### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00363- CR

Tom m y D av is, App e lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

NO. 03-05-00364- CR

Tom m y W ay ne Da vis , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 147TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NOS. 20 3522 5 & D -DC -2004 -3019 44, HO NORAB LE WILF ORD F LOW ERS, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Tommy

Davis wa s place d on d e f

e r r e d a d ju d ic a ti o n c o mm u n it y s upervision afte r he ple aded guilty

to ag g ravated assault. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.02 (West Supp. 2005). A y e ar l a te r, he wa s c on vic te d b y a jur y fo r a g g ra

vate d se xua l a ssa

ult of a c hil d and

se nte nc e d to fi ft

y y ear s’ imprisonment. Se e id . § 22.021. At the conc lusion of the sexual assault trial, the di strict court adjudg ed appe llant guilty in the assault ca se and imposed a twenty -y ear

sentenc e. In his only

point2

of e rr or , a pp e lla nt u rg e s th a t his c ouns e l did no t re nd e r e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e duri ngthe se xua l a ssa ult tr ia l. F ind ingno me ri t to thi s c on te nti on , w e wi ll a ff ir m bo th j ud g me nts
. Sha ro n F lor e s and

he r f our- y e ar- old

da ug hte r, D. B ., c a me to Aus tin fr om t he ir ho me in Alvin to visit family and friends over the L abor Day wee kend. They stay ed with Flor es’s fr iend Tene cia Williams, who shared a n apar tment with her brother , Kenne th Wi lliams, her sister, Tier ra Wil liams, and Tierr a’s infant daug hter, T.W. On Saturday night, Flore s, Tene cia, and Ke nneth went to a par ty , leaving the children in Tierr a’s care
. Appellant, who was Tier ra’ s boy friend a

nd the father of Tier rica , came to the apar

tment during the cour se of the eve n i n g. When Flore s and the other s returne d to the apar

tment at about 3:00 a.m., Tierr a was a sleep a nd appellant wa s sitti ng in the living room watc hing te levision and holding T.W. D.B . was a lso awake
.

Flore s testified that she wa s ang ry beca use D.B . was not in be d aslee p. When Flore s walked into a be droom, D.B . followed he r and beg an to c ry , saying, “Mommy , he touche d me, he touched me.” D.B . told Flores that a ppellant had touche d her “ [b] etwee n my leg s and on my

butt.” F lor e s imme diate ly too k D.B . to Child re n’ s Hos pit a l whe re sh e wa s exam ine d b y a se xua l a ssa

ult
nurse e x aminer. The nurse, Kimber ley Tarla -Rash, testified that she f ound an abras i o n on D.B .’s vag inal vestibule just to the right of the vag inal opening and a one millimeter tea r in her poste rior fourc hette. The nurse wa s of t h e opinion that these injuries occ urre d no more than se venty -two hours prior to the ex amination. Dr. B eth Naue rt, a pe diatrician a nd expert on child sexual abuse, examined Tarla- Rash’s re port and wa s of the opinion that the injuries to D .B.’ s vag ina wer e ca used b y p e n e t r a t i o ni n t o t h e s e x u a l o r g anan d w e r e n o tt h e r e s u l to f

n o r m a l c h i l dh o o d

p l ay. Appellant testified that the two c hildren we re a sleep whe n he ar rived at the apar

tment that evening . L ater , Tierr a also went to be d and appellant sat down to watch a movie on television.3

T. W. b e g an to c ry , s o he br ou g ht he r int o the liv ing ro om an d he ld he r. Sho rt ly the re a ft e r, D. B . a lso awoke and joined them. Appellant denied touching D.B . inappropria tely . When told that night what D. B. h ads ai d , h e i m m ed i at el y p ro t es t edh i s i n n o ce n ce . He ca l l edt h e p o l i ce an d v o l u n t ee re d

t o go to the hospital for an e x amination.

Appellant complains that his tria l c ounsel failed to e licit crucia l testimony reg arding D. B .’ s in jur ie s, fa ile d to c ro ss- e xami ne D. B ., a llo we d the c hil d’ s te sti mony to b e imp ro pe rl y bolstered, a

nd impugne d appellant’ s own cre dibilit y by offe ring evidenc e of a

nother a ccusation
a g a i n s th i m . T o p r e v a i l o nh i s c l a i m o f i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t an c e , a

p p e l l an t m u s ts h o w t h a th i s a t t o r n e ys made suc h serious err ors that they wer e not func tioning ef

fec tively as counse l and that these e rror s prejudice d the def

ense to such a

deg ree that appellant wa s deprived of a fa ir trial. See Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); He rn an de z v . S tate , 9 88 S.W. 2d

77 0, 77 1- 72 (T e x. Cr im. App. 1999). I n revie wing a cla im of ineffe ctive assistanc e, we must indul g e a strongpresumption that counsel’s c onduct fe ll within t he wide r ang e of r easona ble profe ssional assistance. See J ackson

v . S tat e , 877 S.W .2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). T o overc ome this presumption, the
a lle g a tio ns of

ine ff e c tiv e ne ss m

us t be fi rm ly

fo un de d in

the re c or d a

nd the re c or d mus t a ff

ir mativ e ly demonstrate the alleg ed ineffe ctiveness. Ma lle tt v . S tate , 65 S.W .3d 59, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). I n most c ases, the rec ord on direc t a ppeal is unde veloped and cannot adequately ref lect the motives behind trial counse l’s actions. Id
. D.B.’s Inju ries

Dr . N a ue rt te sti fi e d th a t a te ar o r a

br a sio n im

pli e s a “ blo od y surf a c e .” Ne ve rt

he le ss, Tarla -Rash’s re port did not mention the presenc e of blood during her examination of D.B . Appellant
argue s that th is s ug g e sts that D .B .’ s v a g ina l in jur ie s w e re no t in fl ic te d d ur ingthe ho ur s im me diate ly4

pr e c e din g the e xami nat ion wh e n D .B . w a s in

a pp e lla nt’ s c are , b ut e arl ie r whe n D .B . w a s w ith Kenne th Wi lliams and others. Appe llant asserts that his counsel shoul d h av e p ursued this line of defe nse by

specific ally

questioning Ta

rla-Ra sh reg ardingthe abse nce of blood. The re cord r efle cts that appe llant’s attorney s were well awa re of the sig nificanc e of the abse nce of

blood. During her jury

argument at the conc lusion of the g uilt-innocence phase, one of appe llant’s attorney s argued:
Dr. Na uert told us something that our common sense c ould have told us but y ou have testimony to the eff ect that when somebody is injure d they bleed. . . . Where is the blood? A fre sh wound bleeds. The re is no evide nce of blood in the report. Dr
. Naue rt say s, oh, well, they just forg ot to write it down.

. . . . The momma sat on the stand a nd wept and ne ver me ntioned blood o n her child. . . .

. . . . The evidence that would show that it happene d that day isn’t there. N obody mentioned i t to y ou. Nobody . Nobody said Ifound blood in the bed late r on or on the c ou c h or ont h e c l o t h e s . N o b o dy . N o b o dy s a i d i t
. W e l l , t h a tn i g h ti s t h e o n ly night that To mmy

h a d an y th in g to d o w it

h th a t c h il d

a t a ll
. I f

y o uth ink

that something ha

ppened, a nd y ou ag ree that people that are hur t bleed, then you are g oing to ha

ve to say y es, something happene d but Tommy wasn’t ther e.
I t is reasona

ble to infer that defe nse cou n s el , k n o wi ng that there was no mention of blood in the medical r eport, did not question Tarla -Rash about this beca use t hey did not want to risk having the
nurs e sa y tha t she had ob se rv e d th e pr e se nc e of blo od bu t ha d f

a ile d to no te it. A r e a so na bly eff ective attorney

could conc lude that in this inst ance , silence was g olden and pr esente d an ef fec tive ba sis fo r a

rgume nt.5

D. B.’ s T esti mony D. B ., wh o w a s f

ive y e ars old

a t the tim e of

tr ia l, w a s a

re luc tant w itn e ss. Whe n f ir st called by the State, s he professed not to know t he answers to most of t he S tate’s questions, including her la st name. At the court’s s ug g estion, the S tate elected to forg o further questioning until later that morning . When rec alled, D.B . was more forthcoming , but she st ill ref used t o respond to questions pertinent to the a ccusations ag ainst appellant. I t w as only when she was called to the stand a third time, and her

mother wa s allowed to re main i n the cour troom, that D.B. te stified that appellant touched he r “pe e-pe e.” She illustrated this statement by pointing to her

vag inal are a. De fe ns e c o u n s e l e l e c t e d n o t t o c r o s s - e xam i n e D
. B
. I n s t e a d , s h e w a s c a l l e d a s a defe nse witness the followingday . Once ag ain, D.B . was lar g ely u n re s p o n s ive, and she denied
reme mberingany

of the thing s she had sa id about the nig ht in question. Ap pe lla nt c o m p l a i n s t h a t de fe ns e c ouns e l’ s f

a ilure to c ro ss- e xami ne D. B . d e nie d h im his constituti onal rig ht of confr ontation. But g iven the child’s obvious discomfort on t he stand a nd the minimal value of he r testimony to the State, counsel c ould rea sonably believe tha t i t wa s the better strateg y not to pursue cross-examination that day , but to allow D.B . to go home for the nig ht andrecal l her th e nex t day
. Th ere i s n o rea so n t o b eli eve t hat im med iat e cro ss -ex ami nat io n o f D. B.
wo uld have be e n o f a

ny mor e be ne fi t to the de fe ns e tha n th e c ours e fo llo we d b y

c ouns e l.
Forensic Int

ervie w D. B . w a s in te rv ie we d at the Ce nte r fo r C hil d Pr ote c tio n b y fo re ns ic int e rv ie we r A lia A l s a f f ar . T h e i n t e r

v i e w w a s o b s e r

v e d b y D e t e c t i v e K e n n e t h M u r p h y, w h o p r e p ar e d

a s u m m ar y. D. B . to ld A lsa ff

ar t hat a pp e lla nt t ou c he d he r w ithhis ha nd un de r h e r d

re ss a nd un de r h e r p anti e s, appellant touche d the inside of her “pee part” and butt, and this touching hurt. Appellant c ontendsAp pe lla nt a lso c ite s Cra wf

o rd v . W a shington , 5 4 1 U.S. 36 (2004), althoug h he does not 1 expressly asser t that this t estimony

violated his Six th Amendment conf rontation rig ht. As the Court noted in C

r a w for d , t he Six th Amendment place s no constraints on the use of prior testimonial statements if the de clar ant appe ars f or cr oss-examination at trial. Id . at 59 n.9.

6 that counsel wa s ineffe ctive for failing to obj e c t to the testimony rec ounting D.B .’s statements during the int e rv ie w o n h e ars ay

g ro un ds
. 1 For the m ost part, the substance of D.B .’s s tatements during the fore nsic interview
was a dduced by

the def ense, not by

the State. As appe llant acknowle dg es, the de fensive strateg y was to emphasize that D.B. did not ac cuse a ppellant of pe netrating her i n her init ial outcry to her mother , and that she mentioned penetr ation only when she was int ervie wed at the Child P rotec tion Center by a person f

amiliar with the evide nce ne eded f or a suc cessf

ul sex ual assault prose cution. I n other
wo rd s, the de fe ns e so ug ht to sug g e st that D .B . h a d b e e n c oa c he d in to m a kin g he r a c c us a tio ns a g a ins t appellant. In his brief, a

ppellant di smisses this strateg y as “c ompletely unrea sonable” beca

use the Alsaff ar inter view wa s the only

occa sion in which D.B. sa id that appellant pene trated he r. I n assessing trial counsel’ s perf ormanc e, we must avoid the distorting ef fec ts of hindsight. Sta

ffo rd v . S tate , 81 3 S.W. 2d 50 3, 50 6 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ). I t is imp or tant t o n ote that d e f e n s e c o u n s e l d id n o t a d d u c e th e o n ly e v id e n c e o f p e n e tr a ti o n in th is c a u s e . T h e State’s medical testimony , while circ umstantial, was arg uably more persuasive evidence of pene tration than D.B .’s statements to Alsaff ar. “ A lawy er ma

y wel l ch o o s e n o t to object to hear say or other ina dmi ssi ble e vid e nc e if it pote nti a lly e nh anc e s h is c lie nt’ s d e fe ns e or a t le a st d oe s n ot s e ri ou sly prejudice it.” Tho mp so n v . S tate , 9 S.W .3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). On t his rec ord, we cannot sa y that defe nse counse l’s strateg y was so il l -a d v i s ed as to fall outside the broa d rang e of
rea sonable prof

essional assistance
.7

Dr . Ca rte r’ s T esti mony Dr. Willi am Carter , a psy cholog ist, wa s called by the State to give expert testimony reg arding child sexual abuse. Althoug h Carter had tre ated hundr eds of se x ually abused c hildren, he ha d no t e xami ne d or tr e a te d D. B ., no r ha d he pe rf or me d a ps y c ho log ic a l e va luati on of appe lla nt. Carter testified re g arding

the psy cholog ical and be haviora l patte r n s often obser

ved in the victims and pe rp e tr a tor s o f c hil d s e xua l a bu se . App e lla

nt a rgue s th a t w hil e Cart er “was carefu l
. . . to a vo id stating that [ D.B .] was telling the truth a nd Appellant wa s ly ing, t h i s wa s nonetheless the c lear import of his testimony ,” to which de fense counsel should have objected.

A qualified e x pert may

testify reg ardingthe cha

rac teristics commonly

exhibi ted by sexually abused c hildren and ma

y state that the complainant exhibi ted these c hara cter istics, but the
ex p er t m ay n ot express the opinion that the complainant is telling the truth. Y ou nt v . S tate , 872 S.W. 2d 70 6, 70 8- 09 , 7 12 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ); Duc k e tt v . S tate , 7 9 7 S. W. 2 d

9 0 6 , 9 1 5 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1990). I n this c ase, Dr. Carter expressed the opinion that D.B .’s behavior , as desc ribed in the S tate’s hy

pothetical questions, was consistent with that commonly observe d among children who have been se x ually

abused. A s appellant c oncede s, Carter did not testify that D.B . was telling the truth or that appe llant was lying. T hat another attorney might have objected to some of Carte r’s testimony is not evidenc e of ineff ectivene ss. Se e Bl ott v . S tate , 5 88 S.W. 2d

58 8, 59 2 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1979).
Extran eous Allegation

Duringappellant’ s own testimony , and during defe nse counse l’s cross-e x amination
o f s e v e r a l St a te w it

n e s s e s , e v id e n c e w a s a d d u c e d th a t a

p p e ll an t h a d b e e n p r e v io u s ly a c c u sed of
s ex u al l y as saulting a

nother c hild. The rec ord re flec ts, however , that counsel a cted at appellant’s8

be he st. B e fo re te sti mony be g an, c ouns e l ha d ap pe lla nt co nf ir m f or the re c or d th a t “ y ou

wa nt m e to g o in to t he a lle g a tio ns in [the oth e r c a us e ]” on the the or

y that a pp e lla nt’ s a c c us e rs in t

he ins tant c a se
wer e aw are of the e arlier

alleg ations and thus motivated to make similar ac cusations. In his brief, appellant a

rg ues that this wa s not a g ood strateg y , and he further complains that his attorney s did not eff ectively pursue the strateg y

in any case . He a ls o n o t es that the re cord is silent as to whethe r counsel ha d explained to him the conseque nces of offe ring evidenc e of the extraneous ac cusation.

Having insisted that his attorney s pursue this pa rticular de fensive stra

teg y , appellant is i n n o p os iti on

to c la im o n a

pp e a l th a t th e y

we re ine ff

e c tiv e fo r h a vin g do ne so . T hat c ouns e l f e lt the nee d to ge t appellant’s wishe s on the rec ord is ci rcumstantial evidence that counsel had
unsucce ssfully

soug ht to dissuade appellant f rom this co u rs e of action. We will not assume that
c ouns e l f a ile d to dis c us s th e po ssi ble c on se qu e nc e s o f t his str a te g y

wi th a pp e lla nt b e fo re tr ia l. Ap pe lla nt h a s n ot o ve rc o m e t

h e s tr on g pr e sumpt ion

that c ouns e l’ s c on du c t at tr ia l f e ll within the wide ra

ng e of r easona

ble profe ssional assistance. The point of er ror is over

ruled a nd the judgme nts of conviction ar e af firmed.

__________________________________________

W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pembe rton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: August 31, 2006 Do No t Pu

bli sh