DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation

CHALLENGES TO 

SECURITY IN SPACE
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY III

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Space-based capabilities provide integral support to military, commercial, and civilian applications. 

Longstanding technological and cost barriers to space are falling, enabling more countries and commercial 

firms to participate in satellite construction, space launch, space exploration, and human spaceflight. 

Although these advancements are creating new opportunities, new risks for space-enabled services 

have emerged. Having seen the benefits of space-enabled operations, some foreign governments are 

developing capabilities that threaten others’ ability to use space. China and Russia, in particular, have 

taken steps to challenge the United States:

• Chinese and Russian military doctrines indicate that they view space as important to modern warfare 

and view counterspace capabilities as a means to reduce U.S. and allied military effectiveness. Both 

reorganized their militaries in 2015, emphasizing the importance of space operations. 

• Both have developed robust and capable space services, including space-based intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance. Moreover, they are making improvements to existing systems, 

including space launch vehicles and satellite navigation constellations. These capabilities provide 

their militaries with the ability to command and control their forces worldwide and also with 

enhanced situational awareness, enabling them to monitor, track, and target U.S. and allied forces.

• Chinese and Russian space surveillance networks are capable of searching, tracking, and 

characterizing satellites in all earth orbits. This capability supports both space operations and 

counterspace systems.

• Both states are developing jamming and cyberspace capabilities, directed energy weapons, on-orbit 

capabilities, and ground-based antisatellite missiles that can achieve a range of reversible to 

nonreversible effects.

Iran and North Korea also pose a challenge to militaries using space-enabled services, as each has 

demonstrated jamming capabilities. Iran and North Korea maintain independent space launch capabilities, 

which can serve as avenues for testing ballistic missile technologies.

The advantage the United States holds in space—and its perceived dependence on it—will drive actors to 

improve their abilities to access and operate in and through space. These improvements can pose a threat 

to space-based services across the military, commercial, and civil space sectors.
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY V

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Key Space Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Key Counterspace Concepts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Space-based Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Orbit Types and Uses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Strategy, Doctrine, and Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Key Space and Counterspace Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Space and Counterspace Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

Space Launch Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Human Spaceflight and Space Exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

ISR, Navigation, and Communications Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Counterspace Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Strategy, Doctrine, and Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Key Space and Counterspace Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Space and Counterspace Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Space Launch Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Human Spaceflight and Space Exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

ISR, Navigation, and Communications Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Counterspace Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Other Space Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Outlook. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Appendix A: Implications of Debris and Orbital Collisions. . . . . . 35

Appendix B: Counterspace Threats. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36

Appendix C: Glossary of Acronyms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

CONTENTS
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 7

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

INTRODUCTION

Although the United States and the former Soviet Union dominated early space activities, space capabilities 

have proliferated over the past six decades as technological and cost barriers have fallen. These capabilities 

provide important support to many of society’s daily activities, including communications, navigation, 

financial transactions, and weather monitoring. As of 2018, over 1,800 active satellites are on orbit, which 

are owned and operated by over 50 countries and multinational organizations.1 Nine countries and one 

international organization can independently launch spacecraft: China, India, Iran, Israel, Japan, Russia, 

North Korea, South Korea, the United States, and the European Space Agency (from French Guiana).2 

Space has also become more commercialized. The commercial space sector is involved in space launch, 

communications, space situational awareness, remote sensing, and even human spaceflight. These firms 

not only supply products to governments, but they also compete commercially.3

The number of objects on orbit—both active satellites and orbital debris—will continue to increase rapidly 

with the wider availability of lower cost, small satellites and with the prospect of large constellations 

consisting of thousands of satellites. The challenge of space congestion will grow, and actors will need 

better capabilities to track and identify objects and prevent collisions in space.4,5

Space capabilities have become central to many military operations, including missile warning, geolocation 

and navigation, target identification, and tracking of adversary activities. The military and intelligence 

collection capabilities that government and commercial remote sensing satellites provide is reducing the 

ability of all countries to remain undetected while performing sensitive testing and evaluation activities or 

military exercises and operations.6,7

Some actors are seeking ways to deny the effectiveness of the United States, having witnessed more 

than 25 years of U.S. military successes enabled by space capabilities.8 China and Russia, in particular, are 

developing a variety of means to exploit perceived U.S. reliance on space-based systems and challenge the 

U.S. position in space.9 Iran and North Korea also have demonstrated some counterspace capabilities that 

could pose a threat to militaries using space-based services.

While China and Russia are developing counterspace weapons systems, they are promoting agreements at 

the United Nations that limit weaponization of space. Their proposals do not address many space warfare 

capabilities, and they lack verification mechanisms, which provides room for China and Russia to continue 

to develop counterspace weapons.10,11 The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits placing weapons of mass 

destruction on orbit and on any celestial body and it prohibits using celestial bodies for military bases, 

testing, or maneuvers. 107 states have ratified the treaty, including the United States, China, North Korea, 

and Russia. Iran is one of 23 states that have signed, but not ratified, the treaty.12
8

Key Space Concepts

Communication Satellites: Communication satellites provide voice communications, television broadcasts, broadband internet, mobile services, and data transfer services for civil, military, and commercial 

users worldwide.13 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR): ISR satellites support civil, commercial, and military purposes. Civil and commercial ISR satellites provide remote sensing data, which includes data on 

the Earth’s land, sea, and atmosphere. ISR satellites support a variety of military activities by providing 

signals intelligence, warning (including of ballistic missile activity), battle damage assessments, and military force disposition.14,15

Missile Warning: Missile warning uses space-based and terrestrial sensors to notify countries of missile attacks 

and can enable defensive or offensive operations in response. Space-based sensors usually provide the first 

indication of a launch and ground-based radars provide follow-on information and confirm the attack.

Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT): Satellite navigation constellations provide PNT data that 

enable civilian, commercial, and military users to determine their precise location and local time. The 

European Union, Russia, and the United States’ satellite navigation constellations offer global coverage, 

and Japan and India operate regional systems. China operates both a regional and worldwide satellite 

navigation system.16

Satellite Command and Control (C2) Architecture: The satellite C2 architecture is how users control 

and communicate with satellites. The control center uses the uplink to the spacecraft to deliver commands. The spacecraft downlink is how data is sent from the spacecraft to a ground station that has the 

necessary antennas, transmitters, and receivers to receive the data. Some satellite constellations use 

relay satellites, which enable communication between satellites outside the reception area of a ground 

station.17 Any component of the architecture is vulnerable to attack, ranging from physical vulnerabilities of a ground site to electronic warfare (EW) disrupting the connection between the space segment 

and the operator.

Space Launch: Space launch is the ability to deliver payloads into space. Space launch vehicles (SLV) can 

deploy, sustain, augment, or reconstitute satellite constellations in support of military, civilian, or commercial customers.18

Tracking SIte Control Center

downlink

uplink

Tracking SIte

Primary Satellite Relay Satellite

Visualization: DIA, D3 Design • 1812-20206
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 9

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Key Counterspace Concepts

Cyberspace Threats: Cyberspace pervades all other warfighting domains, including space, and many 

space operations depend on cyberspace and vice versa.

19 With sophisticated knowledge of satellite C2 

and data distribution networks, actors can use offensive cyberspace capabilities to enable a range of 

reversible to nonreversible effects against space systems, associated ground infrastructure, users, and 

the links connecting them. 

Directed Energy Weapons (DEW): DEW use directed energy to disrupt, damage, or destroy enemy equipment and facilities.

20 These weapons, which can have effects ranging from temporary to permanent, include 

lasers, high-power microwaves, and other types of radiofrequency weapons. It can be difficult to attribute 

the origin of a DEW attack, depending on the type.

Electronic Warfare: EW includes using jamming and spoofing techniques to control the electromagnetic spectrum.

21 EW can be challenging to attribute and distinguish from unintentional interference. Uplink jamming is 

directed toward the satellite and impairs services for all users in the satellite reception area. Downlink jamming has 

a localized effect because it is directed at ground users, such as a ground forces unit using satellite navigation to 

determine their location. Spoofing deceives the receiver by introducing a fake signal with erroneous information.

Transmitter Jammer Receiver Transmitter Satellite

Telephone

Downlink Site

Communications Satellite Communications Satellite

Uplink Jamming Downlink Jamming

Jamming signal Intended communications signal Jamming combined with the 

intended communications signal

Jammer

Visualization: DIA, D3 Design • 1812-20208

Kinetic Energy Threats Directed Energy Weapons

Visualization: DIA, D3 Design • 1812-20433
10

Kinetic Energy Threats: Kinetic energy threats, or antisatellite (ASAT) missiles, are designed to destroy satellites without placing the weapon system or any of its components into orbit. These systems typically consist 

of a fixed or mobile launch system, a missile, and a kinetic kill vehicle. These weapons could also be launched 

from aircraft. Once released, the kinetic kill vehicle uses an onboard seeker to intercept the target satellite. 

Ground-based ASAT missile attacks are more easily attributed than some other counterspace weapons, 

such as DEW, and their effects can create orbital debris.

Orbital Threats: Orbital or space-based systems are satellites that can deliver temporary or permanent 

effects against other spacecraft. These systems could include payloads such as kinetic kill vehicles, radiofrequency jammers, lasers, chemical sprayers, high-power microwaves, and robotic mechanisms. Some of 

these systems, such as robotic technology for satellite servicing and repair and debris removal, have peaceful uses but can also be used for military purposes.

Space Situational Awareness (SSA): SSA is having current knowledge of a space object’s location and the 

ability to track and predict its future location; it also incorporates understanding of an actor’s intent for their 

spacecraft.

22 SSA is necessary for space operations, including the ability to successfully target space objects 

and assess the effectiveness of an attack. Space object surveillance and identification sensors, which can 

include telescopes, radars, and space-based sensors, provide the data for SSA.

23

Radar Optics Laser Signals

Space-based

Visualization: DIA, D3 Design • 1812-20207

Radiofrequency Jammers Lasers

Chemical Sprayers

High-power Microwaves

Kinetic Kill Vehicles Robotic Mechanisms

Visualization: DIA, D3 Design • 1812-20432
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 11

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Space-based Services

Since the late 1950s, space-enabled technologies have come to provide critical, yet often unrecognized, 

support to many of modern society’s daily activities. Technological advancement and lower-cost barriers mean society is increasingly reliant on these technologies, and losing access to space-based services 

would have far-reaching effects.

Space-enabled applications heavily impact our daily lives in four areas: navigation, communications, 

remote sensing, and science and exploration.

24

Space-based PNT services, such as GPS, provide position and navigation data that enables the use of satellite navigation for directions for routine activities. Positioning and navigation services support sea, ground, 

and air transportation services, such as by helping plan more efficient routes and managing route congestion. For militaries, PNT data, among other things, allows for the precise targeting for munitions and air, 

land, and sea navigation.

PNT signals, especially precise timing, also provide critical support to modern infrastructure. Without precise 

timing, financial institutions would be unable to create timestamps for transactions, impacting the public’s 

ability to use ATMs and credit cards, and utility companies would be unable to efficiently transmit power.25

Communications satellites—which comprise the majority of satellites on orbit—support global communications and complement terrestrial communications networks.

26 Losing these satellites can have 

wide-ranging impacts, which was illustrated in 1998 when a U.S. communications satellite suffered a 

computer failure—people were unable to pay for gas, hospitals were unable to contact physicians who 

relied on pagers, and television stations were unable to deliver programming.

27 For militaries, satellite 

communications improve situational awareness and allow forces greater mobility by eliminating the 

need for ground-based infrastructure.

28

Without remote sensing satellites—which provide data on the Earth’s land, sea, and atmosphere—society would be unable to benefit from weather forecasting, including preparing for weather emergencies. 

These satellites provide data about the terrain and environment, which range from assisting businesses 

in determining areas with mineral resources to assisting farmers in identifying potential agricultural 

disasters. These satellites also support the military by providing ISR data that enables militaries to identify adversary capabilities, track troop movements, and locate potential targets.

29

An inability to access space for scientific purposes could impact technological innovation. In addition to 

providing insights into the nature of Earth and the universe, society has benefitted from technological 

advances enabled by space research and space exploration activities. These advancements include cell 

phone cameras, better metal alloys for jet engine turbines, solar panels, memory foam, portable computers, and compact water purification systems.

30,31
12

Orbit Types and Uses32,33

HEO

GEO

MEO

LEO

ORBIT ALTITUDE* USES

Low Earth Orbit (LEO) Up to 2,000 km

- Communications

- ISR

- Human Spaceflight†

Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) Approx. 2,000 to 35,000 km - Communications

- Position, Navigation, and Timing

Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO)

LEO altitudes at perigee 

(nearest to Earth)

Approx. 40,000 km at apogee 

(farthest from Earth)

- Communications

- ISR

- Missile Warning

Geosynchronous Earth

Orbit (GEO) Approx. 36,000 km

- Communications

- ISR

- Missile Warning

* The advantages of higher orbits for communications and ISR are near-persistent coverage of most of the Earth in view of the satellite, but limited 

access to polar regions. LEO satellites cover all parts of the world, including the poles, but for shorter periods based on the speed of the satellite.

† With the exception of nine U.S. Apollo missions to the Moon, all human spaceflight has been completed in LEO.

Visualization: DIA, D3 Design • 1811-19948

Orbits are notional and for illustrative purposes only.
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 13

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

China has devoted significant economic and political resources to growing all aspects of its space program, from improving military space applications to 

developing human spaceflight and lunar exploration programs. China’s journey toward a space capability began in 1958, less than 9 months after the 

launch of Sputnik-1. However, China’s aspirations to 

match the Soviet Union and the United States soon 

faced self-imposed delays due to internal political 

dynamics that lasted until the late 1960s. China did 

not launch its first satellite until April 1970. In the 

early 1980s, China’s space program began moving 

with purpose.35

Beijing now has a goal of “[building] China into a 

space power in all respects.”36 Its rapidly growing 

space program—China is second only to the United 

States in the number of operational satellites—is 

a source of national pride and part of President Xi 

Jinping’s “China Dream” to establish a powerful and 

prosperous China. The space program supports 

both civil and military interests, including strengthening its science and technology sector, international 

relationships, and military modernization efforts. 

China seeks to achieve these goals rapidly through 

advances in the research and development of space 

systems and space-related technology.37,38,39,40,41

China officially advocates for peaceful use of space, 

and it is pursuing agreements at the United Nations 

on the nonweaponization of space.

42 Nonetheless, 

China continues to improve its counterspace weapons capabilities and has enacted military reforms 

to better integrate cyberspace, space, and EW into 

joint military operations. 

“To explore the vast cosmos, develop the space industry, and build China into a space power is a 

dream we pursue unremittingly.” 

—China’s Space White Paper, December 26, 201634

Image Source: AFP

China launched the Shenzhou-9 in June 2012, which was 

the first crewed spacecraft to dock with the Tiangong-1 

space laboratory.

CHINA
14

Strategy, Doctrine, 

and Intent

The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the information sphere, and denying adversaries the same as key components of conducting modern “informatized" wars.44,45,46,47,48,49 Since 

observing the U.S. military’s performance during 

the 1991 Gulf War, the PLA embarked on an effort 

to modernize weapon systems and update doctrine 

to place the focus on using and countering adversary information-enabled warfare.

Space and counterspace operations will form integral components of PLA campaigns, given China’s 

perceptions of the importance of space-enabled 

operations to U.S. and allied forces and the growing 

importance of space to enable beyond-line-of-sight 

operations for deployed Chinese forces. The PLA also 

sees counterspace operations as a means to deter 

and counter a possible U.S. intervention during a 

regional military conflict.50,51 PLA analysis of U.S. and 

allied military operations states that “destroying or 

capturing satellites and other sensors” would make 

it difficult to use precision guided weapons.

52 Moreover, PLA writings suggest that reconnaissance, communications, navigation, and early warning satellites 

could be among the targets of attacks designed to 

“blind and deafen the enemy.”53

Key Space and

Counterspace

Organizations

China’s space program has a complex structure 

and comprises organizations in the military, political, defense-industrial, and commercial sectors. 

The PLA historically has managed China’s space 

program, and it continues to invest in improving 

China’s capabilities in space-based ISR, satellite 

communication, and satellite navigation, as well as 

human spaceflight and robotic space exploration.

54 

State-owned enterprises are China’s primary civilian 

and military space contractors, but China is placing 

greater emphasis on decentralizing and diversifying 

its space industry to increase competition.

55

As part of the military reforms announced in 2015, 

China established the Strategic Support Force (SSF) 

to integrate cyberspace, space, and EW capabilities 

into joint military operations.56,57,58 The SSF forms the 

core of China’s information warfare force, supports 

the entire PLA, and reports directly to the Central 

Military Commission. The SSF likely is responsible 

for research and development of certain space and 

counterspace capabilities. The SSF’s space function 

is focused primarily on satellite launch and operations to support PLA ISR, navigation, and communication requirements.

59

China’s Military Strategy

In 2015, Beijing directed the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA) to be able to win “informatized local 

wars” with an emphasis on “maritime military 

struggle.” Chinese military strategy documents 

also emphasize the growing importance of 

offensive air, long-distance mobility, and space 

and cyberspace operations. China expects that 

its future wars mostly will be fought outside its 

borders and will involve conflict in the maritime 

domain. China promulgated this through its most 

recent update to its “military strategic guidelines,” 

the top-level directives that Beijing uses to define 

concepts, assess threats, and set priorities for 

planning, force posture, and modernization. 

The PLA uses “informatized” warfare to describe 

the process of acquiring, transmitting, processing, and using information to conduct joint military operations across the domains of land, 

sea, air, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum during a conflict. PLA writings 

highlight the benefit of near-real-time shared 

awareness of the battlefield in enabling quick, 

unified effort to seize tactical opportunities.43
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CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Currently, the State Council’s State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for 

National Defense (SASTIND) is the primary civil 

organization that coordinates and manages China’s space activities, including allocating space 

research and development funds.

62 It also maintains a working relationship with the PLA organization that oversees China’s military acquisitions. 

SASTIND guides and establishes policies for 

state-owned entities conducting China’s space 

activities, whereas the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission provides 

day-to-day management.63,64

The China National Space Administration (CNSA) 

serves as the public face of China’s civil space 

efforts.

65 China is increasingly using these efforts 

to bolster relationships with countries around 

the world, providing opportunities to lead the 

space community.

66,67,68 In April 2018, CNSA stated 

that China had signed 21 civil space cooperation 

agreements with 37 countries and four international organizations.

69

In the commercial space sector, mixed-ownership enterprises such as Zhuhai Orbita, Expace, 

and OK-Space offer remote sensing, launch, and 

communication services.

70,71,72 Many of these space 

technologies can serve a civilian and military purpose and China emphasizes “civil-military integration”—a phrase used, in part, to refer to the 

leveraging of dual-use technologies, policies, and 

organizations for military benefit.

73

Image Source: XINHUA/AFP

In December 2015, President Xi conferred a military flag to the new Strategic Support Force Commander Lt. Gen. 

Gao Jin (left), who was later promoted to general.60 Gen. Gao previously served as the head of the PLA think tank, 

the Academy of Military Sciences, which publishes documents on PLA doctrine.61
16

Space and Counterspace Capabilities

Space Launch Capabilities

China is improving its space launch capabilities to 

ensure it has an independent, reliable means to 

access space and to compete in the international 

space launch market. Recent improvements reduce 

launch timelines, increase manufacturing efficiencies, and support human spaceflight and deep-space 

exploration missions.

74 These improvements include 

new, modular SLVs that allow China to tailor an SLV 

to the specific configuration required for each customer. Using modular SLVs can lead to increases 

in manufacturing efficiency, launch vehicle reliability, and overall cost savings for launch campaigns.

75

China is also in the early stages of developing a super 

heavy-lift SLV similar to the U.S. Saturn-V or the 

newer Space Launch System to support proposed 

crewed lunar and Mars exploration missions.

76

China has developed a “quick response” SLV to 

increase its attractiveness as a commercial small 

satellite launch provider and to rapidly reconstitute LEO space capabilities, which could support 

Chinese Space Launch Vehicles

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

Meters

Medium Lift

2–20 metric tons

Heavy Lift

20–50

metric tons

Super Heavy Lift

>50 

metric tons

Light Lift

<2 metric tons

LM-3C

LM-3B

LM-7

LM-5

LM-9*

Kuaizhou (KZ)-1*

Kaituo-2*

Long March (LM)-6

LM-2D

LM-2C

LM-4B

LM-4C

LM-2F

LM-3A

LM-11

* Developmental

 Depicted payload capacity is approximate and varies depending on planned orbit.

The launch vehicles depicted are representative of China’s launch capabilities. Additional light-, medium-, and heavylift vehicles are in development. China uses its light-lift vehicles to place small payloads into LEO and its medium lift to 

place larger satellites in MEO and smaller satellites in GEO. The LM-5 heavy-lift SLV supports launching crewed space 

station components to LEO and heavy payloads to GEO. The developmental LM-9 primarily will support missions to the 

Moon and Mars. 

Visualization: DIA, D3 Design • 1811-19984
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 17

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

military operations during a conflict or civilian 

response to disasters. Compared to medium- and 

heavy-lift SLVs, these quick response SLVs are 

capable of expedited launch campaigns because 

they are transportable via road or rail and can 

be stored launch-ready for longer periods. Currently, due to their limited size, quick response 

SLVs such as the KZ-1, LM-6, and LM-11 are only 

capable of launching relatively small payloads 

into LEO.

78,79,80

Chinese Space Launch Sites and Key Satellite Control Centers

Satellite Control Center

All locations are approximate. Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Space Launch Site

Depiction of claims on this map is without prejudice to U.S. non-recognition of any such claims.

0 400 800 1,200 Kilometers

NORTH

KOREA

CHINA

BHUTAN INDIA

BURMA

VIETNAM

BANGLADESH

SOUTH

KOREA

South

China

Sea

East

China

Sea

Yellow

Sea

Beijing

Taiyuan

Xian

Wenchang

Xichang

Jiuquan

Beijing

Taiwan

Hainan Island

CHINA

China has four launch sites. The newest, Wenchang on Hainan Island, has a launch latitude closer to the Equator, 

which provides a more efficient path to launch satellites into GEO. China’s main satellite control center is in Xian 

and its primary control center for human spaceflight and lunar missions is in Beijing.77

Visualization: DIA, D3 Design • 1811-19969
18

Human Spaceflight and 

Space Exploration

In 2003, China became the third country to achieve 

independent human spaceflight, when it successfully 

orbited the crewed Shenzhou-5 spacecraft, followed 

by space laboratory Tiangong-1 and -2 launches in 

2011 and 2016, respectively. By 2022, China intends 

to assemble and operate a permanently inhabited, 

modular space station that can host Chinese and foreign payloads and astronauts.

81,82

China is also the third country to have landed a rover 

on the Moon and performed the first-ever landing 

on the lunar far side with its Chang’e-4 rover and 

lander in January 2019.

84,85 Because it is not possible 

to communicate directly with objects on the far side 

of the Moon, China launched a lunar relay satellite 

in May 2018 to enable communication between the 

Chang’e-4 and the Earth.

86,87

Additionally, China announced plans in March 

2018 to assemble a robotic research station on 

the Moon by 2025 and has started establishing 

the foundation for a human lunar exploration 

program to put astronauts on the Moon in the 

mid-2030s.

88,89

ISR, Navigation, and

Communications Capabilities

China employs a robust space-based ISR capability designed to enhance its worldwide situational 

awareness. Used for military and civil remote sensing and mapping, terrestrial and maritime surveillance, and military intelligence collection, China’s ISR 

satellites are capable of providing electro-optical and 

synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery, as well as 

electronic intelligence and signals intelligence data.

90

Image Source: XINHUA/AFP

In December 2013, China conducted the first “soft-landing” on the Moon since 1976.83 The lunar rover, Yutu, took 

this image of the Chang’e-3 lunar lander that month.

Chinese Satellites on Orbit, as of 1 May 201891,92

0

30

60

90

120

150

Communications Relay† ISR Navigation Science &

Technology‡

34

4

124

28

60

Military Civil Commercial

† Relay satellites enable communication between satellites outside the reception area of a ground station.

‡ Science and technology satellites are used for scientific research or testing new space technologies.

Visualization: DIA, D3 Design • 1811-19938
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 19

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

As of May 2018, the Chinese ISR and remote sensing 

satellite fleet contains more than 120 systems—a 

quantity second only to the United States.

94

The PLA owns and operates about half of these 

ISR systems, most of which could support monitoring, tracking, and targeting of U.S. and allied forces 

worldwide, especially throughout the Indo-Pacific 

region. These satellites also allow the PLA to maintain situational awareness of potential regional 

flashpoints, including the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, 

and the South China Sea.95,96,97

China also owns and operates over 30 communications satellites, with 4 dedicated to military use.98

China produces its military-dedicated satellites 

domestically and its civil communications satellites 

incorporate off-the-shelf commercially manufactured components.99

Additionally, China has embarked on several ambitious plans to propel itself to the forefront of the 

global satellite communications (SATCOM) industry.100,101,102 China is testing multiple next-generation 

capabilities, such as quantum-enabled communications, which could supply the means to field highly 

secure communications systems.103

China is continuing to improve its indigenous 

satellite navigation constellation. China offers 

regional PNT services and achieved initial operating capability of its worldwide, next-generation 

BeiDou constellation in 2018.104,105 In addition to 

providing PNT, the BeiDou constellation offers 

unique capabilities, including text messaging and 

user tracking through its short messaging service, to enable mass communications between 

BeiDou users and provide additional C2 capabilities for the PLA.106,107

Image Source: XINHUA/AFP

China launched the world’s first quantum communications satellite in 2016, and this composite time-lapse photo shows 

a ground-to-space link to enable the quantum teleportation of data in a quantum state. The red light emanating from 

the ground station is the uplink laser beacon, which is connecting with the satellite. Due to the time-lapse photo, light 

from the downlink beacon traces the path of the satellite, shown by the white, dashed line. China has included quantum 

communications and computing as one of its focus areas for research and development for 2016-2020.93
20

China also exports its satellite technology globally, including its indigenously-developed communications satellites. China intends to provide SATCOM support to users worldwide and has plans 

to develop at least three new communications 

constellations.108,109,110 China also intends to use its 

BeiDou constellation to offer additional services 

and incentives to countries taking part in the “Belt 

and Road Initiative.” BeiDou supports that initiative’s emphasis on building strong economic ties 

with other countries and shaping their interests to 

align with China’s.111,112

Counterspace Capabilities

Space Situational Awareness. China has a robust 

network of space surveillance sensors capable of 

searching, tracking, and characterizing satellites in all 

Earth orbits. This network includes a variety of telescopes, radars, and other sensors that allow China 

to support missions including intelligence collection, 

counterspace targeting, ballistic missile early warning, spaceflight safety, satellite anomaly resolution, 

and space debris monitoring.113,114

Electronic Warfare. The PLA considers EW capabilities 

key assets for modern warfare and its doctrine emphasizes using EW weapons to suppress or deceive enemy 

equipment.

116 The PLA routinely incorporates jamming 

and anti-jamming techniques against multiple communication, radar systems, and GPS satellite systems in 

exercises.

117 China continues to develop jammers dedicated to targeting SAR aboard military reconnaissance 

platforms, including LEO satellites.

118,119 Additionally, 

China is developing jammers to target SATCOM over a 

range of frequency bands, including military protected 

extremely high frequency communications.

120,121

Directed Energy Weapons. China likely is pursuing 

laser weapons to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellites and their sensors and possibly already has 

a limited capability to employ laser systems against 

satellite sensors. China likely will field a ground-based 

laser weapon that can counter low-orbit space-based 

sensors by 2020, and by the mid-to-late 2020s, it may 

field higher power systems that extend the threat to 

the structures of non-optical satellites.

122,123,124,125,126

Cyberspace Threats. China emphasizes offensive 

cyberspace capabilities as key assets for integrated 

warfare and could use its cyberwarfare capabilities 

to support military operations against space-based 

assets.

127,128 For example, the PLA could employ its 

cyberattack capabilities to establish information 

dominance in the early stages of a conflict to constrain an adversary’s actions, or slow its mobilization 

Chinese International SSA Cooperation

China leads the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization—a multilateral organization with rotating 

leadership whose members include emerging spacefaring nations such as Iran—that oversees a space 

surveillance project known as the Asia-Pacific Ground-Based Optical Space Object Observation System 

(APOSOS). As part of the project, China provided three 15 cm telescopes to Peru, Pakistan, and Iran that 

are capable of tracking objects in LEO and GEO. All tasking information and subsequent observation data 

collected is funneled through the Chinese Academy of Science’s National Astronomical Observatory of 

China. APOSOS has near full coverage of GEO and LEO. The organization is planning on improving optical 

system capabilities, coverage, and redundancy.

129,130

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons

This Chinese Yuan Wang space tracking ship, which 

supports space launch operations from positions in the 

Pacific, is part of China’s SSA network.115
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 21

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

and deployment by targeting network-based command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), 

logistics, and commercial activities.

The PLA also plays a role in cyberespionage targeting foreign space entities, consistent with broader 

state-sponsored industrial and technical espionage 

to increase the level of technologies and expertise 

available to support military research and development and acquisition. The PLA unit responsible 

for conducting signals intelligence has supported 

cyberespionage against U.S. and European satellite 

and aerospace industries since at least 2007.

131,132

Orbital Threats. China is developing sophisticated 

on-orbit capabilities, such as satellite inspection 

and repair, at least some of which could also function as a weapon. China has launched multiple satellites to conduct scientific experiments on space 

maintenance technologies and it is conducting 

space debris cleanup research.

133,134,135,136

Kinetic Energy Threats. The PLA has an operational 

ground-based ASAT missile intended to target LEO 

satellites. China has also formed military units that 

have begun training with ASAT missiles.137,138,139

Other Counterspace Technology Development.

China probably intends to pursue additional ASAT 

weapons capable of destroying satellites up to GEO.

In 2013, China launched an object into space on 

a ballistic trajectory with a peak altitude above 

30,000 km. No new satellites were released from 

the object, and the launch profile was inconsistent 

with traditional SLVs, ballistic missiles, or sounding rocket launches for scientific research.142

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons

China’s 2007 test of its ground-based ASAT missile 

destroyed one of its own defunct satellites in LEO.140,141 

The graphic depicts the orbits of trackable debris generated by the test 1 month after the event. The white line 

represents the International Space Station’s orbit.
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 23

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Russia views its space program as a longstanding 

example of its leadership on the international stage. 

Russia is a pioneer of space, dating back to its launch 

of the first satellite, Sputnik-1, and placing the first person into orbit around Earth, Yuri Gagarin. The International Space Station’s reliance on Russian launch 

vehicles to send astronauts to and from the station 

reinforces Moscow’s perspective that it remains a 

global leader in space. In the years following the end 

of the Cold War, a combination of budgetary constraints and technological setbacks caused a decay 

of Russian space capabilities including space-based 

remote sensing and satellite navigation.144

Russia’s space program is robust but more narrowly 

focused and its budget more limited than China’s 

because of competing priorities with broader military modernization efforts.145 Nonetheless, over the 

last two decades, Moscow has been developing a 

suite of counterspace weapons capabilities, including EW to deny, degrade, and disrupt communications and navigation and DEW to deny the use of 

space-based imagery.146,147 Russia is probably also 

building a ground-based missile capable of destroying satellites in orbit.148,149 Similar to China, Russia 

supports space arms control agreements to prevent 

weaponization of space, even as it views space as a 

warfighting domain.150

Strategy, Doctrine, 

and Intent

Russian military doctrine and authoritative writings clearly articulate that Russia views space as a 

warfighting domain and that achieving supremacy 

in space will be a decisive factor in winning future 

conflicts.

151,152,153,154 Russian military thinkers believe 

the importance of space will continue to expand 

“Only with support from space will it be possible for the Armed Forces to reach maximum effectiveness...The Russian President has repeatedly stressed that our army and navy must not only meet the 

requirements of today, but to [sic] be prepared for tomorrow’s means of conducting armed struggle. 

The solution of this problem doubtlessly depends directly on the availability of a modern orbital 

constellation of military satellites.”

–Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu, March 6, 2018143

RUSSIAImage Source: AFP

Sputnik-1, the world’s first manmade satellite, launched 

in 1957 and was part of the competition between the 

United States and Soviet Union for dominance in space.
24

because of the growing role of precision weapons 

and satellite-supported information networks in all 

types of conflict.

155,156 Meanwhile, Russia regularly 

expresses concern over the weaponization of space 

and is pursuing legal, binding space arms control 

agreements to curb what it sees as U.S. weaponization of outer space.

157,158,159

As Russia continues to modernize its military, it 

will increasingly incorporate space-provided services across its forces. Russia possesses a robust 

space program with a strong foundation of technical knowledge and expertise fostered by over 60 

years of experience in space. However, Moscow 

wants to avoid becoming overly reliant on space 

to carry out its national defense mission.160,161,162

Moscow views space as a key enabler of U.S. precision strike and military force projection capabilities. When paired with U.S. missile defense 

systems, Russia believes U.S. space-enabled, 

conventional precision strike capabilities undermine strategic stability.

163,164 At the same time, 

Russia views America’s perceived dependence 

on space as the “Achilles heel” of U.S. military 

power, which can be exploited to achieve Russian conflict objectives.

165 Russia is therefore 

pursuing counterspace systems to neutralize 

or deny U.S. space-based services, both military 

and commercial, as a means of offsetting a perceived U.S. military advantage and is developing 

an array of weapons designed to interfere with 

or destroy an adversary’s satellites.

166,167

Russian counterspace doctrine involves employing 

ground, air, and space-based systems to target an 

adversary’s satellites, with attacks ranging from 

temporary jamming or sensor blinding to destruction of enemy spacecraft and supporting infrastructure.

168,169,170,171 Moscow believes developing 

and fielding counterspace capabilities will deter 

aggression by adversaries reliant upon space.

172 If 

deterrence fails, Russia believes its counterspace 

forces will offer its military leaders the ability to 

control escalation of a conflict through selective 

targeting of adversary space systems.

173,174

Key Space and Counterspace Organizations

In 2015, Moscow reorganized its military and civilian space programs. Russia created the Aerospace 

Forces by merging the former Air Force and Aerospace Defense Troops. This new force includes Russia’s 

space forces, who have the mission to conduct space 

launches and maintain the ballistic missile early warning system, the satellite control network, and the space 

surveillance network.

175,176,177 The defense minister 

stated the change was “prompted by a shift in the center of gravity... towards the aerospace sphere” and as a 

counter to the U.S. Prompt Global Strike doctrine.

178,179

Russia’s reorganization of its civil space program was 

designed to improve upon inefficiencies across the 

sector, and now Russia’s space industry is almost 

exclusively owned by the Russian state.

182 State corporation Roscosmos is the executive body responsible for overall management of the space industry 

and carries out Russia’s civil space program. The 

space industry is primarily composed of 75 design 

bureaus, enterprises, and companies that carry out 

research, design, and production of its space technologies, satellites, and space launch vehicles for 

both civil and military purposes.

183,184

Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright

The Russian Space Force Commander, Gen-Col Aleksandr Golovko, oversaw the launch of a GLONASS-M 

navigation satellite in November 2018.180 Gen-Col 

Golovko is the first commander of the Space Forces, 

which are subordinate to the Aerospace Forces.181
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Space and Counterspace Capabilities

Space Launch Capabilities

Russia is updating and improving its space launch 

capabilities to enhance reliability, alleviate environmental concerns, increase manufacturing efficiencies, and support future human spaceflight 

and deep-space exploration missions.185,186

Russia’s updates to its medium- and heavy-lift 

launch fleets include modular SLVs, which allow 

Russia to tailor SLVs to the specific configuration 

required for each customer. Unlike China, Russia has not focused on new light-lift SLV designs, 

usually choosing to launch small satellites on 

multi-payload launches. Russia is also in the 

early stages of developing a super heavy-lift SLV 

similar to the U.S. Saturn-V or the newer Space 

Launch System to support proposed crewed 

lunar and Mars exploration missions.187

Russian Space Launch Vehicles

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Meters

Rokot

Angara-1.2*

Soyuz-FG

Soyuz-2.1A

Soyuz-2.1B

Soyuz-2.1V

Zenit-3F

Zenit-3SL

Soyuz-5*

Angara-A5

Proton-M

Energia-5*

Light Lift

<2 metric tons

Medium Lift

2–20 metric tons

Heavy Lift

20–50 metric tons

Super Heavy Lift

>50 metric tons

* Developmental

 Depicted payload capacity is approximate and varies depending on planned orbit.

Russia has focused on maintaining its own military and civil satellites on orbit and selling launch services commercially. Russia usually launches small satellites as multiple payloads on heavier rockets but sometimes uses the Rokot 

light-lift vehicle to launch smaller payloads into LEO. Russia’s heavy-lift vehicles are mostly used for launching into 

GEO or HEO. The developmental Energia SLV, designed to boost the Russian space shuttle into orbit, was discontinued in the 1980s and revived in 2016 to support proposed lunar missions.

Visualization: DIA, D3 Design • 1811-19985
26

Human Spaceflight and

Space Exploration

Russia’s human spaceflight program started in the 

late 1950s and saw its first major milestone with the 

launch of Yuri Gagarin aboard the Vostok-1 spacecraft in 1961. Since that historic launch, the Soviet 

Union and then the Russian Federation has launched 

the Salyut, Almaz, and Mir Space Stations. As of 

2018, Russia is a major player in human spaceflight 

through their work with the International Space Station, which is completely reliant on Russian support 

to launch astronauts to the station.

188,189,190,191

ISR, Navigation, and

Communications Capabilities

Russia numbers third in the world, behind the United 

States and China, in terms of operational satellites, with 

over 140 in various orbits.

192 These systems provide Russia’s military with satellite communications, high-resolution imagery, navigation, ballistic missile early warning, 

electronic intelligence, and meteorological services.

Russian Space Launch Sites and Key Satellite Control Centers

Satellite Control Center

Space Launch Site

Leased Site

All locations are approximate. Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. 

Depiction of claims on this map is without prejudice to U.S. non-recognition of any such claims. 0 1,000 2,000 Kilometers

Astana Moscow

Yakutsk

Moscow

Baikonur

Plesetsk

Dombarovskiy

Yaniseysk

Vostochnyy

Barents

Sea

Kara

Sea

Laptev

Sea

RUSSIA

KAZAKHSTAN

0 250 500 Kilometers

Kourou

ATLANTIC

OCEAN

BRAZIL

French

Guiana

(France)

SURINAME

VENEZUELA

GUYANA

Russia owns three of its launch sites and leases one from Kazakhstan. The European Space Agency has also contracted Russia to conduct launches from Kourou, French Guiana. Russia’s space control sites are spread across 

Russia to enable effective satellite C2.

Visualization: DIA, D3 Design • 1811-19970

Image Source: AFP

Russia’s Soyuz MS-07 carries astronauts to the International Space Station, December 2017.
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 27

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has sought 

to sustain its atrophying ISR and remote sensing 

satellite fleet, despite funding shortfalls, economic 

sanctions, and technological setbacks. Though 

possessing fewer satellites than China, the individual capabilities of Russian ISR and remote sensing 

satellites can surpass China’s. The Russian military owns and operates about half of those, but 

the military may also be able to leverage civil and 

commercial ISR and remote sensing satellites to 

supplement military-dedicated capabilities. These 

systems currently support ongoing military operations in Syria but can also monitor U.S. and NATO 

forces operating globally.197,198

Russia maintains a SATCOM fleet that provides resilient communications services to civil, government, 

and military users within its borders and worldwide. 

Russia continues to lag behind other worldwide providers, even though it has taken some steps toward 

SATCOM modernization, such as establishing partnerships with European satellite manufacturers to 

improve satellite reliability and capabilities.

199,200

Russia views its Global Navigation Satellite System 

(GLONASS) as supporting its economic development and national security interests.

201 The constellation currently provides PNT services worldwide. Following the constellation’s deterioration in 

the late 1990s, Russia committed to reconstituting 

GLONASS during the 2000s and regained full operating capability in 2011.

202 Russia now maintains its 

GLONASS constellation with launches as satellites 

become inoperative while it continues development of next-generation GLONASS satellites, promising higher accuracy.

203

Russian Satellites on Orbit, as of 1 May 2018193,194,195,196

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Communications Relay† ISR Navigation Science & 

Technology‡

77

5

24

28

12

Military Civil Commercial

† Relay satellites enable communication between satellites outside the reception area of a ground station.

‡ Science and technology satellites are used for scientific research or testing new space technologies.

Visualization: DIA, D3 Design • 1811-19937
28

Counterspace Capabilities

Space Situational Awareness. Russia’s space surveillance network, composed of a variety of telescopes, 

radars, and other sensors, is capable of searching for, 

tracking, and characterizing satellites in all Earth orbits.

This network allows Russia to support missions including intelligence collection, counterspace targeting, 

spaceflight safety, satellite anomaly resolution, and 

space debris monitoring. Some of these sensors also 

perform a ballistic missile early warning function.

205

Electronic Warfare. The Russian military views EW as 

an essential tool for gaining and maintaining information superiority over its adversaries, allowing Russia to 

seize the operational initiative by disrupting adversary 

command, control, communications, and intelligence 

capabilities. Russia has fielded a wide range of groundbased EW systems to counter GPS, tactical communications, satellite communications, and radars.

206 

Mobile jammers include radar jammers and SATCOM 

jammers. Russia has aspirations to develop and field 

a full spectrum of EW capabilities to counter Western 

Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright

Russian Aerospace Forces monitor GLONASS satellites at the Titov Main Test and Space Systems Control Center in 

Krasnoznamensk outside Moscow.204

Russian International SSA Efforts

Russia leads the nongovernmental organization International Scientific Optical Network (ISON), which 

has the largest foreign network of ground-based optical space surveillance sensors. ISON can trace its 

existence back to 2001, and participants now include international academic and scientific organizations 

and government entities such as Roscosmos. The Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics coordinates 

sensor tasking and fuses information from nearly 100 ground-based optical sensors on 40 observatories 

spread across 16 countries.

207,208
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 29

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

C4ISR and weapons guidance systems with new technology, data transfer, and capabilities for peacetime 

and wartime use by 2020.

209,210

Directed Energy Weapons. Russia likely is pursuing laser weapons to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellites and their sensors. Prior to July 2018, 

Russia began delivering a laser weapon system 

to the Aerospace Forces that likely is intended 

for an ASAT mission. In public statements, President Vladimir Putin called it a “new type of strategic weapon,” and the Russian Defense Ministry 

asserted that it is capable of “fighting satellites in 

orbit.”211,212,213,214 Russia is also developing an airborne ASAT laser weapon system to use against 

space-based missile defense sensors.

215

Cyberspace Threats. Since at least 2010, the Russian 

military has prioritized the development of forces 

and capabilities, including cyberspace operations, 

for what it terms “information confrontation,” which 

is a holistic concept for ensuring information superiority. The weaponization of information is a key 

aspect of this strategy and is employed in times of 

peace, crisis, and war. Russia considers the information sphere to be strategically decisive and has taken 

steps to modernize its military’s information attack 

and defense organizations and capabilities.

216

Orbital Threats. Russia continues to research 

and develop sophisticated on-orbit capabilities 

that could serve dual-use purposes. For example, 

inspection and servicing satellites can be capable of 

closely approaching satellites to inspect and potentially fix issues causing malfunctions; this same 

technology could also be used to approach another 

country’s satellite and conduct an attack that results 

in temporary or permanent damage.

217 In 2017, 

Russia deployed what it described as an “inspector 

satellite capable of diagnosing the technical condition of a Russian satellite from the closest possible 

distance”; however, its behavior is inconsistent with 

on-orbit inspection activities or space situational 

awareness capabilities.

218,219,220

Ground-based Kinetic Energy Threats. Russia 

likely is developing a ground-based, mobile missile system capable of destroying space targets in 

LEO and ballistic missiles.

221,222 This weapon system is likely to be operational within the next several years.

223

Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright

Russia has invested heavily in developing sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities, including this 

Krashuka-4 jammer.

Image Source: SPUTNIK/AFP

Russian laser weapon likely intended for use against satellites, July 2018.
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 31

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Iran

Iran recognizes the strategic value of space and 

counterspace capabilities and will attempt to deny 

an adversary use of space during a conflict. Tehran has publically acknowledged it has developed 

capabilities to jam communications and GPS signals.

224,225,226 Tehran may also contribute to the proliferation of jamming equipment. Since 2010, Iran 

Electronics Industries has marketed several GPS 

jammers on its website.

227

Tehran’s pursuit of a national space program supports both civilian and military goals, including 

boosting national pride, economic development, 

and military modernization.

228 The Iran Space Agency 

and Iran Space Research Center—which are subordinate to the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology—along with the Ministry of 

Defense and Armed Forces Logistics oversee the 

country’s SLV and satellite development programs. 

Iran is also seeking to improve its space object tracking capabilities and, in 2005, joined the Asia-Pacific 

Space Cooperation Organization.229,230,231,232,233

Tehran states it has developed sophisticated capabilities, including SLVs and communications and 

remote sensing satellites, but its SLVs are only able 

to launch microsatellites into LEO and have proven 

unreliable. Nonetheless, Iran has had a few successful launches of the two-stage Safir SLV since its 

first attempt in 2008. It has also revealed the larger 

two-stage Simorgh SLV, which could serve as a test 

bed for developing intercontinental ballistic missile 

(ICBM) technologies. Because of the inherent overlap in technology between ICBMs and SLVs, Iran’s 

development of larger, more capable SLV boosters 

remains a concern for a future ICBM capability. Also, 

these advancements could be applied to developing a basic ground-based ASAT missile, should Iran 

choose to do so in the future.

235,236,237,238

Image Source: AFP

Iran launched its first satellite on its Safir space launch 

vehicle in February 2009.234

CHALLENGES

OTHER SPACE
32

North Korea

North Korea’s space program is administered by a 

state-run civilian agency, the National Aerospace 

Development Administration.

239 North Korea’s space 

launch complex on the west coast, the Sohae Satellite Launching Station and associated space tracking facilities in Pyongyang both supported satellite 

launch cycles in 2012 and 2016.

240,241 An older space 

launch site on the east coast has not been used for a 

launch since 2009.

242

Similar to Iran, North Korea will try to deny an 

adversary use of space during a conflict. North 

Korea has demonstrated non-kinetic counterspace 

capabilities, including GPS and satellite communication jamming.243,244,245 North Korea also has ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles that can 

reach orbit and could, in theory, be used to target 

satellites in a conflict.246

Although North Korea placed two satellites in 

orbit and has in the past articulated further space 

ambitions, their program enabled them to test 

technology used in ballistic missiles under the 

guise of peaceful use of space.

247,248,249 These systems provided North Korea with valuable data 

applicable to the development of long-range, 

multistage ballistic missiles.

250

Image Source: AFP

A Taepo Dong 2/Unha-3 space launch vehicle preparing 

for launch, April 2012. The launch failed, but an attempt 

later that year was successful.251
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 33

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

Today, space has become a seamless part of 

many military and civilian activities. The advantages the United States holds in space capabilities 

will drive some nations to improve their abilities 

to access and operate in space. Moreover, some 

actors will seek counterspace capabilities that 

target the perceived United States and allied reliance on space, including the ability to use secure 

satellite communications, precision strike capabilities, and ISR assets.

China and Russia will continue to improve their 

space programs, including ISR, communications, 

space launch, and human spaceflight. Commercially, both will compete internationally to build 

satellites and supply space launch, navigation, 

and ISR services. 

Beijing and Moscow will continue to see space as 

integral to winning modern wars. They are developing systems that pose a threat to freedom of action 

in space. Both will continue their efforts to enhance 

their space and counterspace capabilities, and better integrate them into their respective militaries.

Iran and North Korea will avail themselves of 

space-based services, such as ISR, communications, and navigation, to increase their capabilities 

in civil and military domains.

252 Both will maintain 

their ability to conduct EW against adversaries 

and theoretically could use their missile and SLV 

advancements to target orbiting satellites.

Globally, the space industry will continue to 

expand as technological and cost barriers fall 

and international partnerships for joint production grow. State, non-state, and commercial 

actors increasingly will have access to information from space.

253 The number of satellites and 

debris on orbit will grow concurrently, making 

tracking satellites, discriminating threats from 

non-threats, and predicting and preventing collisions a greater challenge.

254,255

As the number of spacefaring nations grows and 

as some actors integrate space and counterspace 

capabilities into military operations, these trends 

will pose a challenge to U.S. space dominance and 

present new risks for assets on orbit.

OUTLOOK
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 35

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

APPENDIX A: Implications of Debris 

and Orbital Collisions

Approximately 21,000 large objects—which are at 

least 10 cm in size—are tracked and catalogued 

in Earth’s orbit, and only about 1,800 of them are 

active satellites. The remaining objects are debris, 

which includes derelict spacecraft, upper stages of 

SLVs, and remnants from explosions or collisions. 

The length of time debris remains in orbit depends 

on the altitude, ranging from a few years for objects 

below 600 kilometers to over a century for objects 

at higher orbits. The vast majority of debris harmlessly burns up in the atmosphere upon reentry.256

Prior to 2007, most debris was from explosions of 

upper stages of SLVs. Today, more than one third 

of all catalogued debris is from two major events: 

China’s destruction of a defunct satellite in 2007 

and the accidental collision between a U.S. communications satellite and a defunct Russian satellite in 

2009.257 Breakups, collisions, and explosions from 

derelict objects will continue to add to the amount 

of space debris on orbit.

Space debris can cause damage and destruction 

to satellites and spacecraft, as well as increase 

costs if satellite manufacturers add additional 

shielding and fuel to allow for more frequent 

avoidance maneuvers. Between 1998 and 2017, 

the International Space Station, which is in LEO, 

has maneuvered at least 25 times to avoid potential orbital collisions.

258 With an expected increase 

in large constellations of satellites and space 

debris, there is higher potential for satellite collisions, particularly in LEO.

259

The increase in number of objects on orbit has implications for policymakers worldwide and is encouraging the development of space debris removal 

technology.260 This technology is dual-use because 

it could be used to damage another satellite.

261

Image Source: NASA

Computer rendering of tracked large objects in Earth’s orbit. Roughly 90 percent of the objects are orbital debris, 

not active satellites. 
36

APPENDIX B: Counterspace Threats

Counterspace Continuum

Denial and

Deception

Directed Energy 

Weapons

Cyberspace 

Threats

Electronic

Warfare 

Kinetic Energy 

Threats

Orbital Threats

Ground Site

Attacks

Nuclear Detonation

in Space

Space Situational

Awareness 

REVERSIBLE NONREVERSIBLE

D&D

Visualization: DIA, D3 Design • 1811-20013

The counterspace continuum represents the range 

of threats to space-based services, arranged from 

reversible to nonreversible effects. Reversible effects 

from denial and deception and EW are non-destructive and temporary, and the system remains capable 

of resuming normal operations after the incident. 

DEW, cyberspace threats, and orbital threats can 

cause temporary or permanent effects. Nonreversible effects from kinetic energy threats, physical 

attacks against space-related ground infrastructure, 

and nuclear detonation in space result in degradation or physical destruction of a space capability. In 

addition to counterspace capabilities already discussed, several others can be used to deny, degrade, 

or destroy space systems.

Denial and Deception: Actors can use knowledge 

of when satellites pass overhead to camouflage and 

conceal their activities on the ground.

Ground Site Attack: An actor could attack a ground 

site using physical means, disrupting an ability to 

communicate with and operate satellites.

Nuclear Detonation in Space: Countries that can 

launch a nuclear weapon with a long range rocket, 

such as an ICBM or SLV, likely are capable of conducting a high-altitude nuclear detonation. Both the 

United States and Soviet Union detonated nuclear 

weapons above the atmosphere in the early 1960s.262
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 37

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

APPENDIX C: Glossary of Acronyms

APOSOS Asia-Pacific Ground-Based Optical Space Object Observation System

ASAT Anti-satellite

C2 Command and control

C4ISR Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

CNSA China National Space Administration

DEW Directed energy weapon

EW Electronic warfare

GEO Geosynchronous Earth orbit

GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System

GPS Global Positioning System

HEO Highly elliptical orbit

ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile

ISR Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

KZ Kuaizhou space launch vehicle

LEO Low Earth orbit

LM Long March space launch vehicle

MEO Medium Earth orbit

PLA People's Liberation Army

PNT Position, navigation, and timing

SAR Synthetic aperture radar

SASTIND China's State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense

SATCOM Satellite communications

SLV Space launch vehicle

SSA Space situational awareness

SSF Strategic Support Force
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 39

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

1 "Satellite Database”; Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS); https://

www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database.

2 “How Many Countries Have Rockets Capable of Reaching Space?”; 

Space Answers; 21 March 2013; https://www.spaceanswers.com/

how-many-countries-have-rockets-capable-of-reaching-space/.

3 Sellers, Jerry Jon; Understanding Space: An Introduction to Astronautics, 4th Edition; CEI: United States; 2015.

4 “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the 

US Intelligence Community”; Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018.

5 “Space Congestion Threatens to ‘Darken Skies’”; National Defense 

Magazine; 28 June 2018; http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2018/6/28/viewpoint-space-congestion-threatens-to-darken-skies.

6 Chin, Carrey; “A Study on the Commercialization of Space-based 

Remote Sensing in the Twenty-First Century and Its Implications to 

United States National Security”; Naval Postgraduate School; June 

2011; http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a547960.pdf.

7 “Space – An Enabler”; Army Space and Missile Defense Command, 

Army Space Journal 2003; 2003; http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/

u2/a525767.pdf.

8 Greenemeier, Larry; “GPS and the World’s First “Space War;” 

Scientific American; 8 February 2016; www.scientificamerican.com/

article/gps-and-the-world-s-first-space-war.

9 “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the 

US Intelligence Community”; Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018.

10 “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the 

US Intelligence Community”; Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018.

11 Plath, Cynthia; “Explanation of Votes in the First Committee on 

Resolutions L.3: ‘Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space’ and 

L.68/Rev.1: ‘Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in 

Outer Space Activities’”; Department of State; 6 November 2018; 

https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls287165.html.

12 “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 

Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 

Celestial Bodies”; United Nations; 10 October 1967.

13 Sellers, Jerry Jon; Understanding Space: An Introduction to Astronautics, 4th Edition; CEI: United States; 2015.

14 Sellers, Jerry Jon; Understanding Space: An Introduction to Astronautics, 4th Edition; CEI: United States; 2015.

15 Joint Publication 3-14: Space Operations; Joint Chiefs of Staff; 10 

April 2018.

16 GPS: The Global Positioning System; www.gps.gov.

17 Sellers, Jerry Jon; Understanding Space: An Introduction to Astronautics, 4th Edition; CEI: United States; 2015.

18 Joint Publication 3-14: Space Operations; Joint Chiefs of Staff; 10 

April 2018.

19 Joint Publication 3-14: Space Operations; Joint Chiefs of Staff; 10 

April 2018.

20 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms; Joint Chiefs of 

Staff; October 2018.

21 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms; Joint Chiefs of 

Staff; October 2018.

22 Joint Publication 3-14: Space Operations; Joint Chiefs of Staff; 10 

April 2018.

23 Wilson, Tom; “Threats to United States Space Capabilities”; Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization; 2001.

24 Sellers, Jerry Jon; Understanding Space: An Introduction to Astronautics, 4th Edition; CEI: United States; 2015.

25 GPS: The Global Positioning System; www.gps.gov.

26 “Satellite Database”; Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS); https://

www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database.

27 “SATELLITE OUTAGE FELT BY MILLIONS”; The Chicago Tribune; 

21 May 1998; https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1998-

05-21-9805210138-story.html.

28 Joint Publication 3-14: Space Operations; Joint Chiefs of Staff; 10 

April 2018.

29 Sellers, Jerry Jon; Understanding Space: An Introduction to Astronautics, 4th Edition; CEI: United States; 2015.

30 “Benefits Stemming from Space Exploration”; International Space 

Exploration Coordination Group; September 2013.

31 “20 Inventions We Wouldn't Have Without Space Travel”; NASA 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory; https://www.jpl.nasa.gov.

32 Joint Publication 3-14: Space Operations; Joint Chiefs of Staff; 10 

April 2018.

33 NASA; http://nasa.gov/.

34 “Full text of white paper on China’s space activities in 2016”; 

The State Council of the People's Republic Of China; 28 Dec 2016; 

http://english.gov.cn.

35 Kulaki, Gregory and Lewis, Jeffery G.; A Place for One’s Mat: 

China's Space Program, 1956-2003; American Academy of Arts 

and Sciences; January 2009; https://www.amacad.org/publications/

spaceChina.pdf.

36 “Full text of white paper on China’s space activities in 2016”; 

The State Council of the People's Republic Of China; 28 Dec 2016; 

http://english.gov.cn.

37 “Full text of white paper on China’s space activities in 2016”; 

The State Council of the People's Republic Of China; 28 Dec 2016; 

http://english.gov.cn.

REFERENCES
40

38 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018; Office of the Secretary 

of Defense; 16 May 2018; p. 39.

39 “China’s Position on a Code of Conduct in Space”; U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC); 8 September 

2017; p. 2.

40 Kulaki, Gregory and Lewis, Jeffery G.; A Place for One’s Mat: 

China's Space Program, 1956-2003; American Academy of Arts 

and Sciences; January 2009; https://www.amacad.org/publications/

spaceChina.pdf.

41 Goswami, Namrata; “Waking Up to China’s Space Dream”; The 

Diplomat; 15 October 2018; https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/waking-up-to-chinas-space-dream/.

42 “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the 

US Intelligence Community”; Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 Feb 2018.

43 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017; Office of the Secretary 

of Defense; May 2017; Department of Defense; p. 39.

44 Pollpeter, Kevin, et al; The Creation of the PLA Strategic Support 

Force and Its Implications for Chinese Military Space Operations; 

RAND Corporation; 2017; p. ix.

45 MacDonald, Bruce W., Dennis Blair, Dean Cheng, Karl Mueller, 

and Victoria Sampson; Crisis Stability in Space: China and Other 

Challenges; Foreign Policy Institute; 2016.

46 Pollpeter, Kevin, et al; The Creation of the PLA Strategic Support 

Force and Its Implications for Chinese Military Space Operations; 

RAND Corporation; 2017; p. 7.

47 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018; Office of the Secretary 

of Defense; 16 May 2018.

48 “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the 

US Intelligence Community”; Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 Feb 2018.

49 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015; Office of the Secretary 

of Defense; April 2015.

50 Pollpeter, Kevin, et al; “China Dream, Space Dream – China’s 

Progress in Space Technologies and Implications for the United 

States”; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 

(USCC); 2 March 2015; p. iv.

51 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018; Office of the Secretary 

of Defense; 16 May 2018.

52 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015; Office of the Secretary 

of Defense; April 2015.

53 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018; Office of the Secretary 

of Defense; 16 May 2018; p. 40.

54 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017; Office of the Secretary 

of Defense; May 2017.

55 “China to tackle monopolies, introduce competition: CPC”; People.cn (Xinhua reprint); 15 November 2013.

56 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017; Office of the Secretary 

of Defense; May 2017; p. 34.

57 Costello, John; “The Strategic Support Force: China’s Information 

Warfare Service”; The Jamestown Foundation; 8 February 2016; 

https://jamestown.org/program/the-strategic-support-force-chinas-information-warfare-service/.

58 Pollpeter, Kevin, et al; The Creation of the PLA Strategic Support 

Force and Its Implications for Chinese Military Space Operations; 

RAND Corporation; 2017; pp. 3, 7.

59 Pollpeter, Kevin, et al; The Creation of the PLA Strategic Support 

Force and Its Implications for Chinese Military Space Operations; 

RAND Corporation; 2017; pp. 3, 7.

60 “China promotes 5 officers to general”; Xinhua; 28 July 2017.

61 Wuthnow, Joel and Philip Saunders; “Chinese Military Reform in 

the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications;” Institute 

for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University; March 

2017; China Strategic Perspectives, No. 10.

62 “State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense”; The State Council of the People’s Republic of China; 

http://english.gov.cn.

63 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017; Office of the Secretary 

of Defense; May 2017; p. 68.

64 “What We Do”; The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council of the People’s Republic of 

China; http://en.sasac.gov.cn/2018/07/17/c_7.htm.

65 Jones, Andrew; “China appoints new space agency administrator”; GB Times; 25 May 2018; https://gbtimes.com.

66 “Full text of white paper on China’s space activities in 2016”; The 

State Council of the People's Republic Of China; 28 December 2016; 

http://english.gov.cn.

67 “Handbook: China Space Station and its Resources for International Cooperation”; UNOOSA; 28 May 2018.

68 “The National Space Science Center of the Chinese Academy 

of Sciences to establish a Research Laboratory in Luxembourg”; 

Luxembourg Ministry of Economy; 17 January 2018.

69 “China Strengthens International Space Cooperation”; Xinhua; 19 

April 2018.

70 “OK Micro Aerospace to understand there is something you can’t 

think of [Translated]”; Spaceflight Fans; 27 June 2018.

71 “Orbita’s Jiang Xiaohua: Commercial satellite big data into the 

"national team" best complement quantitative remote sensing will 

accelerate popularization [Translated]”; CCIDI News; 20 June 2018; 

http://www.ccidnet.com/2018/0620/10398975.shtml.

72 “KZ Promotional Flier”; Expace Technology Co Ltd.

73 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017; Office of the Secretary 

of Defense; May 2017.

74 “Chinese Space Launch Vehicles”; GlobalSecurity.org; https://

www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/launch.htm.

75 “Chinese Space Launch Vehicles”; GlobalSecurity.org; https://

www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/launch.htm.
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 41

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

76 Jones, Andrew; “China reveals details for super-heavy-lift Long March 

9 and reusable Long March 8 rockets”; Space News; 5 July 2018.

77 2015 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission; November 2015; Chapter 2. 

78 “Chinese Space Launch Vehicles”; GlobalSecurity.org; https://

www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/launch.htm.

79 2015 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission; November 2015; Chapter 2.

80 Barbosa, Rui C.; “Chinese Kuaizhou-1A rocket launches several 

small satellites”; Nasaspaceflight.com 9 January 2017; https://www.

nasaspaceflight.com/2017/01/chinese-kuaizhou-ia-launches-several-small-satellites/.

81 “Space Station Project Development Progress”; China Manned 

Space Engineering Office; 23 April 2016; http://www.cmse.gov.cn/

uploadfile/news/uploadfile/201604/20160427104809225.pdf.

82 “China to launch space station Tiangong in 2022, welcomes foreign 

astronauts”; Space News; 8 Aug 2018; http://www.spacedaily.com.

83 “Chinese lunar rover lands on moon”; Al Jazeera; 15 Dec 2013; 

https://www.aljazeera.com.

84 “Chinese lunar rover lands on moon”; Al Jazeera; 15 Dec 2013; 

https://www.aljazeera.com.

85 Wong, Catherine; “China's Chang'e 4 lunar probe sends first 

photo of far side of the moon after historic soft landing”; South China 

Morning Post; 3 January 2019.

86 Chang, Kenneth; “China’s Chang’e-4 Launches on Mission to the 

Moon’s Far Side”; The New York Times; 7 December 2018.

87 “China launches historic mission to land on far side of the moon”; 

Spaceflight Now; 7 December 2018; https://spaceflightnow.

com/2018/12/07/china-launches-historic-mission-to-land-on-farside-of-the-moon/.

88 Mo Hong’e; “China to launch Chang’e 4 this year, eyeing lunar 

base in 2025”; ECNS Wire; http://www.ecns.cn.

89 “Senior Officer Expects Moon Visit by 2036”; Chinese Academy 

of Sciences; 3 May 2016; http://english.cas.cn/newsroom/china_research/201605/t20160503_162635.shtml.

90 Harvey, Brian; China in Space: The Great Leap Forward; 2013; 

Springer Science + Business Media: New York.

91 “Satellite Database”; Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS); https://

www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database.

92 “Tianlian-1, -2, -3, -4”; Gunter’s Space Page; https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/tl-1.htm.

93 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018; Office of the Secretary 

of Defense; 16 May 2018. 

94 “Satellite Database”; Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS); https://

www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database.

95 Keluo Liaofu; “”Jilin-1 Satellite Liftoff Into Space: US Aircraft Carrier 

Has Nowhere to Hide”; Dingsheng Military Forum; 08 October 2015; 

http://www.dingsheng.com/portal.php?mod=view&aid=6852.

96 “China’s Gaofen-4 Satellite Will Be in Space by the End of This 

Year Capable of Monitoring and Locking on American Aircraft Carrier”; China Youth Network; 04 October 2015; http://mil.news.sina.

com.cn/2015-10-04/0936840350.html.

97 “Satellite Database”; Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS); https://

www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database.

98 “Satellite Database”; Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS); https://

www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database.

99 Stokes, Mark A. and Dean Cheng; Project 2049 Institute for the 

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: China’s 

Evolving Space Capabilities: Implications for U.S. Interests; Project 

2049; 26 April 2012; http://project2049.net/documents/uscc_china-space-program-report_april-2012.pdf.

100 “Full text of white paper on China’s space activities in 2016”; The 

State Council of the People's Republic Of China;28 Dec 2016; http://

english.gov.cn.

101 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018; Office of the Secretary 

of Defense; 16 May 2018.

102 “Chinese Aerospace Giant Unveils First Smartphone for Country's 

Satellite Communications Network”; South China Morning Post; 6 

November 2016; http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/2042978/

chinese-aerospace-giant-unveils-first-smartphone-countrys-satellite.

103 “A quantum communications satellite proved its potential in 2017”; 

Science News; 13 December 2017; https://www.sciencenews.org/article/global-quantum-communication-top-science-stories-2017-yir.

104 “Development of BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS) – A 

System Update Report (2017-2018)”; China Satellite Navigation 

Office (CSNO); 5 March 2018; Munich Satellite Navigation Summit 

2018 Proceedings.

105 “China's BeiDou navigation system starts global service”; 

Xinhua; 27 December 2018; http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-12/27/c_137702496.htm.

106 “Beidou to help safeguard fisherman on the high seas;” 

Xinhua; 26 May 2014; http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-05/26/c_133361038.htm.

107 “Beidou Navigation System Installed on More Chinese Fishing 

Boats;” Xinhua; 17 May 2012; http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/

china/2012-05/17/c_131594665.htm.

108 “China to build 300 satellite communications constellation in low 

earth orbit”; GBTimes; 26 February 2018.

109 “China's Rainbow Project Will Launch 156 Small Satellites to 

Build Space-Based Internet”; China National Administration of GNSS 

and Applications; 10 November 2017.

110 “National Constellation – We have been helping”; Ok-Space; 29 

January 2018; http://www.ok-space.cn/article/index/id/169/cid/8.html.

111 “Full Text: China's BeiDou Navigation Satellite System”; The State 

Council of the People's Republic Of China; 16 June 16; http://www.

xinhuanet.com.

112 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018; Office of the Secretary 

of Defense; 16 May 2018.

113 Griesbach, Jacob and Vallado, David; “Simulating Space Surveillance Networks”; Proceedings from the American Astronautical 

Society (AAS) Conference; 4 August 2011.
42

114 “GJB 6776-2009: Space Objects Orbits Cataloging Method”; National Military Standard of the People’s Republic of China; 25 May 2009.

115 Griesbach, Jacob and Vallado, David; “Simulating Space Surveillance Networks”; Proceedings from the American Astronautical 

Society (AAS) Conference; 4 August 2011.

116 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018; Office of the Secretary 

of Defense; 16 May 2018.

117 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018; Office of the Secretary 

of Defense; 16 May 2018.

118 Wang, X. and Zheng, K.; "Deception Jamming Power Against 

SAR"; Electronic Information Warfare Technology, Vol. 30, No. 3; May 

2015; pp. 35-53.

119 Hou, W., Ji, Z., Lu, C., and Leng, K.; "Research on SAR deception jamming on engineering design"; Aerospace Electronic Warfare, 

No. 3; March 2017; pp. 34-37.

120 Lin, J., Feng, T., Chen, B., and Jiang, C.; "Study on Countermeasure against Satellite Adaptive Null-Steering Technique"; Aerospace 

Electronic Warfare, Vol. 26, No. 3; March 2010; pp. 1-4.

121 Wang, H.; "Analysis on Anti-jamming Measures of Mobile User 

Objective System"; Radio Communications Technology, Vol. 35, No. 

2; 2009, pp. 46-49.

122 Li Ying, Zhou Bingyu; “Ground High Power Laser Anti-Satellite 

Reconnaissance Technology”; 53rd Institute of Electronic Research; 

01 April 2002.

123 Gao Guiqing, Xiang Jin, Li Yongxiang, Zhou Yong; “Efficiency 

research on laser jamming photoelectric detector in early-warning 

satellite of infrared”; Laser & Infrared, Vol. 40 No. 2; February 2010.

124 Wang Shiyong, Fu Youyu, Guo Jin; “Evaluation of high energy 

laser effecting on remote distance photoelectron sensor system”; 

Optical Technique, Vol. 28, No 1; January 2002.

125 “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the 

US Intelligence Community”; Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018.

126 PLA Strategic Strike Force in 21st Century, Rise of Great Power – 

East Asia Rising: Focus on Peoples Liberation Army in New Century; 

Lbac Consultant; September 2009.

127 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018; Office of the Secretary 

of Defense; 16 May 2018.

128 “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of 

the US Intelligence Community”; Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence; 13 Feb 2018.

129 “APOSOS Program Review: Annual Report of APOSOS Project, 

2015”; Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) and 

Chinese Academy of Science National Astronomical Observatories 

(NAOC); 13 January 2016.

130 “Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization Brochure”; www.

apsco.int; p. 5.

131 “CrowdStrike Intelligence Report: PUTTER PANDA”; 

CrowdStrike.

132 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018; Office of the Secretary 

of Defense; 16 May 2018.

133 “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the 

US Intelligence Community”; Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018.

134 Liu, Jiayu; “On Compliance Contact Control for Multi-Arm Robotic Capturing of Large Tumbling Space Debris”; 69th International 

Astronautical Congress 2018; October 2018.

135 Gong, Zizheng; “Mission Planning and Simulation System Study 

on Active Debris Removal with Space-based Laser System”; 69th 

International Astronautical Congress 2018; October 2018.

136 “US says China tested anti-satellite missile”; The Associated Press; 25 July 2014; http://www.newsday.com/news/nation/

us-says-china-tested-anti-satellite-missile-1.8892568.

137 “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of 

the U.S. Intelligence Community”; Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence; 11 May 2017; p. 9.

138 “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the 

US Intelligence Community”; Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018.

139 Joint Publication 3-14: Space Operations; Joint Chiefs of Staff; 

10 April 2018. 

140 “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the 

US Intelligence Community”; Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018.

141 Joint Publication 3-14: Space Operations; Joint Chiefs of Staff; 

10 April 2018.

142 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015; Office of the Secretary 

of Defense; April 2015.

143 “Russia Working on Military Satellite Grouping to Counter US 

Space Warfare Plans”; Sputnik News; 6 March 2018; www.sputniknews.com.

144 Siddiqi, Asif; “Russia’s Space Program Is Struggling Mightily”; 

Slate; 21 March 2017; http://www.slate.com.

145 Bodner, Matthew; “60 years after Sputnik, Russia is lost in 

space”; Space News; 4 October 2017; https://spacenews.com.

146 Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power 

Aspirations; Defense Intelligence Agency; 28 June 2017; http://

ww.dia.mil.

147 “Peresvet combat laser can fight satellites - Russian Defense 

Ministry”; Interfax-AVN; 5 December 2018.

148 “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of 

the U.S. Intelligence Community”; Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence; 11 May 2017; p.9.

149 Yaroslav Vyatkin; “Prompt Global Strike’ Russian-Style”; Argumenty Nedeli Online; 21 April 2015; http://argumenti.ru/; p.1.

150 “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of 

the US Intelligence Community”; Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence; 13 Feb 2018.

151 “How They Will Wage War in the Future: Tanks Rumbled Across 

the Sky”; Moscow MK Online in Russian; 9 August 2016.

152 “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by Russian 

Federation President V. Putin”; Official website of Russian Federation 

President; 31 December 2014.
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 43

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

153 “The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War”; Moscow 

Military Thought Vol 4. (2013); 31 January 2014.

154 “A Forecast for Future Wars: Meditations on What They Will Look 

Like”; Moscow Military Thought Vol.4 (2015); 1 October 2015.

155 “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by Russian 

Federation President V. Putin”; Official website of Russian Federation 

President; 31 December 2014.

156 “How They Will Wage War in the Future: Tanks Rumbled Across 

the Sky”; Moscow MK Online in Russian; 9 August 2016.

157 “China Plans To Ban Space Weaponization, Manage Debris, Ensure Research, Work With Russia”; Beijing Zhongguo Taikong Wang; 

17 October 2017.

158 “Space Power: What is Russia’s Military Strategy in Outer Space?”; 

Warsaw Intersection; 25 October 2017; http://intersectionproject.eu/.

159 “MFA Website Provides Overview of Policy on Prevention of 

Placement of Weapons in Outer Space”; Moscow Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs of the Russian Federation; 6 July 2017; http://www.mid.ru.

160 “Impact of Information and Space Superiority on High-Tech 

Military Operations”; Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona; 14 July 

2009; http://www.vko.ru.

161 “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by Russian 

Federation President V. Putin”; Official website of Russian Federation 

President; 31 December 2014.

162 Col. S.G. Chekinov and Lt. Gen. S.A. Bogdanov; “Russia: 

Asymmetrical Actions to Maintain Russia's Military Security”; Moscow 

Military Thought Volume 1 2010; 20 June 2013.

163 “Missile Defense Missiles and Visas - The US Refused Russian 

General Staff Officers Entry Into the Country”; Moscow Rossiyskaya 

Gazeta Online; 15 October 2017; http://rg.ru.

164 “The Clowns Are Demolishing the Circus: US Missile Defense and 

the International Security System in Crisis”; Moscow Izvestiya Online; 

15 June 2018; https://iz.ru.

165 “This is the Achilles’ Heel of Washington’s Military Power”; Sputnik News Online; 30 January 2016; https://sputniknews.com/military/

201601301033971479-us-space-satellites/.

166 “How They Will Wage War in the Future: Tanks Rumbled Across 

the Sky”; Moscow MK Online in Russian; 9 August 2016.

167 “Star Wars: Will Russia Find an Antidote to the X-37; the Space 

Arms Race Enters a New Orbit”; Moscow Svobodnaya Pressa; 

http://www.svpressa.ru.

168 “RF, US, and PRC Antisatellite Weapons and Jammers as Space 

Arms Race Heats Up”; Svobodnaya Pressa; 28 October 2018; http://

www.svpressa.ru/.

169 Selivanov, V.V.; “Choosing Priorities in Developing Kinetic Energy 

Weapons for Military Conflicts”; Military Thought, Volume 4: 2017; 31 

December 2017.

170 “Space Is a Battlefield: Krasukha-2 Counter-Space Broadband 

Jamming System, US Space Efforts”; Izvestiya Online; 14 December 

2017; http://iz.ru/.

171 “Russian Missile Defense Advances, Status of A-235 NUDOL 

Advanced Missile Defense System”; Gazeta; 31 August 2016; http://

www.gazeta.ru/.

172 Selivanov, V.V.; “Choosing Priorities in Developing Kinetic Energy 

Weapons for Military Conflicts”; Military Thought, Volume 4: 2017; 31 

December 2017.

173 Chekinov, S.G.; “Strategic Deterrence and Russia's National 

Security Today”; Military Thought, Volume 1: 2012; 31 December 

2011 – 30 March 2012.

174 Selivanov, V.V.; “Choosing Priorities in Developing Kinetic Energy 

Weapons for Military Conflicts”; Military Thought, Volume 4: 2017; 31 

December 2017.

175 Bodner, Matthew; “Russian Military Merges Air Force and Space 

Command”; The Moscow Times Online; 3 August 2015; http://www.

themoscowtimes.com/.

176 “Russia's Space Troops: Armaments and Facilities”; Voyennoye 

Obozreniye; 25 March 2011; http://topwar.ru/.

177 Durnovo, Aleksey; "Aerospace Defense Troops Space Com¬-

mand's Primary Mission Is to Ensure Russia's Security in Space"; 

Ekho Moskvy Online; 9 December 2014; http://www.echo.msk.ru.

178 Golts, Alexander; “Russia's Aerospace Forces Will Never Take 

Off”; The Moscow Times Online; 10 August 2015; http://www.

themoscowtimes.com/.

179 “New branch of Armed Forces, Aerospace Forces, created in 

Russia – Shoygu”; Interfax; 3 August 2015; http://www.interfax.com/.

180 “Aerospace Forces successfully launch Soyuz-2 vehicle from 

Plesetsk Cosmodrome”; Russian Ministry of Defense; 4 November 

2018; http://eng.mil.ru.

181 “Shoigu: a new kind of armed forces was created in Russia - Air 

and Space Forces”; TASS; 3 August 2015.

182 “Putin Approves Roscosmos Merger with Conglomerate”; Space 

News; 23 January 2015; http://www.spacenews.com/putin-approves-roscosmos-merger-with-conglomerate/.

183 “State Space Corporation to Hire 500 Staff”; Interfax; 16 

November 2015.

184 “State Corporation Organizations”; State Corporation Roscosmos Website; www.roscosmos.ru/24028/.

185 “Russian Space Launch Vehicles”; GlobalSecurity.org; https://

www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/russia/launch.htm.

186 “The future of the Russian space program”; Sputnik News; 

30 November 2011; https://sputniknews.com/infographics/20111130169141926/.

187 “2017 Energia Annual Report”; Energia Corporation; https://

www.energia.ru/en/corporation/inf_shareh.html.

188 “Yuri Gagarin: First Man in Space”; NASA; https://www.nasa.gov/

mission_pages/shuttle/sts1/gagarin_anniversary.html.

189 “Origin of the Vostok Spacecraft”; Russian Space Web; http://

russianspaceweb.com/spacecraft_manned_first.html.

190 “Russian space program in the first half of the 20th century”; Russian 

Space Web; http://russianspaceweb.com/russia_2000_2010.html.

191 “A History of Manned Space Missions”; Windows 2 the Universe; 

https://www.windows2universe.org/.

192 “Satellite Database”; Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS); 

https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database.

193 “Luch-5B”; Gunter’s Space Page; https://space.skyrocket.de/

doc_sdat/luch-5b.htm.
44

194 “Satellite Database”; Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS); 

https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database.

195 “Garpun (14F136)”; Gunter’s Space Page; https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/garpun.htm.

196 “Luch-5A”; Gunter’s Space Page; https://space.skyrocket.de/

doc_sdat/luch-5a.htm.

197 “Military Expert Anton Lavrov Documents Need for Optical Reconnaissance Satellite Array”; Izvestiya Online; 22 September 2017.

198 “Russia involves 10 reconnaissance satellites in Syria operation 

– General Staff”; TASS; 17 November 2015; http://tass.com/science/837273.

199 “Russian communications satellites”; Russian Space Web; http://

www.russianspaceweb.com/spacecraft_comsats.html.

200 Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power 

Aspirations; Defense Intelligence Agency; 28 June 2017; http://

ww.dia.mil.

201 “GLONASS Status Update”; 39th Annual Precise Time and Time 

Interval (PTTI) Meeting; November 2007; https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/

fulltext/u2/a485520.pdf.

202 “Glonass-K Project;” ISS-Reshetnev; 12 October 2018; https://

www.iss-reshetnev.ru/projects.

203 “GLONASS Programme Update;” International Committee on 

Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG): Annual Meeting 2016; 12 

October 2018; http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/icg/2016/icg11/01.pdf.

204 “Titov Main Test and Space Systems Control Centre marks 60th 

anniversary”; Ministry of Defence of the ww Russian Federation; 4 

October 2017; http://eng.mil.ru.

205 Griesbach, Jacob and Vallado, David; “Simulating Space Surveillance Networks”; Proceedings from the American Astronautical 

Society (AAS) Conference; 4 August 2011.

206 Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations; Defense Intelligence Agency; 28 June 2017; http://ww.dia.mil.

207 Agapov, Vladimir; “Second Fragmentation of Titan 3C Transtage 

SSN#2692”; IAA Space Debris Committee Meeting; 27 March 2018.

208 Mokhatkin, A., I. Molotov, V. Voropaev, G. Borovin, S. Andrievsky, 

N. Dorokhov, and V. Agletdinov; “Performance Analysis of the Large 

Space Debris Tracking Telescope in the North Caucasus After the 

Second First Light”; Proc. 7th European Conference on Space Debris, Darmstadt, Germany; 18-21 April 2017.

209 “Radioelectronic Warfare Assets have been Developed that can 

Hide Topol Launch Positions from Space Surveillance"; Militarynews.

ru; 1 May 2015; http://militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=1&nid=374975.

210 "Russia tests satellite jammer system"; UAWire; 28 October 

2018; https://uawire.org/russia-tests-mobile-anti-satellite-system.

211 O’Connor, Tom; “Russia’s Military Has Laser Weapons That 

Can Take Out Enemies In Less Than A Second”; Newsweek; 12 

March 2018; http://www.newsweek.com/russia-military-laser-weapons-take-out-enemies-less-second-841091.

212 “Space Forces Get Combat Laser System”; Interfax; 19 July 

2018; www.interfax.com.

213 “U.S. warns on Russia's new space weapons”; Reuters; 14 

August 2018; https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-usa-space/u-swarns-on-russias-new-space-weapons-idUSL5N1V52IK

214 “Peresvet combat laser can fight satellites - Russian Defense 

Ministry”; Interfax-AVN; 5 December 2018.

215 “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the 

US Intelligence Community”; Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018.

216 Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations; Defense Intelligence Agency; 28 June 2017; http://ww.dia.mil.

217 Mizokami, Kyle; “Is Russia’s Mysterious New Satellite a Space 

Weapon?”; Popular Mechanics; 16 August 2018; https://www.popularmechanics.com.

218 Poblete, Yleem D.S.; “United States Remarks at the Conference 

on Disarmament as Delivered by Assistant Secretary of State for 

Arms Control, Verification and Compliance”; U.S. Mission Geneva; 14 

August 2018.

219 “Russia Tests Military Satellite Capable of Approaching other 

Spacecraft – Newspaper”; Interfax; 26 October 2017.

220 “Russia develops co-orbital anti-satellite capability”; IHS Jane’s; 2018.

221 “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of 

the U.S. Intelligence Community”; Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence; 11 May 2017; p.9.

222 Yaroslav Vyatkin; “Prompt Global Strike’ Russian-Style”; Argumenty Nedeli Online; 21 April 2015; http://argumenti.ru/; p.1.

223 “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the 

US Intelligence Community”; Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018.

224 “Iran: Official Says Satellite Jamming Signals, Radio Frequency 

Radiation Levels Not Health Concern”; IRNA; 21 July 2018; URL: 

http://www.iran-newspaper.com.

225 "Iran Unveils New Achievements in Drone Industry"; Fars News 

Agency; 26 September 2018; http://en.farsnews.com.

226 Harrison, Todd, et al; Space Threat Assessment 2018; Center 

for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); 12 April 2018; https://

www.csis.org/analysis/space-threat-assessment-2018; p. 16-18.

227 "Products"; ieimil.ir; 12 January 2011.

228 “DM: Iran To Give Crushing Response To Enemies' Space 

Threats”; Fars News; 13 November 2018.

229 Chow, Tiffany; “Iranian Space Launch Capabilities Fact Sheet”; 

Secure World Foundation; https//swfound.org/media/1690/swf_iran_

slv_fact_sheet.pdf.

230 "Republic space - Iran's satellite programe accelerates”; Jane's 

Intelligence Review; 14 April 2011.

231 "Don't Count Iran's Nascent Space Capabilities Out"; World 

Politics Review; 29 September 2016; www.worldpoliticsreview.com/

trend-lines/20067/don-t-count-iran-s-nascent-space-capabilities-out.

232 "Iran Plans to Join 2 APSCO Projects”; Financial Tribune; 18 September 2017; financialtribune.com/articles/economy-sci-tech/72519/

iran-plans-to-join-2-apsco-projects.

233 “Signing of APSCO Convention”; Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation 

Organization; http://www.apsco.int/.

234 “Iran Successfully Launches Satellite Into Space, First Since 

2012”; Sputnik News; 2 February 2015.
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 45

CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE

235 “Official: Iran Among 9 Top Satellites Manufacturers”; Fars News 

Agency; 21 Oct 2018.

236 Harrison, Todd, et al; Space Threat Assessment 2018; Center 

for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); 12 April 2018; https://

www.csis.org/analysis/space-threat-assessment-2018; p. 16-18.

237 "Republic space - Iran's satellite programe accelerates”; Jane's 

Intelligence Review; 14 April 2011.

238 "Don't Count Iran's Nascent Space Capabilities Out"; World 

Politics Review; 29 September 2016; www.worldpoliticsreview.com/

trend-lines/20067/don-t-count-iran-s-nascent-space-capabilities-out.

239 Kooser, Amanda; "North Korea Names Space Agency 'NADA,' 

Mimics NASA Logo"; CNET.com; 2 April 2014. https://www.cnet.com/

news/north-korea-names-spaceagency-nada-mimics-nasa-logo/.

240 “N. Korea Confirms Imminent Satellite Launch”; Agence France 

Presse; 2 February 2016.

241 Dominguez, Gabriel; “'Increased activity' spotted at North Korea's Sohae rocket launch site: 38 North”; Jane’s Defence Weekly; 

10 October 2016.

242 “Corrections and Amplifications”; Wall Street Journal; 

5 August 2016.

243 Waterman, Shaun; “North Korean Jamming of GPS shows system’s weakness”; The Washington Times; 23 August 2012.

244 Williams, Martyn; “Report: DPRK Jams South Korean Satellite Comms”; North Korea Tech; 17 November 2012; http://www.northkoreatec.

org/2012/11/17/report-dprk-jams-south-kireab-satellite-comms/.

245 Shim, Elizabeth; "North Korea Jamming GPS Signals in 

South; Can Affect Planes, Cellphones"; UPI; 31 March 2016; 

http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/03/31/NorthKorea-jamming-GPS-signals-in-South-can-affect-planes-cellphones/2551459443059/.

246 Harrison, Todd, et al; Space Threat Assessment 2018; Center 

for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); 12 April 2018; https://

www.csis.org/analysis/space-threat-assessment-2018.

247 Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2015; Office of the 

Secretary of Defense; 5 January 2016.

248 Harrison, Todd, et al; Space Threat Assessment 2018; Center 

for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); 12 April 2018; https://

www.csis.org/analysis/space-threat-assessment-2018; p. 16-18.

249 Lotto Persio, Sophia; “Star Wars: North Korea Unveils Five-YearPlan to Conquer Space”; Newsweek; 30 October 2017.

250 “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat 2017;” Defense Intelligence 

Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee/National Air and Space Intelligence Center; June 2017; p. 27.

251 Choe, Sang-Hun; “North Korea Sets Launch of a Long-Range 

Rocket”; The New York Times; 3 February 2016. 

252 “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of 

the US Intelligence Community”; Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence; 13 February 2018.

253 “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of 

the US Intelligence Community”; Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence; 13 February 2018.

254 “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of 

the US Intelligence Community”; Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence; 13 February 2018.

255 “Space Congestion Threatens to ‘Darken Skies’”; National 

Defense Magazine; 28 June 2018; http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2018/6/28/viewpoint-space-congestion-threatensto-darken-skies.

256 “Frequently Asked Questions”; NASA Orbital Debris Program 

Office; https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/.

257 “Frequently Asked Questions”; NASA Orbital Debris Program 

Office; https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/.

258 Dr. Liou, J.-C.; “U.S. Space Debris Environment, Operations, and 

Research Updates”; UN Office on Outer Space Activities; 9 February 

2018; http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/stsc/2018/

tech-14E.pdf.

259 “Space Debris and Space Traffic Management”; The Aerospace 

Corporation; https://aerospace.org.

260 “How to Collect Space Junk”; The Economist; 21 November 2018.

261 “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of 

the US Intelligence Community”; Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence; 13 February 2018.

262 Global Nuclear Landscape 2018; Defense Intelligence Agency; 

February 2018; www.dia.mil.
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY