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THE PRESIDENT’S FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUDGET 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 13, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. Joseph Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator From Delaware ......................................... 1 

Hon. Richard G. Lugar. U.S. Senator From Indiana ............................................ 5 

Hon. Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 12 

Additional Material Submitted for the Record 

Prepared statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold .................................. 71 

APPENDIX 

Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to Secretary 

of State Condoleezza Rice by Members of the Committee 

Questions Submitted by Senator Biden ...................................................... 73 

Questions Submitted by Senator Lugar ...................................................... 91 

Questions Submitted by Senator Boxer ...................................................... 117 

Questions Submitted by Senator Coleman ................................................. 122 

Questions Submitted by Senator Menendez ............................................... 126 

Questions Submitted by Senator Vitter ...................................................... 129 

Questions Submitted by Senator Casey ...................................................... 130 

Question Submitted by Senator Isakson ..................................................... 132 

(III)

(1) 

THE PRESIDENT’S FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUDGET 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Voinovich, Murkowski, Isakson, Vitter, and Barrasso. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH BIDEN, JR., 

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. It’s a great pleasure to have Secretary Rice before us today to present the budget 

of the State Department and talk about that and other things with 

us. And it’s an honor to have you here Madame Secretary. And it’s 

hard to believe that this is the last—at least maybe—the last budget you’ll be presenting, at least under President Bush. And who 

knows, maybe—maybe it will continue, but we thank you for being 

here, Madame Secretary, and appreciate your cooperation. 

Before we begin, I’d like to acknowledge what all of us are aware 

of, but it warrants being acknowledged, that our counterpart in the 

House, Tom Lantos, has passed away. Tom Lantos, we all had relationship with Tom, but as we say, as a point of personal privilege, 

my relationship with Tom goes back a long, long time. Tom was actually my foreign policy advisor. Tom was working for the Bank of 

America and teaching at the University of San Francisco as an economics professor. And I met him out there and on one occasion, 

and I talked him into coming back to work as my staffer. And I 

may be the only chairman who ever had a chairman work as a 

staffer. 

But we became very close friends, our families, and his daughter, 

Katrina, worked for me as well. And his grandson Tomicah is a 

Ph.D. and handles Europe for me on the committee as we speak. 

But Tom, as we all know, was the only survivor of the Holocaust 

to ever serve in the United States Congress. In a sense, Tom was 

more American than the son of the American Revolution. Tom Tom 

epitomized every value that we herald as being an American value. 

Above all, as the Secretary knows, he was a consummate gentleman. 

I used to kid him, I used to tell him that I believe that the Blarney Stone in Ireland was probably first found in Budapest, because 

2 

I’ve never—I’ve never run across a more charming, more decent, 

and a more brilliant man, with all those qualities rolled into one. 

And, he is—it’s a big loss for the country, and I know he was a 

close friend of Barbara’s as well, being a fellow Californian and 

coming from her neck of the State. So, I just want to acknowledge 

how profoundly missed that Tom will be. 

I’d also like to welcome the newest member of our committee, 

Senator Barrasso. Where—is he here? Oh, there he is. I’m looking 

the wrong way. I’m so used to looking right when I think Republican. I apologize. And you were appointed last evening to take the 

place of Senator Sununu, who left the committee to take a seat on 

the Finance Committee. I welcome you and I really look forward— 

and I know you’re going to have to leave because you’re on the Energy Committee, as well, and there’s a major issue coming before 

that committee today. But, we just want you to know how welcome 

you are and look forward to working with you on this committee. 

Madame Secretary, today the committee meets to hear from you 

on the President’s budget for Foreign Affairs for fiscal year 2009. 

The budget submitted to Congress last week, seeks $39.5 billion in 

spending for Foreign Affairs, a substantial increase over the last 

year, and I commend you. I commend you for persuading the President to continue to expand the Foreign Affairs budget. I’m particularly pleased by the nearly $250 million for funding 

requested for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, which was an 

initiative of my colleague and Chairman Senator Lugar and I, but 

he was the main engine behind all of that. And I think it is extremely important. This builds on legislation that we developed 4 

years ago, to establish a corps of Active Duty and Reserve civilian 

personnel that we can send overseas on short notice to address 

post-conflict needs and humanitarian crisis. We still have unfinished business here in the Senate and the Congress, the latest 

version of our legislation has been stalled in the Senate for nearly 

a year. It is my hope we can unglue it and get it passed. 

I’m also pleased that you are working to increase the number of 

Foreign Service personnel, as well as diplomatic security agents. 

Secretary Powell began that expansion, but it has been offset by 

the demands of Iraq, and there continues to be reports of personnel 

shortages in many areas of the department. 

The President’s Emergency Action Program for HIV/AIDS has 

saved more than a million lives. It may be the greatest legacy this 

President leaves, or any President could leave. It’s saved more than 

a million lives, and it also, not only did the right thing, is doing 

the right thing, but puts America in the right light, once again 

trumpeting our values and our humanity, not just our power. 

This year’s budget includes $6 billion for HIV/AIDS. I know that 

sounds like a lot of money and is a lot of money, but, in reality, 

the request only marginally increases the program over last year. 

We’re not doubling our investment as the President said, we’re just 

barely maintaining it. And I believe we can do even better than 

that, so this may be a case where briar rabbit is allowed to be 

thrown into the briars, because my intention to try to expand that 

number, and I believe others will join me in that regard. 

So Madame Secretary, I strongly support most of your budget efforts. What I don’t support, and this is not your responsibility, is 

3 

the practice of placing tens of billions of dollars for the wars in Iraq 

and Afghanistan in the category of so-called emergency spending, 

which the President again exempts from normal budget rules. I 

think it is wrong to force the taxpayers of tomorrow to pay for the 

wars of today. 

Beyond the budget, this is an opportunity for you to talk about 

your policy priorities for the remaining months of the administration. 

And let me briefly mention a few of mine and what I’m going to 

attempt to, with the help of Senator Lugar and others, have the 

committee focus on. In Iraq, all of us welcome the recent decline 

in violence. Our military, as it always has, has done its job and has 

done its job remarkably well. And they’ve taken advantage of other 

critical developments, including the awakening movement among 

Sunnis and the Sadr cease-fire among Shiites. Unfortunately, political progress, which was the principle aim of the surge, has not followed. 

I still see no strategy for achieving what virtually everyone 

agrees is the key to success in Iraq, a sustainable political settlement that convinces Iraqis they can pursue their interest peacefully without bullets and bombs. Without a political settlement, 

Madame Secretary, we could easily see a resurgence of violence, no 

matter how many troops we keep in Iraq. And, we just can’t keep 

this many troops in Iraq for a whole lot longer. Every day we stay 

in these numbers is another day of terrible strain on our fighting 

forces and their families, on our military readiness and ability to 

meet other threats to American security, on our taxpayers and government’s capacity to meet challenges here at home, and our standing in the world. 

The President says our strategy is to ‘‘to leave on success.’’ The 

question is: Does that mean that it is his intent to stay on failure? 

Because right now, in the absence of a political strategy in Iraq, 

that’s what we’re doing. We’re treading water. That’s better than 

drowning, but we can’t keep doing it. 

I’m pleased that both you and Defense Secretary Gates have now 

clarified the so-called framework for normalization of relations. 

That is the administration’s plan to negotiate with the Government 

of Iraq. And you’ve laid out clearly, it does not include security 

commitments that would bind us to engage our military in Iraq’s 

defense. As I made clear to the President in a letter last December, 

any such commitment would require the consent of the Senate. 

And I’m also pleased that the President himself has said on the 

record, the United States seeks no permanent military bases in 

Iraq. We have passed such legislation, I believe on several occasions in the Senate, and once finally, the entire Congress, signed 

by the President. I’ve repeatedly put a prohibition against permanent bases in legislation because the misplaced belief in Iraq and 

the wider Arab and Muslim world, is that we seek a permanent 

presence, has been used as a recruiting tool for al-Qaeda, and it is 

an accelerant for anti-Americanism, and I’m glad the President has 

stated flatly that is not our intention. 

What I hope to hear from you today, Madame Secretary, and in 

the weeks ahead, is just how we get to success. What is the political strategy in Iraq? What is the diplomatic strategy to help 

4 

achieve it? You know my views and my colleagues, unfortunately, 

know my views. I’ve been like a broken record, as they used to say, 

but unless and until we put our energy into helping the Iraqis 

build what is already in their Constitution, a federal system that 

brings resources and responsibility down to the local and regional 

level, I don’t believe we’re going to reach that political solution. 

Where are we on that? And if we continue to reject that plan, 

which Congress overwhelmingly endorsed, what’s the alternative? 

If we should have surged forces anywhere, I think most of the 

committee would agree it was in Afghanistan. I know you’re just 

back from there, and Senators Kerry and Hagel and I are about to 

go. When we return, the committee will want to hear your ideas 

for how we can turn around the situation that seems to most of us, 

if not the administration, to be slipping from our grasp. Violence 

is up, the Taliban is back, drug production is at an all time high, 

and people seem to be losing faith in Karzai government’s ability 

to deliver progress. 

Afghanistan’s fate, as you know better than anyone, is linked to 

Pakistan’s future, and so is American security. We’re going to see, 

next week, what the elections bring in Pakistan, but we’ll be anxious to hear from you after that. 

But no matter what the result, we need to move in Pakistan 

from Musharraf policy to a Pakistan policy, one that demonstrates 

to its moderate majority that we are with them for the long haul, 

with the help to build schools, roads, clinics, and that we’re going 

to demand accountability for the billions of dollars in a blank check 

that we keep writing for the Pakistan military. 

And finally, in Darfur, the United Nations and the African Union 

jointly assumed control over the peacekeeping mission on December 31, but fewer than 10,000 of the 26,000 authorized troops are 

on the ground. One reason is Khartoum’s obstructionism, but the 

other is the pathetic fact that the international community can not 

muster 24 helicopters needed for this mission. I would like to know 

exactly which leaders you and the President have personally contacted to get these helicopters, and what can be done to deal with 

that. 

There’s a lot more to talk about, Kosovo’s imminent declaration 

of independence, your plans for the NATO summit, your efforts in 

the Middle East, the challenges posed by Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. 

And this committee is going to spend a lot of time in the months 

ahead on some long-term challenges that may seem less urgent, 

but are no less important to America’s future, the emergence of 

China, India, and Russia, the critical issues of energy, security, and 

climate change, which Chairman Lugar started in earnest the last 

2 years, and the need for a more effective strategy to advance democracy and combat extremism that will help us recapture the totality of America’s strength. 

We won’t have time today to cover even a small piece of this 

agenda, so I hope you’ll come back a few times before the year is 

out, Madame Secretary. 

And with that, let me turn to Senator Lugar for his opening comments. 

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Let me ask 

of—I note the presence of a quorum, and both parties have been 

5 

consulted about legislation, five pieces and 19 nominees that have 

unanimous consent, whether it might be the pleasure of the chairman to proceed to that business. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I would ask the Secretary if she minds us 

interrupting. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Now we’ll move back to regular session and the 

floor is yours. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR. 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. I thank the chairman, and I know the Secretary 

thanks the chairman. Nineteen worthy Americans will be heading 

out to embassies that need to have our presence, and we appreciate 

very much this action. 

And I join the chairman in thoughts about Tom Lantos. He was 

a very dear friend and a wonderful partner with this committee. 

We have appreciated that leadership very much throughout the 

years, as well as opportunities to be with him in Hungary during 

CODELs in the past, in which he enriched our understanding. 

Likewise, I want to welcome our new member, Senator John Barrasso. He is going to be a very able and eager participant in our 

hearings. He’ll be back, I understand, after he does his work in the 

Energy Committee today. 

I join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming the Secretary. This hearing gives the committee an opportunity to examine the State Department’s budget and ask fundamental questions about the Bush 

administration’s foreign policies. It’s especially important in a year 

of transition to examine international projects that we have in motion, and the overall strategies of our foreign policy institutions. We 

should ask whether the State Department, the Bush administration, and indeed, the entire political establishment of our country, 

both Democrat and Republican, are adapting to the world as it is. 

Have bureaucrats and budgetary inertia consigned us to spend 

most of our time preparing for yesterday’s military and diplomatic 

threats, or are we fixated on old processes and tactics that are 

being overwhelmed by global economic, demographic, and technological changes? 

The understandable Bush administration response after September 11, 2001, was to shift assets toward combating terrorists. 

And defending this country from terrorist attacks remains a fundamental national security priority. We are also engaged in vital diplomatic efforts related to problem countries, including Iraq, Iran, 

Afghanistan, North Korea, but the gravity of these situations 

should not keep us from responding to dynamic global changes. 

In a recent piece from the Financial Times, the eminent columnist, Martin Wolf wrote, ‘‘Neo-classical economics analyzed economic growth in terms of capital, labor, and technical progress, but 

I now think it is more enlightening to view the fundamental drivers as energy and ideas.’’ If Wolf is correct, and I believe he is, our 

economy and our foreign policy are at risk of being overwhelmed 

by forces that are receiving far too little attention within our Government. 

6 

Principal among these forces is the burgeoning demand for energy from China, India, and elsewhere, and the cosmic economic 

shifts that are being driven by these immense, rapidly industrializing societies. The immediate effect is rising energy prices, but 

longer term effects include accelerating climate change and shortages of hydrocarbon supplies, both of which could become sources 

of serious conflict. 

The most eye-opening statistics emanate from China. That country’s rapid industrialization is obliterating old ways of thinking 

about the global economy. Consider that the Chinese coals plants 

that came online in 2006 alone, added a net 80 gigawatts of electricity generation to the Chinese system, an amount roughly equal 

to the entire electrical capacity of Great Britain. 

Meanwhile, China last year used 32 percent of all the steel consumed in the world. The 7.2 million vehicles sold in China in 2006 

were 41⁄2 times as many as were sold in China just 9 years earlier. 

And thanks both to foreign direct investment in China and its massive current surplus, China has nearly $1.5 trillion in official 

foreign currency reserves. That accounts for a quarter of all the reserves in the world. The value of the dollar has fallen, as our trade 

deficit has risen and our savings rate remains near zero. We are 

not just buying what they are making, America is, in effect, importing debt, along with consumer satisfaction. 

Such statistics raise many disconcerting questions about global 

stability, the United States influence in the world, and the maintenance of American living standards. 

I make these points today because there is a temptation in the 

last year of an administration for observers to dismiss, not only the 

budgetary priorities of the outgoing President, but also important 

foreign policy initiatives. Lame-duck administrations sometimes 

embed such attitudes by failing to quickly appoint nominees, as numerous vacancies come open, and by giving up on initiatives that 

require approval from Congress. I would emphasize the United 

States can not afford to take a year off, and I trust the administration believes that very stoutly. 

The President should be reaching out to the Congress in an effort 

to construct a consensus on how we can respond, not only to a 

high-profile threat such as terrorism and climate change, but also 

more nuanced problems such as U.S. energy vulnerability, the 

struggle to diversify central Asian energy supplies, our weakened 

debt positions, the shift of financial influence to Asia, the growth 

of sovereign wealth funds, and the coming expansion and demand 

for nuclear power, which will complicate our nonproliferation efforts. 

These are economic and political problems that require the reorientation of the State Department. For example, traditional ways of 

thinking about Russia have less salience when Russian foreign policy is now largely based on maximizing the political leverage and 

financial earnings of its energy supplies, and dominating the transport of energy in Eurasia. 

Secretary Rice, I congratulate you for moving toward a muchneeded reinvigoration of U.S. international energy diplomacy. I 

would highlight agreements with Brazil on biofuels, and with India 

on civilian nuclear power as examples of how our strategic alliVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:05 Feb 27, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\47624.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
7 

ances can bring together our foreign policy, our energy security, 

and climate change interests. 

I hope that you will act quickly upon legislation establishing an 

international energy coordinator within your office. The legislation 

was passed unanimously by this committee and signed into law by 

President Bush in December 2007. Swift implementation of this 

legislation, with your clear support, would empower the international energy coordinator to galvanize diplomatic capacities currently stove-piped within the State Department and other executive agencies. 

Last month, I traveled to Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 

Azerbaijan, and Ukraine to advocate for greater cooperation on energy security. The stakes there are high, as President Putin has repeatedly traveled to the region to solidify Russian domination of 

energy supplies. Chairman Biden and I have joined in urging the 

administration to appoint a high-level, Special Envoy for energy in 

that region. Indeed, during my trip, leaders of those countries 

asked that the United States send such a representative to affirm 

U.S. interest in central Asia and affirm U.S. security. 

Madame Secretary, I’m hopeful you will share with us your strategy for the region, and whether you intend to appoint such an 

envoy. 

As we think about how to achieve our goals, we must also consider how to strengthen our diplomatic capabilities. The Bush administration deserves praise for its international affairs budgets, 

which have attempted to reverse the downward spiral in U.S. foreign policy capabilities imposed during the 1990s. 

By 2001, embassy security upgrades were behind schedule. We 

lacked adequate numbers of diplomats with key language skills, 

many important overseas posts were filled by junior Foreign Service officers, and our public diplomacy was completely inadequate 

for the mission in an era of global terrorism. Our diplomatic capabilities have made progress under President Bush, but much work 

is left to be done. 

Congress however, must begin to ask more fundamental questions about the national security budget as a whole. Although our 

Defense, Foreign Affairs and Homeland Security and Intelligence, 

Energy budgets are carefully examined from the incremental perspective of where they were the last year, it is not apparent that 

Congress is adequately evaluating whether the money flowing to 

these areas represents the proper mix for the 21st century security 

threats that we face. 

Last year, in my opening statement at our State Department 

budget hearing, I pointed out that the Foreign Affairs account was 

just one-fourteenth the size of the Defense budget. Defense agencies increasingly have been granted authority to fill gaps in foreign 

assistance and public information programs, but the military is illsuited to run such programs. A far more rational approach would 

be to give the State Department the resources it should have to 

achieve what clearly our civilian missions. 

This view was echoed by Defense Secretary Gates in a speech 

last month at CSIS. He pointed out that the total Foreign Affairs 

budget request was roughly equivalent to what the Pentagon 

spends on health care alone. He also noted that the planned 7,000 

8 

troop increase in the Army expected for 2008 is an, ‘‘equivalent to 

adding the entire U.S. Foreign Service to the Army in one year.’’ 

We must adjust our civilian foreign policy capabilities to deal with 

a dynamic world, where national security threats are increasingly 

based on nonmilitary factors. 

Though the State Department has numerous underfunded priorities, I would emphasize the urgency of establishing a rapidly 

deployable civilian corps that is trained to work with the military 

on stabilization and reconstruction missions to hostile environments. 

I am very pleased that after several years of work by this committee and the State Department, the Bush administration is requesting $248.6 million for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative. 

Creating and sustaining this civilian capacity is precisely the intent of the Lugar-Biden-Hagel legislation that passed the Senate in 

2006, and passed this committee again last March. 

In addition to meeting contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, we 

must be ready for the next post-conflict mission. 

Madame Secretary, it is a pleasure always to have you with us. 

We look forward to your insights and many other matters that you 

wish to bring before us. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Chairman, thank you for an insightful statement. I appreciate it. 

Madame Secretary, one housekeeping measure. We’re told there’s 

going to be a vote around 10:30, and what I’d like to suggest is you 

begin your statement and I’d have you go through your statement. 

But it may be that one of us will leave. I’ve read your statement 

in its entirety already, believe it or not, and may leave to vote so 

we can come back without interruption, and just keep this going. 

But I apologize for the interruption, which is likely to occur around 

10:30. 

The floor is yours, Madame Secretary, and again, welcome. 

Thank you for being here. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY OF 

STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Secretary RICE. Thank you very much, Chairman Biden. 

I would first like to thank the committee. This is, indeed, the last 

budget that I will present to you as Secretary of State. 

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank Senator 

Lugar, and all of the members of the committee for what, I think, 

we have achieved together over the last several years. 

I’d also like to take just a moment to say how much Congressman Tom Lantos will be missed. He was, of course, a northern Californian, someone that I knew very well. I feel that I’ve lost an inspirational mentor, and I’ve lost a good friend. And when I testify 

today before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, it will be a sad 

moment to see him not sitting there. He was a true American hero, 

and I think he embodied the best of our country. 

I want to thank you very much for what we have been able to 

do together. I have a full statement, Mr. Chairman, but I’ll just 

have that entered into the record with your permission. 

9 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the entire statement will be 

placed in the record. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you. 

I’d like to just mention a few highlights of what I think we’ve be 

able to do together, and then to address three questions that came 

up in the remarks that you and Senator Lugar have made. 

First, I’d like to thank you very much for the support of this committee in significantly increasing foreign assistance during this administration. Really, foreign assistance had been essentially flatlined for almost 2 decades, and it was time for the United States 

to do more. 

We have to be able, with your help, to double foreign assistance 

for Latin America, to triple it worldwide, and to quadruple it in Africa. That includes, of course, the development of the HIV/AIDS 

PEPFAR initiative, which you mentioned, Senator Biden, as well 

as the development of innovative approaches in foreign assistance, 

like the Millennium Challenge Corporation. I think it’s been a good 

story. 

If I could say one thing from a point of privilege, I hope that it 

will continue into the future. Because we’ve learned, as important 

as development assistance is, foreign assistance is because of our 

moral obligation to help those less fortunate, it is also critical to 

our national security. We have seen what happens when states are 

failed states, when they are unable to deliver for their people. And 

we have both an obligation and an interest in having well-governed, democratic states that can deliver for their people, that can 

fight poverty, that can defend their borders. And I think foreign assistance is our most valuable tool in doing so. 

Second, I’d like to thank you very much for the support that 

you’ve given to the Department as we’ve tried to transform the Department into one that is capable of taking on the myriad challenges that we face. We are sending diplomats into places that diplomats didn’t used to go. And I want to take a moment to thank 

the men and women of the Foreign Service, the Civil Service, and 

especially Foreign Service Nationals, for their willingness to serve 

in extremely difficult places and difficult circumstances. 

We’ve tried to give them new tools. We’ve tried to develop new 

ways of doing this, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, for instance, in Iraq and Afghanistan that, in effect, marry us with our 

military counterparts. Because, while the military can buy time 

and space, it is really civilians who have to help these people and 

these governments build governance structures, nongovernmental 

institutions, rule of law, justice, and functioning economies. And I 

think that the Provincial Reconstruction Teams will also live on as 

a way to think about post-conflict operations. 

I’m especially pleased that we have included the budget request 

for the Civilian Response Corps. To be very frank, I think we tried 

in Afghanistan to deal with counterinsurgency, and reconstruction 

through a kind of international effort—I’ll be very frank—it was a 

kind of an adopt-a-ministry for each country for capacity-building. 

It was very good to have so many countries involved, I’ve seen 

those efforts. But it also has led to some incoherence, with which 

we are still dealing. And I will make a comment about that, when 

I turn to Afghanistan. 

10 

And then, in response, in Iraq, we tried the single U.S. Government department, the Department of Defense took responsibility, 

but I think did not—was not able to—fully mobilize the range of 

capabilities that were needed. There was no single, U.S. Government institution or agency that was capable of doing that. 

I think that under the State Department with the Civilian Response Corps, we would be better capable of getting the city planners, and the justices and the lawyers, and the health experts, out 

into the field to help countries recover in post-conflict situations. 

And it’s not just the large ones like Iraq or Afghanistan, but 

Haiti or Liberia, or the many places that have to develop. And I 

thank you for the innovation of the Civilian Response Corps, for 

the work that you and Senator Lugar, and Senator Hagel have 

done, and I sincerely hope that we can get it stood up and really 

working. It is probably one of the most important things that we 

can do as the United States Government. 

I want to thank you, also, for the support of increases in public 

diplomacy. When I first testified before this committee for my confirmation hearing, I said that we would try and increase the resources to public diplomacy—this is a long-term prospect. It’s not 

something that is going to take hold overnight. But we’ve increased, dramatically, the number of exchanges. We have record 

numbers of foreign students studying in the United States now. 

I think we’ve overcome some of the difficulties of the post-9/11 

period, when we really did—I have to think hard about who was 

coming into the country, but where we were in danger of sacrificing 

one of our best, long-term tools in improving the understanding of 

the United States and respect for it. That is, people who come here 

and study and go back to their countries to be leaders. And I’m 

very grateful that we’ve been able to rebuild that function. There’s 

much more work to do, and I’m sure that Jim Glassman, as he replaces Karen Hughes, will put energy into that. 

I would also like to note that there is a request for a substantial 

increase in the number of Foreign Service Officers, and USAID officers—roughly 1,100 in the Foreign Service, and 300 in USAID. 

We’re just very small. And on many occasions, I’ve been asked if 

the State Department could do things, it’s been hard to do it. We 

have roughly 6,500 professionals worldwide. I believe there are 

twice as many lawyers in the Defense Department as Foreign Service Officers. And while Secretary Powell and the President started 

the process of rebuilding after the 1990s, with roughly 2,000 over 

4 years, this is another important increment, and I will be counting 

on your support with the appropriators to make sure that we can, 

this time, fully fund the personnel requests. 

It will be important, as a part of that, also, to do compensation 

reform, so that our people do not lose locality pay when they serve 

over, abroad. It is principally our younger officers that suffer from 

that disparity, and we will press again for compensation reform. 

I say all of this because it has been an extraordinary period for 

the United States, in which we’ve been taking on challenges, and 

difficult challenges, that I think perhaps none of us could have 

fully foreseen in 2001. It has required us to make some difficult decisions. We have not always agreed about those decision. But I 

think that we have always done it in the spirit of our great democVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:05 Feb 27, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\47624.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
11 

racy, which is one that recognizes that people can disagree and still 

be patriots. That recognizes that we must always support our men 

and women in uniform, as well as our civilians abroad. 

We have much work to do in the remaining 11 months, and I 

want to assure you—we will sprint to the finish. We, the United 

States of America cannot afford any less. 

In this regard, let me just say briefly on Iraq and Afghanistan 

and then, perhaps, a comment on the energy issue. It has been difficult in Iraq, but I do believe that not only are we starting to see 

security improvements, but we’re starting to see the Iraqis rebuilding their country and developing a young political system to deal 

with their differences. 

I would just note that reconciliation is taking place, from the bottom up, of course, with provincial councils and local councils that 

are working. With an awakening movement—not just in Anbar, but 

efforts to spread it to the southern part of the country. With, frankly, Senator Biden, as we’ve talked, a pretty decentralized structure, 

which I think is probably best for a country as complex as Iraq. 

The local citizens committees that are coming out to defend their 

territory are coming out—not unlike a tradition we’ve had in our 

own country for people to defend that which is nearest to them, 

which is their neighborhoods and their districts. 

The political progress that we’re seeing at those local levels—and 

I will say, I sat with the Kirkuk provincial council and watched 

Kurds and Arabs trying to overcome their difference through political dialog, but those local efforts are starting to have an effect on 

the national level. 

Frankly, I think we thought that it would be the national level, 

downward. In some ways it’s been the local level upward that has 

put the pressure on the Iraqi national leaders to be responsive. 

And thus, they have passed in recent months, a pension law, an 

investment law, a justice and accountability law—in other words a 

de-Baathification reform. Just today, a provincial powers law, setting a date for provincial elections to take place during the fall. A 

general amnesty—which is very much welcomed by the Sunni population, and a 2008 budget, which has significant increases for provincial governments, for Iraq’s own security forces, and a capital 

budget that also has a significant provincial element. 

So, it is hard work, it is harder work, perhaps, than we thought 

when we began this enterprise. But they are going about the business of building a political structure. 

That is welcome among their neighbors. We are seeing Arab 

States begin to engage with them. The Saudis have said that they 

will put a diplomatic mission there, as well as others. The Russians 

have now forgiven, on Paris Club terms, some 90 percent of the 

Iraqi debt. And we will have—I’ve just accepted the invitation of 

the Kuwaiti Government to hold the third Iraqi Expanded Neighbors Conference toward the end of April. So, I believe that we see 

progress on all fronts, although it is fragile, and there is still much 

work to do. 

If I may, just one word on Afghanistan. I was just there. I was 

in both Kabul and in Kandahar. It is quite clear that militarily 

there are battlefield successes against the Taliban that, quite 

frankly, doesn’t do very well when it comes at the coalition forces 

12 

or our forces in military-type formations, and has therefore gone to 

hit-and-run tactics, to suicide bombings to try and to terrorize the 

population. 

And I had extensive discussions there about the importance of 

refocusing on population security and the importance of building 

police forces, and local citizens forces. That can—after an area has 

been cleared by coalition forces—hold the territory so that building 

can take place. And I just want to say that there’s been a lot of 

attention to NATO in the South, and can we get more NATO forces 

in to help the forces that are fighting there—the Canadians, the 

Danes, the British, the Dutch—and they deserve to have the help 

that they have asked for. And Secretary Bob Gates and others are 

working very hard on that. 

But I also saw reconstruction efforts that, frankly, are not as coherent as they should to be. And we are searching now for an 

envoy who can help to bring coherence to that international effort, 

because we now understand that in counterinsurgency, you have to 

defeat the enemy, keep him from coming back, and then give the 

population reason to believe in a better future. 

I believe that we—that the Afghan project is making progress. 

The situation is better than some reports, it is not as good as it 

needs to be. And we are paying a lot of attention to improving the 

circumstances in Afghanistan. 

Let me say just finally, Senator Lugar, on the energy piece—and 

I’ll be very brief—I agree with you, it is a really important part of 

diplomacy. In fact, I think I would go so far as to say that some 

of the politics of energy is warping diplomacy in certain parts of 

the world. And I do, indeed, intend to appoint, and we are looking 

for a special energy coordinator who could especially spend time on 

the central Asian and Caspian region. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Rice follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY OF STATE, 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before the committee today in support of the President’s FY 

2009 international affairs budget request, and to discuss our Nation’s foreign policy 

priorities. This is the fourth time I have come before this committee to discuss and 

defend the international affairs budget. As you know, this is the last budget I will 

present to you in my capacity as Secretary of State. I want to take this occasion 

to thank the committee, and especially the chairman and ranking member, for their 

support and cooperation on many of the issues we addressed here in the past 3 

years, and to let you know that this administration is committed to a vigorous foreign policy during our remaining 11 months. We have many critical issues before 

us and we intend to press forward our national interests on all fronts. I look forward 

to working with the committee to do just that. 

I would like to take a moment to ask you to act quickly on the balance of funding 

requested in the FY 2008 global war on terror supplemental. These additional resources are critical to the Department’s continued diplomatic operations in Iraq. The 

supplemental also addresses critical security and construction requirements in Afghanistan, support for international organizations functioning in Iraq and Afghanistan, and peacekeeping missions in Darfur as well as other urgent humanitarian 

and foreign assistance efforts. This funding is necessary to our ongoing diplomatic 

mission and I ask for your support. 

13 

FY 2009 STATE OPERATIONS REQUEST

Let me begin by discussing our request for Department of State operations. This 

request funds the platform on which we build our foreign policy activities, including 

diplomacy and foreign assistance, around the world. 

The FY 2009 budget for Department of State Operations totals $11.456 billion. 

These funds will significantly strengthen the core programming, policy, and management capabilities of the Department which are necessary to carry out vital U.S. 

diplomatic and consular relations with more than 180 countries. They will also support strategic U.S. engagement abroad through public diplomacy and multilateral 

diplomacy. 

Diplomatic Solutions to National Security Issues 

The request provides $3.806 billion to increase the capacity of American diplomacy to meet challenges to U.S. national security and welfare in the international 

arena where power is defined increasingly in economic and financial terms and 

where transnational threats like terrorism, disease, and drug trafficking have become urgent. The requested funding will strengthen the global operating platform 

for the U.S. Government and add 1,095 new positions. These new positions will 

allow us to expand training in much-needed skills, including in critical foreign 

languages. The positions will also increase the number of political advisors to the 

military combatant commends, enhance interagency collaboration, and allow Department employees to take advantage of interagency development and training opportunities. Increased interagency cooperation is a valuable means to advance our 

diplomacy, but we need sufficient numbers of trained personnel to execute complex, 

coordinated efforts abroad. Building the Department’s capacity to fill this role is my 

highest priority and I ask for your strong support. 

The request also includes funding, as in previous years, for Foreign Service Compensation Reform, which would eliminate the pay disincentive caused by the loss 

of locality pay upon transfer to foreign assignments. When the Government instituted locality pay in the 1990s, it did not include Foreign Service employees working 

abroad. As a result, when officers transfer to overseas assignments, they lose the 

locality portion of their pay. With the Washington, DC, rate now equal to approximately 20 percent of employee compensation, this loss severely undermines the salaries of officers assigned abroad. Moreover, this sizable and growing disincentive undermines our ability to attract talent and reward sacrifice. Diplomacy is a difficult, 

sometimes dangerous business, and the sacrifices made by Foreign Service officers 

and their families are real. In implementing Senior Pay Reform, we were able to 

eliminate this disincentive for our senior members of the Foreign Service, but the 

problem remains—and is more acute—for our mid-level and junior officers. I am 

asking that you provide the necessary authorization requested by the administration to address this problem by enabling a transition to a performance-based pay 

system and a global rate of pay. 

Civilian Stabilization in Post-Conflict States 

The request provides $249 million, including funding for 351 positions, in a new 

appropriation, the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, to build a U.S. Government civilian capacity that can assist in reconstruction and stabilization efforts in post-conflict 

states. The requested funding will support, train, equip, and deploy an interagency 

civilian response corps comprised of interagency Active and Standby components 

and a Civilian Reserve of outside experts. This effort will provide mission-ready experts in fields such as policing and the rule of law, transitional governance, and economic stabilization and development. The request will also fund the personnel and 

operating expenses of the Office of the Coordinator that provides Washington leadership to whole-of-government strategic planning, analysis, policy direction, and coordination of USG reconstruction and stabilization activities. The CSI complements 

our request for additional personnel and has the strong support of the Department 

of Defense. This is a high priority and we need to get this accomplished. 

Protecting America’s Borders 

The FY 2009 budget provides $2.124 billion for the Border Security Program. This 

program helps secure American borders against illegal entry by terrorists and others who threaten homeland security. At the same time, it facilitates the entry of legitimate foreign visitors and students. Revenue from Machine Readable Visa (MRV) 

fees, Enhanced Border Security Program fees, the Western Hemisphere Travel Surcharge, and visa fraud prevention fees will fund continuous improvements in systems, processes, and programs. The fees will also fund 448 additional positions required to address rising passport demand associated with the Western Hemisphere 

14 

Travel Initiative and rising visa demand, including increases related to Border 

Crossing Card renewals. 

Providing Secure Diplomatic Facilities 

The request provides $1.163 billion for worldwide Security Protection to increase 

security for diplomatic personnel, property, and information in the face of international terrorism. The funding will extend the program to upgrade security equipment and technical support, information and systems security, perimeter security, 

and security training. This funding will also support the worldwide local guard force 

protecting diplomatic missions and residences. Funding increases will help meet 

new security demands in all regions and implement the Visa and Passport Security 

Strategic Plan to safeguard the integrity of U.S. travel documents. Because people 

continue to be the single most important factor in deterrence and response to terrorist acts, the funding will add 200 security professionals. 

The request provides $1.790 billion to continue security-driven construction 

projects and to address the major physical security and maintenance needs of U.S. 

embassies and consulates. This total includes $844 million for the Capital Security 

Construction Program to replace diplomatic facilities at the most vulnerable overseas posts. FY 2009 proposed projects include new embassy compounds in Santo Domingo, Dakar, Maputo, and Malabo. During the fifth year of Capital Security Cost 

Sharing (CSCS), U.S. Government agencies with personnel abroad under chief-ofmission authority will contribute $455 million to CSCS construction. The request 

also includes $105 million to upgrade compound security at high-risk posts and to 

increase protection for soft targets such as schools and recreation facilities. In addition, the request includes $841 million for ongoing operations, including major rehabilitations. These programs are essential to protect the investment in real estate 

assets which are currently valued at over $14 billion and to keep more than 15,000 

properties in good working order. 

Influencing Foreign Opinion Through Public Diplomacy 

The request provides $395 million in appropriations for public diplomacy to influence foreign opinion and win support for U.S. foreign policy goals, including through 

providing 20 new public diplomacy positions. In addition to advocating U.S. policies, 

public diplomacy communicates the principles that underpin them and fosters a 

sense of common values and interests. Objectives of the national public diplomacy 

strategy include promoting democracy and good governance, marginalizing extremist 

leaders and organizations, and preventing extremist messaging from gaining a foothold with vulnerable populations. Through innovative programs we are providing 

positive alternatives for Muslim youths, and helping build networks among progressive-minded Muslims, in many cases working in partnership with the private sector, 

civil society, and academia. We also place a high priority on modernizing our communications architecture to strengthen our leadership in the war of ideas and 

sharpen our messaging to counter terrorist propaganda. 

Exchange Programs 

The request provides $522 million and 19 positions for educational and cultural 

exchanges to increase mutual understanding and to engage the leaders of tomorrow. 

Aligned with other public diplomacy efforts, these people-to-people programs are 

uniquely able to address difficult issues. The request includes increased funding for 

academic and professional programs to reach constituencies vital for America— 

youth and those who influence youth. The programs include English language, Fulbright, and other academic initiatives, and Citizens Exchanges, within the President’s Partnership for Latin American Youth. The funding will also continue to support the President’s National Security Language Initiative, promoting teaching and 

study of critical foreign languages, including the Arabic, Chinese, Korean, and Russian languages, and the Indic, Turkic, and Persian language families. 

Information Technology 

The request provides $414 million for State’s Central Fund, including revenue 

from fees, for Central Fund investments in ‘‘knowledge management’’ and information technology (IT). The ability of the Department to support transformational diplomacy, information sharing, rightsizing efforts, and E-Government initiatives depends increasingly on robust, secure IT. Funding increases in FY 2009 will help 

support the State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset project, diplomacy 

through collaboration, and IT infrastructure that provides American diplomats with 

anytime/anywhere computing. 

15 

Multilateral Diplomacy 

The request provides $1.529 billion to pay U.S. assessed contributions to 47 international organizations, including the United Nations. The request includes payments to address outstanding U.S. arrears to international organizations. The 

request recognizes U.S. international obligations and reflects a commitment to 

maintain the financial stability and efficiency of those organizations. Membership 

in international organizations assists in building coalitions and gaining support for 

U.S. policies and interests. Further, multilateral diplomacy through such organizations serves key U.S. foreign policy goals, including advancing democratic principles 

and fundamental human rights, promoting economic growth through free trade and 

investment, settling disputes peacefully, encouraging nonproliferation and arms control, and strengthening international cooperation in environment, agriculture, technology, science, education, and health. 

International Peacekeeping 

The request provides $1.497 billion to pay the U.S. share of costs for U.N. peacekeeping missions. This funding will help support peacekeeping efforts worldwide, including the activities of ongoing missions in Lebanon, Haiti, Liberia, and the Congo. 

Proposed funding increases will also pay U.S. assessments for new missions in 

Darfur and Chad. These peacekeeping activities further U.S. goals by maintaining 

peace and strengthening regional confidence and stability. They also leverage U.S. 

political, military, and financial assets through the participation of other states that 

provide funds and peacekeepers for conflicts around the world. 

FY 2009 FOREIGN OPERATIONS REQUEST

Let me turn now to our foreign assistance request. The total State Department and USAID Foreign Operations request for FY 2009 is $22.7 billion. These funds 

support the strategic purposes of our diplomacy: Securing peace, supporting democracy, advocating our principles and ideals, meeting global challenges, and aiding our 

friends and allies. 

War on Terror 

Fighting and winning the war on terror remains the greatest challenge to our national security, and it will continue to be the focus of our military and diplomatic 

efforts as long as extremist ideologies and their proponents find safety and support 

in unstable and failing states. We have made enormous strides in diplomatic and 

foreign assistance efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are notable for their successes even as we recognize the daunting work that remains. We credit our progress 

in these countries to many who have struggled there, to our military and our diplomats, to the international community, to our counterparts in the military and government in these countries, and to the citizens in Iraq and Afghanistan who recognize and are fighting for the full benefits of freedom. 

Iraq 

Our engagement with Iraq remains a centerpiece of the United States effort in 

the war on terror. 

The administration’s FY 2009 requests of $404 million in foreign assistance funding and $65 million in operations funding are critical to meet these goals. Of this 

total, $300 million in Economic Support Funds will help consolidate the security 

gains realized in 2007 and 2008, and will increase the capacity of local and national 

Iraqi Governments ($75 million) to provide services for their population, which in 

turn will reduce support for extremist elements. The administration is also requesting funds to help the nonoil economy grow, including the development of the agricultural sector ($50 million), support for business formation ($25 million), and continued support for key Iraqi economic reforms ($62 million), such as reducing subsidies. 

These programs will generate jobs and stimulate economic growth. This request also 

includes funding for the Iraqi-American Enterprise Fund ($40 million), which will 

address a critical lack of access to capital and know-how that is preventing Iraqi 

entrepreneurs from forming companies. This request also includes $48 million to 

continue Democracy and Civil Society programs, which will be vital to support Iraq’s 

nascent democracy, particularly in working with new representatives and/or parties 

elected in anticipated nationwide elections in 2009. Democracy and Civil Society 

programs also will have a direct impact in fostering political reconciliation. 

The administration is also requesting $75 million in funding under International 

Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) to bolster Iraq’s rule of law, including continuing training and security for judges and program support for major 

crime task forces, which will help Iraq combat terrorism and a growing criminal element, and mentoring to Iraq’s corrections service to ensure criminals are effectively 

16 

and humanely kept off the streets. The administration is also requesting $20 million 

in Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, and Demining (NADR) programs, of which $16 

million will support expansion of a successful humanitarian demining program that 

has allowed hundreds of communities to bring agricultural and industrial land back 

into production, and $4 million in programs to combat terrorism. 

Taken together, these programs are an integrated approach to build on the significant investment we have already made in Iraq’s success. The FY 2009 programs 

complement our previous investments in infrastructure, security, and capacity-building and will hasten the ability of the Iraqi people to meet their own needs. Failure 

to fully fund these programs will endanger the progress we have made over the last 

5 years. In order for us to carry out these programs, we need the full $65 million 

request for operational funding for core Embassy functions. 

As a final point on Iraq, I would like to bring some clarity to discussions about 

the agreement that we plan to negotiate with Iraq. With the U.N. Security Council 

mandate due to expire at the end of this year, we need an agreement with Iraq that 

will ensure that U.S. forces continue to have the authorities and protections they 

need to operate in Iraq. An agreement with Iraq will not contain a ‘‘security commitment’’; that is, there will be no binding U.S. obligation to act in the common defense 

in the event of an armed attack on Iraq, it will not set troop levels, and it will not 

provide for permanent bases in Iraq. This arrangement will not ‘‘lock in’’ specific 

policies, but will leave policy options open for the next President. In addition, much 

as we did in Afghanistan, we expect to negotiate a strategic framework arrangement 

building on the Declaration of Principles that will formalize our intentions to cooperate in political, economic, cultural, and security fields. We have begun to brief Members of Congress and will continue to do so as our discussions with Iraq progress. 

Afghanistan 

For FY 2009, the President has requested $1.054 billion in foreign assistance to 

help prevent Afghanistan from ever again becoming a sanctuary for terrorists. We 

have achieved many successes in our fight against the Taliban and al-Qaida, but 

we have not won yet. The funds requested are critical to supporting our comprehensive approach to defeat the insurgency and return Afghanistan to long-term stability 

based on Afghan national sovereignty, democratic principles, and respect for human 

rights. The Afghan Government enjoys broad support, while the Taliban offers no 

political vision. We are collaborating bilaterally, with donors, and through NATO 

and other multilateral organizations to tighten the coherence of security, economic, 

and governance capacity-building efforts. Development and security efforts on both 

sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border aim to prevent the deterioration of overall 

progress. 

Recognizing that counterinsurgency requires more than physical security, we have 

requested $370 million for counternarcotics efforts, $248 million for democracy and 

governance, $109 million for health and education, $226 million for economic 

growth, $74 million to support the work of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams, 

and $12 million in nonemergency food aid. Development efforts to improve Afghan 

governance at the national and regional and local levels and to achieve prosperity 

for the Afghan people are as crucial to winning the war as security assistance to 

fight insurgent groups, to prevent Afghanistan from becoming an illicit narcoticsbased economy, and to train the Afghan Security Forces. Simultaneously, the efforts 

of the United States and the international community to work with the Government 

of Afghanistan to improve security, build government capacity, protect human 

rights, reconstruct infrastructure, and provide humanitarian assistance generate 

confidence in the Afghan Government and in turn decrease support for insurgents. 

As part of these efforts, we look forward to working with Congress on Reconstruction Opportunity Zone (ROZ) legislation that would help create employment and 

sustainable economic development in Afghanistan and the border regions of 

Pakistan. 

West Bank/Gaza 

The United States is firmly committed to supporting Israelis and Palestinians as 

they work to realize peace. Working with international donors and Quartet Representative Tony Blair, the United States is strengthening our support for the Palestinian Authority (PA) Government to help achieve this end. 

Our FY 2009 funding request for the West Bank and Gaza is $100 million. This 

includes $25 million for the Palestinian Authority Security Sector Reform Program, 

part of a broader U.S. and international effort to strengthen and transform the Palestinian security sector and assist the PA in its efforts to extend law and order and 

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rity in the West Bank will support President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister 

Salam Fayyad by demonstrating to the Palestinian people that the PA can reduce 

lawlessness and improve their lives, and by building the capacity of the PA to address security threats against Israel. The request includes $24 million for democracy 

projects that will assist the PA government to extend the rule of law and improve 

governance, including bolstering the justice system through training judges and 

building judicial independence, and supporting local municipalities. A further $18 

million will assist the PA to achieve economic growth by focusing on activities that 

increase agricultural productivity, provide support for microenterprises, create private sector opportunity and increase trade. Finally, $33 million will assist the PA 

government to provide essential health, education, and humanitarian services to the 

Palestinian people. 

U.S. Government assistance in these areas will help the Palestinian people directly and support moderates such as President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad, 

while also providing tools through security improvements, civil society building, and 

economic growth to combat Hamas and its terrorist infrastructure. 

Pakistan 

A broad, long-term, and strategic relationship with Pakistan is now crucial to 

global security and regional economic interests. We are encouraging formation of a 

moderate center to complete the transition to democracy and underwrite the fight 

against violent extremism. Our programs support transparent elections, democratic 

institutions, and long-term development. We are cooperating closely with the Pakistanis to defeat extremist groups and networks. U.S. assistance programs support 

all these goals. 

For FY 2009, the Department of State is requesting $826 million for Pakistan, to 

bolster four areas of cooperation: Peace and security, democracy, economic growth, 

and health and education. 

To win the war on terror, this request includes $150 million specifically to support 

development in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. This is the second tranche 

of a 5-year $750 million Presidential Commitment initiated in 2007. This will allow 

the United States to help the Government of Pakistan recast its relationship with 

the country’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 

Of the total $826 million, we are requesting $343 million for peace and security 

assistance, including $7.7 million for counterterrorism programs and $32 million for 

border security, law enforcement capacity-building, and counternarcotics efforts. 

This will aid the Government of Pakistan in countering the terrorist threat, enhancing border security, addressing illicit narcotics activities, and establishing the 

means to provide for a peaceful and secure environment. 

Recognizing that the war on terror can not be won solely by improving security, 

our request includes $55 million to strengthen democracy and good governance, 

$119 million to expand economic opportunity, and $260 million for health and education. 

Lebanon 

Progress in Lebanon remains a critical element of our efforts to foster democracy 

and security in the Middle East. We have joined hands with Lebanon’s elected government to support their struggle for freedom, independence, and security. For FY 

2009, the Department of State has requested $142 million in foreign assistance for 

Lebanon to support two parallel objectives: Countering threats to Lebanon’s sovereignty and security from armed groups backed by Syria and Iran, and helping 

foster good governance and a vibrant economy. 

Three years ago this week, former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was assassinated. One month later, the Lebanese people demanded an end to foreign domination and political violence, taking to the streets to call for Syrian withdrawal from 

Lebanon. The FY 2009 budget request includes support for the Special Tribunal for 

Lebanon—a concrete demonstration of our unwavering commitment to justice, an 

end to political violence, and the protection of Lebanese sovereignty. 

Since then, Lebanon has elected a new Parliament and deployed its army to the 

south of the country for the first time in 40 years. However, Lebanon remains under 

siege by a Syrian and Iranian-backed opposition working to undermine the nation’s 

stability, sovereignty, and state institutions. Meanwhile, political violence continues, 

including a January 15 bombing of an American Embassy vehicle. Our vision of a 

safe, secure, and democratic Middle East cannot survive without a sovereign and 

stable Lebanon. 

18 

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Economic Support Funds 

The FY 2009 request for Economic Support Funds (ESF) is $3.15 billion, an increase of $164 million over the FY 2008 enacted level. ESF remains a reliable assistance mechanism by which we advance U.S. interests through programs that help 

recipient countries address short- and long-term political, economic, and security 

needs. ESF also supports major foreign policy initiatives such as working to resolve 

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and regional economic integration in East Asia. ESF 

funds global and regional programs that support specific U.S. foreign policy goals, 

including assistance to states critical in the war on terror. 

The request includes significant increases in some activities over the administration’s request for FY 2008, such as programs in Nepal to address rural poverty and 

help blunt the appeal of Maoist rebels, Lebanon to bolster that country’s democratic 

traditions and reduce the ability of Hezbollah to divide the populace, and south and 

central Asia to improve communications and transportation linkages between 

Afghanistan and its regional neighbors. 

The administration’s strategic priorities for FY 2009 ESF include funding for our 

partners in the war on terror to mitigate the influence of terrorist and insurgent 

groups and reduce their potential to recruit in regions bereft of political and economic participation; countries and regions at risk of civil unrest, to assist in building democratic institutions, fight poverty, and provide basic services and economic 

opportunities; states of concern to encourage democratic reform and build civil society; and regional and thematic programs like the Asia-Pacific Partnership, Middle 

East Partnership Initiative, and promoting implementation of Free Trade Agreements, especially improving labor and environmental conditions, and efforts to combat Trafficking in Persons. 

Millennium Challenge Corporation 

The request of $2.225 billion supports the continuing assistance efforts of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), an important contributor to U.S. foreign 

assistance through the principles of promoting growth through good governance, investment in health and education, and economic freedom. By early FY 2008, the 

MCC had approved a total of 16 compacts worth over $5.5 billion. An additional 14 

threshold agreements were in place at the end of FY 2007, and there is a robust 

pipeline of compacts under development. MCC expects to sign compacts with Tanzania ($698 million) in February 2008, and with Burkina Faso ($500–$550 million) 

and Namibia ($300–$325 million) this summer. MCC is also engaged with Jordan, 

Moldova, Malawi and other countries in the compact development process, and foresees sizable compacts with those countries in FY 09. 

Eight compacts are entering their second or third year of implementation, and are 

achieving tangible results. For example, in Georgia, the first phase of gas pipeline 

repairs is complete, providing Georgian citizens and businesses with needed electricity and heat. In Honduras and Madagascar, farmers are employing new techniques to improve productivity and links to reliable markets, thereby increasing 

their incomes. 

MCC and USAID programs are complementary and mutually reinforcing. USAID 

programs help countries improve policies to qualify for compacts, build their capacity to manage funds and administer compact and threshold programs, and support 

overall U.S. efforts to keep MCC countries on a transformational development track. 

MCC programs frequently build on existing USAID programs and other USG assistance. They do not overlap with them, and USAID adjusts programs to augment 

funding for opportunities created by MCC programs, and to enhance and sustain assistance in other areas. 

Development Assistance 

The Development Assistance request of $1.639 billion supports programs in countries that range from those with very low incomes whose governments are sufficiently stable and organized, to those with income levels above MCC eligibility that 

are relatively well-governed. The goal of all Development Assistance is to foster an 

expanded community of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people and act responsibly within the international community. 

Countries receiving DA face a range of long-term development challenges. Experience shows that the most effective response is to provide a well-balanced package 

that includes sustained support for transformational democratic and economic reforms and that is closely coordinated with MCC programs and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). These assistance programs also must complement and reinforce other development-related foreign policy initiatives, including 

19 

our diplomatic efforts to advance freedom and democracy, expand international 

trade opportunities, and address climate change and other critical environmental 

issues. Our strategic priorities for DA funding in FY 2009 include: Long-term democratic governance and economic growth programs in Africa; trade capacity-building 

programs in Africa and the Western Hemisphere; capacity-building in support of the 

Global Climate Change initiative; strengthened democratic governance in the Western Hemisphere; accelerated literacy and numeracy programs under the President’s 

International Education Initiative, and more broadly in Africa, the Western Hemisphere, and the Middle East, and alternative development in the Andean countries. 

We also recognize that any effort to improve development initiatives will require 

a significantly increased overseas presence of USAID, together with expanded technical and stewardship capabilities. Therefore, we are requesting $767.2 million in 

USAID Operating Expenses which will allow USAID to increase its overseas workforce. Under the Development Leadership Initiative, USAID will hire 300 Foreign 

Service officers above attrition in FY 2009 to build the capacity to implement the 

National Security Strategy for foreign assistance. 

Trade Agreements 

Let me say a word about the trade agreements we have concluded with Colombia, 

Panama, and Korea. Expanding trade opportunities advances American economic 

and national security interests. The Department is deeply involved in international 

trade issues at all levels. I recently traveled to Colombia with nine Members of Congress, who saw firsthand the impressive results of economic and political reform 

there. Our missions abroad actively support the negotiation and enforcement of our 

trade agreements. 

Through multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade agreements, we lower tariff 

and nontariff barriers to U.S. businesses, farmers, ranchers, and entrepreneurs. The 

American worker can compete successfully with anyone so long as the rules are fair. 

We help set those rules by promoting open markets, as we have done since the end 

of World War II. Our efforts at the World Trade Organization (WTO) strengthen 

these rules and expand opportunities globally. We are at a critical juncture in the 

Doha Round of WTO negotiations, which the President has described as a ‘‘once in 

a generation opportunity’’ to create economic opportunity, promote development, and 

alleviate poverty. As the President noted in his State of the Union Address, the 

United States is committed to the conclusion of a strong Doha Round this year, and 

will provide the leadership necessary to achieve this objective. 

With respect to bilateral trade agreements, our free trade agreement with Colombia is a prime example of how such agreements can strengthen both our economy 

and national security. The United States currently provides duty-free treatment to 

virtually all Colombian products entering the United States under the Andean 

Trade Preference Act. With the United States-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, U.S. 

GDP will grow by an estimated $2.5 billion by expanding opportunities for U.S. exporters as the significant tariffs that are assessed on U.S. exports to Colombia are 

reduced and eliminated. We urge Congress to consider and pass the Colombia FTA 

to allow our exporters to receive the same treatment as is available to Colombian 

exports to the United States. 

The importance of the agreement, however, extends beyond trade. The current 

and previous administrations, as well as the Congress, have made a significant commitment to Colombia by providing over $5 billion in assistance through Plan Colombia. Security in Colombia is vastly improved, the economy has rebounded, and 

Colombians have real hope for the future. The proposed FTA advances our partnership and cements these gains. The Colombia FTA reflects the open, democratic, economic, and political system which is our vision for Latin America. Colombia is a 

friend of the United States. Its government has taken great risks to achieve the successes it has achieved. I urge the Congress to pass this agreement for internal security reasons as well. 

Two additional key allies of the United States are also awaiting congressional action on free trade agreements: Panama and Korea. The United States-Panama Free 

Trade Agreement will build on our already vibrant trade relations and support the 

consolidation of freedom and democracy in this important country. The United 

States-Korea Free Trade Agreement is the most commercially significant FTA in 

over 15 years. Korea has been a steadfast partner and ally in promoting peace and 

security in Northeast Asia and globally. I urge your action on these agreements as 

well. 

20 

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Foreign Military Financing 

The request of $4.812 billion for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) will advance 

U.S. interests by ensuring that coalition partners, allies, and friendly foreign governments have the equipment and training necessary for common security goals and 

burden-sharing in joint missions. This request includes $2.55 billion for Israel, the 

first year of a 10-year $30 billion commitment. FMF promotes our national security 

by strengthening the defense of friendly governments and bolstering their abilities 

to contain transnational threats, terrorism, and trafficking in persons, weapons, and 

narcotics. This request provides funding for Egypt to foster a modern, well-trained 

Egyptian military, and support for force modernization, border surveillance, and 

counterterrorism efforts in Jordan. FMF is helping to build a Lebanese army capable of implementing U.N. Security Council resolutions 1559 and 1701, secure Lebanon’s border against weapons smuggling, and begin the process of disarming militias in Lebanon. The request also finances programs with the Gulf States of Bahrain 

and Oman as part of the Gulf Security Dialogue. FMF will also assist ongoing efforts to incorporate into NATO the most recent members of the alliance and to support prospective NATO members and coalition partners, as well as partners in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. 

The International Military Education and Training 

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program request for 

FY 2009 is $90.5 million. Through professional and technical course curricula and 

specialized instruction, this key component of U.S. security assistance provides valuable education and training on U.S. military practices within a context of respect 

for democratic values and internationally recognized standards of human rights. 

IMET programs in Europe advance regional security and force integration among 

NATO and European Armed Forces, most notably in Turkey, Poland, Ukraine, and 

the Czech Republic. In the Near East, IMET provides technical training necessary 

to maintain U.S.-origin equipment in Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and Oman. In Africa, IMET provides training programs for Ethiopia, Kenya, 

Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa, countries central to long-term regional peace 

and stability. In east Asia, IMET programs with the Philippines and Indonesia, for 

example, focus on professionalizing defense forces and developing skills in fighting 

the war on terror. In south Asia, IMET programs improve military interoperability 

with the United States and educate south Asian armies in respect for human rights 

and civilian-military cooperation. In the Western Hemisphere, IMET focuses on 

building capacity to respond to regional security challenges, with major programs 

in El Salvador, Colombia, and Mexico. 

IMET is a critical tool to strengthen important military relationships in the global 

fight against terrorism and to do so in the context of support for human rights. 

IMET helps ensure that future leaders of foreign militaries are well trained, exposed to the U.S. system of civilian control of the military, and have lasting ties 

to the U.S. defense community. 

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs 

The request for the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs Account is $499 million. With this year’s request, three separate subaccounts, 

Humanitarian Demining, International Trust Fund, and Small Arms/Light Weapons, are combined into one line item in the budget to address more appropriately 

our global Conventional Weapons Destruction efforts. We are also establishing a 

proposed new subaccount for WMD terrorism to undertake projects that improve 

international capabilities to respond to potential WMD terrorist attacks. 

The FY 2009 request includes increases in several important areas. We propose 

continued funding for humanitarian demining and increased funding for programs 

to address the threat to civil and military aviation posed by terrorists and insurgents armed with MANPADS. We have also proposed increased funding for the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund to address emergent nonproliferation and disarmament requirements including additional support for disablement and dismantlement activities in North Korea, as they are achieved in the ongoing six party 

talks. Increases in the Global Threat Reduction program will strengthen biosecurity 

programs and antinuclear smuggling programs. 

Under the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, we are expanding the 

TransSahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in the North Africa region, and 

strengthening linkages with the existing TSCTP in sub-Saharan Africa to prevent 

terrorist movement between Mahgreb and sub-Saharan states and to promote 

21 

greater regional cooperation. Increased funding for ATA will also support counterterrorism programs in East Africa. 

Peacekeeping Operations 

The FY 2009 request for Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) is $247.2 million, which 

is necessary to advance international support for voluntary, multinational stabilization efforts, including support for non-U.N. missions and for U.S. conflict-resolution 

programs. PKO funding enhances the ability of states to participate in peacekeeping 

and stability operations and to address counterterrorism threats. In the aftermath 

of conflict, PKO funds help transform foreign military establishments into professional military forces guided by the rule of law. 

An important element of FY 2009 PKO funding is the President’s Global Peace 

Operations Initiative (GPOI), now in its fifth year. FY 2009 funding will train over 

15,000 peacekeeping troops to reach the initiative’s goal of 75,000 peacekeeping 

troops trained worldwide. GPOI includes the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, as well as train-and-equip programs outside 

of Africa. GPOI assists in the deployment of peace operations troops, provides logistics and transportation support, and assists regional organizations in planning and 

managing peacekeeping operations. PKO funding also helps support TSCTP; Security Sector Reform programs in Liberia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of 

Congo; peacekeeping activities in Somalia; and the Multinational Force and Observers peacekeeping mission in the Sinai. 

GLOBAL CHALLENGES

Democracy & Human Rights 

We will continue to promote democratic development and uphold international standards of human and worker rights globally. We are requesting $1.745 billion for 

programs to advance good governance, democracy and human rights in support of 

the President’s Freedom Agenda, including political competition and consensus 

building, rule of law, and civil society activities in countries around the world. This 

budget will support centrally managed and multilateral efforts that provide targeted 

funding for unforeseen needs and opportunities, advance democracy in difficult 

countries where bilateral programs are not feasible and provide technical support 

to our overseas missions on democracy issues and programs. Our request includes $60 million in ESF for the Human Rights and Democracy 

Fund to support innovative activities that open political space in struggling and nascent democracies and in authoritarian regimes as the leading element of the U.S. 

Government’s efforts to effect positive and lasting change. HRDF will allow us to 

support pivotal democracy and human rights programming in critical target countries such as China, Belarus, Russia, Lebanon, North Korea, Thailand, Venezuela, 

Somalia, Burma, and Pakistan. With HRDF, we will continue to support the Global 

Human Rights Defenders Fund, a program that enables us to quickly disburse small 

grants to human rights defenders facing extraordinary needs due to government repression. In addition, we will fund innovative approaches to advance labor rights 

abroad by strengthening democratic trade unions and will promote corporate social 

responsibility globally. 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

The $1.202 billion request for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) and $406 million for the Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP) in FY 2009 

supports bilateral and global programs to combat transnational crime, illicit narcotics threats, and terrorist networks built upon and funded by the illegal drug 

trade. These programs aim to strengthen and professionalize law enforcement institutions that are weak or subject to corruption. 

INCLE funds are focused mainly on countries in which serious security threats 

exist, both to host governments and to our national interests as well. This includes 

countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, 

Indonesia, Liberia, and Sudan. 

Of particular note this year is the importance and timeliness of the Merida Initiative, our new program for security and law enforcement cooperation with Mexico 

and the nations of Central America. The President has requested $550 million in 

FY 2008 and in FY 2009, a total of $1.1 billion. The administration believes that 

we must act now to assist our southern neighbors in their fight against the criminal 

organizations that threaten their security and prosperity, as well as our own. These 

nations have demonstrated the political will to tackle critical problems and have 

asked us to cooperate with them as partners. I strongly urge Congress to fund this 

important national security initiative both through the FY 2008 supplemental and 

the FY 2009 appropriation. 

22 

Migration and Refugees Assistance 

Our commitment to providing humanitarian assistance and protection for refugees, conflict victims, and vulnerable migrants remains strong. We are requesting 

$764 million in FY 2009 to fund contributions to key international humanitarian 

and nongovernmental organizations and for bilateral programs to respond to humanitarian needs abroad and identify durable solutions, including resettlement of 

refugees in the United States. These funds provide for basic needs to sustain life, 

protect refugees and conflict victims, assist refugees with voluntary repatriation, 

local integration, or permanent resettlement in a third country. They are a humane 

and effective response to pressing needs that reflects the compassion of the American people. Humanitarian needs related to Iraq and Afghanistan will be subject to 

a separate FY 2009 supplemental request. The request of $45 million for the President’s Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund is critical to meet urgent 

and unforeseen humanitarian requirements. 

Global HIV/AIDS Initiative 

The Global HIV/AIDS Initiative account (GHAI) is the largest source of funding 

for the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The request of 

$4.779 billion is a substantial increase over the FY 2008 enacted level for the 

PEPFAR bilateral program, and capitalizes on the demonstrated capacity-building 

and programmatic successes in prevention, care, and treatment during the first 5 

years of the program. Funding will support country-based activities, international 

partners, technical support, and oversight and management. The FY 2009 request 

is the first of a new, 5-year, $30 billion Presidential commitment that builds upon 

and expands our initial 5-year, $15 billion commitment. 

The request also proposes the development of a ‘‘Partnership Compact’’ model, 

with the goal of strengthening host government commitment. In selected countries, 

compacts will outline reciprocal responsibilities, linking our resources to increased 

host country resources for HIV/AIDS and the establishment of policies that foster 

an effective HIV/AIDS response. 

Environment 

As President Bush said in his State of the Union Address, the United States is 

committed to confronting the challenge of climate change. We want an international 

agreement that will slow, stop, and eventually reverse the growth of greenhouse 

gasses. Achieving that goal will require commitments by all major economies, a 

point we have made in the two Major Economies Meetings on Energy Security and 

Climate Change under the initiative launched by the President in support of U.N. 

negotiations. 

In Indonesia this past December, the United States joined with the other parties 

to the U.N. Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to adopt the ‘‘Bali Action 

Plan.’’ This document will guide negotiations of a new post-2012 climate change arrangement by 2009. Our FY 2009 budget request includes $64 million to support 

our efforts to address adaptation and reduce deforestation, major elements of the 

‘‘Bali Roadmap.’’ 

Through the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), 

the United States works with China, India, Australia, South Korea, Canada, and 

Japan to accelerate the adoption of clean energy technologies. Over 100 APP 

projects and activities are reducing emissions in major sectors such as power generation, cement, steel, aluminum, and buildings. Our FY 2009 foreign assistance 

budget request for APP totals $26 million. 

As part of our long-term commitment to protecting the Earth’s ozone layer we are proposing $19 million for the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund. Last year, the 

international community agreed to a landmark U.S. proposal to accelerate the 

phaseout of ozone depleting substances. Over the next two decades, this acceleration 

will provide climate system benefits that could exceed those contemplated under the 

Kyoto Protocol. 

Finally, a request of $40 million supports our commitment to labor and traderelated environmental initiatives with our Dominican Republic-Central American 

Free Trade Agreement partners. These activities will strengthen institutions for 

more effective implementation and enforcement of environmental laws and promote 

biodiversity, market-based conservation, and private-sector environmental performance. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, the FY 2009 International Affairs request proposes an increase of 

16 percent over the FY 2008 base appropriation, and more than 9 percent over all 

FY 2008 appropriations enacted to date. I understand that this is a significant inVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:05 Feb 27, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\47624.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
23 

crease. But the President and I, as well as the officials in all departments and agencies which administer the foreign affairs account, strongly believe this request is 

fully justified and critical to the national security interests of the United States. We 

understand that these funds are the result of the efforts of hard-working American 

taxpayers. You have our commitment that we will manage these funds efficiently 

as stewards of the resources entrusted to us by the American people. 

The CHAIRMAN. Based on who’s here, we can start with 10- 

minute rounds, but we’ll start with 10-minute rounds, and if it 

turns out that other people show up, they’ll just get less time. 

That’s the price of coming late. So, we’ll begin with 10-minute 

rounds, here. 

Madame Secretary, there are reports of growing frustrations in 

the ranks of the former Sunni insurgents, a co-called ‘‘Awakening’’ 

to whom we have been providing monthly payments of $300, which 

I agree with, that’s not a criticism. They want to be integrated into 

the Iraqi Government and security forces, but the central government seems—even with the changes made as recently as yesterday—to be balking, particularly in mixed areas close to Baghdad. 

The situation is said to be so bad that our military has started 

developing plans to create a Depression-era style Civilian Job 

Corps, so these folks are going to be gainfully employed. What are 

the consequences of the Iraqi Government’s failure to hire these 

exinsurgents, or to the concerned local citizens, as they are called 

by our military? What are we going to do to increase this integration? And, if they’re not integrated, can we—by stepping in—stave 

off what is a growing discontent? 

Secretary RICE. The Iraqi Government I think it’s fair to say, 

was initially quite skeptical of the local citizens committees, in 

part, because they worried they might be new militias, in a sense. 

And what we have done is to work with the Maliki government. 

There is a committee that reviews, now, the local citizens committees, and their integration into the security forces. Not all of them 

will be integrated into security forces, and it is important that 

there be job opportunities for them. There is work going on in 

that—not just temporary jobs, but real jobs through, for instance, 

we believe that if the Iraqi Government fully executes its budget 

for housing—the construction industry brings a lot of jobs—that 

that might be a way to absorb some of these people. 

I’m heartened by the budgets that are now coming out for provincial governments. You are starting to see more of an emphasis on 

budgetary resources from the center, going to the provinces. 

We have had—through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams—to 

intensify our efforts to make it possible for the provincial governments, then, to spend the resources that they’re getting. 

I’ve sat with the sheikhs of the awakening—both in Iraqi and 

when they were here—they want more project money into their 

province. In fact, there was an Anbar supplemental of about $70 

million. The Anbaris are politically powerful enough that several 

national politicians decided they should go and deliver it by hand. 

And there was a big ceremony for it. 

The—ultimately I think you will see that the elections at the provincial level will be the real answer to this. Because some of the 

provincial councils, which are not so representative, because of the 

way that the elections took place in 2005, I think, will be renovated 

24 

by a new provincial powers, and it’s why—by new elections—and 

it’s why the provincial powers law is so important. 

I might just say that they were engaged in debates about the 

provincial powers that we would recognize from our own history. 

What was the role of governors who could remove them? Did governors have the right to mobilize military forces—these were really 

very crucial debates, and I think it’s a good thing that they’ve gotten a law. 

The CHAIRMAN. I was there for that ceremony. I was there when 

the central government came out to meet with the sheikhs and 

with Satr, not Sadr, Satr—who was the guy who organized the 

sheikh, who organized the other sheikhs. And I was there at that 

ceremony. I, along with Ambassador Crocker and the General. 

And it was an interesting phenomenon. The fact was that I was 

told by two of the Vice Presidents that came from Baghdad—one 

Sunni and one Shia—that Maliki wouldn’t sign the check until the 

very last minute, and I assume it was because of some significant 

pressure from Ambassador Crocker, I don’t know that. 

And the point I’m making is this—at least it may have changed 

in the last month or so. But there is an overwhelming distrust, as 

you know, as to whether or not these are merely stopgap measures. 

And what I keep being told is that there is a need for there to 

be actual integration—not just in the regional government, and the 

regional elections that will be coming up, but in the central government, and in the security forces. 

And I haven’t—I may be missing something, and I’m not being 

facetious—I may be missing something here, but I don’t see any of 

that integration occurring. Because that’s where—what the sheikhs 

with whom I personally met, and there were, I think, six present— 

they wanted to make sure that they were integrated into the security apparatus, on a permanent basis. And the bottom line was, because they didn’t want Shia patrolling their streets, they didn’t 

want Kurds patrolling their streets, and they wanted to be able to 

patrol their own streets, being a representative of the central government, but in their own areas. 

Secretary RICE. There is a program that is working with the 

Iraqi Government. There is a committee that the Prime Minister, 

himself, appointed—to do precisely that—to work these people into 

permanent structures of the state. 

I think, not everybody who’s in the local citizen committee will 

be. 

The CHAIRMAN. No, no. 

Secretary RICE. But, you’re right, Senator—this will take some 

time. This was a very fortuitous development, Awakening and the 

local citizens’ committee, it was frankly not envisioned in the way 

that the security forces were planned. And now working them into 

the structure if very important. But it is underway. And my only 

point is it’s, I think, working in the security structures is important, but also having Awakening feel that they are really a part of 

the political process. 

The CHAIRMAN. No; I understand both. And I agree. All I’m saying to you is, I think we are, we should be pushing, quite frankly, 

and according to the military, with whom I speak, considerably 

harder. And as you pointed out, that real progress has come—not 

25 

the only progress—but real progress has come the more we’ve empowered people. And I really would argue, again, for you all to take 

another look at what the Congress passed here, about pushing forward on this whole Federal system that their constitution envisions. But, I’ll come back to that. 

In my remaining 21⁄2 minutes here, I’d like to ask you about the 

de-Baathification law. As you know, whether the recently passed 

de-Baathification law promotes healing or further division, depends 

on how it’s implemented. If you listen to some of the voices of 

those, such as Dr. Chalibi, who has been closely associated with deBaathification, the law will actually lead to the expulsion of more 

individuals from key government jobs, then inclusion. 

What steps are we taking, and how are we monitoring this to 

make sure that the de-Baathification law actually integrates more 

people, rather than has this negative impact. Because, the devil 

really is in the details of how this is read, and how it is being advertised, if you will, in Iraq by those individuals representing the 

sectarian interests in Iraq. 

Secretary RICE. We made the point, precisely, that you’ve made. 

That the issue here is going to be implementation. The law itself 

is not a perfect law, it is a compromise law. And, obviously, with 

any law, it is subject to interpretation. 

But when we’ve talked, particularly, with Tariq al-Hashimi, the 

Vice President, he is now very focused on the question of implementation, and also whether or not there need to be certain understandings about how it will be implemented. And we have people 

in the Embassy who are working on that. 

One of those things that has come about, when I was out there, 

a couple of times ago, Senator, I worked very hard with Prime Minister Maliki to restart something called the three-plus-one, which 

is—they now call their Executive Council the Presidency plus the 

Prime Minister. And, by meeting weekly, and then having a little 

steering committee of their people to meet even more frequently— 

we’ve encouraged them to—practically, every day, to look at this 

and how it’s going forward. 

I think the principle concerns are about what may happen to certain people in the security forces, and in the intelligence forces. It 

should be helped by the fact that the pension law and, frankly, also 

by the amnesty—but we’ve been making exactly the point, regarding the implementation, and whether there need to be certain understandings about it. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think Hashimi’s come a long way, I’ve spent a 

lot of time with him, and I think he’s come a long way in terms 

of greater regional authority. And I think there still is a significant 

deal to be made here, tied to oil, but my time is up. And I yield 

to Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Madame Secretary, yesterday Russian President Vladimir Putin, 

while President Yushenko of Ukraine was sitting next to him, 

threatened to target Ukraine with nuclear weapons if Ukraine was 

to deepen their relationship with NATO. Now, this comes on the 

heels of similar threats to Poland, and the Czech Republic, if those 

nations were to cooperate with us on missile defense. 

26 

Last year the Russian Government, fomented unrest and stood 

idly by while government-sponsored groups physically threatened 

the Estonian Ambassador at her Embassy in Moscow, and are suspected of sponsoring a massive cyber-attack on their Baltic neighbor, all because the government in Talin moved a Soviet statue. 

Last year, Russia withdrew from a treaty, restricting conventional weapons in Europe. And this week, a Russian bomber risked 

an international military incident when it flew over a U.S. aircraft 

carrier, while another bomber simultaneously violated Japanese 

airspace. 

And President Putin announced that Russia is in the midst of a 

new arms race with the United States and our allies. 

Meanwhile, Gazprom, the Russian state energy company, threatened to cut off energy supplies to Ukraine, although the intervention yesterday by President Yushenko and some agreement may 

have postponed that for the winter—and Moscow continues to use 

energy as a weapon against its neighbors, to extort sales of vital 

infrastructure, with the goal of monopolizing energy development 

and transportation. 

Other forms used by Russia to bully its neighbors have taken the 

form of a blockage of Georgia, and daily threats to those capitals 

who work cooperatively with the United States. Now, given this 

record of behavior, why is NATO considering inviting President 

Putin to the Summit Conference in Bucharest in early April? It 

would seem that the alliance might very well be intimidated by 

that presence, given all of the experiences of its members. 

I just simply want to ask you to discuss for a moment what you 

perceive in the event the agenda at NATO is new members—three 

have been strongly suggested—our two MAP programs, for Ukraine 

and Georgia, and then, of course, discussion of Afghanistan, or 

other issues in which we are, as an alliance, involved. 

What is the effect of joining President Putin to join the conversation? 

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator. 

First of all, let me just say that I said it at Davos, that the 

unhelpful and, really, reprehensible rhetoric that is coming out of 

Moscow is unacceptable and is not helpful to a relationship that, 

actually, I think, has some positive aspects. And we have cooperated on North Korean denuclearization, and Iran and the Middle 

East, and of course the cooperative threat reduction and global nuclear terrorism—a lot of things. And yet, when it comes to issues 

that I would say come out of the structure of the post-cold-war 

order in Europe, we get this kind of rhetoric which is most certainly not helpful. 

As to the NATO agenda, it’s the administration’s strong belief 

that NATO will do what it must as an alliance, and Russia has no 

veto. 

So, in fact, we will look at what the status of various aspirants 

really is, and whether they’re ready for different stages of, either 

NATO membership or the various relationships that NATO can 

offer, and we’ll make the decision on that basis. I think that’s the 

only way that NATO can proceed. 

We’ve also been very clear that we are absolutely devoted to the 

independence and sovereignty of Ukraine and of the other states 

27 

that were once as part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had 

all of these parts, but that was another point in time. It is gone 

forever. And I hope that Russia understands that. 

Now, as to how these discussions go, I’ve sat through, at least, 

the ministerials of the NATO-Russian Council. And very often, 

Senator, it goes the other way. It’s an opportunity for Russia to see 

the unity of the alliance. It’s very often an opportunity for the Russians to sit and recognize that the Baltic States are part of NATO, 

and therefore enjoy the protection of Article V and of the European 

and North Atlantic allies. 

And so, in that sense, these sessions tend not to be one in which 

the alliance is intimidated by Russia, but rather where a very 

strong message of alliance unity can be communicated. 

And I would hope that if we do go forward with a NATO-Russia 

Council in Bucharest, that that would be what is being communicated—that it is a Russia-NATO conversation, but that NATO is 

a strong and unified alliance that is not going to see a return to 

the cold war, and that means, neither to Russia’s ability to intimidate its neighbors, nor to the times when we had an implacably 

hostile relationship with the Soviet Union. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, I thank you for that response. Can you 

give us an indication of how vigorous the administration will be in 

backing the three new membership applications that are imminent, 

as well as the MAP designation for Ukraine and Georgia? 

Secretary RICE. Well, on the three aspirants, we believe they’re 

making very good progress. We will obviously reserve judgment 

until the time that we’ve had a chance with our allies to determine 

whether or not they’ve met the standard. 

But, should they meet the standard, it’s our view that they ought 

to be invited for membership. 

In terms of the Membership Action Plans, of course, those also 

require an examination of where a state is, and I would give the 

same answer—we’ve always believed that states ought to meet 

these, or receive these relationships as they become able and capable for carrying out the responsibilities that go with them. 

Senator LUGAR. Well, we will certainly ask you, as April approaches, to inform the committee about the impressions of the administration, the vigor of this pursuit. Because, as you know, action will need to be taken by the Senate. The last round was a joyous occasion. Of a good debate, ending in the morning, about noontime. The Foreign Ministers of the countries involved, sitting in the 

gallery of the Senate. Proceeding to the White House for a celebration. I would hope that this would be the case on this occasion, as 

opposed to a very tentative situation in which the countries may 

or may not know where they stand with you or with the Senate. 

And we’ve not had much discussion on the issue, but I cite this 

as a very important set of developments, rather stoutly ahead of 

us, at this point. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator. Let me just add that it’s 

also very important to the future stability of the Balkans, as well, 

so we’re mindful of the fact that this could help in issues of stability in the Balkans. 

Senator LUGAR. I appreciate very much, your response and your 

opening statement that a special coordinator or negotiator or howVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:05 Feb 27, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\47624.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
28 

ever one wants to designate this person, may be charged with a 

very heavy duty in the Near East. 

I cite this, specifically, having come through Kazakhstan and 

Turkmenistan within a week after President Putin, literally, had 

been on the telephone with the Presidents of those two countries, 

almost personally negotiating a natural gas deal, of very sizable 

amounts. 

This is not a bureaucratic functionary from Russia, this is at the 

top. And the necessity of gaining those resources, then, to pass 

them through Russia where—even while I was traveling—deals 

were being inscribed with Bulgaria, with Russia taking control of 

50 percent of the pipelines underneath that country, and then 

shortly after, with Serbia. Negating, in part, the so-called Nabuko 

pipeline idea that we have. So, life is going on, rather seriously in 

this area, which we need to be following. 

And the new President in Turkmenistan, as you know because 

you have met him—is a very different President. After a long 

stretch of total, absolute control by someone with whom we really 

had no dealings. So, there’s an opportunity. He has already been 

in touch with President Sakasvili of Georgia. They see each other 

as the same generation, and what had seemed impossible before, 

with trans-Caspian pipelines, or ships, may happen. And that is 

new. 

But we really need to be there, in Ashkbat, as well as with all 

of the dealings in Astona now, with the six powers, the very large 

Kashagan field—this is a huge situation, for the world, as well as 

for us. 

You know this, but I just applaud the need for our State Department to be on top of it. With somebody—almost on a daily basis— 

in touch with these leaders who want to talk to us. And especially 

President Aleyev, who is waiting for assistance, but values the security of the relationship, vis-a-vis, Russia, Iran—anyone else who 

might breathe heavily in the area. 

Thank you very much. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Dodd is next, but he suggested I—— 

Senator DODD. Well, no, Mr. Chairman, having just arrived, let 

me defer to my colleagues. We had a markup on a Banking Committee bill, Madame Secretary, and I’ll defer my time and come 

back in a few minutes, thanks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kerry. 

Senator KERRY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me join you and the ranking member in expressing our sadness at the loss of Tom Lantos. My daughters and I had the chance 

to have one of those wonderful trips you referred to with him, in 

Budapest, and he was just so full of enthusiasm and energy, and 

had this marvelous warmth and brightness about him that we all 

remember. 

And we will miss him, and his passion for human rights, and for 

the issues that we’re talking about here today. 

And what a family—a great, unbelievable family. 

Madame Secretary, thank you so much for being here with us 

today, for what you’re doing. And I want to congratulate you on the 

29 

increase of the State Department personnel, the Foreign Service 

personnel and USAID personnel—that is so important. And this is 

a very significant increase that you have asked for, and I’m confident the committee will embrace it wholeheartedly. I think it is 

long overdue. 

One concern—well, a number of concerns on the budget, overall. 

Secretary Gates, in a speech at Kansas State University, he said, 

‘‘There’s a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian 

instruments of national security. Diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction 

and development.’’ And I think it’s wonderful to have the Secretary 

of Defense, who is making that argument. 

The question is, really, whether or not this budget, in fact, fully 

meets that task. I know it’s an increase and we welcome the increase and you cited the various increases that have taken place. 

But specifically, for instance, turning to Afghanistan where General Jones and others—I might ask you, parenthetically, to perhaps 

comment on that, I mean you’re familiar with the report—of these 

eminent persons who really see the Afghanistan situation slipping 

away, and that’s the way they’ve cited it. And General Eickenberry 

has said, ‘‘Where the road ends, the Taliban begins.’’ And there’s 

this whole notion that we need to be making a stronger commitment. I think the budget is a plus-up of $150 million over what you 

asked for in the regular budget. Then, of course, there was a supplemental above that. So, the total last year as over $1 billion. 

But the question is asked, why wouldn’t we be asking for that 

full amount here in this budget, and why would the increase not 

be more significant with respect to the support for the PRTs which, 

I think is around $50 million or something, that vicinity. 

So, are you asking for enough to really, in fact, get the job done, 

and where do you assess that situation at this moment, with respect to General Jones reports, et cetera? 

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator. 

Well, first of all, I believe that the budget represents, as you 

said, a significant increase. And I’d like to focus very intensely this 

year on getting it fully funded. 

I think that one of the problems that we’ve had is that we’ve had 

increases, and then we’ve not be able to get them approved—particularly on the personnel side. In the last budget we asked for 280 

positions—that didn’t get approved. And so, I believe this is a very, 

very significant increase, and if we could get this fully funded, then 

we would leave the Department during the next budgetary cycle, 

in a position to increase the funding again, and to get to a place 

where we need to be.— 

Senator KERRY. But that’s the personnel part, right? 

Secretary RICE. That’s the personnel part. 

Senator KERRY. Right. 

Secretary RICE. On Afghanistan, we have tried, in part, through 

supplemental funding, which is really focused on the kinds of 

things that we don’t think will be recurring costs in the budget for 

extended period of time, to infuse counterinsurgency funding. 

A lot of the funding that we think will be longer run governance, 

the building of capacity and all of that—we’ve started to put into 

the regular budget. But there’s certain things—and this is where 

30 

the PRTs are very important, where we really are very much 

linked up in a war-like environment, where we are part of the 

counterinsurgency effort. 

I think these are the right numbers. I will be the first to say that 

we have made a priority decision in favor of roads and electricity. 

And it’s in part, because of what you mentioned—the insurgency 

begins where roads end. 

It is also because we believe that the electricity piece is very important. 

Senator KERRY. Which part of the package goes to that? I’m trying to just break it down, here. There’s $370 million for counternarcotics, there’s $240 million for 

democracy and governance, $109 million for health and education, 

$74 million for the PRTs, $12 million for nonemergency food aid. 

Secretary RICE. And there’s an infrastructure piece in the supplemental; we had a road-building plan over a number of years. 

Senator KERRY. It’s in the supplemental. 

Secretary RICE. Yes; it’s in the supplemental. 

Senator KERRY. I see. 

Secretary RICE. So we are building roads. 

Senator KERRY. Why wouldn’t that be part of the overall budget 

request, to accurately reflect what we need to do in Afghanistan? 

Secretary RICE. Yeah; there’s $834 million in the supplemental. 

A significant portion of that is for infrastructure. I’ll get the exact 

breakout for you, Senator. 

[The information referred to above follows: ] 

In the Fiscal Year 2008 Base Budget, the Department of State has allocated on 

a preliminary basis $94.5 million for power and $95.3 million for roads. An additional $60 million for power and $279 million for roads has been requested in the 

Fiscal Year 2008 Supplemental for the Global War on Terror. 

After the original Supplemental request for Fiscal Year 2008 had been submitted, 

the Government of Afghanistan approached the United States Government with an 

emergency request for diesel generators for Kabul and the Northern Electrical 

Power System. Furthermore, the development of Sheberghan, a thermal power plant 

with adjacent oil and gas fields that would feed electricity into the Northern Electrical Power System, became a high priority for infrastructure development. It has 

the potential to increase access to electrical power for 50 percent of Afghanistan’s 

population and greatly reduce Afghanistan’s reliance on imported electricity and 

fuel. To fund these high priority infrastructure projects, the Department of State 

amended its Fiscal Year 2008 Supplemental request to include an additional $115 

million for power and an additional $50 million for roads. 

Senator KERRY. Come to the heart of the issue; when are you 

going to measure that against what General Jones has said, what 

the Secretary has said, and others—we still have the luxury of the 

majority of the people supporting our presence. We’ve got to keep 

that, which means we’ve got to turn around the on-the-ground delivery, rapidly. 

Secretary RICE. Yes. And I think, Senator, only a portion of that, 

and I would say, a relatively small portion relates to resources. I 

think the problem that we really have—and here I do think the 

international effort has got to be more coherent—is that you really 

have a significant counterinsurgency problem in the South. And 

the forces are able to clear these areas. 

If you take a place like Musukala, they have been able to clear 

it. The question is: Can it be held? And so there is a significant 

program now that I talked to the one-star general who has been 

31 

put in charge of it out there, to rapidly increase the number of police. We will work with them on doing that. There are certain limitations. 

One of the problems in Afghanistan, as you know, this is a very 

poor country with people who are largely illiterate. Just finding 

people is not an easy matter. But, it’s really being able to hold, and 

then making sure that all of the multiple reconstruction efforts— 

ours plus those of the rest of the international community—are 

really getting into an area, and building quickly. 

They have a plan for what they’re calling ‘‘Focus District Development’’ in the south, which means, taking a district, looking at 

the needs of clearing, looking at the needs of holding and then putting the right reconstruction efforts in. I think that will give us a 

much more focused way of doing it. 

Senator KERRY. Let me follow up on that. 

Secretary RICE. It’s just the two of us. 

Senator KERRY. But let me take advantage of that. 

The Paddy Ashdown situation, and your recent trip—did you 

make any progress with the British foreign circuit and Foreign Secretary Miliband on the question of NATO troops, additional troops? 

And obviously, this is an enormous test for NATO. I think Secretary Gates made the right comments. 

As I stated, this is really an important test. Can you report to 

us what progress you made, and what happens if NATO doesn’t 

provide more troops? What are you planning? 

Secretary RICE. Well, as you know, as a temporary matter, we 

are surging some 3,200 marines into Afghanistan. But the real answer here is that somebody’s going to have to join the Canadians 

in the south. And the Canadians have been clear about that—it is 

not a request that should be beyond the alliance to do it. 

And Secretary Gates is working very hard on it, I’m working 

very hard on it. The French have said that they may be able to 

help some, in some parts of the country, there are others who 

might help. 

Senator KERRY. Why do you think this is proving so difficult? I 

realize that a majority of the German population doesn’t want the 

troops there. When I was in Brussels, I met with the Ambassadors 

there, and the Dutch might be characterized as squeamish— 

everybody’s squeamish about this. Where does that leave us, with 

respect to this first mission out of area for NATO and the future? 

Secretary RICE. Well, I think the first point to make is, it is 

NATO’s first really big mission out of area. And this was not what, 

I think, the alliance would have thought that it was going to be 

doing, 4 or 5 years ago. And I think the capabilities have come 

along more slowly than the new demands. 

I also believe, Senator, that we’ve got a bit of a problem, in that 

governments are going to have to be more straightforward with 

their people, that this is not just another peacekeeping operation. 

That this is really a peacemaking operation, and that there are 

going to be casualties. 

It is going to be tough fighting. You can’t do it all with reconstruction assistance. And part of what we’ve been trying to do—Bob 

Gates and myself—is to just say to people, ‘‘We appreciate that 

you’re doing what you can do, but this is a different kind of mission 

32 

than peacekeeping.’’ And so when you have allies like the Canadians, the Danes, and others in the south, who are encountering 

really tough fights. It’s important to get them the military help 

that they need. 

And balancing the rhetoric with populations, about the need to 

do reconstruction and build schools and do health clinics, with a 

full understanding that there is a really tough military mission 

that has to be carried out here, has been part of the problem. 

Senator KERRY. Is it fair to say that the NATO reluctance puts 

the mission in jeopardy? 

Secretary RICE. I believe that if NATO is—if allies, all allies remain reluctant, yes, there is a real problem. 

Senator KERRY. And is the administration envisioning picking up 

that slack with our own troops? I mean, does the temporary deployment of Marines then become permanent? Does it become larger? 

Secretary RICE. I believe there are still good options for the alliance. A lot of effort is being put toward the common of Bucharest, 

to resolve some of these issues. We have increased in-flows, and 

willingness to give equipment and to use Special Forces, that’s important. 

We need more people in the training units, who are—and you 

know, this is not training in a classroom, very often. This is mentoring out in a rough neighborhood where you might encounter terrorists, as well. 

And so I know, and we can all be critical of how the alliance has 

taken this on, but I think we need to recognize that the alliance, 

which was structured to do something else, has only slowly transformed itself, and that the mentality of what it requires to do Afghanistan is only now really dawning on certain members of the 

alliance. 

Senator KERRY. If NATO does not accept this responsibility, does 

this, in fact, put NATO’s rationale on the table? 

Secretary RICE. Well, NATO is doing a lot of things, Senator. 

They’re also, you know, they have a training program in Afghanistan for leadership, we’re in Darfur as a planning element. I still 

believe the alliance will meet this test. But we have not minced 

words, that an alliance that has taken this mission on—and I want 

to underscore, this was a decision taken by the NAC, to take this 

mission on. It is a consensus organization. So there was no one who 

didn’t want to take this mission on. And we’ve not—— 

Senator KERRY. I understand. 

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Minced words that we better succeed, or the alliance, in fact, will be weakened. 

Senator KERRY. In your judgment, as you have these discussions 

with the various ministers and others involved, do they express an 

understanding of the challenge of the stakes in Afghanistan, but 

simply see a different way of dealing with it? Or do they not see 

the, sort of, downstream impact of Taliban resurgence, al-Qaeda, et 

cetera? 

Secretary RICE. I would say that it’s mixed. A lot of countries 

now that are taking on this very heavy fighting understand, fundamentally, now what counterinsurgency is all about. 

To be fair to them, this is something we’ve had to learn, as well. 

This has not been easy to learn that this is a continuum—you 

33 

clear, you hold, you build—it all has to happen in a continuum. 

There isn’t a fine line between war and peace. 

Senator KERRY. It’s also fair to say, they have lived with these 

kinds of things longer, in some ways. Whether it’s been the 

Basques or the IRA or other forms of terror. 

Secretary RICE. Well, they’ve certainly lived with terrorism, but 

I think it’s different, this is a different branch, a different form. 

Senator KERRY. And you think they understand that? Or not? 

Secretary RICE. I think they understand it, it’s been harder to 

come to a realization about what to do with it, what to do about 

it. But in my visits down to the ISAF headquarters, I think people 

are coming to terms with it. 

The problem is the alliance has to come to terms with it, as a 

whole. It cannot just be Canadians and Brits and Danes and Americans and a few others. 

Senator KERRY. And what did Foreign Secretary Miliband say to 

you with respect to the British? 

Secretary RICE. The British, I think, understand this fight. If 

there’s a big piece of this I think we all are going to have to work 

very hard on it. And David Miliband and I spent a lot of time on 

this. I believe the ISAF mission is really understanding better, 

militarily, what has to be done. That you’re going to be fighting for 

population security in circumstances where they won’t come at you 

as an integrated military grouping, because then they get really destroyed. The tried that at Kandahar, they tried that on a spring offensive, they got destroyed. 

The harder piece is the piece that is rounding up cells, using information and intelligence from the population to take down that 

suicide bombing network. It’s that piece of it that they are now 

really trying to do. 

But the piece that I don’t believe is really pulling its weight is 

the build part. And only a small part of it is resources. Everybody 

would love to have more resources. But unless you’re quick, and capable of going right into a community, and saying, ‘‘All right, you 

have helped clear your area of bad guys. We can hold, they’re not 

coming back.’’ 

Senator KERRY. Now we’re going to make a difference. 

Secretary RICE. Now, let’s make a difference for you. A lot of the 

structures of aid—institutions are not really structured to that. 

Senator KERRY. I know I’m trying to draw this out a little bit for 

somebody to get back here so I can go vote. But, Pakistan—Senator 

Biden and Senator Hagel and I are going to be there on the election day and the next day. Can you share with us what the Republican Institute has pulled out of the electoral process. What are we 

doing, and what is your standard going to be, to make a judgment 

about the fairness of those elections? 

Secretary RICE. Well, we will—for a variety of reasons, as you 

said, IRI had to pull out. There’s a large European Commission 

monitoring mission. We will, of course, listen very closely to them, 

there are other NGOs that will be involved, we will listen closely 

to them. We have tried to help train, even local officials in election 

monitoring and the like, and we will have our people out and 

around the country—we have, as you know, several consulates, 

we’ll have people out and around to observe—— 

34 

Senator KERRY. What’s your confidence level at this point, about 

the prospects of those elections being held? 

Secretary RICE. Well, I believe that the Pakistani leadership understands that they have to have an election that inspires confidence in the Pakistani people that this is a step forward for democracy, I think they understand that. 

It’s not going to be easy, we’re all concerned about the potential 

for violence, we’re all concerned, of course, about the potential that 

there will be, at least, pockets where there may be problems with 

the elections. But I think we have to keep pressing and encouraging and insisting that this is an election on which a lot is holding. They have got to inspire confidence that people got to vote 

freely. 

Once that is done, once the elections are over, the key is going 

to be to bring about a government that, again, can inspire that 

there are a wide range of moderate voices that have been integrated into it. 

Senator KERRY. Madame Secretary, thank you, I need to go vote. 

Senator Lugar, I think you get a second round, here. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Madame Secretary, very much. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you. 

Senator LUGAR. While awaiting my colleagues, let me ask a question about our relations with Serbia. It’s anticipated that action 

may occur in Kosovo within days. The Serbians have had an election recently, Tadic was elected—a person who appears to be headed toward affiliation with Europe, and that is very encouraging, 

but can you describe any efforts that we are making to maintain 

very strong ties between the United States and Serbia, and 

thoughts on this transition, period, that may accompany a Kosovo 

announcement? 

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator. 

We want a Serbia that is looking to its future, and that future 

is in Europe. And we’ve been the strongest advocates of its agreement between Europe and Serbia, for reasons having to do with 

Serbian politics, they’ve delayed that somewhat but, I think we 

find our European allies recognizing that the Serbs need a European perspective. 

I personally intervened so that the Partnership for Peace could 

be offered to Serbia. It doesn’t mean that we are unaware of, or are 

uninterested in the important work of still getting the war criminals—we are. But we felt that it was time to move Serbia closer 

to NATO. 

I do know that this is going to be an extraordinarily difficult period of time for the Serbian people. And what the United States 

will be doing is offering a hand of friendship, saying that the status 

of Kosovo and its resolution will allow Serbia to look forward, and 

to move on, then, with what it needs to do. 

We hope to be good partners in exchanges, in economic assistance and all the ways that we could reach out to Serbia. But it’s 

a great culture, and they’re a great people. And I hope that they 

will look to that future, and not to the past. 

35 

Senator LUGAR. I was interim, waiting for Senator Hagel’s arrival, and now I’ll turn attention to him. 

Senator HAGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madame Secretary, I add my thanks to you, for your many years 

of leadership and commitment to this country, in particular, foreign 

policy. I know this will not be the last time we see you, I’m sure— 

I hope—before this committee this year, before your tenure ends. 

But, as was noted at the beginning, it will be your last budget, 

most likely, that you will present. 

And this country is grateful to you for your leadership and your 

good work and your efforts. 

I wanted to go back to a couple of points that were made by 

Chairman Biden and Senator Lugar in their remarks. One references—as you have noted in your budget presentation, to increasing a number of our programs. And in particular, what Secretary 

Gates said, recently, in two speeches over the last 6 weeks, about 

increasing our soft power, our diplomatic power. 

Our entire arsenal of influence that’s so critical for our country 

at a time, as both Senators Lugar and Biden noted—this is a different world, and you understand it, as well as anyone. It is going 

to require a 21st century frame of reference, that I’m not sure we’re 

there, yet. I don’t think that’s anyone’s fault, it is just realities of 

the world we’re dealing in, and a world that experiencing the greatest diffusion of geopolitical, economic power in the history of man. 

And to accommodate and to address those great challenges of our 

time, we are going to rely greatly, I think, on what you have within 

your portfolio, and the next Secretary of State, and the next group 

of leaders that comes behind you, and the President and your team. 

And I want to compliment you—as has been noted here, too—for 

following along with what Secretary Powell has started, in enlarging, deepening those resources that are required as the State Department. 

And General Petraeus has said, and others, there is no military 

solution to Iraq. There is no military solution to any of these problems. So, we’re going to have to depend more and more on this arsenal of influence that, sometimes we’ve not coordinated as well as 

we needed to. 

And, in particular, the energy aspect—what Senator Lugar 

talked about—your reference to trying to implement that energy 

coordinator before you leave office, which I think is one of the more 

important parts of dealing with these great issues. 

I wanted to focus on a couple of areas more specifically, and go 

back to Iraq, because when we really look at this great framework 

of challenges in the world today, we the United States, are committed in two areas, in two wars. Roughly 180,000 troops in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. We’re pouring tremendous resources, as we have 

been, into those two countries. 

We took more casualties, as you know, in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

American casualties, last year than any other year. Our casualties 

in Iraq last month are the highest they’ve been in 4 months, with 

more violence. 

And when you were talking here, and I didn’t hear all of the conversation because of the vote, about the focus on bottom-up, and in 

fact you and I have had this conversation in your office. Efforts to 

36 

secure and stabilize at the regional level, community level, which 

is obviously critically important because that’s an area that represents the human dimension, jobs, growth. How are the individual 

Iraqi lives—how are those lives being improved? 

But also there’s a risk in that, in that it has the potential to 

weaken the strength of a national government. And, if on one 

hand, we are focused on strengthening Iraq, strengthening the loyalty to a nation—not loyalty to a tribe, not loyalty to a region. And 

further, trying to strengthen a national army—loyalty to a national 

army. Trying to root out—which everyone recognizes, a tremendous 

amount of corruption that we are dealing with. 

We’ve got to have some balance, obviously, to that, and I know 

you try to deal with that. And, in particular, I want to note an AP 

story that I just saw this morning that came out of Iraq last night, 

and I’d like to get your reaction to this. 

This is an Associated Press story out of Baghdad. Last night, and 

I’ll quote just a sentence or two from it, ‘‘The Speaker of Iraq’s 

fragmented Parliament threatened Tuesday to disband the legislature in Iraq, saying it is so riddled with distrust, it appears unable 

to adopt the budget, or agree on a law setting a date for provincial 

elections, or any other bills.’’ 

And it goes on in some detail, it quotes other legislators, how 

much and how deeply troubled the Parliament is, and unable, as 

a result of that, to accommodate and address some of these great 

challenges that we know need to go forward. And, of course, that 

was the entire point of the so-called thrust that we, militarily, 

worked through last year, and the surge that was to buy time for 

the politicians, for the national interest, the leaders of Iraq, to not 

just move toward political reconciliation, but toward some political 

accommodation, in order to get these differences on some ground, 

in order to deal with a reconciliation. 

And, as you have noted, we’ve all noted, that progress has been 

lacking. 

Would you comment on this story, and if its accurate, and where 

we go from here? 

Thank you. 

Secretary RICE. Yes, Senator; I was following—I’ve been following very closely what has been happening in the Iraqi Parliament, and I think the Speaker, who I actually know, Mr. 

Mashhadani, was perhaps engaging in a little hyperbole to rally 

the troops. And they, this morning, came back. 

What had been the dispute was going to be the sequencing of the 

bills, because the Kurds wanted their 17 percent before they voted 

the provincial powers, others wanted. 

As you might imagine, legislative sequencing is something you 

understand better than I. They went back and they figured out 

how to do it all as one package, and this morning, they voted all 

three. They voted provincial powers, they set a—apparently, although I don’t have my own confirmation of this, I was passed a 

note—that they’ve said, they will try to hold provincial elections before October 1. 

Those provincial elections are going to be very important to renovating provincial councils that are, perhaps, not wholly representative. They passed their 2008 budget, with significant increases to 

37 

the provinces for funding. They also passed an amnesty that the 

Sunnis are very pleased to see. 

So, the legislature has actually done a lot. We talk a lot about 

bottom-up reconciliation, and I don’t think that’s very, very key— 

the Concerned Citizens Committees, The Awakening movement, 

the functioning provincial councils. 

When I was here on my first testimony on Iraq, in 2005, I talked 

about the formation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams as something we wanted to do. 

I opened the first in 2005 in Mosul. They’ve gotten stronger and 

stronger as a way to bring about provincial and local capability to 

do things like execute budgets. 

But, you’re right—the national level has to work, too. And in the 

last few months, they’ve passed a pension law, an investment law, 

a justice and accountability law, a provincial powers law, a general 

amnesty and a 2008 budget. 

They also, Senator—we’ve worked very hard with them—they’ve 

created a structure now, their Executive Council, which gets the 

Prime Minister to work with the Presidency Council on a weekly 

basis, and they’ve created a Secretariat for that. 

It’s still hard, you’re right, there’s a lot of distrust. There is a lot 

of feeling that is very deep. But when we talk about reconciliation, 

I think it’s important to realize what they’re trying to do right now 

is what I would call de jure reconciliation. They’re trying to get the 

right laws in place, the right distribution of power. The coming together of peoples will happen over a longer period of time. 

But, you see every day, efforts between Sunnis and Shia to assert 

their ‘‘Iraqi-ness’’ not their Sunni or their Shia element, and it will 

be helped by these laws that have been passed. 

So, yes; it was a big kerfluffle last night in the Council of Representatives, apparently they solved it this morning. 

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

Madame Secretary, for testifying before the committee. We are at 

a critical time right now, with regards to our foreign policy, and related spending, which makes this hearing all the more timely. And 

I’d like to just make a few quick remarks, and ask that my full 

statement be placed in the record. 

I’m a strong supporter of increased funding for State Department 

operations, to ensure that we have a robust and fully functioning 

agency. I’m pleased that the President’s proposed fiscal year 2009 

State Department budget has increased 8.5 percent from last year’s 

budget request, including emergency funding. 

I nonetheless remain deeply concerned that the President is still 

failing to properly allocate resources, so we can address our top national security priority, and that of course is the global threat 

posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. 

The misguided and narrow focus on the war in Iraq is depleting 

our financial, diplomatic, and material resources around the 

globe—whether in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Algeria—and making it much more difficult for us to pursue a policy agenda that does, in fact, contribute 

to our national security. 

38 

Following the Defense Secretary’s lead, last week the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs testified before the Senate Arms Services Committee and noted that we need to do a better job of developing the 

capabilities and capacity in other agencies, outside of the Defense 

Department, including State and USAID. 

And, you know, how have we—how has this happened? How 

have we reached the point where the Defense Department has to 

advocate more strongly for building and strengthening our civilian 

and diplomatic capacity than our own State Department? 

In addition to my concerns about misplaced priorities, I continue 

to be concerned about this administration’s misleading budgeting. 

As in previous years, the President’s budgeting fails to account for 

the cost of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and fails to pay for 

those costs, thus sticking our children and grandchildren with the 

bill. Passing the tab for these wars onto future generations is simply irresponsible. 

And I’d also like to echo the comments of some my colleagues 

with respect to Iraq and Afghanistan and the need to ensure that 

we are equally focusing on the so-called ‘‘nonkinetic’’ programs. I 

think such priorities are essential and needs to be substantially robust. 

Madame Secretary, I understand this budget request includes 

creating an additional 50 positions for political liaisons with military counterparts, designed to provide additional support for the 

Department of Defense. And I do believe and understand that 

these relationships are key to ensuring that U.S. military actions 

are consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives. 

However, given that the Department of State is incapable of 

meeting critical foreign policy needs overseas, coupled with the fact 

that the U.S. military is increasingly filling the gaps when the Department of State cannot, it almost seems like the Department of 

State is outsourcing its mission and its jobs to the Department of 

Defense. 

What steps have you taken to ensure that the Department of 

State does not cede its foreign policy responsibilities to the Department of Defense, and retains its position—which I, of course, believe in—as the primary agency responsible for foreign policy? 

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, let me start by saying this problem began in the 1990s, when we tried to capitalize on the peace 

dividend. It was when USIA went away, it was when there was a 

hiring freeze on Foreign Service officer—we now will experience a 

bubble in a couple of years, where we simply didn’t hire anybody 

for years. 

As so, what we have done in this administration, and what I 

have done with the support of this committee—and frankly, not 

just starting this year—is to rebuild those capabilities, over a period of time. That’s why public diplomacy funding has been up 

every year in the President’s budget. That’s why funding for foreign 

assistance has quadrupled in Africa, doubled in Latin America, tripled worldwide. It’s why we have, not just spent more money, but 

we’ve completely restructured the way we think about what the 

State Department is doing. 

I have, frankly, 300 diplomats in Europe that I didn’t need. 

They’re now someplace else. And I think it’s important that they’re 

39 

in India and Brazil and in parts of Africa. I had as many diplomats 

in Germany as I had in India. That was an outrage. 

And so, it is, in fact, not just more people, although, thank goodness we are asking for a lot more people—1,100 new Foreign Service, and 300 new USAID—but it’s also, what are those people going 

to be doing? 

It’s a great thing to have great political reporting—I believe in 

it. But I’ve said to my officers in places like London and Berlin, I 

talk to those people all the time. The political reporting I need is, 

how are we mobilizing the trans-Atlantic alliance to do something 

about Darfur—where you’ve had a tremendous interest, sir—or to 

do something about Somalia? 

And so, we’ve been changing the whole structure of the way that 

we think about diplomacy. I gave a speech yesterday, a second 

speech—I gave the first at Georgetown 2 years ago, and I went to 

update it, called Transformational Diplomacy—what are diplomats 

going to be doing? 

Now, in that regard, diplomats are going to be doing more to 

help people improve their lives, through being able to manage foreign assistance as part of our foreign policy. Diplomats are going 

to be working with the military, which is why the PolAds are important, because we fully believe—and by the way, so do our military counterparts—that they don’t want to, nor should they have, 

the mission of carrying out the foreign policy of the United States. 

It would erode the State Department’s mission, and it would erode 

their mission in terms of military functions. 

But, increasingly we have a continuum. And not just in places 

like Iraq or Afghanistan, but in a Haiti or a Liberia, where an area 

might not yet quite be stable, so you have to work with military 

assets while you build the capacity of the government, which is 

why you see us working very hard for these civil/military-type 

apparatuses, like the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. 

Finally, I was really quite unhappy that, when it came to staffing 

major civilian reconstruction, that we had not developed, in the 

United States of America, civilian institutions to do that. 

I mentioned, Senator Feingold, I think you might not yet have 

been here—the way we did it in Afghanistan with the bond process, 

I will label ‘‘adopt-a-ministry.’’ So, one country took this ministry, 

and another country took that ministry, and frankly, we’re still 

paying for the incoherence of that effort. 

Then we got to Iraq, and it was given to the Defense Department. But they would be the first to say that they weren’t capable 

of mobilizing the full range of civilian capability for reconstruction. 

And it’s only when we went to Provincial Reconstruction Teams, 

this kind of integration of civilian and military, that we were able 

to do more. 

Now, the last big step in that is what Senator Lugar and Senator 

Biden and Senator Hagel and the State Department have been so 

interested in, the Civilian Response Corps. Because what we really 

ought to be able to do is not to turn to the National Guard or to 

the Reserves to provide city planners, or to provide judges or people 

who know how to do a health care system. We ought to be able to 

ask Americans who want to serve, to say, ‘‘If you’re an Arizona 

prosecutor, and you want to take a year off and help the Liberian 

40 

people develop rule of law—the U.S. Government will put you in 

the Civilian Response Corps and we’ll call on you to do that. 

So, I believe that these are all innovations that we’ve made over 

the last several years, with increased resources, but not just with 

increased resources. With really changing the way that we think 

about what diplomats are going to do. And I’m very pleased and 

proud to say that I think that the men and women of the State Department have been excited by the challenge. They’ve been willing 

to think about the different kind of training, and the different kind 

of light that that’s going to require. 

We have had to support families better, just one final example— 

when we wanted people to go to Afghanistan, or to Iraq, unaccompanied—in the old days their family had to move back to the 

United States, that was very disruptive. Now we can leave them 

in theater. 

So, we’ve made a lot of innovations. I want to say that I think 

we’ve made them together, and we’ve increased the resources together. But this is going to take more than what we’ve been able 

to do in one administration, and long after I’m gone, I hope the 

United States will continue to build these capabilities. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Madame Secretary, you know from past experience, I normally wouldn’t tolerate such a long answer, but you 

really were trying to talk about this fundamental issue, and I appreciate the breadth of what you talked about, especially the reference to the civilian corps at the end—this is exactly what we 

need to do. 

And let me just say, as my time is running out, you know, having 

been to Africa many times, and seeing the work of our military in 

some of these situations—it is so moving and wonderful to see, for 

example, in a place called Dire Dawa, Ethiopia, they actually provided these army tents when there was a flood, and it’s the only 

reason people were OK—and this wasn’t even in a military situation, this was a situation just, where we helped people. 

But what bothers me, and I know you’re sensitive to it, is, you 

know, you see the kids running up to the military people, and 

that’s a lovely sight and they’re excited and grateful. But for our 

face to be, first and foremost, military in a situation like that. I 

know you’re sensitive to this, but somehow we have to get to the 

point where our first face is not military in these situations. Their 

role is important, but we have got to have the diplomatic and other 

resources so that it isn’t, ‘‘the United States does good things, if 

they’re in uniform, only.’’ It can’t just be that. 

And I realize you’re sensitive to that, but I think that is one of 

the most overarching issues for our foreign policy throughout the 

world, and it is a continuum between Defense and State in those 

functions, but I think too often the continuum right now is too 

much on the appearance of a military side, and make it more balanced, appropriately balance it, it would be great. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madame Secretary, I want to join my colleagues in thanking you 

for your service, it has been an honor for me to work with you. And 

I do hope that, though this might be your last budget presentation, 

41 

I’m sure there will be lots of conversations that will go on until the 

end of the President’s term. 

Let me just, I want to just start by reflecting on some positives, 

and then raise some areas of concern. 

I also join in appreciation for the increase, 8.5 percent increase 

in State Department funding, I think that’s important. 

I support and applaud the continuing commitment to Millennium 

Challenge Account, though I would hope that we in Congress could 

do better. I think this is one of the really important ways in which 

we do foreign aid, which is to work with local governments, and 

have them identify what they need. And then have in place those 

indices of accountability and transparency that give us a greater 

sense that they’ll return for the investment, that watch it be used 

in the way it’s intended. 

So, I applaud the continued commitment, I would hope that we 

could do better than what’s set forth in the budget. The robust 

funding for global AIDS, I think the—this administration has not 

gotten the recognition for the incredible commitment we’ve made to 

global AIDS, and the impact it’s had, in terms of saving lives, and 

I applaud that. 

I participated in a meeting with Ambassador Negroponte just the 

other day on the Merida initiative, with the Ambassador from Mexico and El Salvador, and I applaud the commitment there to combat transnational organized crime. The places in Minnesota are impacted by the inability to deal with organized crime and drug trafficking in Mexico. 

And finally, if that’s not of great focus, but of great significance 

has been your personal efforts, and the efforts of the State Department to expand the opportunities of student visas, bringing students into this country. I think in the post-9/11 universe, we 

squeezed back, and I have been concerned by the long-term implications of that. And we talked about this, I think during your confirmation you made a commitment to change that. And as I’ve reviewed the numbers, I think we’re back to pre-9/11 numbers of students from other countries. And here, we’re doing a lot of work now 

with the Arab countries. I think it’s important that the best face 

of America—I can only imagine in 10 years, someone in this seat, 

15 years, talking to a Prime Minister from an Arab nation or South 

American nation, if they studied here, it makes a difference, and 

so I applaud that. 

Two areas of significant concern. One, I am concerned about 

what appears to be a push by this administration to complete a 

Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with the Russians. We’ve 

talked a little bit and Chairman Lugar raised the issue of some of 

the language which you, yourself, you know, labeled unhelpful, reprehensive rhetoric. 

I understand that—or our intelligence community has confirmed 

that Russia continues to assist the Iranians in long-ranch missile 

programs, I’d, at least that has been reported. I would ask you, one 

question would be—is that an accurate assessment? 

I also understand that Russia is selling advanced air defenses to 

Iran, defenses that could be deployed to defend Iran’s nuclear sites. 

And I believe the Clinton administration made a point of demandVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:05 Feb 27, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\47624.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
42 

ing in the late 1990s that—a limitation of that. Have we reversed 

that? Are we allowing that to go forward? 

And then, finally, and this is the issue, this—the whole question 

of proliferation. I supported the India agreement, I thought it 

was—it made sense. 

But on the one hand, we have—we’re putting diplomatic pressure 

on nations not to trade with Iran, not to support it, not to put it 

in a position to expand its nuclear efforts. You’ve talked about upping the impact of sanctions about 20 percent, to significantly higher, we begin to see the efforts of that. 

I understand that a few weeks ago, Moscow made its final shipment of nuclear fuel, needed to start up a massive power plant reactor at Bushehr. My understanding is that once this plant is up 

and running, it will produce enough near weapons-grade plutonium 

for roughly 60 crude nuclear weapons. 

So, that’s the information that we’re hearing. I’m hearing that, 

and I don’t know whether that’s Energy or State Department, that 

doesn’t matter to me. The bottom line is, help me understand 

whether, in fact, this is a path we’re moving down. If I’m wrong 

in the assertions I’ve made, let me know. But I would state very 

clearly that it’s a deep concern to me, that moving forward with a 

Russian Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, particularly in light 

of their activities in Iran, really are inconsistent and contrary to 

the diplomatic efforts we’re trying to assert, regarding Iran and its 

capacity to develop a nuclear weapon. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator. 

Well, there certainly are concerns about Russian conventional 

transfers, air defense capabilities, and the like, to Iran. And this 

is something that I bring up consistently and frequently with my 

counterpart. They say, ‘‘Well, these are not arms sales that are illegal,’’ and we say, ‘‘Not everything that is legal, is wise.’’ And this 

is a discussion we have, and will continue to have. 

I do believe that we think that the Civ Nuke agreement—and 

we’ve not yet initialed it, we have largely negotiated it, but we’ve 

not initialed it—we do believe that a Civ Nuke agreement with 

Russia makes sense. They are one of the members of the Nuclear 

Suppliers group. We believe that their proliferation activities—or 

nonproliferation activities, let me put it that way—on nuclear matters are consistent with the obligations that we would be taking 

and they would be taking under the 123 Agreement, and that it 

would be in the benefit of both sides to have it. 

Let me just say, on Bushehr—we frankly have had, over time, a 

kind of evolution of our policy on Bushehr, because when it became 

clear that what we needed to do was to stop the Iranians from enrichment and reprocessing, but not to deny that they had the right 

to peaceful nuclear uses, that the Bushehr strategy, the Bushehr 

framework by which the enrichment and reprocessing of fuel would 

take place, that all spent fuel would be returned to Russia, and 

that the Iranians would not be involved in the technology, therefore 

learning how to enrich and reprocess on their own, was actually a 

good model going forward, for how countries might acquire civil nuclear power, but not have the proliferation risk associated with the 

fuel cycle. 

43 

Senator COLEMAN. But, wouldn’t that be a good model, Madame 

Secretary? If, in fact, the Iranians agreed to step back on, and we 

had a sense of assurance that we’re stepping back on reprocessing 

and enrichment, because we don’t have that right now, and there’s 

nothing in the NIE estimates or anything that says that they—so 

they’re getting the best of both worlds. 

Secretary RICE. I agree. What we’d like them to do, I mean, what 

would be acceptable is if they would stop their own indigenous efforts at reprocessing and enrichment, and accept that fuel would be 

supplied by outside powers. Wewe and the Russians have even put 

forward the concept of a kind of assured fuel supply that might be 

given by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, or some members of it, so 

that countries don’t acquire the fuel cycle. This was a proposal that 

the President made in a speech at the National Defense University 

a couple of years ago, and he and President Putin have agreed that 

that would be a good thing. 

So, my point is that we believe Bushehr is a model that would 

make sense. And the last fuel shipment was sent with the Russians 

saying to the Iranians, ‘‘All right, now you don’t need indigenous 

reprocessing and enrichment,’’ and I think, frankly, has helped us 

to move forward on the next Security Council resolution, which I 

hope will be voted sometime in the next few weeks. 

That does not excuse, Senator, the problems we continue to have 

with the Russians on, particularly, the advanced weapons systems 

sales to Iran. Even if the Russians wish to talk about them as defensive in character, we will continue to press on that. But I think 

we believe that in the nuclear side, for the most part, we have a 

system in which the obligations of the 123 Agreement would be 

sustainable. 

Senator COLEMAN. Again, my concern is to be moving forth in a 

Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement at a time that the Russians 

engage in a range of activities which we find unhelpful—unhelpful, 

at least, and perhaps dangerous—perhaps dangerous, I think certainly this body, I anticipate, will be looking very closely at that. 

Last area of concern, I had forwarded a letter signed by 26 of my 

colleagues about the Durban II conference—and this is an issue, 

obviously, close to the heart of Tom Lantos, who attended Durban 

I, which we walked out of at the end, first the Secretary of State 

wasn’t going to participate, and then we sent a lower level delegation. And then, ultimately, when it resulted at every level, in perpetuating the idea that Zionism is a race and falling into that antiSemitic—just an unhelpful—unhelpful international process, of 

which Tom Lantos said was, you know, recognized that. 

We’re now in Durban II and I appreciate the fact that we made 

a statement about U.S. funding, we’re voting against the budget 

because it included funding for this. We’re not participating in the 

preparatory activities, but we’re walking down the same path. 

And I believe the Canadians have said they are not going to provide credibility to this process by participating, we haven’t made 

that statement yet. Are we going to make that statement? 

Secretary RICE. Well, we’ve not made that statement, but let me 

assure you, Senator, we have no intention of participating in something like Durban I. It was an outrage, and I’ve been very clear 

with my counterparts about that. We sent a signal on the budget, 

44 

and we’ve not tried to make a final decision on this, but let me just 

state very clearly, we don’t have any interest in participating in 

something that deteriorates into the kind of conference that Durban I was. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madame Secretary. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Dodd. 

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I’m going to be brief 

in all of this, because I know my other colleagues have been here 

a little longer than I have this morning. 

And let me join with the chairman and others who have expressed their sorrow over the loss of Tom Lantos, as well. I had a 

nice conversation with his son-in-law Dick Swett the other day, and 

Katrina and Annette, and they’re just wonderful people. 

I go back, running for Congress 30 years ago, when Tom Lantos 

was in the private sector, and very supportive of many of us, beginning early on. He had a remarkable career, made a difference in 

every stage of it. So, it’s a real loss for the country and I know you 

and others expressed your similar sentiments. So, I wanted to join 

you in that. 

Let me ask you about Latin America a bit. I know we’re—obviously tension in Iraq and Afghanistan and these other issues that 

Senators have raised—but there’s some huge issues looming. I was 

going to address the issue of the Merida program, and at some 

point I’ll talk to you or your staff about that—the $500 million that 

are being requested on the drug issue. And that’s the obvious issue 

in Mexico and obviously Colombia we need to deal with. 

But, we’re reading about Bolivia these days, the issue of what’s 

happening with energy resources. You’ve got a new President in 

Argentina. Obviously, the problems that are still looming, and 

maybe growing larger in Venezuela, the issue of the FARC and 

what’s going on between Venezuela and Colombia. 

It seems to me that there are a whole series of issues. And I’ve 

said this over and over again, I want you to know, that obviously 

the issues of Iraq and Afghanistan have sucked a lot of the oxygen 

out of what would be, normally, a foreign policy debate that would 

have included Latin America a lot more. That’s not to say its been 

avoided entirely, but certainly there’s only so many places you can 

keep the kind of level of attention. And, obviously, some huge 

issues here that need our attention. 

And I wonder if you might give us some idea of what thoughts, 

plans, ideas—the post-Castro regime—are there plans being formulated? Are we thinking about this? Are we talking to regional leaders as to what might happen, is there a glide path that others have 

talked about that would allow for an easier transition, if that occurs. 

Would you spend just a couple of minutes and share with me 

some thoughts, and sort of range around the region, if you will, for 

me a bit—beyond the drugs issues—as to where the administration 

is? 

Secretary RICE. Thank you. 

Well, I think we’ve had, actually, quite a lot of focus on Latin 

America. I think the President’s been there five times, or someVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:05 Feb 27, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\47624.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
45 

thing like that, I’ve been there an additional three—I was just in 

Colombia. 

We’ve doubled assistance to Latin America, and I think we have 

a very positive agenda for Latin America, which is one that looks 

for open markets and democracy, and frankly, a much more, a 

much stronger identification with the social justice agenda than the 

United States has had in the past. 

And I think it’s served us well to be very clear that we don’t have 

any ideological tests for our friends. We have very good relations 

with left governments like Brazil and Chile and Uruguay, and 

equally good relations with countries like Colombia. And a very, 

very budding and strong relationship with Brazil which, of course, 

is the big power in South America. 

We, of course, with Central America, have had the Central America Free Trade Agreement and we’ve had a number of other free 

trade agreements. 

I would say that, it is true that there are some troublesome regimes in Latin America, but there are equally as many who have 

come into power who are very strong friends and allies of the 

United States like, for instance, Peru, where we’ve just passed a 

trade agreement. 

The one single thing I’d most want to do is pass the Colombia 

Free Trade Agreement—I was just there. This is a remarkable 

story. We’re talking about a country that, in 2001, everybody was 

talking about it as a failed state. 

Thanks to early work by the Clinton administration, we’ve expanded that work. We now have a Colombia that has literally has 

taken its country back from both paramilitaries and from the guerillas. It’s a country that can now extend police power and military 

power throughout the country. 

We were just in Medellin, which was synonymous, of course, with 

Pablo Escobar and trouble, and is now a thriving city. It’s not all 

perfect, because they’re continuing to work on the justice system, 

and issues of impunity and human rights, I understand that. But 

Colombia is an extraordinary, bipartisan success for the United 

States of America and it stands as a symbol to the rest of the region that friendship with America, and willing to work on your difficulties can—you can succeed. 

We also, of course, are working very hard through the Millennium Challenge Program with some of the poorest countries. I 

would note that even though Nicaragua has a government with 

which, shall I say, we have a history, they’ve been fierce defenders 

of the Millennium Challenge, even though the areas in which that 

is being done is the Sandinista or Sandinista areas—those Sandinista mayors have been really clear that they want those programs 

to go forward. 

And so, I think the combination of support for democratic development, willingness to admit that democracy doesn’t necessarily 

mean social justice, and that we, therefore, have to have programs 

that expand the reach. I, personally, have had a focus on Afro-Colombian, and Afro-Brazilian affairs, I’m looking forward to going to 

Balilla very shortly, and the inclusion of marginalized populations. 

I think we’re doing rather well in Latin America. But it is a place 

that is always in the balance, having made the moves away from 

46 

juntas and from governments that were nondemocratic, there’s always the problem of democratic governments getting elected, and 

then not be able to deliver for their people. And that’s what we’ve 

been very, very focused on, and we’ve tried to do it as a positive 

agenda, not as an agenda against anyone, but rather as a positive 

agenda. 

Senator DODD. I thank you for that and I won’t take the time 

right now, but I’d love to spend a little time with some people, possibly, and talk about this—the $500 million account and how that’s 

going to work. I know it’s starting with Mexico and Columbia, principally, I presume. 

Secretary RICE. And Central America, there’s a significance 

there. 

Senator DODD. I know the transit points. Well, thank you very 

much. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. First of all, I’d like to join with 

my colleagues and say how much the loss of Tom Lantos is going 

to be to this country and to the cause of human rights. I got to 

know Tom during the last several years, when we working on the 

issue of anti-Semitism and trying to bring it to the priority list of 

the OSCE and make sure there was an effort to combat anti-Semitism in the 55 OSCE countries. 

Madame Secretary, I am really happy to see that the Department of State has been included as a National Security Agency in 

the President’s FY 2009 budget. I think that for too long we have 

ignored the importance of public diplomacy and soft power in our 

national security interests. This time last year, we talked about 

getting more personnel for the job. You said you were aware of the 

problem, and I congratulate you for being candid about the needs 

of the State Department and requesting the new positions. I’m very 

interested in personnel training management. I think that’s one of 

the areas where we need to really improve our Federal Government. 

I’ve been asked to be on the Advisory Committee for the American Academy of Diplomacy, led by Ambassador Pickering, to examine the Foreign Affairs budget and resources. I hope these recommendations you’ve made in the President’s final budget will be 

looked upon with great approval by this group, as they advise the 

next President on the challenges in your area. 

I also believe the Civilian Stabilization Initiative is extremely 

important. We all know that we must to do a much better job in 

post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. I’ll never forget being 

in Iraq and talking to some of the sheikhs, particularly the Sunni, 

who said, ‘‘We changed our attitude because one, we’ve concluded 

you don’t want to occupy our country. No. 2, we don’t like al-Qaeda, 

we don’t like their brand of the Sunnis. And No. 3, we love your 

PRTs.’’ 

The PRTs have contributed greatly to our success in Iraq and 

also Afghanistan. We need to do more in this area, and the fact 

that you recognize the need to have people in the State Department to do so, the fact that we’re going to cascade this out in other 

47 

agencies of the Federal Government so they also are prepared to 

contribute will be a wonderful step in the right direction. 

I also mentioned anti-Semitism. I’m a little concerned that there 

doesn’t seem to be any money in the budget for the OSCE because 

it’s critical right now. The Russians are putting a lot of effort into 

the OSCE. Ambassador Christian Strohal, the director of the 

OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 

(ODAIR), is stepping down, and it’s anti-Semitism adviser also is 

leaving. I hope that somebody at the State Department pays attention to the new people that we choose to run ODAIR and the funding that I cannot find it in the budget. 

One of my favorite topics—not so favorite right now because we 

don’t know what’s going to happen—is Kosovo. I recently sent you 

a letter explaining my concerns about that, and I know that you 

share my concerns about preserving human rights there. I’m very, 

very worried, Madame Secretary, about what’s going to happen 

there because I’m getting mixed signals. I think Kosovo probably 

will declare its independence, and the European Union will go 

along with it, but I’m really fearful that the institutions and infrastructure referred to in the Ahtisaari plan will not be put in place 

for the plan to be successful. If it’s not successful, I think it will 

cause a real problem for our goal of integrating Southeast Europe 

into the EU. 

I was interested also in Senator Lugar’s comments about the 

three new countries joining NATO. I’m hopeful that you’ll support 

extending an offer of Membership Action Plans to Georgia and 

Ukraine, and maybe even Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro. I really believe that if we can get these countries into NATO 

and the EU, we will have accomplished a great deal. 

Finally, I’d like for you to comment on why there’s no money in 

the President’s FY 2009 budget for the OSCE, and if that is a priority. 

Secretary RICE. Well, thank you, Senator Voinovich. First of all, 

I think that there is OSCE money. I’m told it is both in the SEED 

account and in the DNCP account, and it’s about $25 million. So, 

it may be distributed in ways that you can’t see. I’ll get you a full 

accounting for it. 

[The information referred to above follows: ] 

In the President’s FY 2009 budget, a total of $26.5 million has been requested for the OSCE in the following accounts: $7.875 million in the Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (FSA) account; $14.625 million in the 

Assistance for Eastern Europe and Baltic States (SEED) account; and $4 million in 

the Diplomatic and Consular Affairs Program (D&CP) account. We expect to meet 

our financial obligations to the OSCE and continue the practice of providing additional, voluntary funding over and above our OSCE budget contributions for activities such as election monitoring, extra-budgetary projects and personnel 

secondments, albeit at lower levels than in the past due to overall funding constraints. In an era of tight budgets, we in the U.S. Government must—and do— 

work hard to ensure that OSCE’s activities fulfill its core missions, complement 

without duplicating other local and international efforts and does so in ways that 

are fiscally sound. 

The administration remains a strong supporter of the OSCE, and appreciates consistent Helsinki Commission and bipartisan Congressional support. In a constrained 

budget environment, we need to focus on top priorities, promote budgetary discipline, and reduce expenses where appropriate (e.g., the OSCE Secretariat). We are 

working with the OSCE and others member states to develop OSCE budgets for 

2008 and beyond that reflect these goals. As the only post-Cold War multilateral organization in the Euro-Atlantic region, the OSCE remains the most effective—and 

48 

cost-effective—organization for promoting core U.S. policy objectives on security, democratization, rule of law, and human rights in the region. We look forward to developing a carefully targeted OSCE program to build border security and customs 

capacity along the Afghanistan border, thereby enhancing cooperation between Afghanistan and its Central Asian neighbors. 

The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) remains one 

of our top priorities, especially in connection with its democratization and human 

rights promotion efforts. The United States has contributed generously to ODIHR 

extra-budgetary programs and projects in the last few years, with a particular focus 

on election observation and tolerance programs. The majority of our contributions 

for the tolerance programs have been for projects to combat anti-Semitism. With 

this support, the ODIHR has published a number of handbooks on teaching about 

the Holocaust and is providing educators with tools for curriculum development to 

promote tolerance education. Our 2008 agenda for supporting events to highlight 

the continuing problem of anti-Semitism is extensive. One expert event has already 

occurred in Berlin, another event focusing on hate crimes is scheduled for the summer in Helsinki, and the Romanian Government will sponsor a conference on antiSemitism in September. We will seek to have an additional session at the yearly 

October Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw devoted to a review 

of implementation of existing commitments to fight anti-Semitism and other racial 

and religious intolerance. 

We share your concern over the need to protect the rights of minority populations 

in Kosovo and are pleased that the Kosovo Assembly has shown its commitment to 

a multi-ethnic Kosovo by moving quickly to adopt much of the legislation required 

to implement the Ahtisaari plan; we expect that all the Ahtisaari legislation will 

be adopted soon. Kosovo Police are actively supporting international efforts to protect all minorities in Kosovo. We also are encouraging these actors to improve the 

situation at Roma camps in the north and to be mindful of the particular challenges 

facing the Roma minority. 

Secretary RICE. But there is money for the OSCE. I’m very supportive, as you know, of the work that the organization does, both 

its peacekeeping operations and its election monitoring. It was very 

critical in helping us in Kyrgyzstan when that was—that drama 

was unfolding. I made a visit to Vienna and addressed the Perm 

Reps. I’ve said I want to look, at some point, the distribution between what we’re doing in Vienna and what’s done in the field, but 

it’s obviously a very important—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, we had a hearing before the Helsinki 

Commission. I’m not on it, but Senator Cardin is, and the people 

that testified indicated they thought that there was less interest by 

the State Department in the OSCE, compared to what it was 2 or 

3 years ago. 

Secretary RICE. No; we’re very interested in it, following it very 

carefully. I think there is a question of the relative distribution of 

resources between Vienna and the actual activities of the OSCE. 

But no, it’s a very important organization and we’ve continued to 

work very hard on it. And you’re right, there are those who would 

turn it to other purposes, which is another reason to be very vigilant about the organization. 

Senator VOINOVICH. By the way, I am concerned that the biggest 

contingent of people in the OSCE is in Kosovo. 

Secretary RICE. Yes. 

Senator VOINOVICH. And now OSCE is going to pull them all out. 

Who will fill the jobs that those people are now doing? 

Secretary RICE. Well, we’ve spent a lot of time with our European allies looking at the so-called supervised independence, 

should it come to that for Kosovo. The Europeans have a mission 

that will be going in, including an ESDP mission to deal with policing and police training and the like. There is, of course, still a U.N. 

49 

activity there. And so, we’re very aware that helping Kosovo develop the infrastructure—we expect there will have to be a donors 

conference for Kosovo. I don’t want to get too far ahead of myself 

in terms of what will happen here, but we’ve spent a lot of time 

being very concerned about the very issues that you’ve mentioned 

out of the Ahtisaari plan, the human rights issues, the respect for 

holy sites, and what happens to the population, the minority populations in Kosovo. So, it is something that’s very much on my mind 

and very much in our planning. 

In fact, we had a Principles Committee meeting yesterday and a 

National Security Council meeting just today about this very issue. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I also appreciate the fact that you supported 

the Partnership for Peace program for Serbia, and that we have a 

State partnership with them. We’ve got to continue to let the Serbian people and President Boris Tadic know that we are supportive 

of them and we want to see their economy and quality of life improve. 

Finally, to my last question. I have spent some time with Ban 

Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, talking about 

the issue of our arrearage, in terms of our dues for peacekeeping 

and generally for the United Nations. Would you comment on how 

this year’s budget impacts our arrears to the United Nations? I 

know there is $1.497 billion for international peacekeeping. Does 

pay our dues in that area? And what about the other general dues? 

Secretary RICE. Well, what it does, Senator, is it allows us to 

meet the peacekeeping assessment that we anticipate. We also 

have some voluntary peacekeeping funds that would come in supplemental, for instance, for Darfur and the like. It will not help us 

to make much progress on the arrearages. My goal right now is to 

prevent us from continuing to fall into greater arrearage. I think 

we can manage this with what is forecast in the budget, but we 

really need to fully fund this this time. We’ve experienced difficulty 

in fully funding. That has caused us to slip, and I would ask that 

we get the full funding. We also, of course, have work going on to 

look at the cap, which is a part of the problem. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, the peacekeeping funds are really important because the U.N. is accomplishing a lot through its peacekeeping efforts that we’re very interested in, and it’s multilateral 

in terms of the participants. I think that getting ourselves up to 

date on the peacekeeping dues will mean a great deal to those 

we’re trying to get involved. 

Secretary RICE. I think we can manage it with the resources that 

we’ve requested, but we really do need the full funding this time. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I want to thank my colleagues. 

They’ve all stayed within the 10 minutes and we’ll do 10 minutes 

with Senator Boxer. Depending on how long the question is, we 

promised we’d get the Secretary out at 1 o’clock. We’re going to run 

very close. I warn my remaining five colleagues, I may cut it back 

to 8 minutes in order to accommodate her—her schedule, but I 

thank everybody for sticking with the time. 

And thank you for your physical endurance, Madame Secretary. 

Senator Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

50 

And thank you, to everyone for your beautiful remarks about 

Tom Lantos. I will tell Annette and she will be so happy to hear 

that this is one area we all agree on. 

Secretary Rice, with 157,000 American troops in Iraq. The 

United States now makes up 94 percent of the total force there. 

The number of forces from other nations has decreased from 47,000 

in 2003 to 10,600 as of today. British forces, which once numbered 

45,000, have been reduced to 4,500. An additional 2,000 British soldiers are expected to leave Iraq this spring, yet you have described 

our coalition partners as strong and active. 

As our strongest allies like Great Britain pull out of Iraq, I don’t 

see how you can believe that they’re strong and active. Here’s the 

point, the American people are beginning to really get more and 

more uncomfortable with the burden that they have to bear for this 

war. Last week, an AP poll asked Americans how to best fix our 

ailing economy. And redeploying from Iraq ranked first. People are 

connecting the dots. Sixty-eight percent said ending the Iraq war 

would help fix our economy. Now the administration first said this 

war would cost tens of billions of dollars. It’s already cost half a 

trillion, and there is no end in sight. Some are saying it could be 

quite a while—I believe Senator McCain said we could be in Iraq 

for 100 years. The war is costing about $10 billion a month, while, 

to give you an example, we spend less than $1 billion a month on 

all the after school programs for our children in a year. How much 

more do you think we should spend in Iraq, especially since some 

of our States are already in a recession? How much more do you 

think we should spend in Iraq? 

Secretary RICE. Well Senator, I can’t give you an answer to how 

much more we need to spend in Iraq. I can tell you what I think 

we need to achieve in Iraq. 

Senator BOXER. I’m not asking that question. 

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, I’m sorry, I can’t give you an answer. 

Senator BOXER. Because people in my State—— 

Secretary RICE. I can’t give you a number. 

Senator BOXER [continuing]. The people that this administration 

talks about all the time, the taxpayers, are getting very disturbed 

that the burden of this war is on their shoulders. So you have no 

answer—— 

Secretary RICE. Senator—— 

Senator BOXER [continuing]. To—— 

Secretary RICE. Senator—— 

Senator BOXER [continuing]. What we should have to spend. 

Secretary RICE [continuing]. I’m not going to try to come up with 

a number of how much more I think we will spend in Iraq. 

Senator BOXER. Then let’s get on to another question. 

Secretary RICE. What I can tell you? 

Senator BOXER. I don’t want another answer. I want an answer 

to how much more we are going to spend. 

Secretary RICE. Well Senator, you asked me a question. 

Senator BOXER. No; you said you can’t answer my question, so 

I’m moving to—— 

Secretary RICE. Senator, you asked me a question, and I’d like 

to have an opportunity to answer. 

51 

1This article first appeared in the September/October 2007 edition of Foreign Policy. 

Senator BOXER. Well, you just said you can’t answer it. 

Secretary RICE. I’m not going to answer how much we need to 

spend. 

Senator BOXER. Right, well, that’s my question. 

Secretary RICE Force levels are being determined by the President and by the commanders on the ground through Secretary 

Gates to get the mission accomplished. Now, Iraqi forces are making up an ever increasing number—— 

Senator BOXER. Madame Secretary, the only reason I’m interrupting you is because you said you couldn’t answer my question 

and I have another couple of questions. 

Secretary RICE. Senator, I don’t think there is an answer to your 

question. 

Senator BOXER. Well, that is a sad statement about the lack of 

planning and foresight. There’s no way out. There’s no end in sight, 

and no one knows what they’re doing and no one can answer important questions. 

Secretary Rice, construction of the U.S. Embassy in Iraq is seen 

by many as a symbol of the administration’s failed policy in Iraq. 

It is plagued by delays, cost overruns, and life-threatening safety 

concerns. 

And I’ll put those statements in the record, Mr. Chairman, if I 

might, backing up what I just said. 

[The information referred to above follows:] 

FORTRESS AMERICA1

By Jane C. Loeffler 

The new U.S. Embassy in Baghdad is the largest the world has ever known. 

Thousands will live inside its blast walls, isolated from the bloody realities of a nation at war. Why has the United States built this place-and what does it mean? 

A citadel is rising on the banks of the Tigris. There, on the river’s western side, 

the United States is building the world’s largest embassy. The land beneath it was 

once a riverside park. What sits atop today is a massive, fortified compound. Encircled by blast walls and cut off from the rest of Baghdad, it stands out like the crusader castles that once dotted the landscape of the Middle East. Its size and scope 

bring into question whether it is even correct to call this facility an ‘‘embassy.’’ Why 

is the United States building something so large, so expensive, and so disconnected 

from the realities of Iraq? In a country shattered by war, what is the meaning of 

this place? 

For security reasons, many details about the embassy’s design and construction 

must remain classified. But the broad outline of its layout says a lot about one of 

America’s most important architectural projects. Located in Baghdad’s 4-square-mile 

Green Zone, the embassy will occupy 104 acres. It will be six times larger than the 

U.N. complex in New York and more than 10 times the size of the new U.S. Embassy being built in Beijing, which at 10 acres is America’s second-largest mission. 

The Baghdad compound will be entirely self-sufficient, with no need to rely on the 

Iraqis for services of any kind. The embassy has its own electricity plant, fresh 

water and sewage treatment facilities, storage warehouses, and maintenance shops. 

The embassy is composed of more than 20 buildings, including six apartment complexes with 619 one-bedroom units. Two office blocks will accomodate about 1,000 

employees. High-ranking diplomats will enjoy well-appointed private residences. 

Once inside the compound, Americans will have almost no reason to leave. It will 

have a shopping market, food court, movie theater, beauty salon, gymnasium, swimming pool, tennis courts, a school, and an American Club for social gatherings. To 

protect it all, the embassy is reportedly surrounded by a wall at least 9 feet highand it has its own defense force. The U.S. Congress has appropriated $592 million 

for the embassy’s construction, though some estimates put the expected building 

52 

costs much higher. Once built, it could cost as much as $1 billion a year to run. 

Charles E. Williams, who directs the State Department’s Overseas Buildings Operations, proudly refers to it as ‘‘the largest U.S. mission ever built.’’ 

But, the idea of an embassy this huge, this costly, and this isolated from events 

taking place outside its walls is not necessarily a cause for celebration. Traditionally, at least, embassies were designed to further interaction with the community 

in which they were built. Diplomats visited the offices of local government officials, 

shopped at local businesses, took their suits to the neighborhood dry cleaner, socialized with community leaders, and mixed with the general public. Diplomacy is not 

the sort of work that can be done by remote control. It takes direct contact to build 

goodwill for the United States and promote democratic values. Otherwise, there 

would be no reason for the United States to maintain its 250-plus diplomatic posts 

around the world. The embassy in Baghdad, however, appears to represent a sea 

change in U.S. diplomacy. Although U.S. diplomats will technically be ′′in Iraq,′′ 

they may as well be in Washington. Judging by the embassy’s design, planners were 

thinking more in terms of a frontier outpost than a facility engaged with its community. ‘‘The embassy,’’ says Edward L. Peck, the former U.S. ambassador to Iraq, ‘‘is 

going to have a thousand people hunkered behind sandbags. I don’t know how you 

conduct diplomacy in that way.’’ 

It is tempting to think that the Baghdad compound must be an anomaly, a special 

circumstance dictated by events on the ground in Iraq. But, while it is larger in 

scope than other U.S. embassies opening around the world, it is hardly unique. 

Since al Qaeda bombed the American missions in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the 

State Department has been aggressively replacing obsolete or vulnerable embassies 

with ones designed under a program it calls Standard Embassy Design. The program mandates look-alike embassies, not the boldly individual designs built during 

the Cold War, when architecture played an important ideological role and U.S. embassies were functionally and architecturally open. The United States opened 14 

newly built embassies last year alone, and long-range plans call for 76 more, including 12 to be completed this year. The result will be a radical redesign of the diplomatic landscape-not only in Baghdad, but in Bamako, Belmopan, Cape Town, 

Dushanbe, Kabul, Lome ́ and elsewhere. 

If architecture reflects the society that creates it, the new U.S. embassy in Baghdad makes a devastating comment about America’s global outlook. Although the 

U.S. government regularly proclaims confidence in Iraq’s democratic future, the 

United States has designed an embassy that conveys no confidence in Iraqis and 

little hope for their future. Instead, the United States has built a fortress capable 

of sustaining a massive, long-term presence in the face of continued violence. 

Forty years ago, America was forced to flee a newly constructed embassy in Baghdad just five years after it was opened, when the United States broke off relations 

with Iraq after the 1967 Six Day War. Given the costs of the new compound, the 

United States would not likely part with its latest Baghdad embassy under almost 

any circumstances, including escalating violence. As much as the situation there 

may deteriorate-the fighting already includes missile and mortar attacks in the 

Green Zone-the biggest problem may not be the embassy’s security; indeed, it is the 

most impenetrable embassy ever built. Rather, the question is, with its high walls 

and isolation, will it be hospitable for conducting American diplomacy? 

A CITY UPON A HILL

An embassy’s precise design is classified. But earlier this year, sketches of the 

massive new U.S. Embassy in Iraq surfaced on the Internet. Herewith, a brief tour 

of Baghdad, U.S.A. 

Mission Colossal 

The main embassy building will include a central atrium and a rear portion housing classified offices, including the ambassador’s. Hundreds of non-diplomatic personnel from dozens of U.S. agencies will work in the annex building. The two office 

buildings will house about 1,000 employees. 

Battle Ready 

Marines will provide embassy security and live in their own separate barracks. 

The embassy grounds will be surrounded by high blast walls, which are all that 

most Iraqis will ever see of the U.S. Embassy. 

Home Sweet Home 

Inside the compound, staff will feel right at home. The complex will include a 

shopping market, beauty salon, movie theater, and American fast food. 

53 

Compound Cribs 

The ambassador’s private residence will offer the most comfortable quarters. 

Lower-level employees will squeeze into 619 one-bedroom apartments. 

Jane C. Loeffler teaches architectural history at the University of Maryland and 

is author of The Architecture of Diplomacy: Building America’s Embassies (New 

York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1998). 

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

October 9, 2007 Tuesday 9:25 PM GMT 

STATE DEPARTMENT STRUGGLES WITH IRAQ EMBASSY DELAYS, VOWS TO HOLD

CONTRACTOR ACCOUNTABLE

BYLINE: By Matthew Lee, Associated Press Writer 

SECTION: Business News 

LENGTH: 795 words 

DATELINE: Washington 

The State Department vowed Tuesday to hold contractors accountable for delays 

and construction problems with the massive new U.S. Embassy in Iraq, saying it 

would not pay for ‘‘a turkey.’’ 

As the U.S. government orders major repairs to correct deficiencies at the Vatican-size compound in Baghdad, the department sought to fend off mounting congressional criticism of the project and its broader operations in Iraq, including the 

use of private security firms to protect diplomats. 

The embassy, which will be the world’s largest diplomatic mission, had been 

scheduled to be completed in September, but last week officials said it was badly 

behind and might not open for business until well into 2008. It will also cost nearly 

$150 million more than its original $600 million price tag, they said. 

The delays, charges of shoddy workmanship and fraud by the main contractor 

have caused growing concerns in Congress, where two top Democratic lawmakers, 

Reps. Tom Lantos and Henry Waxman, the chairmen of the House International Relations and House Oversight and Government Reform committees, are demanding 

answers and a new timeline for the embassy’s opening. 

State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said Tuesday he was unable to 

provide a revised date for the completion of the project. 

‘‘We don’t have an answer,’’ he told reporters, adding that Secretary of State 

Condoleezza Rice was pursuing the matter. ‘‘I can’t tell you when it will open up.’’ 

But McCormack insisted the repairs would be made and that the contractor in 

question, First Kuwaiti General Trading & Contracting Co., would be required to 

finish the embassy for the $592 million it agreed to build it for. At the same time, 

he noted that changes ordered to the original design would cost an additional $144 

million. 

‘‘We’re not going to buy ourself a turkey here,’’ he said. ‘‘We’re going to make sure 

that we get what we paid for.’’ 

McCormack’s comments came in response to questions about the construction 

posed by Waxman in a 10-page letter sent to Rice on Tuesday and a similar letter 

sent last week to Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte by Lantos. 

Both lawmakers noted that they had been assured, in July and again in August, 

that the embassy was ‘‘on schedule and on budget’’ for September completion and 

that staff would begin moving in ‘‘shortly thereafter.’’ 

McCormack maintained that while he could not offer a new opening date, the 

project was now only nine days overdue and that Rice was willing to accept a reasonable delay, particularly on such a large compound. 

‘‘She’s willing to cut everybody involved in the construction project some slack if 

it falls within a reasonable period of time and it falls within the normal practices 

of opening up a large embassy compound around the world if it’s consistent with 

our past practices,’’ he said. 

Her patience, however, is not infinite. 

‘‘There will come a point if the embassy isn’t opened up and doesn’t meet the 

standards that have been required of the contractor, then you have a problem,’’ 

McCormack said. ‘‘I can’t tell you when that point is going to be.’’ 

54 

In his letter, which McCormack said he had not read, Waxman details multiple 

failures of electrical wiring and fire sprinklers that have been pointed out by State 

Department building inspectors. 

An internal Sept. 4 inspection report cited by Waxman says the ‘‘entire (fire suppression) installation is unacceptable’’ and notes widespread deficiencies with electrical wiring. 

McCormack said he could not address the specifics outlined in the letter. 

Embassy employees have been working and living in a makeshift complex in and 

around a Saddam-era palace that the Iraqis have said they want back quickly. 

The temporary quarters are cramped and increasingly dangerous. Many employees live in trailers that are not fully protected from mortars fired from outside the 

Green Zone. 

Insurgents have gotten better at firing into the heavily guarded zone in attacks 

this year have killed several people. The new complex is supposed to be safer, with 

additional blast walls and other protection. 

McCormack also said he could not speak to allegations by Waxman that First Kuwaiti had been involved in illegal kickback schemes on a prior project for the U.S. 

government that should have raised concerns when the State Department hired the 

company for the embassy job. 

Waxman has been a persistent critic of the State Department and its operations 

in Iraq, including its dependence on private security contractors like Blackwater 

USA to protect diplomats and refusal to divulge details of corruption in the Iraqi 

government. 

‘‘Increasingly, it appears that the State Department’s efforts in Iraq are in disarray,’’ he wrote in the letter. McCormack shot back when asked about that remark. 

‘‘That is just a ridiculous statement,’’ he said. 

LOAD-DATE: October 10, 2007 

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH 

PUBLICATION TYPE: Newswire 

Copyright 2007 Associated Press—All Rights Reserved 

Senator BOXER. There’s also an ongoing criminal probe by the Justice Department into the awarding of the contracts. The $700 

million Embassy, originally budgeted at $500 million, will be six 

times larger than the U.N. complex in New York, more than 10 

times the size of the new U.S. Embassy being built in Beijing. 

Iraqis, who resent the U.S. occupation, are set to call the Embassy, 

‘‘George W.’s Palace.’’ 

Jane Loeffler, an expert on the architecture of embassies, has 

written that, ‘‘Encircled by blast walls and cut off from the rest of 

Baghdad, it stands out like the crusader castles that once dominated the Middle East.’’ Secretary Rice, do you agree with these 

criticisms? 

Secretary RICE. No. 

Senator BOXER. OK, so you don’t think that the Embassy that 

we’re going to build, that’s 10 times the size of our largest Embassy 

and way larger than the U.N. complex in New York, sends a message of a long-term occupation to the people of the world? 

Secretary RICE. No, Senator. I think it sends a message that we 

are going to continue, through our political presence, to be a good 

partner for an Iraq that is trying to emerge from years of tyranny, 

that will be a stable ally in the Middle East, that will be at the 

center of a different kind of Middle East, and certainly we need a 

different kind of Middle East than the one that we inherited in 

2001 that produced an ideology of hatred so great that people attacked innocent civilians. So, that’s how I see the Embassy. 

I see it as a place that our men and women can work in safe conditions, that they can work in conditions that will allow them to 

55 

carry out their mission. I think you’ve heard a number of people 

talk about how our Provincial Reconstruction Teams are viewed as 

a force for good among Iraqis who are trying to better their lives, 

and that’s how I see the Embassy. 

Senator BOXER. OK. I would just say, to put our people in this 

walled-off Embassy does not send the type of signal that we usually 

send around the world. 

Now, in August 2007, the New York Times quoted a Central 

Command official, who stated, ‘‘If we were not in Iraq, we’d have 

the Special Forces you need most to conduct precise operations in 

Afghanistan. We’d have more CIA. Anyone who tells you differently 

is blowing smoke.’’ Just last week, the Secretary of Defense, Robert 

Gates, admitted that the war in Iraq has hurt our efforts in Afghanistan, particularly in respect to participation form our European allies. 

Speaking before an International Security Conference in Europe, 

Secretary Gates said that, ‘‘Europeans, many of them I think, have 

a problem with our involvement in Iraq and project that to Afghanistan.’’ In Afghanistan, attacks by al-Qaeda, Taliban, and other extremists are becoming increasingly common and deadly. The number of improvised explosive devices, including car and suicide 

bombs, has nearly tripled since 2005. Support for the Taliban is 

growing, and poppy production continues to rise. It is now accounting for 93 percent of the world’s illicit opium supply. And Osama 

bin Laden is still on the loose. 

Secretary Rice, do you agree with Secretary Gates, that the war 

in Iraq is making it harder to get our allies to contribute to Afghanistan? 

Secretary RICE. I will tell you what I think the problem is in getting our forces—getting our allies, to the extent that they’re not 

contributing, to contribute. And I gave the answer to Senator 

Kerry. 

Senator BOXER. But do you agree with what Secretary Gates 

said? 

Secretary RICE. I would like to answer, Senator. 

Senator BOXER. But my question was do you agree with what 

Secretary Gates said? That was my question. 

Secretary RICE. Senator, I would like to give you an answer to 

your question. 

Senator BOXER. Well, I’d like you to answer whether or not you 

agree with what he said. 

Secretary RICE. Senator, I will answer your question if you permit me the courtesy—— 

Senator BOXER. Please go ahead. 

Secretary RICE [continuing]. To allow me to do so. 

Senator BOXER. And please answer the question, yes. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you. As I said to Senator Kerry, I believe 

that the problem with our allies in Afghanistan—by the way, all 

of whom undertook a decision to go into Afghanistan through the 

North Atlantic Counsel of NATO in a consensus decision to go into 

Afghanistan, so there was no question that our allies were prepared and willing to go into Afghanistan—I do think that there has 

been difficulty with some allies in wanting to deal with the fact 

that this is not a peacekeeping operation, that it is a heavy-duty 

56 

military operation in parts of the country. I think that is the problem with the allies. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Well, let the record show that Secretary 

Gates said that many of our allies have a problem with our involvement in Iraq and project that to Afghanistan. 

Secretary Rice, last Friday in a lead editorial titled, ‘‘A President 

Who Tortured,’’ the Washington Post said that, ‘‘Water boarding 

will leave an indelible stain on the legacy of George W. Bush.’’ Last 

week, the Director of the CIA admitted that the U.S. Government 

had subjected suspected terrorists to water boarding in 2002 and 

2003, years in which you served as President Bush’s National Security Advisor. In 2004, you wrote a letter to Congress opposing legislation that would have prevented the intelligence community from 

using extreme interrogation tactics. In 2005, then-Attorney General 

Alberto Gonzalez, approved two secret memos specifically authorizing water boarding, head slapping, and frigid temperatures. NBC 

News reported that you were aware of these secret memos. 

Secretary Rice, do you remember those memos and do you believe water boarding is torture? 

Secretary RICE. Senator Boxer, I’m not going to comment on matters that I was involved in as National Security Advisor. I will simply repeat what General Hayden has said, which is that this is not 

a part of the CIA program now. If there are issues to be raised 

about this, they will have to be raised through the Attorney General, but as a general proposition, let me state very clearly that the 

President of the United States has never authorized torture and 

that everything that has been done, has been done in accordance 

with our obligations, legal obligations, both domestic and international. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

My last question. Earlier this year, the Center for Public Integrity released a report documenting 935 false statements by administration officials leading up to the Iraq war. According to this 

study, you were responsible for 56 of them. This report only reinforces what we all know now to be true, that the nation was led 

to war under false pretense. Back in 2003, the main justifications 

for going to war in Iraq were the allegations that Iraq had weapons 

of mass destruction and links to al-Qaeda that simply did not exist, 

as we all know. 

Today, the Bush administration claims that one goal of the ongoing war in Iraq is to make sure that the country is ‘‘democratic.’’ 

We hear that all the time. But just 2 years ago, you stated, ‘‘Let’s 

be very clear about the grounds for war against Iraq,’’ and it was 

actually not to bring democracy to Iraq. So I would ask you, what 

is the mission now? 

Secretary RICE. Senator, I remember very well the quote that 

you are—you are referencing. What I said was that much in World 

War II, where we took down Adolph Hitler, not to bring democracy 

to Germany. We then, in order to make stable Germany for the future, insisted on a democratic Germany. In the case of Saddam 

Hussein, he was a threat to our interests, he was a threat to our 

security, we had gone to war with him in 1991, we’d gone to war 

with him in 1998. We believed that he had weapons of mass destruction, and with all due respect, the intelligence community beVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:05 Feb 27, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\47624.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
57 

lieved he had weapons of mass destruction, the United Nations believed he had weapons of mass destruction, and he was a threat 

as he continued to threaten our pilots and take advantage of an Oil 

for Food program that had become a scandal. And so that’s why we 

went to war. 

Having gone to war, we believe that the most stable course for 

Iraq and for the Middle East is, if Iraq can develop democratic institutions that can make it a center of a different kind of Middle 

East, and that is the work in which we are now engaged. 

And so with all due respect, Senator, the quote is not in context 

and it does not reflect what I have said. What I have said is, that 

the reason to go to war was because Saddam Hussein was a threat. 

The reason to build democracy in Iraq is because the only way to 

make certain that Iraq is stable for the long run, is if they learn 

to resolve their differences democratically, not be force or not by 

tyranny. 

Senator BOXER. Yes; I think we all share that and many of us 

think it’s up to them and it isn’t up to us as an occupying force 

to do that. 

Thank you very much. 

Secretary RICE. May I just comment on one thing? 

The CHAIRMAN. Sure. 

Secretary RICE. Because I think it’s extremely important that we 

don’t leave on the record that American men and women in Iraq, 

who are sacrificing every day, are an occupying force. They are 

there on U.N. mandate. They are there at the invitation of a democratically elected Iraqi Government. They are there fighting alQaeda forces that take—that take women who are mentally challenged and send them as suicide bombers. And so I would not like 

to leave it on the record that our men and women in uniform are 

occupiers. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I would take backseat to no one 

in caring about our men and women in uniform, because many of 

those who have been killed or wounded in Iraq have been from 

California or based in California. We have lost 3,960 Americans, 

and we have more than 29,000-plus wounded. We have more soldiers committing suicide. This war is a disaster, and the fact is 

that many of us believe it is now time for the Iraqis to take over 

and to do what most nations do. And many of us believe that we 

have spent too much blood and too much money, and that it is time 

to bring this war to a close. But to say that anyone here, in any 

way, doesn’t love, respect, and revere our fighting men and women, 

I think is a low blow. 

Secretary RICE. Senator, I also take no backseat to support for 

our men and women in uniform, but I would never call them occupiers. 

Senator BOXER. That’s fine. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator—now look, here we are. We’ve reached the point where 

we have half an hour left and we have two, three, four, five, six 

people to ask questions. So, I’m afraid that we’re going to have to 

58 

limit it to 5 minutes in order to meet our commitment to the Secretary. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, I’ll be even more brief than 

that. I do sense we—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Then we’ll give additional time. 

Senator CORKER. Good, I do sense we’ve moved away from the 

budget that’s being discussed. I’m sorry to arrive late, but I noticed 

that coming in. I would, sense we have moved away from the budgetary process, we had a meeting the other day, in sort of a private 

setting, with our Envoy to Darfur, Richard Williamson. And I have 

to tell you, this is not a critical comment, I just love to hear your 

comments regarding that. He’s got four people who work with him. 

From what I can tell, has no budget. 

My sense is, that if we had 26 helicopters there, we could make 

a huge difference in Darfur today. I know there’s some security 

issues that surround that. 

But I have to tell you, when he left, I did wonder, and I don’t 

mean this in any way to be critical, I did wonder whether we had 

a Special Envoy in name, but really had no real activity taking 

place as it related to that. And I wish, if you could, I know several 

of us seemed to sense that when we left there and I wonder if you 

could focus on that for just 1 minute. And that will be my only 

question, may be my only question. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator. 

On Darfur, we have a full-time effort, not just with the Special 

Envoy, but, of course, he has at his disposal the resources of the 

Department to do whatever he needs to do. We have an Africa Bureau that will send people out when he needs. We have an Assistant Secretary who’s also concerned with that account. We’re working it in the United Nations all the time. And so I think the four 

people who work for him, it would be deceptive to think that those 

are the only people working on Darfur. 

And, we, of course, have requested significant resources for 

Darfur, in terms of peacekeeping and for the Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement between Southern Sudan and Northern Sudan, which 

would help to bring stability to Sudan as a whole. So, it is a very 

big effort. 

The difficulty has been really to get the U.N. peacekeeping 

forces, capable to get the numbers in place in order to be able to 

put that U.N. hybrid force on the ground to protect these innocent 

civilians. 

Just yesterday, spoke with the Foreign Minister of Sudan, who 

came to see me. I said to him in no uncertain terms that it was 

time for Sudan to stop making excuses for why the hybrid force 

can’t get in. We’ve also been very supportive of the peace negotiations that are going on to try to bring rebels and the government 

together. 

And so it’s a very active effort in the Department, but we’re hoping that Rich Williamson, who is a very fine diplomat and who everybody thinks very highly of, will be able to bring a certain focus 

to the effort, just as Andrew Natsios did before him. 

Senator CORKER. It seemed like he did not have the tools available and I don’t know—— 

Secretary RICE. He’ll have those. 

59 

Senator CORKER [continuing]. The other departments. If you 

could just look at that. 

Secretary RICE. I certainly will. 

[The information referred to above follows:] 

The Department of State fully supports the efforts of the President’s Special 

Envoy Richard S. Williamson in advancing the administration’s goal of enhancing 

overall the stability in Sudan and bringing an end to the violence in Darfur through 

rapid deployment of the United Nations-African Union peacekeeping mission in 

Darfur (UNAMID), reinvigoration of the Darfur peace talks, and full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 

With regard to operational resources, Congress has generously provided since 2006 more than $850,000 specifically to support the Special Envoy’s office. The Department of State has provided additional resources above and beyond this amount 

to cover the extensive travel and support costs of the Special Envoy. Special Envoy 

Williamson has specifically requested and has been provided with a personal staff 

of two policy officers and an office management specialist located in Washington, DC 

and a senior policy advisor in the U.S. Mission to the U.N. The latter is specifically 

devoted to coordinating U.S. efforts within the U.N. system to facilitate UNAMID’s 

deployment. 

In addition to his personal staff, Special Envoy Williamson is further assisted by 

the Bureau of African Affairs and its Sudan Programs Group Office (SPG) of more 

than 15 staff. The Special Envoy has the full backing of the National Security Council and the Department of Defense, which has offered the Special Envoy a Colonel 

to serve as a defense advisor as needed. The Special Envoy’s efforts are also supported by the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, including two Foreign Service Officers located in Darfur, and our Consulate General in Juba, Southern Sudan. In al of his 

efforts, Special Envoy Williamson has the complete support of the administration 

and the Department of State. 

Senator CORKER. And if 26 helicopters are keeping us from saving thousands of lives, I hope we will not let that be an impediment, by blaming it on other countries not supplying those. 

But thank you very much for your testimony. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you. 

Senator LUGAR. Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the recognition there. 

First, let me add my voice on the loss of Tom Lantos. Tom Lantos was clearly our leader to globally advance human rights. I cherish the time that I spent with him in the House, usually doing rollcall votes, where we would sit down and talk about strategizing 

and what we could do to advance human rights. 

And I also had the opportunity to visit Budapest when he was 

there, and to see firsthand the struggles that he went through. 

Madame Secretary, I want to thank you for being here. I want 

to follow up, first, on the point that Senator Voinovich raised on 

the OSCE budget. 

All of us are very much in favor of the expanded budget you’ve 

brought forward on post-conflict resolution. But we have an international organization that’s been very effective on that. The OSCE 

field missions have been very effective, as to the work they’re doing 

in Afghanistan, on the Tajikistan border, what they’ve done in 

Kosovo, and what they’ve done in Bosnia. 

The budget that you have submitted is actually 20 percent below 

the current budget for the U.S. commitment to OSCE, and I would 

hope that you would take a look at that. 

But, I want to refer specifically to the point that Senator Voinovich raised on the work of ODAIR on human rights. We just talked 

about Tom Lantos, and I think it’s appropriate. 

60 

The United States, through extra-budget means, have always 

been a leader in providing the wherewithal to advance the human 

rights agenda. We’re responsible for initiating the efforts to fight 

anti-Semitism, and we should be proud of that. But there’s virtually no support and no funding for that effort. The United States 

had led donor nations to provide extra budget support, there’s zero, 

I believe, in this year’s budget to do that. 

So, I would just ask if you would get back to me and Senator 

Voinovich as to how we can clearly send the right signal internationally that the United States commitment today is strong as 

ever for OSCE. 

[Secretary Rice’s response appears on page 47 of this hearing 

print.] 

Secretary RICE. I’ll take a look at it. Clearly, we will support 

ODAIR, so let me take a look at it, and get back to you, Senator. 

Senator CARDIN. I thank you very much, Madame Secretary. 

I want to follow up on a point that my colleagues have been making. You usually talk about the DOD budget when it comes to Iraq, 

and how much of it is spent in that regards, but your budget, the 

State Department’s budget, is very much impacted by our responsibilities in Iraq. I personally believe there are so many areas of 

the world we need to be engaged in. That we are spending so much 

effort in Iraq is detracting from our ability to resolve problems in 

other parts of the world. 

But, in one respect, I’m not sure we’re doing what we should be 

doing. And that is, we now know there are 2 million refugees from 

Iraq in Jordan and Syria, primarily. There are 2.2 million internally displaced people in Iraq, and yet the budget doesn’t appear 

to provide help to deal with the refugee issue, which I think the 

United States, again, must be the leader on. And I appreciate your 

comments as to why we are not doing more to help the refugees? 

Secretary RICE. I’m sorry, Senator, did you mean refugees, in 

general, or refugees in Iraq? 

Senator CARDIN. Refugees, internally displaced people in Iraq 

and the Iraqi refugees in Jordan, Syria, and other countries. 

Secretary RICE. Yes. 

Well, I appointed an Iraq Refugee Coordinator so we could have 

a focus on, exactly, this problem. And we have provided resources, 

as a matter of fact I think we’re something like 25 percent of the 

U.N. effort on refugees, and we are—we have money in 

supplementals for refugee affairs for the Iraqis. 

It hasn’t really, quite frankly, been so much an issue of funding. 

It has been a problem of the kind of infrastructure of dealing with 

Iraqi refugees. We only recently have begun to make some progress 

with Syria on the ability to process people coming out, to come out 

of Syria. We have a very good operation in Jordan. We’ve even provided some support to countries that are educating the children of 

Iraqi refugees. 

We’ve also worked very hard, and the Iraqi Government itself 

has earmarked $25 million for its own refugee problem. In that 

sense, it’s not a country without some resources. 

But it really is more of a problem of processing people, and getting them out and—— 

61 

Senator CARDIN. I would just request that we make this a priority. There are so many people who are displaced, and I think we 

have a responsibility to be a leader on that internationally. 

Secretary RICE. Yes. 

Senator CARDIN. I do want to mention two other parts of the 

world. We’re not going to have time for a full response. But in 

Kosovo, we do expect some activity this month, and I want to make 

sure that we’re prepared to support the independence of Kosovo. 

I think the United States has played a very constructive role 

here, but I expect it will be a challenge, internationally in moving 

forward, considering the positions of Serbia and the Russian Federation. 

And then second, so I can get both questions in, under the wire, 

we haven’t asked you about the status of peace between Israel and 

the Palestinians. We all, very much, support the initiatives that 

you brought forward in Annapolis, and want to be as helpful as we 

can to make as much progress as we can in 2008. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you. 

I’ll just very briefly—just one other point on refugees. Another 

thing that we’re trying to do is, there are certain parts of Iraq that 

people can now return to, but the housing, and the like, is not 

there. And encouraging Iraqis to rebuild housing in places like 

Ramadi is also part of our program. 

On Kosovo, yes; we have been working very hard to try to make 

this as smooth a transition as possible. I think you know that we 

believe that the status of Kosovo has to be resolved, and we are 

prepared to take our responsibilities in helping to do so. 

As to the Middle East peace, I think Annapolis was a very good 

start, in that it brought together the right coalition of countries to 

help support the bilateral peace process. I talk to the Israelis and 

the Palestinians quite frequently about how they’re doing. They’re 

continuing to have their negotiations and their discussions. They’ve 

tried to do it off stage, to a certain extent, to do it without much 

public glare on those conversations. I think that’s probably a good 

point. 

But, to the degree that they will need help to get to an agreement, we’re prepared to help. I will probably return to the region 

at the beginning of March, Senator, to see if we can help them. We 

are focused a lot, right now, on trying to improve the circumstances 

of Palestinians on the ground. 

Tony Blair, as you know, has a mission there. This morning I 

met with General Jones, and with GEN Will Frazier who are helping with the security and roadmap obligations piece of that. 

There are a lot of pieces. We’ve been very much challenged by 

what is going on in Gaza. We’ve been very much challenged by continued terrorist and rocket attacks against Israel, and the irresponsible behavior—the deadly behavior—of Hamas. But, I think the 

good news is that the parties, who seem really quite devoted to trying to solve their conflict this time, are continuing their negotiations, and we will be there to try to help them. Because, as the 

President said, the time is now to try to create a Palestinian state, 

and finally end that conflict. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

62 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator. OK. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Senator Murkowski, and I’ll be 

very brief. One comment and one question. 

And the comment is, with respect to Senator Cardin’s question 

on displaced persons and refugees—I’ve just returned from a trip 

to Iraq and saw firsthand, two things that might help you. 

One was, in Ghazaliyah, where I walked the streets, people are 

returning home because of the security, and the second reason 

they’re returning is because of the microloans we approved in last 

year’s budget, the $500 to $2,500 loans to restart businesses. In the 

particular little shopping area I went to, 18 of the 24 booths had 

reopened, and the colonel who traveled with me picked up three 

more applications for loans—which are really grants—to them to 

reestablish their businesses. 

So, I think when you look at the investment in security, and then 

building their economy, people are coming home, and they’re coming home at a pretty rapid rate in that part of Iraq. So, your investment there has paid off. 

My question is this: On that same trip I returned through 

Djibouti and Equatorial Guinea, and I wrote you with regard to the 

Embassy in Equatorial Guinea, and I’m very pleased to see it’s in 

the 2009 budget, but I do want to make a comment. Equatorial 

Guinea has gone from being the poorest country in the world, to 

the most rapidly developing economy in the world. The Chinese are 

building an embassy—I couldn’t see it finished yet, because it 

wasn’t finished—but it will be a huge compound. The Spanish are 

doing the same thing. The Americans and Equatorial Guineans 

have discovered one of the world’s largest reserves of natural gas. 

They’re liquefying it, and it’s shipping into the United States. 

Our Embassy has a hole in the ceiling so big you could drive a 

car through it, and it rains inside. And next to it is an apartment— 

a 2-bedroom, 1-bath apartment, where the Ambassador lives, which 

has no security. 

So, I thank you for appropriating the money—or asking for the 

money for us to appropriate—for construction of the Embassy in 

Malabo. 

But it may be helpful for you to look at the residents as part of 

that. The security of our Ambassadors and our people, I think is 

very important, although that country is relatively safe, it’s not totally safe, and I would certainly encourage you to take a look at 

including the housing of those key State Department personnel, as 

well as the Embassy, in that appropriation request. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator, I will do that, thank you. 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Madame Secretary, thank you for your presence here today, your 

testimony, and of course your public service. 

63 

I’m going to be referring to—as a predicate to my questions— 

your prepared testimony today, and in particular, one aspect of our 

Iraq policy, where you use the word ‘‘bringing clarity’’ to discussions about this. That’s the reason for my question, since I think 

on any issue of importance, but especially the grave question of 

war and our foreign policy, I think it’s critically important that we 

have as much clarity as is possible. 

If you’d just bear with me for a couple of moments, I just wanted 

to make reference to a couple of documents, a couple of parts of the 

record, so to speak, and some of which I’ll add to the record before 

I ask a question. 

The first thing I’d start with is a letter that I spearheaded in December 6, 2007. I wrote—along with 5 other U.S. Senators—to the 

President, a letter pertaining to the question about a declaration 

of principles, with regard to our ongoing relationship with Iraq. 

And I’ll submit the whole letter for the record, but I do want to just 

read one sentence from it that encapsulates, really, what we’re concerned about. 

[The material referred to above follows:] 

U.S. SENATE, Washington, DC 20510, 

December 6, 2007. 

President George W. Bush, 

The White House, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We write you today regarding the ‘‘Declaration of Principles’’ agreed upon last week between the United States and Iraq outlining the 

broad scope of discussions to be held over the next 6 months to institutionalize long 

term U.S.-Iraqi cooperation in the political, economic, and security realms. It is our 

understanding that these discussions seek to produce a strategic framework agreement, no later than July 31, 2008, to help define ‘‘a long-term relationship of cooperation and friendship as two fully sovereign and independent states with common interests.’’ 

The future of American policy towards Iraq, especially in regard to the issues of 

U.S. troop levels, permanent U.S. military bases, and future security commitments, 

has generated strong debate among the American people and their elected representatives. Agreements between our two countries relating to these issues must 

involve the full participation and consent of the Congress as a co-equal branch of 

the U.S. Government. Furthermore, the future U.S. presence in Iraq is a central 

issue in the current Presidential campaign. We believe a security commitment that 

obligates the United States to go to war on behalf of the Government of Iraq at this 

time is not in America’s long-term national security interest and does not reflect the 

will of the American people. Commitments made during the final year of your Presidency should not unduly or artificially constrain your successor when it comes to 

Iraq. 

In particular, we want to convey our strong concern regarding any commitments 

made by the United States with respect to American security assurances to Iraq to 

help deter and defend against foreign aggression or other violations of Iraq’s territorial integrity. Security assurances, once made, cannot be easily rolled back without incurring a great cost to America’s strategic credibility and imperiling the stability of our nations’s other alliances around the world. Accordingly, security assurances must be extended with great care and only in the context of broad bipartisan 

agreement that such assurances serve jour abiding national interest. Such assurances, if legally binding, are generally made in the context of a formal treaty subject 

to the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate but in any case cannot be made without Congressional authorization. 

64 

Our unease is heightened by remarks made on November 26 by General Douglas 

Lute, the assistant to the President for Iraq and Afghanistan, that Congressional 

input is not foreseen. General Lute was quoted as asserting at a White House press 

briefing, ‘‘We don’t anticipate now that these negotiations will lead to the status of 

a formal treaty which would then bring us to formal negotiations or formal inputs 

from the Congress.’’ It is unacceptable for your administration to unilaterally fashion a long-term relationship with Iraq without the full and comprehensive participation of Congress from the very start of such negotiations. 

We look forward to learning more details as the administration commences negotiations with the Iraqi Government on the contours of long-term political, economic, 

and security ties between our two nations. We trust you agree that the proposed 

extension of long-term U.S. security commitments to a nation in a critical region of 

the world requires the full participation and consent of the Congress as a co-equal 

branch of our Government. 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., 

United States Senator. 

ROBERT C. BYRD, 

United States Senator. 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, 

United States Senator. 

JIM WEBB, 

United States Senator. 

HILIARY RODHAM CLINTON, 

United States Senator. 

CARL LEVIN, 

United States Senator. 

Senator CASEY. I’m quoting from the second paragraph, ‘‘I believe—’’ or, we believe, I should say, ‘‘a security commitment that 

obligates the United States to go war on behalf of the Government 

of Iraq, at this time is not in America’s long-term national security 

interests, and does not reflect the will of the American people.’’ 

Later in the letter, we referred to a statement by General Douglas Lute, the Assistant to the President for Iraq and Afghanistan, 

and I’m quoting from him, here. ‘‘We’’ representing the administration, ‘‘We don’t anticipate now that these negotiations will lead to 

the status of a formal treaty, which would then bring us to formal 

negotiations, or formal input from the Congress.’’ 

Then I will go to your op-ed today in the Washington Post. In 

this op-ed written by you and Secretary Gates, you say, with regard to the agreement with Iraq, ‘‘Nothing will set troop levels, 

nothing will commit the United States to join Iraq in a war against 

another country, or provide other security commitments, and nothing will authorize permanent bases in Iraq.’’ 

Finally, I will go to testimony by Secretary Gates, in front of the 

Armed Services Committee, February 6, where he said in different 

parts, basically what you said in the op-ed, together. There’s no 

commitment for security, and there’s no security equipment, nothing to bind a future administration. 

And then I come to—all of which I think is what we were aiming 

at in our letter. Then I come to the language in the Declaration of 

Principles, ‘‘Providing security assurances and commitments to the 

Republic of Iraq to deter foreign aggression against Iraq that violates its sovereignty and integrity of its territories, waters or airspace.’’ 

So, what I’m aiming for, here, is clarity, and an explanation as 

to what all this means. 

Here’s the question. The question for you and the administration 

is, is it the administration’s position—its policy, its intention—and 

65 

contrary to anything else that’s been written so far, in op-eds, or 

policy or statements—is it the policy of this government, this administration, to say categorically that there will be no permanent 

bases in Iraq, No. 1, and No. 2, that there will not be a guarantee 

of a security arrangement, as it pertains to Iraq being invaded, or 

having to defend itself against another country? 

Secretary RICE. On the first of those, Senator, the President has 

also said we don’t seek permanent bases in Iraq, and we do not. 

Second, in terms of security, what we want to do is provide for 

Iraq the capacity to secure itself and to defend itself, which is why 

we are securing, why we are training their Armed Forces and the 

like, and obviously an Iraq that can defend itself is going to make 

the region more stable, but the United States is not taking on that 

obligation, as Secretary Gates and I have put forward in the oped. 

Senator CASEY. But, I still don’t understand why in the Declaration of Principles we would have language that says, ‘‘Providing security assurances and commitments to the Republic of Iraq.’’ Why 

would that appear in the Declaration of Principles if the administration’s policy is not to provide, or to—— 

Secretary RICE. Well—— 

Senator CASEY [continuing]. Set forth a security agreement? 

Secretary RICE. Senator, that Declaration of Principles is a broad 

document that talks about the relationship of Iraq and the United 

States in the broadest possible way, over time. But, I just wanted 

to assure you that nothing in the actual document that we will be 

negotiating with the Iraqis—and I want to be very clear, we will 

also continue, of course, to consult with the Congress on it—nothing in that document would commit the United States to provide 

security guarantees or to engage ourselves in Iraq’s wars with its 

neighbors. 

Senator CASEY. And finally, and I know we’re—— 

Secretary RICE. Which we hope would never happen, because we 

hope, now, that a democratic and stable Iraq will be a force for security in the region, not for trouble, the way that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was. 

Senator CASEY. In my remaining minute, I have to say that what 

you’re saying and what you’ve written—and others have written in 

the administration—seems to conflict, along with the President’s 

signing statement. 

I’m reading from President Bush’s January 28th signing statement as it pertains to the Department of Defense authorization act 

for 2008. And it says, in part, and I’m quoting from the beginning, 

‘‘Provisions of this Act—’’ the DOD act, ‘‘including Sections 841, 

846, 1079, and Section 1222, which pertains specifically to permanent bases—’’. How do we square that—not just in the context of 

this signing statement, but in the context of other signing statements? This is an administration and a President that has had a 

lot of signing statements which calls into question whether or not 

despite or in contravention of statute, that this administration 

thinks that it can go around statutes, or interpret statutes in a way 

that Congress didn’t intend. 

So, based upon that, I would consider this a bad track record as 

it pertains to signing statements, and the reason for them, and 

66 

based upon what I perceive as an apparent conflict between rhetoric about no permanent bases and rhetoric about no long-term security commitment, in the actual policy, I don’t see how you can 

square the two. And I would ask you to—— 

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, we will—— 

Senator CASEY [continuing]. Attempt to do that. 

Secretary RICE. I think we all believe that we will be committed, 

in effect, to Iraq for a long time—politically, economically, et cetera. 

We want to help build their security forces so that they can secure 

themselves, so that they can be a stabilizing force in the region, not 

a destabilizing one. And I would separate that notion, which I 

think is very much at the base of everything that we’re trying to 

do with Iraq, and which I think has, in a sense, broad support that 

that’s the kind of thing that we ought to be doing. 

From the document that is being negotiated with the Iraqis, 

which is principally about a Status of Forces agreement so that our 

forces can operate there in a legal fashion when the U.S. Security 

Council resolution goes out of business at the end of the year—I’m 

not really—I’m not able to reflect on the specific signing statements, Senator, I don’t—I haven’t read them, I don’t remember 

them specifically right now. But only to say that what Secretary 

Gates and I have said in the op-ed, that this is not about permanent bases, this is not about a—undertaking security assurances to 

the defense of Iraq—but it is about a long-term relationship with 

Iraq that would help Iraq be a stable and good neighbor in the region, and that our forces have to be legal in what they’re doing 

there, that that’s really what this is about. 

Senator CASEY. Well, I would ask—and I know I’m way over 

time—but I would ask that you communicate with the President 

that I think people are looking for a lot more clarity on this. When 

you have an internally inconsistent policy, in my judgment. When 

you juxtapose a signing statement, and you juxtapose some of the 

language in the Declaration of Principles with what you have said 

and written and what Secretary Gates has said in testimony, what 

he has written. 

So, I’d ask for—I think that the committee’s record should be 

completed with a clearer and more declarative statement from the 

administration. 

I’d wrap up, because I know I’m over, I ask unanimous consent 

to include in the record any of those documents that I referred to. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, we’ll include them. 

[The information referred to above was not available when this 

hearing print was sent to press.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murkowski. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome, Secretary. 

I’m going to move from Iraq to the Arctic—not a surprise. We’ve 

had discussions about this, and I’ve always said you’re going to 

look at me and think about the Arctic, and I want you to think 

about the Arctic again today. And when we look at the area of the 

world where we have a clean slate in building relationships and, 

in truly developing policies, the Arctic is an opportunity for us. 

67 

We’ve got the International Polar Year underway, some very substantive research projects going on. We’re going to be having the 

Biennial Conference of the Arctic Parliamentarians Meeting in 

Alaska in August, this is the legislative branch equivalent of the 

Arctic Council. 

Just within this past week, we’ve got new mapping data from the 

Coast Guard cutter Healy’s Arctic Expedition that demonstrates 

that Alaska’s Continental Shelf extends more than 100 nautical 

miles further from the North Coast than we had originally thought, 

giving us an opportunity, clearly, to lay greater claim to the Arctic 

region, but we’re still not a signatory to the Law of the Sea Treaty. 

Others nations, as we’re talking with them about Arctic policy, 

clearly want to work with the United States on developing and 

working with an Arctic policy. Can you give me any indication 

where we are in terms of developing that and the support within 

the budget to provide for a policy that does move the United States 

into more of a leadership role on Arctic issues? 

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, we have provided funding for the 

Arctic Council, and there will be, I think, a meeting fairly soon, 

and Paula Dobrianski has represented us in the past, and she will 

in the future. 

There are obviously countries with which we share a lot of interests, and the Russians, in particular, have been interested in developing those ties concerning the Arctic. 

I agree with you that it would be a very good thing if we had 

the Law of the Sea Treaty. That would obviously make possible 

some elements of our leadership that we’ve, that are more difficult 

without it. 

So, the President has put the Law of the Sea Treaty on his list 

of treaties that he wants to see passed. But we are providing both 

funding and representation in the Arctic Council affairs. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. And we would hope that with that funding, 

there is a push to not only talk about the policy, but actually to 

get a policy that is adopted. We’ve been dealing with a policy that, 

as you know, is old and it is important that we try to revamp that. 

Very quickly, then, and going back to the Middle East now— 

there was a GAO report back in October about the amount of 

money that the international donors had pledged for Iraq reconstruction, a total of about $16.4 billion. Of that amount, only about 

$7 billion has been provided, as I am sure you are very well aware. 

But in looking at the list of the countries that have made the 

pledges and what has been delivered so far, what strikes me is that 

the countries who would be most immediately impacted if the Iraq 

Government were to collapse—essentially the neighboring countries 

surrounding Iraq—are the ones who are really not living up to 

their level of commitment in terms of keeping their pledges. What 

are we doing here in the United States to get Iraq’s neighbors really more active in their support of the Iraq Government? 

Secretary RICE. Well, we have an International Compact for Iraq 

and I think it’s under that vehicle that we have seen the pledges 

made. 

There have been some significant pledges from Iraq’s neighbors. 

One of the problems, and one of the reasons that there’s a distinction or a difference between what has been pledged and what has 

68 

been spent, is that frankly, until recently, I think people could either cite the security situation as a reason—or some might say, an 

excuse—and that the security situation is improving and that it is 

now possible to make some of those reconstruction efforts. 

We are, and the Iraqis are redoubling their effort to, actually 

have states deliver on those pledges. And I think, it’s my hope that 

you’ll start to see countries come forward in that way. 

For instance, some of the funding from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 

is project funding, and not budgetary support, and frankly, the 

Iraqis don’t need budgetary support, the project funding is what is 

helpful to them. And so we expect that they will begin to spend out 

that project funding as the security situation improves, and we’re 

working with them on precisely that. 

But it has been a combination of slow absorption by the Iraqis, 

and a security situation that I think has now improved to the place 

where we could expect these disbursements to take place more 

quickly. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Vitter, thank you for your patience. 

Senator VITTER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Madame Secretary for all of your service. We really 

do appreciate it. 

I’m actually going to stay in the Arctic, where Lisa brought us, 

in terms of the Law of the Sea Treaty. 

It’s clear that I disagree with you and the administration and 

some of my colleagues, like Lisa, on the Law of the Sea Treaty. We 

won’t resolve that today, and for now we can put that disagreement 

to the side. 

What I am concerned about, no matter what anybody might think about the merits of the Treaty, is that there is about $5 million designated for two entities created under the Law of the Sea 

Treaty. This is a significant amount of money. There’s $1.3 million 

budgeted to go to the International Seabed Authority. And there is 

$3.6 million budgeted to go to the International Tribunal for the 

Law of the Sea. I hope we can all agree that this money being 

budgeted for entities, which are part of a treaty that is currently 

before the Senate, and has yet to be ratified by the Senate. Isn’t 

it completely jumping the gun, and completely presumptuous for 

those two line items to be in the budget? 

Secretary RICE. Senator, we’re obviously not going to do anything 

in terms of the Law of the Sea Treaty until it’s ratified by the Senate. As I understand it, some of these elements we’ve been willing 

to attend meetings to provide some technical assessments, because 

we have entities in the United States, including the U.S. Navy and 

some of our business interests, that are very concerned that people 

not use our absence of the ratification of the Law of the Sea to take 

advantage of us. 

Senator VITTER. Well, let me just—— 

Secretary RICE. But, we will not spend any funding—— 

Senator VITTER [continuing]. Clarify your response. Is this money 

for American personnel to go to meetings? Will this money go to 

the international entities created by the Law of the Sea Treaty? 

Secretary RICE. I assure you, Senator, we’re not going to actually 

spend anything in conjunction with Law of the Sea unless it is ratiVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:05 Feb 27, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\47624.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
69 

1Transcribed from pages 737 and 740 of the President’s 2009 Budget. 

fied by the Senate. But, in hopes that it might be ratified, we’ve 

made some requests going forward, that would allow us to rapidly 

begin to implement it if it does go forward. 

Senator VITTER. While that should be reassuring, I would like to 

point out that what you just said is not in the budget. The budget 

does not contain your caveat that this money is not available before 

the Senate ratifies the Treaty, and that the money’s just there in 

case the Treaty is ratified. So, I think it’s completely presumptuous—— 

Secretary RICE. Senator, I think there may be—let me get you, 

in writing, an answer. Because I think there are some elements of 

this, the International Seabed, for instance, that we have wanted 

to support in order to protect our own interests. But I will get a— 

an answer to you in writing. 

Senator VITTER. So, therefore, what you are actually saying is 

that the money in the budget could go to Law of the Sea related 

activities or entities prior to Senate ratification. 

Secretary RICE. Senator, I want to have an opportunity to review 

it, and to come back to you in writing on precisely how we would 

use that funding, if we would use it at all. 

Senator VITTER. OK, great. I look forward to that. 

[The information referred to above follows: ] 

The President’s budget request included funding to pay assessed contributions of 

$1.3 million to the International Seabed Authority and $3.6 million to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in FY 2009. In both cases, the budget request explicitly conditioned expenditure of the requested funds on Senate approval 

of U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. Attached are pages 737 and 

740 from the President’s FY 09 budget, which clearly indicate that no funds will 

be provided to either organization until the United States accedes to the Convention. 

We would like to reiterate the administrations’s strong support for U.S. accession 

to the Law of the Sea Convention. Joining the 154 other parties to the Convention 

would promote U.S. security, economic, and environmental interests, with very modest financial implications, especially when weighed against the substantial benefits 

that would accrue to the United States. 

CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS1

International Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica 

($ in thousands) 

Computation of Estimate 

FY 2007 

Actual 

FY 2008 

Estimate 

FY 2009 

Request 

U.S. Requirements in Dollars ............................................ 0 0 1,296 

The International Seabed Authority (ISA) is the institution through which states 

parties to the Law of the Sea Convention regulate activities in those portions of the 

seabed and ocean floor that are beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Regulated 

activities include exploration and exploration and exploitation of solid, liquid and 

gaseous mineral resources at or beneath the seabed. ISA currently has 148 members. The principal organs of ISA are the Assembly, to which all members may belong, a 36-member Council and the Secretariat. 

ISA carries out the Convention’s provisions for non-discriminatory access to deep 

seabed mineral resources and adopts rules and regulations setting forth specific 

70 

terms and conditions for exploration and development, including environmental 

safeguards. ISA has contracts in place with ‘‘pioneer investors,’’ has adopted regulations on prospecting and exploration, developed recommendations for assessing the 

potential environmental impact of certain exploration activities, and is working on 

rules for the exploration of certain oceanic crusts. ISA is also active in collecting and 

disseminating data on specific issues relating to deep seabed mining. Although deep 

seabed mining is not economically feasible at present, ISA will have the authority 

to grant unimpeded access to mining sites when it is. U.S. investors would benefit 

substantially from this predictability. 

Explanation of Estimate 

The FY 2009 request provides for the U.S. assessed contribution for 2009, the first 

year of the 2009-2010 biennial budget. Expenditure of the requested funds is contingent on Senate ratification of the International Law of the Sea Convention, which 

would establish U.S. membership in ISA. As a member of ISA, the U.S. would contribute 22 percent of the assessed budget, which represents the ceiling on member 

state assessed contributions. 

Explanation of Estimate 

Detailed Computation of Estimate 

FY 2007 

Actual 

FY 2008 

Estimate 

FY 2009 

Request 

Assessment against members (in dollars) ....................... 0 0 5,891 

United States percentage share ....................................... 0 0 22 

United States assessment (in dollars) ............................. 0 0 1,296 

* * * * * * * 

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Hamburg, Germany 

($ in thousands) 

Computation of Estimate 

FY 2007 

Actual 

FY 2008 

Estimate 

FY 2009 

Request 

U.S. Requirements in Dollars ............................................ 0 0 3,608 

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) was established by the 

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as one of several dispute resolution mechanisms available to states parties. Although the U.S. would choose arbitration tribunals rather that ITLOS for settlement of disputes where the choice is 

available, the U.S. woul dbe subject to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in certain circumstances involving prompt release of vessels and disputes relating to seabed mining. For this reason, and because the U.S. has an interest in influencing the interpretation and application of the Convention, mmbership [sic] in ITLOS would be of 

significant benefit to the U.S. As a member of ITLOS, the U.S. would also be able 

to nominate a judge for election to ITLOS, which would result in a U.S. judge being 

in the position to promote interpretation and application of the Convention in ways 

that would be helpful to U.S. interests. 

Explanation of Estimate 

The FY 2009 request provides for the U.S. assessed contribution for 2009, the first 

year of the 2009-2010 biennial budget. Expenditure of the requested funds is contingent on Senate ratification of the Convention of the Law of the Sea, which woul 

destablish U.S. membership in ITLOS. As a member of the ITLOS, the U.S. would 

contribute contribute 22 percent of the assessed budget, which represents the ceiling 

on member state assessed contributions. 

71 

Explanation of Estimate 

Detailed Computation of Estimate 

FY 2007 

Actual 

FY 2008 

Estimate 

FY 2009 

Request 

Assessment against members (in euros) ......................... 0 0 11,200 

United States percentage share ....................................... 0 0 22 

United States assessment (in euros) ............................... 0 0 2,464 

Approximate Exchange Rate (euros to dollars) ................ 0 0 0.686 

U.S. requirement (in dollars) ............................................ 0 0 3,608 

Senator VITTER. Let me just say that I think it’s inappropriate 

request or provide the money before the Senate acts. I strongly 

urge the administration, and strongly urge the Congress, to strike 

this particular budget request. 

I would also note, one of the two entities listed in the budget provision, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, is an entity in which the U.S. has said it will not participate if we ratify 

the Treaty. We’re not going to submit to its jurisdiction. We don’t 

trust it to consistently rule on matters involving the U.S. in a fair 

and impartial manner. Ratification is not going to change this. And 

yet we are asking for funding for this Tribunal anyway. I don not 

think there is any precedent for sending money to organizations 

created by a treaty on which the Senate has yet to act, and has 

not yet acted. I would request a review of this, and hopefully a 

change of policy. I would make the same request to Congress. 

Thank you. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Madame Secretary, thank you for your patience 

and thank you for your presence. And believe it or not, it is 1 

o’clock. 

Secretary RICE. Perfect. 

The CHAIRMAN. We got you out. 

We are adjourned. 

Secretary RICE. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

Thank you, Madam Secretary, for testifying before this committee, and thank you, 

Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. We are at a critical time right now with 

regard to our foreign policy and related spending, which makes this hearing all the 

more timely. 

I am a strong supporter of increased funding for State Department operations to 

ensure that we have a robust and fully functioning agency. I am pleased that the 

President’s proposed FY09 State Department budget has increased 81⁄2 percent from 

last year’s budget request, including emergency funding. We have thousands of dedicated Americans who commit themselves to serving this country by working at the 

Department of State—both overseas and at home—and without adequate funding 

our foreign policy agenda is shortchanged as critical staff does not have the necessary resources to do their job. This capacity and resource gap needs to be addressed immediately, and while these initial plus-ups are small compared to the 

overall needs, I am nonetheless pleased to see them. 

Madam Secretary, I remain deeply concerned that the President is still failing to 

properly allocate resources so we can best address our top national security priVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:05 Feb 27, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\47624.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
72 

ority—the global threat posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The misguided and narrow focus on the war in Iraq is depleting our financial, diplomatic, and material resources around the globe—whether in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Democratic 

Republic of Congo, or Algeria—and making it more difficult for us to pursue a policy 

agenda that does, in fact, contribute to our national security. While we are spending 

$10 billion per month in Iraq, our efforts in Afghanistan are being short-changed 

and vital development, disaster assistance, education and health programs that are 

essential for building strong nations and restoring stability in post-conflict situations are underfunded. These programs can play an important role in eradicating 

some of the factors that contribute to extremism and terrorism. 

Following the Defense Secretary’s lead, last week the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs testified before the Senate Armed Services and noted that we need to do a 

better job of developing the capabilities and capacity in other agencies outside the 

Defense Department—including State and USAID. He also said we need to do a better job of deterring conflict and being prepared to ‘‘defeat foes globally by rebalancing our strategic risk.’’ How have we reached the point where the Defense Department is advocating more strongly for building and strengthening our civilian 

and diplomatic capacity than our own State Department? 

In addition to my concerns about misplaced priorities, I continue to be concerned 

about this administration’s misleading budgeting. As in previous years, the President’s budget fails to account for the cost of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 

fails to pay for those costs, thus sticking our children and grandchildren with the 

bill. Passing the tab for these wars onto future generations is simply irresponsible. 

(73) 

A P P E N D I X 

Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for 

the Record to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 

by Members of the Committee 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BIDEN

Question 1. There are at least 10 departments, 25 agencies, and a total of 60 government units engaged in foreign assistance in the U.S. government. Did the FY 

2009 foreign affairs budget request result from a multi-year strategic planning process for development that is coordinated across the entire United States Government? If not, how can we hope to get a coherent, strategic funding plan if the management of foreign aid is so fragmented across the United States Government? 

Answer. Central to our foreign assistance reform efforts is the goal of improving 

our ability to provide assistance more strategically and effectively. Since its establishment in June 2006, the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance has developed and implemented integrated budget planning, program planning, and results monitoring tools. These tools are designed to provide senior leadership with 

the necessary information to assess progress and trade-offs, and improve decisionmaking that supports policy goals, including our goal of achieving transformational 

diplomacy. The FY 2009 budget is country focused with the aim of identifying what 

programs are needed for the unique situation of each recipient country in reaching 

the transformational diplomacy goal. Based on lessons learned from the FY 2008 

budget process, the FY 2009 budget process was adjusted to incorporate greater 

input from our experts in the field. The first stage of the FY 2009 budget build relied on our embassies and USAID missions around the world to form the initial 

basis for each country request through Mission Strategic Plans—a joint StateUSAID filed submission of budget and allocation levels by program element. Washington core teams have been replaced by Assistance Working Groups, composed of 

regional and functional representatives, who evaluate the field-proposed priorities 

and programs, recommending adjustments and addressing global and regional 

issues. In contrast to last year’s process, the field had defined and concrete input 

at multiple stages, which resulted in a budget that represents both field and Washington priorities. Additionally, this budget was built in coordination with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Department of Defense. In some cases, 

this entailed a realignment of State and USAID assistance programs to complement 

or reinforce MCC programs, and avoid redundancy. As a result of these changes to 

the budget process, the FY 2009 request represents a budget that is truly coordinated between field and headquarters, State and USAID. 

We are at the beginning of true foreign assistance reform, not in the middle and 

not at the end. While there is not yet a multi-year strategic planning process, we 

are making progress in that direction. We have started developing a multi-year 

Global Assistance Strategy and will be piloting multi-year country assistance strategies in the coming months. Through the Development Policy Coordination Committee we are working with other U.S. Government agencies to see how we can better align our foreign assistance programs. The Development Policy Coordinating 

Committee has agreed to focus on intra-government coordination in a select number 

of countries. Lessons learned will then be adopted on a broader scale. We will better 

integrate the work of our non-government partners for a comprehensive development approach in each country. 

There are many aspects of the foreign assistance apparatus that have to be carefully examined; for example, whether the current authorities and account structures 

are equipped to meet the evolving needs of a post 9-11 world. We are committed 

74 

to fully engaging with Congress in a collaborative manner regarding further steps 

and improvements to the foreign assistance process and our reform efforts. 

Question 2. There is widespread concern about the growing role of defense strategy in setting development policy. It seems we may also run the risk of our diplomatic strategy overwhelming a sound development policy. For example, we spend 

40% of our foreign aid in the 10 countries where we have key strategic interests. 

But we only spend 4% among the world’s 10 poorest countries. Are you concerned 

that with the budget planning process run by the State Department, we will get a 

development strategy beholden to our diplomatic strategy? What are the consequences of that for our development goals? How would we avoid that? 

Answer. It has become clear that the security and well-being of Americans is inextricably linked to the capacity of foreign states to govern justly and effectively. The 

U.S. Government can no longer draw neat, clear lines between security interests, 

development efforts, and democratic ideals. With proper focus and coordination, we 

can achieve both our development and diplomatic objectives without sacrificing the 

principle of long term development for shorter term objectives. In the past, there 

was a perception that development policy and foreign policy objectives were entirely 

separate and typically at odds. Poverty reduction, good governance, and capacity 

building for sustainable long term success are long-held development goals. Foreign 

policy goals also now recognize that lasting peace and prosperity cannot be achieved 

unless we expand opportunities for all citizens of the global community to live hopeful and prosperous lives. A driving purpose behind the establishment of the Office 

of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance was to strengthen the U.S. commitment 

to long term development. One of the key principles of foreign assistance reform is 

to ensure that State/USAID resources support shared goals, and that our planning, 

budgeting, management and implementation processes for foreign assistance capitalize on the respective strengths of State and USAID. 

I believe that the FY 2009 budget demonstrates our commitment to long term development needs. The budget reflects increased investments aimed at expanding the 

community of stable, democratically-governed, and prosperous nations. This emphasis is reflected in the request for Development Assistance account, which is nearly 

60% higher than the President’s FY 2008 request. Funding for programs to consolidate democratic gains has been increased by 27% from FY 2008 enacted levels. 

Funding for programs that expand economic freedom, help countries open their markets, and spur growth has been increased by nearly $94 million. The United States 

is on track to double assistance to sub-Saharan Africa between 2004 and 2010 to 

$8.7 billion—the FY 2009 request reflects a 25% increase (without GHAI) compared 

to the FY 2008 requests. Similarly, the Western Hemisphere region saw a $41 million increase (without the Merida Initiative and GHAI) from the FY 2008 request. 

Question 3. Many responsible government leaders overseas express concern about 

the challenge of dealing with multiple development donors. Some recipient countries 

receive as many as 800 new development projects each year, host more than 1,000 

donor missions, and are required to present 2,400 quarterly progress reports. Ashraf 

Ghani, the former Finance Minister of Afghanistan, has argued that the costs and 

frustrations of dealing with foreign aid donors overwhelm poor governments-and 

that, in fact, the costs of accepting money from rich countries often outweigh the 

benefits. How do we make the aid system simpler? 

Answer. This is an issue that we take very seriously. As stewards of tax payers’ 

dollars, we look to find that balance between being accountable and programming 

for results, ensuring that our assistance isn’t diverted to terrorist entities, following 

all legal requirements, and being flexible and responsive to host country needs. One 

step that we have taken to improve aid delivery is to hire more staff in the stewardship and technical areas. The President’s Fiscal Year 2009 Budget includes $92.1 

million dollars to hire 300 foreign service officers for USAID—above attrition—in 

Fiscal Year 2009, a 30 percent increase in our foreign service workforce. This will 

move USAID toward a 100 percent increase in deployable staff resources over the 

next three years. 

The Development Leadership Initiative will address critical staffing deficiencies in 

the stewardship and technical areas by hiring officers in the areas of program and 

planning; executive management; contracting; financial management; legal; health; 

economic growth and trade; alliance building; education; and democracy, conflict, 

human rights, and governance. 

We are also taking steps to improve our internal coordination as a donor. In addition to establishing joint and common planning, budgeting, and performance evaluation systems for State/USAID, for the first time, the Director of Foreign Assistance 

and USAID Administrator is chairing the US government’s interagency policy coVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:05 Feb 27, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\47624.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
75 

ordinating committee on Development, which is a forum for consultation and collaboration among senior policy officials representing a wide range of federal agencies involved in foreign assistance activities. As the chair of this forum, the Director 

of Foreign Assistance and USAID Administrator is enhancing the impact of US Government assistance by forging agreement on whole-of-government approaches at the 

country level and on collaboration to foster private sector-led growth in Africa; and 

strengthening our voice on the international stage on key assistance issues such as 

aid effectiveness and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. 

Outside of Washington, the USG is an engaged partner with other donors, providing leadership on practical and results oriented collaboration. This past October, 

USAID agreed with Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, 

and United Kingdom, referred to as the Nordic Plus, to publicly and enthusiastically 

confirm our strong commitment to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and 

most importantly to work in tangible ways to demonstrate this commitment. As a 

result, we’ve committed to work together in Ghana and Tanzania to enhance the 

impact of our aid efforts through greater coordination among donors and with host 

country development strategies. 

Finally, within our PEPFAR program, the USG is a co-sponsor, together with the 

UK and UNAIDS, of the ‘‘three ones’’ approach, in which donors seek to work under 

one country strategy, one monitoring and evaluation system, and through one coordinating mechanism in-country. 

We share your concern about the importance of making aid streamlined, flexible 

and responsive, and welcome your input and feedback on our ongoing efforts. 

Question 4. We need to be able to measure the results of our development aid so 

that we can ensure that we are getting value for taxpayer dollars. But who gets to 

evaluate? Who determines what ‘‘success’’ is? Are we evaluating development 

projects for how well they deliver the results that the U.S. government wants? Or, 

are they measured by how well they deliver the results that poor people in developing countries want? Whose measurement tools are we using? And how can we design measurement tools that ensure our efforts are benefiting poor people? 

Answer. Accountability for development results is one of the fundamental principles of the reform launched in 2006. The U.S. Government incorporates the interests of many constituents when determining the goals and outcomes of its foreign 

assistance programs. Certainly, we recognize that without the ownership of host 

country governments and the validation and support of non-governmental organizations and multilateral donor agencies our efforts stand a lesser chance of success. 

Therefore, just as it is important to recognize that the results that we are striving 

to achieve through foreign assistance are established jointly, it is equally important 

to have an understanding of whether we are achieving U.S. strategic objectives and 

the long-term development goals of the recipient countries. 

We measure the results of foreign assistance programs in several distinct but 

inter-related ways. First, each program that is funded must include specified results 

and related performance measures—indicators—that are monitored by the office 

overseeing the program to determine whether we are meeting our targets. These results and indicators are determined jointly, in advance of starting the project, with 

host country governments and beneficiaries. The Office of the Director of Foreign 

Assistance has also developed a set of standard performance indicators that are intended to enable the aggregation of results across countries and programs to tell us 

what the U.S. government achieved from foreign assistance during a fiscal year. For 

example, the standard indicators can tell us how many people we have inoculated, 

how many farmers we assisted with new crops varieties, or how many electoral systems we have strengthened. By being able to look at assistance data on a countryby-country level as well as in aggregate, we are able to measure whether we are 

achieving success in partnership with individual countries and stakeholders, but 

also at a broader level that is the core of the overarching U.S. foreign policy strategy. 

To further assist our ability to measure progress, a set of 51 representative indicators were identified and utilized in the FY 2007 Foreign Assistance Annual Report, 

published in conjunction with the FY 2009 CBJ. Each of the short-term (annual) indicators included information on the results target set for FY 2007, whether the target was achieved and steps that will be taken to improve performance if it fell short. 

The process of identifying, analyzing and reporting on this indicator set pointed to 

needed adjustments in the process that will be incorporated into future reports. 

Additionally, we also monitor the overall progress of a country or region in the 

sectors we are supporting by using data and information gathered by established 

organizations. For example, by using Freedom House indicators, we are able to determine the progress that a country or region has been making or not making toVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:05 Feb 27, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\47624.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
76 

wards democracy and human rights. Using these second-party measurements helps 

us to validate that our programs are not simply achieving shorter term objectives 

and needs, but that they are contributing to a portfolio of efforts that are accomplishing long-term sustainable change that serve the individual countries as well as 

the regions where they are located. 

Finally, USAID Missions and bureaus and some State Department Bureaus conduct evaluations of their major development projects and programs. Last year, 

USAID offices conducted over 200 evaluations which examined questions such as 

what were the effects of projects and programs, what problems they faced during 

implementation, and what lessons can be learned for the future to aid in designing 

programs that will achieve greater impact. 

Evaluations invariably take into consideration the views and judgments of the intended beneficiaries. Evaluation teams routinely interview the real and intended 

beneficiaries to understand their perspectives and perceptions. 

USAID Administrator and Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance Fore has stressed 

the importance of rigorous and objectives evaluations of all programs administered 

by State and USAID. Both USAID and the State Department are exploring ways 

to strengthen the evaluation function and to improve upon the performance management systems now in place. 

Question 5. The President has requested that Congress provide twenty-five percent of PL-480 funds to purchase food aid locally in emergencies. What are the advantages of this approach? Could you identify specific cases where development or 

humanitarian assistance funds would have more impact if they were spent in recipient countries? 

Answer. What is paramount to the Title II program is having adequate food aid 

available when needed to save lives. Food purchased in the U.S. normally takes up 

to four months to arrive at its destination. Food purchased locally, however, can 

reach the beneficiaries within days or weeks. The ability to use even a fraction of 

Title II for local and regional purchase will allow the U.S. to move with greater 

speed and flexibility to save lives and prevent famine. Such speed is sometimes necessary when a sudden emergency occurs (e.g., a natural disaster or an outbreak of 

fighting), food deliveries are unexpectedly interrupted (e.g., a pipeline break), or an 

unexpected and, often, short-lived cease fire allows rapid access to populations in 

need. We will be better equipped to deal with emergencies if our ‘‘tool-box’’ were to 

include cash that can be used to provide immediate relief until US commodities arrive, or fill in when there are pipeline breaks. 

Local procurement can also save funds, allowing us to feed more people, which 

is especially important as the increasing commodity costs erode the purchasing 

power of the Title II account. Had the U.S. been able to procure commodities in 

Uganda for persons displaced by conflict there, we would have been able to increase 

our support by 31 percent. In 2006 alone, had we purchased commodities available 

in Uganda we would have saved over US$3 million, which could have been used to 

supply Ugandan displaced persons with 6,000 tons of additional commodities. 

Our U.S-grown food will continue to play the primary role and will be the first 

choice in meeting global needs. We plan to use local and regional purchases judiciously. 

Question 6. How can the U.S. Government improve its coordination across the different agencies that conduct international development and health work, like MCC 

and PEPFAR, especially given that the latter two programs are outside the direct 

authority of the Director of Foreign Assistance? While the Director of Foreign Assistance does have coordinating authority over those agencies, the experience over 

the last two years has not demonstrated that that authority is sufficient to effectively coordinate the activities and budget planning between USAID, MCC, and 

PEPFAR—either here in Washington or at the country level. 

Answer. The establishment of a dual-hatted Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance 

and USAID Administrator has led to continued improvement in the interagency coordination of activities and budget planning. For FY 2008, for example, with the establishment of common objectives, a common program lexicon, and common budget 

and program planning processes, State (including PEPFAR) and USAID were able 

to improve coordination, with steps taken toward greater MCC and DOD coordination. For FY 2009, MCC and DOD were formally added as participants in State and 

USAID’s budget and program planning process, in addition to their coordination in 

the field. 

The evidence of such coordination is illustrated by a number of examples: In 

Ghana, for instance, USAID is focusing its programming on enhancing the capacity 

of local government, which is responsible for implementing MCC compact activities 

77 

in economic growth. In Honduras, USAID programming focuses on trade and investment capacity building and private sector competitiveness, in order to complement 

MCC compact investments in infrastructure and agricultural diversification. 

With respect to PEPFAR, the greater coordination achieved through the DFA 

helped highlight development gaps in our non-HIV/AIDS programming, including 

interventions in governance and economic growth that will help build host government capacity to sustain further progress on their own. Thus, in FY 2009, the budget includes $2.1 billion for State Department and USAID programs in Africa to address development gaps and support economic opportunity and governance programs critical to the success of the investments we have made through PEPFAR. 

A number of additional activities are ongoing for this year that we hope will further improve coordination. A strong interagency country strategy development process is being planned for specific pilot countries. The 3-to-5-year strategic plan will 

be developed by the field, under the leadership of Ambassadors, and is explicitly targeted to include full interagency, other donor, and where appropriate, host government participation. As with last year, the annual Operational Plan process will provide additional opportunities for the interagency in the field to develop comprehensive program plans, working together to ensure coordination. 

Finally, to extend coherence across all U.S. Government foreign assistance, the 

Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance and USAID Administrator now leads the interagency Development Policy Coordination Committee. This committee is an important tool for aligning U.S. Government efforts, making joint policy decisions on critical development issues, and forging stronger collaboration to deliver greater impact 

from the U.S. Government’s development efforts around the world. The Development Policy Coordinating Committee has agreed to focus on intra-government coordination-including the use of the DFA-established common objectives, program 

lexicon, and planning processes in a select number of countries. Lessons learned 

from this pilot will then be adopted on a broader scale. 

We share your concern about the importance of such comprehensive coordination, 

and welcome your input and feedback on our ongoing efforts. 

Question 7. Our national security strategy is built around three pillars, also 

known as the ‘‘Three D’s’’: Defense, Diplomacy and Development. Each pillar is intended to be equally crucial to a balanced foreign policy strategy, yet our government’s resources are overwhelming tilted towards the defense pillar. For every dollar of funding we spend on diplomacy and development, we spend $19 on defense. 

Military-led development is the fastest growing form of U.S. overseas aid. Are you 

concerned about the consequences of this imbalance? How does this budget request 

address that imbalance? 

Answer. President Bush’s Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Operations Budget for the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and 

other foreign affairs agencies totals $26.1 billion, an increase of 8.9 percent over the 

total Fiscal Year 2008 enacted to date, including emergency funding, or 14.3 percent 

over the FY 2008 enacted base. This increase reflects a determined effort to enhance 

civilian instruments of national security-including the capacity of our civilian agencies, with staff increases for the Department of State and the largest requested increase in USAID’s operational budget in nearly two decades-and our development, 

reconstruction, and security assistance. 

Development now plays a vastly elevated role in America’s foreign policy. The 

charge I have given to our diplomatic corps is a long-term development goal-to help 

build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their 

people, reduce widespread poverty, and behave responsibly toward their people and 

the international system. In the 21st century, defined as it is thus far by an unprecedented and increasing interdependence, human development is both a moral end 

in itself and also a central pillar of our national security. Today, the idea that foreign assistance-and specifically long-term development-is a vital tool of our international statecraft is met with broad and growing support. 

With respect to funding, we have continued to boost the quantity of our assistance. Since 2001, with the support and partnership of Congress, President Bush has 

launched the largest development agenda since the Marshall Plan. In the past six 

years, we have nearly tripled official development assistance worldwide and quadrupled it to Sub-Saharan Africa. 

As noted above, the FY 2009 request reflects the continuation of this effort, further illustrating the emerging national consensus in support of development. The 

resources requested in the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Operations Budget demonstrate 

our strong commitment to fighting poverty, with a focus on strengthening democratic governance and promoting economic growth. This is reflected in our request 

for the Development Assistance account, which is nearly 60 percent higher than the 

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Fiscal Year 2008 request, and our request of $1.7 billion for democracy promotion 

and governance. 

I would also like to specifically mention the State Department’s Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) that is included in the President’s budget. CSI is the product 

of the work of 15 agencies, including Defense, to build the full complement of U.S. 

government expertise necessary to respond to a stabilization crisis and to promote 

effective rule of law, economic stabilization and transitional governance in weak and 

failing states. 

With the requested resources, the Department of State, USAID and other foreign 

affairs agencies strive to create the conditions conducive to sustained progress in 

governance, economic growth, and human capacity, recognizing that countries that 

move in this direction become our partners in global peace and prosperity. 

Question 8. USAID has been systematically under-resourced, overstretched, and 

disempowered over the last three decades-severely affecting the United State’s capacity to provide global leadership on foreign assistance. Some example of this attrition: In the 1990s, 37 percent of USAID’s workforce left without being replaced. The 

number of direct hires working in the field dropped by 29 percent from 2002 to 

2005. The average U.S. contracting officer should manage about $10 million dollars 

in grants. Today, they manage more than $50 million on average. This budget contains an impressive increase for USAID Operating Expenses. However, some observers argue this attrition has taken place because USAID has lacked the stature necessary to defend itself in the budget process. How have you addressed this issue? 

And, once that rebuilding is complete, what steps would we need to take to ensure 

that this erosion doesn’t happen again in the future? 

Answer. Over the last several years USAID’s OE budget has remained at a virtually straight-lined level, while USAID-managed program funding has increased by 

approximately 40%. The National Security Strategy now recognizes the importance 

of foreign assistance to the achievement of the nation’s foreign policy objectives. The 

FY 2009 budget supports this goal of reestablishing Development as the third leg 

of the foreign policy triad along with Diplomacy and Defense. Leadership at both 

the Departments of State and Defense are on record supporting these increases. 

Without sufficient operating expense funds to hire permanent staff, USAID has 

been forced to utilize a variety of program-funded hiring mechanisms to achieve its 

goals. The way to ensure that the Agency is not again subject to this type of erosion 

to its permanent workforce is to support the requested level of operating expenses. 

Question 9. The HELP Commission focused intensively on the issue of procurement and the weaknesses of our current contracting system. USAID has, in the 

words of General Chiarelli, become ‘‘little more than a contracting agency.’’ More 

than 50% of USAID funding in Afghanistan goes to five for-profit companies who 

do contracting. Each USAID contracting officer should manage about $10 million in 

grants. Today, according to USAID Acting Deputy Administrator James Kunder, 

they manage an average of $50 million. How far will the requested increase in operating expenses go to address this problem? 

Answer. The FY 2009 budget requests an increase in hiring which will include 

approximately 35 Foreign Service contracting officers as part of the Development 

Leadership Initiative (DLI). USAID’s contracting officer shortage will also be addressed by increased hiring in Washington, as well as a pilot program to re-tool a 

limited number of qualified Foreign Service Officers into contracting officers. 

It should be noted that the requested increase will also address shortages in other 

stewardship categories such as financial management, legal, program and budget. 

Question 10. Recently, the HELP Commission issued its report on reforming U.S. 

foreign assistance. Among its recommendations was to dedicate the Economic Support Funds account, or ESF, for short-term economic needs, and protect the Development Assistance Account, or DA, for long-term goals. This budget request continues 

in the trend of funding development work through ESF. Why has the President requested funds for development through ESF? Do you think this is a wise strategy? 

And, if not, what are the obstacles that you feel force the USG to fund development 

work through ESF? 

Answer. We continue to work towards having a clearer and more transparent way 

of allocating Economic Support Funds (ESF) and Development Assistance (DA) 

funds. The FY 2009 request reflects allocations in the two accounts that are consistent with the current purposes of each appropriation. Using the Foreign Assistance Framework country categories as a basis, we have funded countries/bureaus 

with either ESF or DA funds (with one exception, Liberia). We are following a one 

account—one country rule in order to clarify the use of the DA and ESF accounts 

and end the practice of using both accounts in a single country. 

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The DA request funds programs in Developing, Transforming, and Sustaining 

Partner countries (e.g., Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Peru, Philippines, Yemen). The ESF request funds programs in Restrictive 

and Rebuilding countries (e.g., Afghanistan, Burma, Haiti, Liberia, Nepal, Sudan) 

as well as foreign policy priorities such as Egypt and Jordan. By consolidating country programs previously funded with both ESF and DA, the Administration seeks 

to improve transparency and facilitate the performance monitoring of long-term development programs. Additionally, in the FY 2009 request, we have made a concerted effort to elevate the importance of development, in balance with other foreign 

assistance priorities. This led to a $600 million increase in the DA account over the 

FY 2008 request. About one-third of the increase is due to a shift from the ESF account, while two-thirds are programmatic increases. 

Question 11. The global health sector, more than any other part of foreign assistance, is perhaps the most fragmented, with two major health initiatives aimed at 

HIV/AIDS and malaria that are currently not linked into on-going global health programs, such as maternal and child health programs at USAID. As a result, a large 

majority of our global health funding is aimed at 15 countries, most of which are 

in sub-Saharan Africa, but only through two programs, one directed towards HIV/ 

AIDS and one towards malaria. Many have called for a more ‘‘comprehensive’’ or 

holistic approach to global health. How does this budget request, in the short term, 

help coordinate its global health assistance and ensure that services on the ground 

cover the core components of basic health services that are maternal and child 

health, infectious diseases and HIV/AIDS? How do you reconcile that with a 14 percent cut in the overall Child Survival and Health Account? 

Answer. This budget request will support the existing foreign assistance strategy 

to achieve and sustain the greatest possible reduction of maternal and child mortality and malnutrition. As the U.S. Government’s lead foreign assistance agency in 

the global health sector, USAID coordinates health programming to the fullest extent possible—an approach that increases the affordability and sustainability of our 

global efforts to tackle critical public health challenges. We coordinate global health 

assistance and ensure that services on the ground cover the core components of 

basic health services, including maternal and child health, family planning, infectious diseases and HIV/AIDS. This is done through high-level coordination with 

other U.S. Government and host-government partners and strategic coordination of 

services in context-specific approaches. This includes coordination with CDC, FDA, 

HHS, NIH and OGAC, both in strategy development and in-country coordination 

with host governments and other bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. 

An example of coordination of services is the delivery of antenatal, delivery, and 

post-partum care. We know that good antenatal care—including the promotion of 

adequate nutrition and anemia prevention, detection and treatment of infections 

and complications, and planning for adequate care at birth—can have important 

positive effects on outcomes for both women and their babies. In areas where malaria is prevalent, we promote antenatal care as a key opportunity to provide antimalarial treatment and the use of insecticide-treated nets, protecting women from 

anemia and illness and their unborn children from the low birth weight caused by 

maternal malaria infection. In areas where HIV is prevalent, antenatal care is one 

of the best opportunities to offer testing and counseling services and identify mothers requiring anti-retroviral treatment or prevention of mother-to-child transmission 

(PMTCT) of HIV. Most of our missions already support integrated maternal and 

child health/family planning (MCH/FP) and malaria programs and help to build 

broad-based health systems. These programs also strengthen drug management, supervision, community outreach and other critical systems across the board that are 

needed to deliver basic public health services. 

Question 12. One response to the calls for greater integration between HIV/AIDS 

programs and other health, social, and economic needs is ‘‘wrap-around’’ programs. 

But the non-HIV/AIDS programs often have dramatically less funding or may be 

geographically separated from most AIDS programs. How can greater integration be 

achieved under these circumstances? 

Answer. Even with geographic or financial disparities, greater integration can be 

achieved by strengthening and building upon common service delivery platforms, 

implementing national and district-level policies directing such integration, targeting resources, and incorporating strong monitoring and evaluation into programs. 

Service integration becomes formalized when outlined in cross-cutting national and 

district-level policies and championed by country leadership, as in Mozambique, 

Rwanda and other countries. Critical to this process is resource mapping at the community, primary facility, and district levels and then targeting resources. 

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The successful integration of programs is more than co-location of services. Although obvious benefits exist in the integration of services, program, logistic, and 

financial barriers can negate these benefits. HIV programming in Rwanda has 

shown that improved health systems performance through a Pay-for-Performance 

model contributes to improved management in HIV/AIDS services, as well as family 

planning and child health services. An evaluation is underway to elucidate the key 

components with perceived successful integration of HIV/AIDS and other public 

health programming in at least three countries (i.e., Malawi, Mozambique and 

Rwanda). Strong monitoring and evaluation of integration efforts are necessary for 

sustained program quality and coverage. Monitoring and evaluation should address 

donor concerns about accountability and transparency of combined resources. The 

monitoring and evaluation system should be able to track task shifting and give 

some sense of how the health system and health workers may become overburdened 

in an environment of limited resources but increasing expectations. 

Opportunities exist where integration makes sense, building upon the strengths 

of the different programs. For example, in many countries antenatal visits and child 

immunization visits are relatively high. Extending from these strong points to the 

post-partum period may be an incremental approach to integration. High-quality 

care at delivery is one of the most critical interventions for the survival and health 

of mothers and newborns; it prevents or resolves life-threatening complications and 

provides essential immediate care to newborns. It also provides a key opportunity 

for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) of HIV. Increasingly, we 

are extending care into the post-partum period, allowing for the detection and treatment of serious maternal and newborn complications and better promotion of 

breastfeeding and essential newborn care. This extension allows us the opportunity 

to conduct early infant diagnosis and start cotrimoxazole preventive therapy that 

has integrated benefits for HIV-exposed and HIV-infected children for prevention of 

death from pneumonia, TB and malaria. This post-partum period is also one of the 

most important opportunities to counsel women in voluntary family planning methods. Thus, in practice, our maternal, child health, and family planning programs are 

delivered holistically, yielding greater impact and sustainability and providing a 

platform for other important health programs. 

Question 13. When, realistically, do you think the joint United Nations-African 

Union force will be fully deployed to Darfur? What is the anticipated timeline for 

this deployment? 

Answer. Security Council Resolution 1769 authorizes a force of up to 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, and an appropriate civilian component, including up to 3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units of up to 140 personnel each. Currently 9,000 personnel are deployed with 

an additional 3,600 expected by June. 

Special Envoy Williamson recently launched, on behalf of the United States and 

in partnership with Canada, the Friends of UNAMID. Secretary-General Ban has 

given his full support to this group comprising like-minded states that meets weekly 

in New York for the purpose of helping the UN accelerate deployment of an effective 

UNAMID. The Friends aim to help UNAMID meet its deployment goals of an additional 3,600 African troops by June. 

We are hopeful that deployment of an additional 1,600 troops can be achieved 

shortly thereafter, and are pressing for the deployment of the remainder of 

UNAMID’s troops by December 31. 

Question 14. For months, the United Nations has been calling for urgently needed 

helicopters for the peacekeeping mission in Darfur. I’ve written the President on 

this, more than once. The Senate recently approved a resolution that Senator Lugar 

and I wrote calling for the President himself to personally engage on this issue with 

other heads of state. I don’t get the sense that this is as high a priority as it should 

be. Can you tell me the degree of engagement you have had on this issue and with 

whom? How many foreign ministers have you called? With how many heads of state 

has President Bush raised this issue? 

Answer. The United States has been at the forefront of Darfur peacekeeping support since the African Union first deployed in July of 2004. Since that time we have 

provided Darfur peacekeepers with more than $400 million in assistance. We have 

been engaged in an intense high-level diplomatic campaign, both in public and behind the scenes, to lobby on behalf of the UN and the people of Darfur to generate 

and deploy tactical and utility helicopters as well as other critical mission requirements. This diplomatic campaign is starting to bear fruit: Ethiopia has offered 4 attack helicopters to the mission. Our efforts have also included high-level coordination and outreach to multiple NATO and non-NATO countries, including China. We 

81 

have worked closely with the UN to identify those countries most likely to contribute helicopters to this operation. Officials at the most senior levels of the US 

government have approached their counterparts in these countries’ governments to 

urge them to provide the required support. We are also in touch with the UN on 

the full range of alternative options to meet these urgent requirements and to assist 

other countries to strengthen their capabilities to contribute. 

Question 15. The need for peacekeepers in Africa is immense. Darfur, Chad, and 

Somalia are still in the grips of terrible conflicts. The Democratic Republic of Congo, 

which has seen horrendous violence in recent years, may be on the verge of a breakthrough toward genuine peace. The President’s budget request, however, has significant cuts for UN peacekeeping—a cut of $75 million for the Congo mission, a cut 

of $56 million for the mission in Liberia, and a cut of $39 million in the Cote 

d’Ivoire mission. What will be the impact of these budget cuts on these missions and 

these and other countries’ efforts to ensure that gains made in peacemaking are secured? 

Answer. There are eight UN peacekeeping missions in Africa that account for $1.1 

billion of our FY 2009 request. The exact requirements for UN peacekeeping funds 

for future years are difficult to predict, because the size and cost of UN peacekeeping missions depend on UN Security Council decisions based on conditions on 

the ground and UN General Assembly review of the financial implications associated with those decisions. With respect to these missions, we are hopeful for some 

drawdown of peacekeeping forces. In Liberia, a plan is being implemented to consolidate and draw down the mission, measured against progress in building Liberian 

security institutions. The UN Security Council will consider possible further reductions. In Cote d’Ivoire, progress of implementing a peace agreement should open the 

possibility of an eventual drawdown; and in the Congo, we expect a gradual reduction as national forces assume roles and political, reconstruction, and military 

benchmarks are achieved. 

Question 16. What is the Administration’s rationale for proposed reductions in assistance to Armenia, despite increased levels of support for several neighboring 

countries? 

Answer. Within the FY 2009 assistance request for Eurasia, funding is prioritized 

to help the most reform-oriented countries in the region—Georgia, Ukraine, and 

Moldova—by promoting economic and energy independence, helping to diversify export markets, and improving democratic governance in the face of increasing Russian economic and political pressure. Other priorities for the region include democracy programming in Russia and elsewhere and opportunities to promote reform in 

Turkmenistan and the rest of Central Asia. 

Excluding the funding Armenia receives as part of its $235.65 million Millennium 

Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact, the Administration’s FY 2009 request for 

Armenia totals $27.9 million. While funding for the Eurasia region as a whole has 

declined sharply over the last several fiscal years, reductions to the Armenia budget 

have not declined as drastically. The reduced request for FY 2009 does not detract 

from the critical importance of Armenia to U.S. interests nor does it signal a change 

in U.S. policy. Rather, the request level meets the country’s development needs and 

is appropriate within the context of assistance priorities within the region and 

around the globe. Armenia has made real progress on reversing rural poverty; nevertheless, the government’s commitment to reform is not as strong as others in the 

region and the country still struggles with rampant corruption and with weak democratic institutions, as illustrated by recent events. 

Within the Caucasus, the Administration’s request prioritizes funding for Georgia. 

Led by a Western-oriented government under increasing pressure, U.S. assistance 

is intended to help Georgia consolidate its democratic, economic, and social reforms, 

address rural poverty, encourage the peaceful resolution of its separatist conflicts, 

and strengthen Georgia’s economy while decreasing its dependence on Russia as an 

export market and for energy resources. The FY 2009 request for Georgia ($67.1 

million) is a five percent increase over FY 2008 enacted levels. 

Question 17. As U.S. assistance to Europe and Eurasia has declined in recent 

years, many nations in the region have experienced a breakdown in democracy and 

the rule of law. Despite this trend, the Administration’s budget proposes further 

drastic cuts in assistance to the area. How does the Administration justify these cutbacks, particularly in view of the President’s rhetoric about the importance of democracy promotion? 

Answer. Within the Europe and Eurasian region, FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) 

and Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act funding for FY 2009 is 

prioritized to: 

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• advance reform in countries that have faced Russian pressure (Georgia, 

Moldova, Ukraine); 

• support democracy and rule of law in Russia and elsewhere; 

• address concerns about the final status of Kosovo and its impact on the region; 

and 

• promote needed reforms in Central Asia and linkages between Central and 

South Asia. 

In the Europe and Eurasian region, challenges to democracy and rule of law remain most serious in countries in the former Soviet space. From 2006 to 2007, 

democratic reforms and freedoms improved in only two of the countries and regressed in five. Reforming governments have had difficulty consolidating the democratic breakthroughs of 2003-2005. Reflecting these challenges, the Administration’s 

FY 2009 FSA request for the Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD) program 

objective remains the largest of all five program objectives at over $137 million. 

While this year’s request represents a decline from the FY 2008 enacted level, we 

believe that the Administration’s FSA request for GJD programming is appropriate 

and reflects the needs of the region given progress made by some of the Eurasian 

countries in promoting reform, and increased reliance on self-sustaining NGOs and 

legacy grant-making institutions to support democratic reform, particularly in Russia. 

As FSA resources decline, the Administration’s request for FY 2009 continues to 

prioritize FSA-funded GJD programming, directing support to beleaguered democracy activists and advancing democratic openings where they exist. As a statement 

of Administration priorities, the FSA request for GJD assistance is nearly $10 million higher than last year’s request and funding for these programs is increasing 

as a percentage of the total FSA, up to 42 percent in FY 2009. In addition, relative 

to the Administration’s FY 2008 request for FSA-funded GJD programming, the 

GJD request in FY 2009 has significantly increased support for GJD programs to 

support civil society and media organizations, including in Georgia and Ukraine. A 

strategic eight-fold increase in Central Asia regional GJD programming will help 

promote access to independent media in the region and a 30 percent increase in democracy assistance to Turkmenistan will help take advantage of openings to promote reform there. 

For Russia, while this year’s GJD request is a decrease from the FY 2008 enacted level, the Administration has requested a total of $30.3 million for the programs in 

FY 2009, an increase of over $4 million from last year’s request. These funds will 

be used to broaden support for Russian independent media and civil society, including NGO watchdog organizations such as human rights groups, as they face increasing political pressure. Programs will also strengthen political, civil and justice sector 

institutions that reinforce democratic principles and the rule of law. The FY 2009 

request level also takes into account the resources of the U.S.-Russia Foundation 

for Economic Advancement and the Rule of Law (the U.S.-Russia Investment Fund 

or TUSRIF legacy foundation), which will have over $180 million at its disposal to 

support development in Russia, including the rule of law and the free flow of information through its grant-making and other activities. 

Reflecting the important work still needed to promote democracy in the countries 

of South Eastern Europe, the FY 2009 SEED request for the GJD program objective 

remains robust at $79 million. As a percentage of the overall SEED budget, GJD 

assistance declines modestly in FY 2009 compared with FY 2008 enacted levels, 

from 32 percent in FY 2008 to 29 percent in FY 2009. There are several factors that 

explain this decline: 

• A decrease of slightly more than $5 million in Kosovo GJD assistance accounts 

for approximately half of the decline in SEED GJD assistance from FY 2008 to 

FY 2009; this decrease reflects a return to a more sustainable annual level of 

transition assistance following a ‘‘spike’’ in requested resources in the FY 2007 

Emergency Supplemental and the FY 2008 budget request. This ‘‘spike’’ was 

aimed at providing direct support for a successful settlement of Kosovo’s status. 

• The SEED request continues to give high priority to Economic Growth in order 

to create needed jobs, promote economic diversification, repay World Bank debt 

for Kosovo, and integrate the region with the world economy, decreasing EG 

funding in the request by 1 percent compared with the FY 2008 enacted level. 

Economic progress and prosperity continue to be critical factors in checking extreme nationalism, radicalism, and anti-reform sentiment in Eastern Europe. 

• Progress made on democratic reforms and freedoms in the countries of South 

Eastern Europe over the last several years, if somewhat uneven, allows for the 

Administration to focus SEED funding to assist reform in sectors in which 

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SEED-funding recipients remain fragile and, in the case of Kosovo, to stand up 

new governance structures and procedures. 

• To maintain robust security relationships with the countries of South Eastern 

Europe and assist their integration into NATO, the Administration’s FY 2009 

request responds to a decrease in FMF funding allocated to the region by increasing Peace and Security assistance by 5 percent over the FY 2008 enacted 

level; some of this assistance advances respect for the rule of law through law 

enforcement reform. 

Regional programs also play an important role in furthering democratization. One 

of our key tools for the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law 

throughout Europe and Eurasia is the Organization for Security and Cooperation 

in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE enables the United States to advance these interests 

effectively in concert with our friend and allies, with shared costs. In addition to 

FSA and SEED funding, other U.S. resources are being used to support democracy 

in Europe and Eurasia. For example, Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) resources leverage the impact of other U.S. assistance in strengthening democracy and 

good governance, with three countries holding Threshold Programs (Ukraine, 

Moldova. and Albania) and one soon to sign a Threshold Program (Kyrgyz Republic). 

These programs supplement SEED and FSA assistance by helping to fight corruption, increase government transparency, and strengthen civil society watchdog capacity. U.S. resources continue to be used to leverage other donor funding and to 

establish legacy institutions that support civil society, the rule of law, and the transfer of knowledge about democracy throughout the region (e.g., the New Eurasia 

Foundation in Russia, the Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia, the Black Sea Trust 

for Regional Cooperation, and the Balkan Trust for Democracy). 

Question 18. There are reports of growing frustration in Iraq in the ranks of former Sunni insurgents to whom we are providing monthly payments of $300. They 

want to be integrated into the Iraqi government and security forces, but the central 

government is balking, particularly in mixed areas close to Baghdad. The situation 

is said to be so bad that our military has started developing plans to create a depression-era style civil job corps. ?What are the consequences of the Iraqi government failing to hire these ex-insurgents, or ‘‘Concerned Local Citizens’’ as they are 

called by our military? What are we doing to increase their hiring and integration? 

Answer. The Concerned Local Citizen program represents an important element 

of current Iraqi and Multi-National Forces—Iraq security efforts; this program has 

recently been renamed the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program. Through the SOI program, 

members of communities, including former insurgents, work with Coalition and 

Iraqi forces to improve security and economic conditions at the local level. This program is estimated to currently have approximately 91,000 volunteers and enhances 

the ability of Iraqi and Coalition forces to interact with local residents and obtain 

information on insurgents and illegal militia activity, and protect key infrastructure. 

The GoI leadership has made public statements lauding the contribution of SOIs to 

improved security. The SOI effort is crucial to the counterinsurgency effort and will 

require continued support. 

The long-term goal of the SOI program is to transition approximately 20-25% of 

the SOI members into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) as police or army personnel. 

The remaining members will eventually transition into other public or private sector 

education or employment. To date, close to 20,000 have transitioned to the ISF or 

civil employment. The GOI has supported the integration of more than 9,000 former 

SOI members into Iraqi forces in Baghdad alone. Approximately 19,000 additional 

members of SOI groups have expressed their desire to join the Iraqi forces and they 

await an expansion of the government’s integration and training programs. 

The Iraqi and U.S. Governments are also jointly funding multiple private employment and joint technical education programs focusing on SOI members and former 

detainees. For example, the Coalition is teaming with the GoI to implement a new 

technical training and employment program entitled the Joint Technical Education 

and Reintegration Program (JTERP). This program consists of vocational training, 

on-the-job training and job placement for Iraqis, with priority going to former SOIs 

and recently released detainees. JTERP is a collaboration of efforts among multiple 

ministries to include the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Ministry of Higher 

Education, Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Industry and Minerals, as well 

as the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Committee. 

Question 19. As you know, whether the recently passed de-Ba’athification law promotes healing or further division depends upon how it is implemented. According 

to some voices, such as Dr. Chalabi, who has been closely associated with DeBa’athification, the law will actually lead to the expulsion of more than 7,000 indiVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:05 Feb 27, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\47624.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
84 

viduals from key government jobs. What steps are you taking to ensure that the deBa’athification law has a positive, rather than a negative, impact? 

Answer. Since the issuance of the De- Ba’athification Order under CPA in 2003, 

many Sunni Arabs have perceived the de-Ba’athification process as opaque and politicized. However, in the last few months, several key laws have been passed that 

together will help address Sunni Arab concerns. 

In December, the Council of Representatives (CoR) passed amendments to the 

Unified Pension Law, which, among other things, restores pension rights to former 

civil servants and military officials without regard to former party affiliation. In 

January, the CoR passed an amnesty law, which sets provisions by which Iraqis 

held in detention facilities, the majority of whom are Sunni Arabs, can be released. 

Also in January, the CoR passed the Law on Accountability and Justice, which reforms the de-Ba’athification process by allowing some former mid-level party members back into government employment and by establishing an appeals procedure. 

These three laws are necessary for national reconciliation, and passage of these laws 

shows that Iraqis are committed to work together in building the new Iraq. 

As you note, effective implementation of the Accountability and Justice Law is 

vital to broad Iraqi support for the de-Ba’athification process. Although the law provides basic rights to those it affects, the regulations and procedures to implement 

it will determine its political effect. 

Before any action under the law can be taken, the GOI must create a commission, 

which will then establish the new de-Ba’athification process and select judges for 

the appeals committee. We are encouraging the GOI to create the commission as 

soon as possible and, in a spirit of reconciliation, show the Sunni Arab community 

that the government is committed to reforming the de-Ba’athification process. 

Additionally, one section of particular concern requires that all former employees 

of Ba’ath-era security and intelligence agencies be dismissed from government employment, regardless of whether they were party members. We are encouraging the 

GOI to consider issuing exemptions for all those individuals who would be terminated because they worked in the former security apparatus if they have been working since the establishment of the current government, without incident, to help rebuild Iraq. 

Although there is some ambiguity in the language that needs to be clarified, and 

on which the Presidency Council has been working, passage of the Accountability 

and Justice Law has shown that Iraqis are able to compromise on important legislation. The Presidency Council is also reviewing the law, and may seek amendments 

to further refine and clarify the legislation. 

Question 20. What is the process for obtaining additional international sanctions 

against Iran if it continues to fail to halt its uranium enrichment and plutonium 

production activities? When would you anticipate a fourth UN Security Council resolution? What elements are in the third resolution? What separate sanctions will Europe consider? What understandings do you have with Russia and China? 

Answer. The Council clearly expressed its intention in UN Security Council resolution 1747 to consider the adoption of further appropriate measures under Article 

41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter if the IAEA Director General’s report showed 

that Iran had failed to comply with UN Security Council resolutions 1737 and 1747. 

The Director General has reported three times since the adoption of that resolution 

in March 2007 that Iran has failed to do so. 

The Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, UK, and the United 

States (P5+1) reached agreement on the elements of a third UNSC sanctions resolution on 22 January 2008 in Berlin. France and the UK shared the draft resolution 

with the full Council on 5 February 2008. The Council has been engaged in negotiations on the resolution in New York for the past several weeks. We expect the Council will adopt the resolution soon. 

Pursuant to the standing P5+1 strategy of incremental escalation of sanctions on 

Iran until it meets its Security Council obligations, the draft resolution increases 

the severity of existing sanctions and expands upon the previous two UNSC sanctions resolutions (UNSC Resolutions 1737 and 1747). Key provisions include a travel 

ban, a ban on transfers to Iran of all dual use items controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and calls for inspecting cargo, limiting export credits and monitoring 

activities of financial institutions. The resolution is the product of intense negotiations between the members of the P5+1 and is a clear signal to the Iranian regime 

that the P5+1 are united in ensuring that Iran complies with its UNSC obligations. 

On next steps, the draft resolution includes a request for a report from the IAEA 

Director General within 90 days on whether Iran has complied with its obligations. 

The Council will review the report and if it shows that Iran has not complied, the 

Council expresses its intention to adopt further measures under Chapter VII to perVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:05 Feb 27, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\47624.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
85 

suade Iran to comply. UNSC sanctions are part of our dual track strategy to clarify 

to Iran’s leaders the consequences of its continued noncompliance, while also keeping open the door to direct negotiations. 

It is our understanding that the European Union is waiting for the Council to 

adopt the third sanctions resolution before adopting additional sanctions on Iran 

outside the UNSC framework. We will urge the EU both to implement the provision 

in the new resolution as quickly as possible and to move forward with complementary, autonomous sanctions. 

Update to take into account recent developments: 

On 22 February 2008, the IAEA Director General reported that Iran is continuing 

to fail to comply with its UN Security Council obligations and calls by the IAEA 

Board of Governors to suspend all proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, including enrichment-related activities, and has not undertaken full and complete transparency with the IAEA. This is particularly the case with respect to full disclosure 

by Iran of past nuclear weaponization-related activities described in an extensive 

body of Iranian-origin documentation made available to the IAEA. The IAEA has 

concluded that full disclosure by Iran is ‘‘critical to an assessment of a possible military dimension to Iran’s nuclear program.’’ After allowing for time to review and 

consider the IAEA Director General’s report, the Council adopted UNSC sanctions 

resolution 1803 on 3 March 2008 by a vote of 14-0 with one abstention (Indonesia). 

While we regret the necessity, we are very pleased that the Council acted for a 

third time to impose legally-binding Chapter VII sanctions on Iran for its failure to 

comply with the Council’s demands. The Council’s actions, and the high level of support for this third sanctions resolution, reflect the international community’s profound concerns over Iran’s nuclear program. While the international community 

waits for Iran to make the strategic decision to comply with its international nonproliferation obligations, we will focus our efforts and attention on the robust implementation of the provisions of 1737, 1747, and 1803. 

As stated in the P5+1 Ministers Statement of March 3, the P5+1, including Russia 

and China, remains committed to an early negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and a dual-track approach. We have asked Dr. Javier Solana, the European Union’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, to meet 

with Dr. Saeed Jalili, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, to create the conditions for negotiations. We have also reiterated our commitment to the 

proposals included in the generous June 2006 P5+1 incentives package, which remains on the table. The Secretary’s historic offer to sit down with her Iranian counterpart, at any time and any place to discuss any issue, once Iran has fully and 

verifiably suspended its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities— 

also remains on the table. 

It is our understanding that the European Commission has completed draft language to implement UNSCR 1803, which will now have to make its way through 

the formal EU approval process prior to final adoption at a Ministerial level meeting. We hope that EU ministerial level adoption of UNSCR 1803 will take place in 

April. We will continue to urge the EU both to implement UNSCR 1803 as quickly 

as possible and to move forward with complementary, autonomous sanctions. 

Question 21. How detailed of a peace treaty do you expect the Israelis and Palestinians to achieve this year? Is the aim a general framework agreement or a more 

detailed treaty? How quickly could such a peace treaty be implemented? 

Answer. Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas agreed at the Annapolis 

Conference that they would make every effort to conclude a peace agreement before 

the end of 2008. The nature and level of detail of that agreement depends on the 

parties’ own intentions as well as their ability to bridge the gaps that remain on 

the core issues. Their negotiations are proceeding, and the fact that both parties 

have kept the details of these talks secret should be seen as a sign of their seriousness. 

At Annapolis the leaders also agreed that implementation of a peace agreement 

would be subject to implementation of the Roadmap. We are encouraging more rapid 

progress by both parties in fulfilling their commitments under the Roadmap, and 

we have named LTG William Fraser III to monitor and promote progress in this 

area. Exactly how long it will take to implement any agreement reached is unclear 

and will depend on the efforts and commitment of both Israel and the Palestinians, 

as well as the continuing and expanded support of the international community in 

the areas of capacity building, reform, and economic growth. A vital element to implementing a peace agreement will be the commitment and performance of the PA 

fighting terrorism. We are already working with the PA to train, reform, and profesVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:05 Feb 27, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\47624.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
86 

sionalize its security forces and we plan to continue and expand that effort, including with other donors. 

Question 22. In the spring 2007 war supplemental the administration requested, 

and Congress provided, $220 million in Foreign Military Financing for training and 

equipment for the Lebanese Armed Forces. But by the end of September, less than 

one percent of those funds had actually been spent. Committee staff has been told 

that part of the reason for the delay is that it took a long time to actually develop 

a request that the United States could work with. How much of the $220 million 

in supplemental funds to train and equip the Lebanese Armed Forces have been 

spent? What steps has the United States Government taken to improve the ability 

of the Government of Lebanon to request training and equipment from those funds, 

to ensure that they can take advantage of our assistance in a timely and effective 

manner? What additional steps might be needed? 

Answer. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has programmed the entire $220 million in Foreign Military Financing to purchase ammunition, equipment, and training. Cases totaling $95 million are under development, and $11 million has been 

committed thus far. This pace reflects: (1) the LAF began only in late 2006 to relearn USG security assistance procedures following over a decade of Syrian occupation; (2) Embassy Beirut’s Office of Defense Cooperation needed to boost staff levels 

to handle the enormous growth in our security assistance relationship; and (3) nearly all LAF procurements (save for emergency ammunition supplies) were interrupted by the conflict in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in the summer of 2007. 

All of these challenges have now been overcome. 

Ongoing USG security assistance engagement will continue to help the LAF specify and articulate defense requirements, facilitating the processing of Foreign Military Sales cases and speeding the expenditure of funds. In early 2008, a contractorled survey team provided an assessment of LAF needs, and, in the wake of Under 

Secretary of Defense Eric Edelman’s February visit to Beirut, U.S. officials will meet 

Lebanese counterparts in the first mid-level security assistance review since 1996. 

As Lebanon’s political situation permits, we will continue our bilateral politicalmilitary discussions with the LAF. Our goal will remain to better gauge its needs 

in coming months and help the Government of Lebanon develop a national strategy 

to develop and professionalize its security forces to face the challenge of foreign interference in its internal affairs and lingering threats from militant groups operating within the country’s borders. 

Question 23. The budget for the Department requests a total of 1,543 new positions, including 448 of which would be funded by fees. Assuming that all requested 

funds are provided, how quickly do you expect to be able to hire for these additional 

positions? 

Answer. If approved and funded by Congress, the Department will immediately 

begin the process of recruiting and hiring qualified personnel to fill the 1,543 positions requested in the FY 09 budget. This type of surge is not unprecedented. In 

2002, the Department brought on more than 900 new employees, including 360 Foreign and Civil Service Officers as part of the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, 51 IT 

security professionals, 12 positions devoted to Counterterrorism, 98 fee-funded Border Security positions, and 389 security personnel funded by the Worldwide Security 

Upgrades account. And just last year, more than 500 permanent Civil Service personnel were hired to handle the surge in passport demand. The Department rose 

to the task in 2002 and 2007, and we will do so again if Congress approves the 

much needed positions in our FY 09 budget. 

The 1,543 new positions in the FY 09 budget request are split between Foreign 

Service positions and Civil Service positions. For the new Foreign Service positions, 

the Department will rely on the faster, redesigned Foreign Service intake process 

that was introduced in September 2007. The new online Foreign Service Officer Test 

will be offered three times a year, rather than just once or twice, and the time between the test and the oral assessment will be significantly reduced. Utilizing this 

new system, the Department can hire the approximately 820 Foreign Service positions out of the 1543 in the FY 09 request. 

The approximately 720 Civil Service positions requested in the FY 09 budget will 

be advertised on the www.USAjobs.gov website and hired by the relevant bureaus 

or offices, including passport agencies across the country. Recent efforts to consolidate the Department’s HR services into more efficient shared service centers should 

speed up the process of advertising, vetting, and hiring these new Civil Service personnel. We are confident in our ability to attract and bring on board qualified new 

employees. 

87 

Question 24. What has been the level of attrition for the past two fiscal years (FY 

2006 and FY 2007) in the Foreign Service, by grade? 

Answer. Foreign Service attrition levels for fiscal years 2006 and 2007 were as 

follows: 

Foreign Service Attrition Levels for Fiscal Years 

2006 and 2007 

FY 2006 FY 2007 

CM ................................................ 5 3 

MC ................................................ 51 57 

OC ................................................. 45 31 

FS-1 .............................................. 87 103 

FS-2 .............................................. 97 93 

FS-3 .............................................. 58 69 

FS-4 .............................................. 119 95 

FS-5 .............................................. 28 18 

FS-6 .............................................. 22 27 

FS-7 and below ............................ 1 2 

Total ......................................... 513 498 

The numbers above represent an attrition rate of 4.4 percent (2006) and 4.6 percent (2007) for Foreign Service Generalists. The attrition rates for Foreign Service 

Specialists were 5.3 percent (2006) and 5.0 percent (2007).Q02 

Question 25. What has been the level of attrition for the past two fiscal years (FY 

2006 and FY 2007) in the Civil Service? 

Answer. Civil Service career full-time permanent attrition was 624 in 2006 (8%) 

and 637 in 2007 (8%). The Department’s Civil Service attrition rate is lower than 

the government-wide average, but is projected to increase over the coming years as 

more Civil Service employees reach retirement age. 

Question 26. Of the 20 new positions requested for public diplomacy, how many 

positions will be overseas and how many positions will be in domestic offices? 

Answer. At the time we prepared the FY 2009 budget submission, we planned on 

using 16 of the 20 new public diplomacy positions overseas and four in Washington. 

Although there might be a slight change in that plan during FY 2009, depending 

on the situation at that time, we do not anticipate a major change. 

Question 27. The CBJ indicates a more than 100 percent increase in ‘‘PresidentialVice Presidential Travel Support between FY 2007 ($960,000) to FY 2008 ($2 million) (page 386 of FY 2009 CBJ). What are the reasons for such a large increase? 

Answer. The Department provides funding for Presidential and Vice Presidential 

travel support from a number of sources, including funds provided to the Bureau 

of Administration. The amount allocated for Presidential-Vice Presidential Travel 

Support is funded from D&CP public diplomacy funds and contributes to travel expenses for personnel who deliver the US Government message abroad in connection 

with travel of the President and Vice President. D&CP funds allocated for White 

House Travel, also within the Bureau of Administration, are used to support other 

White House travel activities. 

The FY 2008 estimates for these two activities are currently being revised to reflect the increase in travel planned for the President and Vice President in FY 2008 

compared to FY 2007. 

Question 28. What is the backlog of FOIA cases as of October 1, 2007? What is 

the average length of time a request has been pending? 

Answer. The Department’s backlog on October 1, 2007 was 3,430 cases. During 

Fiscal Year 2007, the median number of days a valid, active case had been pending 

was 226 days. In that same time span, the Department processed fast track cases 

in a median of 67 days, routine and complex requests in a median of 212 days, and 

expedited cases in a median of 41 days. 

88 

Question 29. The budget requests $17.6 million to consolidate DS training at a 

single facility. How will a site for this facility be chosen? What are the requirements? What is the expected timeline for decision? Please provide a more detailed 

breakdown of the costs associated with this request. 

Answer. The requirement for a dedicated Diplomatic Security (DS) consolidated 

training center in the D.C. area has existed for more than 10 years. DS currently 

trains personnel in more than 15 locations throughout Northern Virginia, Maryland, 

and West Virginia. DS resources are already stretched to the limits, and the mission 

is growing. 

DS provides training in law enforcement, personal security, attack recognition, 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Anti-Terrorism Assistance, and other specialized training for Department of State employees and dependents, other U.S. government agency personnel, and our foreign partners. Specialized training, especially the 

‘‘hard skills’’ training, such as weapons, counter-threat driving, defensive tactics, 

and high-threat protection, requires suitable driving tracks, firearms ranges and 

adequate facilities. The current Diplomatic Security Training Center (DSTC) does 

not accommodate the volume of students or provide the infrastructure necessary to 

meet these specialized requirements. Consequently, DS must currently utilize multiple sites encompassing three states. 

Among the courses that DS administers is the Foreign Affairs Counter Threat 

(FACT) Course. This training is essential for all Foreign Service Officers and other 

U.S. government personnel preparing for deployment to critical and high threat 

posts around the world, including Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Conducting this 

training outside of driving range of the D.C. area is impractical due to the expensive 

travel and housing costs associated with the heavy volume of USG employees that 

require FACT training prior to deployment overseas. A consolidated facility would 

be capable of incorporating all of the necessary hard and soft skills training, physical fitness, classroom instruction, administrative functions and housing in to one 

location. 

DS plans to identify acceptable property no later than the end of FY 2009. It is 

estimated that funding in the amount of $17.6 million will be required to fund an 

architectural and engineering study and to make the initial land procurement. In 

furtherance of these efforts, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in conjunction with 

the State Department’s Office of Real Property Management and GSA, intends to 

conduct a requirements analysis and search for property that would accommodate 

all DS tactical and technical training needs. The base requirement is for rural property, within a 100-mile radius of Washington, where firearms, explosives, and highspeed driving training can occur without the threat of encroachment. 

In the interim, and to meet current requirements while the search for a consolidated facility continues, DS has established a temporary training facility at Summit 

Point, West Virginia. 

Question 30. Why is funding for Blair House renovation divided between Protocol 

and the Bureau of Administration? 

Answer. The Blair House serves multiple functions and relies on resources from 

several accounts that have the authority to provide funds for those activities. These 

include: 

• Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) Bureau of Administration (A): 

Lease payments, operations and maintenance, utilities and minor facility renovations and repairs. 

• D&CP Office of the Chief of Protocol (CPR): Household expenses, operations and 

maintenance related to official visitors. 

• Emergencies in the Diplomatic & Consular Service (K Fund): Representational 

expenses 

• General Services Administration (GSA): Capital improvements—structural repairs and stabilization 

• Blair House Restoration Fund: De ́cor 

Question 31. What has been the amount expended to date for the SMART initiative (State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset)? The CBJ indicates that in FY 

2008, deployment to 12 pilot posts and selected domestic bureaus will be initiated. 

How many domestic bureaus? Has deployment begun and is it on schedule? 

Answer. The planned budget to date is $51.2 million. SMART is currently within 

budget, with actual spending of $49.6 million. 

89 

Funds Expended to Date for the State Messaging and Archive 

Retrieval Toolset (SMART) 

(in U.S. dollars) 

Planned Actual Remaining 

FY 07 .................... $38,234,520 $38,234,520 $0 

FY 08 .................... $53,692,883 $11,368,281 $42,324,602 

FY 09 .................... $36,329,000 $0 $36,329,000 

SMART will be piloted in three domestic bureaus: one functional bureau, one regional bureau, and the IRM bureau itself. 

Deployment of Instant Messaging was completed April 2007, on schedule. Deployment of SharePoint (MOSS 2007), a centrally-hosted collaboration tool, is underway. 

Pilot I for SMART Messaging (integrating cables, e-mails, and memos)—conducted 

in Belgrade, Stockholm, and Muscat—was successfully completed January 2008, on 

schedule. 

Pilots II and III, beginning, respectively, in September and December 2008, will 

constitute the first wave of deployment, as SMART will permanently replace legacy 

messaging systems at the 12 pilot posts and 3 domestic bureaus. The initiation of 

worldwide deployment of SMART Messaging will be delayed by six months to satisfy 

all requirements and ensure system integrity. However, if the pace of the roll out 

is accelerated, deployment could be completed by September 2009, on schedule. 

Question 32. The CBJ indicates that the ‘‘network of passport facilities will be expanded to accommodate’’ new hires. Yet the request of $40.4 million is $23.7 million 

below the FY 2008 estimate. Why is there such a sizable reduction in the request? 

Answer. We made reductions to our facilities budget estimates for FY 2008 because of the following: 

• Actual costs for renovations to existing spaces, and build-outs for new ones, 

were 52 percent less than previous estimates; 

• Acquisition of leases on new office space for field offices was deferred to FY 

2009; and 

• Telecommunications costs attributable to the acquisition of new office space 

were also deferred to FY 2009.Senator Joseph Biden, Jr. (#33) 

Question. Two years ago, on January 18, 2006, in your speech on Transformational Diplomacy, you described a repositioning of officers, stating that ‘‘over 

the next few years the United States will begin to shift several hundred of our diplomatic positions to new critical posts for the 21st century. We will begin this year 

with a down payment of moving 100 positions from Europe and, yes, from here in 

Washington, D.C., to countries like China and India and Nigeria and Lebanon, 

where additional staffing will make an essential difference.’’ Since that speech, 

through FY 2007, how many positions have been shifted, by region? 

Answer. I initiated the Global Repositioning (GRP) process in autumn 2005 as 

part of my Transformational Diplomacy initiative. Over three rounds of GRP, we 

have approved the realignment or creation of 201 Foreign Service positions overseas, among six regional areas, by reallocating positions and implementing other 

management reforms. The Foreign Service Officers who fill these positions conduct 

transformational diplomacy through public outreach, increased cooperation with 

military combatant commands, and by establishing a U.S. presence in population 

centers outside of capitol cities. The regions of East Asia & Pacific (EAP), South 

Central Asia (SCA), and Near East & Northern Africa (NEA) have been allotted the 

most new positions, with our missions in India and China receiving the largest staffing increases. We have effectively repositioned one-tenth of all of our political, economic and public diplomacy officers overseas through the GRP process. 

The chart below reflects the distribution of all 201 positions as well as the number 

of overseas positions in each region which were used to offset the creation of the 

GRP positions. 

90 

Distribution of Positions Used to Offset Creation of GRP Positions 

Region Created Reprogrammed Net Total 

AF ...................... 24 6 18 

EAP .................... 50 19 31 

EUR ................... 21 59 -38 

IO ...................... 0 2 -2 

NEA ................... 32 3 29 

SCA ................... 47 5 42 

WHA ................... 27 16 11 

Subtotal ........ 201 110 91 

Question 34. In comparing FY 2006 data to the request in FY 2009 (in the D & 

CP budget only), the transformation in the geographic bureaus has been relatively 

modest in all of them except EUR (lost 120 positions) and SCA (gained 133 positions). The shift in other bureaus has been minor or nonexistent (e.g., WHA lost one 

position in this period, while EAP gained one position). Do you believe the transformation is accomplishing its purpose, and if so, why? 

Answer. Global Repositioning (GRP) has been very successful in supporting the 

Secretary’s transformational agenda through the wholesale reprogramming of resources to missions overseas facing high priority policy challenges. Over two years, 

three phases of GRP have resulted in the effective redistribution of 10 percent of 

the Department’s collective overseas base of Political, Economic, and Public Diplomacy positions. Our missions in China and India were greatly strengthened to manage the pressing transformational problems which we faced in those countries. Beyond that, a significant number of mid and smaller sized missions in virtually all 

areas of the world, including Indonesia, UAE, Nigeria, and Venezuela, among others, received increases in Foreign Service staffing to address specific transformational challenges that have arisen in the last several years. This was largely 

accomplished by the reprogramming of resources principally from Washington, DC, 

as well as from our embassies in Europe. 

The FY 2009 budget reflects the implementation of the first two phases of Global 

Diplomatic Repositioning, as decisions on the third phase were made after the FY 

2009 budget went to press. Within the bureau totals there are also shifts between 

domestic and overseas positions. In addition, the comparison between FY 2009 and 

FY 2006 reflects the transfer of five posts (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 

Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) from EUR to SCA as part of a regional bureau reorganization. 

Question 35. In a press release issued on January 28, 2008, the President objected 

to Section 1222 of the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181), 

which prohibits the obligation or expenditure of funds to establish ‘‘any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of 

United States Armed Forces in Iraq’’ or to ‘‘exercise United States control of the oil 

resources of Iraq.’’ 

This is the first time the President has raised a constitutional objection to the provision, despite the fact that the same provision is found in two prior laws: Section 

9012 of the FY 2007 Defense Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-289) and Section 1519 

of the FY 2007 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-364). 

The basis of the President’s objection to Section 1222 is unclear from the statement, which refers to four different provisions in the law to which the President 

says he has constitutional objections (sections 841, 846, 1079, and 1222). In a Statement of Administration Policy issued in relation to an earlier Senate version of the 

FY 2008 Defense Authorization Act (S.1547) that included this same provision, a 

constitutional concern was raised with respect to the provision, but only with regard 

to the second paragraph, which prohibits the obligation or expenditure of funds to 

‘‘exercise United States control of the oil resources of Iraq.’’ No objection was raised 

with respect to the first paragraph, which prohibits the obligation or expenditure 

of funds to establish ‘‘any military installation or base for the purpose of providing 

for the permanent stationing of United States Armed Forces in Iraq.’’ 

Please clarify whether the objection raised with respect to Section 1222 of the 

2008 Defense Authorization Act by the President in his statement of January 28, 

91 

2008, is related only to Section 1222(2), or if the objection is relevant to Section 

1222(1). In addition, please explain in detail the Executive Branch’s constitutional 

concern with respect to either or both paragraphs of Section 1222, as appropriate. 

Answer. The United States is not seeking to establish or maintain permanent 

bases in Iraq. With respect to your specific question, the objection in question was 

addressed to Section 1222(2). As Attorney General Mukasey explained in a November 13, 2007 letter to Chairman Levin concerning the House and Senate versions 

of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, section 1222(2) of 

the Act raises a constitutional concern to the extent that it purports to prohibit U.S. 

control over oil resources in Iraq in connection with U.S. combat operations. More 

specifically, the provision ‘‘may impermissibly interfere with the President’s constitutional authority as Commander in Chief to conduct and direct military operations in Iraq, because in combat operations, taking temporary control over a particular oil resource might be a tactical necessity.’’ 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LUGAR

Question 1. I note that the Department’s vacancy rate for its positions exceeds 

18% for our missions overseas and exceeds 11% for positions in Washington. How 

far will your request, assuming it is filled in total this year, go towards correcting 

such a situation? How many of these positions will be security personnel for Baghdad to address the recent difficulties with contract security firms? If none, where 

will those positions, and how many, be funded from? 

Answer. NOTE: In the question above, the Department’s domestic and overseas 

vacancy rates have been reversed. As of January 2008, the Department’s overseas 

vacancy rate is around 11 percent and domestic vacancy rate is around 18 percent 

for a total of 13 percent overall. 

If approved and fully funded by Congress, the Department’s FY 2009 request for 

1543 new positions (1095 from State Operations Appropriations and 448 fee funded 

positions under the Border Security Program) would significantly reduce the Department’s overall vacancy rate. With the 300 new positions requested for language 

training, for example, the Department’s overseas vacancy rate could be cut in half 

to approximately 6 percent. The overseas vacancies are the most important positions 

for the Department to fill at this time. 

The 300 language training positions would allow us to backfill overseas and domestic positions that are currently left vacant while Foreign Service officers take 

needed foreign language training. A March 2007 study of the Department’s training 

and personnel needs conducted by the State Department’s Office of Resource Management and Analysis (HR/RMA) showed that around 240 new positions were required at that time to cover the number of personnel allocated to foreign language 

training slots without creating vacancies elsewhere. Since the 2007 study, the number of language designated positions has increased even further, including positions 

requiring ‘‘superhard’’ languages, such as Arabic and Chinese, which generally require two years of training to reach a level of general professional proficiency. 

Many of the other new position requests in the FY 2009 budget would support 

important Department initiatives, such as the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, but 

would not reduce the current vacancy rate. These requests include 351 positions for 

the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, 20 new Public Diplomacy positions, 75 positions 

to increase the number of State personnel who can attend military training institutions, 75 positions to support increased interagency exchanges and details, 200 positions for Worldwide Security Protection, 50 new positions to serve as Political Advisors to military commands, 19 positions for Educational and Cultural Affairs program increases, and five positions for Embassy Security, Construction and Maintenance. The 448 fee-funded positions under the Border Security Program will meet 

increasing requirements for visa and passport adjudicators and fraud investigations. 

The Department authorized a permanent increase in Baghdad staffing consistent 

with the staffing recommendations of the Secretary of State’s Panel on Personal 

Protective Services in Iraq. This increased staffing includes 88 Special Agents and 

13 contract positions overseas to implement both the Panel’s recommendations and 

the December 2007 MOA with the Department of Defense. The additional personnel 

will provide staffing for contract oversight, a joint DoS/DoD investigative response 

unit, and other administrative positions. 

92 

Unbudgeted Costs of the Falling Dollar 

Question 2. The falling value of the dollar continues to put enormous pressure on 

the Department’s budget, much of which must be paid in foreign currencies including the Pound, Euro and Yen. This resulted in costs of some $38 million in FY 08, 

money that was paid out of its overall budget. 

Was any funding budgeted in FY 2009 to cover such likely costs given the continued devaluation of the dollar? 

What figure is the Department using for FY 2009 for anticipated exchange rate 

losses? 

Answer. Our FY 2009 budget request incorporates exchange rate assumptions as 

of December 2007. It does not factor in exchange rate losses that will be incurred 

if the dollar continues to weaken over the coming year. Aside from the uncertainty 

of predicting exchange rates 12-18 months in advance, releasing such a prediction 

could be misinterpreted by some observers as an official U.S. government forecast 

or policy. 

We are aware that some independent economic forecasters predict that the dollar’s six-year slide is likely to continue. For example, according to the Global Insight 

forecasting firm, the dollar may decline another 8% vs. the euro over the next 12 

months. 

Exchange rate losses cost the Department nearly $83 million in FY 07 purchasing 

power and perhaps may cost twice that amount in FY 08. Such losses would overwhelm our limited tools to absorb exchange rate fluctuations. Prior to FY 2004, exchange rate losses were offset by the Buying Power Maintenance Account (BPMA), 

at the account had over $16 million at the beginning of FY 2003. During FY 2003 

and FY 2004, exchange rate fluctuations resulted in the total depletion of the account. In the absence of appropriated funding to replenish the BPMA, the Department is seeking legislation that would allow the Department to utilize expired funds 

to more quickly replenish this fund. Greater flexibility to sweep unobligated expired 

balances from D&CP and related accounts could significantly enhance our ability to 

replenish the BPMA up to its $100 million ceiling. 

PEPFAR 

Question 3. (a) This Congress worked hard to increase funding core health programs, especially in the areas of maternal and child health in FY 08. I was dismayed to see that the FY 09 budget request for the Child Survival and Health Fund 

faced a decrease of 14 percent from the FY 08 enacted level and a decrease of 9 

percent from the FY 07 enacted level. 

(b) Can you explain where the cuts occurred and why? 

Answer. (a) The President’s Child Survival and Health (CSH) budget request for FY 2009 is $1.58 billion, a slight increase from the FY 2008 request of $1.56 billion. 

It represents a 14 percent reduction from the FY 2008 estimated level of $1.83 billion. 

Within a constrained budget, the CSH level still represents about 30 percent of 

all program funds appropriated to USAID—making it USAID’s largest single sectoral program. The USG clearly remains the largest donor for health assistance and 

retains its leadership status in this sector. 

(b) The requested levels for FY 2009 were equal to or higher than the requested 

levels in FY 2008 for all CSH elements except Avian Influenza and Malaria. A lower 

request for Avian Influenza (AI) funding in FY 2009 was enabled by building stockpiles of commodities to combat AI. Funds requested for Malaria in FY 2009 are 

above the FY 2008 estimate (by $28 million) to restore funding to the level requested in FY 2008 and ensure meeting the goals of the Presidential Malaria Initiative. 

Severe funding constraints led to difficult choices on how to address health assistance. The FY 2009 request is less than the FY 2008 estimate for Family Planning 

and Reproductive Health (by $90 million), Maternal and Child Health (by $77 million), Avian Influenza (by $65 million), Tuberculosis (by $57 million), HIV/AIDS (by 

$5 million), and Vulnerable Children (by $5 million). 

Question 4. The FY 09 budget request for the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative account 

includes a line item request for ‘‘partnership compacts.’’ 

Can you elaborate further on what this assistance will be used for? Are you planning on moving towards the compact approach for FY 09? 

Answer. We plan to move forward on Partnership Compacts in FY 09. Reflecting 

the paradigm shift from a ‘donor-recipient’ relationship to one of partnership embodied by PEPFAR, the U.S. Government will work with host governments to deVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:05 Feb 27, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\47624.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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velop Partnership Compacts based on mutual trust and respect with obligations and 

responsibilities for all partners. Compacts will be pursued with countries with significant HIV/AIDS burdens in which the U.S. Government has a well established 

on-the-ground presence and where U.S. Government resources would play a substantial role and have a comparative advantage in the fight against HIV/AIDS. 

A country’s progress on financial or policy parameters will not be a pre-condition 

for developing a Compact, and continued efforts in countries currently receiving resources will not be conditioned on Compacts. Rather, Compacts will serve as a 

framework for moving forward together to save as many lives as possible with the 

resources that are available. Compacts will be structured to promote deeper integration of HIV/AIDS services into health systems, seeking to promote sustainability by 

ensuring that HIV/AIDS programs build capacity and benefit health systems overall. 

Additional PEPFAR resources under Compacts will not necessarily be provided 

through governments, but will be provided in support of multi-sectoral national 

HIV/AIDS plans. Compacts must be tailored to local circumstances, so their development will be led by U.S. Government personnel in-country, who have relationships 

with key government counterparts. Compacts are anticipated in both PEPFAR’s current focus countries and in additional countries, and will link new U.S. Government 

resources to host country commitments in two key areas: 

1. Financial commitment 

Resources differ dramatically from country to country, based on each nation’s level 

of development. Almost every nation severely affected by HIV/AIDS can do more. 

For example, in the 2005 Abuja Declaration, African governments committed themselves to devote at least 15% of their budgets to health; only a few have reached 

this level. Several current focus countries have significant resource allocations to 

HIV/AIDS, yet nearly all can do more. In some countries, ‘‘more’’ can be measured 

in hundreds of thousands of dollars, in others millions, tens of millions or more. It 

is important that resources for HIV/AIDS do not offset other health or development 

areas, and this will be reflected in the Compacts. 

2. Policy commitment 

Policy changes can create an environment conducive to an effective health and 

HIV/AIDS response, ensuring that available resources are optimally used to save as 

many lives as possible. While agreements would vary from one country to another, 

key issues addressed might include: 

• Workforce: Regulations and policies that allow effective task-shifting for health 

care workers. 

• Gender: Regulations and policies to limit gender-based violence and discrimination, prevent transgenerational sex, and protect women’s inheritance rights. 

• Orphans: Regulations and policies to protect the inheritance rights of children. 

• HIV-specific: Regulations and policies that promote opt-out counseling and testing, pediatric diagnosis, rapid, tariff-free regulatory procedures for drugs and 

commodities, and full inclusion of people living with HIV/AIDS in a multi-sectoral national response. 

Question 5. The FY 09 Budget requests $30 billion for PEPFAR over the next five 

years. There are many legislators and interested parties advocating for the US commitment to increase to $50-60 Billion over the five years. 

What affect would that large of an increase have on existing development assistance allocations? 

Answer. On May 30, 2007, President Bush announced his intention to work with 

U.S. Congress to reauthorize the Emergency Plan. He proposed a five-year, $30 billion extension that would double the United States’ initial $15 billion commitment. 

Under the proposal, PEPFAR would support treatment for 2.5 million people, prevention of 12 million new infections, and care for 12 million people infected and affected by HIV/AIDS, including 5 million orphans and vulnerable children. 

As you note, some members of Congress have advocated that the reauthorizing 

legislation for PEPFAR commit $50-60 billion in funding in the next phase. We are 

sympathetic to the generous intentions behind such commitments, but are cautious 

that the proposals must encompass a comprehensive view of U.S. development assistance that would not require either an unrealistic increase in foreign assistance 

funding or significant cuts to other valuable programs. We look forward to working 

with the appropriators to further analyze the authorization and verify program 

need. 

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Energy 

Question 6. On December 19, 2007, President Bush signed into law the Energy 

Independence and Security Act. This law contained several international energy 

provisions affecting U.S. foreign policy, State Department organization, and requires 

reporting on U.S. international energy diplomatic activities. 

What is the State Department’s plan for implementing the International Energy 

Coordinator position? How much funding is required for the office? How much staff 

support is to be allocated to the Coordinator? 

Answer. We expect to announce the International Energy Coordinator in the very 

near future. The position will be staffed and funded via restructuring/reallocation 

of existing resources. This is a high priority for the Department of State and will 

result in increased attention to energy issues. 

Note: On March 11, 2008, Under Secretary for Economic, Energy and Agricultural 

Affairs, Ruben Jeffery III, was designated by Secretary Rice Coordinator for International Energy Affairs. 

Question 7. Secretary Rice testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 

February 13, 2008, that a special envoy for energy security for the Caspian region 

and East-West Corridor initiative would be appointed. What is the timeline for such 

a person to be appointed? To whom will the envoy report? 

Answer. We intend to appoint, and we are looking for, a special energy coordinator, who could especially spend time on the Central Asian and Caspian region. 

This effort is ongoing. We anticipate that the envoy most likely will report to the 

Secretary through the Coordinator for International Energy. We also have a strong 

team of senior and mid-level officers who give special emphasis to energy issues in 

Central Asia and the Caspian region, as well as to broader European energy security issues. 

Question 8. What progress has been made on formulating policies to advance energy cooperation with the Government of Chile? Are there specific sectoral areas of 

interest? (Biofuels, hydraulic, cellulosic, gas, nuclear, solar, etc). 

Answer. We have created a four-tiered action plan to deepen our bilateral engagement with Chile on energy. The four main categories of our cooperation are: 

1. Renewable Energy: Biofuels, Geothermal, Wind, and Solar 

2. Nuclear Power for Electricity Generation 

3. Energy Policy 

4. Energy Efficiency 

Last year, working with the Department of Energy’s and business and science organizations, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency sponsored a visit of Chileans 

to study geothermal energy in the United States. From September 30 to October 6, 

2007, a dozen Chilean government, private sector, and academic experts met with 

U.S. industry and government experts to explore the potential for cooperation on 

geothermal energy development. 

From April 7-11, a team of eight Chilean government officials who play important 

roles in determining Chile’s national policies on energy issues, including those related to nuclear power and national security, will visit U.S. nuclear facilities and 

regulators as part of the Voluntary Visitors program organized by the Department 

of State. The costs of this program will be shared by the USG and the Government 

of Chile and the delegation will be led by the Chilean Minister of Energy Marcelo 

Tokman. The group will have meetings with senior officials at the Department of 

State, Department of Energy, NRC, EPA, FEMA, the U.S. Congress, and representatives of the private sector and of non-governmental organizations active on nuclear 

energy issues. There are also plans for the group to visit a nuclear reactor and to 

explore emergency management issues at the local level. 

In addition, U.S. Ambassador to Chile Paul Simons and Chilean Ambassador to 

the U.S. Mariano Fernandez traveled to California on February 14 and 15, 2008. 

They identified partnership opportunities with the California Energy Commission, 

California Air Resources Board, University of California at Davis, and private sector 

organizations. The Economics, Energy and Business Bureau has also sent a science 

fellow to Embassy Santiago who will further energy cooperation with Chile. 

Using U.S. funds at the Organization of American States, the OAS will organize 

a Southern Cone renewable energy conference to be held this spring in Santiago, 

which will bring policy and technology experts to provide specific energy recommendations to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy technologies. 

95 

The Department of State is also assisting with implementing and funding an extensive new academic exchange program with Chile that will enable Chilean students to pursue advanced graduate study in the United States, and some of these 

grantees are expected to be enrolled in Ph.D. programs concentrating on energy 

issues. 

Question 9. What, if any, steps are being taken to increase communication on 

international energy policy formulation and coordination in implementing international energy diplomatic activities with the Department of Energy and other executive agencies? 

Answer. The Department of State continues to coordinate broadly with the Department of Energy and other departments on energy policy. State and DOE work 

closely together in bilateral dialogues with key energy producers. These include the 

Energy Working Group with Saudi Arabia, the Energy Consultative Mechanism 

with Canada, and the North America Energy Working Group, part of the Security 

and Prosperity Partnership with Mexico and Canada. The State Department works 

very closely with DOE in our extensive energy engagement with China and India. 

We exchange information and coordinate with DOE on Caspian energy developments. Leaders from both Departments have traveled together to key Caspian countries to promote our energy security goals of diversification of sources of supply and 

transportation routes for oil and gas. Furthermore, a regular interagency mechanism has been launched involving NSC and State leadership to coordinate interagency work on Eurasian energy topics. 

We coordinate closely with DOE in multilateral fora, including the Five Party Energy Ministerial (China, India, Japan, South Korea, USA), APEC, and the G8. Both 

the Department of State and DOE are on the Board of the International Energy 

Agency (IEA) and jointly develop U.S. Government positions in the IEA. 

The Department of State has asked the Department of Energy to be part of the 

Management Committee of the U.S.-Brazil Memorandum of Understanding on 

Biofuels Cooperation. The Department of State and the Department of Energy are 

also working closely together on the Global Critical Energy Infrastructure Security 

strategy. 

Question 10. (a) How much funding is required to implement the Global Critical 

Energy Infrastructure Security Program? 

(b) How much staff support is allocated to this project? 

Answer. (a) Global Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection is a key U.S. priority, 

and the Department has been working both bilaterally and multilaterally on efforts 

to address it. With our G-8 partners, in APEC, and in the OAS, the U.S. is leading 

initiatives to promote greater recognition of the threat and propose programs to address it. Similarly, with U.S. encouragement, NATO is considering an initiative to 

monitor and assess energy developments that are linked to regional instabilities or 

terrorist threats. 

The U.S. is also working aggressively to address Critical Global Energy Infrastructure protection on a bilateral basis. The Department is working with experts 

from across the interagency to help key partners improve security measures at key 

installations and improve their own internal capabilities to protect these facilities. 

While the U.S. is aiding these efforts by providing expertise, no State Department 

funds have been requested specifically for this initiative. Most of the countries with 

whom we are dealing have their own assets, and we anticipate that they will be 

both able and willing to cover the full costs of developing and implementing recommended security improvements. 

(b) At the moment, two individuals have been assigned to work full time on this 

project in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. As has been the case 

previously in this initiative, however, the Department has identified individuals in 

other agencies and other bureaus of the Department with subject matter expertise 

and utilized their skills in this project on an ‘‘as needed’’ basis. 

Question 11. Funding for the Multilateral Donor’s Fund for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative was authorized in legislation signed by the President 

in December 2007. What is the State Department’s policy on contributing to the 

Fund? 

Answer. We support EITI, participate actively on the EITI board and assist with 

EITI implementation directly through our embassies. Our financial support to date 

has been: 

• FY 06—$990,000 in total funds ($1 million before rescissions) to support civil 

society participation in EITI implementation, administered by USAID 

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• Peru—$445,000 for catalyzing EITI planning and stronger civil society 

participation in EITI 

• Nigeria—$445,000 to expand civil society oversight of EITI 

• Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)—$100,000 to expand civil society 

and private sector engagement in EITI 

• FY 07—$1 million to support civil society participation in EITI implementation. 

USAID is currently determining the recipient countries. 

• FY 08—The FY 08 funding estimate is $3 million. The Foreign Operations Conference Report directs that no less than this amount be provided to the EITI 

multi-donor trust fund at the World Bank; however, the final determinations on 

the amount and destination of the money are subject to 653(a) negotiations on 

FY 08 allocations. 

Clean Technology Fund 

Question 12. What other mechanisms are available to the U.S. to fund clean technology? For example, what is available through the International Finance Corporation, the Global Environment Facility, OPIC, Ex-Im Bank, USAID, Environmental 

Protection Agency, the Energy Department, the Trade and Development Agency, 

etc.? 

Answer. The Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) are all active in financing 

clean technology projects in developing countries and are expanding their support 

for low carbon investments. For example, the World Bank Group provided $1.4 billion in financing for low carbon energy projects in 2007. In addition, the Global Environment Facility has played an important role in leveraging MDB funds to help 

developing countries remove policy, institutional, and other barriers to the uptake 

of cleaner energy technologies. 

The Clean Technology Fund would focus on scaling up the deployment of existing 

commercially available technologies in a smaller number of developing countries 

with significant emissions that are committed to mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. The CTF would help to finance the cost difference between more expensive 

clean technologies and cheaper dirty technologies. The CTF would leverage the existing capital of the multilateral development banks to substantially increase the 

level of their funding of clean technology-related activities. The CTF would also leverage substantial private sector investment in clean technologies through the private sector arms of the MDBs. 

Bilateral agencies, such as OPIC and Ex-Im Bank are expanding their support for 

clean technology, in particular renewable energy projects, and could be co-financiers 

in CTF investments. 

Question 13. In December 2007, President Bush signed into law creation of a 

Clean Energy Foundation with similar purposes to the Clean Technology Fund. 

What is the justification for two new programs with essentially the same goals? 

How would their work be complementary? 

Answer. The CTF would be a multilateral fund targeted at transforming key sectors of major emitting developing countries to lower carbon trajectories by deploying 

clean technologies on a large scale and rewarding appropriate policy reform in recipient countries. By pooling resources from countries such as the UK and Japan, 

and drawing upon the existing MDB capital base, the MDBs’ ongoing policy dialogue 

with developing countries and the technical expertise of these institutions, the CTF 

will develop the scale needed to positively affect policy reform and public and private investment decisions. 

The Clean Energy Foundation would promote the deployment of U.S. clean technology overseas. We expect that both activities, if funded, could provide synergies 

to achieve a common goal of lowering greenhouse gas emissions. 

Question 14. How will the Clean Technology Fund work? Who will provide staff? 

Will they be seconded or will their salaries be paid out of the Fund? Where will the 

Fund be housed? How much will be charged for overhead? How will funding decisions be made? Will there be a matching grant component so that recipient countries contribute some portion of the grant as well? 

Answer. The CTF would be a multilateral trust fund administered by the World 

Bank, as Trustee, but controlled by a trust fund committee composed of donors with 

the participation of recipient countries. The fund would provide grants and 

concessional financing to support national policies and efforts to create better market conditions for the uptake of clean technologies, and to help finance the cost difference between clean and dirty technologies in select developing countries. The 

public and private sector windows of the World Bank and regional development 

97 

banks would submit requests for CTF funding to the trust fund committee. The 

MDBs and their staff would work with public and private investors to finance individual projects. By working through the MDBs, including their private sector-lending windows, the CTF would be able to leverage significant existing public and private sector financing to scale up deployment of clean technologies in major developing countries. 

The CTF’s trust fund committee would review and approve country programs and 

projects generated through a cooperative process between the MDBs and the recipient countries based on these countries’ low carbon economic development strategies. 

Once CTF funding is approved, the MDB implementing the project would follow its 

normal project approval, implementation and safeguard procedures, and provide 

periodic reporting on the status of use of Fund resources back to the World Bank 

for consolidation into reports for the trust fund committee. 

The World Bank would charge the CTF for the actual costs of administering the 

Fund, and there will not be a fixed administrative fee. A small administrative unit 

would be created in the World Bank to coordinate the functions of the CTF, organize 

meetings and prepare needed reports. The costs of the unit as well as other administrative functions provided by the World Bank (e.g. accounting/audit) would be 

charged to the Fund. The CTF would not have its own staff for project development 

because MDB staff would develop projects for CTF support as part of their normal 

project development process. To receive funding, we think that recipient countries 

should take a variety of actions to demonstrate their national commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and co-financing is one of those possible actions. 

Question 15. How will the Clean Technology Fund work in conjunction with the 

Asia-Pacific Partnership? 

Answer. Many of the countries and sectors being supported through the APP are 

also priorities for the CTF. Projects developed for the CTF would benefit from sectoral and project development work of APP subgroups and project financing and 

technical assistance relationships, such as those with the Asian Development Bank. 

Question 16. Is establishment of the Clean Technology Fund an act in fulfillment 

of the United States’ obligations under the United Nations Framework Convention 

on Climate Change? 

Answer. There is no U.S. obligation under the UNFCCC to set up the kind of 

fund, or level of funding, that we have proposed. Having said that, the Clean Technology Fund is one of a number of mechanisms that will serve to implement general 

obligations under the UNFCCC to promote technology transfer. By assisting major 

developing countries in implementing low carbon growth strategies, the CTF will 

contribute to the achievement of the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC to stabilize 

atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. 

Question 17. Why is the Administration proposing to start a new Clean Technology Fund rather than clear U.S. arrears (unfulfilled commitments) to the Global 

Environment Facility for $170.6 million and to the International Development Association for $377.9 million? 

Answer. Energy security and climate change are important priorities for the Administration. Therefore, in September 2007, President Bush proposed a major multilateral initiative to create a new international clean technology fund to help developing countries harness the power of clean energy technologies and address the 

growing problem of accelerating greenhouse gas emissions in major developing countries. The Administration is working with donors and developing countries to create 

a fund, to be launched in 2008, that will catalyze resources of the multilateral development banks and the private sector to create innovative financing instruments to 

spur clean technology investments in the major emitting developing countries. 

The Administration has tried to keep its FY 2009 budget request to a responsible, 

prudent level consistent with the President’s overall emphasis on budget discipline. 

Unfortunately, the Congress did not fund our request for arrears last year—in fact, 

arrears increased overall—and we hope this year’s request is more in line with 

Congress’s expectations and funding intentions. That said, it is even more imperative that Congress fully fund the FY 2009 request of $1.671 billion for the multilateral development banks so as not to further increase our arrears and worsen our 

credibility in the institutions and among fellow donors. 

Question 18. What is the reasoning for the size of the Clean Technology Fund request at $400 million? 

Answer. The World Bank estimates that there is a $30 billion annual gap between 

the cost of deploying clean technology versus dirtier technology in the power sector 

alone in developing countries. This fund would help leverage public and private capVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:05 Feb 27, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00101 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\47624.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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ital to reduce the cost of investing in cleaner technology or energy efficiency in 

power, transport, and other sectors so that developing countries are able to close 

that gap. The goal is for the CTF to have a meaningful impact in incentivizing key 

high emissions developing countries to substantially reduce their emissions trajectories. 

The Administration is seeking authorization for a $2 billion contribution to a mul- tilateral effort that would total up to $10 billion. $400 million is the proposed first 

year amount of a three year contribution. 

Question 19. Does the Administration intend to send authorizing or other legislation for Clean Technology Fund activities for Congressional consideration? If so, 

when will that legislation be sent to Congress? 

Answer. Yes. The Administration intends to send to Congress authorizing legislation for the Clean Technology Fund in March. 

Question 20. What type of reporting will the Administration provide on the activities of the Clean Technology Fund? 

Answer. The World Bank, as trustee for the multilateral CTF, would generate reports on the activities of the Fund, and the finances of the Fund will be audited 

in conjunction with the World Bank annual financial audit. These reports would follow World Bank standards and procedures and be made publicly available. 

Question 21. Will the Treasury Inspector General have investigation authorities 

over the Clean Technology Fund? If not, what part of the U.S. Government will 

have the authority to investigate any fraud and misuse of the Clean Technology 

Fund? 

Answer. The Treasury IG does not audit U.S. contributions to the World Bank. 

The MDBs’ internal and external personnel and auditors would conduct oversight 

of funds contributed to the Clean Technology Fund, and investigate any alleged 

fraud or misuse. The GAO could conduct reviews relating to specific issues of concern as they do on other MDB issues. 

Question 22. If the Clean Technology Fund is housed at the World Bank, would 

it be legal and appropriate to allow Fund proceeds to be given to China given that 

the U.S. is legislatively mandated not to support World Bank loans to China due 

to military audit and human rights concerns? 

Answer. The United States would participate in the CTF in a manner consistent 

with U.S. law. Currently, under certain legislative mandates, the United States does 

not vote in favor of loans or other assistance to China in the MDBs unless the loans 

or assistance support basic human needs. 

Treasury plans to continue to consult closely with Members and staff on how to 

address the existing legislative restrictions that relate to U.S. support for clean 

technology projects in certain countries. The United States has a strong interest in 

promoting the adoption of clean technology and reducing green house gas emissions 

from developing countries, including China, in an environmentally effective and economically efficient manner, given the direct global benefits of such an outcome and 

the fact that the poor are disproportionately vulnerable to the negative effects of 

global climate change and environmental degradation. 

Question 23. How do we explain to constituents who might argue that China has 

enough funds of its own, as demonstrated by their Sovereign Wealth Fund, to fund 

clean technology investments in their own country. What is your response to this 

assertion? 

Answer. This fund is aimed at the broader issue of rapid growth in greenhouse 

gas emissions by developing countries. Its purpose is to create positive incentives 

to put in place legal and regulatory frameworks to encourage the deployment of low 

carbon technologies and to help reduce the risk to public and private investors of 

committing to new clean technology projects. 

By 2030, global demand for energy will increase by 55%, of which 74% will come 

from developing countries. Meeting developing country energy needs will require an 

estimated $10 trillion of investment in energy supply infrastructure over the next 

two decades. Using old, dirty technologies to meet these needs would massively increase global greenhouse gas emissions and offset reductions made in the United 

States and other developed countries. It is in the U.S. interest to encourage major 

developing countries to act now to begin reducing their emissions growth. 

No country would have a guarantee of funding from the CTF. The CTF would 

have selection criteria where interested countries will have to demonstrate a strong 

commitment to national action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. China would 

only be eligible for funding if it were to meet the fund’s eligibility requirements. In 

99 

addition, the CTF would have a limit on the share of CTF financing that any one 

country may receive. Donors are currently considering a country limit of 15-20 percent. 

Given China’s capacity to finance its own development and the scale of its needs, 

we expect that the Chinese Government and Chinese private sector would bear the 

preponderant share of financing costs and obligations needed for energy investments. Any CTF funding in China would play a catalytic role and seek to leverage 

these and other funds. 

Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) 

Question 24. Why did the administration only request $42 million to clear the 

U.S. arrears to the international financial institutions when the total of U.S. arrears 

to the institutions is $872.3 million as of end-FY2008? 

Answer. The Treasury Department tried to keep their request to a responsible, 

prudent level consistent with the President’s overall emphasis on budget discipline. 

Unfortunately, the Congress did not fund the request for arrears last year—in fact 

arrears increased overall—and we hope this year’s request is more in line with Congress’ expectations and funding intentions. That said, it is even more imperative 

that Congress fully fund the FY 2009 request of $1.671 billion for the MDBs so as 

not to further increase our arrears and worsen our credibility in the institutions and 

among fellow donors. 

Question 25. How do continued U.S. arrears impact U.S. influence at the multilateral development banks? 

Answer. Rising arrears jeopardize U.S. credibility and underscore the growing 

international perception that the United States does not fulfill its international commitments. Our arrears to the International Development Association (IDA), the 

World Bank’s concessional window, threaten our ability to meet U.S. debt relief 

commitments to the World Bank. Arrears also undermine our ability to advance key 

reforms on which the United States is the most forceful advocate—continued 

progress on the anti-corruption agenda, improved results of assistance programs, 

and increased transparency and accountability of World Bank operations. Finally, 

our arrears demonstrate a lack of commitment to the capital base of the institutions, which is leading to our shares being auctioned off to other countries. 

Civilian Stability Initiative 

Question 26. Explain the interagency process that took place in developing the Civilian Stabilization Initiative. Provide a breakdown of the individual agencies and 

their equities in this coordinated effort to respond to the demand for civilian skills 

in the field. 

Answer. The Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) is the culmination of two years 

of work by more than 15 agencies, including State, DOD and USAID, with extraordinary additional support from the academic community and members of Congress, 

to determine the full civilian capacity needs of the U.S. Government to respond to 

the stabilization challenges that we face and will continue to face over the next decade. Out of this interagency collaboration, the Interagency Management System 

(IMS) for Reconstruction and Stabilization was developed and approved by the Administration. 

With agreement of the CSI and IMS in place, S/CRS joined with USAID, multiple 

State Department offices, and the Departments of Justice, Commerce, Agriculture, 

Treasury, HHS, and DHS, to form an Interagency Task Force to finalize the design 

of the Active, Standby and Civilian Reserve components. All eight agencies involved 

in the taskforce will develop Active Response Corps members and field Standby Response Corps members. Each of the agencies will also act as ‘‘proponents’’ for categories of Civilian Reserve Corps members according to the agencies’ specialization, 

for example: USAID is the proponent for specific governance, public administration, 

and infrastructure positions, while Treasury is the proponent for the fiscal, monetary, and tax policy and banking systems positions. 

Question 27. If such coordination was available in 2001, what impact might it 

have had on U.S. forces deployment and effectiveness? Do you have any estimates 

of the potential savings such civilian preparation might afford the U.S. government? 

Answer. The Civilian Stabilization Initiative is designed to provide trained and 

equipped civilians with the right skill sets to deploy quickly in a stabilization operation. The Interagency Management System, the command and control structure for 

civilian operations, will improve greatly the efficiency of these operations and should 

save lives and money. 

100 

That said, it is difficult to estimate the potential savings that civilian capability 

might afford the U.S. Government because it has not yet been implemented on a 

broad scale. However, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in 

January, Carlos Pascual of the Brookings Institute estimated that if we had a civilian capacity in Iraq that allowed us to withdraw one division one month early, we 

would have saved $1.2 billion. 

Question 28. What are the key first steps that such a civilian response capacity 

would have to take to make the best use of the critical first days of a crisis? 

Answer. S/CRS would convene a CRSG (Country Reconstruction and Stabilization 

Group) with the NSC, the State Department geographic bureau, and with policy levels at USAID, DOD and other federal agencies likely to be involved in a response 

to determine an initial course of action and to task immediate information collection 

and response assessment. A CRSG secretariat would be established to join up civilian and military planning, consult with the U.S. embassy in country (if any), dispatch a coordination group, or Integrated Planning Cell (IPC), to the relevant military combatant command, and deploy an Advanced Civilian Team (ACT) of highly 

trained experts to the country in crisis. 

S/CRS and the CRSG secretariat would be responsible for calling up the civilian 

response from all the agencies participating in the CSI. The first responders would, 

for the most part, come from the inter-agency Active Response Corps (ARC). S/CRS 

would also activate the interagency Stand-by Response Corps (SRC) and thereby 

identify and make available a wider pool of government employees with relevant 

skills. 

The Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) Home Office, a part of S/CRS, would review 

critical civilian skills needed to support the request and begin identifying possible 

CRC members to alert for federal activation. 

The initial ARC teams could be on the ground at the site of an overseas crisis 

48 hours after the decision to deploy them, and begin the response effort in coordination with the existing U.S. mission in country (if any) and any other crisis response teams (such as USAID’s DART) that might be there. This civilian response 

would partner, as necessary and advisable, with any U.S. military assets deployed 

to the crisis (for instance, a Joint Task Force), and/or with partners or international 

organizations that might also be part of a broader international response. 

Question 29. Describe the Coordinator’s role and position with respect to his ability to coordinate among the most senior officials at fellow agencies? How will you 

support the Coordinator in this responsibility? 

Answer. Under National Security Presidential Directive 44, the Secretary of State 

is charged with leading and coordinating integrated United States Government efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. I 

have instructed the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Ambassador 

John Herbst, to act on my behalf in fulfilling this directive. 

The role of the State Department in this context is one of leadership and coordination, not directive authority. However, the Coordinator has very effectively led an 

interagency effort to prepare and plan for such activities. The Coordinator reports 

directly to me and has my full support in this effort. 

Question 30. Please describe the Defense Authorization Section 1207 funding. 

How would you and the Coordinator utilize such funding? How would you be able 

to prevent its premature use for other purposes as was apparently the case when 

State sought funding to respond to the Lebanon crisis in 2006 and only some $17 

million remained from the original $100 million authorized? Please provide a breakdown of the amounts and uses of Section 1207 funding by year since its inception. 

Answer. Section 1207 of the FY 06 National Defense Authorization Act authorized 

the Secretary of Defense to transfer to the Department of State up to $100 million 

in both FY 06 and FY 07 to improve U.S. capacity and interagency coordination for 

immediate reconstruction, security or stabilization assistance to a foreign country. 

Section 1210 of the FY 08 National Defense Authorization Act extended the authorization for $100 million through FY 08. 

S/CRS used FY 06 and FY 07 funds for projects in eight countries where security, 

stabilization and reconstruction issues overlap. The first one of these projects, and 

the only expenditure under 1207 in FY 06, was $10 million for assistance to Lebanon in August 2006. The Lebanese Internal Security forces received $5 million and 

$5 million was used for demining activities. Because this project also occurred at 

the end of the fiscal year, there was not sufficient time to use all available 1207 

funding for 2006. 

In FY 07, an interagency Technical Working Group (TWG) composed of S/CRS, 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of 

101 

the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (F) was formed to ensure a more cohesive 

decision-making process and to evaluate and fund projects throughout the year. In FY 07, a total of $99.7 million, or virtually the entire amount of the authority, was funded for activities in Haiti ($20m), Somalia ($25m), Nepal ($10m), Colombia 

($4m), Yemen ($8.845m), the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Program ($15m for 

Mauritania, Mali and Niger), and the East Asia Tri-Border Initiative ($16.9m for 

Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. These funds are being used for activities 

ranging from police training to public diplomacy, civil society support and employment generation. 

AFRICOM 

Political Advisors 

Question 31. The FY 2009 budget request includes 50 additional FTE positions for 

‘‘Political Advisors.’’ State has indicated that these are intended to meet the demand 

for new Combatant Command positions. 

a. To whom will they belong organizationally and through what chain of command 

will they be responsible? Who will pay their salaries when attached to a COCOM? 

Answer. Foreign Policy Advisors (POLADs) are State Department officers detailed 

to the command in which they are serving. Their salaries will be paid by the Department of State. The command pays for travel expenses associated with their duties at the command. 

Question b. Will these State Department and other civilian agency personnel be 

responsive to their respective Congressional Committees of Oversight? 

Answer. Yes 

Question c. Will the State Department and USAID IG offices participate in review 

of the COCOM activities insofar as they fall within U.S. foreign policy parameters 

such as humanitarian or development assistance, security cooperation etc.? 

Answer. The Department of State Office of Inspector General (OIG) regularly reviews coordination between Chiefs of Mission and the respective combatant commands (COCOM) when inspecting U.S. embassies. OIG will solicit input from DOS 

Political Advisors (POLADs) who are assigned to COCOMs on areas such as the 

adequacy of political or economic advocacy and reporting in specific missions, and 

extent and effectiveness of COM coordination with all DoD elements with programs 

or interests in the country. OIG considers entering into, as circumstances and resources allow, joint reviews with other OIGs, e.g., USAID OIG and DoD OIG, on 

implementation of humanitarian and development assistance, security cooperation, 

etc. 

Question d. What authority will these personnel have to use or direct the use of 

State Department or USAID funding? 

Answer. None. 

Question e. What specific training with these personnel receive that differs from 

other State Department personnel? 

Answer. POLADs attend an Orientation course organized by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the Foreign Service Institute as they assume their assignments. They are also encouraged to take the Foreign Service Institute’s PoliticalMilitary Course. Other training is available based on the officer’s experience and the 

position they will take. 

Question f. AFRICOM stand-up personnel have briefed staff that their intent is 

to seek 150 or more non-DoD civilian personnel? How many have they requested 

to date from State and USAID? How many have been provided from State and 

USAID or are intended to be provided by State and USAID? Please provide a list 

of the position or roles that will be filled at the COCOM. 

Answer. Our discussions with the Department of Defense over a period of months 

have focused on different numbers of State Department and/or USAID detailees to 

AFRICOM. Currently, State and USAID have filled or are planning to fill six positions at AFRICOM. The State Department has detailed personnel for the positions 

of Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities and of Foreign Policy to 

the Commander (POLAD), and a USAID employee is in the Senior Development Advisor position. In addition, USAID plans to detail one of its personnel to serve as 

the Chief of 

Humanitarian Assistance at AFRICOM, and State and USAID anticipate making 

nominations for two more positions in the near future: Chief of Outreach and Director of Programs. We have not received any additional requests from DoD to fill posiVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:05 Feb 27, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\47624.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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tions at AFRICOM. We are prepared to consider any future requests, taking into 

account our own staffing requirements and available funding. 

Question g. Are any other agencies making similar personnel requests for the purpose of manning the new model of COCOM? Is the Department of Energy providing 

personnel? 

Answer. We suggest that you may wish to contact the Department of Defense on 

this point. According to what we have heard from DoD, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Departments of Energy, Treasury, Education, and Homeland 

Security have provided nominees for the positions of either the Chief of Outreach 

and/or the Director or Programs. We understand that a Department of Commerce 

nominee has been selected for the position of Deputy Director for Resources. 

Budget 

The DoD budget request for FY 2009 includes $389 million ‘‘to establish a new 

command’’ known as AFRICOM. 

Question 32a. What if any funding is requested for FY 2009 in the 150 or 050 

account for the planning, preparation or construction of a military headquarters in 

Africa in FY 2009 or thereafter? 

Answer. The State Department has not requested any funds for AFRICOM from 

the 150 account for the planning, preparation or construction of a military headquarters in Africa. We understand from the Department of Defense that there are 

no funds in its FY 2009 050 budget request for the construction of a military headquarters. We suggest, however, that you may wish to contact DoD directly on this 

point. 

Question 32b. What is the budget of the State Department/USAID personnel contingent for AFRICOM in FY 2009 and are the funds from the 050 or 150 account 

resources? 

Answer. With the exception of the Foreign Policy Advisor to the Commander 

(POLAD), all direct hire State Department/USAID positions at the Command are 

reimbursable by the Department of Defense and therefore do not have specific implications for the 150 account. The POLAD position is funded from the State Operations budget. A contractor position to be filled by the Office of Disaster Assistance 

(OFDA) will be funded from International Disaster Famine Assistance (IDFA) resources. 

Question 32c. Has there been any coordination on planning for an African continent-based AFRICOM headquarters? 

Answer. No specific plans or decisions have been made regarding an AFRICOM 

Headquarters on the African continent. We expect the headquarters to remain in 

Stuttgart for the immediate future. 

Question 32d. What is the extent of such planning and what countries does it involve? 

Answer. No plans have been made regarding an AFRICOM headquarters on the 

African continent. 

Question 32e. Has Liberia formally or informally requested that the AFRICOM 

headquarters be based in that country? 

Answer. President Johnson Sirleaf has publicly expressed Liberia’s interest in 

hosting an AFRICOM presence. 

Question 32f. What is State Department’s position on Liberia as the location of 

AFRICOM? 

Answer. Liberia is the only country that has publicly expressed an interest in 

hosting an AFRICOM presence. Selection of any location for an AFRICOM presence 

would depend foremost on host nation willingness. Additional factors would likely 

include other foreign policy considerations, security, infrastructure, and logistical 

supportability. No decisions have been made regarding the structure or location of 

an AFRICOM headquarters on the continent. However, President Bush said during 

his recent trip to Africa that he would strongly consider Liberia’s offer to host 

AFRICOM. 

Question 32g. Would you provide any review that has been made of options for 

physical location or locations of AFRICOM? 

Answer. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) led a technical mission to 

visit a small number of African countries in November 2007. The site visits were 

intended to support U.S. decision-making processes. A representative of the Bureau 

103 

of African Affairs participated in the site visits. We suggest you may want to contact 

OSD for the trip report. 

Democracy and Governance 

Question 33. Describe the planned U.S. democracy and governance programming 

for FY 2008 and FY 2009 in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya and Pakistan. 

What lessons have been learned and what changes in such programming are 

being incorporated in the wake of disappointing progress in these four instances? 

Answer. In Ethiopia, the USG adapted to the flawed 2005 elections with a strategy to work outside the national government while also recognizing the potential for 

future democratic progress. To exploit potential openings, the USG is promoting constructive dialogue on key issues, legislation, and policies; expanding conflict management and reconciliation work at the national and local levels; and supporting 

multi-party capacity building in the legislature. Working outside the government, 

the USG started new programs to strengthen independent human rights monitoring. These programs complement efforts to improve respect for human rights in 

the judiciary and police. Support is also being provided to assist the Gambella and 

Somali Regional State and Municipal Governments to improve governance through 

better service delivery. The USG has reduced its plans to contribute to long-term 

multilateral support for the national and regional state parliaments and the National Elections Board (NEB) due to significant cuts in FY 2008 funding and a lack 

of demonstrated openness on the part of the Government of Ethiopia to consultative 

reform. The USG is currently soliciting new proposals for Ethiopia to provide legal 

assistance to journalists; build the capacity of independent media outlets; build the 

capacity of the judiciary; and improve the capacity of civil society to effectively monitor and report on human rights. 

In Nigeria, the primary democracy and governance problem is that political 

power, both formal and informal, lies almost exclusively in the hands of non-accountable political elites. This problem existed before last year’s flawed elections, 

and it still exists today. Consequently, the USG strategy in Nigeria is to address 

the elite control of political power at the national level and the crippling dysfunctions it creates at the sub-national level. USG assistance will support the creation 

of more responsive governance structures and help build the capacity of civil society 

organizations. U.S. assistance will also work to improve the capacity and credibility 

of the electoral commission and promote civil society input into electoral and constitutional reform dialogue in advance of the 2011 elections. We hope to start a new 

rule of law program in FY 2009. 

In Kenya, the USG is working to develop a new strategy in response to the current political crisis. It is clear that Constitutional and electoral reforms will be essential to address the issues that have arisen since December. Parliament and civil 

society will both be critical to the success of reform efforts. USG programs will work 

with the Parliament, local government, and political parties to improve the system 

of checks and balances and to facilitate necessary anti-corruption reforms. U.S. assistance will also promote civil society efforts to advocate for further governance reforms, provide citizen input to influence government policy, and monitor the government’s progress. In addition, the U.S. is providing funds to assist civil society in promoting national dialogue and discussion on a political solution to the current crisis. 

The USG will also support longer-term constitutional, land, and electoral reforms 

as part of the recent peace and reconciliation accord following the flawed general 

elections of December 27, 2007. 

In Pakistan, in the aftermath of the February 18 Parliamentary and Provincial 

elections, the USG will continue to support the strengthening of political processes 

to support the Government of Pakistan to establish truly democratic institutions 

with significant involvement by Pakistani civil society groups and NGOs. The USG 

strategy includes supporting the empowerment of women and youth to take active 

roles in civil society, promoting rule of law, strengthening political party development, promoting electoral reform, and expanding independent media. The USG will 

also help Pakistan strengthen its legal institutions and support reform of the judicial systems to protect human rights and promote the rule of law. 

Our experience in these four countries indicates the importance of an independent 

electoral commission and a proper election adjudication system to ensure open and 

fair electoral processes that instill legitimacy in newly-elected governments. These 

countries also illustrate the need for civil society to expand its base beyond politically motivated individuals engaged in episodic political events and address broader 

constituency demands in order for democratic institution building to take root over 

the long term. 

104 

Afghanistan 

Question 34. Describe the planned U.S. programming for FY 2008 and FY 2009 

with regard to building judicial capacity in Afghanistan. 

Answer. The primary U.S. agencies involved in building Afghanistan’s justice sector are the Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the United States Agency for International Development 

(USAID), and the Department of Justice (DOJ). The Department of Defense (DOD) 

is also expanding its rule of law programming, focusing on Eastern Afghanistan and 

on police-prosecutor overlaps. Over the past year these agencies have played a central role in improving the justice sector, including the judiciary (Supreme Court), 

the Ministry of Justice, the Attorney General’s office, and various governmental and 

non-governmental entities that are key to establishing the rule of law. They have 

been implementing the goals of a U.S. strategy approved by the National Security 

Council in August 2006 to (a) accelerate U.S. Government justice programs at the 

central level, (b) encourage increased donor contributions, and (c) expand justice to 

the provinces. We have made significant progress in all areas. 

At the central level, we have roughly doubled the scope of our assistance to the 

three primary justice institutions since early 2007, launching organizational reforms, rolling out a new court administration program, revising legislation that governs the administration of justice, establishing new training and mentoring programs, and providing infrastructure and equipment support. At the same time, we 

have played a leading role in Kabul and with other capitals in increasing the focus 

on the justice system. Our strong encouragement was a major factor in the Government of Italy’s decision to host the July 2007 Rome Conference on the Rule of Law 

in Afghanistan, co-hosted by the Italian Prime Minister, Afghan President Hamid 

Karzai, and the United Nations Secretary General. The conference garnered $98 

million in new contributions to the justice sector over four years, on top of existing 

commitments. We also have pushed the expansion of justice assistance into the 

provinces, which have received comparatively little support to date, by expanding 

our own bilateral programs and developing the Provincial Justice Coordination 

Mechanism, which is presently deploying rule of law coordinators across the country 

to work with Afghan and international actors. 

Meanwhile, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) is finalizing the National Justice Sector Strategy of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), which sets development goals to be met by 2013. To implement these, the GIRoA and international community are finalizing the National 

Justice Program (NJP) which will use a combination of Afghan and donor programs 

(both bilateral and multilateral) to develop and reform the justice system. The 

World Bank is establishing a justice program that will support the NJP, using 

pooled donor funding to reduce the number of small-scale implementers. 

With the National Justice Program providing a new strategic framework for the 

justice sector, the U.S. Government is developing its own strategy to support the 

NJP that is coordinated through the U.S. Embassy and incorporates U.S. military 

efforts. This new strategy, currently under development, will ensure the NJP priorities are implemented. These priority areas include: accelerating institutional reform; building provincial infrastructure and capacities; bolstering counter-narcotics 

and anti-corruption prosecutions; investing in the corrections system; improving 

linkages between police and prosecutors; and focusing on public awareness and legal 

aid to improve public confidence and access to justice. These efforts support the 

overall U.S. Government push to project governance to the provincial and district 

levels, which in turn will build nationwide confidence in the central Government’s 

ability to provide security and services. 

Building Afghanistan’s capacities to manage its own system is fundamental to 

success in Afghanistan. U.S. Government efforts also recognize that building justice 

sector capacities and public demand for justice alone will do little without high-level 

political will on the part of the GIRoA to tackle corruption, from the top down. To 

that end, the U.S. strategy emphasizes using diplomatic, political, and law enforcement tools to strengthen the Afghan political will to institute true reforms and tackle corruption within their government. We have seen several positive signs, including the recent passage of the Advocates Law (establishing a national bar and legal 

defense service). The GIRoA recently became a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), an important step in the right direction. 

Question 34a. What are the levels of U.S. assistance and in what areas has U.S. 

assistance been used to reform the judicial system, with the exception of police 

training? 

105 

Answer. U.S. Government assistance to the justice sector has gradually grown over the years, with an FY 07 budget of $67.35 million ($55 million in INLCLE 

funding and $12.35 million in USAID funding). For FY 08, the projected INCLE 

funding level for justice is $68 million, while USAID is projected at $4 million. This 

makes the U.S. Government the largest donor in the justice sector. 

As noted above, there are four US agencies primarily involved in building Afghanistan’s justice system: INL, USAID, DOJ, and DOD. These agencies and their 

programs are coordinated through the US Embassy Special Committee on the Rule 

of Law, chaired by the U.S. Rule of Law Coordinator. Below is an overview of each 

agency’s activities. 

Department of State—International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

The INL Afghanistan Administration of Justice program is primary concerned 

with building and reforming the criminal justice and corrections systems. Two major 

assistance platforms support this program: the Justice Sector Support Program 

(JSSP) and the Corrections System Support Program (CSSP), described in greater 

detail below. Both programs are implemented by Pacific Architects and Engineers 

(PAE) Government Services and have been in place since mid 2005 and early 2006, 

respectively. 

In addition to these two primary programs, INL also supports several smaller initiatives, including: (1) a grant with the University of Washington—Seattle which 

brings Afghan law professors to the U.S. to earn certificate and Master’s of Law 

(LLM) degrees; (2) a grant with the International Association of Women Judges 

(IAWJ) to support women in the legal profession; (3) an agreement with the United 

States Institute of Peace (USIP) to focus on specific policy and reform issues; (4) 

contributions to two multilateral trust funds to address disproportionately low salaries for judges, prosecutors and corrections personnel; and (5) funding to support 

three field offices of the Provincial Justice Coordination Mechanism mentioned 

above. INL also funds the Department of Justice (DOJ) Senior Federal Prosecutors 

Program in Afghanistan. 

The JSSP supports 30 U.S. justice advisors (prosecutors, judges, defense attorneys, and criminal justice systems experts) and 30 Afghan legal advisors, and has 

permanent teams based in Kabul, Herat, Balkh, Konduz, and Nangarhar provinces 

to build Afghanistan’s criminal justice system. JSSP provincial teams as well as 

DOJ prosecutors are conducting police-prosecutor training and mentoring, and will 

soon establish a new training program to improve justice capacities at the district 

level, working closely with the police program’s Focused District Development initiative. To date, DOJ and the JSSP have trained more than 1,000 Afghan lawyers. The 

Kabul JSSP team is split into three sections. The first section consists of 16 U.S. 

and Afghan advisors who are reorganizing the Attorney General’s Office, providing 

training and mentoring, and advising the Afghan Attorney General on key matters. 

The second section supports the Ministry of Justice and its key directorates with 

three U.S. and 11 Afghan advisors, including the recently established (entirely Afghan staffed) Policy and Strategy Unit which provides policy and organizational reform advice to the Minister. The third JSSP section focuses on improving access to 

justice, which includes mentoring and capacity building for private legal defense organizations, legal education and training, and organizing provincial justice conferences. The JSSP also has a gender justice advisor who is developing linkages between police Family Response Units and the prosecution services; as well as a military liaison to coordinate joint police-justice efforts. 

The CSSP supports over 30 U.S. corrections advisors in Kabul, Herat, Balkh, 

Nangarhar and Paktia provinces and is focused on four areas: training, capacitybuilding, infrastructure support, and operations and maintenance for a new facility 

in Kabul. The provincial teams have trained over 1,300 corrections officers to date 

in a basic 8-week course and a ‘‘train the trainers’’ course. The training program, 

which is based on international and United Nations human rights standards and 

was developed specifically for (and with) the Afghan Government, and is launching 

numerous advanced and specialized courses this year. The CSSP also supports a capacity-building program which is advising the Ministry of Justice’s Central Prison 

Directorate (CPD) on prison policies, prison management, establishing a prisoner 

tracking system and organizational reforms. The third CSSP component is the infrastructure team, which has refurbished the national corrections training center, completed numerous small-scale renovations of prisons, provided a new annex for the 

CPD headquarters for staff, and established an Afghan Engineering Office within 

the CPD. Together with Afghan architects and engineers, the CSSP has developed 

a ‘‘hybrid’’ prison design that incorporates international human rights standards 

with Afghan realities and cost-effectiveness to create a sustainable, humane, and secure prison design. In addition to constructing two prisons over the coming year, the 

106 

CSSP is also advising other donors to ensure that their designs and construction 

of prisons implement this Afghan-approved sustainable model. Lastly, the CSSP will 

support the operations and maintenance of the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center 

(CNJC) in Kabul, a secure facility built by the Army Corps of Engineers that will 

house the Counter-Narcotics Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) and Central Narcotics Tribunal (CNT) as well as a detention center. 

Finally, INL entered into an agreement with the United States Institute of Peace 

in mid 2007 to work with Afghan and international actors to develop policies and 

possible linkages with the non-state system of dispute resolution. While the focus 

of U.S. assistance must be on building the central government’s reach through the 

formal justice institutions, there may be linkages with the informal system for certain civil (but not criminal) disputes that could maximize efficiency and utilize the 

legitimacy that many customary systems enjoy, so long as human rights and gender 

rights are respected and enforced. 

United States Agency for International Development 

The USAID-funded Afghanistan Rule of Law Project assists in the development 

of a democratic Afghan government, which has broad citizen participation and a vigorous economic sector, by improving the country’s legal infrastructure. 

Working with the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court, as well as with faculties of law and Sharia in five provincial universities, the project works to: improve 

the formal court system; strengthen institutional capacity for lawmaking, and increase citizens’ awareness of their legal rights and how the judicial system operates. 

The project is divided into seven components: 

• Court administration. Simplifies and standardizes court administration procedures to improve access to court information 

• Judicial Training and Professional Development. Creates opportunities for improving judicial professionalism, knowledge and skills 

• Commercial Dispute Resolution. Lays a foundation for the effective resolution 

of commercial disputes 

• Legal Education. Strengthens the formal legal education system 

• Legislative Process Reform. Improves the legislative process and access to legal 

information 

• Women’s Rights Under Islam. Increases knowledge of women’s rights under 

Islam 

• Access to Justice and Building Links to the Informal Justice Sector. Ensures 

that the appropriate sector for resolving disputes is recognized 

USAID is also working to assist the Afghan government in fighting corruption. 

Judicial corruption remains endemic in Afghanistan. Since his appointment to the 

Supreme Court in August 2006, Chief Justice Abdul Salam Azimi has made cleaning up the courts his top priority. He has instituted an aggressive, two-pronged approach to reduce the level of corruption in the courts and to raise the level of public 

trust and confidence in the judiciary. The strategy includes instituting a new code 

of conduct for judges and raising judges’ salaries so they are more immune to bribery. 

The New Regulation of Judicial Conduct. The first part of the Supreme Court 

strategy focused on developing a modern code of judicial conduct that establishes 

ethical standards for how all of Afghanistan’s judges are to conduct their affairs. On 

June 19, 2007, that code, entitled the Regulation of Judicial Conduct for the Judges 

of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, was adopted. Each of Afghanistan’s 1,280 

judges will receive training on the Regulation’s meaning and importance by the end 

of September 2008. 

Improving Judicial Salaries and Working Conditions. The second part of the 

strategy focuses on securing funds from the international community to increase 

judges’ wages and improve their working conditions so that they are less inclined 

to accept bribes. Donor money for judges’ salaries was incorporated as one of the 

court’s highest funding priorities this past July, when the Supreme Court presented 

its Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) to international donors at 

the Rome Conference on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan, July 2-3, 2007. 

Starting in 2007, the Supreme Court also began sending its justices on inspection 

tours of provincial courts to ensure they are in compliance with judicial regulations. 

The inspections are followed by three-day conferences, where the visiting Supreme 

Court justice will discuss the inspection results, recent or coming changes in court 

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107 

ported by the Afghanistan Rule of Law Project (ARoLP), also receive training in the 

Regulation of Judicial Conduct and the recently adopted Afghan Court Administration System (ACAS) for streamlining the courts’ case-management processes. 

Department of Justice 

Since 2005, the Department of Justice DOJ has assigned up to four senior Assistant United States Attorneys as Senior Legal Advisors and three senior experienced 

criminal investigators to Kabul to assist in law reform and training and mentoring 

of the Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) and the Central Narcotics Tribunal 

(CNT), a special task force of Afghan judges, prosecutors, and police investigators 

responsible for cases against mid- and high-level drug traffickers. DOJ’s Senior Federal Prosecutor Program also provides criminal law advice to the Embassy and Afghan leadership and U.S. law enforcement, upon request. The prosecutors have succeeded in 1) drafting and enacting a comprehensive counternarcotics law that also 

provides for the use of modern investigative techniques (e.g., electronic surveillance, 

and the use of informants and undercover officers); 2) establishing a specialized narcotics court with nationwide exclusive jurisdiction for cases against mid- and highlevel traffickers; 3) achieving the first-ever extraditions (of major drug traffickers) 

from Afghanistan to the U.S., and 4) working with our U.S, and international partners to establish, train, and mentor the CJTF and CNT. 

More specifically, DOJ’s prosecutors have: 

1. Drafted (in consultation with Afghan legal advisors, DOJ’s Criminal Division, 

and the international community) and had signed into law a Comprehensive 

Counter-Narcotics Law that builds upon former Afghan law to criminalize all narcotics and narcotics-related offenses, sets controls on processing chemicals, authorizes the use of modern investigative techniques, and confirms the use of the 1988 

U.N. Convention against Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances in extradition; 

2. Drafted and had signed into law the Presidential Decree establishing the Central Narcotics Tribunal with exclusive nationwide authority for the trial of all midand high-level narcotics trafficking cases; 

3. Refined and had signed into law the Military Courts Legislation and Military 

Courts Penal and Procedural Law that established a separate court and its law and 

attendant procedures for the Afghan National Army that meet international standards; 

4. Drafted counter-terrorism and extradition laws now under review by the Afghan legislative unit at the Ministry of Justice; 

5. Prepared a legal analysis of Afghanistan’s former, interim, and proposed criminal procedure codes, highlighting areas for reform; 

6. Deployed a DOJ expert team to Kabul to assess current capacities and make 

recommendations for assisting the Afghan Attorney General and the CJTF with an 

anti-corruption initiative. As a result, DOJ has now assigned one of the federal prosecutors full-time to the Attorney General’s Office and will be establishing a sub-unit 

within the CJTF dedicated to investigating and prosecuting narcotics-related corruption cases upon country clearance approval from the Department of State for additional DOJ attorneys; 

7. Provided and continues to provide prosecutorial advice to the Embassy leadership, Afghan officials, and U.S. law enforcement (DEA and FBI) and prosecutors in 

the development of criminal investigations for prosecution in Afghanistan, the U.S., 

or elsewhere; 

8. Prepared an in-depth training regime and conducted training for the CJTF and 

CNT focused on the new Afghan Counternarcotics Law and proactive investigations. 

In addition, the DOJ attorneys provide in-depth special topics seminars for the 

CJTF, CNT, and provincial prosecutors on regular basis to improve understanding 

of fundamental concepts and the implementation of investigative modern techniques; 

9. Advised on the design of Afghanistan’s Counter-Narcotics Justice Center in 

Kabul that is under construction and will soon house the CJTF and CNT; 

10. Assisted in the development of an adjunct project by the U.S. Marshals Service that has been deployed to train a protective corps drawn from the Afghan National Police to provide court security at the CNT and protection to CNT judges and 

CJTF prosecutors; and 

11. Coordinated with Department of Defense/Combined Joint Task Force-82 

(CJTF-82) authorities regarding counternarcotics and counterinsurgency operations 

in Afghanistan. 

108 

Department of Defense 

The Department of Defense has increased its activities in providing rule of law 

assistance over the past year in two main areas: improving linkages between the 

justice and police sectors, and expanding rule of law programming by the Judge Advocate General Corps in eastern Afghanistan. 

On police-justice integration, Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC-A) has played an important role in furthering joint initiatives to support 

the justice sector and CSTC-A’s primary mission, building the Afghan National Police and the Ministry of Interior (MOI). In this capacity, CSTC-A has advised the 

MOI Legal Advisor’s Office on key legislation and procedures that govern law enforcement, and is working closely with other US agency efforts and the international 

community on advancing overall justice sector development and reform. 

In addition, Combined Joint Task Force—82 (CJTF-82) is implementing rule of 

law initiates in its area of operations under NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Eastern Afghanistan. CJTF-82 has worked with the US Embassy and programs listed above on legal training, distribution of legal texts, and 

infrastructure support to improve provincial and district level justice systems. 

Question 34b. What assistance has the international community provided to date 

and in what areas of the country has it been applied, with the exception of police 

training? 

Answer. The international community has been a key partner in the justice sector. Unfortunately, the enormous gaps in the justice system overwhelm the capacity 

of any single donor; as a result, there is a proliferation of small-scale donor assistance programs. The National Justice Program and its subordinate multilateral implementation mechanisms will likely reduce the number of bilateral programs at the 

central level over the coming years, as donors’ small contributions are pooled. This 

will also reduce the number of actors involved in institutional reform over the next 

several years. The primary donors at present include Canada, the United Kingdom, 

the United States, Germany, Italy, and the European Commission. Key implementers include direct-hire international officials (such as prosecutors), various United 

Nations agencies, NGO’s, and government contractors. 

The focus of the international community to date has been on building and reforming the Kabul institutions, though progress has been slow. Major accomplishments include advancing reforms in the Ministry of Justice, progress on reforming 

and amending the legislative framework for governance, improving detention conditions for women and juveniles, training for prosecutors and judges, and construction 

of justice facilities and prisons. The United Kingdom has been a key partner in the 

area of corrections and counter-narcotics justice. The Italian Government completed 

the National Legal Training Center in 2007, with support from the U.S., which is 

currently home to a judicial training program. 

Some donors have launched provincial justice programs, including the U.K. in 

Helmand, Canada in Kandahar, and Germany in Balkh and Konduz. Others, such 

as Italy, have launched provincial assistance programs based out of Kabul, but have 

not established provincial advisor teams. Thus, the U.S. is the only donor that has 

deployed advisor teams across the nation. The hope is that with additional commitments from the Rome Conference and the establishment of the Provincial Justice 

Coordination Program, the number of donor programs outside of Kabul will increase. 

Question 34c. What is the State Department assessment of the status of the Afghan judicial system from the district to national level? How many narcotics cases 

have been brought to trial in 2007 by region? How many have been sentenced? 

Answer. The GIRoA has made strides in drafting and consolidating the National 

Justice Sector Strategy (NJSS). However, disproportionately low salaries, widespread corruption, poor infrastructure, inefficient organizational structures, untrained professionals, and a lack of equipment and supplies plague the system. 

To ensure the integrity of legal reform, the justice sector must be built out from 

the center to ensure standardized training and application of laws. At the same 

time, we must build the 34 provincial justice systems, which at present remain very 

weak and have limited capacities to administer justice effectively. Many districts 

don’t have courthouses or prosecutors due to infrastructure gaps, and to the fact 

that judges and prosecutors with jurisdiction over the districts often reside in the 

provincial capital. Detention centers and prisons can be found in most districts and 

provinces, though many are rented houses and are unacceptable in terms of living 

conditions. Furthermore, Afghans frequently turn to the informal justice system to 

resolve their disputes, which do not always adhere to the constitutional rights of 

citizens, particularly women. 

109 

On a positive note, the central justice institutions have competent leaders willing 

to work with the international community. Several key laws have been passed or 

are being revised that will lay the foundation for the justice sector, and the institutions are generally being supportive of organizational restructuring and civil service 

reform. 

In addition, the GIRoA is advancing narcotics prosecutions under the Central 

Narcotics Tribunal (CNT) and Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) in Kabul. Since 

March 2005, when the CJTF was set up, it has investigated and prosecuted over 

1200 cases involving 1600 defendants from 33 provinces for narcotics-related crimes. 

Of these, 1450 defendants were convicted. Convictions include the high-level narcotics traffickers Misri Khan, Bahram Kahn, and Noor Ullah who are currently 

serving their sentence in Afghanistan. Other Afghan high-level narcotics traffickers 

have been sent to the United States for prosecution and are awaiting trial, sentencing, or are serving their sentence. They include Haji Bushehr Noorzai, Haji Baz 

Mohammad, Mohammad Essa, and Khan Mohammad. The President of the United 

States had designated two high-level traffickers—Noorzai and Baz Mohammad—as 

foreign narcotics kingpins under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. 

To effectively move the justice sector forward, the GIRoA and international community must carefully build and balance the central, provincial and district levels 

in a coordinated manner. At the central level, our programs and Embassy are working closely with the Afghan Government and international community, and are 

making progress. At the provincial level, our programs are leading the way, but the 

needs far exceed available donor resources and programs at present. At the district 

level, there are few justice systems in the first place, but we are launching a plan 

to train district-level personnel at the provincial level starting in the summer of 

2008. In summary, we are making notable progress and have carefully prioritized 

our U.S. Government assistance programs, though the overall needs of the justice 

sector and demands placed on it outpace available international resources. 

MEPI 

Question 35. Please describe the scope of intended Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) programming. Have there been any substantive or organizational 

changes to MEPI? 

Answer. MEPI programs seek to redress the deficits in the region associated with 

unaccountable governments, weak educational systems, inadequate government 

services, lack of political and economic opportunities for women, poor governance, 

and economies that provide insufficient job opportunities for young people. 

There have been no substantive or organizational changes to the Middle East 

Partnership Initiative. MEPI programs are still focused on four primary areas: 

1. To promote democratic reform by providing technical assistance for parliamentary and municipal elections; supporting and training political parties and candidates; aiding democratic reformers and activists; assisting local NGOs with voter 

education, reform advocacy, and popular mobilization behind the reform agenda; 

and expanding independent media, civil society, and rule of law programming. 

2. To advance women’s empowerment by promoting women’s political and economic rights, providing increased professional development opportunities and political training, helping secure women’s equal rights under the law, and building public-private partnerships that champion women’s issues. 

3. To enhance the existing business environment and encourage private sector-led 

economic growth by assisting political, judicial, regulatory, and commercial leaders 

in making improvements to their policies, laws, and organizational structures. 

4. To revitalize education systems to improve curriculum content and delivery, increase students’ awareness of civic rights and responsibilities, and develop their 

leadership and critical thinking skills. 

Merida Initiative 

According to U.S. Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell, Venezuela 

is undermining counterdrug efforts in neighboring countries by serving as an increasingly frequent transit zone for Colombian cocaine. In 2005, the Government of 

Venezuela ended its long-standing cooperative relationship with the US Drug Enforcement Agency, claiming DEA agents were nothing but American spies. Since 

that year, President Bush has continually designated Venezuela as having ‘‘failed 

demonstrably’’ in certification for his annual report on the major drug producing 

and/or transit countries. 

Question 36. How have actions undertaken by the Government of Venezuela undermined success in U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Colombia (Plan Colombia)? 

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What are the potential implications for the Merida Initiative and Central American 

Security Assistance (CASA) programs? 

Answer. The Government of Venezuela’s unwillingness to cooperate creates opportunities for drug trafficking organizations to resist and evade U.S.-supported counternarcotics efforts in Colombia and the region as a whole. The Venezuelan government has not systematically policed the 1,400-mile Venezuelan-Colombian border to 

prevent the movement of groups of armed terrorists or to meaningfully interdict the 

flow of arms and illicit narcotics. Particularly damaging has been President Chavez’ 

ideological and political tolerance of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 

(FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) terrorist organizations which finance their activities through the proceeds of drug-running. As a result, Venezuela 

has failed to prevent its territory from being used as a safe haven by the FARC and 

the ELN, effectively flouting UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540. FARC 

and ELN units often cross into Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup with relative impunity. It remains unclear to what extent the Venezuelan government provides material support to Colombian terrorists. Limited amounts of weapons and 

ammunition—some from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities—have turned up in 

the hands of Colombian terrorist organizations. Regardless, it is clear that a conscientious partner in Venezuela would increase the effectiveness of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Colombia. 

Because Venezuela is not fully cooperating in the fight against narcotics traffickers, there is a gap in our regional line of defense. That line should run in a semicircle around the Caribbean, giving drug runners no space to ply their trade. The 

break in the line of defense puts everyone more at risk and complicates our approach at every turn. The evidence is clear. 

As for the second question, while the Venezuelan government’s unwillingness to 

cooperate may assist the narcotics traffickers, the Merida Initiative demonstrates 

the commitment of the United States and our partners in Mexico and Central America to work together to confront the criminal organizations that plague the region 

and spill over into the United States. By focusing our efforts in Mexico and Central 

America, we can deny these groups the bulk of the territory they currently use to 

transit narcotics and other contraband, regardless of the Venezuelan government’s 

unwillingness to cooperate. 

Question 37. You have a 19% vacancy rate across NEA, which some would suggest 

is a key region in the war on terror. Can you explain the trendline on this? In Iraq, 

you have made extensive use of temporary hires to fill State Department positions. 

Many of these individuals are very impressive. Nevertheless, with recruiting, training and especially overtime pay, this is tremendously costly. Have you put a cost 

figure to the savings that replacing temporary personnel with Foreign Service officers will bring you over a year? 

Answer. The Department has done its best to staff Foreign Service positions at 

overseas posts, particularly those deemed as high priority to meet our policy goals. 

The overall overseas vacancy rate of 13 percent demonstrates the deficit of midlevel 

Foreign Service personnel due to hiring shortages in the 1990s. The 19 percent vacancy rate in Near East Asia (NEA)—while appearing slightly higher than the overall overseas rate—does not take into consideration the more than 60 Foreign Service 

generalists and specialists who have volunteered to serve in Iraq and been sent on 

long or short-term temporary duty (TDY) assignments from other overseas posts or 

from Washington. These TDY Foreign Service employees are filling high priority 

jobs in Iraq and other posts—though that means the positions they left behind in 

other overseas posts or in Washington remain empty, as there are not enough Foreign Service personnel to backfill. 

The 19 percent vacancy rate referred to above was derived from a calculation that 

considered only the status of permanent Foreign Service positions at Near East Asia 

(NEA) posts. Positions designated for employees of and within the Iraq Transition 

Support Office (ITAO), a 5 U.S.C. § 3161 temporary organization, or positions staffed 

by other federal agencies were not counted. We have not used ITAO employees to 

fill vacant Foreign Service positions. 

The cost of filling Iraq positions with Foreign Service officers on temporary duty 

is not significantly higher than assigning them to Iraq on a permanent basis. Because these employees are recruited from within the existing Foreign Service corps, 

there are no additional recruiting costs. The costs associated with training and overtime are the same for employees on permanent assignment or TDY. All Foreign 

Service personnel going to Baghdad on permanent assignment or TDY are required 

to take training courses to prepare them for their responsibilities in Iraq and its 

security environment. Whether on TDY or permanently assigned, untenured Foreign 

Service officers and specialists are eligible for overtime pay for hours worked beyond 

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the normal 40 hours work week and tenured Foreign Service personnel, who are not 

entitled to overtime, may be eligible for a special differential. The main differences 

in the cost of permanent assignment versus TDY relate to the eligibility for locality 

pay or Involuntary Separate Maintenance Allowance and not to recruiting, training, 

or overtime. 

Question 38. A Washington Post article critical of the SIGIR operations noted the 

extensive overtime pay claimed and paid to its temporary employees. Do State Department temporary employees earn the same pays? How many hours on average 

does a 3161 employee claim in a week? 

How many 3161 hires are working on Iraq for the Department of State—both in 

country and elsewhere? What is the annual cost of the average 3161 hire—including 

overtime, care and feeding, travel expenses and other compensations? 

Can you describe how you recruit 3161 hires with specialties suitable for Iraq missions? What advertising do you do and where? 

Do State Department temporary employees earn the same pay? 

Answer. Compensation paid to employees hired under 3161 appointments is based 

on the grade of the position. Grades are determined according to OPM classification 

standards and pay rates are equivalent to General Service (GS) employees with 

similar levels of responsibilities. 3161’s receive the same benefits as GS employees. 

Our 3161 employees are paid overtime based on hours submitted, although the 

hourly pay for overtime is straight time and not time and a half. 

Question 39. How many hours on average does a 3161 employee claim in a week? 

Answer. Taking a sample of two pay periods, the average overtime hours per pay 

period was 34 hours for 145 Baghdad employees and 4 hours for 14 DC employees. 

Question 40. How many 3161 hires are working on Iraq for the Department of 

State—both in country and elsewhere? 

Answer. As of February 2008, there are currently 156 3161 hires working in Iraq 

and an additional 25 3161 hire in Washington, DC. 

Question 41. What is the annual cost of the average 3161 hire—including overtime, care and feeding, travel expenses and other compensation? 

Answer. These positions run from the equivalent of a GS-9 to that of a Senior Executive Service position (there are only 5 such positions). The average salary is 

$107,800 (taking the total salary of all 3161’s and dividing it by the number of such 

employees)—related costs are as follows: 

Salary and Related Costs of 3161 Employees 

(in U.S. dollars) 

Employees 

located in DC 

Employees 

located in Iraq 

Base pay .................................................................. $107,800 $107,800 

Overtime for Baghdad Employees ........................... $45,814 

Overtime for DC Employees ..................................... $5,389 

Post differential (35% of pay) ................................ $37,730 

Danger pay (35% of pay) ....................................... $37,730 

Costs for food and lodging in Iraq ......................... $60,000 

Initial deployment travel and miscellaneous costs $4,600 

Initial training costs ................................................ $3,500 

Annual cost of travel for rest/consultation breaks $8,300 

Return travel at end of appointment ..................... $2,200 

Unaccompanied Air Baggage .................................. $2,200 

Total .................................................................... $113,189.00 $309,874.00 

Question 42. Can you describe how you recruit 3161 hires with specialties suitable 

for Iraq missions? What advertising do you do and where? 

Answer. Our main source of recruiting is USAJobs, the OPM website. However, 

we have also advertised on other on-line job banks such as Monster, CareerBuilder, 

and engineeringjobs.net. As needed, we also meet with officials and advertise on 

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websites connected with professional organizations such as the Government Finance 

Officer Association, the Foreign Policy Association, and American Banker’s Association. 

Question 43. In Irbil, there has been a plan to move the RRT (Regional Reconstruction Team) to the Korean base. What are the advantages to this? Some have 

expressed concern that this will further isolate the team from interaction with 

Iraqis, NGO’s and other visitors. 

Answer. RRT Erbil is a Coalition unit. The operation in the city of Erbil was always intended to be temporary. The plan was to get the team up and running while 

the site at the Korean base, about 10-20 minutes away from the current location, 

is being prepared. The current offices in the city are too small to house all the elements of the RRT. In addition, following the massive truck bombing in Erbil, the 

RSO determined that the site in the city of Erbil where the team works and lives 

is too vulnerable. The work to prepare the new site at the Korean Camp is now underway and with completion scheduled for August, after which employees will be 

housed on the base. The former site in the city of Erbil has been retained as an 

office and meeting site in order to facilitate frequent and convenient interactions 

with Iraqi counterparts, but the USG personnel will live in safer conditions at the 

Korean base. While some have voiced concern that Iraqis will not be as likely to 

visit the Korean site, our experience in REOs Al-Hillah and Basra tell us that this 

is not the case. Both sites host frequent meetings with Iraqi counterparts and are 

in areas are much less hospitable than the Korean base. 

Question 44. This morning the Parliament passed the 2008 Budget, the Amnesty 

Law and the Provincial Powers law. This is a tremendous accomplishment for the 

Iraqi Parliament. Do you see any hope for the Hydrocarbon Laws with the Minister 

of Oil and the Kurds taking such strong and potentially poisonous stances? 

It appears that the Iraqis are coming to practical pragmatic accommodations to 

work through major legislative and political issues, and perhaps the Council of Representatives is finding its feet and working through the building blocks that will 

‘‘bring Iraqis together as Iraqis.’’ At the top, they are using almost 3+1 collaborative 

government whereby Prime Minister Maliki, President Talabani, and the two Deputy Prime Ministers (Hashimi and Abdel Mahdi) come to a consensus before moving 

forward. Can you comment on how this is viewed within the Iraqi body politic? Is 

this sustainable? 

Answer. Political reconciliation is an essential component of a peaceful, stable, 

and democratic Iraq. Iraqi leaders are working to reach a political accommodation 

among the various parties in Baghdad, and as importantly, in the provinces. Iraqis 

still struggle with fundamental questions about how to share power, accept their differences and overcome their past. Most Iraqis genuinely accept Iraq as a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian society. 

The Executive Council (which embodies the process formerly known as the 3+1 

power sharing agreement), made up of the Prime Minister, the President, and the 

two Vice Presidents, met for the first time in January 2008. They have since established a secretariat and are meeting regularly. These events show that Iraq’s leaders recognize that to achieve national reconciliation and political progress, they 

must cooperate across sectarian, party, and institutional lines. Iraqis prefer to see 

their political leaders work together toward common goals; effective power sharing 

is one area in which Iraq’s leaders can meet the expectations of their citizens. 

The United States Government is engaging with leaders from both sides at a high 

level to encourage them to address the unresolved oil law issues, which relate to 

authority to approve contracts and how revenue will be shared. Despite the disagreements by both sides this past year, we believe a settlement is still possible, 

because until a national law is ratified, all parties face enormous legal obstacles to 

developing the hydrocarbon industry and the KRG cannot export any crude oil. The 

United States Government continues to discourage the KRG from signing deals 

until a national law is ratified. 

We will continue our efforts to assist Iraqis in the pursuit of national reconciliation, while recognizing that progress on this front may come in many forms and 

must ultimately be achieved by Iraqis themselves. 

UNAMI 

Question 45. I am pleased at the news that UNAMI has taken on work to help 

resolve the Article 140 issues in Iraq. Increased UN activity in Iraq can only be 

good, and they have a long hill to climb to overcome the scars from the Canal Hotel 

bombing and the Oil For Food scandal. What can we do to help them with their 

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transportation needs—specifically airlift? We have been informed that DoD cannot 

provide a dedicated aircraft to support their needs. 

Answer. The U.S. welcomes the increased UN involvement in Iraq since the adoption of their expanded mandate in UNSCR 1770. Staffan de Mistura, the new Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), and his staff are to be commended for the work they are undertaking in difficult circumstances. Plans to increase UN staffing in Baghdad and in Erbil are further positive steps. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) has supported UNAMI’s transportation requests over the past seven months. At the same time UNAMI is signing logistical 

support contracts with international corporations and securing the lease of an aircraft. DOD will continue to provide the maximum possible support to UNAMI’s mission while the UN works to get a contract carrier in place. The SRSG appreciates 

the transportation being provided by the U.S. 

The U.S. will continue to support UNAMI. We will also urge other member states 

to maintain and expand their assistance to ensure the success of the UN mission 

in Iraq, and to respond favorably to SRSG de Mistura’s appeals for logistical and 

other assistance. 

Regional Support 

Question 46. I noted your announcement that the Kuwaitis would be hosting another Neighbors’ Summit. This is encouraging; nevertheless, short of hosting refugees, we have seen no additional reports of concrete activities taken by Iraq’s neighbors (the sending of ambassadors, assistance, calling of regional working groups, 

etc.) What headway are the Iraqis making in getting along with their Arab neighbors? 

Answer. The Government of Iraq is making considerable headway in getting along 

with its neighbors, but admittedly, there is still room for improvement. Over the 

last year, the Expanded Neighbors of Iraq process has emerged as a forum in which 

Iraq’s neighbors, and others in the international community, can address the political and security challenges facing Iraq. As you note, the next Ministerial is scheduled to take place in Kuwait in April, with working groups hosted by Jordan, Syria 

and Turkey convening sometime in March. 

Arab states need to do more to increase support for the Government of Iraq. We 

continue to urge them to openly demonstrate their support on a bilateral basis by 

opening diplomatic missions and sending ambassadors. We are starting to see some 

progress in this area; during a January 15, 2008 press conference in Riyadh, Saudi 

FM Prince Saud al Faisal reiterated his government’s commitment to re-open a diplomatic mission in Baghdad and post a resident ambassador. The Saudis have since 

sent a delegation to Baghdad to discuss possible embassy sites. This is welcome 

progress, and we are actively encouraging other countries to take similar steps. 

The launching of the International Compact with Iraq (ICI) represented a major 

step forward in Iraq’s economic integration into the international community and 

its neighbors played a significant role in this process. Kuwait, the United Arab 

Emirates and Saudi Arabia were members of the Preparatory Group that drafted 

the ICI. The UAE hosted the conference where the broad outlines of the ICI were 

agreed, and Kuwait hosted the conference in October 2006 where the final text of 

the ICI was adopted. Egypt hosted the launching of the ICI with more than 70 countries and international organizations in attendance. 

Iraq’s neighbors have also been helpful in other ways when it comes to assistance. 

Kuwait and Iraq recently signed a memorandum of understanding providing $160 

million of Kuwaiti economic assistance to Iraq, and Saudi-Iraqi negotiations on debt 

forgiveness continue. 

Saudi and Iraqi officials have met to discuss security issues, and the Saudis are 

working to stop the flow of foreign fighters to Iraq. We continue to urge them to 

intensify their efforts. 

Question 47. I was pleased to hear that this morning the legislature passed the 

2008 Iraqi budget, which reports estimate at 60 trillion Dinar, or about $50 billion. 

Charts that the Committee has received indicate that oil revenues have steadily increased from $31.3 billion in 2006 to $41 billion in 2007. January 2008 figures show 

$5.21 billion generated in 2008 already, with exports expected to rise. Can you provide further detail on Iraq’s budget situation, cash on hand, etc, including prior 

years unexpended funds? How much do they retain in cash reserves? Please include 

all provincial and ministerial allocations and disbursements. 

Answer. On account of high oil prices and increased export levels in the second 

half of the year, the Government of Iraq (GOI) earned significantly more in 2007 

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than projected. Early estimates indicate that the GOI received over $37 billion in 

oil revenues, compared to $31 billion projected in the 2007 budget. 

With higher-than-expected revenue, the Ministry of Finance has accumulated 

cash balances at the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the DFI balance is currently estimated at $12.5 billion. The money in the DFI represents the funds on which the Iraqi Government 

can draw to pay for its expenditures. 

The GOI will use part of these funds to cover projected 2008 deficits, which are estimated to be $6 billion. The GOI needs to maintain a reserves cushion in the DFI 

going forward because of the volatility of the oil sector, which contributes 90 percent 

of budget revenue. 

In separate accounts, the foreign currency reserves at the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) have reached $27 billion. These funds are controlled by the CBI, which is an 

independent institution. CBI reserves support monetary policy, not GOI expenditure. The current IMF Stand-By Agreement sets a floor of approximately $21 billion 

on net international reserves for the CBI. The Central Bank Law prohibits CBI 

lending to the Ministry of Finance for budget purposes or to other government entities. These reserves will also be used for Iraq to finance large external debt service 

payments beginning in 2011. Debt service to the Paris Club will exceed $3 billion 

in 2011, and required debt repayments will increase in later years as non-Paris 

Club and commercial debt repayments come due. 

The 2008 GOI Budget, which was passed by the Council of Representatives on 

February 13, projects $42.5 billion in revenues and allocates $48.4 billion for expenditures. The GOI is increasingly allocating its revenues for security and capital 

investment. The 2008 budget allocates $9 billion to security ministries and $13 billion for capital projects and reconstruction. This represents a 23 percent increase 

and a 29 percent increase, respectively, over 2007 allocations in these areas. Oil revenues in the 2008 budget are based on oil prices of $57 per barrel and oil exports 

of 1.7 million barrels per day. If oil prices remain high, it is likely that the budget 

deficit for 2008 will be less than the projected $6 billion. 

Regarding prior year unexpended funds, complete GOI expenditure data for 2007 

is not yet available; expenditure data in Iraq as elsewhere takes time to consolidate. 

However, a recent unofficial Ministry of Finance (MoF) special report on capital expenditures indicates that, through October 31, 2007, the Iraqis had contributed over 

$6 billion of their own money to capital projects and reconstruction at the national, 

regional, and provincial levels in 2007. This includes central government ministries 

expending 37 percent of their 2007 capital budgets, the Kurdistan Regional Government expending 89 percent of its 2007 capital budget, and provincial governments 

expending over 57 percent of their combined 2006 and 2007 capital budgets, through 

October 31, 2007. 

While the ability of the GOI to spend its own resources improved substantially 

in 2007, the two year old government still suffers from maturing budgetary processes, leaving it unable to execute its entire 2007 capital budget. Residual funds can 

be used in 2008 or revert to the DFI. The serious challenges to capital budget execution continue to include the security environment, corruption, fear of corruption 

charges, lack of clarity on budget execution rules and responsibilities and, in many 

cases, a lack of technical expertise. U.S. Embassy officials and Provincial Reconstruction Teams continue to work with central government and provincial officials 

to improve this picture through building technical capacity on budgeting and budget 

execution. 

Question 48. Reports received by the Committee suggest that on average, Iraqi 

ministries are ineffective, they lack management skills, budgetary controls, executive capacity, they fail to cooperate with each other, management is not empowered, 

and much worse they continue to fail in delivery of basic services. This is dire news. 

Do the Iraqis recognize this? Roughly how much has the United States spent to improve ministerial capacity over the past five years? How much is left in the current 

contract? What do you estimate to be the most effective programs? 

Answer. Iraqi Government ministries have made progress, in some cases very significant progress, over the two years of their existence. The maturing institutions 

are improving their capacity to deliver essential services to the Iraqi people. These 

ministries are making progress both at the national level, and in their regional offices, which are helping improve delivery of services in the provinces. There is no 

question that the record of achievement is mixed, with some ministries performing 

better than others, and all the ministries continue to face significant challenges. 

Over the past two years, security has posed a challenge for USAID contractors 

working with some of these ministries. Also during this period several ministries objected to working with the USG. With the improvement of security on the ground, 

115 

and changes in some ministers, we have largely been able to overcome these difficulties. 

Despite these constraints, the Embassy and USAID have identified a number of 

alternative and creative approaches to deliver assistance. The National Capacity Development Program (NCDP) involves engagement on the part of the Embassy and 

USAID with the leadership and working-level civil servants at the Iraqi ministries. 

The Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO) oversees several short-term projects 

organized to enable rapid response to immediate priorities. These projects, the program administered by USAID (Tatweer) and the Embassy’s Rule of Law program 

are designed to assist Iraq’s transition to self-sufficiency by enabling the government to provide security, to ensure the rule of law, to deliver essential services to 

the Iraqi people, and to develop a market-driven economy through democratic processes. 

USAID’s Tatweer program is designed to meet this goal by developing the skills 

and qualifications of public servants through public management and administration training. In addition to working with key ministries to improve their ability to 

carry out core functions, such as strategic planning and policy development, budgeting, training, and managing a personnel system, CD programs are also being implemented in the Prime Minister’s and Deputy Prime Minister’s offices as well as 

the Council of Ministers’ Secretariat. Tatweer is a three-year program with an 

award ceiling of $209.5 million. To date, USAID has received $205,000,000 to support ministerial capacity development programs. 

In January 2008 the Embassy’s Ministerial Engagement Team concluded an informal assessment of the 11 civilian ministries participating in USAID’s Tatweer program and ITAO’s short-term national capacity development programs. This informal 

assessment covered the period of January 2006 through December 2007. Across the 

board, improvement was noted in the areas of budget execution, contracting and 

procurement. These findings are confirmed by the increased national spending 

rates. The January ministerial assessment revealed that in the areas of technology 

development, strategic planning, and human resource and workforce management, 

weaknesses exist. We are working with our implementers, international partners 

and the Government of Iraq to address shortcomings. 

Our capacity development programs do not stop at the national level. Our Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are instrumental in strengthening provincial government capacity to transparently allocate and spend their capital budgets through 

direct US technical assistance and training and by fostering working relations with 

national ministries. In 2006 and 2007 the central government channeled over $3 billion to the provinces, of which over $2 billion has been spent. Acting as a driver 

of political reconciliation, the budget has drawn different partners to work together 

to improve the lives of Iraqi citizens. Another important outcome of PRT efforts has 

been to generate domestic, bottom-up pressure for improved ministerial performance. However, insurgents hurt the ability of the provincial governments to perform. 

Provinces with the lowest level of attacks in 2007 executed the highest portion of 

their budgets. 

The Provincial Reconstruction Development Council (PRDC) program and the 

Local Governance Program (LGP) are just two examples of ongoing provincial level 

capacity building programs implemented via the PRTs. The PRDC program helps 

develop local and provincial capabilities to plan and execute small-scale infrastructure projects using USG and Iraqi resources. USAID’s Local Governance Program 

(LGP) builds the capacity of local political institutions at the governorate, district, 

sub-district, and neighborhood levels. Congress has allocated approximately $790 

million for PRDC and $245 million for LGP in the 2006 and 2007 supplementals. 

Refugees 

Question 49. Can you provide an update on Iraq’s $25 million pledge to Syria and 

Jordan to help support its citizens who are being hosted by those governments? Are 

more contributions expected? 

Please describe US, Iraqi efforts to resettle families who wish to return. Are international organizations actively involved on the ground? Are the Iraqis willing to 

fund this further? 

The Administration has increased sanctions against Syria against reports that the 

Syrian government has been helpful to the Iraqis who have sought refuge there. 

How many refugees have been interviewed for processing by US teams in Syria? Do 

you expect the Syrians to reciprocate? What provisions have been made to ensure 

our DHS and State Department teams who have been working to process Iraqi refugees are not limited by new sanctions? 

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Answer. The Government of Iraq pledged to provide $25 million in refugee assist- ance to Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. The Iraqi government has delivered $15 million 

directly to the Syrian government and $2 million to the Lebanese government. The 

$8 million allocated by Iraq for assistance to refugees in Jordan has not yet been 

disbursed. The Iraqi and Jordanian governments are still engaged in discussions 

about the mechanism through which these funds will be disbursed to support Iraqi 

refugees in Jordan. Senior GoI officials agreed with Under Secretary for Democracy 

and Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky during her visit to Baghdad on February 7, 

2008, that the Iraqi government needs to do more for its vulnerable citizens displaced abroad. 

Recent reports from international humanitarian organizations caution that conditions for Iraqis displaced inside Iraq and in the region continue to deteriorate. These 

reports, along with the short-lived spike in repatriation in late 2007, have focused 

GOI, USG, and international humanitarian community attention on the need to prepare for returns. 

The Iraqi Government has launched a number of initiatives to address displacement and repatriation. In the spring of 2007, the GOI announced that it would 

make one-time payments of one million Iraqi dinars, approximately USD 800, to displaced families who returned to their homes in Baghdad. Several thousand families 

received payments under this program before it was temporarily suspended. In late 

November, when there was a sudden surge in returns of both refugees and IDPs, 

the GOI, in coordination with the UN, launched the Joint Rapid Response Plan. 

This Plan is a pilot project to target assistance to the most vulnerable returnees. UNHCR provided funding of more than $10 million to assist returnees to Baghdad 

at that time. 

The USG, UN, and other international humanitarian organizations are also working closely with the Iraqi government to plan for returns. Embassy and MNF-I staff 

meet regularly with senior GOI and UN officials to urge the GOI to take a more 

pro-active role in preparing for large scale IDP and refugee returns, including the 

creation of a broad national policy, the identification of resources, and the creation 

of governmental coordination structures to manage returns. The USG has established an inter-agency working group in Washington, DC that focuses on planning 

for Iraqi returns and repatriation. 

The international humanitarian community is increasing its engagement as well. 

UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres announced during his visit 

to Baghdad on February 16 that UNHCR would increase its international staff in 

Baghdad from two to six people, including the senior-level Resident Representative. 

Commissioner Guterres also announced that UNHCR had proposed to join the GOI 

in assessing conditions for large-scale return of displaced Iraqis. UNHCR and the 

GOI are now discussing Terms of Reference for the proposed mission. A conference 

is also being planned to include the Iraqi Ministry of Migration (MoM), the UN, 

PRTs, USAID, the International Organization for Migration, and the U.S. Embassy. 

The goals of the conference are to further refine GoI policy on internally displaced 

Iraqis and to coordinate technical assistance to the MoM from the USG, its implementing partners, and the UN. 

Regarding Syria, we recognize that the Syrian government plays an important humanitarian role in hosting almost half of all refugees displaced in the region. The 

State Department has engaged the Syrians on this important humanitarian issue. 

Former Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration 

Ellen Sauerbrey visited Damascus in March 2007 to discuss humanitarian and refugee issues. Ambassador James Foley, the Secretary’s Senior Coordinator for Iraqi 

Refugee Affairs, traveled to Damascus in October 2007, where he reiterated our 

commitment to providing assistance to Iraqis living in Syria through the United Nations and our international partners, as well as our commitment to resettling particularly vulnerable refugees in the United States. Due to A/S Sauerbrey’s and Ambassador Foley’s efforts, we have an agreed framework with the Syrian Government 

and the UNHCR for carrying out U.S. refugee admissions processing in Syria. 

As of February 13, UNHCR had referred 6,451 Iraqi refugees in Syria to the U.S. 

Refugee Admissions Program, of which 2,483 individuals had been interviewed by 

the Department of Homeland Security. The remainder will be interviewed by DHS 

between March and July of this year. 

We would like the Syrians to do more; refugee processing in Syria is contingent 

upon the ability of DHS and State Department officials to continue to receive visas 

to enter the country, and we have asked the SARG to provide those visas as needed. 

We have also asked the SARG to allow our implementing partner in refugee processing, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), to bring in added staff 

necessary for training and processing. While the DHS visas have generally been 

granted, we have not had success with visas for IOM staff. 

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U.S.-Brazil MOU 

Question 50. What progress has been made on implementing the biofuels investment feasibility studies envisioned under the U.S.-Brazil Memorandum of Understanding? 

Answer. We have identified nearly 30 possible feasibility studies and technical assistance projects across our four target countries: El Salvador, Haiti, the Dominican 

Republic, and St. Kitts and Nevis. Working with the target country governments 

and our consultants (Winrock International and Getulio Vargas Foundation), we 

identified eight priority opportunities, which involve feasibility studies and/or technical assistance in each of the target countries and have begun committing funds 

for each. The United States, Brazil, and our donor partners will support as many 

projects as possible in the coming months. Our consultants will continue to develop 

funding proposals for the remaining projects. 

Question 51. How much funding is required to implement the MOU? 

Answer. The eight current projects are budgeted at $2.5 million. The United 

States is collaborating with donors including the Organization of American States 

(OAS), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and United Nations Foundation 

that have expressed their willingness to contribute a total of $11 million. We are 

pleased with our commitments to date and do not foresee the need for additional 

funding. 

Question 52. Has the Brazilian government met their obligations under the MOU? 

Answer. Yes, the GOB has met its obligations, both in management and implementation of the agreement as evidenced by the strong progress across all three 

prongs of the MOU. 

To advance the bilateral R&D cooperation, the GOB sent a team of Brazilian scientists to the United States in September 2007 to visit U.S. Departments of Energy 

and Agriculture renewable energy labs and offered to receive a team of U.S. scientists for a reciprocal visit in the Spring or Summer 2008. We expect joint agreement on areas of cooperation and an implementation roadmap shortly after. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Energy and the Brazilian government (Ministry of 

Foreign Relations/Ministry of Science and Technology) initiated a bilateral project 

on the impact on greenhouse gases (GHG) from the expansion of ethanol production 

in the two countries. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) and the 

State University of Campinas (UNICAMP, Brazil) are implementing this project. 

To advance regional cooperation, the GOB hired technical consultants from the 

Fundacao Getulio Vargas to assist target country governments in their long-term 

planning for biofuels development. The GOB has joined the United States in engaging diplomatically in the target countries and meetings with target country officials 

in the United States. 

To advance multilateral cooperation on standards and codes, the GOB established 

the International Biofuels Forum (IBF) in the fall of 2006. In addition to Brazil and 

the U.S., the IBF includes India, China, the European Commission (EC), and South 

Africa. The United States, GOB, and EC have advanced work on standards and 

codes through our respective standards bodies (NIST in the case of the United 

States). The results of the collaboration are summarized in the United States, 

Brazil, and the European Union Release Report on Biofuels Standards http:// 

www.nist.gov/public_affairs/biofuels_report_fact_sheet.pdf and the white paper is 

available at http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/biofuels_report.pdf. 

Question 53. Is the State Department planning to send the Congress proposed legislation for the U.S.-Brazil led biofuels initiative? Would authorizing legislation be 

useful in maintaining momentum for the initiative past January 2007? 

Answer. The Department currently has no plans to propose legislation to the Congress on this initiative. Given the broad support for the partnership, we do not anticipate barriers to continuing work beyond January 2009. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOXER

Question 1. In 2005, when you were Secretary of State, then attorney general 

Alberto Gonzales reportedly approved two secret memos specifically authorizing 

waterboarding, head slapping, and frigid temperatures. NBC News reported that 

you were aware of these secret memos. Were you aware of these memos? If so, did 

you agree with the decision to authorize waterboarding? 

Is waterboarding ever permitted under the U.N. Convention Against Torture? 

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Answer. Although I would not comment on the accuracy that report, I was aware 

that the Department of Justice prepared legal opinions in 2005 relating to the CIA 

interrogation program. 

As to the question whether waterboarding would be lawful, I would emphasize 

that there have been a number of changes in the law applicable to interrogation 

techniques, including enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the 

Military Commissions Act of 2006, and the promulgation of the President’s Executive Order of July 2007, which implement the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan 

v. Rumsfeld (2006) that Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions applies 

to the armed conflict with al Qaeda. These provisions make clear that any techniques within the CIA program must comply with the legal prohibitions on torture, 

cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and the humane treatment requirements 

of Common Article 3. Were any U.S. agency or person to propose the use of 

waterboarding in the future, it would be necessary to consider the lawfulness of the 

technique under all applicable domestic and international law. Furthermore, the 

President would have to determine whether to authorize its use. 

Question 2. I remain very concerned about Iran’s failure to suspend its nuclear 

enrichment program as required by the UN Security Council. What are the prospects for a tough UN Security Council resolution that has the support of the international community? 

Answer. The Council clearly expressed its intention in UN Security Council resolution 1747 to consider the adoption of further appropriate measures under Article 

41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter if the IAEA Director General’s report showed 

that Iran had failed to comply with UN Security Council resolutions 1737 and 1747. 

The Director General has reported three times since the adoption of that resolution 

in March 2007 that Iran has failed to do so. 

The Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, UK, and the United 

States (P5+1) reached agreement on the elements of a third UNSC sanctions resolution on 22 January 2008 in Berlin. The EU3 shared the draft resolution with the 

full Council on 5 February 2008. The Council has been engaged in negotiations on 

the resolution in New York for the past several weeks. We expect the Council will 

adopt the resolution soon. 

Pursuant to standing P5+1 strategy of incremental increases on sanctions on Iran 

until it meets its Security Council obligations, the draft resolution increases the severity of existing sanctions and expands upon the previous two UNSC sanctions resolutions (UNSC Resolutions 1737 and 1747). The resolution is the product of intense 

negotiations between the members of the P5+1 and is a clear signal to the Iranian 

regime that the P5+1 are united in ensuring that Iran complies with its UNSC obligations. These obligations include providing the IAEA with the all of the information and access it needs to verify that Iran has permanently ceased all weaponsrelated work. 

Until Iran meets its UNSC obligations, as clearly outlined in UNSCRs 1696, 1737, 

and 1747, and the calls of the IAEA Board of Governors and has fully disclosed any 

weapons-related activities to the IAEA, the international community can have no 

confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. UNSC sanctions are part of our dual track strategy to clarify to Iran’s leaders the consequences 

of its continued noncompliance, while also keeping open the door to direct negotiations. 

Update to take into account recent developments: 

On 22 February 2008 the IAEA Director General reported that Iran is continuing 

to fail to comply with its UN Security Council obligations and calls by the IAEA 

Board of Governors to suspend all proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, including enrichment-related activities, and has not undertaken full and complete transparency with the IAEA. After allowing for time to review and consider the IAEA 

Director General’s report, the Council adopted UNSC sanctions resolution 1803 on 

3 March 2008 by a vote of 14-0 with one abstention (Indonesia). This is now the 

third time that the Council has imposed Chapter VII sanctions on Iran. 

Question 3. Please describe the progress made, if any, by the Philippine Government in implementing the recommendations of the United Nations Special 

Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions. 

Answer. United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions Philip Alston visited the Philippines in February 2007. In his final 

report, which was released in November 2007, the Special Rapporteur made numerous recommendations aimed at eliminating extrajudicial killings (EJKs) from counterinsurgency operations, achieving convictions in EJK cases, reforming the witness 

119 

protection program, and bolstering human rights enforcement throughout the government’s civilian, military and security agencies. 

The Philippine government has taken significant measures to address the problem 

of EJKs. To begin, President Arroyo has been clear in directing members of the 

Armed Forces to adhere strictly to human rights principles. The military leadership 

issued a directive outlining command responsibility as a basis for criminal liability. 

The Philippine government has underway a number of investigations and prosecutions into EJKs and forced disappearances. As of December 2007, the Philippine Department of Justice State Prosecutor Task Force was investigating 23 cases. Between January and November 2007, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) investigated 30 cases of politically motivated killings involving 38 victims. The Philippine National Police Task Force Usig reports that it has filed 59 cases in court, 

archived 49 as ‘‘cold’’ (no developments or progress in one year), and dropped one. 

The Philippine Department of Justice reports that one police officer and eight civilians have been convicted for extrajudicial killings. According to the Philippine Supreme Court, 45 cases of extrajudicial killings are currently pending in the regional 

trial courts. To streamline the prosecution of these and other EJK cases, President 

Arroyo has mandated cooperation and coordination between prosecutors and police 

from the outset of a political or media killing until the termination of cases in court. 

Further, the Philippine Department of Justice has implemented several reforms 

to the Witness Protection Program. According to the Philippine government, admission requirements for witness protection coverage have been liberalized. Regional 

prosecutors have also been authorized to grant provisional coverage to high-risk witnesses under threat pending confirmation of their admission to the Program. The 

economic benefits and social services for witnesses under the Program have also 

been enhanced. 

In October 2007, the Philippine Supreme Court issued new rules regarding the 

‘‘writ of amparo,’’ a remedy available to human rights advocates and families of victims of human rights abuses by government agencies. Under the new rules, any aggrieved person or family member may file a petition against any public official or 

agency. The judge may then issue a writ of amparo mandating that the respondent 

within five days produce the missing person, provide information on the person’s 

whereabouts, or demonstrate that the government agency is taking affirmative action to locate the missing person. The judge may also issue inspection orders to 

search particular locations. Human rights lawyers have filed at least 15 writs of 

amparo against the military. Seven cases were resolved and eight are pending hearings. Of the seven resolved cases, four resulted in the release of the accused from 

military custody. 

In 2007, there was a significant decline in EJKs. According to Task Force Usig, 

there were seven EJKs in 2007, down from 41 in 2006. Similarly, the Commission 

on Human Rights reported 38 victims through November 2007, down from 159 during the equivalent time frame in 2006. The NGO Karapatan reported 68 victims in 

2007, down from 209 in 2006. The numbers vary because each organization differs 

in its definition of EJK; however, there is an unmistakable downward trend in each 

report. The decline in extrajudicial killings was most likely due to the measures 

noted above, along with heightened international attention to the issue. 

While we welcome the government’s steps and last year’s apparent decline in 

EJKs, we remain concerned about the problem of EJKs and continue to press the 

Philippine authorities to pursue these investigations and seek convictions, as well 

as to further strengthen institutional efforts to combat EJKs. 

Question 4. Please describe the progress made, if any, by the Philippine Government in implementing a policy of promoting military personnel who demonstrate 

professionalism and respect for human rights, and investigating and prosecuting 

military personnel and others who have been credibly alleged to have committed 

extrajudicial executions or other violations of human rights. 

Answer. It is the Department’s understanding that professionalism and respect 

for human rights are among the factors considered by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in making promotion decisions. The Human Rights Office of the AFP, 

which was created in January 2007, organizes continuing human rights education 

programs and investigates formal complaints on alleged violations of human rights. 

We remain concerned about the problem of EJKs and continue to press the Armed 

Forces of the Philippines to pursue investigations and seek convictions, as well as 

to further strengthen institutional efforts to combat EJKs. 

Question 5. Is the Philippine military engaging in acts of intimidation or violence 

against members of legal organizations who advocate for human rights? 

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Answer. Concerns that members of the security forces are involved in 

extrajudicial killings persist. U.S. military assistance programs continue to encourage respect for due process, combat corruption, and strengthen the professionalism, 

commitment to human rights, discipline, and technical expertise of the Philippine 

military. Hence, significant numbers of Philippine soldiers each year receive some 

form of human rights training, which is embedded in training exercises, by U.S. 

military personnel. U.S. support for the Philippine Defense Reform program remains crucial for building the command and control necessary to end practices such 

as extrajudicial killings and ensure widespread respect for human rights. 

Question 6. Japan is the only G-7 industrialized country which is not a party to 

the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Please 

describe the State Department’s efforts to resolve active cases of international parental child abduction involving Japan. 

Answer. The Office of Children’s Issues currently maintains more than forty open 

cases of international parental child abduction to Japan involving more than fifty 

children. That number increases steadily because children abducted to Japan are 

seldom returned. The Department is aware of only three cases of abduction to Japan 

that have resolved favorably. In two of those cases, the couple reconciled. In a third, 

a sixteen-year-old boy surreptitiously left the taking parent’s home with the aid of 

the left-behind parent. The consulate issued the boy an emergency U.S. passport 

and assisted him as appropriate with his return to the United States. 

Through our Office of Children’s Issues, the Department provides a point of contact and a resource for left-behind parents whose children have been taken to 

Japan. We tailor our efforts to the individual situation and work diligently to be responsive to the requests of our left-behind parents while balancing the realities of 

the tragic situation. The Office of Children’s Issues works individually with the parents to advise them regarding options in domestic courts, with local law enforcement 

and the FBI, and in the courts in Japan. We advise them to move expediently to 

seek custody of their children in U.S. courts. We assist them in communicating the 

gravity of the situation to local law enforcement and the FBI and identifying federal 

statutes that may be applicable. We consult with attorneys, many of whom are dealing with an international abduction situation for the first time. We inform left-behind parents of patterns observed in the behavior of taking parents in Japan and 

the difficulty facing American parents in Japanese courts. The Department also 

seeks to designate non-U.S. citizen abductors and those who assist them as ineligible for U.S. visas. Measures such as pursuing criminal charges, seeking Interpol 

notices, and designating abductors ineligible for U.S. visas restrict taking parents’ 

ability to travel and put pressure on them to negotiate a resolution. 

Where it is appropriate, we work to build communication between the parties. By 

so doing, in other EAP countries, we are occasionally able to help negotiate informal 

solutions or compromises whereby a left-behind parent can gain occasional access 

to their child. While these compromises fall short of a full resolution of the situation, 

most parents consider occasional access preferable to being completely cut off from 

their child as frequently happens in Japan. 

Our ability to help the left-behind parent is crucial, but the highest priority of 

the Department is safeguarding the welfare of U.S. citizen children. To protect our 

most vulnerable citizens, the victims of parental child abduction, we work through 

our embassy in Tokyo and consulates to conduct welfare and whereabouts visits 

with abducted children; we raise abuse and neglect concerns with the Japanese government; and we pursue all lawful and appropriate means to return abducted children to their custodial parents. 

Welfare visits often require assistance from the host government, as taking parents may not provide information about their whereabouts to the left behind parents. Citing privacy laws and legal and cultural differences, and noting that the 

children in question are often Japanese citizens as well, the Government of Japan 

has long declined to assist with welfare and whereabouts visits. In one notable example, a diplomatic note requesting assistance in gaining consular access to an abducted child has gone unanswered for more than a year. However, in a recent break 

with that policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded quickly to a subsequent 

diplomatic note in a separate case and contacted the attorney of a taking parent 

to underscore our request for a welfare and whereabouts visit. Although the taking 

parent continued her refusal and no visit has occurred, this direct action by the 

Government of Japan was the first of its kind. 

In Japan, our ability to assist on individual cases has proven consistently to be 

sharply limited. Consequently, the Department focuses significant effort on the bilateral relationship between the United States and Japan to enable us to provide 

better assistance to left-behind parents in the United States. When the Hague ConVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:05 Feb 27, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00124 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\47624.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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vention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction applies, the Office of 

Children’s Issues, which is the Central Authority for the Convention, assists parents 

in filing an application with foreign central authorities for return of, or access to, 

the child. Japan is not a partner in the Hague Abduction Convention. Consequently, 

our strategy with respect to international parental abduction cases to Japan is to 

raise the issue with the Government of Japan at every appropriate opportunity. 

When Ambassador Maura Harty, then the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of 

Consular Affairs, traveled to Tokyo in December 2005, she initiated a high-level 

State Department dialogue with the Japanese Government on issues involving 

international parental child abduction. On September 6, 2006, U.S. and Japanese 

representatives met again in Tokyo to discuss international parental abduction. The 

Department once again urged Japan to accede to the Hague Abduction Convention, 

which we have been doing since the early 1990’s. In March 2008, the Department 

participated in a Canadian-sponsored symposium in Japan to once again press the 

issue. In conjunction with her participation in the symposium, the Deputy Director 

of the Office of Children’s Issues met with Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials to 

stress the importance of the issue to the U.S. Government. However, the Japanese 

Government’s reception to these requests to join the Hague Convention has been 

consistently unfavorable. 

Other efforts appear to be yielding incremental, but significant, gains. In parallel 

with their efforts to gain Japan’s agreement to join the Hague Convention, State 

Department officials in Washington have pressed the Japanese Embassy at a high 

level on the abduction issue. The Department has encouraged the U.S. Embassy in 

Tokyo to identify and push for alternative ways the Japanese Government can address the concerns of the left behind parents. These meetings, coupled with the senior-official discussions held in Japan, appear to have increased Japanese Government awareness of the agonizing separation forced upon the left-behind parents and 

encouraged a willingness in the central government to consider how they could promote greater readiness at the local level in Japan to assist in such cases. At the 

conclusion of the Canadian-sponsored symposium, Japanese officials delivered a 

long-awaited ‘‘handbook’’ to guide left-behind parents whose children are in Japan 

and those seeking to assist them. The U.S. Embassy in Tokyo is working to translate the document to analyze how this will affect the Department’s assistance to 

left-behind parents. 

Given the difficulties in resolving the situation after a child has been taken to 

Japan, it is infinitely preferable if the child does not become a victim in the first 

place. Consequently, we work to prevent abductions. The Prevention Unit of the Bureau’s Office of Children’s Issues educates parents on the dangers of international 

abduction and works with them to protect children in the United States from this 

threat. Prevention tools on the Bureau of Consular Affairs website 

(www.travel.state.gov) include information on precautions for parents, the importance of custody orders, passport requirements for minor children including parental 

consent regulations, and the Children’s Passport Issuance Alert Program (CPIAP). 

This important program enables Children’s Issues to notify a parent or court-ordered legal guardian before issuing a U.S. passport to his or her minor child. To 

enter a child’s name in the program, parents or guardians need to submit a written 

request to Children’s Issues. 

We also endeavor to interrupt abductions in progress. Our abduction and prevention officers often act as points of contact as a parent works to marshal legal remedies to try to prevent a potential abductor from leaving the United States. By 

working with a parent’s legal representative, local law enforcement, and the FBI, 

we are sometimes able to utilize the Department of Homeland Security’s Prevent 

Departure program to keep a potential abductor from leaving the United States. 

Question 7. On January 25, 2008, I sent a letter with my colleague, Sen. Dianne 

Feinstein, to the Prime Minister of Vietnam, Mr. Nguyen Tan Dung regarding Mr. 

Nguyen Quoc Quan, an American citizen and California resident. According to available news reports, Mr. Nguyen Quoc Quan was arrested in Vietnam on November 

17, 2007 for peacefully distributing pro-democracy leaflets. Our letter called for Mr. 

Nguyen Quoc Quan’s release and the release of all political prisoners detained for 

the peaceful advocacy of democracy. Will you continue to work for the release of Mr. 

Nguyen Quoc Quan? What more can be done to encourage Vietnam to improve its 

human rights record? 

Answer. We have expressed our concern over the arrest of American citizen Dr. 

Nguyen Quoc Quan to senior Vietnamese officials in Hanoi and to the Vietnamese 

Ambassador in Washington. We have made clear that the United Stated opposes the 

arrest of anyone for the peaceful expression of his or her views, and that anyone 

122 

detained on that basis should be released immediately. We will continue to raise at 

high levels our concerns with the Vietnamese government. 

We continue to press Vietnam to improve its human rights record. We are urging 

Vietnam to release all remaining political prisoners, and end the use of catch-all 

‘‘national security’’ provisions like Article 88 of the criminal code, which outlaws 

‘‘propaganda against the State’’ and is used to suppress political opposition. The 

next round of our bilateral Human Rights Dialogue is planned for May this year. 

We have made clear to the Vietnamese that the Dialogue must lead to concrete action to improve the human rights situation. More broadly, we have underscored that 

expanding our relationship will depend on progress in all areas, including greater 

respect for human rights and more freedom for the people of Vietnam. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR COLEMAN

Hmong Human Rights 

Question 1. What are we doing in conjunction with the Thai government to protect 

the lives of Hmong refugees and ensure that they are not deported back to Laos? 

Answer. We have repeatedly urged the Thai government to evaluate all Hmong 

claims to refugee status individually before a decision is made on deportation. We 

understand that the Thai government has established a vetting process to evaluate 

Hmong asylum-seekers’ cases and has consistently assured us that Hmong asylumseekers with a legitimate fear of persecution will not be repatriated to Laos. Nevertheless, Thai authorities did deport several groups of Hmong asylum-seekers without screening in 2006 and 2007. We have registered strong concerns about those repatriations at senior levels of the Thai government. 

The Department of State, through the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, in late 2007 contributed approximately $500,000 to support basic humanitarian 

assistance at the Hmong settlement at Petchaboon, Thailand through a contribution 

to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). UNICEF works with the sole 

non-governmental organization present at the settlement, Medecins Sans Frontieres 

(MSF), to provide food, cooking fuel, blankets and other basic assistance to residents. MSF has provided basic health care for the Hmong at Petchaboon for over 

two years. UNICEF will continue to monitor living conditions there during regular 

visits to the settlement. 

With respect to the issue of potential return of any Hmong not found to be refugees, we have urged the Lao government to allow international monitors access to 

areas where Hmong have been repatriated and permit humanitarian organizations 

based outside of Laos to assist with reintegration. That system was in place in the 

1990s when Thailand repatriated to Laos the last of approximately 29,000 ethnic 

Hmong and others deemed economic migrants, and UNHCR was permitted to monitor their return and reintegration. It should be noted that UNHCR assessed that 

these returnees were not mistreated by the Lao government, and UNHCR closed its 

office in Laos in 2001. U.S. officials will also continue to seek expanded international access to Hmong areas in general. 

Question. What other efforts are being made to improve the human rights situation in Laos? 

Answer. Senior U.S. officials, including Deputy Assistant Secretary for Southeast 

Asia Scot Marciel during his visit to Laos in January 2008 and Ambassador Ravic 

Huso on several recent occasions, have had productive discussions with Lao officials 

on improving the status of the Hmong ethnic minority. We have actively raised a 

range of Hmong-related issues, including: Hmong asylum-seekers in Thailand, treatment of those in hiding in remote areas of Laos, and the Lao government’s overall 

relations with this ethnic minority group. In general, the Lao response to our concerns in recent months has been cautious but slightly more encouraging than in the 

past. Nonetheless, we will continue to urge the Lao government to permit international humanitarian access to and monitoring of the Hmong in remote areas. 

Bahrain 

Question 3. I am concerned about reports of abuses in Bahraini prisons, particularly of individuals whose imprisonment may have been politically motivated. Does 

the State Department believe Bahrain holds political prisoners? What is the Department’s view about allegations of mistreatment of individuals detained in Bahrain? 

Can you tell me the Department’s position on the jailing and reported abuse of activist Mohamed Al-Singace? 

123 

Answer. In December 2007, Bahraini officials arrested many individuals in connection with protest-related violence and the beating of one police officer. Fifteen 

men are being held on an array of offenses including arson, attempted murder of 

a police officer, theft of a weapon, and illegal possession of a firearm. On February 

24, the detainees appeared in court to hear the charges against them. Human rights 

observers, family members, and the defendant’s legal representatives were present 

at the hearing. The Bahraini government has refused to allow a few of the detainees 

access to legal counsel or family members. Two men received temporary release 

from jail in order to complete education and family obligations. 

The Department of State views the allegations of abuse relating to Mr. Mohamed 

Al-Singace quite seriously and although we are satisfied with the review of his case 

thus far, we continue to discuss this matter with appropriate Bahraini officials and 

human rights activists in an effort to ensure that Mr. Al-Singace receives a transparent and fair review of his case. 

Question 4. As a board member of the National Endowment for Democracy, I’m 

concerned about the fact that the National Democratic Institute was expelled from 

Bahrain. Can you please tell me how the Department responded to that expulsion, 

and what the U.S. is doing to promote democratic reform in Bahrain? 

Answer. In July 2007, NDI resumed activities in Bahrain in cooperation with the 

Bahrain Institute for Political Development. USG dialogue with the government of 

Bahrain, led by our Embassy in Manama and by the State Department, was instrumental in NDI’s successful return to Bahrain. Since reaching agreement, NDI has 

successfully completed two parliamentary training programs and has received Bahraini permission to carry out additional programs in March and April 2008. 

In May 2006, the Government of Bahrain declined to renew a residency permit 

for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) funded Country Director of the 

National Democratic Institute (NDI), effectively closing down NDI’s operations in 

Bahrain. While USG programs on democratic development (many of them implemented by NDI) were paralyzed for a period of time, NDI and the Government of 

Bahrain began a dialogue about proposed Bahraini-NDI cooperation a short while 

later. During these discussions senior USG officials strongly urged the Bahraini government to support NDI activities. The Department recognizes that increased and 

sustained Bahraini support for NDI activities is critical to continued democratic reform in Bahrain. 

Bahrain is a friend and ally to the United States; human rights and democratic 

development continue to progress despite some setbacks and challenges. We continue to promote these issues in Bahrain through frank and constructive dialogue 

with Bahraini government officials and activists. Additionally, our Embassy in 

Manama has at its disposal an array of public diplomacy tools to support democratic 

development as well as effective programs funded by the Middle East Partnership 

Initiative to increase respect for human rights and the rule of law in Bahrain. 

Question 5. Some have suggested that Bahraini elections are a sham because 

elected leaders wield little real power. Do you agree or disagree with this viewpoint? 

What is the Department doing to strengthen Bahraini elected institutions? 

Answer. The November 2006 parliamentary and municipal elections in Bahrain 

have largely been viewed as a success. The elections were Bahrain’s second since 

democratic reforms were instituted in 1999. In contrast to its decision to boycott the 

2002 parliamentary elections, the Shia oppositionist group Al-Wifaq chose to participate during the 2006 elections and now holds 18 of 40 seats in the elected Council 

of Representative (COR), making it the COR’s largest block. Al-Wifaq has used its 

new position of influence to seek positive, tangible reforms to benefit Bahrain’s Shia 

community. However, Al-Wifaq’s increasingly prominent role in the Bahraini political process is a positive example of democratic participation in Bahrain.Strong Bahraini institutions are important to Bahrain’s ongoing democratic development, and 

despite some powers such as the ability to propose legislation and question ministers, more needs to be done to support COR authority. NDI has held two successful training sessions to empower and educate Bahraini parliamentarians, and two 

additional sessions are scheduled to take place in spring 2008. Embassy Manama 

continues to work diligently to strengthen democratic institutions by encouraging 

broad participation in Bahrain’s political process and by participating in meetings 

and dialogue with Bahraini officials and activists. 

Question 6. During President Bush’s recent visit to Bahrain, I understand a petition with more than 83,000 signatures was delivered to the U.S. Embassy to express 

concern about a lack of democracy in Bahrain. Can you tell me how this petition 

was received and what is the U.S. response to it? 

124 

Answer. On January 8, Embassy Manama made special accommodations to receive the petition you mention, delivered by Mr. Abdujalil Singace. Despite a holiday-related closure, the Embassy opened its doors to Mr. Singace and made special 

accommodations to facilitate his entry onto the Embassy compound. Mr. Singace requested to personally deliver the petition to President Bush. Embassy staff could 

not accommodate this request, but did deliver the petition to appropriate White 

House staff during President Bush’s January 12-13 visit to Bahrain. Embassy 

Manama did not confirm the number of signatures on the petition before delivering 

it to White House staff. The petition remains under review by White House staff. 

Question 7. Does the U.S. Embassy in Bahrain or State Department in Washington meet with Bahraini political dissidents and democracy activists? 

Answer. U.S. officials in Bahrain and Washington regularly meet with those Bahraini activists who responsibly express their opposition and do not advocate violence 

or extremism. Senior U.S. officials also regularly meet with such activists and NGO 

leaders. For example, during a February 25-26 visit to Bahrain, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Kent Patton hosted separate roundtable 

discussions with Bahraini oppositionists and NGO leaders. In July 2007, the Bureau 

of Democracy Human Rights and Labor Affairs sponsored a roundtable discussion 

in Washington among then U.S. Ambassador-designate to Bahrain Adam Ereli, 

NGO representatives, and Bahraini activists. Ambassador Ereli has pledged to engage the Bahraini government in a dialogue about human rights and hopes ongoing 

discussion will continue to highlight the importance of NGO groups as an asset in 

promoting respect for democratic reform and human rights in Bahrain. 

Philippines 

Question 8. Could you please describe the efforts of how the State Department is 

working with the Philippine government to monitor and ensure that ‘‘command responsibility’’ is being properly implemented in the Philippine military, and that current and former military officers credibly alleged to be responsible for extrajudicial 

executions and disappearances are prosecuted? 

Answer. Senior USG officials, both in Washington and Manila, repeatedly raise 

concerns about allegations of extrajudicial killings (EJKs) and urge the Philippine 

authorities to investigate cases and prosecute cases, if credible evidence is discovered. State Department officers also communicate with international and local 

NGOs and activists to receive updates on human rights conditions in the Philippines, including extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, and implementation 

of command responsibility. 

In May 2007, as part of its ongoing efforts to help the Philippine government promote and protect human rights and rule of law, the U.S. Embassy held a sevenday seminar that included a significant component on command responsibility. This 

seminar was taught by a U.S. Attorney’s Office expert and focused on the investigation and prosecution of extrajudicial killings. It was attended by 31 Philippine investigators, 10 Philippine Department of Justice prosecutors who specialize in the prosecution of these cases, and four Philippine Commission on Human Rights regional 

directors. 

Ongoing U.S. military assistance programs enhance professionalism, encourage 

respect for human rights, and strengthen the concept of command responsibility 

among members of the Philippine Armed Forces. Each year, thousands of soldiers 

receive some form of human rights training, which is embedded in training exercises 

conducted by U.S. military personnel. 

Question 9. What role is the State Department playing in helping the Philippine 

government with the reform of the newly enacted anti-terror law, the Human Security Act, so that the law provides basic procedural guarantees and are in accordance 

with international human rights standards? 

Answer. The Philippine Human Security Act of 2007, signed into law on March 

6, 2007, expanded the tools available to the Philippine government to investigate 

and prosecute acts of terrorism. The United States supported the passage of this 

legislation since the lack of a prior legal framework for counterterrorism efforts by 

law enforcement agencies had contributed to the Philippines becoming a haven safe 

for al Qaida-linked groups, such as the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiya. 

The Human Security Act should enable prosecutors to use new investigative tools, 

including electronic surveillance, which will help bolster their cases against terrorists in court. 

The legislation has been criticized by some non-government organizations concerned about potential government abuse of the Act’s provisions. Accordingly, the 

Philippine Senate added safeguards to ensure the Act was not misused by targeting 

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government critics and opposition politicians. These safeguard provisions are considered highly protective of civil liberties; some Philippine Congressmen have since expressed concerns that these provisions are exceedingly strong, so much so that the 

Act itself may be difficult to implement. Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo publicly promised that ‘‘law abiding Filipinos have nothing to fear.for it is a 

weapon that shall be wielded against bombers and not protesters.’’ To further allay 

public concerns, President Arroyo delayed implementation of the Act until two 

months after the May 2007 mid-term elections. 

The U.S. Embassy worked closely with Philippine legislators and officials to improve and strengthen the counterterrorism legislation prior to its passage, while 

strongly advocating for the inclusion of built-in protections of the rights of Philippine citizens. After the act was signed, the Embassy also issued a statement congratulating the Philippine government and Congress for taking a positive step in 

countering and preventing terrorism in the Philippines by providing needed legal 

tools while ensuring protection of civil liberties and human rights. 

Since the passage of the Act, we continue to work with the Philippine government 

as it implements the law. The Embassy provides training and assistance to officials 

from the military, police, and the Philippines National Intelligence Coordinating 

Agency, who implement the Human Security Act. U.S.-sponsored training, whether 

for the military, intelligence, or law enforcement community, includes a human 

rights component. We will continue to encourage the Philippine government to use 

its new counterterrorism tools so as to ensure that the rights of Philippine citizens 

are protected in accordance with international human rights standards. 

In December 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice conducted a training program 

with the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency and representatives of the Philippine Anti-Terrorism Council that addressed the Act and compared it with U.S. 

law. The focus was on use of electronic surveillance for presentation in court and, 

among other things, discussed the procedural safeguards contained in U.S. law as 

a basis for implementation of the act’s provisions. The conference also addressed the 

current restrictions of the act and the need for accountability of law enforcement 

through the public criminal justice system. 

Question 10. Prior to providing military assistance to the Philippine military, how 

is the State Department monitoring and identifying those military units whose 

members have been credibly alleged to have committed human rights violations, as 

required by the Leahy Law? 

Answer. We conduct intensive vetting of all Philippine members of law enforcement or military units who are candidates for U.S.-funded training, including civilians attached or assigned to security force units. The three-part vetting process includes 1) internal vetting by relevant USG law enforcement agencies at post, including the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, 

and the Regional Security Office; 2) host country vetting by the Philippine National 

Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine Commission on Human Rights; and 3) 

vetting with the State Department’s Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and 

Labor; Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. If there is no credible information 

of gross violations of human rights by the candidate at all three levels, the individual and/or unit are permitted to attend the scheduled training. Candidates for 

whom questionable or identified derogatory information is available have been and 

will continue to be excluded from receiving U.S. assistance, as required by the 

Leahy Amendment. All derogatory information received on vetted individuals and 

units is maintained for review and consultation in future vetting processes. 

In 2007, we vetted 2,235 law enforcement and armed forces training candidates 

and identified derogatory information on 196 candidates. Upon further investigation, we excluded 39 individuals and one entire unit for various human rights violations. 

Question 11. Is the State Department working with the Philippine National Police 

and the Armed Forces of the Philippines to ensure that all writs of amparo and 

other summonses issued by Philippine courts and the Philippine Commission on 

Human Rights are fully and completely enforced and responded to by the PNP and 

AFP? 

Answer. In October 2007, the Philippine Supreme Court promulgated new rules 

regarding the writ of amparo, a remedy available to victims of human rights abuses, 

particularly extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The writ may be 

filed in any of the 800 Regional Trial Courts against any agency, public official, or 

private individual and gives the respondent five working days to provide all relevant 

information regarding the case, including steps taken to investigate the fate or 

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whereabouts of the victim. Since the rules came into effect in October 2007, human 

rights lawyers have filed 17 writ of amparo petitions against the military. Six petitions have resulted in the release of six persons from military custody. 

The USG supported the development and application of the writ of amparo 

through programs implemented by the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID). In July 2007, USAID co-sponsored the Supreme Court’s National Consultative Summit on Extra-judicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances, which identified measures to address human rights violations in the country, including the urgent need for the writ of amparo. After the Supreme Court issued the writ of 

amparo in October 2007, USAID supported a series of events designed to foster 

greater understanding of the writ and to encourage its appropriate use, including 

a USAID-supported one-day Supreme Court event with 20 human rights organizations to discuss guidelines for their accreditation as private protection providers (the 

writ of amparo stipulates that private organizations can provide witness protection 

in human rights cases). 

In November 2007, USAID support enabled 247 judges and clerks of court from 

the regions of Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao to participate in a conference to clarify 

provisions of the new rule and to discuss how petitions should be handled. This February, USAID supported a case conference attended by networks of human rights 

organizations to discuss specific actions needed to support the filing of petitions for 

writ of amparo in connection with ten cases of enforced disappearances. USAID is 

currently working with the Supreme Court to develop information materials that 

will easily convey, through storytelling and illustrations, the legal procedures involved in securing a writ of amparo. 

In 2007, the Department of Justice/International Criminal Investigative Training 

Assistance Program (DOJ/ICITAP) provided training to approximately 1,500 police 

officers. While all training includes a human rights component, approximately 500 

of these officers were specifically trained in Police Ethics or Human Rights. We are 

on course to train another 250 by the end of March. Finally, our ICITAP program 

is collaborating with the Philippine National Police Human Rights Affairs Office to 

help support them with the delivery of their own in-house human rights training 

throughout the country. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MENENDEZ

Question 1. The Administration requested $550 million in the 2008 supplemental 

and now another $550 million in the 2009 budget for a counterdrug package in Mexico. In light of this increase, please justify the $37 million overall cut in the 2009 

request from DA, ESF, and CSH accounts compared to the 2008 levels in Latin 

America. 

Answer. A key priority in building the FY 2009 foreign assistance request was reinvigorating our investment in the Western Hemisphere. While the Me ́rida security 

initiative to combat drug trafficking, transnational crime, and terrorism in the region is an important focus of this year’s request, the FY 2009 budget also prioritizes 

funding for development objectives in the Western Hemisphere such as advancing 

democracy and free trade. Excluding funding for the Me ́rida initiative, the FY 2009 

request for the region represents $31.5 million (2.1 percent) increase over FY 2008 

enacted levels. 

The FY 2009 budget acknowledges criticism of last year’s request by increasing 

development assistance (DA/ESF) funding for the region. Combined, these two accounts increase $77.3 million (13.8 percent) from last year’s request, with significant 

investments for Bolivia, Ecuador, and Central America to promote democratic governance and economic opportunity, as well as support for the implementation of the 

Central American and Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). 

Funding is also targeted to expand democracy, poverty reduction, and environment 

programs in Haiti. 

We appreciate Congress’ strong support for programs funded from the Child Survival and Health (CSH) account, reflected by an FY 2008 enacted level for the region of $134 million, a 24 percent increase over the Administration’s FY 2008 request. CSH programs are a top priority for this Administration as we continue to 

balance assistance across all sectors to support sustainable development practices. 

As a result, the FY 2009 request for the CSH in the Western Hemisphere is essentially straight lined from last year’s request level. 

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Staffing at USAID 

I believe that the strength of U.S. development assistance efforts depends on the 

strength and morale of the people who make up its workforce. I also believe, that 

one good way to ensure impact of our programs is ensure that we have the most 

capable, dedicated, and diverse workforce on the ground. Over the last few decades, 

there has been a stark erosion of the technical and managerial capacity at USAID. 

As a result, many of USAID’s staff have left to pursue better opportunities. 

I recently sent a letter along with Sen. Biden asking USAID Administrator Fore 

to come to Congress with a comprehensive plan to staff up the Agency, rather than 

the stop-gap measure they have proposed to increase the number of Foreign Service 

officers. While I believe that getting more people is important, but it won’t solve the 

problem—getting the right people and retaining the best people is the only way that 

USAID is going to re-establish itself as the heavy-weight in the U.S. Government’s 

foreign assistance. In your budget request, the Administration has asked for an 18 

percent increase of Overhead Expenses (OE) or $117 million dollars. While more resources are part of this equation, they are only a small part. 

Question 2. What are you doing to make sure that USAID is able to attract and 

retain the most qualified workforce? 

Answer. Recognizing the development landscape has changed over the past two 

decades with levels in trade, foreign direct investment and remittances overtaking 

official, development assistance, I have instituted an aggressive outreach program 

that will target candidates with the skills needed for a 21st Century USAID workforce. Demonstrating a commitment to enriching the application pool, senior USAID 

leadership will be participating in recruitment events that will identify quality candidates to be considered for upcoming Foreign Service Officer positions. 

Question 3. Do you plan to make a sincere gesture to build the capacity of the 

staff at USAID, instead of just increasing the number of Foreign Service Officers? 

Answer. New initiatives have been undertaken focusing on strengthening the 

skills of the entire workforce. The USAID training budget was doubled for FY 2007 

and maintained at this level in FY 2008 even under significant budget constraints. 

I have directed the staff to look at the content and how we deliver training, including bringing a greater number of more relevant courses to the desk tops of our staff 

through e-learning. In addition, USAID is moving to greatly expand our foreign language training beyond French, Spanish, Portuguese and Russian to include Arabic, 

the languages of South and East Asia and some of the more common African languages. 

Question 4. What percentage of Personal Services Contractors and Institutional 

Contractors, respectively, represent in the current USAID workforce? 

Answer. The total U.S. workforce is 3,308. Of this total, Personal Services Contractor and institutional contractor staff amount to 628 and 280, respectively. The 

percentage of the USAID U.S. workforce for Personal Services Contractors is 15% 

and for institutional contractor staff it is 19%. 

Question 5. How will these individuals be integrated into the staffing at USAID? 

Answer. As I have mentioned in the past, USAID cannot double the size of the 

Foreign Service workforce by solely bringing in entry-level hires. The workforce gap 

analysis is identifying areas of mid-level shortfalls taking into account the organizational needs and on-board staff. USAID will then competitively recruit to fill these 

gaps. It is anticipated that qualified Personal Services Contractors that apply would 

rise to the top of the list. There will also be a continued need for a very small number of Personal Services Contractor staff to fill short-term targeted needs. 

Question 6. In November, Defense Secretary Gates stated in a speech at Kansas 

State University that there is a ‘‘need for a dramatic increase in spending on the 

civilian instruments of national security—diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development.’’ Do you 

agree with this? If so, can you elaborate? 

Please comment specifically on why the key elements of our development assistance efforts—basic education for example, or fighting disease and improving health 

care—are particularly effective instruments of national security today, and will be 

even more so in the months and years to come? 

Answer. I absolutely agree with Secretary Gate’s statement. President Bush’s Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Operations Budget for the Department of State, the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID) and other foreign affairs agencies 

totals $26.1 billion, an increase of 8.9 percent over the total Fiscal Year 2008 enacted to date, including emergency funding, or 14.3 percent over the FY 2008 enVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:05 Feb 27, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00131 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\47624.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
128 

acted base. This increase reflects a determined effort to enhance civilian instruments of national security-including the capacity of our civilian agencies, with staff 

increases for the Department of State and the largest requested increase in USAID’s 

operational budget in nearly two decades-and our development, reconstruction, and 

security assistance. 

Development now plays a vastly elevated role in America’s foreign policy. The 

charge I have given to our diplomatic corps is a long-term development goal-to help 

build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their 

people, reduce widespread poverty, and behave responsibly toward their people and 

the international system. In the 21st century, defined as it is thus far by an unprecedented and increasing interdependence, human development is both a moral end 

in itself and also a central pillar of our national security. 

Today, the idea that foreign assistance-and specifically long-term development-is 

a vital tool of our international statecraft meets with broad and growing support. 

The closer collaboration of State and USAID enacted under the establishment of a 

dual-hatted Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance and USAID Administrator has aided 

that effort, providing our development professionals the opportunity-indeed the 

mandate-to more fully participate at all levels of budget and program planning, providing their insight, perspective, and superior development expertise across the 

range of our programs and accounts, not just those appropriated to USAID, and to 

the tough choices that need to be made across our global budget. 

With respect to funding, we have continued to boost the quantity of our assistance. Since 2001, with the support and partnership of Congress, President Bush has 

launched the largest development agenda since the Marshall Plan. In the past six 

years, we have nearly tripled official development assistance worldwide and quadrupled it to Sub-Saharan Africa. 

As noted above, the FY 2009 request reflects the continuation of this effort, further illustrating the emerging national consensus in support of development. The 

resources requested in the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Operations Budget demonstrate 

our strong commitment to fighting poverty, with a focus on strengthening democratic governance and promoting economic growth. This is reflected in our request 

for the Development Assistance account, which is nearly 60 percent higher than the 

Fiscal Year 2008 request, and our request of $1.7 billion for democracy promotion 

and governance. 

I would also like to specifically mention the State Department’s Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) that is included in the President’s budget. CSI is the product 

of the work of 15 agencies, including Defense, to build the full complement of U.S. 

government expertise necessary to respond to a stabilization crisis and to promote 

effective rule of law, economic stabilization and transitional governance in weak and 

failing states. 

With the requested resources, the Department of State, USAID and other foreign 

affairs agencies strive to create the conditions conducive to sustained progress in 

governance, economic growth, and human capacity, recognizing that countries that 

move in this direction become our partners in global peace and prosperity. 

Question 7. How can the U.S. Government improve its coordination across the different agencies conducting international development and health work, like MCC 

and PEPFAR, especially given that the latter two programs are outside the direct 

authority of the Director of Foreign Assistance? While the Director of Foreign Assistance does have coordinating authority over those agencies, the experience over 

the last two years has not demonstrated that that authority is sufficient to effectively coordinate the activities and budget planning between USAID, MCC, and 

PEPFAR—either here in Washington or at the country level. 

Answer. The establishment of a dual-hatted Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance 

and USAID Administrator has led to continued improvement in the interagency coordination of activities and budget planning. For FY 2008, for example, with the establishment of common objectives, a common program lexicon, and common budget 

and program planning processes, State (including PEPFAR) and USAID were able 

to improve coordination, with steps taken toward greater MCC and DOD coordination. For FY 2009, MCC and DOD were formally added as participants in State and 

USAID’s budget and program planning process, in addition to their coordination in 

the field. 

The evidence of such coordination is illustrated by a number of examples: In 

Ghana, for instance, USAID is focusing its programming on enhancing the capacity 

of local government, which is responsible for implementing MCC compact activities 

in economic growth. In Honduras, USAID programming focuses on trade and investment capacity building and private sector competitiveness, in order to complement 

MCC compact investments in infrastructure and agricultural diversification. 

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With respect to PEPFAR, the greater coordination achieved through the DFA 

helped highlight development gaps in our non-HIV/AIDS programming, including 

interventions in governance and economic growth that will help build host government capacity to sustain further progress on their own. Thus, in FY 2009, the budget includes $2.1 billion for State Department and USAID programs in Africa to address development gaps and support economic opportunity and governance programs critical to the success of the investments we have made through PEPFAR. 

A number of additional activities are ongoing for this year that we hope will further improve coordination. A strong interagency country strategy development process is being planned for specific pilot countries. The 3-to-5-year strategic plan will 

be developed by the field, under the leadership of Ambassadors, and is explicitly targeted to include full interagency, other donor, and where appropriate, host government participation. As with last year, the annual Operational Plan process will provide additional opportunities for the interagency in the field to develop comprehensive program plans, working together to ensure coordination. 

Finally, to extend coherence across all U.S. Government foreign assistance, the 

Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance and USAID Administrator now leads the interagency Development Policy Coordination Committee. As technical as it sounds, this 

committee is an important tool for aligning U.S. Government efforts, making joint 

policy decisions on critical development issues, and forging stronger collaboration to 

deliver greater impact from the U.S. Government’s development efforts around the 

world. The Development Policy Coordinating Committee has agreed to focus on 

intra-government coordination-including the use of the DFA-established common objectives, program lexicon, and planning processes-in a select number of countries. 

Lessons learned from this pilot will then be adopted on a broader scale. 

We share your concern about the importance of such comprehensive coordination, 

and welcome your input and feedback on our ongoing efforts. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR VITTER

Question 1. The United States has not ratified the Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST) 

and therefore is not a party to the Treaty. Under the U.S. Constitution, without 

Senate ratification, the Treaty has no force of law in the U.S. and the U.S. is not 

bound to provide financial support to the International Tribunal of the Law of the 

Sea (ITLOS) and the Deep Seabed Authority (the ‘‘Authority’’). 

For what reason is the Administration requesting funding for entities to which 

the U.S. has no financial obligation, have not been previously funded, and were created by a Treaty that has not been ratified? 

Under what authority does the Administration propose to fund international organizations created by a Treaty which has not been ratified by the U.S. Senate? 

Answer. The Administration did not request funding for a treaty that has not 

been ratified. The President’s budget request related to the Law of the Sea Convention ($1.3 million to the International Seabed Authority and $3.6 million to the 

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in FY 2009) was explicitly conditioned 

on Senate approval of U.S. accession to the Convention. (Attached are pages 737 

and 740 from the Contributions to International Organizations Appropriation section of the FY 2009 Department of State Congressional Budget Justification.) As our 

budget presentation indicates, no funds will be provided to either organization until 

the United States accedes to the Convention. 

Let me reiterate the Administration’s strong support for U.S. accession to the Law 

of the Sea Convention. Joining the 154 other parties to the Convention would promote U.S. security, economic, and environmental interests, with very modest financial implications, especially when weighed against the substantial benefits that 

would accrue to the United States. 

Question 2. Even if the Senate ratifies LOST, the U.S. will not fall under the jurisdiction of ITLOS; to settle disputes arising under LOST, the U.S. has chosen to 

utilize arbitral tribunals created under Annex VII, and special arbitral tribunals for 

specified categories of disputes constituted pursuant to Annex VIII. 

Why is the Administration funding an international tribunal (ITLOS) that has no 

jurisdiction over the U.S. and to which, even if LOST is ratified, the U.S. has no 

plans to submit? 

Answer. You correctly note that the United States would not generally be subject 

to ITLOS jurisdiction (choosing arbitration and special arbitration for its disputes). 

However, as the Administration and others have made clear, certain matters can 

130 

be brought to ITLOS in any event (such as the prompt release of vessels held for 

fishing violations, which cannot wait for the establishment of an arbitral tribunal). 

It should also be noted that joining the Convention would give the United States 

the opportunity to nominate a judge to sit on the ITLOS. Thus, while we would generally not be subject to its jurisdiction, a U.S. national would potentially be in a position to influence its deliberations. 

Question 3. Not only is the Administration funding international entities that are 

not approved by the Senate, but it is handing over American dollars to organizations 

at which there are no American representatives present to protect U.S. interests. 

There are no American representatives because the U.S. is not a member of this 

treaty. 

Has the Administration taken steps necessary to restrict the uses of U.S. funding 

to the Authority and ITLOS, to ensure it is spent only to further U.S. interests? 

Has the Administration taken any precautions to ensure that American taxpayers’ 

money is not used to support endless bureaucratic meetings or bloated payrolls? 

Has the Administration tied restrictions to the uses of the funding? 

Answer. As stated in the response to Question 1, no funds will be provided to either entity until the United States accedes to the Convention. As a Party to the 

Convention, the United States along with the other States Parties would approve 

the budget of the International Tribunal and review its expenditures at an annual 

meeting. As a Party, the United States would have a guaranteed seat on the Finance Committee of the International Seabed Authority, which has jurisdiction over 

all budgetary and financial matters; the Finance Committee must make decisions 

by consensus. 

We believe the activities of both the Seabed Authority and the Tribunal are consistent with U.S. interests. The United States has consistently sought the inclusion 

of effective dispute settlement provisions in any law of the sea treaty, as an additional tool to promote compliance. Consistent with U.S. interests, the 1982 Convention provides appropriate flexibility to parties with respect to both forum and subject matter. 

Question 4. Among its various flaws, LOST creates new unaccountable, bureaucratic institutions manned by foreign interests that may be hostile to the U.S.; 

threatens American sovereignty by leaving open the question of ‘‘military activities’’ 

and intelligence operations to the jurisdiction of binding international tribunals; and 

promises to undermine our economy through environmental law-fare. Yet the Administration is proposing to provide the funding for two LOST organizations 

(ITLOS, the Authority). 

Has the Administration taken any precautions to ensure that American dollars 

would not be used in a way that would harm U.S. interests? 

Answer. Please see the answers to the first three questions. The Administration 

does not agree with your characterizations of these two organizations. We strongly 

support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. Joining the 154 other parties to the Convention would promote U.S. security, economic, and environmental 

interests, with very modest financial implications, especially when weighed against 

the substantial benefits that would accrue to the United States. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CASEY

Question 1. Why was the budget request for the State Department’s nonproliferation programs cut? The final FY 2008 appropriations for State Department nonproliferation programs came in at $211 million, yet the Administration is only requesting $210 million for the upcoming year. 

In particular, why was funding reduced for such key nonproliferation initiatives 

like the State Department’s Export Controls and Border Security program ($4.3 million dollar cut) and U.S. contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency 

($1 million cut)? 

Answer. The State Department strongly supports robust funding for its nonproliferation programs and, since FY 2007 we have provided a 6 percent increase 

in these programs. However, in FY 2009, due to competing priorities, we were not 

able to plus-up the nonproliferation programs as a whole. Our FY 2009 requests for 

the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program and for the U.S. 

voluntary contribution to the IAEA were the same as the President’s request for FY 

2008 (the final FY 2008 appropriation reflects additional funding by Congress), and 

131 

continue to reflect adequate funding for these two important nonproliferation programs. 

Question 2. The Blackwater shooting incident on September 16, 2007, in which 

Blackwater employees opened fire in a crowd of Iraqis killing 17 civilians and 

wounding 27 others publicly revealed many of the dangers that private contractors 

in Iraq pose for the broader U.S. mission in the country. In late October, you 

reached an agreement with Secretary Gates to revise the rules under which security 

contractors working for the State Department operate in Iraq. That agreement was 

implemented by a memorandum of understanding between General Petraeus and 

Ambassador Crocker in early December. 

How have the new rules addressed the problems revealed by the Sept 16th incident? What legislative actions or policy recommendations do you suggest the Congress take to ensure that security contractors operate fully within the military chain 

of command and in support of the broader national interest? 

Answer. Following the events of September 16, 2007, the Department of State initiated a thorough review of its security operations in Iraq. A panel of experts assembled by the Secretary of State determined the Department’s security practices in 

Iraq to be highly effective in ensuring the safety of mission personnel and recommended additional measures to strengthen coordination, oversight, and accountability of the Department’s security programs. Many of the panel’s recommendations 

are incorporated into the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed on December 

5, 2007, between the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Defense 

(DOD). The MOA represents a joint effort to develop and implement core standards 

for all DOS- and DOD-contracted private security companies (PSCs) in Iraq. 

The Department continues to move forward with implementation of the panel’s 

recommendations and provisions of the MOA. Significant progress has been made 

in a number of critical areas, including use-of-force policies, incident response and 

investigation, and movement coordination and control. The Department increased 

the staffing levels, bolstered Iraq-specific training for security contractors, and increased the use of technology. The Department has also taken strides to strengthen 

oversight and accountability of PSCs that protect contractors, subcontractors, or 

grantees of the State Department or other civilian agencies under Chief of Mission 

authority. 

The joint efforts between the Departments of State and Defense in developing and 

implementing the December 2007 MOA have established a strong foundation for 

continued coordination in meeting the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Sections 861 (Memorandum of Understanding on 

Matters Relating to Contracting) and 862 (Contractors Performing Private Security 

Functions in Areas of Combat Operations). We feel that the December 2007 MOA 

coupled with the newly enacted legislation found in NDAA 08 Sections 861 and 862 

provides all necessary guidelines to integrate DOS and DOD operations in a designated battle space. For example, DOS is prepared to participate in DOD’s Synchronized Pre-Deployment Operational Tracking (SPOT) database, upon its anticipated rollout to the Department this March. 

The Department believes its efforts have positively impacted operations and have 

effectively strengthened accountability and oversight of private security contractors. 

The Department strongly supports efforts to provide greater legal accountability for 

unlawful acts its security contractors may commit abroad. The Administration is 

currently working with Congress on legislation to clarify coverage of U.S. criminal 

laws, so that we have the laws we need to hold private contractors overseas accountable when appropriate. 

Question 3. The criminal investigation into the conduct of the Blackwater security 

contractors during the September 16th shooting incident has been hindered by a 

number of significant legal complications. Among those legal setbacks is the promise 

of limited immunity from prosecution that was granted to Blackwater employees by 

State Department investigators. 

How is the State Department cooperating with the Justice Department to resolve 

these legal issues so that the contractors and Blackwater can be held accountable 

for their actions? 

Answer. The Department of State is not in a position to immunize individuals 

from federal criminal prosecution. The Department of Justice, in their October 30, 

2007 press release, indicated that any suggestion of immunity from federal criminal 

prosecution for Blackwater employees is inaccurate. The Department of State continues to cooperate fully with the Department of Justice and the FBI in their ongoing investigation of the September 16 shooting incident. 

132 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ISAKSON

Question 1. Does the Department plan to advance the schedule of the Malabo New 

Embassy Compound (NEC) for construction; also, are their plans for improving the 

Ambassador’s residence? 

Answer. The Department of State has a Congressionally-mandated process by 

which our embassy facilities are ranked and prioritized for replacement construction. Under the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 

(SECCA), the Department is authorized to spend security capital appropriations 

only among the top 80 most vulnerable posts (the ‘‘top 80 list’’). (Although SECCA 

contained a sunset provision after 5 years, the Department continues to work with 

Congress consistent with SECCA requirements.) 

Annually, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) reviews the vulnerability of all 

chancery and consulate buildings, considering many security factors and assigned 

threat levels. the regional bureaus, in consultation with DS, Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), and Department senior management, recommend posts for addition 

to the top 80 list, and each regional bureau prioritizes its posts within the top 80. 

In August 2006, Malabo was added to the top 80 list for construction of a NEC 

and was at that time prioritized by the Bureau of African Affairs for a construction 

award for FY 2014. However, in December 2005, the Government of Equatorial 

Guinea passed a resolution to grant a 12.3-acre site to the United States at no cost. 

The site was determined to be viable for a NEC, and on October 18, 2007, Embassy 

Malabo took title in the name of the United States of America. As a result of this 

action, Malabo is currently planned for a new embassy contract award in FY 2009. 

Suitable housing is scarce and expensive in Malabo. Post and OBO have been 

working to find a more suitable Chief of Mission Residence (CMR), even before current Ambassador Johnson’s arrival at post. Unfortunately, there are major problems 

in finding properties in Malabo that meet a wide variety of OBO and Diplomatic 

Security requirements. We are continuing our search for an adequate CMR. In order 

to assist in the search, OBO’s Division of Real Estate will be sending a team to 

Malabo to review the housing situation at post. 

Æ