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43–786 2009

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–149] 

HOUSE RESOLUTION 834—GROUND 

FORCE READINESS SHORTFALLS 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

MEETING JOINTLY WITH

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 16, 2008 


Congress.#13
(II) 

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas, Chairman 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii, Chairman 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

PAUL ARCANGELI, Professional Staff Member 

LYNN WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member 

MEGAN PUTNAM, Staff Assistant 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2008 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, April 16, 2008, House Resolution 834—Ground Force Readiness 

Shortfalls ............................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, April 16, 2008 ..................................................................................... 31 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 16, 2008 

HOUSE RESOLUTION 834—GROUND FORCE READINESS SHORTFALLS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Abercrombie, Hon. Neil, a Representative from Hawaii, Chairman, Air and 

Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................................. 4 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking Member, 

Readiness Subcommittee ..................................................................................... 2 

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Readiness 

Subcommittee ....................................................................................................... 1 

Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Ranking Member, 

Air and Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................... 17 

WITNESSES 

Donnelly, Thomas, Resident Fellow, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, The 

American Enterprise Institute ............................................................................ 10 

Flournoy, Miche`le A., President, Center for a New American Security .............. 6 

Korb, Lawrence J., Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress ...................... 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Abercrombie, Hon. Neil .................................................................................... 38 

Donnelly, Thomas ............................................................................................. 74 

Flournoy, Miche`le A. ........................................................................................ 45 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 40 

Korb, Lawrence J. ............................................................................................. 57 

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P. ..................................................................................... 35 

Saxton, Hon. Jim .............................................................................................. 43 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

H. Res. 834 ........................................................................................................ 85 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Mr. Loebsack ..................................................................................................... 93 

Mr. Ortiz ........................................................................................................... 93 

(1) 

HOUSE RESOLUTION 834—GROUND FORCE READINESS 

SHORTFALLS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE, MEETING JOINTLY WITH AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 16, 2008. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2:08 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Solomon Ortiz (chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. ORTIZ. The meeting will come to order, and we are going to 

see—we don’t want to hurry you, gentlemen and ladies, but we are 

going to have some votes in about the next 10 minutes, and then 

I think we might be out for at least 40 minutes, and I know that 

you all have a busy schedule. 

So what we are trying to do now is to get one of the delegates 

who does not vote on the floor votes, and maybe she can continue 

to run the meeting until we come back. 

But we are going to get started. 

Today, we meet in a joint session with the Air and Land Forces 

Subcommittee to discuss and hear testimony on H.R. 834. This resolution identifies ground force readiness shortfalls, acknowledges 

the strategic risk and resolves that Congress should commit to attempt to restore the health of our ground forces. 

The purpose of this resolution and of this hearing today is on improving military readiness, about how we, as Members of Congress, 

can restore readiness to ensure a well-trained, well-equipped 

ground force for a safe homeland. 

Today, we are here because we are seeking solutions, a way forward. 

As we know, the readiness of the ground forces is measured in 

three categories: Equipment, personnel, and training. 

Today, the Army, Marine Corps, National Guard and Reserves 

are reporting lower levels of readiness in all the three categories 

than they were in 2001. This is a fact. No matter how you measure 

it, using Army and Marine Corps current metrics to measure readiness against all requirements, there are significant shortfalls. 

In previous hearings, we have learned that our troops are worn 

out, and their families are stressed from repeated deployments and 

redeployments. Equipment has been consumed by combat and prepositioned stocks almost depleted. Equipment shortfalls and time 

2 

constraints limit the amount and type of training our troops receive 

as they prepare to protect this country. 

While we have the world’s best counterinsurgency-trained ground 

force, we do not have a force that is prepared for many of the tasks 

that they could need to support other contingencies. This reduced 

readiness posture has left the United States in a risky strategic position. 

At a hearing last week with the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army 

and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, we heard that 

neither was confident of their respective service’s ability to deploy 

to meet other contingency requirements to their eyes. This leaves 

an America more vulnerable than we want to be and, more importantly, than we should be. 

What we know is concerning on many levels, but it is the unknown that concerns me the most. How would our ground forces 

respond if called upon today for another contingency? Will they be 

trained? Will they have the equipment they need? How long will 

it take for them to respond? And could we support our troops once 

they are engaged, the sustainability part of it? And are they prepared for contingencies other than Iraq and Afghanistan? 

I commend every one of our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines 

serving today. The sacrifices they make are honorable, but as General Cody said, ‘‘The awards our soldiers have earned reflect the accomplishment and bravery on the battlefield, but their valor is not 

enough to restore balance and readiness to our Army.’’ He is right. 

This is our job. 

I ask my colleagues to join me in co-sponsoring H.R. 834 to recognize the readiness shortfalls, acknowledge the strategic risk and, 

most importantly, make a commitment to restoring the health of 

the ground forces. 

I look forward to our witnesses today and their testimony and 

hearing their recommendations. And this is one of the reasons we 

are here. 

You know, we are all in the same boat, and we need recommendations. We are not here to point fingers at anybody. We are 

trying to see how we can resolve and restore the strength of the 

ground forces. 

And the chair now recognizes my good friend, the distinguished 

gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes, the ranking member for the 

Readiness Subcommittee, for any remarks that he would like to 

make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ortiz can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, as always, I thank you for your leadership, and thank you for this hearing. 

This hearing on H.R. 834 follows a series of hearings this committee has recently held focusing on the readiness of our forces and 

our strategic posture. There is no doubt that we face an enormous 

challenge as we work to rebuild, transform and grow our armed 

forces while they are actively engaged in combat. However, I am 

3 

uncertain as to how our soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen will 

benefit from either this hearing or the proposed resolution. 

I do believe, however, that this committee and this Congress can 

take action for the benefit of our troops and readiness by passing 

the fiscal year 2008 supplemental. This funding will benefit our 

troops by growing the force and initiating the process of refitting 

our five combat brigades returning from Iraq. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) has gone on the record stating 

that they can continue to operate if they have the supplemental by 

the end of May. However, continuing to operate and having the 

funds needed to operate and improve readiness are different targets. 

While testifying before the full House Armed Services Committee 

on February 6, 2008, Secretary Gates stressed that funding in the 

2008 supplemental request was direct linked to the readiness of 

our military forces. General Magnus and General Cody delivered 

the same message last week. 

During the hearing, General Cody stated, ‘‘This year, we didn’t get all the money for refit. There is still $7.6 billion for the Army 

sitting out there, and time is not on our side. We now have the 

most brigades deployed that we have ever had consuming our 

equipment. Our depots are running at 26 million direct labor 

hours, and we need that $7.6 billion like in October of last year to 

start buying long lead items, because we have got the workforce energized, and then as these five brigades come out, be able to rapidly reset so we can start getting into the time factor of building 

a strategic reserve. And so when I talk about timely and fully funding, that is critical to get back to strategic readiness.’’ 

General Magnus echoed his remarks when he said, ‘‘Until we receive these supplemental funds, the Navy and us cannot put under 

contract for this Nation’s industry to build the aircraft that we 

need, the ground combat vehicles and equipment that we need, in 

addition to the personnel and operations and maintenance expenses that are needed. Our systems command is ready to contract 

with American industry now, and these are all lead time away 

from delivering some of these systems.’’ 

In addition to the funds for equipment reset, the supplemental 

also includes $5.4 billion to grow the force. $4.1 billion of that is 

for Army efforts and $1.3 billion for the Marine Corps. In layman’s 

terms, this equates to more people. There is no question our men 

and women have made tremendous sacrifices in defending the Nation since 2001. The resolution before us details extended combat 

hours, limited time at home to train, multiple deployments, and 

personnel shortfalls. 

All of these challenges are real, and they can be mitigated with 

more people. We must take responsibility then for the fact that 

Army and Marine Corps efforts to increase combat forces and decrease dwell time are directly tied to the funds in the 2008 supplemental and the failure of the Congress to act on it for more than 

a year. 

On that note, I met just last week with Major General Thiessen, 

the Assistant Deputy Commandant for program and resources for 

the Marine Corps. He commented that readiness is the balance of 

people, equipment, and time, people with the right skills, rank, 

4 

equipment, and training. We must realize we cannot snap our fingers and produce a military that is fully ready, regardless of the 

funds provided. It takes time, measured in months, not weeks, to 

recruit, train, and ready soldiers and Marines. 

It also takes time, often 18 months or more, to field the equipment our soldiers and Marines need to accomplish their missions. 

Every day that passes without the readiness funding included in 

the 2008 supplemental is one more day that we delay gains in strategic readiness. 

To be clear, I do not approach today’s hearing seeking to minimize the fact that our army is out of balance or that the armed 

services have presented large unfunded requirements to the Congress this year. It is time we take responsibility for our readiness 

shortfalls, readiness shortfalls that are grounded in decades of an 

inadequate defense top line and fund the needs of our troops. 

For all these reasons, I testified before the House Budget Committee that we ought to increase the top line for defense spending. 

As you well know, the budget resolution passed in the House included no such increase. Unless we take action on this matter of 

funding, then I believe it is premature to consider the resolution 

before us today. 

Mr. Chairman, I welcome our witnesses and look forward to 

hearing from each of them today, and I yield back the balance of 

my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 40.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. 

Let me just say that the House, our committee, has passed the 

authorizing supplemental, but it is in the Appropriation Committee’s sight, and they are the ones—and I do agree, you know, we 

do need to get this funding. But it is not that I am passing the 

buck. We have done our job. Now, the gentlemen on the Appropriations Committee need to do the same, because, he is right, we need 

to fund it. 

Now, let me yield to my good friend, the Chairman of the Air and 

Land Subcommittee, my good friend from Hawaii, Mr. Abercrombie. 

STATEMENT OF HON. NEIL ABERCROMBIE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM HAWAII, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND FORCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

To our witnesses, I hope you don’t feel it is unfair that we are 

making these opening remarks just at the time the bell is going off. 

The reason for it is, is I think it is important, as we receive your 

testimony, for you to have the context within which we are operating in our decision-making, because I think it will help you to 

help us understand where we need to go. 

I am especially appreciative of Mr. Forbes’ commentary, because 

I reach a different conclusion from that commentary than he does 

about whether or not the resolution is premature. We suffer from 

some very great difficulty here on the committee. People like Mr. 

Forbes knows what he is talking about. People on the committee, 

by definition, are consumed with the subject matter that is in front 

5 

of us. The sad reality is, is that many of our colleagues, let alone 

most of the people in the United States, are unaware of the circumstances that we are dealing with here today and unaware of 

the subject matter that you will be discussing in your various presentations. 

One of the reasons, I believe that we do need to have this resolution is not because we don’t know it or that we are not aware of 

what is involved in the regular order budget process, or the supplemental budgets that have become part and parcel of our response 

where defense is concerned, but that most people don’t know. 

We want to pass this resolution or get this resolution forward to 

inform our colleagues, the rest of the Congress and, by extension, 

the country as to why we are doing what we are doing, what we 

need to do and, more particularly, from my point of view, get away 

from these supplemental budgets. The very things that my good 

friend, Mr. Forbes cited, are what we should be taking up in the 

regular order of the budget process and the regular order of the authorization. 

Think about it, long lead items, building strategic reserves, 

ground combat vehicles, building the necessary air carriers that we 

need to have, growing the force. The failure of the Congress to act 

on the supplemental for over a year now. You can’t depend on the 

supplemental budget, you can’t start mixing up the regular budget 

order, the regular Department of Defense Authorization Act that 

leads to appropriations and become dependent on a supplemental 

budget which may or may not get presented. 

We don’t know when it is going to be presented, we don’t know 

how it is going to be presented, we don’t know what other items 

or elements will come into it in the course of its presentation, we 

don’t know when it is going to pass. And yet we are talking about 

strategic elements, such as I have just mentioned and such as Mr. 

Forbes outlined, being dependent on as undependable a process as 

a supplemental budget. 

We need to have a readiness resolution out there that, in my 

judgment, that can explain to our colleagues and explain to the 

American people what is at stake and why we are doing what we 

are doing. 

I have a further comment, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to 

enter into the record, which outlines, essentially, what you have 

said and what Mr. Forbes has said, reiterating it and possibly adding some detail. But with your permission, I would like to put it 

in. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Hearing no objection, so ordered. The rest of your 

statement will be submitted for the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Abercrombie can be found in the 

Appendix on page 38.] 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And I want to echo the chairman’s remarks 

that we did not plan on having this vote take place as it is right 

now, and it probably will be 40 minutes, and I am not quite sure 

how we are going to work it now. I would like very much to hear 

the witnesses. 

Mr. ORTIZ. I am the same way. And I know that all three of you 

are very, very busy individuals. And one of the reasons why we are 

6 

here is to get your input and to hear from you. I understand we 

are having how many votes? Okay. 

So we should be back, pray to God, we should be back in about 

15 minutes. 

Is that okay with you, witnesses? Thank you. 

The committee will recess for about 15 minutes 

[Recess.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. We are going to see if we can really get going now, 

but since we have a 10-minute debate on a motion to recommit and 

then we have a 50-minute vote, we really didn’t want to waste your 

time. I think we need to continue to go on. 

And I would like to submit a statement for the record for Mr. 

Jim Saxton. I hope he comes back in. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Saxton can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. But today we have a panel of distinguished witnesses, 

and we are very happy that you are with us today. 

We have Ms. Flournoy, Miche`le Flournoy, she is the president of 

the Center for a New American Security; Mr. Lawrence J. Korb, 

Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress; Mr. Thomas 

Donnelly, Resident Fellow of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at 

the American Enterprise Institute. 

Without objection, all the witnesses’ prepared statements will be 

accepted for the record. 

And, Ms. Flournoy, welcome, and you may proceed with your 

opening remarks that you might have. 

STATEMENT OF MICHE` LE A. FLOURNOY, PRESIDENT, CENTER 

FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Thank you very much, Chairman Ortiz, Chairman Abercrombie and Ranking Member Forbes, members of the 

committee. Thank you very much for holding these hearings and 

for inviting us to speak to you today. 

I want to start by saying I applaud your holding these hearings, 

because I think it is very important that the American people become more aware of the significant strains and stresses on the 

force, because that is part of building the support that is necessary 

to fully fund the refit and recovery of the U.S. military, which is 

going on long beyond the current force levels in Iraq start to come 

down, long beyond when the supplementals run out. 

So I applaud your calling attention to this issue, because I think 

it is critical to building the political support necessary to fully fund 

the recovery of the U.S. military, particularly our ground forces. 

As you all well know, the high tempo of operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan has taken a substantial toll on the force, particularly 

the Army, the Marine Corps and the National Guard and Reserve. 

Personnel, training, and equipment in these components have been 

under sustained stress for several years due to multiple deployments with back-to-back times overseas and minimal time in between at home. 

Readiness has kept pace with current operations but just barely. 

And, now, in recent weeks, we have had Army leaders, sort of, raising the red flag and warning that the demand for forces in Iraq 

7 

and Afghanistan is actually exceeding what the Army can 

sustainably supply. 

The other key concern I have is that the United States currently 

lacks an adequate strategic reserve of ground forces that could be 

ready and available to respond to other potential contingencies that 

might arise. As a global power with global interests, and at a time 

when we face daunting challenges around the globe, I think restoring that strategic reserve of ready ground forces is absolutely critical for the United States. 

In the interest of time, I am going to pass over some of the detailed analysis I have tried to provide in my written testimony 

about how multiple back-to-back deployments with little time at 

home are stressing the force specifically. 

I just would note that while I think it is a very positive step that 

the President has announced that the 15-month tours for the Army 

are now going to return to 12-month tours with 12 months in between, I just want to note with caution that one-to-one ration, although it is an improvement over what we have had, is not sustainable over time, particularly coming on the wake for units that 

have already had three and four tours overseas in a short amount 

of time. 

I also talked in my statement how compressed training time has 

narrowed the focus of our training to be primary for counterinsurgency without enabling units to have the time they need to train 

on the full spectrum of missions. 

I also talk about wear and tear on equipment and how Army 

equipment, for example, is wearing out at up to nine times the normal rate, and that is starting to really build the cost of refitting 

the force and recapitalizing the force to quite a substantial level 

and, again, one that is going to be, kind of, a bad hangover. It is 

going to go on beyond the time that supplemental funding and be 

a bill that we have to pay for many years going forward. 

Let me just focus on two key areas: recruitment and retention. 

As you all know, the Army has been making its overall recruiting 

and retention targets in recent years, but I think there are some 

very serious challenges that we need to pay attention to. 

For the Army, for all of the services, one of the problems is on 

the supply side. Only three in 10 young Americans actually meet 

the educational, moral, and health standards required for military 

service. So that is a very small percentage of the population that 

we are able to recruit from. The Army has had, particularly as it 

tries to grow the force and needs to recruit more people, has had 

a particular challenge meeting its own standards. For example, the 

percentage of new recruits that has high school diplomas has fallen 

from the target of being over 90 percent to about 82 percent in this 

fiscal year. 

In addition, the Army has had to grant additional numbers of 

waivers, some for medical, some for other reasons but particularly 

so-called moral waivers so that you now have 20 percent of new recruits receiving a waiver of some kind. Now, many of these are for 

misdemeanors, but I think as the Army begins to track the performance of these troops, the record is mixed. Some are performing 

better than average, some are performing less. This is a quality 

issue that we have to pay very close attention to over time. 

8 

On retention—— 

Mr. ORTIZ. You can go ahead. We still have about 10 good minutes left. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Okay. I will try to be very quick. 

On retention, again, overall target is being met. I think there is 

growing concern, within the Army, particularly, also the Marine 

Corps, about retention of company grade officers. Lots of concern 

about people coming off their third or even fourth tours and deciding to leave the service. These challenges will grow. As these forces 

grow, you have to actually achieve higher than historical retention 

rates. 

In my testimony, I tried to, again, underscore the challenge that 

readiness poses for us and to highlight five specific steps that the 

Congress can take. One is to continue to support the growth of the 

force, the growing of the size of the Army and the Marine Corps, 

but to make sure that the pace of growth does not exceed our ability to maintain quality that really sets our force apart from any 

other in the world. 

Second, begin to drawdown forces in Iraq over time to reduce the 

level of strains on the force, to increase dwell times between deployments, and to make more time for full spectrum of training and 

eventually the ability to both send more forces to Afghanistan and 

reconstitute a ready reserve of ground forces. 

Third, reestablish that ready reserve of ground forces, absolutely 

essential to lowering strategic risk for our Nation. 

Fourth, fully fund and continue to fund the reset and force expansion, which will become more challenging as supplementals 

come down over time. 

And, finally, rebalance the force for the 21st century. Pay close 

attention to how we allocate growth to the different kinds of capability areas and ensure that our forces have the mix of capabilities 

they need for the full spectrum of warfare, not just conventional 

war at the high end. 

In the interest of time, I will conclude my remarks there and be 

happy to take any questions when the time comes. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Flournoy can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Korb, you can begin. Somebody just didn’t talk to the Pope 

today, and that is why we are having all these votes. 

But go ahead and you can get started, sir. 

STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE J. KORB, SENIOR FELLOW, 

CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 

Mr. KORB. All right. As you said, my testimony will be entered 

into the record. 

Let me make a few comments. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Can you pull the mike a touch closer, Mr. 

Korb, please? 

Mr. KORB. All right. Let me make a few—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Even closer. 

9 

Mr. KORB. Okay. This is not the first time this has happened, 

and I think it is important to keep in mind, they say history 

doesn’t repeat itself, but sometimes it rhymes. 

The Army was broken as a result of Vietnam, and the transition 

to an all-volunteer military when to meet our numbers we lowered 

our standards. And, basically, it took us a decade to fix it. I had 

the privilege of working with President Reagan and some of those 

distinguished gentlemen on the wall, as well as people like Senator 

Nunn, Senator Warner and Senator Goldwater on the Senate side 

to get it back to where it needed to be. 

In my view, you are there again. People use euphemisms: hollow, 

out of balance. I mean, the fact of the matter is you have a very, 

very serious problem. 

Now, I want to make a point: How did we get into this? The reason we got into this is that we did not have the courage of our convictions. I did not support this war, but if you wanted to fight it, 

you had to realize that when we set up the volunteer military, we 

had four pillars. One, a comparatively small active duty Army, a 

guard and reserve that would be a bridge to conscription. We did 

not do that, and because of that, we caused the problems that you 

have to address here. Multiple tours, not sufficient dwell time, 

guard and reserve not used as a strategic Reserve but an operational Reserve, getting deployed over and over again and then 

substituting private contractors to do military functions. And that 

is the reason we got into it was we didn’t have the courage of our 

convictions. 

General Abizaid, the most distinguished commander of the Central Command we have had in this war, basically put it well when 

he said, ‘‘The Army was not designed for a long war,’’ and so we 

didn’t do it. 

So the question becomes, now what do you do? You have got two 

choices, in my view. You want to continue this endless war in Iraq, 

go back to the draft. If you don’t want to do that, get out of Iraq. 

Set a responsible deployment plan. 

General Maxwell Taylor, former Army Chief of Staff, Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Ambassador to Saigon said, ‘‘We 

went to Vietnam, we sent the Army to Vietnam to save Vietnam. 

We took the Army out to save the Army.’’ 

The late Bill Buckley put it even more succinctly. He said, ‘‘Had 

you not gotten out of Vietnam, you wouldn’t have won the Cold 

War, and if you don’t get out of Iraq, you are not going to win the 

war on terror,’’ because as Miche`le has pointed out, and I have in 

my testimony, you do not have the capacity to do the things that 

you need as long as you are bogged down, and you are weakening 

your military. 

The thing most disturbing is, 13 percent of the people coming 

into the Army in fiscal year 2008 have moral waivers. That is the 

type that you are getting in. We did that in the 70’s to meet our 

targets, and we had an absolute disaster on our hands. 

Now, what to do as you get out of Iraq, I think there are a couple 

of things to keep in mind when you expand the force. You should 

expand the ground forces, because, basically, the Guard needs to 

stay home to guard the homeland, and if you have other things, 

you do not want to rely on them as much. Do not lower your qualVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:29 Feb 25, 2009 Jkt 043786 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-149\107030.000 HAS1 PsN: LINDA
10 

ity standards. If you can’t get the people, don’t do it. The Commandant of the Marine Corps in the 70’s, Lou Wilson, said, ‘‘I don’t 

care if I don’t meet my numbers, I am not going to take in people 

I shouldn’t,’’ and that turned out to be the correct strategy in the 

long run. 

Number two, don’t make the force that you expand a mirror 

image of what you have got. You need forces that understand 

peacekeeping and stabilization. 

Number three, do it in a fiscally sound manner. We have got too 

many weapons that deal with threats from a bygone era. Get rid 

of those to pay for the expansion of the ground forces. 

And then, finally, drop of these outmoded social restrictions on 

people who come in. Get rid of, ‘‘Don’t ask, don’t tell,’’ okay? Basically, the uniform code of military justice is enough to deal with it. 

We are throwing out people who have critical skills that we need, 

and if you look at all of—for example, General Shalikashvili, the 

Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff in the 90’s basically said 

that that policy is outmoded. 

And then, finally, drop the restrictions on women in combat. You 

should set specific criteria for every job in the military, and they 

should not be determined by gender. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Korb can be found in the Appendix on page 57.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. 

We have a couple of votes, and hopefully we will be back in the 

next 10 minutes. Ms. Bordallo will continue with the hearing, so 

take your time when you are making your testimony, because we 

do have some very key members in the audience with us today. So 

we can go vote, and you can continue with the hearing. 

Thank you so much. 

Madam Chairwoman. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Donnelly, I assure you your testimony 

has been gone over by us, and when we come back we will pick on 

you as quick as we can. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS DONNELLY, RESIDENT FELLOW, 

FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY STUDIES, THE AMERICAN 

ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. DONNELLY. Mr. Abercrombie, I appreciate that attention. 

[Laughter.] 

As a former staff member, it is always an honor to return to this 

committee room. I look forward to being picked on. 

I am also relieved to be excused from the obligation to speed testify, so if we are going to continue, okay. 

Much of what I have to say will be informed by my previous 

service as a committee staff member. When I worked here force 

readiness was something I spent a lot of time on, but also the condition of American land forces is something I have spent all my career doing. 

And if I may be permitted a bit of shameless commerce, the questions that the committee asks are the primary subject of a book 

that my colleague, Fred Kagan, and I will be publishing in the next 

11 

month called, ‘‘Ground Truth: The Future of U.S. Land Power.’’ So 

I appreciate your indulgence, even if the chairmen aren’t here. 

I want to supplement the testimony that Miche`le and Larry gave 

by trying to give a little bit of a larger context as to how we came 

to this pass. Because if this is a perfect storm, it is not something 

that brewed up just in the last couple of years, in fact. There are 

a number of factors that should be considered when contemplating 

the condition of U.S. land forces and the challenges they face today. 

As Larry suggested in his testimony, even the land force mission 

of the Cold War years was kind of an economy of force mission. 

Those units forward stationed in Germany, the five divisions that 

were permanently garrisoned there, were only intended to hold the 

line for a very brief period while further active units were deployed. And, as Larry said, the Reserve components then would be 

mobilized and deployed as necessary. 

The Cold War came to an end, and the era of peace then was 

upon us. Certainly, the first Bush administration took as its first 

target for defense reductions the land forces of the United States, 

and Congress went along happily with this. Senator Sam Nunn, in 

particular, allowed that he couldn’t find any future use or an important future use for large-scale, heavily equipped land forces. 

Now, obviously, this drawdown was interrupted by Operation 

Desert Storm, which tended to remind people of the value of land 

forces, more generally, but of heavily equipped land forces. But 

after the war was over and the pace picked up again during the 

Clinton administration years, the process continued until the U.S. 

Army’s roles were about 40 percent smaller than they were in 

1988. 

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review process, which was conducted by this Bush administration, also planned to eliminate two 

further Army divisions from the active structure, but those plans 

were shelved in the wake of the September 11 attacks. 

Land forces were also disproportionately, in my judgment, targeted during what we came to call the Procurement Holiday of the 

1990’s. That was, in some ways, understandable, because a smaller 

force could live off the accumulated investments of the Reagan administration. And it is true that the so-called big five procurement 

programs, things like the M1 tank, the Bradley fighting vehicle, 

Blackhawk and Apache helicopters and so forth, were, and continue to remain, the most lethal and modern land force systems on 

the planet. But they got older, and they have been used much more 

rapidly than anticipated, and they have been subject to combat conditions rather than just training conditions. 

Also, the Army’s two signal modernization programs of this period, the Comanche helicopter and the Crusader howitzer, fell victim, first of all, to lack of funding and then to what we have come 

to know as the defense transformation movement. 

And, indeed, the current Future Combat Systems Program, 

which has now started to generate important new capabilities, not 

only for high technology conventional warfare but the kind of irregular warfare that has become the part and parcel of U.S. land 

forces over the last four or five years, has just begun to bring those 

capabilities into the field. 

12 

And, in my judgment, this modernization effort remains underfunded, and even if it were more sufficiently funded, it would be 

years before the full effects of the modernization effort would be 

felt. 

But the transformation movement, as promulgated by former 

Secretary Rumsfeld, was based on two insights that don’t look very 

good in retrospect. One was about the state of the world, that we 

were in an extended period of so-called strategic pause. If that were 

ever true, it certainly seems to be over now, and, certainly, that is 

true if you are wearing a green uniform. Land forces are running 

as fast as they can to do what we ask them to do. 

The second insight was that technologies, and particularly information technologies, would reveal a transparent battlefield. Former 

Admiral Bill Owens, who was the Vice Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 

chairman, talked a lot about this transparent battlefield, lifting the 

fog of war. And we thought that because we would see the battlefield completely, our ability to tailor forces would be more precise 

and more efficient and more effective. 

And, in particular, our land forces might be more valuable as 

nodes in an information network rather than for conducting close 

combat with the enemy. As Chinese theorists who have a gift for 

aphorism came to call it, we thought we had entered an era of no 

contact warfare, and the war in Kosovo seemed to bear that out in 

some sense. 

This really had a whipsawing effect on the U.S. Army, and to the 

degree that the U.S. Army really struggled to be relevant to the 

Kosovo operation, the Army became motivated to emphasize the 

quality of strategic deployability. It was worried about its simple 

ability to get to the fight and secondarily about what would happen 

after they got there. And so the Army has transformed itself into 

a lighter and more mobile and a modular force. 

And this has been supplemented by a Marine-like adoption of a 

force generation model that is based on rotational deployments, 

predictable rotational deployments. 

And so we have to understand that the force itself has changed 

the way it measures its own readiness and the kind of deployment 

that particularly the Army has set for itself. So it has set itself an 

entire set of benchmarks that might be less relevant today than 

they were when they were introduced. Today, I would submit that 

the primary question is not how quickly we can get to a conflict, 

but how long we can remain engaged in it. 

And, obviously, our initial experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

the very successful initial invasions, seemed to suggest that faster 

and lighter were synonymous with better. But if the global war on 

terror has extended from being a global manhunt, as it was often 

called, into the long war, which is more often described as a global 

counterinsurgency, the qualities of sustainability and durability 

seem much more salient than they did when this war began after 

September 11. 

So I would just say that where we are today is a product of 

events that go back at least 15 years. And as the committee considers and submits the resolution for the Congress’ consideration, 

while there are many aspects of the resolution that I find admiVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:29 Feb 25, 2009 Jkt 043786 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-149\107030.000 HAS1 PsN: LINDA
13 

rable, there are some more enduring questions that need to be answered if we are to dig out of the hold that we are in. 

And to conclude very rapidly, I would suggest that whether it is 

a matter of passing the immediate supplemental or including the 

Grow-the-Army initiatives that are in the supplemental in longterm regular budget order of planning, it is simply going to be a 

question of whether we are willing to, as Larry says, summon the 

moral courage to pay the price, and by which I mean primarily the 

fiscal price, because there is no way that the full burden of this 

commitment can be shared equally across the American people. 

This is a war that demands regular forces, highly motivated, 

well-trained regular forces, and I would just submit that we really 

need to increase the size of the force to meet the demands of the 

war and the admirable impulse to reduce the strain on folks cannot 

be solved by pretending the war isn’t as large and as long lasting 

as it is likely to be. We need to size the force to meet the commitment, rather than reduce the war to meet the size of the force. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Donnelly can be found in the Appendix on page 74.] 

Ms. BORDALLO [presiding]. Thank you. Thank you very much, 

Mr. Donnelly. 

I have a couple of questions, and, of course, I do want to thank 

Chairman Ortiz and Chairman Abercrombie for calling this hearing 

and for their leadership overseeing the readiness of our armed 

forces. 

Today’s topic about the readiness shortfalls in our ground forces 

is extremely important to all of us. I am one of the sponsors of H.R. 

834, and I believe that it is important for us, as a Congress, to acknowledge that there are some critical readiness shortfalls and 

that we should take the necessary actions to correct this. 

And I want to thank all of you, this panel of defense policy experts. Thank you for your testimony this afternoon. 

I am particularly concerned about the current levels of equipment that are available to the governors of the 50 states and the 

four territories, including Guam. Lieutenant General Blum puts it 

best. He says, ‘‘It takes the people, plus equipment, plus training 

to equal a capability.’’ 

Nationally, the National Guard only has about 43 percent of its 

equipment on hand and available for use by the commanders in 

chief of the states and the territories and our governors. On Guam, 

we only have a staggering 17 percent of equipment available for 

use by the governor. Obviously, this poses a significant challenge 

to having a viable operational force. The equation is out of balance, 

and we need to fix this problem. 

So I pose this question to any one of you who feels that you can 

answer it. Each year, the President’s budget request includes a document known as the P1R, which provides a breakdown of how 

much of the service procurement request is planned for the National Guard and the Reserves. The annual National Guard and 

Reserve equipment report required under Title 10 does not really 

provide the Congress with an effective oversight tool for visibility 

on whether or not services are, in actual fact, sending the money 

as indicated in the P1R. 

14 

So could you answer this: In your opinion, do you think it would 

be effective if Congress reformatted its Authorization and Appropriations Committee conference report to convey congressional intent for breakdown of each procurement line for active, National 

Guard and Reserve components? Or would it be more beneficial to 

have a separate procurement account for the National Guard and 

Reserves? 

I would like to hear your thoughts on such ideas for potential action. 

Any one of you? 

Mr. KORB. I think given the fact that the Guard has become an 

operational Reserve rather than a strategic Reserve, and, obviously, nobody wants to go back to conscription, you need to ensure 

in the appropriation process that the equipment goes right to them. 

Because if you don’t, and I can tell you from my own days, as they 

say, in the building, it will go to where the overall service wants 

it. So you need to do that. 

I mean, that is why, for example, Congress created a separate 

Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, because there was a concern that if you did not do that, that the voice of the Reserves 

would not be held, and it would get lost in the shuffle. That is why 

Congress created a special operations force budget so they could do 

that. 

So, yes, if you want to do that, I think you need to do that, and 

you also might want to consider—I know other people have talked 

about it—making the head of the National Guard Bureau a fourstar officer so that he or she can sit at the table with the other 

chiefs. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Flournoy, do you have comments on that? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. I have not looked at the specific alternatives 

that you have laid out to have a strong opinion over which way is 

best, but I do agree with the sentiment that now that we are turning to the National Guard and Reserves as more of an operational 

force, we need to fundamentally reprioritize the equipping of that 

force. They have been consistently underresourced over a period of 

years. 

The wear and tear that they have experienced in recent situations has only exacerbated that problem. And I think even current 

plans to withdraw their equipment only brings them up—doesn’t 

bring them up to 100 percent of their authorized levels. So even the 

get well plan only gets them about 75 percent of the way. 

And now that we have the, sort of, transnational terrorism and 

very real risks to our homeland security, not only natural disasters 

like Katrina, but attacks like 9/11, I think the strategic importance 

of the Guard, not only as an operational Reserve for missions 

abroad but as a force for response at home, has gone up substantially, and I think we have to adjust the way we equip and fund 

the Guard, accordingly. 

Mr. DONNELLY. If I may, I would—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes, Mr. Donnelly. 

Mr. DONNELLY. Thank you. I would agree with the diagnosis of 

the problem. I would be very leery of a separate and discrete procurement account, particularly in a time of war, and when we have 

15 

essentially a just-in-time readiness model, removing any further 

flexibility from the Army’s ability to manage its resources is likely 

to have unintended second order consequences. 

And, also, I think it is important to distinguish between the federally organized Army Reserve and the state level National Guard 

units. So I would agree that the need to modernize the Guard is 

more pressing than it has ever been, and I would agree with both 

Miche`le and Larry’s characterization of the Guard as an operational Reserve; however, I am not sure that, certainly, a discrete 

and separate procurement account, or set of accounts, would not 

create more problems than it solves. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Donnelly. 

Well, I can’t quite agree with you. I feel that there has to be 

some specific language or whatever—whenever you don’t have a 

specific account of something, it is going to be lost in the general 

fund, and I do agree that this is what is happening here, and I 

think this is why the Guard and Reserves are shortchanged. 

I have another question here. This, again, is to any one of our 

panelists. As with all the other services, the National Guard Bureau publishes an unfunded requirements document every year. 

Every year, it seems the unfunded requirements grow for issues 

like full-time support and training, which are essential elements to 

have a ready and operational force. 

The service components have acknowledged that the National 

Guard is an operational force; however, I am skeptical of the financial commitment that is truly needed to make the National Guard 

a truly operational force. 

Short of ending the war in Iraq, what other alternatives or actions should Congress look into in order to provide additional training dollars for the National Guard? Are there any recommendations from the recent National Guard and Reserve commission report that could help with this aspect of funding? 

Maybe we will begin with you, Mr. Korb. 

Mr. KORB. The job of the Secretary of Defense and the President 

and the Congress is to set priorities. I don’t care how much money 

you are willing to spend, you can’t buy perfect security. And it 

seems to me, as you look at the threats that the United States 

faces, the immediate threats, that you have got to give priority, as 

Miche`le mentioned here, to homeland defense. That is now a new 

mission. You have also got to give priority to the fact that the 

Guard, as you pointed out, is going to be used as an operational 

Reserve. 

So I think, therefore, when you look at the unfunded requirements, you have to put them up against things like buying weapons systems for an era that no longer exists. We still buy an awful 

lot of weapons that were designed primarily for the Cold War and 

now continue to be justified on the basis of some potential future 

threat. 

So I think that is what you have to do. And as I look at the budget that was submitted to Congress this year by the administration, 

they made no hard choice; they just kicked the can down the road 

to the next administration. 

For example, both Secretary Gates and Deputy Secretary Gordon 

England are on record as saying that the production of the F/A– 

16 

22 should stop at 182 or 183 planes, whatever it is, but yet they 

didn’t close the production line. So what that means is that the Air 

Force will come back next year and ask for more, and that is what 

we will be competing against, these unfunded requirements, which, 

in my view, should have a higher priority, given the immediate 

threats that we face. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Flournoy. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I guess I would just echo the priorities of, I 

think, the first task is to restore the Guard’s readiness for its 

homeland defense and security missions, because we have no 

backup there. I mean, they are it, given how busy the active duty 

force is, which is usually the backup. So I think that has got to be 

the first priority. 

And the second, I would say, there are parts of the Guard that 

are more stressed than others. The Army has parked a number of 

so-called high-demand, low-density assets in the Guard, and those 

forces are the ones who are seeing the particularly high levels of 

perstempo and optempo, repeated deployments and so forth. And I 

would focus on getting that part of the force well, both in terms of 

time at home for personnel and equipment. 

And then I would look to trying to get back to resourcing the 

kinds of sustainable deployment tempos that are in Army plans, 

sort of, five to six years between one-year tours for looking at the 

Guard as an operational reserve, which seem a very far, just very 

distant vision at this point, but I think that would be the next priority on my list of things to try to get back to. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

Mr. Donnelly. 

Mr. DONNELLY. Again, I would just say that the active force and 

the Reserve components are so deeply intertwined at this point 

that any solution that targets only a part of the problem is almost 

sure to have unintended consequences. 

So if we want to restore the pace of operations for the Reserve 

components, that, I would agree, is preferable. I think the first 

thing that has to be fixed is the active component and particularly 

the active duty Army. The Marine Corps is now essentially embroiled in what are traditional Army long duration land force missions. 

So if we want to fix the system, I would say the place to start 

is with the active force, and we have to have some patience in 

order to understand this is going to take a long time to remedy the 

problems that have accumulated over the past 15 years. 

One of the problems is, is that we don’t have a good measure for 

balancing these various risks, the risks of fighting abroad, versus 

the lack of preparedness for homeland defense and homeland security. 

So I understand that these shortfalls increase the stress on 

guardsmen and reservists, but I think anything less than a holistic 

approach to the solution runs a very great risk of making the 

thing, in an unintended way, just compounding our problems rather than solving them. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Donnelly. 

17 

I now have a question, perhaps, Mr. Korb, you would answer 

this. Do you have any suggestions for actions the Congress can 

take to improve readiness beyond the supplemental? 

Mr. KORB. I think what you have to do, again, is to focus in the 

budget on the short-term problems. I think that, for example—I 

will leave personnel aside for a second—you can buy equipment, 

you know it is being worn out. I think that Congressman Abercrombie and people like Senator McCain have said after more than 

five years of war in Iraq and six in Afghanistan, we should put this 

stuff in the regular budget. We know how much this equipment is 

being burned up as we go. So that should be in the regular budget 

where it would then have to compete with other programs that 

don’t deal with the immediate threat. 

And I think that is the way you do it. Once you settle on how 

much money you are going to spend, then I think then you can look 

at the priorities. But what is happening now is you are putting a 

lot of this into the supplemental, and at some point the 

supplementals will end, and when the supplementals end, then the 

question becomes, what happens to these? 

After Vietnam, we did not do that. I mean, after the war in Vietnam ended, we did not continue to reset the force, and it took us 

quite a while to be able to get the readiness back to where we 

needed. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much for your suggestions, Mr. Korb. 

The chair would like to recognize another one of the members of 

the Readiness Committee, Mr. Saxton, for any questions he may 

have. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

NEW JERSEY, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND FORCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. SAXTON. Madam Chairlady, I guess I have an observation 

rather than a question, and I will invite the witnesses to comment 

if they would like to. 

I have taken special interest in the resolution, that is H.R. 834, 

which is the subject of this hearing, which goes to great lengths to 

point out the deficiencies, or the perceived deficiencies, by those 

who wrote the resolution in our deployed forces and in the forces, 

as noted in the resolution, that are training to deploy. 

And I guess my problem is that we have had two hearings previously on this subject, and they were both with representatives 

from the Pentagon. The first hearing was where there were representatives from the U.S. Army Reserve and the National Guard 

who concluded that whatever deficiencies there are have been remedied to some extent by appropriations, usually through supplemental appropriations. 

I noted, for example, that the Army National Guard in 2001 on 

equipment had fewer than 290 medium tactical vehicles on hand, 

which was a huge problem. But by the time we held the hearing, 

which was several weeks ago, instead of 290 medium tactical vehicles on hand, they had 4,722. 

And when General Cody came in a subsequent hearing and 

talked about the same subject, we asked him how that growth was 

18 

possible, and he said the growth in equipment was possible because 

of the supplemental appropriations bills that we had passed, which 

brings me to this resolution, which points out many of the deficiencies, perceived deficiencies, which are apparently on their way 

to being fixed if you believe the Army National Guard and subsequently General Cody. 

And that leads me to the question, and I know that the gentleman in the chair can’t answer this question, because it is not his 

decision, but why in the world we haven’t passed the proposed supplemental that is languishing in the House is the decision, apparently, of the Democrat leadership to delay it or perhaps not to pass 

it. 

So there is a road to a fix for the equipment readiness issue, 

which lies, according to General Cody and according to the National Guard representative, General Vaughn, and according to the 

U.S. Army Reserve representative, General Stultz, that can be 

fixed with the supplementals, and we have one languishing. And 

it is beyond me why those who would vote for this resolution, or 

maybe we should, maybe we shouldn’t, why the leadership of that 

party will not permit us to vote on a supplemental, which is the 

road to recovery. 

So that is just my observation. I was late and didn’t get a chance 

to give an opening statement, so I am venting my feelings, and if 

you care to comment, you are certainly welcome. 

Mr. KORB. Congressman, even when you pass the supplemental 

with the Guard, you are not going to solve the whole problem, because you need to take a look at the report that Arnold Punaro put 

out and says, yes, this would be a step in the direction, but it is 

not because, according to that report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, there is a $48 billion equipment shortfall. The money there will move a little bit toward it. And according 

to Arnold, 88 percent of all Army National Guard units are not 

ready. So even this, while it would help some, is not going to solve 

the problem. 

Mr. SAXTON. I am delighted that you said it would help some, because it certainly would. As a matter of fact, I am told that in order 

to fix the entire problem, that is to bring all units up to C1 level, 

it would cost something in the neighborhood of $1 trillion. Well, we 

are not going to do that. We never had done it. That condition has 

never existed. 

And so it seems to me that if the old saying holds any water, 

that if you are getting yourself in trouble by digging a hole, the 

first thing you ought to do is stop digging and then start to climb 

out. Well, we stopped digging, and we have started to climb out 

through the use of supplementals, and yet there is a supplemental 

which has been proposed, is in a position to be voted on, and the 

leadership of the House will not permit us to do that. 

Mr. ORTIZ. One of the reasons, like I stated before I left this 

hearing, that we are here because we know we have a problem. 

And going back to the National Guard and the Reserves, we have 

to be realistic. They serve two masters. They respond to the needs 

of the state, and they respond to the needs of the Federal Government for deployments whenever they are activated and needed. 

19 

The problem that we have now is that some of these National 

Guard and Reserve people have gone and have been deployed, and 

you know what, they came back and they did not bring their equipment back. They left it behind, because some of the equipment was 

being destroyed and was being utilized by the active Army. 

So now I am going to ask a question here that I had. 

Ms. Flournoy, what is your assessment of the testimony, and I 

am pretty sure you are familiar with it, given last week by General 

Magnus and General Cody concerning ground forces readiness, specifically their comments concerning the ground force ability to respond to other contingencies that arise? And you know what I fear 

is the unknown. 

Maybe you can respond to the question that I just asked about 

the testimony of both generals. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. When I heard and then re-read their testimonies, 

it was the closest I have ever heard senior leaders in the Marine 

Corps and the Army come to sounding an alarm. It is not in their 

culture to sound alarms. I mean, you give them a certain mission, 

they are going to die trying to do the mission. 

But I think when General Cody said, ‘‘Our readiness is being 

consumed as fast as we build it. If unaddressed, the lack of balance 

poses a significant risk to the all-volunteer force and degrades the 

Army’s ability to make a timely response to other contingencies.’’ 

They know they are on the hook, not only to supply forces for 

Iraq and Afghanistan but for any other contingency that might 

arise and the President might tell them to go to deal with a threat. 

And they are acutely aware of the fact that there are many possible challenges out there, and we do not have an adequate reserve 

of ready and available ground forces. And I think that makes them, 

as force suppliers, deeply uncomfortable and deeply aware of the 

strategic risk that we are accepting at the moment. 

So I think they are very interested in seeing a rebalancing of demand and supply. I think here supporting growth is very, very important to bringing that back into balance. But that is going to 

take time. In the nearer term, the only way you are going to get 

closer to that balance is by moderating demand. 

Mr. ORTIZ. I know we have been gone, so let me just yield to my 

good friend, Mr. Forbes, for a question that he might have. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I have got a number 

of questions if this is the appropriate time to go ahead and ask 

some of those. 

And I want to begin by stating what we all know up here but 

make sure that everybody knows it, if there is anybody who is neutral out there, and that is that some of my dearest friends are sitting on this subcommittee, and I have just absolute respect for the 

chairman and for Neil Abercrombie and Madeleine, who was handling this and who has left now, and, of course, Mr. Saxton and Mr. 

Jones and Mr. Wilson, who is coming in. 

Oh, I am sorry, Madeleine, I didn’t see you sitting back there. 

And I also have incredible respect for our witnesses. 

But I have stated this before, and I continue to believe it, every 

time I see you guys, it reminds of the end of the Casablanca movie 

where we say, ‘‘Okay, round up the usual suspects.’’ We have heard 

this testimony over and over and over again, you know? And one 

20 

of the big concerns I had today was, if we are really serious about 

talking about readiness, we don’t need an interpretation from our 

witnesses as to what our men and women say; we need them here. 

Let you say whatever you want and put them behind you and let 

them answer, and we requested that, but we were denied that ability to have them come in here and answer these readiness questions. 

And the concern that I have today is what Mr. Saxton has raised. 

There is an article in the paper that talks about the fact that over 

and over again now what we are doing is taking matters that 

would normally be on the suspension calendar, running them 

through the Rules Committee and then bringing them up on the 

floor so we can have a vote to look like we have something to do. 

We don’t need to have a discussion about having a discussion on 

readiness. Mr. Saxton said, we need today to pass the supplemental and to get that passed. And my dear friend, the chairman, 

rightly so, we have passed the supplemental out, but as my other 

dear friend, Neil Abercrombie said, as a lot of people in this body 

don’t understand the need for readiness, what we really need to be 

doing, if we could really focus on our readiness concerns, is we need 

to pass a resolution that says, we want that supplemental coming 

back without loading it up with all these pork barrel projects and 

with any other kind of political agendas on it, because that will do 

more to help our readiness than any discussion we are going to 

have here today. 

Now, Ms. Flournoy, I want to just ask you a question, because 

I listened to your testimony, read your testimony, listened to Mr. 

Korb’s, read his—Mr. Donnelly, I apologize, I didn’t get to hear 

yours, but I read yours—and, Ms. Flournoy, you talked about 43 

percent, I think, of the equipment available to the Guard for their 

equipment utilization. Is that an accurate statement in your testimony? Am I misinterpreting what you said? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. This is from the Commission on the Guard and 

Reserve, that the Army National Guard currently lacks 43.5 percent of its authorized equipment. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Can I stop you right there? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. 

Mr. FORBES. Can I ask you this question: Is that an accurate figure today? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. It may have changed in recent weeks. 

Mr. FORBES. You don’t know, do you? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I don’t know since the report has come out. 

Mr. FORBES. All right. And now let me ask you this: Do you know 

the date that that number was effective for in that report? I have 

got a copy of the report here. What date was that date effective for? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I know it was within the last year, but I don’t 

know if it has changed substantially. 

Mr. FORBES. Would it have been February of 2007? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Pardon me? 

Mr. FORBES. Would it have been February of 2007? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Like I said, I don’t have a specific date. 

Mr. FORBES. So your testimony today is that the figure that you 

are testifying to, you got out of a report, a report that you don’t 

know when the effective date was based on—— 

21 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, I can tell you that I actually had my testimony reviewed by people for accuracy, not for judgment or opinion 

but for accuracy, within the Army staff, and they said that is still 

in the ballpark. There was not a meaningful change. 

Mr. FORBES. Ms. Flournoy—— 

Mr. ORTIZ. Why don’t we just go ahead and let her answer your 

question? 

Mr. FORBES. No, please, I want you to. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. No, that was my answer, that there may be some 

change but not a significant change. 

Mr. FORBES. And in all due respect, these are the figures that 

have been given to us by the Army Chief of Staff in March of 2008 

to this committee. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Okay. 

Mr. FORBES. They are enormously different. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Great. That is a very good news story. 

Mr. FORBES. They have figures of 79 percent and 66 percent. 

Now, the Army chief of staff, I would imagine, would have a greater degree of accuracy, perhaps, than some of the people you had 

look it over. And my point is not to discredit you, it is to simply 

say, between that time period and today, we authorized $20 billion 

in the 2007 budget that is beginning to be implemented in here, 

and I think you would agree with me, if the Army Chief of Staff 

is not giving us false information, that 79 percent and 66 percent, 

the two figures that they gave, is a whole lot different than 43.5 

percent and 33.5 percent. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I have not been given access to that information. 

I gave you the best information that I had. 

Mr. FORBES. And, Ms. Flournoy—— 

Ms. FLOURNOY. So I am glad to hear it is a better story. That 

would make me very happy. 

Mr. FORBES. And my point is, if we had had them in here testifying, as we requested, they would have at least been able to give 

us that accurate picture. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think General Cody was here. 

Mr. FORBES. The other question I would ask is this, how many 

members of the Navy do we have currently in ground force supplemental capacities today, as you and I are listening and looking at 

our overall readiness capacity, do you know? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Sir, I know that there are a number of not only 

Navy personnel but also Air Force personnel, but I do not have the 

exact figure in my head. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Korb. 

Mr. KORB. I do know that they call them ILOs, in lieu of, over 

there, and the number probably—and it changes, obviously, all of 

the time. And when we try and get those numbers, we are told they 

are classified. As I pointed out in my testimony here, when we 

tried to get information on active duty units, Guard units, they 

wouldn’t give them to us. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Korb, first of all, let me just say, I wasn’t with 

you when you asked, but, again, it comes back to what we had requested. If we had them here testifying, they have to tell us the 

information or they can tell us it is classified. Just as of yesterday, 

22 

they told me it was 14,671 that you don’t even know that they 

have, and that is a huge impact on readiness. 

Now, let me ask you this question: If you look at those individuals, what was the largest, most expensive, most powerful platform 

the Navy had for readiness capability in their arsenal of tricks? 

What would you say it would be? The largest platform the Navy 

has. 

Mr. KORB. Probably an aircraft carrier. 

Mr. FORBES. Aircraft carrier. On September the 11th of 2001, 

how many did we have that were deployable? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I believe it was 11. 

Mr. FORBES. Eleven deployable? 

Mr. Korb? 

Mr. KORB. Well, when you say fully ready to be deployed? 

Mr. FORBES. Absolutely. That is the word, ‘‘deployable,’’ ready to 

be deployed. 

Mr. KORB. Okay. I mean, the Navy—and I remember my own 

days as a naval flight officer where you would basically be deployed 

for six months, you would come back for six months to get yourself 

ready, so I would say two-thirds were fully deployable. 

Mr. FORBES. How many would that be? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. With the possibility of surges. 

Mr. KORB. At that particular time, I would say, probably eight. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. You would say 8, you said 11. The actual answer was two. Do you know how many we have deployable today? 

Let me give you the answer, because I don’t think if you didn’t 

know what it was on September 11, you probably don’t know today. 

Today, we have three; in 30 days, we could have six; in 90 days, 

we could have seven. That is a huge readiness benefit that we 

have, because we don’t have to ask permission where we land our 

planes, we have got those carriers ready. And I would think that 

would be a discussion that we would want to have and that you 

would want to know if we were talking about readiness. 

Now, the other thing I want to just raise up, and Brian, if you 

could throw me that first chart, because this is Ms. Flournoy’s testimony, and it was good testimony, but she basically made a statement that I think was very accurate, and she said, when you talk 

about the sky is falling stuff, if we take a step back, because that 

is what the American people are really looking at, one of the things 

that she said that she experienced when she looked at our force 

was that we had the most experienced, the most adaptive, the most 

professional and the most capable force this country has ever fielded. 

And I asked her if that meant more than last year. Last year, 

the figures that she had on the Guard were from February of last 

year. ‘‘More than last year,’’ she said, ‘‘Yes.’’ I said, ‘‘More than the 

year before that?’’ ‘‘Yes.’’ And we went all the way back to 2000. 

Now, since that time, I have asked that same question of Secretary Geren. You know what he said? He agreed with you, the 

most experienced, adaptive, professional and capable force this 

country has ever fielded, more than in 2000, more than 2001, 2002, 

2003, you can do the rest of the math. I asked General Casey, same 

quote, he agreed; Admiral Fallon, who at that time was commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), he agreed; General 

23 

David Petraeus, he agreed; Admiral Eric Olson, he agreed; Admiral 

Timothy Keating, he agreed. 

Mr. Korb, a while ago, said if we got the supplemental, it 

wouldn’t fix all the problems. We have never fixed all the problems. 

In fact, in 2000, we had a picture of $56 billion of holes in the yard. 

Our testimony from all of our men and women in uniform, who 

know the figures, said that as of next year, it would be $17 billion. 

Brian, if you would give me the next chart. This is what Mr. 

Saxton was just pointing out. Instead of saying we want to educate 

all the Members of Congress about the need for readiness, instead 

of having debates on whether we are going to have additional debates, if we pass this supplemental right now, if we focused our energy and our time and said, ‘‘Let’s have a resolution that passes 

that,’’ this would do more to grow the force, which would deal with 

the problems you are talking about, because we are talking about 

36,000 additional end strength needs that we begin the process of 

meeting with that supplemental that is tied up today. But we are 

not talking about that. 

We can’t be content to just say we can wash our hands because 

we passed it. We have got to say, we need to get this money to our 

troops, because they need it. 

And the last one. And that is why Mr. Saxton and I today put 

in a resolution that, in all due respect, with all of our friendships 

to everybody, is the resolution we should be debating today, and we 

should have military folks here to at least have a supplement with 

accurate facts of our readiness that says this, that Congress should 

immediately act to pass the supplemental without additional 

strings attached to it. 

That resolution, Mr. Saxton and I are filing today, that is the 

resolution, I would submit, we need to be talking about if we are 

really serious about moving forward with readiness. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Mr. KORB. Mr. Chairman, can I make a comment? 

Mr. ORTIZ. Sure, go ahead, Mr. Korb. 

Mr. KORB. I used to be in charge of readiness in the Reagan administration, and I think you have to be very careful when you use 

the term, ‘‘readiness,’’ because you go C1, C2, C3, C4. And so when 

you say ready, are you talking C1 or C2 or C3? And those numbers 

are classified. So when you ask a question, like to Miche`le and myself, on this date how many were ready, were you saying, C1, C2, 

C3, okay? And I think that is important. 

Now, let me give you another example from my own experience, 

okay? When I was a naval flight officer, I had the duty one day, 

we got a call from the seventh fleet, and they said, ‘‘How many of 

your planes are ready?’’ So I read the chart, the C1s. My commanding officer almost had me court marshaled. He said, ‘‘When 

the seventh fleet calls, all of our planes are ready.’’ 

In the readiness thing, there is also a commander’s evaluation, 

so those are not objective, because I used to go over those things. 

Basically, you have a commander’s evaluation that the commander 

decides whether he or she is going to put things in there. 

24 

So when you talk about this, I think you have to make it very 

clear exactly what you are talking about when you talk about 

ready. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, if I could respond, since Mr. Korb responded with a new question. I never asked you about whether 

they were ready, I asked if they were deployable. And the second 

thing is, I would not only agree with your comment about readiness, because readiness is a big picture, and you can’t go in and 

look at one single category, I agree with that, but the other thing 

I would suggest to you is we have changed those definitions of 

readiness, haven’t we, since we moved from a strategic Reserve to 

an operational Reserve. Would you agree with me on that? 

Mr. KORB. For the Guard? 

Mr. FORBES. Yes. 

Mr. KORB. Again, those numbers are classified, okay, in terms 

of—now, what you do—— 

Mr. FORBES. I understand, but going from a strategic Reserve to 

an operational Reserve—— 

Mr. KORB. I understand, but what you do is you have criteria. 

The personnel, do you have the number of personnel, do you have 

the equipment, and do you have the training, okay? And, basically, 

when you say deployable, again, it is a misuse of words, because 

deployable is up to the commanding officer of that unit, and if the 

commanding officer decides that that unit is deployable, it can deploy. And a commanding officer sometimes—and, again, he or she 

has to look at that information. So I think we are mixing apples 

and oranges here, because they have to sign off on it. 

I can tell you this: We sent the brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division to Iraq in December of 2006 as part of the surge. There were 

43 people in that unit who were assigned that missed the unit 

training, and they were sent over there, but that unit was certified 

as ready. If I were the commanding officer of that, I would not have 

certified it as ready. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Let me say something—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, just for point of clarification, 

so that we stay on track here, prior to September 11, the Navy operated an entirely different deployment cycle. 

Mr. Donnelly, you are shaking your head, maybe you would like 

to comment on it. I don’t want to start, in a sense, arguments 

about this, but if the argument is going to be that the readiness 

resolution in front of us is deficient, at least we ought to have 

our—we ought to be comparing apples to apples is what I am driving at. 

Now, what I mean by that, and not so much in response to Mr. 

Forbes, but to make sure that we are on the same page, apples to 

apples, you had a different deployment cycle. You had a 2-year 

cycle and 18-month preparation. Then it has changed now to exactly what Mr. Forbes says it is, which is the three carriers in 30 

days, but that wasn’t because the three carriers in 30 days is now 

what it should have been prior to September 11 and wasn’t, it was 

an entirely different basis of deployment specifications prior to September 11. I believe that is accurate. 

You seem to be knowledgeable, Mr. Donnelly. Am I stating it correctly? I think I am. 

25 

Mr. DONNELLY. Mr. Abercrombie, I would agree with you, and as 

I said in my opening statement, the Army has, likewise, changed 

its force generation model. So comparing apples to apples through 

the years is much more difficult than it used to be. 

Ultimately, I would say this is an intimately regressive chase 

that isn’t very helpful, and I would say also that there has always 

been commanders’ discretion in certifying units to be ready, so we 

ought to deal with the statistics as they present themselves. That 

is not an opinion as to whether there should have been DOD witnesses here or not. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I appreciate that. I don’t want to take further 

time on it. I just want to make sure that we don’t operate across 

purposes. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Let me just say something: You know, if you read the 

resolution, our main concern is ground forces, Marines and Army. 

I know that when you talk about the full spectrum, it includes a 

lot of other things, but we are talking today about ground forces. 

And talking about testimony, the most recent testimony that we 

had was last week, General Cody and General Magnus. This is 

what General Cody said. He said, ‘‘We have got the best soldiers, 

the best equipment, but we are also unprepared for the full spectrum.’’ He goes on to say, ‘‘to fight and lack the strategic depth that 

has been our traditional fallback for the uncertainties of this 

world.’’ 

See, the factor out there is the unknown factor. Now, you hear 

candidates say that we might be there 30 days and get them out. 

You hear other candidates say we might be there 100 years. Well, 

do we know when this war is going to end? Does anybody know? 

Can anybody tell me when it is going to end? We don’t know. It 

is the uncertainty factor that is out there. 

And all we are trying to do is to get into it from the witnesses 

today, from members on both sides of the aisle, because we know 

that we have a problem. 

You know, look at the preposition to stop them. And I don’t want 

to go into a lot of secret briefings that we have had. This is not 

the place to do that. All I am saying is that we have horrendous 

problems. I mean, we are having to pay big, big, big-time bonuses 

for our soldiers who stay there. You know, it is a strain on the families. The recruiters are having problems. They have to reduce 

some of the criteria that we had before. Young officers are leaving 

the military, they are getting out. And you remember sometime 

back that they were getting to the theater without proper training, 

they were getting the equipment in Kuwait before they went to 

Iraq. 

There are a lot of problems, but the thing is this: We are not 

here to point fingers at anybody. We want to fix this problem, because we know that we have a serious problem. 

Today, Mr. Abercrombie and I are focusing on the problem of the 

ground troops. 

Now, let me yield—I think that my good friend, Mr. Abercrombie—— 

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. ORTIZ. Sure. 

26 

Mr. WILSON. I would like to move unanimous consent to be listed 

as a co-sponsor of the Forbes-Saxton resolution. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Hearing no objection, so ordered. 

I guess the next gentleman in line is Mr. Abercrombie for questions. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

I am not quite sure why we are at the stage where we are having 

an argument about readiness, per se. The question is more, I think, 

and part of the motivation for the resolution that is in front of us 

today, is to try to get information out and perspective on it, particularly as a result of this supplemental question. 

It is easy to say that one should have a clean supplemental, but, 

by definition, if it is an emergency supplemental bill, it is going to 

take whatever comes along. You can’t change the rules of the Congress. And what constitutes something clean, I am not quite sure. 

We just passed a resolution over on the floor while we were away 

that says we can’t do any business with any country that does business with Iran. Iraq does business with Iran, so, presumably, we 

are not going to do any business with them. So the overall level 

of—another context might be frivolousness, although something so 

serious as this, to be taking that kind of an attitude, seems to me, 

at best, dysfunctional, at worst, it is a mockery of the troops serving in the field. 

It leads me back to where I think we should be, which is, can 

we get across the idea that we have a readiness question that has 

to be addressed. 

So I promised you, Mr. Donnelly, that I would pick on you as 

soon as I could, as recompense for walking out on you when you 

were about to talk. I wonder if you could comment—let me go directly to your testimony. If you will forgive me, I had it right here. 

I lost my page. Yes. 

You said, as one of your preferences, ‘‘To understand the challenge that our land forces now face just look back to the years of 

the Cold War period.’’ And then you cited two insights which you 

attributed to Secretary Rumsfeld. One is the state of international 

politics and concluding the early 21st century is a period of strategic pause, and that said, you then went further on, ‘‘and the initial post–9/11 operation, most notably the invasion of Afghanistan,’’ 

you were talking about special operation forces. 

I wonder if you could comment on do you see a connection between readiness, as outlined in the resolution, and the capacity to 

be able to deal effectively militarily now, setting aside, if you can, 

the politics, in Afghanistan and what you think that that would entail in order to accomplish readiness, as we understand it by Army 

standards, which is your C–1, 2, 3, 4? 

It is a pretty big order, but it follows—I appreciate the way you 

put your testimony, because it let us up in a—not a theoretical but 

a doctrinal basis, if you will, to where we are. Is that a fair summary of what you were saying? 

Mr. DONNELLY. Yes, sir, I think it is. And I think it is important 

for us to focus more than we have done on what the actual mission 

now is in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, too much of our debate about 

Afghanistan pretends as though that is actually the central front 

27 

of the al Qaeda war in terms of tracking down the al Qaeda senior 

leadership. 

In Afghanistan today, there is really actually very little al Qaeda 

presence, and so it is less a counterterror operation than it is a 

classic counterinsurgency operation. And so the kinds of forces that 

are demanded are really kind of at the opposite end of the spectrum of those that were so effective during the initial invasion. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. May I add, parenthetically, while you are at 

it, you understand why I am asking, because we tend to get focused 

on Iraq and we are talking about readiness here, as a general proposition for the Army. That is why I value what you had to say. 

Mr. DONNELLY. I agree, and, unfortunately, so much of the mission in Afghanistan that is so critical at the moment or in those 

areas where our North Atlantic Treaty Organizsation (NATO) partners have the lead, rather than U.S. forces, actually things are 

going relatively well in the U.S. sector. And as everybody is aware, 

then deployment of the Marine expeditionary unit to Kandahar is 

a response to try to cover those areas that aren’t getting adequate 

attention. 

But we shouldn’t mislead ourselves about what the nature of the 

mission is. It is not really primarily a counterterrorism mission but 

in broadly similar terms to the mission in Iraq, it is another long 

duration, at least as I understand it, counterinsurgency mission 

that is going to tax the general purpose forces, the conventional 

formations of the U.S. Army. And so, again, to echo something that 

Miche`le Flournoy said, even if force levels in Iraq are reduced for 

whatever reason in the future, my prediction would be that the demand for forces in Afghanistan will remain constant, if not grow. 

But, again, it is not an al Qaeda mission, it is a counterinsurgency 

mission. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If I can follow up on that with you then, because that is my concern. I have no problem with the supplemental, but given what we have done, I have a problem of why we 

are where we are. We shouldn’t have done this in the first place. 

Just for purposes of the record, I will state, although many of the 

members of this committee know, I put an amendment one time to 

actually pay for the war in Iraq, and I was defeated with the idea 

that, ‘‘Well, we will take that up in the supplemental budget.’’ We 

have been paying for the war in the supplemental budget. 

That is why I am opposed to it, and that is why we have got the 

readiness thing here. I don’t want to get into an argument—I hope 

I don’t—about what the real resolution should be or not be. Every 

resolution is as worthy as what it says. The reason this resolution 

is here is because I am trying to get to the question, the fundamentals behind the question of supplementary budgets having to make 

up for what we didn’t do. And everybody has got a stain on them 

with that respect. Every administration and every Congress has 

done it, no matter who has been in charge. 

What we are trying to do is act in a responsible way here to deal 

with the fundamental readiness questions that transcend where we 

are at the moment that we have to make up for it. I will be happy 

to vote for a supplemental budget that takes care—if we want to 

talk about a clean resolution, then I don’t want anything in it 

about paying for the war that we should be paying for anyway, but 

28 

if you put in a resolution that deals with the ongoing readiness 

questions that helps us with reset and so on, I will do it. I will sign 

on in a second. 

But I am not going to keep voting for supplemental budgets or 

supplemental resolutions, or however the hell we characterize 

them, that keep on paying for the same mistakes and keep on rewarding people for doing the same thing over and over again. 

Now, in that context, you say, my greatest concern is that in an 

attempt to relieve the stresses and strains on the Army and Marine 

Corps, we will attempt to fit the war to the size of the force rather 

than sizing the force to win the war. 

Now, in that context then, and in the context of the answer that 

you just gave, could you comment a little bit further on what you 

think it would take to enable us to continue in Afghanistan at this 

present time without getting lost in the weeds of surge policy or 

whatever the hell else we are talking about in Iraq? 

Mr. DONNELLY. I will do my best. And based on an exercise that 

we ran fairly recently at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), 

and based on my understanding of what General McNeill’s requirement is, and based further on the ways in which the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) command needs to be supplemented 

in Afghanistan, I think the minimum requirement for Afghanistan 

is an additional three American brigade combat teams or equivalents, be they Marine RCT, regimental combat units, or Army brigades. 

So I think in order to not only sustain the progress in the east 

sector that we have responsibility for, but to make more rapid 

progress in Helmond and Kandahar in the south sector, particularly with a view toward securing the elections that are supposed 

to take place in 2009 and 2010, which are crucial for progress in 

Afghanistan, that is, I think, a generally agreed estimate of what 

the minimum requirement is. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. I will conclude because I am afraid we 

got trapped in another vote. I take your points on the question of 

fundamental integrity of the military as a whole threatening the 

broad national security of the United States. I did not think that 

the resolution had that implication. I am sorry that you felt you 

had to use the word, ‘‘egregious,’’ with it. I assure you that that 

certainly is not the intent of Mr. Ortiz or myself to do anything 

which is egregious in this context. It is too a serious a matter. But 

if that is an interpretation that could reasonably be drawn, we will 

take another look at it and try to remove that, I can assure you. 

Mr. DONNELLY. As a former staffer, I would appreciate your willingness to consider diverse judgment. It was not an assessment of 

the intent of the resolution, but I think it is an inaccurate description of the state of the force. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Then we will take that into account, 

because the kind of recommendations that you are making right 

there is what we are trying to get at. That is the idea behind the 

resolution. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. We have another couple of votes, but before we do, 

let me yield to Mr. Saxton for—— 

VOICE. Are we coming back, Mr. Chairman? 

29 

Mr. ORTIZ. Well, I was going to ask the witnesses. I know that 

we have really belabored you this afternoon, and I don’t know how 

much time you have. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I would like to come back if you folks could 

stay. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Yes. If you are going to be here, we will take about 

10 minutes. 

Mr. SAXTON. Well, there is actually a motion to recommit pending, I believe, so we will be out for a vote and then a 10-minute 

debate and then another vote. That is the way I understand it, 

anyway. So it is going to be more like half hour, 45 minutes. 

Mr. ORTIZ. It will take another 30 minutes. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That long? 

Mr. ORTIZ. Yes, because he says we have a motion to recommit, 

10 minutes of debate and then passage. Is that what it is? 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, no. We wouldn’t be voting on—the debate would have already occurred. What are we voting on? 

Mr. SAXTON. So we are out of here. 

Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make a suggestion. I have studied your resolution in detail, and, frankly, I agree with a lot of the 

provisions that are in it. And readiness is an issue; however, there 

is a path to recovery, as pointed out by General Vaughn and General Stultz and General Cody and General Magnus, all four. And 

Mr. Forbes and I have introduced a resolution which is similar in 

nature except that the resolve provision provides for a path forward that is the path that is recommended by the military leaders 

that this committee has invited here for advice. 

And so my suggestion is that we take your resolution and try to 

identify those areas where we can agree in the whereas provisions 

and then try to rework a resolve provision that would provide for 

encouragement for the House to go ahead and pass the supplemental, which most people who have studied this issue believe is 

a path forward to solve the problem that we both agree needs to 

be solved. 

So that is just a suggestion. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Well, just give us time, because we haven’t had a 

chance on this side to look at your resolution. 

Mr. SAXTON. Yes. Well, our resolution is not written in stone. 

The provisions move in a direction that I think is positive, and I 

think you are correct in pointing out the problems that you see as 

existing with regard to readiness. 

So why don’t we get together, put the provisions that we can all 

agree on together in a single resolution and see if we can’t get it 

passed? 

Mr. ORTIZ. Well, let’s give your copy, whatever you have, to the 

staff, and now I know we are running out of time before we get to 

the vote. But there are a lot of things that we need to talk about 

readiness. All the focus has been on equipment, manpower going 

to Iraq and Afghanistan, and I feel that sometimes I fear—this is 

personally—that we are forgetting that the focus should be on how 

to defend the homeland. And I don’t think we are putting enough 

focus there. 

But I am going to recess this hearing now. 

VOICE. Are we going to have a panel? 

30 

Mr. ORTIZ. I don’t know about the witnesses. How much time do 

you have? 

Mr. DONNELLY. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure, absolutely. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, I will tell you, why don’t we— 

I am sure the witnesses will be available to us individually. I think 

it is going to be at least half an hour before we are able to get back, 

given what is—I, for one, think that we have used their time long 

enough, and I am sure any of you would be available to us individually for consulting, would you not? 

Mr. ORTIZ. We are getting more information. It might take 45 

minutes or longer to get back. 

But thank you so much. I think that this has been an eye opener 

for all of us. And we need to learn from one another, because we 

want to do what is best for our country, for our troops, our families, 

and we thank you for joining us today. 

And this hearing stands adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 16, 2008 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 16, 2008 

(85) 


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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE 

RECORD 

APRIL 16, 2008 

(93) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ 

Mr. ORTIZ. During the hearing, Representative Forbes referred to your prior testimony on February 14 regarding the strengths of the U.S. military—namely, that the 

force is adaptable, experienced, and professional. Please elaborate for the record how 

the ground forces, while certainly serving our Nation heroically, are nevertheless experiencing the types of readiness challenges that you described in your testimony 

for this hearing. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. As you point out in your first question, I have testified previously 

regarding the impressive performance of the Army and Marine Corps in current 

military operations despite serious stresses to personnel and equipment. While I believe that the current generation of America’s soldiers and Marines is remarkably 

adaptable and experienced, I also believe that we are fast approaching the physical 

limits of what the Army and Marine Corps can sustain. Even the world’s best military can be pushed beyond the limits of what it was designed to support. Ceaseless 

high-tempo operations will constrain training time, wear down equipment, and exhaust personnel and their families no matter their quality. To ignore or deny the 

evident strains on the ground forces puts both the force and the Nation at risk. I 

therefore urge the Committee, as I did in my testimony, to do everything in its 

power to reestablish a ready reserve of ground forces, fund reset and expansion, and 

support a rebalancing of the force to deepen capacity in higher-demand capability 

areas. Doing so will help our forces to build on the experience they have gained 

while also restoring readiness. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Please describe for the committee the scale of investment rebuilding 

readiness will require. Will we be able to address our readiness concerns with one 

supplemental, or will recovery be a longer-term challenge? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. In answer to your second question, rebuilding ground force readiness will not be a simple or short-term endeavor. Addressing today’s readiness 

shortfalls involves both recovering from the Nation’s two ongoing wars and readjusting to the range of likely future contingencies. Resetting and modernizing equipment, in addition to expanding the force and training for full-spectrum operations, 

will require at least a decade of continuous, robust investment. For example, the 

Government Accountability Office estimated this past April that the costs for Army 

equipment reset alone could reach $118 billion. Meanwhile, the Marine Corps estimated in its 2008 posture statement that it needs almost $5 billion more to repair 

and replace equipment from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such investment 

must be made with long-term budgetary management in mind and should, over 

time, be migrated to the base defense budget from short-term supplemental funding 

packages. 

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to update one of the statements I 

made during my testimony. In my written and oral remarks, I referred to equipment data taken from the Final Report of the Commission on the National Guard 

and Reserves. I have since received an updated briefing from the Army, and would 

like to share the information provided to me with the Committee. Specifically, updated Army data now shows that the Army National Guard (ARNG) had 79 percent 

of its required equipment at the end of fiscal year 2007, and that 13 percent of that 

equipment was deployed with units, leaving 66 percent of ARNG equipment available to State Governors. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Last week, General Cody appeared before this Committee and 

stated that the army is ‘‘out of balance’’, that we are ‘‘unprepared for the full-spectrum fight and lack the strategic depth that has been our traditional fallback for 

the uncertainties of this world.’’ 

In Iowa, we have seen how our National Guard has born much of the brunt of 

the current readiness strain of our ground forces, leaving our Nation’s first line of 

defense against emergencies—of any nature—depleted, and our homeland less secure. 

94 

To date, the Iowa National Guard has mobilized 10,000 Soldiers and Airmen in 

support of operation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Every Iowan is deeply proud of the 

service and dedication of our National Guard men and women. 

However, as the Adjutant General of the Iowa National Guard Major General Ron 

Dardis, has stated, the Iowa Guard and their families are ‘‘stressed and strained.’’ 

When the 224th Engineer Battalion, which is based in my District, was deployed 

to Iraq it was at 100% equipment readiness. When it redeployed, it was forced to 

leave most of its equipment in theater, leaving it with 30% of its required equipment. 

When the 833rd Engineer Company, also based in my District, was recalled to Iraq 

after only 14 MONTHS at home, they had no equipment on which to train. 

To say that this training, equipment, and readiness situation is alarming is a 

gross understatement. Iowa leans heavily on its National Guard for emergency response. Guard units operating with 30% of their equipment and with only 14 

months of dwell time are simply not in a position to respond to an emergency at 

home—or be called up as an operational force to respond to threats facing our Nation abroad. 

1. Last week General Cody told me that, even once the Grow the Force Initiative is complete, our ground forces will be operating at a 1:2 dwell time ratio 

while the size and pace of our current deployments continue. DOD’s deployment policy currently requires Reserve components to meet a 1 in 5 deployment ratio. This was clearly not the case for the 833rd Engineer Company 

nor for the many units across the country that are experiencing 1 to 1 deployment ratios. 

a. Can you please outline for me what, in your belief, must be 

achieved in dwell time ratios in order to assure that our ground 

forces—both active duty and reserve—are properly trained, 

equipped, and rested? 

b. What are the strategic risks associated with continuing deployments at the current rate? What are the risks to our 

servicemembers and their families? 

c. According to Admiral Mullen, ‘‘the most likely near term attack on 

the United States will come from al Qaeda’’ via the safe havens in 

the under-governed regions of Pakistan. How would current commitments and readinesss levels affect the timeliness and effectiveness of our response to an unforeseen contingency along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border or elsewhere? 

Thank you. I believe that it is imperative that Congress acknowledge and address 

the declining readiness of the ground forces in the interest of our security at home 

and abroad. I strongly believe that we must commit to restoring the readiness of 

the military, particularly the ground forces, in order to mitigate the strategic risk 

of our current readiness shortfalls. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Secretary of Defense Gates’ recent efforts to improve deploymentto-dwell ratios are commendable precisely because, as you point out, such compressed dwell times limit training time and increase our level of strategic risk. 

When the ground forces do not have adequate time to train for the full array of possible missions, the force as a whole becomes imbalanced, increasing the risk that 

it will not be prepared for future contingencies that may differ from today’s operational challenges. As my colleague, Alice Hunt, and I write in a forthcoming piece 

on the state of the U.S. military, ‘‘readiness means more than having forces ready 

to deploy to ongoing operations. The U.S. military must also maintain its readiness 

for possible contingencies such as a conflict in the Middle East, with North Korea 

or China . . . Maintaining the readiness of the U.S. military writ large is a balancing act between the demands of ongoing operations and the possible requirements of other missions that may arise. As force providers to the combatant commanders, and to support deterrence globally, the services must ensure that their 

forces train and equip for a broad array of potential missions—something the Army 

calls ‘readiness for the full-spectrum of operations’’ ’ 

One such contingency, as you point out, could arise in the Afghanistan-Pakistan 

border region. The complexity of operations in Afghanistan, the evolving nature of 

the relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban, and the precarious political situation in Pakistan make possible contingencies—and the plausible American responses—very difficult to predict. However, many analysts have noted that the 

strain on our ground forces has precluded a more robust commitment to the conflict 

in Afghanistan, and a timely and effective response to any wider events in the region could be hampered by the ongoing force demands in Iraq. Beyond possible 

95 

events in the Afghanistan area of operations, I am personally concerned that the 

Army has only one fully ready brigade in the United States that could respond immediately to other contingencies. 

Compressed dwell time and repeated deployments also increase the risk to the allvolunteer military. As you also point out, shortened dwell time at home has adverse 

effects on service members and their families. Studies have shown that repeated 

tours in Iraq increase a soldier’s likelihood of developing mental distress, including 

post-traumatic stress disorder. One study conducted by the RAND Corporation, for 

example, showed that approximately 14% of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans reported 

symptoms of PTSD. Even for those who do not experience these very real wounds 

of war, 15-month deployments often mean that soldiers spend two cycles of holidays 

away from loved ones; children have multiple birthdays without their parents, and 

spouses juggle the challenges of family and finances on their own for an extended 

period of time. I personally have spoken to several soldiers who decided to retire 

from the force simply because their families cannot continue to withstand the stress 

of these back-to-back deployments. 

I therefore applaud the President’s recent decision to return the Army to a 12- 

month deployment cycle, but I believe the Nation must act as quickly as possible 

to bring the active Army back to a 1:22 deployment-to-dwell time ratio in order to 

allow soldiers more time with their families and more time to train to the full spectrum of operations. But even this is not sustainable indefinitely. The Army must 

continue to move toward a 1:3 ratio once operational demands are reduced and the 

expansion is completed in order to realize robust and sustainable readiness conditions for the ground forces. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Last week, General Cody appeared before this Committee and 

stated that the army is ‘‘out of balance’’, that we are ‘‘unprepared for the full-spectrum fight and lack the strategic depth that has been our traditional fallback for 

the uncertainties of this world.’’ 

In Iowa, we have seen how our National Guard has born much of the brunt of 

the current readiness strain of our ground forces, leaving our Nation’s first line of 

defense against emergencies—of any nature—depleted, and our homeland less secure. To date, the Iowa National Guard has mobilized 10,000 Soldiers and Airmen in 

support of operation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Every Iowan is deeply proud of the 

service and dedication of our National Guard men and women. 

However, as the Adjutant General of the Iowa National Guard Major General Ron 

Dardis, has stated, the Iowa Guard and their families are ‘‘stressed and strained.’’ 

When the 224th Engineer Battalion, which is based in my District, was deployed 

to Iraq it was at 100% equipment readiness. When it redeployed, it was forced to 

leave most of its equipment in theater, leaving it with 30% of its required equipment. 

When the 833rd Engineer company, also based in my District, was recalled to Iraq 

after only 14 MONTHS at home, they had no equipment on which to train. 

To say that this training, equipment, and readiness situation is alarming is a 

gross understatement. Iowa leans heavily on its National Guard for emergency response. Guard units operating with 30% of their equipment and with only 14 

months of dwell time are simply not in a position to respond to an emergency at 

home—or be called up as an operational force to responds to threats facing our Nation abroad. 

1. Last week General Cody told me that, even once the Grow the Force Initiative is complete, our ground forces will be operating at a 1:2 dwell time ratio 

while the size and pace of our current deployments continue. DOD’s deployment policy currently requires Reserve components to meet a 1 in 5 deployment ratio. This was clearly not the case for the 833rd Engineer Company 

nor for the many units across the country that are experiencing 1 to 1 deployment ratios. 

a. Can you please outline for me what, in your belief, must be 

achieved in dwell time rations in order to assure that our ground 

forces—both active duty and reserve—are properly trained, 

equipped, and rested? 

b. What are the strategic risks associated with continuing deployments at the current rate? What are the risks to our 

servicemembers and their families? 

c. According to Admiral Mullen, ‘‘the most likely near term attack on 

the United States will come from al Qaeda’’ via the safe havens in 

the under-governed regions of Pakistan. How would current commitments and readinesss levels affect the timeliness and effectiveVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:29 Feb 25, 2009 Jkt 043786 PO 00000 Frm 00099 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-149\107030.000 HAS1 PsN: LINDA
96 

ness of our response to an unforeseen contingency along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border or elsewhere? 

Thank you. I believe that it is imperative that Congress acknowledge and address 

the declining readiness of the ground forces in the interest of our security at home 

and abroad. I strongly believe that we must commit to restoring the readiness of 

the military, particularly the ground forces, in order to mitigate the strategic risk 

of our current readiness shortfalls. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. A. Can you please outline for me what, in your belief, must 

be achieved in dwell time ratios in order to assure that our ground forces— 

both active duty and reserve—are properly trained, equipped and rested? 

Mr. KORB. Readiness requires that a given unit have an adequate number of personnel, the right amount of equipment and that the personnel receive appropriate 

training on tactics they will use in carrying out their mission. 

Personnel: Army policy recommends that after serving 12 months in theater, active duty troops come home to recuperate and retrain for 24 months before being 

returned to the theater. For every 12 months in a combat zone, reserve soldiers 

should spend 60 months at home before returning to a war zone. 

Training: Readiness also requires that Army troops be adequately trained to perform the duties they will be assigned in theater and learn to operate the equipment 

they will use in combat. The concept of ‘‘combat readiness’’ is subjective and difficult 

to measure. By its very nature readiness is only truly determined once the unit is 

placed into combat. Even the best system to measure readiness can only do so 

through the use of surrogates or substitutes. At present, the Pentagon places combat units into five categories of readiness: 

• C–1: Fully combat-ready. 

• C–2: Substantially combat-ready, that is, the unit only has minor combat-deficiencies. 

• C–3: Marginally combat-ready, that is, the unit has major deficiencies but can 

still perform its assigned missions. 

• C–4: Not combat-ready because the unit has so many deficiencies that it cannot 

perform its wartime functions. 

• C–5: Not combat-ready because the unit is undergoing a planned period of overhaul or maintenance. 

Equipment: Finally, readiness requires that troops have a sufficient supply of 

appropriate equipment to carry out their mission and that the equipment be in good 

working order. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. B. What are the strategic risks associated with continuing 

deployments at the current rate? What are the risks to our service members and their families? 

Mr. KORB. Continuing deployments to Iraq at current rates poses great strategic 

risks to overall U.S. national security interests. Below are three most pressing strategic risks. 

First, the U.S. incurs a substantial risk to its interests in the greater Middle East 

and to its own security by allowing the security situation in Afghanistan, the true 

central front in the War on Terror and the orgin of the 9/11 attacks, to deteriorate. 

As the U.S. intelligence community has pointed out, the failure to consolidate the 

gains made in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban has allowed the group to 

reconstitute itself in its safe haven along the Afghan-Pakistan border region while 

training and inspiring a new generation of Pakistani militants. As long as the U.S. 

remains so heavily engaged in Iraq, it will not be able to send sufficient troops to 

Afghanistan. 

2007 was the deadliest year for U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan since the 

2001 invasion and 2008 is on pace to be even deadlier. Indeed, May 2008 was the 

most violent month in Afghanistan since the 2001 invasion. May saw 214 violent 

incidents in more than 100 of the country’s 398 districts, up from April’s count of 

199 violent incidents in 86 districts. As a result of the country’s declining security 

situation, the government of President Hamid Karzai controls less than a third of 

Afghanistan’s territory. 

Second, the continued large-scale deployment of U.S. troops to Iraq also plays into 

the al Qaeda narrative that the U.S. intends to occupy Muslim lands and exploit 

its people for their oil. Consequently, as the intelligence community made clear in 

a 2006 National Intelligence Estimate, a large-scale U.S. presence in Iraq remains 

a ‘‘cause ce ́le`bre’’ for the worldwide jihadist movement and will continue to be a 

boon for al Qaeda recruitment. A large U.S. presence in Iraq also plays into al 

97 

Qaeda’s stated objective to bog the American military down in Iraq and thereby 

produce economic and strategic exhaustion. 

Third, maintaining an average of 130,000 troops in Iraq over the last five years 

has not only decimated U.S. ground forces, it also has compromised our ability to 

respond to other threats or conflicts around the globe. According the Army Vice 

Chief of Staff Gen. Richard Cody, the Army no longer has any fully ready combat 

brigades on standby should a conflict occur. 

General Cody’s immediate superior, Army Chief of Staff Gen. George W. Casey 

Jr., told the House Armed Services Committee last fall that, ‘‘the Army is out of 

balance.’’ That’s a polite way of saying it’s broken. Casey, who is responsible for the 

Army’s overall health, is rightfully concerned. 

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Navy Adm. Michael G. Mullen, echoed 

Casey’s unease. In January, Mullen told the Marine Corps Times that there was reserve capacity in the Navy and Air Force but that ground troops were a different 

story. ‘‘Clearly, if we had to do something with our ground forces, a significant substitute would be a big challenge,’’ he said. Mullen’s predecessor, Marine Gen. Peter 

Pace, also expressed his discomfort with our ability to respond to other crises. Before leaving his post last October, Pace, stated that the troop commitment to Iraq 

would ‘‘make a large difference in our ability to be prepared for unforeseen contingencies’’ in the region and elsewhere. 

Unfortunately, our service members and their families have paid a 

disproportionally high price for our large scale military presence in Iraq. The Pentagon’s decision last year to extend tours in Iraq and Afghanistan to 15 months from 

12 months until the fall of 2008 resulted in the longest Army combat tours since 

World War II. Moreover, dwell time—time in-between deployments—has been shortened to 12 months as many soldiers are on their second, third, or even fourth tour 

of duty in either theatre. As a result, many soldiers and their families are being 

pushed beyond their physical and mental breaking points. 

The full psychological effect of the war is impossible to estimate, as debilitating 

conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder and clinical depression can take 

years to appear and last a lifetime. Warning signs, however, are already appearing 

that indicate that large numbers of soldiers and Marines returning from the wars 

in Iraq and Afghanistan will face lasting psychological effects. A RAND study estimated earlier this year that nearly 20 percent of military service members who have 

returned from Iraq and Afghanistan—300,000 in all—report symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder or major depression. 

An in-depth review of the problems facing our brave men and women in uniform 

indicates the scope of the challenge ahead. 

Overall Mental Health 

• 30 to 40: The percentage of Iraq veterans who will face a serious psychological 

wound, including depression, anxiety, or PTSD. Multiple tours and inadequate 

time between deployments increase rates of combat stress by 50 percent. 

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 

• One in five: Number of troops returning from Iraq and Afghanistan who show 

signs and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. 

• Nearly 20,000: The increase in the number of Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans seeking treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder from the Department of Veterans Affairs in the 12 months ending June 30, 2007, VA records 

show. This represents a nearly 70 percent jump since June 30, 2006. 

• 30 percent: The percentage of troops returning from war zones who experience some level of PTSD, according to the Department of Veterans Affairs. 

Sustance Abuse 

• 40,000: The number of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans who have been treated 

at a VA hospital for substance abuse. 

Families 

• 20 percent: The number of married troops in Iraq who say they are planning 

a divorce. 

• 42 percent: Number of returning soldiers and Marines who said they felt like 

‘‘a guest in their own home,’’ according to a 2007 poll. The study also found 

a link between family problems and PTSD, with the two reinforcing each other 

in a vicious spiral. 

Traumatic Brain Injury 

98 

• 150,000 to 300,000: The number of veterans who have suffered a TBI during 

the war. • 30 percent: The percentage of soldiers admitted to Walter Reed Army Medical 

Center who have suffered TBI. 

Suicide 

• 115: Number of Army suicides in 2007, a nearly 10 percent increase since 

2006. • 2,100: The number of attempted suicides and self-injuries in 2007, as reported 

by the Army. There were less than 1,500 in 2006 and less than 500 in 2002. • 55 percent: The percentage of suicide cases in 2006 that involved soldiers who 

were serving or had served at some point over the preceding five years in Iraq 

or Afghanistan. 

A Strained System 

• Over 100,000 percent: The number of mental health diagnoses the VA has 

already given to Iraq and Afghanistan veterans, or 38 percent of new veterans 

who visited the VA for any reason. • 150 percent: The percentage increase in VA disability pay for PTSD among veterans between 1999 and 2004—or $4.2 billion. • 200:1: The ratio that patients outnumber primary care managers in some 

major military facilities. Until recently, the ratio was 1200:1. • 22 percent: The percentage decrease of licensed psychologists in the military 

in recent years. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. C. According to Admiral Mullen, ‘‘the most likely near 

term attack on the United States will come from al Qaeda’’ via the safe havens in the under-governed regions of Pakistan. How would current commitments and readiness levels affect the timelines and effectiveness of our 

response to an unforeseen contingency along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border or elsewhere? 

Mr. KROB. The pace of deployments to Iraq has significantly impacted our ability 

to send more troops to Afghanistan, as the meager temporary deployment of 3,200 

Marines to Afghanistan this spring has demonstrated. 

Army Vice Chief of Staff, Gen. Cody testified before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee that the Army no longer has any fully ready combat brigades on standby 

should a threat or conflict occur. ‘‘I’ve never seen our lack of strategic depth be 

where it is today,’’ said Cody, who has been the senior Army official in charge of 

operations and readiness for the past six years. 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Navy Adm. Michael G. Mullen, echoed 

Cody’s concern. ‘‘Clearly, if we had to do something with our ground forces, a significant substitute would be a big challenge.’’ he acknowledged in January of this year. 

The Marine Corps’ ability to train for potential conflicts has also been ‘‘significantly degraded,’’ said Gen. Robert Magnus, assistant commandant of the Marine 

Corps, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee this last April. 

Gen. Manus went on to state that the current pace of operations is, ‘‘unsustainable.’’ 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Last week, General Cody appeared before this Committee and 

stated that the army is ‘‘out of balance’’, that we are ‘‘unprepared for the full-spectrum fight and lack the strategic depth that has been our traditional fallback for 

the uncertainties of this world.’’ 

In Iowa, we have seen how our National Guard has born much of the brunt of 

the current readiness strain of our ground forces, leaving our Nation’s first line of 

defense against emergencies—of any nature—depleted, and our homeland less secure. 

To date, the Iowa National Guard has mobilized 10,000 Soldiers and Airmen in 

support of operation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Every Iowan is deeply proud of the 

service and dedication of our National Guard men and women. 

However, as the Adjutant General of the Iowa National Guard Major General Ron 

Dardis, has stated, the Iowa Guard and their families are ‘‘stressed and strained.’’ 

When the 224th Engineer Battalion, which is based in my District, was deployed 

to Iraq it was at 100% equipment readiness. When it redeployed, it was forced to 

leave most of its equipment in theater, leaving it with 30% of its required equipment. 

When the 833rd Engineer company, also based in my District, was recalled to Iraq 

after only 14 MONTHS at home, they had no equipment on which to train. 

To say that this training, equipment, and readiness situation is alarming is a 

gross understatement. Iowa leans heavily on its National Guard for emergency response. Guard units operating with 30% of their equipment and with only 14 

99 

months of dwell time are simply not in a position to respond to an emergency at 

home—or be called up as an operational force to responds to threats facing our Nation abroad. 

1. Last week General Cody told me that, even once the Grow the Force Initiative is complete, our ground forces will be operating at a 1:2 dwell time ration while the size and pace of our current deployments continue. DOD’s deployment policy currently requires Reserve components to meet a 1 in 5 deployment ratio. This was clearly not the case for the 833rd Engineer Company nor for the many units across the country that are experiencing 1 to 

1 deployment ratios. 

a. Can you please outline for me what, in your belief, must be achieved 

in dwell time ratios in order to assure that our ground forces—both 

active duty and reserve—are properly trained, equipped, and rested? 

b. What are the strategic risks associated with continuing deployments 

at the current rate? What are the risks to our servicemembers and 

their families? 

c. According to Admiral Mullen, ‘‘the most likely near term attack on 

the United States will come from al Qaeda’’ via the safe havens in the 

under-governed regions of Pakistan. How would current commitments 

and readinesss levels affect the timeliness and effectiveness of our response to an unforeseen contingency along the Afghanistan-Pakistan 

border or elsewhere? 

Thank you. I believe that it is imperative that Congress acknowledge and address 

the declining readiness of the ground forces in the interest of our security at home 

and abroad. I strongly believe that we must commit to restoring the readiness of 

the military, particularly the ground forces, in order to mitigate the strategic risk 

of our current readiness shortfalls. 

Mr. DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Loebsack, for your important and incisive questions. In our recent book, Ground Truth: The Future of U.S. Land Power, Fred 

Kagan and I addressed a number of the issues that you have raised. Our core argument is that the insufficient size of America’s land forces is the most significant constraint on U.S. military strategy. In order to address the dire divergence between 

American military ends and American military means, Fred and I have argued that 

the United States requires a million-man active-duty land force, with a proper balance of marines and soldiers, configured in such a way as to win the conficts that 

have come to characterize the Long War on terrorism. In order to meet the full spectrum of the nation’s needs, however, we must look beyond the number of active brigades and regiments. We must also restore the role of the National Guard and reserve components as genuine strategic reserve, not simply another pool of resources 

to meet immediate rotational requirements. 

For five years, activated reservists and National Guardsmen have been providing 

15 to 20 percent of present U.S. Army active strength. As a result, they no longer 

represent a strategic reserve, hedging against unforeseen contingencies, but an 

operational reserve. As such, they are being strained by the rotational demands of 

Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Long War efforts just like the regular force. In sum, 

the failure to expand, refit, and restructure U.S. land forces in a timely fashion that 

the 9/11 attacks has left the Army and Marine Corps brittle. The force certainly is 

not broken, but its institutional basis is cracking. 

The growing willingness of the senior military leadership to see Guard units as 

operational rather than strategic reserves is sure to have implications for their 

training and their availability for traditional homeland security and disaster relief 

missions, but the trade-offs are not clear-cut. As long as America faces an urgent 

need for combat power in ongoing wars, the priority must go to addressing that 

need, rather than keeping force at home for possible contingencies. Nevertheless, 

the military remains the only force that can reliably and quickly respond to large 

scale disasters. This capability, therefore, must continue to be resourced as a core 

mission, not simply as a lesser included requirement, even as the Guard is takes 

on additional missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

With regard to the necessary length of dwell times, I would call your attention 

to a series of observations by Lieutenant General Ray Odierno. Since April 2007, 

Lieutenant General Odierno has been frequently questioned as to the strains that 

extended, 15-month tours and the 1:1 dwell time ratio has exacted on his soldiers. 

In response, he has pointed out that there are two good ways to relieve these 

strains: first, win the war that we are fighting; second, increase the size of our 

ground forces. The sooner we accomplish either of these objectives, the sooner our 

forces can come home. Constraining the number and rate at which forces can be deVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:29 Feb 25, 2009 Jkt 043786 PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-149\107030.000 HAS1 PsN: LINDA
100 

ployed only serves to extend and jeopardize the success of the missions in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. 

As Fred and I argue in Ground Truth, the current strain on America’s ground 

forces has required the armed services to accept an increasing imbalance among the 

active and reserve components and their missions. America’s ground forces can mitigate this imbalance, first and foremost, by increasing their numbers dramatically— 

though that would simply be a starting point. Any effort to grow U.S. ground forces 

must also be supplemented by an effort to reshape, restructure, and reequip them. 

Improving this balance and growing the force would ease the burden on soldiers and 

marines, who would need to be deployed less often, as well as on the National 

Guard and Reserves, which could pursue their true functions instead of being called 

upon to make up any shortages in Army manpower. 

Æ