AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE 

AIR UNIVERSITY 

AFSO 21: IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL FAILURE POINTS 

IN SUSTAINING CONTINUOUS PROCESS IMPROVEMENT 

ACROSS THE AIR FORCE 

by 

Harold W. Linnean III, Major, USAFR 

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty 

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements 

Advisor: Lt Col William Polakowski 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 

April 2007 
Report Documentation Page Form Approved

OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and

maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,

including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington

VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it

does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE

APR 2007 2. REPORT TYPE

3. DATES COVERED

 00-00-2007 to 00-00-2007 

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

AFSO 21: Identifying Potential Failure Points in Sustaining Continuous

Process Improvement Across the Air Force

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Air University,Air Command and Staff College,225 Chennault

Circle,Maxwell AFB ,AL,36112

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 

NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

see report

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 

ABSTRACT

Same as

Report (SAR)

18. NUMBER

OF PAGES

40

19a. NAME OF

RESPONSIBLE PERSON

a. REPORT

unclassified

b. ABSTRACT

unclassified

c. THIS PAGE

unclassified

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not 

reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In 

accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the 

United States government. 

ii 
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

Preface 

 I have always been a proponent of working smarter and not harder. I could never stand to 

here the words, “we’ve always done it this way.” Those words were enough to send shivers up 

my spine. I believe, as leaders, we should always try to find better, faster, smarter ways of doing 

business. In addition, we should naturally solicit honest feedback and opinions from our people. 

Sometimes, we tend to complicate our lives by introducing programs with new languages, rules, 

processes, training, etc. I think leadership is much simpler than that—it is serving your people. 

 I selected this topic with the hope of learning more about AFSO 21. I do believe its 

philosophy and principles are sound. However, as a member of Generation TQM (see Chapter 7, 

Mid-level Officers—Generation TQM), I am skeptical about creating and implementing another 

“quality” program. I do believe it is a fad, which will soon fade away. 

 I would like to acknowledge several people who made significant contributions enabling me 

to complete this research odyssey—it has been a strange ride. I owe thanks to Lt Col Bill 

Polakowski, my research advisor, and his deputy, Maj John Sawyer, for tackling this new and 

challenging class—a job well done. I owe special thanks to Maj Kelly Jost for being my cohort 

in crime. She was invaluable in helping me keep my sanity throughout the research process. In 

addition, I would like to give a “shout out” to the Third Herd—you guys rock. 

 I owe a very special thanks (and a place in my heart) to my wife, Joy. She endured my many 

late nights and cranky days as I “pounded” the keyboard. Thank you all. I’ll see ya on the other 

side. 

iii 
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

Abstract 

 Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO 21) is the Air Force’s initiative to 

recapitalize funds by maximizing value and minimizing waste in operations. This is a 

fundamental shift, by the Air Force, toward a desired end state of continuous process 

improvement. Will AFSO 21 change the culture of the Air Force? A successful change requires 

a balance between the system components of culture, vision, structure, leadership and systems. 

 Air Force leadership may avoid failure in its AFSO 21 implementation if it addresses 

potential failure points before they fester and take root. The first potential failure point is 

focusing only on culture and thus creating an unbalanced system or organization. The next 

potential failure point is the inflexibility of the Air Force structure. A third potential failure point 

is its human resource management systems. 

 When it comes to “quality” programs, Air Force mid-level officers are experiencing déjà vu. 

How will mid-level officers accept it? The failure to win over Generation TQM, the mid-level 

officers, is a fourth potential failure point for the sustainment of AFSO 21. Does the Air Force 

have a vision for AFSO 21? The Air Force must rectify this disparity between vision and 

message and remove a final potential failure point in sustaining AFSO 21. 

 This paper identifies potential failure points associated with changing Air Force culture. 

Overall, the Air Force’s change plan appears to be proceeding according to schedule. However, 

it does not appear that the Air Force is adequately planning for a long-term sustainment of AFSO 

21. There is still time for Air Force senior leadership to correct the system’s alignment and put 

AFSO 21 on track for long-term sustainment. A culture of continuous process improvement will 

take root once the Air Force leadership fully commits to AFSO 21. 

iv 
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

Table of Contents 

DISCLAIMER................................................................................................................................ ii 

PREFACE......................................................................................................................................iii 

ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................... iv 

ILLUSTRATIONS ........................................................................................................................ vi 

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE ................................................................................................... 4 

A Journey Across the “Unknown” State..................................................................................... 4 

How to Change (and How Not to Change)................................................................................. 6 

SYSTEMS THINKING APPROACH............................................................................................ 8 

What is Systems Thinking? ........................................................................................................ 8 

Interrelationships Take Time ...................................................................................................... 9 

Just Like Tires – Alignment and Balance Matters.................................................................... 10 

POTENTIAL FAILURE POINT # 1: IT’S THE CULTURE, STUPID—OR IS IT?.................. 12 

What is Culture ......................................................................................................................... 13 

More than the Culture ............................................................................................................... 13 

POTENTIAL FAILURE POINT # 2: INFLEXIBLE STRUCTURE .......................................... 14 

Combat vs. Business ................................................................................................................. 14 

Dr Jekyll and Mr. Hyde ............................................................................................................ 16 

Is the Zenith Good Enough? ..................................................................................................... 17 

POTENTIAL FAILURE POINT # 3: HRM SYSTEMS.............................................................. 19 

What about the People? ............................................................................................................ 19 

Wrong People off the Bus......................................................................................................... 20 

Right People on the Bus............................................................................................................ 21 

POTENTIAL FAILURE POINT # 4: MID-LEVEL OFFICERS— GENERATION TQM........ 23 

Generation TQM....................................................................................................................... 23 

Once a Cynic, Always a Cynic ................................................................................................. 24

POTENTIAL FAILURE POINT # 5: LACK OF VISION .......................................................... 26 

The Moon Speech ..................................................................................................................... 26 

A Vision or Not......................................................................................................................... 27 

Daydreams or Nightmares ........................................................................................................ 28 

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................. 29 

BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................................................................................................... 31 

END NOTES ................................................................................................................................ 33 

v 
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

Illustrations 

Figure 1 Change Gap 5 

Figure 2 Kotter’s Eight Steps to Change 6 

Figure 3 Kotter’s Eight Change Process Barriers 7 

Figure 4 Beer’s System Model for Change 10 

Figure 5 Air Force Standard Levels of Organization 15 

Figure 6 Efficiency Spectrum 18 

vi 
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

Chapter 1 

Introduction 

Money makes the world go around, of that we both are sure 

─Money, Money; The Musical Cabaret

 This line from the musical Cabaret highlights a certain truth in the world. Whether it is 

people, businesses, or militaries, money is the engine that powers them all. For example, people 

must have money to provide adequately for themselves and their families. Businesses must have 

money to operate and earn a profit. In short, money makes the world go around. Militaries are 

not exempt from this economic reality. 

 It takes a tremendous amount of money to operate a world-class military. To illustrate this 

point, the requested fiscal year 2008 budget for the United States Air Force is over $110 billion. 

Moreover, the Air Force has requested another $17 billion for operations supporting the Global 

War on Terror (GWOT).1

 However, even this amount is not enough. The Air Force needs more 

funds to modernize and recapitalize its aging fleet. Many aircraft have long passed their 

intended lifespan. For example, the average age of the KC-135E Stratotanker is 48 years old and 

the B-52H Stratofortress is 45 years old.2

 Operational and budgetary pressures further hinder the 

modernization and recapitalization effort. Fiscal pressures include rising operating costs (e.g. 

personnel and energy resources) and cutthroat interservice competition for defense funds. 

Operational pressures include funding new weapon systems, assuming new missions and 

sustaining current mission requirements. These pressures stress an already constrained budget. 

 These budget problems are basic Economics 101. The Air Force has “x” amount of dollars to 

pay for “y” amount of goods and services. If the need for “y” is greater than “x,” then the 

1
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

reduction of expenses and fiscal obligations are the only ways to generate the necessary savings. 

Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO 21) is the Air Force’s initiative to 

recapitalize funds by maximizing value and minimizing waste in operations. Per the Secretary of 

the Air Force, Michael W. Wynne, and the Air Force Chief of Staff, General T. Michael 

Moseley, “our strategy will be a comprehensive effort to improve our work processes across our 

Air Force.”3 This is a fundamental shift, by the Air Force, toward a desired end state of 

continuous process improvement. 

 AFSO 21 incorporates many different types of process improvement models such as Lean, 

Six Sigma and the Theory of Constraints. According to the Director of the AFSO 21 office, 

Brigadier General S. Gilbert, the intent is to build a tool kit with a variety of tools that are 

flexible enough to apply across many areas.4

 The Air Force is emphasizing Lean because “Lean 

has an infectious quality [with] quick, visible results that cause natural replication.”5 

Undeniably, the Air Force is trying to ensure AFSO 21 develops and infectiously spreads across 

the Air Force. As expected, positive results (i.e. quick wins) are pouring in from units. The 

program appears to be working, efficiencies are being gained and money is being saved, but for 

how long?

 The introduction of a new Air Force-wide program generates many questions regarding the 

“real” reasons behind it. For instance, is AFSO 21 just a short-term initiative to navigate the Air 

Force through a few years of treacherous financial waters? What happens if the current 

operations (and thus the cost) of the Global War on Terror decrease? What if energy costs 

suddenly fall and maintain a steadily low price? What happens after Presidential Budget 720 

force reductions are off the financial ledgers? Will leadership’s interest with continuous process 

improvement wane once fiscal and operational pressures are alleviated? 

2
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

 On the other hand, is AFSO 21 a long-term program for developing the world’s best combat 

force? Will it actually improve combat readiness? Will it increase the delivery of warfighting 

capabilities? Will it ultimately shorten the “kill chain” in combat? According to Secretary 

Wynne, AFSO 21 will be around for a long time. In a Letter to Airmen, he stated, “the 

continuous process improvements of AFSO 21 will be the new culture of our Air Force.”6 

Therefore, one can submit that the sustainment of AFSO 21 is dependant upon reaching the 

desired end state. One must also derive that the desired end state is a culture of continuous 

process improvement. Thus, the Air Force must change to achieve the end state and become a 

continuous process improvement organization. This task is not as easy as it sounds. 

 The Air Force has tried an organizational culture change, in the name of quality, before. A 

little over a decade ago, the Air Force tried to sow the seeds of quality on its force. That foray 

was Quality Air Force or Total Quality Management (TQM); the program ultimately failed to 

take hold and sustain itself. So, what is different this time around that will enable a new 

continuous process improvement culture? The philosophy and principles of Lean and Six Sigma 

are sound; the problems with these programs will be with their implementation. Therefore, this 

paper will not debate or challenge the merit of the AFSO 21 program. Instead, it will explore 

how the Air Force is implementing AFSO 21 and discuss potential failure points. It is too late to 

suggest how to initiate the program but it is not too late to bring awareness to possible stumbling 

points in sustaining a long-term culture of continuous process improvement. Furthermore, it is 

about changing the culture, which requires a balance between the parts of the organization. The 

thesis of this study is that AFSO 21 will fail to sustain itself unless there is a successful change in 

Air Force culture; a change requiring a balance between the system parts of vision, structure, 

leadership and systems. 

3
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

Chapter 2 

Organizational Change 

I cannot say whether things will get better if we change; what I can say is they must 

change if they are to get better. 

─Georg C. Lichtenberg 

Change is in the air. The Air Force is trying to become smarter, faster, cheaper and more 

efficient. The current status quo of doing business is unacceptable to the Secretary and Chief of 

Staff of the Air Force. As acknowledged in the previous chapter, there is a new desired end 

state; it is an Air Force culture of continuous process improvement. The challenge for the Air 

Force is making the change from the current state to the desired end state. Organizational 

change is hard but is predictable and manageable. This chapter will briefly explore the concept 

of change in order to establish a common understanding of what is in involved with 

implementing and sustaining a transformation initiative. 

A Journey Across the “Unknown” State

 Organizational “change is a dynamic process, rather than a series of events.”7 Human nature 

tends to gravitate toward the path of least resistance. The tendency is to believe that very simple 

answers will handle the complex problems we face. However, change requires more than simply 

redrawing an organizational chart. It is active and is in constant motion. Change is relentlessly 

creating a new crisis or challenge. This dynamic process requires an organization to 

continuously monitor and adjust their activities accordingly. As the rate of change fluctuates, 

leadership and followers must adapt to it. Failing to adapt, can lead to a slowdown or 

discontinuation of the change effort. 

4
Current State Gap (Unknown State) Desired State

AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

 Another way to frame change is by looking at it from a different perspective. Organizational 

change occurs when an organization realizes there is a significant gap between its current 

environment and its desired environment. This unknown state is a foreign and mysterious place. 

Change occurs when an organization closes this gap (see Figure 1). 

Current State Gap (Unknown State) Desired State 

Figure 1 

“Failure to close this gap...that is, the failure to change—will spell doom for the organization.”8 

Closing this gap is difficult. 

 The trek across the unknown state is an unfamiliar journey (or at least for the people in the 

organization). After all, the people must endure the process. Involving the human aspect injects 

a host of other complications such as emotions. According to Jeanie Duck, “changing an 

organization is inherently and inescapably an emotional human process.”9 This emotional 

process may include uncertainty, fear and excitement. As we will discover in later chapters, the 

introduction of the human aspect further complicates the change effort. 

 Thus, an organization’s change effort is dependant upon discovering the best way(s) to close 

this gap. Random unplanned forays, for closing the gap, are discouraged because it is easy to 

become lost, overwhelmed and discouraged. This “close the gap” endeavor requires a broad plan 

of action focused on the long-term. The journey will be long, but successfully changing an 

organization is dependant upon reaching the end state. 

5
Change Process

AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

How to Change (and How Not to Change)

 Once an organization realizes it must change, the next step is determining how to change. 

There are a number of drivers and barriers for change. Jeanie Duck frames change efforts into 

three essential elements: 

1. Strategy: a passionate belief in where you’re going. Clear strategy; more easily 

understood; translates into action. 

2. Execution: good, basic management. Indispensable during radical change. 

3. Managing all the human issues that swirl around change.10 

In her view, Duck articulates that the most important driver of change is managing all the human 

issues that swirl around change. This perspective on how human issues affect change will 

resurface in later chapters. 

Another example of how to change 

is John Kotter’s eight steps to 

transforming your organization (Figure Consolidate

Reinvigorate

2).11 He argues that change requires 

Short-Term

much more effort than simply WinsVision

Urgency 

Institutionalize 

Vision 

Create 

Coalition 

Vision 

Communicate 

Empower 

Urgency

Institutionalize

Vision

Create

Coalition

Vision

Communicate

Empower

Change Process 

redrawing organizational charts. A Figure 2 

true transformation of an organization requires leadership and all its trappings. However, these 

steps are not as simple. An organization will transition through the steps at different speeds—

sometimes fast, but most often, slow. 

Moving through these steps is complicated and time consuming—it can take years. 

According to Kotter, this is where trouble begins with the change initiative. These long periods 

are “incomprehensible to short-term, reactive managers.” As a result, they are more likely to 

make a critical mistake in one of the steps, which “can have a devastating impact, slowing 

6
Change Process Barriers

AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

momentum and negating hard-won gains.”12 Kotter has categorized these critical mistakes into 

eight barriers to change (Figure 3)13: 

Change Process Barriers 

Change efforts are nothing new to 

the Air Force. It has undergone many 

organizational and cultural changes 

such as realignment of Major 

Commands and the bomber-to-fighter 

coup d'état. However, not all changes 

took root. The Air Force’s attempt in the 1990s at a “quality” culture experienced many of 

Kotter’s change barriers. Admittedly, the Air Force “made mistakes in implementing TQM and 

there were some significant flaws in the approach itself.”14 With this in mind, it is one thing to 

acknowledge past mistakes, but it is another thing to learn from them. 

Lacks 

Urgency 

Declare 

Victory 

Too Soon 

Short-Term 

Wins 

No Plan 

Failure to 

Institutionalize 

Lacks 

Vision 

Weak 

Coalition 

Vision 

Undercommunicate Vision 

Obstacles Remain 

Lacks 

Urgency

Declar

Failure to

e

Victory

Too Soon

Short-Term

Wins

No Plan

Institutionalize

Lacks

Vision

Weak

Coalition

Vision

Undercommunicate Vision

Obstacles Remain

Figure 3 

Did the Air Force learn from its past failures and develop a comprehensive strategy and 

change plan for AFSO 21? Furthermore, what is the best way to analyze these products and the 

survivability of AFSO 21? The next chapter utilizes the systems thinking approach for 

conceptualizing the Air Force and identifying potential failure points for AFSO 21. 

7
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

Chapter 3 

Systems Thinking Approach 

The significant problems we have cannot be solved at the same level of thinking 

with which we created them. 

─Albert Einstein 

 The Air Force is a large, complex organization; thereby making it a challenge to grasp and 

understand its many interdependent components. The systems thinking approach provides a 

structure for visualizing the organization as interrelationships and not just separate parts. This 

chapter will utilize the systems thinking approach to identify potential failure points in changing 

the Air Force culture to one of continuous process improvement. Note: The intent of this paper 

is not to fully utilize the systems thinking processes of loops and links, diagnostics, systems 

archetypes or computer modeling. It simply uses systems thinking to conceptualize the Air 

Force and its components to identify potential failure points in the change initiative. However, 

before examining the various components, it is important to discuss systems thinking. 

What is Systems Thinking? 

 Systems thinking is a process for looking at the whole and not its parts. It is a concept 

popularized by Peter Senge. In his book, The Fifth Discipline, Senge suggests that, “systems 

thinking is a discipline for seeing wholes, recognizing patterns and interrelationships, and 

learning how to structure those interrelationships in more effective, efficient ways."15 In other 

words, to spin an old country saying, it is seeing the forest and not just the trees. As an 

illustration, consider the composition of an automobile. It consists of thousands of individual 

8
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

parts that connect to form a large, complex system. In addition, there are smaller sub-systems 

such as electrical, brake and fuel systems. Each part directly or indirectly affects the operation of 

the automobile. (The key concept is that each part, no matter the size or importance, has a 

central role in the system.) However, if there is a problem, the complexity of the automobile 

makes it difficult to determine which part is failing (or has failed). The systems thinking 

approach allows the mechanic to see the interrelationships rather than parts. This approach is 

useful in troubleshooting because it eliminates the mayhem under the hood. In his book, Systems 

Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity, Jamshid Gharajedaghi submits that systems 

thinking provides “a holistic picture that will allow us to see through chaos and understand 

complexity.”16

 In essence, systems thinking is an excellent way to view change because it focuses not on the 

individual component but rather the big picture. This is very useful when examining large, 

complex organizations like the Air Force. Systems thinking “organizes complexity into a 

coherent story that illuminates the causes of problems and how they can be remedied in enduring 

ways.”17 Understanding the system as a whole enables you to predict, influence or control its 

behavior. 

Interrelationships Take Time 

 Changes to a system do not occur over night. It takes time to make holistic changes due to 

processes, linkages and interactions between the components; these are complex and dynamic 

interrelationships. “Very often, people expect improvements too soon after changes are 

implemented.”18 This may explain why long-term change efforts sometimes fail in 

organizations. In some cases of failure, a frequent mistake is overlooking these 

9
Vision

Capabilities

Technical

Leadership

Culture

- Norms

Shared Beliefs

Structure

Span of Control

Team Composition

Hierarchy

Systems

Accounting

- HR - IT - Sales

AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

-

- -

-

-

-

-

Vision 

Capabilities 

- Technical 

- Leadership 

Culture 

- Norms 

- Shared Beliefs 

Structure 

- Span of Control 

- Team Composition 

- Hierarchy 

Systems 

- Accounting 

- HR - IT - Sales 

Figure 4 

interrelationships. It is important to remember that changing or ignoring one part of a system 

can have consequences elsewhere. This is even more apparent when one considers that 

organizations do not operate in a vacuum; they interact with both internal and external 

environments. The level of these interactions varies between simple and complex relationships. 

Therefore, leaders need a tool to distinguish processes, patterns and relationships from events. 

Just Like Tires – Alignment and Balance Matters 

“Systems thinking is a useful tool to initiate 

organizational change and continuous 

improvement.”19 Michael Beer provides an 

organizational change model for leaders20 He 

believes “one of the keys to successful 

organizational change is ensuring that all 

components in Figure [4] are in alignment.”21 In 

other words, no one component is an island; all components must work in unison to achieve the 

desired change. However, there is a difference in the amount of time and energy invested in 

each component. Organizations must find the appropriate balance. “Any imbalance diminishes 

the system’s ability to effectively accomplish its purpose and causes conflict within the 

system.”22

 The following chapters utilize Beer’s systems model to identify potential points of failure to 

sustaining AFSO 21 and its culture of continuous process improvement. This is important 

because change failures often occur when only addressing one part of a larger complex system. 

As a result, an organization focuses on the symptom and not the problem. This focus on a short10
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

term symptom fails to address the long-term problem, thus, the energy and resources directed at 

it will not create a culture of continuous process improvement. “[Culture] does not stand alone; 

it must operate effectively (in balance) with other parts for the system to accomplish its 

purpose.”23 The sustainment of a long-term program demands that, “no area of the organization 

can be off-limits or protected.”24 Because of this, the Air Force must be willing to address the 

long-term problems of change resistance and not just the symptoms. 

11
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

Chapter 4 

Potential Failure Point # 1: It’s the Culture, Stupid—Or is It? 

The continuous process improvements of AFSO 21 will be the new culture of our Air Force. 

─Michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force 

 Secretary Wynne has zeroed in on culture as the key to making continuous process 

improvement a reality. In his view, 

we must fundamentally change the culture of our Air Force so that all Airmen 

understand their individual role in improving their daily processes and eliminating 

things that don’t add value to the mission.25

 Organizational culture is a mystifying thing. How else does one explain how a deftly 

constructed strategy can fail when employees do not “buy-in” to it? After all, is strategy not the 

driver for action? On the contrary, does culture drive how effectively people work together? For 

instance, an organization’s strategy is to increase efficiencies across the organization. However, 

if its culture is one where people get the job done at any cost, then the disparity between the 

strategy and the culture could be impossible to achieve. The challenge for organizations is 

overcoming these differences in order to sustain a long-term change. Hence, an important aspect 

to organizational change is the understanding of how to change culture while keeping it in 

alignment with the plan.

 First of all, it is very difficult to change what one does not comprehend. Therefore, it is 

important to establish an understanding of culture. “If we understand the dynamics of 

culture...we will have a deeper understanding not only of why various groups of people or 

organizations can be so different, but also why it is so hard to change them.”26 Secondly, it is 

important to understand why attempts to change it fail. So what is culture? 

12
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

What is Culture 

 It appears that a definitive meaning of culture does not exist. The definition is open for 

interpretation depending upon the subject, the career disciplines or context. For example, 

Samuel Huntington defined culture as, “the values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations, and underlying 

assumptions prevalent among people in a society.”27 Edgar Schein defined culture as, “a pattern 

of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems...taught to new 

members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”28 For this 

paper, probably the most appropriate definition incorporates the works of Huntington, Schein 

and others. James Detert sums it up best, “there is some consensus that organizational culture is 

holistic, historically determined, and socially constructed, and it involves beliefs and behavior, 

exists at a variety of levels, and manifests itself in a wide range of features of organizational 

life.”29 To put it in an overly simple way, culture influences how effectively employees work 

together. Moreover, according to Schein, “leadership creates and changes cultures.”30 

More than the Culture 

 According to Hughes, “a common mistake for many leaders is to change the organization’s 

vision, structure, and systems and overlook the organization’s culture and leader and follower 

capabilities.”31 As demonstrated in the previous chapter, equally important to changing culture 

is changing the other parts of the system. Leadership may avoid a culture change failure if it 

addresses potential failure points before they fester and take root. Therefore, a potential failure 

point for sustaining AFSO 21 is focusing only on the culture and thus creating an unbalanced 

system. 

13
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

Chapter 5 

Potential Failure Point # 2: Inflexible Structure 

You do need to put people into a new organizational context that creates new 

roles, responsibilities, and relationships if you are to affect their behavior.32 

─Bill Creech 

 Jack Welch, the former CEO of General Electric (GE), is famous for restructuring GE and 

instilling a process improvement culture. He is a firm believer in a decentralized approach to 

organization. In his book, Jack, Welch predicts, “hierarchy is dead. The organization of the 

future will be virtually layerless and increasingly boundaryless, a series of information networks 

in which more electrons and fewer people will manage processes.”33

 Does the Air Force’s current organizational structure support the idea of continuous process 

improvement? If not, can it change? Alternatively, will the autocratic hierarchy, which defines 

the Air Force, become a potential failure point? The answer for both of these questions is “it 

depends.” As a result, the structure, or its inflexibility, is an AFSO 21 potential failure point. 

Combat vs. Business 

 The Air Force desires a culture of continuous process improvement. The only way to reach 

and sustain the desired end state, is to address the structure. However, upon reviewing AFSO 21 

key documents (e.g. CONOPS, White Paper and Implementation Plan), the restructuring of the 

organization does not gather much attention. A successful continuous process improvement 

program requires a flat organization. It is team based and void of layers of unnecessary 

management. In keeping with the philosophy of eliminating waste, the pathway of every product 

14
HQ USAF

MAJCOM

NAF

Wing

Squadron

Group

Flight

MAJCOM

Center

Branch

Directorate

Section

DRU

FOA

MAJCOM DRU

MAJCOM FOA

Detachments

OL

MAJCOM

NAF

Wing

Squadron

Group

Flight

MAJCOM

Center

Branch

Directorate

Section

DRU

FOA

MAJCOM DRU

MAJCOM FOA

AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

must be simple and direct. In order to make it work, the Air Force must move from a centralized 

approach to a decentralized approach to improve efficiencies. “A centralized approach provides 

improved control while decentralization leads to employee autonomy and empowerment.”34

 Due to the conglomerate makeup of the Air Force, delayering the organization will be 

difficult. This conglomerate consists of many different types of industries such as service, 

financial and manufacturing industries. Although these industries seem to mirror private 

businesses, the distinguishing factor is the “go to Air Force Standard Levels of Organization Air Force Standard Levels of Organization

war” side of the business. Therefore, this paper 

developed the depicted organizational model, 

which categorized the Air Force structure (i.e. 

industries) into combat and business groupings 

(Figure 5). Of course, the Air Force does not 

categorize its structure this way. Air Force 

Instruction 38-101, Manpower and Organization, Figure 5 

categorizes the Air Force in a variety of structures such as a Wing, Center, Direct Reporting Unit 

or Nonunit. 

The depicted organizational model categorizes the standard Air Force wing structure as 

“combat.” Per AFI 38-101, “the standard wing generates and employs combat capability.”35 

Alternately, the “business” category are those organizations aligned closer with industry (i.e. 

non-combat). Within the combat category of the model, various organizations, depending on 

their combat/peacetime status, also fit the business category requirements such as aircraft 

maintenance and communications. To a private corporation, a conglomerate like the Air Force is 

not efficient because there are too many financial draining sub-organizations. The key is to 

COMBAT 

BUSINESS 

HQ USAF 

MAJCOM 

NAF 

Wing 

Squadron 

Group 

Flight 

MAJCOM 

Center 

Branch 

Directorate 

Section 

DRU 

FOA 

MAJCOM DRU 

MAJCOM FOA 

Detachments 

OL 

COMBAT

BUSINESS

15
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

understand your business; do it well. Divest of what does not fit. For example, GE conducted “a 

stem-to-stem review of [their] conglomerate makeup and produced over $9 billion in divestures. 

In addition, they reduced a diverse mix of 350 businesses to 13 core businesses.”36 Can the Air 

Force accomplish such a divesture? 

Dr Jekyll and Mr. Hyde 

 This conflict between business models is a classic “Dr Jekyll and Mr. Hyde” phenomenon. 

The Air Force does not really understand what it is—a manager of violence or a Fortune 500 

company. The metaphor of “Dr Jekyll and Mr. Hyde” is ideal for describing the bipolar actions 

of the Air Force as it constantly changes between its “combat” and “business” faces. 

 “Dr Jekyll” desires to operate his business as efficiently as possible. His focus is production, 

eliminating waste and reducing cycle times. He wants to make a profit (or recapitalize dollars to 

spend elsewhere). His ideal structure is a decentralized approach. In his mind, a flatter 

organization means increased efficiency and cost savings. “The plain fact of life is that authentic 

quality improvements demand the flattening of structures, the liberation of line management 

from corporate control...and the breakdown of functional foxholes.”37 Dr Jekyll wants to “adopt 

the business-management language of those cutting the budgetary pieces of the pie and gradually 

whittle away at the warrior culture.”38 This “efficiency” approach appears good for business but 

what about combat. In contrast, “Mr. Hyde’s” perspective is much different from “Dr Jekyll.” 

 “Mr. Hyde” desires to blow things up; he wants effects not efficiency. His focus is defeating 

the enemy before he defeats you. “Hyde” delivers sovereign options for the defense of the 

United States and its global interests—to fly and fight in Air, Space, and Cyberspace.”39 Sure, 

he would like to be efficient as possible on the battlefield, but that is not a requirement—survival 

is. In the heat of battle, efficiencies go out the window. If a unit is in serious trouble, everything 

16
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

available is sent to save them. Does it matter if the “Lean” process determined two aircraft 

would be enough? Does it really matter whether nine aircraft respond instead of two? The unit 

in trouble demands effects not efficiency. 

The military is used to operating in the fog of war, a world of uncertainty, and at 

levels of efficiency that might reach 5 or 10 percent—such levels of uncertainty 

[means it will not] cripple a military operation, only lower its efficiency.40

 Equally important as effects is decision making. In combat, there is no time for team 

decisions; leaders must step up and tell troops what to do—sometimes there is validity to the 

term “gut feeling.” Hence, “Mr. Hyde” views layers of organizations as unavoidable. There 

must be a chain of command—people must be in charge. The Air Force even touts this in the 

AFSO 21 CONOPS, “the Air Force must leverage the advantages we have over...large 

commercial and public organizations [such as] well-defined lines of authority.”41 Due to the 

demands of combat, “Mr. Hyde” prefers the centralized approach. 

Is the Zenith Good Enough? 

 The Air Force understands its mission; they do it well. Nevertheless, due to its unique 

mission of defending the United States, the Air Force cannot divest of the “business” side. It 

needs to keep the “business” side because there is no other viable option for supplying and 

maintaining combat systems and infrastructure. However, every few years, some of the 

“business” side divests via outsourcing. In addition, the Air Force is slowly changing to reflect 

its new “flattening” position: 

Organizations must encourage rapid decision making, so they should be flat 

structures without immediate levels, unless mission requirements cannot 

otherwise be met...Both the number of supervisors and the number of internal 

subdivisions within organizations should be designed to minimize layers and 

maximize worker-to-supervisor ratios.42 

17
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

However, this effort is not one of active encouragement; it will not make a significant 

difference. The root problem is that the Air Force does not know who it is today (Dr Jekyll) or 

who it will be tomorrow (Mr. Hyde). As a result, the Air Force’s bipolar disorder will prevent a 

substantial change in structure. Although, the Air Force will make minor structural changes, this 

tweaking and massaging will only support short-term results. This struggle between “Jekyll” and 

“Hyde” will allow only minimal movement up and down the efficiency spectrum (See Figure 6). 

Efficiency Spectrum

Functional Functional Production

Centralized Centralized Air Force Decentralized

(Zenit h)

 Figure 6 

The centralized spectrum is a traditional hierarchy structure, while the decentralized end of the 

spectrum is flat. The ability and capability for continuous process improvement resides in the 

decentralized spectrum. The minimal movement on the spectrum is because of both personalities 

[Jekyll and Hyde] countering each other’s efforts. Two steps forward today could be two steps 

backward in six months. An unbalance in other system components (e.g. change of leadership or 

poor incentives) are usually the reasons for this countering effect. This “Jekyll and Hyde” tugof-war drags out the effort and increases the chances for potential failure points. 

Therefore, the Air Force’s desire for establishing and sustaining a continuous process 

improvement organization will stop short of “true” efficiency. Its zenith will reside somewhere 

in between the two ends of the spectrum. Will the efficiency zenith be good enough? 

Consequently, the inflexibility of the Air Force structure is a potential failure point for AFSO 21. 

18
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

Chapter 6 

Potential Failure Point # 3: HRM Systems 

Don’t fight the system. Change the rules and the system will change itself.43 

─Gene Bellinger 

 Organizations consist of many different types of systems. There are production systems, 

financial systems and supply systems to name a few. These systems are all vital to an 

organization’s ability to operate. As an illustration, consider a maintenance process’s 

interrelationship with the supply system. A process improvement team can “Lean” out an 

aircraft repair process so well that it makes one’s eyes water. However, if the legacy supply 

system does not change, then that team may have a perfect process but they still must wait on the 

inefficient supply system. For this reason, systems must keep up with the changes undergoing 

elsewhere in the organization. Therefore, a potential failure point for sustaining AFSO 21 is the 

human resources management (HRM) system. 

What about the People? 

 “The key to an effective organization is to align the structure with strategy and at the same 

time to design high commitment human resource policies and practices.”44 People manage and 

operate an organization. In other words, human resources are the core of an organization. 

Hence, when trying to change the organization’s culture, systems should be a primary 

consideration in the strategic planning phase. Systems serve to develop and reinforce 

organizational culture. With this in mind, will the Air Force pay attention to the HRM system. 

19
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

 A thorough review of AFSO 21 key documents (e.g. CONOPS, White Paper and 

Implementation Plan), does not reveal such consideration. Why was HRM systems left out of 

the strategic planning for AFSO 21? After all, decisions about how people are managed make a 

difference. The Air Force is well aware of the significance of its people. The AFSO 21 

CONOPS emphasizes the “use of our greatest resource...our innovative, dedicated Airmen.”45 

Consequently, where is the emphasis on HRM systems? These systems help guide and shape 

Airmen’s behavior. This chapter will address two key areas of HRM that enable the sustainment 

of a continuous process improvement culture. They are incentives and staffing. 

Wrong People off the Bus 

 The Air Force is trying to rationally appeal to its employees by informing and educating them 

on the importance of a continuous process improvement culture. Articles and messages crying 

that the “fiscal sky” is falling have bombarded airmen. The problem with this approach is that, 

in most cases, these budgetary constraints have not affected Airmen at their local operating level. 

Therefore, saving the Air Force programmed money is not an attractive selling point. It does not 

answer the question of “what is in it for me and why should I care?” However, HRM practices 

and polices directly affect Airmen. Michael Beer articulates that, “decisions about human 

resource policies affect levels of employee commitment.”46

 The two most attractive incentive areas for policy adjustment are promotions and evaluations. 

The day continuous process improvement becomes officially part of the promotion and 

evaluation process is the day people start taking AFSO 21 seriously. Airmen will need to know 

that their evaluations, promotions and appraisal bonuses are dependant on having significant 

amounts of continuous process improvement in their respective areas of responsibility. 

20
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

 Consider the promotion process and the mixed signals that it is currently sending Airmen. 

The promotion process should favor Airmen who are most concerned with group improvement. 

However, the current system does not favor this approach. According to Gene Bellinger, current 

promotion processes focus individuals on individual performance rather than the team. “One of 

the most prevalent of these mixed messages comes from management continuing to talk about 

the benefits of a team based operation, while still performing individual performance 

appraisals.”47 The Air Force needs promotions and evaluations based on how Airmen’s attitudes 

and capabilities fit the desired continuous process improvement culture. Jim Collins sums it up 

best in his book, Good to Great, the “transformation [began] by first getting the right people on 

the bus (and the wrong people off the bus).”48 

Right People on the Bus 

 Retention and recruitment both encompass staffing. As mentioned earlier, people are at the 

center of an organization. Retention is significant because the Air Force invests a lot of time and 

money in training Airmen. Likewise, recruiting is just as important as retention. Because of 

this, selecting and hiring qualified people saves on the amount of time and money required 

before the Airman becomes a productive contributor. 

 High labor turnover makes sustaining a culture of continuous process improvement difficult. 

The Air Force’s permanent change of station (PCS) is an excellent example of high turnover and 

a potential change barrier. The Air Force frequently PCSs its force. (Although a recent 

budgetary constraint has slowed down PCSing, the effort to instill a continuous process 

improvement culture did not factor this into the decision to extend time on station.) The 

cumulative effect of PCSs is staggering. It is probably safe to say that within a 5-year window, 

21
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

the majority of the Air Force personnel have changed duty assignments. This fluid workforce 

erodes culture change momentum in organizations. “Management reshuffling regularly strips 

away program champions and replaces them with managers who may not share the interests or 

the skills of those who initiated existing programs.”49 Should the Air Force go ahead and make 

extended times on station a policy? 

 When recruiting an individual, how selective is the Air Force? Does the Air Force base 

recruiting efforts on a recruit’s predisposition for continuous process improvement? Is recruiting 

another example of the Air Force’s “Dr Jekyll and Mr. Hyde” condition? Current recruiting 

criteria focus more on the physical capabilities and moral histories of potential recruits. There is 

no emphasis on an individual penchant for value creation and waste reduction. “In a good-togreat transformation, people are not your most important asset. The right people are.”50 The Air 

Force should selectively recruit the “right” people. 

 Resources are limited; creativity is not. The Air Force needs to find a way to change HRM 

practices and policies and ensure an appropriate level of balance between the other system 

components. The institutionalization of new HRM practices through incentives and staffing will 

mold the new organizational culture. Until such an emphasis, HRM systems remain a potential 

failure point for sustaining AFSO 21. 

22
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

Chapter 7 

Potential Failure Point # 4: Mid-Level Officers— Generation TQM 

Thank you sir, may I have another. 

─Chip Diller, Animal House 

 A mid-level officer is either a major or a young lieutenant colonel. At this point in the career, 

he or she has already experienced two or three levels of professional military schools. Here, 

these officers study history and explore battles, leaders and theorists to learn from their 

experiences and mistakes. Upon studying history, a central theme resonates throughout time— 

history is bound to repeat itself. When it comes to “quality” programs, Air Force mid-level 

officers are experiencing déjà vu. AFSO 21 is knocking on the door and it looks eerily similar to 

TQM. How will mid-level officers accept it? This chapter briefly explores cynicism as it relates 

to mid-level officers and their opinion of AFSO 21. Therefore, mid-level officers may be a 

potential failure point for sustaining AFSO 21. 

Generation TQM

 Cynicism is “an attitude of scornful or jaded negativity, especially a general distrust of the 

integrity or professed motives of others.”51 Mention “quality” to a mid-level officer and watch 

him or her roll their eyes. After all, today’s mid-level officers cut their Air Force teeth on TQM. 

Thus, this paper coined the term Generation TQM to describe them. The term, Generation TQM, 

characterizes Air Force officers who entered service in the early-to-mid 1990s and experienced 

TQM indoctrination. As Lieutenants, today’s mid-level officers were conditioned with the many 

promises of TQM: “it is not a fad, continuous improvement, responsibility of every Airman and 

23
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

customers are first, to name a few.”52 (It is painfully funny how AFSO 21 uses those same 

words.) By the late 1990s, the TQM movement fizzled away sort of like the Soviets guarding 

the Berlin Wall—here today, gone tomorrow. 

 Why are they so cynical? Many mid-level officers have seen numerous fads during their 

careers. As one retiring Airman described his career experiences, “I’ve been zero defected, total 

quality managed, micromanaged, one-minute managed, synergized, had my paradigms shifted, 

had my paradigm broken, and been told to decrease my habits to seven.”53 Officer attitudes were 

not much better during the implementation of TQM. In 1993, a survey assessed the attitudes and 

perceptions of Pope Air Force Base personnel towards TQM. The results were less than 

positive. “Officer perceptions and attitudes [were less] favorable as a whole than those of either 

the [SNCO or Civilian] groups.”54 These officers learned early in their career about “lip service” 

toward TQM. 

The result...was cynicism by employees who saw inconsistencies between 

management’s espoused TQM direction and the reality of superficial change. 

‘This too will pass,’ was one of the most frequent responses to new programs, an 

indication of low commitment, an essential ingredient for fundamental change.55 

Why should they think anything different of AFSO 21? 

Once a Cynic, Always a Cynic 

 The Air Force is in a tough position with mid-level officers. These officers are the gas that 

makes the Air Force operate. “They are the backbone...our aces-in-the-hole for the long war. 

[They] have a passion to fight to win.”56 These majors and lieutenant colonels want to do their 

jobs—leading troops in combat. If they wanted to value stream a process, they would have 

joined GE. The Air Force cannot afford to lose these officers because the sustainment of AFSO 

21 depends upon winning them over. These officers influence and shape the cultures of their 

24
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

organizations. Michael Beer points out that, “organizational changes often stall, however, due to 

the inability of the leader to confront resistance to change and develop required commitment and 

skills [for the change effort].”57 AFSO 21 cynics are looking for their next champion in the mold 

of General (Retired) John Jumper. In 2001, General Jumper delivered these lines at a Senior 

Non-Commissioned Officer Academy Graduation: 

[The Air Force] went through a period in the decade of the 90s where the Air 

Force lost some of its character as an institution. We once had a quality Air Force 

that was ruined by a concept known as Quality Air Force. We were told to 

believe that big business had all the answers...Words like empowerment, break 

down barriers. We stopped mentoring our people. We lost touch with the fine art 

of chewing ass.58

 The balancing of the other systems parts may hold the key to “winning” over the mid-level 

officer cynics. General (Retired) Bill Creech believed “you must change the organization 

conceptually and structurally to bring leadership alive at all levels.”59 Changing the HRM 

system and the structure may demonstrate that senior leadership really means action instead of 

rhetoric. If senior leaders: 

Want to ensure that [AFSO 21] practices are sustained over time, they will have 

to consider requiring all [mid-level officers] to lead a regular process of 

organizational learning from which they also can learn. This will of course, place 

demands on them to engage in a similar process at the top. It will be the loudest 

and most believable signal that senior management is serious about creating a 

[continuous process improvement] culture.60 

The above quote originally discussed TQM; however, Beer’s insights are just as applicable to 

today’s improvement program of AFSO 21. The successful change of Air Force culture and the 

sustainment of AFSO 21 are dependant upon leadership. The failure to win over Generation 

TQM, the mid-level officers, is a potential failure point for the sustainment of AFSO 21. 

25
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

Chapter 8 

Potential Failure Point # 5: Lack of Vision 

When you prepare well, you convey confidence and trust to the people. Lack of 

preparation has the opposite effect.61 

─John Maxwell 

The Moon Speech 

 A vision is fundamental to a strategy; it is the strategy’s guide. The vision provides a 

depiction of where an organization wants to be. A shared vision takes it a step further by 

obtaining commitment from the people for a common goal. It inspires and guides the 

organization to its destination. An excellent example of a shared vision was President John F. 

Kennedy’s moon speech. 

Kennedy’s call to “put a man on the moon by the end of the decade” is a classic 

vision statement—clear, short, compelling, broad enough for all to contribute, and 

with an emotional hook that motivates.62

 On the other hand, a blurry or absent vision spells certain doom to a change effort. Without a 

vision, will the organization reach its desired end state? How will the employees sustain their 

drive for excellence? Proverbs conveys the importance of vision, “Where there is no vision, the 

people perish” (Prov. 29.18). Hence, a poor or blurry vision is almost as ineffective as not 

having one at all, because it can de-motivate and confuse the organization. These ill-effects 

make it difficult for employees to maintain their drive, passion and resolve toward the change 

effort. As a result, change initiatives will often fail due to these shortcomings. John Kotter has 

asserted that in “failed transformations, you often find plenty of plans and directives and 

26
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

programs, but no vision”63 True to military form, the Air Force has a plethora of plans and 

directives for AFSO 21. Conversely, has the Air Force met the vision component requirement? 

A Vision or Not 

 There are a couple of ways to answer this question. The Air Force does have an official 

organizational vision statement; it reads, “Lasting heritage...limitless horizons.”64 However, this 

overarching vision does not clearly convey the direction in which the Air Force is heading— 

toward a culture of continuous process improvement. It is very difficult for Airmen to link this 

vision to the AFSO 21 initiative. For instance, where is the emotional hook that motivates 

Airmen? In similar fashion, the Air Force included a vision for AFSO 21 in the draft AFSO 21 

Concept of Operations (CONOPS).65 However, it is a very long, wordy and vague message that 

is difficult for Airmen to understand; in essence, it might as well be absent. As with the Air 

Force vision, the AFSO 21 vision does not compel leaders or followers to embrace the idea of 

continuous process improvement. Both of these visions run counter to Kotter’s belief that the 

vision must be “relatively easy to communicate and appeals to...employees.”66 It would seem 

obvious then, AFSO 21 needs a “moon speech” to inspire and rally the force. 

 On a related note, locating and obtaining the vision is part of the “relatively easy to 

communicate” aspect. Yet, both visions are difficult to track down. For example, the Air Force 

vision is not in any of the more recent highly publicized Air Force strategic communications 

publications such as the Air Force Handbook or the Air Force Roadmap. It is even harder to find 

the AFSO 21 vision. It is in one, repeat, only one document [draft AFSO 21 CONOPS]. It 

would seem obvious then, that the Air Force has failed in meeting the vision component 

requirement. Its poor and blurry vision does not inspire or provide an emotional hook for either 

AFSO 21 or continuous process improvement. Specifically, what should the vision be? 

27
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

Daydreams or Nightmares 

 The Air Force vision for AFSO 21 should encapsulate the message the Air Force is already 

communicating. These messages contain meaningful words and phrases such as increasing 

combat capability, value to customers, improving readiness, maximizing value and eliminating 

waste. This disparity between vision and message is puzzling because it appears, in a round 

about way, that Air Force senior leaders convey an appropriate vision for AFSO 21. For 

example, one Air Force publication states, “the AFSO 21 vision is to increase combat capability 

by integrating process improvement into the culture...”67 Secretary Wynne and General 

Moseley both have communicated the previously mentioned key words and phrases in numerous 

speeches, articles and memorandums. Their message seems to be sound and constant—in 

essence, an undeclared vision. However, AFSO 21 needs a marketable vision that captures the 

essence of continuous process improvement and motivates Airmen to “reach for the stars.” 

 The Air Force must rectify this disparity between vision and message and remove a potential 

failure point in sustaining AFSO 21. It cannot overlook the importance of a vision because 

“building shared visions fosters a commitment to the long term.”68 The vision is the beacon of 

light that will guide the program through calm and stormy waters. If not, according to a 

Japanese proverb, the Air Force may soon experience nightmares: Vision without action is a 

daydream. Action without vision is a nightmare. 

28
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

Chapter 9 

Conclusion 

AFSO 21 signifies a shift in our thinking.69 

─Michael Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force 

 This paper identified potential failure points associated with successfully changing Air Force 

culture to one of continuous process improvement. The AFSO 21 program is the catalyst for this 

change initiative. AFSO 21 is the Air Force’s program for maximizing value and minimizing 

waste in operations. The Air Force is counting on the program’s return on investment to fund its 

recapitalization and modernization effort. Will AFSO 21 sustain itself over the long-term and 

succeed in establishing a culture of continuous process improvement?

 Overall, the Air Force’s change plan appears to be proceeding according to schedule. AFSO 

21 quick wins are in the news. In addition, AFSO 21 is beginning to spread to the Air Force’s 

professional military education schools such as Air Command and Staff College. However, 

there are many potential weak spots, which may shift the balance between system components. 

As a result, misaligned components may eventually erode the AFSO 21 foundation. 

 Therefore, an effective change plan needs to address components other than just culture. It is 

the interrelationships between the various parts of the system that gives it strength and longevity. 

Upon reviewing key AFSO 21 program documents (e.g. CONOPS, Implementation Plan and 

White Paper), it does not appear that the Air Force is adequately planning for a long-term 

sustainment of AFSO 21. There is no mention or discussion about structure or systems. This 

omission may indicate that the focus is on the short-term and not a long view. In addition, there 

29
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

is no substantial discussion on vision or “winning” over mid-level officers. Once again, it 

appears the Air Force is proceeding with a “mandate”; thus, the goal is quick wins without 

sufficiently planning for the long-term. 

 This paper identified several potential failure points for senior leadership to address. These 

failure points are observations and not criticisms of the AFSO 21 implementation. There is still 

time for Air Force senior leadership to correct the system’s alignment and put AFSO 21 on track 

for a long-term sustainment. However, the journey toward establishing this new culture is 

difficult. According to Jack Welch, a culture change requires dedication and perseverance: 

Even with my constant cheerleading and a lot of pounding, it took us three years 

to get all the best people into Six Sigma.70 

Making initiatives successful is all about focus and passionate commitment. The 

drumbeat must be relentless. Every leadership action must demonstrate total 

commitment to the initiative.71

 The philosophy and principles behind AFSO 21 are sound. A culture of continuous process 

improvement will take root once the Air Force leadership fully commits to AFSO 21. Major 

Kenneth R. Theriot’s view on quality is just as appropriate now for AFSO 21 as it was for TQM. 

When leadership commits its resources to all aspects of process improvement, and where a 

continuous improvement-friendly culture is established and nurtured, AFSO 21 will succeed.72 

“If [AFSO 21] is truly the centerpiece of doing business, it becomes everyone’s responsibility 

and the cornerstone of strategy and operations.”73 Therefore, this paper asks, is AFSO 21 

shifting how you think? 

30
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Beer, Michael. "Organizational Behavior and Development." 16: Harvard Business School, 

1998. 

———. "Why TQM Programs Do Not Persist." Decision Sciences, no. Fall 2003 (2003). 

Bellinger, Gene. "Bureaucracy & Organizational Politics." http://www.systemsthinking.org/bop/bop.htm. 

Bill, Thornton, Peltier Gary, and Perreault George. "Systems Thinking: A Skill to Improve 

Student Achievement." The Clearing House 77, no. 5 (2004): 222. 

Clancy, Tom, and Chuck Horner. Every Man a Tiger. New York: Putnam, 1999. 

Collins, James C. Good to Great : Why Some Companies Make the Leap--and Others Don't. 1st 

ed. New York, NY: HarperBusiness, 2001. 

Creech, Bill. The Five Pillars of TQM : How to Make Total Quality Management Work for You. 

New York: Truman Talley Books/Dutton, 1994. 

Dictionary.com. "The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language." Place 

Published: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004. 

Dubrin, Andrew J. Management and Organization. 2nd ed. Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western 

Publishing Co., 1993. 

Duck, Jeanie Daniel. The Change Monster : The Human Forces That Fuel or Foil Corporate 

Transformation and Change. 1st ed. New York: Crown Business, 2001. 

Editors, SWJ. "A Wake up Call for DIA." Small Wars Journal: SWJ Blog (2007), 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/02. 

Faykes, Maj Gen Frank. "Fy08 President's Budget: We Are America's Airmen." 49: Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management and Comptroller 

(SAF/FMB), 2007. 

Gharajedaghi, Jamshid, and NetLibrary Inc. Systems Thinking 

Managing Chaos and Complexity : A Platform for Designing Business Architecture. Boston, 

Mass.: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1999. 

Gilbert, Brig Gen S. "AFSO 21." 49: AFSO 21 Office (HQ USAF/A3-SO), 2006. 

Harari, Oren. "Ten Reasons TQM Doesn't Work." Management Review 86, no. 1 (1997): 38. 

Harrison, Lawrence E., and Samuel P. Huntington. Culture Matters : How Values Shape Human 

Progress. 1st ed. New York: Basic Books, 2000. 

Hughes, Richard L., Robert C. Ginnett, and Gordon J. Curphy. Leadership : Enhancing the 

Lessons of Experience. 5th ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill Custom Publishing, 2006. 

James, R. Detert, G. Schroeder Roger, and J. Mauriel John. "A Framework for Linking Culture 

and Improvement Initiatives in Organizations." Academy of Management. The Academy 

of Management Review 25, no. 4 (2000): 850. 

Jumper, General John P., 27 June 2001. 

Keating, Elizabeth K. "Overcoming the Improvement Paradox." European Management Journal 

17, no. 2 (1999): 14. 

Kotter, John P. John P. Kotter on What Leaders Really Do. Boston: Harvard Business School 

Press, 1999. 

———. "Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail." Harvard Business Review 85, no. 

1 (2000): 96. 

31
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

Maxwell, John C. The 21 Irrefutable Laws of Leadership : Follow Them and People Will Follow 

You. Nashville, Tenn.: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1998. 

Palladini, Julia I. "Total Quality Management : Perceptions and Attitudes of Military Personnel 

Assigned to Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina." 1993. 

Pierce, F. David. "Applying Systems Thinking to Safety." Professional Safety 47, no. 6 (2002): 

49. 

Rinehart, Graham W. LtCol Ret. "How the Air Force Embraced "Partial Quality" (and Avoiding 

Similar Mistakes in New Endeavors)." Air & Space Power Journal vol 20 no 4 (2006): 

p34-43. 

SAF/A3-SO. "White Paper: Air Force Smart Ops for the 21st Century." edited by Department of 

the Air Force, 12. 

Schein, Edgar H. Organizational Culture and Leadership. 3rd ed. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 

2004. 

Senge, Peter M. The Fifth Discipline : The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization. 1st 

ed. New York: Doubleday/Currency, 1990. 

———. The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook : Strategies and Tools for Building a Learning 

Organization. New York: Currency Doubleday, 1994. 

USAF. "2007 U.S. Air Force Posture Statement." edited by SAF/CM, 44: Department of the Air 

Force, 2007. 

———. "AFI 38-101: Manpower and Organization." edited by HQ USAF/DPMO, 81: 

Department of the Air Force, 2006. 

———. "AFSO 21 CONOPS and Implementation Plan (Draft)." edited by HQ USAF/A3-SO, 

16: Department of the Air Force, 2006. 

———. "Air Force Roadmap 2006-2025." edited by HQ USAF A8X, 159: Department of the 

Air Force, 2006. 

———. "The Air Force Story." edited by SAF/CM, 19: Department of the Air Force, 2006. 

Vest, Hugh S. "Tomorrow's "Cyber Warriors"." Air & Space Power Chronicles (2000): 8. 

Walker, Wallace Earl. Changing Organizational Culture : Strategy, Structure, and 

Professionalism in the U.S. General Accounting Office. 1st ed. Knoxville: University of 

Tennessee Press, 1986. 

Welch, Jack. Jack: Straight from the Gut. 1st ed. New York: Warner Business Books, 2001. 

Wynne, Secretary Michael W. "Lean across the Air Force -- Process Development and 

Improvement." edited by All MAJCOM Commanders, 1: SECAF, 2005. 

———. "Letter to Airmen: Air Force Smart Operations 21." edited by Airmen of the United 

States Air Force, 1, 2006. 

32
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

END NOTES 

1

 Maj Gen Frank Faykes, "Fy08 President's Budget: We Are America's Airmen," (Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of the Air Force for Financial Management and Comptroller (SAF/FMB), 2007), 50. 

2

 Ibid., 15.

3

 Secretary Michael W. Wynne, "Lean across the Air Force -- Process Development and Improvement," ed. All

MAJCOM Commanders (SECAF, 2005). 

4 Brig Gen S. Gilbert, "AFSO 21," (AFSO 21 Office (HQ USAF/A3-SO), 2006). 

5

 Ibid. 

6

 Secretary Michael W. Wynne, "Letter to Airmen: Air Force Smart Operations 21," ed. Airmen of the United States 

Air Force (2006). 

7

 Jeanie Daniel Duck, The Change Monster : The Human Forces That Fuel or Foil Corporate Transformation and

Change, 1st ed. (New York: Crown Business, 2001), xiii. 8

 Wallace Earl Walker, Changing Organizational Culture : Strategy, Structure, and Professionalism in the U.S.

General Accounting Office, 1st ed. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986), 7. 9

 Duck, The Change Monster : The Human Forces That Fuel or Foil Corporate Transformation and Change, 9. 10 Ibid., 11.

11 John P. Kotter, John P. Kotter on What Leaders Really Do (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 92. 12 ———, "Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail," Harvard Business Review 85, no. 1 (2000): 60. 13 Ibid.: 60-67.

14 SAF/A3-SO, "White Paper: Air Force Smart Ops for the 21st Century," ed. Department of the Air Force, 7. 15 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline : The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, 1st ed. (New York: 

Doubleday/Currency, 1990), 375.

16 Jamshid Gharajedaghi and NetLibrary Inc., Systems Thinking 

Managing Chaos and Complexity : A Platform for Designing Business Architecture (Boston, Mass.: ButterworthHeinemann, 1999), 26. 

17 Senge, The Fifth Discipline : The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, 128. 18 Thornton Bill, Peltier Gary, and Perreault George, "Systems Thinking: A Skill to Improve Student Achievement," 

The Clearing House 77, no. 5 (2004): 225. 

19 Ibid.: 223. 

20 Richard L. Hughes, Robert C. Ginnett, and Gordon J. Curphy, Leadership : Enhancing the Lessons of Experience, 

5th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill Custom Publishing, 2006), 398. 

21 Ibid., 397. 

22 F. David Pierce, "Applying Systems Thinking to Safety," Professional Safety 47, no. 6 (2002): 49. 23 Ibid.: 50. 

24 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook : Strategies and Tools for Building a Learning Organization (New

York: Currency Doubleday, 1994), 92. 

25 Wynne, "Lean across the Air Force -- Process Development and Improvement." 26 Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 3rd ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004), 10. 27 Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington, Culture Matters : How Values Shape Human Progress, 1st ed. 

(New York: Basic Books, 2000), xv. 

28 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 17.

29 R. Detert James, G. Schroeder Roger, and J. Mauriel John, "A Framework for Linking Culture and Improvement

Initiatives in Organizations," Academy of Management. The Academy of Management Review 25, no. 4 (2000): 851. 30 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 11. 31 Hughes, Ginnett, and Curphy, Leadership : Enhancing the Lessons of Experience, 397. 32 Bill Creech, The Five Pillars of TQM : How to Make Total Quality Management Work for You (New York: 

Truman Talley Books/Dutton, 1994), 13. 

33 Jack Welch, Jack: Straight from the Gut, 1st ed. (New York: Warner Business Books, 2001), 433. 34 Andrew J. Dubrin, Management and Organization, 2nd ed. (Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western Publishing Co., 

1993), 231. 

33
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 

35 USAF, "AFI 38-101: Manpower and Organization," ed. HQ USAF/DPMO (Department of the Air Force, 2006), 

16. 

36 Creech, The Five Pillars of TQM : How to Make Total Quality Management Work for You, 108. 37 Oren Harari, "Ten Reasons TQM Doesn't Work," Management Review 86, no. 1 (1997): 41. 38 Hugh S. Vest, "Tomorrow's "Cyber Warriors"," Air & Space Power Chronicles (2000): 5.

39 USAF, "Air Force Roadmap 2006-2025," ed. HQ USAF A8X (Department of the Air Force, 2006), 11. 40 Tom Clancy and Chuck Horner, Every Man a Tiger (New York: Putnam, 1999), 512. 41 USAF, "AFSO 21 CONOPS and Implementation Plan (Draft)," ed. HQ USAF/A3-SO (Department of the Air 

Force, 2006), 7. 

42 ———, "AFI 38-101: Manpower and Organization," 6.

43 Gene Bellinger, "Bureaucracy & Organizational Politics," http://www.systems-thinking.org/bop/bop.htm. 44 Michael Beer, "Organizational Behavior and Development," (Harvard Business School, 1998), 7.

45 USAF, "AFSO 21 CONOPS and Implementation Plan (Draft)," 3. 

46 Beer, "Organizational Behavior and Development," 6. 

47 Bellinger, "Bureaucracy & Organizational Politics." 

48 James C. Collins, Good to Great : Why Some Companies Make the Leap--and Others Don't, 1st ed. (New York, 

NY: HarperBusiness, 2001), 63. 

49 Elizabeth K. Keating, "Overcoming the Improvement Paradox," European Management Journal 17, no. 2 (1999): 

11. 

50 Collins, Good to Great : Why Some Companies Make the Leap--and Others Don't, 51. 51 Dictionary.com. "The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language." (Place Published: Houghton 

Mifflin Company, 2004), http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/cynicism. 52 Julia I. Palladini, "Total Quality Management : Perceptions and Attitudes of Military Personnel Assigned to Pope

Air Force Base, North Carolina" (1993), 29. 

53 Graham W. LtCol Ret Rinehart, "How the Air Force Embraced "Partial Quality" (and Avoiding Similar Mistakes 

in New Endeavors)," Air & Space Power Journal vol 20 no 4 (2006). 54 Palladini, "Total Quality Management : Perceptions and Attitudes of Military Personnel Assigned to Pope Air 

Force Base, North Carolina", 140. 55 Michael Beer, "Why TQM Programs Do Not Persist," Decision Sciences, no. Fall 2003 (2003): 3. 56 SWJ Editors, "A Wake up Call for DIA," Small Wars Journal: SWJ Blog (2007),

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/02. 

57 Beer, "Organizational Behavior and Development," 11. 

58 General John P. Jumper, 27 June 2001.

59 Creech, The Five Pillars of TQM : How to Make Total Quality Management Work for You, 297. 60 Beer, "Why TQM Programs Do Not Persist," 12. 

61 John C. Maxwell, The 21 Irrefutable Laws of Leadership : Follow Them and People Will Follow You (Nashville, 

Tenn.: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1998), 42. 

62 Duck, The Change Monster : The Human Forces That Fuel or Foil Corporate Transformation and Change, 49. 63 Kotter, John P. Kotter on What Leaders Really Do, 81. 64 USAF, "The Air Force Story," ed. SAF/CM (Department of the Air Force, 2006), 4. 65 ———, "AFSO 21 CONOPS and Implementation Plan (Draft)," 4. 

66 Kotter, John P. Kotter on What Leaders Really Do, 81. 67 USAF, "2007 U.S. Air Force Posture Statement," ed. SAF/CM (Department of the Air Force, 2007), 38. 68 Senge, The Fifth Discipline : The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, 12. 69 Wynne, "Letter to Airmen: Air Force Smart Operations 21." 70 Welch, Jack: Straight from the Gut, 333. 71 Ibid., 299. 

72 Rinehart, "How the Air Force Embraced "Partial Quality" (and Avoiding Similar Mistakes in New Endeavors)," 7. 73 Harari, "Ten Reasons TQM Doesn't Work," 40. 

34