DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2009 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE 

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

ROBERT E. ‘‘BUD’’ CRAMER, JR., Alabama 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

PAUL JUOLA, GREG LANKLER, SARAH YOUNG, PAUL TERRY, KRIS MALLARD, LINDA PAGELSEN, 

ADAM HARRIS, ANN REESE, TIM PRINCE, BROOKE BOYER, MATT WASHINGTON, B G WRIGHT, 

CHRIS WHITE, CELES HUGHES, and ADRIENNE RAMSAY, Staff Assistants 

SHERRY L. YOUNG, Administrative Aide 

PART 3 

Page 

Defense Health Program ....................................................... 1 

National Guard and Reserve Issues ................................... 83 

Department of the Air Force ................................................ 197 

United States Central Command ......................................... 243 

Air Force Posture .................................................................... 315 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 


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PART 3—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2009 


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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2009 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE 

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

ROBERT E. ‘‘BUD’’ CRAMER, JR., Alabama 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

PAUL JUOLA, GREG LANKLER, SARAH YOUNG, PAUL TERRY, KRIS MALLARD, LINDA PAGELSEN, 

ADAM HARRIS, ANN REESE, TIM PRINCE, BROOKE BOYER, MATT WASHINGTON, B G WRIGHT, 

CHRIS WHITE, CELES HUGHES, and ADRIENNE RAMSAY, Staff Assistants 

SHERRY L. YOUNG, Administrative Aide 

PART 3 

Page 

Defense Health Program ....................................................... 1 

National Guard and Reserve Issues ................................... 83 

Department of the Air Force ................................................ 197 

United States Central Command ......................................... 243 

Air Force Posture .................................................................... 315 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

46–475 WASHINGTON : 2009 


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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin, Chairman 

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

JOSE ́ E. SERRANO, New York 

ROSA L. DELAURO, Connecticut 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts 

ED PASTOR, Arizona 

DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina 

CHET EDWARDS, Texas 

ROBERT E. ‘‘BUD’’ CRAMER, JR., Alabama 

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California 

SAM FARR, California 

JESSE L. JACKSON, JR., Illinois 

CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

ADAM SCHIFF, California 

MICHAEL HONDA, California 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas 

JERRY LEWIS, California 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

RALPH REGULA, Ohio 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia 

JAMES T. WALSH, New York 

DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio 

JOE KNOLLENBERG, Michigan 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

ZACH WAMP, Tennessee 

TOM LATHAM, Iowa 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

JOHN E. PETERSON, Pennsylvania 

VIRGIL H. GOODE, JR., Virginia 

RAY LAHOOD, Illinois 

DAVE WELDON, Florida 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas 

MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois 

ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida 

DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 

KEN CALVERT, California 

JO BONNER, Alabama 

ROB NABORS, Clerk and Staff Director 

(II)


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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2009 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2008. 

DEFENSE HEALTH PROGRAM 

WITNESSES 

HON. S. WARD ‘‘TRIP’’ CASSCELLS, M.D., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ERIC B. SCHOOMAKER, M.D., PH.D., ARMY SURGEON GENERAL, COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY MEDICAL COMMAND 

VICE ADMIRAL ADAM M. ROBINSON, M.D., SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. 

NAVY 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES G. ROUDEBUSH, M.D., SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. AIR FORCE 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. I want to welcome this distinguished panel before 

the Committee. This is an open hearing. And we appreciate what 

you folks have done. I was just talking to some of you privately, 

and Mr. Young was, too. And of course, what we have been wrestling with is trying to figure out, is there a better time to intervene? Can we intervene sooner? 

And Admiral Mullen gave me a book, ‘‘War and Redemption,’’ 

which talks about the difficulties and struggles people had in 

World War II and Iraq and so forth. And I have read three or four 

books. John Parrish, Dr. Parrish, wrote a book about his experience 

in Vietnam. And a couple other books I have read talked about the 

emotional and mental problems that they have had. 

One thing I found is when I went to Fort Hood, I found a much 

better clinical screening course than I saw before, a much better 

counseling service. And I think, as we work our way through this 

extra money we put in last year and we get case workers out there 

who can follow people through the whole system, I think we are 

going to be much better off. But we welcome you. And there are 

a lot of different hearings going on, and many of our members are 

both chairmen and ranking members, because they are senior before they can get on this subcommittee anyway, so we will go as 

quickly as we can. We will take your testimony, if you will summarize it for us, and we will get right to the questions. 

Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I just want to extend my welcome 

also to the witnesses today. And as I have said so many times before, you know, I do not have much of a medical background, but 

I have seen what I consider to be some real miracles in our miliVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:38 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046475 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\A475P2.XXX A475P2

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tary hospitals. And we have had some problems, but we deal with 

the problems. We are just glad to have you here, and I look forward 

to hearing your testimony. 

Mr. MURTHA. Nobody has been in the forefront more than Mr. 

Young and his wife going to the hospitals, talking to people, making sure that they had—and I have done my bit, and we want to 

make sure medical services get their share of the budget. And some 

of the things we have done I think have been obviously very important to the overall ability of the medical services to respond to the 

needs that are out there of the troops. 

So, Dr. Casscells, we will start with you and go right through the 

surgeons general. But we want to keep your opening statements as 

short as you can. 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Young. 

I really want to say, on behalf of the Under Secretary, Dr. Chu, 

and Gordon England, and all the Pentagon leaders, and you will 

hear from the services, we appreciate this chance to visit with you. 

We come here, as usual, with two eyes open, two ears open, and 

great appreciation for what this committee has done. 

Mr. MURTHA. Is his microphone turned on there? 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF DR. CASSCELLS

Dr. CASSCELLS. Sorry, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Young. I really want to say, on behalf of the Under Secretary, 

Dr. Chu, and Gordon England and all the Pentagon leaders, and 

you will hear from the Services, we appreciate this opportunity to 

get your guidance. We have gotten a lot of excellent guidance over 

the past year, in addition to some extraordinary support. And as 

I mentioned to you a minute ago, you and this Committee have 

been the leading advocates for the healthcare for our members. 

And it is deeply, deeply appreciated because it is an arm wrestle 

in the Pentagon. Dollars do count, as well as the other guidance. 

So your continued interest in this and Mr. Young’s and Mrs. 

Young’s is deeply, deeply appreciated, sir. 

So we are today, again, to get guidance and to give you a report. 

The simple form of the report is, we are making pretty good 

progress. The GAO report this morning in the Washington Post on 

the situation at Walter Reed, for example, is encouraging. We have 

got a ways to go. I actually have some data, which I can share with 

you, which just came out yesterday, from a survey that we commissioned done by an independent pollster of 600 of our recently 

wounded warriors. That, too, shows a big change compared to last 

year. Again, there is some room for improvement. So we are always 

looking for new ideas, and we welcome this opportunity to get some 

input from you, sir. Thank you. 

[The statement of Dr. Casscells follows:] 


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SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL ROUDEBUSH

General ROUDEBUSH. Chairman Murtha, Ranking Member 

Young, distinguished members, it really is a pleasure to be before 

you here today. You all very well understand the challenges that 

we face. Our first task is to provide a healthy, fit force; fit and able 

and resilient; able to go forward and do the mission in some very 

challenging places. And while we are doing that, taking care of 

family members as well as retirees to the full extent that we can; 

you understand that this is a challenge always in a resource-constrained environment, providing the right resources, both manpower as well as money and facilities, to do that. And you all have 

been very forthcoming in supporting and working with us to find 

that right balance within a very challenging environment to do 

that. 

But as we work the challenges for today, I think the focus certainly of this committee in working with us to do the mission today 

is also to look forward to tomorrow, to understand the challenges 

of those missions, because they may be rather different than we 

face today. Certainly, in the Air Force, as we use the Chief’s priorities as our direct vector, winning today’s fight, taking care of our 

people, and preparing for tomorrow’s challenges, that is the task 

before us, while we work to recapitalize facilities and equipment, 

reset equipment to be sure that it is prepared for tomorrow. So we 

truly appreciate the energy, the focus, the understanding, and certainly the enduring support that you all bring to assist us as we 

take care of our Nation’s most precious treasure. For that we thank 

you, and I certainly look forward to your questions. Thank you, sir. 

[The statement of General Roudebush follows:] 


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SUMMARY STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ROBINSON

Admiral ROBINSON. Chairman Murtha, Ranking Member Young, 

distinguished members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to be 

here with you again to share my vision of Navy Medicine in the 

upcoming fiscal year. You have been very supportive of our mission 

in the past, and I want to express my gratitude, and on behalf of 

all of those who work for Navy Medicine, we certainly appreciate 

everything you have done for us. 

Navy Medicine is at a particularly critical time in history, as the 

Military Health System has come under increased scrutiny. Resource constraints are real, along with the increasing pressure to 

operate more efficiently, while compromising neither mission nor 

healthcare quality. The budget for the Defense Health Program 

contains fiscal limits that continue to be a challenge. The demands 

for wounded warrior care continue to steadily increase due to military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

At the same time, Navy Medicine must meet the requirement to 

maintain a peacetime mission of family and retiree healthcare as 

well as provide a new strategic, imperative humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as needed around the globe. Our mission 

is force health protection, a fit and ready force deployed with the 

warfighters, support the warfighters in everything they do, and 

then make sure that we care for eligible family members and those 

who have worn the cloth of our Nation. That is what force health 

protection is, and that is what Navy Medicine is all about. 

Navy Medicine must ensure that we have the excellence in clinical care, the excellence in graduate health education, and the excellence in biomedical research in order to meet that mission. And 

those missions—and those are the foundations and the core of 

Navy Medicine. Thank you, again, sir, for your help in the past. 

Thank this Committee for all of its help. And I stand by and look 

forward to answering your questions. 

[The statement of Admiral Robinson follows:] 


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SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL SCHOOMAKER

General SCHOOMAKER. Well, let me join my distinguished and esteemed colleagues in thanking you, Chairman Murtha and Congressman Young and other distinguished members of this subcommittee, for providing me an opportunity to discuss Army Medicine and the Defense Health Program. I have been in front of a 

number of congressional committees in the past few weeks and 

have spoken at length about the Army Medical Action Plan and the 

Army’s care and support of our wounded, ill, and injured warriors. 

The care of these great warriors and their families is the most important thing we do. We are committed to getting it right and providing a level of care and support that is equal to the quality of 

their service. 

However, as my colleagues have each mentioned, this is not the 

only thing we do in Army Medicine. In fact, the care we provide 

to wounded, ill, and injured warriors is less than 10 percent of our 

outpatient healthcare managed by the Army. So I appreciate the 

opportunity today to talk about the other 90 percent of what we do, 

the extremely important work that is done by the dedicated men 

and women, military and civilian, of the Army Medical Department 

who really, in my view, personify the value of selfless service. 

In January, I traveled to Iraq with a congressional delegation to 

see firsthand the incredible performance of Army soldiers and medics and medics within the Joint Force. In fact, those of us on the 

panel here today had a kind of reunion of sort in the Air Force 

Hospital at Balad because we were all downrange seeing firsthand 

how our medical personnel were performing. During that trip, and 

many times visiting hospitals and seeing wounded, ill, and injured 

soldiers, and seeing family members that were caring for them and 

retirees, I am reminded of the parallels that exist between how the 

Joint Force fights and how the Joint Medical Force protects health 

and delivers healing. The joint warfighting community employs all 

tools of intelligence and this fearsome array of lethal and nonlethal 

weapons to deliver precise force to bear on our enemies. 

The medical force, represented by those of us at this panel here, 

work in parallel but on behalf of healing and health. We employ 

tools of medical information about the individual soldier patient, 

his or her state of health or injury and illness, to deliver the right 

care by the right medic, and by medic, it is a capital M, all uniforms, all roles, at the right time and the right place from the point 

of injury on a battlefield through evacuation to rehab centers in the 

United States. 

In the Army, we promote best clinical practices by aligning business practices with incentives for our clinicians, administrators and 

commanders. We do not simply fund commanders based upon what 

they got last year and add a factor for inflation. We do not just pay 

for productivity, although it is a very important element of what 

we do. We focus on quality and best value for the efforts that our 

caregivers have. At the end of the day, that is what our families, 

that is what our patients really want and deserve. They want to 

remain healthy, and they want to know that we are addressing 

their problems and they are better off for their encounters with us. 


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We then address this through evidence-based medicine and a 

focus on clinical outcomes. We have used the system of outcomesbased incentives for now 4 years. It has been implemented across 

the entire Medical Command last year after an initial trial in the 

southeast for several years. I strongly support this approach. It 

promotes a focus, again, on adding value to people’s lives through 

the efforts of health promotion and in the healthcare delivery community. Our results have resulted in the Army’s being able to raise 

the measurable health of our population and deliver more 

healthcare every year since 2003. 

As the Army and the Military Health System moves forward, I 

have three principal areas of concern that require attention. These 

concerns are our people, the care we deliver in our distributed system of clinics and hospitals, which we call the Direct Care System, 

and our aging facility infrastructure. You know, I am really impressed with the professionalism, commitment, and selfless service 

of our people in Army Medicine and in the Joint Force. Nothing is 

more important to our success than our dedicated workforce. And 

I have asked our former assistant—or excuse me, Acting Surgeon 

General, Major General Gale Pollock to serve as the Deputy Surgeon General for Force Management. She is putting together a 

human capital strategy for Army Medicine to make it the employer 

of choice for healthcare professionals. We need your help in breaking the notion that we are one-size-fits-all mentality. We need to 

have tailored approaches, with flexibility and innovation, that attract and retain the very best civilians and uniformed personnel in 

the uniform. 

Second, I would like to emphasize the importance of the Direct 

Care System and our ability to maintain an all-volunteer force in 

an era of persistent conflict. One of the major lessons that has been 

reinforced throughout the global war on terror, and especially this 

last year in caring for our casualties, and reinforced by my colleagues here is the Direct Care System is the foundation for caring 

for wounded, ill, and injured service members. The Direct Care 

System, what we do in our military hospitals every day, and clinics, is the foundation for our caring for our wounded, ill, and injured soldiers. All of our successes on the battlefield, through evacuation, through our medical facilities back home, derives from the 

success of our Direct Care System. 

And sir, I know this is a particular interest of you, Chairman, 

and you, Congressman Young. I want to tell you publicly how much 

we appreciate your personal investment in our Direct Care System 

and your continuing to emphasize the importance and support that 

we require. It is where we educate. It is where we train. It is where 

we develop critical skills that we use then to protect the warfighter 

and to save lives. It is the foundation of military medicine. And it 

is very vulnerable. Congress, especially this committee, has been 

very supportive of our Direct Care System. Thank you for recognizing our importance. Last year, in addition to funding the Direct 

Care System, you provided us additional supplemental funding for 

operations and maintenance, procurement and research. I want to 

again thank you for doing that and providing us those additional 

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tended it to be. And we appreciate that continued support for our 

infrastructure and Direct Care System. 

My last concern is about this aging infrastructure of our medical 

facilities. If we are going to provide consistent world class healing, 

we need environments that promote that. The quality of our facilities, whether they are treatment facilities or research and development and support, is a tangible demonstration of our commitment 

to our most valuable assets, our families and our Military Health 

System staff. It is the bedrock of our generating force; it is how we 

continue to support the Joint Force. And we need your help. 

In closing, I want to reassure you that Army Medicine is committed to the highest priority of caring for our wounded, ill, and injured soldiers and their families. I am proud of the Army Medical 

Department’s efforts over the last 232 years, and especially the last 

12 months, in this regard. I am convinced that with the help of the 

Department of Defense and with the Veterans Affairs, we have 

turned the corner on some of the problems we suffered last year. 

Thank you for this opportunity to appear before this committee, 

and I look forward to your questions. 

[The statement of General Schoomaker follows:] 


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MEDICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Let me just say 

that we have asked for a list of the infrastructure, medical infrastructure deficiencies, and we have gotten it from the Army. We 

got it from all three? Okay. Well, Mr. Young and I, are going to 

present to the committee that we are going to transfer the money 

to the Military Construction Committee to take care of those deficiencies. If it does not get done in those next 2 years, it won’t get 

done. 

In talking to Major Rozelle, I asked him how it was going with 

the center that he works so effectively with, and he said it is so 

much better. He believes that the troops now understand, if something happens to them, they have some place they can go and get 

rehabilitated. And I appreciate that. That is the kind of thing that 

we do all the time. 

I do not know about the Defense Department, because we have 

some arguments with the Defense Department about their priorities, but this committee stands ready to make sure that the troops 

have what they need when they come home. And infrastructure is 

such an important part of it. So we will continue to ask you questions, and as long as you give us the answers, we will take care 

of it financially in the next—I do not know if we will get it all in 

1 year, but we will get it in the next 2 years because it is going 

to amount to $6 billion or $7 billion. We will work it out. We are 

looking for places to find other money. And the staff has been very 

good in ferreting out some of the extra spending in some of the 

other agencies that have asked us for money. 

Mr. Young. 

WARRIOR TRANSITION UNITS

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

And I think all of you know of Chairman Murtha’s dedication, especially to the wounded troops and their families. And I really like 

to visit the hospitals and visit the wounded kids along with Mr. 

Murtha, because when my wife finds out about a family that needs 

financial help, she makes me empty my wallet. She also makes him 

empty his wallet. 

Mr. MURTHA. I empty my wallet before I see her. 

Mr. YOUNG. I want to ask or talk about the Army’s Warrior 

Transition Units. And my first question is going to be, does the 

Navy and the Air Force have similar programs like the Warrior 

Transition Unit? 

General ROUDEBUSH. Sir, I can speak for the Air Force. Our 

focus is to transition those individuals back to their unit, preferably, or back to their home of record for recovery, rehabilitation. 

We do that through a variety of activities. The Air Force Wounded 

Warrior Program, formerly Palace HART, has a family liaison officer assigned to each severely wounded individual, who assists in 

not only the immediate delivery of care, the immediate recuperation, but continues to follow through rehabilitation back to the 

unit and then onto transition to the Veterans Administration (VA) 

if that is appropriate. So we track those individuals one by one 

with their unit commander, their line commander, principally with 


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view and responsibility and accountability for those folks as they 

work in close collaboration with the medics. So, for us, it is not so 

much a unit activity as it is a, one by one, returning them to their 

unit of record or their home of record to assist them in their rehabilitation. 

Admiral ROBINSON. Congressman Young, the Navy has a program which includes a Wounded Warrior Regiment that is located 

in D.C. And the commanding officer is Colonel Boyle. And then we 

have Wounded Warrior Battalions at Camp Lejeune and at Camp 

Pendleton. The concept is to make sure that Navy Medicine partners with the line of both blue Navy and also the green side, the 

Marine Corps, to make sure that the nonmedical and the medical 

care needs of the individuals are taken into consideration. Our goal 

is to decentralize the care, get it away from the medical place of 

treatment as soon as that is advisable, not a day or a second before, do the nonmedical and the medical case management from the 

administrative and the medical perspective, then if, I can use the 

word, repatriate the patients back with their units and back into 

their home environments or their units’ environments because we 

think that there is better healing and there is a better transition 

that occurs. So we do in fact take care of those young men and 

women that are coming through in that regard. And I will leave it 

at that. 

Mr. YOUNG. I am glad you mentioned the Wounded Warrior at 

Pendleton and Lejeune. Just a couple weeks ago, I had a chance 

to visit with the Wounded Warrior Battalion at Camp Pendleton. 

It was very impressive I have to tell you. And the reason I asked 

about this, and I knew that you all had similar programs, and 

when you talk about returning them to duty, what I am concerned 

about is going beyond that and preparing them for a successful life 

as a veteran in their community. And I just wonder how much follow-up, and this may not be the right group of witnesses to ask this 

question of. It may be better asked of the VA, and I am doing that, 

too. But I want to tell you, just give you an example of a situation 

that we dealt with. In fact, it was a Marine that was from my area 

in Florida. I got to know him very well and the family. His injuries 

were serious. And after going through Bethesda and after going 

through the VA Hospital at Haley in Tampa, the VA decided that 

he was never going to get any better. He was more or less totally 

incapacitated. His family would not settle for that. And they took 

him to a private facility in California. And this private facility 

brought this Marine back to life. He is able to walk. He is able to 

talk. He had some legal matters, and he was able to appear in 

court to the satisfaction of the Judge to make decisions. Somewhere 

along the line, he was warehoused because he was never going to 

survive. The family decided that was not good enough. Now, did 

the Warrior Transition Units that have organizations in all those 

services, do you follow up on those young men and women that 

have gone into the VA system to a conclusion one way or the other? 

Because you know, this man is returning to a very useful life, a life 

that he can enjoy. And the government had given up on him. 

Admiral ROBINSON. I think that, from the Navy’s perspective, we 

have case managers that, once a wounded person has come back, 

will stay with them throughout the care process. So that means 


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that as they transition to the Department of Veterans Affairs and 

to VA Hospitals, our case managers will still track them and keep 

up with them. I am not going to tell you that at any point we are 

going to make sure that we take care of everyone and have the success of this one individual. But your example actually has been repeated more than one time during this particular war. So it needs 

to be looked at. And that is the capacity for the injuried, particularly on the neurologic point of view, to come back even after we, 

from a medical perspective, have thought that they could not. And 

certainly at the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda, we 

have learned that repeatedly with the very traumatic and extensive 

head injuries that we have received. We have seen people, who 

heretofore medically it had been concluded were not going to have 

a good quality of life, then come back and go to college and become 

very productive. 

So the answer to your question is, yes, we try to track everyone. 

I am not sure that we are always successful at providing the longterm systematic rehabilitative care that they need. We have to depend on DVA, Department of Veterans Affairs, to help us with it, 

but we still track them, even as they go to the VA. 

Mr. YOUNG. I have talked to General Peake about this considerably since he became Secretary of Veterans Affairs. You will remember this case, Admiral, because he was the Marine that was 

so tall you had to get a long extension to put on his bed. And I 

know you remember that very well. 

Admiral ROBINSON. Yes. I do. 

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, sir, and I would just add my comments. We have obviously three very similar parallel systems with 

case managers that are especially engaged during the acute phase 

of treatment and intermediate rehabilitation. A major provision I 

think of Dole-Shalala recommendations, as well as the work of the 

senior oversight committee between the VA and the Department of 

Defense, the committee chaired by Deputy Secretary Mansfield 

from the VA and Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, is 

the development of these Federal care coordinators who exist, as I 

describe them, as AWACs that fly over the two environments, DOD 

Medicine and the VA Medicine, and even into the network of private care and rehabilitation. And they reduce the interagency friction that may occur. But they are also committed to lifetime management. Because, frankly, three decades from now, none of us sitting at this table are going to be around for the management of 

that young Marine or that young soldier or airman or sailor. What 

we need is that warm hand off and continued handshake between 

the agencies to make that happen. And, sir, I think we are working 

very hard at exactly that. And I know Secretary Peake is focused 

on it. 

General ROUDEBUSH. Yes, Congressman Young, relative to the 

Air Force, we follow three tracks for our severely injured and 

wounded Airmen. First is obviously full recuperation or rehabilitation, and if they desire, back to active duty, and if that is able to 

be accommodated within the demands and the construct of the active duty service requirements. If they are not able to come back 

to active duty, but wish to continue to serve in the Air Force, we 

facilitate and aggressively work to place them within Department 


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of the Air Force civilian positions, and have done that. But for 

those who either transit into civilian positions or transit to the VA, 

by policy, our Air Force Wounded Warrior Program follows them 

for a minimum of five years with contact, with query, with support 

to assure that they are in fact continuing to do well so that each 

is returned to the maximum in terms of lifestyle and capabilities. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, thank you all very much. We owe these heroes 

the very best that we can provide them and their families. It is 

really important. And we appreciate all of you. Mr. Chairman, I 

know I have gone over time, but thank you very much. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Moran. 

TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY

Mr. MORAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, have you asked why the Pentagon has only obli- gated $53 million of the $900 million that this Committee provided 

for traumatic brain injury? It might be useful to—I do not want to 

take up a lot of time on that, and there is probably a good reason, 

but it is a pretty small amount given the priority that this Defense 

Appropriations Subcommittee gave to traumatic brain injury. Is 

there a quick, concise explanation for that? 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Mr. Moran—— 

Mr. MORAN. Good to see you, Dr. Casscells. 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Thank you, sir. 

We, as you know, feel this is job number one. And we had a little 

delay in getting it out of the Pentagon to the Army as the executive 

agent for this research. And what the Army has done now, and I 

will brag about them because they will not brag about themselves, 

is they have reached out, sir, to NIH, to top academic centers 

around the country, all the hands, everybody welcome, competitive 

process, and they set these requirements for, what does it really 

mean? How can we have a balanced program where we work hard 

to reduce the stigma and study it and where we get the caregivers 

in there? And now this money is flowing. They are obligating it. 

They are spending it. And more importantly, sir, they are getting 

quick returns on investment, and two types primarily. One is, General Schoomaker can talk to this, it is about they are studying the 

impact on stigma, people’s reluctance to ask for help. That is one 

issue. Second is the tremendous number of top notch academic proposals, people wanting to work with us. 

Mr. MORAN. That is what I want to hear, Dr. Casscells. I have 

got a lot of question areas. I just—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. MORAN. Sure. 

Mr. MURTHA. You are not telling me we are spending a lot of 

money on administration and not spending money on taking care 

of people? 

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, maybe, I can intervene for just a second to say, of the $900 million, sir, $300 million has gone to research, as Dr. Casscells said; $600 million is going to care. Of the 

$300 million, the bulk of those dollars will be obligated in June and 

July. They are all programmed. There will be 100 percent obligation by the end of the fiscal year for the $300 million. Of the $600 

million, the bulk of that came to the Army, $262 million. All of it 


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is programmed. Not all of it is obligated yet, because we want to 

do a deliberate process of contracting and the like. But at least for 

this Service, and I think for the other Services as well, we have a 

very good program. We understand your interest in ensuring that 

we obligate those dollars before the end of the fiscal year. And 

frankly, we have to. 

Mr. MORAN. That is the point of asking the question, to emphasize the priority that this Committee has given that. And this is 

one of the—the four of you, and those folks whom you represent— 

is the real success story that we have the most agreement with on 

this Committee. When you consider the fact that killed-in-action 

rate is half what it was in World War II; it is a third less than 

it was in Vietnam; the survivability rate is 90 percent, that shows 

that in this particular area we have made enormous progress. 

When you think that these soldiers have such a higher chance of 

surviving being wounded in action, in some cases as Mr. Young 

said, if it were Vietnam or World War II, they would be goners. 

And they are not today because of what you have done. 

PROSTHETIC IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

Now I was over at DARPA recently, and they were showing us 

some tremendous progress. I am going to take a little more time 

since you extended a bit there, but there they showed tremendous 

progress. They were showing us some monkeys that they regularly 

fed them, and then the monkeys, they were not able to reach it, 

and they found that there are brain waves that can actually cause 

prosthetic limbs to move and get the food and so on. And they say 

that they are ready now for brain waves to really control these 

prosthetic devices. And they want to introduce it at Walter Reed, 

but they are a little concerned that, again, as the chairman says, 

the administrative process of getting this stuff working for soldiers. 

And, you know, these are just scientists, but they said, you know, 

it really troubles us, we have got it working now, and it would 

mean so much to us if we could see it working on soldiers at Walter 

Reed, and it is not just because there is this administrative delay. 

We know we can give them a prosthetic device that can be controlled by the brain waves. Now, are we trying to facilitate this? 

You know, I know you have got so much bureaucracy you have to 

work with, but—— 

General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, I am actually very familiar with that 

program. 

Mr. MORAN. You are. Good. 

General SCHOOMAKER. That is the third phase of the Prosthetic 

Improvement Program. We have gone through the first phase that 

has been around a hundred years. We are into the second phase 

in which we actually put now myoelectric connectors to the stump. 

And DARPA is helping us to develop the implanted chip in the 

brain that works on the brain’s intent to move the prosthesis. And 

so that program is actually aligned with the Blast Injury Program 

that is being administered for the Department of Defense out of the 

United States Army Medical Research and Materiel Command. 


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SHORTAGE OF HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS

Mr. MORAN. So we are going to implement it while they are still 

in the hospital. 

Third thing, I am concerned—we have been talking about Walter 

Reed. And we are replacing it, and we are going to get first class 

facilities, but we are not going to close down Walter Reed until we 

are ready. DeWitt is one of those replacement facilities. And it is 

going to be one of the finest military medical facilities in the country. But I am told one of their concerns is that, while they have 

the facility up, they are afraid they are going to have a major 

shortage of nurses, physical therapists, mental health counselors, 

the Warrior Transition Teams. They do not have the personnel 

ready to fill in. So they will have a big building, and they will have 

lots of wounded warriors needing help, but they are not going to 

have the health professionals, particularly the healthcare professionals, that they desperately need. Are we going to be able to fill 

that gap in time, Dr. Casscells? 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Congressman Moran, that is a great question, 

and we are continually having to increase the special incentive 

pays for caregivers, nurses in particular, and dentists are in short 

supply, certain surgical specialties are in short supply. In addition, 

we want to be able to take advantage of people who are local. That 

is why, with your help, we met with people at Northern Virginia 

College and Inova Mount Vernon. We are looking forward to interaction there. There are a lot of opportunities there to work with 

them. So, in some places, it will be—the situations will be adapted 

to the local opportunities. 

MEDICARE TRUST FUND

Mr. MORAN. All right. Thanks. As long as you are on top of that. 

I have one other question. Mr. Horner asked, and maybe you can 

answer it for the record, but I wonder, too, we just passed this 

major Medicare—you know, we have this major Medicare Part B 

program. If you are in a military treatment facility that is reimbursed by Medicare, can they get reimbursement from Medicare 

Part B if they are providing care to our TRICARE For Life personnel? Are you going after that money to reimburse the military 

budget? 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Yes, sir. You know, we put I think it is $15 billion into the Medicare Trust Fund every year, but in addition, 

when patients are hospitalized we do bill third-party providers. 

And one of the things that we have learned in the last few years 

is that if all of those moneys come back to my office, nobody bothers to collect them. Now leaving those moneys with the commander 

who collects them, there is an incentive, and they are collecting 

those third-party payments. They can use them for operations, or 

education and research. That is the way to go. As I said before, 

healthcare is local, and the commanders learn from each other. We 

want to make sure that there is plenty of decentralization in our 

system for that kind of reason. 

Mr. MORAN. All right. Well, that is a lot of money. I am glad you 

are doing that. We will ask later about the 30-minute drive time 


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standard that is affecting a lot of our seniors that was just implemented. 

But thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. I am encouraged to hear from the staff that you 

have requested more money for—to continue the PTSD and the 

brain damage money for next year. We want to make sure that this 

is not just a one-time deal; this is something that is going to take 

a long time. And we just obviously do not want to appropriate 

money that is not needed, but I am encouraged that you have already come to us and said, okay, this is something we need in addition to the military medical infrastructure. 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Thank you, sir. 

May I just say, the more we have gotten into this, the more we 

have found what the opportunities are. Several things have happened since we first got the—for example, the $300 million research fund and the $600 million for operations. On the research 

side, one of the exciting things is that we had the developments in 

November with the Japanese and Jim Thompson from the University of Wisconsin found that you could take your own skin cells and 

reprogram them to become stem cells. This is obviously a blockbuster breakthrough. And we think this is going to help. We have 

got 150 people or so with spinal cord trauma. We have got about 

the same number of bad eye injuries, people who are really functionally blind. This is probably their best hope, this kind of thing. 

Now that is on the basic science side. 

In addition, sir, we have been reminded by our patients that 

there are a lot of therapies that patients are very interested in and 

keen on that are what you might call soft therapies. They might 

be meditation. They might be sunshine, exercise, diet, vitamin supplements, or electromagnetic. There are all kinds of things people 

are keen on, and they are doing them anyway in an uncontrolled 

way. So one of the things we would like to do with these funds, sir, 

is take a what I call a hard look at soft therapies, put a scientific 

look on some of these things that are—some of them are very valuable. Some of them could be voodoo. So we want to look. We would 

like to recognize that people make their own decisions in 

healthcare. But we ought to factor them into what we are doing. 

The third thing, sir, is that we had a report yesterday from the 

Iraqi ambassador and the Iraqi surgeon general. They estimate 

that 60 percent of the country has PTSD. I do not mean PTS, I 

mean PTSD. And they have asked for our help in developing culturally sensitive ways to reach out to that country. And as we go 

into Africa, where there are many traumatized people, Asia, their 

concept of psychology is different than ours. And it has different 

cultural roots. 

But I believe, sir, that the Uniformed Services University and 

Armed Services, which are highly diverse, particularly in our enlisted population, we have got 11 percent foreign born. These are 

people who want to give back to the world. And mental health is 

a big deal. And I will just close by saying the number two at World 

Health Organization visited me this week. He said, in two years— 

this is Dr. Ala Alwan—depression will be the biggest cause of 

death globally. Depression. Because it causes so much mayhem, 

heart attacks, and suicide and so on. And he said this is the numVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:38 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046475 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A475P2.XXX A475P2

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ber one cause of death. So he said the U.S. military sounds like it 

is going to become the world leader in psychological health, and I 

applaud that. And to hear that from the World Health Organization, sir, that was a new day. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kaptur. 

REMARKS OF MS. KAPTUR

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you. 

Dr. Casscells, could you repeat the percentage of Iraqis you stated were symptomatic with PTSD? 

Dr. CASSCELLS. The figure I got from Drs. Shakir and Samir was 

about 65 percent. They feel that about two-thirds of the people 

have had some kind of—have been traumatized either by trauma 

to themselves, a family member, a close associate at work, and they 

are struggling with that. Now, most people recover from PTSD. 

Most people recover. But this is an opportunity and an obligation. 

You know, of course, we saw this in Europe after World War II. 

We saw it in Vietnam. And these societies have rebounded. One of 

our questions is, how can we be of help? 

Ms. KAPTUR. Maybe I will start my questioning here, and I want 

to thank the Chairman for showing such a deep interest in this 

health issue. I think every member and every soldier we represent 

thanks him very, very much for that. I certainly do. Thank you 

gentlemen, Doctor, Generals, Admiral. I have great admiration for 

your work and for what you are trying to do. I will begin with an 

analogy from a meeting the other day, because you work for the 

largest bureaucracy in the world. Maybe I should say the largest 

organization in the world. We had a hearing on defensive missile 

systems. And I asked a question of the Defense researchers whether they knew about the Harpoon, which is an offensive system. It 

was very interesting to me they did not. That was a shocking moment. And it just said to me how massive the institution is that 

people often do not know what one another are doing. I can’t imagine in the medical area it is much different. There may be something happening on the Air Force side that Navy does not know or 

Army. And then I wonder about Guard and Reserves, because it is 

such a large organization. So I am going to ask some specific questions, because I can only understand how effective we are working 

together for our country if I follow specific cases up the bureaucracy and figure out what happened. I am going to ask you to report 

back to us, if you could, on Ohio, the State I represent, and our efforts, our extraordinary efforts long before the $900 million was 

passed in the last budget to deal with the issues of 

neuropsychiatric care for our returning vets. Because we had so 

many combat vets not just from—we do not have bases like Fort 

Hood, but we have Guard and Reserve units that have been in theater multiple times. And it is my impression they are not being 

properly diagnosed and treated. I have actually—I know that. That 

is not a hypothesis; that is a fact. So here is what I am going to 

ask you kindly to report back to us on in some way. I do not know, 

Dr. Casscells, if you are in charge or if each branch is in charge. 

I do not know who I am asking to report back, but I wish you 

would do it all together somehow. I am interested in the following 

facts: Number one, for 2009, in your proposed budget, how many 


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more psychiatrists will work for the Department of Defense to treat 

these illnesses we are talking about in the neuropsychiatric area, 

right now I am focusing on, including traumatic brain injury, which 

is not a neuropsychiatric illness, but concussion related, but headrelated injuries? And how many psychiatric nurses, how many 

more psychiatric nurses will be working for the Department based 

on the legislation that we have passed this coming year compared 

to last year and this year? Look at this 3-year period. So we look 

at before we passed the legislation, this fiscal year, which is the 

first year, and then looking toward next year in your proposed 

budget. All I am looking at are psychiatrists and psychiatric 

nurses. 

Number two, I would like you to look at Ohio. Our commanding 

officer for the Guard and Reserves is General Wayt, W–A–Y–T. 

General Wayt is working with Case Western Reserve University, 

and a preeminent neuropsychiatrist by the name of Dr. Joseph 

Calabrese. And I do not think I am speaking out of turn to say Dr. 

Calabrese says the worst experience of his entire career, and he is 

in his mid-50s, is trying to get the funds from the Department of 

Defense that we voted over multiple years now to deal with returning vets. 

My question to you is, why has it been so hard? What is going 

on in there that a brilliant set of doctors who are trying—and I do 

not even represent Case. All I know is it is the best institution in 

my State to help to spearhead this effort working with all of our 

medical facilities and with our Guard and Reserve. What happened 

inside of Defense for him to say to me, ‘‘this is the worst experience 

of my professional career, trying to work with that bureaucracy’’? 

I am not blaming anyone. All I want to do is take care of sick veterans coming home, and I can’t get it done. All right. So I want 

to know why—I would like somebody to call Dr. Calabrese, figure 

out, working with General Wayt at the State level, what is going 

on inside DoD that we can’t get this done? So that is the second 

question. 

The third question I want to know, I am going to mention two 

specific veterans from my district who are wounded forever. One is 

Matthew Drake, who will be probably a quadriplegic—no, excuse 

me, Matthew Kyle, Matthew Kyle, quadriplegic for life. He is down 

somewhere near Fort Hood right now. I would like to know, I 

would like to have a profile on how he is being taken care of; why 

did he end up in Texas rather than Ohio where he is from? Why 

were we unable to take care of him in Ohio? Maybe it was a family 

choice. And also, veteran Matthew Drake, who I understand is in 

some family facility somewhere in Colorado. These are both Army. 

His family is in Ohio. But they took him out of the government 

medical facilities because they were unable to care for him. I want 

to know why. I just do not know why. He needs 24-hour-a-day care, 

but he is not near his family. He is over in Colorado. His family 

is in Ohio. Matthew Kyle, Matthew Drake. Okay. 

Another question, I have an asset I want to put on the table. Dr. 

Casscells, you talked about the Iraqi people. I have wondered about 

PTSD and all kind of things because of the bombing and the pressure on people for different reasons. I represent a lot of Arabspeaking doctors. I have wondered about backup in theater either 


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for our own medical units or working with hospitals or medical facilities in Iraq, if we could not get telemedicine in there. The 

former head of our medical college in Toledo, Dr. Gohara, is Arabic 

speaking. We have a Marine now who is a head of our medical college back home, Dr. Lloyd Jacobs. I am looking at this asset I have 

of Arabic-speaking doctors and saying to myself, how can we use 

telemedicine into several commands that are out there to treat 

both our soldiers and the Iraqi people where it is possible and develop relationships that help on the medical front? Does that make 

any sense or not? Could you report back to me on that? 

My time has probably expired, Mr. Chairman, but I would finally 

ask to use a unit in my district as a test case of whether what we 

are trying to do at this level is working at the ground level. And 

that is the 983rd Engineering Battalion Army Reserves located in 

Ohio, commanding officer in Chicago, Illinois. There are men and 

women in that unit, largely men, with PTSD untreated. How is 

that possible with all the money that I have been voting for here 

in the Congress? 

[The information follows:] 


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Mr. MURTHA. Let me just say, Mr. Young has to leave, and we 

have no Republican here, so we are going to have to shorten our 

questioning. So you will need to get that done here by 11 o’clock, 

because Mr. Young has to leave. So if you will shorten your questions. 

Ms. KAPTUR. That was my last one, Mr. Chairman. A lot of it is 

reporting back and asking them to comment on specifics so I can 

understand why what I voted for still does not create more help for 

my veterans that are coming home in our region. 

Mr. MURTHA. I will say we would work, this Committee is in the 

forefront, we have been working hard trying to have case workers 

to take them not only through the stay in the military hospital, but 

in through the VA right through survival. And the examples I used 

are two civilians, two reporters that were hurt so badly and had 

civilian case workers help them. And Bill Young earlier talked 

about how the family got involved, and now we have case workers 

who are going to be following these people, and General 

Schoomaker talked about this, the whole way through. We all have 

the same problems and concerns. And the thing that I worry about, 

though, is not—talking about it does not solve it. We have got to 

make sure it happens. And I would hope—I went to Fort Hood just 

recently. I saw an improvement, substantial improvement of how 

it used to be. In other words, they talked to the troops. The troops 

reacted. They screened them, and then they started counseling 

them. I do not know when you intervene because the book I am 

reading about war and redemption that Admiral Mullen gave me 

said, if you intervene too soon, they will not talk. It is the worst 

thing you can do. It is the most delicate, difficult problem you can 

possibly face. And all of us struggle with it. I have been reading 

three or four books about it. And Vietnam, Korea. And so I think 

what you brought up is the point all of us are struggling with, trying to get to the bottom of it. But there is nobody that has done 

more than we have in this subcommittee for military medicine. So 

I appreciate what you have just said, and we work at it all the 

time. And if you folks will answer any questions she has for the 

record. 

Dr. CASSCELLS. Sir, I will take the responsibility. I think I will 

have to get with your staff on some of these telephone numbers, 

ma’am, to contact these people and get you your answers. But as 

you can see, just a few people who are struggling with PTSD really 

capture your heart, as they captured yours. And if I could just follow up, I would say again, this is collectively the thing we are most 

focused on. 

[The information follows:] 

My staff has attempted on numerous occasions to contact Dr. Joseph Calabrese 

via email and phone and have not heard back from him. 

The Army staff has contacted your office regarding Matthew Drake and Matthew 

Kyle to address the specifics of their case. 

Mr. MURTHA. I hate to interrupt you, Dr. Casscells, but you are 

going to have somebody call and talk to her, because we have to 

get to Mr. Bishop and then adjourn the committee. 

Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 


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Gentlemen, welcome once again. My questions today, I want to 

focus on joint military-VA medical facilities. And I would be extremely interested in hearing the panel’s views on the effectiveness 

and productivity of the joint military and VA medical facilities that 

we have now operating. For example, I think, the North Central 

Federal Clinic in San Antonio, which is the Air Force and the VA, 

as well as joint facilities in Chicago, Biloxi, Mississippi and Alaska, 

how viable an option is this moving forward, particularly as we are 

now going to be investing more of taxpayers funds in construction 

of new military medical facilities? And are there any obstacles, pitfalls, or other issues in establishing more such relationships that 

we should know about that would make it more difficult? And are 

you open to more cooperation and more utilization of joint facilities 

between the DOD and the VA? 

General ROUDEBUSH. Congressman Bishop, I will take the first 

turn at that one. The Air Force has four of the eight current joint 

venture relationships. And we have found those to be very, very 

productive. Our experience is that the most productive relationships are established locally when you have the local military facility commander and the local VA director leverage each other’s capability, find the gaps, find the opportunities, and bring those together. We have had very productive relationships. We have a hundred sharing arrangements and agreements with the Guard, Reserve and Active activities with our VA counterparts. They are two 

different institutions with two different funding streams and rather 

different foci, if you will, or focus of their activities, with many 

areas of overlap. So, in short, I would say there are wonderful opportunities. My experience is they tend to be best leveraged locally 

but I think ought to be encouraged in every regard because this is 

not only good medicine, but it is good sense in getting the most out 

of every taxpayer dollar into the hands of the people that can really 

provide the care. 

General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, sir, I will just say for the Army, we 

all agree I think about the value in planning and building 

coordinately with the VA. The VA has a very good way of predicting future populations for the VA. And we have done many coordinated plans with the VA for community-based outpatient clinics and the like. In your own district, I know that you are distressed, as we are, about the replacement of Martin Army Community Hospital. It is a $400 million to $450 million hospital that, because of priorities within the Defense Health Program, Military 

Construction Program, we had to split into two pieces as a bill 

payer for the United States Army Institute for Chemical Defense 

to replace it. So it became a bill payer for part of the construction 

of Martin. We are going to do that in two pieces. One piece of it 

is funded in 08–09, and then the balance in the 8 to 13 POM. We 

would like to have it as a single project. We have gone to the VA 

is my understanding. The VA does not have the money to pony up 

for a joint VA–DOD Hospital at Martin. 

Mr. BISHOP. It is my understanding that, prior to my arrival this 

morning, the Chairman indicated that the subcommittee was considering transferring a substantial sum of money for medical facilities to the MILCON, which is slash also Veterans Affairs Subcommittee of Appropriations. I happen to serve on that subVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:38 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046475 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A475P2.XXX A475P2

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committee also. It would appear to me that that might be some indication that VA will not have that kind of a problem with resources if, of course—— 

Mr. MURTHA. If the gentleman would yield, let me just say this. 

We are going to fund this hospital. But you have to have 35 percent design completed. We do not want to hold this thing up because of the VA. My experience dealing with VA, it will take a hell 

of a long time before you get done what you want to get done. And 

I know what Bishop has in mind. But you know, we want to go forward with this hospital. I do not want the damn thing slowed up 

because we got some bureaucratic beef. Not only will you be gone, 

we will all be gone before it gets done. 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, my only concern, I just wanted to get 

an understanding that if we were to pursue that, that there would 

be no objection on the part of the DOD to that effect. I certainly 

do not want to hold it up, I want it to go forward. But once it goes 

forward, I would like very much for us to pursue the VA end of 

that. 

General SCHOOMAKER. That is our oldest hospital in the inventory. Our hospitals in the top five are over two times the age of 

comparable civilian facilities. We are very much in agreement. 

Mr. MURTHA. We will have the money to do it. Because of your 

suggestion, request, because of your diligence, and because of your 

influence with this Committee, they will have the money to do it. 

Thank you very much, gentlemen. I appreciate your coming before 

the Committee. And I just want to say one thing. General 

Schoomaker said before—I was talking about PTSD—he said he 

gets PTSD coming before the Committee. I get PTSD from visiting 

these troops sometimes. So I appreciate it very much for you coming before the Committee. Thank you very much. 

The Committee is adjourned to 1:30. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Question submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answer therefore follow:] 

Question. We understand that the Department of Veterans Affairs will be responsible for hiring all Federal Recovery Coordinators. Can you tell me what resources 

(both personnel and funding) the Department of Defense is providing to this program? 

Answer. DoD funds and personnel were used to support the development of the 

Federal Recovery Coordinators (FRC) training curriculum and training programs. 

DoD also provided funding to support development of the web-based National Resource Directory, an integral part of the Federal Individual Recovery Plan, that will 

allow wounded, ill and injured Service members, veterans, and their families as well 

as the FRCs to access nation-wide information on care and services. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of question submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2008. 

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE ISSUES 

PANEL I 

WITNESSES FOR RESERVES 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACK STULTZ, CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE 

VICE ADMIRAL JOHN COTTON, CHIEF, NAVY RESERVE 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN BERGMAN, COMMANDER, MARINE 

FORCES RESERVE 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN BRADLEY, CHIEF, AIR FORCE RESERVE 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. We are going to welcome this distinguished panel. 

And if you keep your testimony short we will keep our questions 

short, because I think we have gotten pretty well to the point 

where we want to be. And you have given us some good information about what we think needs to be done. So with that, I will ask 

Mr. Hobson if he has any opening remarks. 

Mr. HOBSON. No. I have a few questions I am going to ask, but 

we will get to that. 

Mr. MURTHA. All right. Without objection, we will put your full 

testimony in the record. And if you will each say a few words we 

will get right to the questions. 

General BRADLEY. Mr. Chairman, Committee members, thank 

you, sir, for having this hearing. I think this is important. It gives 

us a chance to talk about our people and advocate for things we 

need so that they are better prepared to do their jobs. I want to 

thank you particularly for the great help you have given us over 

the last few years. 

The National Guard and Reserve equipment account is our life 

blood to really improve our aircraft and other equipment so that 

the folks that we put over in the United States Central Command 

Area of Responsibility (AOR) can help look after their business and 

be safe and do good, close air support. We supply missions for Soldiers and Marines on the ground. 

So thanks for your help, and I look forward to your questions, 

sir. 

[The statement of General Bradley follows:] 


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General BERGMAN. Mr. Chairman, as always, it is a pleasure to 

be here in front of you and the Committee. Thanks for your continued support to the Marines and their families. In the last 5 years, 

with over $200 million for the Marine Corps in the degree account, 

you have allowed us to close out roughly 32 programs or training 

allowance allocations where we have been able to get the equipment, both hard combat-deployable equipment and training assimilation technology that has allowed us to maintain and increase our 

readiness. 

There are a lot of things on the table today, and I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The statement of General Bergman follows:] 


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Admiral COTTON. Mr. Chairman, two things, and a comment. 

NGREA echoes same comments. 

TRICARE Reserve Select is enormous. Since October 1, 2007, if 

you are a drilling selected Reservist you have access to health care. 

In America this is unbelievable. We have noticed an uptick in retention and especially in recruitment of veterans that are going to 

college and need health benefits. We have got about 7,000 Reservists on the program now. So for about $260 for a family, $81 for 

a single, you now have health care. It is enormous. It has really 

helped. 

I have been chief for 41⁄2 years. It is my last time before you. I 

have got to say, Active-Reserve Integration, this journey that Admiral Clark started, Admiral Mullen continued, and now Admiral 

Roughead is a huge advocate. It has really worked well for us. We 

are full partners in everything we do. The Navy tells our story. We 

are sailors for life in a continuum of service, and we thank you for 

your support. 

[The statement of Admiral Cotton follows:] 


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General STULTZ. Yes, sir. Just to echo my comrades in arms here, 

thanks for all the support we have gotten from Congress. We are 

getting support for the Reserve components at record levels in 

terms of dollars being spent against our soldiers for the benefits 

and incentives as well as the equipment. 

At this time last year when I came before you, the Army Reserve 

had an end strength of 188,500; today we have got an end strength 

of 193,500—5,000 more than we had this time last year. At a time 

when we are at record op tempo, we keep 25,000 to 30,000 soldiers 

deployed in 18 different countries in the world right now, and they 

are reenlisting at record rates. 

We are meeting our retention goals at record rates with our firstterm soldiers. And the reason I believe they do that is they feel 

like, one, what they are doing is important and they feel good 

about it; but number two, that they have got the support of this 

Congress behind them. 

So thanks for what you are doing. I look forward to your questions. 

[The statement of General Stultz follows:] 


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TRICARE MEDICAL

Mr. MURTHA. I appreciate those summaries. 

Let me just say TRICARE started in this committee before I was 

Chairman, as a demonstration project. We had a lot of problems at 

first, a lot of complaints and we adapted to that. And I think when 

I go to the field, I always ask about how TRICARE is going and 

how important is it. I get very high marks from the troops in the 

field. And I am glad to hear that it is helping with retention, because I found that if we don’t take care of the families we are sure 

as hell going to have a problem retaining the people in the military, especially with the strain that our folks are under right now 

with extended deployments and with the fact they have been deployed so often. 

So I am pleased to hear that that is going well. We had all kinds 

of problems at first. We still have a lot of health care problems. We 

had the health care folks in front of us today, but it is getting better. We are going to adjust some of the budget requests to take 

care of them. 

For instance, military medical facilities we are going to improve 

substantially. There has been a backlog for a long-term with military medical facilities. We are going to do the same thing with infrastructure for the regulars. And where the Guard goes to train 

and where the Reserves go to train, we are going to increase that 

money for that infrastructure. I am going to transfer that to the 

Military Construction Committee so they have an opportunity to 

have better facilities, the same type of facilities the Regulars have. 

So the advice we get from you folks is invaluable. And of course, 

visiting the bases and having an opportunity to talk to the troops 

gives us some insight. Sometimes it gets so sanitized up here we 

don’t get exactly what we need to hear in order to get the budget 

developed the way it should be developed. 

So I appreciate your coming before the committee, and we will 

ask Mr. Hobson if he has any questions. 

Mr. HOBSON. I most certainly do. First of all, General Stultz, 

does what the Chairman just said help you fix the base I have been 

complaining about and some other bases and put you in a better 

line? 

General STULTZ. Sir, we are getting funding, and specifically we 

are talking about Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, one of our heaviest used. 

Mr. HOBSON. 10,000 to 12,000 people go through there a year. 

General STULTZ. Go through there every year. 

Mr. HOBSON. It looks like it did in 1958 when I was up there. 

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. I will say the good news—and I will 

characterize that first—is we are getting funding for Fort McCoy 

for certain projects when it comes to the training facilities like 

ranges and things like that. The problem I have got is, as you very 

well know, sir, we need better billeting for the soldiers who are out 

there. We are still putting those soldiers in World War II buildings. 

And when we go into the construction program it seems like the 

facilities, places like McCoy and some of the other places, like Shelby and others with the Guard, are pushed back. 

We have got our first ORTC, which is the Operational Readiness 

Training Center, which is your brick training facilities billets 


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scheduled for Fort McCoy in fiscal year 2011. That is too late; we 

need it started now. 

Mr. MURTHA. We have a list from—I assume you are included in 

that list—from all the services about infrastructure deficiencies. 

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. And it amounts to $7 billion or $8 billion. We intend over the next two supplementals to take care of that, plus 

military medical facilities that are deficient. So we have seen those 

facilities and we are sure as hell going to try to take care of them. 

General STULTZ. We just can’t afford to keep pouring money into 

putting wood on World War II buildings. 

UNIT DEPLOYMENT/COHESION

Mr. HOBSON. One more thing in this round. General Bergman, 

he knows I am not happy. We have the former chief first sergeant 

of the Lima Company here with us today. Right, Auggie? 

VOICE. XO, sir. 

Mr. HOBSON. XO. He is here. He cares about these Marines. He 

cares about the Marines in Lima Company. I wish the Marine 

Corps, to be frank with you, cared as much about those Marines 

as I do. I want to—there is a memorandum of 19 January 2007 

from the Secretary of Defense: Mobilization of ground combat, combat support and combat service support will be managed on a unit 

basis. This will allow greater cohesion and predictability in how 

these Reserve units train and deploy. Exceptions will require my 

approval. 

Did you have that approval or do you need that approval now? 

General BERGMAN. Sir, we need that approval when that goes 

forward when there are exceptions to dwell time. 

Mr. HOBSON. Do you have that today? 

General BERGMAN. The—— 

Mr. HOBSON. I am asking you a very straightforward question, 

sir. 

General BERGMAN. The book that goes to the SECDEF for unit 

activation goes at a defined time. Prior to that unit activation, 

there is a timing process. So the unit that we are talking about to 

activate those Marines out of Lima Company 325, that book will 

not go forth to the SECDEF until a time here in the near future. 

Mr. HOBSON. But you have already, you have—— 

General BERGMAN. We have already identified them. 

Mr. HOBSON. You have already told people—— 

General BERGMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HOBSON [continuing]. Involuntarily, when you had volunteers to go forward in that unit who had not served overseas, you 

had volunteers, you said no, we don’t want those volunteers, we 

want sergeants and we want corporals, and we are going to do 

cross-leveling. You didn’t go to the IRR to get people out of the 

IRR, which is what it is for. And one of the basic tenets of the Marine Corps is to keep these units together, and all of a sudden we 

are going to do this. 

And then I asked somebody, I said, what about the schooling 

these kids were going to go to to help their unit? Some of them 

were going to go to sniper school. They were waiting 3 years to go 


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to sniper school, and now 9 of the 11 are involuntary. That is a 

problem, sir. 

Secondly, what is your recruitment compared to the National 

Guard and even the Reserve? Is your recruitment up? Are you 

meeting everything? 

General BERGMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HOBSON. The same levels? 

General BERGMAN. We are at 100 percent. We were at 100 percent for 2007. Basically 6,287. 

Mr. HOBSON. You are not going to be with this kind of treatment 

of Marines, in my opinion. Marines are supposed to care about 

their people. When I ask what schools are going to be messed up 

by this, nobody knows. When I ask about certain types about these 

individuals nobody knows. All they know is we needed corporals 

and we needed sergeants. And I would like you to tell me why you 

didn’t go to the IRR. 

General BERGMAN. Well, sir, we go to the IRR every day. We 

have scrubbed the IRR. Right now we have about over 2,000 IRR 

Marines on Active Duty that are in Iraq and Afghanistan and preparing to go. The reality is in caring about those Marines, we care 

deeply, just as everyone in this room does. One of the reasons that 

those corporals and sergeants were chosen is because those new 

first-time Marines need qualified leadership, because it is those 

corporals and sergeants. And quite honestly, sir, those are a little 

bit in short supply. 

Mr. HOBSON. But let me tell you the other side of this, too. Lima 

Company may go back in 2009. Some of these kids were wounded 

that are going back in Iraq, their previous year. Sending them 

back. And when Lima deploys again in 2009, you are going to have 

this same problem, cause you have taken people out of Lima Company now and put them over in another company. And probably 

when they get back, I am not sure they are going to stay as Marines. 

General BERGMAN. Sir, Lima Company will go as part of the 3rd 

Battalion, 25th Marines. And if we hold to the Force generation 

model we will go in June of 2010. And the fact of the matter is 

when we started deploying the infantry battalions in 2003, it took 

one battalion to make one battalion; 100 percent unit cohesion. By 

2006, because of the second activations and because we had at that 

time an unwritten policy of voluntary-involuntary activations, 

which through the model that the Marine Corps and the Marine 

Corps Reserve had set up for a year activation, which Secretary 

Gates referred to in his memo, that year made up of about not 

quite 4 months of predeployment training, a 7-month deployment 

and then a demobilization time, we got set back by, again, an unwritten policy on you couldn’t involuntarily call someone a second 

time, because we had set our business model to utilize the 24 

months under law in two 12-month periods. And all the Marines 

and Marine Forces Reserve knew that at the time, that if a young 

Marine joined, you could go in your first year, you would have approximately between 4 and 5 years dwell time, and in your sixth 

year you would go a second time. That setback in the 2006—2005– 

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talion in one battalion, to make one regiment to make one battalion. So the folks in 25th Marines were just coming out of that. 

We project that when 1st Battalion, 23rd Marines goes in December of 2010, we will be at the virtually no or minimal just specialty 

MOS cross-leveling. It took us a 41⁄2 year cycle to get back to where 

we started, which is exactly what you are talking about sir. 

Unfortunately the timing of 225 gone does catch us a little bit 

short of zero cross-leveling. 

Mr. HOBSON. I think it is poor planning. And second of all, I 

think by the time this gets to the SECDEF, he doesn’t even know 

where it is in the book you give him and it is already done. I mean, 

so what you have done, the way you are doing it is you are taking 

the action before you have the approval. And then, after the fact, 

is so buried that he won’t even know that you violated the policy 

or you are intending to violate it when he signs off on whatever you 

give him. And if it is reviewed by the same people who send me 

memos, you know, that say nothing but bureaucratic mumbojumbo, certainly he will sign off on it. 

I mean this is just, I think, poor planning, poor treatment of people. It should have been foreseen. And you are telling me now you 

don’t—basically what you are telling me is—when did anybody look 

at whether there were sergeants or corporals available in the IRR? 

I always forget which one. The guys that you give points to for 

doing nothing and standing around and now you are calling them 

up. 

General BERGMAN. That is ongoing, sir. We scrub that list continually, because those IRR Marines—oh, by the way, what we try to 

do, because most of those Marines who are in the IRR are coming 

right from Active Duty and have served multiple combat tours already. So the policy that we have tried to put together is that when 

a Marine enters the IRR they will have a 4-year time frame in the 

IRR. They serve 4 years on Active Duty and a 4-year commitment 

in the IRR. 

We give that first year of Active Duty, a chance to refresh, get 

themselves established in their civilian careers, and then they are 

eligible during the second and third year for recall. We don’t want 

to wait too long because individual skill sets combat capabilities 

are a perishable skill. And in that fourth year of the IRR, they are 

pretty much on their way out, and we do not touch them unless 

there is some type of greater national emergency. 

Sir, it is all about people, and we are short of people. And we felt 

we would err on the side of openness to tell these young Marines 

early, because they need to prepare for the eventuality, so they 

know they can have the medical benefits available. And if the 

SECDEF decides to say no, then he says no. 

Mr. HOBSON. Let me ask, if you have some people who were willing to go, young Marines who were willing to go and willing to volunteer, and you have a period of time that you are giving people 

advance notice that you are going, if people have been in a while 

are you telling me none of those were promotable to the ranks that 

were necessary that they could go with this unit? I doubt that anybody looked at that. I think this was just a numbers game and they 

said, hey, these are the guys, you are done, you are going. We don’t 

care about the three that are going to sniper school to help their 


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unit. They have been waiting 3 years to do that. And you turned 

down the kids that volunteered, as I understand it. 

Now, maybe there is a different story to this, but I understand 

kids volunteered to do this. And that whoever the officer is that 

said we are not going to do that, nobody looks—did anybody look 

to see if there is anybody promotable that can go? 

General BERGMAN. Yes, sir. If a Marine is turned down for voluntary deployment, it is because, for whatever reason, they don’t 

have the skill sets or the capabilities that we need in that particular mission. 

Mr. HOBSON. Do you know that happened here? 

General BERGMAN. I will find out for you. I am willing to bet 

you—here is the key. 25th Marines is a regiment, and we seek to 

keep that regiment intact with its infantry battalions, so that we 

have that management at the level that they can look right down 

in those battalions and down into those companies to make sure we 

get it. But I will double-check to make sure and get back to you. 

[The information follows:] 

By choosing Company L NCOs to augment 2nd Battalion instead of volunteers, 

the command is able to fully utilize their combat-proven leadership and occupational 

skills to train and lead the Marines of 2nd Battalion. This plan also allows the junior Marines (who may have volunteered) within Company L to progressively assume 

greater responsibility during peacetime training events, and thereby be better prepared to assume NCO billets during 3rd Battalion’s next deployment. Consequently, 

the current plan optimizes the quality and quantity of NCO leadership provided to 

both 2nd Battalion and 3rd Battalion during combat operations in support of the 

War on Terror. 

Mr. HOBSON. When you looked down, it didn’t happen here, because you didn’t have it in the one unit that is going. You had it 

in some people in another unit to fill it. And that is called crossleveling, which everybody, especially the Marine Corps, has been 

totally taboo on. The Air Force doesn’t do it because they can volunteer their people. 

But anyway, it is just—this is a decorated group of people, they 

want to go, they are willing to go, but I don’t think this is the right 

way to get them to go or to treat them to go, especially when they 

waited 3 years. 

I know the Army has the donkey as their mascot. I don’t know 

what the Marine Corps’ is, but it has got to be about the same. 

General BERGMAN. It is kind of a bulldog, a very friendly little 

one, unless you piss him off. 

Mr. HOBSON. I have seen that one over there. But I will tell you 

I am just, as you can tell, frustrated. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks. 

STRATEGIC TO OPERATIONAL RESERVE

Mr. DICKS. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, the Commission on National Guard and Reserves believes that the dramatic 

change from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational Reserve without 

any study is a far-reaching decision and is a mistake, because it 

is not clear that the public or Congress stand behind this new concept. What do you think of this criticism? 

Admiral COTTON. I will jump in first. I will tell you, I think the 

rules changed in 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down. We all got 

a wakeup call in 1991 with Desert Storm, and we did really well 


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there. Afterwards, we all expected a peace dividend. The work did 

not go away. So we flexed and some of our Reservists started getting more operational. 

I was an F/A–18 team pilot, where we practiced for world war 

and we became trainers of Active component members before they 

deployed. So we have been doing a lot of operational support since 

1991. The Air Force will tell you they have been at war since 1991 

providing aircraft overseas, so we have been doing this. People 

have called it different things. 

I think the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves did 

a great job of looking for 2 years at all the things we are going to 

be dealing with, both in the past and the future. Operational support, I think, is here to stay. And the best proof is the customer 

likes it, the combatant commanders and our Sailors—I will speak 

for them—they love it, rather than staying in a—— 

Mr. MURTHA. If the gentleman will yield? 

Mr. DICKS. Yes, I yield. 

Mr. MURTHA. I talked to the four generals before, and admiral 

before, and we talked about this. It is really a matter they just 

don’t have enough troops. They can’t deploy for any length of time 

without the Reserve in the first place, without the Guard in the 

second place. So we just don’t have enough forces to sustain a deployment, one deployment, for any length of time. And that is basically the problem. That is the thing we face. 

Mr. DICKS. Well, the issue, then, is if we have done this, if we 

have moved the Guard to an—I mean the Reserve to be in an operational setting, then do we have a Strategic Reserve? Should we be 

worried about that? Should Congress be worried that everybody 

now is training for counterinsurgency, I guess, in the Marine Corps 

and the Army? And so do we any longer have a Strategic Reserve? 

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir I believe we do. I don’t think we 

should be worried about it. We have highly trained Reservists who 

are not being used every day in an operational way, but we are 

available. I think this Operational Reserve is the right way to do 

it. But those that are not employed every day could still be considered a Strategic Reserve. 

Mr. DICKS. Have you guys debated this within your services to 

say, now what do we do; what are we going to have for our Strategic Reserve and what are we going to have for our Operational 

Reserve? Or is this one of those things that just happened? Not 

really anybody making a decision, it just happened. And now we 

are kind of stuck with it, because we don’t have enough—as the 

Chairman said, we don’t have enough forces, obviously, to do the 

whole operational mission with the Active force. 

General BRADLEY. Well, sir, I think the decision to do this predates any of us being in our current positions. I cannot answer the 

question whether it was debated in the service before we did it, because it goes back so far before my time in this position. But I will 

tell you, I think it is the right thing to do. 

I agree with Admiral Cotton. It helps our retention dramatically. 

Our people like being involved in the real-world things every day. 

It doesn’t mean that 100 percent of our Reservists are involved in 

it every day. But the Active Air Force depends on the Air National 

Guard and the Air Force Reserve to do everything they do. We are 


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spread across every mission area, practically every one, every mission area. Our volunteerism rate is high. 

I don’t think there is enough money to put all of us on Active 

Duty so that you don’t need the Guard and Reserve, and you just 

keep them as a Strategic Reserve. I don’t think we can afford to 

do that anymore. I think it is an affordability issue. But it has paid 

off and is working well in my view, sir. 

DWELL TIME

General STULTZ. Sir, I will just tell you from the Army Reserve’s 

perspective, to answer your first question, I don’t think it was a deliberate decision. I think what we did is we got into the war on terror, not really understanding that this was going to be an extended 

conflict. And that has led us into the process of saying we are going 

to have to depend on the Reserve for the enduring future if we are 

going to be engaged in a long war. 

So based on that we better get into some kind of an operational 

format because the soldiers are going to demand, to sustain an allvolunteer Reserve component, what my soldiers tell me is I need 

some predictability in my life; I have got to be able to know when 

I am going to be able to have a civilian job and a civilian life, and 

I have got to be able to know when I am expected to be in the military. 

So what we are doing in the Army Reserve is we are developing 

a 5-year model, and we are rating our forces across that 5 years, 

so that I can tell the Army and DoD each year, here is how much 

I can give you in terms of engineer capability or MP capability or 

transportation capability. 

The good news, I will tell you, is in the current sourcing for fiscal 

year 2008, 94 percent of the units I am sending into the war are 

coming out of the right year group. So we are starting to build that 

predictability. 

The challenge we have got is to your point; one, I can tell you 

how much I can give you, but the theater asks for more. So when 

I can say, here is what predictably I can give you in terms of engineer capability, but the theater comes back and says, but I need 

an extra engineer group in two more battalions, then I have got to 

pull somebody forward; which gets to the point of we are kind of 

breaking that dwell promise that we said we were going to give you 

years back. 

Mr. DICKS. The 1 in 5. 

General STULTZ. The 1 in 5; yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Now we are about 1 in 2 and 3. 

General STULTZ. We are about 1 in 3 right now, because we have 

got to get the capability to sustain it. The other thing is for the 

strategic depth piece we have to look back and say, okay, if I have 

got units that are in this 5-year model, my Strategic Reserve is 

really probably in years 2 and 3 of this model. And if I don’t have 

the equipment to train those units—that is, the right equipment 

that they need to deploy to war with—then that degrades my ability to have that Strategic Reserve out there. But that is what we 

are looking at, is the Strategic Reserve piece. 

Mr. DICKS. And are testifying you don’t have the equipment now? 


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General STULTZ. Not all the equipment we need. No, sir. I can 

tell you the units that deploy to theater are deployed with the best 

equipment. 

Mr. DICKS. But you don’t have the stuff to train the people that 

are supposed to be part of the Strategic Reserve. 

General STULTZ. Yes, sir, that is what I am telling you. We don’t. 

And a lot of times what we are using is what we call ‘‘in lieu of’’ 

equipment, which is equipment that we could use back home, like 

an M35 deuce-and-a-half. But that is not what you are going to operate when you get to theater. You are going to operate a light medium tactical vehicle truck. That is what they need to have back 

here to train on. If we are taking our engineers into theater to do 

route clearance and we are using the Huskies and the Buffalos and 

the RG–31s and the Cougars, that is what they need back here to 

train on, because that is what they are going to be expected to operate in the theater. 

So right now the equipping side of the Army Reserve is my concern for the Strategic Reserve piece of it; that I look back into those 

earlier years. 

Mr. DICKS. General Bergman, do you have a comment on this? 

General BERGMAN. Sir, I would suggest to you that the Operational Reserve has evolved as a subset of the Global War on Terror. And we are looking now as to how do we sustain our forward 

presence capability. And because the Guard and Reserve forces 

have continued to step up to the plate to the tune of millions of 

man days, it has been able to sustain us. So this is a byproduct. 

And the future—and also meeting the future expectations of the future Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen who 

look to join a Service and say, how long do I want to spend on Active Duty; how do I want to dovetail that with my civilian career? 

The continuum of service will be the next step in the evolution 

of the Operational Reserve. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, I will tell you, it is somewhere in between 

what you are saying. If we have a major confrontation, there is no 

Strategic Reserve. It is just like every war that has come about; we 

have to fall back, unfortunately, until we build up to the point 

where—what I am trying to do, what this subcommittee is trying 

to do, is look to the future, look beyond Iraq, make sure you have 

the equipment, make sure you have what you need so that somebody doesn’t have a misconception that we are not prepared. That 

is the thing that worries me. 

So that is why we are looking at more ships, we are looking at 

more—for instance, we have a list for the subcommittee to know 

of things that they are short, and it is substantial. And we are 

going to try to fulfill that list with these two supplementals that 

are coming up, because we know damn well you don’t have the 

equipment to train on, we know damn well you don’t have the 

equipment to deploy with if you had to deploy. So we are going to 

try to come up with the money to take care of that. Plus the infrastructure money that we have committed to the Military Construction Subcommittee. 

Mr. Young. 


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PERSONNEL RETENTION/EQUIPMENT NEEDS

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I just 

want to say thank you for the men and women that you lead in 

your Reserve units. Without them and without your organizations 

we couldn’t get there, where we have to be, and so we appreciate 

very much that. 

And Chairman Murtha just cited something that we have both 

been concerned about for a long time, and that is being prepared 

for any other contingency other than what we are involved in 

today. And he specifically mentioned equipment, which is, of 

course, important. But what about the personnel? Are your tables 

of organization, are you at full strength, not at full strength? 

And, secondly, what is your recruiting situation? Are you able to 

get recruits to fill in the attrition or to maintain what your end 

strength needs to be? 

Mr. HOBSON. And retention, if I might add. 

Admiral COTTON. I will jump in first. The Navy Reserve is over 

strength by almost 3,000. We are in a very enviable position right 

now, as we look toward the end of the fiscal year, to pick and 

choose the ones we want to keep and transfer the others to the 

IRR. 

Recruiting has improved greatly because we have combined recruiting. The best recruiters now are the commanding officers on 

Active Duty and the senior enlisted advisors that encourage people 

to serve in a continuum of service, Sailors for life. So we are getting much more transfers from the Fleet to our centers. 

With that said, I will tell you I think all of us have a shortage 

of junior- to mid-grade officers and also senior enlisted, perhaps 

past the 20-year point, the experienced people that stay. So the incentives, the bonuses, the things that we ask for to target those 

kind of skill sets capabilities that we need at those officer and enlisted year groups, that has really been beneficial to us. So thank 

you. 

General STULTZ. From the Army Reserve’s perspective, sir, I will 

tell you this. Currently we are at 193,500 and we are authorized 

205K, so we are 11,000-some below end strength of where we need 

to be. That is not all a bad-news story. We took our end strength 

down to almost 185K in the past couple of years because we had 

a lot of trash we needed to clean out of the system. If we are going 

to be an operational force and if we are going to ask soldiers to go 

and step forward and risk their lives, then we have got people who 

aren’t willing to serve we have to get rid of. Every day, almost, I 

sign papers discharging officers, lieutenants and captains who just 

refuse to participate. And I have told the other officers in my corps, 

you know, I owe it to them not to let those soldiers leave without 

something on their record. So we are sending them home with a 

less than honorable discharge. So we are cleaning up the force. 

So we went down to about 185K. Today we are 193,500. We have 

come up 5,000 in the last 12 months. So we are bringing into the 

force the right quality that we need. And we are turning upward 

to get to the 205K by fiscal year 2010. 

The other thing that is a good-news story is last year we reenlisted 119 percent of our goal. In quantitative, we reenlisted three 


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times more soldiers than we did the year before that were firstterm soldiers. 

In January I went to Iraq, and in the palace with General 

Petraeus, we reenlisted 100 Army Reserve soldiers to celebrate our 

100th anniversary year of 2008, all in one ceremony. So the good 

news is those young soldiers that we brought in after 9/11 knew 

what they were getting into and they are sticking with us because 

they trust us that we are going to give them some predictability, 

that we are going to give them the right incentives and compensation and we are going to take care of their family. So I see a real 

positive trend. But we have got to maintain that support in terms 

of the incentives and the compensation and everything that they 

deserve if we are going to maintain this all-volunteer Reserve force. 

General BERGMAN. 39,600 is the authorized end strength of the 

Marine Corps Reserve. We are at about 38,300 right now, a little 

bit lower than authorized end strength. That really doesn’t tell the 

whole story. The Marine Corps, the Active component Marine 

Corps, is growing to 202,000. Some of those prior-service Marines 

who would normally join the Reserves are staying on Active Duty 

because it is the right thing to do and we need them. We exist for 

one reason and one reason only in the Marine Corps Reserve, and 

that is to augment and reinforce the Active component. So we have 

a short-term challenge with some of those young sergeants and corporals who won’t be available to us because they will still be on Active Duty. 

We have always had a challenge with company-grade officers in 

the Reserves, because in the Marine Corps all of us serve our company-grade time, that lieutenant time, on Active Duty in our initial 

commitment, because that leadership in the Marine Corps Reserve 

has that Active component background. 

We have instituted some new programs that will mitigate the 

company-grade officer shortfall somewhat. We still have room to 

grow there. But the young 18- to 22-year-old who is the non-priorservice Marine, those numbers are still strong. Challenging, you 

have to work to have them join, but the bottom line is they are still 

coming in the door so we are in good shape. 

Mr. HOBSON. What is your retention? 

General BERGMAN. About 82 percent. 

General BRADLEY. Mr. Young, the Air Force Reserve is doing 

fairly well, I would say. I am very happy with our recruiting. We 

have for the seventh year in a row recruited more than 100 percent 

of our goal. Not as hard to recruit for the Air Force Reserve as it 

is maybe for some other Services or components. So I am very 

pleased with our recruiting. 

What I will tell you, though, it is a less experienced force than 

we have had in the past because we have to recruit more non-priorservice people, people who have not been in the military, than we 

used to, because the Air Force is a lot smaller and fewer people are 

getting out and transferring into the Reserve or the Guard than 

used to because of just a smaller force overall in the Active component. Our retention is okay, but some people are leaving sooner 

than they have to, even retiring, because they are eligible. 

And the demands have been pretty tough. We have asked a lot 

of people to deploy a number of times. I have many units who have 


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deployed four or five times in the last six years. My deployments 

are not as long as the Marines or the Army, so truth in advertising 

there. 

But we have had a fabulous rate of volunteerism with a predictive model the Air Force has, our Air Expeditionary Forces. So 

our folks know when they are going to go, when they are going to 

come back and when their next time is. And we have had no shortage of volunteers. We would rather use volunteers than mobilize 

people. We have done a fair amount of mobilization and that has 

worked okay, but I would rather use volunteers. 

So our retention is okay, but there are some people in the 15- 

year point to 20-year point who sometimes also decide to leave. 

And that is really tough because we hate to lose those middle-manager kind of people. So retention is all right, but not quite as good 

as I would like it to be. 

Mr. YOUNG. You know, in view of the many deployments and the 

length of some of those deployments, this is a pretty good news 

story. And I think it says something very special about the young 

men and women that serve in our uniform. And that just makes 

me feel really proud, even more proud than I was when I walked 

in this room this afternoon. 

General BRADLEY. Sir, if I can make another comment along that 

line. I really believe it is true. I get out to my units a lot and I 

talk to people at all levels. I go to the AOR. I have been to Iraq 

and Afghanistan several times, and I talk to people. And as I said 

in my answer to Mr. Dicks, our folks I believe really want to be 

involved in our Nation’s important business. So it is more stress on 

the force, but they would rather do that than just sit at home and 

train all the time for it to be a Strategic Reserve. They like being 

operational. And I think our retention is good. 

And I will tell you, I have been in this Air Force Reserve for 35 

years and I think our morale is much better today than it was 15, 

20, 25 years ago. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, with all the technology that we talk about and 

the equipment and the things that we are going to buy for you and 

replace that you have worn out, the most important part of this 

whole equation are the men and women that operate them and 

make them function. So that is also a sign of good leadership at 

the top. 

Thank you all very much for what you do and the folks that work 

with you. 

Mr. DICKS. Would the gentleman yield for one question? How 

long are your troops sent out there for? 

LENGTH OF DEPLOYMENT

General BRADLEY. Varied lengths, sir. I have some people who 

are mobilized for a year and deployed. I have some that are mobilized for six months and deployed. Most of our deployments are 120 

days, similar to the Air Force model for active duty rotations. However, some key positions stay longer. But the average Active Duty 

person goes for 120 days. And my people do that as well. But we 

do have the capability sometimes to rotate people at 45, 50, 60-day 

tours inside those 120. 


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So the Air Force gives us some flexibility, and that allows more 

of my people to volunteer, relieving stress on the Active force, so 

that they don’t have to deploy too often. So it is a good thing, because we get to deploy and do that, but it is a shorter tour sometimes. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kaptur. 

RECRUITING/RETENTION BONUSES

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Admiral and Generals, welcome. It is really good to have you here today. Thank you 

for your service. 

I just wanted to ask in terms of retention and recruitment, are 

the bonuses being paid by the Reserves per individual at the same 

level as in the Active Duty. 

General STULTZ. No ma’am. Our average—I think the average 

reenlistment bonus for the Army Reserve is somewhere between— 

we can pay $20,000 to $30,000, somewhere in that range. It depends on some of the specialties. And what you will find in the Active forces, theirs are much larger. That seems to be—you know, 

it gets to the point—I keep saying I would prefer we manage one 

end strength in the Army. Right now we manage three end 

strengths. We manage an Active Army, an Army Reserve and an 

Army Guard, and in a lot of cases we are competing with each 

other. 

And I will give you a good example. If you are in an Active Army 

and I am Reserve, and you have 100 people and I have 100 people, 

if 10 of my people leave Reserve duty and go to Active Duty the 

system shows 10 gains. If 10 of your people leave Active Duty and 

come to the Reserve, we show 10 gains. So now we show 20 gains 

in the system but we still only have 200 people. We need to get to 

the point of managing one end strength so that we can flow between components freely and we can pay bonuses and incentives 

equally for service, not service on Active Duty versus service in the 

Reserve or service in the Guard. 

Mr. MURTHA. Will the gentlewoman yield? I will tell you, the bonuses went from $187 million to $1 billion. We talk about how good 

the troops are, but these bonuses, this is real money. My God, I 

mean, I hope there is some consideration for—we are borrowing all 

this money from somebody in order to pay these bonuses. Can we 

not do this without bonuses and reenlistment and so forth incentive? Can we do this without it? Does the volunteer Army have to 

have the bonuses? 

General STULTZ. Sir, I think the answer there is, from my perspective, it is almost like a value equation; here is what we ask and 

here is what you get in return. And it used to be we asked 1 week 

in a month, 2 weeks in the summer, and here is what you get. Now 

we are asking—every 4 or 5 years we ask you to leave your family, 

your life, your job, and you risk your life. 

Now, to your point. I think in the future we need to look at not 

just throwing money, we need to look at things and say how do we 

sustain a person’s lifestyle. Maybe health insurance in lieu of an 

enlistment bonus is a good thing. Maybe prepaid tuition for your 

kids instead of an enlistment bonus, so we are taking care of your 


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family and not just spending money, throwing money idly out 

there. 

Ms. KAPTUR. What if we had no bonuses, what would happen? 

Admiral COTTON. I want to say first of all in the Navy we manage one end strength, and we use the bonuses to target behavior 

of skill sets and capabilities we need to sustain the force and especially deploy with in the Global War on Terror. So you are looking 

at some pretty varsity skill sets—civil affairs, provisional reconstruction teams, doctors, dentists, nurses; you know, people who 

deploy and build things—to sustain. And this behavior we have of 

the repeated deployments, this is where the bonuses come in. If we 

had none of them you would still have a force, but I don’t think 

you would have the numbers that we have now. It has grown to 

be an expectation. And I will also admit that you see some behaviors of our youngsters today that will shop their skill sets between 

the Services, who will wait a certain time to be out to get back in, 

because they know we all need these skill sets. But I also look at 

our young Sailors, Soldiers and our Marines, too. They all want a 

little time off, go into something else, come back to us; so we see 

all new behavior of the people that we are all recruiting from. 

General BRADLEY. Ma’am, it might be that is kind of a cost, the 

portion of the bonus the Chairman is talking about which goes to 

Guardsmen and Reservists. It might be the cost of the Operational 

Reserve versus a Strategic Reserve, which is probably a heck of a 

lot cheaper than paying to have all of that from the Active component because that is more expensive. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Well, in view of what you said and the Chairman 

has said, what has troubled me about this war from the beginning 

is that only some people fight and only some people sacrifice, only 

some families sacrifice and some sacrifice a whole lot. 

And if one looks at a bonus versus a patriotic sense of duty, I 

really am troubled by the apparently larger and larger amounts we 

are having to extend for bonuses as a society, as opposed to asking 

all families to sacrifice. I am troubled by the trend. 

But I would appreciate if you would place on the record the comparison between your bonuses versus Active Duty and the amounts 

of funds that have been expended to date, if you could, in each of 

your branches, and the increasing rate that we are paying for bonuses. 

[The information follows:] 

The Active Duty and Air Force Reserve provide similar bonuses to Airmen to help 

meet recruiting and retention goals. Below is a breakout of the funds spent or budgeted for the different types of bonuses. 

[Dollars in millions] 

Bonus type 

Active Air Force Reserve 

FY07 FY08 FY09 FY08 

YTD * FY07 FY08 FY09 FY08 YTD * 

Non-Prior Enlistment ........................ 5 .9 13 .0 13 .0 1 .0 12 .4 14 .4 15 .3 6 .0 

Prior Enlistment ................................ 0 0 0 0 5 .7 8 .5 10 .4 2 .1 

Reenlistment ..................................... 146 .0 131 .0 179 .0 64 .0 8 .4 10 .5 12 .8 2 .0 

Health Specialist .............................. 12 .5 11 .5 52 .3 34 .0 3 .1 7 .2 9 .8 0 .1 

Affiliation .......................................... 0 0 0 0 0 .07 0 .3 0 .2 0 

Educational Loan Repayment ........... 126 .0 14 .0 71 .0 1 .0 1 .4 1 .4 1 .7 0 .3 

Foreign Language Proficiency ........... 20 .5 0 21 .8 10 .0 0 .5 0 .5 0 .5 0 .1 


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[Dollars in millions] 

Bonus type 

Active Air Force Reserve 

FY07 FY08 FY09 FY08 

YTD * FY07 FY08 FY09 FY08 YTD * 

Aviator Continuation Pay .................. 153 .1 149 .7 127 .3 59 .7 4 .6 4 .4 2 .9 1 .9 

Totals .............................. 310 .9 169 .5 337 .1 169 .7 31 .6 42 .8 50 .7 12 .5 

Dollars may not add due to rounding. 

* As of end of March 2008. 

For clarification, the term ‘‘bonuses’’ will include Incentive Pays, Special Pays and 

Allowances, Stipends, Enlistment/Reenlistment Bonuses, and various other bonustype payments. 

USN Active Duty Bonuses USN Selected Reserve Bonuses 

Incentives Pay (Examples: Submarine Duty, Flying Duty, Parachute Jumping Duty, Incentive Bonus for Conversion, etc.).

Special Pays (Examples: Physician Pay, Hardship Duty, Linguist Pay, Combat Injury Pay, etc.).

Special Duty Assignment Pay 

Enlistment/Reenlistment Bonuses 

Education Pays 

Loan Repayment Program 

Enlistment Bonus (New accession Training—NAT) 

Affiliation Bonus (Prior Service Veterans) 

Education Pays 

Critical Wartime Specialty Pays (Examples: Health Professional Special Pays, Medical Stipend, etc.) 

Rating change to critical skill-set (RESCORE–R) 

High Priority Unit Pay 

Second BAH Allowance (without dependents) 

Income Replacement (for extended or frequent involuntary 

mobilizations) 

Loan Repayment Program 

The amounts of funds that have been expended to date on bonuses and the increasing rate that have been paid for bonuses are summarized as follows: 

FY04 Increase 

from 04–05 FY05 Increase from 05–06 FY06 Increase from 06–07 FY07 2008 (to date) 

Active Duty .................. $1,392M 4.02% $1,448M 4.12% $1,508M 7.22% $1,617M $500M 

Drilling Reservist ........ $7.7M 58.5% $12.2M 339.3% $53.7M 31.9% $70.8M $15.2M 

SMCR (Selected Marine Corps Reserves) Enlistment Bonus 

—$20,000 lump sum payment for a 6X2 contract (6 years of drilling time followed 

by 2 years of Inactive Ready Reserve (IRR) time) 

—Only certain critical skills qualify 

—USMC has issued enlistment bonus agreements totaling $4.82 million in FY08 

(to be paid in full once reserve members complete all required training) 

* Active Component (AC) Enlistment Bonus 

—$10,000 for a 4X4 contract (4 years of active duty followed by 4 years of IRR) 

—$15,000 for a 5X3 or 6X2 contract 

—Only certain critical skills qualify 

—Expended to date: $27 million 

SMCR Reenlistment Bonus 

—$15,000 lump sum payment for a 3-year reenlistment 

—Only certain critical skills qualify 

—USMC has issued reenlistment bonus agreements totaling $1.6 million in FY08 

(to be paid in full once reserve members complete all required training) 

* AC Selective Reenlistment Bonus 

—Max $80,000; average is $30,000 for a 4-year reenlistment 

—Only certain critical skills qualify 

—Expended to date: $224 million 

SMCR Enlisted Affiliation Bonus 

—$15,000 lump sum payment for a 3-year SMCR unit affiliation 

—Only certain critical skills qualify 

—USMC has issued enlisted affiliation bonus agreements totaling $2 million in 

FY08 (to be paid in full once reserve members complete all required training) 

SMCR Officer Affiliation Bonus (Total obligated for FY08 is $320,000) 

—$10,000 lump sum payment for a 3-year SMCR unit affiliation 

—Offered to company grade officers and aviation majors 


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—USMC has issued officer affiliation bonus agreements totaling $320,000 in FY08 

(to be paid in full once reserve members complete all required training) 

——— 

* There is no comparable AC bonus to this bonus. 

Based on available data, for the past 3 years, Active Duty, Military Personnel 

Army (MPA) funds accounted for the following overall Recruiting & Retention bonus 

payments: $671,478,000 (FY05); $1,090,077,000 (FY06); $1,038,764,000 (FY07); and 

$1,011,962,980 (as of March 31, 2008). 

Further, Army Reserve, Reserve Personnel Army (RPA) funds accounted for the following overall Recruiting & Retention bonus payments: $180,979,000 (FY05); 

$330,711,000 (FY06); $314,742,000 (FY07); and $271,027,532 (as of March 31, 2008). 

The accompanying chart depicts fiscal year 2007 side-by-side Active Duty and 

United States Army Reserve incentive comparisons. 

POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER

I also wanted to make a comment. Earlier today we had an excellent hearing on health care. And I would say in the Reserve and 

Guard forces, which I tend to represent more of than the Active 

Duty forces, like some of my dear colleagues—like Sanford Bishop 

here—my impression is that the assistance rendered to returning 

veterans, Iraqi veterans, Afghani veterans, health care simply just 

isn’t as good, because of the way that the units are deployed, and 

also the fear of people in the ranks that if they report a condition 

such as PTSD, that they will lose their promotion. I just want to 

sensitize you to that. 

I asked this morning for the doctors to report back on one Army 

unit in my area, the 983rd Engineering Battalion, which has had 

several combat deployments. And I know there is PTSD in the 

ranks. The unit is from Ohio, the members are from everywhere, 

the commanding officer is over in Chicago, the Ohio system isn’t 

terribly organized to receive them back. 

We simply have to have a more thoughtful manner in which to 

take care of those who are coming back. And I would posit the theory that in the Guard and Reserve, more will come back with 

PTSD perhaps than in Active Duty ranks. And readjustment will 

be more difficult because they don’t come home to a base. And I 

would like to use the 983rd as an example of how it is currently 

working versus how it could work. 

How could we make treatment available, how could we make assessment available when they come back? That microcosm will help 

me understand whether the policies we have set in place at the national level are really working to take care of our returning 

Guardsmen and Reservists who have been in combat. Are you capable of doing that, general? 

General STULTZ. You are striking to the heart of one of my concerns, and that is the overall wellness of our force in the Army Reserve. And I have said this for some time. We have to figure this 

out. We have got to figure out how to provide continuity of health 

care for an operational force both on the front end, to make sure 

they are healthy and ready before they deploy—because we can’t 

afford time at the end to try to get their teeth ready or whatever— 

we have got to have some confidence in our system to say we know 

our forces are ready in terms of their health and their dental 

health before they are deployed, but on the back end especially. 

When I came out of Iraq after 2 years in 2004, before you left 

country they give you a screening. And they say, tell us if anything 


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is wrong so we can keep you here. Well, you are not going to tell 

them anything is wrong. Then when you get back to the mobilization station where you left from, they tell you the same thing: We 

are going to put you through a screening, but tell us if anything 

is wrong so we can keep you here. You are focused on going home. 

I want to get home with my family. 

We need a system in place that says, listen, the primary objective when a soldier comes out of theater is to get him back, reintegrated with his family. Then let us start taking care of him. 

Let us don’t demobilize him and say, okay, now you are on your 

own. We have to have a system of health care that says, okay, 

when you come home, the first month you are home we are going 

to do some screenings and look at your health care, the second 

month we are going to start looking at your mental situation; the 

third month we are going to look at your family situation. We are 

going to reintegrate you over a period of 6 months and we are 

going to have that system in place. 

That is what we have got to have, because a lot of these symptoms, like PTSD or traumatic brain injury, do not manifest themselves. Soldiers don’t know they have a problem. And we have got 

to have a way of identifying when a soldier needs help. And we 

have got to take that stigma away that says if you ask for help 

there is something wrong. We have got to have a system in place 

that says everybody goes through this. 

Ms. KAPTUR. And, sir, even when they can identify, what happens then is unfortunate oftentimes at the unit level, and the systems do not work for them, and they are lost. It is not like they 

return to Fort Hood or Fort Benning or wherever. They are out 

there somewhere across Ohio or Michigan or Indiana, the ones that 

are in our region of country. 

I would invite you to come and visit the 983rd with me. They are 

a wonderful combat engineer unit. They deserve better health care. 

I will also tell you—Mr. Chairman, I know I am over time—I will 

say this morning when we had the doctors before us, I said the 

DoD is so big that one smokestack doesn’t know what another 

smokestack is doing. And we in Ohio try to prepare early for the 

return of our Guard and Reserve through General Wayt at the 

State level—who is a saint—and our local units and our doctors at 

Case Western Reserve University. 

The docs at Case, who aren’t DoD doctors, they are private doctors, the best psychiatrists we have in the entire Midwest, I would 

have to say; the worst experience they ever had in their career was 

trying to work with DoD so we could be ready early, okay? We 

could not connect to DoD. And I would love for you to talk with Dr. 

Calabrese from Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland and 

figure out why can’t we get this done. For me to go out to these 

units and to see these sick people—and we tried to prevent what 

is happening and we were not successful. I did everything I could 

in my job to provide the money, to fight certain forces inside this 

place that don’t recognize this set of illnesses. And then to have 

these illnesses happening right before my eyes, and I can’t help 

these soldiers, is a horrible thing to experience. 


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So I would invite you. This is a wonderful unit, and I don’t want 

to blame any commanding officer or anybody, but I want to help 

these soldiers. 

Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. The time of the gentlewoman has expired. 

I just visited Fort Hood, and I want to tell you the Regulars have 

it down to where they are screening, they are counseling. But it is 

a problem with the Reserve and Guard, there is no question about 

it. I mean this is a real problem for us because these folks are no 

longer from the same town, they are from all over the country. And 

it really is a dilemma. 

And I would be very interested if your folks could come over and 

talk to the staff and tell them exactly what you have, what plans 

you have in order to try to solve this problem. Because I have got 

a young fellow that is working for us that has taken him over a 

year, and he is getting counseling and everything else, but it has 

still taken him a year to adjust back to normal life. It was Reserve, 

15 months in Iraq and Kuwait. So it is a hell of a problem. 

I talked to a woman just the other day. She said one of her sons 

was killed in Iraq and one of her sons committed suicide who was 

in the Army. And her husband is an officer in the Army. So, you 

know, we face this kind of stuff. He is in the Regular Army. But 

I think we still have a long ways to go, even in Regulars, but especially Reserve and Guard. 

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. The policy that was put out last January for the involuntary recall of the Reserve and Guard put in 

place a policy that said when a unit returns they do not come back 

together, are not required to drill or anything for the first 90 days. 

I have sent a letter to General Casey asking him to reverse that 

policy. We asked for relief of that, because to that exact point, the 

worst thing we can do is bring soldiers home from war and say we 

don’t want to see you for 90 days. We need those soldiers back in 

their formations immediately so we can look at them and take care 

of them. 

Mr. MURTHA. The gentleman from New Jersey. 

PAY AND BENEFITS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When you are 

at the end of the food chain of questions, you can just do your level 

best to try to ask something that has not been asked before. But 

like my colleagues, I thank each of you for your leadership and the 

men and women you represent. 

I sort of want to get into the issue of pay and benefits. We have 

sort of touched that issue and if there is, in your view, some inequity. Obviously we are proud of everybody who fights and who 

wears the uniform. And I always preface all of my public appearances by thanking those in the Regular military and Guard and 

Reserve. And I talk a lot about the inseparability, everybody working very closely together. 

But there are some pretty basic inequities. There are no pay inequities, as I understand it, on the war front, is that right, in 

terms of pay? But in terms of benefits, Guard and Reserve are not 

in the same category. 


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And you, General Stultz, you talked about things that we might 

do to enhance benefits for our citizen soldiers. Could each of you 

perhaps add on to that aspect? I mean, this gets—you know, historically there had been sort of a separation between the Regular 

and the Guard and Reserve. And I would like to believe that that 

inseparability has been erased. I know the Air Force historically 

was ahead of the curve. But I would sort of like to know on the 

benefit side what we might be doing. 

General BRADLEY. Well, sir, I have one thought that—I do not 

know how my fellow colleagues feel about it, but on which that I 

am very grateful has changed. It is something our people have been 

asking for quite some time relative to retirement. 

As you know, Reservists and Guardsmen who serve the proper 

number of years in a good status receive their retired pay at age 

60. This past year, the Congress passed legislation that would 

allow some who have been mobilized or served on active duty for 

long periods of time to get credit for that and get their retirement 

pay earlier, based on the number of months they were mobilized 

or on active duty. 

And I am very grateful for that provision. It is a wonderful 

change, and I think our folks are very happy about it. However, 

they said the clock starts when the President signs the National 

Defense Authorization Act. And so all of the things that our folks 

have done for the last 61⁄2 years in combat, in great tragedies, that 

time does not count. 

I wish that provision had not been written quite that way. 

Now, I hate to look a gift horse in the mouth, but our folks have 

worked hard. And you all have held them in high honor, as do we; 

and I wish that we could count those months and years of mobilizations, many people who have deployed—from the Army particularly 

and Marines, multiple tours—and the other Services as well, the 

Navy and the Air Force, that time since September 11, 2001, does 

not count. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. We hear about it. People, you know, suck 

it up, but in reality it is one of those things that does affect morale. 

And I assume, even though there are some fairly rosy and recruitment and retention figures, these are things that worry you as 

military leaders. 

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. I have had many, I have had thousands in the Air Force Reserve who have been mobilized for two 

years. And it is a wonderful service; they are proud of their service, 

and I appreciate what they have done. I wish they could get credit 

for that on their retirement. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. General Bergman or Admiral Cotton? 

General BERGMAN. Sir, I would suggest to you that as we design 

benefit packages, if we are designing again for that young man and 

woman who is very early in the stages of their career, those of us 

who have been around a while, we are pretty much—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But just for the record, many of those who 

serve in the Guard and Reserve are not all spring chickens here. 

I mean, they are adults. They are leaving their civilian jobs. They 

are highly motivated and trained. 

General BERGMAN. Absolutely. I guess my point was if you design the package so that that individual, as they weigh the value 


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of their service and the time it is going to take away from their 

civilian employment and what it means to their family’s life plan, 

and all of those metrics that they would apply as individuals—if it 

is affordable to us as a Nation and it is exciting to them as individuals—we will get to where we are going. 

There is probably not one size fits all. But the expectations of 

some of the folks who have seen their—in their civilian jobs, their 

pensions disappear, the different kinds of things; the one thing you 

cannot do in life is turn the clock back. So we have to be very 

proactive and visionary in how we provide benefits packages for the 

not-so-spring chickens, as we said, the youngsters who contemplate 

military service part-time, full-time, and balancing that with a career. 

I guess it is not a one-size-fits-all, but I think there is an answer 

in the middle ground that we can afford as a Nation and the young 

people and not-so-young people will take advantage of. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. We are taking advantage of a mature population. That is what I see. 

Admiral? 

Admiral COTTON. The new folks that we have in the force are incredible, these millenials. The old folks are great. They are stepping up, doing everything. The one thing I see that is constant 

amongst all of them, their pay and benefits, their bonuses, their 

medical care, all the things this Committee has helped out on is 

great. 

Next is education. So there are, in our Services, differences in 

tuition assistance for courses, online courses. Each Service is a little bit different, and there is a disparity between AC and RC expectation. 

And probably the thing we have talked about in the last couple 

of years—I have not seen action on it yet—is the transportability 

of the Montgomery GI bill. So, in other words, it is a benefit I have 

earned, but I am at a station in life where I maybe do not need 

it, but I can’t afford sending my child: Could I not use my benefit 

for a family member? 

I think that would be a huge retention tool, particularly for the 

midgrade at the 20-year point where I can jump off and get benefits, but if I am a reservist for another 4 or 5 years, I can use that 

benefit for one of my children or multiple children. 

I think that might be something we should look at for the future. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Excellent. 

General Stultz, any additional comments? I know you volunteered some information earlier. 

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. 

What I propose is, we look at what corporate America does. What 

corporate America and a lot of corporations offer is a portfolio approach where you say, look at where you are in your life and here 

is how much we are willing to invest. Now let’s look at how you 

want to spend that. 

And it might be to John’s point. Maybe instead of an enlistment 

bonus or maybe, for staying a few more years, it’s going to pay for 

my children’s education, so I can go home and tell the family, I am 

staying in and the kids’ education is paid for. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Or the spouse. 


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General STULTZ. Or the spouse. Or maybe it is some other type 

of benefit that I need out there in terms of special orthodontics for 

the kids, or eyeglasses, or whatever; but a portfolio approach that 

says, hey, the service I am providing to my country is taking care 

of my family or providing me a better lifestyle, rather than just 

throwing money out there at it each time. 

See, I have said for some time I would look at a system that says 

maybe you lower the retirement age that you can withdraw retirement based on years you stay past 20. And for every year you stay 

past 20 maybe that retirement is 6 months earlier. And if you stay 

22 years you could draw your retirement at 59. If you stayed for 

30, you could draw it at 55. Then you do not pay incentives or reenlistment bonuses or whatever for that time. The reward comes at 

the other end, staying for longer service to your country. 

I think we have got to look outside the box, that we traditionally 

have said, money is the answer. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The chairman has admonished, when we 

talk about bonuses, you are talking about real money; and I am not 

suggesting there would not be real money associated with some of 

your proposals. But I know some committees are looking at it, and 

I think it is sort of important to have it on the table. I thank you 

for your response. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. I am interested in what you said. And we are going 

to release this panel and go to the next panel in a minute. Mr. Visclosky will be the first to question. 

But you may remember a few years ago Congress changed the 

pension plan for the military from 50 percent to 40 percent. You 

may not be old enough to remember that. But I went out into the 

field and I saw a fellow sitting here with 40 percent pension and 

a 50 percent pension. And I came back and told the Defense Department we could not live with that. Well, John Hamre said, You know what? That would cost $15 billion. I said, It may cost 15 billion, but we have to do it. President 

Clinton agreed with us. Hugh Shelton stepped up and said, We 

have to change it. And we changed it. 

I am gratified to hear you say, that is an important part of retaining people because it just was not fair to have half the people, 

just because they enlisted at a later period of time, getting 40 percent pension rather than 50 percent pension. 

Now, we appreciate your testimony, we appreciate your dedication. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. MURTHA. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, but could I just ask General Bergman one question for the record quickly? 

In his testimony on page 4 he says, Marine Force Reserves have 

provided civil affairs capabilities since the start of the Operation 

Iraqi Freedom. My question is, of the Marine Reserve forces inside 

of Iraq, what percent are being used as a strike force and what percent are being used for some other purpose? 

I do not know if you know that right now, but I would be interested in knowing. 

Mr. MURTHA. If you would answer that for the record. 


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General BERGMAN. I will take that for the record. 

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I appreciate it. 

[The information follows:] 

The figures for the latest SMCR rotation in Iraq are: 

Number of ‘‘Strike Force’’ Marines ................................................................. 2,161 

Total number of SMCR: .................................................................................. 2,910 

Percentage of ‘‘Strike Force’’ Marines ............................................................ 74% 

PANEL II 

WITNESSES FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL H. STEVEN BLUM, CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD 

BUREAU 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLYDE VAUGHN, DIRECTOR OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CRAIG McKINLEY, DIRECTOR OF THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. I want to welcome this distinguished panel before 

this Committee. I know you have been coached and they have been 

telling you to refrain from any outbursts, refrain from any telling 

us anything that may go on here that is out of the ordinary, that 

you have got plenty of money in your budget and there are no problems. 

I know that is what you have been urged to do. And they probably have spies in this room—— 

Mr. HOBSON. I am shocked, shocked. 

Mr. MURTHA [continuing]. As to what you might say. But it has 

never inhibited you in the past, and we hope that you will have the 

same kind of frankness with us that you have had in the past, because your National Guard has been better because of the testimony of this distinguished panel. 

So, with that, I will ask Mr. Hobson if he has any opening remarks. 

Mr. HOBSON. Not opening remarks, but I have some questions. 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, we will ask Mr. Visclosky. 

Mr. Visclosky has no questions. Mr. Hobson. 

Wait a minute, have you got any testimony? You want to say 

anything? 

Mr. DICKS. You are ahead right now, guys. This is when they are 

going to tell us the truth, Mr. Chairman. 

General BLUM. We will tell you the truth. I do not care who is 

in the room; we will tell you the truth. 

Mr. MURTHA. We will put your comments in the record. But give 

us a short summary. 

General BLUM. I would like to put our long comments in the 

record, but this Committee is due at least a short word of thanks 

for what you have done over the years to make sure that what 

those magnificent citizen soldiers and airmen are doing every day 

is possible. 

You and I had a conversation before the hearing, but it is worth 

sharing with the other members that we feel—and the enlisted behind us, our senior enlisted advisors—feel if it were not for the acVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:38 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046475 PO 00000 Frm 00164 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A475P2.XXX A475P2

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tions of the Congress and this Committee in particular we would 

not have the tools, the equipment, the training or the manning to 

do what our Nation needs us to do overseas and what our governors expect us to do, with no notice tonight. So thanks. 

I think I might actually make that my opening statement, and 

we will go right to questions. 

[The joint statement of General Blum, General Vaughn and General McKinley follows:] 


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GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT

Mr. MURTHA. All right. Well, let me just say to the subcommittee 

that I have asked them to give us a list of equipment which they 

need and may be available. We talked about a number of things. 

There are big shortages. If we want them to be operational Reserves, we have got to give them the equipment to train on. We 

have got to give them the dual equipment so they can train not 

only for combat, but they can train for any emergency in the 

United States. We either have that list or we will get that list. 

That will help us recommend to the full committee what needs to 

be done. 

Mr. Hobson. 

Mr. HOBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be brief. 

First of all, thank you, gentlemen, for all your help to me personally and to the Guard, both the Army and the Air Guard. General 

McKinley and General Blum have particularly been helpful with 

the Springfield Air National Guard situation. And hopefully we 

have got that under control. 

General Vaughn, you have done just a terrific job in recruiting. 

I mean, this recruiting for the Army Guard and the Air Guard is 

just outstanding, but especially the Army. It is a tough job. And as 

I understand it, you guys are ahead of schedule, you are retaining 

people; and that speaks well for leadership when that happens, in 

my opinion, sir. 

But there is a problem, you have a problem with big Army. It 

is always the big Army that is a problem with you guys. They have 

done such a great job in recruiting that they may lose some of their 

money for recruiting at the very time—and you can’t stop and start 

this stuff. It has to go. 

I would like one of you to talk about that a little bit, Mr. Chairman, because I do not think that came up, because we talked mainly about equipment when I walked in the room. 

The second item that is a problem—it is a problem, and I am 

sorry Ms. Kaptur left—but in Ohio, and I think this may be symptomatic across the country, we are officially required to have about 

2,000 full-time Army Guard positions, but it is only authorized and 

funded for 1,200, 800 short, so we have about 60 percent that we 

need, and they will not give you the money. 

I do not know how you can continue to do what you are doing 

if there is that kind of disparity in this. And it is the big Army I 

think that is holding back the money for this. And I would like you 

to explain if it is a problem across the country, a problem in the 

Air Guard, we do need to know that. And we do have a great TAG 

in Ohio that fortunately our new governor kept the guy on. 

And the equipment, he has got a book on the equipment, the little thing he is carrying around with him, so we know what the 

equipment is. The problem with the equipment is—and I need you 

to respond to this—it goes into the wrong accounts, and you lose 

control and it gets siphoned away into the big Army. And they get 

caught short again; they do not have the equipment. 


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EQUIPMENT ACCOUNTS

First of all, am I right about it being siphoned off into other accounts, the equipment? 

General VAUGHN. Sir, I am getting coached here. We do not have 

visibility on it. 

Mr. HOBSON. General Blum can answer it. You do not have to 

answer that one. I want you on the recruiting one. 

General BLUM. I would not use the words ‘‘siphoned off.’’ That 

would imply there is a deliberate scheme to rob the National 

Guard, deny them. 

Mr. HOBSON. We would not want to say that. 

Mr. DICKS. That would be wrong. 

Mr. HOBSON. You certainly would not want to say that. I might 

want to say that, but you might not. 

Mr. MURTHA. That would be terrible. 

General BLUM. But I will tell you when we get NGREA money 

I know exactly where every penny is going, what it was spent on, 

when it arrived and where it went. 

Mr. MURTHA. We are going to make sure that happens. 

General BLUM. General Vaughn, do you want to talk about the 

recruiting issues that the Congressman brought up? 

General VAUGHN. Congressman Hobson, on the recruiting issues, 

we testified to this last year, that it was not in the base, that we 

were dependent on the supplemental for something that ought to 

be in the base program. 

PERSONNEL FUNDING, RECRUITING AND RETENTION

We come over on the Hill with a very distinguished group, and 

we were told that that would not happen again. It appears it is 

going to happen again. 

I will tell you that I think that we have got enormous support 

out of the Army to make sure that gets paid, but right now it does 

look like, you know, if it does not come in the supplemental—and 

supposedly it was put back into the sup—we were going to be faced 

with another omnibus reprogramming. So we are dependent on 

that sup—— 

Mr. MURTHA. I do not understand this. So the staff understands 

what we are talking about, go over this for us. Tell us what the 

situation is here. 

General BLUM. Let me set the stage for it, and then General 

Vaughn can run the details to you. 

My issue has been and continues to be that I do not believe that 

the manning of the force to the end strength authorized by Congress should be any other place but the base budget. It is not for 

the Army National Guard; it is for the United States Army to a 

large extent. They have some grow-the-Army in the supplemental, 

but most of their manning of the force is in the base budget. 

Ours is not. We are dependent significantly upon supplemental 

funds, which this body knows full well arrive at different times for 

different reasons; and unless they arrive early, they are often not 

effective. Right now, frankly, we will run out of money for recruiting about April 15th of this year. 


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We have assurances—commitments by senior leaders in the Department of Defense and the Army—that we will be funded to continue our bonus programs and our recruiting and retention programs. However, it is now March. We do not have that money. We 

will run out next month; we will not have that money. That money 

is contained in a supplemental that no one in this room—well, 

maybe somebody in this room can guarantee. But I can’t guarantee 

we will receive it in time to execute it, which will require some extremely painful reprogramming and put other significant readiness 

programs at risk to pay that bill until that bridge happens, if the 

supplemental arrives. 

Mr. MURTHA. How much money are we talking about? 

General BLUM. We will give you the exact figure, sir. 

General VAUGHN. Chairman, it is $440 million in recruiting and 

retention. It is $299 million in bonuses and incentives. 

General BLUM. Roughly $700 million is the number we have been 

operating on. 

Mr. MURTHA. You are telling this committee there is $700 million, not in the base budget, supposedly in the supplemental. 

And when you say ‘‘in the supplemental,’’—we are the ones that 

provide the supplemental, just like we provide the base bill—and 

you are saying at this point you do not know whether it is going 

to be available or not? 

General BLUM. Sir, I am going to be absolutely honest and blunt 

with you. I have been assured by the Secretary of the Army that 

they will pay the bill. I have been assured by the Chief of Staff of 

the Army that they will pay the bill. But the resources to pay that 

bill are contained in the supplemental. And if the supplemental arrives, I have reasonable assurances we will get that money. 

But what I am trying to say is, I would much prefer that that 

is in the base budget so that we do not have to continually manage 

to grow the force and maintain the force at a critical time when 

our Nation is at war and we need the biggest Guard we have ever 

had. 

Mr. MURTHA. I hate to tell you, I do not know what the Army 

is assuring you, but we do not know a thing about it. My staff does 

not know a thing about it. 

Mr. HOBSON. And tell him the consequences if you do not get this 

money. 

General BLUM. The consequences are that the National Guard 

recruiting machine will stop, which means, frankly, the Army’s recruiting machine will stop because we are recruiting for the United 

States Army today as well as the National Guard. 

PERSONNEL FUNDING, RECRUITING AND RETENTION

We are so successful—General Vaughn has got a program that 

is so successful that the Army has asked us to recruit for them. 

Mr. MURTHA. They tell us the military personnel budget is the 

most stressed budget in the military. Now, I guess what they are 

telling you is, if there is a supplemental, they will find a way to 

reprogram money for this program. Because we are going to look 

at it now that it has been brought to our attention. 


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General BLUM. I am telling you, the condition that the leadership 

of the Army National Guard operates under is one of trust in the 

senior leadership of the Army. 

Mr. MURTHA. Yeah, but you have got to remember what they told 

you. They told you, if a supplemental passes; when it passes, that 

is when you have the money. 

This supplemental, I met with leadership yesterday. Hopefully, I 

thought we would be able to pass a supplemental because we are 

going to be finished with this subcommittee by the end of this 

month. But the other parts of it are not ready, so it is not going 

to be passed until sometime after our recess at Easter. 

General BLUM. In that case, sir, then the senior leadership of the 

Army has got some very painful reprogramming to do to deliver on 

the promise of the money that they assured us we would get. 

Mr. MURTHA. This is why I say over and over again, we should 

have no supplementals; put it all in the base bill so we know what 

the hell we are doing. I mean, that is the problem that we have. 

Mr. Hobson. 

Mr. HOBSON. Well, I just wanted to raise those things. 

FULL-TIME MANNING

General BLUM. There is another aspect of that that gets to your 

question, Congressman Hobson. The issue in Ohio is not unique. 

All across the country, if you were to ask all of your adjutants general in every State, they do not have sufficient full-time manning 

to do the job that you are asking them to do. 

It is not a problem in the Air National Guard. The Air Force 

stepped up to the plate. When we went to the volunteer force, they 

recognized that we were an operational force then. They were visionary and knew that the United States Air Force could not do its 

job, day to day, without the Guard and Reserve, and they invested 

the resources, to include full-time manning, to assure that they 

would be an operational part of the Air Force when we went to the 

volunteer force. 

The Army, frankly, the land forces we are in, I do not want to 

use the word ‘‘denial,’’ but they failed to realize that when we went 

to a volunteer force, we would be forced to use the Reserve in a 

sustained conflict or any large conflict as an operational force; and 

they did not resource the Army National Guard or the Army Reserve to be able to accomplish that task. 

We have now done this for 61⁄2 years at an unprecedented rate, 

and we are operating with an authorization for full-time manning 

that is built on the Cold War, when we were going to be a strategic 

reserve, going to show up at the end of World War III, and where 

you find two people in an armory in Ohio to push out 175 to go 

to war, to go to Afghanistan, to go to Iraq, to go to the Horn of Africa, to defend, to keep the peace treaties in the Sinai, to go run 

Guantanamo, to go keep the peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, to 

send troops to the Southwest border, to respond to the 17 natural 

disasters that your governors called the Guard out on yesterday. 

We are supposed to do that with two guys in the fire house, and 

it isn’t going to work that way. 

That model allows for an authorization that is 40 percent higher 

than what we are able to fill. We are only resourced to hire the 


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full-time guys to man the equipment, train the force, administer to 

the citizen soldiers and their families, and to reintegrate the people 

coming back home. To do all of this work—administrative, logistics, 

operations, training and maintenance, we are authorized to do that 

and fill it at 67 percent. 

It is time to throw in the flag and question the model. 

We need additional funds, frankly, to grow the full-time manning 

force, or we cannot deliver on the promise that we made to the 

President and the Secretary of Defense and the governors to do the 

job the American citizens expect the Guard to do. 

So what I am saying is, we are authorized one number, we are 

funded at 67 percent of that number at a time when they are using 

us in an unprecedented manner; at times where we are not only 

doing what we are doing at home, we are providing 50 percent at 

times—or more, at peak times—of the ground combat forces, Mr. 

Chairman, not just the combat support and the combat service support, but at times we have actually surged and provided over 50 

percent of the brigade combat forces on the ground, and yet we 

have not moved up the full-time manning fill any higher than it 

was during the Cold War pre-9/11. 

I think that time has come. 

Mr. HOBSON. And it is going to break. It is going to break. 

General BLUM. It is placing challenges on us heavier than we 

should place on the force right now. 

FULL-TIME MANNING

Mr. HOBSON. Thank you, General. I think the chairman understands the immense problem. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Hobson has done a service, because I asked our 

expert on O&M, I said, Where in the hell does the information 

come from? I do not know where Hobson gets his information. He 

has a pipeline someplace that I do not know about. That is really—— 

Mr. HOBSON. I was listening. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks. 

Mr. DICKS. So you said 67 percent of full-time manning. What 

would that be in people? What are the numbers? 

General BLUM. You want to talk about the numbers? 

General VAUGHN. Fifty-seven thousand. So it is roughly 15 percent of our force. I mean, you are talking about a percent of a percent. We are supposed to have—— 

Mr. DICKS. That is to run everything, to make sure when they 

come in that they are going to have good training and everything. 

And you really have to have those people to make the Guard 

work; isn’t that right? 

General BLUM. Yes, sir. 

General VAUGHN. Most people would equate readiness with the 

number of active folks that you have got doing things. In other 

words, if the Army says, You all can’t be as ready as us, the active 

Army—because they do this all the time—I constantly tell them, if 

you want us to have a higher level of readiness, you have to give 

us more folks that do this full-time. 


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EQUIPMENT SHORTFALLS

Mr. DICKS. And you have got to have the equipment. 

General VAUGHN. And we have to have the equipment. 

Mr. DICKS. What is the number now, 40 percent? Is that what 

your statement said? You are about 40 percent of the equipment, 

State by State, it averages out? 

General BLUM. There are two numbers here, sir. They are very 

close, as a matter of fact; they are within 1 percent of each other. 

We have 66 percent of the equipment that we are required to have 

in our hands back here at home for the units that are not deployed 

overseas, the units in the Army Guard. 

The units that are overseas have 100 percent of what they are 

supposed to have and then some, and that is fabulous; that is the 

way it is supposed to be. 

What we are saying is, the units that are back here at home are 

underequipped. And the Army has made historic commitment to 

this. And this is General Casey’s letter to the Congress that was 

sent to the Honorable Duncan Hunter, but is also copied to Chairman Murtha and Chairman Young. So he is saying, for the first 

time in the history of the Army National Guard and the Army’s relationship, that they now recognize that there is a requirement for 

the National Guard to be able to respond here at home, to weapons 

of mass destruction, counterterrorism or natural disasters; and that 

we have agreed, General Casey has agreed, the Guard leadership 

has agreed—Jack Stultz, who was just in here before, has agreed. 

We have nicked that down to 342 pieces, items of equipment, certain types of equipment that are absolutely necessary for any unit 

to be able to do command and control, transportation, medical assistance, communication, aviation, maintenance, logistics, those 

kinds of things, if we were called upon tonight to either do counterterrorism, respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), or go 

out and respond to an act of Mother Nature or a man-made accident. 

The Chief of Staff of the Army signed the letter and listed an abbreviated list of the 342 items, but it gets to the essence of what 

I am talking about. And he puts a bill on there for $3.9 billion 

above what is in the budget and in the supplemental that we expect or we hope to receive. 

So even after the supplemental funds were to come in for 2009 

and the budget, base budget, would come in for 2009, General 

Casey, the Chief of Staff of the Army—— 

Mr. DICKS. You still need $3.9 billion. 

General BLUM. You’ve got it, sir. You have it. 

Mr. DICKS. I was good in math. 

General BLUM [continuing]. But for once we are speaking with 

one voice: The Chief of Staff of the Army says we need it, and we 

checked his math and we agreed, we need $3.9 billion. 

Mr. DICKS. Then we have got to get it in the budget somehow. 

I mean you have to get the Defense Department to request it. 

General BLUM. Now, the budget is quite an ample budget. The 

President’s budget is a much better budget for the Guard than we 

have ever gotten before. 

Mr. DICKS. Right. 


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General BLUM. But General Casey is saying, if additional money 

were available, this is what we would spend it on. And we totally 

agree. The only thing I would prefer is, if I get to choose the wrapping paper if the gift is coming, we would like it wrapped in 

NGREA. 

Mr. MURTHA. But that would be an earmark. 

Mr. DICKS. It is a national program, Mr. Chairman. We can increase those. 

Mr. MURTHA. Oh, I am sorry. 

General BLUM. I will not label what it is called. I just know we 

need it. 

Mr. DICKS. You need it. 

However you get it, you will take it, right? 

General BLUM. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. Also, in the Air National Guard which—you guys are 

doing a fantastic job. I see that your airplanes are now what, 27 

years old? 

EQUIPMENT SHORTFALLS

General MCKINLEY. Sir, that is the average age. Our tankers are 

45 years old. 

Mr. DICKS. We want to do something about that. 

General MCKINLEY. Yes, sir, we do. But our aging fleet is our 

problem. 

We have got 36,000 full-time members of the Air National 

Guard. As General Blum said, that is what keeps us whole. That 

is what keeps us ready. That is what lets us deploy in 72 hours 

anywhere in the world with our Air Force. 

Our biggest problem, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, 

is recapitalizing the fleet. And we have got to build some new airplanes, we have got to look at how to do that in proportion so that 

the active, the Guard, and the Reserve get those airplanes. 

Mr. DICKS. How many airplanes are in your budget this year? 

How many do you get out of this budget? 

General MCKINLEY. Sir, it is the Air Force’s budget. 

Mr. DICKS. Right. 

General MCKINLEY. And we will not get any new aircraft this 

year. 

Mr. DICKS. So the airplanes you have will just get older, another 

year older? 

General MCKINLEY. Yes. I was here a year ago, our planes are 

a year older. 

We do have some MQ–1 unmanned vehicles that are new. Those 

went to North Dakota, Arizona, California, and they will go to New 

York, but that is all our new aircraft. 

Mr. DICKS. And most of the Air Force’s new airplanes are UAVs, 

I think. 

General MCKINLEY. Yes, sir, a high percentage is unmanned vehicles. 

YOUTH CHALLENGE

Mr. DICKS. I think you are doing a tremendous job. And General, 

I was proud of you both at the Youth Challenge event the other 

night. I do not mention it because of anything specific, but I do 


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think this program—this is a program they have that is in 30 

States now, where they take 150 students twice a year, and these 

are kids that are dropouts, and they have a phenomenal program 

of bringing them around—these kids, when you hear their 

testimonials about what this program means, which we fund, and 

I just want to encourage you to keep this thing going because I 

think it is doing a lot of good for a lot of people. And it is a real 

example, I think, in every State that has it. 

We are looking forward to having ours in Washington State this 

next year. 

General BLUM. Thank you, sir. That program has saved almost 

80,000 young men’s and women’s lives, or at least given them a 

second chance in life so that they do not end up incarcerated or in 

a cemetery. So we are quite proud of that. And we are even more 

proud that, as busy as we have been in the last 7 years, we have 

still found time to expand that program. We did not shrink it or 

walk away from it. 

YOUTH CHALLENGE

So I am quite proud of all of the States that do that. And I appreciate your support, and I know you are going to beat Oregon. 

Mr. DICKS. We are going to do our best. 

General VAUGHN. You know there is another program that we 

are very proud of called the GED Plus Program that we run down 

at North Little Rock at the Professional Education Center. We take 

folks that have dropped out, a little older than the ones that you 

saw, and help them get their GED. And we are actually averaging 

about 94 to 95 percent graduation down there. 

So we are after the Nation’s youth, and giving them a second 

chance. And if they turn out, great, you know, for the American 

public, and if they happen to join us, that is fine too. 

Mr. DICKS. And our General Lowenberg is doing a great job. He 

is one of the best. 

General BLUM. He is one of the best. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me get this straight now. You gave us a list 

of the equipment. That does not include the people shortage you 

have. In other words, you have to add another $700 million onto 

the equipment shortage, right? 

FUNDING SHORTFALLS

General BLUM. Only, sir, if that money is not provided to us, as 

has been assured by the leadership of the Army—the Secretary of 

the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army. Not only to us; they made 

those assurances to the Senate, they made assurances to congressional hearings. 

There is a no-kidding, honest commitment to provide that money. 

The only thing I can’t tell you is—— 

Mr. MURTHA. I am not doubting General Casey’s word. But you 

know how things go: If this does not happen, that does not happen. 

What I am concerned about is, you are now the operational reserve for this Nation, the operational reserve. 

General BLUM. Yes, sir, we are. 


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Mr. MURTHA. And you are short by 33 percent of the personnel 

that you need—37 or 33 percent? 

General BLUM. We are filled to 67 percent of the authorized requirement on the full-time manning. So we are short roughly—the 

appropriate math is probably what, 33? 

Mr. MURTHA. Why should we have to depend on the regular 

Army to fund this? Why should not this be part of what we appropriate directly to the National Guard? Why should we have to depend upon General Casey sending you a letter? 

General BLUM. I would welcome the money no matter in what 

form it came. I would prefer it would come in a form that ensures 

the money was used for the exact intended purpose. 

Like NGREA, last year. When you gave us the NGREA money 

for the Air Guard and the Army Guard, for every dollar I can account to the last for penny what was spent. And by the way, it was 

all spent, and it was spent on exactly what you asked for. Because 

your staff came back and said, ‘‘Show me what you spent it on’’; 

and when they saw it, they said, ‘‘My God, you spent it on exactly 

what you said.’’ 

Well, I thought that is what we were supposed to do. So that is 

what we did. 

Mr. MURTHA. The gentleman from New Jersey. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; General Blum 

and colleagues. 

READINESS

General Blum, I think you know half of the New Jersey National 

Guard will be deployed to Iraq starting in June—I said this in 

other hearings and—literally half. That obviously exposes New Jersey; and we are not the only State that is in that type of predicament. And as you are aware, many of these citizen soldiers were 

over there in Iraq in 2004. 

I know we have talked about, you know, the force generation 

model, but to some extent, to a great extent, it is a future goal. 

General BLUM. It is a future goal. And the future goal is to get 

it to one deployment followed by about five periods of equal time 

back. If that goes to 10, we would be delighted. 

But that goal is not attainable right now, and the reality is that 

the average unit is turning about one in three. And that is what 

is happening with New Jersey. 

Sir, you are rightfully concerned about having half of the Guard 

deployed. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The troops are not complaining, I must say. 

General BLUM. No, the troops are not complaining, but the governors are quite concerned; yet they do not mind shouldering the 

burden. As a matter of fact, they have done a magnificent job of 

providing every unit we have asked for when we needed it. 

We have had no push-back from any governor of any State or territory in 61⁄2 years. They understand their role as commander in 

chief in providing the Guard when we need it for overseas duty. 

But what we did was make a commitment to them that we would 

not take more than half of their force at any given time. 

We have just gone to the high end of the promise with New Jersey. But we will leverage what we call the Mutual Assistance ComVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:38 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046475 PO 00000 Frm 00184 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A475P2.XXX A475P2

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pacts that every State has signed, including all of the other adjutants general around New Jersey: New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Delaware, and as far away as Ohio and West Virginia. 

If an event would occur in New Jersey that would require a response greater than the governor could deliver, we would flow 

forces into New Jersey from all the neighboring States to help 

them. And if it were a regional effort that really would not permit 

that, we would flow forces in from the disaffected or unaffected 

States. 

And to those that say, ‘‘does that work?’’ Yes, it does. Remember 

Katrina, we flowed 50,000 soldiers into Louisiana and Mississippi 

in 6 days from every State and every territory of this great Nation. 

Nobody said ‘‘no.’’ And that included even the States that were 

right in the hurricane belt, Florida and Puerto Rico and the Virgin 

Islands and Alabama; everybody ran to assist them. With that happening when we had 70,000 people overseas—it was our high water 

mark for overseas—we still were able to flow 50,000 into Katrina, 

and we still had 300,000 left in the country. 

You talk about a strategic reserve, you are looking at it. You are 

talking about America’s force, I think you are looking at it. I think 

it is exactly the way we should do business. We should never send 

troops overseas without involving the National Guard, because 

when you call out the Guard, you call out America. But what we 

should do that we are not doing is making sure they have the 

equipment they are supposed to have to do both missions 

through—— 

READINESS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And to which this committee has committed help. 

General BLUM. Absolutely. And we need the full-time manning. 

If you take away the military gobbledygook and just talk about, 

every place where you live you have a fire house—and most of you 

have volunteer fire departments, because it costs a lot of money to 

have a full-time fire fighting force. 

You still have fire engines that are modernized, because nobody 

wants an old clunker coming to their house fire. And you still have 

modern hoses and turnout gear and equipment. That is what we 

are asking for. 

We do not want to be a reenactment group; we want to be a real 

capable force when you call us. And there are a couple of full-time 

firemen in all those fire houses that maintain that equipment and 

make sure the firemen are trained and they are alerted, so when 

you call them, they show up, where they push the gear out, and 

these guys call in on them. 

That is what the Guard’s got to be, your 21st century Minutemen 

and women that respond locally in your ZIP Code, exactly that 

way; and respond to go overseas—to get to the chairman’s point 

earlier—so that we do not have to tie them up for 4 months, handing them a radio to teach them how to use a radio they should have 

had in their possession for 2 years. And we are experts on how to 

maintain it and operate it. 

I am sorry for the digression. 


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Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I wanted you to digress, because I think 

that is obviously essential, and you represent the critical mass. 

And I may say, in those fire departments and police forces quite 

a lot of those people are wearing that National Guard uniform. If 

you look across the country, it is amazing how many have stood up 

to be counted. 

A couple of related questions: family support, the whole readiness issue, how you work with families to embrace those families 

as their loved ones go abroad. And would you comment on the— 

we have not talked about it today—the employer angle here. At 

times you hear good stories, and in other cases—because of, you 

know, so many deployments—there are some pretty horrendous 

stories; and what we should be doing and, perhaps, what you were 

doing to provide a higher level of support to make sure that the 

jobs are there when these soldiers return. 

FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT

General VAUGHN. Sir, as you are aware, we have a good number 

of family assistance centers and family readiness groups. We have 

had them for as much as 20 years. I mean, we have been about 

taking care of all the service members. But for the Army National 

Guard, it is a big deal because we are by far the largest of all the 

community-based defense forces. 

We team with the Army. The Army is going to put a lot of money 

in reaching out into these communities. And they know obviously 

that is where we are at. Their plan with us is to stand up 250 permanent family readiness groups around this Nation. And this is to 

help folks—you know, especially with all the youngsters in the active force that have grandmothers and grandfathers and moms and 

dad and are not necessarily married, but how do they interact, how 

do we all solve the different problems they have? 

So I think over the last 3 or 4 years we have made great strides, 

you know, in what we do with our families. 

EMPLOYER SUPPORT

The employer piece is another problem, and we do not have that 

solved. The big employers in this Nation, I think are doing a wonderful job; but the self-employed and the small employers, there 

has to be something, you know, that we make progress on this, because if we do not, we are going to end up seeing just people that 

belong to the big organizations in our Army National Guard. 

STRESS ON THE FORCE

I will tell you that there is a tremendous amount of stress on the 

force right now. And I know that there have probably been questions asked earlier maybe about the suicide thing. We have looked 

at it and analyzed it every way we can. Less than half of those soldiers involved in suicides have actually deployed. And so, you 

know, why is it that our suicide rate is creeping up? And it has to 

do with stress. And it really has to do with—what our folks tell us, 

as much as anything, is this relationship with employers and the 

lack of predictability. 


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EMPLOYER SUPPORT

We try to get the predictability better. This thing, on the 12- 

month mobilization problem, is huge, because the more we can cut 

down on time away from employers the better off we are. 

Our folks tell us the primary reason we are having trouble in the 

families is because of the employers and the fact that they do not 

have any way—when they come back, in many instances, they are 

afraid of what they are faced with, you know, with reduced 

amounts of income and supporting their families. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. They are the breadwinners often; I think 

there is an element of despair, and we hope it does not translate 

into suicide. I am not sure what there is because there are so many 

different types of employers. 

But I assume you have been analyzing this—analyzing and reanalyzing this, and hopefully there is some prescription that you 

can come up with where we can be of assistance. 

General BLUM. The Federal Government’s been a little slow to be 

frank about it, in responding to exactly the issue you are talking 

about. The States have been much more agile. 

You will find that some States—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Some. 

General BLUM. Some States. That is true. Because there is no 

universal statement for all 50 States. I appreciate that. You are 

right. 

But some States have stepped forward and made low-interest 

loans to small business operators and self-employed members of 

the Guard, so that they can reestablish and get back on their feet 

when they come home. 

If you are a small business owner, particularly a very small business owner—in other words, two or three people—and a significant 

rainmaker is mobilized for a year, year-and-a-half, it essentially 

puts the business on ice. So they realize that, and they need to 

kind of jump-start their organization when it gets back. 

So we have seen some help in that effort in regard to the States. 

The Federal Government has not yet decided exactly how they are 

going to handle large employer incentives, self-employed incentives 

or small business incentives. All three have to be dealt with somewhat differently. 

EMPLOYER SUPPORT

It is quite different dealing with Home Depot as opposed to Joe’s 

House Painting Company, you know. It is quite a big different level 

of magnitude. Home Depot is a great patriotic employer. I think 

they have 1,500 people deployed right now out of their workforce, 

which is a huge number, except that they employ about 38,000 people nationally. And then they literally have more people out sick 

with the flu on any given day than they have mobilized. So they 

can handle and absorb that much better than Joe’s Hardware Store 

where the manager is deployed or something like that. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General MCKINLEY. Mr. Chairman, could I make a quick comment on New Jersey while we have a minute? 

Thank you for your support. We have got two great fighter units. 


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AIR NATIONAL GUARD

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I didn’t want to turn my back on the Air 

Force. I apologize. We need some new tankers, too. 

General MCKINLEY. But we want to let you know that under 

General Blum’s leadership the Air National Guard really has become a Joint Force in the National Guard. So in the event of an 

emergency in New Jersey, that Air National Guard force of almost 

3,000 people would be available. 

I am very proud of our relationship with the Army National 

Guard; it is working very well. And I did not want to leave out a 

couple things, because I know General Vaughn and Chief Blum 

said there are needs in the Army National Guard. 

We have about a $1.5 billion need, too, which will help baseline 

the Air Sovereignty Mission. That is a mission which the Air Force 

has not baselined. We would like to see that baselined so that we 

can encourage members to stay on more often. We have some recruiting and retention issues also. 

Sir? 

Mr. MURTHA. Is this in this list here? 

General MCKINLEY. It is on the budget card, yes. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. All the Air—— 

General MCKINLEY. Yes, sir, it is an Air National Guard unfunded requirement. 

General BLUM. Mr. Chairman, I will leave a document that captures all of the needs in a very concise fashion with you before I 

leave the hearing. 

General MCKINLEY. And that is all I had, sir. Thank you for the 

time. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Visclosky. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I am fine, Mr. Chairman. 

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

Mr. MURTHA. I just want to ask what DHS and NORTHCOM— 

do they coordinate all this for you? They provide forces and money 

for you—do they? 

General BLUM. No, sir. That is not well understood. They do not 

actually provide any forces for the Guard. The governors provide 

the forces for the Guard here in CONUS. Anything that happens 

domestically. 

Mr. MURTHA. What do they do? 

General BLUM. Sir, they have a very vital role to play. 

Mr. MURTHA. Like what? 

General BLUM. For instance, I have no ships in the National 

Guard, and if I needed a ship or I needed a maritime capability, 

the place to go for that would be Northern Command, and they 

would in fact coordinate that. 

But Northern Command cannot do their job without the Army 

and Air National Guard, and the Army and Air National Guard 

cannot do everything that we could be asked to do without them. 

So there is a very real need for the Northern Command and the 

National Guard Bureau to have a very close coordinating and collaborating effort. 


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Now, with the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008, there 

are certain reports and requirements in there that will force that 

to a much further degree than they have. The Congress—— 

Mr. MURTHA. How about DHS? 

General BLUM. Up until very recently, the Department of Defense and the DHS were kind of two separate and totally apart organizations. There is a recognition that the two of those departments must work closer together, or the American people are not 

going to be very well served when they need to be. 

The National Guard does not control either one of those, but we 

are absolutely critical to the linkage of one to the other. So we will 

play in that arena with them and coordinate and synchronize. 

Where it does work is at the State and local level, where the State 

equivalent of DHS and the State equivalent of DOD are merged 

seamlessly by the governors, because they cannot do their operations without joining them together. So if we take that State and 

local model and build on it at the regional and national level, I 

think we will all be better served. 

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you very much, gentlemen. We appreciate 

it. 

The Committee is now adjourned. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Hobson and the answers thereto follow:] 

MARINE CORPS RESERVE

Question. Several Marine Reservists are being cherry picked from Ohio’s Marine 

Corps Reserve ‘‘Lima Company’’ and sister units in the 3rd Battalion 25th Marines 

in order to deploy to Iraq with another battalion, the 2nd Battalion 25th Marines. 

This practice, known as ‘‘Cross Leveling,’’ steals the leadership, experience, and cohesion of an infantry unit. It places the unit that lost Marines at a horrible disadvantage when it has to deploy, and initiates a vicious cycle of ‘‘robbing Peter to 

pay Paul.’’ Why are you not filling these open spots with Marines from the IRR (Individual Ready Reserve)? Isn’t that what the IRR is for? 

Answer. The IRR is a pool of reservists who can be called to active duty in case 

of crisis. In the case of OIF/OEF, the Marine Corps uses its IRR to source individual 

augments to support the transition training teams, Joint Manning Documents, and 

other Total Force Marine Corps requirements. The IRR is used to source requirements when sourcing from the active component operational forces, bases and stations, and the Selective Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) (with units or unit detachments) have failed to provide the solution. The IRR requires a separate SECDEF 

authority and is the solution used prior to activating retired reservists. The IRR 

does not exclusively support the SMCR. 

The Marine Corps invokes the least amount of mobilization authority required to 

satisfy requirements. When an infantry battalion cannot be sourced to the minimum 

required manning levels, the net is cast throughout the next higher unit in its 

chain, i.e., the regiment. If the regiment cannot source the requirement (by using 

its HQ and its other battalions) then the net would be cast over the next higher 

unit in its chain, i.e. the division (by using its other regiments), and so forth. 

The use of the IRR to attempt to round out NCO leadership of an infantry battalion produces much more risk than our current practice of allowing the Regiment 

to first source from sister battalions. IRR Marines don’t have the benefit of training 

with the Battalion prior to activation. The Marines from 3/25 have already started 

to drill and have had a two-week annual training package with the Marines that 

they are deploying with and will be leading into combat. These cohesion building 

training events will increase the combat effectiveness and survivability of the Marines scheduled to deploy. Additionally, several individual block training events will 

be completed by the time the unit is activated. Use of IRRs to fill the NCO shortfall 

would require activation followed by the need to conduct all individual pre-deployment training while the unit is conducting unit pre-deployment training. This would 

be detrimental to unit cohesion. 


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Question. A 19 January 2007 Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense states 

‘‘mobilization of ground combat, combat support and combat services support will be 

managed on a unit basis. This will allow greater cohesion and predictability in how 

these Reserve units train and deploy. Exceptions will require my approval.’’ Do you 

have/need approval of the SecDef? 

Answer. A 19 Jan 07 SECDEF Memo published Departmental policy changes resulting from an assessment on how best to support global military operational 

needs. In addition to this assessment, and as noted in this Memo, these changes 

were also based on recommendations made by both the uniform and civilian leadership. The 19 Jan 07 policy was further implemented in a 15 Mar 07 USD (P&R) 

Memo containing additional guidance that is currently used by the Joint Staff, Service Secretaries, and OSD when approving individual activation packages. As previously addressed in our answer to question 1, this activation process recognizes 

that although we try to manage mobilizations ‘‘primarily on a unit basis,’’ there is 

a necessity to fill unit manning shortfalls. In this case, MARFORRES generated a 

sourcing solution based on cross leveling of units organic to the 25th Marine Regiment (2/25’s parent regiment). This package was routed via the Commandant of the 

Marine Corps to the SecNav for determination, in compliance with paragraph lf of 

the USD (P&R)’s 15 Mar 07 implementing guidance directing that, the Service Secretary ‘‘determine the best method to fill unit manning shortfalls.’’ 

Question. I understand that junior marines, who have never deployed, volunteered 

to make up the compliment. However, they were taken off the list and replaced with 

Corporals and Sergeants who had previously deployed with Lima Company in 2005. 

Some of these Marines were wounded in action. How will involuntarily striping the 

leadership benefit Lima Company when it deploys, possibly in late 2009? 

Answer. The deployment of selected NCOs from Company L will not adversely affect the Company when it activates in late 2009 and subsequently deploys in 2010. 

The Company and Battalion will have sufficient NCOs to provide leadership to its 

Marines should the Company L NCOs selected to augment 2nd Battalion decide to 

not reenlist and not deploy in 2010. 

Company L currently has 55 of its 56 NCO billets filled [per the Company’s Table 

of Organization]. Over the intervening two-year period, approximately 85 Company 

L Marines will be eligible for promotion to NCO (given current promotion rates). 

The Company L NCOs selected to augment 2nd Battalion have Mandatory Drill 

Stop Dates prior to 3rd Battalion’s next OIF deployment. Therefore, their participation in the next Battalion deployment would be strictly voluntary and is not assured. Ho ever, by deploying with 2nd Battalion, the command is able to fully utilize 

their combat-proven leadership and occupational skills to train and lead the Marines of 2nd Battalion. In addition, this plan allows junior Marines within Company 

L to progressively assume greater responsibility during peacetime training events, 

and thereby be better prepared to assume NCO billet during 3rd Battalion’s next 

deployment. Consequently, the current plan optimizes the quality an quantity of 

NCO leadership provided to both 2nd Battalion and 3rd Battalion during combat 

operations in support of the War on Terror. 

** Note: Of the augments only [delete] was previously wounded in action. He sustained a shrapnel wound to his right calf during Operation MATADOR in Al Qaim. 

He was medically evacuated from theater and subsequently returned to full duty. 

Question. Three Lima Marines have been waiting for some time to attend sniper 

training. These three Marines will now have to forgo that training due to their involuntary activation. How will forgoing the training of these ‘‘would be’’ Marine 

snipers benefit Lima Company when it deploys, possibly in late 2009? 

Answer. When Marine Forces Reserve researched this question it was determined 

that the three Marines awaiting Scout Sniper training are all members of Weapons 

Company, 3d Bn, 25th Marines. Further, they did not meet all of the prerequisites. 

One needed to retake the ASVAB since his GT score was not high enough and the 

others did not have a current HIV on record. Those discrepancies have been rectified 

and all three Marines (delete) are scheduled to attend the below Scout Sniper 

Course at MCB Camp Lejeune, NC and will join 2d Bn, 25th Marines upon graduation. They all have approved orders in the system and have been notified by their 

command. 

CID: M0381Z4 

COURSE: SCOUT SNIPER CRS 

LOCATION: CAMP LEJEUNE 

CLASS#: 2008003 

REPORT DATE: 20080413 

GRAD DATE: 20080627 


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AIR FORCE RESERVE

Question. General Bradley, the recently published report from the Commission on 

the National Guard and Reserves included a number of recommendations that have 

budgetary impact on the Services. Are the Reserves included in the dialogue on how 

to address the impact to your budgets? 

Answer. My personnel have been fully involved in developing the Air Force position on the Commission’s 95 recommendations. Initially we were not invited as a 

member of the working group that will be discussing the budgetary impact of the 

Commission on the National Guard and Reserves recommendation on the Total 

Force. However, Major General (Select) James Rubeor, my deputy, was added to the 

General Officer/Senior Executive Service working group, but will not be a voting 

member. 

Question. Do you feel that the funding level for NGREA (National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account) is sufficient for the Air Force Reserve to allow you to 

modernize and remain a viable tier one ready force? 

Answer. While we are resourced through the Air Force budget process, we have 

combat requirements that are not funded. The National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account (NGREA) has been a lifeline to Air Force Reserve modernization. 

While the NGREA funding has helped keep us a ready and relevant combat force, 

it is insufficient to meet all modernization efforts. Over the past three years NGREA 

funding increases have allowed improvements in defensive systems, advanced targeting pods, radars, multifunction displays, communications and night vision equipment. The Air Force Reserve has over $670 million in modernization shortfalls each 

year. The NGREA covers approximately 5% of this shortfall, but partial funding of 

the shortfall increases the time to field capabilities. Air Force Reserve aircraft and 

systems modernization requirements are projected to increase and, while NGREA 

funding has increased, it alone is not sufficient to keep Air Force Reserve a viable 

tier one ready force. 

Question. Are there any other budgetary areas where you feel as though you are 

at risk? 

Answer. The Global War on Terror (GWOT), Base Realignment and Closure 

(BRAC) and Total Force Integration (TFI) have created considerable pressures on 

the Air Force Reserve’s budget. Recruiting and retention challenges, along with the 

training of Air Force to Reserve personnel due to BRAC/TFI mission changes create 

potential funding shortfalls in these areas. Additionally, the Fiscal Year 2009 depot 

purchased equipment maintenance funding level of 79% has resulted in the 

deferment of program depot maintenance on numerous aircraft, increasing risk to 

our readiness. While we strive to mitigate this risk in execution year, our ability 

to attain an acceptable level of risk is becoming more difficult. The under execution 

of our programmed flying hours and the increase in GWOT flying results in budget 

reductions to our training hours, which may effect readiness in the future, especially 

if GWOT flying decreases. Lastly, long term Military Personnel appropriations orders by Reservists volunteering to support GWOT results in the under execution of 

Reserve Personnel appropriations, which may result in baseline cuts to this appropriation effecting the ability for Reservists to train in the future. 

Question. What impact is the Air Force Reserve’s participation in the war having 

on your readiness, in terms of your personnel and operational capabilities? 

Answer. Although the readiness of the Air Force Reserve training objectives is 

still being met with an increase in the operations tempo due to the war, wear of 

our equipment has accelerated above normal peace time standards. Results of this 

acceleration increases concerns for the need to recapitalize equipment as well as the 

funding needed to ensure Reservists are able to maintain operational readiness. Additionally, under-execution of programmed flying hours may lead to reduced appropriations for flying hours. This could result in a shortfall of flying hours when the 

Reserve returns to a peace time operations tempo. Lastly, Air Force Reserve missions are being accomplished primarily with volunteers on Military Personnel appropriation orders which results in an under execution of the Reserve Personnel appropriation account. As with flying hours, if Reserve Personnel appropriation funding 

is reduced, the ability for Reservists to train during a peace time environment could 

be jeopardized. 

Question. How has AF Reserve recruiting and retention been affected by the increased demands of the Global War on Terrorism? 

Answer. The Air Force Reserve has met its recruiting goals for the last seven 

years. While we anticipate challenges in the future due to Base Realignment and 

Closure, and Total Force Integration initiatives and a shrinking active duty force 

in which to recruit from, we have seen nothing to indicate that Global War on Terrorism has affected our recruiting efforts. As for retention, we’ve met or barely 


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missed our retention goals during the same period. We are monitoring this area 

closely as there are some indications for potential concerns with first term and career Airmen reenlistment rates. However, as with recruiting, we cannot say with 

any degree of certainty that Global War on Terrorism is adversely affecting our retention rates. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Hobson. 

Questions submitted by Ms. Granger and the answers thereto follow:] 

SOUTH TEXAS TRAINING CENTER

Question. The Texas Governor and the Texas Adjutant General have discussed establishing at least one additional training center in the southern portion of the state 

in order to provide more training space to our Guard. What is being done to address 

this issue that affects the Guard’s readiness for both overseas and domestic missions? 

Answer. The establishment and enhancement of National Guard response capabilities (Civil Support Teams, Chemical Enhanced Response Force Package, National Guard Response Force, etc.) to provide support to civil authorities have created additional training and training space requirements for nearly all of the states. 

The National Guard Bureau continues to work on developing training capabilities 

and identify facilities that would support the effective and efficient delivery of training, exercise, and evaluation of the readiness of the domestic response capabilities. 

Question. Are other states facing the same training space dilemma? 

Answer. Yes, states with Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High 

Yield Explosives Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) teams have a valid 

issue because of the specialized nature of the venue required to train for their mission. The cost of these training areas would be prohibitive if established at one time, 

but could be feasible in phases. The National Guard Bureau has recommended that 

up to six regional training centers be established and that funding be provided to 

allow CERFPs to use the regional centers on a rotational basis. This solution would 

provide a 1 to 3 training site to CERFP ratio and would likely be a more cost effective solution. 

PAY ISSUES

Question. Late last year, NBC ran a story describing multiple instances of pay 

problems with members of the National Guard. The story made reference to a GAO 

report that examined six National Guard Units—94% of those Guardsmen had pay 

problems. What is being done to remedy this and to ensure that our National 

Guardsmen are being paid correctly and in a timely manner? 

Answer. The NBC story refers to a November 2003 GAO Report entitles ‘‘Military 

Pay: Army National Guard Personnel Mobilized to Active Duty Experienced Significant Pay Problems.’’ That GAO report correctly identified several deficiencies in our 

pay system, mostly relating to adjustments in pay and benefits when Army National 

Guard soldiers transitioned between reserve duty and active duty assignments. 

Those widespread, systematic problems have been addressed. In 2003 I began 

working with the Assistant Secretary of Army, Financial Management and Comptroller, an the Director of Defense Finance & Accounting Service (DFAS) to address 

these pay problems. 

Among the corrective actions taken includes establishing joint National Guard 

Bureau and DFAS dedicated support team to assist mobilizing and demobilizing soldiers; enhancing demobilization briefings and ensuring that all personnel know how 

to contact the Soldier and Family Support Centers for any pay assistance or other 

problems arise. Additionally, we have implemented standard operating instructions 

to prevent problems from arising due to turnover of financial personnel. Also, we 

have established procedures for reviewing and monitoring the pay process by DFAS, 

Army, and the Army National Guard; and improving the quality and availability of 

online pay and benefit information for soldiers. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Ms. Granger. 

Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow:] 


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NATIONAL GUARD ROLE IN HOMELAND SECURITY

Question. Has the Guard defined its operational requirements for its domestic 

mission?—what missions are expected of the Guard—and is there a plan, and do 

units regularly train for this mission? 

Answer. The National Guard has worked hard to define our operational requirements for domestic missions, especially in the area of consequence management. 

These efforts have resulted in the development of specialized units and capabilities, 

including: Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) and Joint Task Force-State (JTFState); Joint Incident Site Communications Capability (JISCC); Civil Support Teams 

(CST); Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) teams; National Guard Response Forces; 

and Critical Infrastructure Program-Mission Assurance Assessment teams. Additionally, the National Guard has analyzed civil support operational requirements 

and has defined the service-provided Army National Guard and Air National Guard 

equipment that specifically supports civil support missions. These equipment lists 

have been provided to service staffs to influence the rapid fielding of specific sets 

of equipment to National Guard units to enhance the National Guard’s overall capability to respond to domestic incidents. 

Although National Guard has made significant progress in defining our homeland 

defense and civil support operational requirements, there is more to be done. That 

is why the National Guard Bureau is also institutionalizing a Capability Assessment and Development Process that will use National and Defense Planning Scenarios to systematically define future National Guard capability needs across the 

spectrum of homeland defense and civil support missions. 

As to what missions are expected of the Guard, it serves our nation and communities across the full spectrum of domestic missions, including, but not limited to: 

Counter Drug, protecting critical physical and cyber infrastructure, air sovereignty, 

air and ballistic missile defense, transportation, engineering, and medical. These responses are to both natural and manmade disasters, as well as civil disturbance. 

Over 70 Domestic Operation plans involving the National Guard have been written by United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the National Guard 

Bureau and the 54 states, territories and the District of Columbia. In addition, the 

National Guard Bureau, in coordination with the 54 Joint Force HeadquartersState, has developed a Joint Capabilities Database (JCD) that focuses on ‘‘Essential 

10’’ capabilities that are needed and available for homeland defense, homeland security, and civil support missions that are frequently conducted by the National 

Guard. The JCD is designed to assess current and future National Guard joint capabilities required by the Governors in the event of an emergency, and to inform both 

Contingency and Crisis Action Planners on the status of capabilities and where capability gaps lie when formalizing plans. 

The National Guard Bureau, in conjunction with USNORTHCOM, has developed 

and implemented a Joint Interagency Training Capability (JITC) that includes a regional exercise program, staff training for JFHQ/JTF State staff elements, and collective chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives (CBRNE) 

training for National Guard CERFPs and CSTs. CSTs also have rigorous internal 

exercise programs and CERFPs have focused individual and collective training 

events. 

Additionally, the National Guard regularly participates in National and Combatant Command homeland defense and civil support Exercises. However, although the 

National Guard has made major strides in developing effective homeland defense 

and civil support training, there is much left to be done to assess the sufficiency 

of this training with respect to the increasing National Guard homeland defense and 

civil support responsibilities and to address continued training gaps in the areas of 

port and border security, information sharing and Continuity of Operations and 

Continuity of Government planning and exercises. 

Question. Regardless of the source, would it be helpful if additional funding, over 

and above that provided for military readiness, were to be made available to states 

for domestic planning and exercises performed by the National Guard? 

Answer. Yes, additional funding for domestic planning and exercises would significantly improve the National Guard’s readiness to respond to domestic emergencies. 

While the National Guard has made progress in domestic planning and exercises, 

increased funding would enable us to address gaps in training, to improve the assessment of that training, and to fully integrate our planning efforts at the federal, 

state and local levels. 


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NATIONAL GUARD AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND (USNORTHCOM) 

Question. If there is federal military support to civil authorities that needs to be 

provided for a disaster relief operation, is that the responsibility of the Reserve 

Component or NORTHCOM? 

Answer. Disaster relief response within the United States has several tiers of response, with the goal of supporting the needs of the local authorities. Local authorities, first on the scene, provide initial assessments and response. If further assistance is required, state assets, such as the National Guard, will be called upon. The 

National Guard also can be employed in Title 32 status if federally funded military 

support is required. 

National Guard units are located in communities across all 50 states, three territories, and the District of Columbia. If requirements exceed the capability of available forces, elected leaders may execute an Emergency Management Assistance 

Compact (EMAC) request, a voluntary agreement between states and territories to 

share National Guard and other resources. This tool allows for a sharing of resources and solves the problem at a state or regional level. However, EMACs are 

not only for neighboring states. If a disaster is regional in nature, states outside the 

affected area may choose to send assets. 

Federal assistance may also be requested. These requests are collected by the lead 

federal agency and then forwarded to the appropriate federal agency. If the Department of Defense receives a request, it would pass to USNORTHCOM for execution. 

At that point, USNORTHCOM would provide the required capability. In some cases, 

USNORTHCOM is the only source of capabilities. For example, states typically do 

not have any maritime assets. If required, these would come from active duty forces. 

In some cases this may require reserve component elements to be called into active 

federal service. 

Question. What are some of the challenges with the NORTHCOM arrangement? 

Answer. The National Guard can provide significant domestic response support by 

rapidly deploying Soldiers and Airmen and necessary equipment over great distances, as was done in the response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. United States 

Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is a fully capable Combatant Command 

(COCOM) that is staffed to manage Federal Defense Support to Civil Authorities 

if needed. It is critical that these separate, but complementary, missions function 

together when disaster situations arise. 

While the National Guard Bureau has been working with USNORTHCOM on 

their domestic support plans, there have been limited opportunities for 

USNORTHCOM commanders, staff and forces to assist state forces on domestic response missions. This leaves significant room for improvement on coordination of efforts and planning. Increased coordination and exchange of staff for training and exercises will go a long way towards addressing any coordination deficit between 

USNORTHCOM and the National Guard. 

Question. Title 32 operations have been coordinated in the past—NOT by US 

Northern Command, but by the National Guard Bureau. What are the advantages 

to having this consistent channel of communication between the States and the 

DOD for operations that are conducted with federal funds?—and what role, if any, 

does NORTHCOM play in these missions? 

Answer. The Title 10 requirement for the National Guard Bureau to serve as the 

conduit of information between the individual states and the Departments of the 

Army and Air Force is well established and clearly understood by all parties. There 

would be many advantages to continuing this proven process for Title 32 operations. 

The communication process between the National Guard Bureau and the individual states is well established and utilized on a daily basis. State Joint Operations 

Centers have been established under the Adjutants General and are tied into the 

National Guard Bureau Joint Operations Center. The National Guard Bureau Joint 

Operations Center then makes the information available to the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security. 

The National Guard Bureau also manages the distribution of Title 32 funding 

that is allocated to the Army National Guard and Air National Guard to train for 

their federal mission. The appropriate fiscal accounting processes are already established and used on a daily basis. 

Finally, maintaining a single, consistent Title 32 process that is exercised on a 

daily basis means National Guard personnel are trained and ready to react in a disaster the same way they operate day-to-day. This ‘‘train like you fight’’ concept provides a high state of readiness and is well understood and used throughout the Department of Defense. 

NORTHCOM, however, does not play a significant role in Title 32 operational 

missions. Since command and control of Title 32 operations remain with the GovVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:38 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046475 PO 00000 Frm 00194 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A475P2.XXX A475P2

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ernor and state Adjutants General, there is no USNORTHCOM involvement in 

these operations other than maintaining situational awareness. Also, not all states 

and territories reside within the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility. Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands are assigned to either the Pacific 

Command (PACOM) or the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). 

NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT CHALLENGES

Question. LTG Blum you have previously noted the relatively rapid National 

Guard response to Hurricane Katrina, but isn’t it true that if the Army National 

Guard had had 100 percent of all of the equipment it is required to have, that response would have been even faster? 

Answer. There is no doubt that higher levels of equipment generally would facilitate a faster response in a catastrophe. While the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) ensures that a disaster-affected state can bring in National 

Guard equipment and personnel from other states when needed. 

If the affected state has a relatively low level of equipment on hand, this increases 

the demand on external sources and invariably will take a longer time to meet all 

equipment requirements. 

Question. If the National Guard were to receive the full amount of the President’s 

Budget request as well as the full amount currently planned over the Future Year 

Defense Program, how much additional funding would still be needed in order to 

bring the National Guard to 100 percent of the equipment it is required to have? 

Answer. If the Army National Guard were to receive all of the equipment in the 

President’s Budget and the Future Years Defense Program, the additional requirement of $9.9 billion to reach full equipping levels. However, this figure would not 

displace all substitute and ‘‘in lieu of items currently in the National Guard’s inventory. Additional funding would be required to fully equip the force with the most 

modern equipment available. 

Question. Please describe the Emergency Management Assistance Compact and 

how it allows the National Guard to mass equipment across state lines during disasters—and would this work in a major crisis when many Guard units are deployed? 

Answer. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a national 

mutual aid agreement administered by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA). All 50 states, as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and 

the Virgin Islands, are members. The National Guard and other responders (police, 

fire, etc.) are subject to request by the impacted state. It is up to the state receiving 

such a request whether to respond as requested, respond with a proposed substitute 

asset or to decline the request. As a general rule, requested support is honored in 

a timely and efficient manner. 

During a crisis requiring interstate mutual aid a state publishes requests for support using the EMAC process. Using its knowledge of National Guard asset availability, the National Guard Bureau contacts the state owning the appropriate asset 

and asks that state to consider picking up the support requirement identified by 

EMAC. The state accepting the mission then advises the requesting state and 

NEMA of its availability. The actual agreement between the supported and supporting states is made between those states, using the EMAC agreement as the 

basis. 

The EMAC system works very well, even when National Guard units are deployed. For example, during the Hurricane Katrina disaster the National Guard deployed approximately 50,000 troops, with appropriate equipment, in a timely and effective response in support of civil authorities, and more National Guard personnel 

and equipment were available if they had been needed. At the time, 13,000 National 

Guard personnel and significant amounts of equipment were deployed overseas in 

the Global War on Terror. 

Question. How many full-time personnel is the Army National Guard required to 

have? How many is it currently authorized to have and how does this difference affect the readiness of the Army National Guard? 

Answer. The Army validated requirement for Army National Guard full-time support is 42,533 Active Guard and Reserve and 42,329 Military Technicians, for a total 

of 84,862 full-time support personnel. 

The Army National Guard’s FY2008 authorization is 29,204 Active Guard and Reserve and 28,102 Military Technicians, for a total of 57,306 full-time support personnel. 

The current full-time support requirements are formulated from a 1999 manpower 

study based on the pre-9/11 mission of a strategic reserve. The Army National 

Guard is now an operational force and has inherently increased mission needs at 

the strategic, operational and tactical levels. As we prepare and train our force for 


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missions, in an era of persistent conflict, the negative delta in full-time support adversely affects our ability to meet the readiness levels required for an operational 

force. Our full-time support personnel complete essential day-to-day training preparation, maintenance and personnel actions that allow our part-time soldiers to maximize training during their limited training periods. Full-time support is a key readiness multiplier. 

Question. Generals Vaughn and McKinley, can you compare the full-time percentages of required versus authorized personnel compare to ANG? What is percentage 

of full-time to total end strength? I have heard that ANG has it about right as far 

as working as a true operational reserve? 

Answer. The Army’s validated fiscal year 2008 (FY08) requirement for Army National Guard full-time support is 42,533 Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) and 

42,329 Military Technicians (MilTech), for a total of 84,862 full-time support personnel. The Army National Guard’s actual FY08 authorization is 29,204 AGR and 

28,102 MilTech, for a total of 57,306 full-time support personnel. The Army National 

Guard’s authorized end-strength for FY08 is 351,300. This yields an authorized level 

of full-time support at 16.3 percent. 

The current full-time support requirements are formulated from a 1999 manpower 

study based on the pre-9/11 mission of a strategic reserve. This study validated a 

requirement for 84,850 full-time support positions to perform the Army National 

Guard mission as a strategic reserve. The Army National Guard is now an operational force and has inherently increased mission needs at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. 

The Air Force validated FY08 requirement and authorization for Air National 

Guard full-time support is 13,936 Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) and 22,897 Military Technicians (MilTech), for a total of 36,833 full-time support personnel. The Air 

National Guard authorized end-strength for FY08 is 106,700. This yields an authorized level of full-time support at 34.5 percent. The Air National Guard’s full-time 

force allows it to provide a high level of volunteerism for missions at 92 percent. 

This is a proven, ready, combat capability to the Air Force. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 5, 2008. 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE CONTRACT AWARD 

FOR TANKER REPLACEMENT 

WITNESSES 

HON. SUE C. PAYTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR 

ACQUISITION 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN L. ‘‘JACK’’ HUDSON, COMMANDER, 

AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS CENTER 

TERRY KASTEN, KC–45A PROGRAM MANAGER 

OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN MURTHA

Mr. MURTHA. The Committee will come to order. 

I want to welcome Ms. Payton and General Hudson to the Committee. 

I do not think there is any subcommittee or any committee that 

has done more to try to move this tanker program forward. When 

Bill Young was Chairman, he recognized the problem. We tried everything we could to put money in, prompted the Defense Department to go forward. All of us realized the critical nature and the 

national significance of this program. This is a weapons system just 

like the F–22 or the JSF or anything else. This is absolutely critical 

to our national security. 

Having said that, what I worry about and the reason that I 

wanted to have a hearing is this also has political implications. Not 

only are the facts important, but the political implications are just 

as important. 

I look at the banks being bailed out by foreign countries. I see 

a rising trade deficit with China, the rest of the world. And when 

my staff gives me a paper that shows our Treasury owes—and 

other U.S. Agencies owe China $922 billion, I think it is imperative 

that the Air Force explain to this committee its decision and how 

it came about to award this contract. 

I do not know what the estimate of the contract is going to be. 

It is going to be a big contract, probably as big as any contract that 

we have had over the years. And I know it will grow, because all 

of them do. Our experience is that all of them get bigger. But we 

want to make sure everybody was treated fairly. 

And we want to know as many details as we can. We understand 

that there are a lot of details that you cannot talk about because 

you have not been briefed. But you have to remember this: This 

committee funds this program. And all this committee has to do is 

stop the money, and this program is not going to go forward. 

We want to make sure everybody is treated fairly. We want to 

make sure you made the right decision. We want to support the 

right decision in this endeavor. 

So, with that, I will ask Mr. Young for his opening statement. 


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OPENING REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I 

want to join you in welcoming Secretary Payton and General Hudson to this very important hearing. 

This subcommittee has recognized the need for a new fleet of 

tankers for many years, actually, and we are really disappointed 

that it has taken so long even to get where we are today. The fiasco 

that encircled the leasing program—by the way, even back then, 

we supported buying the tankers as opposed to leasing them. But 

we were overruled in that matter. But the important thing here is, 

when can we put new tankers into the air to meet the requirement 

of the United States national security requirements? And that is 

our issue today. 

Secretary Payton, I read your prepared statement, but also I 

read in The Washington Post yesterday the comments of Loren B. 

Thompson of the Lexington Institute. Frankly—and please do not 

be offended by this—but your statement does not say anything 

about this contract, but Thompson has—well, I am sure you have 

seen this. 

Ms. PAYTON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thompson has a whole list of why this contract was 

awarded. And I do not know that this subcommittee is going to try 

to be in the business of determining which contractors get the contract awards; I do not think that is our prerogative. But if Thompson knows something about this, we expect that you might know 

something about this as well. So, although your statement was not 

very thorough in detail, I think we are probably going to be asking 

you a lot of questions about this. 

So thank you for being here and being willing to—— 

Ms. PAYTON. Thank you. 

Mr. YOUNG [continuing]. Face what you know is going to be an 

interesting session. 

Ms. PAYTON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. I am going to ask the two members that have the 

political concerns in their own district to make a few opening remarks. First we will hear from Mr. Dicks. 

REMARKS OF MR. DICKS

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I wish I could say that I was happy with this decision, but 

I certainly am not. And I have been a very strong advocate for this 

tanker program. There are a number of things that I think are basically unfair in what the Air Force did. 

First was the decision not to take into account the massive subsidy received by Airbus to build the A330 in launch aid. The A330 

and the A340 received over $5 billion in launch aid, and yet, in 

evaluating these proposals, the Air Force did not take that into account. 

The most damning of all is the bait-and-switch tactics used by 

the Air Force to first say that they wanted a medium-sized tanker. 

They said, we do not want a great big tanker, we want a mediumsized tanker to replace the smaller plane, the KC–135. This was 


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not a replacement for the KC–10. Had Boeing known—as General 

Lichte kept saying more is better, more is better—if Boeing had 

known that the Air Force wanted more, it would have bid the 777. 

But they were never given that opportunity. They were never suggested. 

And let me just read to you what the Air Force said about this 

program. ‘‘We want to buy a tanker. We do not want to buy a cargo 

plane that tanks. We also do not want to buy a passenger airplane 

that tanks. We want to buy a tanker. Its primary mission is going 

to be a tanker. The fact that it can carry cargo or passengers is a 

benefit, but it is not the primary reason for the procurement.’’ 

So I think the Air Force has failed us here. I think they went 

with the wrong airplane. By going with a bigger airplane over lifetime, if you compare the two, the KC–767 and the A330, the A330 

will burn $15 billion more in fuel. It will also have higher maintenance costs. It is a 53 percent larger airplane. It is going to have 

higher maintenance costs. 

Also, at the very end, after all the things that the Air Force did 

to capitulate to Airbus and EADS and Northrop Grumman, they 

have had one final capitulation on the integrated mission assessment, where they changed it right at the end so that they would 

be able to—instead of having to have—I mean, this is a very major 

issue—a smaller plane, because we have learned in airlift an airfield can accommodate more planes. They can have more C–17s at 

a field than C–5s. The same thing is true here. You can have more 

767s at a field than you can have the larger plane. 

But the Air Force changed the criteria. They said, we can look 

at the—instead of looking at the weakest strength of the airfield, 

you look at the strongest strength. They changed the distance between wings from 50 feet to 25 feet. They also changed the ramps. 

Also, because of the size of this airplane, you are going to have to 

have a massive military construction program to build new hangars 

all over the world. And so I say the Air Force changed the deal in 

midstream to accommodate Airbus because they said they would 

pull out of the competition if we did not do it. 

Also, this is a crown jewel of American technology. We are now 

giving away to the Europeans one of the most significant things 

we, as a country, can do, and that is build these aerial tankers. 

Also, you said they have great mission capability, I mean, that 

their boom and their drogue have great capability. They have not 

even passed fuel yet. If they did, it has been in the last week. And 

at the Paris Air Show, they had a wooden thing that they had out 

there that they said was a boom, but it wasn’t. It was just a piece 

of wood. 

They are behind in their Australian deal. Boeing has delivered 

a tanker to the Japanese. Airbus is still 1 or 2 years behind. So 

how could you say that they have a superior proposal, when they 

have not even delivered this airplane? 

And then, to take away these jobs from the American people— 

the Boeing Company and our State of Washington, which has been 

one of the greatest supporters and suppliers to the Air Force, taking these jobs away and giving this—and remember, the major 

parts of this plane will be built in Europe. The tail is built in 

Spain. Germany builds the fuselage. Somebody builds the wings. 


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They are going to send that all to Alabama and assemble it. There 

is going to be very little added to that in the United States. It is 

all going to be done in Europe by a subsidized company. 

And one other thing. They also—Boeing has to pay health-care 

insurance. I do not think you took that into account, that over in 

these European countries they get socialized medicine—which is 

fine; I think it is a great program. But that should be evaluated. 

Boeing has to pay health-care insurance. 

So I just think this thing is totally unfair. I think the Air Force 

has made a big mistake in shifting from the medium-sized tanker 

to the large tanker. And I hope that we can reconsider this decision 

and do the right thing, which is to build this thing in the United 

States with an American company with American workers. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. We agreed before we started to let Mr. Tiahrt also 

have an opening statement, and Mr. Cramer, and then we will go 

forward with the witnesses making their statement. 

Mr. Tiahrt. 

REMARKS OF MR. TIAHRT

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this very important hearing. 

I look forward to hearing from Secretary Payton and General 

Hudson on the Air Force decision to award the KC–X tanker contract to a foreign competitor over an American company. I understand they want to limit their comments because the competitors 

have not yet been debriefed and there is a possible protest decision 

looming. However, I hope they understand the seriousness of our 

concerns. The committee needs and demands answers. 

Mr. Chairman, perhaps we should have had Loren B. Thompson, 

Ph.D., here, because he has been debriefed on this program, but we 

cannot get debriefed on it. 

Mr. DICKS. By the Air Force, in fact. He said the Air Force officials gave him the information. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Absolutely. 

Unfortunately, the process of the Air Force’s decision leaves me 

asking a tremendous amount of questions. The American public is 

rightfully outraged by this decision. I am outraged by this decision. 

It is outsourcing our national security. An American tanker should 

be built by an American company with American workers. Choosing a French tanker over an American tanker does not make sense 

to the American people, and it does not make any sense to me. 

But the more I investigate this decision and others like it, the 

more I am beginning to see a pattern that is deeply disturbing. We 

are stacking the deck against American manufacturers at the expense of our own national and economic security. Three of the last 

big defense contracts have all been awarded to foreign companies, 

because the deck is stacked against American manufacturers. We 

should have suspected it when the Navy awarded the Marine One 

contract to a foreign manufacturer, the replacement of the President’s helicopter. We should have known when the Army awarded 

the light utility helicopter to EADS. And now, with the Air Force 

awarding the KC–X to a foreign manufacturer, it is as plain as the 

nose on your face. 


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Foreign competitors were able to compete and win against American manufacturers because our acquisition laws favor foreign competitors. If we were to compete Air Force One today, it would go 

to a foreign manufacturer. 

For instance, the Air Force did not take into account the illegal 

subsidies or other nonaccounted-for costs that EADS and Airbus receives from European nations. These subsidies make Airbus aircraft cheaper in civilian markets, and clearly they make the A330 

cheaper in this competition. 

Although these facts are well-established, I routinely brought 

them up to the Air Force’s attention. In the final analysis, it seems 

that the Air Force did not even try to evaluate the impact of European subsidies on a tanker competition. And you should have 

known, when you have an airplane that is 43 percent larger built 

in a country where the euro is stronger than the dollar, it should 

send up a red flag that there are subsidies buried in their bid. And 

that makes an unlevel playing field for American manufacturers. 

In addition to stacking the deck against American manufacturers, I am concerned that the Air Force poorly judged one of the 

most heavily contested competitions in history. Although I am not 

blaming any one person—and this is not personal, as I said earlier 

to you personally—the fact remains that the Air Force looked at 

this competition, Congress was briefed on it, that the competition 

that we were—but we were not shown the same—the same thing 

you asked for is not the same thing we were shown last Friday. 

And I think Congressman Dicks pointed that out. 

You asked—or it appears you were wanting to get a KC–135, 

when you first told us, to replace the KC–135. But the airplane you 

selected is a replacement for the KC–10. That is a total switch in 

the requirements. And based on your selection, it appears that the 

Air Force was interested in a cargo aircraft that could tank and not 

a tanker with a cargo capability. 

It appears that the Air Force was willing to ignore serious risks: 

the Northrop Grumman-EADS proposal regarding supply chain 

mitigation, construction of new facilities, training a new workforce, 

let alone the fact that Northrop Grumman has absolutely no experience in air refueling marketplace. 

It appears that the Air Force was willing to ignore EADS’ past 

performance history when it came to the A400, which was late in 

delivery; the A380, which was late in delivery; and the A330, which 

was late in delivery. All had scheduled delays, and yet that that 

is not appearing anywhere in the analysis that I have seen. 

It appears that the Air Force was willing to ignore the mission 

capability by picking an aircraft that can operate in fewer places 

rather than more. It appears that the Air Force was willing to 

choose an aircraft that, because of its size, will require significant 

military construction investment during a time of a shrinking military construction budget. 

Those are just a few of the discrepancies in what Congress was 

originally led to believe. There are many inconsistencies in the public statements of the Air Force, and the results of this competition 

are simply astounding. 

One additional point. The Air Force did not take into consideration or account for economic security when evaluating the KC–X 


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proposal. I understand that economic security does not fit into any 

bid criteria or your KPPs, but the need for a domestic industrial 

base sure should. Congress has made clear over the years its intent 

that taxpayer dollars should be spent for American work whenever 

possible. During a time of economic uncertainty, it is baffling why 

the Department should decide to send, at a minimum, 19,000 jobs 

overseas to the nations of France, Germany, Spain and the United 

Kingdom. And they are more likely to gain more jobs than any single State here in America. This proposal benefits European aerospace workers at the expense of American workers and economic 

security. 

I have started a survey on my Web site, www.house.gov/Tiahrt. 

That survey says, if allowed to stand, this contract awarded to a 

foreign company will: hurt American workers by the loss of U.S. 

jobs; outsource an essential military asset to Europe; force the 

United States to depend on Europe for its national defense; result 

in an inferior tanker for the United States Air Force; and result in 

the U.S. being more vulnerable at a time when we need to be less 

vulnerable. 

We cannot allow this to come true. We must have an American 

tanker built by an American company with American workers. 

Congress must act to save the Air Force from itself, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate that Secretary Payton and General Hudson have 

agreed to join us today, and I look forward to the informative hearing. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Cramer. 

REMARKS OF MR. CRAMER

Mr. CRAMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. 

This is an important opportunity for us, as members of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, to scrutinize the Air Force’s 

process, this country’s process, that would allow a competition like 

this to occur and then an outcome like this to occur. 

If I understand what the Air Force evaluated, you had five categories. And I would like to hear you get into those categories: capability—we need some details about that capability, how that 

stacked up proposal to proposal; then proposal risk—what issues 

did you evaluate there; past performance—a very important category, especially considering the track records of these teams that 

were involved here; price—what place did price have in this and 

the evaluation; and then the Integrated Fleet Air Refueling Assessment. And if I am wrong about those categories, I want to be corrected. 

I would like to know how this process worked. It was a competition that was started. Was it amended? Was it postponed? What 

kind of reaction did you get from the teams that were involved in 

this? Did they have a chance to amend? Did they have a chance 

to, with the flexibility of this process, respond to maybe changing 

requirements that the Air Force had? Because, finally, we have to 

come out of this with some degree of confidence that this process 

worked and that American workers had an opportunity, the kind 

of opportunity that they should have, to have been involved in this. 

Ms. Payton, I would like for you to outline the Federal requirements on military contracts. Give us some history to judge this 


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competition by, especially regarding the percentages of American 

jobs or the share which is required for large-scale procurements. 

Because what we have here today is an issue that reflects on the 

procurement process of this country. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Payton, now we will hear your presentation. 

And normally we put the whole presentation in the record, but I 

think it is so important that you go through the details of what the 

members suggested, so that we can all get a feel for exactly what 

you have gone through. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SUE PAYTON

Ms. PAYTON. Thank you very much. And, Mr. Chairman and 

members of this committee, I am honored to be here today. I am 

very interested in answering as many questions as possible that I 

can, within the law and within the phases of the procurement as 

it is today. 

I am really, really honored to be joined by Lieutenant General 

Jack Hudson, who is our Air Force PEO, program executive officer, 

for aircraft systems, and by Mr. Terry Kasten, who is our current 

program manager for the KC–45A. 

As you are aware, last Friday, the Air Force awarded the KC– 

X contract to Northrop Grumman. And this is a team who met and 

exceeded the requirements of the request for proposals and who 

provided the best overall value to the warfighter and to every 

American taxpayer based on the competition and the evaluation 

factors. 

At this time in the process and in this public forum, we cannot 

disclose proprietary information or source selection-sensitive data 

from either vendor. The Air Force must protect both offerors’ information unless we are given specific permission to release it. Of 

course, now, they are able to release their own data, but we cannot 

validate public comments or media information without violating 

proprietary boundaries. We cannot confirm or deny what is in the 

press. 

Furthermore, after the debrief of the unsuccessful offeror, they 

have the right to file a protest. And we cannot jeopardize the Government’s probability of winning a protest with any comments that 

are made for the record today. 

I would like to reiterate that the Air Force followed a carefully 

structured source selection process, which was designed to provide 

transparency, maintain integrity and ensure a fair competition 

throughout the entire source selection process. The evaluation team 

was comprised of experts covering a broad spectrum of specialties, 

from acquisition to operations, hand-picked from across the Air 

Force and other Government agencies. We had an unprecedented 

amount of time spent to gain a thorough understanding of each 

proposal. 

Additionally, the Air Force and the offerors had hundreds of formal exchanges regarding the proposals throughout the evaluation 

process. The Air Force provided all offerors with continuous feedback through discussions on the strengths and weaknesses of their 

proposals. 


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Competition for major weapons systems are very complex. This 

entire process was very lengthy, but there were numerous exchanges that fostered a mutual understanding and clarity. As a result of this fair and open competition, the Air Force will deliver a 

tremendous capability to the warfighter at a great value to the taxpayer. 

We are ready now to move forward on something that is very 

late to need, on a program that is smart, has steady reinvestment 

to ensure future viability of something that is extremely unique 

and vital to our U.S. security. 

I would also like to point out that the Air Force’s acquisition 

strategy was approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

and is in compliance with the Competition in Contracting Act, the 

Buy America Act, and the Federal acquisition regulations that are 

derived from those acts. 

As part of the acquisition strategy, the contract we awarded is 

the first of a three-part set of tranches to recapitalize our entire 

KC–135 fleet. In a few more years, we will take a look at the tanker requirements and evaluate whether the KC–45 aircraft is still 

the best solution or whether we need further competition. 

KC–45A is our highest procurement priority. It is critical to the 

entire joint coalition military team’s ability to project combat power 

all around the world. It gives America and our allies unparalleled 

rapid response to combat and humanitarian relief operations. KC– 

45A tankers will provide increased aircraft availability, more 

adaptable technology, more flexible employment operations, and a 

greater overall capability than the current inventory of KC–135Es 

and KC–135Rs. 

The KC–45A will be able to refuel receptacle and probe-equipped 

aircraft on every mission and, itself, be in-flight refuelable. Also, 

the KC–45A will have an additional role, secondary, of carrying 

cargo, aeromedical evacuation and passengers, and will be 

equipped with defensive systems to enhance its utility to the 

warfighter. 

As you know, the current fleet of Eisenhower-era KC–135s averages over 47 years old. The KC–45A program is based on a planned 

purchase of 179 aircraft and is the first of up to three recapitalization programs to replace that entire fleet, as I mentioned earlier. 

The Air Force has budgeted approximately $3 billion per year for 

an annual production rate of 12 to 18 aircraft. But even with this 

level of investment, it will take several decades to replace the 500– 

plus KC–135s. It is absolutely critical for the Air Force to move forward now on this program. 

On behalf of the entire Air Force community, I would like to express my appreciation to both the teams for their tremendous efforts. I thank you for the opportunity to be here today to clarify as 

much as I can. And I look forward to General Hudson, Mr. Kasten 

and I answering any questions that we can within the constraints 

of where we are in the source selection process. 

Thank you. 

[The joint statement of Secretary Payton and General Hudson 

follows:] 


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Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask you a question, if 

I could. It just seems to me that they are not going to be able to 

answer any of our questions that we have presented. And I would 

just like to know when in the procurement process can they address the issues that we have raised here this morning? 

Mr. MURTHA. Let’s see what they can answer. 

This is as political as anything that we do. You say you budgeted, but we are the ones that appropriate the money. 

Ms. PAYTON. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. When I look at the Dubai crisis that we had—and 

the public was up in arms—this committee, the full committee, 

voted 60 to 2 to stop that provision. So this has to be completely 

aired so that the public understands. 

Were any presidential candidates briefed about this before the 

information was released to the public? 

Ms. PAYTON. Absolutely not. 

REMARKS OF MR. LEWIS

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman? I really hate to—I am going to have 

to run. We have 22 hearings today. But in the meantime, if I could 

just—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Sure. 

Mr. LEWIS [continuing]. Make a comment? 

To you, General Hudson, let me just say that this subcommittee 

has lots of reasons to seriously question what we do within the 

building over there relative to procurement processes. 

When I was first a brand-new Chairman of this Committee, with 

both sides of the aisle present, closed the door for 2 hours and 

made a decision to pull procurement recommendations regarding 

the F–22. You would have thought we blew the top off the Pentagon when we did that. And we did that because we were convinced that a lot needed to be done in terms of evaluating the capability of that aircraft before going forward, like software in the 

wings, et cetera. I think if we had not done that, that program 

would have fallen off the cliff. 

Now, General, I would make this point. I do not believe that the 

F–22 program was ever scheduled in a fashion to have manufacturing take place outside the United States. 

Now, let me further make another comment, General and 

Madam Secretary. It is very important for you to know that Northrop Grumman has a very sizable presence in my district. But I 

am not here today and I am not going to be asking questions because of employment, period. I am looking at capability. I do know 

that, about 21⁄2 years ago, we were that close to giving the contract 

to Boeing, and other things developed that caused us to reconsider 

the direction that we were about. 

I want to make certain that we continue with manufacturing capability in the United States. I want to make certain that any technical developments within this program that are vital to the future 

interests of the United States are not going to be transferred to the 

likes of a country that I do not have all the confidence I would like 

to have in, namely France. 

There are elements like that that are very important. Short-term 

products that will deliver the requirements we need, very, very 


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critical. But there is a long-term interest of the United States security involved here as well. 

And those are the questions I want to ask you all behind closed 

doors. This is not the place. 

Ms. PAYTON. Thank you. 

Mr. LEWIS. But there was a need for this forum, without any 

question. And so, with that, Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Mr. MURTHA. Yes, the political implications are so severe in this 

case. For instance, we could not even get NATO to give us an additional 3,000 troops in Afghanistan. In Iraq, they have pulled back 

most of the forces from Europe. They had 47,000 there, at one time; 

now we have 10,000. 

So the political implications are very severe here. So this committee, in particular, has to take into consideration not only the 

technical details, the capability, but also the possible technical 

transfer of information. So we would hope, as this hearing goes 

along, you will be able to answer those questions, satisfy the committee, and this committee then will make a decision whether we 

are going to go forward. 

Obviously, it is going to make a difference if both Democrat presidential candidates are saying—I think they said they were against 

this proposal. This proposal is going to be funded over a long period 

of time. It is going to be a lot of money. So it is something that 

we have to take into consideration, because we are going to be here 

and this subcommittee is going to be here, whoever is the Chairman of it, and we will have to consider what the White House 

wants to do about it. 

Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have a good attendance 

today. And I am wondering if Mr. Loren Thompson is in the audience? 

Mr. DICKS. No. 

PRESS REPORTS

Mr. YOUNG. Because some of my questioning goes to the issue of 

why Loren Thompson was given information that this subcommittee is not going to receive today from the official witnesses. 

Mr. Thompson said that—this is what I mentioned earlier, in my 

earlier statement—Mr. Thompson said that his information was 

based on information from the Air Force and company officials. If 

that is the case, if Thompson is entitled to have information from 

the Air Force, certainly this subcommittee should be entitled to 

have that information. 

But one of the things that Thompson reports on, based on his information from the Air Force, said that the awardee and its subcontractors were more highly rated. And I just wonder about that. 

Most of the subcontractors, I understand, are going to be involved 

from our friends in Europe. I just tend to believe that American 

subcontractors—actually, what I am saying is I am a little offended 

by the fact that the Air Force seems to rate subcontractors outside 

of the country higher than they do contractors, subcontractors 

within the country. 


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Do you have any comment on that? 

Ms. PAYTON. Yes, sir. And I appreciate the question. 

The Air Force, to my knowledge, no one on this source selection 

team provided any information to Loren Thompson. In e-mail traffic that I have seen recently, it did say that he did get information 

from Government individuals and that he got information from 

both of the offerors. 

I cannot comment on the facts of Loren Thompson’s article. I am 

more than willing to go behind closed doors and discuss these 

things. But as I said earlier, I cannot disclose things that are competition-sensitive, source selection-sensitive or proprietary in an 

open forum. And I cannot discuss this until I have debriefed both 

the successful offeror and the unsuccessful offeror. 

Mr. YOUNG. Secretary Payton, I understand that, and I agree 

with that. And I think we have to—it is sensitive here. We have 

to be very careful that we are not trying to, as a subcommittee, 

that we are not trying to affect the outcome of any contract. That 

is not our role in life. 

But it is important that we know that the funding that we would 

appropriate is going to be handled properly. 

Ms. PAYTON. Yes. 

JOB CREATION

Mr. YOUNG. That it was because of a decision based on quality, 

on truth. 

And some of my colleagues here have raised some serious questions. And I think that, Mr. Chairman, it may be that we would 

have to have a closed-door session on this subject. Because I think 

my colleagues have a right to have their questions answered, because they have very specific parochial interests on both sides of 

this issue. 

The issue of jobs, this is an important issue to the United States 

and to Members of Congress. Can you estimate how many jobs 

would be created if the contract, as recommended today, how many 

jobs would be created outside of the United States for this first 179 

aircraft? 

Ms. PAYTON. Job creation, location of assembly and manufacturing were not part of this evaluation criteria, according to the 

law. The law gives a special exemption, under the Buy America 

Act, to a dozen countries, and they say that we should treat those 

countries as the U.S. The Buy America Act is very clear on that. 

The countries that have companies that will be engaged in the new 

KC–45A are all on that exempted list. So the laws of the Federal 

acquisition regulation, the provisions of the Buy America Act are 

all being followed here. 

Mr. YOUNG. Okay. And I will accept that. And I understand it 

is important to follow the law. But do you know the answer to 

that? Do you personally know the answer to that? 

Ms. PAYTON. You know, I do not, because it was not part of the 

evaluation criteria. And as a person who has to follow the law, I 

made sure, as the Air Force made sure, that we stayed within what 

the request for proposal asked for, that we made sure that all the 

requirements were evaluated in the way that we had discussed 

with the offerors. 


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We had dozens of discussions with the offerors, so there is no 

mystery here about—and no new information about where each offeror stood in relation to the RFP. 

Mr. YOUNG. Okay. And I understand your position and your responsibilities. And I am just, sort of, testing to see if we can break 

through that a little bit. 

Ms. PAYTON. Well, let me put it this way. I wish I could award 

to somebody I like. I wish I could award to somebody who offers 

things that I personally like. But according to the law—and, you 

know, I promised the House and the Senate when I went through 

confirmation that I would uphold the laws as written of this country—those things cannot enter into the decisions made in acquisition. And that is where I am finding myself, sir. 

KC–135 FLEET

Mr. YOUNG. Okay. Well, I understand that. And, frankly, I appreciate that, and I think it is important that people in positions 

of responsibility like yours do follow the letter of the law. 

Okay, but let me ask you something I think you can answer. 

How much time—or maybe General Hudson would have a good answer on this—how much time is left in the KC–135 fleet? 

I know there are several different blocks of aircraft. We are very, 

very interested in this issue in my part of Florida because of 

MacDill Air Force Base, and we have some of the older KC–135s. 

How much life is left in the KC–135s? And will the new KC–45A 

program, will it intersect the line somewhere where before the KC– 

135s all quit flying? 

Ms. PAYTON. Yes, sir. I would like to have Terry Kasten answer 

that question, because he is very in tune with all of that. 

I will say, first of all, that our KC–135s are very old. We have 

incredible maintenance crews, who, honestly, they will keep them 

flying as long as we need them, because that is how great they are. 

But our warfighter deserves better. 

And so I would like Terry to give more detail to exactly what the 

real conundrum is that we are facing here. 

Mr. KASTEN. Thank you, ma’am. 

Yes, sir. Our projections are at a recapitalization rate of 15 aircraft per year, which is kind of the target for the source selection, 

that the 135 fleet is going to be out there in diminishing numbers 

for the next 20 to 30 years, out to the mid-2030s and mid-2040s. 

That would make that aircraft, as the last one leaves the fleet, over 

80 years old. 

Again, that is driven by how quickly we can bring the KC–45 

into the inventory. But if you are talking about replacing 400 to 

500 aircraft at 15 aircraft per year with the KC–45, you can just 

do the numbers. 

Now, we are going to maintain the 135 and keep it viable as best 

as we can, but when you get airframes operating that are that old, 

you get into the realm of unknowns there. And we are just hoping 

to avoid any catastrophic issues there that would force us to 

ground that aircraft for long periods of time. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, we need to get these new tankers. And it is 

too bad, as I said in my opening statement, it is too bad that we 


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have lost so much time because of the fiasco surrounding the proposed lease program some years ago. 

Mr. Chairman, a lot of our members have a lot of interesting 

questions. And I thank you for the time. 

INDUSTRIAL BASE

Mr. MURTHA. Did the Air Force consider the impact in industrial 

capacity? The reason I ask that question is we produced 86,000 airplanes in 1943. We are going to buy about 400—and a lot of those 

are UAVs—this year. Did you consider industrial capacity when 

you make your consideration on these contracts? 

Ms. PAYTON. No, sir. Industrial capacity was not part of the evaluation criteria. It is not part of the Federal acquisition regulation. 

And so industrial capacity was not considered. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks. 

LAUNCH AID

Mr. DICKS. Was the fact that the A330 received launch aid, 

which is a violation of the WTO regulations, and that the U.S. 

Trade Representative was bringing a case against Airbus and 

EADS for this violation, was that taken into account? 

Ms. PAYTON. Subsidies are not taken into account within the 

evaluation criteria. However, because of the WTO environment, 

each contractor offered, and they are contractually bound, that if 

there are penalties assessed on them should they lose the suit in 

WTO that they would not convey any of those losses onto the Air 

Force. 

So relative to the cost of the aircraft, depending on who would 

win or lose, because there is a suit and there is a countersuit, the 

Air Force will not be culpable to pay any of those. 

Mr. DICKS. Don’t you think it is unfair, though? I mean, going 

back to just the fairness of this. You have done your work now, and 

it is the Congress’s time to make a decision of whether what you 

did is in the best interest of our country. 

Ms. PAYTON. Absolutely. 

Mr. DICKS. What worries me is that if we do not take subsidy 

into account, then it allows the foreign competitor to have a lower 

development cost or bid lower on the price because they know they 

have already received a subsidy. And they also have been bailed 

out repeatedly by the European countries. When they have gotten 

into trouble, there have been cash infusions into Airbus. Boeing 

does not get any help like that. Boeing has to do it the old-fashioned way; it has to go to the banks. This is, I think, a basic unfairness. 

Now, is it not true that the Air Force changed the RFP at the 

final release to include additional evaluation criteria for airlift that 

was advantageous to Airbus? 

And I have the letters, I have the deal, so I would urge you not 

to say no, because you did do it. Okay? 


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KC–X REQUIREMENTS

Ms. PAYTON. Well, I would respectfully submit that the requirements for the KC–X were approved by the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council, I believe in early January—— 

General HUDSON. About right. 

Ms. PAYTON. Not one requirement has changed since the JROC 

approved them. 

Mr. DICKS. I said additional evaluation criteria for airlift. 

Ms. PAYTON. No, sir, there has not been any additional criteria 

added for airlift. As a matter of fact, we have—— 

Mr. DICKS. There was no real—on the airlift, there was no real 

requirement in the document for airlift. Isn’t that correct? You 

know, they did not say, you have to have this much airlift in order 

to be able to compete. Isn’t that correct? 

Ms. PAYTON. There were nine key performance parameters—go 

ahead. 

Mr. DICKS. Let him answer. That is a good idea. 

General HUDSON. Yes, sir. I will talk to the requirement for airlift capability. 

There are nine key performance parameters. These key performance parameters are minimum attributes or characteristics considered most essential for effective military capability. So they are the 

basic nine. They are developed by the warfighting command, in this 

case the Air Mobility Command. They go up through the Air Force 

Requirement Oversight Council; they go up through the Joint Requirement Oversight Council. And, at that point, they are fully vetted. 

These requirements then are part of the request for proposal. It 

is called a systems requirements document. We just take what 

those requirements are that are vetted by DOD, and they become 

part of the RFP, and then the contractors respond. 

One of the nine key performance parametersis (KPPs) is called 

airlift capability. This is the ability to carry passengers, palletized 

cargo, and air medical patients in the airplane. So there is a fundamental capability in terms of this one KPP; it is number four that 

was in the RFP. 

The contractors responded. We evaluated the proposals from both 

competitors. We fed back our evaluation to them, asked questions 

along the way. In fact, we fed back the data several times to the 

competitors, gave them a chance to clarify their proposals and improve them as they saw fit. And then that was finally evaluated 

for the final decision process. 

So that is how that worked. Again, airlift capability was one of 

the fundamental nine. 

INTEGRATED FLEET AERIAL REFUELING ASSESSMENT

Mr. DICKS. Yes. But the problem I have here is that you made 

some changes in this right at the end. And Boeing was told that 

the reason the changes were made was because Airbus and Northrop Grumman and EADS would pull out of the competition if 

these changes were not made. This is what they were told. 

Let me just talk about some of these so that you get a flavor of 

what I am talking about. 


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‘‘Maximum tankers at base have been calculated using precise 

parking space rules multiplied by mission capability rate. After the 

model was run, a 13 percent credit reduction in the number of aircraft required was applied for receptacle-equipped tankers.’’ 

Then it goes into, ‘‘The maximum takeoff weight and takeoff fuel 

calculations for bases with multiple ramps was determined in accordance with the lowest ramp strength, i.e. Pavement classification numbers. It is now determined using the highest ramp 

strength, which would obviously favor a larger airplane.’’ 

This was done in January of this year. Parking space was calculated based on wing-tip-to-wing-tip separation of 50 feet. This 

separation is decreased to 25 feet for the two employment scenarios. So that would favor, again, a larger airplane. 

Tanker ground turnaround time was set to a fixed number plus 

the time required to ground-refuel the tanker, resulting in longer 

turnaround time for larger tankers. 

So all of these things were done. And we all know—I have been 

in this airlift thing for many, many years. We all know a bigger 

plane takes up more space on the ramp. And that is why Boeing 

went with the KC–767. The requirements were all met by the KC– 

767. All these requirements, these five things were all met, every 

single one of them. 

And you then decided to go with a larger plane. And if Boeing 

had known you had wanted a larger plane, they would have bid the 

777. But they were told that you wanted a medium-sized airplane, 

and that was in the criteria of the RFP. So that is why I say this 

is bait and switch, very unfair, and cost Boeing the competition. If 

bigger was better, the Air Force should have said that up front, 

and they did not. They said you have to meet the criteria. If you 

meet the criteria, you have done it. You do not get any advantage 

for more air cargo capability, for more pallets, for more this, more 

that. And they were told what they wanted was a tanker and it 

was the tanking that is important. 

And Boeing has built tankers. Airbus has never built a tanker. 

And they are 2 years or 11⁄2 years behind in their deal with Australia. They have never had a boom that has passed fuel. And you 

give them a superior rating on the boom drogue capability. That is 

just impossible. 

I mean, this thing is fatally flawed, in my judgment. Can you explain all these changes at the last minute in a competition of this 

magnitude? 

Ms. PAYTON. Congressman Dicks, if I could indulge on Mr. Terry 

Kasten to answer the questions relative—this is relative to our Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment (IFARA) rating. And I 

think Terry has a lot of detail on that, so if I could do that, I would 

appreciate it. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Mr. KASTEN. Thank you, ma’am. 

Sir, we have not changed any of the requirements since the RFP 

went out. The things that you talked about were pre-RFP. The 

offerors had an opportunity to see that. All the potential offerors 

had an opportunity to see that. 


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Mr. DICKS. And Boeing objected very seriously to your doing it 

and were told, if they did not go along, that the Air Force was worried that Airbus would drop out of the competition. 

Mr. KASTEN. Sir, I am not aware of that. 

Mr. DICKS. That was what was communicated to them, and that 

is what they told me. 

Mr. KASTEN. That was not communicated—— 

CHANGES IN REQUIREMENTS

Mr. DICKS. And that is why you guys said we have to make these 

changes, we have to accommodate them. 

I can remember way back, at the start of this whole thing, when 

Ken Miller would come in and tell me, ‘‘Hey, Norm, this is going 

to be on tanking only. We don’t want a great big airplane. We want 

a plane that can do the tanking mission.’’ 

And by the way, on this thing, the Boeing proposal met the 

curve, the tanking curve by 20 percent exceeded the requirement 

there. 

But the whole idea was we want a smaller plane because you can 

put it on more fields, it is more energy efficient over the lifetime, 

we will save $15 billion over the lifetime, there will be $5 billion 

less in repair work. 

You know, smaller is better, in some cases. And, you know, it 

does not take up and jam up the fields like a C–5 would compared 

to a C–17. 

So if you wanted a big plane, why didn’t you say so right up 

front? Why didn’t you say so right up front, that you wanted a larger aircraft, instead of saying you want a medium-sized aircraft and 

then going to a—I call it bait and switch. The Air Force said one 

thing and then did the other thing. 

And General Lichte is up there praising the ‘‘more, more, more 

is better, better, better.’’ I mean, somebody should have showed 

him the memo from the Secretary that said we want a tanker that 

does the job, we don’t want a great big airplane that is going to 

be expensive to operate. And the emissions are going to violate all 

kinds of environmental rules, at some point, when we have greenhouse effects and all that. 

Mr. MURTHA. I think the member has gotten his point across. 

Mr. DICKS. I do. But I would just like one chance to answer, and 

then I will shut up for a moment. 

Ms. PAYTON. If I could respond to General Lichte’s comments, his 

comments were in relation to the KC–135, not in relation to any 

other proposed aircraft. He was not read in to the source selection. 

Mr. DICKS. Why did you have him standing up there? 

Ms. PAYTON. Because he is the customer for Air Mobility Command. He is the customer that—we are meeting the requirements 

of Air Mobility Command. 

Mr. DICKS. Shouldn’t you have gone to him first, then, and asked 

him if they wanted a bigger plane? Shouldn’t you have done that 

first, instead of waiting till the end to decide that? 

Ms. PAYTON. We had representatives from Air Mobility Command on the source selection team. We followed all of the laws to 

specifics. It has been fair and open. We have communicated constantly with both of the offerors. There have been no change in reVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:38 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046475 PO 00000 Frm 00221 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A475P2.XXX A475P2

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quirements. And everything we have done is in the effort of competition, which is what this is about. It is about fair and open competition. 

Mr. MURTHA. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. MURTHA. Yeah. 

Mr. YOUNG. I am not sure that we are getting an answer to what 

Mr. Dicks is suggesting about the changes during the process. 

Could you give us a direct answer? Were those changes actually 

made, or is Mr. Dicks inaccurate? Give us a direct answer on that. 

Ms. PAYTON. There were no changes made to the requirements 

or the evaluation criteria of this RFP after it was approved by the 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council. There have been no requirements changes. 

Mr. DICKS. Were the changes that I suggested made in the document that was sent out to both the parties? I have got the letter 

right here that says these changes were made. And it was an advantage to Airbus to have them made. 

Maybe they are not requirements, but they may be called something else. You are the guy now. Were these changes made or not? 

Remember now, when you are up here before Congress, even if you 

are not under oath, you are expected to answer truthfully. 

Mr. KASTEN. Sir, I always answer truthfully. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Mr. KASTEN. As I started to say, no requirements changes since 

the RFP went out, from my recollection. 

Mr. DICKS. What about the changes I mentioned, the ones I read 

to you? Were these things changed? 

Mr. KASTEN. Those were, as part of the RFP development process. And we discussed those with the offerors and notified the 

offerors of the—— 

Mr. DICKS. That you were going to make these changes? 

Mr. KASTEN. They saw these specific aspects of the draft RFP as 

we sent those out. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I have a letter for the record that—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Wait just a minute. Now, as I understand it, what 

he is saying is changes were made in order to accommodate Airbus 

after the RFP. You are saying they were not. That is very clear to 

me. It was clear to me before. There have been no changes 

made—— 

Ms. PAYTON. That is correct. 

Mr. MURTHA [continuing]. In the RFP in requirements, in any 

kind of whatever you call them after the RFP. Is that accurate? 

Ms. PAYTON. Correct. 

Mr. KASTEN. Not that I recall; that is correct. 

Ms. PAYTON. On January 30th, the RFP was released. We released various levels of draft RFP well before that to coordinate 

with both offerors so that they fully understood. 

Mr. MURTHA. It is fully possible that, before the RFP was finalized, that you may have made changes in order to accommodate 

competition. 

Ms. PAYTON. I would like to take the question for the record, so 

that I can come back with the details of what happened back more 

than a year ago. 


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But anything that we looked at relative to this RFP had to do 

with Air Mobility Command and the customer. 

Mr. MURTHA. That is not what I am asking. I am asking that any 

of the requirements that were changed could have been made to accommodate Airbus, but if they were, they were made before the 

RFP was finalized. Is that accurate? 

Mr. KASTEN. That is my recollection, ma’am. 

Ms. PAYTON. I am not willing to say that changes were made to 

accommodate Airbus. I am not willing to say that, under any circumstances. The requirements of the RFP were what the flying 

customer, Air Mobility Command, put in their capability development document (CDD). 

Mr. MURTHA. Madam Secretary, there was tremendous pressure 

from an individual in the Senate to get competition. We know what 

happened. We know this is costing billions of dollars. We are in a 

terrible position. You are putting us in a position—when I say 

‘‘you,’’ the country is in a position where, because of the individual 

in the other body stopping what we—the Air Force and this committee agreed to do, it is costing billions of dollars. And we are at 

a point where we do not know how long it is going to take to get 

these things out in the air. 

And so, how many of these have been grounded so far? How 

many are grounded right now, how many of these tankers? 

Ms. PAYTON. I will have to take that question for the record. 

Mr. MURTHA. Do you see the dilemma we have been put in? 

Ms. PAYTON. Absolutely. This is why we have a sense of urgency. 

But I will tell you—— 

Mr. MURTHA. We have a sense of urgency. We want to make sure 

the right decision is made here. That is our problem. 

Ms. PAYTON. And I will tell you that there are three things that 

I have encouraged the Air Force team to always consider: The motive must be pure, the cause must be just, and the process must 

be sound. And we must have no fear and no favor. 

Mr. MURTHA. No, I understand that. But you—— 

Ms. PAYTON. This is done in accordance with the law. 

Mr. MURTHA [continuing]. The pressure put on for competition in 

this particular endeavor. 

Mr. Hobson. 

Mr. HOBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Payton, you know I have great respect for both you and the 

General and your staffs. You have to operate within certain constraints. 

Ms. PAYTON. Yes, sir. 

INDUSTRIAL BASE

Mr. HOBSON. But I have a lot of problems with your decision. We 

have another job, too, that apparently is not in your purview, and 

that is the industrial base. 

I have been told by the previous Secretary of Defense he did not 

care about industrial base; he was going to buy what he thought 

was the best thing wherever he could buy it. We have a different 

duty sometimes than that, if there is an equally good proposition. 

And I would tell you that the countries that are on that list think 

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ducing something that was introduced in one of the parliaments of 

Europe some time ago when a company in my State, who actually 

wins somewhat in this deal, was trying to sell something to a country in Europe. And one of their parliamentarians stood up on the 

floor and said in their parliament, ‘‘I don’t care if it is a better price 

or a better deal; it affects our industrial base. And we are going 

to buy our engines from our country, and not the engines from the 

United States.’’ And they did, because their country valued their 

industrial base over what their military said to them—or their 

Navy, in this case, I think it was. 

Mr. HOBSON. We have an obligation to do that. Apparently from 

what you say, that is not in your purview; am I correct in that? 

Ms. PAYTON. Let me say a couple of things. First of all, I view 

Northrop Grumman as an American company. I view General Electric, who has jobs from this in Ohio and North Carolina, as an 

American company. 

Mr. HOBSON. Do you view EADS as an American company? 

Ms. PAYTON. I view the folks in Mobile, Alabama, and Melbourne, Florida, as Americans. But that did not enter into my decision here. What entered into my decision is that according to the 

law, the House and the Senate have approved a law called the Buy 

American Act that says that Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, 

Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 

Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Northern 

Ireland are to be viewed as the U.S. views our own industrial base. 

That is the law of the United States of America. 

I look to the legislative branch to write the laws of this country, 

and I am sworn to enforce the laws. When you said we want a fair 

and open competition under the laws of the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation, the Buy America Act, the Trade Secrets Act and a million other acts, I complied with those laws. And I will tell you that 

we have a very, very capable new KC–45A. And I will tell you that 

when Congressman Tiahrt and I go out to the golf course to tee it 

up, we either bring our A game, or we don’t bring our A game. Northrop Grumman brought their A game based on the law that I 

must abide by. 

Mr. HOBSON. Well, when they brought it, they brought an airplane that has not flown in its capability. You have one competitor 

who has flown an airplane as a tanker who has a system that it 

has used to refuel. I have flown in them. They are old, but I have 

flown in them. They are building a new one. The other airplane, 

has it been delivered anywhere in the world to a customer today 

with the capability, without delays? We already know that this program needs to move forward. Had we not been messed up before 

by some inappropriate actions, and then had we not had inappropriate actions again, we would have had this well on its way by 

now, and at much less cost than I think we are probably going to 

be at today. You know that better than I do. 

Ms. PAYTON. There are some false assumptions. I believe there 

may be some false assumptions in your statement. I look very 

much forward to talking with you in a closed session. 

Mr. HOBSON. What I am talking about, can you tell me when we 

are comparing apples to apples? In the two situations, you have 


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one experienced company at this, who I happen to think is an 

American company, and, as far as I, am concerned, Northrop 

Grumman is a front. They are a fine company, but they are a front 

for the French and their other partners, and a company that does 

have problems or whatever you want to call it. And we are rewarding that by giving them this thing. This is what I am saying. You 

are not saying it. What I don’t understand is there doesn’t seem 

to be credit for the people who have delivered and who have a proven product versus the people who are giving you a scenario that is 

all in the future of what they are going to do. You have made a 

judgment on that basis that such actions don’t count, I guess. 

Ms. PAYTON. The Air Force looked at an integrated assessment 

of all five of the factors that drove the decision, and based on the 

source-selection-sensitive data that was provided, the Northrop 

Grumman proposal offers the very best value to the Air Force and 

to every American taxpayer, and I look forward to discussing—— 

Mr. HOBSON. You keep saying the Northrop Grumman proposal. 

Ms. PAYTON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HOBSON. Is that the title in it? I thought the title was, when 

I keep reading about—it is the Northrop Grumman-EADS proposal. 

Ms. PAYTON. The prime contractor is Northrop Grumman. The 

prime contractor is Boeing. 

PROFITS

Mr. HOBSON. How much of the profits from this deal resides in 

this country versus these other countries? Let us assume you can’t 

treat them all the same. What percentage of the profit resides in 

this country versus the profit that goes into the European countries? 

Ms. PAYTON. Sir, there were no laws. It was not part of the evaluation criteria and—— 

Mr. HOBSON. I didn’t ask you what you the law was. I asked you 

what percentage of profits. You say you didn’t take that into account? 

Ms. PAYTON. We did not take it into account, sir. 

Mr. HOBSON. That is what I want to know. 

So there are things in here that we may want to take into account that you all didn’t have to take into any account. 

Ms. PAYTON. Absolutely. We could not take it into account because it was not part of the requirements in the evaluation criteria 

that each of the proposals was going to be evaluated against, and 

that would have been an immediate protest for us to throw in any 

additional things that were not in the requirements as traced. I 

will say the DOD Inspector General came in and made sure that 

we traced every single requirement out of the JROC into the system requirements document and into the RFP without dropping a 

single requirement. I have to stay within the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation. 

Mr. HOBSON. I know after all the problems on the CSARs and 

the other things, that you tried to scrub everything you could on 

this one. But we still have some disagreements, and, you know, I 

don’t care who the contractors are in this deal, whether it is GE— 

I didn’t get into that. They are in Cincinnati. I don’t represent Cincinnati. I represent Wright-Patterson. 


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Anyway, what I am concerned about is we get the best tanker 

for the best dollar value, and it be, frankly, an American one. Basically you say you think you have done that. I disagree, but that is 

where we are. 

Ms. PAYTON. We have to go to the law and look at the law. 

Mr. HOBSON. I understand that, and I have no question of your 

integrity. 

Ms. PAYTON. Thank you, sir. I appreciate it. 

Mr. HOBSON. You are tops. You are tops. 

Mr. MURTHA. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. Moran. 

Mr. MORAN. First of all, Ms. Payton, when the Chairman last 

year asked me to look into the acquisition procurement process, 

which we were having a great deal of trouble with throughout the 

services, I did a lot of asking around. And it might be relevant at 

this point to observe the fact that you have the very best reputation of every service acquisition officer. 

Ms. PAYTON. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. MORAN. I didn’t know you. I don’t know that I ever met you 

before. I never thought I would ever have reason to mention that. 

But what I was consistently told is that you were the one. Maybe 

it is kind of ironic they would mention it was a woman who would 

stand up when everybody else was trying to cut back on the acquisition staff because the authorizing committee wanted you to cut 

about 50 percent. You stood your ground. You kept them, and as 

a result, you kept the highest-quality people. It didn’t happen in a 

number of the other services. So I appreciate your doing that. 

Ms. PAYTON. Thank you, sir. 

FOREIGN SUPPLIERS

Mr. MORAN. I was also a little disturbed, frankly, at the implication when—I don’t know who this gentleman to your right is, but 

when he had to be reminded to tell the truth, we assumed that you 

have all told the truth, and I am trying to—as far as I am concerned, it seems to me that we need to simply know what the law 

was and the extent to which that you observed the law. If politics 

is going to trump policy, then it ought to be in such a manner to 

change the law so that the law is different next time we have a 

contract situation like this. 

Now, in the interest of full disclosure, I have all of them based 

in my district in northern Virginia. Most of them are just an office, 

but everybody is there. We don’t make anything, though, so it has 

nothing to do with jobs. Now, I have known the Boeing people for 

what, at least 35 years, Mr. Dicks, because I used to work on the 

appropriations staff for Senator Magnusson, and I know they are 

very good people, and I like them personally, as I happen to like 

Mr. Dicks. And I admire his commitment to not only his constituents, but to America’s industrial base. But I am a little bothered 

by the direction in which we are going. 

The Chairman mentioned the Dubai Ports World situation. It 

was a 62–2 vote. I happened to be one of those two, so my comments have to be taken in that context. They are hardly representative. But the other guy retired. Jim Kolbe. 

I don’t go down easily. 


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But, you know, I have also had occasion—I don’t want to get into 

too much of a digression—but to go with the Chairman of Homeland Security Subcommittee. It turns out Dubai Ports World has 

the very best technology, and as a result of that politically oriented 

decision, we made ourselves somewhat more vulnerable at the 

ports, and the Secretary of Homeland Security will acknowledge 

that. It also had implications that may be relevant here because 

when our financial institutions go to people with money, mainly the 

Emirates right now, for a bailout of our financial institutions, they 

tell them that we have to attach as much as a 10 percent political 

risk premium on every investment in the United States because of 

the Dubai Ports World situation. So it is going to continue to cost 

us billions of dollars. Now they invest anyways, and they have lost 

billions, but they still want to invest in the United States. 

So with that context, are both contracts in any way using foreign 

suppliers? In other words, we know the EADS role, but does the 

other contract involve any kind of foreign supplier or manufacturing base? Do we know that? I know it wasn’t your job to find 

out, but I would be curious. 

Ms. PAYTON. Sir, I would be very happy to take that for the 

record. I think we owe you more detail as to if so, how much. 

[The information follows:] 

FOREIGN SUPPLIERS

This information is source selection sensitive. During the Government Accountability Office protest period, such information will be provided verbally in a closed 

session, when requested by the Chairman or Ranking Member of the Committee. 

Mr. MORAN. I am told both that contracts actually had subcontractors who were going to make things outside the United 

States. 

Ms. PAYTON. The vendor supply chain for both aircraft does include piece parts components from people all over the world. 

Mr. MORAN. From foreign manufacturers, exactly. And I am also 

concerned, I doubt you are going to be able to tell us, but the potential retaliation if we were to deny this contract, what might happen 

to some of the sales overseas. You can’t answer that, but I think 

it is worth putting on the record, since we are laying out the political context here, Boeing has a great deal of foreign operation in 

other countries, France included. But if we are going to get into 

this, we ought to know what the long-term ramifications are going 

to be, because the long-term ramifications of the Dubai Ports World 

situation are lasting and very serious and expensive to the United 

States. 

SPLIT BUY

Now, let me ask you another question that, because I have been 

sort of watching this as afar since I didn’t really have a dog in the 

hunt, but late in 2007, there was a split-buy replacement strategy 

that was discussed so that we would replace the refueling tanker 

fleet with a split-buy proposal. The Air Force and DOD would simultaneously develop, test and procure two tanker aircraft, and the 

people that wanted this thought they would reduce costs through 

enhanced competition and expand operational flexibility. 


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Was that considered? What was the determination to not do that, 

to go with the one? 

Ms. PAYTON. At the time that we were looking at a dual procurement, I asked Mr. Kasten to go look at how that would play itself 

out relative to having two aircraft in the mix, having two production lines, having two supply chains, having different configuration 

management. Out in the field when you repair two different aircraft, what does that mean for maintenance, training; what does it 

mean for sparing; what does it mean for training pilots? So I want 

to turn this over to him because we found that it was not affordable relative to the level of funding that we, the Air Force, had 

to—— 

Mr. MORAN. So it was primarily a cost consideration to go on 

dual tracks? 

Ms. PAYTON. Yes, sir. 

Terry, is there any more? 

Mr. KASTEN. No. You answered it pretty well right there. It is 

a cost consideration. We looked at all the plans Mrs. Payton indicated and provided that to her prior to—we looked at all that, provided that information to Ms. Payton prior to finalizing the acquisition strategy and elevating that to OSD for the final decision on 

what the acquisition strategy was—— 

Mr. MORAN. I am not going to take as much time as my colleagues largely because I don’t have the political motivation in this, 

but I just want to reiterate something. As far as I can see, and I 

am happy to see any more information provided, that you have 

obeyed the law that you were given as well as regulation. If you 

didn’t, and if you had made any decision on a political subjective 

nature, it seems to me any criticism would be more than warranted. 

My other concern is that even though our job seems to be politics, it is supposed to be legislation, and when we let politics trump 

policy, then we get into very dangerous ground. And lastly—— 

Mr. DICKS. Would the gentleman yield since he has mentioned 

my name several times? 

Mr. MORAN. I mentioned it once, one critical and one positive. I 

will yield to you in a moment, Mr. Dicks. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Mr. MORAN. Again, if we don’t like the way the law is written, 

particularly considering all of our allies as though that is apparently part of the expanded industrial base, then we ought to consider changing that law, but I would hope that we would not criticize you for carrying out the existing law. 

Now, Mr. Dicks. 

REMARKS OF MR. DICKS

Mr. DICKS. I just would say to the gentleman who I have a great 

deal of respect for—— 

Mr. MORAN. And you know it is mutual. 

Mr. DICKS [continuing]. We have worked with him many years. 

I would just say to him, both Mr. Tiahrt and I have approached 

this in a very substantive way. We are asking substantive questions that we think need to be answered so that the American people know how this position was made. I have taken a great deal 


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of my own time to try and study this, and I find that are there 

some very serious conflicts here in what happened and what was 

supposed to happen, I mean, in terms of the way this was—we are 

not treating this frivolously. 

Mr. MURTHA. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. MORAN. You don’t remind witnesses that they have to tell 

the truth. You assume that they do unless they give reason not to. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Tiahrt. 

CHANGE IN REQUIREMENTS

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to ask important questions. 

To go back to this change in requirements, Mr. Chairman, perhaps we should request in writing when they can provide it, a 

schedule of the draft RFP and the RFP’s release, and any changes 

to those documents or revisions; also include the specifications and 

the statement of work so that we can tell if there are any changes 

during the process, just a schedule of any changes, when it was initially released and the final release. I think that is important. 

Mr. MURTHA. I think it is important to see that. 

Ms. PAYTON. We look forward to doing that. 

REMARKS OF MR. TIAHRT

Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Chairman, I want to mention one more time 

that this Loren B. Thompson, the information that he was given by 

the Air Force was a leak. I believe that leak was politically motivated to sway public opinion towards a bad decision by the Air 

Force. So before any of the details can get out, here we have something that is trying to influence this decision and how wonderful 

the decision was. It was a slam dunk. 

I think this was a strong political statement about this decision, 

and I think we ought to have a chance to talk to Mr. Thompson 

at some point in the future. This is very clear that what Ms. 

Payton says is that the United States job creation or impact was 

not part of the criteria. And as Mr. Moran said, if there are problems with the criteria, maybe we ought to look at the criteria, because I’m sure these people in good faith tried to follow all the regulations they could have. 

There is one thing I would respectfully disagree with. I believe 

the Buy American Act, the law did not list these countries that you 

mentioned, but the memorandum of understanding that the Department of Defense released included our NATO allies. So I think 

that is a decision by the Department of Defense and not the Congress. But I may stand corrected on that. I believe that is the way 

it came down. Now, what this does—— 

Mr. YOUNG. We would like to get an answer on that. 

Ms. PAYTON. We would like to take that for the record if we can 

so do. I appreciate that we will take it for the record. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you. That is a great suggestion. 

[The information follows:] 

BUY AMERICAN ACT—LIST OF COUNTRIES

The following qualifying countries are party to existing Memoranda of Understanding between the Secretary of Defense and individual country representatives 


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for increased security and cooperation: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 

Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, 

Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the 

United Kingdom. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. Chairman, we are getting so many taken questions for the 

record, and you know what is going to happen is we are going to 

get this information back to us in bits and pieces. We are going to 

be distracted with other issues. It might be better for us to have 

a follow-up hearing if it is possible, because I just see getting 

things for the record is not going to help the group come up with 

a decision here. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Reclaiming my time to make the point that this puts 

American manufacturers at a huge disadvantage. Talk to an American manufacturer like Caterpillar. Caterpillar makes engines for 

the MRAP and our heavy trucks. They make them in South Carolina, and they make them in Belgium. It is cheaper to make them 

in Belgium even though the euro is stronger than the dollar because they have a lot of regulations waived, including specialty 

metals. So there is an unfair advantage going into a bid like this. 

This was stacked against an American manufacturer from the very 

beginning. 

I know that this was carefully structured to be an open and fair 

competition, but it was not. It was an unlevel playing field. This 

is just one example. And I will give you some more. 

I want to say one thing. We talked about the requirements, the 

initial requirement, what are you replacing? What is the aircraft 

that you are trying to replace here? Is it not the KC–135E? 

TYPE OF AIRCRAFT REPLACEMENT

Ms. PAYTON. Yes, sir, the KC–X will replace all KC–135s, not 

just the KC–135E. 

Mr. TIAHRT. What you came up with, though, if you look at the 

size of the airplanes, you are replacing the KC–10, which is a larger airplane, not the KC–135, which is a smaller airplane. So if your 

requirements were to replace the KC–135, it is a little curious why 

you came up with a replacement for the KC–10. Now, the evaluation criteria, as I understand it, according to Loren B. Thompson, 

you looked at Northrop Grumman, and you looked at Boeing. Did 

you look at EADS in the evaluation criteria past performance and 

risk? 

Ms. PAYTON. I will turn that question to Mr. Kasten, but, yes, 

we did. 

Mr. KASTEN. Yes, we did. We looked at all the offerors identified, 

the major contracts that they had, and principal subs and then 

subs below that. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Did you choose the programs that were using the 

criteria, or did you always choose from a list that was presented 

by those companies? 

Mr. KASTEN. No, sir, we did both. 

Mr. TIAHRT. So you chose some of these as per evaluation, and 

you asked for some for evaluation? 

Mr. KASTEN. Yes, sir. 


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Mr. TIAHRT. Did you look at the light utility helicopter in its performance? 

Mr. KASTEN. Sir, I can’t go into the details of what we looked at. 

LIGHT UTILITY HELICOPTER

Mr. TIAHRT. If you had looked at the light utility helicopter, you 

would have found out that they made a proposal, and it was accepted by the Army on a bid that was based on American jobs, and 

once that contract was awarded, they pulled those jobs back to Germany. So it had a worse impact on American jobs for a domestic 

use helicopter than what we first thought. 

Now, that is how this is going to work. I believe that is how this 

is going to work anyway. And if you look at the House news service, the first five new KC–45s are going to be built in Toulouse, 

France. I think what they are going to say, just like with the light 

utility helicopter, you know, we already have a manufacturing line 

set up. We are just going to keep those jobs in France. Right now 

they are planning on having 1,800 jobs in America and the rest in 

France or the United Kingdom or Italy overseas the rest of them. 

So you have a criterion here that I think needs to be part of your 

evaluation process. I hope it was. I hope you also looked at the A– 

400, which is late in its delivery. I hope you considered the A–380, 

which is late in its delivery. I hope you considered the A–330, 

which was late in its delivery. All of those increased the risk of this 

program. And if you want to know further about risk, which I 

think you should know, if you look at the replacement for the Presidential helicopter, they moved the production line from Italy and 

England to America. And when they did that, they couldn’t find 

skilled workers. They got behind schedule, and the costs now are 

67 percent over what their original bid was. 

Do you have provisions in here to pay Northrop Grumman-EADS 

when they go over their original contract? What happens? If they 

can’t meet their original contract, original obligations, what are you 

going to do? 

Mr. MURTHA. They are going to come to Congress and ask for 

more money. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Exactly right. 

Mr. DICKS. Like they always do. 

Ms. PAYTON. We would like to address these questions with you, 

because they are source-selection-sensitive, because there is proprietary information in our answers. We very much would like to discuss this with you. I would say something about the KC–135. 

Because we were not developing an aircraft from scratch, the 

KC–135 became the comparative point so that we would be able to 

understand the value of each offeror based on the KC–135. Our 

goal was to not end up with another KC–135. It was to end up with 

a better capability for aerial refueling. But the only way we could 

determine, because the commercial aircraft are out there, and they 

are different, was to baseline and compare each offeror to the KC– 

135, and that gave us better information. 

Mr. TIAHRT. You came up with an apple-and-oranges comparison 

because you have a replacement for the KC–135 with one company 

and a replacement for the KC–10 with another one. So you are saying you got the best value? And how is it that you can get the best 


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value when you have an airplane that is 43 percent bigger, built 

in a country where the euro is stronger than the dollar, and it is 

still cheaper for all 179 airplanes? How can that be? 

Ms. PAYTON. I think you have a false assumption in that last 

statement that I would like to take behind closed doors to discuss 

with you. 

Mr. TIAHRT. My question is what was the lowest cost for all 179 

airplanes in each phase of that, because I am sure you will release 

that as soon as you can because it’s going to be in the contract, correct? 

Ms. PAYTON. We will release that as soon as we can; however, 

there are certain things that we need to at this point not discuss. 

SCHEDULING ADDITIONAL HEARINGS

Mr. MURTHA. Let me ask you a question. When will you brief the 

contractors? When can we have a closed session where you can talk 

to the Members freely? 

Ms. PAYTON. We are currently scheduled to brief Boeing on Friday, and we are trying to schedule the Northrop Grumman debrief 

some time next week. 

Mr. MURTHA. So we will tell the staff when you finished your 

briefings because then we will have a closed briefing for the Members. 

Ms. PAYTON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, this is a timely issue because I look 

at the schedule we are talking about, Congress will be in the district work period during the time that this information will be 

available to the subcommittee. And I am just wondering if other 

events will take place prior to the time we have that opportunity. 

Maybe we should accelerate this plan. 

Mr. MURTHA. We will see what you can work out. Obviously, we 

won’t be putting our bill together for a month or so, and that is the 

decision we have to make based on what we hear from them, so 

I think we will have enough time. But let us know as quickly, as 

expeditiously as possible, and then we will have a closed briefing. 

Ms. PAYTON. Yes, sir. Will do. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Chairman, may I continue? 

Mr. MURTHA. Let’s go to some of the other Members here. Let’s 

go to Mr. Cramer. 

Mr. CRAMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

REMARKS OF MR. CRAMER

As I said at the outset, this is an opportunity for us to look at 

how this process worked. But I am glad the Chairman referred to 

an opportunity down the line for us to have a closed-door session 

because apparently a lot of the issues that a lot of us have to be 

concerned about are issues that you can only discuss after the 

debriefings occur, and those are scheduled soon, but not soon 

enough for us to engage in that. So I hope we can come back to 

this. 

I, of course, have Boeing presence, Northrop Grumman presence 

in my district. I don’t have an iron in this very fire. My State of 

Alabama certainly does. And my Governor has weighed in on this, 


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and Jo Bonner, our colleague in the Congress who represents the 

Mobile area, they certainly have a stake in this, too. So to some 

extent, I am their mouthpiece in this as well. 

But I think, as Mr. Moran said, what we want to do is examine 

this process and make sure that integrity is preserved and that 

fairness is preserved as well. And in the final analysis, are we picking the best tanker for our men and women that are out there 

using the tanker and that will represent this country in that process? 

So when I referred in my opening statement to the criteria that 

I understand that you considered, capability, proposal risk, past 

performance, price and integrated assessment, I assume that you 

evaluated those criteria based on the teams that were involved and 

not just the lead contractors, not just Boeing, not just Northrop 

Grumman; is that correct? 

FACTORS IN PROPOSAL REVIEWS

Ms. PAYTON. Yes, sir, that is correct. And I would like to ask 

General Hudson if there is anything he would like to add to the 

way that these offers were assessed relative to our five factors. 

General HUDSON. Sir, if I can, I would like to talk a little bit 

about the process we used in these factors that you mentioned earlier. There were five factors that we used in the evaluation. We developed these. We worked these with the contractors through the 

draft RFP process, and then the five factors were in the RFP. They 

supplied the proposals to reflect their submittal for the five factors. 

The five factors were mission capability, and there were subfactors under that: key systems requirements, systems integration 

and software product support, program management, technology 

maturity and demonstration. That was the first factor, mission capability. 

The second factor was proposal risk. And we looked at risk with 

four of those first—of those subfactors. Technology maturity and 

demonstrations does not have a risk associated with it. 

And then factor three is past performance. 

Factor four is cost price. 

Factor five is the Integrated Air Refueling Assessment. 

The first three factors, mission capability and proposal risk and 

past performance, are all of equal importance. The second two, cost 

price and Integrated Air Refueling Assessment, are of equal importance, but each is of less importance than the first three. 

Mr. CRAMER. But is there a winner and loser in each category? 

General HUDSON. What we did was we gave for all those five 

subcontractors, mission capability, each one of them received a 

color code, and each one of those received a risk assessment except 

for technology and maturity. That is a pass-fail evaluation. And 

then, proposal risk, it is an overall assessment, and it also had subfactors within it that were assessed. Cost price, we looked at the 

most probable life cycle cost; that is, everything from development 

through production, through operating and sustaining the fleet of 

airplanes for a 25-year lifetime. And then the Integrated Air Refueling Assessment generates a number, and we used the KC–135R 

model as the baseline, so that was given a 1.0, and then each contractor’s proposal, the system was evaluated within a complex warVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:38 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046475 PO 00000 Frm 00233 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A475P2.XXX A475P2

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time scenario involving two combat scenarios in two major theaters, plus homeland defense, plus deployment. So a number was 

generated that reflected essentially the effectiveness of each competitor’s aircraft within that complex scenario, again with the R 

model had a baseline of 1.0. 

So, we looked at each one of those factors in the priority that I 

described and with the subfactors that were associated with each, 

looked at, and each one was assessed a grade. And then also in cost 

price we looked at risk associated with the development work and 

the production work for the five priced production lots that each 

competitor bid to us. 

BRIEFING STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Mr. CRAMER. At some point in this process, isn’t there an opportunity for the teams to come in and defend their strengths and 

weaknesses or for you to cross examine their strengths and weaknesses? 

General HUDSON. Yes, sir. Here is the way this worked. We got 

the initial proposals from each competitor. We did what we called 

an initial evaluation on each, and then we fed all those results 

back to the contractors. They got all of the grades that I described. 

So they had full and complete feedback on everything, and we fed 

that back by means of a face-to-face briefing with each competitor. 

As we worked through the evaluation process, we also went to 

each competitor with what we call evaluation notices, and these 

were formal questions that went to each. They were able to respond to each. So we used those responses in the evaluation as 

well. 

SIZE OF THE TANKER

Mr. CRAMER. Because time is limited for me anyway, the issue 

of the size of the tanker and whether Boeing understood what size 

they were being asked to submit for, how would you respond to the 

issues that have been raised about that, especially considering the 

process that was involved? 

General HUDSON. Well, sir, each competitor had to make a decision about what to submit in their proposal, what kind of airplane, 

what were those military modifications that would be made to the 

baseline commercial airplane to make it compatible with the requirements as stated in the RFP. So what was submitted was a 

business decision that each made. 

ECONOMIC IMPACT

Mr. CRAMER. In any of what you have described, do you evaluate 

economic impact within the United States or jobs within the United 

States? 

General HUDSON. Well, as Ms. Payton mentioned earlier, sir, 

each proposal had to be compliant with the provisions in the RFP 

as mandated by the Buy American Act, and both were compliant. 

In terms of X number of jobs or Y number of jobs, we did not consider that, nor did we evaluate it. 

Mr. CRAMER. Do you even know how many supplier companies 

would be involved if a team wins? 


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General HUDSON. Well, we knew, inside the proposal, each competitor described their supplier chain to us. 

Mr. CRAMER. By name? 

General HUDSON. By name. Who would make the avionics or the 

other unique things that would go into the airplane. So they described, and this is called their subcontractor structure. They described that in their proposal, so we were aware of that. 

TIME PERIOD FOR DEVELOPMENT

Mr. CRAMER. And one last question. Within the categories that 

you have described, where is it that—you want this tanker produced within a certain period of time. How do you get the response? Which of the categories causes them to respond to that? Is 

that capability? 

General HUDSON. Sir, we do not mandate a specific time for an 

initial operational capability; in other words, schedule. We wanted 

to have a risk-prudent schedule from each contractor, so we let 

them determine that, and then they told us that. 

Mr. CRAMER. And then you evaluate one against the other based 

on what they—— 

General HUDSON. Well, sir, we didn’t have a specific criteria that 

was attached with schedule. So neither got—— 

Mr. CRAMER. Why not? 

General HUDSON. Well, because the interest was that we get a 

risk-prudent schedule from each competitor. And we wanted a 

plan, a program that would come in from each contractor to be one 

that we would have confidence in, that we would be able to award, 

and they would successfully execute to. So therefore the evaluation 

did not say, for example, it had to be available by a certain time. 

Mr. CRAMER. By a day and year. But then you react to what they 

say they are capable of doing and what the schedule will be that 

they submit to you? 

General HUDSON. Yes, sir. And we evaluate that. We looked at 

the proposal that was submitted by both, looked at the program 

plan that they gave us, and then looked at—for example, in the 

case of the program management subfactor, we looked at the program plan that each laid out, looked at its risk, and we fed that 

back to both contractors. So we gave them a chance several times 

to iterate that and improve it as they saw fit. 

Mr. CRAMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. We have about 15 minutes, and then we will be 

about an hour of voting, so we want to try to limit the other folks 

as much as we can. 

Mr. Kingston. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Madam Secretary, you obviously have a battery or team of people 

who make these decisions. Can you describe the hierarchy of the 

decisions? 

Ms. PAYTON. Yes, sir. We have what is called a source selection 

evaluation team. That is comprised of well over 100 people. And 

they are composed of skill sets that are very important. So we have 

subject matter experts that look at the proposals as proposed and 


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assess whether the proposal is substantiated, and is realistic and 

is reasonable. 

And the source selection evaluation team does their job. They 

then provide information to a source selection advisory committee. 

The source selection advisory committee then provides their 

outbrief to the Source Selection Authority (SSA), and decisions are 

made. 

And I would like Mr. Terry Kasten to even further talk about 

this because he has lived a lot of it over the last year. 

Mr. KASTEN. That is correct. We had a team of well over 100 people from across the Air Force and around the country. Other government agencies come in and evaluate proposals. Periodically, 

throughout the summer and the fall, they evaluated all the offers 

relative to the criteria and provided a feedback to them specifically 

on what their scores were, what their ratings, what their color ratings were relative to the things that General Hudson just described. 

Mr. KINGSTON. It is a series of microdecisions that maybe make 

up the tipping point towards the ultimate decision, correct? 

Mr. KASTEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KINGSTON. And it is not a vote. Is there ever a vote in the 

process? Is this mostly a gradual micro-decision-making process to 

big decisions? 

Mr. KASTEN. Yes, sir. At my level that is what we do, and, in 

fact, we very much tell the teams going in doing the evaluation 

don’t even compare the offerors here. Put the assessments out 

there. At the very end of the process, just in the last few weeks 

to a month or so, that information is provided for offeror A and offeror B to a source selection advisory council. Very senior Air Force 

people that review the results do the comparison and then make 

a recommendation to the source selection authority, who then ultimately makes the final decisions. 

Mr. KINGSTON. And I understand your issue is not jobs or the industrial base that are some of the considerations that Congress 

has. If Congress, because of these other issues, decides to reverse 

this decision, what happens to this process? What happens to the 

tanker program? 

Mr. KASTEN. That would be tough to speculate, sir. 

Ms. PAYTON. I absolutely have to take that question for the 

record, because I think that it will impact acquisition programs in 

general. I am really not sure how to answer that at this point. But 

we have a process that is regulated according to the law. 

[The information follows:] 

IMPACT TO ACQUISITION PROCESS

Subsequent to the posing of this question, the Boeing Company filed a protest 

with the Government Accountability Office on March 11, 2008. The Air Force has 

suspended performance on the contract as a result of this protest. We look forward 

to working with the Congress and the Government Accountability Office while seeking to conclude this matter as expeditiously as possible. It is important to national 

security that we commence recapitalizing our aging tanker fleet without further 

delays. If we have to conduct a new competition, it will delay the delivery of tankers 

to the warfighter by 18 to 24 months. 


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Mr. KINGSTON. In that process that is regulated according to the 

law, was that developed or passed by a legislative act and then 

fine-tuned over time? 

Ms. PAYTON. Yes, sir. To my knowledge, that is—— 

Mr. KINGSTON. But it does not take the jobs or the industrial 

base consideration in it? 

Ms. PAYTON. No, sir, it does not. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Is that something that we should revisit at some 

point? 

Ms. PAYTON. Well, I don’t know. I am really not prepared to answer that at this time either. I think that it is up to our policy people and our legislators to determine policy for the United States of 

America. I am in a position where I just enforce the law relative 

to acquisition regulations, and I can’t speculate as to unintended 

consequences or the upside or the downside of that action. Thank 

you for the question. 

BUY AMERICA

Mr. HOBSON. Chairman, Mr. Tiahrt asked you a question about— 

because we don’t remember all those countries being in the Buy 

America thing. If you were to find out that that was a waiver by 

the Defense Department, then it wouldn’t necessarily be passed by 

this Congress in what you filed; would that be correct? Or do you 

have to take that for the record, too? 

Ms. PAYTON. Sir, I really do have to take that for the record because I am under the defense Federal Acquisition Regulation. Buy 

America is part of that. And these exemptions, I believe, have been 

in effect since 1970 or 1980. So I appreciate being able to take that 

for the record. 

[The information follows:] 

BUY AMERICAN EXEMPTIONS

The ‘‘The Buy American Act,’’ 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a–d, enacted on March 3, 1933 during the Depression was designed to save and create jobs for American workers. The 

central consideration of the Act is the place of manufacture as opposed to the nationality of the contractor. Congress has recognized that application of the Buy 

American Act in certain instances might unduly restrict an agency’s ability to meet 

its needs; however, the Buy American Act and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 

19 U.S.C. § 2501 et seq. establish a number of exceptions to provide procuring agencies with certain flexibilities. Additionally, the Trade Agreements Act authorized the 

President to waive any otherwise applicable ‘‘law, regulation, procedure or practice 

regarding government procurement’’ that would accord foreign products less favorable treatment than that given to domestic products (19 U.S.C. § 2511(a)). That provision of the Trade Agreements Act has been implemented by the President in Executive Order No. 12260, 46 Fed. Reg. 1653 (1981). Therefore, the Buy American Act 

restrictions favoring domestic products have been superseded for specific products 

from certain countries. The European Community has entered into a Memorandum 

of Understanding on Government Procurement (Agreement) that provides appropriate reciprocal competitive government procurement opportunities. The Trade 

Agreements Act of 1979, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2511–2518) signed by President 

William J. Clinton, implemented the following: 

Section 1. The heads of the agencies, as of the date of this order, shall not apply 

a price differential between articles, materials, or supplies of U.S. origin and those 

originating in the member states of the European Community. 

Section 2. The rule of origin shall apply in determining whether goods originate 

in the member states of the European Community. 

Section 3. This order shall apply only to solicitations, issued by DoD (and other 

agencies) listed in 19 U.S.C. § 2511, Annex 1, Parts A and B above the threshold 

of $176,000 for goods. According to existing Memoranda of Understanding between 


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the Secretary of Defense and individual country representatives, the DoD has determined it is inconsistent with the public interest to apply the Buy American Act to 

the acquisition of end products from the following qualifying countries: Australia, 

Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, 

Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Based on federal law and these memoranda, 

the content of these products are counted as U.S. content. Much of the foreign content of the KC–45 comes from Germany, Spain, and France. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Rothman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

REMARKS OF MR. ROTHMAN

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that there are two tasks for the 

Congress, and in particular this committee. The first one is to 

evaluate how this decision was made and whether, given the law 

that was guiding the decisionmakers, the decisionmakers made the 

right judgment under the law. And apparently we are unable to get 

all the answers that we have sought, and we are waiting. We will 

wait for answers to be forthcoming at either another hearing or in 

written form. And I look forward to receiving those answers so we 

can do our job and evaluate whether the decisionmakers made the 

right decision under the law that they were given. 

But, Mr. Chairman, I believe that there is another obligation of 

the Congress, which is to decide, perhaps in hindsight, but to decide whether—let’s assume for argument’s sake that the decisionmakers here made the judgment that they made according to the 

law that they had instructing them, but that we, today, as representatives of the American people, understand that what was 

guiding them in the law led them to the wrong answer, bad policy, 

a bad judgment. Then I believe it is the requirement of this Congress and this committee to overturn that decision and to embrace 

the right decision. 

Now, it may require for future projects that we amend the law 

so that our decisionmakers can be guided the first time with a comprehensive list of criteria, including perhaps, perhaps not, this is 

subject for debate in the future, job creation, location of manufacturing, industrial base, whether the competitors are receiving subsidies from their governments or not, the location of where the 

profits reside and other elements. But that doesn’t mean that we 

have to accept—if, in fact, the law was guiding these decisionmakers in the wrong direction, it doesn’t mean we’re handcuffed to 

the wrong decision that will be against the interests of the United 

States and the American taxpayers. 

Mr. MURTHA. You got that right. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. So I would suggest that our work is not done, Mr. 

Chairman, and that the work of the decisionmakers here may have 

been done in an exemplary manner with the highest of professionalism and integrity, but because perhaps they were given the 

wrong list of criteria or an incomplete list, they were bound to come 

up with the wrong answer. 

We will find out when we get the responses to our questions, but 

in the end, Mr. Chairman, I do believe it is up to the representatives of the people, the taxpayers, to ultimately make the right decision whether or not every—the directions were followed under a 

bad set of directions and the wrong outcome came to be. 


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Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Bishop. 

REMARKS OF MR. BISHOP

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me thank the panel for the information that has been 

brought to us this morning. Seems to me that, as I understand it, 

the tanker procurement program is the Air Force’s number one priority because of the aging of the 135 fleet. However, we are now 

tied in knots, if you will, because based on the policy decisions that 

have been made, the Air Force is going forth in a way that seems 

to be very disturbing to a number of the members of this Committee and, of course, to some of our colleagues outside the committee. And it is disturbing to me that we are now placed in a position where we can’t provide for the needs of our servicemen and 

women and the needs of our national defense in providing this particular equipment because of the lack of clear guidelines and policy 

set by our policymakers in the procurement process. 

I don’t know how we resolve this other than to have us take another look. I think that the suggestion that we have a follow-up 

hearing might be appropriate when we can get answers to some of 

the questions that have been raised. 

I certainly am sympathetic to the awardee of the contract. I happen to be a native of Mobile, Alabama, and, of course, Alabama 

named me, but Georgia has now claimed me. I still feel compelled 

to try to look at this situation in an objective fashion, and I would 

hope that that is what our committee and I am sure the Chairman 

will lead us in that direction. 

REMARKS OF MR. MURTHA

Mr. MURTHA. I want to say this: None of us dispute the integrity 

of this panel. We understand you follow the law. There may have 

been some insinuations and so forth; we have no question you did 

the best you could do. But we are going to do the best we can do 

also in evaluating this thing politically. When I say ‘‘politically,’’ I 

am talking about industrial base which with the Navy we consider 

very carefully. As you well know, they put the ships, they announce 

where the ships are going. So this is part of it. So we have that 

responsibility under the Constitution. 

So we will have another briefing with you as soon as we can. As 

Mr. Young said and Mr. Kingston suggested, we will have a private 

briefing so we can get some of the answers. 

I think you had pointed out you followed the law to the best of 

your ability, and we all appreciate that, even though some Members may disagree with the outcome. 

Mr. Dicks has a clarification. 

INTEGRATED FLEET AERIAL REFUELING ASSESSMENT

Mr. DICKS. I wanted to clarify that when I spoke earlier, the 

changes were in the Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment. 

That was made in February, I believe, of 2007. That was different. 

The other change, Mr. Chairman, if you just give me a little time 

here, this is Reuters, weeks before a final decision, the U.S. Air 


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Force changed criteria used to assess rival bids from Boeing Company and Northrop Grumman for new refueling tankers. Loren 

Thompson of the Lexington Institute said the last-minute change 

in the evaluation criteria could be significant since both proposals 

met nine key requirements for the new tanker, including 

aerorefueling, capability range, and ability to carry cargo and passengers. 

So, again, I want to ask you, was there a change made? I asked 

this question, and I was told repeatedly there wasn’t. But here it 

is right in the Loren Thompson, who is the Air Force’s Bible. 

Ms. PAYTON. Yes. I believe you might be referring to something 

that had to do with the model, and this would have been February 

2008. 

Mr. DICKS. Yes. 

Ms. PAYTON. Not 2007. 

Mr. DICKS. No, this was 2008. 

The other one I talked about was changes in airlift evaluation. 

That was the runways and the distance between the wings. 

Ms. PAYTON. And we have taken action to bring you back the 

timeline on any changes. 

But I would like General Hudson to address the model, the 

IFARA, and what that involved. 

Mr. DICKS. So we have two changes, one in seven and one in 

eight. 

Ms. PAYTON. No. I am not saying we had two changes. We did 

not have any changes in requirements, but I would like to clarify 

what went on with the model in 2008. 

General HUDSON. Sir, I will talk about the IFARA model and the 

process we used. The IFARA model has been in existence since the 

1980s. It is an air mobility command model, and it is used for looking at fleet effectiveness given a fleet of airplanes, in this case of 

the competitors’ proposals. 

What we did is we provided both offerors all the information on 

the model so they could use this themselves and then generate 

their own numbers for IFARA and then submit that to us. And 

then we took their information and evaluated it, had the same kind 

of feedback process back and forth with them. 

Last fall, we were in the process of evaluating the model, looking 

at what we call receptacle credit, and that is the ability. 

Mr. MURTHA. This is factor five, isn’t it? 

General HUDSON. Yes, it is factor five of—— 

Mr. MURTHA. I think you explained that very well. 

Mr. Tiahrt, you had something else? 

REMARKS OF MR. TIAHRT

Mr. TIAHRT. Yes. First of all, I hope we can make this transcript 

available to the public as soon as possible, because I believe the Air 

Force has made a big mistake here. They just don’t realize how big 

a mistake it is yet. 

One thing I want to point out in addition is under proposal risk, 

according to Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D., who was debriefed on this 

program even though we can’t be, he said the proposal risk, the 

competitors matched in this area, but only after Boeing agreed to 


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lengthen its development schedule. The rescheduling added cost to 

the Boeing proposal. 

Now, in another point in this proposal, I understand that the Air 

Force believed that they would have more aircraft on the tarmac 

by a certain point in time from EADS than they would from Boeing. So in other words, they think it is okay for EADS to have an 

aggressive schedule, but if Boeing has an aggressive schedule, then 

we are going to penalize them with a higher cost. These kind of details need to be brought out. 

Ms. PAYTON. This is very important for a closed hearing, because 

there may be some false assumptions. 

CONCLUDING REMARKS OF MR. MURTHA

Mr. MURTHA. We are going to have a closed briefing, but we appreciate the panel, and it has been very helpful, I think, to the 

committee to make a final judgment. So I appreciate very much the 

time that you have come up here. 

Ms. PAYTON. Thank you all for what you do for our Air Force. 

We appreciate it. 


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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 6, 2008. 

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND 

WITNESS 

ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. The Committee will come to order. I want to welcome Admiral Fallon, one of the premiere commanders in the field, 

one of the really—people who turned things around, an individual 

that has had a phenomenal influence on what is going on overseas. 

And we appreciate it. A lot of confidence in yourself. And I see you 

have a very light staff. Most of these guys come in, they got it filled 

up in the back room and right behind them. You have got yourself 

and a couple other people. We like to see that. We like to see somebody that—are your people outside or where are they? 

Admiral FALLON. No, sir, this is it. We are traveling light. 

Mr. MURTHA. Where is the spy from the Defense Department? 

Admiral FALLON. We are trying to slash staff. 

Mr. MURTHA. Where is the spy from the Defense Department? 

Who is representing them? Because they always send a spy over. 

No spy? 

Admiral FALLON. Spy, please stand up and identify yourself. 

Mr. MURTHA. No spy. All right. Well, we welcome you and we 

look forward to your statement. And Mr. Young. 

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I move that those portions of the 

hearing today which involve classified material be held in executive 

session because of the classification of the material to be discussed. 

Mr. MURTHA. Without objection. You have an opening statement? 

Mr. YOUNG. No, just welcome Admiral Fallon here. I have had 

a chance to visit with him the weekend before last and went by his 

headquarters, and I picked out a spot for a new building that he 

really needs. 

Mr. MURTHA. Is there anything that you don’t have down there 

that Bill has not put in there already? 

Mr. YOUNG. There is not much room left, I tell you that. 

Admiral FALLON. We are anxious to get the rest of that headquarters. 

Mr. MURTHA. We welcome your statement, Admiral. 

Admiral FALLON. Thanks very much. I have submitted a written 

statement. 

Mr. MURTHA. Without objection it will be part of the record. 


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SUMMARY STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL FALLON

Admiral FALLON. Thanks. And just a couple words. Chairman 

Murtha, Congressman Young, distinguished members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to be back here with you. And I am honored 

to have the opportunity to spend a little bit of time with you. I 

would like to, first of all, give credit where it is really due, and that 

is to our people, men and women in uniform who continue to astound me with their good works every day in Iraq and Afghanistan 

and throughout the theater, whether it is the Horn of Africa. As 

I see the young people and the responsibility that they are very 

willing to accept, the way they discharge their duties, most impressive to me are those small units, individuals, most of them pretty 

low ranking that are out there using their heads. They have got 

the picture on where we are trying to go, and they just figure out 

how to do it, the smart way and the effective way. We are really 

honored to have them working for us. 

CENTRAL COMMAND ISSUES

There are lots of challenges and issues in the Central Command 

region. I think you know that as well as I do. I look at the countries here, and every day I say let’s see, let me find a glowing spot 

of goodness here. And I think I came closest to that in Oman the 

other day, where they actually have a ruler that is progressive and 

wants good things for his people, and the country is stable and secure, and they get along with their neighbors, and they maintain 

their own internal security. Of course, it is still a one-man rule. He 

is trying to loosen that up. But the other places all have some degree of instability, insecurity or challenge. And it is just the facts 

of life. We have to deal with them, which we will. 

IRAQ

I will tell you that I am very encouraged with Iraq since I was 

last here about 10 months ago. Real progress, and it has been enabled by a lot of things. Great work by our people using their 

heads, refocusing on what they are doing, doing it much smarter. 

And they are getting a lot of help from many things. And we can 

talk about all that. I will save that until your questions. 

AFGHANISTAN

There is real progress in Afghanistan. I know there is a lot of 

chatter in the air these days about how this is going bad and that 

is going bad and bombings are up and things. The facts are the 

facts. I look at this from my perspective in a couple ways. One is 

when I look at the number of events in Afghanistan and I compare 

them to what has been going on in Iraq, there is absolutely no comparison. The scales just are not even appropriate to look at. That 

said, there are some challenges. 

In Afghanistan, the leader, President Karzai, actually enjoys support from the majority of his people. And that is a really good start. 

Governance is a major issue. They do it their way. It is very different than ours. And it is a struggle, frankly, to import our kind 

of democracy into their way of thinking. I do not think we are 

going to change this any time soon, nor probably should we. But 


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for the most part they not only enjoy the support of the people, 

they are actively working to try to give people something that they 

can be happy with. 

Again, it is a huge difference from Iraq. In this country 70 percent of the people are illiterate. Most of them live in remote places, 

inaccessible, very few roads. They have lived that way for centuries. It is just a different problem set than in Iraq. There are 

other things that I would like to highlight in a positive way. The 

Afghan Army is coming along very well. They are making progress. 

They are small, but they are well led. The leaders all have experience fighting the Soviets. Could be good, could be bad. I view it as 

good because they understand how armies are supposed to work. 

They understand the primacy and importance of leadership. And 

they realize that unless they figure out the enablers all the way 

down to the bottom they can’t get a job done. And they are actually 

working on these things. The people that make up the Army are 

ethnically mixed. I do not have the problems that we had faced certainly a year ago in Iraq, where if you were not a Shi’a, you were 

going to have a tough time getting into the security services. 

In this Army, they really do get along whether they are Tajiks 

or Pashtuns or whatever persuasion they are. We have some additional American forces that are coming into Afghanistan in the 

next couple of months. One is a Marine maneuver unit that I think 

will be very helpful in the south, that will help us to leverage 

where we left off in the fall. The other unit is just as important, 

maybe more important to me, and that is a Marine battalion that 

is going to be mentored to help in the training piece. Because that 

is the real future is to get the Afghan security people ready to take 

over security for their people. And we will be able to hand it over 

to them and significantly reduce our footprint. Just across the border in Pakistan, in my mind, cannot separate Afghanistan from 

Pakistan. There may be a border out there, but the reality is that 

the people that make up a large part of Afghanistan and a significant part of Pakistan are Pashtun tribesmen. 

The border is insignificant to them. and we have to deal with the 

reality that they are on both sides, and it really complicates business, particularly in Pakistan. There are, as you know, elections 

were just held. They are in the process of trying to form a new government. I am anxiously watching to see how this is going to work 

out. The good news is it is a democratic process. People were elected to form a government. The challenge is just the traditional insecurity and uncertainty within that country and how this is going 

to work out. So we are certainly following that closely. 

There is some good news, though. Kenya, which as you know, 

was just torn by ethnic fighting amongst the people there, Kofi 

Annan went down there and brokered a peace deal finally between 

Kibaki and Odinga, and fingers crossed that they will follow 

through not only with what they say and what they agreed to, but 

that they actually put in place things that are going to give confidence to people to get back together again. 

I will spare you the rest of the litany of the 27 other countries, 

except to say that we spend a lot of time working on trying to build 

capacity within these countries to provide for their own security so 

they can do it rather than us. But we recognize how essential it 


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is for American leadership and presence in this region to try to get 

people to work together. They do not come naturally to it. It is just 

a fact. Most of them are very willing to work with us. They do not 

like to work with each other. And that goes for most of the Arab 

countries as well as the others, but I think it is in our best interests to keep pushing it, so we do that. I think I will end it here. 

Thanks for the opportunity to be here. And why don’t I turn it back 

over to the Chairman and let you all see where you would like to 

go. Thank you, sir. 

[The statement of Admiral Fallon follows:] 


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FINANCIAL CONTROLS

Mr. MURTHA. A couple things that I just want to point out. One, 

I worry we have so much problem in Iraq with the acquisition program, where cash was just such a temptation. I worry about the 

program that the troops are actually running, because these people, 

may of them were uniform people that were involved in this acquisition program. You keep asking—when I say you, most of the commanders keep asking for more money, and I realize the value of it. 

But we got to be very, very cautious. And they have got to be told, 

you know, when that cash is floating around, they have got to be 

responsible for it. And at the early stages of the war there was all 

kinds of access to that money, and it was not necessarily the military, but certainly lately it has been, and I am hoping that your 

commanders understand they have got to be very responsible for 

that money and to be very careful in the way they hand it out. 

Admiral FALLON. Sir. 

PRISON SYSTEM

Mr. MURTHA. The prison system, talk about the prison system. 

When I was over there at Thanksgiving I visited the one prison. 

I was so impressed by what General Stone was doing. And I think 

that was a big part of the change, because I saw—staff told me 6 

months or so before that it was ready to explode. Stone came in 

and did a job. here is it now? 

Admiral FALLON. Chairman, I concur with your assessment. 

When I first went over there last year and took my first look at 

Buca the smoke was still rising from the latest riot. They burned 

down their hooches in these. And I took one look at it and said oh, 

big trouble. Big strides. In the probably two significant areas of approach here, first the physical dimension of moving away from 

those cages and putting people into much smaller confinement 

areas, hardening some. And most importantly is what is going on 

with the individual people. As you know, the approach here has 

been to not treat them all like they are all arch criminals, but to 

actually spend some time sifting through each of the cases trying 

to sort out the bad from the real bad from those that may have gotten—they may not be purely innocent, but we can figure out a way 

to work with them. My sense is that we have to figure this out and 

to try our best to return to society as many of these folks as we 

can. Otherwise I suspect that the day we finally leave they are just 

going to get turned over and they will all run. 

General Stone has done remarkable work in first thinking 

through this problem, recognizing that everybody is not the same. 

And we have to figure out a way to try and rehabilitate those that 

can be done, and not let them get tied up with the zealots, of which 

there are certainly some in there. And so he has worked hard at 

separating them. This is a tough sell, I will be honest with you. 

Our troops were gagging at the idea that we were going to turn 

these guys loose. They said we captured the, we found them out in 

the field trying to kill us and do other things, and they just did not 

like it at all. There is a process now for reviewing each case. 

They bring the field commander’s representatives in to let them 

sit in, watch and see so they can have a vote in it. But the deal 


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is that the numbers are going up that are being turned back into 

society. And they are not just being turned over. They are being 

trained, educated. And the guys are taking to it. Most of these people do not have a high school education. And part of the deal is to 

offer them a chance to learn something. And we actually had a case 

some months ago where there were a bunch of youngsters, there 

were teenagers, I think about a hundred and some, or I think there 

was like 700 total that were under 21. They were in an education 

program. And a large number of them said we do not want to be 

released yet. We want to finish the schooling, because it is our only 

opportunity. 

I think that is success in my book. So it is coming along. I have 

got to tell you we have got to do the same thing in Afghanistan. 

Numbers are dramatically smaller, less than a thousand detainees, 

facilities unsat. Have not been coming at it the same way. Asked 

General Stone to go down and take a look at this. He spent a week 

out there, came back, kind of verified my first impression, and is 

helping us to craft a program and do the same thing in Afghanistan. 

Mr. MURTHA. You mentioned the possibility that you needed 

money for a prison. 

Admiral FALLON. Need to rebuild that facility. 

Mr. MURTHA. Have we gotten that request? 

Admiral FALLON. You have not. It is in work back in the building. We will figure it out. 

PISTOLS

Mr. MURTHA. One other thing I wanted to mention is when I was 

over there the trainers themselves said the pistols did not work, 

that they had problems with it the safeties were defective. I talked 

to a lot of trainers, and they all agreed. Now, your staff came back 

and said there is no problem with these pistols. I wish you would 

have them relook at that because I am talking to people who are 

actually training people, looking at it, and they are telling me personally that these things do not work. 

I do not know how far your staff looked into it, but somebody sitting at your headquarters may not know as much as they know. 

So I would appreciate it. There is 37,000 of them. They are Smith 

& Wesson pistols. And every trainer I have talked to felt they were 

defective. So I would appreciate it if you would look into that yourself. 

Admiral FALLON. Will do, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Young. 

EUROPEAN SUPPORT IN AFGHANISTAN

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Admiral, welcome. Always glad to have you here. We appreciate your responsibility and the really good way that you carry it out. Chairman 

Murtha this morning at a hearing relative to the Air Force’s decision on awarding the contract for the new tankers made a point 

that I have been thinking about all day. And I thought it was a 

pretty good point. And that is in this contract, many of our European friends are going to have strong economic effect, positive economic effect, but they are the very ones who are refusing to help 


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in Afghanistan to meet what really is their part of the share—that 

share of the burden as part of NATO. Is there a good reason why 

these other countries do not want to join up in Afghanistan as we 

face an aggressive Taliban? 

Admiral FALLON. In my mind, no, sir. I think it is a lack of will, 

a lack of leadership, lack of willingness to accept some casualties. 

It is, frankly, just not wanting to get hands dirty doing the tough 

jobs. The lists of qualifiers, of caveats as they call them that General McNeil has to put up with from the majority of our allies is 

pretty sad. He is a better man than I am. I probably would have 

lost patience with this sometime ago. They just do not seem to have 

the stomach for it. Happy to talk about it, but walking the talk is 

a different matter. I think that is just what it comes down to. 

REGIONAL THREATS

Mr. YOUNG. I know that you are in contact with the leaders of 

at least most of these nations, especially the ones in your AOR. Do 

they understand what the long term threat from the Taliban might 

be or al Qaeda if they are not held in check? 

Admiral FALLON. I think they do. Different degrees of that. And 

perceptions are all over the place. Certainly in Afghanistan, Karzai 

and his leadership recognize the challenge these folks present to 

them. In Pakistan, the leadership understands it. There is a significant part of the population that is very sympathetic to these 

folks, though. In the rest of the region it depends on who you are 

and where you are as to who you see as threat. Most of the other 

countries feel Iran is the long term concern because of doubts about 

where the Iranians’ intentions really lie. Most of them, if you get 

them off line, will tell you that they think they want to create another Persian empire, and they are going to try to do whatever 

they can to be in that position. So they recognize these things. 

One of the challenges we deal with, frankly, and in some places, 

Pakistan is a good example, is that they see us do things that they 

like, but then they doubt how much or to what extent we are willing to stick by them for the long term. They recognize that a lot 

of these problems are not going to be solved overnight, and they 

look at things like actions that we take that they feel are not in 

their best interests. We had about a 12-some-year hiatus when the 

General ran them and other things, and I understand why these 

things get ginned up, but at the end of the day, we have now lost 

12 years’ worth of time with the leadership in the military, for example, who during that period when we had no engagement are 

tending to be distrustful of us. 

And you know, okay, you guys talk, but are you going to be here 

if we really need you? So that presents some challenges. There is 

also the reality that these folks, for a host of reasons, do not really 

cooperate too well with one another. They will go, they will smile, 

they will drink tea, they will all attend various summits, but when 

it comes to real cooperation, well, let’s band together and do this, 

we will work with you. Let’s leave these guys out of it for now. So 

that is reality. We deal with it as best we can. I think most of them 

recognize the threats. They see Iran, Iranian behavior, do not like 

it. They see the nuclear program that has a big question mark over 

it. And then they look at what the Taliban have done, they look 


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at the methods of al Qaeda, kill people to make their point, torture 

people, and I think these things register with most of them. 

PAKISTANI ARMY

MR. YOUNG. One of the important players, maybe I should not 

say players, but one of the important individuals in this area is the 

general who is the new commander of the Pakistani Army. Is he 

somebody that we can depend on or—— 

Admiral FALLON. I think so. I have met General Kiyani several 

times. I was just telling Chairman Murtha that I spoke with Admiral Mullen early this mo ning. He had just flown back from Pakistan. Had another meeting with him. We both feel the same way, 

that even though he has only been on the job a few months, he 

seems to understand the strategic priorities. He has taken pains to 

try to pull the Army away from politics. They had gotten pretty enmeshed in it as Musharraf was both chief of the Army and the 

President, the lines got blurred. He has directed Army guys to start 

backing away, including retired people, to get out of a lot of these 

civilian institutions that are part of the government. 

So these things tell me that he gets it. And we will try and help 

him in any way we can. 

Mr. YOUNG. Does he have control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons? 

Admiral FALLON. ———. 

Mr. YOUNG, Well, you have a real heavy responsibility. And I appreciate the way that you have taken over and charge in running 

your responsibilities so well. So thank you very much for that, and 

thank you for being here today. 

Admiral FALLON. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

TRAINING TEAMS IN AFGHANISTAN

Mr. MURTHA. One of the things I did not mention is these training teams you have in Afghanistan, my understanding are the most 

part of our deployment, because they react with the people, they 

train the Afghans. That is really what it is all about. And it is supposed to be a State Department training team. Of course, not all 

of your people. But your protege there, young woman you introduced me to is going to AFRICOM, tells me they are loading it up 

with the Commerce and so forth, which I am glad to hear, because 

that is really what we need to be involved in with these other agencies. I know the shortages that I heard about were agriculture, 

commerce, and things like that. So the State Department, this committee has offered over and over again to give them money if they 

would provide the leadership of those teams, but they just can’t do 

it. 

Admiral FALLON. This is a case of, first of all, the Armed Forces 

are expeditionary by designed and by nature, and so the idea that 

we have an emergency, we pack up and go is part of the business. 

Our other institutions except the Department of State generally are 

domestically focused, always have been. And so to change the culture to one that is expeditionary I think is a real challenge. And 

the numbers are really thin. 


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So we are doing what we can. We are blessed with folks in uniform, a lot of the Reserves and Guardsmen that have other jobs 

that are in these areas. So we are trying to leverage those for the 

time being. And actually, what is really interesting, some of these 

PRTs, these Provincial Reconstruction Teams that are being led by 

uniform people, completely new, different than what they ad done, 

I went to one place, and I kid you not, the commander and two of 

his subordinates were submarine officers, nuclear engineers that 

are out running these things. 

And by all accounts, the guys were ding pretty darn good at it, 

pretty darn well at it. An F–18 pilot, Navy guy, and again these 

are just Navy examples because they highlight them to me, they 

think I am still in the Navy every day, but there are folks from 

every walk of life that are stepping up and doing these things. 

EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION

Mr. MURTHA. One of the things Mr. Young mentioned that I 

talked about this morning, the last time we were over there we 

were waiting on the Europeans to put mere troops into NATO. And 

this was one of the things finally we had to send the Marines in. 

But the frustrating thing is they tell me the British lose more people from drug abuse than they do in Afghanistan. And the poppy 

growing has increased so significantly, it all goes to Europe, and 

they still can’t understand the importance of this effort, or at least 

they do not seem to participate. They just let us do it. But we appreciate your difficulty in dealing with them. And Mr. Cramer? 

Mr. CRAMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Fallon, welcome back. I want to stick on this Afghan issue. You sounded fairly 

optimistic about Afghanistan, yet everything I hear and read would 

indicate there is not much reason to be optimistic about what is 

going on there. 

SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

Admiral FALLON. I guess my sense is you got to keep putting it 

in context. I have to do that myself. Even within the Interagency, 

I have to tell you it is actually a great novel idea, and one that I 

much appreciate, is some of our intelligence agencies are now actually sending me their draft reports for comment. And the last one 

that I saw I actually said, interesting. I understand what you are 

trying to say here, but I choose to disagree with this conclusion and 

this conclusion, and here is why. 

Part of it is data. Afghanistan is a challenge because it is so rugged geographically and so chopped up by tribes and district and so 

forth. We have a significant presence in a relatively small percentage of that country. There is a lot of data extrapolation in my opinion that takes a point here and a point here, and next thing we 

have—the data that I have seen indicates that somewhere in the 

70 to 80 percent of all the kinetic activity takes place in about 10 

percent of the districts in the country. And so the converse of that 

is that there are large tracks of this country where it is pretty benign. 

I try, every visit to that country, to go to a different place so I 

can have my own assessment of what it is really like. And I have 

been to some places that are very benign. I take my wife to AfVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:38 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046475 PO 00000 Frm 00285 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A475P2.XXX A475P2

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ghanistan almost every trip. And I am tied up in meetings a good 

chunk of the time, but she is not, and she gets a chance to go meet 

real people in real places. And is it great? Is it totally secure? Are 

people not nervous? No. There are definitely problems. But my 

sense is it is not as bad as some might have yo., believe. 

NATO CONTRIBUTION

Mr. CRAMER. The NATO presence there is uneven. I mean with 

the caveats and the division of the PRTs and their ability to engage 

in direct combat, and some countries are, some countries are not. 

By the way, which ones are? 

Admiral FALLON. To be quite frank, our best partners to date by 

demonstrated performance are the Canadians. And after that it is 

starting to get pretty spotty. 

POPPY PRODUCTION

Mr. CRAMER. Even the Brits, and I think their PRT is the biggest 

poppy-producing region, or one of the bigger. 

Admiral FALLON. Well, but that is kind of by circumstance. 

Helmand Province is the number one poppy-producing area in Afghanistan. A lot of that, to be fair, is geography. It happens to sit 

right athwart probably the biggest river valley, which means the 

most irrigation, which means the most fertile land, and it is a huge 

province. And it has traditionally been a poppy growing area. That 

said, and I keep my observations to the security side rather than 

the PRTs and others. But each of them have restrictions, stated or 

otherwise. And when General McNeil, our commander, has to— 

wants them to do something, in many cases they tell him to hold 

the line for a bit, and they will go back and even go all the way 

back to their capitals to ask a specific permission to do a single 

operational thing. And that is certainly not the way to do it. 

Mr. CRAMER. Are the Italians making any progress? Aren’t they 

charged with trying to create or help create a judiciary there? 

Admiral FALLON. I can talk more of the security. They just had 

the west until recently. And I did not see much action at all. They 

have got people on the ground, but not doing the things that—— 

U.S. MARINES IN AFGHANISTAN

Mr. CRAMER. Our 2,200 Marines that are employed there, will 

that be for a seven-month deployment? 

Admiral FALLON. There are actually two different groups of Marines. 

Mr. CRAMER. One for training and one for—— 

Admiral FALLON. Total of about 3,200. The one of 2,200 size is 

going to be a maneuver unit. It is going to go and work for the 

NATO command for General McNeil. And he has told me he expects to use them in the south, where he thinks he has got his biggest problem. They will be there until next fall. And I specifically 

asked for a unit for that period of time, because that is when I 

think they are going to be useful. In the winter, things really tend 

to die down because the weather just is too difficult to operate. So 

given the demands on our forces right now, it seemed to me this 


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was a prudent use of them and will not tie them up excessively 

after that. 

So I think they can get a lot done, because this is going to be 

the—in Afghan tradition, we do not like the choice of words, but 

they call the spring, summer and fall the fighting season. And then 

they go back and try to stay out of the weather during the winter. 

So they are there for that purpose. The battalion that is going to 

do the training, working directly for me in the OEF hat, to do that, 

they will also be there for about that period of time. Because of the 

demands on the system, I do not want to—I would like to be able 

to come up with replacements for them later in the year. 

We will have to jump that fence when we get there. But they are 

going to be there just for a limited period of time. But I think in 

the case of the maneuver unit, it is exactly the right period of time 

and should—— 

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES

Mr. CRAMER. I want to ask you a question about MRAPs in Iraq. 

When MRAPs were first deployed to Iraq we were using contractors to train Marines to use the new vehicles. Are we still doing 

that? 

Admiral FALLON. I couldn’t tell you the answer to that one directly. I can tell you that the MRAPs are now in widespread use 

throughout the country. In fact, I rode in one the other night when 

the weather, sandstorm shut us down and couldn’t fly to get back 

to Baghdad. They are very, very helpful. They have saved a lot of 

lives. In fact, to the best of my knowledge we have had two people 

killed in these things, one when the thing blew up and actually 

rolled over and the gunner unfortunately was crushed but the people inside survived. And another one when some terrorist actually 

managed to shoot an RPG into the turret of the gunner. 

But the things have been remarkable in keeping our people from 

being seriously hurt. And they are there in significant numbers. In 

fact, I just saw an e-mail this morning from TRANSCOM that they 

have hundreds queued up now ready to go, and they have made a 

big difference. The training, I think—whatever the training, is, 

they appear to be doing fine, whoever is doing it. And I will get 

back to you. 

[The information follows:] 

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle training is the responsibility 

of the Joint Program Office, Program Manager, MRAP (JPO PM MRAP). The training team is comprised of a consortium of contracted instructors from the respective 

MRAP Original Engineer Manufacturers (OEMs). 

MRAP New Equipment Training (NET) is a 32 hour block of instruction conducted over a four day period. Pre-requisite for the course is assignment or anticipated assignment to a unit operating MRAP vehicles. NET consists of Vehicle Characteristics, Preventive Maintenance Checks, Emergency Egress/Roll-Over, Vehicle 

Driving Operations Phase I and II (Day/Night), Operating Under Unusual Conditions, Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) Training, Vehicle Self Recovery/ 

Auxiliary Equipment/Flat Tow and Operator Level Vehicle Troubleshooting and 

Maintenance. NET concludes with a Final Exam an End of Course Critique. 

LENGTH OF DEPLOYMENTS

Mr. CRAMER. We have an opportunity to go to Iraq from time to 

time And one of the biggest issues that I hear from my constituent 

troops there is about the length of deployment there. This time last 


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year, the Secretary announced that tours would be increased from 

1 year to 15 months. How is that having—what morale effect is 

that having? 

Admiral FALLON. Clearly, 15 months is a long time. I have been 

around this institution for 40-some years. I have made a couple of 

10-month deployments at sea, and they get pretty old after a while. 

15 months in a combat zone is a long time. We know it. The expectation is that as the drawdown accelerates here later this year, 

General Casey has indicated he thinks he can go back to 12-month 

deployments with 12 months off. 

We all know that is not good enough either. We want to get 

much more time. We would like to go to twice as much time at 

home before you go out, Marines on a little different cycle, but the 

stress is about there. It has an effect no doubt on it. It has a big 

effect on families. And my assessment is that you can only keep 

this up for so long. And we have got to bring it down. And we are 

going to work to that end. But when they are out there despite the 

amount of time, the troops are performing terrifically. With very, 

very few exceptions they are just getting the job done, and they are 

sucking it up, and we ought to be really grateful for what they do. 

But we know we have to change this. And we are going to do it. 

Mr. CRAMER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. The gentleman from Georgia. 

CONGRESSIONAL SPOUSE TRAVEL TO AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, I want to 

ask you a question. First of all, in terms of when we go to Afghanistan, we are not allowed to take our spouses. When will that be allowed on a CODEL? 

Admiral FALLON. I don’t know. And that is a loaded question. If 

I could come back at you. 

[The information follows:] 

The Department of Defense limits combat zone visitations to mission essential 

personnel only. Members of Congress qualify as mission essential due to their oversight capacity. However, current United States Central Command policy denies 

spouses and children accompaniment on Congressional Delegations for security reasons. 

United States Central Command cannot provide a specific timeline when the benefits and symbolism of spouses attending Congressional Delegations to a combat 

zone will offset the security concerns. Admiral Fallon concurred that spouses and 

family members provide significant partnership benefits with host nations. He endorsed the return of dependents to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, in 

part because of the contribution their return would make in our relations. As the 

security situation improves in Afghanistan, prohibition of spouse accompaniment 

into a combat zone may change as appropriate for the conditions 

United States Central Command, the Chief of Mission to Afghanistan, and Combined Joint Task Force–101 continually assess security concerns in Afghanistan. 

Should the situation warrant a change in Office of Secretary of Defense policy, 

United States Central Command will conduct proper coordination. 

Mr. KINGSTON. It would have a lot of not just symbolism, but 

substance if we could do that. 

Admiral FALLON. I will be frank with you. I actually had planned 

to take my wife to Iraq last month. And at the last minute a decision was made to not let that happen. It really irritated her. And 

we had a whole program set up. But I think that is part of the 

problem, that Iraq’s a little bit less stable than Afghanistan. And 


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my sense is that right now we are probably about where we ought 

to be. Let’s get this thing moved down. My wife can go—or I want 

her because she is actually engaging with Karzai’s wife, for example. They have become more than just passing acquaintances. And 

it is interesting how effective sometimes that those messages that 

we are trying to send can be. So I understand what you want to 

do. I think we probably ought to wait a little bit longer. 

AMERICA’S IMAGE

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you. Another question, we often hear in 

popular discussions that America’s image overseas has fallen and 

so forth. And so often I always think, well, that is just because 

France is mad at us, and usually it is the Europeans who are constantly very unhappy. Do you find that to be true in your 27 countries? Would you say our stock is about where it has been or is it 

down or up? 

Admiral FALLON. It all depends on where you are. I think that 

we are seen in a better light now just because our folks have been 

successful in Iraq, for one thing. There is a continuing criticism, 

frustration with the situation in the Levant with Israel and the 

Palestinians. And this is constantly being spread out. And we are 

blamed because we have been historically very supportive of Israel. 

Of course we are supportive of the peace process, and trying to get 

everybody a fair shake here. 

And I heard something I actually thought remarkable. I was 

sharing a dais and a forum in Doha a few weeks ago, and a gentleman who had been the chief negotiator for the Palestinians for 

about a decade was speaking. And he actually said, and I almost 

fell out of my chair, he said, you know, we, and he pointed to himself, he said we have to take responsibility for a solution here. Not 

the Americans, not others, we have to do it. We have to figure out 

how we are going to deal with Hamas and get this job done. And 

I thought wow, that is terrific. Record that. But then he regressed 

into some other stuff about the U.S. should do this, and this and 

this. But this is a job. The Palestinian issue in the Arab world is 

a continuing thorn in our side in terms of thrown in front of our 

faces constantly. 

ISRAEL

Mr. KINGSTON. And as long as we have our relationship with 

Israel, then that is going to continue to be a problem. 

Admiral FALLON. Well, I have another view of this thing. It is 

also a handy whipping boy, in my opinion, for lack of people getting 

along to knuckle down and get stuff done. One of the other challenges in the Arab world, frankly, is they just will not cooperate 

well enough in my opinion with each other. And so it is easy to 

have somebody else be the bogeyman for this stuff. I got to tell you 

something else. On the flip side of this, the engagement and the 

good will that our people generate, our individual soldiers and sailors and civilian employees of the Department and of the other 

agencies that actually get out and do real work in these countries, 

that is appreciated—recognized, appreciated, and that is its own 

little enclave of goodness. And you know, word gets around. 


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So it seems to me that the right approach here is to continue to 

work these seemingly intransigent issues which sooner or later 

they are only going to get solved by people that are willing to take 

leadership positions and force the solutions and to keep our people 

working at the grass roots level. 

TRADE AGREEMENTS

Mr. KINGSTON. The only country we have a trade agreement with 

I think is Jordan, relatively new, ’05 I think, and then Bahrain. 

Admiral FALLON. Bahrain, too. 

Mr. KINGSTON. That is not on line yet, is it? Or is it just getting 

on? 

Admiral FALLON. I think Jordan and Bahrain are both—— 

Mr. KINGSTON. Jordan was ’05 I think. I am not sure, but I know 

our trade with them has gone up 90 percent since the implementation of that agreement. Is that something we need to start really 

running out and doing a lot of these trade agreements like that? 

Admiral FALLON [continuing]. A little bit out of my lane, but it 

seems to me it is the economy, and this where you can really make 

some hay. And so without being the expert by a long shot here, it 

seems to me that these are good areas to move down. 

SOMALIA

Mr. KINGSTON. And I have one more question, Mr. Chairman. 

Where are we on Somalia these days? You only had a paragraph 

in your statement on it. 

Admiral FALLON. Somalia is one of the few countries that I have 

not put my feet on the ground. It is very unstable. It has had a 

succession of challenges. As you know, it is very tribal. The idea 

of a central government is kind of wishful thinking it seems to me. 

It got pretty bad last year, so the Ethiopians decided to go fix it. 

It got too bad for them. And they have another problem because 

they have a region of Ethiopia in the east called the Ogaden which 

has been traditionally a very distressed and fractious area. The instability in Somalia was spilling over, and they finally had enough 

and went in to try to fix it. As they discovered, along with some 

of us, it is a lot easier to get in sometimes than get out, and so 

now getting out without leaving total instability has been a problem. They are working on it. They are trying to train security 

forces and so forth. 

Somalia is still pretty dicey. It is a very tough, tough area. And 

as you probably saw, we actually did a 

So Somalia is very tough. It is certainly not a place that I think 

is going to get much better any time soon. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Rothman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Fallon, great 

pleasure to have you back. 

Admiral FALLON. Thanks. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. How many carriers do we have in the Persian 

Gulf now, sir? 

Admiral FALLON. One. 


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Mr. ROTHMAN. One. And I read we were about to have three warships off the Lebanese coast. Or are they there yet? 

Admiral FALLON. One for sure. And actually Lebanon is my responsibility, but the waters to the west of there are NAVEUR’s. I 

think the plan was to have three out there for some period of time. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Is there one there now? 

Admiral FALLON. There was a destroyer out there this weekend. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. There is a lot of speculation as to why we would 

have that show of force there. Thee are lots of reasons. My question 

is—well, first of all, what is the reason? 

Admiral FALLON. The idea is to demonstrate that we care a lot 

about this country called Lebanon, that we are aware that among 

others, Syria is influencing it negatively. And it is a show of interest rather than a show of force. It is a show of caring. And it is 

one of these balancing acts. You do not want to be obvious—— 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Right. 

Admiral FALLON [continuing]. In terms of being seen or threatening, but you want to show that you are interested. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. There is a belief that if Israel has to go into Gaza 

to try to stop Hamas from sending these rockets and killing the civilians that this warship the several warships off the Lebanese 

coast will have a chastening effect or chilling effect hopefully on 

Hezbollah. Is that related at all? And if Israel did enter—or rather 

if Hezbollah attacked Israel from the north, would those warships 

be involved in any military operations? 

Admiral FALLON. No. Not unless some discussion and agreement 

were made. They are not connected at all. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Okay. 

Admiral FALLON. But Israel has gone into Gaza, though. In fact, 

they just pulled back yesterday after an incursion to go after the 

rocket men. 

TROOP STRENGTH IN IRAQ

Mr. ROTHMAN. Right. And without much effect on the numbers 

of rockets sent into Ashkelon. With regard to Iraq, it was reported 

that you had said that there should be a pause in the troop reductions in Iraq. 

Admiral FALLON. I did not use the term—I think we probably 

ought to stop using that term pause because it is not really appropriate. What I think, and I am waiting for General Petraeus coming back to me with his proposals, the way this works, I had sent 

him what we call a planning order a couple months ago and said 

as we look ahead, and I did the same thing back last summer as 

we try to figure out, so I said after July what do you think we 

ought to do? And to help you, I want to frame some scenarios for 

you. 

Conditions continue to improve, conditions are staying about the 

same, or conditions deteriorate. Give me your proposed ways you 

are going to come to grips with this. And so he is going to get that 

back to me here. We will consider it at our headquarters, and we 

are going to talk to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Now, here 

is what I think is going on in the background. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. So those report were inaccurate, sir? 


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Admiral FALLON. Well, they are inaccurately stated. But if I 

could—— 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Please. 

Admiral FALLON [continuing]. Explain why I think it is appropriate to have some assessment. What I think—General Petraeus, 

I am ahead of him, because he is the guy on the ground, he has 

got to deal with this, he is going to come to me. But what I expect 

him to tell me is that what is going on between now and July is 

that we are going to pull back four brigade combat teams very 

quickly. We are also in the process of changing out two other brigade combat teams, whose replacements will continue to maintain 

our force level at 15 in the country. That is a lot of moving parts 

in a short period of time. 

The reality, if you could picture Iraq, God’s eye view looking 

down on it as a big chess board, and the operational commanders 

have divided responsibility for various pieces of the turf to different 

commanders, as we cull these commands and all their troops out 

of there, those areas of responsibility are going to have to expand. 

And so the new commanders on the ground are going to take responsibility for areas they did not have before. There are a lot of 

places that this is going to be pretty interesting, because we have 

had difficulties, as you know, in the past in Baghdad and Diyala 

and certain other places. 

And so as these things change around, I think it is probably pretty smart to take a little 1ook at this and see what it is. How long? 

Do not know. We are all of the same mind here. We want to bring 

our forces down, and we would like to do it as quickly as makes 

sense. We do not want to throw away the blood, sweat and tears 

that have just been poured into this thing in the last year. And the 

solution here is Iraqi Army stepping up to take over responsibility. 

At the same time we are moving all of our forces, they are going 

to be moving forces as well to take over chunks of this turf. So all 

these things going on, I think it is probably going to be prudent, 

I will be surprised if General Petraeus doesn’t come back to me and 

say let’s take a look at this for a little bit. 

IRAN AND SYRIA

Mr. ROTHMAN. If I may follow up, in analyzing how fast to draw 

down, lots of people talk about concerns regarding Iran and Syria. 

Can you talk to us about what is the level of Syrian—or rather Iranian involvement in Iraq good and bad, and Syrian involvement 

good and bad? It is reported that 90 percent of the foreign fighters 

are coming in through Syria. Have they done anything positive to 

help us or is it just one good effort and then one bad effort equals 

nothing? 

And if I may, since I know we have to vote, I will just throw this 

question out, if it is not too flippant, but I am concerned, if you get 

a chance to read other than the extraordinary materials that you 

do, what fiction book are you reading? 

Admiral FALLON. It is not a fiction book, and I will confess Chairman Murtha might get a kick out of this. I had a special treat last 

week in that I discovered down in Tampa that one of my childhood 

idols, a baseball player by the name of Robin Roberts, who used to 

pitch for the Philadelphia Phillies had actually retired to Tampa. 


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So I immediately got ahold of him and asked him to come in and 

maybe honor me by coming to lunch one day. So he did. And on 

Monday he showed up, and I was just thrilled. And he is a great 

gentleman, mind sharp as a tack, and remembers those games almost a lot better than I did. 

And when he left he was kind enough to leave me with a couple 

books that he had written. And one of them is the 1950 Whiz Kids 

and their story. So that is what I am actually reading in my spare 

time. I have got about 20 pages done. 

Syria. 

Iran has got to play a better role. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you. 

EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION

Mr. HOBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, it is good to 

see you again. I want to go to Afghanistan. And Mr. Murtha may 

have talked about some of this, but I want to go over a little bit 

of it. Mr. Murtha and myself went to Afghanistan, and we found 

out some disturbing things there. We found a situation I think 

could be winnable. I think Mr. Murtha agrees. But we don’t see the 

Europeans doing their part. I think we have been awfully nice 

about this with the Europeans. They are in right now stealing jobs 

from this country on an airplane at the same time—that is not 

your problem—but at the same time they are lot living up to the 

responsibilities that they voted to do. 

For example, the number two guy in Afghanistan told us that if 

they had about, maximum, maybe 3,500 more troops they could 

pretty well contain—over what we are already putting in they 

could pretty well get around this thing, but the Europeans won’t 

do it, and I guess the Germans don’t go out at night and lots of 

caveats and things. And it still continues, I understand, and there 

has been no change in that? 

Admiral FALLON. The bottom line there is they have more reasons than you can count for not doing the job. It is more than 

troops. The numbers of troops are interesting, but my opinion is if 

all the folks who were on the ground already were doing what they 

should be doing we would be in tall cotton right now. 

AGRICULTURAL TRAINING TEAMS

Mr. HOBSON. One of the things he told us they needed to win, 

and I am going to meet this afternoon with my Department of Agriculture of Ohio State, is these teams to go out and help the Afghans get some infrastructure. And let me give you an example, 

just see if you agree with this because I am going to be talking 

about this, I think Mr. Murtha is probably talking about this to 

others. Pomegranates, they have the ability to grow lots of fruits, 

vegetables, and one example they gave to us was they grow these 

and there is no way to process them. So they send them to Pakistan where they pay somebody an extra fee to do, and then they 

send them out through their port. They apparently used to have 

this, but the Russians or somebody blew up all this infrastructure 

and even the irrigation stuff. 


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Is there a program that you all are sponsoring that maybe the 

Europeans could get into that they might be more willing to do 

something like that to put these teams out there under some protection from our troops and their troops to get this going in a 

meaningful way? 

Admiral FALLON. If I could give you an opinion, first of all, that 

in Afghanistan the priorities, the needs are electricity, roads, agricultural development and water management far exceed all the 

other things in the country. 

Mr. HOBSON. Aren’t there some movement on the electricity? 

Admiral FALLON. Yeah, but it is not the kind of movement that 

is really going to get the results. There is, each is, and that is the 

problem. I have seen people coming to me with a half dozen proposals on agriculture, specifically grow this, and pomegranates are 

one of them. Any one of these things would be helpful. The challenge is getting the right people with the right skill sets to get engaged and actually do it. And it is certainly something the Europeans could do. If they would be willing to undertake in a coordinated manner these other things, they would be very, very helpful 

to us. 

What I see is there are lots of folk who will volunteer to come 

help, most of them working in small groups individually, and it 

needs to be a much more comprehensive approach to this that 

would be helpful. So we have asked from the U.S. side our AID 

folks in the embassy to take a turn on this. I have hired—not hired 

but I have talked to one of our senior AID personnel to come and 

work with my staff to help, to add her insight. She has been in the 

field about 35 years. She knows how to do this stuff, and we will 

try to get it done. 

ELECTRICITY IN AFGHANISTAN

Mr. HOBSON. What about the electric? What would you do—if 

you could play king for a day or Karzai for a day or yourself, how 

would you fix the electric problem? 

Admiral FALLON. First thing I would do is to get the leaders of 

Afghanistan and other neighboring countries to, 

But they have phenomenal potential in water reserves. They 

have some huge piles of snow up there all the time in the winter. 

They have some dams they are building. They could be a good 

source of power. There needs to be a comprehensive approach. 

There was a meeting in November—— 

Mr. MURTHA. What was the question, Mr. Hobson? 

WATER PROBLEMS

Mr. HOBSON. Remember, they told us about the water problem. 

I said how would you fix the water problem; if you could play king 

for a day, what would yo do to fix the water? 

Admiral FALLON. You need a comprehensive approach. Here is 

what I see: I go over there and the same complaint everywhere. 

There are provinces over there that have zero electrical power except for generators. Everybody wants it. And what is happening is 

we have been trying to solve it at the local level, solve it at the proVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:38 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046475 PO 00000 Frm 00294 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A475P2.XXX A475P2

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vincial level. It is not going to work. You need a national, and really an international solution, in my opinion, because each of those 

countries have similar challenges, Pakistan, Afghanistan, 

Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan. If they can figure out a way to cooperatively say we are going to build a dam here and a dam here and 

a dam here, run the lines, we would be in tall cotton. But it needs 

a big picture, coordinated approach. Okay, we will hope for that 

and try to move it along. 

Meanwhile back at the ranch in Afghanistan today there is a 

dam at a place called Kajaki in the south. Unfortunately, it sits in 

a hotbed of insurgent activity. But the dam is up and there is a 

power plant next to it. It happens to have one operable turbine in 

it today. It is designed for three. I have been trying since I got in 

this job to get three turbines in the plant installed and operating. 

It took me several months to get the rest of the story. It turns out 

you can’t just put the turbines in. That is a chore in itself. With 

one turbine operating at max capacity, it turns out that the power 

lines are maxed out. So they need to put new power lines up. Of 

course power lines mean new towers. That means you have to have 

some security. Frankly, I couldn’t get the Brits to do anything last 

year. Wouldn’t even talk to me. Wouldn’t even fly my team up 

there to look at this. They are not in charge anymore. And we are 

going to figure this out. And clever man that he is, old General 

McNeill and General Cohen, they have taken a look. It just so happens that the turf where Marines are going to be operating may 

just include the turf that we need. So we are going to get it done 

one way or the other. 

But if we can get that power plant functioning and it is going to 

take a year probably, maybe more than that to get it up, we will 

provide power for large areas of those provinces that are most problematic. And I think this is what people need. 

POWER LINES

Mr. HOBSON. Can I make one suggestion to you? I have two 

quick things I want to add to that. On the power lines, 3M Company makes a product that will boost those power lines dramatically and DOE didn’t want to look at it. I got an earmark, and now 

DOE loves it. They think it is the greatest thing since sliced bread 

on power lines. You might have somebody look at that. 

Admiral FALLON. Name, address and phone number? I’m all ears. 

PISTOLS

Mr. HOBSON. We will help you. One other thing, and I will yield 

back. I have a lot of stuff, but the one thing I want to talk about 

that really is distressing when we go some place and talk to somebody and we are out there talking about a neat program, I think, 

because one of the problems is in the police departments in how 

they handle the cops and the training. So we go and we are visiting 

this thing and they are showing them off to us and I know you 

don’t have the paper on this but I am going to hit you with it anyway. You can find out because it is really frustrating to me and I 

think to the chairman, all of us, when we do this. So we are touring this place and they are showing us how they got these guys and 

they got them doing this stuff and they are clicking the guns and 


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the pistols and everything. So we start talking to the guys that are 

doing the training. And the guy—I said, how is everything going? 

And the guy says everything is fine, sir, it is a good program. We 

think we are going to get good results from this, but these damn 

pistols aren’t worth a god damn. And then I get a report back. 

Admiral FALLON. These were the police trainers, right? 

Mr. HOBSON. Yes. One guy is from Pennsylvania. I don’t want to 

get him in trouble. 

Mr. MURTHA. State policeman? 

Mr. HOBSON. State policeman. He didn’t just make this up, sir, 

but when I get the stuff back that I got here, it is from DoD. It 

is like you guys don’t know what you are talking about. Nobody 

ever told you this, I mean, summary of report of province, no manufacturing defects have been reported. Well, I just reported one. 

Stovepiping. I mean. 

Admiral FALLON. Tell me the place you were. Where were you? 

Kabul? 

Mr. HOBSON. Kabul, in that little place where they are training 

the police. Who is the contractor? These guys were DynCorps. 

These guys were trying hard, doing well. But I don’t understand 

it. How many times do we go through this situation where, you 

know, it is like we didn’t hear it. It is like who are you guys? Well. 

Admiral FALLON. Don’t worry. I get that same effect. 

Mr. MURTHA. Power line problem in Iraq, we had the same problem he is talking about in Afghanistan. Haditha. 

Mr. HOBSON. We went to Haditha Dam to visit Marines there. 

Admiral FALLON. By the way that refinery they tell me is going 

to be operating up there in about 21⁄2 months. Told me it couldn’t 

be done a year and a half ago. 

HYDROELECTRIC POWER

Mr. HOBSON. We went to Haditha. I said why didn’t you get a 

Corps of Engineers guy up here? And it took how long to get a 

Corps of Engineers guy up there and look at the dam and tell them 

what to do with the dam. The general there couldn’t get anybody 

up there to look at the dam to make it work better. You got to be— 

if it frustrates us, it has to drive you crazy. 

Admiral FALLON. Invite NATO to come in with all the caveats 

and then see. 

Mr. HOBSON. We got into the Dutch guy over there at NATO. But 

it is McNeill, let me tell you, McNeill is a straight commander, I 

think, and he came in and did a lot of good stuff. But I think he 

is very frustrated as he goes out the door. But I think he is a good 

warfighter from what I can see. I think he thinks it is winnable 

if he could get the right stuff done. But anyway, I don’t mean to 

beat you up about this. 

[The information follows:] 

I have confirmed with the Combined Security Transition Command in Afghanistan (CSTC–A) that they are confident the 9mm Smith & Wesson Sigma Series pistols provided to the Afghan Army and police do not have manufacturing defects. 

That said, the S&W Sigma, though a modern and effective handgun, is considered 

by some observers to be a somewhat lesser-quality pistol compared to more expensive handguns such as the U.S.-issue M9 Beretta, the Glocks or Sig Sauers. Additionally, some individuals do not like certain features of the Sigma’s design such as 

certain disassembly procedures and the lack of a positive thumb safety feature that 


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some other models offer. While the S&W Sigma 9mm meets all requirements, it has 

been decided future pistol procurements will specify features comparable to the M– 

9 Beretta that is issued to U.S. forces. 

Admiral FALLON. I will be looking for pistols, 9mm. 

Mr. HOBSON. They are the stupid 9mm, which don’t kill a lot. 

Mr. MURTHA. Gentleman from Georgia 

Admiral FALLON. It was a congressional decision, I think, wasn’t 

it, to replace all those guns? 

Mr. HOBSON. But I wasn’t here at the time and I have been fighting it ever since. 

Admiral FALLON. What happened to the old 45s? 

Mr. MURTHA. General Moseley said to us he wants 45s for the 

Air Force. So we put money in to experiment with the 45s. I said 

what do you carry? He said a 38. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Gentleman from Georgia. 

AFRICAN COMMAND

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. Admiral, I have a couple questions. The 

first has to do with the stand-up of the African Command. Of 

course General Ward got a star and then of course he was designated to head up the new African Command, and that means 

that the Horn of Africa region will transfer from your responsibility 

to CENTCOM to AFRICOM, and reportedly it is supposed to happen by October. 

Do you know whether or not a decision has been made on the 

home for AFRICOM? Do they have a home? 

Admiral FALLON. They have not found a home other than Germany, and this young lady behind me is going to be their chief of 

requirements and resources. So I think they will probably give her 

one of those jobs to try and find a place. Right? 

No, they are still working on it. There is a problem, of course, 

real anxiety in Africa about where this place goes. 

Mr. BISHOP. Because Nigeria said absolutely not. And next place 

I understand is Liberia, and I don’t know what the status of that 

is. Do you have any idea? 

Admiral FALLON. No. 

PIRACY

Mr. BISHOP. What is the status of the efforts to transition the 

command, and the piracy, as I understand, off the coast of Africa 

has been increasing. Do you have enough international effort for 

that, a long-term solution to that? You have to take control of that 

and be responsible for policing those waters. 

Admiral FALLON. Our idea here is to take the Horn of Africa 

Command, Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, which now reports to 

me, and to chop that over to General Ward with the idea that it 

stays intact, and it really crosses the boundary between AFRICOM 

and CENTCOM. I would like to stay very well connected to this entity because frankly AFRICOM is not going to have the resources, 

knowledge, or experienced people to do the things we have going 

on for quite some time. 

Mr. BISHOP. Will that be left up to you or be left up to the—— 


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Admiral FALLON. The way this whole thing will really work is 

they will ultimately report to General Ward. If I see something 

that I think needs doing, I can through the staff call up and say 

here is what we recommend. And we have had this discussion already. I think that is the way it is going to work. Most of the reason is that they don’t have assets. We still have them and so piracy, we will be working that one pretty much from NAVCENT. 

ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA BORDER DISPUTE

Mr. BISHOP. What is the current status of the situation with 

Ethiopia and Eritrea, the border dispute and the U.N. mission in 

Eritrea and Ethiopia? 

Admiral FALLON. Tensions are rising. Background here is that 

two leaders, Isaias and Meles use to be good buddies. In fact now 

they are—not only buddies, they are cousins of some pedigree. 

They really don’t like each other now, and the personalities drive 

this agenda, friction between the two. The problem in the last few 

weeks is that the Eritreans have been starving the U.N. contingent 

in there of all supplies and basically forcing them to leave the 

country as unsustainable, and as they withdraw it is going to leave 

no buffer between the two. 

My assessment of the situation, and I will admit I haven’t been 

to see Isaias yet, hasn’t been very welcoming. I have talked to 

Meles about it. Neither one probably wants a war. They might be 

able to stumble into it if they are not careful, so it is something 

that needs attention. I know the U.N. is focused on it. We don’t 

really have the ability to go help negotiate much at this point from 

what I can see, so we have to be careful. 

SURGE UNIT EQUIPMENT

Mr. BISHOP. I am going to have to run and vote. But I did want 

to switch gears on the surge equipment. I hear about what happens 

with equipment that has been used by the surge units when they 

depart. Are they taking them with them? They normally would 

be—equipment would stay to be used by replacement follow-on 

units. But some of the equipment will be sent back for reset. Will 

it be reconditioned for theater? 

Admiral FALLON. Most of it is coming out. We are bringing it out, 

yes, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, Admiral, we appreciate your coming before 

the Committee. We appreciate your dedicated work and we hope 

your protege is going to do as well in Africa. We hope she straightens it out in Africa. Thank you very much. The Committee is adjourned until 10:00 o’clock Tuesday. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow:] 

EXTENDED DEPLOYMENTS

Question. Admiral Fallon, when you last appeared before this Committee, Secretary Gates had just announced that all active-duty soldiers currently deployed or 

going to Iraq and Afghanistan would see their one-year tours extended to 15 

months. In his statement, the Secretary said that the extended tours were necessary 

to support the surge in Iraq and to allow for 12 months at home between tours for 

rest and reset. 


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Admiral, the drawdown in the number of soldiers, marines an supporting forces 

involved in the surge has begun, but so has talk of a pause in the drawdown. What 

are the metrics that are in use to help inform decisions about the continuation of 

the surge, or a pause in the drawdown? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. What are the resource implications of a pause in the drawdown? Will 

additional funding be needed? 

Answer. Resource implications depend on the length of the pause. United States 

Central Command does not see an immediate need for additional funding to support 

operations due to a pause in the drawdown. However, we would likely require additional funding commensurate with the force levels retained, if the pause continues 

into the second or third quarter of Fiscal Year 2009. We are coordinating with the 

Services to identify specific funding requirements necessary to support a prolonged 

pause in the drawdown. 

Question. Admiral do you endorse a drawdown in troop strength to pre-surge levels, or can we drawdown to significantly lower levels? 

Answer. As you know, we are currently reducing forces to pre-surge levels as directed by the President. Planning efforts are underway to determine the appropriate 

longer-term troop strength for Iraq. It would be premature to comment on the results of those efforts, but any determination will be based on the conditions on the 

ground, and the judgment of commanders in the field. 

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Question. Part of the new strategy in Iraq is to use larger numbers of trained 

Iraqi security forces, accompanied by U.S. forces to ‘‘clear and hold’’ sectors of Baghdad and other places in Iraq. 

What can you tell us about the numbers of Iraqi Army units that are accompanied 

by U.S. forces, their manning strengths, their capabilities and desire to engage in 

the fight, and most importantly, their ability to assume the lead in counterinsurgency operations? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. Reports from Iraq generally conclude that the Iraqi military forces are 

improving steadily. However, the Iraqi police have so far been less capable, and 

mere prone to corruption. What is your assessment of the Iraqi police forces? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. Some U.S. military personnel are living with their Iraqi counterpars in 

the neighborhoods they are securing in Iraq. Can you inform the Committee process 

is progressing? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. How many U.S. personnel are involved in operations teaming with the 

Iraqis? Is this number increasing or decreasing as the surge draws down? 

Answer. It is impossible to provide a specific number of U.S. personnel who are 

involved in operations teaming with the Iraqis. Many U.S. personnel are members 

of transition and training teams, who work directly with Iraqi units every day. Even 

those not on transition and training teams are still involved in operations, as members of units partnered with Iraqi counterpart units. In this role, U.S. personnel 

work with their Iraqi partner unit to conduct training and work together in combined operations. This is true for personnel in combat, combat support and combat 

service support positions, since nearly all of these types of units have counterparts 

in the Iraqi Security Forces. The number of U.S. forces involved in operations with 

the Iraqis will decrease as overall force levels decrease, but the proportion will remain about the same—however, over time the nature of the relationship will change 

as Iraqis increasingly take the lead in security operations. 

Question. How many U.S. soldiers are in the typical small unit, or team, that is 

embedded with the Iraqis? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. What are the experience and training levels of the officers and NCOs 

that are provided as members of embedded training teams? 

Answer. ———. 

PROGRESS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ

Question. In mid-February, Iraq’s parliament passed three key pieces of legislation that (1) set a date for provincial elections, (2) approved $48 billion for 2008 

spending, and (3) provided for limited amnesty for detainees in Iraqi custody. 

How specifically do these legislative actions influence security and stability in 

Iraq? 


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Answer. Setting a date for provincial elections are a key to rebalancing of Iraqis 

and empowers decentralized governments in the provinces. An approved budget 

brings along money for reconstruction and government services that employ and better the conditions of Iraqi citizens. The Iraqi motivation for the passage of a general 

amnesty law was to further reconciliation efforts by pardoning certain offenses and 

allowing those individuals a second chance to become productive members of the 

new Iraq. The passage of the law is a significant reconciliation step, given its clear 

benefit to the Sunni community that constitutes an estimated 85% of the detention 

population. 

Question. Highlight some of the important aspects of the fiscal year 2008 Government of Iraq budget? 

Answer. On February 13, 2008, Iraq’s Council of Representatives (CoR) passed a $49.9 billion budget for FY 2008—21% rise in expenditures over last year’s budget. 

Based on increased crude oil exports and persistently high oil prices, Iraq is well 

positioned to afford an expanded budget in 2008. Oil revenues are expected to grow 

from $31.0 billion in 2007 to $35.5 billion this year, an increase of 15%. Other revenues are expected to grow from $2.4 billion to $6.9 billion. Total 2008 budgetary expenditures will increase to $49.9 billion, including $37 billion for operating expenditures, a 19% increase over last year. Security expenditures 

will increase by 23%—from $7.3 billion to $9.0 billion—with $5.1 billion earmarked 

for Ministry of Defense and $3.9 billion earmarked for Ministry of Interior. 2008 Budget allots $13.2 billion for investment spending, an increase of 32% over last year’s $10.0 billion. Capital funds allocated to the 15 provinces will increase 

over 50%, from $2.1 billion to $3.3 billion, reflecting the improved budget execution 

performance by the provinces in 2007. Total capital allocations for the Kurdistan 

Regional Government will grow from $1.6 billion to $2.7 billion, keeping them at 

17% of GoI revenues after deduction of ‘‘Sovereign Expenses.’’ Ministry of Oil’s investment allocation will be cut back from $2.4 billion to $2.0 billion, based on this 

Ministry’s persistent under-spending, while Ministry of Electricity will be budgeted 

a flat $1.3 billion. Iraq’s 2008 budget contains funding for key investment programs 

necessary to promote economic development and support security gains, including: 

$70 million for a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program, 

$417 million for public works programs, $250 million for housing and construction 

programs, and $62 million for agricultural programs. 

Question. Can you describe for us some of the improvements in Iraqi Provincial 

and local governance? 

Answer. Iraqi provincial and local governance continue to improve and build upon 

the progress seen during last quarter. The provinces made some real progress in the 

past year, particularly when many of the provinces executed only a very small portion of their budgets in 2006. They spent most of their $2.0 billion allocation for 

2006 in 2007. 

Mentoring by Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) has resulted in 17 out of 18 

Provincial Councils submitting their Provincial Development Strategies (PDS) to the 

Ministry of Planning on a timely basis. The PDS serves as the framework document 

for building provincial budgets and links the provinces to supporting ministries 

throughout the Government of Iraq. According to preliminary Iraqi budget execution 

data, most provinces are making significant progress in capital projects as well. 

These improvements are due in part to capacity-building efforts, including Procurement Assistance Centers, training activities and capacity development programs in 

the ministries and in the provinces. 

In addition, the PRTs are helping to successfully nurture this process. At present, 

there are 11 PRTs working at the provincial level, 13 PRTs embedded with Brigade 

Combat Teams (BCTs) and seven Provincial Support Teams operating from established bases at the local level. They draw on U.S. interagency and Coalition expertise to assist local, municipal and provincial governments to strengthen the Government of Iraq’s capacity to deliver basic services to its citizens, facilitate economic 

development, foster reconciliation and encourage application of the rule of law. PRTs 

are working to facilitate this transition by assisting provincial and local governments in meeting basic needs related to schools, roads, sewage, an water services. 

Question. Can you also discuss the impact of the Concerned Local Citizens groups, 

which I understand are now called Sons of Iraq? Are the members of these groups 

all Sunni? 

Answer. The Sons of Iraq (formerly known as Concerned Local Citizens) are an 

indigenous ally fighting a common adversary in Iraq, Al Qaeda. Their activities 

range from conducting joint Coalition Forces and Iraqi Army patrols and manning 

check points providing actionable intelligence on weapons caches, terrorists and 

criminal elements in their areas. Their effort constitutes a new, armed ally for the 

Coalition, while simultaneously drawing from the Al Qaeda recruiting pool. These 


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groups are force multipliers that have played an integral part in reducing Coalition 

casualties, equipment losses, and the overall violence in Iraq. The overwhelming 

majority of the Sons of Iraq are Sunni. 

Question. How much U.S. funding goes to support the Concerned Local Citizens 

groups? 

Answer. From 1 Jul 07 to 31 Jan 08, $148M has been expended on CLC programs. 

As the program grows, more funding will be expended. However, this summer the 

program will start transferring to the government of Iraq. 

JORDANIAN INTERNATIONAL POLICE TRAINING CENTER

Question. The Jordanian International Police Training Center was created to train 

Iraqi police cadets. The cost to construct the facility was over $140 million. 

What is the current usage of the facility? 

Answer. Training at JIPTC has lately been dedicated to developing security forces 

of the Palestinian Authority (PA). 418 PA Presidential Guard personnel graduated 

a 2-month program at JIPTC on 13 Apr 2008. A battalion (approx. 600 soldiers) of 

PA National Security Force graduated a 4-month course on 28 May 2008. 

Question. What are the future plans for the facility? 

Answer. Palestinian Authority security force training at JIPTC has been very successful this spring. Negotiations for follow-on training are ongoing. While the current round of U.S.-funded training has concluded, Jordan has agreed in principle to 

work with us in the future to provide mutually beneficial internal security force 

training for any number of friendly nations. 

Question. Does the facility continue to receive U.S. funding? 

Answer. The Jordanian International Police Training Center (JIPTC) is not receiving funding from the Department of Defense. Department of State is currently 

paying the Jordanian government to train Palestinian forces at the JIPTC. 

Question. In addition to the Jordanian International Police Training Center, are 

there plans underway to complete construction of the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center. How are these training facilities not duplicative of each 

other? 

Answer. The Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) was originally 

used to train Iraqi police, but now has moved on to train international police officers, most recently for the Palestinian Authority. This center focuses on interaction 

with civilians, rule of law and basic police tactics. The facilities are largely oriented 

toward this law enforcement role and consist largely of classrooms, basic small arms 

training ranges, and a driving course. 

In contrast, the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center’s (KASOTC) 

primary mission is training U.S. and international special operations forces in 

counter terrorism operations. This facility has military-oriented capabilities including a sniper/rappelling tower, aircraft breeching facility, 360 degree live-fire shoot 

houses, as well as classroom facilities and dorms. 

TROOP STRENGTH IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. We have heard a lot about an anticipated spring offensive in Afghanistan by the Taliban. The United States is sending a force of approximately 2,200 

Marines to bolster combat power to counter the Taliban Spring offensive, and another 1,000 to train and otherwise work with and strengthen the Afghan military. 

Where in Afghanistan will the Marines conduct combat operations? 

Answer. For the past several years we have observed a natural pattern in the resumption of Taliban activity in the spring months building up to a summer peak 

and tapering off as the harsh Afghan winter sets in. To characterize this activity 

as a ‘‘Spring Offensive’’ is to give inordinate credit to an enemy incapable of making 

a coordinated effort. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces have been 

very effective in preventing the Taliban from coordinating their efforts and in 2007 

had significant successes against Taliban core leadership. 

This year, we committed additional forces to give ISAF an additional combat 

punch to continue pressure on the Taliban and to bolster security for the Afghan 

people in the southern region. General McNeill, followed by General McKiernan, 

will position these forces as they see fit, but the 2,200 Marines are currently forecast to conduct combat operations in Regional Command (RC) South. 

Question. After their seven month tour is up, will they be replaced with another 

Marine unit? 

Answer. Currently, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit and the 2D Battalion, 7th 

Marines is a one time U.S. deployment to Afghanistan. Any replacement units will 

be a Secretary of Defense decision. 


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Question. As U.S. brigades are withdrawn from Iraq, will you request additional 

brigades for combat operations in Afghanistan? 

Answer. There is no relationship to the drawdown of forces in Iraq and the buildup of combat power in Afghanistan. All sourcing options are considered when trying 

to fill U.S. force requirements and shortfalls in any region; however, withdrawals 

of U.S. brigades from Iraq do not necessarily trigger additional requests for U.S. brigades for Afghanistan. 

Question. Assuming that the additional U.S. trainers are mid-grade NCOs and officers, how will this surge in trainers impact dwell time for those soldiers that comprise a part of the force that is already difficult to retain? 

Answer. The additional U.S. trainers are a Marine Air-Ground Task Force containing a mix of all grades, not a concentration of mid-grade NCOs and officers. As 

for the impact of dwell time for these Marines, this question is best answered by 

Headquarters Marine Corps. USCENTCOM does not have visibility on Marine 

Corps retention and/or dwell time statistics. 

Question. What is your overall impression of the situation in Afghanistan, the capability of the Taliban, and the preparedness of the Afghan security forces to fight 

and defeat them? 

Answer. The insurgency in Afghanistan’s predominantly Pashtun south and east 

will not directly threaten central institutions or prevent progress in the north and 

west. However, Afghanistan’s challenging situation is likely to become more difficult 

over the next year despite planned improvements to governance, development, and 

security. 

Afghan Security Forces continue to mature and develop, especially the Afghan National Army (ANA). The ANA took several steps forward over the past six months. 

In December 2007, the ANA played a prominent role in retaking Musa Qaleh in 

Northern Helmand Province. In March 2008, the first ANA Battalion was certified 

as fully capable of conducting independent combat operations. The Afghan National 

Police (ANP) has not yet progressed as well as the Army, but significant effort is 

being put into the ANP to improve their performance. 

Question. What is your assessment of the capabilities and abilities of the various 

NATO member contingents and their ability to engage in combat operation against 

the Taliban? 

Answer. We appreciate the troop contributions the many NATO nations and other 

partner states continue to make to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). 

These forces are engaging the Taliban effectively. Last year’s predicted Spring Offensive did not materialize largely due to ISAF troop effectiveness. Earlier this year, 

ISAF forces in conjunction with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) re-took 

the vital Musa Qala area from Taliban control. While there are shortages in resources, the NATO and ANSF forces on the ground are taking the fight to the 

Taliban and effectively delivering improved security and stability throughout Afghanistan. 

Question. Which NATO countries provide forces to engage in direct combat, and 

in what numbers? 

Answer. NATO contributes approximately 26 thousand of the 45 thousand ISAF 

forces with Great Britain, Germany, Canada, and Italy making the largest contributions. NATO is committed to the mission in Afghanistan and understands that it 

is a long-term commitment in which all NATO nations share the borders. Nations 

participate in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) according to their 

individual national interests and capabilities. 

VIOLENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. While violence seems to have decreased in Iraq, violent acts in Afghanistan appear to have increased including the use of Improvised Explosive Devices, 

and suicide bombers. There are those who are concerned about the situation in Afghanistan, highlighting levels of violence and suicide bombings. Others point to 

progress made in curbing violence, improving governance, and expansion of the Afghan Security Forces. 

Is timely and accurate intelligence available on the Taliban? 

Answer. Our intelligence on the Taliban and other insurgent groups is timely and 

accurate, but is now and will always be incomplete based on the nature of the 

enemy and this war. We continue to use all our capabilities to collect the most accurate information possible, and send the analysis of that information to the units and 

decision makers who most need it. Increasing the number of ISAF personnel on the 

ground in Afghanistan in 2008 will further enhance our understanding of the enemy 

in Afghanistan and the tribal support network they rely on so heavily for 

sustainment and to conduct operations. 


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Question. Please describe the contributions of the various NATO member countries to combat operations and support operations in Afghanistan. 

Answer. There are currently 26 NATO member countries and 13 partner nations 

providing significant combat and support operations in Afghanistan as part of the 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom 

(OEF). These NATO member countries are providing a full range of operations from 

war fighting to civil reconstruction operations to include: Command and control, 

combat maneuver units, special operations, psychological operations (PSYOPs), regional signal intelligence/electron warfare/human intelligence teams and enhanced 

medical treatment facilities capable of delivering primary surgical treatment. In addition, instrumental contributions are made by NATO provincial reconstruction 

teams (PRTs) which provide critical support to the Government, Islamic Republic 

of Afghanistan local representatives for civil/admin law and order, justice, and public services. 

Question. Is the NATO experiment working? 

Answer. The NATO ‘‘experiment’’ in Afghanistan is working. NATO member nations are supporting the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission 

with national treasure and blood. International cooperation towards the noble goals 

set forth by the Afghans and the International Community to rebuild and develop 

Afghanistan is unprecedented. ISAF forces in Afghanistan are making a difference. 

Security, despite reports to the contrary, is improving in Afghanistan. 

Question. Are you adequately resourced for the mission in Afghanistan? 

Answer. No. For U.S. forces in Afghanistan, the Commander, Combined Joint 

Task Force–82 and the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A), submit their requests for forces to U.S. Central Command for 

consolidation and prioritization. The outstanding priorities for U.S. force fills in Afghanistan are embedded training team personnel to mentor and train Afghanistan 

National Army and Police forces; and additional intelligence, medical, criminal investigation, and other support personnel needed for combat support requirements. 

The Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) identifies combat 

force requirements via the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe in the Combined 

Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR). The CJSOR is sourced through for ISAF 

via NATO channels. The outstanding priorities in Afghanistan include requirements 

for rotary wing aircraft, maneuver forces, operational mentor liaison teams, and 

medical support. 

Question. Are coalition forces adequately resourced? 

Answer. Yes, coalition forces have the resources and equipment required to defeat 

the insurgency and assist in rebuilding of Afghanistan. NATO mandates that countries are responsible for their own national training, equipping and human resources. Partnering NATO countries have many avenues to acquire the best personal military equipment for their fighting forces; however, there continues to be a 

need for high demand items which are fielded as soon as they are produced. 

Several of our coalition partners have training facilities, and trainers that rival 

those found in the United States. These countries offer a variety of training opportunities for partnering countries who feel they can benefit from training and developing relationships with other countries. 

Adequate manpower is always a challenge, but our partnering NATO countries 

are constantly evaluating how they can contribute more. We are seeing our coalition 

partners contribute in a variety of ways including military forces, civilian expertise, 

in country and out of country training, equipment and weapons donations, and funding support. 

IRAN

Question. Admiral, it seems that Iran is pursuing a multi-track policy in Iraq, consisting of overtly supporting the information of a stable, Shia Islamist-led central 

government while covertly working to diminish popular and military support for 

U.S. and Coalition operations there. 

What actions does CENTCOM have underway in the region to prevent or curtail 

Iran’s destabilizing activities that contribute to internal Iraqi or Afghan frictions, 

and that threaten regional stabilities? 

Answer. In Iraq, Multi National Forces—Iraq (MNF–I) is using Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets to monitor border activities for lethal aid 

flow. Special Operations forces, along with Iraqi Special Operations Forces, are targeting Iranian surrogates and Qods Force operatives in Iraq. Coalition Forces are 

assisting the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement by training, and reinforcing 

ethical border enforcement technique at border crossings in Maysan and Basrah 

Provinces. MNF–I leadership continues to encourage GoI to diplomatically engage 


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Tehran to stop the flow of lethal aid into Iraq. As Coalition Forces unearth caches 

with Iranian munitions, information is cataloged and presented to the GoI as further proof of Tehran’s meddling to destabilize security in Iraq. 

Regionally, CENTCOM is partnering with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members to deter Iran’s maligning influence in the region. Through theater security cooperation and multi- and bi-lateral exercises with our GCC partners, we convey to 

Iran our strong resolve for regional stability. Our operations in and around the Arabian Gulf prevent Iranian Qods Forces from further maligning influence and from 

pursuing greater control of international commerce flowing through the Gulf. Our 

presence in the Gulf also curtails piracy from Iranian surrogates and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy—Qods Force (IRGCN–QF). 

Question. What is the status of your contingency plans for potential operations in 

this theater and what shortfalls or concerns have you been able to identify? 

Answer. CENTCOM is always looking at ways to ensure we are prepared for a 

range of contingencies in this very dynamic theater of operations. As you know, 

there are many threats we face on a day to day basis that require a critical eye 

and focus. Iran’s maligned influence throughout the region, most notably in Iraq, 

their defiance of the international community with respect to its nuclear program 

and recent reckless behavior at sea demonstrated by their Revolutionary Guard 

Corps Naval Forces against a U.S. Naval Vessel are all troubling signs that require 

our attention and concern. CENTCOM will be prepared to support any military option should it be necessary to confront Iranian aggression, but I’m optimistic that 

the current U.S. Government and international community efforts to work towards 

a diplomatic solution in dealing with Iran’s destabilizing policies in the region will 

be successful. 

Question. Considering the recent Strait of Hormuz encounter between the U.S. 

Navy and Iranian speed boats, do you believe Iran has become more aggressive 

against U.S. and Coalition Forces? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. How would you characterize Iran’s influence and objectives Iraq? 

Answer. Iran’s objectives include an Iraq that is militarily weak and able to maintain its own security, free from Coalition or U.S. military presence, receptive to Iranian influence, and led by a Shia Islamist government. Iran works to build longterm influence among Iraqis by pursuing humanitarian, reconstruction, and economic projects and by providing Shia militia the means to achieve their goals, including weapons, training, and funding. These efforts are almost entirely led by the 

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—Qods Force (IRGC–QF). Iran, through the 

IRGC–QF, pursues its short-term objective of a painful Coalition military withdrawal by encouraging Shia militants under varying degrees of influence to attack 

Coalition targets. Iran pursues its long-term goal of an Iraq free from U.S. military 

presence through attempts to influence Iraqi Shia, Sunni and Kurdish politicians. 

Question. In probable reaction to Iran’s nuclear program, Egypt and many Gulf 

Cooperation Council countries expressed an interest in developing a peaceful nuclear program, individually and collectively. What is your assessment of the underlying rationale for peaceful nuclear programs when most of these countries possess 

abundant oil and natural gas reserves? 

Answer. Many Arab countries have a long-standing interest in nuclear technologies. Arab governments have closely monitored the Iranian nuclear negotiations, 

and are aware of the prestige and bargaining power Iran derives from its nuclear 

program. Rapidly expanding populations and the expectation of an improved standard of living in Arab nations is creating chronic energy deficiencies throughout the 

region. Greater quantities of fossil fuels will be required to meet the growing demand for electricity thus limiting potential export profits. While the region is rich 

in fossil fuels, natural gas (the preferred fuel for electrical power generation) is unevenly distributed, and transporting industrial quantities of natural gas requires a 

highly specialized infrastructure. The additional revenue available from the record 

price of petroleum products encourages maximum export vice internal consumption 

and further encourages alternative methods of power generation. 

Question. As a follow-up question, how concerned are you that these nuclear programs could rapidly transform from a peaceful power-generation program into a nuclear weapons program? 

Answer. While the proliferation of nuclear knowledge and materials are worrisome, Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula countries that are interested in nuclear 

power have pledged to develop transparent programs in compliance with International Atomic Energy Administration guidelines. These nations have traditionally 

respected their international obligations and have lived peacefully in the region. 

There is no reason to believe that these nations would be anything other than responsible in their peaceful development of nuclear programs. 


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PAKISTAN

Question. The U.S. and Pakistan are fighting a common enemy in the Taliban. 

The U.S. provides material assistance and training to Pakistan which is intended 

to support a common strategic effort to counter extremism and militancy. 

Are you comfortable with your ability to measure accountability and effectiveness 

of funding and resources provided to Pakistan? 

Answer. The U.S. provides significant support to Pakistan, commensurate with its 

importance to U.S. national security interests. It is difficult to make a direct correlation between the dollars we provide and Pakistan’s actions, but Pakistan has been 

and continues to be an essential ally in the war on terror. Our engagement and security assistance programs are effective in building trust and confidence within the 

Pakistani Army; however, it will take time to overcome imbedded perceptions that 

have resulted from years of sanctions. 

We have a comprehensive process to reimburse Pakistan for the additional costs 

it incurs as a result of operations conducted in support of the war on terrorism. This 

process has served us well in allocating an appropriate level of assistance and supports our other security assistance programs (Foreign Military Finance, International Military Education and Training). It is important to ensure that our various assistance programs are focused on not only reimbursement, but also with the 

aim to solidify a strategically focused, long-term balanced bilateral relationship. 

This requires that we constantly assess whether the tools we are using lead to this 

end. 

In the case of Coalition Support Funds, we have asked for and are now receiving 

additional accountability detail to justify these claims. We continue to closely scrutinize Pakistani claims and are working with the Pakistanis to clarify what is and 

is not reimbursable. With regard to Foreign Military Financing (FMF), we have 

begun moving towards funding efforts that more closely support the war on terrorism and will work with the Pakistanis on FMF for 2010 and beyond. Congressional funding of the Security Development Plan will directly target improvements 

to Frontier Corps capabilities that support our regional efforts. Equipment that we 

provide to Pakistan is typically procured through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 

process, regardless of funding source and so includes the End Use Monitoring provisions that are part of that system. 

Question. Given ongoing media scrutiny over Pakistan’s ability to safeguard its 

nuclear weapons during periods of instability, are you convinced the Government of 

Pakistan has taken adequate measures to ensure their nuclear weapons remain secure? 

Answer. We are confident Pakistan’s military maintains firm control of its nuclear 

weapons and will continue to do so throughout periods of political uncertainty. The 

exponential growth of Pakistan’s nuclear program coupled with the A.Q. Khan scandal (late 2003) posed inherent security concerns and revealed program 

vulnerabilities. Since then, Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, charged with oversight of its nuclear program and headed by now retired Lieutenant General, has implemented a variety of physical and personnel security measures designed to eliminate threats to its nuclear program. They have expanded outer perimeters of nuclear facilities to counter suicide attacks, enhanced nuclear accounting and control 

procedures and implemented a more robust personnel reliability program. 

Question. How will recent elections in Pakistan affect our relations with the Pakistan military? 

Answer. I expect positive military-to-military relations will continue, barring any 

major changes to Pakistan’s willingness or commitment to reject extremism in favor 

of ideologies that are responsible and enduring. Pakistan and the United States 

share a common goal to dissuade extremism and defeat the terrorism which threatens world security—and we are both strongly committed to this end. This mutual 

goal eclipses all political dynamics and serves to foster an already productive and 

strong military-to-military relationship between our two countries. The recent election and its developing outcomes do highlight changing political dynamics in Pakistan, which will require acknowledgment and some adjustment on our part, although I foresee no major changes in our strategic relationship. The changing political dynamics as a result of the recent elections will affect the position of Pakistan’s 

military in society and government. Prime Minister Gillani’s stated desire to put a 

Pakistani face on the war on terrorism domestically may result in Pakistani efforts 

to downplay the U.S. military role in Pakistan. 

It is vital that we maintain continuous military relations with the Pakistan military while their civilian political process unfolds. This election gives the U.S. the 

opportunity to further relationships with institutions and individuals other than 

Pres. Musharraf as well as provide support to Pakistan for countering extremists’ 


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activities. Outside of Admiral Mullen’s two meetings with Pres. Musharraf, the engagement of U.S. senior military leaders has been almost exclusively with their 

Pakistan military counterparts since Pakistan’s parliamentary elections. During 

these meetings, Admiral Mullen has stressed the importance of the U.S.-Pakistan 

relationship to both countries and his commitment to strengthening that relationship. Although Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Kayani, and the Pakistani Army would 

prefer Musharraf remained president, even out of uniform, Musharraf would serve 

as a known quantity that will protect the interests of the army. However, the army 

will not likely choose to support Musharraf over its own corporate interests or in 

the event of untenable levels of civil unrest. Generally there is agreement amongst 

the politicians and the media that the extremist activity emanating from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is an issue that needs to be addressed at 

the national level. In fact, several politicians have emphasized the need for a ‘‘twopronged’’ approach where political development and security initiatives in the 

Northwestern Frontier Province (NWFP) and the FATA complemented one another. 

Further, administrative isolation of the FATA was a colonial policy that made no 

sense for a modern Pakistan and needed to be redressed through a series of steps 

beginning with extension of the Political Parties Act to the FATA and reform of the 

Frontier Crimes Regulation. These attitudes and approaches bode well for continued 

military-to-military relations between our two nations. 

Question. What is your assessment of the cooperation and assistance the coalition 

is receiving from Pakistan? 

Answer. Pakistan has been, and will remain, a key ally in the War on Terror; 

however, the type and scope of their support is heavily impacted by Pakistan’s regional security concerns and domestic politics. Statements by recently elected Pakistani officials indicate that Pakistan will remain an ally in the War on Terror; however, they may review the nature and level of that support. Since 2001, Pakistan’s 

support has been a key enabler of coalition operations in Afghanistan. Without their 

contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), crucial air and ground links 

which provide a lifeline of support and operational flexibility to coalition forces 

would not be possible. Moreover, despite growing public resentment, the government 

has maintained approximately 100,000 security forces throughout Baluchistan and 

the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 

Question. Please describe the anti-Taliban operations underway in Pakistan and 

how have these operations evolved over time? 

Answer. Pakistan launched counter-terrorism operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in December of 2001 in support of our operations in 

Afghanistan. The historic animosity between the tribes and the Army, combined 

with a well equipped and aggressive foreign fighter element, challenged Pakistani 

security forces. In July 2006, the government entered into a peace accord with the 

tribes and militant leaders in order to regain stability and relieve pressure on the 

Army. 

Violence increased significantly in July 2007 following the government’s raid on 

the Red Mosque in Islamabad, because it fueled extremist animosity toward the government. Pakistani security forces continued counter-militancy efforts in the FATA 

and surrounding regions through late 2007; however, the Army shifted to a less aggressive posture to allow the elections to proceed in early 2008. As of early April 

2008 the ceasefires between the government and tribes are holding; however, there 

are indications the situation is eroding. 

Pakistan’s priorities in the border region are domestic politics and Pakistan’s regional security concerns. As a result, their military posture, strategy and operations 

are focused on countering the domestic militant threat emanating from this region. 

Improving Pakistan’s ability to address U.S. concerns in this region will require 

more than diplomatic pressure, funding and training; it will also require a change 

in the current domestic and regional environment that creates conditions that allow 

Pakistan to take steps to address U.S. concerns. 

Question. How are these operations likely to change in the short- and long-term, 

particularly in light of increasing cross-border incursions by the Taliban into Afghanistan? 

Answer. First, available data does not indicate ‘‘increasing’’ cross-border incursions, but rather a predictable return to heightened militant operations that occurs 

each year in the spring as weather improves. Pakistan’s current political situation 

and statements by military and civilian leaders indicate we are unlikely to see a 

renewal of large-scale military operations in the tribal areas in the near-term. The 

long-term plan for the FATA focuses on development and improved governance, supported by a strong yet constrained military presence. Pakistan’s long-term plan for 

improved border security includes developing Frontier Corps capacity to better 

interdict cross-border activity. 


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Question. Do you believe you have all the assets important to your mission requirements in Pakistan? 

Answer. The U.S.-Pakistan military-to-military security relationship is strong and 

improving. We must continue to support Pakistan in its efforts to combat terrorism 

on its own territory, while respecting Pakistani sovereignty. Legislatively, supporting Pakistan’s legitimate defense and counter-terrorism needs will improve both 

its capability and our relationship. The war on terror is as much a challenge for 

Pakistan as it is for the U.S. The Government of Pakistan (GoP) is empowering the 

Frontier Corps, a largely indigenous force that has traditionally operated in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. We support this effort through the U.S. Security Development Plan and are working with 

Pakistan to make the Frontier Corps into an effective security force through a longterm plan to address shortfalls in equipment, training and intelligence capability, 

in concert with Embassy and GoP efforts. Line item funding of this program for 

2009 and beyond would help ensure that we are able to focus our efforts on these 

most critical forces. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Pakistan currently runs 

through 2009. Continuing FMF funding at current levels in the out years would simultaneously provide tangible evidence of U.S. commitment to Pakistan and help 

fund programs that support both Pakistani and U.S. efforts in the war on terror. 

MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Admiral, please describe for the Committee some of the key militaryto-military relationships within your area of responsibility and why these relationships are important to you as a combatant commander. 

What can Congress do to support these relationships? 

Answer. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is absolutely vital to ensuring we succeed 

in the war against terrorism. Pakistan is a major contributor to our operations, having killed or captured more terrorists than almost any other partner. Pakistan has 

suffered as consequence as well, losing more than 1000 military personnel as part 

of operations conducted in support of the U.S. since 9/11. The bulk of our ground 

and aerial resupply for Afghanistan operations flows through Pakistan. More importantly, Pakistani support for the war against terror is essential due to its geographic 

location and relationship with Afghanistan. In addition, as the sole Islamic nuclear 

power, security and stability in Pakistan is of the utmost importance to U.S. national security interests. Congress can support this vital relationship by continuing 

to fund critical programs in Pakistan, including the Security Development Program 

and by continuing to support Pakistani efforts to meet legitimate defense needs, 

such as with the F–16 sale. Through these efforts the U.S. will signal that it is committed to a long-term bilateral relationship and continues to build essential trust 

and confidence within the Pakistani military. 

Jordan is an ally on the War on Terror, a steadfast regional partner, and at peace 

with its neighbors. The ties between our militaries are deep and longstanding, with 

an extremely robust bilateral exercise schedule and frequent, fruitful exchanges between officers at all levels of command. However, Jordan has made this commitment 

to our mutual success at a higher percentage of their gross national product than 

is sustainable. Congress can help by funding Jordan’s Foreign Military Financing 

allocation at the requested multi-year level of approximately $345 million, as well 

as continuing to support programs which contribute to Jordan’s ability to defend 

themselves and secure their borders. 

Egypt is another of our key partners and serves as an anchor state towards 

achieving CENTCOM’s Theater Strategic Objectives in the region. The Egyptian 

military is a coalition partner with us in Afghanistan, provides expedited canal 

transits, grants nearly unlimited overflights for our aircraft, and serves as a moderating voice of support for our efforts in the region. The cornerstone of our partnership with Egypt is commonly recognized as the $1.3 billion annual Foreign Military 

Financing (FMF) allocation that was established in 1979 following the historic 

Camp David Accords. Over the last three years, that FMF has been the target of 

proposed reductions and conditioning by members of Congress. Those attempts to 

reduce FMF have led many of our Egyptian friends to question the U.S. commitment to the partnership and threaten to undermine the relationship that has been 

built over the past twenty-nine years. I encourage Congress to preserve current 

FMF funding levels for Egypt and protect its FMF from conditionality or reduction. 

The UAE is another key partner within our area of responsibility. Our relationship with this progressive and forward thinking military friend and ally is very 

strong. Its importance not only lies on its strategic location but more so in its commitment to regional security and its efforts in the war on terrorism. Its Armed 

Forces have been working hand in hand with us toward peace and stability in the 


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Middle East. Congress can best sustain our excellent relations by ensuring quick action on notifications of defense related hardware of mutual interest and by considering the UAE’s requests for defense systems on their merits, not linked to other 

countries’ requests. Additionally, at every opportunity, we can thank the UAE for 

their steadfast support of Coalition and U.S. Forces in the region and for leading 

and participating in several multilateral, as well as bilateral, military exercises and 

symposiums. 

Congress helped greatly by approving JDAM and LANTIRN sales to the Kingdom 

of Saudi Arabia. Both of these programs increase our military interoperability and 

modernize the weapons of a key partner. Congress can further help by approving 

the AIM–9X missile program. The AIM–9X will be a key component in Saudi Arabia’s ability to counter regional threats. Additionally, the U.S. is working with the 

Kingdom to enhance its navy and secure critical infrastructure. Both of these are 

key areas of interest for regional stability and continued economic access. As requests in these areas come before Congress, CENTCOM looks forward to working 

with members to facilitate approval and show our key partner that the U.S. takes 

Saudi security seriously. 

Question. Please describe the influences of China and India in the geopolitics of 

the area and what you are doing to counter these influences. 

Answer. China’s influence in the CENTCOM AOR is growing in proportion to China’s investment in the energy sectors of various countries in the region and China’s 

expanding markets for its commercial products. China remains an alternative market for arms purchases and a limited amount of military assistance for many of the 

region’s nations, but has its strongest role in this regard with Pakistan. China is 

seeking to ensure access to energy resources to meet its growing energy demand, 

especially via overland routes. In terms of energy, China is significantly invested 

in Sudan, Qatar, Iran, Kazakhstan, and recently signed a $30 billion pipeline deal 

with Turkmenistan that has yet to be constructed. China’s most significant investments are in Pakistan where it provided funding for the construction of Gwadar 

Port and other infrastructure projects—investments which augment the robust security partnership the two countries have shared. 

India’s influence in our AOR is not as significant as China’s, but is also growing, 

especially in regard to expanding energy relationships with Iran. India has continually sought to remain engaged in Afghanistan’s reconstruction, primarily to demonstrate its role as a regional power but also to frustrate Pakistani interests in denying India access to Afghanistan. The most significant influence India has in the 

AOR is the potential for conflict with Pakistan and the tensions arising from Kashmir and water management issues. India’s increasing economic strength and diplomatic status have consequently led to India’s expanding contacts in the AOR, especially in Central Asia and Iran. 

Neither China nor India actively seek to counter U.S. interests in the region, per 

se, but more accurately, they are pursuing their own economic interests and desire 

to achieve access and diplomatic relationships to support their commercial and energy requirements. They are not deterred by any potential conflicts of interest with 

the U.S. or Europe as they pursue their own national interests. China and India 

would prefer to see less U.S. military presence in the region, but they generally support U.S. security interests in defeating violent extremist organizations; both China 

and India support the role of the international community in stabilizing Afghanistan. 

CENTCOM does not specifically focus any of its activities in countering Chinese 

and Indian influence in the region. CENTCOM programs and operations support 

U.S. national security interests in the region; at present, neither China nor India 

are officially viewed as strategic threats to be actively countered. In most cases, regional militaries require more assistance than is currently allocated by the U.S. and 

Europe, which leaves room for China, Russia, and to a lesser extent India, to contribute as well. The lack of U.S. economic and military engagement with Iran and 

Syria, naturally forces those countries to look elsewhere. 

Question. Are military to military programs adequately resourced? 

Answer. Military to military programs are generally adequately resourced. As our 

security cooperation relationships in the region expand, however, the need for additional resources will also increase. Currently funding for Central and South Asia 

has been adequate, however, each source of funding has its own restrictions on how 

monies can be spent, creating a challenge to support all military contact events. Additionally, a number of Central and South Asian uniformed services do not align 

perfectly with Department of Defense (DoD) military branches, yet the need for military contact events with these foreign uniformed services are necessary to build 

stronger security cooperation relationships. For example, the Border Guards of some 

Central Asian countries do not fall under the Ministry of Defense and therefore are 


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not eligible for DoD funded military contact events. However, the Border Guards 

play a significant role in counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism and regional stability 

and so CENTCOM explores other ways to fund this sort of engagement. Funding 

for Pakistan’s Security Development plan, while adequately met in FY08 through 

supplemental and other funding sources, will require additional resources in the out 

years, ideally as a line item in the DoD budget. In short, we are adequately 

resourced, but we must remain flexible in order to maximize our security cooperation potential. 

COOPERATION WITH CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES

Question. The U.S. has expanded its security cooperation with the Central Asian 

regimes since 2001, to include varying levels of military basing and access. 

What is your assessment of the current U.S. military relationship with its Central 

Asian counterparts? 

Answer. The military relationship with most of our Central Asian counterparts is 

good and improving. Soon after the September 11th attacks, Uzbekistan stepped forward and offered basing access and overflight rights to the U.S. for operations in 

Afghanistan. While this relationship soured late in 2005 after the Andijon events 

and termination of the access agreement, recently there have been modest signs of 

improvement in the relationship. Since the U.S. left Kharshi-Khanabad Airbase in 

Uzbekistan, Manas Airbase in Kyrgyzstan has become more important as the only 

remaining northern Central Asia base. The Kyrgyz have been willing to expand and 

solidify that relationship and improvements to the infrastructure and capabilities of 

Manas airbase continue. Kazakhstan has aggressively pursued strengthening of the 

bilateral relationship with the U.S. The Kazakhstanis recently signed a five-yearplan of military cooperation with the U.S., which is further proof of our strengthening cooperation. Although Turkmenistan’s approach to the bilateral relationship 

has been quite circumspect since 2001 it has improved and shows real promise since 

the death of President Niyazov last year. Turkmenistan’s new President 

Berdimukhammedov continues to allow U.S. humanitarian overflight and gas and 

go operations within Turkmenistan. Recent gestures toward improving the international investment climate as well as breaking down Niyazov’s cult of personality 

suggest a much brighter future for the bilateral military relationship with 

Turkmenistan. 

Question. Does CENTCOM have an interest in long term military basing and access in support of operations in Afghanistan? 

Answer. Yes. In our annual Master Plan submission we stated that we desire long 

term access to two locations in Afghanistan. One location is Bagram Air Base which 

will serve as the long term operational hub for CENTCOM military operations in 

Central and south Asia. The other location is Kandahar which provides critical support for U.S. operations in Afghanistan and would provide surge capability for U.S. 

military activities in this region in the future. This basing and access is assessed 

each year and provided to SECDEF for approval and submitted to Congress in our 

annual Master Plan submission. 

RECENT REPORT FINDINGS CONCERNING THE SECURITY SITUATION IN IRAQ

Question. In general, incidents of violence are down significantly. However, these 

are many, intertwined reasons for this including: the surge, changes in the tactics 

employed by U.S. and coalition forces, cooperation between tribal leaders (the ‘‘tribal 

awakening’’), ethnic cleansing of formerly mixed localities, and the continued ceasefire on the part of Sadrist militias. 

Admiral, do you believe that Iraqi security forces are capable of operating independently soon? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. Recent reporting available to the Congress suggests that Iraqi forces 

have not reached a point of being able to operate independently. Would you comment? 

Answer. ———. 

THE IRAQ WEEKLY SECURITY INCIDENTS REPORT

Question. The Iraq Weekly Security Incidents, 15–21 February 2008 reports incidents of violence in total and stratifies incidents based on an assessment of the intended targets. The reported period is March 2005 through the present and shows 

a decline in weekly incidents of violence from a high of nearly 1,600 incidents per 

week in early June 2007 down to about 450 incidents for the most recent reporting 

period, a level roughly comparable to the level reported in March 2005. 


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Admiral, do you believe that we should be encouraged that the level of violence 

since the surge is roughly comparable to the level in March 2005? 

Answer. The reduced level of violence in Iraq is encouraging and it allows the 

Government of Iraq to work on creating a functioning state that is not totally focused on security issues. That said, the nature of violence has changed and it continues to have the potential to spike. Sectarian violence is the primary area where 

attacks have been reduced in the past year. The U.S. ‘‘surge’’ set conditions that allowed tribal efforts (Sons of Iraq) to blossom, creating jobs for many disaffected 

Sunni Arabs. This enabled Sunnis to reduce support for and to combat al Qaeda in 

Iraq (AQI). Additionally, Sadr’s call for a Jash al Mahdi (JAM) ceasefire further reduced sectarian violence. Finally, coalition pressure on AQI reduced AQI’s ability to 

sustain attacks. 

THE 9010 REPORT

Question. What is your assessment? 

Answer. I’ve got to tell you that, after going to Iraq, I am very encouraged. The 

situation has improved substantially in the security arena, and I believe that there 

are many other aspects of the situation that are coming together that have contributed to this improvement, and I see this on an upward vector. General Petraeus has 

the major task of resetting the battlefield there. He has to focus on keeping this 

momentum moving towards increased stability and security. It is truly remarkable 

today to look at the statistical evidence and—as many of you know because you 

were there to see it, to actually see the difference on the ground. 

Further progress will depend on the continued ability of Iraqi leaders to capitalize 

on the hard-fought gains achieved by the Coalition and Iraqi forces and gradually 

assume responsibility for security in their country. However, I remain concerned 

that real, sustained progress in Iraq over the long term will depend on their ability 

to address a complex set of issues associated with key political and economic objectives. 

On the political front, I am concerned that the Iraqi political leadership continues 

to squander the opportunity our troops and taxpayers gave them. Much in Iraq will 

depend on the continued legislative progress, improvements in the Iraqi ministries 

and their will to turn nascent political accommodation at the local and national levels into lasting national reconciliation. I am troubled by the fact that our soldiers 

continue to risk their lives while Iraqi politicians continue to refuse to take political 

risks. 

On the economic front, any enduring improvements for Iraq will be dependent on 

the government of Iraq’s still-tenuous ability to provide essential services and improve the oil, electricity and water infrastructures. Advances in these areas will be 

critical to keeping Iraq on the path to sustainable economic development. As the 

economic activity levels increase in Iraq, this is really the longer-term solution. 

We’ve got to have help from the development agencies and from others. I’m encouraged by the beginnings of investment from outside private money into Iraq in the 

future of this country, and that’s the real answer, giving them alternatives. 

Question. The Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq (the 9010 Report), December 2007 makes several references to ‘‘bottom-up’’ reconciliation which is reconciliation among Sunni and Shi’a tribal leaders who are increasingly working with the 

Government of Iraq and Provincial Reconstruction Teams. 

Please explain the ‘‘bottom-up’’ reconciliation. 

Answer. Bottom-up reconciliation efforts represent one way we have been able to 

work towards national reconciliation within Iraq. Because national-level progress 

continues to be hindered by competing political interests, we initiated some locallevel, bottom-up level security improvements in Anbar province that has led to favorable conditions at the local level for positive movement in the areas of reconciliation, political accommodation, economic development and the provision of basic 

public services. Once it took hold in Anbar, we expanded it to other areas—and we 

were able to incorporate growing numbers of Sunni and Shi’a tribal leaders into 

working with the Government of Iraq and the Coalition to improve security and economic conditions at the local level. 

While the record on ‘‘top-down’’ reconciliation remains mixed, the Awakening 

movement among the tribes of western, central and northern Iraq continues to 

grow. Sunni Arab and a growing number of Shi’a sheikhs are now working with the 

Coalition. Their tribal members and other local citizens are fighting AQI through 

participation in the Sons of Iraq groups. Nationwide, some 91,000 members continue 

to reject extremism and are joining the political process by working through established governing institutions. The Sons of Iraq groups complement Iraqi Army, Iraqi 

Police and Coalition forces and have begun to integrate its members into the Iraqi 


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forces. Some senior Iraqi politicians who formerly opposed Sons of Iraq members 

have begun to recognize the value of these groups in stabilizing Iraq. These politicians are making public statements about the significance of this ‘‘bottom-up’’ initiative and supporting the program. 

Question. Admiral, would you comment on the progress on key legislation, as well 

as political reform and reconciliation? 

Answer. The Government of Iraq passed a number of key pieces of legislation this 

past reporting period. In early February, the Iraqi Government passed the Accountability and Justice Law, reforming the draconian de-Baathification measures that 

were in place. This was a controversial bill on all sides, and was never going to 

please all former Baathists and all victims of the Hussein regime. But it was also 

a compromise in which all sides took some risk. We are watching closely now to see 

that it is implemented in a spirit of reconciliation. Even more impressively, on February 13, the Council of Representatives (CoR) passed three laws; the 2008 Budget, 

the Amnesty Law and the Provincial Powers Law. This was an unprecedented legislative grand bargain that included major compromises across political alliances and 

ethno-sectarian lines. On February 26, 2008, the Presidency Council endorsed the 

Budget and Amnesty Laws, but Vice President Mehdi returned the Provincial Powers Law for amendment on constitutional grounds. On 19 Mar, VP Mehdi waived 

his objection, provided the CoR consider amendments in the future. The passing of 

the Provincial Powers Law, in concert with the Provincial Elections Law now in the 

works, puts into motion the possibility that provincial elections will be held before 

the end of 2008. And ultimately these elections are the means by which the provinces of Iraq will realize their individual importance within a functioning federal 

system. This will be an eye-opener for all Iraq leaders; reforming the political landscape at the local, provincial and federal levels and above all localizing politics and 

the means of providing for the population. These types of legislative successes represent a significant step toward broader political reconciliation within Iraq. 

The passing of the 2008 Budget was a significant event. There were numerous 

contested issues with regard to the budget, but none more so than the overall percentage of the budget provided to the Kurdistan region in the North (17%). This was 

the major sticking point in the budget’s passage, but this was overcome by a CoR 

that recognized the importance of their offices and their duties and responsibilities 

to the Iraq citizenry. 

The Amnesty Law passage was a major accomplishment toward reconciliation and 

reform. It greatly reduced an obstacle to the return of key Sunni parties to the political process by releasing significant numbers of detainees from Iraqi custody if they 

have not been charged or convicted of serious crimes. 

Several key laws remain to be tackled in the weeks and months to come; the Provincial Elections Law just mentioned, and the package of Hydrocarbon laws being 

the most prominent. But the actions of the CoR this past February indicate that 

dialogue can occur, compromise can happen, and Iraq’s future looks brighter today 

than in recent past. 

As I mentioned earlier, reconciliation in Iraq is taking on a ‘‘bottom up’’ flavor. 

The tribal sheiks and provincial leaders are searching for avenues for reconciliation. 

This momentum will be fostered (I believe) by the Provincial elections that are now 

on the calendar. They will further power an Iraq reconciliation that will recognize 

the right to religious differences and yet instill a sense of nationalism amongst its 

people. I would like to point out that the Government of Iraq also passed a highly 

symbolic flag law, eliminating the Saddam Hussein-era flag. Today, the new Iraqi 

flag flies over all parts of Iraq, including Iraqi Kurdistan. 

It’s been encouraging to watch the development of the Iraqi leadership, from 

Prime Minister al-Maliki on down, to see them take responsibility. It’s not a straight 

line, and I don’t think it’s going to be. And there are things that are frustrating. 

This is a different culture from ours, and, frankly, it’s a different political process 

and philosophy in this country, but its coming along. So I think we have to continue 

to engage them, continue to point out to them the cost of this in terms of blood, 

sweat and tears on the part of our people, which is, as you know, very substantial— 

the resources that we’ve devoted to this country. They’re working on it. They’re taking responsibility, in my view. Whether it’s in the political process or in recognition, 

it seems to me they are more aggressive now in going out and addressing issues 

away from the capital, and this is essential to me. If they can’t figure out how to 

get people in the provinces, the basics that they need, we’re not going to be successful nor are they. But increasingly I see them paying attention to it. 

Question. With regard to the officer and NCO shortfall, the report finds that it 

will be years before Iraq can round out its leadership requirements because of constrained training facilities which are presently operating continuously at or near capacity. 


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Admiral, would you say that Iraqi forces are dependent upon Coalition enablers? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. Please describe these ‘‘enablers’’ and those that are most critical to the 

effectiveness of the Iraqi security forces. 

Answer. ———. 

Question. Admiral, according to Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq (the 

9010 Report), dated December 2007 ‘‘Syria is estimated to be the entry point for 

90% of all foreign terrorists known in Iraq’’. 

Would you comment? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. Would you comment on the continuing activities of the Kurdistan Peoples Congress (KGK) such as its cross-border raids into Turkey? How do you believe 

the current situation can be resolved? 

Answer. ———. 

THE JONES COMMISSION REPORT

Question. Address the training, equipping, command, control and intelligence, and 

logistics capabilities capacity of the ISF, and Assess the likelihood that the continued support of U.S. troops will contribute to the readiness of the ISF to fulfill its 

missions. 

Admiral, the Jones Commission found that ‘‘. . . the Iraqi Security Forces will not 

be able to secure Iraqi borders against conventional military threats in the near 

term.’’ Would you comment? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. The Jones Commission reports signs of improvement including evidence 

that baseline infrastructure is forming to lead to successful national defense capabilities but the ISF will be ‘‘unable to fulfill their essential security responsibilities 

independently over the next 12–18 months’’. 

What is your assessment? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. The Commission report states: ‘‘The Iraqi Police Service is fragile . . . 

the force is underequipped and compromised by militias and insurgent infiltration. 

In general, the Iraqi Police Service is incapable today of providing security at a level 

sufficient to protect Iraqi neighborhoods from insurgents and sectarian violence’’. 

Admiral, how is this being addressed? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. The Commission found specific weaknesses due to a lack of key support 

functions such as aviation support, intelligence and communications and found that 

the Iraqi Defense Forces lack required combat support services such as adequate indigenous training, logistics, supply chain management and equipment maintenance 

capabilities. The Commission concludes: ‘‘Logistics remains the Achilles’s heel of 

Iraqi ground forces’’. 

Do you agree with the commission’s assessment that, ‘‘ . . . achieving an adequate force-wide logistics capability is as least 24 months away’’? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. Are the Iraqis making progress on improving their logistics capability? 

Answer. Iraqi Army logistics have improved significantly since June 2007 and 

continue to move forward. All logistics disciplines exist in various stages of independence. Leveraging existing Iraqi processes, overarching policies and procedures 

are still in early stages of development across the logistics spectrum. Life Support 

Self Reliance (LSSR) is the process furthest along and independence increases 

monthly. Ministry of Defense (MOD) is becoming less reliant on coalition fuel support. 

While the Iraq Air Force development began in earnest just one year ago, the Air 

Force logistics concept is similar to the Army system with the maintenance system 

having four levels or lines of maintenance, currently using a mix of Iraqi Air Force 

technicians (under advisement of Coalition military and contractor personnel) and 

contractors at regional maintenance facilities. 

The Iraqi Navy, meanwhile, utilizes organic sustainment capability which currently completes mainly first and second line repairs on their vessels and vehicles. 

Third and fourth line repairs will likely be conducted by contractors which is consistent with the Gulf Naval forces. 

Question. How can U.S. Forces assist the Iraqi armed forces to improved their logistics capability? 

Answer. Partnership and over watch are linchpins to successful transition to Iraqi 

logistics self sufficiency and is a joint Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD)—Coalition 

imperative. Both Multi-National Corps—Iraq and Multi-National Security TransiVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:38 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046475 PO 00000 Frm 00312 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A475P2.XXX A475P2

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tion Command—Iraq have coordinated to accelerate the development of logistics capabilities and capacities in partnership with Iraqi leadership. Coalition over watch 

along side Iraqi counterparts enables the identification of logistics priorities through 

joint assessment and engagements, facilitating Iraqi solutions and priorities to Iraqi 

challenges. 

Question. Do the Iraqis lack logistics ‘‘know how’’, or do they lack the actual supplies and delivery capability? 

Answer. It would be incorrect to state the Iraqis lack the know how or the delivery capability, but rather state there are limitations in both areas. While there are 

current Iraqi processes in place, additional overarching procedures continue to be 

developed. In addition, while there are certain categories of logistics that are farther 

along than others, the development of additional trained personnel and facilities for 

the storage, repair and distribution of supplies and equipment continues. While the 

system is not sufficiently developed to support and sustain itself, the process is ongoing to improve both the ‘‘know how’’ (the training of personnel and the policies 

and procedures) and the delivery and maintenance capabilities. 

Question. The Commission report states that: ‘‘The Ministry of the Interior is a 

ministry in name only. It is widely regarded as being dysfunctional and sectarian, 

and suffers from ineffective leadership. Such fundamental flaws present a serious 

obstacle to achieving the levels of readiness, capability, and effectiveness in police 

and border security forces that are essential for internal security and stability’’. 

How long do you expect this will be corrected? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. How long do you expect that it will take? 

Answer. ———. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


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TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 2008. 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 AIR FORCE POSTURE 

WITNESSES 

HON. MICHAEL W. WYNNE, SECRETARY, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 

GENERAL T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES 

AIR FORCE 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. ROTHMAN [presiding]. Good morning. This hearing of the 

House Appropriations Committee on Defense will now convene. 

This morning the Committee will hold an open hearing concerning 

the Air Force fiscal year 2009 budget request. 

We are pleased to welcome two distinguished witnesses, Mr. Michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force, and General T. Michael Moseley, Chief of Staff of the Air Force. They are very well 

qualified to discuss these areas and to answer the questions of the 

committee. 

Secretary Wynne, General Moseley, thank you for being here this 

morning. The Committee is very interested in hearing what you 

have to say about the Air Force’s fiscal year 2009 budget. We look 

forward to your testimony and to a spirited and informative question-and-answer session. Now, before we hear your testimony and 

opening statements, I would like to call on Mr. Tiahrt for his opening remarks. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. TIAHRT

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for 

being here for this hearing. I also want to thank Chairman Murtha 

for holding the hearing. I am looking forward to the testimony of 

Secretary Wynne and General Moseley. And although this is an annual Air Force posturing, hearing, I hope the witnesses will be willing to comment on the recent KC–X tanker contract. This controversial decision to award a $35 billion contract to a foreign supplier has rightfully outraged the American public around the country. The losing bidder has announced they intend to protest this decision, and rightfully so, but I still believe that both of you need 

to answer some questions on this vitally important issue and also 

the methodology used by the Pentagon on any decision for a contract. 

The more I learned about this decision, the more I realized that 

this competition will need to be redone. It will save the Air Force 

time and money to immediately revise the RFP with your apparent 

goal of replacing the KC–10. 

Secretary Wynne, General Moseley, one of the most difficult 

things from this whole experience is that I believe I was misled by 


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the United States Air Force. Since 2001, the Air Force has said 

that it must replace the KC–135, our medium-sized tanker. For 7 

years and countless hearings, the Air Force has said the same 

thing: We need to replace the medium-sized tanker. 

And now the Air Force buys an airplane bigger than the KC–10, 

not as efficient as the KC–10, but bigger. What has changed and 

why was not Congress informed that the Air Force actually wanted 

to replace the KC–10 and not the KC–135? Why did the RFP baseline reflect a KC–10 instead of the KC–135? 

It is hard for me to understand how something as integral as the 

size of the aircraft was misconstrued in the award decision. This 

is just one of the many reasons why you will save time and money 

by deciding to recompete this with your real goals and intent. 

However, in the meantime, I believe Congress has an important 

role of understanding how the acquisition system failed the American people. It is becoming clear to me that the government has a 

stacked deck in favor of European manufacturers. As I mentioned 

last week, three of the last big defense contracts have been awarded to foreign companies. The Navy awarded the Marine One contract to a foreign manufacturer. We should have suspected something was going on. Then the Army awarded the light utility helicopter to a foreign manufacturer. We should have known something was going on. And now with the Air Force awarding the KCX to a foreign manufacturer, it is as plain as the nose on our face. 

Foreign competitors are able to compete and win against American 

manufacturers because our acquisition laws actually favor foreign 

competitors. The deck is stacked for foreign competitors. 

For instance, the Air Force did not account for the costly regulations that our domestic manufacturers have to comply with. And 

you simply waive it for our European allies, with an internal procedure inside the Pentagon. This includes cost accounting standards, 

specialty metals laws, the Berry amendment, Buy American provisions, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and ITAR compliance. These 

are the ones I know of. There are probably others. 

The Air Force did not account for the $5 billion illegal subsidy 

that European governments provided to Airbus for the development 

of the A330. One part of our government is suing them for this illegal subsidy, and then another part awards them a contract that 

has it embedded in the price. You simply ignore the subsidies, and 

yet the cost accounting standards would require an American manufacturer to amortize such costs. Foreign manufacturers gain a 

huge cost advantage which is unacceptable in the final contract 

award. 

The Air Force did not account for the billions of legal subsidies, 

such as socialized health care and workmen’s compensation that 

the American manufacturer, because of cost accounting standards 

in the Federal Acquisition Regulations, have to include in their 

costs. This provides a French company with a competitive advantage over an American company. 

The Air Force did not account for the loss of tax revenue with 

fewer American jobs. Under the Airbus tanker, America will see a 

minimum—just taking a minimum of 19,000 jobs, if you just take 

the proposals at their face value. I think it is actually going to be 

greater based upon past performance of EADS in other contracts. 


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These are good, high-paying jobs. We should expect that these 

workers would pay a minimum of $10,000 a year in Federal taxes. 

If you factor that throughout the life of this program, that means 

lost revenue to the Federal Government of $3.8 billion. 

So what does this $35 billion contract cost the American people? 

It costs them 35 billion for the initial contract and then an additional 3.8 billion in lost revenue. So it is 38.8 billion, not 35.0 billion. What should our system do to account for these type of lost 

costs? The Air Force did not account for the industrial base concerns. The Navy does when making acquisitions for submarines 

and all ships. They take into consideration the industrial base. But 

the Air Force did not even ask that question. Maybe they were not 

interested in the answer. 

The Air Force did not account for the national security concerns. 

As you know, tankers are a single point of failure. Our national defense and United States military does not project power without 

tankers. But no consideration was given to our national industrial 

base. 

Secretary Wynne, General Moseley, you may argue that you did 

not have legal responsibilities or requirements to address these 

issues, but didn’t you have a professional obligation to at least address them? You had two competitors, but they were not on equal 

footing. It was not a fair competition. The deck was stacked against 

the American supplier and against the American workers. 

I hope that we can take these things into consideration and learn 

lessons from our experience. But it would save the government 

money if we would just go ahead and put in the RFP your apparent 

intent of buying a replacement for the KC–10 and save us all a lot 

of money. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Tiahrt. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. I know that Mr. Dicks has an opening statement 

as well. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. DICKS

Mr. DICKS. Well, I want to welcome our witnesses, and I too 

must say this is one of the most regrettable days I have had since 

I have been in the United States Congress. And I say that because 

I, too, feel that I was personally misled. I think the Congress was 

misled, this committee was misled, the Boeing Company was misled. 

And, you know, we start with what the Air Force was saying in 

2002. The KC–330’s increase in size does not bring with it commensurate increase in available air refueling offload. The Air Force 

went on to say that the EADS aircraft would demand a greater infrastructure investment and dramatically limit the aircraft’s ability 

to operate effectively in worldwide deployment. 

And if we could put my chart up here, in a hearing in 2006 before this Committee, Secretary Wynne, I asked—we were talking 

about this, and Secretary Wynne said, So as we look at this, we 

would tell you that the first—our highest motivation is actually 

medium-sized tankers. Then our highest motivation is mixed fleet. 

Our last thing we want to do is have a whole fleet of large airplanes. 


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I also feel that a memorandum that Ken Miller provided to me, 

if we can put that up now, really lays this thing out in a way 

that—and this was given to me in December of 2007. And it shows 

tanker road map, KC–135R, which is a medium-sized tanker 

equivalency. And it shows the first tranche of airplanes is going to 

be the KC–X, 15 years, a medium. Then the KC–Y, 15 years, a medium. And the KC–Z, 9 years, large. And at the bottom we have 

the KC–10. And it is there all the way through this. 

And, General Moseley, I asked the question, How many of these 

do we have? We have 59 of these airplanes. They are the newest 

airplanes. They would be the last that you would replace first. In 

fact, that was testified to in several cases. So I feel that I was misled in this. Boeing was misled. They wrote a letter to the Air Force 

after—there were some changes in a model that was owned and operated by Northrop-Grumman. Were you aware that this CMARPS 

model, Mr. Secretary, was under the control of the Northrop Company, was owned and operated by them? And I hope there was a 

firewall between that model, because a number of changes were 

made to it right up to the time of the decision, which made it 

more—made it possible for the bigger plane to be competitive. 

In fact, Northrop-Grumman wrote a letter to the Air Force, 

which I do not think our committee has yet received, which we 

would like to have, that basically said if you do not change the criteria then we are going to pull out of the competition. So what did 

the Air Force do? It changed the criteria. Ken Miller came to my 

office and said, We cannot do anything. They will drop out. We 

have to do this. 

And in fact, the Air Force didn’t tell anybody until Boeing wrote 

a letter to the Air Force, saying you made these changes, and we 

think it indicates that you favor a large airplane. And then they 

wrote a letter to the Air Force saying, if you want a large airplane 

we will compete the 777. And they were discouraged from doing 

this by the Air Force. 

So I feel that we were misled. And I am with Mr. Tiahrt, I think 

there is only one way to fix this. And that is to go back and compete the two planes. And if the Air Force wanted a large plane, 

they should have said it. And they did not say it. You said it repeatedly, over and over again. In fact, here is what Secretary 

Wynne said in January of 2007. And I bring this up because in the 

paper there has been all this credit given for a larger—for cargo 

space and passenger space. But those were not in the requirements. They were secondary issues. There was no requirement for 

a certain amount of pallets or a certain amount of passengers. It 

was a secondary issue. 

Quoting Secretary Wynne—this is in the ‘‘Inside the Air Force.’’ 

We want to buy a tanker. We do not want to buy a cargo airplane 

that tanks. We also do not want to buy a passenger airplane that 

tanks. We want to buy a tanker. Its primary mission is going to 

be a tanker. The fact that it can carry cargo or passengers is a benefit, but it is not the primary reason for the procurement. 

And General, I got to tell you General Lichte did not put a lot 

of honor on his stars the other day when he said what we want 

is more, more, more. That was not part of the RFP. He was wrong 

to say it. And you cannot take this pig and put a flag on it and 


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say it is an American airplane. It is not an American airplane. It 

is built, the wings, the fuselage, the tail, all these things are built 

in Europe. They are going to be brought to Mobile, Alabama. 

And we have tried to build some of these projects, the A–6 

rewinging. I think we tried, Northrop-Grumman tried to do their 

Joint Stars program down there in Southern States, and they had 

a hard time getting this thing done. Yet Boeing, who has got a 

plant, who has built this plane, was written down and added risk 

to their proposal for doing an in-line approach to this thing, while 

the other people who have to bring all these parts from Europe and 

bring them to Mobile, assemble them in a plant that does not exist, 

with people that do not exist. The risk is clearly on that side of the 

equation. 

So I urge you to go back and start over. This is a sad day because, after all the work and effort—and the necessity for these 

tankers is without question. But you made a big mistake. You did 

not do this right. You were not honest with the Congress, myself, 

or the American people or Boeing, and you got to go back and start 

over. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—The testimony and chart referred to by Mr. 

Dicks follow.] 


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OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. ROTHMAN

Mr. ROTHMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Secretary, General, now I would welcome your opening remarks, understanding that your full statements will be admitted 

for the record. 

I did want to acknowledge that the issue that Mr. Tiahrt and Mr. 

Dicks—is of great importance to this Committee. But we have already had one hearing on it, and I know that we will have another 

one. We may well have several more. And we are all very interested in that subject. 

The subject matter for today’s hearing is the Air Force’s Annual 

Posture Statement articulating the major element requirements for 

the Air Force to fulfill its entire mission and its priorities over the 

course of the next year and into the future, and in particular explaining why the fiscal year 2009 budget request looks the way it 

does and why it should be changed or should not be changed. 

So Mr. Secretary, if you would begin. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Yes. 

Mr. MORAN. If, as apparently has happened, two of our colleagues have addressed another issue in opening remarks, I would 

like about 30 seconds to reflect another point of view from this subcommittee. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Certainly. If the Secretary and the General, if you 

will just allow me, I will recognize Mr. Moran for 60 seconds. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. MORAN

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, there are some on this subcommittee who believe 

that the professionals responsible for this procurement acted in a 

professional manner. And in fact Ms. Payton, from everything I can 

understand, is perhaps the best procurement acquisition officer we 

have in the services, and that she followed the law. And that some 

of us believe that it is the Congress’ responsibility, if they do not 

like the law, to change the law. But unless there is something that 

can be shown to us where the Air Force did not follow the law that 

it was required to implement, then the disappointment in the results may be only that. And you should know that there is a difference of opinion with regard to that acquisition. Although there 

may be shared disappointment that the contract is not going to be 

carried out by American firms in all respects, there is less disappointment in the way in which the Air Force personnel conducted themselves. I think they conducted themselves professionally. And I thank you for having professional personnel working for you and working for us. 

Thank you. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Moran. 

Mr. Lewis, would you like to make opening remarks? 

Mr. LEWIS. No opening remarks. I am just anxious to attend the 

tanker hearing this afternoon. The posture hearing is this morning, 

I believe. 

Mr. DICKS. The briefing is this afternoon. 


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Mr. ROTHMAN. Very well. Mr. Secretary, if you would proceed 

with your opening remarks. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SECRETARY WYNNE

Mr. WYNNE. Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of America’s Air Force. 

Thank you as well for your support to our improved readiness via 

retirement and recapitalization, as we are working hard to see it 

through. 

Today we also urge you to pass the pending supplemental, as it 

will help. Across the Total Force of Active, Guard, Reserve, and Civilian, we are America’s strategic shield in air and in space and in 

cyberspace. We are contributing to today’s fight with increasing 

ordnance drops, and we stand watch at the missile fields, and we 

stand ready in the nuclear field, and we are an effective air superiority and strike force to both deter and dissuade any opponent who 

may consider our forces to be stretched in the Global War on Terror. 

We are gratified to hear that role reaffirmed by the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs in the deliberate message to those who might seek 

to dissuade or deter us from our own options in the future. This 

is why we seek to move forward and not backward into fifth-generation fighters, into new expeditionary tankers, and into longrange strike assets. 

We recently awarded the new KC–45A air refueling tanker. We 

believe we accurately followed the laws and arrived at a decision, 

selecting the better of two very qualified competitors to some published criterion, a major step in the Air Force critical recapitalization and modernization effort. It is why we seek to modernize space 

assets as the Executive Agent for Space and not see further fragmentation of the management of this now vulnerable area. It is 

why we have established the provisional Air Force Cyber Command, and see this as a warfighting domain in which we need to 

dominate to remain a netcentric force for the future. 

Clearly, beyond the Global War on Terror, we must not lose 

America’s asymmetric advantage in strategic forces. Your Air Force 

has been in the fight for 17 years, and yet has over the same 17 

years seen underfunded modernization. We thank you for initiatives to restore fleet management to the United States Air Force, 

a responsibility we do not take lightly. 

When General Moseley and I came to our posts, we set about a 

strategy to restructure our Air Force, to develop a lean and efficient Air Force in order to husband the resources for investment. 

We worried about the industrial base and the need to look after the 

open lines. I am pleased to report to you that the Department and 

the Air Force have indicated a desire to not close the F–22 line and 

to develop the long-range strike asset. It is to these we would like 

to apply the saved resources over the near term, while the F–35 

proves itself through rigorous tests and is effectively capped on production. 

We ask that you agree with an approach for the F–22 aircraft 

while we work to restore readiness with younger aircraft. The F– 

35 and the F–22 are complementary. The F–22 is bigger, is faster, 

and is planned to fly higher and can carry more air-to-air weapons 


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internally. Also, with less than 20 penetrating bombers in our current fleet, it is time to develop an alternative t as well. 

We have talked about being underfunded, but we here have 

worked to offer a balanced budget prioritized to best defend America, and we will continue to do that over the fiscal year defense 

plan. 

The Air Force Research Laboratory is well-engaged in technology 

development, expanding the opportunity for energy alternatives, 

while reducing our demand in our fleet and at our bases and also 

expanding in unmanned flight, in propulsion, in material science, 

as well as in human effectiveness. 

With regard to space, at Kirtland Air Force Base, a branch of the 

Air Force Research Laboratory is creating inherently defensive 

space assets. In cyberspace, career development, including the Air 

Force Institute of Technology and also warfighting schools, are 

keys. Combatant commanders and agencies partner with us in this 

increasingly contested domain. 

I have worked in space for almost two decades, and have worked 

in commercial and classified space as a supplier and a customer. 

We need consolidated leadership to maintain our current strategic 

advantage. Congress asked for a relook at responses to the Space 

Commission, and we should really consider what is in the report. 

The Air Force is undergoing a ‘‘back to basics’’ as well as a ‘‘back 

to blue,’’ complementary efforts to restore a steady demand and 

knowledge base. I recommend we keep the executive agency where 

it is. I have engaged Airmen in both theaters of operation, and they 

have asked about the continuation of our presence and the continuation of the ground force tasking referred to as ‘‘in lieu of tasking.’’ 

My answer is they perform so well that our Army colleagues do not 

want to give them up. And they do perform well, many winning 

Bronze and Silver Stars. 

Your Air Force is currently protecting the air sovereignty of 

these fledgling nations, and until their Air Forces can do that, I 

would not be surprised to see our Air Forces remain. As a result, 

we are reconsidering force cuts, although we are currently continuing to give top priority in our budget to recapitalization. 

I again thank you for the privilege of leading the best Air Force 

in the world. Every day our Airmen earn the respect of our friends 

as well as our enemies. We worry for their quality of life as we 

seek efficiencies and as we implement joint basing, but we never 

worry about their sense of mission that they bring to the task. 

I will not have the privilege to represent them in this setting for 

the force posture again, and I hope I have reflected their pride in 

service, as I have felt myself. I am ready to answer your questions. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

[The joint statement of Secretary Wynne and General Moseley 

follows:] 


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Mr. ROTHMAN. General Moseley. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF GENERAL MOSELEY

General MOSELEY. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the 

committee, thank you for the opportunity for Secretary Wynne and 

I to talk about the posture of the United States Air Force, our vision for the future, and the strategy to achieve it. 

If you allow me to take my time, I would like to introduce six 

distinguished Airmen that we brought with us today to put a face 

to the committee on this great Air Force. And I would like to, if 

you allow me to, take my time for a brief introduction of each. 

First, Lieutenant Colonel Brian Turner, University of Virginia 

graduate, is a Virginia Air National Guardsman who flies F–22As 

at Langley Air Force Base as part of the First Raptor Classic Association between Air National Guard and Active units. He is the assistant operations officer of the 149th Fighter Squadron. He is a 

symbol of the Air Force’s ironclad commitment to Total Force Integration and to maximizing the strengths of the Air National Guard, 

Reserve, and Active components. He has logged over 3,600 flying 

hours in the F–16A, B, C and D and F–22A. He has got over 300 

combat hours. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Excuse me, General, forgive me. We want to make 

sure we get to all the questions, and I am honored to meet all the 

people that you would like to introduce. If we do not have to hear 

every part of their biography, I am sure they are all distinguished, 

but a briefer synopsis of each’s contribution. 

General MOSELEY. Yes, sir. And I will stay inside my five minutes. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. I am willing to give you leeway, but much more 

than that I think would impinge on the rights of the members to 

ask all the questions they have. But I am anxious to hear your 

presentation, sir. 

SIX AMERICAN AIRMEN

General MOSELEY. All right, sir. One of his roles at Langley Air 

Force Base, Virginia was flying in operation Noble Eagle, with sorties over Washington, DC, New York, and the East Coast. 

Next is Captain Kari Fleming, a C–17 pilot from Charleston Air 

Force Base, South Carolina. She is a 2003 graduate of the United 

States Air Force Academy. Charleston Air Force Base is her first 

assignment. She has amassed over 1,200 hours, total flying hours, 

including 900 hours in the C–17. She has flown 124 combat missions, 278 combat hours since 2005 for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, where she has flown missions 

that include direct supply, aeromedical evacuation, and operational 

air drops, and she has just returned from a deployment in the U.S. 

Central Command Area of Responsibility (AOR). She is pretty 

proud to say she has landed that big airplane in the dirt six times. 

Who would have thought not long ago we would be landing a strategic airlifter on dirt strips, or dirt roads? That is a face on the 

strategic airlift of our country. 

Next is Captain Scott Nichols of the 55th Rescue Squadron. He 

is an HH–60G combat search-and-rescue pilot from Davis-Monthan 


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Air Force Base, Arizona where he is a flight commander. Like Kari, 

he is a United States Air Force Academy graduate, and he is also 

a distinguished graduate of the Air Force Weapons School. Since 

May 2002, he has been deployed five times: three times to 

Kandahar, Afghanistan, for Operation Enduring Freedom; and two 

times to Balad Air Base in Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom. He 

has logged over 2,000 total flying hours, including 158 combat 

hours and 53 combat support hours. 

Next is Technical Sergeant Jim Jochum. He is an aerial gunner 

on a Special Operations AC–130 gunship out of Hurlburt Field in 

Florida. He joined the Air Force in August 1989, and spent five 

years as an aircraft maintainer before he joined Air Force Special 

Operations. Since November 1995, he has logged over 4,300 flying 

hours, 2,500 combat hours on 367 combat sorties, in the AC–130, 

more than anyone else in Air Force Special Operations Command. 

Since October 2001, he has accrued 892 days deployed, over three 

years. He wears an Air Medal and 16 oak leaf clusters. 

Next is Technical Sergeant Michelle Rochelle. She is one of the 

lead operators on the joint team of cyber operations under the tactical control of U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare. There she executes computer 

network attack missions and National Security Agency task computer network exploitation missions. She is in direct involvement 

with the Global War on Terror and supplying strategic intelligence 

to America’s political and military leaders. Mr. Chairman, she represents the vanguard of the forces we are organizing, training and 

equipping to operate in cyberspace, and she is a reminder that we 

believe the cyber domain is critical, the nexus of all warfighting domains. 

Last we have Technical Sergeant Michael Shropshire, currently 

the acting operations superintendent for the 12th Combat Training 

Squadron at Fort Irwin, California. The National Training Center 

is our interface between the Air Warfare Center at Nellis Air Force 

Base, Nevada and the United States Army. He enlisted in July 

1992. He is a battlefield Airman who has spent his entire career 

associated with the United States Army. Multiple deployments, 

from operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia to Operation Iraqi Freedom, he wears a Silver Star and a Bronze Star. The Silver Star 

was awarded for heroic actions while surrounded, cut off, under 

hail of enemy gunfire in the largest sandstorm in four decades. He 

quickly coordinated close air support, delivered 12 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) on 10 Iraqi T–72 tanks, while constantly 

switching from his radio headset to his rifle, personally engaging 

and killing three hostiles at close range. He wears a Bronze Star 

for exceptional performance as a tactical air control party member 

during the Third Infantry Division’s push on Baghdad in 2003. 

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to take my time 

for oral statements to introduce six great Americans that wear Air 

Force blue. Secretary Wynne and I are proud to introduce these to 

the committee today, and I am particularly proud to wear the same 

uniform as the Chief of Staff of this great Air Force, serving alongside these men and women that represent a variety of functions inside your Air Force. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 


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Mr. ROTHMAN. General, thank you so much for introducing us to 

these outstanding Americans. If I may ask the committee for a 

round of applause to acknowledge in the briefest way their service. 

[Applause.] 

ORGANIZING, TRAINING AND EQUIPPING

Mr. ROTHMAN. Let me say a brief round of applause certainly is 

not enough to honor and address what you do, but that is what we 

are here today to accomplish: to provide a budget for the Air Force 

for fiscal year 2009, which will allow you brave men and women, 

and your leaders, to accomplish the critical and noble mission that 

you have accepted on behalf of your country. 

Let me begin by asking some general questions, an overview for 

the General and the Secretary. How is the Air Force today organizing, training, and equipping itself to deal with the threats that 

face our Nation today and the threats that you can foresee in the 

future? And how are these efforts reflected in the 2009 budget? 

Mr. WYNNE. Sir, we believe that we are presently stretched, but 

we are accomplishing the missions that have been assigned. We 

demonstrate that we are being a little bit stressed in a couple of 

ways. One is we took a real position to reduce our Air Force from 

November of 2005 to now by about 10 percent. Our Airmen are 

struggling with that reduction because we have seen a growth in 

the ground forces, and we are responding to that. 

We are stretched in the sense that we have airplanes that are 

20 years old on average in our fighter world, and 44 years old on 

average in our tanker world, but yet our maintainers are doing a 

crack job. Their best effort is to make sure that those airplanes are 

satisfactory to the mission. So I would tell you that we are 

stressed, but we are proud of the Airmen that are keeping us aloft. 

REDUCTION IN FORCE

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Secretary, before I get to the General, you indicated a reduction in forces. The budget request is for a 9 percent 

increase in Air Force budget over last year. You indicated a reduction in forces, but at the same time there is an increase in forces, 

in personnel. My understanding was that the reduction in forces 

was to, for lack of a better term, address an oversupply of middle 

management in the Air Force; and the increase in personnel, which 

would exceed the decrease, addresses the need for other types of 

personnel in the Air Force. Is that correct, sir? 

Mr. WYNNE. Mr. Chairman, every person in our Air Force, 

whether Active, Reserve, Guard or Civilian is a volunteer. We 

value what they bring to our Air Force. We regretted any reduction 

in force that we were required to do, but the affordability is an 

issue. And affordability is how we are responding. We are trying 

to prioritize what percent of the American Gross Domestic Product 

(GDP) has allowed us to in fact protect America. We prioritize this 

in such a way that right now, with the age of our fleet, we need 

recapitalization. And we need the investment. So we decided to 

prioritize the kind of people we had as a reduction. 

Now, I will tell you this is delicately balanced, because if you lay 

off the maintenance people and they can not maintain the airplanes, the airplanes will fall out of the sky. So we have got to balVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:38 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046475 PO 00000 Frm 00371 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A475P2.XXX A475P2

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ance the recapitalization along the way with this. When the Army 

and Marines have elected to increase their force structure, which 

they have, we have got to relook at what the impact is on our Air 

Force, because we directly support them with our ground units, 

with our Joint Tactical Air Controllers (JTACs), and with our airborne units. And so we need to be very careful about making sure 

that we are not out of balance and not out of synchrony with our 

ground force components. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. General, did you want to address this? And by the 

way, we are talking about—by the way, I am sure the committee 

members know, but perhaps not the whole audience, you are explaining the President’s request. 

Mr. WYNNE. Right. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. This is the President’s request for the Air Force. 

Mr. WYNNE. Right. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. A 9 percent increase with these reductions in one 

segment of the force, and increases in another segment. So what 

you are presenting to us is what the President would like us to accept. Okay. So you are fitting within a 9 percent increase that he 

has imposed on you as his limit, and the priorities you can accomplish for the Air Force within his priority dollar figure; is that correct, sir? 

Mr. WYNNE. That is correct. We support the President’s Budget 

request. We believe we prioritized it within that. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. General. 

General MOSELEY. Mr. Chairman, as we look at 17 years of continued deployed combat in the Middle East, to include Bosnia, 

Kosovo, Mogadishu, Somalia, along with the 12 years of no-fly 

zones, some of the lessons learned from that length of deployment 

in combat operations are we can continue to evolve the Air Force. 

As the Air Force organizes, trains and equips, we look at units, 

look at mission types, look at equipment, and determine how to 

train these great Airmen to conduct tasks. 

So as we look at the growth of unmanned vehicles with multiple 

wings and the growth of combat search and rescue, we hope to recapitalize with newer equipment. Now what does that mean for our 

logistics support? For instance, we believe with the Joint Strike 

Fighter, we can reduce the number of Air Force specialty codes 

from 18 to eight relative to those squadrons. So we think there are 

some inherent savings relative to these new weapon systems. 

But Mr. Chairman, I will also tell you as our comrades in the 

Army grow, the Air Force interface in Air Force units that directly 

support the Army also grows. For every one of the brigade combat 

teams that the Army grows, we have embedded Airmen—we have 

one Airman sitting behind me here—that performs combat communications, combat weather, terminal air control parties—all embedded. So for the Army growth that is programmed, we grow about 

a thousand or so Airmen that reside inside the Army. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Gentlemen, if I may, and I am just going to ask 

this question briefly, it is a large question, and then I want to recognize Mr. Lewis—— 

Mr. LEWIS. Go on to Norman. 


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UNFUNDED REQUIREMENT LIST

Mr. ROTHMAN. Then I will go the other way around then. In your 

opinion, Mr. Secretary, General, you have requested—the President’s request is a 9 percent increase over last year, from 108 to 

roughly 117.9 billion; but you are looking for an additional, or have 

mentioned that there is an additional wish list, so to speak, or 

rather a list of unfunded mandates as it has been called, of an additional 17.9 billion on top of the 9 percent increase that you would 

like to have funded. 

In your opinion, is there any part of the President’s Air Force 

budget that can be used to address any portion of the 17.9 billion 

unfunded mandate list or that should be substituted for what is in 

the President’s 9 percent increase? 

Mr. WYNNE. Sir, we were pleased to get a nine percent increase, 

as you mentioned. We were pleased that the President saw that we 

needed an allocation of that magnitude. The Congress asks us each 

year to come to them with what is the requirement to meet the National Security Strategy, how would you spend the next dollar? We 

felt like the appropriate thing to do was stipulate a required force, 

to come off of that required force in a very balanced way, and to 

defend the President’s Budget request as an acceptance of risk 

below that. 

We think, as well, that you deserve to know where we would 

spend the next dollar. And we have established a baseline for the 

required force that we think is necessary. And I encourage the 

members of this committee to become familiar with that, so that 

you understand the baseline with which the Air Force is operating. 

Chief? 

General MOSELEY. Mr. Chairman, we take the National Military 

Strategy, we dialogue with the combatant commanders, we take 

their demand signals and their requirements, and we build a required force that is parallel to those requirements. The required 

force is the amount of funding that we have inside the President’s 

Budget request. The delta is a reflection of the congressional requested unfunded requirements list. 

Sir, I would take a bit of issue with calling it a wish list because 

it deals with our people, it deals with combat capabilities, and it 

deals with an Air Force that is at war. So we provide that to the 

Congress. And that is a very open process that we say, given one 

more dollar, this is where we would spend it. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. So if we wanted to give you more money you 

would not spend it on these things, General? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, that is where the funding would go, because that is what you asked us to provide. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And let me correct myself. It is not an unfunded 

mandate, these are unfunded requirements. And we are grateful 

that you have thought through and laid out for the Congress these 

additional items. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, would you just yield on this point just 

a second to clarify? 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. Congress, by statute I think, has required the Air 

Force to do this. 


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Mr. ROTHMAN. Yeah. I am not being critical of that. 

Mr. DICKS. I think this is a good thing so that we know what we 

could do at the margins if we had a little extra money. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And frankly, I think it is our responsibility to 

analyze the President’s Budget and analyze the list of unfunded requirements that the Air Force has presided. We may have a difference of opinion with the administration, as have prior committees with prior Presidents in prior fiscal year budgets. But I would 

like now to—so I do not take all the time—to acknowledge and recognize Mr. Tiahrt. 

FOREIGN MANUFACTURING

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I want to thank you for introducing the troops. Only 

1 percent of our population wears the uniform. And I believe they 

are elite. And you just explained why when you introduced those 

six individuals. So thank you for serving. I appreciate it very much. 

And I also appreciate what Mr. Moran said about having a professional workforce. 

And Secretary Wynne, General Moseley, Assistant Secretary 

Payton, Special Assistant Ken Miller, you have all done a very professional job. And this is not about you individuals, this is about 

the system that I believe is weighted heavily in favor of foreign 

manufacturers. And some of it has come around because of a 

memorandum of understanding within the Pentagon, and it has 

created an unlevel playing field. And that is why a lot more contracts today are going to foreign manufacturers than ever have before in the history of this country. 

The DFARS 225.872–1, General, is a memorandum of understanding. It says as a result of memorandum of understanding and 

other international agreements, DOD has determined it is inconsistent with public interest to apply restrictions of the Buy America 

Act or Balance of Payments Program to the acquisition of qualifying country end products from the following qualifying countries. 

And you list 18 countries, which include our NATO allies, basically. 

And then there is another section which adds another three: Austria, Finland, and Sweden. 

And yet the requirements that you waive for these countries are 

firmly held for American manufacturers, Specialty Metals Act, cost 

accounting standards, the things I listed in my opening statement, 

ITAR. All these things are paperwork that require people and 

money and time to be invested in our products. 

In the future—and you know, we are focusing on the tanker 

today, but this is something that is important to the whole procurement system within the Pentagon because it was the Navy that 

bought Marine One from a foreign manufacturer, it was the Army 

that bought the light utility helicopter from a foreign manufacturer, and it is the Air Force that made this decision. All three of 

those were impacted by agreements of the Department of Defense, 

internal memorandums and understandings that you have in the 

Department of Defense that have created an unlevel playing field 

for American manufacturers. And we have to straighten this out if 

we ever hope to maintain a defense industrial base. 


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In addition to the unlevel playing field and regulations, where 

are we going to account for the difference in lost revenue? I mean 

right now it is clear that when you lose over 10 percent of the cost 

of this contract—in addition to the cost of this contract in lost revenue, what is the true cost of a product? What is the true cost of 

replacing the 179 tankers? And how did you take that into consideration? I mean there was zero recognition given to it. And you say, 

Well, we do not have a legal obligation to. We should, because it 

is a net loss for the American taxpayer. 

So I think when we point these things out to you, I would like 

you to comment on what we can do to make it a level playing field 

for American manufacturers. How can we address the memorandum of understanding that excludes our European allies from 

regulatory—gives them regulatory relief and excludes American 

manufacturers from regulatory relief? How can we take into consideration the subsidies, whether legal or illegal? And how can we 

make sure that we take into consideration the defense industrial 

base, as the Navy does when they buy ships? Would you care to 

comment? 

Mr. WYNNE. Well, one thing I would tell you, sir, is the acquisition system is increasingly complex. And it has been layered, as 

you have seen, by laws and then regulations and memorandums. 

It is a burden. 

I would encourage the Congress to take a good hard look at the 

total system, and especially if the Congress is unhappy with the 

outcome, because for us we are constrained to be obedient to the 

laws, the regulations, and the memoranda, and we believe we have 

fairly applied them. 

If I could take just a second on this Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment (IFARA) model, we exposed the firewall to both 

Boeing and to Northrop-Grumman. We recognized that the Air 

Force actually owns, operates and changes the software, but we 

gave each of those contractors the model, and we allowed them to 

run their own software. And so they could develop their own inferences as to how their product was performing. We think we have 

conducted this hearing now, sir, in as open and transparent a manner, but constrained by, as you say, a very complex set of rules and 

regulations. 

KC–X REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL

Mr. TIAHRT. In this modeling, the RFP was released January of 

last year, the end of January, I think it was the 30th or 31st. A 

week later a change to the modeling comes to both contractors. 

After analyzing, which takes some period of time, how did you expect any company to respond in the short amount of time you gave 

them to analyze and produce a proposal? I mean they have 90 days 

to produce a proposal. You took 120 days to evaluate it. They get 

this change to their modeling a week after the RFP comes out 

within that 90 days. And what the modeling appears to say is that 

we are not buying a KC–135, we are buying a KC–10. 

And so it really did not give a fair opportunity by your own 

rules—a fair opportunity for the American manufacturer. I mean 

the baseline of the RFP is a KC–135E. Is that not true? The baseline RFP. 


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Mr. WYNNE. The baseline Request for Proposal (RFP) is to a set 

of requirements that were vetted by the Joint Requirements Operations Council. It does not favor one or the other. It simply states 

refueling is primary and—— 

Mr. TIAHRT. But the baseline RFP is a KC–135E. 

Mr. WYNNE. It is a replacement program for the KC–135. It does 

not baseline the KC–135. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Okay. That is what everybody gets on January 31st. 

And that is what everything was indicated for the last 7 years, including the RFI, comes up to this point. And then the modeling 

comes out a week later that says, you know, this really is not a 

KC–135 replacement, this is a KC–10 replacement because we are 

going to put these new scenarios in that include longer range. And 

so after 7 years you expect a company to give a complete proposal 

and address all the things that you have to address, it is just unfair. 

Mr. WYNNE. Sir, while the contract is under protest I really cannot go into the details, but I think you will find it was done in a 

fair and legal manner. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. I thank the gentleman. I am exceeding the 5 minutes per member and am prepared to do more on the next round. 

Just so we can make sure that we until then have an opportunity 

for everyone to ask their questions. Mr. Dicks. 

AIR FORCE MEDIUM TANKER

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Secretary, how can you explain the difference 

from your testimony and what happened here? I mean your testimony basically said we are looking for a medium tanker. I will read 

it to you one more time. 

Mr. WYNNE. So as we look at this, we would tell you that the 

first, our highest motivation is actually medium-sized tankers. 

Then our highest motivation is mixed fleet. Our last thing we want 

to do is have a whole fleet of large airplanes. 

And I said, Mr. Dicks, and that is because you need a number, 

not just size. 

And Wynne says quantity has a quality all of its own. 

Mr. DICKS. So we were all—Mr. Secretary, I think you are a decent person. Everything I have ever dealt with you on has been 

straightforward. You have always tried to help on things. This is 

not personal. And if I said anything that sounded that way, I am 

not saying we were intentionally misled, I am just saying we were 

misled, that we thought you wanted a medium-sized tanker. And 

this committee, that you testified in front of, how can you explain 

the difference in what happened? We went and did what you said 

we would never do, and that is buy big tankers, because we still 

have the KC–10. How can you explain that? 

Mr. WYNNE. The replacement program was for the KC–135. The 

RAND analysis of alternatives ranked various airplanes, from the 

737 to the 777, the Airbus 330, the Airbus 340 as candidates for 

this. Every competitor understood the offerings pretty much of 

what the other people had. 

Mr. DICKS. But there are just two competitors, Mr. Secretary. 


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Mr. WYNNE. And therefore, I think it was a fair and open competition, very transparent, a lot of feedback to the offerors of 

record, done in a very legal way. 

Mr. DICKS. But Mr. Secretary, just to take the opposite, if it was 

transparent and if it was open and honest and wonderful, you 

would have said we want a large tanker. We want a big tanker. 

This is what General Lichte kept talking about at this press conference. And Sue Payton says he was not part of the selection 

thing. Because more wasn’t part of the selection. Cargo—there was 

no number of pallets, no number of passengers. None of that. It 

was all secondary. You said it over and over again: We want a 

tanker, not a cargo plane. 

Mr. WYNNE. I can only tell you—— 

Mr. DICKS. So all I am saying to you, Mr. Secretary, can you understand why we feel we were misled? 

Mr. WYNNE. Sir, I can fully understand. 

Mr. DICKS. Explain your testimony. I am talking about your testimony and what had been said over and over again. 

Mr. WYNNE. No, sir, there was no size in any of the Requests for 

Proposal. These are very competent suppliers. They can read the 

request for proposal. 

CMARPS MODEL

Mr. DICKS. Boeing said it wrote a letter to the Air Force after 

these changes in the CMARP were made to advantage Airbus so 

that they could compete. They could not even have competed, had 

those changes not been made in the criteria. Once they were made 

and acknowledged, the changes were made, Boeing wrote a letter 

to the Air Force saying, If you want a big tanker, we will—let us 

bring in the 777. They were discouraged from doing that by the Air 

Force. 

Mr. WYNNE. Boeing had every right—— 

Mr. DICKS. And that is why we feel so mistreated in this deal. 

And that is why we are so angry about it, because we do not think 

this was fair, open, and transparent. You keep saying those words, 

but the words do not mean anything if the actions—look at the actions. And the actions were not fair, open, and transparent. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Dicks, this will not come from your time. 

Mr. Secretary, did you want to respond? Did you want to respond? 

Mr. WYNNE. Only to say that we can empathize, but we have to 

comply with the laws and regulations. Both of these competitors 

brought qualified products. One was judged to be better. And you 

are going to find out about that this afternoon. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Dicks. 

Mr. DICKS. Now, one thing I keep hearing from the spin masters—and Mr. Miller, by the way, is very good at spin. He and 

Lauren Thompson are about the two best in this town, I think. But 

one of the things they keep saying about this—and this has been 

said all over the Hill, and I have people who called me and told 

me about it—is that the Air Force is saying that somehow Boeing 

was discourteous or was arrogant. 

Do you have any indication of any—have you heard this? That 

during this competition Boeing’s people who worked on this were 


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arrogant or worked not in a professional way? I have not ever 

heard of that ever from the Boeing Company. 

Mr. WYNNE. Sir, all my dealings with Boeing were on a completely professional and objective manner, even to the point of getting notified about the protest. 

Mr. DICKS. And one other thing. You know, the day after the decision is made, Lauren Thompson has all of this information. And 

he says to the press he got it from the Air Force. Now, that was 

not right. They should not have leaked this information out there, 

because the other competitor in this who did not win had not even 

been debriefed. 

I mean why would the Air Force do that? Why would the Air 

Force give Lauren Thompson, who gets a huge fee from NorthropGrumman to operate his Lexington Institute, why would they give 

him all this inside information? And he says in the paper that it 

was given to him by Air Force officers and Northrop-Grumman. 

How can you explain that? 

Mr. WYNNE. We have no way of explaining. We have asked who 

was it—— 

Mr. DICKS. Can you check into that for us? 

Mr. WYNNE. Yes, sir, I would be happy to. That was a violation. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General MOSELEY. Mr. Chairman, can I offer one follow-up? Congressman Dicks, I will defend General Lichte for a minute. It is my 

understanding when he said more, he was talking relative to the 

KC–135, not relative to the two offerings. When he was talking—— 

Mr. DICKS. But more was not part of the competition. And if he 

does not know what he is doing, you should not have him standing 

up there, because he was in contradiction of the entire RFP. The 

RFP was to get a tanker. And the Secretary said this publicly 

many times. It was to get a tanker. And cargo—as I said, there was 

no requirement in the—let me finish this. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Sure. 

Mr. DICKS. There was no requirement in the bid for a certain 

number of pallets or a certain number of passengers. There was 

some requirement on aeromedical and on fuel offload. Boeing met 

those. Boeing met all the requirements that were there in this competition. 

And this general gets up there and says more, more, more, and 

all these things that were not part of the requirement. That is, 

again, trying to spin the obvious change in direction that the Air 

Force went, in picking this large plane over the medium-sized 

plane that they testified here that that is what they wanted. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank the gentleman. General, did you have another response? 

General MOSELEY. No, sir. I was just going to say, Congressman 

Dicks, his comments were relative to the advantage over the 135, 

not the two offerings. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Lewis, please. 

AIR FORCE ADVERTISING CAMPAIGN

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Wynne, General Moseley, welcome to the committee on 

the posture of the Air Force. As you can sense in this environment, 


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it is going to be very difficult to have members who are very concerned about their constituencies and implications of the process 

that is before us to spend a lot of time on posture. But one area 

where you could help me and maybe the committee would be to 

spend just a few moments, Secretary Wynne, and certainly General 

Moseley if you like, on the funding that you will be delivering for 

advertising purposes relative to the, above all, public understanding of the Air Force’s role. 

Will you spend a little time doing that for the committee? And 

maybe we will go back to the tanker after a while. 

Mr. WYNNE. Sir, the intent of it was to reach the influencers. 

What we find is you have to reach people who are inclined to support defense. And what we will tell you is that the way we are 

going about this is to really create an image in the press, in the 

thing that allows coaches, allows people to essentially influence 

these smart kids, that we are going to require to keep our hightechnology Air Force, to come see us and sign up. It is actually far 

less than our sister Services are presently spending. But we asked 

if they could at least make sure that the influencers would take a 

peek, take it home with them and understand that their Air Force 

is an important element in the defense of the country. Chief? 

Mr. LEWIS. General Moseley. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, thank you for the question. We have had 

a couple of questions from the staff that would reference that we 

are attempting to lobby the Congress. And sir, that is not the case. 

We would not do that because it is not right. It is also in violation 

of policies. So that would never happen. 

But I would like to be on the record as saying we have the lowest 

number of recruiters per recruited member. We have a fraction of 

the recruiting budget or the outreach budget of any of the Services. 

We recruit the same numbers of people that the United States Marine Corps does. The recruiting population out there is getting 

smaller and smaller. The understanding, as Congressman Tiahrt 

mentioned, the understanding of the American military, whether it 

is Soldiers, Sailors, Coast Guard, Marines or Airmen is less and 

less. This campaign that we started is not just in newspapers, it 

is in magazines, it is in video, it is on TV. 

Mr. LEWIS. Right. 

General MOSELEY. And it also establishes directly into an Air 

Force dot.com Web site that goes immediately to enlisted opportunities and officer opportunities, and a variety of other Web sites, 

to bring people who are influencers or interested parties to understand more about their Air Force as we look at air, space and 

cyberspace. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General MOSELEY. And, sir, if you need, for the record, we can 

get you the numbers and the comparisons with our other brothers 

on recruiting and on outreach and the numbers of recruiters. 

Mr. LEWIS. It would be appropriate to provide that material. 

Thank you. 

[The information follows:] 


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FY07 Air Force Army Marine Corps Navy 

# of Recruiters ....................................... 1,312 6,439 2,783 3,501 

Advertising Budget ................................ $63.1 $308.7 $167.9 $146.7 

Air Force Reserve Army Reserve Marine Corps Reserve Navy Reserve 

# of Recruiters ....................................... 175 1,800 N/A 700 

Advertising Budget ................................ $12.2 ‘$54.5 Included in active 

duty 

Included in active 

duty 

Air Guard Army Guard 

# of Recruiters ....................................... 408 5,100 

Advertising Budget ................................ $10.7 $85.6 

All active duty data and all recruiter numbers received from OSD P&R, all other data received from the respective Service components. Dol- lars are reflected in millions. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lewis. 

Mr. Moran. 

MASSIVE ORDNANCE PENETRATOR

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What? Did you draw the 

short straw in this hearing here? 

Mr. ROTHMAN. I am proud to be here and in this Chair. 

Mr. MORAN. I know you are. Nice job, Steve. Good to have you 

chairing it. 

Would it be okay if I switched the subject for just a moment? 

Would you mind that, Mr. Secretary? 

Last year, in the President’s supplemental request, the Air Force 

asked for $88 million to retrofit B–2 stealth bombers. That would 

have enabled the B–2 to carry a 30,000-pound bunker buster. You 

will refer to it as a massive ordnance penetrator. At that time, 

there was speculation that this funding might be a signal regarding 

the Administration’s efforts to attack Iran’s subterranean nuclear 

enrichment program, either Natanz or any other facility. The bunker buster could be used in Afghanistan, but really there isn’t any 

need to retrofit a B–2 stealth bomber since there is less need for 

stealth capabilities in the Afghan skies. 

So some of us in the Congress were concerned about that request, since the only justification that we ever received is that the 

funding was necessary in response to, and I quote, an urgent operational need from theater commanders. Can you assure the subcommittee today that the retrofitting for B–2 will not be used for 

a preemptive strike on Iran? Because that was the speculation, as 

you know. 

Either one of you can answer that, General or Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. WYNNE. Sir, all I can say is we are subject to the guidance 

of the National Command Authorities, and I know of no direct instructions to us to complete that such that it could be a preemptive 

strike. But I will tell you, as a matter of policy for the United 

States, that option is always on the table. 

COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE

Mr. MORAN. Well, that certainly is the same script we have been 

hearing from. 


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The second-highest priority behind the tanker replacement program is the combat search and rescue helicopter replacement program. We have had contractual problems dating back to 2007. The 

GAO upheld a protest over the contractual award to the company 

that was initially given it. Just last month, the DOD Inspector 

General said that it will begin an audit of the latest competition 

to determine if the Air Force followed the rules regarding the requirements for this aircraft. What effect will that delay caused by 

the big protest have on the program schedule and do you still anticipate awarding that contract in the next few months, General 

Moseley. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, I will defer the contract award questions 

to my boss, but I will tell you the operational impact. 

Just like this captain sitting behind me, we are flying HH–60 

aircraft that are limited in range and payload and capability in 

some pretty severe places in combat today. The desire is to give our 

combat search and rescue team the best possible flying machine 

with the best possible capability. Because we do combat search and 

rescue for the entire joint team, not just for the Air Force, but for 

Marines, Navy, Army, special operations and for our Coalition partners. 

So, Congressman Moran, that is a great question. And the further it slips the more risk we take in theater combat operations 

and the more risk these crews, like this captain sitting behind me, 

take with an aircraft that is underpowered, has not much range, 

and has not much capability. 

Mr. WYNNE. Sir, I will tell you that August or September is our 

target. Yes, sir. And, hopefully, everything is saucered upright. 

RELIGION AT THE AIR FORCE ACADEMY

Mr. MORAN. That is good. I am glad to hear that. 

I have one further question. Last night, I saw a movie about a 

subject that I have only heard about, but it was very disturbing. 

It was about the Air Force Academy, and it detailed incidences of 

real anti-Semitism, that religious evangelicals have had an undue 

influence on that university. We heard a great deal from the chaplain who was very much troubled by it but who had been threatened as a result, and a gentleman who sued the Air Force Academy. He had three sons going there. And you probably—Mikey 

Weinstein, I think was his name. He had sued, and he has gotten 

death threats as a result, and it detailed what his sons had gone 

through. 

I have a constituent who is a Dallas State delegate who also attended the Air Force Academy who also happens to be Jewish. 

This stuff is real, and I want to know that it has now been put 

an end to. There is no more of that kind of real discrimination and 

almost persecution of people who are not Christian at that university. Can you assure us of that? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, let me take that, as the Air Force Chief 

of Staff. It is outrageous that someone would attempt to do that to 

people in an institution, whether it is a public or private institution 

but for sure in the United States military. 

Mr. MORAN. But it did happen? You acknowledge it was happening? 


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General MOSELEY. We have had issues. So has everyone else. 

And we have taken it on. And it is outrageous that sort of thing 

occurs to people, citizens. We watch this as far as all faiths. We 

hold very dear the notions of dignity and respect for all people that 

go through the United States Air Force Academy, as well as basic 

military training and any place where they serve while on Active 

Duty, in the Guard or the Reserve or anywhere in the United 

States Air Force. 

Mr. MORAN. You are telling me what we want to hear, General. 

The problem is that the people who were involved have been rewarded by promotions, and I would hope that you are looking into 

that situation with some real depth and not just the kind of superficial response that is normally given. 

It didn’t happen at the other academies in the way it happened 

at the Air Force Academy. It should not have happened; and I 

would hope that measures have been put in place to ensure that 

the Academy is open for everyone and that everyone’s participation 

is desired and that that is not considered to be any kind of semireligious institution, i.e., some kind of Christian academy, as some 

preachers would have wanted it to be, such as Ted Haggard. 

I won’t go into it in any greater length, but I want you to know 

that there are some people in this subcommittee and I know in the 

Congress who are adamant that that kind of stuff has got to stop. 

It is far beneath the dignity of our service academies. 

General MOSELEY. Sir, as the Air Force Chief of Staff, I agree 

100 percent with that. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. General, I am just going to exercise the privilege 

of the Chair to ask for further clarification. Is it your testimony or 

your statement to this committee that the Air Force is now taking 

all the necessary steps to make certain that this kind of religious 

discrimination that Mr. Moran described will not happen again? 

General MOSELEY. Absolutely, sir; and we can provide for the 

record all of the studies and the work that we have done since 

those episodes, if you would like that. We had a commission run 

by our Deputy Chief of Staff of Personnel and rounded up several 

outside experts to be able to go look at that; and Mr. Chairman, 

Congressman Moran, we would be happy to provide that and answer any other questions. Because it is outrageous, and it is unsat, 

and we don’t buy it. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And, General, you are satisfied that you are taking and have taken all the steps necessary to assure that this won’t 

happen again? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, you are never satisfied as a Commander 

or as a Chief of Staff, because you don’t know what you don’t know 

until it happens. But I am satisfied we have made the case that 

this is unacceptable behavior. We welcome all faiths and all disciplines, and that is the way it should be. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. This is your watch, General, right? 

General MOSELEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Hobson. 

MOBILITY AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT

Mr. HOBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, nice to see you today. I know it is not an easy day. 


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I want to thank you both for the foreign military training mission at the Springfield National Guard base and your continued 

help in making that successful, as you have been very helpful in 

that and continue to be. 

I would like to talk about the C–5s and the C–17s, if we could, 

because we have some of the C–5s. Can you give us your perspective on what we are going to do to C–5s and what we are going 

to do with—are we going to buy any more C–17s? 

I think Ms. Granger left. There are a lot of people interested in 

C–17s and C–5s, and you have had some discussions on that. 

Mr. WYNNE. Sir, I can give you a quick snapshot and then I will 

segue into affordability. There was a recent acquisition decision following a Nunn-McCurdy breach. The Nunn-McCurdy breach was 

as a result of the program exceeding its cost budget by more than 

50 percent of its original baseline and 25 percent of its current 

baseline. The acquisition decision memorandum came down from 

the OSD AT&L that certified the program for 52 RERP’d, if you 

will, C–5s; and I believe they are going to be called C–5Ms at the 

time. 

This leaves approximately 59 or so C–5As which we intend to 

Avionics Modernization Program (AMP). You have to AMP them to 

meet the international standards for position and navigation. So, 

right now, it is the policy of the Air Force to follow that acquisition 

model and to re-engine approximately to the total of 52 what will 

be called C–5Ms. 

As to what happens beyond for the C–5 fleet, we are going to follow the law. The law currently prohibits retiring of the C–5s. We 

have put forward, I think, an argument for the fact that C–17s are 

being used to a tremendous extent. I would say sometimes we use 

the phrase ‘‘flying the wings off’’, but they are the workhorse of this 

engagement, and we believe that the models that are used do not 

accommodate the moving goalpost that the mobility capability 

study did, and we can see a case for additional airplanes. 

General MOSELEY. Congressman, the President’s Budget request 

has no C–17s in there. We support that. We have discussed this. 

We don’t have an updated mobility capability study. There will be 

one. We are working hard with the Joint Staff and USTRANSCOM 

that hopefully in the early 2009 time frame will deploy. 

Mr. HOBSON. Will the line be shut down by then, General, the 

C–17 line? 

General MOSELEY. There were 10 airplanes in last year’s supplemental. That takes us to 190. There were 14 aircraft in the foreign 

military sale. So that 24 airplanes will go to some length to maintain the line. 

Sir, I don’t know the answer to that. I will have to take that for 

the record. 

[The information follows:] 

With no additional Air Force procurement above 190 aircraft, the Boeing C–17 

production line may begin to shut down in 2008. The last contracted foreign customer deliveries are to the United Kingdom—six in June 2008 and the final production line C–17 deliveries to the U.S. Air Force—190 in August 2009. There are no 

other orders for C–17s; however, the United Kingdom, NATO Strategic Airlift Capability, and Qatar (two aircraft each) are potential remaining foreign customers. Boeing is currently at risk protecting long lead items for 10 aircraft. C–17s have a 34 


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month build time. Without commitment for more procurement, Boeing may halt production on protected aircraft. 

General MOSELEY. But, Congressman, the challenge we have in 

attempting to define this requirement has been the goalpost being 

moved. We have an Army and Marine Corps that has grown close 

to 100,000. Most MRAPs are incapable of being transported on C– 

130s. Only the MRAP version RG31, category 1 can be transported 

in a C–130. This MRAP version is used by special forces and is currently being procured by the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps. 

Mr. HOBSON. That you are renting? You rented former Russian 

aircraft? 

General MOSELEY. Air transport of MRAP vehicles are being 

done with the Russian-made Antonov AN–124. Sir, our C–5 inventory, the C–5As are less reliable; and that gets to the Secretary’s 

point about the Avionics Modernization Program to actually be able 

to fly them in the international environment. And then our C–17s 

and C–130s we are burning up with high utilization rates, and this 

young captain sitting behind me is a good example of that. Every 

month we take somewhere around 3,500 convoys off the road and 

close to 9,000 people off the road inside C–17s and our C–130s to 

avoid Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), to avoid insurgents. 

And so, sir, as you look at all of those, the goalposts do continue 

to move on us a bit when you look at strategic airlift. And so the 

mix of C–17 and modified, reliable C–5s takes us to the place 

where in the unfunded requirements list we put additional C–17s. 

Because, if we had extra dollars, that is where we would spend it 

to be able to maintain this very, very critical piece of the joint 

fight. 

Mr. WYNNE. I endorse what the Chairman said. I am very 

pleased with the nine percent improvement that the President has 

offered us, and we have tried to prioritize it within that. As the 

Chief said, though, the goalposts keep moving. We have to adhere 

to that goal. 

Mr. HOBSON. But we need your advice. And if Mr. Murtha was 

here, I think he would—I can’t speak for him, but I think he would 

say, as I have heard him speak before, if these goalposts are moving, you need to help us keep you in the game by telling us what 

you need to stay in the game. 

And, for example, I have a parochial interest in the C–5s that 

are at Wright-Patterson; and I would hope that someday those 

would be C–17s as we move forward and the goalposts—that was 

even before the goalposts changed, so I am not going to beat you 

up about that, but I would like to see that happen. 

JSF ALTERNATE ENGINE

I would like to ask your personal feelings about one other thing. 

The President’s budget, again, does not contain an alternate engine 

on the joint strike fighter. And you have both had experience with 

the wars of single engines in the past. Can you give us your personal opinion—because I wouldn’t have asked you this, but I think 

you have been asked this before. Will you tell us your personal 

opinion about the alternate engine? 

Mr. WYNNE. Sir, the first thing we have to say is that we support 

where the President’s Budget request came in. We recognize that 


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it was a business case. We recognize that that business case tried 

to postulate where it is. 

Now, having given all that, it is my personal opinion that we 

have many nations participating with us. There is even a tendency 

to go with a single-engine fighter for all the American forces; and 

if it is going to be all of the free Air Forces are going to fly the 

same airplane, I think then you have to reach beyond a simple 

business case into a reliability case. 

And if you reach into that reliability case, I can’t tell you how 

happy I was when we stood down the F–15 fleet that I happened 

to have a second airplane, namely the F–16s to backfill. If I am not 

going to have any other airplanes to backfill, then I ought to have 

an extra engine to backfill. And that is where it makes the case 

I think for excessive reliability, but I think that is what we owe 

our partner nations. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hobson. 

General, did you want to address that? 

General MOSELEY. Yes, please, sir. 

Sir, this, like the C–17 issue, is truly an affordability issue. 

When we say we support the President’s Budget request, we have 

been in hard work for over a year to balance our Program Objective 

Memorandum (POM) and to be able to submit an Air Force budget. 

So we support that. 

These issues that we are talking about are absolutely linked to 

affordability; and the $2 billion that it would take to field the second engine, my fear is I don’t know where the $2 billion comes 

from. And the desire to hold the IOC, the initial operational capability, of the airplane constant, I don’t know where the funding 

comes from; and I don’t know how that is squared inside that program. But, sir, if you are asking my personal opinion of should 

there be a second engine, I believe there should be. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Hobson, did you want to make a brief comment? 

General MOSELEY. I just don’t know where the funding comes 

from, sir. 

Mr. HOBSON. I understand. We will take care of that. That is our 

job. 

The other thing I wanted to say for the record before I leave relates to something we haven’t talked about today, but it is very important I think to the future of the Air Force and the military in 

general. That is synthetic fuel. I am not going to ask you to comment, because I have to leave, and there are other members who 

want to talk. I hope before you leave you all will talk about synthetic fuels for our aircraft and where we are going with other 

types of vehicles on that. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your diligence. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hobson. 

Mr. Cramer. 

BRAC 2005

Mr. CRAMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and welcome, both of 

you, to the subcommittee. 

General Moseley, I want to ask you a question about BRAC, 

BRAC 2005; and the Alabama delegation has been trying to underVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:38 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046475 PO 00000 Frm 00385 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A475P2.XXX A475P2

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stand where the Air Force is coming from. This is about rotary 

wing activities. In the BRAC 2005 recommendation, there was a 

consolidation of the rotary wing activities into Redstone Arsenal, 

my base there in North Alabama; and we still haven’t gotten an 

answer. 

I think the Air Force has been trying to evaluate whether the 

jobs were related to development or acquisition; and that is what 

the BRAC order more or less said, that these jobs will be moved 

there. And, at first, there were 120 jobs; and then the Joint Cross 

Service Group cost of base realignment assessment reduced that 

number to 50. But we still seem to be at a disagreement over 

whether those 50 will be moved there or not; and our offices, Senator Sessions and I, were trying to present this issue to your folks 

early in February. Do you have a position on that? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, if you will allow me to take for the record 

the detailed calendar of what happened, who did what, we will get 

that to you. 

But, sir, you know we will 100 percent comply with BRAC, because that is the law of the land, and we will do that. 

Mr. WYNNE. I will also add to that, sir, that when we completed 

the BRAC analysis we then turned into trying to make sure that 

they had the right business case and that they were accurate when 

they came up with the information; and I think there is some discrepancy in there. I think the Chief is right. We should take this 

for the record, go back and make sure that you have a correct assessment of what it is. 

Mr. CRAMER. Well, you need to do that. 

[The information follows:] 

BRAC recommendation number 189 consolidates Army and Air Force rotary wing 

(RW) DAT&E from Ft. Rucker, AL, Robins AFB, GA, and 50 manpower billets, to 

the Technical Test Center at Redstone Arsenal, AL. This recommendation was the 

product of a Technical Joint Cross Service Group (TJCSG) recommendation. 

In March 2004, Air Force Material Command (AFMC) responded to a TJCSG data 

call, certifying that Robins AFB, GA performed RW DAT&E with approximately 10 

civilian full time employees as of September 30, 2003 (the snapshot-in-time date for 

all BRAC recommendations). 

In May 2005, the Department of Defense BRAC recommendations were forwarded 

to the Commission, and made public. In the summer of 2005, the BRAC Commissioners and staff visited all locations nominated for BRAC action. In July 2005 

through April 2006, AFMC conducted site surveys at Robins AFB, GA and found 

significant differences in reported data and actual RW DAT&E work at Robins. (incidental to other activities then, now discontinued). 

In October 2007 AFMC certfied, in a letter to the Air Force BRAC Program Management Office that they incorrectly responded to the BRAC 2005 data call and that 

RW DAT&E is no longer accomplished at Robins AFB, GA. 

AFMC’s re-certification superseded the BRAC requirement to relocate the mission 

and 50 civilian billets, since those billets were no longer utilized by RW DAT&E. 

In short, the Air Force cannot move what no longer exists. 

Mr. CRAMER. And, of course, we all have to respect the BRAC 

process, and we are bound by law to do that. But if there is a disagreement there I would like for you to point that, if you think a 

mistake was made, how that mistake was made. There is construction money at stake here, too, so we have got an unjoined path of 

construction of needing to go forward, yet we are not clear about 

where this is going. 

General MOSELEY. And, Congressman, there is another part of 

that, which is where is the work actually done? Where is rotary 


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wing development acquisition test logistics actually done? So that 

will be part of the reply that we put for the record to show you 

where we did that at the time of BRAC and where that work is 

done now because I depend on the United States Army to do most 

of that for us. 

TSAT

Mr. CRAMER. And then we need the opportunity to hear where 

you are coming from so that we can respond to that with honoring 

the process, too. 

Secretary Wynne, I would like to ask you a question about TSAT. 

TSAT has been the keystone system in DOD’s communication and 

architecture, yet you pulled $4 billion out of the TSAT program, 

which seemed to me further delaying the system’s protected communication capabilities and communication on the move which are 

critical components in the future combat systems as well. Can you 

respond to that? 

Mr. WYNNE. Sir, I can tell you that we were directed to buy another AEHF satellite, the fourth one. We saw this as a direct influence into where the Congress at the time felt like the TSAT program was going. We attempted to be very, very clear about the fact 

that we thought the tactical readiness level of the TSAT was higher than the Congress had assessed, but we recognized the risk. And 

I think overall, as we went down the road of constructing the budget that we have today, AEHF four took a prime position and essentially slid the TSAT; and the response was, from inside of the 

building, that this would give us a further opportunity to mature 

the technologies. From an Air Force perspective, we thought they 

had been matured, but, frankly, we went along. 

Mr. CRAMER. So this is a slide rather than a reconsideration of 

how TSAT fits in? 

Mr. WYNNE. We see that TSAT is a requirement of communications-on-the-move. We think that if we are going to be overburdened we see it as essentially saving what we forecast as a saturation of bandwidth downstream. 

Mr. CRAMER. Do you know the time frames for when that next 

AEHF satellite will be available? 

Mr. WYNNE. I believe, sir, that they—I don’t. I will have to take 

that for the record, just to make sure I don’t misspeak. 

Mr. CRAMER. All right. Thank you. 

[The information follows:] 

The Fiscal Year 2009 President’s Budget submission plans for the launch of 

AEHF Satellite Vehicle 4 (AEHF 4) in Fiscal Year 2014. Because the production of 

AEHF 4 follows a four year production break, the Air Force is currently conducting 

a study to assess the impacts of diminishing manufacturing sources, long lead parts, 

the production break, and other potential vendor issues. Following the completion 

of this study in April 2008, any potential updates would be reflected in the Fiscal 

Year 2010 President’s Budget submission. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cramer. 

Mr. Boyd. 

ABOVE ALL ADVERTISING CAMPAIGN

Mr. BOYD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


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Secretary Wynne and General Moseley, first of all, let me commend both of you for your very distinguished careers serving our 

country. I have had the opportunity to work with your offices over 

the years; and particularly I know, Secretary Wynne, you spent 

most of your career there in research and development. And I have 

my interest in the research labs at Tyndall Air Force Base that 

worked with your office, General Moseley, often. I commend you for 

your service and the way you conduct yourselves. 

I want to revert back to a question that Jerry Lewis from California asked earlier, and this will be very brief. But it is the Above 

All advertising campaign. Maybe, Secretary Wynne, it will be more 

appropriate for you. In the information I have it is about an $81 

million cost. Can you tell me, was this ad campaign developed completely in-house or was it done outside by contractors? 

Mr. WYNNE. Sir, I believe it was done outside by contractors. 

Mr. BOYD. Can you briefly tell the committee why the Air Force 

felt compelled to run these ads, which to some appear to be the 

kinds of ads that an advocacy group would run, when, in fact, it 

is specifically prohibited in law? 

Mr. WYNNE. Sir, we have no intention of lobbying Congress. In 

fact, the survey that was conducted said that we need to get noticed by the influencers, the coaches, the counselors, the parents of 

people; and we need to push for the Air Force’s highest quality individual we can get. 

We recognize that there is only about two or three percent of the 

American population that we essentially compete with. We do this 

with a relatively meager budget. I would tell you it is probably onethird of anybody else’s. We have one-third the recruiters per recruit 

out there. 

So the fact is, and I will say that the papers that we put it in, 

the New York Times, the Washington Post, go to all the school libraries. So it seemed to me to be a very effective way of contacting 

the influencers. 

There was no intent to lobby, advocate, except to make sure that 

the influencers understood that there is an opportunity here for 

their kids to come join the Air Force and defend America. 

Mr. BOYD. So your position is it is used as a recruiting tool only? 

Mr. WYNNE. Yes, sir. It directs those kids to Web sites for placement within the enlisted or officer corps. 

Mr. BOYD. Thank you. I have no more questions. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Boyd. 

Mr. Bishop. 

F–22 PROCUREMENT

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. 

I would like to ask you about the F–22A procurement program. 

The Office of the Secretary stated that 183 F–22As are affordable 

and sufficient to meet the projected threats. But the Air Force continues to state the need to procure a minimum of 381 F–22As to 

meet the national strategic needs. Are there plans to procure additional F–22As beyond the 183 aircraft buy? Do the problems with 

the F–15s support the acquisition of more F–22As? And does a 

multi-year current procurement contract provide for variation and 

quantity? If you decide to procure more aircraft, can they be added 


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to the multi-year contract and purchased at the same reduced 

price? If procurement is complete at 183, when will the F–22A production lines start to shut down? 

Mr. WYNNE. Sir, the first thing I need to say is that we support 

the President’s Budget request, which currently has an agreement 

to not shut the F–22 line down but to allow the next Administration to do it. So the budget has essentially removed all of the closedown funds, which would probably have to be reentered, because 

I think about $40 million is required by about November of this 

year. 

But, nevertheless, as we present ourselves, we have to say that 

it was a huge argument about affordability, with the Office of Secretary of Defense determining that the Air Force could not afford 

to have the F–22 program going forward while the F–35 became 

developed. 

That raging argument, sir, a decision has been rendered, although the Deputy Secretary said he would put four more airplanes into the supplemental request that is coming out later. Now, 

those four airplanes will be an attempt to add to the multi-year. 

And it is an agreement that has to be made, but there is no variation in quantity, to your point. We don’t think it is sufficient to 

get it to the other side. But I would say that that is up to the contractor of record. 

Mr. BISHOP. General Moseley. 

General MOSELEY. Congressman, I will echo Secretary Wynne. 

This is fundamentally an affordability issue, and we support the 

President’s Budget request in trying to square all of the requirements we have with the budget authority that we receive. The 183 

airplanes, plus the perhaps four more, will get us to a place that 

offers us some opportunities to be able to employ the airplane. 

There have been discussions about requirements higher than 

that. There have been discussions about the studies that take you 

to those higher numbers. But the affordability question that we 

face now takes us to those smaller numbers. 

Mr. BISHOP. So are you saying that you need the 381, but you 

just can’t afford it right now? Is that what you are saying? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, my personal opinion as the Chief of Staff 

is that the larger numbers provide much more capacity and much 

more depth than they cover the things like the unforeseen grounding of the F–15s and in the numbers of squadrons that we need to 

be able to deploy relative to the national military strategy. Except, 

sir, this is fundamentally an affordability issue. 

Mr. BISHOP. So that is your personal opinion, not the official? 

General MOSELEY. My personal opinion is more airplanes are 

better. 

Mr. BISHOP. And so that would strengthen strategic capabilities? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, it would allow us to retire the fourth-generation airplanes that we are having some challenges with maintaining. The modification lines that we have, particularly for the 

F–15, I asked General Corley at Air Combat Command a week or 

so ago, of every dollar spent on modifications, how much goes to 

true combat capability? Eighty-six percent goes to safety and 

sustainment issues on those older airplanes. 


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And, sir, we have made this case in supporting the President’s 

Budget request and attempting to balance our budget authority. 

This is about funding, and this is about what we can afford. 

Mr. BISHOP. So every dollar you put in there is like throwing 

good money after bad to work on that maintenance and that safety 

of the old aircraft, as opposed to going on and investing in the new? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, I would say all funding is good, but the 

return on that dollar spent is not necessarily pure combat capability because of the age of the system. 

Mr. BISHOP. Do you agree with that, Secretary Wynne? 

Mr. WYNNE. Yes, sir. In those figures, only 14 percent goes to enhanced combat capability; 86 percent goes to essentially sustain the 

system. You cannot at the end of the day survive like that as a nation. 

Mr. BISHOP. So you have a personal opinion about more aircraft 

being better? 

Mr. WYNNE. My personal opinion actually stems from a study 

that was done by an outside contractor. Because I don’t have the 

warfighting background that the Chief of Staff has. But Whitney, 

Bradley and Brown, Incorporated (WBB) did a study that basically 

said that the Nation would be in a medium-risk category, not in 

a low-risk category, with a quantity approaching 280 ships—280 

aircraft, excuse me. 

Mr. BISHOP. Because we are talking about 183 versus 381? 

Mr. WYNNE. Yes, sir. The WBB study actually took a middle position and ended up with about 277 to 280 units. 

Mr. BISHOP. So that would be my middle? 

Mr. WYNNE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Do you have anything more? 

Mr. BISHOP. No. 

UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS LIST

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. Secretary, General, I have a few questions; and then we will 

start the second round. But, for the record, understand that we as 

a committee and as Americans are in awe of the capability and the 

dedication of your service people under your command. We know 

that you are the difference between, you and the other services, between the security of our country and the insecurity or lack of security. We are extraordinarily grateful for what you do, and we are 

mindful that it is only a handful of you with this extraordinary 

ability and talent and professionalism that make our Air Force the 

best on the planet earth. 

It is the responsibility of this Congress, however, and this committee to receive the President’s budget for the Air Force and examine it thoroughly to make sure that our shared commitment to 

our national security is achieved—is maximized by the President’s 

allocation of dollars and that we spend the taxpayer dollars as 

wisely as possible. And there may be a disagreement about what 

system, what plane, what ordinance that we would include if the 

President hasn’t, et cetera, et cetera. But we are sharing the same 

goal. We are simply doing our job to make sure that we examine 

these numbers ourselves as a check and balance and to fulfill our 

constitutional responsibilities. 


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Along those lines, I have been told that in previous years the unfunded requirements list was called an unfunded priorities list and 

that not only did the name change this year but that the unfunded 

requirements list this year is not in priority order. If that is an accurate statement, I would ask for the record for the unfunded requirements list to be provided to us in priority order. Do either of 

you gentlemen have a problem with that? 

Mr. WYNNE. No, sir. 

General MOSELEY. No, sir. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you. Obviously, as soon as we can get that, 

it would be much appreciated and allow us to do our work even 

more effectively. 

[The information follows:] 

Priority Requirement FY09 Amount 

($ M) Item description 

1 B–52 NDAA Compliance (76 

aircraft).

183.1 FY08 Authorization Act directed 76 TAI/44 Combat Coded (CC) fleet 

with common configuration. Currently funded at 56 TIA/32 CC. 

Funds four additional aircraft Programmed Depot Maintenance inductions, increased MILPERS/flying hours, and modifications for 

additional aircraft. Maintains viability and execution of B–52 

CONECT program. Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module 

(SASSM) GPS receiver upgrade is required to address capability 

deficiencies, maintain combat capability and ability to deliver all 

modern weapons. Supports Required Force. 

2 Blue Ribbon Review.

99.5 Funds the following items in accordance with the Blue Ribbon Review: Remote Visual Assessment (RVA) $0.3M; ICBM Payload 

Transporter (PT) High Security Locks $4.2M; Common Vertical Lift 

Support Platform (CVLSP) $4.5M; Radiation Sensors $5.8M; ICBM 

Cryptography Upgrade, Increment II $7.5M; Nuclear Storage Structures/Areas Upgrades $15.4M; New ICBM Payload Transporter (PT) 

$20.0M; Nuclear Surety, SDT $6.0M; Nuclear Surety, Test Equipment $9.0M; Nuclear Surety, Procure non-powered munitions trailer 

$22.8M; Nuclear Surety, Powered Munitions Trailer $4.0M. 

3 Total Force End 

Strength for 

Required Force.

385.0 The FY08 Defense Appropriations Act tasked the AF to report on end 

strength requirements. This requirement requests funding to increase Active end strength by 13,554, civilian by 1,830, and reserve by 3,400 in FY 09 in support of the Air Force’s 86 Combat 

Wings (Required Force). Also includes McConnell AF Reserves. 

4 C–130J (+8 aircraft).576.0 C–130J procurement ensures recapitalization of the aging C–130E 

fleet, in accordance with Fleet Viability Board recommendation. 

Continued C–130J procurement allows the Air Force to continue 

meeting the Intra-theater Airlift requirements for the Combatant 

Commanders. Part of Required Force. 

5 C–17 (+15 aircraft).3,900.0 Procures 15 C–17s, keeping only active strategic airlift production 

line open. Part of Required Force. 

6 Special Ops Aircraft (+2 C– 

27Bs, +1 CV– 

22).

156.8 C–27B for SOF $74.8M—Funds two C–27B aircraft, initial spares, 

and ground support equipment for delivery to AFSOC. Accelerates 

delivery of C–27B aircraft to AFSOC by two years, meeting Commander’s needs for precision attack and specialized airlift. Part of 

Required Force. CV–22 Aircraft $82M—Buys one additional CV–22 

in FY09 to accelerate fielding of SOF aircraft as directed by QDR. 

Part of Required Force. 

7 F–35 (+5 aircraft in FY09 

& Advance 

Procurement 

for FY10).

828.0 5 additional aircraft in FY09 $761M—Procures 5 additional F–35s 

(including long lead) to meet Required Force procurement profile. 

Advance Procurement for six additional aircraft $67M—Funds advanced procurement items for 6 additional aircraft to be programmed in the FY10 budget to meet Required Force. Without procuring additional aircraft to meet Required Force, the Air Force is 

unable to sufficiently recapitalize its aging aircraft. 


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Priority Requirement FY09 Amount 

($ M) Item description 

8 Vanishing Vendor 

Base.

48.4 ICBM Solid Rocket Motor Life Extension $31.0M—Following completion of Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program this initiative would fund a low-rate ICBM Solid Rocket Motor sustainment 

production line producing 6 booster sets per year to maintain critical industrial skills, certifications, and supplier base. Mitigates 

impact of loss of critical propulsion skills/industrial base until a 

follow-on booster program is approved; U–2 Vanishing Vendor Mitigation $17.4M—Funds for Vanishing Vendor Mitigation of ASARS 

On Board Processor (OBP). Funding will purchase two OBPs. Additionally, diminishing manufacturing suppliers and increased GWOT 

operations tempo is accelerating depletion of Remote Airborne Sensor (SIGINT sensor—RAS–1R) spares, support equipment, Senior 

Year Electro-optical Reconnaissance Sensor (SYERS) visible and IR 

focal planes and circuit card assemblies. Insufficient spares inventory to sustain operations results in the inability to meet 

COCOM intelligence collection requirements. 

9 Quality of Life 

MILCON 

Projects.

166.0 Funds MILCON requirements for construction, improvement, planning, 

and design of facilities to improve quality of life of Air Force personnel. Projects include libraries, youth centers, fitness centers, 

child development centers and workplace improvements. 

10 Critical Base 

Services.

276.9 Provides critical funds to base services that impact the quality of life 

for all Airmen. Adjustment will bring non-pay programs to 85% of 

the total requirement, consistent with historical execution rates. 

FY09 baseline funding is at 63% and barely covers the average 

execution for contracts, and does not adequately fund services 

such as base shuttle service, dining hall service hours, fitness/ 

recreation programs, etc. Lack of funding impacts the entire base 

community and, specifically, junior Airmen. Support Required Force. 

AGING AIRCRAFT

Mr. ROTHMAN. In November of ’07, the F–15 broke apart. My understanding is, as was appropriate, the entire inventory of F–15s 

was then examined with a fine-tooth comb and several of the aircraft were deemed to be in danger of falling apart because of a 

crack or other defects. And I am assuming it, but I would like you 

to confirm, that you feel confident now that you have identified the 

problems or problem with the F–15. 

Can you tell me, have you gone through the KC–135s with the 

same fine-tooth comb, given their age, to assure us and the American people that we have—we are paying as close attention as possible to a potential problem with these KC–135s? 

Mr. WYNNE. I can tell you, sir, that there are no engineering 

models that go this long. There are no engineering models that 

have these kind of hours in them. So every day is a brand new discovery. Our maintenance people are doing miracle work. We do, 

however, do teardowns; and we look very hard at the KC–135s that 

are going to be flying we think for another 35 to 40 years, at least 

the last one. 

We also will tell you that on the F–15s there is the third factor 

of stressing. You know, stresses have to go somewhere on an airplane. When you pull an airplane at nine Gs, they have to go somewhere. We have chased them down into the region we think is the 

problem, and we are repairing that. We believe that we have gotten 

it down to the point where we can tell our pilots that this is a safe 

and effective fleet. 

But I can tell you, sir, that as time goes on you can’t patch your 

way into a combat force. You are going to experience what I call 


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geriatric aging, that we all hate to admit among ourselves. But it 

does occur in metal fatigue. It does occur in systems. 

Chief. 

General MOSELEY. Mr. Chairman, thanks for that question. 

We have a fleet viability board that looks at major weapon systems. We have looked at the KC–135. We have looked at the C– 

5, the C–130, the A–10. Now we are asking the system to look at 

the F–15 to give us some idea about long-term sustainability. 

But the Secretary is exactly right. On the KC–135, we are beyond any engineering fail rate data from the company that built 

the airplane. And they build good airplanes. And to go to them and 

ask them what is going to break on this airplane, it is tough to 

know. 

So as the question about dignity and the United States Air Force 

Academy, as the Service Chief of Staff I am never satisfied that I 

know everything about the aircraft as they age and that I understand everything that is going to break next, because I don’t. 

On the F–15s, it was a major wake-up when we had a longeron 

break and have an airplane break apart in flight. We got our Missouri Guardsman back. He has had some surgery, and we will get 

him back in shape. But, sir, you are never satisfied that you know 

everything about that. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. As long as you make—I understand what your 

testimony is, that you are making the effort to do as much as you 

can to discover problems in these other aircraft. 

General MOSELEY. Yes, sir. And on the F–15 side we are about 

to embark on another set of evaluations where we go through another set of fatigue tests on an airplane off the line as well as a 

teardown test and let the company partner with us on finding out 

what is any more predictive data that is knowable on how to maintain the aircraft that are now 30 years old. 

COUNTERSPACE PROGRAMS

Mr. ROTHMAN. I have one more question. Then I am going to go 

to Mr. Tiahrt. And this is a general broad-picture question about 

changes that the Air Force has made to the counterspace systems 

programs, if any, in response to the recent Chinese anti-satellite 

test. 

This is an open hearing. I am certain that there are plenty of 

things that are being done that you can’t talk about in an open 

hearing. But to address that potential threat, the present threat of 

anti-satellite weapons or the future threat of anti-satellite weapons. 

Mr. WYNNE. I can tell you, sir, this goes to the Executive Agent 

for Space. The Executive Agent for Space, which is myself, does not 

have the authority that he could have. We have demanded, for example, that any future space thing come with a defensive suite, 

which can be argued as to whether it has merit or not. But I find 

myself engrossed in a coalition of the willing. In other words, I 

don’t have the authority to direct it. I have to encourage and essentially take the moral high ground that America’s space needs defense. 


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EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR SPACE

Mr. ROTHMAN. Excuse me, Secretary, I am not sure I follow. Who 

do you have to encourage and is this a lack of congressional authority or some other authority? 

Mr. WYNNE. Sir, there are more people managing space than 

there are suppliers to space in our government; and this is a question of who is in charge of space within the national security regime. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Are you requesting that the Congress delineate or 

designate your office, and you in particular, to head this effort and 

that all efforts be unified under your command? 

Mr. WYNNE. The Congress actually created a panel to examine 

the implementation of the Space Commission that was chartered 

and chaired by, I think at the time, Secretary Rumsfeld before he 

became Defense Secretary. They have a report coming to Congress. 

I think I would encourage the Congress to review that and take 

them up on their offer that some of the implementation is a little 

bit flawed, and I think they would seek to restore the Executive 

Agent for Space to make sure there is one. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Do you know when we can expect that report, sir? 

Mr. WYNNE. Yes, sir. I believe they are making it available this 

spring. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. This spring. Thank you. 

ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS

General, did you want to comment on that, on the anti-satellite 

weapons program? 

General MOSELEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question. Because that also 

gets at the heart of maintaining space and assured access to space 

for this country, not only military but for commercial use. The 

United States Air Force takes this role very seriously as far as 

space situation awareness and beginning to look at ways to maintain security of systems, not just the satellite itself but the link in 

the ground station, because that is the synergy of all of that. 

We have Air Force Space Command that spends 24 hours a day, 

seven days a week worrying about this problem; and we have a 

new commander of United States Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM) that happens to have been the Commander of Air 

Force Space Command. So I will tell you that we worry about this 

quite a bit, and we understand very well what the threats to those 

systems are and what options we have as we evolve into newer systems, fielding newer systems that are much more survival and 

much more capable, that they should fit inside that concern. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Tiahrt. 

KC–X PROGRAM

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, you said that you believe you accurately followed 

the law in the procurement of the replacement for the KC–135E. 

And I do believe that within the Federal acquisition regulations 

there is a requirement for the Air Force to provide a fair and open 


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competition when they do in fact have a competition versus a sole 

source contract, but I believe it is very clear now that this was not 

a fair competition. 

I think you would agree that it is not a fair competition when 

you demand a set of regulations be followed by one manufacturer 

and you waive those regulations for another manufacturer, because 

that does change the cost scheme. I think you would agree that 

subsidies, whether legal or illegal, do change the cost of these products, depending on where they are made; and by ignoring the subsidies and not accounting for it this is not a fair competition. 

And it is very clear you had no consideration given to lost revenue or the revenue that would have been gained, in other words, 

by having an American manufacturer versus a foreign manufacturer. 

But there are also areas where it was not a fair competition in 

the way you evaluated risk. 

The Air Force tried to start a program depot maintenance facility 

in Lake Charles, Louisiana. That facility was unable to get FAA 

approval or get qualified aerospace workers. 

The Navy tried to start up a facility in Greenville, Mississippi, 

to do the A–6 replacement wing. That facility was unable to get 

FAA approval or find qualified aerospace workers. 

But yet you completely accepted the risk of a foreign manufacturer when they said they were going to—so they promised to move 

and set up I believe two—maybe as many as four—production lines 

in America in a place where they have never had FAA certification 

or they have qualified aerospace workers. That is a huge risk. 

And if you look at VH–71, the cost overruns by setting up an 

American manufacturing facility and transferring work from—a 

portion of the work from Europe to America, they have overrun 

their cost by 67 percent, a huge risk; and yet none of that was 

taken into consideration by the Air Force and created an unfair 

level of competition. This I think is a bad decision, and it was tried 

to be sold as a good decision. And the way it was done is the Air 

Force, not releasing data, leaked this to a guy named Loren B. 

Thompson, PhD, a guy with a great deal of authority; and he is in 

a think tank, and everybody gives it a lot of credibility. 

It was leaked by the Air Force to say that this bad decision was 

a slam dunk for Airbus. And the truth is it was a very close competition. In spite of all these inequalities, in spite of all these 

things that pushed this to a foreign manufacturer, it was still very, 

very close. 

And I want to go back to this modeling. Because the RFP baseline to KC–135 released on January 31st. I said a week later that 

you had a change to the modeling on February 6th, and I was accurate when I said that. What I failed to mention is that on February 

20th, another 2 weeks later, you came out with a third modeling— 

second-change, third-modeling scenario. 

Now, the first one was clearly—the first that was released in October of ’06 was clearly a modeling that looked at a KC–135 replacement. Then on February 6th, after the RFP was released, the 

second modeling started to look like you were looking at a bigger 

tanker. And the third modeling was clearly pushing this to a bigger 

airplane, clearly pushing this to a bigger airplane. If you look at 


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the change in scenarios and putting greater emphasis, this was 

pushed by the Air Force to a bigger airplane. It wasn’t a fair and 

even competition. So I don’t see any way that you can claim that 

it is fair with all these inequities, all of these inequities. 

And then there was given extra credit—even though the RFP 

doesn’t demand extra credit, it was given extra credit for passengers and for fuel capability—or, excuse me, passengers and 

cargo. 

Now, right now, tankers haul about 1 percent of the cargo; and 

when you put cargo in them it really defeats the purpose of the 

tanker portion. I mean, what you want is a tanker up there flying 

around ready to refuel airplanes. If they are carrying cargo, they 

have less capability. And what percentage of the time do they even 

carry cargo? It is such a small percentage of the time. 

This is a refueling aircraft, and yet this unfair competition was 

pushed towards a bigger aircraft because it exceeds cargo, which 

wasn’t in the RFP. Meeting the criteria was what was. It exceeds 

passenger carriers, which wasn’t in the RFP. Just meeting the 

standard was in the RFP. 

So this has clearly been pushed to a bigger airplane and a foreign manufacturer. There is just no avoiding that data. It is not a 

fair competition. How can you accept this as a fair competition 

when you know this data exists and you know, in fact, that you 

have waived regulations; you know you didn’t consider for subsidies; you know that you didn’t consider lost revenue; you didn’t 

even consider for the lost hangars and the reinforced ramps and 

the extended runways? 

Where is the cost for these items in this solution? It isn’t. You 

may have considered it in your scenarios, but the cost is not in 

there. So how can you tell me that this is a fair competition knowing that all these inequities exist and they are violating the intent 

of the FAR to provide a fair and level competition? 

Mr. WYNNE. I would like really to leave the policy discussion. I 

think some of those questions ought to be directed to the General 

Accounting Office to see whether or not the policy implications 

ought to be considered as you have indicated in a competition. We 

currently are not, if you will, authorized to examine that under the 

laws of the United States. 

I would also say that since this isn’t—I would love to be loquacious about it, but since it is under a protest and you are going to 

get I think a good inside look, I would ask that you might reserve 

an open mind and take a briefing later. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. General, did you have a comment? 

General MOSELEY. No. 

Mr. TIAHRT. In conclusion, it is an unfair competition. It is outrageous that we would do something like this, because the FAR demands a fair competition. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Tiahrt. 

Mr. Dicks. 

Mr. DICKS. Just to follow up on a few of these issues, and I am 

doing this because this is like a historical record, just like we found 

Secretary Wynne’s comments 2 years ago, which led us to believe 

that we were going to buy a medium-sized tanker. And let me just 


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go into a couple other things that I think the Air Force needs to 

think about. 

In 2006, the Air Force commissioned a RAND study looking at 

issues associated with the modernization of the aging KC–135 fleet. 

It concluded that an inline production approach for a new tanker 

would eliminate risk and reduce cost. 

Boeing proposed an inline approach to the KC–767 tanker production. 

Northrop Grumman’s approach to production certainly does not 

appear to be inline and, in fact, appears to be characterized by significant uncertainty and risk, involving manufacturing and modifications in multiple countries, the need to build new facilities, hire 

and train a new work force, certify new processes and even to 

produce an operational boom for the first time. 

In light of RAND’s conclusions, Boeing was marked down in this 

competition for proposing the inline thing that RAND said it 

should do. They are doing the same thing right now on the P–3 replacement at the Renton plant in Renton. And everyone says after 

a few initial hiccups—and they have learned a lot from that—of 

doing this is the right way to do it. So this is another issue that 

I think was unfairly discriminated against Boeing. 

Also, on this whole—Mr. Tiahrt brought up the area of refueling 

issue and air cargo and passengers. It is normally, looking at Air 

Force records in terms of cargo, only 1 percent of cargo that is carried in tankers. It is not a big deal. And in most operations of tankers they come back with 70,000 or better pounds of fuel when they 

come back. They don’t use up all the fuel. So having massive 

amounts of fuel capacity—in fact, I think this plane met the requirement for fuel offload, went over by 20 percent, the KC–767. 

So, again, big is not better. Secretary, you said it over and over 

and over again, Ken Miller told me over and over again, that the 

medium-sized plane is better because it costs less. You don’t burn 

up as much fuel. Over 25 years, the difference in fuel consumption 

is $15 billion. 

The difference in maintenance—and this plane is 53 percent 

larger than the 767—is $5 billion to $6 billion. So there is $20 billion. 

No one has ever talked to Congress about hangars. We are going 

to have to have hangars, new ramps. And the National Guard is 

coming in with a letter saying, wait a minute, we haven’t got any 

hangars this large. 

Now, you took most of the tankers away from the National 

Guard. They are still smarting over that. But for the people who 

still have a chance to do it, they don’t have any hangars this size. 

That is going to cost billions of dollars. 

And, again, I go back to this scenario. I mean, these people over 

in France having to bring in Germans because the manuals on the 

A–380 were done in German. I mean, you know we are going to 

build the tail, the fuselage, the wings in Europe, bring it to the 

United States and then build it in a plant that doesn’t exist with 

a workforce workers that doesn’t exist. 

Todd has detailed you all the times we have tried to do this before, and it just doesn’t work. And this is going to be a catastrophic 


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fiasco that is going to hurt the reputation of the United States Air 

Force. You two are the leaders of the United States Air Force. 

I implore you to go back and take another look at this and do 

what we have suggested. Redo this competition. Send out the RFP. 

And I think big is wrong. I still think that the medium size—that 

Secretary Wynne was right when he said we want a medium-sized 

tanker. Because it is more flexible. It can go to more air fields. It 

is more adaptable. And the bigger the tanker is—the more runways 

are going to have to be strengthened for these tankers. They have 

got to have hangars. 

Big is just not the answer. A medium-sized tanker to replace the 

KC–135R is the answer. 

And we have had a competition. I mean, to me, this isn’t even 

a close call; and the idea that it was some kind of a slam dunk is 

just totally ridiculous. 

And again, going back to the spinmeisters over there in the corner, you know, you can’t spin something that is this flagrantly 

wrong. And so—if you want to comment, fine. I know you are going 

to say we have to defer to the protest and all this. 

And, by the way, one other thing. The GAO said they looked at 

this thing on cargo and on passengers, and they said the Air Force 

did not follow its requirements. They did not look at whether this 

was needed. And their conclusion was the Air Force could spend 

billions of extra dollars getting excess cargo and passenger capability that is not needed, and they didn’t do the studies to justify 

that. 

So the GAO I hope will take a look at this when they evaluate 

this. 

I just want you to know I have been here for 40 years, and this 

is the worst decision I have ever seen. There is no justification that 

I have heard yet for what happened, switching this thing in the 

middle, going away from the midsize tanker to a great big tanker 

that is going to be more expensive. And the risk of building this 

thing is huge, huge. And I just hope—I just hope you guys will go 

back and say we have got to do the right thing. We should reconsider this. This is obviously a mistake. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Do either of you gentlemen wish to respond 

again? 

Mr. WYNNE. Sir, I think we took that all on board. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Bishop. 

C–130J PROGRAM

Mr. BISHOP. Sir, I want to ask you about the Air Force’s supplemental request that included funding for an additional 15 C–130Js 

and 2 MC–130Js in the aircraft ’08 supplemental request. Given 

the utilization rates of the C–130 and the Air Force’s request for 

additional aircraft in ’08 and ’09, does the subcommittee need to 

consider authorizing a follow-on multi-year procurement of additional J models after the current multi-year expires in ’08? 

Mr. WYNNE. Sir, I would say this, that we are very pleased that 

the Department sought to expand the fleet of C–130Js. Frankly, we 

didn’t talk about the C–130Es that are out there, but many of them 


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have flown the wings off them. They have cracked bulkheads. We 

have a real dilemma on our hands. 

The Air Force Special Operations Command and the Marine 

Corps all want C–130Js. And I will tell you one of the laments that 

people have that I think is so real is when you get material assets 

delivered to you in a supplemental you cannot push them into a 

proper acquisition model. 

So I would encourage this committee to tell the Air Force to 

package up the C–130J program and get a follow-on multi-year. I 

think having them delivered, whether they are from the regular 

appropriations or from the supplemental or as it goes, we should 

have the ability—I think somebody mentioned a variation in quantity. I think you did, sir. And I think we need to be encouraged to 

get a contract that allows for a little bit of growth or a little bit 

of shrinkage as time goes on and do it on a multi-year basis. 

Mr. BISHOP. How much are we paying for the supplemental aircraft in comparison to the multi-year aircraft? 

Mr. WYNNE. Sir, I would have to get that for the record, because 

the supplemental aircraft is an estimate and a multi-year is an actual contract. 

[The information follows:] 

The cost of the Fiscal Year 2008 supplemental aircraft is dependent upon the 

number of aircraft approved. If 17 U.S. Air Force and 7 U.S. Marine Corps aircraft 

requested were to be approved, we are estimating a contract price of $61 million 

for a C–130J, $62.5 million for a KC–130J and $77 million for the MC–130J. 

In Fiscal Year 2008 the price under the Multi-Year Procurement contract was $59.8 million for a C–130J and $59.7 million for a KC–130J. 

Mr. BISHOP. When will they be delivered? 

Mr. WYNNE. The multi-year delivers—sir, I would have to take 

that on for the record. 

[The information follows:] 

The Fiscal Year 2008 GWOT supplemental aircraft delivery dates depend upon 

when the Fiscal Year 2008 GWOT supplemental request is approved. Whether the 

aircraft are procured under a multiyear procurement contract or an annual procurement contract the projected aircraft delivery dates are the same at 31 months from 

Congressional approval to the first C–130J delivery. 

Mr. WYNNE. But I will only tell you this. The multi-year prices 

lower than if we have to buy the original aircraft on an individual 

basis, and I think the multi-year runs out either this year, in calendar year 2008, or in calendar year 2009. 

Mr. BISHOP. How many J models have been deployed to the 

AOR? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, every one we have has been deployed. 

Mr. BISHOP. What was the initial estimate of the annual flying 

hours for a C–130J and what have the average actual annual flying 

hours been? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, let us take that for the record and get you 

the numbers. 

[The information follows:] 

The C–130J continues to perform admirably in the Global War on Terrorism and 

is the intra-theater aircraft of choice for the joint force. Since 2000, the C–130J has 

flown an average of over 8,500 hours versus over 8,200 programmed hours programmed for an over-fly percentage of 4%. 

Mr. BISHOP. Would you say the actual flying numbers have exceeded what you had originally estimated? 


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General MOSELEY. I bet that is what we will see. 

Mr. BISHOP. You don’t have an indication of that? 

General MOSELEY. I will have to get you those numbers, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. I understand you would have to get the exact numbers. You would have to do some calculations. But do you have a 

sense of whether or not you have overutilized what the estimates 

were? 

General MOSELEY. Yes. 

Mr. BISHOP. What is that sense? 

General MOSELEY. Over the programmed estimate I think we are 

overflying the airplanes. And, sir, if you let me contact the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve Command and Air Mobility 

Command, I will provide you those actual numbers. 

Mr. BISHOP. How many C–130 aircraft that are deployed in the 

AOR have infrared countermeasurement protection? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, I am thinking all of the new ones, the C– 

130Hs and the C–130Js, but let me provide those numbers to you, 

also. 

[The information follows:] 

All of the C–130’s currently deployed in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility are equipped with infrared countermeasures. This includes 36 Air Mobility Command, 11 Air Force Special Operations Command and six Air Combat 

Command aircraft for a total of 53 aircraft. 

Mr. BISHOP. You have some old ones there that don’t have it? 

General MOSELEY. We have different ways to do that, but they 

don’t have the new systems. That is correct. Those are the ones we 

are looking to retire, the C–130Es. 

Mr. BISHOP. How many of the C–130s are grounded or flight restricted? 

General MOSELEY. Almost all of the 119 C–130Es. But those are 

the ones we are looking to retire. Some of the C–130Hs are also 

operating under those restrictions. 

Mr. BISHOP. My next question is going to be how many of the 

grounded aircraft have been returned to flight? 

General MOSELEY. Sir, a lot of the aircraft are flying under restrictions; and some of the airplanes are so restricted that we can 

only fly the crews. So we have some grounded. We have some severely restricted. And those are the older versions of the C–130, 

which is why the C–130J is so important to us, sir. 

Sir, if I could follow up, it is also not just for the cargo carrier 

C–130s, but it is for the special operations aircraft, also. Those are 

the ones that are probably more critical to replace in the supplemental because of combat losses. 

Mr. WYNNE. And they are flying more? 

General MOSELEY. Correct. 

CLOSING REMARKS OF MR. ROTHMAN

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. Secretary, General, thank you so much for testifying and 

coming before our committee. We look forward to receiving the 

items that you indicated you would be providing the committee for 

the record and, again, receiving them as soon as possible. 

Please convey to the men and women under your command our 

deep gratitude, respect, affection and support for their profesVerDate Nov 24 2008 01:38 Feb 04, 2009 Jkt 046475 PO 00000 Frm 00400 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A475P2.XXX A475P2

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sionalism and effectiveness in defending our country and doing 

what they do better than any other air force, again, on the planet 

Earth. 

We know that you gentlemen, as their leaders, have an awesome 

responsibility to coordinate all of these efforts and to do so within 

the budget provided to you by the President and by the Congress; 

and we are grateful for your many, many years of outstanding 

service. 

You are in our prayers, but we do expect from all of the people 

who work in government, ourselves and you as well, the highest 

degree of excellence, effectiveness and professionalism. So Godspeed to you both and to the men and women who serve with you. 

This subcommittee stands adjourned and will reconvene at 1:30 

p.m. For another hearing. 

Mr. WYNNE. We thank you for your time and attention, Mr. 

Chairman. 

General MOSELEY. Mr. Chairman, thanks also for watching over 

not just Airmen, but Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, Coast-Guardsmen, 

all of the young military members that we have defending this Nation. Thanks to this committee for watching over them. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. That is our honor and our privilege. 

General MOSELEY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Tiahrt and the answers thereto follow:] 

B–52 CORE COMPONENT JAMMER

Question. General Moseley, we understand the Air Force and OSD have endorsed 

the requirement for a stand-off jamming capability that supports Air Force and joint 

operations. With the pending retirement of the EA–6B which has been providing 

jamming support to the Air Force, this makes great sense to me. However, I am 

concerned about how tight the Air Force budget is, and there does not appear to 

be sufficient funding for the Air Force to seriously begin developing the technology 

and entering into a program of record. Would you please tell the committee the Air 

Force plans for establishing an acquisition program that will lead to a fielded standoff jamming capability by the fiscal year 2015 time-frame? 

Answer. To date, we have no plans for establishing an acquisition program for a 

stand-off jamming capability. The proposed Core Component Jammer program is not 

funded. However, the Air Force is pursuing technical maturation efforts for a possible stand-off jamming solution. In this effort, the Service has increased technical 

materials funding in the President’s Budget request for Fiscal Year 2008 by $20.5 

million and in the President’s Budget request for Fiscal Year 2009 by $52 million. 

We have also applied the $4 million Congressional added to the President’s Budget 

request for Fiscal Year 2008 to risk reduction efforts in pod development and design. 

We are investigating phased array weight and power requirements; systems architecture refinement; and development of low/mid band phased array suppliers in 

order to increase technical readiness levels and position the service for a possible 

program start of an affordable stand-off capability in the near future. 

RE-ENGINE OF THE B–52 

Question: General Moseley, with the current national focus on energy dependence 

on foreign sources for oil, and recognizing that the Air Force is the largest consumer 

of fuel in the Defense Department, would you please discuss what the Air Force is 

doing to address recent study recommendations for large aircraft fuel efficiency? 

Answer. The Air Force has implemented an energy strategy that consists of reducing our overall demand for energy, increasing the supply of secure energy, and 

changing the Air Force culture to make energy a consideration in everything we do. 

Through our Air Force Smart Operations (AFSO) 21 efforts, the Air Force is reducing fuel demand by purchasing fuel-efficient equipment whenever possible and flying more efficiently. We are implementing cost efficiencies, such as reducing the 

weight of our aircraft and optimizing the routes we fly, where mission appropriate. 


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Our goal is to achieve an overarching cultural change down to the aircraft commander and crew chief level to conserve fuel while maintaining a level of accountability. 

In 2007, the National Research Council released a report entitled ‘‘Improving the 

Efficiency of Engines for Large Non-fighter Aircraft’’ that assessed possible technical 

options, including some for the B–52. The Air Force is currently examining the report and identifying ways to move forward. We are also continuing to pursue new 

aviation technologies to increase the efficiency of jet engines and airframes. Next 

generation aircraft systems will save energy through more efficient engine technology. Programs such as Adaptive Versatile Engine Technology and Highly Efficient Embedded Turbine Engine are expected to produce greater gains in performance, while resulting in substantially increased range, persistence and speed for 

both subsonic and supersonic missions while significantly decreasing fuel usage. 

INVESTING IN AIR FORCE BOMBERS

Question. General Moseley, concerning our three bomber fleets, the B–52, B–1 and 

B–2, and given each bomber has a number of decades of life remaining in the aircraft structure, the amount of funding dedicated year over to year toward taking 

advantage of new capabilities that are available such as radar upgrades, tactical 

data links, and getting more smart weapons in the weapons bays, has been pretty 

slim. I recognize the Air Force has a very tight budget right now, but, it also makes 

sense that we take advantage of the nation’s investment in these bombers through 

a program that provides enhancements that keeps them flying safely and allows 

them to better support military operations. Would you please comment on the Air 

Force plans with regard to ensuring the nation has a viable bomber fleet for this 

decade and next through investing in our current bombers to sustain and enhance 

their capabilities, as well as though investing in a future bomber? 

Answer. The Air Force is moving forward to enhance its Long Range Strike (LRS) 

capability by implementing a comprehensive three-phased LRS strategy which addresses near-term issues while also preparing for future operational needs. The 

strategy and upgrades are detailed in the Air Force Long Range Strike 2007 White 

Paper, which includes the below highlights: 

Phase I (already underway) of this strategy is to modernize the present bomber 

force and reduce risk. The B–1, B–2 and B–52 are undergoing upgrades focused on 

sustainability, lethality, responsiveness and survivability that enhance their combat 

capabilities for the combatant commander. Primary among these are the following 

bomber upgrades: B–1—Fully Integrated Data Link and Advanced Targeting Pod integration, B–2—Radar Modernization Program and Advanced Extremely High Frequency integration (with primary flight computer upgrades), B–52 Combat Network 

Communications Technology. 

The second phase requires a highly survivable, penetrating, persistent LRS capability in the anti-access environment expected to exist after 2015. The Air Force has 

completed an analysis of alternatives validating these requirements and identified 

the most promising platform concepts. Phase II, the Next Generation bomber program, will leverage existing and near-term technologies to meet these requirements 

by 2018. 

For the longer term, Phase III of the air Force’s LRS strategy will employ advanced technologies to provide the speed, range, accuracy, connectivity and survivability required in the 2035 timeframe. 

MIXED FLEET

Question. The 2005 Mobility Capability Study stated that the United States Air 

Force should continue to have a mixed fleet of tanker aircraft—medium and large. 

The Air Force chose the KC–30 as a replacement for the medium-sized tanker. However, the KC–30 is 27% larger than our largest tanker, the KC–10. 

Does the United States Air Force still believe we need a mixed fleet of medium 

and large tankers? do you consider the KC–30, although it is bigger than our ‘‘large’’ 

tanker, to be a medium-sized tanker? 

Answer. The Air Force benefits from the operational flexibility provided by a 

mixed fleet of tankers. We are taking a three-phased approach—KC–X, KC–Y, and 

KC–Z—over the next several decades to replace the KC–135s and eventually the 

KC–10s. It is envisioned that each phase will be a next competition based on 

warfighter requirements at the start of each phase (i.e., for KC–Y and KC–Z), we 

anticipate repeating the requirements and acquisition processes we went through 

for KC–X. at the recapitalization, we still plan to have a mixed fleet for the operational flexibility we need. 


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The KC–X solicitation was silent as to the size of the aircraft in order to give the 

offerors maximum flexibility in crafting their proposed solutions. According to the 

RAND Analysis of Alternatives for KC–135 recapitalization, medium sized tankers 

are those with a maximum takeoff gross weight (MTOGW) of 300,000 to 550,000 lbs. 

Using this Analysis of Alternatives, the KC–135, KC–45 (previously referred to as 

KC–30 by Northrop Grumman), and KC–767 are all in the medium size class. The 

KC–10 MTOGW is nearly 600,000 lbs., putting it in the large size class. 

SUBSIDIES

Question. It is clear that Airbus received Subsidies and launch aid from European 

governments for the A–330 and other aircraft. Airbus was given $5 billion in subsidies to develop the A–330/A–340 aircraft. This launch aid and subsidies allows airbus to undercut Boeing’s bid the commercial market, and the same thing happened 

in the KC–X competition. 

Given the subsidies and other non-accounted for costs, do you believe there is 

level-playing field for American and foreign competitors in Department of Defense 

competitions? 

Answer. The Air Force worked diligently to conduct a fair and transparent competition. This was done throughout by strict adherence to the laws and regulations 

that govern this process. Prior to the start of the competition, the Air Force addressed the World Trade Organization dispute (both claims and counterclaims) with 

the offerors and Members of Congress. Since the dispute had not been resolved, the 

Air Force sought to protect the government and taxpayers by preventing any costs 

imposed by the outcome of this letigation from being passed on to the KC–45 contract. Both offerors agreed to this condition as evidenced by the contract clauses 

they submitted in their final proposals. 

CHANGES TO RFP 

Question. It is clear that the Air Force made changes to the draft RFP that allowed a large tanker, such as the KC–30, to compete in a competition for a mediumsized tanker replacement. 

Why did the Air Force change the RFP at final release to include additional evaluation criteria for airlift? Were these changes directly the result of Northrop Grumman’s threat to withdraw from the competition unless greater value was placed on 

airlift? 

Answer. There were two draft Requests for Proposals (RFPs) prior to the final 

RFP. The purpose of the draft RFPs was to facilitate discussions with potential 

offerors and government agencies to ensure the government clearly stated its requirements and evaluation methods and set the groundwork for a fair and open 

competition. Both offerors provided verbal and written comments prior to the final 

RFP. None of the changes were made to favor one offeror over another. 

Five amendments were accomplished on the final RFP. Amendments one through 

three were accomplished prior to proposal receipt; amendments four and five were 

done after proposal receipt. Amendment one included clarifications of the RFP. 

Amendment two included minor mandatory updates including required chemical, biological, and environmental information and administrative changes to the Systems 

Requirements Document (SRD). Amendment three clarified the Combined Mating 

and Ranging Planning System (CMARPS) model along with numerous administrative changes. CMARPS is a modeling and simulation tool used in the evaluation of 

the Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment (IFARA). This amendment contained clarifications to the SRD. Amendments four and five were strictly administrative. 

On February 23, 2007, amendment one of the RFP included clarifications of the 

RFP. On February 28, 2007, amendment two of the RFP included minor mandatory 

updates including required chemical, biological, and environmental information and 

administrative changes to the Systems Requirements Document (SRD). On March 

21, 2007, amendment three of the RFP was issued extending the proposal date to 

April 12, 2007 and included administrative changes to clauses, data requirements, 

and Section L. Also included was an SRD update, clarifications to the O&S form 

and CMARPS model clarifications to attachments seventeen and eighteen. Two corrections requested drag index values and expanded aircraft performance array. All 

amendments occurred prior to the Air Force knowing what aircraft Boeing and Northrop were going to bid. Both offerors could have offered multiple aircraft types. 

Both offerors could have exploited provisions in the law if they felt any of the RFP 

amendments were unfair. 


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BOEING’S PAST EXPERIENCE WITH NEW CONSTRUCTION

Question. Gentlemen, Boeing once tried to build facilities in Greensville, Mississippi and Lake Charles, Louisiana. Those facilities failed due to the difficulty in 

getting FAA certification and difficulty in hiring qualified aerospace workers. However, the Airbus proposal apparently contains plans for construction of two new 

manufacturing plants, the training of a new workforce, and a shift of the supply 

chain from Europe to the United States. 

During the KC–X competition, did you examine the failed experiments at 

Greensville and Lake Charles to understand the risk of starting a new aerospace 

facility in this region of the country? 

Answer. The government carefully examined production strategies of both 

offerors. The assessment of these strategies is source selection sensitive. During the 

Government Accountability Office protest period, such information will be provided 

orally in a closed session, when requested by the Chairman or Ranking Member of 

the Committee. We are ready to provide such a briefing at your convenience. 

NG–EADS RISK

Question. In the KC–X competition, we have two clear competitors: Boeing has a 

flying tanker that is FAA certified and delivered to the Japanese Air Force. Airbus 

has not yet produced a tanker and is already falling behind schedule in the Australian tanker. 

How did the Air Force evaluate risk given that Boeing has delivered a tanker and 

EADS has not? did the Air Force evaluate the failures in the EADS Australian 

tanker? Why didn’t the AF deem the NG–EADS proposal more risky given that they 

have not produced a tanker? 

Answer. The risk assessments of each proposal are source selection sensitive. During the Government Accountability Office protect period, such information will be 

provided orally in a closed session, when requested by the Chairman or Ranking 

Member of the Committee. We are ready to provide such a briefing at your convenience. 

VH–71 MODEL

Question. The Presidential Helicopter, VH–71, has risen 67% since the contract 

was awarded in 2005. Although the VH–71 is being built by Agusta/Westland and 

Lockheed-Martin, Northrop Grumman-EADS used a similar model of migrating 

minimal supply chains from Europe to the United States. 

Did the Air Force examine the VH–71 contract in determining contract risk of the 

Northrop Grumman-EADS proposal? 

Answer. Transition of production facilities from Europe to the United States was 

thoroughly scrutinized during the source selection. The details of this evaluation are 

source selection sensitive. During the Government Accountability Office protest period, such information will be provided orally in a closed session, when requested 

by the Chairman or Ranking Member of the Committee. We are ready to provide 

such a briefing at your convenience. 

MULTIPLE PRODUCTION LOCATIONS RISK

Question. The Airbus KC–X proposal apparently involves building the first 7 aircraft using multiple production models and 5 different production locations spanning 

two continents. 

Given the complexity and the fact this is all new territory, how can the Air Force 

accurately assess Northrop-Grumman’s tanker manufacturing risk? 

Answer. The Government carefully examined productions strategies of both 

offerors. The assessment of these strategies is source selection sensitive. During the 

Government Accountability Office protest period, such information will be provided 

orally in a closed session, when requested by the Chairman or Ranking Member of 

the Committee. We are ready to provide such a briefing at your convenience. 

PAST PERFORMANCE OF EADS AND NG 

Question. In the KC–X competition, what was the past performance criteria used 

for EADS? Please provide all documentation to the Committee. 

Was the Army’s experience with the Light Utility Helicopter considered in EADS’ 

past performance? Was Northrop-Grumman’s past performance with Deepwater considered? The A400M is a year behind schedule and $2 billion over cost. Was EADS’ 

experience with the A400M considered? The A380 is 2 years behind schedule and 


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around $7 billion over cost. Was Airbus’ experience with the A380 considered in past 

performance in the KC–X Competition? 

EADS has demonstrated very poor A400M and A380 performance for their own 

design and build process. How can they be entrusted to build a U.S. tanker? 

Answer. As stated in the Request for Proposal (RFP), past performance on contracts was evaluated if it was both recent and relevant to the mission capability 

evaluation factors and cost/price. The specific contracts considered, and the results 

of the past performance evaluations, are source selection sensitive. During the Government Accountability Office protest period, such information will be provided orally in a closed session, when requested by the Chairman or Ranking Member of the 

Committee. We are ready to provide such a briefing at your convenience. 

LIFE-CYCLE COSTS

Question. In the KC–X competition, how did the AF evaluate out-year costs for 

life-cycle costs? Did the AF take into consideration the likely increase in the price 

of fuel? 

Answer. Life cycle costs include development, production, operation, personnel, 

and sustainment costs. Fuel costs are one component of operation costs. For the 

evaluation, the Air Force used the Department of Defense published fuel prices and 

fuel inflation indices that were available at the Request for Proposal release. 

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION COSTS

Question. The KC–30 won’t fit in our hangers, it is too heavy for our runways, 

and it needs longer runways than we have at many air bases. 

Were the costs of military construction investments, new hangers, runways, tools, 

additional training, etc., considered as part of the competition? Were the Military 

Construction costs for any Air National Guard bases considered? 

Answer. One of the five source selection evaluation factors was Most Probable Life 

Cycle Cost (MPLCC). Military construction is one component of the MPLCC and includes new buildings, modifications to existing buildings, new hangars, ramp expansions, and relocation of fuel hydrants. Since basing decisions have not been finalized 

yet, Air Mobility Command conducted site surveys at representative bases to support an estimate of total military construction costs. 

TANKER DECISION IN 2001 

Question. In March 2001, after examining offerings from both Boeing and Airbus, 

the Air Force decided that the Boeing KC–767 Tanker was the right choice for KC– 

X, the Next-Generation Air-Refueling Tanker. 

At that time, the USAF gave four main reasons for this selection of the KC–767 

over Airbus’s KC–330: 

(1) ‘‘The KC–330 increase in size does not bring with it a commensurate increase 

in available air refueling offload.’’ 

(2) The KC–330 ‘‘. . . presents a higher-risk technical approach and a less preferred financial arrangement.’’ 

(3) ‘‘The size difference of the EADS-proposed KC–330 results in an 81 percent 

larger ground footprint compared to the KC–135E it would replace, whereas the 

Boeing 767 is only 29 percent larger.’’ 

(4) The KC–330 requires ‘‘. . . greater infrastructure investment and dramatically 

limits the aircraft’s ability to operate effectively in worldwide deployment.’’ 

What has changed from the analysis in 2001 to the analysis today? 

Answer. There have been several significant changes since then. The Request for 

Information evaluation in 2001 was conducted prior to RAND’s Analysis of Alternatives for KC–135 Recapitalization, which was developed from 2004 to 2006. This 

comprehensive analysis informed both the defining of requirements and the drafting 

of the acquisition strategy. The requirements were written by the Air Force and 

validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in November 2006. 

The acquisition strategy was approved by the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in January 2007 which then led to the release of the 

final RFP later that month. The source selection decision was based on an integrated assessment of the five evaluation criteria described in the RFP. This assessment considered capabilities (for example, aerial refueling and airlift efficiencies) 

relative to the requirements validated by the JROC and in light of costs, risks, and 

past performance. All the issues enumerated above were accounted for in the assessment. 

Since 2001, both offerors have leveraged development efforts for international customers, allowing them to propose more capable and technologically mature aircraft. 


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For example, the A330-based tanker was a paper design in 2001, but prior to the 

conclusion of the source selection, the aircraft had entered flight testing. 

Additionally, conducting a competition changes the equation because of the motivation to maximize capability relative to the taxpayers’ investment. As a result, the 

Air Force concluded the Northrop Grumman KC–45 proposal provided the best 

value approach to begin the replacement of our KC–135s. 

WAIVERS

Question. The Department of Defense waives at least 5 costly regulations for our 

allies with which our domestic manufacturers have to comply. These include ‘‘Cost 

Accounting Standards,’’ the Specialty Metal laws, Buy America provisions, Foreign 

Corrupt Practices Act, and ITAR Compliance. 

What is the complete list of regulations in the FAR that are waived for foreign 

manufacturers with which domestic manufacturers must comply? 

Answer. Waivers of the FARs are considered on a case by case basis and are rigorously reviewed by Air Force contracting and legal professionals prior to acceptance 

using long accepted practices and legal precedent. This particular question requires 

some diligent research and cannot be answered effectively without completion of 

such research. A clarification must also be made regarding those elements of U.S. 

law that are legally ‘‘waived’’ by treaty and therefore set forth in the FAR (as supplemented), and those ‘‘waivers’’ of FAR requirements granted by the Department 

on a case by case basis. 

It is readily acknowledged that the FAR, as supplemented, is a complex set of regulations implementing both law and exemptions from law derived from lawful negotiated treaty agreements. Accordingly, some amount of time will be required to fully 

research which FAR requirements actually incorporate treaty agreements that appear to ‘‘waive’’ laws that are otherwise applicable to domestic entities thereby exempting foreign manufacturers that partner with us. The Department of Defense 

does have a few specific waivers in place (including some of those things listed in 

the Congressman’s question), but it is quite possible that many other waivers are 

in place and appropriately incorporated in the FAR which affect labor, environmental, tax, small business, subcontracting, and many other laws, any of which 

could in effect exempt entities manufacturing outside the U.S. from U.S. law, and 

for good reason. Furthermore, U.S. law is not generally applicable outside the U.S. 

for entities that are manufacturing outside the U.S. Notwithstanding, those same 

entities would need to comply with those laws when their point of manufacture is 

inside the U.S. 

Accordingly, a complete assessment of the issue raised by the Congressman will 

require a team of international lawyers and will require an exhaustive sifting of the 

FAR as supplemented in order to determine what is, what is not, what cannot be, 

and what should not be enforced on foreign entities. 

NATIONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

Question. Did the Air Force evaluate national security implications of having a 

tanker so dependent on a foreign company? When you announced buying a French 

tanker for KC–X, you said that U.S. jobs didn’t impact the decision. Are you implying that we would have no problem buying Russian bombers and Korean ships for 

our military if we thought they were a good deal? 

Answer. The Department of Defense believes the participation of allied countries 

in the procurement of weapon systems can improve our national security. A Department of Defense Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) lists countries whose companies are exempt from restrictions in the Buy American Act; lifting such restrictions 

promotes security cooperation. Northrop Grumman’s major subcontractors outside 

the United States are located in Spain, Germany, and France—all three are listed 

in the MOU. 

Furthermore, these three countries are NATO allies. The experiences we have had 

with our NATO allies on other programs have not negatively impacted our national 

security. As an example, the engines that power our KC–135R tankers are manufactured by CFM International, a joint venture between General Electric and the 

French company Snecma. Despite past disagreements between the United States 

and France over foreign policy, we have not experienced problems in maintaining 

these engines. We have no reason to anticipate negative impacts to our national security due to Northrop Grumman’s production and sustainment of KC–45 tankers. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Tiahrt.] 


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W I T N E S S E S 

Page 

Bergman, Lieutenant General John ....................................................................... 83 

Blum, Lieutenant General H.S ............................................................................... 164 

Bradley, Lieutenant General John ......................................................................... 83 

Casscells, S.W. ‘‘Trip’’ .............................................................................................. 1 

Cotton, Vice Admiral John ...................................................................................... 83 

Fallon, Admiral W.J ................................................................................................ 243 

Hudson, Lieutenant General J.L ............................................................................ 197 

Kasten, Terry ........................................................................................................... 197 

McKinley, Lieutenant General Craig ..................................................................... 164 

Moseley, General T.M .............................................................................................. 315 

Payton, S.C ............................................................................................................... 197 

Robinson, Vice Admiral A.M ................................................................................... 1 

Roudebush, Lieutenant General J.G ...................................................................... 1 

Schoomaker, Lieutenant General E.B .................................................................... 1 

Stultz, Lieutenant General Jack ............................................................................ 83 

Vaughn, Lieutenant General Clyde ....................................................................... 164 

Wynne, M.W ............................................................................................................. 315 

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