its players and coaches. Mayer further does

not appear to contest the fact that a team is evidently permitted

by the rules to engage in a wide variety of arguably “dishonest”

conduct to uncover an opponent’s signals. For example, a team

is apparently free to take advantage of the knowledge that a

newly hired player or coach takes with him after leaving his

former team, and it may even have personnel on the sidelines

who try to pick up the opposing team’s signals with the

assistance of lip-reading, binoculars, note-taking, and other

devices. In addition, even Mayer acknowledged in his amended

complaint that “[t]eams are allowed to have a limited number of

their own videographers on the sideline during the game.” 

(A21.) 

In fact, the NFL’s own commissioner (like the boxing

officials in Castillo and the various parties in Bowers) did

ultimately take action here. He found that the Patriots and

Belichick were guilty of violating the applicable NFL rules,

imposed sanctions in the form of fines and the loss of draft

picks, and rather harshly characterized the whole episode as a

calculated attempt to avoid well-established rules designed to

encourage fair play and honest competition. At least in this

specific context, it is not the role of judges and juries to be

second-guessing the decision taken by a professional sports

league purportedly enforcing its own rules. In fact, we generally

lack the knowledge, experience, and tools in which to engage in

such an inquiry. For instance, there appear to be no real

standards or criteria that a legal decision-maker may use to

determine when a particular rule violation gives rise to an

actionable claim or should instead be accepted as a usual and
24

expected part of the game. At the very least, a ruling in favor of

Mayer could lead to other disappointed fans filing lawsuits

because of “a blown call” that apparently caused their team to

lose or any number of allegedly improper acts committed by

teams, coaches, players, referees and umpires, and others. This

Court refuses to countenance a course of action that would only

further burden already limited judicial resources and force

professional sports organizations and related individuals to

expend money, time, and resources to defend against such

litigation. See, e.g., Bickett, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 883 (“Buffalo

News sports editor, Larry Felser, in his column of May 30, 1983

warned of the dire consequences of permitting such a theory of

recovery to exist, ‘If the fan (plaintiff) wins against the Bills,

every lawyer in Western New York could use the precedent to

finance a vacation to the Riviera.’”). Under the circumstances,

public policy considerations evidently weigh against Mayer and

his various claims. See Garifine, 461 A.2d at 1137-38. 

In conclusion, this Court will affirm the dismissal of

Mayer’s amended complaint. Again, it bears repeating that our

reasoning here is limited to the unusual and even unique

circumstances presented by this appeal. We do not condone the

conduct on the part of the Patriots and the team’s head coach,

and we likewise refrain from assessing whether the NFL’s

sanctions (and its alleged destruction of the videotapes

themselves) were otherwise appropriate. We further recognize

that professional football, like other professional sports, is a

multi-billion dollar business. In turn, ticket-holders and other

fans may have legitimate issues with the manner in which they

are treated. See, e.g., Charpentier, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 314 (“It is

common knowledge that professional sports franchisees have a

sordid history of arrogant disdain for the consumers of the

product.” (footnote omitted)). Significantly, our ruling also does

not leave Mayer and other ticket-holders without any recourse. 

Instead, fans could speak out against the Patriots, their coach,

and the NFL itself. In fact, they could even go so far as to refuse

to purchase tickets or NFL-related merchandise. See, e.g.,

Bowers, 489 F.3d at 321 (noting possible effects of bad

reputation on future prospects of sport); Seko, 22 F.3d at 774

(stating that, “instead of going to the Cubs game, the fan may
25

head south for Comiskey Park and the White Sox”). However,

the one thing they cannot do is bring a legal action in a court of

law. 

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District

Court’s order dismissing Mayer’s amended complaint in its

entirety.