COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

May 5, 2022

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal Nos. 2021AP1006

2021AP1620-CR

Cir. Ct. Nos. 2020TR5071

2021CT38

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT IV

IN THE MATTER OF THE REFUSAL OF JOSHUA JOHN HANSEN:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

JOSHUA JOHN HANSEN,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

JOSHUA JOHN HANSEN,

 DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Nos. 2021AP1006

2021AP1620-CR

2

APPEALS from judgments of the circuit court for Dodge County: 

KRISTINE A. SNOW, Judge. Affirmed. 

¶1 BLANCHARD, P.J.1 Joshua Hansen appeals a judgment of 

conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and operating a firearm 

while intoxicated. He challenges the circuit court’s denial of his motion to 

suppress evidence obtained as a result of a traffic stop. Hansen argues that the 

officer who stopped him lacked reasonable suspicion to do so based solely on the 

fact that a blue light illuminated the rear license plate of the vehicle that Hansen

was driving. I conclude that the State established reasonable suspicion based on 

the officer’s observation of this light. Separately, Hansen argues that the officer 

unlawfully extended the stop by asking him whether he had been drinking, in 

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. I conclude that the officer’s questions 

about drinking did not unlawfully extend the stop because, by that time, the officer 

had reasonable suspicion of intoxicated operation. Accordingly, I affirm the 

judgment, the court’s denial of the suppression motion, and the court’s conclusion 

that Hansen’s refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test was unreasonable.2

 

1

 These appeals are decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(f) (2019-

20). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted.

2

 Hansen relies on the same substantive grounds in challenging both the circuit court’s 

denial of his suppression motion and its ruling that Hansen’s refusal to submit to a blood sample 

was unreasonable. The circuit court held a combined evidentiary hearing to address both issues, 

and it ruled against Hansen on both based in part on the same Fourth Amendment analysis, which 

I affirm in discussion below. Hansen challenges the court’s refusal decision based solely on the 

same arguments that he makes in challenging the suppression decision. For these reasons, I 

affirm the refusal decision based on the discussion in the text, but for ease of reference I refer 

only to the suppression motion and the related hearing. 
Nos. 2021AP1006

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3

BACKGROUND

¶2 At the hearing on Hansen’s motion to suppress evidence, the State 

offered into evidence testimony by a Mayville police officer and a recording from 

a dashboard-mounted video camera in the officer’s squad car. The circuit court 

credited all of the deputy’s testimony.3 Hansen does not challenge any factual 

finding of the court related to the stop issue. Below I address, and reject, his 

challenge to one finding related to the extension-of-stop issue. The following 

background summarizes that testimony, as supplemented by details reflected in the 

dashboard camera recording. 

¶3 On a Thursday in November 2020, a Mayville police officer was on 

patrol in his marked squad car in Mayville, Dodge County. At around 9:30 p.m., 

the officer observed a vehicle with a blue light illuminating its rear license plate. 

Based on his policing experience, the officer believed blue lights to be authorized 

only for use on law enforcement vehicles and he did not believe that the observed 

vehicle was a law enforcement vehicle. The officer began to follow the vehicle. 

¶4 As reflected in the dash camera recording, the vehicle with the blue 

light turned at three consecutive intersections as the squad car followed it, at 

which point the officer activated his car’s red and blue emergency lights. 

 

3

 Explaining further, as pertinent to my discussion of the extension-of-stop issue below,

the circuit court explicitly credited the officer’s testimony regarding factors contributing to 

reasonable suspicion that Hansen was intoxicated (slurred speech, bloodshot, watery or glassy 

eyes, and inconsistent statements about where he was coming from and going to). However, the 

circuit court did not expressly credit the officer’s specific testimony that the officer smelled an 

odor of intoxicants on Hansen’s breath. Nevertheless, both parties on appeal treat as an 

established fact that, as the officer testified, he smelled an odor of intoxicants on Hansen’s breath. 

Indeed, on appeal Hansen without criticism treats this as a finding made by the circuit court, and I 

understand the court to have implicitly made this finding. For these reasons, I consider the circuit 

court to have credited all of the officer’s testimony. 
Nos. 2021AP1006

2021AP1620-CR

4

Approximately thirty seconds later, the vehicle turned into a gas station and 

parked next to a gas pump.4 The officer parked behind the vehicle, got out of his 

squad car, and approached the vehicle on the driver’s side. 

¶5 The officer told the driver, later identified as Hansen, that the reason 

for the stop was that it is illegal in Wisconsin to operate a vehicle with a rear 

license plate illuminated by a blue light. Hansen responded, “Is it?” The officer 

asked for Hansen’s driver’s license. While waiting for Hansen to produce his 

license, the officer asked where he was headed, to which Hansen responded 

“home.” After searching for about fifteen seconds, Hansen handed his license to 

the officer. The officer clarified with Hansen where his current residence was, 

then asked for proof of car insurance, which Hansen indicated he would search 

for. 

¶6 While Hansen searched for proof of insurance, the officer asked him 

where he was coming from. Hansen said “um,” and then paused. The passenger 

responded that Hansen had picked the passenger up from home and they were 

going to a bar. The officer asked the passenger where he lived and if he had any 

identification. The passenger responded with an address but said that he did not 

have any identification with him. 

¶7 Turning back to Hansen, the officer asked if he was lost, noting that 

he had just driven “around the few blocks a few times.” The passenger responded 

 

4

 I omit from this summary additional references to aspects of Hansen’s driving behavior 

before the stop, which the State relies on in partial support of its argument that the stop was not 

unlawfully extended. This is because, as explained below, I conclude that the officer’s 

observations of Hansen immediately following the stop were sufficient in themselves to establish 

reasonable suspicion to extend the stop long enough to inquire about drinking. 
Nos. 2021AP1006

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5

that he had been giving Hansen directions because Hansen was not from the area, 

but that the passenger had messed up the directions. Hansen said, “I’m not new—

I am very new here.” The officer asked the passenger for his name and date of 

birth, and the passenger provided a name and a date.

¶8 I pause to note that, at this point, the officer had spent approximately 

two minutes investigating the blue light illuminating the rear license plate (the 

original mission of the stop). This included making “‘ordinary inquiries incident 

to the traffic stop,’” such as asking for a driver’s license and proof of insurance 

and inquiring about where Hansen was coming from and going to. See Rodriguez 

v. U.S., 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015) (alteration removed; quoted source omitted); see 

also State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 93, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999) (once a 

vehicle is lawfully stopped for suspected traffic violation, “the driver may be 

asked questions reasonably related to the nature of the stop—including his or her 

destination and purpose”).

5 The officer later testified that, during this two-minute 

period, he observed that Hansen’s eyes were red, glassy, and bloodshot, that he 

could smell intoxicants on Hansen’s breath, and that Hansen slurred some words.6

¶9 Returning to the chronology, the officer asked Hansen how much he 

had drunk that evening. It is this question that Hansen contends began the

 

5

 Hansen does not argue that any of the questions that the officer posed to Hansen or the 

passenger were unrelated to the original mission of the stop until the officer asked about drinking. 

See State v. Burgess, No. 2021AP1067-CR, slip op., ¶¶30, 36 (Apr. 21, 2022) (not recommended 

for publication) (an officer’s “passenger checks,” including asking for passenger identification,

were “‘ordinary inquiries incident to [a traffic] stop’” (quoted sources omitted; alteration in 

original)).

6

 Implied in the circuit court’s findings was that the officer observed indicia of Hansen 

having consumed alcohol, perhaps to the point of intoxication, before the officer asked whether 

Hansen had been drinking. Hansen does not argue that the officer noticed the indicia for the first 

time only after the officer asked about drinking. 
Nos. 2021AP1006

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6

unlawful extension of the stop. That is, Hansen argues that it is at this point that,

even though the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to investigate a driving-whileintoxicated offense, the officer’s mission changed from investigating the rear plate 

light to investigating suspected driving while intoxicated. Hansen responded that 

he had consumed “a few [drinks]” that evening. When the officer asked for 

clarification, Hansen said that he had consumed two drinks and two shots within 

the past hour at a bar. 

¶10 Hansen eventually told the officer that he could not find proof of 

insurance, and the officer responded that he would return shortly. The officer 

headed back to his squad car with Hansen’s driver’s license.

¶11 After completing identification checks using the license, the officer 

conducted field sobriety tests of Hansen. After conducting these tests and 

administering a preliminary breath test, the officer arrested Hansen on a charge of 

operating a motor vehicle while under the influence. 

¶12 In the circuit court, Hansen moved to suppress the evidence obtained 

as a result of the traffic stop and its allegedly unlawful extension. The court 

denied Hansen’s suppression motion. Hansen pleaded no contest to one count of 

operating while intoxicated and one count of operating a firearm while intoxicated. 

The court entered a judgment against Hansen on these two counts and sentenced 

him. Hansen now appeals the court’s denial of his suppression motion and the 

court’s finding that his refusal to submit to a blood draw was unreasonable. 

DISCUSSION

¶13 On appeal, Hansen argues that: (1) the officer merely observing the 

blue light illuminating Hansen’s rear license plate did not constitute reasonable 
Nos. 2021AP1006

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7

suspicion justifying the traffic stop and (2) the officer lacked reasonable suspicion 

to ask Hansen whether he had been drinking, and therefore unlawfully extended

the stop to inquire into that topic. After providing the pertinent standards of 

review, I address these arguments in turn. 

¶14 This court reviews an order granting or denying a motion to suppress 

evidence as an issue “‘of constitutional fact,’” which involves “‘a two-step 

inquiry.’” State v. Howes, 2017 WI 18, ¶17, 373 Wis. 2d 468, 893 N.W.2d 812 

(quoted source omitted). “First, [this court] will uphold the circuit court’s findings 

of fact unless they are clearly erroneous,” and “[a] finding of fact is clearly 

erroneous if it is against the great weight and clear preponderance of the 

evidence.” State v. Anderson, 2019 WI 97, ¶20, 389 Wis. 2d 106, 935 N.W.2d 

285. “Second, [this court] review[s] the application of constitutional principles to 

those facts independently of the decision[ ] rendered by the circuit court ....” See

id. 

Reasonable Suspicion For Stop

¶15 Hansen argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress on the ground that the blue light illuminating his rear plate was 

insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for the stop. This is because, the 

argument proceeds, the officer failed to take steps, after seeing the blue light but

before the stop, to rule out the possibility that the blue light did not fall within any 

of what Hansen contends are statutory exceptions to the general prohibition of 

blue lights on vehicles. I now provide pertinent legal standards and then explain 

my conclusion that the mere observation of the blue light on the rear plate of this 

vehicle provided reasonable suspicion for the stop.
Nos. 2021AP1006

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8

¶16 “[S]hort investigative stops,” sometimes called Terry stops,7are 

exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s protection against warrantless searches and 

seizures. See State v. Brown, 2020 WI 63, ¶10, 392 Wis. 2d 454, 945 N.W.2d 

584, cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 881 (2020) (mem.). These can include traffic stops of 

the type at issue here. See id. “While a traffic stop constitutes a seizure under the 

Fourth Amendment, it requires only reasonable suspicion of a legal violation.” Id. 

“Reasonable suspicion requires that ‘[t]he officer must be able to point to specific 

and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those 

facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion of the stop.’” State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, 

¶20, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560 (alteration in original; quoted source 

omitted). “The question of what constitutes reasonable suspicion is a 

commonsense test: under all the facts and circumstances present, what would a 

reasonable police officer reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and 

experience[?]” State v. Young, 212 Wis. 2d 417, 424, 569 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 

1997). “[T]he State bears the burden of proving that the seizure complied with the 

Fourth Amendment ....” State v. Blatterman, 2015 WI 46, ¶17, 362 Wis. 2d 138, 

864 N.W.2d 26. 

¶17 Applying these standards here, I conclude that the State established 

that the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop based solely on 

the officer’s observation of the blue light on the rear plate of this vehicle, which 

could have constituted a traffic violation. See Brown, 392 Wis. 2d 454, ¶10. The 

officer observed what reasonably appeared to be a violation of Wisconsin’s traffic 

 

7

 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Nos. 2021AP1006

2021AP1620-CR

9

laws under WIS. STAT. § 347.13(3), which requires vehicles operating on 

Wisconsin highways to have white lights illuminating rear license plates.

8

 

¶18 Hansen argues that a proper construction of pertinent statutes 

establishes that a blue light on the rear of a vehicle is not categorically prohibited

on all vehicles operating on public roads. I now summarize these statutes. 

Turning first to rules addressing illumination of the rear of a vehicle (without 

reference to the illumination of license plates), WIS. STAT. § 347.07(2)(b) prohibits 

the operation of vehicles on Wisconsin roads that have lights “on the rear” that are 

any color other than red, unless “otherwise expressly authorized or required” by 

ch. 347. See § 347.07(2)(intro) (“Except ... as otherwise expressly authorized or 

required by this chapter ....”). As referenced above, one example of when a nonred, rear-placed light is expressly required is contained in WIS. STAT. § 347.13(3): 

A vehicle must have a white light illuminating the rear license plate. Thus, to this 

point, the result is familiar to anyone who drives Wisconsin roads: a general rule 

requiring only red lights on the rear of vehicles and a more specific exception 

requiring lights, which must be white, on rear plates.

 

8

 WISCONSIN STAT. § 347.13(3) states:

No person shall operate on a highway during hours of darkness 

any motor vehicle upon the rear of which a registration plate is 

required to be displayed unless such motor vehicle is equipped 

with a lamp so constructed and placed as to illuminate with a 

white light the rear registration plate and render it clearly legible 

from a distance of 50 feet to the rear.

“Highway,” as used in WIS. STAT. § 347.13(3), means “all public ways and thoroughfares and 

bridges on the same” and “includes those roads or driveways in the state, county, ... which have 

been opened to the use of the public for the purpose of vehicular travel ....” WIS. STAT.

§ 340.01(22); see also WIS. STAT. § 347.01.
Nos. 2021AP1006

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10

¶19 Hansen notes that WIS. STAT. § 347.25(4) expressly authorizes 

vehicles used in police work to display blue lights generally, without specifying

whether a blue light on a police vehicle can be located on the rear or elsewhere.

9

¶20 With this as background, Hansen contends that, given the policework exception in WIS. STAT. § 347.25(4), it was possible, from the perspective of 

the officer here, that Hansen’s vehicle was an unmarked law enforcement vehicle, 

and therefore it could be legally operated with a blue colored light illuminating the 

rear plate.10 For this reason, Hansen contends, the officer needed to rule out this 

purported possibility by looking up Hansen’s vehicle’s registration, or by having 

dispatch do so, before initiating the traffic stop. I now explain why Hansen’s 

statutory argument fails based on statutory analysis and for additional reasons.

¶21 First, Hansen fails to come to grips with how, as noted above, the 

blue light on the rear plate here plainly violates WIS. STAT. § 347.13(3). That 

statute imposes an unqualified requirement that all vehicles operating in hours of 

darkness use white lights to illuminate their rear plates. See § 347.13(3). Unlike 

the general rule about red rear lights in WIS. STAT. § 347.07(2)(b), § 347.13(3) 

does not contemplate other statutes expressly authorizing non-white rear plate 

 

9

 WISCONSIN STAT. § 347.25(4) states in pertinent part:

No vehicle may be equipped with or display any blue colored 

light or lamp unless the vehicle is used in police work authorized 

by the state or a political subdivision of the state ....

10

 In order to address all arguments that Hansen may intend to make, I use the phrase 

“unmarked” as a reference to all police vehicles that do not bear the conventional rooftop flashing 

lights and distinctive coloring and emblems, including vehicles owned by police agencies that are 

used to catch traffic law violators and for undercover operations.
Nos. 2021AP1006

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11

lights, and Hansen points to no source of authority that directly conflicts with 

§ 347.13(3)’s requirement that the rear plate light be white.

11

 

¶22 Second, even setting aside the fact that the officer could reasonably 

suspect that Hansen was in violation of WIS. STAT. § 347.13(3)’s unqualified rule 

requiring white rear plate lights, Hansen fails to address other relevant limitations 

on the authorization of blue lights for police vehicles in WIS. STAT. § 347.25(4). 

For example, § 347.25(1m)(a) specifies that “[a] police vehicle ... may be 

equipped with a blue light and a red light which are flashing, oscillating or 

rotating.” (Emphasis added.) Section 347.25(1m)(b) further specifies that, for 

unmarked police vehicles, “the blue light shall be mounted on the passenger side 

of the vehicle.” Hansen does not assert (nor could he assert, based on the evidence 

credited by the circuit court) that the blue light on his vehicle was flashing,

oscillating, or rotating, nor that it was on his vehicle’s passenger side. Thus, while

§ 347.25(4) authorizes blue lights on police vehicles under some circumstances, it 

would have been evident to a reasonable officer in the position of the officer here 

that the blue light he observed illuminating the rear plate did not comply with 

other requirements under § 347.25 for unmarked police vehicles. Hansen does not 

argue that any other exception to the general prohibition of non-red rear lights 

found in WIS. STAT. § 347.07(2)(b) could have rendered the blue light here to be 

lawful. In sum, there were no pertinent statutory exceptions for the officer to rule 

out prior to stopping Hansen. 

 

11

 Hansen briefly acknowledges the existence of WIS. STAT. § 347.13(3), but he fails to 

address its application here. He references the statute apparently to merely make the broad point 

that, as contemplated in WIS. STAT. § 347.07(2)(b), other provisions in ch. 347 expressly 

authorize or require non-red rear-placed lights on vehicles in some situations. This broad point is 

true, but it goes nowhere for Hansen for the reasons explained in the text. 
Nos. 2021AP1006

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12

¶23 Moreover, even if the statutes summarized above could be 

interpreted to authorize blue rear plate lights for police vehicles, Hansen’s 

argument that the officer had to rule out such possibilities rests on an inaccurate 

application of basic Fourth Amendment principles and a misreading of a onejudge opinion of our court, State v. Palaia, No. 2016AP467-CR, unpublished slip 

op. (WI App Dec. 30, 2016), which he cites as persuasive authority. Hansen 

specifically asserts that the reasoning in Palaia required the officer here to exclude 

the possibility that Hansen’s vehicle was an unmarked police vehicle because WIS.

STAT. § 347.25(4) generally permits police vehicles to display blue lights. I 

disagree that Palaia supports any argument that Hansen makes. 

¶24 In Palaia, an officer obtained data on a vehicle with Wisconsin 

plates that the officer was following. Palaia, No. 2016AP467-CR, ¶2. The officer 

stopped the vehicle, with the only justification asserted by the State being that the 

officer learned that one of the vehicle’s two registered owners did not have a 

Wisconsin driver’s license. Id., ¶¶2-3, 9. The problem with this justification, this 

court explained, is that the officer had “no reasonable basis ... to suspect [that] the 

person operating the vehicle was doing so illegally” because “driving a 

Wisconsin[-]registered vehicle without a Wisconsin-issued driver’s license is not a 

criminal or traffic offense.” Id., ¶9. Moreover, the inference that the driver in 

Palaia was violating an administrative requirement—specifically that new 

Wisconsin residents obtain a Wisconsin driver’s license within 60 days of 

establishing residency—was nothing more than an “‘inchoate and unparticularized 

suspicion, or hunch’” based on the officer’s limited information about the driver. 

See id., ¶¶8, 11-12. These points entirely eliminated the only asserted basis to 

suspect that the driver was committing a criminal or traffic offense. See id., ¶¶9, 

14. 
Nos. 2021AP1006

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13

¶25 Contrary to Hansen’s argument, Palaia does not require officers 

who rely on a purported violation of a statute as a basis for a traffic stop to exclude 

all possible statutory exceptions prior to the stop. Rather, Palaia simply states that 

there could be no reasonable suspicion for a stop when an officer has not obtained

any facts that would lead a reasonable officer in the same position to believe that a 

driver is violating a criminal or traffic law. See id., ¶9. Further, although the 

officer in Palaia did not observe facts sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion 

justifying the stop, it remains true that “behavior that has a possible innocent 

explanation” can still “give rise to reasonable suspicion.” See State v. Hogan, 

2015 WI 76, ¶36, 364 Wis. 2d 167, 868 N.W.2d 124; see also Palaia, 

No. 2016AP467-CR, ¶9. 

¶26 In contrast to Palaia, here the officer observed a traffic violation, for 

reasons explained above. Cf. Palaia, No. 2016AP467-CR, ¶9. The officer here 

was not required to rule out merely possible innocent explanations for the light 

before stopping Hansen, even if Hansen’s interpretation of the pertinent statutes 

were correct. See Hogan, 364 Wis. 2d 167, ¶36; Palaia, No. 2016AP467-CR, ¶9;

Brown, 392 Wis. 2d 454, ¶10. 

¶27 Further, as the State points out, the officer here could rely on the 

commonsense notion that, even if an unmarked police car could legally display a 

blue light on its rear plate, it would be unreasonable to expect that an unmarked 

police vehicle would effectively announce its police status with a blue light on the 

plate. That is, in non-emergency situations, police would not make it so obvious 

that the vehicle is a police vehicle or, at a minimum, police would not want the 

vehicle to be especially noticeable—as any vehicle with a blue light on its plate 

would tend to be. At bottom, it is reasonable for an officer to conclude that a blue 

rear plate light is much more likely to be a civilian vehicle violating the statutes 
Nos. 2021AP1006

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14

summarized above. Thus, an officer’s dismissal of the possibility that an observed

blue light on a rear plate is on a police vehicle, without taking steps to confirm 

non-police status, is not nearly so speculative or “tenuous” as the assumptions at 

issue in Palaia regarding the nature of the driver’s residency. See Palaia, 

No. 2016AP467-CR, ¶12 (noting that people are highly mobile in modern society, 

and therefore the place of registration for a given vehicle has little significance in 

providing reasonable suspicion of a violation of a licensing requirement). In sum, 

the officer here did not need to rule out possible statutory exceptions to blue lights 

on the rear of vehicles, and nothing more than reasonable suspicion of a criminal 

or traffic violation is required to conduct a traffic stop. See Hogan, 364 Wis. 2d 

167, ¶36; Palaia, No. 2016AP467-CR, ¶9; Brown, 392 Wis. 2d 454, ¶10.

¶28 In addition, beyond these commonsense points, there is the issue of 

whether the officer here could reasonably assess whether Hansen’s vehicle was in 

fact not likely a police vehicle. I question Hansen’s suggestion that an officer with 

the experience of the officer here could not reasonably rely on that experience to 

discern whether an observed vehicle is a police vehicle, even if it lacks the 

conventional rooftop flashing lights and distinctive coloring and emblems. 

Hansen emphasizes that the officer here testified that, given that there are many 

police agencies in Wisconsin, each of which could in theory use unmarked 

vehicles, the officer “would not be able to conclusively determine from plain view 

alone” whether Hansen’s car was an unmarked police vehicle. But in Fourth 

Amendment analysis, officers may act reasonably without the benefit of 

“conclusive” determinations of fact. Moreover, Hansen fails to explain why the 

circuit court here could not credit and place weight on the officer’s additional 

testimony that he had never seen a police vehicle with a blue light on the rear plate 

and that Hansen’s vehicle did not appear to the officer to be an unmarked police 
Nos. 2021AP1006

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vehicle, particularly given WIS. STAT. § 347.25(1m)(b)’s specifications regarding 

the nature of blue lights on police vehicles.12

Extension Of Stop

¶29 Hansen argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress evidence obtained as a result of the officer’s extension of the stop to 

investigate whether Hansen was driving while intoxicated. Specifically, Hansen 

argues that asking about drinking extended the stop in violation of his Fourth 

Amendment rights because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion justifying the 

extension. I conclude that the officer’s question did not unlawfully extend the stop 

because reasonable suspicion of driving while intoxication was objectively 

established, during the brief interaction before the officer questioned Hansen about 

drinking, as part of the original mission of the stop. As explained below, I reject 

Hansen’s three arguments: that the court clearly erred in finding that he slurred 

some of his words; that evidence of bloodshot eyes could add nothing to the 

analysis; and that the lack of evidence of “bad driving” fatally undermines a 

reasonable suspicion determination.

 

12

 Hansen makes an additional reference that does not advance his stop argument. He 

argues that the relative ease with which the officer could have sought additional information 

about Hansen’s vehicle to dispel the possibility that he was operating a police vehicle before 

initiating the traffic stop is significant to determining whether it was reasonable to initiate the stop 

without further investigation. In support, he cites State v. Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d 663, 407 N.W.2d 

548 (1987), in which our supreme court explained that circumstances surrounding a police seizure 

challenged under the Fourth Amendment influence whether a given quantum of facts gives rise to 

reasonable suspicion, including consideration of investigative means that police could have used 

in lieu of the seizure or whether failing to initiate the seizure would have risked losing the 

opportunity to conduct further investigation. See id. at 678-82. But, for reasons explained above, 

this is not a case involving “scant” evidence of a law violation of the type referenced in Guzy, 

139 Wis. 2d at 678—the blue light on the plate was a facial law violation.
Nos. 2021AP1006

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¶30 The “permissible duration” of a traffic stop “depends on the stop’s 

‘mission’ which includes ‘(1) addressing the traffic violation that warranted the 

stop; (2) conducting ordinary inquiries incident to the stop; and (3) taking 

negligibly burdensome precautions to ensure officer safety.’” Brown, 392 Wis. 2d 

454, ¶16 (quoted source omitted). “The ordinary inquiries portion of the traffic 

stop’s mission includes ‘checking the driver’s license, determining whether there 

are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s 

registration and proof of insurance.’” State v. Smith, 2018 WI 2, ¶10, 379 Wis. 2d 

86, 905 N.W.2d 353 (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355). 

¶31 The length of a stop becomes unreasonable if extended past the point 

“‘when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—

completed.’” Brown, 392 Wis. 2d 454, ¶10 (quoted source omitted). “Officers 

may engage in unrelated inquiries during the course of a traffic stop—but, unless 

reasonable suspicion develops to support such inquiries, they cannot prolong the 

duration of the stop beyond the time that it reasonably should take to complete the 

[original] mission.” State v. Davis, 2021 WI App 65, ¶24, 399 Wis. 2d 354, 965 

N.W.2d 84. 

¶32 To recap, the officer’s original mission in stopping Hansen was to 

investigate the blue light on the plate. During the roughly two minutes the officer 

spent conducting ordinary inquiries incident to the original mission of the stop, the 

officer observed that Hansen had bloodshot, glassy eyes, slurred speech, and the 

odor of intoxicants on his breath. I conclude that these observations constituted 

specific and articulable facts that lead to the reasonable inference that Hansen was 

violating the law by operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. See Floyd, 377 

Wis. 2d 394, ¶20. This permitted the officer to lawfully extend the stop by asking 
Nos. 2021AP1006

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17

questions, separate from the original mission of the stop, about recent alcohol 

consumption. See Davis, 399 Wis. 2d 354, ¶24. 

¶33 Hansen argues that the circuit court clearly erred in crediting the 

testimony of the officer that Hansen slurred some words and that this finding

should be excluded from the reasonable suspicion analysis. Specifically, Hansen 

argues that the court erred in making this finding because the officer could not 

recall which specific words Hansen slurred and, Hansen now submits, he cannot 

be heard slurring words on the dash camera video prior to the officer asking him 

the first question about drinking. As noted, under the clearly erroneous standard, 

this court affirms a circuit court’s findings of fact unless “it is against the great 

weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.” See Anderson, 389 Wis. 2d 

106, ¶20. Although the officer could not recall while testifying precisely which 

words Hansen slurred, the circuit court credited the officer’s testimony that 

Hansen slurred his speech, and my review of the dash cam footage does not 

clearly contradict this finding. For these reasons, I reject Hansen’s argument that 

the court’s slurred-speech finding is clearly erroneous when evaluated against the 

great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. See id. 

¶34 Having established that the slurred-speech finding was not a clear 

error, that finding becomes part of the totality of the circumstances under which 

each relevant finding is assessed. Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶22 (This court 

“draw[s] the line between traffic stops of proper duration and those that extend 

into unconstitutional territory according to functional considerations” “in the 

context of the ‘totality of the circumstances.’” (quoted source omitted)). Hansen 

does not argue that the court clearly erred in making the findings of bloodshot eyes 

and the smell of intoxicants on Hansen’s breath. 
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¶35 Hansen argues that the circuit court’s finding that his eyes were 

bloodshot, even when coupled with the odor of intoxicants, was insufficient to 

establish reasonable suspicion, in part because bloodshot eyes can have many 

potential causes. But even if each individual indicia of intoxication here could 

have had an innocent explanation, such possible explanations do not detract from 

the reasonableness of the possibility that drinking was the cause, and this 

possibility was greatly reinforced by the combination of different indicia. See 

Hogan, 364 Wis. 2d 167, ¶36. Further, Hansen’s argument about bloodshot eyes 

is based in part on the argument I reject above that Hansen was not slurring some 

of his words.13 

¶36 Considering the totality of the circumstances, the officer observed 

specific and articulable facts (slurred speech, bloodshot, glassy eyes, and odor of 

intoxicants on breath) which, when evaluated together with rational inferences 

drawn from those facts, established reasonable suspicion of intoxication. See 

Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶¶20, 22. For these reasons, the officer did not violate 

Hansen’s Fourth Amendment rights by extending the stop to inquire about 

 

13

 As part of his argument about bloodshot eyes, Hansen makes a confusing reference to 

this court’s decision in State v. Kolman, No. 2011AP1917-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App 

Jan. 12, 2012), and I reject whatever he intends to argue based on Kolman for at least the reason 

that its facts are distinguishable. In Kolman, this court applied the legal standards that existed at 

that time to determine whether it was reasonable for an officer to change the mission of a traffic 

stop from an investigation of a potential brake light violation to an investigation of potential 

impaired driving. See id., ¶¶3-5, 21-22. This court reasoned that the officer’s decision to extend 

the stop was permissible under the Fourth Amendment even though “the facts possessed by the 

trooper at the time of [the stop’s extension] may have fallen short of reasonable suspicion of 

intoxicated driving.” See id., ¶¶22, 25. These facts included that the driver had “bloodshot and 

glassy eyes,” along with the “overwhelming odor of cigarette smoke coming from the vehicle,” 

which the officer testified is a not uncommon way to intentionally mask the smell of intoxicants. 

Id., ¶¶3-4. The facts here are different from the facts in Kolman that “may” not have been 

sufficient. It is uncontested that the officer here did smell intoxicants, in addition to seeing 

bloodshot eyes, without the presence of cigarette smoke, and with the presence of some slurring 

of words.
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Hansen’s drinking. Hansen provides no alternative basis for me to conclude that 

the officer made inquiries unrelated to the original mission or unsupported by 

reasonable suspicion that measurably and unlawfully extended the stop. See 

Brown, 392 Wis. 2d 454, ¶16. 

¶37 Hansen further argues that, because the officer here did not observe

driving behavior that was indicative of impairment, “other factors suggesting 

impairment must be more substantial” to justify extending the stop to investigate 

impaired driving. See County of Sauk v. Leon, No. 2010AP1593, unpublished 

slip op., ¶20, (WI App Nov. 24, 2020) (“When an officer is not aware of bad 

driving, then other factors suggesting impairment must be more substantial.”). As 

noted above, I assume without deciding in Hansen’s favor that none of Hansen’s 

driving behavior contributed to reasonable suspicion justifying an extension of the 

stop—in my analysis Hansen has the benefit of driving that did not suggest 

impairment. See note 4, supra. However, Leon does not impose a heightened 

standard for justifying a stop extension to investigate possible impairment when 

the officer has not observed driving that suggests impairment. Rather, it states that 

police must have reasonable suspicion to extend a stop, whether that suspicion is 

based wholly or partially on the observation of impairment-suggestive driving 

behavior or entirely on other indicia of driver impairment. See Leon, No. 

2010AP1593, ¶20. As explained above, the officer here did observe other signs 

during the investigation of the original mission of the stop that I conclude 

established reasonable suspicion justifying a brief extension of the stop, even 

when I do not consider Hansen’s driving behavior. 
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CONCLUSION

¶38 For all of these reasons, I affirm the judgment and the circuit court’s 

denial of Hansen’s suppression motion.

By the Court.—Judgments affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.