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WHY TAIWAN MATTERS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 16, 2011

Serial No. 112–42

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Ms. June Teufel Dreyer, professor of political science at University of Miami, 

senior fellow at Foreign Policy Research Institute ............................................ 11

Mr. Randall G. Schriver, partner at Armitage International LLC., president 

& CEO of the Project 2049 Institute .................................................................. 17

Mr. Rupert J. Hammond-Chambers, president of the U.S.-Taiwan Business 

Council, Member of National Committee on United States-China Relations . 25

Ms. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, professor, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown 

University ............................................................................................................. 45

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 3

Ms. June Teufel Dreyer: Prepared statement ....................................................... 13

Mr. Randall G. Schriver: Prepared statement ...................................................... 19

Mr. Rupert J. Hammond-Chambers: Prepared statement ................................... 27

Ms. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker: Prepared statement ................................................ 47

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 70

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 71

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 73

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from 

American Samoa: Prepared statement ............................................................... 75

Written responses from Ms. June Teufel Dreyer to questions submitted for 

the record by the Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of South Carolina ........................................................................ 77

Written responses from Mr. Randall G. Schriver to questions submitted for 

the record by the Honorable Jeff Duncan .......................................................... 82

(1)

WHY TAIWAN MATTERS 

THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The committee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr. Berman, 

for 7 minutes each for our opening statements, I will recognize the 

chairman and the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Asia 

and the Pacific for 3 minutes each for their opening remarks. 

We will then hear from our witnesses, and I would ask that you 

summarize your prepared statements in 5 minutes each before we 

move to questions and answers from the members under the 5-

minute rule. 

Without objection, your prepared statements will be made part 

of the record; and members may have 5 days to insert statements 

and questions for the record subject to the length limitation of the 

rules. 

The chair now recognizes herself for 7 minutes. 

Today’s hearing is entitled ′′Why Taiwan Matters.′′ The answer 

simply is that Taiwan matters because people matter. I do not 

mean ‘‘people’’ in that false use as in the ‘‘People’s Republic of 

China.’’ I refer to people as in ‘‘We, the People.’’

Taiwan has taken the ‘‘We, the People’’ principles of democracy—

human rights, freedom of religion, and a free market economy—

and transplanted them firmly into East Asian soil. Taiwan has 

belied those critics who asserted that a Confucian-based, hierarchical society is ill-suited for the tenets of Jeffersonian democracy. Taiwan offers the audacity of hope—do you like that phrase, 

Mr. Berman—to the survivors of the Tiananmen Square massacre. 

Taiwan inspires all victims of Beijing’s totalitarian oppression 

that they need not be faint of heart. It is for this very reason, this 

shining example of liberty, that the cynical old men who still rule 

in Beijing are so fearful of Taiwan. It is for this very reason that 

they strive to eliminate this beacon of democracy. And it is for this 

very reason that Congress, through the Taiwan Relations Act, must 

strive to help preserve a Taiwan that reflects the aspirations of its 

people. 

This hearing is especially timely and necessary because it has 

come to my attention that there is a new spirit of appeasement in 

the air. Some in Washington policy circles are suggesting that the 

2

time has come to recognize the reality of a rising China and to cut 

our ties to Taiwan. This would be a terrible mistake which would 

have far-reaching ramifications on how the U.S. treats its democratic allies, its friends. 

Turning to Taiwan’s round of free elections early next year, it 

should be perfectly clear: The people of Taiwan must be able to 

choose their leaders and influence their future, free from outside 

bullying or coercion. I have heard that some Communist cronies in 

Beijing even recently urged the people of Taiwan to ‘‘choose the 

right person’’ in the upcoming elections—or else. This naysayer 

would seem to be subscribing to Chairman Mao’s old dictum that 

‘‘political power rose out of the barrel of a gun.’’ To the Communist 

leaders in Beijing I say this: The ballot box is mightier than the 

gun’s barrel. 

I have news for the naysayers on Taiwan policy as well: The 

United States is a Pacific power and plans to remain so for this 

century and beyond. The commitments made in the Taiwan Relations Act have remained unchanged for over 30 years and still hold 

true today. The pledges in the six assurances given by President 

Ronald Reagan to Taiwan, including the one not to set a date for 

termination of arm sales to Taiwan, remain as firm today as they 

were back in 1982. 

With over 1,600 missiles pointed directly across the Taiwan 

Strait, Taiwan needs the means to defend itself from threats and 

intimidation. Taiwan needs the next generation of F–16 fighters 

now in order to protect its skies. With CIA Director—and incoming 

Defense Secretary—Leon Panetta recently telling our Senate colleagues that China is preparing for ‘‘potential contingencies’’ that 

may involve Taiwan, there is a clear and present danger of sending 

Beijing the wrong signal. To avoid any misinterpretation about congressional commitment to Taiwan security and its survival, I will 

soon introduce legislation to enhance the Taiwan Relations Act. 

I would like to add a final word of caution for our friends regarding Taiwan. The American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei in its 

annual white paper cautioned Taiwan against an overreliance on 

trade with China and urged a diversification of Taiwan’s overseas 

markets. I, too, cautioned last year and repeat here today that Beijing’s pursuit of ever-deepening trade ties with Taiwan could prove 

to be a Trojan horse. Beijing’s game plan seems to be that economic 

integration will lead inevitably to political integration. The people 

of Taiwan must be vigilant in remembering that all that glitters is 

not gold. 

The challenges in the 32 years since the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act have been many, and they remain so today. But 

we in Washington, as in Taiwan, give due diligence to the challenges at hand. We can look forward to the continuation of the vibrant democracy and the free market economy enjoyed by the people of Taiwan. 

Before recognizing the ranking member for his opening remarks, 

I would like to note the presence in our audience today of our 

former colleague, Congressman Lester Wolff of New York. Lester, 

will you stand? 

He was chairman of this committee’s Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee during the crucial period of the late 1970s. Congressman 

3

Wolff played a leadership role in the framing and legislative enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act. 

I would like to note the presence also of the Formosa Foundation 

Student Ambassadors with whom I will meet later on today. If you 

could stand, young student leaders, thank you. Thank you for being 

with us. 

Now I am pleased to turn to my good friend, the ranking member, Mr. Berman, for his opening remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen follows:]


66902e-1.eps
4


66902e-2.eps
5

Mr. BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman; and 

I am very glad you are having this hearing. 

Seeing Lester Wolff, former Congressman Wolff, in the audience 

is good in many respects, one of which is it makes me feel like I 

just got here. 

Taiwan is a flourishing multiparty democracy of 23 million people with a vibrant free market economy. It is the ninth biggest 

trading partner of the United States, ahead of much bigger countries like Brazil and India, and has been a consistent advocate for 

trade liberalization in the WTO and APEC. 

Over the past 60 years, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship has undergone dramatic changes, but Taiwan’s development into a robust 

and lively democracy, as the chair so eloquently pointed out, underpins the strong U.S.-Taiwan friendship we enjoy today. 

Our relationship with Taiwan was initially defined by a shared 

strategic purpose of containing the spread of communism in Asia. 

With the end of the Cold War, Taiwan’s political evolution from 

authoritarianism to one of the strongest democratic systems in Asia 

has transformed the U.S.-Taiwan relationship from one based essentially on shared interest to one based on shared values. The 

Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 is the cornerstone of the relationship 

between our two nations. It has been instrumental in maintaining 

peace and security across the Taiwan Straits and in Asia. 

One of the main obligations of the United States under that legislation is to make available to Taiwan defensive arms so that Taiwan is able to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. Last 

year’s Defense Department report to Congress on the Chinese military stated that China’s military buildup opposite Taiwan is continuing and that the balance of cross-strait military forces continues to shift in China’s favor. 

In addition, another DoD assessment of Taiwan’s air defense status concluded that, while Taiwan has nearly 400 combat aircraft in 

service, ‘‘far fewer of these are operationally capable.’’

Taiwan urgently needs new tactical fighters. I encourage the administration to work closely with Congress in meeting our obligations pursuant to the TRA and provide Taiwan with the weapons 

it requires, including F–16 fighters. 

While the cross-strait security situation remains tenuous, it is 

encouraging to see that stronger economic and cultural ties have 

developed between Taiwan and China in recent years. There are 

now more than 350 direct flights between Taiwan and the mainland, and last year over 1.6 million tourists from China visited Taiwan. The two sides also signed a landmark trade agreement last 

year that lowered and eliminated tariffs on hundreds of commodities. 

These examples are part of a positive trend that has strengthened relations between Taiwan and China, and it would benefit 

both Taiwan and Beijing to take additional steps to build crossstrait trust and cooperation. 

Three years ago when he took office, Taiwan’s President initiated 

a policy of rapprochement with the mainland, declaring, ‘‘no unification, no independence, and no use of force.’’

China could have responded in kind by forswearing the use of 

military force to bring about reunification and reducing their miliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:36 Aug 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\061611\66902 HFA PsN: SHIRL
6

tary threat against Taiwan. Instead, they increased their missile 

deployment targeting in Taiwan. If China won’t take steps to reduce this military threat even after all of Taiwan’s efforts at rapprochement, can we expect that China ever will renounce the use 

of force? 

Taiwan’s political, economic, and social transformation over the 

past 60 years has demonstrated that a state can be thoroughly Chinese, modern, and democratic. Taiwan’s example is an inspiration 

for other countries in Asia and throughout the world that linger 

under the control of one person or one party. And next year’s election in Taiwan, its fifth direct Presidential election, will be another 

sign of the political maturity of the Taiwanese people and a signal 

to Beijing that a change in relations between Taiwan and China 

cannot be imposed by the mainland. 

For many years, I have been a staunch supporter of the people 

of Taiwan; and I will continue to foster efforts here in Congress to 

demonstrate our country’s continued strong support for Taiwan. I 

look forward to the testimony of our expert witnesses this morning 

and in hearing their views on how to further strengthen ties between the United States and Taiwan. 

And, Madam Chairman, I yield back yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Berman. 

Thank you for that opening statement. 

Mr. Manzullo, the chairman of the appropriate subcommittee, is 

recognized. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for calling this 

important hearing today regarding our relationship with Taiwan. 

We have enjoyed a long and fruitful relationship with the Taiwanese, and it goes without saying that Taiwan has always 

mattered, now and into the future. 

The U.S. and Taiwan share common goals that ensure an economically vibrant and peaceful Asia based on respect for intellectual property rights, human rights, domestic principles, and adherence to the rule of law. Taiwan is a success story in promoting universal freedoms and advancing democracy and trade. The people of 

Taiwan have shown true leadership in developing their country 

through their economy, raising standards of living, and adhering to 

a democratic system of governance. 

Economics and trade have played a key role in delicately balancing our relationship between the People’s Republic of China and 

Taiwan. Taiwan’s success and economic prowess in the 1970s influenced the leadership of mainland China to consider and ultimately 

implement economic reforms. Taiwan therefore serves as a beacon 

of reform but, just as importantly, as a beacon of democracy in a 

continent that has very few democracies. 

As a major innovator and producer of information technology, 

Taiwan is a pioneer in high-tech goods and has successfully moved 

up the value chain in manufacturing. 

Taiwan is also America’s ninth largest trading partner and thirteenth largest export market for U.S. agricultural products. Taiwan 

imports a wide variety of electronics, optical, precision instruments, 

information and communications products, transportation equipment, machinery, and electrical products from the United States. 

7

Needless to say, this is an important export market for American 

manufacturers. 

Maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait must be the priority 

for the U.S. and all countries in the broader Asia-Pacific region. 

The Taiwan Relations Act governs America’s relationship with Taiwan, and as chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 

I believe the TRA must continue to play a central role in the future. 

Providing Taiwan with the means to defend itself is a cornerstone of a stable cross-strait policy. The economic prosperity and 

livelihood of people in the region and in the United States depend 

on a stable and peaceful cross-strait relationship. Taiwan embraces 

our democratic values and world view and has consistently remained a staunch supporter and friend. The friendship between 

our two peoples has stood the test of time, and it will into the future. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Manzullo. 

Mr. Faleomavaega is recognized as the ranking member of the 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Madam Chair and our ranking 

member, for calling this hearing. I think it could not be more appropriately stated: Why Taiwan Matters. 

Madam Chair, since 1979, the U.S. policy regarding Taiwan has 

remained unchanged. The Joint Communique ́, together with the 

Taiwan Relations Act, are the foundation of our policy which acknowledges that one China position on both sides of the straits and 

implies, as Republican President Ronald Reagan once said, and I 

quote, ‘‘the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people on 

both sides of the Taiwan Straits to resolve.’’

Whether Democrat or Republican, every U.S. President since 

1979 has stood by this assertion. In fact, the Taiwan Relations Act 

states that it is the policy of the United States, and I quote, ‘‘to 

preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, 

cultural, and other relations between the people of the United 

States and the people of Taiwan, as well as the people on the 

China mainland.’’

For the sake of our U.S. troops, I also support this policy; and 

I believe we should do everything we can to make sure this policy 

works so that U.S. troops are not called upon to resolve any unnecessary conflict between Taipei and Beijing. 

And, as you noted earlier, also, Madam Chair, I do want to also 

note the contribution, the tremendous contribution of the former 

chairman of the Asia Pacific Subcommittee, my good friend and colleague, Congressman Lester Wolff, for his outstanding contributions and one of the critical forces who brought about the passage 

of the Taiwan Relations Act. Very much appreciate his presence 

here with us. 

On a personal note, Madam Chair, I want to commend President 

Ma for his leadership in reducing tensions in the cross-straits. I 

also support President Ma’s efforts to call upon the United States 

to sell the Government of Taiwan all the F–16 C/Ds it requires in 

accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act which requires the 

United States, and I quote, ‘‘to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character, in order to maintain the capacity of the United 

8

States to resist any resort to force or the forms of coercion that 

would jeopardize the security of the social and economic system of 

the people of Taiwan.’’

Given that Beijing has some 1,400 missiles aimed at Taiwan, I 

add my voice to those calling upon the Obama administration to 

authorize armed sales to Taiwan as a primary military deterrence. 

Having said this, Madam Chair, I also want to note that since 

President Ma took office Taiwan has participated as an observer at 

the World Health Assembly. There are now 307 direct flights from 

the cities in Taiwan every week. There has been a relaxation of 

China-bound investments, more visas, more mainland tourists, and 

more exchange in many other areas. Taiwan and China also inked 

the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement last summer, 

and trade between China and Taiwan now totals over $110 billion 

a year. 

So I commend both Beijing and Taipei for their efforts in trying 

to bring about a peaceful resolution to some of the issues that they 

now are confronted with. 

And with that, Madam Chair, I know my time is up; and I yield 

back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

I would like to yield 1 minute to the members who would like 

to speak. 

Mr. Chabot, the subcommittee chair on the Middle East and 

South Asia is recognized. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for holding this very 

important hearing. I want to commend you for doing so. 

Taiwan is a long-time friend and loyal democratic ally of the 

United States, and your convening a hearing entitled Why Taiwan 

Matters couldn’t be more appropriate. 

As one of the founding co-chairs of the congressional Taiwan 

Caucus and having visited that nation many times, I can say with 

some authority that the freedom-loving Taiwanese people know you 

to be a great friend and a true champion of democracy. 

I am sorry the administration did not find it convenient to send 

a witness this morning. There always seems to be time for an 

elaborate arrival ceremony or a State dinner for visiting Communist leaders from Beijing, but when our democratic ally Taiwan 

is being discussed, time on the schedule seems to get a little tight. 

We do, however, have a great panel of witnesses. 

One final comment. The fact that former President Chen Shuibian, a strong ally of the United States, still occupies a jail cell is 

of great concern. To me, there is the scent of the criminalization 

of politics, and it smacks of third worldism. Taiwan is much better 

than that; and, as a very strong ally of Taiwan, I would like to see 

this addressed. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this hearing. 

You know, the U.S. relationship with Taiwan is a multifaceted 

one and a very important one. Our policy with regard to the defensive capabilities of Taiwan should not surprise anybody. It is clearly outlined in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which states it is 

9

the policy of the United States Government to provide Taiwan with 

arms of a defensive character. 

Moreover, the three Joint Communique ́s between the U.S. and 

the People’s Republic of China and the six assurances to Taipei offered by President Reagan add additional context to the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. It is important that the United States show 

strength and fortitude in this relationship as it pursues other relationships that are also important in the region. 

With that, I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Burton, the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia chairman. 

Mr. BURTON. I won’t add too much to what has already been 

said. Taiwan is a great friend and always has been. 

My colleague from Ohio mentioned that the Chinese Communist 

leader got the red carpet treatment at the White House treatment 

and said we ought to show some attention to Taiwan. You know, 

one of the things that really bothers me is that they can’t even get 

off the plane. The President of Taiwan comes to the United States, 

and I am down there in Florida to meet him, and he can’t get off 

the plane. That is a disgrace. 

When we want to talk about diplomacy with Taiwan, one of our 

great trading partners and great friends, we can’t get people in the 

administration or any administration to go over there and talk to 

them. They can’t come here to sit down and talk to us, in many 

cases. That is just not right, and we need to change that, and that 

is one of the questions I will be asking our panel. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Burton. 

Mr. Higgins of New York. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I, too, look forward to the expert testimony of our panel here. 

Taiwan is a very important nation of over 23 million people, a dynamic economy which has experienced some slow growth in the last 

several years. So I look forward to the testimony and exploring 

ways and opportunities the United States can benefit from a strategic partnership with Taiwan. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Royce is recognized, the chairman of the Subcommittee on 

Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I think what really strikes us is it has just been a mere few decades since Taiwan has gone from poverty to prosperity and from 

autocracy to democracy. I think Taiwanese Americans are rightfully proud about what has happened here. Taiwan is truly a responsible stakeholder today. It is a long-time friend to the United 

States. 

It is a friend that faces some serious challenges. One is that China’s rapid militarization and continued belligerent actions in the 

South China Sea are a serious cause for concern to Taiwan, to all 

of Asia, and to us. 

I think another observation is, since the 1990s, China has 

warned Asian nations not to sign free trade agreements with Taiwan. So you have numerous global FTAs out of the region already 

in place. There are about 100 of them in East Asia. And they are 

10

steadily undermining Taiwan’s international competitiveness 

through trade and investment discrimination. 

So what can we do? Well, one of the issues that the American 

Chamber of Commerce in Taipei called for were closer trade relations between U.S. and Taiwan to strengthen that bilateral relationship and we could move forward on our Trade and Investment 

Framework Agreement agenda with Taiwan. It is something we 

should look at today. I would hope our witnesses would comment 

on it. 

And I thank you very much, Madam Chairman, for holding this 

hearing. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Chairman 

Royce. 

And now the chair is pleased to welcome our witnesses. 

First, I am happy to introduce a fellow south Floridian as a panel 

member. I don’t know how she got to be a panel member. 

June Teufel Dreyer is a professor of political science at the University of Miami. Go ’Canes. Professor Dreyer’s extensive research 

has focused on Chinese and cross-strait politics, as well as on defense issues involving both Taiwan and China. Among the many 

books she has authored is the ‘‘Chinese Political System: Modernization and Tradition.’’ Thank you for the inscription. 

Professor Dreyer is a former commissioner of the congressionally 

established United States Economic and Security Review Commission. She is also a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London and earned her doctorate from Harvard 

University. 

Welcome, Professor. 

Next, I would like to welcome Randall Schriver. I did not see you 

at the beginning or would have said hello. I apologize. 

Randy is one of the five founding partners of Armitage International. Mr. Schriver is also the CEO and president of the Project 

2049 Institute, a nonprofit research organization dedicated to the 

study of security in Asia. 

He previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 

East Asian and Pacific Affairs, with the responsibility of Taiwan, 

China, and Hong Kong during the first George W. Bush administration. Prior to that, he worked for 4 years in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where his responsibility included the day-to-day 

management of U.S. relations with the People’s Liberation Army 

and the bilateral security and military relationships with Taiwan. 

Randy served his country as an active duty Navy intelligence officer between 1989 and 1991. Mr. Schriver holds a master’s degree 

in public policy from Harvard University and received a bachelor’s 

in history from Williams College. 

We are glad to have you with us, Mr. Schriver. 

We now have one of the world’s foremost experts on Taiwan’s 

economy here with us today, Mr. Hammond-Chambers, who was 

born and raised in Scotland before coming to the United States in 

1987. 

In 1993, he joined The Center for Security Policy, a defense and 

foreign policy think tank in Washington, DC, as the associate for 

development. Mr. Hammond-Chambers was elected president of the 

11

U.S.-Taiwan Business Council in November, 2000, after working 

for the Council since 1994. 

He is also a member of both the National Committee on United 

States-China Relations and the Council of Foreign Relations. He 

holds a bachelor’s degree in history and religion from Denison University. 

Welcome, Mr. Hammond-Chambers. 

And now, rounding off the panel, we are so pleased to welcome 

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, a professor of history at Georgetown University in its School of Foreign Service. 

Professor Tucker is a highly regarded American diplomatic historian who specializes in American-East Asian relations, including 

relations with Taiwan, China, and Hong Kong. In 2007, she received the National Intelligence Medal of Achievement for her contributions as an Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence 

in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Previous U.S. 

Government service dating back to the 1980s included working in 

both the Office of Chinese Affairs in the Department of State and 

the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. 

The professor’s most recent book, published in 2009, is entitled, 

‘‘Strait Talk: U.S.-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China’’—

I am holding it right now—which examines the Washington, Taipei, Beijing triangular relationship. Her numerous academic essays 

have appeared in such journals as Foreign Affairs, the Journal of 

American History, and Political Science Quarterly. Professor Tucker holds a Ph.D. degree from Columbia and is a member of the 

Council on Foreign Relations. 

Good to have you here, Professor. 

I kindly remind our witnesses to keep your oral testimony to no 

more than 5 minutes. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ written statements will be inserted into the record; and we hope to get through them without 

any problem before the votes start at 11 o’clock. 

So we will begin with you, Professor Dreyer. 

STATEMENT OF MS. JUNE TEUFEL DREYER, PROFESSOR OF 

POLITICAL SCIENCE AT UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, SENIOR FELLOW AT FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 

Ms. DREYER. Thank you very much for having me here. 

I begin my remarks with reference to a recent article entitled 

Taiwan’s Narrowing Options, talking about the inevitability of its 

absorption into China. My opinion is that this is not in the best interest of the United States, for two major reasons. The first is strategic and the second is that it is a betrayal of the very principles 

that the United States was founded on. It mocks us to the rest of 

the world as just another hypocritical state making decisions that 

negatively affect millions of people, purely on the basis of shortterm expediency. 

To take the first first, as part of my research into Chinese defense policies, I read Chinese defense journals. These don’t circulate in the United States. They are in Chinese. And I find there 

that Taiwan is not discussed here as terra irredenta, some sacred, 

long-lost part of China that has to be recouped. No. It is regarded 

as a springboard for the Chinese military to break out of the island 

12

chains around China and into the open Pacific from which point 

China can gain control of the sea lanes of communication. And, of 

course, these are vital to commerce and the transport of energy. 

They give whoever controls them a stranglehold on whoever does 

not control them. At present, United States controls them. Are we 

willing to cede this? 

Second, the United States was founded on the principle that 

human beings have the right to self-determination. It is so stated 

in our Declaration of Independence; it was reiterated in Woodrow 

Wilson’s Fourteen Points; and, most recently, it was stated emphatically by President Obama when speaking about the Middle 

East. Yet we explicitly have denied this right to the people of Taiwan. This is a disgrace. 

Now this occurs against a background of errors and 

‘‘misstatements’’ by members of our administration. This is not a 

Democratic/Republican thing. This has happened under several administrations. 

In 2003, the Department of Defense published a handbook entitled ‘‘Taiwan, Province of China.’’ If I had a cell phone, I would be 

typing OMG. After that, Colin Powell, as Secretary of State, said, 

‘‘Taiwan is not independent. It is not a sovereign state.’’ Violation 

of six assurances in Taiwan Relations Act—well, he misspoke. 

Most recently, Secretary of Defense Gates said, ‘‘We take Chinese 

sensitivities into account when deciding to sell what weapons Taiwan will get.’’

This is surreal. We are allowing a country that has insisted it 

has the right to conquer another country by force to decide what 

weapons we sell to that country. Think about the absurdity of that 

statement. 

There have also been a couple of articles in a journal that is 

widely regarded as reflecting official opinion to the effect that the 

United States should abandon Taiwan. This journal has printed no 

articles expressing any other point of view. If I am a Taiwanese, 

what do I think? Taiwan is pretty responsive to China for its economic ties. Yet it is responsible to the United States for its strategic independence. And they realize, if the United States means 

to abandon them, maybe it is better to bandwagon with China, 

rather than wait to be conquered by force. 

I can see I am running out of time here. I will close with my four 

recommendations: That is, to reiterate things, representatives have 

said, sell the F–16 C/Ds to Taiwan; second, reassess Taiwan’s legitimate defense needs and what we can do to satisfy them; three, 

remove the restrictions on high-level visits between our officials 

and also on the locations they can be held in; and, fourth, issue a 

strong affirmation of the right of the people of Taiwan to determine 

their own political future free from pressure by external forces. 

Thank you for this opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dreyer follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Professor. 

Mr. Schriver, the partner at Armitage International is recognized. 

STATEMENT OF MR. RANDALL G. SCHRIVER, PARTNER AT 

ARMITAGE INTERNATIONAL LLC., PRESIDENT & CEO OF 

THE PROJECT 2049 INSTITUTE 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Good morning. Thank you, Madam Chair, and 

thank you for the opportunity to testify before the committee today 

and for having a hearing on this very important topic. 

In the interest of time, let me just make four very quick points. 

The first point is that, for all the reasons previously articulated, 

Taiwan is extremely important and extremely important to the 

United States. We do have a strong and stable relationship with 

Taiwan. However, I feel as though this administration—and, to be 

candid, like previous administrations—does not hold high enough 

aspirations for Taiwan or the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. It is too 

often seen as merely a subset of U.S.-China relations. It is too often 

seen as an issue to manage in the context of U.S.-China relations. 

That not only relegates Taiwan to this sub-issue category, but it 

brings opportunity costs. We are losing the opportunities to partner 

with Taiwan that is a like-minded country in so many ways, and 

we are losing the opportunity to leverage what Taiwan can bring 

to bear on so many regional and international challenges. 

Second point, there is no doubt in my mind that we have witnessed an improvement in the cross-strait relationship in the last 

3 years, and I think some credit is certainly due to President Ma. 

Credit is also due to the DPP, of course. They started a lot of the 

economic cross-strait activity on their watch under President Chen 

Shui-bian. So all the people of Taiwan deserve credit for the good 

work that has been done to promote cross-strait relations. 

The one thing that hasn’t changed—and this has already been 

pointed out, of course—is the dramatic nature of the military buildup opposite Taiwan. I think we need to be very clear on this point. 

We have a very senior ranking Chinese general coming to the 

United States and saying there aren’t missiles pointed at Taiwan. 


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We have some U.S. scholars and even former officials saying that 

China has taken steps to reduce the threat to Taiwan. And this is 

just false, and this is well-documented in our DoD reports, well 

documented by objective analysts, and it is an important point. Because, of course, what our law says is that our decisions will be 

based solely based on the needs of Taiwan. So it is an important 

point to recognize that this buildup continues unabated. 

The third point, I feel as though the response to this buildup on 

the part of the United States has been insufficient. And, again, I 

would be candid and say my own administration I served in was 

not robust enough in response, and that has continued and perhaps 

gotten worse in the current administration. 

There are several platforms and systems under consideration—

some have been mentioned here—F–16 C/Ds, submarines, other 

systems. I would say not only does Taiwan need these systems, not 

only does our law suggest that they should be made available to 

Taiwan, I think if they are withheld, not made available, I would 

seriously call into question whether or not the law is being honored 

at this point, given the state of the buildup. 

And I do fear that there is a growing Chinese influence on our 

own process and our own decision making. The comment already 

made quoting Secretary Gates is of great concern when we have six 

assurances that we still allege to honor and we have a law that 

says our decisions will be solely based on Taiwan’s defense needs. 

It looks as though to me that there is growing Chinese influence. 

We are facing what I sometimes call the ‘‘tyranny of the calendar,’’ 

all these different high-level U.S.-China activities when we can’t 

possibly do a congressional notification for Taiwan in any proximity 

to those visits. This is not the way that the original architects of 

the law—it is just such a pleasure to have Congressman Wolff here 

and those that are still the stewards and the overseers of the law. 

It is not the way that people intended this to be carried out. 

The fourth point is there have been some people calling for reducing or eliminating arms sales, changing the TRA, perhaps abandoning Taiwan. I think this is a very bad idea; and, in fact, I would 

go in the opposite direction. I applaud your efforts to strengthen 

the Taiwan Relations Act, but those that are saying we should 

abandon Taiwan I think are operating on a number of false assumptions, somehow we are going to get better U.S.-China cooperation on North Korea and Iran. Whereas I think China’s policies 

there are driven by her own interests, which are very important 

strategic interests for China, not a fit of pique over our Taiwan policy. 

Some people think that somehow this will help improve the 

cross-strait relationship, when, in fact, the historical data actually 

shows our arm sales support cross-strait negotiations. The 150 F–

16s sold in 1992 preceded by a mere few months the so-called 1992 

Consensus, the agreement reached in Hong Kong. 

Even the $6.4 billion package that the Obama administration did 

in early 2010 preceded by just a few months the ECFA agreement, 

the economic agreement between the two sides. 

So why would we change course now and alter the negotiating 

environment? I think this is a policy that is successful, and we 

should continue it. 

19

And I look forward to your questions, Madam Chair, and other 

committee members. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schriver follows:]


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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Next, we will hear from Mr. Hammond-Chambers, the president 

of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council. And I would note that in your 

official biography you have a very cool Robert De Niro goatee. 

Maybe the Mrs. behind you nixed that one, huh? 

STATEMENT OF MR. RUPERT J. HAMMOND–CHAMBERS, PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.–TAIWAN BUSINESS COUNCIL, MEMBER OF 

NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON UNITED STATES–CHINA RELATIONS 

Mr. HAMMOND-CHAMBERS. Very perceptive of you, Madam Chairwoman, yes. She said, ‘‘Enough.’’

Madam Chairman, esteemed committee members, as an immigrant to the United States I want to say what an honor it is to testify in front of this committee. As my good friend Randy likes to 

point, I am Scottish by birth, but I am American by choice, and I 

take that with great pride. 

I believe that the relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan is 

suffering significantly from a lack of ambition and a lack of leadership. We have throughout the different areas of policy a lack of 

leadership on the part of the administration to move forward in 

areas that would benefit our country. 

As you, Madam Chairman, pointed out, Taiwan is a dynamic democracy. We have seen a peaceful transition of power. We have dynamic legislative and executive branches vested with real power. 

We have an active dual party democracy, respect for human rights, 

and media. And Taiwan also a serious player on the defense security region when it can get access to equipment, of course. 

For many, many reasons—for those reasons and many reasons 

more, Taiwan stands as a beacon for U.S. Policy in the region and 

around the world and is deserving of American support. 

There are three specific areas in which we are coming up short: 

Econ, military, and communication. 

In the economic area, as mentioned by one of your committee 

members, the TIFA process is again frozen. We are in the 7th year 

out of 11 years in which the principal process for negotiating with 

Taiwan on economic matters is frozen, this time over beef. 

In the early part of this year, the administration was preparing 

to send Demetrios Marantis, the deputy, out to Taiwan. There was 

another beef issue of ractopamine. That issue undermined efforts 

to get Mr. Marantis to Taiwan, and again we were thrown back 

into crisis. 

There appears to be no likelihood that this issue will be resolved 

anytime soon, indeed through at least until the middle of 2012. 

Beef represents less than 1 percent of bilateral trade relationship, 

and yet it continues to dominate and to undermine the best intentions and hurt U.S. economic interests. 

From an FTA standpoint, Free Trade Agreement, I think it is 

simple enough to point out that, in the absence of a TIFA, it is difficult to talk about FTA in the absence of fast track and an FTA 

policy on the part of the administration. It is difficult to see how 

Taiwan fits there. However, at such time as the President has FTA 

as part of his policy objectives, we would hope to see Taiwan as a 

priority. 

26

On the arm sales issue, we have an almost complete breakdown 

in process as well as consideration of movement forward on capabilities and new capabilities. We have had no new significant programs in the system. We have no new significant programs in the 

system other than the F–16 A/Bs. They are sitting at State. They 

have been there since September, 2010. The pricing and availability data is ready to be sent to Taiwan; and the Department of 

State has offered no reason as to why, in the middle of the bureaucratic process in which a sale is considered, they have sat on the 

F–16 A/B upgrade for so many months. 

The submarine program, too, is at State. The congressional notification could be sent to Capitol Hill after due process at any time 

and yet we see no movement on that. That issue is of significant 

interest and importance to Taiwan. 

Of course, the issue of the LOR for F–16 C/Ds, Taiwan has been 

attempting to submit a lateral request for 66 F–16 C/Ds since 2007, 

and successive administrations have refused to even accept the 

LOR, bearing in mind, of course, as you and your committee members know, that accepting an LOR isn’t an agreement to sell; it is 

simply an agreement to consider. And yet we find ourselves in a 

position where even the follow-on sale of additional equipment that 

Taiwan already has in its inventory is not under consideration. 

In process, you, Madam Chairman, have pointed out, issues over 

the Javits report, Senator Lugar has pointed out issues over due 

process, prenotification for congressional notification and other 

areas. 

At what point do we challenge the administration’s rhetorical 

claim that they are abiding by the Taiwan Relations Act, following 

the proper FMS process for arm sales, and involving Congress in 

Taiwan-related security matters? I believe that time has come. 

The recommendations I would make are relaunching TIFA immediately, finish the extradition and visa waiver agreements in 2011, 

accept an LOR for F–16 C/Ds, notify to Congress at earliest possible opportunity the phase 1 submarine design, notify to Congress 

as early as possible the F–16 A/B upgrade program, and to restart 

the sending of Cabinet officers off to Taiwan. 

I hope very many, Madam Chairman, that your chair and your 

committee will look to fill the role of leadership where the administration at present is not. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hammond-Chambers follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir. 

Professor Tucker, thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MS. NANCY BERNKOPF TUCKER, PROFESSOR, 

SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 

Ms. TUCKER. Thank you. 

U.S. relations with Taiwan rarely merit special attention from 

the U.S. Government, the Congress, or the American people. In 

fact, for many years, the level of knowledge about and awareness 

of developments in Taiwan has been regrettably low. The House 

Foreign Affairs committee is making an important contribution by 

holding these hearings; and I want to thank the chairman, the 

ranking minority member, and the committee for the opportunity 

to be here. 

I am told if I knew more about sports I would understand the 

value of being the cleanup player here, and I will try to do that. 

We have already heard why Taiwan matters to the U.S.—its democracy, its highly developed economy, and its security profile. 

I want to underscore three points about security. 

First, the Taiwan Straits is the only place in the world where 

two nuclear armed great powers could go to war, if not by intent 

then by miscalculation, misunderstanding, or accident. 

Secondly, Taiwan’s geostrategic position astride the sea lanes of 

supply and communication are critical to Japan and for the U.S. 

Navy’s freedom of navigation. 

Third, Taiwan is a test of China’s intentions and behavior. It can 

alert us to continued patience or mounting aggressiveness. It is 

also a test of U.S. reliability and credibility. 

However frightening or seductive China is, appeasing it by sacrificing Taiwan would not be good policy. But I believe the U.S. will 

not abandon Taiwan, despite Chinese threats and the potential 

benefits involved. 

The administration continues to build on policy inherited from 

George Bush, Bill Clinton, and their predecessors when it makes 

arm sales, shares intelligence, trains the military, observes military exercises, and conducts wide-ranging bilateral consultations 

with military and civilian officials; when it rebuffs Chinese efforts 

to destabilize U.S.-Taiwan relations with demands for a fourth 

communique ́ on Taiwan and false claims that Beijing has no missiles threatening Taiwan, that Congress is eager to revise the Taiwan Relations Act, and that Secretary of State Clinton accepted 

that Taiwan is a part of China. 

The administration strongly supports peaceful resolution of the 

cross-strait stalemate but only with the assent of the people of Taiwan. It encourages Taiwan’s democratic system, which, I think, is 

particularly important since reports suggest that China is already 

interfering with the January elections. 

And, finally, as a visible symbol of U.S. friendship for Taiwan, 

it is completing construction of a new American Institute in Taiwan headquarters on land that we have leased for 99 years. 

But I believe government can and should do more. 

First, it should, as others have said, sell the F–16 C/D and upgrade F–16 A/Bs despite China’s likely retaliation. They are vital 

46

for defense, for the confidence to negotiate, and admittedly as a 

tangible indicator of U.S. support. 

The government should resume Cabinet-level visits that are important symbolically but also improve communication and because 

I know from my own government service that they educate officials 

who have to prepare for the trips. It should grant better access to 

the U.S. Government for higher-level Taiwan officials and approve 

visa waiver and extradition policies. 

I also want to say something specifically about Congress, and I 

join the chairman in this with the audacity of hope to recommend 

to the Congress that it should restore active oversight of Taiwan 

affairs. That was notable after passage of the TRA but has been 

minimal more recently. 

Secondly, I believe it should intervene to neutralize political debate and facilitate settlement of the beef controversy so that we 

can get TIFA talks going. 

Thirdly, it should assist development of Taiwan’s legislature and 

its other democratic institutions. 

And, fourthly, it should educate the U.S. public and its own 

Members of Congress about why Taiwan matters. 

In conclusion, sustaining U.S.-Taiwan ties will not be easy, but 

it is essential. There is nothing inevitable about the course of Taiwan-China relations. Options remain open. It would be a serious 

mistake to appease China and abandon Taiwan. The challenge is 

benefiting from, while also controlling, improved relations with Beijing. Only Taiwan can defend itself, but it needs the United States 

as a counterweight to China’s growing power and influence. 

The U.S. wants Taiwan stable, peaceful, and democratic for the 

people of Taiwan, as a model to others in East Asia, and as an assurance of U.S. credibility and dependability. Congress can and 

should serve the U.S. national interest by more actively promoting 

positive development of U.S.-Taiwan relations. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Tucker follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Excellent testimony from all of our witnesses. 

As we all know, Taiwan is a full member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC, and this forum is a very important one 

internationally. The United States will host the next APEC summit 

in Honolulu this November, and I strongly encourage the Obama 

administration to invite Taiwan’s President to the Honolulu APEC 

summit along with the leaders of the other APEC countries, and 

we hope that that happens. 

I wanted to ask our panelists about arm sales. There has been 

an unwillingness since January, 2010, by the administration to notify Congress regarding any foreign military sales to Taiwan. This 

has resulted in an ongoing neglect of Taiwan and a growing disregard for U.S. obligations under the TRA, the Taiwan Relations 

Act. 

Has China established any so-called ‘‘red lines’’ with respect to 

potential U.S. defense transfers to Taiwan? And, if so, what are 

they? And at present what do you think are the most pressing 

needs of Taiwan’s military that can and should be met by the 

United States through the foreign military sales process? Is it the 

F–16s, the diesel submarines, et cetera? 

We will begin down the line. Thank you. 

Ms. DREYER. Yes, I think the F–16s would be a very important 

symbolic gesture. It is just that the F–16, even in its C/D version, 

is not going to be any match for new fourth-generation, fifth-generation Chinese planes coming on line. I would therefore very seriously suggest that we get busy with the submarine sales as well. 

I am sorry. There was another question you had there. 


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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. It was if China has established any 

red lines with respect to——

Ms. DREYER. Thank you. 

The problem is that China lets us know it has these red lines, 

but does not tell us what the red lines are. This fits in with a very 

clever propaganda that it uses on its own people that U.S. scholar 

Perry Link has referred to as ‘‘the anaconda in the chandelier.’’ In 

other words, there is something up there looking at you in the light 

fixture, and every so often it moves and you wince in terror, but 

it never lets you know what it is. And this induces on the part of 

the United States something that you might call a preemptive 

cringe and——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Ms. DREYER [continuing]. It works every time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Schriver. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. I agree with everything Professor Dreyer just 

said. 

I have from time to time heard the Chinese describe the F–16 

C/D sale as a red line, but—Professor Dreyer is absolutely correct—

they don’t describe exactly what that means, what they might do 

in response. Threats they have made in the past about arm sales 

have not been realized. There were threats of sanctions against 

U.S. companies. The last time, there was a $6.4 billion package notified. None of those companies that had commercial sales ongoing 

in Beijing were affected whatsoever. And we shouldn’t put these 

things in China’s face to challenge them: Will you really do something this time? 

But I think it speaks to the point we should not hold these notifications so long, sit on them so that pressure grows and grows and 

China starts to believe that, hey, we can influence their decision 

making, and we can threaten them with so-called red lines. And it 

has really warped our process. We should do these as a matter of 

routine course, based on objectives, analysis of the military balance, and just explain it that way. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Professor Tucker.

Ms. TUCKER. I think I would underline what Randy just said. 

There have been Chinese red lines. There are Chinese red lines. 

There are rumors today that China could perhaps tolerate the upgrades if we divide that into small packages, but the C/Ds are unacceptable. 

I also think that there will always be red lines, but we have 

crossed them before. Who would have thought that they could sit 

back and tolerate a DPP President of Taiwan? So there have been 

a number of things that have happened, and China has had to deal 

with it, and I think that this is not that big an issue that we are 

likely to be severely punished for it. 

As far as which sales, my own sense is that the aircraft are the 

most important. Unless we have made a decision that Taiwan does 

not need an air force, they have to have those planes. Their F–5s 

are falling out of the sky. F–16s are in serious trouble. They are 

about to retire the Mirage because they are too expensive to keep 

up. So I think aircraft should be the first priority. 

55

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Hammond-Chambers.

Mr. HAMMOND-CHAMBERS. Yes, ma’am. 

On the red lines again, as you point out, it is China’s position 

that it is a red line. It is not our position that it is a red line, of 

course. I think that is essential. 

We have an FMS process here in the United States that works 

for our foreign military partners. We should use it in respect to 

Taiwan and regularize and normalize the armed sales process, 

which is not regularized and normalized at the moment. 

We have allowed China to start influencing the process, and I 

think the nonacceptance of the LOR for the F–16s is an example 

of that. It is the F–16s today, and then it is whatever comes tomorrow. It will be less than the F–16s. The Chinese will attempt to incrementally walk down our commitment to a point where it is negligible and then they have free run. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Absolutely. Thank you so much for 

those answers. 

I am pleased to yield to the ranking member, my friend Mr. Berman, for 5 minutes of questions. 

Mr. BERMAN. I thank you very much. 

Fundamentally, I agree with what both my colleagues have said, 

and what the witnesses have said on this issue. But let’s for a second try to put ourselves out there—the chairman referred to it, in 

some policy circles, there is a notion that our relationship and our 

position with Taiwan undercuts our interests, oh, because we want 

China to do more on currency revaluation, because we want them 

to be more assertive with North Korea, because we don’t want 

them to backfill on Iran—because, because, because, because and 

that somehow all of these important concerns aren’t being addressed by the Chinese because of Taiwan Relations Act and policies. And that is why people are hesitant to do the sales and all 

that. 

Some of you have touched on that, but I would like to hear you 

talk, a few of you at least, talk a little more on it. 

And I am curious about the extent to which the other panelists 

agree with Ms. Tucker’s point that basically she doesn’t doubt, even 

though it is not always so clearly stated and there is a little bit 

of ambiguity, that the United States is committed to Taiwan’s security; and implicit in that is the Chinese know that the United 

States is committed. Ms. Tucker didn’t say that, but if I am right 

that that was implied, do you agree with that conclusion? 

Why don’t you just take the next 3 minutes, any of you who 

want, to dwell on that? 

Ms. DREYER. If I could go first, it seems to me that the United 

States needs to assert in some meaningful way that it does still 

mean to protect Taiwan’s security. It has to do that by making a 

gesture, like selling the F–16s. 

Mr. BERMAN. Why, because you don’t think that we intend to? Or 

because you don’t think China thinks we intend to? 

Ms. DREYER. I think some of both. Those are not mutually exclusive. 

Mr. BERMAN. So you disagree with Ms. Tucker’s——

56

Ms. DREYER. I am not sure I do disagree with Ms. Tucker. But 

in any case, I do think the sale must take place in order to 

show——

Mr. BERMAN. Well, so does she and so do we. 

Ms. DREYER. Yes, in order to show our sincerity, because there 

are two ways that the Taiwan Relations Act could deteriorate. 

What China would like us to do, of course, is repudiate it, which 

is not going to happen. But things often happen by inaction. What 

seems to be happening now is that the Taiwan Relations Act is 

eroding through inaction on the part of the United States to live 

up to its commitments. 

Mr. BERMAN. Anybody else? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Congressman Berman, if I could address the first 

part of your question about what we could expect from China if we 

changed our policies on Taiwan because I did address this in my 

statement. I think it is absurd to think that somehow China is currently taking suboptimal positions on North Korea, Iran, currency 

to show their annoyance about our Taiwan policy or that they 

would take suboptimal positions in the future as an expression of 

gratitude if we changed something. These are very important strategic interests for China. And we could go at length about——

Mr. BERMAN. They take their positions——

Mr. SCHRIVER. They are interest-based, and they would not be altered if we changed our positions on Taiwan. The atmosphere 

might be better. There might be, you know, nicer greetings. 

Mr. BERMAN. Apparently the military could meet more frequently. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Well, you know, I ran that program for a long 

time. It always struck me that if China has ambitions to become 

a greater military and more powerful, capable military, and they 

are choosing not to interact with the world’s greatest military, who 

gains and who loses in that equation? 

Mr. BERMAN. Some of our military leaders act like we are losing. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. I have never understood why we would the ardent 

suitor in a military relationship with China. 

Ms. TUCKER. As a historian, I would have to remind you that 

talk of abandoning Taiwan is not new. It has happened many times 

in the past, and there is no doubt that at least for the moment, the 

U.S.——

Mr. BERMAN. There was a lot of that in the 1950s; wasn’t there? 

Ms. TUCKER. Absolutely. There was even one Member of Congress who hoped that Taiwan would sink into the sea so we could 

stop worrying about it. 

Mr. BERMAN. Usually, they ask that California to do that, so I 

am glad——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The ranking member’s time is up. So 

I am going to cut you off if I could, just because we have so many 

votes coming up. Save that answer for another question. 

Mr. Chabot, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Middle East 

and South Asia, is recognized. 

Mr. CHABOT. Once again, Madam Chair, let me thank you for 

holding this very important hearing on Taiwan. This is truly a very 

distinguished panel this morning. 

57

First let me address the issue of restrictions on diplomatic visits 

by high-ranking Taiwanese officials, something I have always felt 

was both insulting and counterproductive. 

I can remember joining a number of my colleagues, there were 

25 Members, approximately, some years ago, and we flew up to 

New York City one evening after votes to meet with then-President 

Chen Shui-bian, a great friend of America. We traveled to New 

York—and I think you were there, Dan, if I am not mistaken—because President Chen could not come to Washington, DC. I can remember the veiled threats from Communist China when former 

President Lee Teng-Hui, another great friend of the United States, 

known as the father of Taiwanese democracy, wanted to visit his 

alma mater, Cornell, Cornell University. 

And I vividly remember meeting a Taiwanese legislator, Mark 

Chen, here in the United States Capitol where he was allowed to 

visit. And only a few weeks later, we had to travel all of the way 

up to Baltimore to meet with him because he had become the 

equivalent of Secretary of State, the foreign minister. And because 

of his new position, he was no longer welcomed in Washington, DC. 

Now, the policy that I just talked about is U.S. policy. That is 

American policy. That is our Government’s policy that says that 

they can’t come here. This is outrageous. This is plain nonsense 

and ought to be changed. 

So I will ask the panel, what are your thoughts on that policy? 

Perhaps, Mr. Schriver, you might want to comment as a former 

State Department official how these restrictions might affect our 

diplomatic exchanges with the Government of Taiwan if they can’t 

even come here, the President and Vice President, Secretary of 

State, et cetera, and before I turn it over to the panel, let me also 

ask a question about arms sales. We already talked a little about 

that. 

I remember when I first came to Congress after the 1994 election, back in 1995, and I was the co-chair of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus for about 10 years, one of the founding members of it, 

there were a few hundred missiles aimed at Taiwan, and then it 

increased more. It went to six, seven, eight, nine. My understanding is that the latest number is about 1,600 short- and medium-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan, our friend and our 

ally. 

If you can comment on that and perhaps if you have time, also 

China’s campaign to isolate Taiwan, whether it is the World Health 

Organization, where they objected to them being there on observer 

status, or participation at the U.N., or their campaign to try to get 

those who still recognize Taiwan to rescind that and basically 

bribing these nations to do so. 

So any of these things that I mentioned, I would ask any of the 

panel members. 

Professor, I don’t know if you would like to start. 

Ms. DREYER. Thank you. I share your concern about the absurdity of not allowing official interaction and visits. We argue under 

any circumstance that dialogue is good. We dialogue with terrorist 

leaders. We insist that meeting with the Chinese military is good 

because we need to understand each other. And yet we deny this 

to a country we have an alliance with. 

58

As for the World Health Organization, this is one of these things 

that has been blown out, way out, of proportion as a victory for the 

current Taiwan administration. The way that Taiwan has been allowed into the WTO is as an observer, which is on the same status 

as Hong Kong, which is considered part of China. And also, it is 

worse than Hong Kong because it allows China to agree or disagree 

to allow Taiwan on an annual basis, which is, of course, a mechanism for behavior compliance. 

Thank you. 

Ms. TUCKER. If I might, I would say that it has been a principle 

of American foreign policy that meeting with heads of state from 

other countries is a vital practice. Summitry was very important 

during the Cold War. We emphasized it with China. There should 

be an opportunity for Presidents to talk to each other, get to know 

each other. George Bush looked into Putin’s eyes, and it made all 

of the difference in the world. I think that Obama meeting Ma 

Ying-jeou would be a very good thing. 

But I also want to go back and underline something about the 

question of abandonment, and that is that we have talked about 

but we haven’t emphasized the importance of democracy as a bond 

between the United States and Taiwan. If you were to ask me why 

the United States will not abandon Taiwan, it is because of the 

shared democracy that we helped to nurture, that we celebrate. I 

don’t believe that Congress or the administration would abandon a 

democracy. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. I hate to cut you 

off yet again. 

Mr. Faleomavaega, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on 

Asia and the Pacific. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I want to commend and thank the distinguished members of the 

panel for not only their expertise but certainly understanding of 

the situation in Taiwan. 

Taiwan is in a predicament not by choice. I think we all understand historically how this whole thing evolved from the civil war 

that China was under between Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek. 

And there was a dream that Chaing Kai-shek had to someday want 

to go back to mainland China and take over from Mao Tse-tung. 

That is history. Correct me if I am wrong in this respect. 

China and its terms as one of the most critical factors of the 

whole Nixon policy and its efforts, which in my opinion literally 

changed the course of history, when Henry Kissinger and his efforts that made, that caused the relations between China and the 

United States very understandable, and Taiwan was one of those 

issues that to still to this day is still in a form of ambiguity and 

not really saying for what it is and what it stands for. 

Now call it what you may; it looks like a duck, acts like a duck 

and quacks like a duck. The fact that Taiwan has diplomatic relations with 23 countries, 6 of those countries are South Pacific Island countries. 

There has also been a consideration to say that Taiwan and 

China were conducting checkbook diplomacy to gain the favors and 

understanding and appreciation of those countries that they recogVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:36 Aug 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\061611\66902 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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nize for whatever given interest that they have between those two 

countries and what we have here. 

I don’t think that this administration is any different from what 

President Clinton did when he sent two battle groups, naval battle 

groups, to prove to our friends in China that we mean every bit of 

the substance of the Taiwan Relations Act, that we will defend Taiwan at all costs. 

Now, I don’t know, I am not a genius in military strategic matters in terms of the fact that there are 1,400 missiles in mainland 

China pointing at Taiwan. I really don’t know if selling 66 F–16s 

is going to provide some sense of safety for the lives of some 23 million people living in Taiwan. Well, you say it is for symbolic reasons. But in reality, are we serious about the fact that selling these 

arms equipment to Taiwan is going to give them the capability of 

defending itself against China? 

I would love a response from our distinguished panel. 

Ms. DREYER. I would say that the F–16 is a capable plane without being solely, by itself, able to redress the military balance 

across the strait. So it will not solve the problem completely, but 

it will be a step in the correct direction. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And I believe China also currently has 

about 100 nuclear-capable submarines all over the world, and I 

suspect in the Pacific—Asia-Pacific region. And the Chinese are not 

stupid. Why build an aircraft carrier when you can build a nuclear 

submarine that is more lethal and more dangerous in its capabilities in terms of really when you talk about serious strategic and 

military advantage. This is, as it is to any country, is to defend 

itself. 

Ms. DREYER. Sir, it is not an either/or. They are doing both. 

Mr. HAMMOND-CHAMBERS. Congressman, again, I would like to 

echo professor Dreyer’s point. It is important to not consider the F–

16s simply as the only solution we are proposing. There are two 

issues I think at play here. The first is getting the process moving 

again, getting things considered. 

At the moment, we are not even considering stuff, and stuff that 

is supposed to be being considered is frozen in the system. So it is 

getting the system moving again so that F–16s can be considered. 

If the decision is no, then the decision is no. But we should at least 

consider the sale, which we are not doing at the moment. Submarines, an asymmetric capability, can confuse—can make it 

tougher for the Chinese to calculate on whether or not they should 

go over to the Taiwan Strait. There are things that we can do in 

total and ongoing that can improve Taiwan’s security. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Sure, I know my time is running, but there 

is one thing I want to emphasize again. The One-China policy has 

not changed from all of the previous administrations, including 

President Reagan, all of the way down even to this President. The 

fact that this is one of the ambiguities dealing with the people of 

Taiwan, and I feel for the 23 million people living in Taiwan and 

not wanting to know the fact that they are not really being treated 

as a full sovereign country as a state, but in terms of—I don’t 

know, international laws or whatever it is, and giving this undue 

recognition, as my friend, Mr. Chabot, was saying, it is how we 

60

treat these officials coming from Taiwan. To me it is unfair. But 

that is the reality that we are dealing with. 

I am sorry, Madam Chair, my time is up. I want to thank the 

panel for their excellent testimony. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Faleomavaega. 

The chairman of the Europe and Eurasia Subcommittee is recognized, Mr. Burton. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want you to know I 

really appreciate you holding this hearing. Taiwan has been a 

great friend to the United States forever. We need to live up to our 

commitments. 

I would just like to answer one of the questions that Mr. 

Faleomavaega just raised, and that is: Are the F–16s going to be 

a deterrent if China decides to launch its 1,600 missiles and come 

across the strait and blow up Taiwan. 

No, but what it does do is it shows that we are committed to the 

Taiwan Relations Act, which also includes defending Taiwan in the 

event of an attack. Now, if we don’t sell them the things that we 

said we would sell them to protect themselves under the Taiwan 

Relations Act, it looks like a move toward appeasement. It looks 

like we are not going to live up to our agreements, so China may 

say, oh, will if they won’t do this, even sell them the weapons to 

defend themselves, maybe they won’t come in and bring the Fifth 

Fleet in to defend Taiwan if it is necessary. I think it is the Fifth 

Fleet. 

But in any event, I think it is important that we live up to every 

item in the Taiwan Relations Act, and I think that sends a very 

strong signal to China. 

I really abhor watching the head of China come to the White 

House, get the red carpet treatment, the handshakes, the dinners 

and all of the accolades when there are 10 million people in communist gulags and human rights violations are horrible, and forced 

abortions are—abortions are forced upon people. 

I mean, this is not our good buddies. They are our adversaries, 

and we need to continue to look at them that way. They are in the 

world. We have to deal with them. I understand all that. But we 

need to live up to our commitments, and our commitment to Taiwan is very clearly stated in the Taiwan Relations Act. I wish it 

was more than that, if I had my way. 

Now, Madam Chairman, Chairwoman, Chairperson—I still have 

trouble knowing how to address people—one thing I would really 

urge the chairman to do and that is to make a copy of all of the 

statements today, because I thought they were all great, and send 

them to Secretary Clinton and to the White House and ask them 

to read those remarks. I am serious because I think that they need 

to take a hard look at what was said here today and let them know 

that the Congress of the United States supports the statements 

that were made. 

The last thing that I would like to say is that I am so disappointed that this administration didn’t come here today to testify. It shows an absence of concern that is remarkable. We have 

dealt with Taiwan, not only in foreign policy but in trade and so 

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ed, and at the very least, the State Department should have had 

somebody here to testify and to answer questions today. I think 

they were afraid to because I don’t think they have the answers. 

Thank you for having this hearing. 

Thank you very much, panelists. I thought you were great. Usually I disagree with two or three panelists, and I jump all over 

them. But today, I love you all. 

I sure hope that you will send these remarks to Hillary. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Burton. 

Mr. Connolly of Virginia is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Gosh, I don’t know what to say to a panel that is loved, beloved 

by Dan Burton. Uh-oh. But thank you for your testimony. 

Professor Tucker, you were talking a little bit earlier about, you 

know, abandonment, and Mr. Berman mentioned in the 1950s, certainly there were Members of Congress who said to abandon. But 

I mean, today, in serious public policy discussions, are you aware 

of prominent folks in the foreign policy field, in the Congress and 

in the administration, for example, who have given voice to that 

worry? 

Ms. TUCKER. Unfortunately, yes. 

Ambassador Joseph Prueher, our former Ambassador to China, 

led a study group that included Jim Shinn, a former Pentagon official, and others, who all said it was time to rethink our Taiwan 

policy. Even Members of Congress——

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, no, my question was the word ‘‘abandonment.’’

Ms. TUCKER. Oh, using that word in particular? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. 

Ms. TUCKER. I am not sure. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. No. So rethinking policy is one thing; abandonment is quite another. I just wanted to get that on record because 

no one is talking about that. 

With respect to—I mean, the title of this hearing is, ‘‘Why Taiwan Matters.’’ Why does Taiwan matter to the United States? Why 

is it of any critical interest to the United States in the year 2011? 

How about you start, Professor Tucker? All wisdom we know in 

Washington flows from the Georgetown Foreign Service School. 

Ms. TUCKER. Absolutely. 

I would underline because of its democracy, because it shares our 

values in a region of the world where we would like to see democracy spread. It is a potential model for China in the future. Also, 

it is a strategic asset and potentially a strategic problem for us if 

Taiwan was not there, and we couldn’t cooperate with it. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You might also want to say, Professor Tucker, 

that there is a statutory framework for the relationship that is 

spelled out in law. 

Ms. TUCKER. Yes. And I think China should be reminded that we 

do take our laws seriously. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And that law, also, does it not, addresses the defense relationship? 

Ms. TUCKER. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Schriver, you made reference to the F–16s. 

I think you may have mentioned, or maybe it was Ms. Dreyer, that 

62

the F–16s are not—even if the sale went through tomorrow, unfortunately, they are not going to be—their deterrent—their ability to 

deter an actual attack, given the capability on the mainland, is limited. Could you expand on that just a little bit? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. I would make a couple of comments. Again, nobody talks about the F–16s in complete isolation. There are many 

things that Taiwan needs to do to enhance its capabilities and its 

deterrence position, and there are many things the United States 

can do to support that beyond F–16s, but I would say that the F–

16s are part of it. 

Number two, a lot of people who say that the F–16s won’t help, 

won’t do enough because the posture of China is so overwhelming, 

they only talk about one scenario, which is the all-out attack scenario. The F–16s are actually quite useful as a multi-role aircraft 

in a number of contingencies, like the counter blockade, like if 

there was a battle over one of the offshore islands and as a ground 

attack capability. 

So there are a number of things that the F–16s can do beyond 

defending that all-out attack. Although it is a piece of the answer 

for that as well. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is a very good point you make, that we cannot look at just one scenario and that in other scenarios, the F–

16s clearly have value. But what about the current capacity, air 

fleet capacity of Taiwan? Where are they in their current fleet? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. It is an aging fleet. They are still flying F–16s, 

I believe. Dr. Tucker said they are falling out of the sky. That is 

literally true. They have Mirage aircraft that they can’t support 

adequately because spare parts and logistics are unavailable. 

Frankly, the F–16 is getting on itself. It is still very capable aircraft for Taiwan’s needs. But if this decision is not made and the 

F–16 closes, the F–16 line closes, we are either going to have Taiwan with no air force, or we are going to have to consider a more 

advanced aircraft, like the F–35, which I would be prepared to do, 

but I suspect that an administration that is already reluctant to 

sell F–16s is not going to like the idea of an F–35. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I think that is a really good point we can end on: 

70 percent of the current air fleet has to be retired. We cannot have 

Taiwan without some air defense capability, and that means the F–

16 decision can’t be somehow put off forever. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Rivera of Florida is recognized. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I thank the witnesses for their testimony. 

I want to start off by letting you all know that I have visited Taiwan on several occasions, and I am familiar with the important 

issues facing Taiwan and facing our bilateral relations, and also 

our relations with China. I am particularly familiar with how important Taiwan is to our Nation as an ally. China’s large military 

expansion throughout the past decade, I believe, poses a clear and 

present danger to Taiwan and the entire region, a threat that may 

have implications for the United States as well, as has been discussed here today. 

63

This administration, I believe as well, has clearly been pressured 

by the Chinese to control Taiwan and Taiwan policy in every way 

possible. I still find it unconscionable how our Government refuses 

to allow any senior leaders of Taiwan’s Government into the United 

States and into Washington, DC. 

China should never, I repeat, never be allowed to dictate our Nation’s foreign policy. And our lack of action when it relates to arms 

sales to Taiwan is a clear sign that the Chinese are pressuring us 

in order to further China’s interests with respect to defense and 

foreign policy. 

As I have previously stated in this committee, it is important for 

the United States to stand with our allies, and I believe specifically 

in this case with respect to this hearing that it is important to note 

that we must deliver those F–16s and the diesel submarines to Taiwan. Because the Chinese military poses a clear threat to the region, it is time that we commit to helping a great friend like Taiwan and act with them in providing them these defense systems 

that is are critical to their national self-defense. 

So let me ask the panel, and I will begin with Professor Tucker, 

can you just spell it out for us in plain and simple terms, what is 

the thinking in the West Wing, the National Security Council, 

what is their thinking? Why won’t they help Taiwan and deliver 

these weapons systems? 

Ms. TUCKER. I can’t speak for the administration. 

Mr. RIVERA. What do you think their thinking is? 

Ms. TUCKER. I do believe that the pressure from China is a significant factor, and it shouldn’t be, as several people have mentioned. I think there has been over time a sense that Taiwan is not 

important in comparison to what China can contribute in world affairs. I think that is a problem. 

Mr. RIVERA. So they are basically throwing Taiwan under the 

bus because of the larger interests with China? 

Ms. TUCKER. I wouldn’t go quite that far. I do think, for instance, 

that the government spokesmen who intended or perhaps should 

have been here today, Kurt Campbell and Derek Mitchell, are actually good friends of Taiwan and have promoted policies to help Taiwan in the past. So I wouldn’t say that we are throwing them 

under the bus; but I do think that on a value scale, there is a lot 

of concern about China’s actions in the world. 

Mr. RIVERA. Mr. Schriver, you have been in the belly of the 

beast. You know the process over there in the National Security 

Council and the State Department at the highest levels. In plain 

and simple terms, what are they thinking? Why won’t they support 

Taiwan and these weapons system deliveries? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. I agree with what Dr. Tucker said. I think there 

is a growing influence on the part on China on our decision making. But I use this term ‘‘the tyranny of the calendar.’’ Our administration seems to always look for the right time to have an arms 

sales announcement. If you look at our calendar of activities, we 

have got the strategic and economic dialogue in May. We have got 

Vice President Biden visiting in July. We have Hu Jintao coming 

in September for the U.N. General Assembly. We have got—so 

guess what, there is no right time. And then they have to take into 

account the congressional schedule, because there are certain days 

64

that are required for a notification. And these things get backed up 

and backed up, and then the problem gets harder, not easier, because then the Chinese are looking at a much larger package because everything is backed. 

So I think they have gotten themselves bollixed up. I think they 

need to just—I am sorry, there is not a better way to say it. They 

need to be bolder and more courageous and deal with the Chinese 

fallout because I think the historical data suggests we can absorb 

the fallout. 

Mr. RIVERA. Well, it seems pretty clear from just the panelists 

I have heard that this administration is kowtowing to pressure for 

a variety of reasons from the Chinese; and hopefully they will reconsider those positions and stand by our ally, Taiwan. 

I yield back, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. And batting cleanup for our team, 

Congressman Wilson of South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for your leadership on this issue. I am very appreciative of all of our witnesses, 

the recognition of Taiwan as such a significant friend of the United 

States. And it is particularly important to me, my father served 

with the Flying Tigers in China in World War II. He was in 

Kunming and Xiangcheng, too, and he developed a great affection 

for the people of China. 

I have had the privilege and opportunity of visiting Taiwan. 

What an extraordinary country. What a model of development and 

opportunity for people in the Far East. 

Additionally, I have had the opportunity to visit Beijing-Shanghai, and I had the opportunity to visit with President Jiang Zemin 

at the Presidential compound. He was somewhat interested to meet 

me as a Member of Congress. But when it was announced that I 

was the son of a Flying Tiger, he stopped the meeting and announced something very surprising to the American people, that 

the American military is revered in China. 

And I did go back several years later for the 60th anniversary 

of VJ Day where monuments were erected to the Flying Tigers, to 

the American service members who saved millions of Chinese lives. 

So my view is that you can be a friend of Taiwan; you can be 

a friend of the People’s Republic. And I am just hoping that each 

can develop in such a way, particularly as democracy, hopefully, 

spreads and is developed on the mainland. 

With that in mind and that background, since 2006—and this is 

for any one of you who would like to answer, and I am regretful 

that there is not a representative from the administration here—

since 2006, Taiwan has been trying to submit a formal letter of request to procure new F–16 C/DD fighters to replace aging fighters, 

as you have discussed. Defense Secretary Robert Gates submitted 

to Congress in February 2010 an unclassified assessment of Taiwan’s air defenses, including its F–16s fighters, which stated that 

Taiwan faced a diminished ability to deny the PRC air superiority. 

Why has the Obama administration not acted in regard to Taiwan’s 

need for the new F–16 fighters? When does the President need to 

make a decision in order to sustain the F–16 production line? 

Mr. HAMMOND-CHAMBERS. Thank you, Congressman Wilson. 

65

Just quickly, on the industrial base issue—the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council works closely on this—the line will start to wind down 

at the end of this year. Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth facility will 

deliver the last F–16 at the end of 2013, but it requires 2 to 21⁄2

years of lead order time to ensure that the supply chain provides 

the necessary parts. So for there to be smooth production for any 

order from Taiwan, the letter of request really needs to be brought 

into the U.S. Government by the end of 2011 for that to take place. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. That is very clear. I appreciate that. 

For each of you, there has been no comprehensive review of U.S. 

Policy toward Taiwan since 1994. Many experts believe that a comprehensive U.S. Strategy and policy review is needed to adjust to 

the new realities of the Taiwan Strait and to sustain U.S. security, 

political and economic interests in regard to Taiwan and China. Do 

you think it is now time for a comprehensive policy review? 

Ms. DREYER. Sir, that was one of the four recommendations I 

made. I do hope that it will be more successful than the 1994 policy 

review, which in my opinion worsened Taiwan’s situation rather 

than helped it because it was that 1994 policy review that restricted the visits. And so a review, you mentioned in light of new 

realities across the Taiwan Strait, that scares me. So I hope this 

review would be conducted with Taiwan’s best interest in mind 

rather than the ‘‘new realities across the strait.’’ Thank you. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. That relates directly to my next question, and that is: To what extent does uncertainty about U.S. security commitment to Taiwan lead to a broader uncertainty as to 

America as a security guarantor in East Asia, particularly we think 

of DPRK? 

Ms. TUCKER. I think that is one of the critical issues that we 

don’t hear a lot from other countries in Asia about what we should 

do, certainly not publicly. But privately, it is my understanding 

that many of them have said, stand by your promises. We need to 

rely on you. And if we don’t follow through on our promises to Taiwan, I think it will have a very negative effect on a number of 

friends and allies in the region. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Thank you, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. Payne is recognized. He is the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam Chair, 

first, for calling this very important hearing. 

The upcoming elections, I am wondering if anyone wants to try 

to answer, the Koumintang regime, under the leadership of President Ma Ying-Jeou, has recently charged 17 former opposition officials belonging to the Democratic Progressive Party as violating 

laws, including the National Archives Act, alleging that they failed 

to return about 36,000 documents during the DPP administration. 

Critics in Canada, Europe, Australia, and the U.S. are concerned 

about the timing of these announcements, noting that if there were 

any documents withheld or missing, an alarm should have been 

gone off during the transition period between the DPP administration and the current government in 2008, not 3 years after the fact 

and during the current primary season for next year’s Presidential 

66

elections. Can anyone here address, in your opinion, the criticism 

that the judiciary process is being used as a political weapon? 

Ms. DREYER. If I can start off with that, yes. That is one excellent example. Not only the, ‘‘suddenly missing’’ 36,000 documents 

that have been missing for quite some time, but there have also 

been wholesale indictments of officials of the previous administration. The judiciary has been used in ways that were so irregular 

that it prompted a series of—I think—five different letters by 

human rights advocates and others. The signatories included President Ma’s former mentor at Harvard Law School, who also expressed his concern. This is something I didn’t have time to address in my oral statement, but you will find in the written one. 

In ways that are very worrisome, the United States’ seeming withdraw from support of Taiwan is having very deleterious effects on 

Taiwan’s democracy and its civil liberties. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. If I could just add very briefly to that, I think that 

what is really needed is full transparency and that there is aggressive oversight on the part of the press, aggressive response from 

the international community when they see things. It is hard to 

know ground truth. I mean, it certainly looks like there is something that is not consistent with rule of law and that the judiciary 

has not been used appropriately in certain instances. But I do 

think that if there is transparency and this is brought out into the 

daylight, the people of Taiwan will respond the right way, which 

is to punish that kind of activity. I do have confidence in Taiwan’s 

democracy and that the people will exercise their vote, taking these 

things into account. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Taiwan, and we all know in comparison to many of the countries 

in Asia, Taiwan for the most part currently has a pretty decent 

human rights standard, as I said in comparison. The current President, Ma Ying-Jeou, has contended that he has valued democracy, 

freedom, and human rights. 

Critics of President Ma and the KMT party, however, have criticized the current Taiwanese administration as not doing enough to 

promote the democratic values and the PRC, and that the judicial 

reforms in Taiwan have really not been addressed. President Tsai 

Ing-wen, chairwoman of the opposition Democratic Progressive 

Party, called for adding human rights in the cross-strait talks and 

agreements, and for Taiwan to be more vocal of the suppression of 

democracy within China. 

Can any of you provide insight into what democratic factors 

should be discussed in cross-strait exchanges in negotiations between Taiwan and China? 

Ms. DREYER. It seems very difficult for the President of Taiwan, 

who is constantly being urged to better relations across the strait, 

to be chiding the People’s Republic of China on that. I notice that 

even when our own Secretary of State, who is in a far more powerful position does that, and innocently—I think she was innocently 

suggesting that the disputes in the South China Sea be settled in 

a democratic manner, and incurred the invective of the Chinese 

Government. So they don’t take well to that. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. I apologize, but 

our voting series has started. 

67

Thank you, Mr. Payne. Your time is up. 

Mr. Royce, I would like to recognize you, so that you can ask 

your questions. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

The question I asked the panelists originally, if we can go back 

to that. We have free trade agreements in Asia, about 100 of them. 

But China has really leaned on its neighbors not to allow Taiwan 

to engage in any of those. And as a result, that sort of steadily 

erodes the ability to compete and the ability to be engaged in trade 

and investment there from the competitiveness standpoint. 

What can we do to move forward on our Trade and Investment 

Framework Agreement? That is an agenda that we have with Taiwan, and how can we use this dialogue to increase the prospect of 

securing a U.S. free trade agreement with Taiwan in the near future? 

Mr. HAMMOND-CHAMBERS. Thank you, Congressman Royce. 

On the TIFA, I believe with the present situation with USTR, 

the USTR really is looking to Mr. Baucus and those who are friendly to the beef community to drive this issue. 

But there is no counter in Congress. There is no pressure from 

other parts of Congress to try and counter the pressure on beef. 

And as a consequence, the USTR is acting really with the sole 

guidance of one particular constituency on the Hill. 

So I think congressional leadership, pressuring USTR to put beef 

aside, not to give up on it, but to put it aside and allow the broader 

relationship to move forward. Of course, the benefit would be senior level USTR officials traveling to Taiwan and the improvement 

in communication. 

And then, of course, the possibility that we could start putting 

into place some building block agreements that would move us 

close toward a free trade agreement at such time as the U.S. is 

ready to start signing FTAs with other trading partners. 

Mr. ROYCE. Other ideas? Any commentary? 

Ms. TUCKER. I would just add that it is not an entirely bleak picture about Taiwan and its isolation in the region. Since the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement was signed with China, 

China has stepped out of the way, and Taiwan is now negotiating 

with Singapore for a free trade agreement, and there is talk about 

one, perhaps, with India. 

I think the one that Taiwan wants most is with us. As I understand it, that is in your court. I think Congress needs to deal with 

free trade agreements from a lot of places and move forward because Taiwan is not going to get it if Korea doesn’t get it or Panama doesn’t get it. 

Mr. ROYCE. That is what we are trying to elicit here. Go ahead. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. I can’t quite resist this question to talk a little 

broader than Taiwan. Because the hearing is ‘‘Why Taiwan Matters,’’ if we don’t have a more aggressive trade policy, people are 

going to start wondering will the United States continue to matter 

because trade and commerce is the lifeblood of Asia, and we are in 

the game right now. 

Mr. ROYCE. Yes. Over 100 agreements, and we are party to two 

of them. 

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Mr. SCHRIVER. Yes. We should do Taiwan, and we should get 

KORUS done. And we should be much more aggressive. We should 

be a player rather than a very reluctant observer. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Any other commentary? 

If not, Madam Chair, I will yield back so we can go to the vote. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, very much, Mr. Royce, because Taiwan matters, but so do our voting percentages. So thank 

you very much. 

With that, the meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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WRITTEN RESPONSES FROM MS. JUNE TEUFEL DREYER, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL

SCIENCE AT UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, SENIOR FELLOW AT FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH

INSTITUTE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE JEFF

DUNCAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA


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WRITTEN RESPONSES FROM MR. RANDALL G. SCHRIVER, PARTNER AT ARMITAGE

INTERNATIONAL LLC., PRESIDENT & CEO OF THE PROJECT 2049 INSTITUTE, TO

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE JEFF DUNCAN, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA


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Nancy Bernkopf Tucker to the previous questions prior to printing.]

[NOTE: Responses were not received from Mr. Rupert J. Hammond-Chambers or Ms. 

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