alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### § 95.11 Pre-award policies.

Public Notice and Priority Setting. Federal awarding agencies shall notify the public of its intended funding priorities for discretionary grant programs, unless funding priorities are established by Federal statute.
```

[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 247 (Tuesday, December 24, 2013)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 77574]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-30527]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION

16 CFR Part 1218

Safety Standard for Bassinets and Cradles; Correction

AGENCY: Consumer Product Safety Commission.

ACTION: Final rule; correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The United States Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(Commission) is correcting a final rule that appeared in the Federal 
Register of October 23, 2013 (78 FR 63019). The document established a 
standard for bassinets and cradles that incorporates by reference ASTM 
F2194-13, with certain modifications. The Commission is correcting two 
references to sections of ASTM F2194-13.

DATES: Effective on April 23, 2014.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William Dewgard, Directorate for 
Compliance, Consumer Product Safety Commission, 4330 East West Highway, 
Bethesda, MD 20814; telephone: (301) 504-7599; wdewgard@cpsc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission published a final rule 
establishing a standard for bassinets and cradles that incorporates by 
reference ASTM F2194-13, with certain modifications. In FR Doc. 2013-
24023, appearing on page 63019 in the Federal Register of October 23, 
2013, two references to sections of ASTM F2194-13 were not correct.
    The following corrections are made:

Sec.  1218.2  [Corrected]

0
1. On page 63034, in the third column, in Sec.  1218.2, in paragraph 
(b)(1)(i), ``In addition, bassinet/cradle attachments to cribs or play 
yards, as defined in 3.1.2 or 3.1.12, are included in the scope of the 
standard when in the bassinet/cradle use mode.'' is corrected to read: 
``In addition, bassinet/cradle attachments to cribs or play yards, as 
defined in 3.1.2 or 3.1.13, are included in the scope of the standard 
when in the bassinet/cradle use mode.''
0
2. On page 63035, in the second column, in Sec.  1218.2, in paragraph 
(b)(5)(vi), ``The bassinet bed shall not tip over and shall retain the 
CAMI newborn dummy when tested in accordance with 7.12.5.3.'' is 
corrected to read: ``The bassinet bed shall not tip over and shall 
retain the CAMI newborn dummy when tested in accordance with 
7.12.4.3.''

    Dated: December 18, 2013.
Todd Stevenson,
Secretary, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission.
[FR Doc. 2013-30527 Filed 12-23-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6355-01-P
```
### Regulatory Evaluation

Docket No. FAA

- 

### 2015

- 4810 Directorate Identifier: 

### 2015

- NM

- 090

- AD

If you make changes to the values in the table below, you must ensure the totals update accordingly. If

they do not, click (or Tab) into and then ou t of the changed cell

.

Estimated Costs:

Action

(e.g., Inspection,

replacement)

Do not include on

condition costs here Costs per Product (e.g., aircraft, engine,

propeller, appliance)

Work

- hours

(include

access, testing,

and close

- up) Labor

cost

(@$8 5 / h

our) Parts Cost Total Costs

(labor +

parts) Number of

U.S.

Registered

Products Total Cost

for U.S. Fleet



### Inspection 3

. 0 $ 255.00 $ 255.00 

### 55 $ 14,025.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.0 0 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00



### Th e known number of products in compliance: 

### 0

Total Costs of compliance for U.S. fleet: $ 14,025



### Costs covered under warranty ( if known ) $ 

### 0

On

- Condition Costs:

Action

(e.g., Inspection,

replacement) Work

- hours

(include access,

testing, and close

up) Labor cost

(@$85/hour) Parts Cost Cost per Product



### Replacement 5 $ 1,700.00 $0 $ 1,700.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00



### Special considerations for Economic Analysis ( Use this field to explain anything in the Estimated Costs table

that was assumed or might not be obvious. Th is field can also be used to explain warranty costs) 

### :

### Executive Order 12866:

Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action”?

YES * NO

* Explanation:

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures:

Is the AD significant?

YES * NO

* Explanation:

Regulatory Flexibility Act:

Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities? E xplain for

either a Yes or No answer.

YES NO

Explanation:

Intrastate Aviation in Alaska:

This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. Is it appropr iate to include specific requirements for

aircraft operated in Alaska where aviation might be the only mode of transportation?

YES * NO



### * Explanation 

### :
----

|   | (1) | the      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the      Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | the      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company      as of the dates and for the periods covered by the  Report. |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| February 23, 2009 |   | /s/ Levon L. Mathews                                                   |
|-------------------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Date              |   | Levon      L. Mathews                                                  |
|              |   | President      and Chief Executive Officer                             |
|              |   |                                                                   |
|              |   |                                                                   |
| February 23, 2009 |   | /s/ Michael S. Moderski                                                |
| Date              |   | Michael      S. Moderski                                               |
|              |   | Senior      Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and      Treasurer |

----
III 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. RES. 397 

Recognizing the 2007–2008 Siemens Competition in Math, Science and Technology and celebrating the first time in the history of the competition 

that young women have won top honors. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

DECEMBER 7, 2007 

Mr. CASEY (for himself, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. SCHUMER, Mrs. CLINTON, Mr. 

MENENDEZ, Mr. LAUTENBERG, and Mr. STEVENS) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to 

RESOLUTION 

Recognizing the 2007–2008 Siemens Competition in Math, 

Science and Technology and celebrating the first time 

in the history of the competition that young women 

have won top honors. 

Whereas the Siemens Competition in Math, Science and 

Technology was first held in 1998 and is one of the top 

science competitions in the country for high school students; 

Whereas Isha Himani Jain, 16, is a senior at Freedom High 

School in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, and placed first in 

the individual category for her studies of bone growth in 

zebra fish; 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with BILLS
2 

•SRES 397 ATS 

Whereas Janelle Schlossberger and Amanda Marinoff, both 

17, are seniors at Plainview-Old Bethpage John F. Kennedy High School on Long Island and won the team category for creating a molecule that helps block the reproduction of drug-resistant tuberculosis bacteria; 

Whereas Alicia Darnell is 17 and a senior at Pelham Memorial High School in Pelham, New York, and won second 

place in the individual category for research that identified genetic defects related to amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig’s Disease); 

Whereas Caroline Lang, 16, Rebecca Ehrhardt, 15, and 

Naomi Collipp, 16, of Pennsylvania and New Jersey took 

fifth place in the team category for their project on the 

safe elimination of E. coli bacteria; and 

Whereas the awards were announced on December 3, 2007, 

at New York University and mark the first time that 

young women have won the grand prizes in both the individual and team categories of the Siemens Competition: 

Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That the Senate— 

2 (1) honors the Siemens Foundation, sponsor of 

3 the Siemens Competition in Math, Science and 

4 Technology, for its contributions to science edu5 cation and academic excellence; 

6 (2) congratulates all the competitors and final7 ists in the Siemens Competition in Math, Science 

8 and Technology; 

9 (3) celebrates the many contributions of women 

10 in the fields of math, science, and technology on the 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with BILLS
3 

•SRES 397 ATS 

1 occasion of the first time that young women have 

2 won both the individual and team grand prizes in 

3 the Siemens Competition; and 

4 (4) recognizes the dedication of parents, edu5 cators, and organizations such as the Siemens Foun6 dation in helping young men and women achieve 

7 academic excellence. 

Æ 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with BILLS
Argued and submitted December 14, 1992,

reversed and remanded for reconsideration January 6, 1993

#### In the Matter of the Compensation of Aletha R. Samperi, Claimant. MERLE WEST MEDICAL CENTER, *Petitioner, v.*Aletha SAMPERI, *Respondent.*

(WCB 91-09848; CA A75564)

842 P2d 820

Adam T. Stamper, Medford, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Cowling & Heysell, Medford.

Michael Ratliff and Parks & Ratliff, Klamath Falls, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Warren, Presiding Judge, and Riggs and Edmonds, Judges.

PER CURIAM

Reversed and remanded for reconsideration. *SAIF v. Herron,*114 Or App 64, 836 P2d 131, *rev den*315 Or 271 (1992).
#### § 780.608 “During his workweek.”

Section 13(b)(13) specifically requires that the unit of time to be used in determining whether an employee is primarily employed in agriculture is “during his workweek.” The employee's own workweek, and not that of any other person, is to be used in applying the exemption. The employee's employment must meet the “primarily” test in each workweek in which the exemption is applied to him.
#### § 93.210 Reporting.

No reporting is required with respect to payments of reasonable compensation made to regularly employed officers or employees of a person.
§ 801.2 Definitions. For purposes of this part: ( a ) Act or EPPA means the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (Pub. L. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646, 29 U.S.C. 2001-2009).
( b ) ( 1 ) The term *commerce* has the meaning provided in section 3(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 203(b)). As so defined, *commerce* means trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or between any State and any place outside thereof.
( 2 ) The term *State* means any of the fifty States and the District of Columbia and any Territory or possession of the United States.
( c ) The term *employer* means any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee or prospective employee. A polygraph examiner either employed for or whose services are retained for the sole purpose of administering polygraph tests ordinarily would not be deemed an *employer* with respect to the examinees.
( d ) ( 1 ) The term *lie detector* means a polygraph, deceptograph, voice stress analyzer, psychological stress evaluator, or any other similar device (whether mechanical or electrical) that is used, or the results of which are used, for the purpose of rendering a diagnostic opinion regarding the honesty or dishonesty of an individual. Voice stress analyzers, or psychological stress evaluators, include any systems that utilize voice stress analysis, whether or not an opinion on honesty or dishonesty is specifically rendered.
( 2 ) The term *lie detector* does not include medical tests used to determine the presence or absence of controlled substances or alcohol in bodily fluids. Also not included in the definition of *lie detector* are written or oral tests commonly referred to as “honesty” or “paper and pencil” tests, machine-scored or otherwise; and graphology tests commonly referred to as handwriting tests.
( e ) The term *polygraph* means an instrument that— ( 1 ) Records continuously, visually, permanently, and simultaneously changes in cardiovascular, respiratory, and electrodermal patterns as minimum instrumentation standards; and
( 2 ) Is used, or the results of which are used, for the purpose of rendering a diagnostic opinion regarding the honesty or dishonesty of an individual.
( f ) The terms *manufacture, dispense, distribute,* and *deliver* have the meanings set forth in the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 812.
( g ) The term *Secretary* means the Secretary of Labor or authorized representative.
( h ) *Wage and Hour Division* means the organizational unit of the Department of Labor to which is assigned primary responsibility for enforcement and administration of the Act.
( i ) *Administrator* means the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, or authorized representative.
[56 FR 9064, Mar. 4, 1991, as amended at 82 FR 2230, Jan. 9, 2017]
#### Moss and als. *v.*Davis and als.

*(Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia,*

*February, 1877.)*

[Virginia Law Journal, 1879, p. 106.]

Partnership — Deed of Trust by One Partner on Goods without Knowledge of Othei — Case at Bar.*

In 1869, P. A. Davis and William A. Moss formed a co-partnership for the purpose of merchandising at Buckingham Courthouse, Va. On the 21st January, 1870, Davis came to Richmond and executed a deed of trust on the stock of merchandise in the store at Buckingham Courthouse, to Albert Ordway, trustee, to secure to sundry parties, not named in the deed, a negotiable note executed by Davis for the sum of $2,750, bearing even date with the deed. This deed'was not admitted to record in Buckingham until January 3, 1871. Moss did not join in the note' or the deed, and neither he, nor any other party, so far as the record discloses,, except Davis and Ordway, knew of the existence of the deed until it was recorded in Buckingham. The firm continued to carry on the business after the execution of the deed as formerly. No inventory of the stock conveyed was annexed to the deed. No-account was kept of the sales or money collected, nor does it appear that any was ever demanded by Ordway and those he claimed to represent. Between the date of the deed and its recordation, Davis purchased goods in Richmond to the amount of at least $3,000, and shortly thereafter to the amount of three or four thousand dollars. A large portion of these goods were put in the store at Buckingham Courthouse, and mingled with those contained in the deed of trust to Ordway. Ordway swears that he did not know Moss was a member of the firm. On a bill filed by Moss to set aside this deed, and for a proper administration and distri*341bution of the social assets of the said firm, the circuit court of Buckingham held that the deed to Ordway was valid, and that the holders of the note thereby secured were entitled to priority out of the funds derived from the sale of the stock in the store of said Moss & Davis. On an appeal to the supreme court of appeals: held:

Same — Same—Same.

The deed from Davis to Ordway is fraudulent and void, and the creditors secured thereby must share *pro rata*with the other creditors of the firm of Davis & Moss in the distribution of the fund derived from the sale of the assets of said concern.

Same — Right of Partner to Assign Assets without Consent of Other.

*Qucere.*Can one partner, without the consent of his co-partner, assign the entire assets of the firm to a trustee for the benefit of creditors ?

The facts and points decided sufficiently appear in the headnotes.

*Oamm Patteson*and *G. J. Hundley,*for the appellants.

*Gvy (& Gilliam,*for the appellees.

*

See foot-note to Gordon *v*. Cannon, 18 Gratt. 387 (Va. Rep. Anno.).

Staples, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court, in which the other judges concurred.

Decree reversed.
§ 106.240 Communications. ( a ) The Facility Security Officer (FSO) must have a means to effectively notify OCS facility personnel of changes in security conditions at the OCS facility.
( b ) Communication systems and procedures must allow effective and continuous communications between the OCS facility security personnel, vessels interfacing with the OCS facility, the cognizant District Commander, and national and local authorities with security responsibilities.
( c ) Facility communications systems must have a backup means for both internal and external communications.
[USCG-2003-14759, 68 FR 39345, July 1, 2003; 68 FR 41917, July 16, 2003]
#### § 785.8 Effect of custom, contract, or agreement.

The principles are applicable, even though there may be a custom, contract, or agreement not to pay for the time so spent with special statutory exceptions discussed in §§ 785.9 and 785.26.

[35 FR 15289, Oct. 1, 1970]
#### Powell *vs*Triplett.

Appeal prom the Franklin Circuit.

Replevín,

*‘Case*88.

The statute of 1842, (3 *Stat. Laws, 603,)*does not restrict a tenant reélrainedupon by his landlord to a suit ágainst him *alone,*he may-sue the officer also.

*Replevin. Parlies. Pleas and pleadings,*

*April*27.

*ívi/ai*Mak-shall

delivered tie opinion of the Court.

The act of 1-842, concerning the action of replevin, (3 *Stat. Laws,*503,) does not *restrict*the tenant, who conceives that his property has been wrongfully taken by way of distress for rents, to an action against the landlord, but allows him, if he choose, to sue the landlord alone. The eleventh section makes provision for the case of an action of replevin by the tenant against the officer who executes the distress warrant, by authorizing the landlord to defend the action upon terms prescribed, and in effect, to put himself in the place of the officer, which case would not have been provided for if it could' not have existed under the statute.

*421Although the officer levying a distress warrant for rent in arrear- may be justified by the warrant for the taking, yet there should be no return unless the pleading and finding of the jury show that rent was due and in arrear at the emanation of the warrant.

A failure of party sueing out a distress warrant to pursue aíl the pre-requisits pointed out *by*the 7th section of the statute of 1842, is not prevented by a demurrer to replication to a plea.

*Hewitt*for appellant: *Morehead &/• Reed*for appellee.

We cannot admit, therefore, that the disclosure by the defendant’s plea, of the fact that the taking complained of was under a distress warrant, and the admission of that fact by the replication, showed that the action could not be maintained, and therefore, justified the judgment *de retorno habendo,*for the defendant on his demurrer to the replication. On the contrary, although the distress' warrant was a justification to the officer for taking the property, whether the rent claimed was due or not, he was not entitled to a return of it if there was in fact no rent in arrear. And if when the distress warrant issued, the plaintiff, by his replication, had put that single fact in -issue, though he might thereby have given up all claim to damages against the officer, he might still have been entitled to retain the property, and it would have been erroneous to render a judgment for a return until that issue had been disposed of.

The failure of the plaintiff to pursue precisely the steps pointed out in the 7th section of the statute above referred to, could not be enquired into, nor have any effect on the demurrer to his replication. But as the replication does not deny that there was any rent in arrear and due when the distress warrant issued, but denies that any was due on either of two particular days, neither of which is named either in the warrant or in the defendant’s pleas, as the day on which the rent claimed was due, the replication was not a sufficient answer to the plea, for any purpose, and therefore the demurrer was properly sustained, and the defendant was entitled to judgment of return.

Wherefore, the judgment is affiriped.
#### § 779.1 General scope of the Act.

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, is a Federal statute of general application which establishes minimum wage, maximum hours, overtime pay, equal pay, and child labor requirements that apply as provided in the Act. Employers and employees in enterprises in which retail sales of goods or services are made need to know how the Act applies to employment in these enterprises so that they may understand their rights and obligations under the law. All employees whose employment has the relationship to interstate or foreign commerce which the Act specifies are subject to the prescribed labor standards unless specifically exempted from them. Employers having such employees are required to comply with the Act's provisions in this regard and with specified recordkeeping requirements contained in Part 516 of this chapter. The law authorizes the Department of Labor to investigate for compliance and, in the event of violations, to supervise the payment of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation owing to any employee. The law also provides for enforcement in the courts.
#### § 778.315 Payment for all hours worked in overtime workweek is required.

In determining the number of hours for which overtime compensation is due, all hours worked (see § 778.223) by an employee for an employer in a particular workweek must be counted. Overtime compensation, at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay, must be paid for each hour worked in the workweek in excess of the applicable maximum hours standard. This extra compensation for the excess hours of overtime work under the Act cannot be said to have been paid to an employee unless all the straight time compensation due him for the nonovertime hours under his contract (express or implied) or under any applicable statute has been paid.