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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHAD LAMAR FARRAR

(AC 40879)

Lavine, Prescott and Elgo, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, who had been convicted, on a guilty plea, of the crimes of

possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell and criminal

possession of a firearm, and had been sentenced to a total effective

term of seven years incarceration followed by eight years of special

parole, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. In his motion to correct

an illegal sentence, he claimed that his sentence, which included a term

of imprisonment and a period of special parole, was not authorized by

statute and, thus, violated his constitutional right against double jeopardy. Specifically, he claimed that his sentence of incarceration followed

by a period of special parole was prohibited by the statute (§ 53a-35a)

that requires that a defendant be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment, because special parole is not a definite term of imprisonment.

Held that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to

correct an illegal sentence; the defendant’s sentence was explicitly

authorized by statute and did not constitute an illegal sentence, as the

applicable statutes (§§ 53a-28 [b] [9] and 54-128 [c]) explicitly authorize

a defendant to be sentenced to a term of imprisonment followed by a

period of special parole, provided that the combined term of the period

of imprisonment and special parole do not exceed the statutory maximum for the crime for which the defendant was convicted, and the

defendant’s sentence of seven years incarceration followed by eight

years of special parole did not exceed the maximum sentence of incarceration for his conviction of possession of a controlled substance with

intent to sell, which is punishable for up to fifteen years of incarceration

for a first offense.

Argued October 19—officially released November 20, 2018

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

the crimes of possession of a controlled substance with

intent to sell and criminal possession of a firearm,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

Waterbury, where the defendant was presented to the

court, Fasano, J., on a plea of guilty; judgment of guilty

in accordance with the plea; thereafter, the court denied

the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence,

and the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Chad Farrar, self-represented, the appellant

(defendant).

Sarah Hanna, assistant state’s attorney, with whom,

on the brief, was Maureen Platt, state’s attorney, for

the appellee (state).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The self-represented defendant, Chad

Lamar Farrar, appeals from the judgment of the trial

court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly concluded that the sentence imposed on him for

a term of incarceration followed by a period of special

parole was authorized by statute and, therefore, was

not illegal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history underlie

the defendant’s appeal. On October 9, 2014, the defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes

§ 21a-277 (a) and criminal possession of a firearm in

violation of General Statutes § 53a-217. The trial court

sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of

seven years of incarceration followed by eight years of

special parole.

On February 27, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to

correct an illegal sentence, claiming that his sentence,

which included a term of imprisonment followed by a

period of special parole, was not authorized by statute

and, thus, violated his constitutional right against double jeopardy. The court held a hearing on the defendant’s motion on May 31, 2017. In a memorandum of

decision issued on June 7, 2017, the court denied the

defendant’s motion, concluding that ‘‘there is no authority for the proposition that special parole constitutes a

separate sentence as opposed to a parole status and,

therefore, a double jeopardy violation . . . .’’ The

defendant appealed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court

improperly denied his motion to correct an illegal sentence, asserting that his sentence of seven years of

incarceration followed by eight years of special parole

is prohibited by statute because special parole is not a

definite term of imprisonment and that General Statutes

§ 53a-35a1

requires that a defendant be sentenced to a

definite term of imprisonment. He contends, therefore,

that the court illegally sentenced him to both a definite

term of imprisonment and a period of special parole in

violation of § 53a-35a.

The issue raised by the defendant is the same one

he raised in his motion to correct an illegal sentence.

We have examined the record on appeal and the briefs

and arguments of the parties and conclude that special

parole is a status duly authorized by General Statutes

§ 53a-28 (b).2 We decline to adopt the defendant’s construction of § 53a-35a, as that construction would conflict with § 53a-28 (b) (9) and General Statutes § 54-128

(c). Sections 53a-28 (b) (9) and 54-128 (c) explicitly

authorize a defendant to be sentenced to a term of

imprisonment followed by a period of special parole,

provided that the combined term of the period of impris-
onment and special parole do not exceed the statutory

maximum for the crime for which the defendant was

convicted.

‘‘It . . . is well established that, [i]n cases in which

more than one [statutory provision] is involved, we

presume that the legislature intended [those provisions]

to be read together to create a harmonious body of law

. . . and we construe the [provisions], if possible, to

avoid conflict between them.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Victor O., 320 Conn. 239, 248–

49, 128 A.3d 940 (2016).

Here, the defendant received a definite period of

incarceration of seven years followed by a period of

eight years of special parole, and the combined terms

of imprisonment and special parole did not exceed the

maximum sentence of incarceration for his conviction

of possession of a controlled substance with intent to

sell pursuant to § 21a-277 (a), which is punishable for

up to fifteen years of incarceration for a first offense.

The defendant’s sentence, therefore, was explicitly

authorized by statute and does not constitute an illegal

sentence. Therefore, the trial court properly denied the

defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence.

The judgment is affirmed.

1 General Statutes § 53a-35a titled, ‘‘Imprisonment for felony committed

on or after July 1, 1981. Definite sentence. Authorized term,’’ provides in

relevant part: ‘‘For any felony committed on or after July 1, 1981, the sentence

of imprisonment shall be a definite sentence and, unless the section of the

general statutes that defines or provides the penalty for the crime specifically

provides otherwise, the term shall be fixed by the court . . . .’’

2 General Statutes § 53a-28 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Except as provided in section 53a-46a, when a person is convicted of an offense, the court

shall impose one of the following sentences . . . (9) a term of imprisonment

and period of special parole as provided in section 53-125e.’’ (Emphasis

added.)

Pursuant to General Statutes § 54-128 (c), ‘‘[t]he total length of the term

of incarceration and term of special parole combined shall not exceed the

maximum sentence of incarceration authorized for the offense for which

the person was convicted.’’ See also General Statutes § 54-125e.