2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

5-19-2004 

# Lee v . Att y Ge n U S A

P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al
D ocke t N o . 02-4602

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/657PRECE DENTI AL

UNIT ED STA TES C OURT OF AP PEA LS F OR TH E TH IRD CIR CU IT

No. 02-4602

KI S E LEE ; HY ANG MAHN YANG,

Petitioners

v.
JOHN ASHC ROFT , Attorney General of the United States,

Respondent

ON PET IT ION F OR REVI EW OF AN ORDER OF THE BOAR D OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS (Nos. A38 656 406, A36 775 995)

Argued: December 5, 2003

Bef or e: SLOVI TER a nd A LI TO, Circu it Judges , a nd OBERDORF ER, * Distri ct Judge
(Opinion Fi led: May 19, 2004) Counsel for Petitioners
Steven A. Morley(Argued) Morl ey , S ur in & Gri ffi n, P. C. Constit ution Pl ace 325 C hestnut Street, Su ite 1305-P Philadelphia, Pennsyl vania 19106
Counsel for

Respondent

Peter D. Keis ler Assist ant Attorney General Civil Divi sion Linda S . Werne ry Senior Lit

igati on Counsel Office of Immigrat

ion Litigati on Lyle D. Jentzer

(Argued) Trial Attorney Douglas E. Ginsbur g, Esq. Michael P. Li ndemann, Esq. John M. McA dams Jr. , Esq. John D. Willi ams, Esq. Office of Immigrat

ion Litigati on Civil Divi sion United States Department of Justi ce P.O. Box 878, Ben Frankl in Station Washington, DC 20044-0878

OPINI ON OF THE COURT

OB ER DO RF ER , Senior Dist rict Judge : In this appeal we cons ide r the questi on of w hether a conviction for fi ling
a false t ax return, in vi olati on of 26 U. S. C. § 720 6(1) o f the In ternal R even ue C ode, is
an “ag grav ated fel ony” as defined by
sec tion 101(a)( 43)(M)(i) of th e Immigration and N aturaliza tio n A ct, 8 * The Honorab le Loui s F. Oberdorfer, Senior Dist rict Judge for the Distri ct of Columbia, sitting by designation.2

U.S .C. § 1101 (a)(43)(M )(i). We conclude that it is not, and, therefore , tha t the petit ioner s’ convi ctions do not render them removable. A cc or di ng ly, we will grant the Petition fo r Re vi ew of t he decisi on and
vaca te the order

of removal agai nst the petiti oners.

I. BACKGROUND The rele v ant fact s are not complicated. The pe t iti oners, Ki Se Lee and Hyang Mahn Yang, are husband and wife. They are bo th native s and citizens of Korea, but they

have resi ded in the United States as lawful permanentresi dents si nce t he 1980s. 1 They have gr own children who are U nited States ci tizens.
For ma ny years, the petitioners operate d a dry cleani ng busi nes s in Philadelphia. In May 1997, t hey pl ed guilty to a three-count

information, which charged them with fil ing fal se income t ax returns for 1 989 , 1990 and 1 991 , all in violat ion of 26 U

. S .C. § 720 6(1). 2 The in for mation further alle ged that , in t

he three tax years at issue, petitioners underst ated their

income by $112 ,4 53,
caus in g a tax defi ciencyof $55,811. Departing downward substanti ally , each petit ionerwas sentenced to three years probati on, a condition of which was three months hom e c onf in eme nt , w i t h permissi on to lea ve for wo rk, medi cal services, etc. , on e hu ndred hours of
com mu nity servi ce, and the payme nt of a ll taxes, int ere st and penal ties due to the IRS. 3 AR 110. Thereafter , in November 1997, the

1 Petitioner Yang ent ered the United States in 1980; petit ioner Lee entere d in 1984.

2 In rel evant part, s ecti on 7206 prov ides tha t

any p erso n w ho . . . ( 1) . . . Willful ly makes and subscri bes any return, stat ement, or

other document, which c ontains or is ve rifi ed by a wri tten declar ation t

hat it is made under the pe nalti es of perjury, and which he does not beli eve to be t

rue and correct as to ever

y mate rial matter

. . .
shallbe guilt

y of a fe lony and, upon convi ction thereof, shal l be fi ned not more than $100, 000 ($500,000 i n the case of a corporation), or impri soned not more than 3 year s, or both, together wit

h the costs of prosecution.
26 U.S.C. § 7206.

3 The petitioners ’ Sentenci ng Guideline range was 4 to 10 months confinement, one year supervi sed relea se, and a $1, 000 to $10,000 fi ne.3

INS charged petiti oners with being
remo vable for having been convict ed of an “aggravat ed felony ,” as def ined by se ction 101 (a)(43 )(M )(i) and ( i i) of th e Immigration and Na tura lizatio n A ct. See 8 U.S.C . § 1101(a ) (43)(M). Sec tion 10 1( a) ( 43 ) ( M) incl ude s in the feloni es class ifie d as “aggravated” for purposes of deportat ion:
An offe nse th at - (i) involve s fraud o r dece it in w hich th e loss to the vi ct im or victim s exceeds $10, 000; or (ii) is de s c ribed in § 7201[ 4 ] of t he Internal Re ve nue Code of 1986 (rel ated to tax e vasio n) in which th e reven ue los s to the Go vern men t e x ceeds $10 ,000 ; . . . 8 U.S. C . § 1101(a) (43)(M)(i ) & (ii) . The petitioners move d t o terminate removal proceedi ng s on th e gro und that a conviction for violat

ing section 7206(1) of the Internal Revenue Code was not an aggravat ed felonyunder eit her subsec tion ( M )(i) or (M)(ii ). The i mmigrati on judg e de n ied their

motion, ruli ng in Jul y 1998 that petit ion ers’ convi ctions rendered t hem
remo vable under ei th er subsection. App. 47. He orde red ea ch pe tit ione r “removed to the R epu blic o f (S out h) K ore a.” A pp. 48. On December 2, 2002, t he Board of Imm igratio n Appe al s a ffi rme d th e immigr at ion judge’s decisi on without opinion, making it

the final a gency decisi on. See 8 C.F.R . § 1003.1(e )(4). The pe ti ti one rs se ekre vi ew.

II
. DIS CUSS ION On appeal, the p etit

ion ers chal lenge the immigration judge’s o rder of r emoval
on the ground t

hat the ir convi ct ions for violat ing 8 U. S. C. § 7206(1) do not qualif y as ag gr avated fe lonies unde r either 8 U.S .C. § 1101(a) (4 3)(M )(i) or (ii ), and, theref ore, that they are n ot rem ovab le 4 In rel evant part, s ecti on 7201 provides:
Attempt t o evade or defeat tax.

An y person wh o w illfully attem pts in an y mann er to evade or defeat

any t ax imposed by this title or t he payme nt there of sh all, in additi on to other

penalties prov ided b y law, be guilty of a felonyand, upon conviction thereof, shal l be fined not more than $100,000 ($500, 000 in the case of a cor

porati on), or impris oned not more than 5 year s, or both, together with the c osts of prosecution.
26 U.S.C. § 7201.4

pursuant to 8 U.S.C . § 1227(a )(2)(A)(iii). 5 As the government

now concedes tha t subsection (M)(ii ) does not apply , we need only consider w hether the petitioners’ convictions mee t the de finiti on of aggrava ted felony in subse ction (M )(i). A. Jurisdic tion As an init

ial matte r, we consider

the gove r nmen t’s contention tha t under 8 U.S .C. § 1252 (a)(2)(C) w e lac k jurisdic ti on to revi ew the peti tioner s’ order of remo val. That provi sion stat es that “no court shallhave juri sdiction to revi ew any final order of r emoval agains t an alie n who is removable byreas o n of having committeda crimi nal offense cove re d in secti on
. . . 1 227 (a )( 2) (A) (i ii ). ” As
recen tl y explai ned, however, thi s juri sdiction-st

rippi ng provisi on c omes int o playonly when two facts exi st: “(1) the petit ioneris an al ien (2) who is dep ortable by reason of havi ng been convict ed of one of the enumerated offenses. ” Dr akes v. Zimski , 240 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 200 1). We nece ssarily hav e jurisd iction “ to determi ne whether these jurisd i ctiona l f acts are pres ent. ” Id. ; see Va lansi v
. Ashcroft , 278 F.3 d 20 3, 207 ( 3d C ir. 200 2). We are thus not preclude d fro m reviewing the pe titi one rs’ argument that t hey have not been convi cted of a n “enumeratedoffense .” If th e petitioners ar e right , judi cial review of the remova l

orde rs is not precluded, and they wil l be vacated f or fa iling to a llege a remo vable offense. If

th e p etit io ne rs ar e wr ong , w e lackjurisdictio n to inqu ire any fu rther into the merits , an d the remo val ord er w ill stan d. B. Have the Petitioners Been Convi cte d of a n Aggra vat ed Fel ony? The petiti on ers ar gue that no conviction under section 7206(1) for fili ng false tax ret

urns can satis fy t

he defini tion of agg rav ated felo ny in 8 U.S .C

. § 1101(a)( 43) ( M)(i). W e a pp ly de novo review to this pu relylegal questi on of statutory inter

pretat ion that gover ns our own juris dicti on. See Valansi , 278 F.3d at 207. “The first step in in terp reti ng a statute is t o determi ne ‘whether t he language at is sue has a pl ain and unambiguo us m eaning with regard t o the parti cular

disput e in the case.’ ” Id. at 209 (quoti ng Marsh ak v. Tr ead we ll , 240 F.3d 184, 192 (3d C ir. 2001 )). If the s tatuto r y meaning is cl ear, our

inquiry i s at an end. Id

. If the s tatutory meaning is not cl ear , we must try t o discern Cong ress ’ int ent using the ordinary tools of statutory
con struc tion. See INS v

. Cardoza-Fonseca , 480 U.S . 421 , 44 7-48 (1987). “If, by em ploying tra ditiona l tools of stat utoryconstruction, we determine that Co ngr ess’ inten t is cle ar, that i s the end of the matter.” Valansi , 278 F.3 d at 208 (quoti ng Bell v. Reno , 218 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 2000) ). I f w e are un able to discern Congress’ i ntent using the normal tools of stat

ut or y cons truction , we w ill 5 In rel evant part, s ecti on 1227(a)( 2)(A)(i ii) provides that “ [a]ny alie n who is convicted of an aggravated felon y at any time a fter ad missio n is dep orta ble.” 8 U .S.C . § 1227(a )(2)(A)(iii).5

gene rally give d eference to the Bo ard’s inter pretat ion, so long as i t is reasonabl e. Id.
We thus b egin o ur an alysis with the statutory language of subse ction (M )(i). It may be argu e d that the peti tioners’ convictions under section 7206(1) for fili ng false t ax returns clearly involve “fraud and dec eit, ” as requi red by
su bsecti on (M )(i), and th at we need lo o k
no further. However, the pre cise ques tion before us is whether the stat utorylanguage makes it pl ain and unambiguous that subsection (M)(i) c overs convi cti ons for
v iol ating secti on 7206(1). This question cannotbe answered sol elyby l ooking at “the language i tsel f”; we must al so be cognizant

of “the specifi c context

in which that language i s used, an d the broade r context of the statute as a whole.” Id. at 20 9 ; cf. United States Nat’lBank of Oregon v. Independe nt Ins. Agents of America, Inc. , 50 8 U.S. 439, 454- 55 (1993) (“A statute’s plain mean ing must be enforced, of course, and the meaning of a stat ut e will t

ypi call y heed t

he commands of its punctua ti on. But a purported plain- meaning an alys is b as ed on ly o n pun ctuatio n is ne cessa rily incomplete and
runs the ri sk of d isto rti ng a stat ute' s true
m eaning. Along with punctuation, text
cons is ts of words li ving ‘a communal
ex i sten ce,’ in Judge L earned H and’s phrase, the meaning of e ach w ord informing the oth ers an d all in th eir aggr egate tak[in g] their pur port fr om the setting in which they are use d. Over and
over we have str essed that [i ]n expounding
a stat ute, we mu st no t b e g ui de d b y a sin gle sentence or member of a sent enc e , but look to the pro vision s of th e w hole la w, and to it s object and polic y. ”) (int ernal citations and quotations o mitted). Here, these broader considerati ons, spe cifically the pres ence of subsect ion (M)(ii), pr e clude a conclusion that the statutory language of su bsec tion (M )(i) clearly an d unambiguously covers a secti on 72 0 6(1) convi ction. Subsecti ons (M )(i) and (M )(ii) we re ena cte d
s imulta neou sly in 19 96. S ubse ction (M )(i) has a generalapplic ation – t he ga mu t o f state and federalcrimes i nvolving fr aud and dece it causin g lo sse s over $10, 000. Subsecti on (M)( ii ) z er oes in on the c ri me of fe deral ta x eva sion, as desc ribed in sectio n 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7201; it i s sil ent about any other criminal tax o ffenses. G ro s s examinati on of (M) leaves obvi ous ques ti ons: Wh y do es s ub s ec t i on ( M) i nclude bo th a ge neral p rovisio n encompassing “fra ud and deceit ” and spec ific provi si on directed solel y at the offense of fede ral tax evasion? If subsection M(i) applies to tax offenses, what is the purpose of

subsection (M )(ii)? Doe s the juxt aposition of subse ctions (M )(i) and ( M )(ii) signa l an inte nt to
exc l ude other t ax offenses fr om the de finit ion of ag gravated f elonies in (M )(i)? That subsection (M)(i) rais es these qu e sti ons demonstrates that its language does not hav e a p la in and una mb i guous meaning, at le ast not as appli ed to a conviction under section 7206 (1 ) of the6

Interna l Revenue Code. 6 The re fo re , w e must turn t o the tr aditi onal tool s of statutory construc tion to see if theyassist in disce rning Co ngre ss’ inten t. We start w ith the prin ciple th at if at
a ll possibl e, we shoul d ado pt a cons tructio n which recogni zes eac h ele ment of th e sta tute. See Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Sloan , 263 F.3d 27 8, 283 (3d Cir. 200 1) (rec ogn izing th at it is an “axiom of st atut or y co ns tr

uc ti on t ha t wh en ever poss ible each w ord in a statutory provisi on is to be give n meaning an d not to be treat ed as surpl usage”) ( internal quot ation s omitted). The only construction t hat sati sfies this princi ple is the one suggeste d by the pe tit ione rs: that su bsec tion (M )(i) does not app ly to tax off ens es. If the govern ment’s proposed construction w ere adopted, and we were to hold that anytax offense involvi ng fraud an d deceit over $10,000 was an aggravat ed felonyunder subsection (M )(i), subse ction (M )(ii)
wo uld be m ere s urp lusa ge. We h ave consider ed the government ’s co n tenti on that there c ould be a cas e where a conviction for t ax evasion would not involve fraud or dece it, in which ca se subsection (M)(ii) would exist simp ly to catch any ca ses not c overed by subsection (M)( i ), but the gove rnment has not ident ifie d, and we are unable to envisi on, what that c ase mig ht b e. In deed , in addressi ng wh at con duct m ight con stitute tax eva s ion under s ecti on 7201, the Supreme Co u rt has stat ed that an “af firmative wil lful attempt [to evade] may be in ferred from . . . any conduc t, t he likely effectof which would be to mislead
or to conceal .” Spies v. United States , 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943) (emphas i s added ). Ac cord in gl y, the goal of avoiding surplus age in con struin g a statute is sati sfied only if subse ction ( M)(i) does not apply to t ax offenses. Another “commonplace [rul e] of statutory cons truction ” is that the “spe cific governs the gener al. ” Doe v. NationalBd. of Me dical Exam iners , 199 F.3d 146, 154- 55 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airli nes , Inc. , 504 U.S. 374, 384 (199 2)); see also Fourco Glass Co. v. Transm irra Products Corp. , 353 U.S. 222, 228 (1957) (“ The law is set tled t hat however inclus ive may be the general language of a stat

ute, it wil l not be held to apply to a matter spec ifically dealt w ith in another part of t

he same e nac tment.”), quoted in Doe v. Nati onal Bd. of Medical Exam iners , 199 F.3d at 155. As explained by the S upr em e C our t, “ whe re Congress include s parti cular l anguage in one s ecti on of the statu te but o mi ts i t in anot her secti on of the sam e act, it is gen erally presumed that Congress acts inte ntiona lly and purposel y i n the dispar ate i nclusi on or exc lusio n.” Cardoza-Fonseca , 480 U.S. at 447-48; see also Albright v. Olive r , 510 U.S. 266, 273 (199 4) . Mo reov er, “[t]h is princip le has specialforce when C ongress has targeted specif

ic pr ob lems w ith spec ific solutions i n the cont ex t of a general st atute .” Doe v. NationalBd. of Medical Exam iners , 199 F.3d at 155. And 6 But see Abr eu -Re y es v. INS , 292 F.3d 1029, 1037 ( 9th Cir. 2002) (deny ing petit ion for rev iew ), withdrawn on other grounds , 350 F.3d 966 (9th C ir. 2003).7

it appl ies “p arti cu larl y whe n the two [provisions] are interrel ated and cl os ely positioned , both in fa ct bei ng parts of the
sa me statutory sc heme.” Id. (int ernal quotations o mitted). The stat utorysecti on at issue here is
a perfect example of thi s phenomenon. Subsecti ons (M)(i) and (M)(ii) we re adopted at

the sa me time, appear adj acent to ea ch othe r, an d a re th e o nl y two parts of subsection (M ), wit h in a statu te with
m an y, man y subsections. Subsecti on (M )(i) is a ge n eral pr ovisi on covering “fraud and deceit”; subsecti on (M)(ii) is a very specifi c provis ion that only app lies to federal tax evasi on. According ly , the princip le that the sp e cifi c governs the general also fav o rs the inter pretat ion that subsection (M )(ii) identif ies the o nly removable t ax offense, tax evas ion, w hile subsection (M)(i) doe s notap ply to tax offenses. 7
Wh ile the le gisl ative hist ory of t h e Immigration and Natural ization Act of fers no help in discer ning Co ngre ss’ inten t in enacti ng s ubs ection (M )(i), 8 the history and st ru ctur e o f the cr im in al ta x l aws per su ade us that

in enacting subsec tion (M)(ii), Congress intended to si ng le o ut tax eva sion as the only tax crime that i s a remo vable off ens e. See United States N at'l Bank of O r. v. Indep. I ns. Agents of America, Inc. , 508 U .S. 439, 455 (1993) (“Statutory construction i s a ho lis tic endeavorand, at

a mi ni mum, must account for a statute’s full text, lang uage [,] as w ell
a s pun ctuatio n, structu re, and subje c t matter .”) (int ernal quot ations and cit ations omitted), quoted in Tineo v. Ashcroft , 350 F.3d 38 2, 391 (3d Cir 200 3). As the Supreme Court exp lai ned many years ago, t ax “evasi on” is the “capstone ” of tax l aw violations

. See Spies , 317 U.S. at

497. A felony s ince at least1903, it

has long been recogniz ed as

“ the grav est of o ffen ses ag ainst t h e reve nues. ” Id. at 499. In his opi nion for the Co urt in Spies , Justice Robe rt Jackson (a former General Counsel forthe Bureau
o f Internal Revenue, Assi stant Attor ne y General for the Tax Divi sion, Solici tor Gen er al, and Attorney General), after 7 See also Abreu-Reyes , 292 F.3d at 1037 (Paez, J ., di ssenti ng) (“That Con gress included a separate statutory provisi on for tax e vasion demonst rates that i t did not

intend to include tax offe nses w ithin the “frau d or d eceit” te xt. Rather, as the stat

ute reflects, Congress drew a distincti on between tax offe nses and other c rimes i nvolving fr aud and deceit . Congress then targeted onl y the more egregi ous act of t ax evasion, and only when the loss to the gove rnment exceeds $10, 000, as s uffici ently seri ous to warrant

removal. ”) 8 In 19 96, C ong ress va stly expanded the number a nd ty pes of offenses t

hat qual ifie d as aggravated felo nies

. See Ill egal Immigr ation Ref orm and I mm igrant R espo nsibility Act of 1996 (II RIRA), Pub. L. 104- 208, 110 Stat. 30 09 (1 996 ). For th e mo st part, these cha nges were adopte d without any discuss ion of the ir particul ar purpose
.8

outli ning the the n civiland crimi nal “penalties imposed by Congress to enforc e the t ax la ws ,” 9 id. at 495, concluded that “[t]he climax of this variet y of s ancti ons is the seri ous and inclus ive fe lo ny, defin ed to consist of a will ful attempt i n any manner to eva de or defeat

the ta x,” id. at 497 (emp hasis adde d). Th us, fo r Co ngre ss to select tax evasi on as the “a ggravate d” tax fe lo ny, justify ing removal of an ali en who
c ommitted it, while sparing lesser t a x felo ns, is thoroughlyconsistent with t he history and structure of c ri minal t ax offenses.
In the e nd, a fter co nsidering vari ous tools of stat

utoryconstruction, we believe that Congress’ intent is c lear: in enacting subsection ( M) ( ii) , it

intende d to speci fy tax evasion as the onl y d eportabl e tax offense; it fol low s t hat it did not i ntend subsection (M )(i) to co ver tax offenses. 10 To the extent that any am biguity lingers , we note that there is a “l ongstandi ng princip le of construing anyling er ing ambiguities in deportat

ion stat utes i n favor of the a lien.” INS v. Cardoza-Fonse ca , 48 0 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (principle is a corollary to the ru le of le nity th at applie s in construing crim inal statu tes); see also INS v. S t. C yr , 533 U.S . 2 89 (20 01); see also Valansi (“This r

ule of construction .

.

. may be applied as a canon of last resort to determi ne the intent of Congress on an ambiguous issu e.” ). T he facts of the present case h ighligh t the rea son th is pr inciple exists: it is a p lain fa ct that in
re ali ty neithe r the pr osecuti on, nor t he sentenci ng judge inv olved in th e prosecution, plea and se ntenci ng of petit ion ers , treated thei r offense as “aggravat ed. ” The pro secuti on acquiesc ed in, if it did not n egotia te, a plea agree men t, and the ju dg e imposed a sentence chara cteristic of a misd em eano r, not a fel ony – much less an “a ggravate d one” (however it be d efin ed)

. See Francis v. Reno , 269 F.3d 162, 170-71 ( 3d Cir. 2001) (noti ng th at the im portan ce of this princip le is hi ghlighted “given the changes in immigration law effect uated by the [1996 ame ndm ents to the I mmigrati on and 9 The se san ctions r ange d fro m civ il delinq uenc y penalties rang ing fro m 5 to 25 percent

to cri minal penal ties calibrated from misdemeanors ( e.g. former § 145(a) ) to t ax evasion, punishabl e as a fel ony and carry ing a maximum penaltyof 5 year s confinement and a $5,000 fi ne (former § 145( b), now § 7201 ).

10 We note that i f we had not reach ed this c onclu sion, w e w ould
co nf ro ntth e q ue stio n of

whe th erwe should defer

to the Boar d’s interpret ation in a si tuati on where the Board i tsel f has not rule d on the is sue bef ore us, see 8 C.F.R. 1003. 1(e)( 4) (affi rmance without opinion i ndicat es onlyapproval of the outcom e, not the imm igration judge’s reasoni ng), and where t he meaning of the stat utoryprovisi on depends, i n part, on an underst anding of the Internal Revenue Code, a subj ect on which the Board has no experti se.9

Na tion ality A ct]).” 11 According ly , we conclude that the petiti oners’ conv iction f or vio latin g secti on 7206(1) of the Internal Revenue Code i s not a rem ovable o ffense u nder 8 U.S .C. § 1101(a )(43)(M )(i). That decis ion makes it u nne cessary t o consider the petit ioners ’ argument t

hat the record does not est ablis h a loss of

$10,000.
II I. CONCLU SI ON The Petition for Review of the decisi on of the BIA approvi ng the removal orderof the IJ is grantedwith directio ns to
vaca t e the rem oval o rders w ith resp ect to the petiti oners.

11 Our dissenting coll eague speculates that

“If Congress had not wanted subsection M(i) t o applyto ‘t ax offenses, ’ Congress s urelywould have include d some language i n that provisi on to sign al that inte ntion.” Bu t Con gress is charg eab le with kn owl edg e of th e s ame well-established p rinciples of statutory
cons truction wh ich w e fee l com pelled to apply . If Congres s had not i ntended us to apply them, i t sure ly would have signa led to th at eff ect.
Further, our coll eague also speculates that

Congress may have
enac ted M (ii) “simp ly to mak e certa in even at the ris k of redundancythat t ax evasion qual ifie s as an ‘a ggravate d felon y.’” It may be th at Co ngre ss w ill wish to broa den the categories of aggr avate d felo ny to inclu de oth er or all tax fel onies. But we must int erpret what it has writt en by well -recogni zed rule s of stat utoryconstruction, unaided by speculat ion.10

Lee v. A shcro ft No. 02-4602
AL ITO , Circuit

Judge , dis senti ng I must respe ctfully dissent because I believe that t

he offense of

filing a false tax return and thereby

causing a t ax loss of
m ore than $ 10,00 0 falls s quar ely within the defin ition of an “a ggra vated felon y” in 8 U.S.C . § 1101(a )(43)(M )(i). Accord Abreu-Reyes v. INS , 292 F.3 d 1029 (9 th C ir. 200 2), withdrawn on other ground , 350 F .3d 966 (9 th Cir . 200 3). The term “ aggr avate d felo ny” is defined t o include : (M ) an o ffen se that - (i) involv e s fraud or dece itin w h ich the loss to the vict im or vict im s exceeds $10, 000 ; or (ii ) is de scri bed i n se cti on 7201 of Titl e 26 (rel ating to tax e vasion) in wh ich the reven ue los s to t he Government exceeds $10 ,000

. . . . 8 U.S .C. § 110 1(43 )(M )(em phas is added ).
T hus, subsection (M )(i ) sets out tw o requirements. Fir st, t he offense must “involve fraud or dece it. ” This means that the off ens e mu st i nclud e “fra ud o r dece it
as a ne ces sary co mp one nt o r elem ent.” Valansi v. Ashcroft , 278 F.3d 203, 210 ( 3d Cir. 200 2). Seco nd, “th e loss to the vic tim
or v ictim s” m ust e xce ed $ 10,0 00. The offense of fi ling a f alse t ax return and causing a tax l oss of more than $10,000 sati sfies these el ements. “Fraud”
or “deceit ” is a n ecessa ry element of 26 U.S .C. § 7206(1), which makes it a cr ime to make or subscribe “an y r eturn, statem ent, or o ther document ” that the defendant“does not bel ieve t o be true and correct as to ev ery mate rial ma tte r. ” In addi tion, caus ing a ta x loss o f mo re th a n $10,000 resul ts i n a quali fyi ng “loss to the victi m,” i.e ., t

he Un ited S tates Tre asu ry.

De spite the cla rity o f subsection M (i), the m ajority con clude s that this provisi on does not apply t o tax offenses. Invoking t wo ve nerable canons of statutory inter

pretat ion (v iz. , that st atute s shou ld be re ad if p ossible to avo id
su rplusa ge and that

the speci fic shou l d take pre ce dence over the general ), t he majo rity reasons a s foll ows. The provis ion that directly follows subse ction (M ) (i), i. e., 8 U .S .C. §1 101 (43)(M )(ii), specif ically provides t hat the offense of tax evas ion (26 U.S.C. § 7201) i s an agg rav ated fe lo ny. This specifi c provis ion would not have been needed if ( M)(i) ap plied to tax offenses, beca use tax evas ion is an offense that involves fraud or dece it. Ther efor e, Co n gress mu st hav e inten ded th at (M )(i) not apply

to “ta x offenses. ”
I mus t d is ag re e wi th this ana lysis for two reas ons
. First and most impo rtant, th i s analy sis fa ils to account for the lang uag e of sub sec tion M (i). If Congress had not wanted subs ection M (i) to app ly to

“ tax offenses, ” Congress sur elywou l d have i n cluded some l anguage in that provisi on to si gna l t

ha t i nt en ti on. As11

adopt ed, howeve r, subsection M (i ) contai ns no such hint . In or der to a rgue that the filing of a false tax return does not
come with in th e language of s ubsecti on M(i), one wou ld have t o argue ei ther t hat the term “ victim ” w as no t mea nt to ap ply to the Treas ury or that

the te rm “loss” does not inclu de a tax lo ss. However , both of these argu men ts fail t o co mp ort w ith ordinary usa ge. See United States v. Fleming , 128 F.3d 285, 288 (6 t h Cir. 1997)(“In tax fraud ca se s, we consider the United States Treasurythe vi ctim.”); U.S .S.G . § 2T 4.1 ( “T ax L oss ” tab le). Second, th e m ajo rity e rrs in inferring from subsection M(ii) that Congress bel ie ved th at sub section M (i) did not reach t ax off ense s. Sub section M (ii)
ma y hav e be en e nac te d si mpl y to ma k e certain – eve n at the ri sk of re du nd an cy – that tax evasi on qualif

ies as an aggravated fe lo ny. Whi le goo d sta tutor y drafts man ship seek s to avoid sur plusage, othergoals, such as certaint y and t he avoidance of lit

igati on, are s om etimes
more i m portan t. Here , those re spon sible for drafti ng the provisi ons in quest ion may have had a measure of doubt that subsection M(i) would be interpreted as covering all ( or any ) evasi on cases, and subsection M(i i) ma y ha ve be en ad ded to disp el an y such unc ertai nty.

The tax evas ion statu te prov ides in relevant part as fol lows:

Any person who w illfully attem pts in any ma nner to evade or defeat any t ax imposed by this titl e or t he payment thereo f sha ll, in additi on to other

penalties pr o vided by law, b e guilty of a felo ny . . . .

26 U.S.C. § 7201.

This offense has t

hree ele ments: “1) the exist ence of a tax d efici ency, 2) an affirmative act co nstituti ng a n attem pt to evade or defeat

payment of the tax, and 3) wil lfuln ess.” United State v. M cG ill , 964 F.2d 222 , 229 (3d Cir .), cert

. d enied , 506 U.S. 102 3 (1 992 ). See also United States
v. Voigt , 89 F.3d 10 50, 1089 (3d Cir. 1996). In this context , will fulness requir es proof that t he de f endant knew that his or her c ond uct w as u nlaw ful. Cheek v. United States , 498 U.S. 192 , 201 (19 91)

.

Neither “fraud” nor “ deceit ” i s mentioned in the sta tu te a s a necessa ry elementof

tax evasi on. The stat

ute appl ies to the w illful attem pt “ in any manner to evade or defeat any tax im pose d by this title or the payment

ther eof .” 26 U.S .C. § 7201 (emphasis added). Li kewise, l eading
cases inte r preti ng this language do not hold that f

raud or dece i t is an element of the off ens e. In Spies v. United States , 317 U.S. 492 (19 43), the Sup reme C ourt emphasized the br eadth of th e statutory language:12

Co n gress did not def

ine or limit the m eth ods by which
a willfulatte mpt to d efe at
an d ev ade m ight b e ac c omplishedand perhaps did not d efine lest it s effort t o do s o r es ul t i n so me unexpected lim i tati on. Nor
wo uld we b y defi niti on co nstri ct the scope of t h e Congressional prov is ion th a t it may be accomplish ed “in any m ann er.”

Id . at 499. 12

In lig ht of the stat

utorylanguage and th e case l aw, cauti ous draft ers might have concluded that i t was prudent to add
su bsecti on M(ii) for at least two reasons. First, even if

the draf ters , li ke the m ajority in t his c ase ( see M aj. Op . at 9-10 ), could not think of an evasion case thatdid not involve fraudulen t or d eceitfu l cond uct, the drafte rs mig ht no t have trusted their ability to antic ipate e very po ssible v ariety of evasion ca se and might ha ve added subsection M(i i) just

to be sur e that

no evasion case f ell o utsi de the defi niti on. Second, even if the dr a fters w ere ce rtain that no defendant would ever be convict ed of tax evasi on without pr oof of fraudul ent
or deceitful condu ct, the draf ters might have been conc erned that som e cou rts
wo uld hold that

tax evas ion fal ls out side the scope of subsection M(i) because neithe r “f

raud” nor “decei t” is a formal elementof th e of fen se. See Valan si , 278 F.3d at 210 (i n de term ining whethe r an offense involves “fraud or dec eit, ” we look to the ne cessa ry eleme nts of the offense of conviction). Thus, gi ven the choi ce between (a) the ri sk that s ome or all tax evasion cases would not be covered and (b) the inc lusi on of a potenti ally redundant statuto ry provisi on, the drafte rs might ha v e sele cted the la tter o ptio n.

For these r easo ns, I thin k that it is
un warrantedto infer from subsection M (i i ) that subs ection M (i) wa s not in tende d to reach “tax offens es.” I would heed the clear language of s ubsecti on M( i) 13 and

12 Alth oug h the C ourt w ent on to provide a l ist

of deceitful activities fr om wh ich an “aff irmativ e w illful attem pt” could be inf erred, th e Co urt took pains to note that this list was fu rnished “[b ]y way of il lust

rati on, and not

by wayof limita tion .” 31 7 U .S. at 499

. 13 Even if the statutory language w ere ambigu ous, I wo uld defer to th e BIA ’s reasonabl e inte rpret ation t hat § 7206(1) is an agg rav ated felo ny. See I.N.S. v. Agu irre-Aguirre , 526 U.S. 415, 424 (199 9)(“B ecau se the C ourt o f A ppea ls confronte d questi ons impli cati ng ‘[the BIA’s] const

ructi on of the st atute which it admi nist ers, ’ the cour t shoul d have applie d the pri nciple s of deferenc e descri bed in Chevron ”); Valansi , 278 F.3d at 208 ( “Despite our exerci se of de
nov o rev iew, w e w ill give d efere nce to the agency ’s interpret ation of the aggr avate d felo ny defin ition if13

hold that the offense of fil ing of a false tax return and causing a

tax loss of

more than $10 ,000 is an agg rav ated felo ny.

Co ngre ss’s inten t is uncle ar”); Lukwago v. Ashcroft , 329 F.3d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 2003)(“W e must rev iew the B IA’s stat utoryinter

pretat ion of the INA under the defer entia l st andard of Chevron .”). Ap pellan ts argu e that w hen th e IN A is ambiguous we should i nvoke the rul e of lenit y and find in th e alie n’s f avo r. See , e.g. , I.N.S. v. Cardoza- Fonseca , 480 U.S ., 421, 4 49 (1 987 ); I.N .S . v. St . C yr , 533 U.S. 289, 320 ( 2001). The rul e of lenit y, however, is reserved for si tuati ons in which the norm al rules of statutory inter pre tatio n ar e un help ful. See St . C yr , 533 U.S. at 320, n. 45 (“[T] he cases and rules cited by Petitioner are distinguishable b ecause ‘[w ]e only defer, however, to a gency i nterpr etations of statutes th at, app lying the n orm al “too ls of statutory construction,” are ambiguous.’ ”)