### In th e



# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-2658

L I P P E R T T I L E C OMPANY

, I N C ., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants ,

v.

I NT E R NAT I O NAL U N I O N

OF B RI C K L A Y E RSAND A L L I E D C R AF T S M E N , D I S TRI C T C OUN C I LOF W I S C O N S I N AND I T S L O C AL 5, Defen dant-Appellee.

Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the

Eastern Distri ct o f Wi sconsi n. No. 11 -cv-00 41 2 — Lynn Ad el man , Judg e.

A RGU E D J ANUAR

Y 23, 2013

— D E C I D E D A UGUS T 1, 2013

Before P O S N E R and W I L L I AMS , Cir c uit Judges and N ORG L E, District Judge. *

The Hono rab l e Charles R. Nor gle of the Uni ted States Distri ct Co urt fo r * the No rthern Di stric t o f Il l i noi s, Eastern Di v i sio n, si tting by desi gna tio n.2 No. 12-2658
W I L L I AM S

, Cir cui t Judge. Bro thers Les and Jeffrey Li ppert
own a tile installati on business that employs uni on w or ker s. So me of thei r customers require or prefer that uni on w or ker s be employ ed for til e in s ta l lation proj ects, but other s prefer nonun io n labor becau se they can be cheaper

. So in 2004 th e brot hers created a new tile installat i on c om p a ny th at employ ed non-uni on w or ker s solely to serv e thi s market

. Pursu ant to the governing collecti v e bargaining agr eement, the uni o n fi led a gr i ev anc e w i th the jo in t arbi tr ation commi tte e (“JAC”), seeking uni on benefi ts for the non-uni on tile installers w or kin g for the

new company

. After the JAC gr anted thi s relief, the compani es petiti oned to v acate the aw ard in federal di stric t court, arg uing t hat the new company should not hav e been bound by t he arbi tr ation aw ard becau se i t w as not a party to the col l e ct i v e bargaining agr eement. How ev er , the di stric t court gr anted the uni on’s motion t o e nfo rce the aw ard on sum mary judgment, finding that the nominally new company co ul d be tr eated as
one and the same wi th the old co mpany for purposes of the agr eement under the “single employ er” doctrine. The compani es appealed. The compani es fi rst arg ue that th e arbi tr ation aw ard i s unenf or ceable becau se the National Labor Relations Board has

nev er found that the non-uni on laborer s a r e in t he same bargaining uni t as the uni on laborer s. They maintai n that such

a finding i s required to deter m ine whe the r d i sputes concerning the non-uni on w or ker s are subject to arbi tr ation under the collecti v e bargaining agr e e me nt

. W e do not resolv e thi s is sue becau se the compani es w ai v ed thi s arg ument by fai ling to present i t to the JAC. The compani es next challen ge the di stric t court’s finding that they are a “single employ er ,” but w e agr eeNo. 12-2658 3

wi th the di stric t c ourt that the compani es, whi ch are centrally oper ated by the same entity , are one and the same for purposes of arbi tr abi li ty under the c ontr act. Fin ally , they ass ert that the JAC w as tain ted b e c a u s e the uni on repr esentativ e who fi led the g r ie v ance also sat on the JAC, but nothin g in the contr a ct forbid s thi s practi ce. Therefore, w e affi rm.

I. BACKGRO UND The following facts a r e undis puted. Brot hers Les and Jeff Li ppert establi shed Li ppert Ti le Company , Inc. (“Li ppert Ti le”), a floor tile installati on company , in 2000. Lipp e rt Ti le services cus tomer s in the four -county Greater Milw aukee area. The Brick l ay ers and Alli ed Craftsmen, Di stric t Counci l of Wi scons in and i ts Local 5 (collecti v ely , the “uni on”) repr esent the tile installati on w or ker s of Li ppert Ti le. The gove rnin g collecti v e bar gain ing agr eement (“CBA”) betw een the uni on and Li ppert Ti le prov ide d fo r certain benefi ts and w ages for the employ ees and prohibi ted Li ppert Ti le from “sub let[ting], assi gn[ing] or tr ansfer[ring] any w or k cov ered by thi s Ag reement to be perfor med at the si te of a co ns t ructi on proj ect to
a ny person, fi rm or corpor ation except where the Employe r si gni fi es and agr ees in wri tin g to be bound by the full ter ms of thi s Agr eement an d compli es wi th all of the terms and condi

tions of thi s Agr eement.” The CBA a lso prov i ded for the creati on of a jo in t arbi tr ation commi tte e, consi sting of “three (3) Employ ers and t hree (3) Repr e se nt atives o f the Uni on for the purpose of deci ding di sputes, whi ch may aris e in connecti on wi th the appli cati on of thi s agr eement.” (In the case of a tie, the CBA prov i d e d for refer ral to the Wi scons in Employment Relations Commi ssi on for resolution.) The CBA added, “In the

ev ent an Employ er or the Uni on does no t co mp l y wi th the4 No. 12-2658
A w ard of the arbi tr ator

, the other party shall hav e the right to use all l egal and economi c recourse.”
Li ppert Ti le’s market for tile installati on w or k inclu des gen e r a l contracto rs subject to their o wn collectiv e bargaining agr eements, proj ect owne r s ha ving or w anti ng to use uni on-repr e sented tile contracto rs, and government-regulated entiti es tending to use un ion labor due to prev ai ling w age reg ulati ons (the “uni on market “). Ov er the last 1 0 yea rs, how ev er , thi s market has been declining, and more cus tomer s in t he reg i on hav e sought non-uni on tile installers, gener ally becau se t he y a r e 25% to 45% cheaper (the “non-uni on market “). Becaus e the Lippert brot hers beli ev ed i t w as futi le for Li ppert Ti le to tr y and compete in t his gr owing non-uni on
mar ket, the brot hers in 2004 created a new tile installati on company , DeanAlan, that w ould only use non-uni on w or ker s and compete only in the non-uni on tile installati on market for the same four counti es. (The creation of a non-uni on company for thi s purpose i s kno wn as “double-b reasting.”) They also created the Li ppert Group, a corpor ate entity that w ould prov i de management servicesto bo th tile installati on compani es. Subsequently

, Li p p e r t Ti le conti nued prov i ding tile installati on services to the uni on market, while DeanAlan prov i de d tile installati on services to the non-uni on market in the same area. All three compani es—Li ppert Ti le, DeanAlan, and the Li ppert Group—lease offi ce and w arehouse spac e in the same bui lding whi ch i s owne d by t he Li ppert brot hers. DeanAlan also rents tr ucks from, and or ders i ts supp li es thro ugh, Li ppert Ti le. The Li ppert Group prov i des admini strat i v e services for the other tw o compani es, maintai ning bus iness rec o r d s,No. 12-2658 5 processing p a yr oll, handling bi lling, and managing bank

accoun ts. The Li ppert Group also supp li es both compani es wi th o ffi ce and w arehouse staff, inclu ding salesm en and esti mator s, who deci de whi ch company wil l bid on a proj ect and how much to bi d. At the same tim e, the compani es do not share spac e wi thi n the bui lding and hav e separate lease

arr angements (though wi th the same owners). Th ey do not share e qui pment. They hav e di fferent corpor ate offi cers, separate bank accoun ts, separate lines of credi t, and separate insu rance prog rams. And becau se the whole poin t of creating DeanAlan w as to serv e the non-uni on market wi th non-uni on labor , the compani es naturally hav e separate employ ees and separate customers. In 2010, the uni on d i re c to r , J e ffrey Leckw ee, di scov ered that DeanAlan had been created to perfor m non-uni on tile installation w or k in the same reg i on, and fi led a gr i ev ance again st the three compani es wi th the JAC. He a l l eged that thi s setup violated the CBA’s assi gnment prov i si on becau se i t essenti ally assi gned Li ppert Tile’s w or k to DeanAlan w or ker s wi thout giving DeanAlan w or ker s the same uni on benefi ts

. The compani es arg ued as a threshold matter that the gr i ev ance w as not arbi tr able becau se DeanAlan and the Li ppert Group w ere not parties to the CBA. The uni on responded that all three compani es should e ssentially be consi dered a “single employ er ,” i .e., th a t De anAlan and the Li ppert Group were the

same entity as Li ppert Ti le, and that a l l three w ere there fore bound by the arbi tr abi li ty prov i si ons of the CBA. The compani es also rais ed a ho st of procedural objections, inc luding the fact that Leckw e e him self sat on the si x-member JAC, whi ch allegedly bi ased the JAC again st the compani es. At no poin t,6 No. 12-2658
how ev er , di d the compani es arg ue to the JAC that the di spute

w as not arbi tr able becau se the non-uni on w or ker s w ere not in the same bargaining uni t as the uni on w or ker s cov ered by the CBA. Nor does any party sugge st that they w ere not giv en ample opport uni ties to pr esent arg uments b efore t he JAC.
In Mar ch 2011, the JAC upheld the gr i ev ance and adopted the uni on’s requested deci si on and aw ard. Wi thout further explanation, the JAC found that “Li ppert Tile , The Li ppert Group and De a nA l an are a single employ er and that the Agr eement w as violated by the f ai lure of Li ppert to apply the ter ms and condi tions of the Agr eement t o De anAlan.” It di d not say anythin g about whether t he DeanAlan w or ker s w ere in the same bargaining uni t. It or dered that DeanAlan w or ker s be made whole for w or k done since June 1, 2010, that the uni on be made whole fo r lost dues, and that uni on benefi ts be prov i ded to DeanAlan w or ker s from that point forw ard. The co mpani es tog ether fi led a petiti on wi th the federal di stric t cour t t o v acate the JAC aw ard, and the uni on responded by asking the court to e nf o r ce i t, in the form of a motion for sum mary ju d gm e n t. Th e c om p a ni es rais ed the same arg uments they ma d e before the JAC, except thi s tim e they arg ued for the fi rst tim e that the di spute w as not arbi tr able by the JAC becau se the aggr i ev ed DeanA l a n w or ker s were not part of the same bargaining uni t as the uni on w or ker s cov ered by the CBA. The di stric t courtgr anted the uni on’s motion for

sum mary judgment and or dered that the aw ard be enforc ed. First, the court found that the only i ssu e whi ch i t could deci de de nov o w as the “single employ er” i ssu e, becau se that i ssu e
w ent to whethe r the di spute w as proper ly subject to JAC arbi tr ation under the CBA, and t he r e w as no “clear[] andNo. 12-2658 7
unmi stakabl[e]“ agr eement by the parties (e.g., nothin g in the CBA suggesti ng) that only the JAC could make that threshold deter minati on. On that i ssu e, i t agr eed wi th the JAC that the compani es w ere essenti ally a “sing l e employ er” and so the d i spute w as arbi tr able. Second, the court appeared to agr ee wi th the compani e s t hat the bargaining uni t i ssu e had to be resolv ed before the aw ard could i ssu e, but i t di d not view i t as
an arbi tr abi li ty questi on. As a result, the court d eclined to decid e it de nov o, found that the JAC had i mpli ci tly deci ded that the DeanAlan w or ker s w er e in the same bargaining uni t
as the uni on w or ker s, and deferre d to that deci si on becau se no deci si on from the Nat ional Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”)

ev er suggested other wi se. Thi rd, the court rej ected the compani e s ’ a rgu ment that Leckw ee’s presence on the JAC inv ali dated the a w a r d , becau se all the CBA required w as balanc ed employ er -uni on repr esentation and i t w as undi sputed that the condi tio n w a s met. Last, the court sum mari ly rej ected the

c om p a ni e s’ remain ing procedural ob je c ti on s a n d a rgu m e nts on the merits, according gr eat deference to the JAC’s resolution of those is sues in the uni on’s fav or . The compan i es appealed.
II. ANAL

YSIS Becau se thi s appeal challen ges the di stric t court’s enforcement of a JAC aw ard i ssu ed pursuant to a CBA, a bri ef

rev i ew of our li mi ted jurisdi cti on i s in or der

. Section 301 of the Labor -Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) p r ov i des for federal subject-matt er jurisdi cti on ov er “[s] ui ts for violati on of contracts betwe e n a n e m p l oye r a n d a labor or gani zation” (su ch

as collecti v e bargaining a g reements), “wi thout respect to the amount in contro v ersy or w i thout regar d to the ci tizens hi p of the part i es ... .” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). As the Supr eme Courthas8 No. 12-2658 explain ed, thi s prov i si on prov i des federal courts ju ri s d i c ti on to
e n for c e “ f

in a l a nd binding” arbi tr ation aw ards i ssu ed pur s u a n t to a CBA. Gen. Driv er s v
. Ri ss & Co., 372 U.S. 517, 519 (1963). How ev er

, given t ha t Section 301 essenti ally li mi ts the federal

co urt’s jurisdi cti on to applyi ng the ter ms of a CBA, when a CBA prov i des for the sub mi ssi on of contractual di sputes to an arbi tr ator

, the court “i s confined to ascerta ining whether the party seeki ng arbi tr ation i s maki ng a clai m whi ch on i ts face i s governed by the contract.” United Steelworkers v
. Am. Mfg. Co. , 363 U.S. 564, 56 8 (1960). “[T] he judi ci al inqui ry under s 301

mus t be stric tly confined to the questi on whether the reluctant party di d agr ee to ar bi tr ate the griev ance or did agr ee to giv e the arb i tr ator pow er to make the aw ard he made.” United Steelworkers v
. W

arrior & Gulf Nav

. Co. , 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960). In other w or ds, “W

e are responsible on ly for the questi on of

a r bit r abi li ty.” United Steel v
. T riMas Corp. , 531 F .3d 531, 53 5 (7th Ci r
. 2008). Consequently , “a court i s not t o r ul e o n the potent i al merits of the underlyin g clai ms[ ,]

... ev en i f i t appears to the court to be fri v olous.” A T&T T e c h s ., Inc. v
. Commc’n s W orkers of Am. , 475 U.S. 643, 649-50 (1986); see also T riMas Corp. , 531 F .3d at 536 (“ I f t he parties hav e in fact agr eed to arbi tr ate their di spute, then t he y hav e bargained for the arbitra tor’s interpr etat i on of their contract—no t our s.”). A. Bargaining Unit Argument W aived Becaus e Not Rais ed in Arbitration The compani es fi rst a r g ue that the di spute w as not arbi tr able under the CBA becau se no thre shold finding had been made that the DeanAlan non-uni on w or ker s w ere in the

same bargaining uni t as t he L ippert Ti le uni on w or ker s. AsNo. 12-2658 9 they point out, other ci rcui ts hav e held that sucha finding ( in addi tion to the “ s in gl e e m p l oye r” finding, di scu ssed separately infr a ) i s a prer equi si te for a p p l y ing the CBA’s arbi tr ation prov i si ons to non - c ontr a c tu al-party entiti es li ke DeanAlan and the Li ppert Group. See So. Cal. Painters v
. Rodin & Co., Inc. , 558 F

. 3 d 1028, 1034 (9th Ci r
. 2009); Stardyne, Inc. v
. NLR B , 41 F .3 d 141, 152 n. 11 (3d Ci r
. 1994); Amalgamat e d Lithographers v
. Stearns & Beale, In c
. , 812 F .2d 763, 769 (2d Ci r
. 1987); but cf. Moria rty v
. Svec, 164 F .3d 323, 334 (7th Ci r
. 1998) (rej ecti ng thi s arg ument in ERIS A context ). The compani es furthermor e contend that only the NLRB may make such a bargaining-uni t finding. See Local 343 v
. Nor-Cal Plumbin g, 48 F .3d 1465, 1470-71 (9th Ci r
. 1994); but see Brown v
. Sandimo Mat erials , 250 F .3d 120, 1 2 9 (2d Ci r
. 2001); T

rs. of Colo. Statewide Iron W orkers v
. A&P Ste e l , In c. , 812 F .2d 1518, 1526-27 (10th Ci r
. 1987); Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v
. Pratt -Farnsworth, Inc. , 690 F .2d 489, 514- 17 (5th Ci r
. 1982). The compani es conclu de that i f the bargaining uni t i ssu e w ere appropr i ate for judi ci al deter minati on, w e should resol ve i t by conclu ding that the DeanAlan w or ker s
w ere no t inthe same bargain ing uni t as the uni on w or ker s. W e agr ee wi th the uni on, how ev er , that th e co mpanies

w ai v ed all aspects o f t hi s bargaining uni t arg ument, becau se they failed to rais e i t inany form before the JAC. “The fai lure to pose an av ai lable ar g ument to the arbi tr ator w ai v es that arg ument in collateral proceedings to e nf or ce or v acate the arbi tr ation aw ard.” Ganto n T echs., In c
. v
. UA W

, 358 F .3d 459, 462 (7th Ci r . 2004). “Arbi tr ation w ould not be an effi ci ent an d cost-effec tiv e method of resolv ing labor disp ut es i f federal courts indulged late arg uments that w ere not br o ug ht to the atte nti on of the arbi tr ator below .” Id. ; see also Nat’l W

recking Co.10 No. 12-2658

v
. T eamsters Local 731, 990 F .2d 957, 960 (7th Ci r
. 1993) (“Fai lure to present an is sue before an arbi tr ator w ai v es t he i ssu e in an enforcement pr o ce e ding.”). The compani es “cannot stand by duri ng arbi tr ation, wi thholdi ng certain arg uments, then, upon losing the arbi tr ation, rais e such arg uments in federal court. W e wi ll not toler ate such sandb agging.” Id. ; see also United Food & Commer cial W

orkers Local 100A v
. John Hofmeister & Son, Inc. , 950 F .2d 1340, 1344 (7th Ci r
. 1991) (“If parti es w ere allow ed to wi thhold info rmation duri ng arbi tr ation, and then use i t to sandb ag their opponents duri ng enforcement proceedings,

much of the effi ci ency and us efulnes s of arbi tr ation w ould be lost.”). There i s als o no suggestion that t he compani es had no oppor tuni ty to present such an arg ument, and indeed, they d i d not hesi tate to present a host of other arbi tr a bility and pr ocedural arg uments to the JAC. Thi s w ai v er rule appli es equally to questi ons concer ning arbi tr abi li ty. See Environ. Barrier Co., LLC v
. Slu rry Sys., Inc. , 540 F .3d 598, 607 (7th Ci r
. 2008) (“[E] v en though the or dinary rule i s that the questi on whether an agr eement to arbi tr ate exis ts i s
one fo r the court, the right to a judi ci al deter minati on of arbi tr abi li ty i s, li ke many rights, one that can be w ai v e d [in arbi tr ation].” (ci tations omi tte d ))

. Of course, the compani es insi st that the bargaining uni t i ssu e can only be deter mined by the NLRB, not the JAC (or any other tr ibunal ). But assu ming thi s i s true, the compani es sh ould hav e then asked the JAC to stay the proceedings pending an NLRB deter minati on. If the stay w ere gr anted and the NLRB ruled in the compani es’ fav or , t he arbi tr ation process w ould hav e ended wi thout w asting tim e on other i ssu es. At the v ery least, t he compani es could hav e re se r ved an objection to arbi tr abi li ty on the bargainingNo. 12-2658 11
uni t i ssu e, whi ch mi ght hav e caus ed the uni on to i mmedi ately go to the NLRB so that suc h a t hr e shold i ssu e could be effi

ci ently r esolv ed at the o utset. See, e.g. , id. at 606 ( “There i s not
a hint in the recor d that SS I ev er called thi s i ssu e to the arbi tr ator ’s atte nti on or sought to enjo in the arbi tr ation on the gr ound that there w as no agr eement t o arbi tr ate...

. Any one who

w ants to object to arbi tr abi li ty i s entitled to make her posi tion known to the arbi tr ator and the other party ; the ot her party may then, i f i t wi shes, respond wi th a petiti on for an o rder to compel arbi tr ation... and obtain a j udic i al deter minati on on arbi tr abi li ty.”). For the se r easons, w e hav e repeat edly di sapproved of the practic e of remain ing si lent on an arbi tr abi li ty i ssu e during arbi tr ation proceedings, only to play t he arbi tr abi li ty card in federal court after the party loses. See, e.g. , Roughnec k Concrete D r i llin g & Sawing Co. v
. Plumbers’ Pension Fun d, 640 F .3d 761, 766-67 (7th Ci r
. 2011) (cri tic i zing thi s practic e as a “heads I win, tails y ou lose” approach, and noting that a party “could hav e consented to hav e Judge Judy resolv e the di spute, and w ould hav e been bound ev en thoug h the collecti v e bargaining agr eement di d not authorize her to resolv e d isp ut e s”); Environ. Barrier Co., LLC, 540 F .3d at 606 (“Only after the arbi tr ator i ssu ed an aw ard unfav or able to SS I and the case w ound up in court di d SS I rais e an objection to the arbi tr ato r ’ s authority to deci de the di spute...

. Thi s i s not a tactic w e can accept, for sound poli cy reasons. I t i s ter rib ly

w asteful of the arbi tr ator ’s tim e , t he parties’ tim e, and the court’s tim e...
. [K]eeping the arbi tr abi li ty ca rd close to the ches t w ou l d allow a party li ke SS I to take a w ai t-and-s ee approach: i f i t had li ked [the arbi tr ator ’s] deci sio n, i t w ould hav e remain ed si lent, but since i t di d not, i t i s now complaining12 No. 12-2658
about arbi tr abi li ty.”); Slaney v
. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n , 244 F .3d 580, 591 (7th Ci r
. 2001) (“Slaney had t he oppor tuni ty to show that she had nev er agreed to arbi tr ate the di spute when she w as notifi ed of the arbi tr ation, but she let that oppor tuni ty pass
. Slaney could not ‘si t back and allow the arbi tr ation to go forw ard, and o nly after i t w a s a l l d one
... say: oh by the w ay , w e ne ver a gr eed to the arbi tr ation clause. That i s a tactic that the law o f ar bi tr ation, wi th i ts commi tment to speed, wi l l not toler at e
. ’ ” (quoti ng Comprehensi ve Accountin g Corp. v
. Rudel l , 760 F .2d 138, 140 (7th Ci r
. 1985))) ; AGCO Corp. v
. Anglin , 216 F .3d 589, 593 (7th Ci r . 2000) (“If a party wi llingly and wi thout

reserv ation allows an i ssu e to be sub mi tt e d t o a rbi tr ation, he

ca nnot aw ai t the outcome and then later arg ue that the arbi tr ator lacked authority to deci de the m atte r .”); Jones Dairy Farm v . Local No. P-1236 , 760 F .2d 173, 175 (7th Ci r . 1985) (“[ I]f

a party v oluntarily and unreserv edly sub mi ts an i ssu e to arbi tr ation, he cannot later arg ue that the arbi t r a t or had no authority t o r esolv e i t.”). Although the compani es di d at least br ing the i ssu e of arbi tr abil i ty to the atte nti on of the JAC on other gr ounds, unli ke the parties in some of the ci ted cases who fai led to rais e the i ssu e of arbi tr abi li ty at all, w e see no reason why the same effi ci ency consi derat i ons do not also apply when a party rais es certain arbi tr abi li ty i ssu es before the arbi tr ator but not other s. Cf. Ganto n T

echs., Inc. , 358 F .3d at 462 (rej ecting argument that “to preserve an arg ument for presentation in an e nfo rcement proceeding, a party need only present the informatio n that underli es the arg umen t at the arbi tr ation proceeding”). The JAC should hav e been giv en a meaningful o p p o rt uni ty to consi der whether to hold off on an aw ard pending a n NLRBNo. 12-2658 13
deter minati on on the bargaining uni t i ssue
. So w e di sagree wi th the di stric t court’s suggesti on that the JAC i mpli ci tly deci ded the i ssu e; the JAC a w a r d ma de no menti on of i t. The compani es di d not giv e the JAC that oppor tuni ty , and w e find the barg aining uni t is sue w ai v ed.
B. Disp ute Arbitrable Becaus e Companies W ere “Single Employ er” Se c ond, the compani es challen ge the di stric t court’s finding that the di spute w as arbi tr able becau se all three co mpani es should be consi dered a “sing l e employ er ,” there by binding DeanAlan and the Li ppert Group to the CBA’s ar bit rabi li ty prov i si ons ev en though they were not si gnato ries to the CBA. Gi v en that arbi tr abi li ty i s essenti ally a questi on of contract interpr etat i on, w e rev i ew the di stric t c ourt ’s deter minati on of arbi tr a bi li ty de nov o. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. W orkers, Local 21 v
. Ill. Bell T el. Co. , 491 F .3d 685, 687 (7th Ci r . 2007). “The single employ er doctrine holds that when tw o entiti es
are suffi ci ently integr ated, they wi ll be tr eated as a single entity for certain purposes.” Moria rty, 164 F .3d at 332. “T o deter mine whether tw o nomin ally s eparat e bus iness entiti es are a single employ er

, one mus t examine four factors set out by the Supreme Court : (1) interr elation of oper ations, (2) comm o n management, (3) centralized contro l of labor relat i ons, and (4)

common ownershi p.” T rs
. of Pension, W

elfare, and V

acatio n Frin ge Benefi t Fun ds of IBEW Local 701 v
. Favia Elec. Co., Inc. , 995 F .2d 785, 788 (7th Ci r
. 199 3 ) (c it ing South Prairie Constr

. Co. v
. Local No. 627, 425 U.S. 800, 803 (1976))

. “No one of these factors i s conclu si v e; instead, the deci si onmaker mus t w ei g h the tot ali ty of the ci rcums tances.” Id. “‘Ultimately , single employ er14 No. 12-2658

status... i s characterized by the absenc e o f a n arm’s length relat i onshi p found among unintegr ated compan ies.’” Lihli F as h ions Corp., Inc. v
. NLR B , 80 F .3d 743, 747 (2d Ci r
. 1 9 9 6 ) (ci tation omi tte d).
For essenti ally the same reasons set fort h by the di stric t court, we co nc l ud e that the three compani es are a “single employ er” for purposes of enforci ng the arbi tr ation prov i si ons of t he C B A

. First, w e agr ee wi th the compani es that when analyzi ng the interr elation of oper ations, i t i s the “day-to-day oper ational matter s” that are the most relev ant. Y et i t i s for that

v ery reason that thi s factor cuts again st them. The same entity , the Li ppert Group, maintai ns bus ine ss r ecords, processes payro ll, handles bi lling, and manages bank accoun ts for bot h compani es, and these shared, d a i l y op erat i ons are cri tic al to the smooth func tioning of the proj ect-by-pr oj ect nature of both compani es’ w or k. Mor e i mport antly , t he Li ppert Group personnel make the cri tic al deci si on whether Li ppe r t Tile or DeanAlan should make a bi d on a particu lar proj ect, and i f so, what to bi d, as if a l l three compani es were part of the same
or gani zational chart. The compani es do not share the exact
sa me spac e but are housed in the same w arehouse, ma k ing shared sup e rv i si on of both compani es easi er
. The compani es li ke to emphas i ze that they had di fferent tile installers serving di fferent market s, but they st i ll serv ed the same geo gr aphi c
area and perfor med the exact same labor

. So on bala nc e w e find the oper ations to be ext ensi v ely int err elated i f not inter

twined. Second, though Li ppert Ti l e a n d D e a nAl a n te chni cally hav e di fferent corpor ate offi cers, the “common management” factor look s at “actual or acti v e co nt r o l, as di stingui shed fromNo. 12-2658 15 potent i al contro l, ov er the other ’s day-to-day oper ations,” C i mato Brothers, Inc. , 352 NLRB 797, 799 (2008), and certain l y not formal jo b t i tles. See, e.g. , id. (di sregar ding fact t hat someone w as “presi dent” when he had no actual manag ement responsibi li ty). Becaus e the same entity not only oper ates, but also contro ls, the bi dding process and admini strat i v e tasks for both compani es, the “common management” factor wei ghs in fav or of a single employ er finding. T o the ext ent that any actual mana ger i al func tions are being perfor med separately , the compani es do not poin t us to any examp l e s. Thi rd, the compani es do not di spute that there w as common ownershi p. As for the last factor

, w e find that t here w as centralized contro l of labor relat i ons be ca use i t w as t he Li ppert brot hers’ deci si on in the fi rst place to create a new company that w ould giv e ro om to a new

, non-uni on labor system solely to serv e the non-uni on market

. See, e.g. , Local 343 , 48 F .3d at 1471. So whi le i t i s not entirely clear who w as responsible for day-to-day labor relat i ons deci si ons li ke setting w ages (for the non-uni on
w or ker s), hi ring, or fi ring, the ov erall parameter s were set in place by t he Li ppert brothers when they deci ded to create separate uni on and non-uni on entiti es. The compani e s’ o nly

a r g um ent on thi s factor i s that centralized contro l of labor relat i ons i s not present when one of the compani es has no employ ees, ci tin g Cimato Brothers , 352 NLRB at 799 (“Centrali zed contro l of labor rel a t io ns i s not present here becau se Ci mato 1 had no statuto ry employ ees duri ng the relev ant tim e period.”), and they point out that DeanAlan techni cally di d not hav e e mp l oy ees, o nly sub contracto rs. But w e do not see ho w Cimato Brothers helps them, b ecaus e i t goe s o n t o say that thi s factor “i s giv en less w ei ght where, as in this ca se, one of the16 No. 12-2658 compani es has no employ ees.” Id. at 799 n.9. So ev en i f thi s fa ctor fav or s t he compani es, it only does so sli ghtly and d o e s not o v ercome the o ther facto rs whi ch f av or the uni on. In sum, w e a g r ee wi th the di stric t court’s conclu si on that, “for all practic al purposes, the Compani es func tion as a single entity .” Whi l e the di stincti on betw een the “uni on” and “nonuni on” market i s usef

ul, the bott om line reason Li ppert Group and DeanAlan w ere created w as to incr e a se t he Li ppert brot hers’ share of the tile installati on market in the four -county Grea t e r Milw aukee area by prov i ding the same service at l o w e r pric es, just as any single company mi ght atte mpt t o capture a gr eater share of the market by reducing pric es. Of

co ur se, w e expr ess no opin i on whatsoev er on whether this type of double-b reasting pr acti ce w as a violati on of t he C BA, be ca use that w as a merits deter minati on by the JAC. And w e certainly expr ess no opin i on as to whether thi s practic e i s goo d

or bad. B ut so lely for purposes of deci ding whether the JAC had the p owe r to d e c i d e w h ether their double-b reasting practic e
w as a violatio n o f the CBA and i ssu e a binding arbi tr ation

aw ard , w e find, under the “single employ er” doctrine, that i t di d. C. Leckwee’s Pres ence on JAC Did N ot Violate CBA Last, the compani es arg ue that the aw ard shoul d b e v acated becau se Leckwee, the indi vidu al who fi led the uni on gr i evance, sat on the same JAC that deci ded the gr i ev ance. They contend that in r eviewing arbi tr ation a w a rds pursuant t o the jurisdi cti onal gr ant of Section 301 of the LMRA, federal courts are permi tte d to rev i ew aw ards for fund amental fai rness. See, e.g. , Carpenters 46 N. Ca l. Co unties Conf. Bd. v
. Zcon Builders , 96No. 12-2658 17
F .3d 410, 413 (9th Ci r
. 1996). And they su gge st that we should

rev i ew labor arbi tr ation aw ards for “evident partiali ty” just as
w e do in our rev i ew of arbi t rat i on aw ards under the Feder al Arbitration Act (“F

AA”). But we already expl o red at length, and rej ected, thi s type of arg ument in Merryman Excav a t io n, I nc
. v
. International Union of Operating Engin eers, Local 150, 639 F .3d 286, 289-93 (7th Ci r . 2011). Review of labor arbi tr ation aw ards under Section 301 of the LMRA i s di fferent from the rev i ew of arbi tr ation aw ards under the FAA, ev en i f they resemble each other in some respects. See Merryman , 639 F .3d at 290 (“A fa ilu r e to comply wi th a jo int commi tte e aw ard i s a breach of a federal labor contract subject to secti on 301 jurisdi cti on—not an FAA acti on.”). Unli ke in the FA A , see 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)( 2) (“evid ent partiali ty” standard), “evident partiali ty” i s not inherently bui lt into the Section 301

rev i ew mechan i sm. See Merryman , 639 F .3d at 292-93. W e, of course, agr ee wi th the compani es that labor arbi tr ation aw ards

are subject to Section 301 rev i ew (a basi c propo si tion to whi ch their bri ef dev ote s sev eral pages). The questi on i s what that

rev i ew inc ludes , and Section 301 rev ie w si mply does not inclu de a free-floating pro cedural fai rness standard absent a showing that some pr ov i si on of the CBA w as v i olated. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (prov i d ing federal subject-matt er jurisdi cti on
ov er “[s] ui ts for violati on of contracts betw een an employ er and a labor or gani zation”). And w e do not find any such v i olation o f t he CBA. T o the ext ent the CBA sought to deal wi th pot e nt i al bi as, all i t required w as that the p a nel consi st of three employ er repr esentativ es a nd three uni on repr esentativ es. So long as thi s equal18 No. 12-2658

repr esentation requirement i s met, nothin g in the C B A p ro hi bi

ted the fi ler of a gr i ev ance from sit t ing on the JAC. See, e.g. , Merryman , 639 F

. 3 d at 292 (“Merr yman agr eed that di sputes

w ould be resolv ed in the fi rst instance not by a neutral arbi tr ator but by a co mm it tee composed of an equal numb er of employ er and uni on repr esentativ es. The agr eement d oes not require the repr esentativ es on the jo int commi tte e t o a ct li ke detached magi strat es or neutral arbi tr ator s. Rather , w e rely on the balanc ed v oting membershi p o f the jo int commi tte e to prov i de fai rness t o t he intere sted parties.”)

. It i s undi sputed that the JAC consi sted of three empl o yer repr esentativ es and three uni on repr esentativ es (one of whi ch w as Leckw ee). That resolv es any arg ument concerning repr esentation. See, e.g. , id.

a t 2 9 2

- 9 3 (rej ecti ng bi as arg ument si mply becau s e the c ontr a c t’ s equal representat i on requirement w as met). W e ackno wl e d g e that i t mi ght seem unus ual (at least to those outsi de the w or ld o f labor arbi tr ation) to al low the fi ler of the gr i ev ance t o si t on t he p a ne l that adjudi cates it. If so, i t i s up to neg otiati ng p art i es to make sure that a CBA p ro hibi ts i t. Cf. Barava ti v
. Josephthal, L yon & Ross, Inc. , 28 F .3d 704, 709 (7th Ci r . 1994) (“Indeed, s hortof author i zing tr i al by battle o r
or deal or

, more doubtfully

, by a pa ne l of three monkeys, parties can st ipu l a t e to whatev er procedures they w ant to govern the arbi tr ation of their d isp ut es; parties are as free to speci fy i di osyncratic ter ms of arbi tr ation as they are to speci fy any other ter ms in t he i r contract.”). It i s not for the courts to rewrite contracts. III. CONCLUSION For the abov e-stated reasons, w e A F F I R M

.