* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUN 21 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT VIGIL,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO HEALTH SCIENCE CENTER,

Defendant - Appellee. No. 98-1174 (D. Ct. No. 97-WY-1759-WD)

(D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before TACHA , BARRETT , and BRORBY , Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff Robert Vigil brought this action under Ti tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), alleging that defendant, Colorado Department of Higher Education, University of Colorado Health Sci ence Center (“The University”), terminated him in retaliation for eng aging in protected activity. The United States District Court for the District of Co lorado granted summary- 2 -

judgment in favor of defendant and dismissed the ca se. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the district court erred by: (1) findin g that Vigil engaged in protected activity only after disciplinary proceedings had be gun; (2) finding that Vigil and Glen Roberts exerted pressure on Jose Garcia and Di ck Kovach to falsify overtime reports; (3) finding that Vigil and Robert s were not similarly situated; (4) finding that Vigil and Garcia were not similarl y situated; (5) failing to consider certain evidence that allegedly shows thatdefendant’s proffered nonretaliatory reasons for terminating him are pret extual; and (6) relying upon unreviewed findings of a state administrative law j udge. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. Background Robert Vigil commenced employment with the Universi ty on July 2, 1990. He worked as a telecommunications/electronics speci alist and was a certified state employee, which, under Colorado law, means that def endant could only terminate him for just cause and after he had an opportunity to respond to the charges. See Colo. Const. art. XII, §13(8); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2 4-50-125; Department of Insts., Div. for Developmental Disabilities, Wheat Ridge Re g’l Ctr. v. Kinchen , 886 P.2d 700, 704 (Colo. 1994) (en banc). Prior to the even ts forming the basis of this lawsuit, plaintiff had never been disciplined and h ad received satisfactory job performance evaluations.- 3 -

On August 22, 1996, defendant scheduled Vigil to wo rk overtime with three co-workers, Jose Garcia, Dick Kovach, and Glen Robe rts. On August 26, 1996, Kovach reported that he, along with Vigil, Garcia, and Roberts, submitted inflated overtime reports for work performed on August 22. Based on Kovach’s admission, Patrick Hellman, defendant’s Director of Communications and Technical Support, directed Vigil’s supervisors to investigate the matter. The supervisors took written statements from Vigil, Gar cia, Kovach, and Roberts on August 28, 1996. Vigil and Roberts denied overstat ing their overtime hours. Garcia and Kovach admitted to falsifying their overtime hours. Later that day, Hellman informed Vigil that he was scheduled to app ear at a September 3 meeting, pursuant to Colorado State Personnel BoardRule 8-3-3 (“the 8-3-3 meeting”), to determine whether cause existed for d isciplinary action in connection with the overtime allegations. Before receiving notice of his 8-3-3 meeting, Vigil attempted to set up a meeting with George Thomas, defendant’s Director of Human Resources and equal employment opportunity (“EEO”) officer. Plai ntiff wished to meet with Thomas because he wanted to be informed of his lega l rights regarding the questioning about overtime. Vigil contacted the ot her accused employees, including Kovach, to urge them to attend the meetin g with him. The meeting never occurred because Thomas was too busy. On Aug ust 29, 1996, Kovach- 4 -

notified Hellman that Vigil was trying to meet with Thomas and that he did not want to be associated with such a meeting. Hellman told Kovach not to worry because he would shortly “take care” of the situati on. Within two hours, Hellman placed all four employees on paid administrative su spension pending further investigation. At the 8-3-3 meetings, Vigil and Roberts, through t heir attorney, continued to deny any wrongdoing and asserted that Kovach andGarcia had left early but that they had stayed behind to perform system backups. Defendant’s investigation uncovered no evidence verifying plaintiff’s claim t hat a system backup was performed on August 22. Defendant allowed Kovach a nd Garcia to return to work after they corrected their time reports, and i t took no further action against them. Plaintiff remained on paid administrative suspensio n. On September 10, 1996, the University sent each of the four employee s additional interrogatories regarding the overtime matter. Garcia and Kovach r esponded to the interrogatories. However, plaintiff’s attorney wro te to defendant on September 20, 1996, and proclaimed that he had no obligation to answer defendant’s interrogatories and that Vigil and Roberts stood bytheir responses in the 8-3-3 meetings, which he believed fully explained the matter. On September 25, 1996, defendant terminated both plaintiff and Roberts. I n Vigil’s notice of disciplinary- 5 -

action, Hellman informed plaintiff that he was bein g terminated because he was in a position of trust, conspired to misreport overtim e, and lied about it. Plaintiff appealed the University’s termination decision to t he Colorado State Personnel Board. On January 21, 1997, a state administrative law judge (“ALJ”) affirmed the University’s actions, finding that plaintiff wa s afforded due process and that defendant did not otherwise violate Colorado law in disciplining plaintiff. On August 13, 1997, Vigil commenced this Title VII action in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging that defendant terminated him in retaliation for engaging in prote cted activity, specifically, for attempting to meet with George Thomas in his capaci ty as defendant’s EEO officer. On January 6, 1998, the University filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted on April 14, 1998.
Standard of Review We review the district court’s grant of summary jud gment de novo, applying the same legal standard used by the distri ct court. See Byers v. City of Albuquerque , 150 F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 1998). Summary ju dgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, i f any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c ). When applying this- 6 -

standard, we view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Byers , 150 F.3d at 1274. Although the movant must show the absence of a genu ine issue of material fact, he or she need not negate the nonmovant’s cla im. See, e.g. , Jenkins v. Wood , 81 F.3d 988, 990 (10th Cir. 1996). Once the mova nt carries this burden, the nonmovant cannot rest upon his or her pleadings , but “must bring forward specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which [he or she] carries the burden of proof.” Id

. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmovant’s position is insufficient to create a dispute of fact that is ‘genuine’; an issu e of material fact is genuine only if the nonmovant presents facts such that a reasona ble jury could find in favor of the nonmovant.” Lawmaster v. Ward , 125 F.3d 1341, 1347 (10th Cir. 1997). If there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispu te, we determine whether the district court correctly applied the substantive law. See Kaul v. Stephan , 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996).
Discussion In deciding whether to grant summary judgment on a Title VII retaliation claim, we utilize the burden-shifting framework setforth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973). “Under this approach, the p laintiff initially bears the burden of production to establish a primafacie case of a Title VII- 7 -

violation.” Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep’t of Men tal Health & Substance Abuse Servs. , 165 F.3d 1321, 1328 (10th Cir. 1999), petition fo r cert. filed , (May 24, 1999) (No. 98-1884); accordBerry v. Stevinson Chevrolet , 74 F.3d 980, 985- 86 (10th Cir. 1996). To establish a prima facie ca se of retaliation, a plaintiff must show: “(1) protected opposition to Title VII d iscrimination or participation in a Title VII proceeding; (2) adverse action by th e employer subsequent to or contemporaneous with such employee activity; and (3 ) a causal connection between such activity and the employer’s adverse ac tion.” Berry , 74 F.3d at 985; see also McCue v. Kansas, Dep’t of Human Resources , 165 F.3d 784, 789 (10th Cir. 1999). A plaintiff can demonstrate a causal c onnection either by direct evidence or by inferences arising from an adverse e mployment action that closely follows the protected conduct. See Candelaria v. EG&G Energy Measurements,
Inc. , 33 F.3d 1259, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 1994). Once pla intiff has presented a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendan t to advance a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the challenged employmentaction. See Berry , 74 F.3d at 986. If the defendant provides such reasons forthe employment action, the plaintiff may defeat summary judgment by showing th at the defendant’s proffered reasons for the employment action are a pretext forretaliation, that is, unworthy of belief. See id. ; Randle v. City of Aurora , 69 F.3d 441, 451 (10th Cir. 1995). Although the evidence in support of plaintiff’s ret aliation claim is thin, we1 The record indicates that defendant may have also based its decision to terminate

Vigil, in part, on the allegations that Vigil exerted pressure upon other employees to falsify their overtime reports. - 8 - conclude, as did the district court, that plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Th e record reflects that Vigil attempted to meet with defendant’s EEO officer and was suspended within two hours after defendant learned of this attempted mee ting. Vigil was also ultimately terminated. Thus, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to advance a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the employmen t actions. The defendant has satisfied its burden by providing several nonretali atory reasons for the adverse employment actions, namely, that it believed plaint iff submitted inflated overtime reports and lied about it. 1 Consequently, the burden of production returns to plaintiff to produce evidence demonstrating that th ose proffered reasons are pretextual. A. Pretext Analysis To establish pretext in a retaliation claim, plaint iff must show “‘that the tendered reason for the employment decision was notthe genuine motivating reason, but rather was a disingenuous or sham reaso n.’” McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp. , 149 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Rey nolds v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo. , 69 F.3d 1523, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995)). Plaintiff may accomplish this by demonstrating “such weaknesses, implausibilities,- 9 -

inconsistencies, incoherences, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted . . . reasons.” Morgan v. Hilti, Inc. , 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted). In support of his assertion of pretext, Vigil advanced the following evidence before the districtcourt: (1) the close temporal proximity of the adverse employment action to the p rotected activity; (2) defendant’s more severe punishment of Vigil than si milarly situated employees who committed the same misconduct; and (3) defendan t’s allegedly disturbing procedural irregularities in justifying Vigil’s ter mination. The district court held that Vigil failed to meet his burden of showing pre text. Plaintiff claims that the district court erred because, in the course of its analysis, it made numerous factual findings unsupported in the record and ignored some evidence of pretext. 1. Temporal Proximity Plaintiff argued below that the temporal proximity of his attempt to meet with defendant’s EEO officer and the subsequent sus pension established pretext under Marx v. Schnuck Markets, Inc. , 76 F.3d 324 (10th Cir. 1996). The district court distinguished this case from Marxin that plaintiff did not engage in protected activity until after the investigation an d disciplinary proceedings had begun. The district court further noted that:- 10 -

To rule, as Plaintiff wishes, would create a situat ion where potential plaintiffs who are facing a termination could manuf acture a triable issue of fact by seeking a protected right after te rmination proceedings had begun but before those proceedings had reached a conclusion. Such a conclusion would appear to be a n untenable perversion of the protections afforded by Title VII

. Dist. Ct. Order at 8. On appeal, plaintiff asserts that the district court erred in making a factual conclusion that he had engaged in protected activity only after disciplinary proceedings had begun. We agree that temporal proximity of an adverse empl oyment action to protected activity may permit a plaintiff to meet t he causal connection requirement and thus establish a prima facie case of retaliation, creating a presumption of retaliatory motive. See Conner v. Schnuck Markets, Inc. , 121 F.3d 1390, 1395 (10th Cir. 1997); Marx , 76 F.3d at 329. However, that presumption “drops out of the picture” once the emp loyer advances a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the employment action. S t. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). At that point, unless th e plaintiff meets his burden of showing that the proffered reason is unworthy of cr edence, summary judgment is appropriate. Temporal proximity of adverse employm ent action to protected activity is not dispositive in the pretext analysis , but instead is simply one fact that may throw doubt on defendant’s termination jus tification. See Conner , 121 F.3d at 1398 (rejecting argument that “protected co nduct closely followed by adverse action always justifies an inference of retaliatory motive” suff icient to2Even if Thomas, an employee of the defendant and its EEO officer, was aware

that plaintiff was engaging in protected activity on August 28, that is not sufficient to support an inference that defendant had a retaliatory motive for its decision to suspend Vigil. In order to show that the employer had knowledge of the protected activity, “an employee must show that the ‘individual responsible for making the adverse employment decision ’ knew of the protected activity.” Lockaby v. United Testing Group, Inc. , 986 F. Supp. 1400, 1404 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (quoting Lewis v. Zilog, Inc. , 908 F. Supp. 931, 949 (N.D. Ga. 1995)); see alsoCohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc. , 686 F.2d 793, 797 (9th Cir. 1982); Corley v. Jackson Police Dep’t, 639 F.2d 1296, 1300 n.6 (5th Cir. 1981); Cichon v. Roto- - 11 - defeat summary judgment). We must evaluate each ca se based on its specific facts. See id. Here, we find plaintiff’s evidence of temporal prox imity insufficient to establish pretext. Although defendant took an adve rse action against Vigil, the suspension, within hours of when it learned of plai ntiff’s attempt to meet with its EEO officer, defendant explicitly informed Vigil th at he was being placed on administrative suspension due to allegations of his complicity in a scheme to misreport overtime. Indeed, the undisputed facts c omport with defendant’s proffered reason for the suspension. Defendant notonly suspended plaintiff, but also contemporaneously suspended the three other employees involved in the overtime incident, some of whom never attempted to contact the EEO officer. Furthermore, the undisputed facts indicate that def endant was considering some type of disciplinary action against all four employ ees on August 28, 1996, a day before Kovach informed Hellman that Vigil was attempting to meet with Thomas. 2 This timeline greatly undermines the nefarious mo tive plaintiff wishesRooter Servs. Co. , 1998 WL 851501, at *9 n.9 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 1998) (slip opinion).

Plaintiff provided no evidence that Hellman knew of plaintiff’s effort to contact the EEO officer prior to Kovach informing him of that fact on August 29, 1996. - 12 - to impute to the timing of defendant’s decision to place him on administrative suspension. See Morgan v. Hilti, Inc. , 108 F.3d 1319, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding temporal proximity insufficient to establi sh pretext when disciplinary action had begun prior to the protected activity be cause the subsequent adverse employment acts “simply completed the disciplinary process already set in motion”). Plaintiff does not dispute the timeline. He merely asserts that, at the time he contacted Thomas, he did not know that disciplin ary proceedings had begun. Vigil’s state of mind is irrelevant to this inquiry . Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Vigil, we nevertheless conc lude that he failed to put forth sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to concl ude that the timing of his suspension rendered defendant’s legitimate, nonreta liatory reason for it unworthy of belief. 2. Disparate Treatment Vigil also argued below that the fact defendant dis ciplined him more severely than employees who engaged in similar misc onduct establishes pretext. In particular, plaintiff asserted that he was simil arly situated to Garcia and Kovach, who also overstated overtime, but who were not terminated. In addition,- 13 -

plaintiff argued that Roberts’ termination supporte d his pretext argument because he also engaged in protected activity with plaintif f. The district court found Vigil not similarly situated to Garcia and Kovach because they admitted to their misconduct, whereas Vigil continued to deny any wro ngdoing. The district court further noted that Roberts’ termination did not adv ance plaintiff’s claim because: (1) defendant disciplined Roberts, who was more sim ilarly situated to plaintiff than any other person involved in the overtime inci dent, in the same manner -- termination, and (2) the evidence did not support t hat Roberts had engaged in protected activity. As a result, the district court found that Vigil had failed to show pretext. Plaintiff asserts that the district court erred in its conclusions regarding who was similarly situated and the meanin g attributable to defendant’s actions with respect to the similarly situated empl oyees. Based on our review of the record, we agree with th e district court that plaintiff’s disparate treatment argument fails to d emonstrate that defendant’s proffered reasons for Vigil’s termination are unworthy of belief. Instances of disparate treatment of similarly situated individua ls may support a claim of pretext, such as when employees who “are involved i n or accused of the same offense . . . are disciplined in different ways.” Ward v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Co. , 111 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation omitted); see also Aramburu v. The Boeing Co. , 112 F.3d 1398, 1404 (10th Cir. 1997).3 The district court also distinguished plaintiff’s conduct from that of Garcia and

Kovach because Vigil was accused of pressuring employees to misreport overtime. Plaintiff disputes the veracity of this accusation. We need not address this contention because we find the accusation that plaintiff not only misreported overtime, but also subsequently lied to conceal the wrongdoing is itself sufficient to distinguish his actions from those of Garcia and Kovach. - 14 - However, plaintiff must show that he was similarly situated in all relevant aspects. See Ward , 111 F.3d at 560. Although the violations need on ly be of “comparable seriousness,” see Aramburu , 112 F.3d at 1404, plaintiff must account for all “differentiating or mitigating circumstance s that would distinguish [his] conduct or the employer’s treatment of [him] for it ,” Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp. , 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992); accordDavid v. City & County of Denver , 101 F.3d 1344, 1360 (10th Cir.) (quoting EEOC v. Flashe r Co. , 986 F.2d 1312, 1320 (10th Cir. 1992)), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 157 (1997). The undisputed facts show that plaintiff was not si milarly situated to Garcia and Kovach because defendant not only accused Vigil of violating a workplace rule by submitting an inflated overtime report, it also accused him of subsequently lying about his alleged misconduct. 3 Throughout defendant’s investigation, plaintiff and Roberts repeatedly denied any wrongdo ing, asserting that they worked all hours reported performing a system backup. Defendant ultimately concluded that they were lying about their overtime since no computer records existed of the purported system backup. The accusation that Vigil remained- 15 -

untruthful aggravated his offense and distinguishedthe seriousness of his conduct from that of Garcia and Kovach, thereby justifying more severe punishment. We also find plaintiff’s contention that Roberts’ t ermination supports an inference of retaliatory intent without merit. Eve n assuming, arguendo, that Roberts and Vigil were similarly situated because t hey both engaged in protected activity, they were also similarly situated because they were accused of the same misconduct . As noted above, both Vigil and Roberts continued to deny that they inflated their overtime reports. Thus, it is no su rprise that the University treated Vigil and Roberts similarly and terminated both. T hus, Roberts’ termination refutes, rather than supports, plaintiff’s claim of pretext. It is, at the minimum, consistent with defendant’s proffered reasons for V igil’s termination. Therefore, we find that plaintiff’s assertion regarding his tr eatment vis-a-vis the other accused employees is, in this case, insufficient fo r a reasonable juror to conclude that defendant’s proffered reasons for Vigil’s term ination constituted pretext. 3. Procedural Irregularities Plaintiff also argued below that the defendant enga ged in disturbing procedural irregularities that demonstrate pretext. See Simms , 165 F.3d at 1328 (noting that evidence of pretext in Title VII discr imination case includes, among other things, disturbing procedural irregularities) . In particular, plaintiff claims defendant changed the reasons for its disciplinary action against him and4The particular reason that plaintiff challenged below was that he continued to lie

about his overtime hours. To the extent that plaintiff argues additional reasons (e.g., allegations of threats and pressure), he has waived such arguments because he did not properly raise them before the district court in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment. See, e.g. , Sports Racing Servs., Inc. v. Sports Car Club of Am. , 131 F.3d 874, 880 n.8 (10th Cir. 1997); In re Walker, 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992). - 16 - disciplined him for reasons not presented at his 8- 3-3 hearing, which plaintiff asserts is in violation of Colorado law. 4 The district court did not address these arguments in its order. Plaintiff contends this co nstitutes reversible error. We disagree. To begin with, defendant did not change its origina l basis for disciplining plaintiff, that is, its belief that Vigil submitted falsified overtime reports. At most, it added an additional aggravating factor fordisciplining Vigil -- his subsequent deceitfulness -- which resulted in more severe punishment. The additional basis of Vigil’s perceived untruthfulnes s in no way discredits the original reason for disciplinary action, particular ly when the additional basis flows naturally from the underlying charge. Thus, we find that the addition of a new reason for the University’s disciplinary actionagainst Vigil does not amount to a disturbing procedural irregularity that supports a finding of pretext. Similarly, we find unavailing plaintiff’s argument that defendant’s failure to inform him of all bases for his termination at h is 8-3-3 meeting constitutes a disturbing procedural irregularity that implies pre text. Pursuant to state law, see- 17 -

Colo. State Personnel Bd. R. 8-3-3(D)(1), 4 Code Co lo. Reg. 801-1, defendant held an 8-3-3 meeting in which plaintiff had an opp ortunity to, and did, through his attorney, confront the allegations of misreport ing overtime. The challenged basis for Vigil’s termination -- that he continued to lie about the overtime matter - - was a natural outgrowth from the underlying alleg ations that he intentionally misreported overtime. It is incredible that plaint iff would be unduly surprised to learn that repeatedly providing what the employer r easonably believed was false information during the investigation of the overtim e matter could result in further or more severe disciplinary measures. Regardless, plaintiff did, in essence, respond to the allegation that he was lying. Durin g his 8-3-3 meeting, Vigil’s denials to the underlying charge that he inflated o vertime hours also constitute assertions that he was telling the truth regarding the matter. Furthermore, defendant subsequently requested plaintiff to respo nd to additional interrogatories in which plaintiff was free to present further evid ence that his account of the events was accurate and truthful. He declined to d o so. Therefore, even if defendant failed to explicitly inform plaintiff that deceitfulness during the investigation process could enhance his punishment, that failure to inform, under these circumstances, neither violates Colorado law nor constitutes a procedural irregularity that supports a finding of pretext. In sum, viewing the evidence and reasonable inferen ces therefrom in the- 18 -

light most favorable to plaintiff, we find that he has presented insufficient evidence to enable a rational fact finder to conclu de that defendant’s proffered reasons for its decision to discipline him were “un worthy of credence.” See Morgan v. Hilti, Inc. , 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal qu otations omitted). Consequently, plaintiff has failed his b urden of showing that the defendant’s legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for disciplining him were pretextual. B. Reliance on State Administrative Law Judge’s Fi ndings Finally, plaintiff argues that the district court c ommitted reversible error by relying on a state ALJ’s unreviewed factual finding s. We disagree. Although it is well established that a court may not give the u nreviewed findings of a state ALJ preclusive effect in a subsequent Title VII act ion, see, e.g. , University of Tenn. v. Elliott , 478 U.S. 788, 796 (1986), we do not believe that the district court improperly relied on the ALJ’s findings in ma king its decision. The district court opinion makes reference to the ALJ’s findings only once, stating: “The materials submitted to this Court establish that Mr . Garcia admitted he had inflated hours while Mr. Vigil continued to deny any wrongdoing, a denial that was ultimately refuted by an administrative law jud ge’s findings.” Dist. Ct. Order at 9. This passing reference was made in the distr ict court’s discussion of why Garcia and Vigil were not similarly situated. Such a fleeting reference does not- 19 -

establish that the district court gave the ALJ’s fi ndings preclusive effect. More importantly, the veracity of Mr. Vigil’s denia l of wrongdoing was, at best, collateral to the district court’s analysis. The central issue was whether defendant’s proffered reason for Vigil’s terminatio n constituted pretext for retaliation, that is, was unworthy of belief. The University’s good faith belief that Vigil and Roberts misreported overtime and the n lied about it are sufficient nonretaliatory reasons to rebut a Title VII retaliation claim, whether or not the allegations are later proven true in subsequent adm inistrative proceedings. See McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp. , 149 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 1998) (“An articulated motivating reason is not converted into pretext merely because, with the benefit of hindsight, it turned out to be poor business judgment. The test is good faith belief.” (internal citation omitted)). Even though plaintiff vehemently denies any wrongdoing, he fails to present sufficie nt evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that defendant’s belief that he m isreported overtime and subsequently lied about it was not made in good fai th. Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s reference to the stat e ALJ’s findings.- 20 - Conclusion For the above reasons, we AFFIRM the district court ’s order of April 14, 1998, granting defendant’s motion for summary judgm ent.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT,

Deanell Reece Tacha Circuit Judge