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S. HRG. 110–748 

THE CONTINUING CRISIS IN DARFUR 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 23, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Almquist, Hon. Katherine J., Assistant Administrator for Africa, U.S. Agency 

for International Development, Washington, DC .............................................. 44 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 47 

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator From Delaware ................................... 1 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator From Indiana ........................................... 3 

Lute, Jane Holl, Officer in Charge, Department of Field Support, United 

Nations, New York, NY ....................................................................................... 5 

Williamson, Hon. Richard, President’s Special Envoy to Sudan, Department 

of State, Washington, DC .................................................................................... 33 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 36 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to Special Envoy Richard 

Williamson by Members of the Committee ........................................................ 69 

Questions Submitted by Senator Lugar ...................................................... 69 

Questions Submitted by Senator Feingold ................................................. 74 

Questions Submitted by Senator Obama .................................................... 75 

Questions Submitted by Senator Casey ...................................................... 77 

Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to USAID Assistant Administrator for Africa Katherine Almquist ................................................................. 77 

Questions Submitted by Senator Feingold ................................................. 77 

Questions Submitted by Senator Obama .................................................... 80 

Questions Submitted by Senator Casey ...................................................... 81 

Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher J. Dodd, U.S. Senator From Connecticut .................................................................................................................. 83 

Prepared Statement of Hon. Barack Obama, U.S. Senator for Illinois ............... 84 

(III)

(1) 

THE CONTINUING CRISIS IN DARFUR 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 23, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Nelson, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Lugar, Hagel, Corker, Isakson, and Barrasso. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., 

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. 

Let me begin by welcoming our witnesses and thank them for 

taking the time to come today and testify. I genuinely appreciate 

it. 

A little over a year ago, this committee held a hearing entitled 

‘‘Darfur: A Plan B to Stop Genocide.’’ At that time, there were over 

2 million people living in camps in Darfur, millions more at risk, 

and an estimated 7,700 African Union peacekeepers. The United 

Nations assumed joint control of the peacekeeping mission on December 31, 2007, but, from my perspective at least, the situation 

seems to have improved very little. 

Since January 1, 90,000 more people have been driven from their 

homes, and, since that date, peacekeeping forces have seen a net 

increase of only 293 troops, if my numbers are correct. Additional 

police personnel are now present, and peacekeepers on the ground 

are better equipped, but it defies my comprehension that the international community has not managed to do better than we have. 

Violence and banditry are still the order of the day. Last week, 

the World Food Programme announced that it’s going to have to 

cut its rations for people in Darfur in half because so many of its 

trucks are being hijacked, and it cannot maintain supply lines. 

Just yesterday, the head of the United Nations-African Union 

mission into Darfur reported that it’s unlikely that the peacekeeping force will be fully operational this year. 

Another top U.N. official estimated that 300,000 people have died 

in Darfur since the beginning of the conflict. That’s a very grim 

juxtaposition of the world’s inability or unwillingness to act. 

At the time of our hearing last April, the biggest obstacle to 

peace seemed to be the refusal of the Sudanese Government to 

allow U.N. peacekeepers in the country. Well, last June, Sudan 

agreed to let them in, at least it agreed on paper. 

2 

The question is: Why have we seen so little progress over the 

course of the year? Earlier this month, the U.N. Secretary General 

published a report assessing the situation in Darfur in which he 

expressed disappointment with, ‘‘the lack of progress on all fronts,’’ 

and his report spells out the dismal situation in stark terms. He 

said, ‘‘The parties appear determined to pursue a military solution. 

The political process is stalled. The deployment is progressing very 

slowly. And the humanitarian situation is not improving.’’ 

This the best the international community can do in response to 

genocide? It really is discouraging. And, from my perspective, I 

don’t think it’s acceptable. 

The purpose of this hearing is to get answers to some very basic 

questions. And I want to make it clear I do not, nor does anyone 

in this panel, hold the witnesses responsible for the lack of 

progress. But, we need to get some answers. We’ve got to try to figure out if there’s any way through this. 

The basic questions I want to ask about are, What is delaying 

the deployment of the full complement of 26,000 peacekeepers and 

police? Sudanese obstruction? The failure of other countries to contribute needed equipment, such as helicopters? The U.N. bureaucracy that has been cited as a source of delay? Is it some or all of 

the above? Is it the fact that since the last time we had a hearing— 

the rebel groups have now morphed into 25 different identifiable 

bands? I remember, several years ago, meeting with what was 

then, I think, five or six rebel groups. The commanders came out 

of the field in Darfur and met with me in Chad. And they were 

somewhat dysfunctional then, but it’s now gone way beyond that. 

The second question I want to ask about is: What is the U.N. 

going to do to help to overcome these obstacles to deployment? 

What is the United States doing to lead the way through or around 

any of the impediments I’ve cited? Is it helicopters that are needed? 

Then we should find a way to provide them, convince others to step 

up, or actually, as I said to the President—I think my colleague 

was with me—if that’s the only problem, appropriate the money 

and build new helicopters here. Is the Sudanese obstruction the 

reason? Five years into the conflict, this is simply not something 

the international community should be continuing to tolerate. Are 

bureaucrats getting in the way? Well, if that’s true—I don’t know 

that it is, but it’s reported—if that’s true, it’s time to steamroll the 

bureaucrats. 

What is the current security and humanitarian situation in 

Darfur on the ground today? What are the prospects for a peace 

process between the government and the rebel groups, or maybe 

even among the rebel groups? Why are we allowing Sudan to continue to violate the U.N. ban on offensive military flights over 

Darfur? 

And finally, I would pose the same question I did a year ago. On 

September the 9, 2004, in testimony before this committee, Secretary of State Colin Powell—then Secretary of State—said clearly 

that the killing in Darfur was genocide. Shortly thereafter, so did 

President Bush. So, I now ask again, What are we doing about it? 

Recent news accounts in the New York Times and elsewhere 

have described bilateral talks between the United States and the 

Government of Sudan held in Rome. These talks were headed up, 

3 

on the United States side, by Ambassador Williamson, who we’ll be 

hearing from later this morning, and a high ranking Sudanese official on their side. The newspaper article indicated that these talks 

might lead to United States easing sanctions on Sudan, removing 

Sudan designation as a state sponsor or terrorism, or taking other 

steps to normalize relations. I know that the administration has 

asked to discuss this issue in a classified forum, which I welcome, 

and I’m sure my colleagues will—we can work out a time to make 

us all available. But—and I’ve also been around long enough to 

know that I don’t believe everything I read in the newspaper. And 

so—but, absent the classified briefing, I’d like to state very clearly, 

in terms strong enough to be heard all the way to Khartoum, that, 

in my opinion, none of the steps should be considered until the Sudanese Government ceases all attacks on civilians, allows U.N. 

peacekeeper—peacekeeping mission full access to Darfur with the 

freedom to carry out its mandate, disarms the janjaweed, whom it 

unleashed on innocent villagers, and upholds its commitment to 

the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the South and the 

Darfur Peace Agreement. 

For 5 years, the people of Darfur have suffered death, deprivation, and destruction. Government forces, Janjaweed, militia, and 

rebel groups have all preyed upon civilians and aid workers trying 

to help them. When the United Nations finally assumed joint control of the peacekeeping missions, hopes rose that it would make 

a real difference to the people in Darfur. Those hopes have not yet 

been fulfilled. I truly want to know, as I expect my colleagues do, 

why not, and what will it take to change the circumstances on the 

ground? I don’t want to be here, a year from now, asking the same 

questions to a new administration that I posed last April and just 

posed again. Genocide is happening on our watch. The question is: 

What is there, if anything, we can do about it? Because what we’re 

doing now doesn’t seem to be working. 

I will yield to my colleague, Chairman Lugar. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And 

I thank you for holding this hearing on the continuing humanitarian and security challenges in Sudan. 

I welcome the distinguished witnesses, appreciate their willingness to testify, and the willingness of the United Nations to brief 

members of the committee on the status of international peacekeeping deployment in Darfur. 

The Darfur crisis is now in its fifth year, and the prospects for 

peace in the region appear to be little better than they were 3 or 

4 years ago, when the international community first responded 

with a massive humanitarian intervention. In the face of direct obstruction and willful delays by Khartoum, these humanitarian efforts probably saved hundreds of thousands of lives, but those lives 

continue to be under extreme threat. Regional and global conditions have worked against a solution to the human suffering in 

Darfur. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and 

South Sudan, which many consider essential for peace in Darfur, 

is faltering. To the west, Chad and Sudan continue to sustain rebel 

4 

forces intent upon destabilizing or overthrowing each other’s government. These rebels are preying on the hundreds of thousands 

of displaced persons in eastern Chad, the Central African Republic, 

and in Darfur, as well as targeting the humanitarian workers in 

the region. 

As the wet season descends on Darfur, and the roads are increasingly impassable, the World Food Programme is facing a global 

food crisis that has forced the subsistence rations for millions in 

Sudan to be reduced. During the last several years, the United 

States Government and private American citizens have responded 

to the crisis by providing billions in humanitarian assistance. This 

national response continues today, and it has been the predominant portion of the international efforts for Darfur. 

The United Nations also has played an important role in response to this catastrophic situation through the U.N. Security 

Council and the individual agencies, such as the World Food Programme, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and UNICEF. 

In addition, the African Union, the European Union, NATO, and 

numerous countries have made bilateral contributions. Despite 

such efforts, the crisis remains, and security is deteriorating. 

Last July, hopes were raised by the United Nations Security 

Council’s approval of an enlargement of the peacekeeping force in 

Darfur to 26,000 troops. Unfortunately, that hope has been fading, 

due to Khartoum’s continued obstruction and delay, and rebel factionalism, and international ambivalence expressed through limited 

contributions to the peacekeeping force. Thus far, only 2,000 additional peacekeepers have been deployed. And the force continues to 

lack helicopters and other types of equipment that are essential to 

achieve mobility and to deliver humanitarian supplies. 

We’re faced with the sobering reality that, after almost 9 months, 

only a small fraction of the troops approved in the Security Council 

resolution have been deployed to mitigate what many consider to 

be the world’s most dire and visible humanitarian crisis. Improving 

security will not automatically resolve the underlying causes of the 

conflict, but it will provide physical and psychological relief that 

would create opportunities for leaders in the communities to assert 

themselves and explore the compromises necessary to make peace 

sustainable. 

The United States must lead in finding ways to address these political and logistical shortcomings. We must also understand that 

even the successful deployment of a full peacekeeping contingent 

will not guarantee a political resolution to the crisis. Consequently, 

we must simultaneously work with like-minded nations to reinvigorate a viable and coherent peace process. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses how these efforts 

are progressing and what more we can do. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

We’re going to, with your permission, after we hear from our first 

witness, go to 7-minute rounds. 

And I want to make it clear how much we appreciate, Dr. Lute, 

you being here. I understand, under the rules, you are ‘‘briefing’’ 

us, as in representing the office in charge of the Department of 

Field Support in the United Nations in New York; you are not here 

5 

to testify. That is not your role, nor is it the practice of the U.N. 

But, we truly appreciate you taking the time to be here to brief us. 

And, as I said, through the Office of our Special Envoy, we’ll also 

seek a closed briefing, as well. But, we thank you, and welcome 

you. And, again, please do not read into anything you heard from 

me or the chairman that we’re looking at you to suggest that, 

‘‘Geez, why haven’t you solved this?’’ This is a very, very difficult, 

and maybe intractable, problem, but it is frustrating, and if it’s 

frustrating to me and to the members here, it must be exceedingly 

frustrating to you. 

So, again, thank you for being here, and the floor is yours, Doctor. You have the little button on the mike there. 

STATEMENT OF JANE HOLL LUTE, OFFICER IN CHARGE, DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT, UNITED NATIONS, NEW 

YORK, NY 

Dr. LUTE. Mr. Chairman, thank you—— 

The CHAIRMAN. She’s from the U.N. She’s way ahead of you. 

They’re used to buttons up there. [Laughter.] 

Dr. LUTE. Always listen to the tech support. [Laughter.] 

Dr. LUTE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is my privilege to be with you this morning, and my colleagues and I deeply 

appreciate the opportunity to brief you on our recent trip to Darfur, 

the second that we’ve made this year to engage with the mission 

on the ground and find ways to maximize the deployment of the 

force. So, thank you for this opportunity. 

You have generously, I think, said that we should not feel responsible for the lack of progress that has—that we are seeing on 

the ground. I’d like to say, in response to that, Mr. Chairman, two 

things. 

First is that no one can be satisfied with the progress on the 

ground to date. We have been talking among ourselves, in the 

international community, broadly and specifically, in these corridors and in the corridors of the United Nations, about Darfur for 

4 years. No one can be satisfied at the rate of progress that has 

been thus far. 

And, second, what I would like to say is that I do feel responsible, and my colleagues do feel responsible, for our part. But, we 

have only a part. The U.N. is a good organization, it’s an important 

organization. It is not the only organization. And it is not the only 

actor with a role to play in Darfur, as I will describe to you in my 

brief remarks. 

What is the situation on the ground as we find it? The situation 

on the ground in Darfur continues to be deeply troubling from 

nearly every angle. Violence continues. It is exacerbated, as you 

have said, by the proliferation of militia groups who are now taking 

matters into their own hands. Some of them are ideologically motivated, and some of them are simply motivated by the opportunities 

presented in the lawless environment, particularly out in the west. 

Population continues to be menaced and threatened. Their circumstances are exacerbated by a food crisis, as we know, and the 

humanitarian situation, as the Chief of Humanitarian—the Office 

of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs mentioned yesterday, is 

only worsening. 

6 

The main goal of the United Nations is to engage in a three-part 

strategy in Darfur: A humanitarian strategy, a peacekeeping strategy, and a strategy that continues and emphasizes and encourages 

political talks among the parties, to bring a lasting solution to the 

situation in Darfur. 

I should back up, Mr. Chairman, and put this mission in the context of peacekeeping over the last 5 years. I first arrived at the 

United Nations in peacekeeping in 2003. At that point, the budget 

for all of peacekeeping was approximately $1.8 billion. It is now 

over $7 billion. Darfur is the 18th new mission my colleagues and 

I have started up in the past 5 years. In the last 18 months alone, 

we have done five new peacekeeping missions. Peacekeeping now 

represents, with Darfur and with the associated and simultaneously starting mission in Chad, the second largest deployed military presence in the world with the functions and responsibilities 

that it has. For this, we have a staff of less than 800 in New York. 

But, we are complemented by our colleagues in the field, who work 

tirelessly under difficult and arduous conditions. I can assure you, 

Mr. Chairman, we have no peacekeeping missions in Paris. Our 

peacekeeping missions around the world are in some of the most 

difficult, challenging, and increasingly dangerous circumstances 

that are around the world. Darfur represents, in that context, only 

the latest of a series of very difficult situations in which peacekeepers have been introduced. And the situation is, as I describe 

it, a bad one, particularly for the victims, the displaced, and those 

who have been terrorized year after year after year as the world 

has watched. 

The purpose of our recent trip, Mr. Chairman, was to sit down 

with the mission and assist them in looking at all of the factors 

that need to be assembled in order to maximize the deployment of 

the force in 2008. Our goal, of course, is a 100-percent deployment. 

We will likely achieve something less than that before the end of 

the calendar year, but it is our committed and collective effort to 

do what we can to maximize the deployment, not only of the military force which is so essential for the—to support the delivery of 

humanitarian assistance, provide a security backdrop for the political talks that are going on, but also to provide the very necessary 

protection functions that are required in its mandate—to deploy 

that force, which will number over 19,000; in addition, to deploy 

over 6,000 police, through a combination of both individual policemen and -women and—which is a relatively new phenomenon in 

U.N. peacekeeping, the deployment of formed police units, the mandate of 1769—Security Council Resolution 1769 calls for the deployment of 19 such units, which number up to 140 individuals each. 

Now, this policing component is an essential component to the success of UNAMID, as we call the mission in Darfur. 

In addition to that, we have projected to deploy over 5,000 civilian personnel—roughly two-thirds of them will be national civilian 

personnel; one-third, international civilian personnel—spread out 

over a variety of grades and specialties, numbering over three 

dozen. 

Our operational concept for the deployment in the coming period 

is designed specifically to address some of the questions that you 

have raised: The impediments that have presented themselves to 

7 

the deployment, the shortfalls that exist, and trying to craft creative ways to overcome those shortfalls and overcome those impediments. 

Essentially, the force will be deployed along the lines of a half 

battalion laydown spread out over Darfur. Darfur is a province in 

Sudan, a part of Sudan that is the size of France. The total force, 

when it is deployed—military, police, and civilian—will number 

31,000. This number, we believe, while considering it an extremely 

robust mission, may not be all that needs doing on the ground in 

Darfur to turn the tide definitively from conflict and allow the population to exist in peace. But, our deployment and the force commanders’ concept of operation makes the maximum effective use of 

the force on the ground. It will be spread over very great distances. 

Therefore, it needs the mobility, it needs the command and control, 

it needs the self-sustaining assets as part of the deployment of the 

forces to maximize their presence to fulfill their mandate. 

In this regard, I can tell you that we have had pledges of nearly 

all the infantry units that we require. Where we are still lacking 

commitments are in key enabling capabilities, Mr. Chairman, some 

of which you’ve highlighted, in the area of helicopters, certainly in 

long-haul transportation and in other areas. The Member States of 

the United Nations have been made aware of these shortfalls that 

we continue to have without which this mission will be severely 

handicapped in trying to fully implement its mandate. 

The operational concept calls for Darfur itself to be broken into 

three sectors, and the allocation of these units by sector reflects the 

force commander’s and the head of mission’s judgment regarding 

the critical areas where the protection responsibilities are greatest 

initially. It’s also designed to give the leadership in the mission, 

which is jointly answerable to the United Nations and to the African Union, which has been fully involved itself in every phase of 

planning and implementation of this operation, to be—to give them 

the flexibility they need to respond to an unfolding circumstance on 

the ground. 

I want to take a moment, Mr. Chairman, because it is my specific set of responsibilities to address the logistical personnel, financial, and other operational aspects of the mission, to spend a moment on what is needed now. 

What is needed now, fundamentally, is land to deploy all of these 

forces, but not just terrain on the ground; we also need land with 

associated proximate water access so that this force can be sustained. Part of our water strategy, I should point out, Mr. Chairman, at the outset and for the years that we have had it under development, is a water-sharing strategy, because we are aware that, 

certainly, this is at the heart of so much privation in the region. 

And so, we represent a large consumer of water when we come in, 

and so, our strategy, again, at the outset, and as we have developed it over time, is designed to share that water with the population and in full concert and consciousness of the demands that we 

will be presenting in what is already a very fragile system in place. 

So, land, associated water rights, this requires drilling for water in 

an environment where proven water sources are far between and 

uncertain to establish. 

8 

We need engineering capability to accelerate the deployment of 

forces on the ground. We have spoken to a number of troop-contributing countries about how to configure their forces through their 

initial deployment to bring, as an organic part of their capacity, a 

pioneering or light-engineering ability to facilitate the introduction 

of forces until such time as the U.N. can follow through with our 

normal logistics package and sustain them over time. 

We talk a lot about self-sustainment in the context of U.N. deployment, and here in Darfur, this will be key. The units must 

come equipped, trained on the equipment that they have, with organic mobility, command and control, and communications, as I 

mentioned before, to administer and discharge their operational responsibilities, as well as provide for their self-sustainment in the 

camps and as they are out in operations. This will be key. The ability of the force to deploy robustly in this year will depend on the 

self-sustaining ability of the troop-contributing countries. 

In this regard, Mr. Chairman, I should say that partner countries, including, specifically, the United States and others, have 

been extremely important in partnering with many of the TCCs on 

the ground to help provide them the enabling capabilities they 

need to meet their requirements of troop deployments and operations. This engagement of the partners must continue. We will not 

be able to mount and sustain this force and present the kind of 

foundation for the onward deployment of subsequent troops and 

forces if the elements that are currently present are not brought 

up to strength, in terms of the U.N. numbers that we require and 

their sustainability and mobility, and command-and-control capacities are enhanced, as well. For this, the partnering countries will 

be critical. 

I mentioned before, Mr. Chairman, that we, in the U.N., do feel 

responsible for our role in helping to get this mission in on the 

ground as we feel for every mission that we deploy. And, as I mentioned briefly in my remarks, the troop-contributing countries 

themselves have a responsibility, and the partnering countries 

have responsibilities, as well, to stay engaged with the troop contributors, with the United Nations, with the mission on the ground, 

with the African Union, and with the neighboring countries, as 

well, to do what they can, and do what they can, Mr. Chairman, 

not only for the operation that’s on the ground, but for the peace 

process, as well. 

The purpose of peacekeeping is to protect and strengthen fragile 

peace. That’s why the world has peacekeepers. And we, in the 

United Nations, who have been doing peacekeeping—this year 

marks the 60th anniversary of United Nations peacekeeping—understand, through many lessons over those years, many bitter lessons through the decade of the nineties, the conditions under which 

peacekeepers are right to deploy and when they can maximally 

contribute to a durable peace. There must be a peace to keep. 

Peacekeepers can usefully accompany political processes. We cannot substitute for the lack of those processes. 

And, as you rightly pointed out, Mr. Chairman, the peace process 

for Darfur needs the attention and care and engagement of the 

international community, and of all key actors with a role to play, 

9 

to encourage the parties to come to talk and pursue their continuing differences around a peace table. 

The Government of Sudan, of course, itself has responsibilities. 

I meet with them every time I go to the region, both in the region 

and in Khartoum, engage them at an operational level with the 

pragmatic challenges that we have on the ground. It’s my view 

they clearly understand what their roles and responsibilities are. 

It’s a continuing dialog and challenge for us. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to close the way I began, by 

thanking you for this opportunity that you’ve given to my colleagues and I to brief you this morning, to thank the United States, 

not only for its role and attention that it has paid to the problem 

in Darfur, but to thank the United States for its contribution to 

peacekeeping over 60 years, and for its contributions and support 

to the United Nations. The United Nations is an extraordinary institution. It’s not perfect. We, in peacekeeping, are not perfect. But, 

it does represent the kind of aspiration where the world can pool 

its strengths to share its burden, and it’s our privilege to be a part 

of it. 

Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Doctor. With your 

permission, we’d like to ask a few questions, if that’s OK. 

Let me begin where you ended. I think an awful lot of Americans—and, I suspect, Europeans and others, as well—are sometimes confused by the distinction between peacekeeping and peacemaking. And, for example—we have a line—I’m informed by Chairman Dodd that—a line that is all the way down the hallway, here, 

of people wanting to come in to hear your testimony, and this is 

an issue that has caught the heart, imagination, and attention of 

people all around the world, because it seems so intractable, and 

so many innocent people. I’ve only visited it once. I visited the 

camps on the border in Chad, the northernmost camps. It’s amazing what the U.N. is doing, keeping those folks alive in what is a 

Godforsaken part of the world. 

But, let me begin talking about peacekeeping versus peacemaking. I would posit that there’s no peace to keep right now. 

There is an agreement, of sorts. You mentioned engineering necessities—capacity, self-sustaining capability. As I understand it, 

Sudan—notwithstanding their assertions, Khartoum is holding up 

supplies at the Port of Sudan, restricting communications equipment that can come in, which is essential to a self-sustaining capacity on the ground for any force. I may be mistaken, but I am 

told, denying engineering capacity—that is, the very things that 

come in to construct the capacity for troops to be self-sustaining— 

and a number of other obstacles. And I would like to ask you to 

contrast that to what I would suggest in the parlance is a slightly 

different kind of force—EUFOR-Chad. The European Union is deploying, quote, ‘‘a peacekeeping force’’ inside the Chad border with 

Darfur, approximately 3,700 people. Most of these troops are 

French. France has a long history, a former colony. They have an 

airbase there that could be used. And Russia is contributing helicopters. 

Now, one of the things that I’m a little bit confused about is that 

it seems as though the distinction between, in broad terms, the 

10 

European Union’s action to deploy 3,700 troops that are self-sustaining, know how to shoot straight, are organized, are capable— 

and that’s not a criticism of the AU. I met with the AU commanders on the ground; they desperately need everything from infrastructure to training to equipment. And I know the Rwandans 

are probably ahead of the game, because of the training they’ve 

gotten, and probably the most capable of the AU forces. But, how 

would things change for you if the continued resistance from the 

various sectors for deployment of this force, the peacekeeping force 

that you are charged with, if, in fact, there is a deployment of 2,500 

to 4,000 NATO troops on the ground establishing, without having 

to any longer put up with the interminable delays of the Sudanese 

Government, just within west Darfur and just initially—which they 

could do—not establish peace, but establish some order, set the 

table, set the groundwork for all that infrastructure you’re talking 

about. I know that’s heretical, I know no one but me supports 

that—I shouldn’t say ‘‘no one,’’ but not many people—and I’m not 

sure, at this point, that its force would be available; but, how would 

that change your circumstance? Would it just make it impossible, 

or would it, in fact, send a message to Khartoum that there are 

certain actions that when countries engage in genocide, they forfeit 

their sovereignty, that the international community has a right to 

come in to protect people? 

And I want to make it clear—it’s a long question; it’s the only 

question I’ll ask—I want to make it clear what Senator Lugar 

pointed out in his statement, I don’t think that portends for a political settlement. That will not create a political settlement. That 

will not alter a lot of the other pieces on the ground. But, one thing 

it would do, it would sure in hell shut down the Janjaweed real 

quickly, and it would blow away those rebel groups that are engaged, real quickly, in the area where they were. Is that a good 

thing or a bad thing, if it could happen? 

Dr. LUTE. At every level, this is an extremely relevant question 

for us in the United Nations. We have our own piece, the Chad operation, to deploy. That operation consists, really, of three parts: 

The EUFOR, which you described; the United Nations mission, 

which will be about 1,200 and that mission is designed to support 

the third component; the 800 Chadian police, whose job it will be 

to bring security to the camps and to the refugee sites and to the 

IDP sites and to the surrounding cities. That operation is being 

stood up simultaneous to our effort to stand up Darfur. 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. 

Dr. LUTE. So, from the U.N.’s perspective, it is there—— 

The CHAIRMAN. My guess is, it’ll be stood up 20 times faster than 

your operation. 

Dr. LUTE. Certainly, the European component of this tripartite 

mission will be. They project to stand up—to be at initial operating 

capability—by May. And that is with the bulk of their force. 

As you know, the U.N. has no standing military. 

The CHAIRMAN. No; I understand. Yes. 

Dr. LUTE. We have no standing training. We have very little 

doctrine. We’ve just begun to write that. We have no standing 

civilian cadre of personnel. Every single mission is, to a certain extent, stood up as if for the first time. We are able to rely on troopVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:47 Mar 05, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\DARFUR MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
11 

contributing countries that, themselves, feel stretched around the 

world. There is not only the operation in Chad, but other operations, as well, which are pressing down on troop-contributing 

countries and police-contributing countries. 

But, your point about the presence of a robust force on both sides 

of the border, frankly, Mr. Chairman, is what’s necessary, and 

we’re aiming to do our part. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much. 

I yield to Chairman Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Dr. Lute, as has been mentioned in opening 

statements and your testimony, one of the compelling reasons why 

world attention is focused on Sudan and on Darfur is because there 

has been testimony here in the United States by Secretary Powell 

and, the chairman mentioned, by the President, that genocide is 

being committed. 

Now, let me just ask you, as a very close observer of the situation, who is committing genocide? That is, what group of persons? 

And who are the victims of genocide? So that at least the public 

can get clear in its own mind precisely where that charge lies. 

Dr. LUTE. Mr. Chairman, I am no expert on the tribal or ethnic 

politics of Darfur, but I can tell you that the so-called militias, the 

Janjaweed, in addition, have used force against populations that 

are themselves unarmed, that live in huts and encampments made 

of twigs, that burn these to the ground. There are other actors, as 

well, engaged. Very few conflicts, in my experience, exist in splendid isolation. There is the existence of forces, there is the existence 

of funding, there is the existence of ammunition that fuels these 

groups in targeting innocent civilians in a conflict that, in some instance, traces itself, deep roots, in the region—— 

Senator LUGAR. Well, now—— 

Dr. LUTE [continuing]. In some instance—— 

Senator LUGAR. Yes. What are the deep roots? In other words, 

what group or racial/ethnic characteristic are the Janjaweed, and 

what are the ethnic characteristics of the victims, these persons in 

the huts? 

Dr. LUTE. Again, Senator, I’m really not the best person to ask 

for the kind of detailed information that you’re asking in this regard. I have a layman’s understanding of that element of it. My 

focus has been on the U.N.’s logistics effort and peacekeeping effort 

to address the situation on the ground, and I don’t want, under the 

pressure of time, to make a misstatement that would be misleading 

in this context. But we can certainly provide the detailed information, that I know my colleagues have, to you. 

[The information referred to above was not available at press 

time.] 

Senator LUGAR. I think that’s important, and I don’t mean to 

dwell on this, but clearly one aspect of the Sudan situation that 

has elevated attention, in the religious community and persons in 

humanitarian causes all over the world, has been because the word 

‘‘genocide’’ is applied to this. You know, it’s a very tragic circumstance that, throughout Africa, there are many groups currently fighting each other and trying to undermine each other, 

undermining governments and so forth. Sudan has had at least 

12 

some relative success with negotiations between North and South 

Sudan. 

Now, experts will point out how that has come unraveled. And 

yet, at the same time, there has been at least some negotiating 

process moving toward a peace settlement. You’re involved, admittedly, in peacekeeping, but you’re not divorced from trying to negotiate peace, but, nevertheless, this is a part of the process. There 

have to be persons, even around a table, a campfire, or somewhere, 

who are prepared to compromise, who see at least some—and, 

therefore, you can come in, along with the international community, and hopefully retain that agreement. 

So, I suppose my second line of inquiry is: Where in this process 

are, in fact, the negotiations of any sort? Are they occurring in any 

part of Sudan, quite apart from parts of Darfur? In other words, 

is there some promising negotiation that might establish even 

a modicum of peace that somebody could, as a peacekeeper, help 

enforce? 

Dr. LUTE. Senator, the conflict in Sudan, in Darfur, is, by some 

experts’ description—a reflection of the conflict that also existed, 

North/South, a deep question of identity and political enfranchisement of those identities in Sudan as a whole. There are a number 

of groups that are involved in the talks in Darfur, which have gone 

back for several years now. There have been many efforts at bringing the militias, the warring factions, the government, supported 

again around—but with key regional actors around a table. Jan 

Eliasson and Dr. Salim Salim, from the African Union, have been 

jointly mediating the talks. They have just concluded a 2-week trip 

to the region, and it’s very clear that some of the key groups have 

determined that fighting is the preferred strategy to talking. And 

this is why I mentioned, in my remarks, that all of the key actors 

need to stay engaged to put the pressure on those parties to pursue 

meaningful talks in an effort to create the kind of viable dialogue 

that a peacekeeping mission can support. 

Senator LUGAR. Are these groups who would prefer fighting, are 

their objectives racial or ethnic domination, or are they trying to 

just simply carve out spheres of land, more food, water? In other 

words—— 

Dr. LUTE. All of the above. 

Senator LUGAR. Yes. So, I’m trying to—not to separate the problems of the genocide and the ethnic conflict and so forth from the 

fact that people are warring in many parts of the world over food 

and water. But, I think, at some point, in discussing this, we really 

have to begin to sort out what at least the world perceives as the 

various motivating factors, as well as the players, to have some 

sense—otherwise, we have one hearing after another in which we 

come, understanding we’re going to hear that things are once again 

amiss, sort of almost beyond reconciliation, and we’re not doing 

enough. And I’m, sort of, one who, at this point, would like to have 

much more of a business plan of who is who and what are the equities and how could any type of agreement come about that then 

armed forces or peacekeepers might be helpful? 

Well, that is my dilemma, Mr. Chairman. I’ll leave it at that and 

pass it along. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

13 

Senator Dodd. 

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome to the committee. I appreciate your being here. 

And let me just pick up, I guess, on where Senator Lugar and 

Senator Biden were heading. There’s obviously a sort of an antiseptic quality here as we gather in a hearing room like this and 

talk about the situation. And, you know, and you read these numbers, and the numbers can be dulling, in a way. You read the number of a quarter of a million to half a million have died, two million 

displaced, they just don’t seem to have the—kind of, the potency 

I wish they did, because the fact that there are many young people 

lined up around this building trying to get into this hearing is an 

indication of how deeply felt this issue is, and growing, and with 

great legitimacy. 

Let me just focus on two areas. One is, it seems to me that we’ve 

tried several things, here. In the committee that I chair, the Banking Committee, we were able to pass, unanimously—Senator Bob 

Casey is a member of that committee, Senator Bob Corker, Senator 

Hagel, all on that committee with me—and we passed out of our 

committee, back in December, unanimously, a sanctions bill on the 

Sudanese Government, assisting States and localities to be able to 

disenfranchise their financial support for the Sudanese Government. And I wonder if you might share with us, because, in some 

sense, if you can stop feeding the beast that supports these activities financially, it may have a desired effect. And I wonder if you’d 

comment on that. How effective are these measures? Why aren’t we 

getting more support for that approach around the world? I guess 

I understand, from time to time, the unwillingness or the inability 

for people to find helicopters or other equipment to provide for a 

situation that could provide some stability and resolve a military 

conflict, but, to the extent the world community could stand up and 

decide not to finance those who are doing this, would be one quick 

measure. In fact, the mere announcement of it may have the desired effect. But, when you’re acting, sort of, alone or not getting 

the kind of cooperation, it’s awfully hard to achieve that. So, I wonder if you’d comment on that approach. 

And then, second, in a very practical matter, Senator Biden and 

Senator Lugar have a proposal here, which I think all of us are 

supporting—I certainly am—a resolution calling for the 24 helicopters that are needed. Would you comment on the likelihood of 

the international community responding to that request, for that 

very practical request for assistance to be able to manage, or at 

least to try to do something more constructive to avoid the continued genocide that’s going on. 

Dr. LUTE. Thank you, Senator. 

I, too, am always struck by the way we talk about death and 

dying in the context of conflict. I had an uncle who wrote a poem 

once, called ‘‘Stars and Atoms Have No Size.’’ And it’s true. I mean, 

how can you imagine a star or an atom? And we talk about conflict, 

and we talk about war in a way that, at times, offends me. 

I spent the first half of my adult life as a soldier in the United 

States Army. And one thing you learn as a soldier early on is, 

people die one at a time. In the end, numbers can add up pretty 

quickly. 

14 

We talk about the Rwandan genocide; it was 800,000 people in 

90 days. In Darfur, it’s two-thirds of the population of 6 million— 

4 million people have been affected by this conflict. The brutality 

has been staggering. Part of the tragedy is that people forget why. 

So, I take the numbers very seriously, and I share your sensibility. 

This is a challenge of monumental proportions. We’ve used the 

word ‘‘intractable’’ several times this morning. Can that really be 

so? Can it be we are so bereft of ideas and of things and of knowledge to do something about this? And our part of it, and my part 

of this, is the peacekeeping effort. 

You mentioned the effectiveness of sanctions. Before I joined the 

U.N., I had the privilege of working with former Secretary of State 

Cyrus Vance and David Hamburg, the former president of Carnegie 

Corporation of New York, on the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. And some of you around—Senator Lugar, 

certainly, and others I had the privilege of associating with during 

that work—and we examined the role of sanctions. Are they effective? If not, why not? What does it take to make an effective sanctions regime? And the work was not purely theoretical. It was, 

What does it take? And what we learned is that sticks are not 

enough. Sticks have to be balanced against carrots, an upside. Because sticks against returning to the status quo, the status quo is 

no reward, so the sticks have to be balanced against an upside. 

What is in it on an upside to make the sanctions have more bite? 

But, sanctions are a necessary step, in the mind of many governments, before they can take more stringent measures. 

As a peacekeeper in the United Nations, it is not for me to pronounce myself on the advisability of a sanctions regime, its dimensions, et cetera. But, it is very clear that the conflict that continues 

to rage in Darfur is still funded, it is still supplied with arms and 

ammunition, and they are coming from somewhere. 

On the question of helicopters, this has been a deep puzzlement 

to me, personally. You—the chairman, in his remarks, mentioned 

that he had meetings with the African Union. And, depending on 

whom you speak to in the African Union, they are very forthright 

and honest about what the challenges are and what the challenges 

were when they agreed to go into Darfur when no one else would. 

And they needed everything from boots to Black Hawks, in some 

cases. 

And do we need helicopters? This is a region the size of France. 

We have a military force of 19,000. There are 4,000 helicopters 

available, I understand, in the inventory of the NATO countries, 

collectively. Are there not 24 for Darfur? 

So, we are working with the Member States of the United Nations, including with the United States. Ambassador Williamson 

has been aggressive in his efforts to find creative solutions. So, 

we’re turning over every stone. 

Senator DODD. Well, let us know. I mean, 4,000 helicopters with 

the NATO countries, it seems to me this shouldn’t take a piece of 

legislation. Do you have any suggestions for us here as to how we 

might effectuate that—the release of 24 helicopters? 

Dr. LUTE. I—Senator, I wouldn’t presume to—I’ll tell you what 

we are exploring. We are exploring whether or not we can find— 

our preferred solution is to go to a contributing country to give a 

15 

complete squadron of helicopters, with the airframes, with the pilots, with the maintenance package, as a self-contained unit to operate the way this government recognized its military operating, or 

anyone else, for that matter. Second, we’re looking to—for countries 

to put on—offer what they can. Again, equipping the airframes 

with the pilots and the maintenance package. Failing that, we’re 

looking at each of these pieces—airframes, pilots, maintenance 

packages—to see what can be put together. 

We deeply appreciate the effort that has been undertaken by the 

chairman and by Senator Lugar in this regard, and by others in 

this committee. And we will continue to look for them. 

Does this mean the mission won’t deploy? No; the mission will 

deploy. But, it will not be as operationally effective as it needs to 

be without these assets. 

Senator DODD. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Hagel. 

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

And, Doctor, thank you. Thank you, as well, for your many years 

of service to these great world challenges, as well as your husband. 

And, to you both, we’re grateful for your service. 

I’d like to just focus on one general question, and it frames, at 

least in my mind, this great challenge that you are dealing with, 

a good deal of the world is dealing with, and it is this. Are we in 

need of a different kind of organizational institutional structure in 

the world today to deal with these kinds of events? Now, recognizing that the world has always been violent, we have always experienced some number of these human catastrophes, genocide certainly being one of them. But, as we look, today, and we project beyond the horizon, 61⁄2 billion people on the face of the Earth, projecting to be 8 to 9 billion one of these days, we are much aware 

that resources in many of these areas are scarce. 

Some of the line of questioning that my colleagues have had this 

morning—food, water, fuel—oil is getting close to $120 a barrel— 

is it possible that the 21st-century challenges are of such a magnitude that the world is going to have to restructure, in some formalized way, a system to better deal with this? Or is it just a matter of lack of will by governments, by the developed countries? Is 

it a lack of prioritization? Certainly, when we focus on the helicopter issue, we are all befuddled why we can’t find 24 helicopters 

in a significant arsenal of the world’s leading military powers. 

Now, we can continue to have hearings, and you can continue to 

make statements and give speeches, but, just as you note, Doctor, 

about dying and death and your experience as a soldier, these are 

not abstractions, but, far too often, we speak in abstractions, and 

then believe, somehow, that we’ve accomplished something. Sanctions are a good example of that, which you have responded to. 

But, I would like, in the time I have left, if you would respond 

to that general question. 

Thank you. 

Dr. LUTE. Thank you, sir. 

Do we need a new organizational structure? I’ll tell you what we 

need in peacekeeping. We need a strategic planning capacity. We 

16 

need a standing brigade-sized force—that is ready, able, equipped, 

deployable—to move into a situation while there’s still a peace to 

keep, or to prevent a conflict from spreading unacceptably. World 

Bank data show that when ongoing conflict has an adverse effect 

800 kilometers away, within—if you drew a circle around a conflict 

zone that had a radius of 800 kilometers, you would find the affected zone of that conflict. We need a cadre of professional people 

skilled in a variety of areas, everything from human rights monitoring to political analysis to engineering, aviation safety, and 

everything in between, that is deployable on a moment’s notice 

within the context of rules and accountability, that can assure 

Member States that we are reflecting their collective will. 

So, the organizations exist. There are regional organizations—the 

African Union, the EU. There are other organizations, such as 

NATO and others around the world, and the United Nations. The 

United Nations is unique, in that it is deeply inclusive. We have 

an ability to mobilize complexity. It’s not always pretty. But, we 

can reach resources around the world—governmental, nongovernmental, international. And, again, reflecting the engagement of the 

Member States. 

Is it a lack of political will? You know, the old expression, ‘‘When 

you want to do something, any excuse will do. When you don’t want 

to do something, any excuse will do.’’ Is it political will, or is it the 

fact that we all exist in an environment of constrained choice? And 

where are your priorities? If a problem is intractable, is it because 

we don’t understand the problem? Is it because we lack the capacity, or it’s because we don’t have good theories of remedy in trying 

to solve that problem? All of the above. Is some answer a new, asyet-uninvented organization? Perhaps. But, I think the tools are on 

the table at the moment. 

Senator HAGEL. So, why can’t we get it done? 

Dr. LUTE. It’s all—— 

Senator HAGEL. Why are having this hearing today? Why can’t 

we get it done? NATO Foreign Ministers met in December of last 

year, and all agreed, every one of them, that we would all work on 

this, carry forward, get the peacekeeping force structure, helicopters, resources, prioritize this in our foreign policy. But, here we 

are. So, why can’t we get it done? 

Dr. LUTE. I will only speak for myself, Senator, and for the issues 

under my control. And that’s a question I also ask, Why is this not 

happening? What’s happening? What’s not happening? How we can 

effect the difference? And there are reasons that are unacceptable, 

there are reasons that are unexplainable. 

You know, is it a lack of contributions? In some cases, we don’t 

have it. The U.N.—we don’t own all of our troops, we don’t own all 

of our equipment. We depend on the contributions of the Member 

States. We depend on the agreement of the government to facilitate 

our operations in and on the ground. We depend, in part, on commercial contractors, and the contracting process is, as you know, 

for the United Nations, is not unlike in the United States—long, 

difficult, and engaged. So, it—none of these reasons are satisfying. 

Senator HAGEL. But, you said something in your first response, 

it seems to me, to make sense that we’re going to have to pursue 

it in some way, and the next administration is certainly going to 

17 

have to deal with this, as all other governments. Some strategic 

context. We have this tremendous framework of assets within the 

developing country. And, as you say, we’ve got NATO. We’ve got 

the United Nations. We’ve got dozens of these multilateral institutions focused on carefully crafted, defined missions within the 

structures of the organizational charter. But yet, somehow we can’t 

connect it with getting the job done. 

Strategic context is pretty critical. And I think that is as much 

the answer to what you’re saying today, but that strategic context 

must be within the arc of the membership to get it done. And if 

there’s no international strategic context, these kinds of problems 

that we’ve been dealing with for years in this part of the world are 

going to get worse, they’ll get deeper. 

And, just as you say in your answer to Senator Dodd regarding 

sanctions, sanctions don’t work if it’s just all sticks; somehow we’re 

going to have to find some balance and new—some new strategic 

context here that you will, hopefully, have a significant role in. 

But, it seems to me that’s the essence, very much, of your answer 

to this committee. 

Thank you for what you and your colleagues are doing. 

Dr. LUTE. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. If I could interject, just a second, back in 1988 

I proposed that there be a small standing force under U.N. Charter. We’re allowed to have that happen if the U.N. votes for it. It 

received a very cold reception here in the United States, and not 

a very warm reception anywhere else. And all we were calling for 

is, in the post-cold war, that there be a provision to have this 

peacekeeping capacity. Senator Lugar is trying to—with the help of 

me and others, trying to provide such a capacity here at home, 

civilian as well. But, as they say, it’s above both our paygrades. 

But, I think it’s a worthwhile thing to pursue again. 

The Senator from Florida, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Bill NELSON. Mr. Chairman, my wife and I wanted to go 

to Darfur, and the government would not let me in, so I had to go 

in the back door, and I went through Chad. And, of course, when 

anybody sees what we saw, you just can’t understand how the 

world community, through this organization, the United Nations, 

cannot come together. 

Now, I want to ask you—just in the last couple of days, we find 

out that there are Chinese-armed shipments going to Zimbabwe, 

and we know the problem there on whether or not an election is 

going to be honored in Zimbabwe and all the controversy there. 

And, in light of that and the fact that some Chinese AK–47s have 

turned up in the Sudan, in the Darfur region, what should we, the 

United States Government, and you, the United Nations, be doing 

to lean on the Chinese not to make arms shipments into the 

Sudan? 

Dr. LUTE. Senator, in this respect, I’m—I apologize, I’m not as 

current as you on the information of the last several days, but 

what I will say is, it is incumbent on the Member States of the organization to uphold the required—under international law and on 

the basis of their own commitments, to uphold the rules and—of 

the organization and of the pronouncements of the Security Council. This is not a wish, this is a requirement. They agreed to be 

18 

bound by its provisions. It’s not appropriate, as a U.N. official, to 

comment on—or to engage in—— 

Senator Bill NELSON. Well, I agree. 

Dr. LUTE [continuing]. Bilateral behavior—— 

Senator Bill NELSON. I agree. There is a U.N. Security Council 

ruling that says that there is an arms embargo in Darfur. Member 

nations of the United Nations ought to be honoring that U.N.—— 

Dr. LUTE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Bill NELSON [continuing]. Declaration. But, we see that 

China is pushing arms into Africa. And I used the example of 

Zimbabwe, just in the last couple of days. It’s also been sending 

arms sales to the Sudan. So, how do we get people—if we’re ever 

going to get to the bottom of this and stop this thing, we’ve got to 

stop items that continue to foster the unrest, and arms are certainly one of them. 

Dr. LUTE. For our part, Senator, the presence of the peacekeeping force in and on the ground, the existence of a robust political dialog among the warring parties, will create an environment 

where—that will alter—it is our—it is not only our expectation, it 

is our hope and expectation that that will alter the circumstances 

on the ground. 

Member States are—have available to themselves a whole host 

of bilateral means of engaging on these questions, in addition. But, 

it is our responsibility, job, and obligation to get this peacekeeping 

mission in, to create the circumstances that are better for the people of Darfur on the ground, and for the Member States to use all 

of their means to help that be so, and to help reduce the levels of 

violence. 

Senator Bill NELSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, when the government 

witnesses come up, this question needs to be put to them, the representatives of the United States Government, about leaning on the 

Chinese to stop the arms sales to the Sudan. 

Let me ask you, what is the U.N.’s strategy to keep Darfur from 

destabilizing the neighboring countries—Chad, where I came in, 

and clearly there was, increasingly, a problem of destabilization on 

the eastern part of Chad, near the border—and also the Central African Republic? 

Dr. LUTE. Thank you, Senator. 

It is—it’s, indeed, a concern. I heard, in my talks in Khartoum, 

government officials were certainly watching the situation in Chad, 

as well, for their own reasons. The peacekeeping mission in Chad 

is a separate mission from the mission in Darfur, but obviously 

there is a common border, and the dynamic is such—it’s a very porous border, and the situations bear on each other measurably. 

In the broader regional context, as I mentioned earlier, no conflict exists in splendid isolation. Our strategy in Darfur has three 

parts: Engage with the humanitarian situation on the ground to 

bring relief to those who are suffering; to support a political process 

designed to bring those warring factions to a table to broker their 

differences at that table, as opposed to military force; and to introduce the peacekeeping force on the ground for the protection of innocent civilians, to support the peace process, and to facilitate that 

humanitarian agenda; and also to bring regional—to provide an anchor point for stability in that region. 

19 

Senator Bill NELSON. And I compliment you, and I compliment 

the United Nations. I can’t tell you how admirable—these people 

were, representing the United Nations—what’s the organization for 

food and refugees? 

Dr. LUTE. Well, there are several out there. There’s the—— 

Senator Bill NELSON. Well, they were there. And since then, 

they’ve had to abandon part of that area that I went—east of 

Abeche, Chad, to the border there—they’ve had to abandon that 

area because of Chad being destabilized. I can’t say enough good 

stuff about those U.N.-provided people and their dedication and 

their selflessness. 

But, the bottom line is, it’s not working. And that’s what we’re 

trying to get at, here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator DODD [presiding]. Thank you. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Dr. Lute, thank you for your testimony and your life’s work. 

I want to follow up a little bit on the final questioning that Senator Hagel brought forth, just the—and you alluded to—the strategic piece. And I don’t know how you do what you do. It’s almost 

like—when you were talking about standing up efforts as they 

come about and not having a standing operation. But, it seems like 

a big piece of making the most of a very difficult situation, where 

you have to stand these up, means having, at the central office and 

United Nations headquarters, sort of, the personnel, if you will, to 

organize and logistically make these things occur. Could you tell us 

a little bit about that? Because, in addition to—because, in addition 

to having to get countries to volunteer to help, if you will, I suppose 

that the whole issue of having things logistically planned out and 

ready are—is another huge obstacle that you have. Could you tell 

us a little bit about how you’re set up at headquarters, how many 

authorized positions, how many of those are filled, and, sort of, 

where you are in that position? 

Dr. LUTE. Yes, sir. That’s what we do. That’s what I do. It is— 

we stand up every mission each time as if for the first time, with 

the exception of in—the OPTEMPO for us over the past 5 years 

has been intense. We currently have 20 peacekeeping missions on 

the ground. 

Every mission consists of some combination of three things: What 

the U.N. is able to bring to the table or put on the ground, what 

the troop-contributing countries, and, increasingly, police-contributing countries, can put on the ground, and what services we can 

contract out for commercially. So, every mission is some combination of those three things. 

We actually have very little standing capacity, as I mentioned. 

We have no cadre of civilian personnel. We have no standing military capacity. We have no—— 

Senator CORKER. But, at the headquarters itself, as far as the 

people who are to line these things up and make all of these things 

happen, talk to us a little bit about that capacity. 

Dr. LUTE. My—the Department of Field Support, which I oversee, has 442 people, in New York, and there is nothing standing 

between them and, actually, 35 missions out in the field. They 

20 

liaise with them directly. There are no intervening headquarters. 

And, you’re right, we have to find the personnel every single time. 

Every vacancy is an individual vacancy. Every travel is an individual travel. We have roughly, at the moment, 27,000 civilian 

posts authorized in peacekeeping worldwide. They’re managed by 

an office of about 125, in New York. 

Senator CORKER. OK. It seems like, to me, that even if you had 

tremendous cooperation, which we do not have right now in these 

efforts, that you lack just the basic infrastructure to be successful. 

Matter of fact, if you had a standing operation, it seems to me that 

you lack the basic infrastructure—440 people to support that large 

number of missions and all the many logistical issues that need to 

be dealt with—that that’s an impossible task. I’d like for you to respond to that. 

Dr. LUTE. It feels like that, a lot of days. But, we rely on the 

Member States. Each mission has its own headquarters element, 

leadership element. It’s supported by headquarters, in addition to 

my department, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has 

another 600 individuals. We total about 1,000, collectively, overseeing—but, we do rely on the contributions of the Member States. 

Each mission is stood up largely to be self-contained and self-sufficient, from an operations point of view, in terms of implementing 

its mandate and sustaining itself, supported back in New York by 

the headquarters and by the important role of the troop- and police-contributing countries, which rotate. 

The challenge is an enormous one. We have a fairly chronic 25- 

percent vacancy rate of our civilian personnel in the field. We say 

that we will have 140,000 peacekeepers in the field when Darfur 

is deployed. We actually manage, annually, about twice that number, because all the troops rotate every 6 months—the majority of 

the troops rotate every 6 months. It is a way of doing business that 

has come to characterize the U.N.’s approach to peacekeeping. And 

this is—this is as hard as it gets. It’s as hard as it gets. 

Senator CORKER. It seems to me that, in spite of the apparent 

great leadership you’re providing, that what we have right now is 

built for failure. 

Dr. LUTE. That’s not how we view it. 

Senator CORKER. But—— 

Dr. LUTE. It’s both—it’s both the minimum necessary and the 

best possible that the international is able to provide a situation 

like that. We’re the operators. These—we choose none of our missions on the ground. These are a function of political choice. Our 

job is to mobilize, deploy, support, and operate the resources—the 

human, the materiel, and other resources on the ground that have 

been given an enormous challenge and privilege by the international community. 

Senator CORKER. But, my point—— 

Dr. LUTE. We are not—— 

Senator CORKER. But, my point is—— 

Dr. LUTE [continuing]. We’re not built for failure. 

Senator CORKER [continuing]. The infrastructure—the infrastructure that lacks seems to me to—is that one of the reasons that we 

have difficulty getting people to contribute troops and contribute 

helicopters, which I want to get to before we end—it’s—what— 

21 

you’ve been in the U.S. military—let me just go to that, with a 

minute-25 left—you were part of the U.S. military. 

Dr. LUTE. Yes, sir. 

Senator CORKER. Just—I know we’ve sort of been nibbling 

around the edges. I’ve asked this in other hearings. But, what is 

it that keeps the United States, with its vast resources—with its 

vast resources, from participating at least, if you will—I know they 

don’t want our troops there—but at least in having the helicopters 

available? 

Dr. LUTE. Sir, certainly—and my colleagues in the U.S. Government will speak for themselves—the United States has been fully 

engaged in helping us find the helicopter assets that we need. 

Senator CORKER. We’re fully engaged in trying to find them. 

Dr. LUTE. Yes, sir. 

Senator CORKER. Twenty-six helicopters. 

Dr. LUTE. Yes, sir. Every conversation that I have with U.S. officials is extremely supportive, and they recognize what—the challenges that exist, and are working with us along these lines that 

I outlined before, in trying to find creative ways to solve the problem, to meet the shortfall. 

Senator CORKER. But, do you—I know you sense what spoof that 

sounds like, to say that our military is working with you to try to 

find 26 helicopters, and yet has not produced one. 

Dr. LUTE. Sir, I’ll—that’s—I’ll ask my colleagues from the U.S. 

Government to respond to that. 

Senator CORKER. It’s almost beyond belief that we have hearings—I know we had one in a secure setting recently, talking about 

this, but it’s almost beyond belief that, with the numbers of people 

that are dying, the number of people that have been affected, we 

sit here and we’re criticizing China, rightfully so, but that our own 

country, with the vast resources we have in military hardware, 

cannot even produce one helicopter as it relates to this particular 

conflict. 

Dr. LUTE. Sir, there are 192 member nations of—Member States 

of the United Nations. And we have been unsuccessful with any of 

them. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

And thank you for your testimony. 

Senator DODD. Well, I’d just say, we all have that same sense of 

lack of credulity in all of this. How can we be in this situation, with 

these numbers over this period of time? And this pathetic response 

is breathtaking, candidly. 

Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Lute, you are the officer responsible for the deployment of 

UNAMID, are you not? 

Dr. LUTE. I am—my responsibility is for the logistical operations 

personnel and support aspects; yes, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So, you would, in essence, be responsible for 

its deployment? 

Dr. LUTE. Yes, sir; I have a share of that responsibility. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Now, on July 31 of last year, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1769, and its goal, as I understand 

22 

it, was to fully deploy 26,000 peacekeeping troops to Darfur by mid2008. Is that correct? 

Dr. LUTE. Yes, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So, here we are today, April 23, 2008, we 

have only about 300 new personnel on the ground—150 

Bangladeshi police officers, and 140 Chinese engineers. And, at this 

pace, we will have the 26,000 peacekeepers on the ground by June 

2026. At this pace. Eighteen years after the goal set by the United 

Nations. I don’t understand—I’ve heard your answers, and I understand you’re not solely responsible, so it is not all aimed at you. 

But, I think we need to be more explicit about what Member States 

are not giving you the support. 

You know, the U.S. Government has done some things. We talk 

about the helicopter, and certainly we should be able to do something in that regard. Of course, our engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan leave us, in large degree, unable to respond in a way 

that we should. But, the fact of the matter is, I know that we have 

come up with over $450 million to construct bases. Maybe that’s 

not enough. But, at the rate that we’re going, the United States 

Government’s ability to work with the United Nations, we should 

forget about the next administration and the next administration 

after that and the next administration after and the next administration after that, before we finally get to the deployment of what 

we are looking for. 

I hope you can give this committee some sense—what do you expect to have, boots on the ground, at the end of this year? 

Dr. LUTE. Eighty percent. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Eighty percent? 

Dr. LUTE. Yes, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Eighty percent of the 26,000? 

Dr. LUTE. Yes, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. If we have achieved only 300 new personnel 

during this period of time, can you give us the projection of how 

you’re going to get to that 80 percent? 

Dr. LUTE. Yes, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I’m listening. 

Dr. LUTE. We have spoken to the troop-contributing countries 

about—they have conducted their reconnaissance. We have, at the 

moment, streaming in what we call COE, contingent-owned equipment, from several of them. We will have additional battalions 

from a number of the existing troop-contributing countries on the 

ground. We are engaging the partners—that is to say, the nontroop-contributing countries—to engage with other countries who 

are willing to put troops on the ground, to ready them in the area 

of equipment, important training, mobility, command and control. 

As I mentioned before, we are bidding out a multifunction logistics 

contract to facilitate the support to these units on the ground. We 

are asking them to deploy, self-sufficient, with a light-engineering 

capacity, to—because they will be going into brownfield sites. So, 

yes, we are working out the detailed planning to accelerate the 

force deployment. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So, you are telling the committee that, by 

the end of 2008, you will have a little over 20,000 troops there? 

23 

Dr. LUTE. We—the numbers—the total force of UNAMID, the 

total mission size, is just over 31,000, consisting of military, police, 

including formed units and individual police, and civilians. We 

project to have 80 percent of those numbers on the ground, if we— 

if our assumptions hold true, if the partners stay engaged, if the 

government continues to allow us to deploy smoothly. So, yes. 

Are there planning assumptions in that? Yes; there are. Is it a 

plan? Yes; it’s a plan. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So far, the government has created its own 

set of obstacles. What leads us to believe that, in fact, it won’t continue to provide those obstacles, moving forward? 

Dr. LUTE. We’re going to continue to stay engaged with the government, both at the national level and at the regional level, and 

throughout, from the port of entry, Port Sudan, through to the forward-positioning sites of these battalions. That’s our job. And then, 

we’re going to have to stay engaged. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I must say that I hope that your testimony ends up being fact, because if you are sitting, as a Darfurian, 

in the camps in the Sudan, if you are being attacked by the 

janjaweed, if your life is a living hell, you would really have a 

doubt about the value of the United Nations. You would wonder 

about the world and its response to genocide. 

And, just because it takes place within the confines of a country, 

if that is going to be our view of genocide, then we should stop saying ‘‘never again,’’ because ‘‘never again’’ can continue to be a hollow promise if all we are allowed to do is see the genocide take 

place and talk about impediments. I cannot believe the world cannot come up with 26 helicopters. I cannot believe that the world 

cannot generate enough pressure on the Sudan to make sure that 

all of the roadblocks are removed, as well as the redtape and all 

of the bureaucracy. 

And let me just close with this, we’re going to hear from Ambassador Williamson. In part of his testimony, he says, ‘‘In the face of 

these obstacles’’—he talks about what’s going on today—‘‘the 

United Nations has demonstrated far too little creativity or flexibility in addressing the slow pace of UNAMID’s deployment.’’ 

Would you disagree with this. 

Dr. LUTE. I absolutely disagree. 

Senator MENENDEZ. You would. 

Dr. LUTE. Yes, I would. 

Senator MENENDEZ. You’ve had a lot of creativity, and you’ve had 

a lot of flexibility. 

Dr. LUTE. You know, I’m—we have explored—as I mentioned, 

Senator, when I started, this is the 18th new mission I’ve done in 

5 years. We have both expertise and we have some experience 

under our belt about how to put a mission in on the ground, what 

it takes to mobilize the civilian expertise, the military expertise. 

We know how to do it when it’s easy, and we know how to do it 

when it’s hard. Have we been as creative as we should be? Probably not. Have we done our best? We can always do better. Have 

we been flexible? The system is not really designed for flexibility. 

Have we stretched the limit—the system to its limits? Yes, and 

we’ll continue to do so. 

24 

But, I don’t agree, and I don’t think my colleagues deserve an accusation of inflexibility and a lack of creativity. But, we’ll—we just 

have to stay at it, and we have to continue to work to do our best. 

Senator MENENDEZ. My time is up, but let me say, Dr. Lute, if 

I was sitting in one of those camps, the counsels of patience and 

delay would not be something that I want to hear. 

And I hope that, Mr. Chairman, this committee looks, as we look 

at the supplemental, at opportunities to further show U.S. leadership in this regard; otherwise, these words about ‘‘never again’’ are 

hollow promises, and I don’t believe in that. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator. We will look at 

that. But, it takes an administration commitment, which I have 

been talking directly with the President about for 4 years, and I 

don’t see it yet. But, that’s a different story. 

The Senator from Maryland. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, Dr. Lute, let me thank you for your service and your commitment to do everything you can to help the people in the Sudan. 

I think you share our frustration. It’s been 5 years. And I ask 

myself, on a regular basis, is there anything more I can do as a 

Senator? And we’re all frustrated. The tragedies continue. And we 

look at what we can do to be more effective. 

Now, you have one responsibility. I appreciated that you started 

your testimony by accepting responsibility for the role that you 

play in trying to get the forces on the ground to provide the stability and security in the Darfur region of Sudan so that humanitarian assistance can be delivered and people can live without fear 

of being killed. That’s one part of the problem. And, in that area, 

we’re not getting the international cooperation we should. Too 

many countries have not cooperated. 

When you responded to Senator Menendez’s point about the 80 

percent by the end of the year, you put, as you should, many ‘‘ifs.’’ 

Some of those ifs involve players that have been far from consistent, including the Sudanese government. We don’t know what 

their attitude will be tomorrow. 

The difficulty we have is that it’s not just the stability on the 

ground, it’s the peace process within Sudan, it’s the meddling of 

Sudan’s neighbors, it’s a complicated situation. 

So, my question to you is: Who is responsible here for the overall 

strategy? The United Nations is the premier international organization. We know that the leadership within the region is not capable or willing to resolve the problems, and it involves the international community. We’ve acknowledged that with the U.N. resolutions. So, if you were the chairman of this committee, who would 

you suggest that we bring in for briefings? Who can bring this all 

together? As you make progress on one front, we lose ground on the 

peace process, or we find that Chad’s getting involved here in a 

very unconstructive way. So, who? Is it the President of the United 

States? Who is the person who can bring the type of progress that 

each one of us wants? We don’t want to continue to say that genocide is continuing under our watch. 

Dr. LUTE. I always feel like I should never speak for others. I 

was born into the middle of seven children, and it’s not a habit I 

developed. From Jersey. It’s—there’s a certain—dealing with 

25 

reality that you have. My reality, Senator, is getting that operation 

in on the ground. Who’s responsible? You won’t like my answer. We 

all are. We’re all doing everything we can. We’re all, every day, 

waking up and looking at our hands, saying, ‘‘How are we acquitting ourselves today?’’ You know? Are we all doing everything—the 

answer, of course, is ‘‘No.’’ Could we be doing more? Yes; we could 

do more. Could the Government of Sudan do more? Sure. Could the 

leaders of the people under duress do more? Could the leaders of 

these militias and the groups that insist to pursue their agenda by 

fighting do more and do better? Yes. Could the regional actors do 

more? Could the international community do more? Yes. We can all 

do more. 

Senator CARDIN. The problem is that a lot of the players you just 

mentioned have very narrow views. There’s a power struggle, 

there’s hatred, there’s all things that go on when people’s lives are 

destroyed. Yes, they could do more. But what can the international 

community do to stop the genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan? 

What can we do to end this? Our chairman, at one time, suggested 

a more robust U.S. involvement, militarily, to stop the genocide. I 

can’t think of a more appropriate use of military than to stop genocide. So, what can we do? 

Dr. LUTE. What I—I can only answer that for myself, Senator. 

What we have to do is—we’ve been given a challenge to deploy a 

31,000-person force onto the ground in Darfur. I need some help to 

do that. I can’t do it by myself. We can’t do it—the U.N. can’t do 

all that needs doing, and all that needs doing can’t be done alone. 

I need the Member States to continue to stay engaged politically, 

both through the Government of Khartoum and with those parts of 

the warring factions on the ground with which they have influence. 

And they do. We need the regional actors of prominence to engage 

and—supportive of the political process that has been led by Mr. 

Eliasson and Dr. Salim Salim. We need troop-contributing countries willing to put their forces on the ground. We need countries 

who don’t have, or for other reasons cannot, put forces on the 

ground to be willing to equip those forces, to help train them, and 

to provide them with the means necessary to discharge their operational mandate on the ground, and achieve their self-sustainability. 

We need a lot of things and all of these things. There’s no simple 

answer. 

Senator CARDIN. And I would suggest one more thing we need— 

and our chairman has really been out in front on this—is to keep 

this issue before the public. 

Dr. LUTE. Yes, sir. 

Senator CARDIN. And I appreciate the fact that we have a large 

group at this hearing. I think that’s reflective that the United 

States, people of this Nation, are really concerned about what’s 

happening. We cannot let countries and leaders and factions continue to go unchallenged. 

I’m frustrated. I would like to see us come up with creative new 

ideas. I think that we’ve let a lot of deadlines go by without action. 

To me, that just encourages the factions that want to cause problems to continue to cause problems. I think we should have been 

a lot firmer earlier. I am disappointed that the international comVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:47 Mar 05, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\DARFUR MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
26 

munity has not shown the same urgency that I think has been 

demonstrated by your activities and by the activities of our country. 

I am proud that America has really made this a priority. I think 

we could have done a lot more. But, we certainly haven’t had the 

help of the other countries with the same urgency that this circumstance requires. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Doctor, I want to thank you for your service, as both a soldier and a peacekeeper, under terribly difficult circumstances. 

I wanted to ask you a couple of questions, some of which may 

be redundant, but I think it’s important to repeat ourselves a little 

bit in order to establish certain facts. 

I’m thinking about this issue from the context of my responsibility as a U.S. Senator, as well as in the context of people listening 

to this hearing. You know the frustration. We share it; there’s a lot 

of frustration in this room, which is a dramatic understatement. 

But, I want to give people who are watching this hearing, who will 

report on it, and have the record reflect some of the basics. 

When anyone looks at this continuing failure to have enough 

troops deployed on the ground to be able to effectuate what we’re 

trying to get done—in terms of providing the apparatus or the conditions to provide help—it’s very hard for me or anyone—and I 

know it’s hard for people in this room—to understand why we can’t 

get 25 or however number of helicopters we need on the ground. 

It’s very hard for people to understand why years have gone by, or 

at least many months have gone by in this specific case, when 

troop level commitments have been made, yet they’re not on the 

ground. Can you just speak to—in terms of the mechanics—why 

this isn’t happening? 

Dr. LUTE. It—Senator, it’s challenging, because we have no existing capacity. So, every time a mission is developed, a mandate is 

given by the Security Council, we go to the Member States and 

compose the force, unit by unit by unit, from the Member States 

that are willing to put their soldiers on offer, their peacekeepers, 

their police men and women on offer. We design the force and we 

compose it, and then we go to the troop—our familiar troop-contributing countries and others and ask them, can they provide this battalion, can they provide a transportation unit, can they provide a 

helicopter squadron? Every time, one by one. 

Senator CASEY. But, I guess I still don’t understand the disconnect there. Commitments are made, but—— 

Dr. LUTE. Oh, they’re—and, by and large, they are followed 

through on. But, for our major troop-contributing countries, for example, they agree to a force deployment. It goes through the political process of being acknowledged, agreed, and formulated into a 

coherent peace operation strategy for the ground. The units then— 

or the countries, the contributing countries then go through the 

process of preparing their units for deployment to those specific circumstances in the area where you’re asking them to go, easily recognizable by anyone in the U.S. military as the standard way of 

27 

preparing a force for a specific application in mission duties on the 

ground. They conduct a reconnaissance. They mobilize the equipment that they need. They train their soldiers. Sometimes they 

don’t have the equipment or the training hasn’t yet occurred. We 

need, then, to work with them. They need to work bilaterally with 

other partners to augment their capabilities with this additional 

equipment. It all takes time. 

Senator CASEY. It doesn’t make much sense to me. It really 

doesn’t. But, let me move on. 

With regard to the armed groups and the militias, can you describe those groups to us? That’s part one—and part two is: Are 

U.N. peacekeepers allowed to, and have they, recently engaged 

those armed groups or militias in any way that’s been productive? 

Dr. LUTE. Senator, with your permission, again, I am familiar 

with, but I fear it would be too superficial for your interests. The 

array of militia groups on the ground, the various SLA factions, the 

SLM, the JEM, et cetera, we can provide that information—— 

Senator CASEY. Sure. 

Dr. LUTE [continuing]. To the committee with an assessment of, 

by and large, their agenda that is in play. 

[The information referred to above was not available at press 

time.] 

Dr. LUTE. The force has the—it is a force that is equipped to defend itself and to use force, if necessary, to discharge its mandate. 

There has—it is a force that has been under attack. Eleven soldiers 

were killed in an attack on one of our camps in Haskanita. It was 

essentially a fixed encampment with nothing between it, the forces 

that were sleeping—it was a nighttime attack—and acres and acres 

and miles and miles of dirt—nothing between them and as far as 

the eye can see, except concertina wire. And these soldiers were, 

tragically, killed. It is, therefore, important to us—we know there 

is still fighting going on—it is important to us that this force have 

the political backing of all of the Member States, that it have the 

support of the government, that it be well equipped, well trained, 

and ready to defend itself for these kinds of contingencies. So—and, 

yes, it is—we are designing a force. It is not a warfighting force. 

It is a peacekeeping force; nevertheless, armed to use force, if necessary, to discharge its mandate. 

Senator CASEY. But, has there been any recent engagement between peacekeeping forces and militias or similar groups? 

Dr. LUTE. January was the most recent. 

Senator CASEY. OK. Let me ask you—I know I’m out of time, 

but—we have a responsibility here to do everything we can. If you 

could mandate or have a magic wand, so to speak, to direct the 

U.S. Senate to do something, what would you want us to do to 

help? 

Dr. LUTE. Senator, I will—I’m a little in danger of repeating myself, so forgive me, but—I can tell you what we need, to do robust 

peacekeeping. We—there must be a peace to keep. You will decide 

for yourself if you have—the Senate has a role in enforcing that 

process. There must be unanimity in the Council and political unanimity and consensus among the Member States of support for this 

mission in every way possible, in their bilateral relations, in their 

28 

multilateral relations, as well. There must be willing troop-contributing countries who have the capacity, because a peacekeeping mission is not just about numbers, it’s about the capacity of those 

numbers to discharge their mandate on the ground in difficult, austere, and dangerous circumstances, including, when necessary, the 

use of force. 

Some of our troop contributors lack key capacities, and 

partnering countries, such as the United States, have been very 

supportive in the past. We’re very grateful for that support. They 

need to continue to stay engaged and do everything they can to ensure that the follow-on forces committed into the peacekeeping mission have the capacity that they need, as well. 

Coming back to the chairman’s point earlier, the only thing about 

the standing force is, every idea whose time has come began as an 

idea ahead of its time. This is an idea whose time has come. We 

need a robust strategic planning capacity at the United Nations. 

We need the ability to draw on standing resources, material, personnel of all kinds. This is not spending money on peacekeeping, 

this is investing in the capacity of this organization to mount and 

sustain these operations instead of doing them ad hoc or in haste. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, let me—I just have one comment and 

maybe one question, then we’ll let you go. First of all, you live in 

a busy household. You’re taking care of Darfur, and your husband 

is taking care of Iraq and Afghanistan. No easy problems in your 

house. 

Dr. LUTE. No, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. It must be great kitchen-table discussion. 

Dr. LUTE. We don’t see each other that much, sir. [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Not a lot of pillow talk. [Laughter.] 

Let me say to you what I said at the outset. I just know more 

about you, maybe, than some of my colleagues do, because some of 

my staff worked with you. You are held in exceedingly high regard, 

and I mean that sincerely. I think you’re really smart and you’re 

really in a difficult spot. 

I’d like to—not for you to comment, unless you choose to, but I 

think that we all know why things have dragged on as long as they 

have. I don’t know of any situation that has spontaneously solved 

itself like the situation in Somalia, in the North/South issue, or 

Darfur. 

I went to see one of your former military colleagues, and a colleague of your husband of similar rank, 4 years ago, and he gathered together a group of his compatriots, who had stars and bars 

on their shoulders from NATO, and I spent some time sitting in 

the headquarters in Europe, and I said, ‘‘What would it take to stabilize the situation in Darfur?’’ This was 4 years ago, now. And 

they whipped out a plan. And the bottom line was, to oversimplify 

it, 2,500 to 3,500 NATO forces, trainers to go in, cargo planes, airlift capacity, helicopters—but, to go in and shut down the 

Janjaweed. I visited an airbase in Chad, which you’re familiar 

with, former French base, where you could impose the no-fly zone. 

I know that would impact on what already is impacted on anyway—food delivery and aid. But, the answers that I got from the 

military was, ‘‘We can do this, but there’s not any political will to 

29 

do this, in Europe or in the United States, for that matter.’’ And 

it was suggested, by one general in particular, that if the President 

of the United States made this an issue, took it to the forefront at 

the NAC, that this could get done. This could get done. 

Now, things have deteriorated significantly since then. Our situation, in my view, in Iraq has complicated things. You had a great 

expression; I can’t remember it exactly—but, ‘‘If you’re looking for 

an excuse, you can find one,’’ or whatever the phrase you used before. Now, I had called for the unilateral use of American forces, 

absent NATO’s willingness to move. Didn’t get any reception here 

in the Congress, didn’t get any reception in Iowa or anywhere else. 

And I said if I were in that spot—yes, with present company excluded, present company excluded—— 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. That’s why we both got out so quickly. [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. But, all—— 

Senator DODD. Now they say experience matters. [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. That’s right. [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. We spent more time endorsing one another in 

Iowa, and it probably was the kiss of death when I said, ‘‘If I 

wasn’t in, I’d be for him.’’ And he said the same. That was it. So, 

we both came home. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. But, all kidding aside, the arguments now—and 

I may ask you to comment on one aspect of what I’m going to say— 

only one, because you’re not in a position, in your present role, to 

comment on all of them—there’s an argument that, because of 

Iraq—whether we made mistakes or everything we did was right— 

we now have a, ‘‘Muslim problem’’ worldwide. So, for the United 

States to go in and take on a Muslim government in Khartoum 

that is, in my view, responsible for the killing, we would lose further standing throughout the Muslim world. So, that’s one of the 

‘‘why we can’t’’—we, the United States, can’t do anything unilaterally. 

China, big problem. China could be a major part of the solution. 

But, China has a—oil resource stream there. They don’t want to be 

any part of any real crack down on Khartoum. 

The no-fly zone. The very community that I care most about, and 

we all do, the humanitarian community, was very critical of my 

suggesting imposing a no-fly zone. Understandably. I understand 

that. But, what I predicted happened anyway, they’re not able to 

deliver the food anyway now. 

And then, there’s this overarching concern here in the United 

States, which totally understandable, starts on my pillow with my 

wife, who’s also a doctor, who says, ‘‘Joe, I don’t want us to be involved in any more. I don’t want to send my son. He’s already 

going to Iraq. I don’t want him going other places.’’ I mean, we 

can’t solve this. We can’t solve this. 

One thing I want you to comment on—there are all the 

pushbacks I’ve been getting for 4 years. And I’m not saying they’re 

not legitimate. I think this is a very tough call. But, were I making 

the call, I would, literally, not figuratively, unilaterally deploy U.S. 

forces. I would do it. NATO would follow, because they’d have no 

30 

choice, in my humble opinion. And I believe, when a nation engages in genocide, it forfeits its right to claim sovereignty. And so, 

I would not even consult with Khartoum. That would leave a lot 

of problems. A lot of problems. But, I think we have to face up to 

the fact that if we really want action, there’s only one way it’s 

going to happen: If the United States mobilizes the rest of the 

world and says, ‘‘We’re going to act.’’ Short of that, no one else is. 

No one else is. In the near term. 

That’s why I raised the issue of the Euro-U.N. force in Chad. 

And—because you could argue the same problems exist there. 

We’re siding with the Chadian Government against the rebels in 

Chad. We’re in a position where we’re making a judgment. We’re 

engaged in the sovereignty issue in Chad. We’re dealing with all 

the same problems, except it’s more doable in Chad, so we’re prepared to do it, in my view. 

So, here’s the point, and I apologize for going on. Absent the 

United States leading the way and deciding to go in, providing the 

cargo capability, providing the helicopters—I mean, the idea of the 

United States of America with a half-a-trillion-dollar military budget now? It’s about a half a trillion, isn’t it? A half a trillion dollars. 

As I said to the President, ‘‘We can’t find eight helicopters?’’ Literally, if I were President, or if Roosevelt were President, guess 

what? He’d manufacture them. Literally, not figuratively. We’d 

pass legislation, special authorization, a supplemental, authorizing 

the construction of eight new helicopters. We’d go to Boeing, whoever, and say, ‘‘Build ’em.’’ 

Senator DODD. Sikorsky. 

The CHAIRMAN. So, we go to Connecticut and—— 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. And do it. 

Senator DODD. Just want to get in a pitch. [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. That might end up being the biggest problem of 

building them. [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Pennsylvania and I might 

want it at Boeing, down in south Philly. All kidding aside, you 

know, short of that, though, for us to go at the U.N. for not doing 

something, I find it inconsistent—what can you all do? 

So, here’s my question, after that long, long prelude. In the experience of you and your colleagues in the peacekeeping side of the 

mission, is there, for lack of a better phrase, an ‘‘allergy’’ to U.S. 

forces being involved, in any capacity, in a country led by a Muslim 

government? Is it—do you hear, from your colleagues at the United 

Nations, talk that I hear coming from those who don’t want us to— 

and there’s good reasons not to want to get engaged in a military 

operation unilaterally in the United States after asking people to 

help, but not being willing to do it—but would it be different if 

the—Khartoum were not a Muslim government? How much does 

that play, when you’re putting together forces, when you’re pushing 

for engineers, when we’re trying to get communications equipment 

in—how much of it is cast in the light of the United States imposing its view on another Muslim country? Do you hear that chatter? 

Is that part of what goes on up in New York? Or is it—if you’re 

able to—and you can demure, obviously, if you wish, because, 

31 

again, you’re in a difficult position. But, I’d like to have a sense of 

that. 

Dr. LUTE. What I would say in response, Senator, is that there 

has—there had been a traditional avoidance of using any of the 

Permanent-Five Members of the Security Council in a very large 

way in peacekeeping, with a few important exceptions. That traditional—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me go back. We both would agree, we’re 

not really peacekeeping here. We’ve got to establish peace. I mean, 

I would argue, this is a helluva lot more like when I was pushing 

Clinton to go into Bosnia. This is a helluva lot more like ending 

genocide, where we had to unilaterally act. We went to the United 

Nations, the United Nations was unwilling to act, and we eventually go the point where, quite frankly, I think, the French and others were shamed into acting, once we decided we were going to act. 

Up to that time, people sat—I sat in Sarajevo, talking to people 

who had been butchered, their families, I mean, literally 2, 3 days 

before. And Lord Owen—the Foreign Minister of Great Britain— 

was talking about the cantonization of Bosnia. And we were talking 

about getting the U.N. in. The U.N. was the problem. Not their 

fault. The U.N. stood there and watched people in Srebrenica get 

loaded onto trucks, with the whole world watching, and drug off to 

stand above a pit, get their brains blown out, and put in mass 

graves. The U.N. did not intentionally, but it indirectly facilitated 

it. I remember speaking with General Rose, heading up the U.N., 

wearing a blue helmet, him telling me, ‘‘You can’t bring in air 

power, you may strike one of the U.N. forces.’’ 

So, I mean, at some point, you’ve got to establish the peace. I’m 

talking much too much. But, my frustration is, like yours, intense. 

I’ve concluded there’s no way anything’s going to happen unless the 

President of the United States says something’s going to happen. 

And they’re going to have to take a great risk. Other than that, 

we’re going to beat up on you, we’re going to beat up on the U.N., 

and the truth of the matter is, it is beyond the capacity of the U.N., 

without the willingness of Khartoum to genuinely cooperate, and 

without the willingness of the rebels to genuinely begin to negotiate, and, in the meantime, as that old expression attributable to 

the world-famous economist says, in the long run, they’ll all be 

dead. They’ll all be dead in the long run. Nothing is—the best thing 

that’s happened so far, in my opinion, Doctor, is the fact that you 

and the EU have committed 3,700 EU troops on the ground in 

Chad because that will end what’s happening in those camps. It 

will significantly reduce the killing going on in the camps and people outside the camps. It will impact the cross-border raids. Short 

of that, I don’t know what you can do. 

But, do you hear any talk about this Muslim-U.S. conundrum? 

Is that a topic of discussion? 

Dr. LUTE. By and large, Senator, the—that is not a major feature 

of the conversation. It is the other commitments that exist that 

permit or preclude Member States from committing. And the same 

is true with the United States. 

The CHAIRMAN. I—again, I’ll yield to anybody who has any question—I would like to give to you time, and I know we have a second 

panel, and my staff is telling me ‘‘get going,’’ here. But, I want to 

32 

note—article 43 says, ‘‘All members of the United Nations, in order 

to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council on its 

call, in accordance with special agreement or agreements, armed 

forces assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary purpose,’’ et cetera, et cetera. That’s article 43, section 1. 

For your benefit, I’m going to give you a copy of that proposal I 

made in 1992—— 

Dr. LUTE. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. And I would appreciate your constructive criticism of whether or not it may be more feasible today 

than it was in 1992, because it is—it’s more along the lines of what 

you were saying regarding what you need to have to effect this capacity. 

So, are there any further questions for the Doctor? 

[No response.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, again, thank you for your service. What 

rank were you in the military? 

Dr. LUTE. I was a major, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I’ll tell you what, you talk like a really 

tough sergeant-major. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I tell you what, I don’t think anybody gave you 

any guff. [Laughter.] 

And I’m glad—— 

Dr. LUTE. I have a 3-year-old. [Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. You’re in the position you’re in. 

Dr. LUTE. Sir, if you’ll permit me, Mr. Chairman, I—you have 

been very kind, and the Senators have been very kind in complimenting me, and I would just like to say, in response, is that the 

ones who deserve the compliments are the young men and women, 

the young soldiers who are peacekeepers, who go to these places 

expecting the worst humanity has to offer, and the young civilians, 

some of whom I have with me today, who go to these places believing in the best humanity has to offer. This is the combination of 

peacekeeping. And, sir, it’s my privilege just to be one of their 

number. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it’s our privilege to have you here. And it 

seems to me it’s our obligation, as one of the leaders in the world, 

to try to get the major nations to move toward a position where we 

establish peace before you have to go keep it. 

But, at any rate, thank you very, very much, Doctor. 

Our next panel, and our last panel, is the Honorable Richard 

Williamson, the President of—Special Envoy to Sudan, to whom a 

lot of the questions we had might more appropriately be directed; 

and the Honorable Katherine Almquist, who is the Assistant Administrator for Africa, U.S. Agency for International Development. 

Both have equally difficult jobs. I welcome them. And I particularly 

welcome back Mr. Williamson, the Special Envoy, whose predecessor had some very strong words, a year ago. We may have been 

better if we had listened to him, I think. 

But, at any rate, ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for 

being here. Thank you for your patience. And, why don’t we recognize you for your statements in the order in which you were called. 

33 

And if you do not want to do your whole statement, we will include 

it in the record, and you can summarize. But, the floor is yours. 

Good to have you. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD WILLIAMSON, PRESIDENT’S 

SPECIAL ENVOY TO SUDAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’ve submitted a lengthy written statement and look forward to 

the opportunity for questions and trying to respond to them. And 

I deeply appreciate the interest of the members of this committee 

in the terrible situation that is ongoing in Sudan. 

Rather than go through my written statement, I’d like to make 

just a few observations, including regarding the dialog that’s now 

going on, which was in the New York Times last week. 

First, I think it’s important to recognize that there are a lot of 

bad actors in Sudan, in Darfur. The government, in its reply to a 

rebel attack in 2003, opened the gates of hell. Since then, the Arab 

militia, the Janjaweed, the ‘‘devils on horseback,’’ sometimes in coordinated attacks with the government now, sometimes on their 

own, are engaged in terrible acts, and rebels also—rebel movements are also engaged in acts that harm innocent civilians. 

I have a slightly different take on the question of whether or not 

there’s a peace to keep. I first became involved in U.N. peacekeeping over 25 years ago, in my first ambassadorship. I think, in 

my opinion, in Sudan you will not move to peace until you change 

facts on the ground. And a key to changing facts on the ground is 

moving to some—more toward sustainable stability. 

I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, I think the deployment of the 

EUFOR forces are important. Those 3,700 European forces, and 

their activity on the Chad border is important to gain security. 

That’s why, last Monday, I had discussions in Paris, including with 

Foreign Minister Kouchner exactly about that, because the bleedin of violence in Chad into Darfur, and the bleed-in of violence from 

Sudan into Chad, are interlinked, and progress has to be made on 

both sides. 

Further, I—and so, the deployment—and I hope I have a chance 

to discuss the particulars—of these peacekeepers are very urgent. 

They are not ‘‘the’’ answer in Darfur, they are not ‘‘the’’ answer for 

peace, but they will contribute to more stability. It will crowd out 

the space in which bad actors can be perpetuating atrocities, insecurity, preventing humanitarian assistance to flow, et cetera. 

Second, I agree with you, Mr. Chairman and others who have 

commented, that there needs to be progress on a political solution. 

I cannot sit here and say I am optimistic that we are making that 

progress. I am in frequent contact with my old friend Jan Eliasson, 

the U.N. mediator; in fact, talked to him this morning about his 

most recent trip. And we, of course, support Ambassador Eliasson 

and AU Representative Salim in their efforts. 

But, if I can, let me just talk through the events that went on 

the last 3 months that have resulted in a dialog, going forward at 

Addis, and about the AU summit. The Sudanese Foreign Minister 

Deng Alor, who is from the South and is a member of the SPLM, 

in a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 

34 

Jendayi Frazer, and I, approached us and gave us the message that 

President Bashir and the NCP, and in consultation with the SPLM 

members of the National Unity Government, had a series of meetings and wanted to make an overture to see if it was possible to 

have an adjustment of relations with the United States. After consultation back with Washington, Secretary of State invited Foreign 

Minister Deng Alor to come here for a discussion. He did so, along 

with Mustafa Ismail, a principal advisor of President Bashir and 

a member of the NCP. There were a series of meetings with Deputy Secretary Negroponte, the Assistant Secretary Frazer, and myself, and then with Secretary Rice, in which this was explored. 

Secretary Rice made absolutely clear that this should not be an 

initiative entered into lightly, that we had a trail of broken promises and broken efforts in the past and any discussion with the 

Government of Sudan, and that it would not be good for the Government of Sudan unless it was a serious effort. They assured us 

it was. 

After some deliberation, we then proceeded to prepare a document with specific actionable, verifiable steps. We’ve had lots of 

promises about peace and other generalities, stability. The items 

we developed, with the help of Kate Almquist and USAID on the 

humanitarian side, dealt with specific matters, such as multiple 

entry of visas for humanitarian workers, visas within 48 hours, 

container in the Port of Sudan released within 7 days, allowing the 

corn soy blend product, which is high in nutrition, is used all over 

the world to deal with malnutrition of children, and had been prevented from being allowed into Sudan, that that would be entered, 

et cetera. 

We sent that paper. And then I traveled to Sudan. I had a series 

of meetings in Khartoum; of course, traveled to Darfur, visited a 

camp, et cetera, met with UNAMID officers, and in Juba, sat down 

with Salva Kiir to review this and to share it before we went up 

back to Khartoum to meet with Dr. Nafie and President Bashir and 

give them a copy of this nonpaper outlining the sort of things we 

would need for any discussion. 

And let me emphasize that we said, repeatedly, that we were laying out a long, tough road that had to be verifiable and progress 

on the ground for any better relations. Also let me say that, in my 

conversation with President Bashir, he said he was suspicious of 

the United States. We’ve had a troubled relationship. They feel 

there were certain representations when the CPA was signed in 

the DPA that we’ve not followed through on. Of course, we felt it’s 

impossible to follow through on them because of the continued violence in Darfur. But, I also said to him we think the Government 

of Sudan lies. There’s going to be nothing taken on faith, nothing 

on promises. I referred to my first diplomatic tour during the 

Reagan administration, 25 years ago, when President Reagan 

called the Soviets the ‘‘Evil Empire.’’ Nonetheless, on nuclear nonproliferation, we made deals, step by step, verifiable. We were able 

to make some progress. And, while on many areas in those days, 

we couldn’t, at least in the nonproliferation areas, we built some 

bridges and did make some progress. 

The Government of Sudan replied, a couple of weeks later, with 

their paper, which we—I think I’ll give a—maybe I’m a generous 

35 

grader. They got their bat on the ball, they didn’t hit it very far. 

We shared it with them. We agreed to have meetings in Paris. We 

made clear that past agreements, such as the Joint Communique ́

on Humanitarian Issues, the CPA, cease-fire, et cetera, were not 

part of these discussions, those were commitments they had to live 

up to. We went through the very specific things I’ve alluded to earlier, and we said if there is change on the ground—we promised 

nothing up front, but if there is change on the ground and these 

things are happening, which we believe would help alleviate humanitarian assistance, would contribute to greater stability, then 

we would look at taking steps. 

Let me emphasize, what we’ve done is outlined, laid out in detail, 

a long, tough road to better relations, similar to how Senator Jack 

Danforth did when he had—was the President’s Special Envoy to 

Sudan, and initiated the talks on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and he laid out what the Government of Sudan must do. 

Senator, I wish I could sit here and say I’m optimistic that this 

will be fully successful. I also wish I could tell you that, in the foreseeable future, there’s possibility for peace. There are a lot of bad 

actors who have done incomprehensibly evil things to innocent people. The violence continues. The genocide in slow motion continues. 

But, one thing I know is, we can take practical steps to get boots 

on the ground. We have done them. I’ll look forward, during the 

question-and-answer period to outline them in more detail. 

I know we can do a better job of humanitarian assistance. Last 

year, the areas accessible for humanitarian assistance have 

shrunk. That means more people aren’t getting the aid they got 

just a year ago. Even as you mentioned in your opening statement, 

90,000 more people have been driven from their homes because of 

violence near El Geneina. 

We do think a political dialogue is necessary. We support the 

United Nations-African Union effort. We also will have our discussions, which I have talked to rebel leaders, as well as Government 

of Sudan officials, and, of course, consultation with the southern 

government. 

Let me, finally, say, any progress in Darfur is contingent on the 

continued implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 

And there have been times it has seemed threatened. It has been 

frayed. There were concerns, legitimate concerns it might unravel. 

The United States continues to be deeply engaged to try to give 

every support it can for that process to continue to keep the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on track. We’re pleased an arrangement was worked out between the North and the South so the census could go forward in a few days. We’re pleased the SPLM will 

have its first political convention next month. We’re disappointed 

there hasn’t been progress on the Abyei border. We’re disappointed 

that there are other issues that remain outstanding, including the 

transparency of oil revenue sharing. 

But, as you’ve said, Mr. Chairman and other members of this 

committee, this is a complex issue. But, I don’t think its complexity 

is an excuse for us not to make progress. And I do know progress 

will result by getting more boots on the ground. Progress will result if we can get humanitarian aid to more people. Progress will 

result if we work more closely with the French and others on the 

36 

joint problem in Chad, in Darfur, where there’s cross-border support, cross-border travel, and Darfurians, either in IDP camps in 

Sudan or in refugee camps in eastern Chad, continue to be terrorized. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Williamson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD S. WILLIAMSON, THE PRESIDENT’S SPECIAL

ENVOY TO SUDAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Thank you, Chairman Biden and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I am grateful for the opportunity to be here with you today to discuss how 

the United States is addressing the tragic situation in Darfur and working to support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). 

The suffering and misery of the Darfur people has gone on too long. The humanitarian situation is deteriorating. Since the horrific atrocities committed in 2003 and 

2004, civilian lives continue to be taken, displaced, or shattered by rape, beatings, 

malnutrition, and disease. Since 2003, an estimated 200,000 people have died in 

Darfur as a result of this brutal conflict and some 2.5 million people have been displaced. Countless women have been raped and children have been injured. The 

number of killed and displaced persons continues to grow and reflects an atmosphere of continuing violence. 

Civilians who have been forced from their homes and live in internally displaced 

persons (IDP) camps are not safe from violence. Women who venture out to gather 

wood without escorts are molested, robbed, and raped, while men are abducted and 

tortured or murdered. Armed men have been known to enter these camps to either 

attack or harass the IDPs. 

A December 10, 2006, Save Darfur Coalition Press Release from their Advocates 

Rally in the Nations Capital Against Rape and Sexual Violence in Darfur recounted 

the horrific experience of a survivor of the violence in Darfur, only one of too many 

lives that have been destroyed by this tragedy. She recalled, ‘‘Janjaweed militia and 

Government soldiers attacked a primary school for girls, raping the pupils. . . . 

Because I told people what happened, the authorities arrested me. They said, ‘we 

will show you what rape is.’ They beat me severely. At night, three men raped me. 

The following day the same thing, different men. Torture and rape, every day, torture and rape.’’ 

In recent months, the security situation on the ground has become increasingly 

chaotic. Civilians are caught in the crossfire of rebel groups, armed militia, tribal 

groups, and government forces. Villages are desolated, livelihoods destroyed, and 

people are either killed or forced from their homes. 

Attacks in west Darfur this past February displaced more than 50,000 people, including an outpouring of more than 13,000 who have crossed into eastern Chad, and 

caused over 200 casualties. According to the United Nations (U.N.) Office for the 

Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA), nearly 80,000 Darfuris have 

been displaced since January 2008. This lack of security in Darfur fuels the humanitarian crisis by impeding humanitarian operations in Darfur. The priority of the 

U.S. Government is to ensure the delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance to 

the more than 2.4 million internally displaced persons and more than 200,000 

Darfurian refugees and displaced host populations in eastern Chad. 

After renewed clashes over recent months in areas north of El Geneina, west 

Darfur, between rebels and the Sudanese Army, there was limited humanitarian access to the area. Beginning in mid-December 2007, the northern corridor (an area 

north of El Geneina that stretches north to Kulbus) was a ‘‘no-go’’ for the U.N. and 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). As a result, humanitarian supplies were 

not dispatched to the north until late February of this year. Access to this area was 

completely restricted as a result of government-imposed restrictions on the movement of people, goods, and services after the area fell into the hands of the Chadian 

Government-supported Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). OCHA estimated 

that a total of 160,000 civilians were affected by this blockade. In addition, on February 20, the Government of National Unity (GNU) Humanitarian Aid Commission 

(HAC) cancelled flights in west Darfur for 1 week, significantly limiting NGO access 

and ability to respond to humanitarian needs. Flights resumed by March, and although the situation has improved since that time and some IDPs have begun to 

return home, maintaining the delivery of humanitarian assistance remains an urgent concern. Indeed, accessibility to humanitarian resources remains a concern due 

to government and rebel military activity and outright banditry. This means there 

is ongoing malnutrition, disease, and deaths. 

37 

Despite dangerous conditions, approximately 13,000 humanitarian workers and 

embassy staff are doing a remarkable and heroic job. Darfur is currently the largest 

humanitarian relief operation in the world, and the United States remains the single largest donor. In FY 2006 and FY 2007, the U.S. Government contributed over 

$1.3 billion to support emergency humanitarian activities in Sudan, including more 

than $920 million for Darfur. Since 2005, the United States has provided more than 

$4 billion in humanitarian, peacekeeping, and reconstruction assistance to Sudan. 

To date, the World Food Programme (WFP) has been able to work at 90 percent 

capacity to distribute food aid to the people of Darfur. However, since the beginning 

of the year, 60 WFP-contracted trucks have been hijacked in Darfur and 39 trucks 

and 26 drivers remain missing, and the WFP has stated it will have to cut its food 

distribution by 50 percent for May because of an alarming rise in banditry. The people of Darfur will not experience long-term progress until there is security on the 

ground in Darfur. 

The conflict that has created all of this humanitarian suffering has mutated from 

the Sudanese Government’s counterinsurgency campaign against new active rebel 

groups in Darfur in 2003 which targeted innocent Darfurians with unconscionable 

savagery to a situation that is complicated by shifting alliances, growing ambitions, 

tribal conflicts, and regional meddling. The Government of Sudan, the Arab militias, 

and rebel leaders all have blood on their hands. Make no mistake; this ‘‘genocide 

in slow motion’’ continues, casualties mount, and more must be done to alleviate the 

terrible humanitarian suffering and bring sustainable stability and peace to this region brutalized and stained with the blood of innocent people. 

Khartoum’s policy in Darfur has been the same tactic they used in the South: To 

‘‘divide and destroy.’’ By manipulating tribal divisions, creating militias from Arab 

tribes, forcing people from their homes, and separating them from their tribal leaders, the government has created a lawless environment in Darfur that it can no 

longer control. 

Renewed clashes between Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Chadian-backed 

Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in west Darfur resulted in a major military 

campaign by the Government of Sudan. The Sudanese military attacks involved aerial bombardments by helicopter gunships and fixed-wing aircraft, accompanied by 

ground offensives by SAF and militias, the ‘‘devils on horseback.’’ Human rights officers from UNAMID, the United Nations/African Union (AU) Mission in Darfur, 

underscored that these actions failed to distinguish between civilian and military 

objects and noted that the scale of destruction of civilian property suggests the damage was deliberate. A Reuters story quoted a resident of Abu Surug in west Darfur, 

saying, ‘‘The helicopters hit us four times and around 20 bombs were dropped. I am 

outside the city and can see it burning. They (the attackers) are still inside.’’ There 

were also credible accounts of rape committed by armed uniformed men during and 

after an attack in Sirba. 

The government-supported Janjaweed militias that are responsible for most of the 

attacks on civilians have been neither disarmed nor controlled, as outlined in the 

Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). A report by the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) describes an attack on January 24 in which witnesses 

described their attackers as ‘‘Arabs’’ in military uniforms, riding on camels, horses, 

and a number of camouflaged military vehicles. The attackers entered the town and 

started torching houses and shops and shooting deliberately at people. This style of 

fighting mirrors the gruesome attacks by the SAF in 2003 and 2004, indicating 

fighting may be reverting back to the 2003/2004 style of engagement. The Washington Post reported on February 15 a story of a woman who ‘‘had no breast milk 

to feed her 5-month-old baby after she spent a week under a tree with no food following the attack. ‘The Janjaweed came and took everything; our food, our furniture,’ said the 35-year-old mother, who did not know where any of her other six 

children or her husband was.’’ As this ongoing conflict mutates, Arab militias not 

only support SAF attacks on civilians in Darfur, but also shift alliances, join the 

rebels or attack SAF forces in retaliation for not being paid. Their services are available to the highest bidder. 

Government forces and Janjaweed are not the only parties to the conflict in 

Darfur inciting violence. In December 2007, JEM forces launched an attack on the 

local police station and SAF forces in Silea, a town north of El Geneina. These attacks prompted harsh counterattacks by SAF forces and started the ongoing fighting 

in west Darfur in early 2008 that led to exacerbated humanitarian suffering and 

increased the areas that were inaccessible to humanitarian workers. 

Because rebel leaders have growing ambitions about wealth and power-sharing, 

many of the rebel groups have fragmented due to internal disagreements. The situation on the ground in Darfur is no longer simply a war between the GOS and rebel 

groups. Violent clashes between signatories and nonsignatories of the DPA, interVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:47 Mar 05, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\DARFUR MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
38 

ethnic clashes, banditry and general lawlessness proves this is not a simple war. 

It is not only the Government of Sudan that is culpable in the ongoing bloodshed 

in Darfur. Some rebels have taken on the role of warlords and even criminals and 

are responsible for attacks on civilians. Armed men attack convoys carrying humanitarian assistance to Darfur, stealing vehicles and kidnapping drivers. NGO compounds are being looted, and local humanitarian staff are being intimidated. 

Quite simply, there is no shortage of bad actors in Sudan: In the Government of 

Sudan, among the rebels, and within the militia. I have seen with my own eyes the 

tragic consequences of the massive violence in Darfur. When I traveled there in February, I visited the Al Salam Camp for internally displaced persons and met some 

of the innocent victims of this ‘‘genocide in slow motion.’’ I met one beautiful, 10- 

year-old girl whose father was killed in an attack on her village 3 years ago. Her 

mother and sister rode on a donkey for 19 days before arriving at an IDP camp. 

This young girl told me she loved Sharea, the village she left behind. Her days were 

happy there. She misses her village, but she does not know if she will ever return 

home because ‘‘now it is too dangerous.’’ 

For this young child and thousands of others, there is little hope. And one thing 

seems certain. If we continue on our current path, the numbers will continue to rise. 

Despite our empathy for the innocent victims, our condemnation of the aggressors, 

our punitive sanctions, and our substantial humanitarian offering, this great tragedy will go on unabated. Our actions must give meaning to our words—we must 

work to create stability and security for the people of Darfur. 

The deployment of UNAMID peacekeepers would be a significant step in the right 

direction to help change facts on the ground in Darfur. But unfortunately, since the 

transition from the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to the African Union/ 

United Nations peacekeeping operation, UNAMID, there has been little change on 

the ground. 

Without a doubt, it is a difficult and complex endeavor to coordinate and deploy 

a hybrid peacekeeping mission in a country with a strong and often uncooperative 

central government. The Government of Sudan has been characteristically obstructionist, especially with regard to the composition of UNAMID. Earlier this year, engineering units from Norway and Sweden were rejected by the Government of 

Sudan, even though they would have provided vital resources in the transition from 

AMIS to UNAMID and helped to quickly create the necessary infrastructure for new 

troops. Without the Nordic engineering company, the only engineering unit that has 

arrived in Darfur is the advance party from China. These 140 engineers are less 

than one-third of the overall engineering assets necessary for the mission—and the 

slow deployment of engineers has made it more difficult for UNAMID to receive the 

troops necessary to complete their mission. 

Unfortunately, many of the obstacles presented by Sudan have been difficult to 

pinpoint, and the lack of a ‘‘smoking gun’’ has made it difficult to use the U.N. Security Council to address these problems. For example, access to land is a critical issue 

in Darfur. UNAMID cannot be successful without adequate camp structures, and 

the Government of Sudan has delayed the mission’s expansion by limiting access to 

land. One of the largest UNAMID headquarters, in Nyala, experienced delays in 

construction due to prolonged negotiations with the Government of Sudan, which ultimately yielded land that was significantly lacking in water resources. 

The delays in UNAMID’s deployment are also due in part to a lack of troop contributor resources. There has been an insufficient pledging of specialized units that 

provide critical force multipliers vital to the mission. We have been engaged in an 

intense high-level diplomatic campaign to lobby on behalf of the United Nations and 

help to generate and deploy tactical and utility helicopters as well as other critical 

mission requirements. This diplomatic campaign is starting to bear fruit: Ethiopia 

has recently offered helicopters to the mission. Our efforts have also included highlevel coordination and outreach to multiple NATO and non-NATO countries, including China. The United States has worked closely with the U.N. to identify those 

countries most likely to contribute helicopters to this operation. Senior U.S. officials, 

including the President and Secretary of State, have urged their international counterparts to provide the required support. In addition to helicopters, it is important 

to note that UNAMID also will require additional military transport and logistical 

units—these so-called ‘‘enabling’’ units are vital to the creation of the proper infrastructure and support of a larger peacekeeping mission. These units will help move 

materials and personnel to begin the construction of storage, maintenance, and fuel 

storage facilities as well as improving security on existing compounds. 

In the face of these obstacles, unfortunately, the United Nations has demonstrated far too little creativity or flexibility in addressing the slow pace of 

UNAMID’s deployment. In early March, I met with United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie 

39 

Gue ́henno to discuss my concerns and explore ways to give more urgency to 

UNAMID deployment. The United States is focused on practical steps that we and 

partner countries can take to assist with deployment. The United States and Canada have organized a standing committee of partner countries—the Friends of 

UNAMID—which meets on a weekly basis in New York to review the status of 

UNAMID deployment and address problems as they develop. 

The United States has already contributed significant funding for the AMIS and 

UNAMID in addition to funding 25 percent of these missions through assessed 

peacekeeping dues to the United Nations. Since 2004, the United States has contributed over $450 million to construct and maintain 34 base camps in Darfur for AMIS 

peacekeepers. And during the President’s trip to Africa in February he announced 

the U.S. commitment of more than $100 million to assist African nations willing to 

step forward for the cause of peace in Darfur. These funds are being used to provide 

training and equipment—ranging from personal troop kits to Armored Personnel 

Carriers—for Ethiopia, Rwanda, Senegal, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Malawi, and Tanzania. The training provided by the United States through the African Contingency 

Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program includes courses on peacekeeping with an emphasis on issues such as human rights. The contribution of the 

United States to UNAMID has encouraged an additional $59 million worth of support from countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and 

France. Through the Friends of UNAMID group, we are closely coordinating these 

efforts. 

Together with the United Nations, the Friends of UNAMID group has worked to 

speed deployment by addressing problems such as the U.N. practice of placing technical requirements on Troop Contributing Countries that—in some cases—they are 

unable to achieve. The application of these practices would have prevented African 

troops from deploying to Darfur. I am pleased to report that the Friends group and 

the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) have devised a solution 

that will allow troops to deploy as quickly as possible with appropriate training and 

equipment. Technical experts will continue to work to ensure that deployment is not 

impeded by bureaucratic practices. 

The conflict in Darfur must be resolved through a political dialog, and the United 

States continues to urge the parties to the conflict to commit to negotiated political 

settlement. The United States supports the United Nations/African Union-led peace 

process, and we have called for the appointment of a single chief negotiator to provide leadership and vision to the Joint Mediation Support Team for a successful 

pathway to peace. The conflict in Darfur cannot be resolved by a peacekeeping mission alone. But thus far, Sudanese civilians have not received the protection promised to them by the United Nations Security Council. We have an obligation to alleviate their suffering, and increasing UNAMID’s size and capabilities is a step in 

the right direction—toward peace and stability. When I returned from my travels 

to Sudan in March, I urged UNAMID to focus its efforts on the deployment of an 

additional 3,600 African troops by June 1—the scheduled spring deployment of 

Egyptian and Ethiopian troops and a rotation of former AMIS battalions. The arrival of new troops will enable UNAMID to achieve greater stability on the ground 

by this summer, and the United States is working with great dedication to make 

this objective a reality. The United Nations continues to work with Ethiopia and 

Egypt to schedule their deployment. Although those deployment dates have been delayed, the United States is coordinating with African Troop Contributing Countries, 

such as Rwanda and Senegal, to train and equip peacekeepers for rapid deployment 

to Darfur. The United States has already delivered equipment for Ethiopian troops 

and is pressing forward to provide training and equipment for Rwanda and Senegal 

in the first phase of our assistance. We have urged the United Nations to deploy 

the Ethiopian troops and rotate new Rwandan soldiers by June, when they will be 

prepared for deployment. We are working to ensure that relief arrives quickly, but 

ultimately the responsibility lies with the United Nations, Troop Contributing Countries and donors to meet their deployment targets and deliver on our shared commitments to the people of Darfur. 

In addition to on-the-ground measures to relieve the suffering of the people of 

Darfur, I am focusing on steps the United States and international partners can 

take to make progress in achieving peace and stability in Darfur and throughout 

Sudan. Last week, I held discussions with various parties on these issues in response to an overture from Khartoum. At the African Union summit in Addis Ababa 

in February, Government of Sudan Foreign Minister Deng Alor had raised, with Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer and me, a decision by President al-Bashir 

to explore the possibility of Sudan and the United States moving toward a path of 

constructive engagement. In February, Minister Deng Alor came to Washington to 

40 

deliver to Secretary of State Rice a proposal for improving relations between the 

United States and Sudan. 

I traveled to Sudan in late February to meet with officials from the Government 

of Sudan. During the course of our meetings, I provided the Government of Sudan 

with a response to their overture, a preliminary outline of specific, verifiable steps 

to be taken by the Government of Sudan to increase humanitarian relief to the people of Sudan, ensure the rapid deployment of UNAMID in order to achieve security 

and stability on the ground, and further the implementation of the CPA. 

During last week’s meetings, officials from the Government of Sudan and the 

United States discussed the Sudanese response to this preliminary proposal for a 

work plan. We addressed matters ranging from multiple reentry visas for staff of 

nongovernmental organizations to passage of UNAMID equipment through the Port 

of Sudan. Some may wonder why the administration is choosing to accept the Government of Sudan’s overture and attempting engagement with the Government of 

Sudan and rebel leaders now, when we have witnessed years of suffering, broken 

promises, and a trail of terror and tears. I believe that we cannot take any options 

off the table at this point. Let me be clear: There are many bad actors with whom 

I have engaged, and I do not forget that for a minute. But as with the CPA, their 

engagement may prove critical for progress to be achieved. The cost of human suffering is simply too high for us to let the Government of Sudan run out the clock. 

Instead of standing by and wringing our hands as more lives are destroyed by violence and displacement, we must seriously consider the full range of actionable options before us, from further sanctions to muscular actions and everything in between. This is why I have responded to rebel leaders and to the Government of 

Sudan, regardless of their violent history—to determine whether down this road 

there exists a path to a sustainable peace in Darfur. Finally, let me be clear. We 

will not rely on promises of future actions. Concrete, verifiable, significant progress 

must be achieved on the ground before we can contemplate improved relations. 

While the tragedy in Darfur demands our greatest focus and energy, we remain 

attentive to the CPA, which ended decades of civil war between North and South 

and provides the framework through which peace can be achieved and sustained for 

all Sudan. In the 3 years since its signing, we have seen great changes in Sudan. 

Formerly warring parties have joined together in a Government of National Unity. 

There is no more war in the South, and there is no more famine. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) established a Government of Southern Sudan 

(GOSS) in Juba, as well as 10 state governments throughout the South. $3.5 billion 

in oil revenues have been transferred from Khartoum to the GOSS. Roads are being 

built. Southerners are returning to help rebuild their homeland. With the support 

of the U.S. Government, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) is being transformed from a rebel force into a professional military body. In FY08 the USG will 

provide over $40 million dollars to increase the SPLA’s command and control infrastructure, advise its senior officers as they produce a Defense White Paper, and provide training to build institutional and strategic capacity. These efforts are intended 

to act as a security guarantee to prevent either party of the CPA from abrogating 

the agreement, as well as transform the SPLA into a smaller, disciplined, and defensively oriented organization. 

On my recent trip to Juba, I met with GOSS President Salva Kiir to hear his 

views and concerns about the CPA. Implementation of the CPA faces many challenges. Last week’s initial decision by the GOSS to unilaterally delay their portion 

of the census, an important milestone in the CPA, was cause for dismay, though 

I welcome the decision of the National Congress Party (NCP) and SPLM to work 

together to reach a compromise to follow through on the census, delayed by only a 

week. The issue of border demarcation in the oil-rich Abyei region remains a sensitive issue, and Abyei could spark renewed hostilities. Therefore it is urgent that 

the CPA parties find a solution to the Abyei border issue. At the same time, the 

parties’ recent decision to allow the U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to monitor 

Abyei for 2 weeks demonstrates their interest in avoiding new violence. The continuing lack of full transparency in the oil sector also is a concern, as is the failure 

of the parties to withdraw their military forces from the North/South border in accordance with the timeline stipulated in the CPA. The parties themselves bear the 

ultimate responsibility to resolve these difficult issues, but U.S. encouragement and 

engagement concerning implementation of other CPA commitments will remain crucial for progress to be made in Sudan. And here I want to acknowledge the continuing and heroic work of U.S. Embassy Khartoum and Consulate Juba staff, including the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID), and other agencies, in making this happen. 

I stress the importance of the CPA not only because of the need to prevent a resurgence of war with Southern Sudan. If the CPA unravels, the tragic North/South 

41 

civil war could reignite and our opportunities for peace in Sudan would disappear. 

Beyond that, it is helpful to consider Darfur from the wider perspective of the problems facing Sudan overall. We see through census efforts in Darfur that the citizens 

of that region are skeptical of the relevance of the CPA to their own political struggle. This reminds us that the importance of the CPA must be underscored across 

Sudan, not only in the South. Moreover, although this is an oversimplification of the 

matters, the conflict between North and South and that in Darfur both stem, at 

least in part, from problems in the central government’s treatment of marginalized 

sections of Sudan. The CPA addressed the problem of marginalization of the South. 

We should be working to similarly address the marginalization of Darfur. Moreover, 

if rebels in Darfur see the Government of Sudan implementing a peace agreement, 

they might believe that a similar path might be achieved to secure peace in Darfur. 

Similarly, our continuing pressure on the parties to implement the CPA shows the 

international community’s continuing support for the agreements it encouraged, facilitated, and guaranteed. 

And the relationship operates in the opposite direction as well: Continued violence 

in Darfur threatens implementation of the CPA. Without peace in Darfur, it will be 

extremely difficult to pull off the 2009 nationwide elections called for in the CPA. 

Today, we are witnessing the impact of insecurity in Darfur on preparations for the 

census, another milestone under the framework of the CPA. We must not let the 

tragedy in Darfur displace the attention we must also give to the crucial matter of 

peace in the rest of the country, and we must not address one crisis without informing our perspective with the lessons of the other. They are not separate issues; instead, they go hand in hand. 

The U.S. Government is committed and is acting to end the suffering of the people 

of Darfur. We are committed to doing this by providing humanitarian assistance, 

by creating security and stability on the ground, and by pushing for implementation 

of the CPA. Only with sustained focus and creativity will we end this tragedy that 

has already gone on far too long. 

The innocent people of Sudan have suffered too much, and too many continue to 

suffer. It is unconscionable. We must be forward-leaning in pursuit of any and every 

avenue to alleviate human suffering, bring sustainable stability on the ground, and 

move to real peace. In that the American people, the President, and Congress are 

in agreement. 

Again, thank you for allowing me to be here today and participate in this hearing 

on an issue about which we all care so much. 

STATEMENT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE

‘‘FRIENDS OF UNAMID’’ INITIATIVE

The Secretary-General welcomes the initiative to establish a group of ‘‘Friends of 

UNAMID’’ which will focus on supporting the deployment of the AU–UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur. The first meeting of the group was convened by the 

United States and Canada on 6 March 2008 in New York. 

The Secretary-General urges all UNAMID troop and police contributors to expedite the deployment of the units and assets that they have pledged to the Operation. 

In this connection, the Secretary-General also welcomes the initiative of the U.S. 

Government to help accelerate the deployment of UNAMID by providing $100 million to African troop contributing countries for training and equipping military units 

which have been pledged for UNAMID. 

The Secretary-General also urges Member States to provide the outstanding enabling units, including air assets, in order to permit UNAMID to achieve full operating capability. 

The Secretary-General looks forward to sustained and focused international engagement on both peacekeeping and the political process in Darfur, and calls on all 

parties to engage in good faith in political negotiations in order to bring the current 

crisis to an end and achieve lasting peace. 

New York, 6 March 2008. 

UNAMID DEPLOYABILITY SCHEDULE FOR TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES RECEIVING

INTERNATIONAL DONOR SUPPORT

Below are the deployability target dates by which the United States and other 

international donors will have units from Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) 

trained, equipped and fully prepared for deployment. 

Ethiopian battalions: (1—April) (1—September) 

42 

Rwandan battalions: (3—June–August) (1—November) 

Senegal battalions: (2—June–August) 

Ghanaian battalion: (1—October) 

Burkinabe battalion: (1—November) 

Malawian battalion: (1—December) 

Tanzanian battalion: (1—January, 2009) 

INTERNATIONAL DONORS TO UNAMID

United States—$100 million 

Canada—$40 million 

U.K.—$8 million 

Netherlands—$4.5 million 

France—(15 APCs loaned, valued at $6 million) 

MEMBERS OF THE FRIENDS OF UNAMID

Cochaired by: United State and Canada 

Members: Norway, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, the European 

Union, the African Union, France, Denmark, Germany, Italy, and Japan 

* This schedule assumes that each TCC contributor and DPKO finalize deployment 

dates and other issues in their bilateral MOU negotiations. The ‘‘deployability’’ 

schedule is subject to change depending on sovereign decisions of TTCs. 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 

Washington, DC, March 27, 2008. 

His Excellency BAN KI-MOON, 

Secretary General of the United Nations, 

New York, NY. 

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: The United States appreciates your personal 

commitment to bringing stability and security to the people of Sudan, and we look 

forward to working in partnership with the United Nations to ensure the successful 

deployment of peacekeepers to Darfur. When we met earlier this month. you encouraged a direct and ongoing dialogue regarding the situation in Darfur. I appreciated 

our conversation, and wanted to raise with you a concern that I also addressed this 

week with Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guehenno. 

We believe that the deployment of 3,600 new African troops by June—a target 

number based on the U.N.’s planning schedule—will bring increased security and 

stability to the people of Darfur. At this crucial moment, the deployment of new 

troops as quickly as possible is our best hope to change the course of this tragedy. 

The United States has committed $100 million to train and equip African peacekeepers pledged to deploy under UNAMID, and we will work to assist Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) in meeting the U.N. deployment schedule. 

However, we are approaching an impasse that will prevent the timely deployment 

of peacekeepers, and a firm commitment to a deployment timeline will ensure we 

move forward with the greatest efficiency. We would welcome your commitment to 

address any outstanding issues that might affect the deployment of these troops. 

An excellent example has arisen which is causing some concern: Whether Troop 

Contributing Countries will be able to fulfill current U.N. self-sustainment requirements. The United States supports the U.N.’s objective to deploy the best-equipped 

troops possible, but it seems that some U.N. practices may hinder deployment. To 

promote sustainable deployment, the United States will continue to work with partner TCCs to develop their own self-sustainment and maintenance capabilities, but 

a complete transformation will not be achieved in the near future. We strongly encourage the Secretariat to consider bridging the gaps that might remain for TCCs. 

In particular, we note that current U.N. regulations provide an option that should 

be fully utilized to support Troop Contributing Countries—a robust ‘‘dry lease’’ 

arrangement. 

As we previously discussed, the new Friends of UNAMID group continues to meet 

on a weekly basis to identify and remove any impediments to the deployment of 

peacekeepers to Darfur. We appreciate the full partnership of the United Nations 

in this effort, especially as we focus on the deployment of the Egyptians, Ethiopians 

and Rwandans by June. We are pleased to report that Ethiopian and Rwandan 

troops are currently participating in U.S.-sponsored training prior to their deployment to Darfur, and the United States will urge additional partner countries to contribute to UNAMID. 

43 

I look forward to discussing this matter with you further, and appreciate your 

partnership as we work to help bring peace to the people of Darfur. 

Sincerely, 

RICHARD S. WILLIAMSON, 

Ambassador, 

Presidential Envoy for Sudan. 

APRIL 11, 2008. 

His Excellency BAN KI-MOON, 

Secretary General, United Nations, 

New York, NY. 

DEAR MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL: As supporters of the UN/AU-led Darfur peace 

process, we commend your efforts to resolve the Darfur conflict and deploy 

UNAMID, and improve the humanitarian situation. We are highly appreciative of 

the efforts of United Nations Special Envoy Eliasson and AU Special Envoy Salim 

to advance the peace process. 

We remain concerned, however, that a Joint Chief Mediator has yet to be appointed to lead the UN/AU peace process. We therefore support the current Envoys 

in their view that having a single mediator working with the Government of Sudan, 

rebel movements, and other stakeholders, and providing day-to-day leadership of the 

Joint Mediation Support Team, will, be crucial for the success of the peace process. 

Such a mediator should be acceptable to all parties, dedicated full-time to the issue 

of resolving the Darfur conflict, anal of a sufficiently high rank as to compel the 

attention of the parties and the international community. He or she should be willing to live and work full-time in Sudan, and if not based in Darfur, should be willing 

to travel there regularly and for extended periods. 

At the recent meeting of the International Partners in Geneva, there was consensus that the appointment of a Chief Mediator is an urgent and important next 

step in moving the Darfur peace process forward. We count on such a step to translate into significant progress for the UN/AU process at this particular juncture We 

believe this issue to be extremely urgent, and respectfully request your immediate 

attention. 

We reiterate our appreciation for the work of the Special Envoys Eliasson and 

Salim, and your personal dedication to resolution of the Darfur conflict. We also remain committed to peace in Darfur and in the rest of Sudan, and are ready to assist 

your efforts as the process moves forward. 

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of our highest consideration. 

JOHN MCNEE, 

Permanent Representative of Canada 

to the United Nations. 

SAMA STIGLIC, 

European Union Presidency. 

JEAN-MAURICE RIPERT, 

Permanent Representative of France 

to the United Nations. 

FRANK MAJOOR, 

Permanent Representative of the 

Kingdom of the Netherlands to the 

United Nations. 

JOHAN L. LOVALD, 

Permanent Representative of Norway 

to the United Nations. 

JOHN SAWERS, 

Permanent Representative of the 

United Kingdom to the United Nations 

ZALMAY KHALILZAD, 

Permanent Representative of the 

United States to the United Nations. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Almquist. 

44 

STATEMENT OF HON. KATHERINE J. ALMQUIST, ASSISTANT 

ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. ALMQUIST. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

committee. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to testify on Darfur and eastern Chad and our programs in Sudan. 

I’ve submitted a longer written statement for the record that I 

hope will be added. Thank you. 

As Ambassador Williamson has just said, we are 3 years into the 

Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and this is the most important 

thing for the overall stability and unity of the country, and our assistance programs across the map of Sudan continue to focus on 

implementation of the CPA and all of its related aspects. It is as 

much important for Darfur as it is for North, South, and the rest 

of the country. 

Sudan is USAID’s largest program in Africa, and among the largest in the world. It’s our top foreign-policy priority in Africa. Darfur 

is the largest international humanitarian operation in the world, 

providing lifesaving assistance to more than 4 million people each 

year; some 21⁄2 million, nearly, are displaced inside Darfur, another 

250–260,000 are refugees in Chad and the Central African Republic, and we have a massive investment in this humanitarian operations. We are the largest bilateral donor providing assistance, 

more than $1.5 billion since 2004 to Darfur and eastern Chad. Our 

total program for Sudan has averaged around $750 million for the 

last several years. 

Today in Darfur, however, we face the most formidable challenges in our long-term commitment to helping the Sudanese transition toward peace and stability. Insecurity is affecting humanitarian operations, and it’s at its highest point, and our ability to 

access people in need is at its lowest point since 2005. This is because of fighting among the Sudanese armed forces, tribal militias, 

and rebel groups, who continue to kill, injure, displace, and otherwise terrorize the civilian population. 

Since January 1 of this year, aerial bombardment and clashes between these groups have displaced a further 100,000 Darfuris. In 

addition, banditry and lawlessness severely impede humanitarian 

aid deliveries on a daily basis. 

With most camps in their fourth or fifth year of existence, the infrastructure of assistance is largely in place, and people in camps 

are, for the most part, receiving food, water, health services, and 

other lifesaving interventions. However, with insecurity worsening 

and access decreasing, humanitarian conditions are precarious. 

Miraculously, the World Food Programme is still able to reach 

over 90 percent of its intended beneficiaries, despite the numerous 

obstacles that confront, both bureaucratic and security, yet 

Darfuris are tired of living in the camps, and the communities are 

becoming increasingly polarized and politicized and violent. In addition, many camps have reached capacity. But, the newly displaced continue to arrive. 

The people affected by this conflict desperately need lifesaving 

assistance, but it is becoming increasingly difficult and dangerous 

to provide it. In addition to the increasing bureaucratic obstacles 

by the Government of Sudan impeding humanitarian assistance, 

45 

each day brings more danger and more challenges for the more 

than 14,000 humanitarian workers, who risk their own lives to provide assistance to Darfuris. According to the United Nations, assailants have killed six aid workers and abducted 90 staff members 

in Darfur this year, including 36 U.N. World Food Programme contracted drivers, 26 of whom still remain missing. So far, in 2008, 

bandits have hijacked over 100 vehicles from humanitarian organizations and UNAMID, twice as many as the same period in 2007, 

and three times as many as the same period in 2006. As a result 

of attacks on WFP contracted commercial transport perpetrated by 

tribal militias and rogue rebel elements, starting in May WFP will 

cut by half the amount of cereals, pulses, and sugar provided to 

2.45 million Darfuris in their general ration. WFP is planning to 

resume full rations and expand the number of Darfuris receiving 

food assistance in time for the June-to-September hunger gap. But, 

if the attacks on convoys continue and the United States does not 

bolster security for the convoys to get the food from the port and 

the distribution points into Darfur, WFP may be forced to make 

further cuts in the ration. 

Delivery of food assistance is not the only worry for the humanitarians. Security for all types of aid operations on the ground has 

steadily declined over 2007, and this year, in 2008, access is now 

at an all-time low. Cessation of all attacks on humanitarian operations is essential to ensuring that aid can continue to be delivered 

to the millions of Darfuris who rely on international assistance for 

survival. At a minimum, the Government of Sudan must remove its 

bureaucratic impediments to aid, and it should immediately increase the number and frequency of police escorts for commercial 

transport carrying humanitarian supplies, and further ensure security for humanitarian and commercial traffic along the routes most 

affected by military and rebel operations, banditry, and lawlessness. 

Even if the bureaucratic and security challenges to the delivery 

of aid are rectified, humanitarian assistance cannot, ultimately, resolve the conflict in Darfur; it is merely a Band-Aid attempting to 

mitigate the worst effects of the conflict. Lasting resolution requires recognition of the conflict’s changing dynamics since it 

began, 5 years ago. Fundamentally, popular support for the rebellion, the resistance, continues, because the people of Darfur do not 

believe their grievances have yet been met. Darfuris want to know 

that their families, their land, their livestock will be protected from 

predatory attack, that basic social services will be provided by their 

government, that the lost assets essential to sustain their families 

and communities will be restored, that critical issues to the longterm sustainability of Darfur’s economy and social structure will be 

dealt with transparently and fairly—its use of access to land and 

to water; and finally, that they will have meaningful participation, 

first and foremost, in their own regional affairs, and, secondarily, 

in the national affairs of the country. 

The transition from the African Union Mission in Sudan to the 

United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur, UNAMID, since 

the beginning of the year, has yet to improve the security situation 

for the civilian population, as we’ve been hearing. 

46 

Now, the security situation is, ultimately, the responsibility of 

the GoS. Nevertheless, each additional day that the UNAMID cannot provide civilian protection, its credibility among Darfuris diminishes, and the difficulty of its task increases exponentially. Effective deployment is, therefore, of paramount importance to creating an enabling environment for a durable political settlement to 

be found and, ultimately, for displaced people to be able to return 

home. 

Redoubling our efforts to find this durable political framework to 

address the grievances of the Darfuri people, African and Arab 

alike, is equally vital to finding this resolution. Key spoilers to this 

process—and Ambassador Williamson has been talking to a number of them—must somehow be managed. This includes rebel leaders who variously wield significant political power over displaced 

communities or impressive military capability that allows them to 

prosecute war against the Sudanese Government and its proxy 

forces. 

The situation in eastern Chad is inextricably linked to what is 

happening in Darfur, and the security threats facing humanitarian 

operations there are similar to those in Darfur. USAID continues 

to provide humanitarian assistance for 250,000 Sudanese refugees, 

180,000 displaced people, and many of the 700,000 affected populations or permanent residents of eastern Chad in the areas of refugee flows and displacement. 

Conflict and banditry continually disrupt operations, nevertheless, and as long as the Governments of Sudan and Chad continue 

to manipulate pre-existing domestic political animosities by fueling 

each other’s armed oppositions, any viable solution or peace and 

stability on either side of the border will not be possible. 

While we struggle to overcome the challenges facing Darfur and 

eastern Chad, it is an equally critical time in the implementation 

of the CPA. Ambassador Williamson has mentioned the census. 

Enumeration, in fact, has just begun yesterday, after much controversy and some further delay in the South. In Darfur, it’s even 

more of a flashpoint. The people of Darfur, one, don’t understand 

the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, they don’t understand the 

Darfur Peace Agreement, which is predicated on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and they feel that the census will solidify 

facts on the ground that do not represent their interests, in terms 

of displaced populations and other outsiders who may have come 

in and settled on their lands while they’ve been in IDP camps. 

Therefore, this process of the census is a critical testing point, 

these next couple of weeks, for the entire country, as the democratic transformation of Sudan unrolls and moves towards elections, which are due to take place by July 2009. 

USAID remains committed to carrying out the full range of humanitarian recovery, reconstruction, and development activities 

that are vital to supporting Sudanese efforts to consolidate peace 

in Southern Sudan and in Darfur. 

And before concluding, I would like to take a moment to remember two of our USAID colleagues who were murdered in Khartoum 

on January 1st this year. John Granville was a USAID Foreign 

Service officer and dedicated to making democracy a reality for people at all levels of society. He worked for many years on Sudan and 

47 

other parts of Africa, and was an invaluable member of our team. 

He, in particular, put significant effort into our support for the census, and the technical assistance that was provided to Southern 

Sudan for this process to happen. 

Abdelrahman Abbas Rahama was a Sudanese Foreign Service 

national and an original member of the USAID Disaster Assistance 

Response Team in Darfur in 2004. And, by virtue of his role as one 

of our drivers, he got to know all of our staff personally and individually, and was also a very valuable member of our team. 

We miss these colleagues and friends very much, and their commitment and dedication will continue to guide our efforts toward 

a just, stable, and peaceful Sudan. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Almquist follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. KATHERINE J. ALMQUIST, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR

FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC 

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. Thank you for the 

opportunity to testify on Sudan and in particular the ongoing crisis in Darfur and 

eastern Chad. My testimony will provide an update on the humanitarian situation 

and what the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is doing 

to respond. 

Three years into the six-year roadmap known as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), ‘‘comprehensive peace’’ in Sudan remains elusive. While there has been 

significant, albeit fragile, progress in the South, Sudan remains a sum of its troubled parts. Regionalized politics, and regional approaches to resolving political differences, are at the very core of these troubles despite the CPA’s careful intent to 

guide the peaceful and democratic transformation for all of Sudan. While its integrity and durability have been tested, the CPA still provides Sudan the most viable 

approach to addressing the many grave historic political, economic, and social inequities in Sudan. The success of the CPA is of critical importance to maintaining 

stability throughout the country, including in Darfur, and therefore support for its 

implementation will continue to be the keystone of our assistance in Sudan. Darfur, 

however, is not yet positioned to contribute to, nor benefit from, the CPA, and recognition of this fact will be vital to any successful resolution of the issues driving 

conflict in Darfur. 

Sudan is USAID’s largest program in Africa and among the largest in the world. 

It is the United States top foreign policy priority in Africa and Darfur is the focus 

of the largest international humanitarian operation in the world, which provides 

life-saving assistance to more than 3 million people a year. This devastating conflict 

has left 2.45 million people internally displaced and another 250,000 refugees in 

Chad. Since 2004, USAID has spent an average of $750 million annually in assistance to Sudan, including a total of $1.5 billion in humanitarian assistance in Darfur 

and eastern Chad. 

Today in Darfur we face one of the most formidable challenges in our long-term 

commitment to helping the Sudanese in their transition toward peace and stability. 

Insecurity affecting humanitarian operations is at its highest point and our ability 

to access people in need is at its lowest point since 2005, when the international 

humanitarian community first succeeded in reversing Darfur’s dire humanitarian 

situation. Fighting among the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), tribal militias, and 

rebel groups continues to kill, injure, displace, and otherwise terrorize the civilian 

population. Since January 1 of this year, SAF bombardment of villages and clashes 

between armed groups has displaced approximately 100,000 Darfuris. In addition, 

banditry and lawlessness severely impede humanitarian aid deliveries on a daily 

basis. 

With most camps in their fourth or fifth year of existence, the ‘‘infrastructure of 

assistance’’ is largely in place, and people in camps are, for the most part, receiving 

food, water, health services, and other life-saving interventions. However, with insecurity worsening and access decreasing, humanitarian conditions are precarious. 

Darfuris are tired of living in the camps, and the communities are becoming increasingly politicized and violent. In addition, many camps have reached capacity, but 

the newly displaced continue to arrive. The situation in south Darfur is particularly 

dire: Al Salaam camp does not have enough water for its current residents, much 

less the many more displaced people in the area who are not even yet registered. 

48 

The people affected by this conflict desperately need life-saving assistance, but it 

is becoming increasingly dangerous and difficult for humanitarian agencies to provide it. The fact that morbidity and mortality rates are currently holding belowemergency levels is a tribute to the hard work, ingenuity, and forbearance of humanitarian agencies in Darfur and the more than 14,000 humanitarian workers who 

daily risk their lives to assist those by the conflict. However, if security and access 

continue their downward spiral, our ability to provide life-saving assistance will further degenerate—as will the lives of millions of Darfur’s people. 

BUREAUCRATIC IMPEDIMENTS

At the most basic-level aid delivery in Darfur has been impeded by bureaucratic 

obstacles imposed by the Sudanese Government since the beginning of the crisis. In 

an important step to address these bureaucratic impediments, the Sudanese Government and the United Nations signed the Joint Communique ́ on the Facilitation 

of Humanitarian Activities in Darfur in March 2007. The Joint Communique ́ did result in some improvements for humanitarian actors initially: For example, the government and the humanitarian community jointly developed a General Directory of 

Procedures listing the process requirements that all NGOs must complete. 

Unfortunately, despite this initial cooperation, the Sudanese Government continues to disregard articles of the Joint Communique ́ and has created new impediments that further hamper humanitarian programs in Sudan. Between December 

and February, the Sudanese Government imposed blockades in some parts of west 

Darfur that prevented humanitarian agencies from providing lifesaving assistance 

to those in need. USAID partners report excessive delays in visa processing, inaction 

when approving technical agreements and lack of adherence to previously agreedupon procedures. Delays in processing humanitarian goods through Sudanese customs threaten vital relief supplies such as medicines and food commodities. 

In addition to disregarding some articles of the Joint Communique ́, the Sudanese 

Government has also begun to create new bureaucratic obstacles for humanitarian 

actors. Since the beginning of 2008, the Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Commission 

has required NGOs to obtain travel permits for transport in commercial or rented 

vehicles—and then denied those permits; required that NGOs write technical agreements in Arabic; repeatedly cancelled high-level committee meetings on implementing the Joint Communique ́; and requested additional information regarding the 

transport, purpose, and recipients of NGO cash. For the past year, Sudan has 

blocked the use of processed food aid containing genetically modified organism 

(GMOs). This has restricted the U.S. Government from providing WFP with cornsoya blend, which is used mainly to treat malnourished children. The loss of this 

significant commodity contribution has stretched the already tight resources of 

WFP, which now has to spend precious cash to procure the commodity from other 

sources. 

Humanitarian operations are significantly hobbled by the Sudanese Government’s 

lack of cooperation and its noncompliance with the signed Joint Communique ́. Their 

acts violate the Sudanese Government’s commitment to respect the independence of 

humanitarian actors and undermine the principles and spirit of the Joint 

Communique ́. They defy the government’s promise to respect the provision of assistance and freedom of access to all people in need. 

INSECURITY

In addition to the increasing bureaucratic obstacles impeding humanitarian assistance, each day brings more danger and more challenges for humanitarian staff 

who risk their own lives as they work to save others’. According to the United Nations, assailants have killed 6 aid workers and abducted 90 staff members in Darfur 

this year, including 36 U.N. World Food Program (WFP)-contracted drivers, 26 of 

whom remain missing. So far in 2008, bandits have hijacked 106 vehicles from humanitarian organizations and the United Nations-African Union Mission in 

Darfur—twice as many as the same period in 2007 and three times as many as the 

same period in 2006. 

As a result of attacks on WFP-contracted commercial transport perpetrated by 

tribal militias and rogue rebel elements, trucking companies are now refusing to deliver commodities to Darfur from logistical hubs without Government of Sudan police escorts. The escorts, however, have been slow to materialize and too inadequate 

to protect 150-vehicle convoys. At this time of year, WFP-contracted trucks should 

be delivering 1,800 metric tons of food daily to supply warehouses in Darfur ahead 

of the rainy season; deliveries have dropped to less than 900 tons a day. 

On April 17, WFP announced that the current environment will force it to reduce 

the general food ration in Darfur. Starting in May, WFP will cut by half the amount 

49 

of cereals, pulses, and sugar provided to 2.45 million Darfuris in their general ration. The United States is greatly concerned about the reduction of critical food assistance to the people of Darfur, and we are working with WFP to assure that full 

rations resume as soon as practicable. WFP is planning to resume full rations and 

expand the number of Darfuris receiving food assistance in time for the June ‘‘hunger gap’’—the time between the end of one year’s food stocks and the next harvest. 

However, if attacks on convoys continue and the GOS is unable to bolster security 

for convoys, WFP may be forced to make additional significant reductions in assistance. Delivery of food assistance is not the only worry for the humanitarian operation, 

however. Security for all types of aid operations on the ground has steadily declined 

over 2007 and 2008. Access is now at an all-time low. In west Darfur, 90 percent 

of roads are closed to humanitarian agencies due to the presence of Arab militia and 

Chadian and Sudanese rebel groups. Here, many NGOs are only able to access 

project areas by helicopter, allowing them only 1 or 2 hours on the ground—enough 

time to take a whirlwind tour of a clinic, check the books and supplies, talk to the 

staff and maybe a few beneficiaries, and hop back in the helicopter. This type of 

visit is not unlike those many of you have experienced on a tightly scheduled congressional visit. And it is no way to manage programs or maintain effective operations. Some aid agencies have to rely on remote staff or volunteers who elect to 

travel insecure roads in order to reach the main office—literally risking life and 

limb—to provide guidance and oversight to operations. 

Cessation of all attacks on humanitarian operations is essential to ensuring that 

life-saving aid can continue to be delivered to the millions of Darfuris who rely on 

international assistance for survival. At a minimum, the Government of Sudan 

should urgently increase the number and frequency of police escorts for commercial 

transports carrying humanitarian supplies and ensure security for humanitarian 

and commercial traffic along the roads most affected by military and rebel operations, banditry and lawlessness. 

Even if the bureaucratic and security challenges to the delivery of aid are rectified, humanitarian assistance cannot ultimately resolve the conflict in Darfur. It 

is merely a band-aid attempting to mitigate the worst effects of the conflict. Lasting 

resolution requires recognition of the conflict’s changing dynamics since the outbreak of violent rebellion in 2003, the signing of the N’Djamena Humanitarian 

Ceasefire Agreement in 2004, and the conclusion of the Darfur Peace Agreement in 

2006. Yet even while alliances and patterns of conflict have shifted significantly during the past 5 years, fundamentally the conflict continues because the people of 

Darfur do not believe that their grievances have been addressed. Darfuris want to 

know that their families, their land, and their livestock will be protected from predatory attack; that basic social services will be provided by their government; that 

the lost assets essential to sustain their families and communities will be restored; 

that critical issues important to the long-term sustainability of the Darfuri economy 

and social order, such as access to land and water, will be addressed fairly and 

transparently; and that they will have meaningful participation first and foremost 

in the governance of their own regional affairs, and secondarily in the national affairs of the country. 

Even though the United States and the international community have invested 

considerable resources and effort in political and security arrangements to help address these grievances, many, if not most, Darfuris remain unconvinced and therefore popular support for continued political and violent resistance persists. This furthers an environment for opportunistic banditry to thrive and results in a downward 

spiral of lawlessness and violence. The transition from the African Union Mission 

in Sudan to the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) since 

the beginning of the year has yet to improve the security situation for the civilian 

population. Each additional day that UNAMID cannot provide civilian protection, its 

credibility among Darfuris diminishes and the difficulty of its task increases exponentially. The efforts of the United Nations and the Friends of UNAMID to speed 

effective deployment of the peacekeeping force is therefore of paramount importance 

to creating an enabling environment for a durable political settlement to be found 

and ultimately for displaced people to return home. 

Redoubling efforts to find a durable political framework to address the grievances 

of the Darfuri people, African and Arab alike, is equally vital to finding a resolution 

that will move Darfur beyond its dependence on humanitarian assistance. Key spoilers to this process must somehow be managed—including rebel leaders who variously wield significant political power over displaced communities, or impressive 

military capability that allows them to prosecute war against the Sudanese Government and its proxy forces. The Darfur Peace Agreement did not fully address these 

issues, and therefore cannot be considered the final resolution to this conflict. Still, 

50 

it represents a significant step forward on the path to peace and provides a framework to build upon. Essential next steps include implementation of the DPA’s key 

provisions to support mediators’ efforts to win over protagonists who remain on the 

outside. As well, a successful mediation will require an iterative process that accounts for the differing characteristics of the principal rebel movements. This kind 

of nuanced approach will require much more focused international support from 

countries with leverage over key parties in the process. 

EASTERN CHAD

The situation in eastern Chad is inextricably linked to what is happening in 

Darfur, and the security threats facing humanitarian operations in eastern Chad 

are similar to those in Darfur. USAID continues to provide humanitarian assistance 

for 250,000 Sudanese refugees, 180,000 displaced people, and many of the 700,000 

affected permanent residents of eastern Chad, but conflict and banditry continually 

disrupt operations, including the fighting that occurred recently in N’Djamena and 

Ade. As in Darfur, aid operations are heavily reliant on air transportation to access 

people in need. The WFP food pipeline has been particularly challenged, as the logistics required to transport food into the land-locked country are enormous and 

must rely on the same limited routes as those used to supply the U.N.- and EUsupported peacekeeping operations for Chad and the Central African Republic. The 

fighting in February particularly disrupted the transport of food into eastern Chad. 

However, despite these obstacles, USAID partners continue to deliver humanitarian 

assistance. In FY 2007, the U.S. Government provided more than $89 million in aid 

to eastern Chad, and so far in FY 2008, we have provided nearly $74 million. 

Just as any viable political settlement to the Darfur conflict must account for the 

principal Darfuri rebel spoilers, it must also account for the reciprocal effect that 

the Chadian domestic political crisis and the Darfur conflict have on each other. The 

Chad-Darfur border amounts to an international boundary on paper only. It will not 

be possible to ameliorate the humanitarian situation on one side without commensurately improving it on the other as both combatants and civilians move freely 

back and forth. As long as the Governments of Sudan and Chad continue to manipulate preexisting domestic political animosities by fueling each other’s armed opposition, peace and stability on both sides of the border will remain elusive. The United 

States is working to put in place a political process that concurrently addresses 

Chadian political grievances with President Deby at the same time as Darfuri grievances with the Sudanese Government. 

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT

While we struggle to overcome the challenges facing Darfur and eastern Chad, it 

is an equally critical time in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended two decades of civil war between Northern and Southern Sudan 

in 2005 and is intended to provide the overall framework for the democratic transformation of governance in Sudan. This week marks the realization of the CPA’s 

first major milestone since standing up the Government of National Unity (GNU) 

and the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS)—the first nationwide post-war census. In addition to giving the government and donors crucial demographic information to inform recovery and development plans, the results of the Sudanese census 

will be used to recalculate equitable representation in the central government as 

well as the distribution of national resources. This is both the census’ promise and 

its downfall. 

Only 3 days before enumeration was scheduled to start on April 15, the South 

surprised us all by announcing a postponement, citing a lack of funding, insecurity, 

the unresolved issue of border demarcation, the inability of displaced people to return to the South, and the absence of ethnicity and religion questions on census 

forms. A strong, unified donor community reaction helped to put the nationwide census back on track. Enumeration began yesterday, April 22, and will continue until 

May 6. 

However, the census has also become a flashpoint in Darfur where neither the 

DPA nor the CPA is widely understood, much less well-received. Darfuris view the 

CPA as a deal for Southern Sudan only. Consequently, they do not see the DPA, 

which is predicated on the CPA, as truly responsive to their grievances. Specifically, 

going forward with the census in Darfur at this time is not supported by any of the 

main rebel leaders, whether a signatory to the DPA or not. IDPs in particular fear 

that outsiders have entered Darfur and settled on their vacated land, and thus will 

be counted to the detriment of the millions of displaced who currently reside in 

camps. As well, late census preparations seemed to many Darfuris to clearly highlight how the region does not fit into Sudan’s power-sharing mechanisms. (The final 

51 

results must be endorsed by the northern and southern census agencies, as well as 

the Presidents of the Governments of National Unity and of Southern Sudan.) 

A valid nationwide census result nevertheless requires enumeration in Darfur, despite the formidable challenges. It will likely not be perfect anywhere, but its shortcomings can be managed and addressed. Delaying or canceling the census in one 

part of the country, whether in the South or Darfur, will call into question the integrity and therefore validity of the nationwide results. It would also be a dangerous 

precedent to compromise this first major milestone of the fragile CPA. If the leadup 

to the census provides an indicator for the next critical power-sharing benchmark— 

the elections before July 2009—then much more work needs to be done to help keep 

the CPA on track and to reach an inclusive political settlement in Darfur in time 

for Darfuris to participate meaningfully in the democratic processes laid out in the 

CPA. 

The extensive negotiation of both the CPA and the DPA required persistent international effort. Stewarding their implementation requires no less. The difficulties of 

the last 3 years for the CPA are clear testimony that without committed, vigorous 

proactive and reactive international engagement, this fragile peace remains very 

much at risk. While imperfect in its implementation, it is the true ‘‘whole’’ solution 

that will strengthen Sudan’s viability and integrity as a nation-state accountable to 

its people in the south, north, east, and west. Without it, the international community will be faced with the task of sustaining millions of Sudanese through the provision of humanitarian assistance for many more years to come. 

USAID remains committed to carrying out the full range of humanitarian, recovery, reconstruction and development activities that are vital to supporting Sudanese 

efforts to consolidate peace in Southern Sudan and to achieve it in Darfur. We look 

forward to the day when the people of Darfur are not substantially reliant on humanitarian aid for their very survival and we can work together with them, as we 

do with the people of Southern Sudan and the Three Areas, to realize their aspirations for development and democracy. 

Before concluding, I would like to take a moment to remember our two USAID 

colleagues who were murdered in Khartoum on January 1. John Granville, a USAID 

Foreign Service officer, was dedicated to making democracy a reality for people at 

all levels of society, and his years of work in Sudan and in other parts of Africa 

made him an invaluable member of our team. Abdelrahman Abbas Rahama, a Sudanese Foreign Service national and an original member of USAID’s disaster assistance response team in Darfur in 2004, was a critical team member who, by virtue 

of where he sat, had the unique ability to get to know the USAID team one by one. 

They were our colleagues and our friends. The work and character of both of these 

men epitomized the goodness of the human spirit, and what we can accomplish 

when we are focused on bettering the lives of those in need. I can think of no better 

way to honor them than to rededicate our efforts to bring peace to those who endure 

violence, health to those who struggle with sickness, and prosperity to those who 

live in poverty. We hope that their commitment and dedication will guide our efforts 

toward achieving a just, stable, and peaceful Sudan. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee for your continued interest, and for all the work and support that you have dedicated to Sudan and the 

region. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

And, on behalf of all of us, we really do appreciate the significant 

physical risk that you and your colleagues have taken. 

We’ll do 7-minute rounds, if that’s OK. 

And, Ambassador, I have some questions for you, but I’d like to 

make them fairly pointed. If you can give me relatively short answers and expand on it later, if you wish, it would be helpful as 

I try to stay within my time, here. 

We all know the story. December 31, the U.N. joined the African 

Union, and took charge, 7,700 folks on the ground then, we’re now 

up to 9,200 folks on the ground to protect 4 million people in the 

affected area. It’s 26,000 authorized. What’s the primary obstacle, 

if you had to summarize it? And I’m asking you to summarize it 

for me. What’s the primary obstacle to the U.N.-African Union 

force achieving operational capacity? Why haven’t they achieved it 

by now? 

52 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. I think there was a lack of sense of urgency on all parties, leading up to the transfer. I think that there 

was a extra challenge, because there had been an agreement that 

it would be predominantly an African-troop-filled force, and there 

was a lack of capacity in many of the African countries for peacekeeping. I was in northeastern Sierra Leone when Nigeria had its 

first peacekeepers there, in 2002. They have learned an enormous 

amount. Nigeria is now quite good. We had many countries without 

the capacity. That’s why President Bush stepped forward, made a 

$100-million commitment and—for training and equipping African 

forces. And we’re now working with Ethiopia, Rwanda, Senegal, 

Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Mali—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, how long do you think it’s 

going to take to have a sufficient number of troops trained to actually get to the point where we have 26,000 deployed? When I met 

with the commander of the AU on the border—this is now, how 

many years ago?—4 years—he said the mandate he had then was 

peacekeeping primarily by monitoring, and his folks—his troops 

would actually stand there and watch. There wasn’t much they 

could do, they’d stand there and watch the Janjaweed make a son 

rape his mother. He showed us vivid photographs that they had. 

He said, ‘‘But, there’s nothing we can do. Our mandate is—we cannot—we cannot intervene.’’ 

So, I assume the folks we’re training are trained to shoot straight 

and keep the peace. In your professional estimation, how much 

longer will it take for us to have help trained, with the $100 million we have—and I understand the Rwandans are doing pretty 

well—how long will it take to get a contingent of 26,000 forces on 

the ground? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. It’ll take—well, could I just say two 

things—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Sure. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON [continuing]. Quick? What was—one of 

the things important in the resolution passed last July, it was 

under chapter VII, which means the peacekeepers can be more robust. It’s not just a monitoring force. 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Second, we do have a deployment 

schedule that we’ve pushed and worked with through the U.N., and 

I can go through it very quickly, but the bottom line is, we’ll have 

about an increase of 6,500 more troops by the end of this year, solely—because of our African partners and the U.S. assistance in 

training and equipping. 

The CHAIRMAN. So, if we’re lucky, we’ll get around 15,000 forces 

on the ground within the next 6 months. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Sir—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Seven months. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON [continuing]. We will have the troops 

trained. We will have the troops—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Gotcha. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON [continuing]. Ready to deploy. Right 

now, the U.N. does not have the capacity to absorb them. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they never have, have they? I mean—— 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. They’re—— 

53 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. I mean, the U.N. doesn’t have that 

capacity, do they? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. They have a budget of $1.28 billion—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah, but do they have—— 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON [continuing]. 12 months to go—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Cargo planes? Do they have—— 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON [continuing]. End of June, they’ve 

only—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Helicopters? Do they—— 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON [continuing]. Spent 26 percent. 

The CHAIRMAN. They haven’t got that—— 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. They have camps, and they haven’t 

spent—— 

The CHAIRMAN. But—spent on what? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. On camps, sir. Right now, the camps 

they have, the United States paid for. We—— 

The CHAIRMAN. No, no; I got that. I’m just trying to—I’m trying 

to find—focus on one thing. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. The physical requirements to logistically put 

26,000 trained African Union forces, with U.N. Blue Helmets leading them, on the ground in Darfur. I understand the other pieces, 

and they’re legitimate. But, I’m curious—we—you say ‘‘by the end 

of this calendar year,’’ 7 months from now, whatever it is, 8 

months, we will have—the United States will have trained another 

6,500 forces. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. We will have trained 9,200—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Total. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON [continuing]. 65 new ones. 

The CHAIRMAN. See, that’s what I’m saying. Sixty-five new ones, 

9,200 total. There’s 9,200 on the ground now, not all trained by us. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. So that we would have roughly 15-16,000 troops, 

at least theoretically, available, 93 there, another 65 to come, but 

they’ll be trained by the end of the year—and I understand, by the 

way, I say to both of you, that, you know, putting boots on the 

ground doesn’t solve the political problem, but that’s an interesting 

thing; it keeps my daughter alive, it keeps my son alive, it keeps 

my wife from being raped, it keeps me being put in a grave. So, 

it does have some effect. You know, as I said, I’ll use the phrase 

again, in the long run, they’ll all be dead if we don’t act—but, anyway, back to the question. It’s not a criticism, it’s a question, a genuine question. What is the expectation that you have, as a seasoned diplomat involved in these kinds of things—nothing quite 

like this, but you’ve been involved in an awful lot by this time next 

year, will there be 15,000 qualified forces on the ground, with communications equipment, with the ability and the infrastructure to 

be able to maintain, logistically, 15,000 troops that are able to 

exert force to keep the peace on the ground? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Yes, sir. I’d say there’s been a change, 

both because of the U.S. being more proactive, but also I wanted 

to give credit to Secretary General Ban Ki-moon—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. 

54 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON [continuing]. Who has personally gotten more involved and been forward-leaning and helpful. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. And let me just, if I could, sir, briefly—one of the mechanisms we’ve put together that’s been enormously helpful is a Friends of UNAMID Group, chaired by the Canadians and ourselves—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON [continuing]. With 14 other countries, 

who can give assistance. And let me just give you one example. 

One of the difficulties is, most of these African countries have 

never negotiated an MOU for deployment. We’ve broken them up. 

So, Senegal—France has adopted, if you will, is working with them, 

helping them with the negotiations. These are the kind of needless 

impediments that we have tried to get through, and I think we’re 

going to be successful. 

The CHAIRMAN. No; again, I’m not taking issue with that. What 

I’m trying to get at is: What, in the meantime, is going to happen 

while this deployment goes on? Is there anything we could do, temporarily, that will prevent the Janjaweed being transported by Sudanese helicopters, sitting above villages, wiping people out, riding 

in on horseback, wiping out and burning villages to the ground? 

Would a no-fly zone, which is totally within our wheelhouse to be 

able to do—would that be helpful? Would that be hurtful? What 

can we do to tell those people in the camps you’ve visited, I’ve visited, others visited, that, ‘‘By the way, there’s a chance you’ll be 

alive next year by the time we get these troops on the ground?’’ Is 

there anything we can do? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. I think there’s a few things. One, we 

have to have serious discussions with President Deby and the Chad 

Government to stop their support of the JEM, which, in turn, are 

initiating military offensives which the government then responds 

in a totally disproportionate way, killing innocent civilians, creating the rapes, the burnings of villages, et cetera. 

The CHAIRMAN. Increasing, not creating. Increasing. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Increasing. 

Second, we have to try to put pressure on those countries that 

Sudan listens to more carefully than they do us. 

The CHAIRMAN. China. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. It would be nice. 

The CHAIRMAN. Not likely. Is it? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Um—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. My time’s up; I’m over. 

Let me just conclude by saying, you know, we heard from the 

U.N. representative earlier about the need for engineers on the 

ground. I understand Norway just withdrew their offer, after the 

Sudanese stonewalling that took place. I understand it’s a possibility to, maybe, accept troops from Thailand and Nepal. The Chinese may support these troops to go, that may be a possibility. 

They may have a self-interest in that. But, all kidding aside, I don’t 

see anything that is going to, in the near term—meaning, the next 

2, 3, 4, 5, 6 months—not be, on New Year’s Day, when we look at 

the numbers, see another 90-100,000, 125,000 innocent women and 

children either dead or displaced. I don’t know what happens in the 

55 

meantime. And that’s the part I’m focused on. But, I’ve spoken too 

long. 

I yield to my friend from Tennessee. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for your testimony, the thoroughness, and 

certainly for what you’re doing. 

I want to, sort of, step back and—I think that the whole world, 

and all of us on this panel, and probably you, are just semi-, I 

guess, in shock, that, if you will, so much is happening in a part 

of the world, and yet, nothing is happening, in some ways, to rectify the situation. I think we all have, sort of, a range of thoughts. 

One is that this is a problem that cannot be solved—OK? I think 

we range in and out of that from time to time—that potentially the 

U.N. is incompetent to deal with this issue, or, third, the United 

States doesn’t care. 

And, Mr. Williamson, I’d love, if you could, to sort of share your 

thoughts. I know you’ve just been on the ground, doing this for 6 

or 8 months, but, if you would, sort of, walk us through that, briefly, just to give some context as to why we haven’t made more 

progress. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Senator, believe me, that’s a question 

that I go to bed with every night. It’s unbelievable, in the 21st century, that a genocide in slow motion like this could continue as long 

as it has. I give great credit to the American people, so many of 

whom have been engaged and moved and activated, and their representatives in Congress. And I can tell you, the reason I accepted 

this job—and it’s reaffirmed every time I’m in the Oval Office—is 

how deeply President Bush feels about it. 

I do not think the U.N. is incompetent. I have worked it in many 

diplomatic and other capacities over the last 25 years. The U.N. is 

a useful tool in the United States foreign-policy toolbox. But, 

often—indeed, perhaps usually—it cannot be the only tool to solve 

a problem. 

I do think one area where they make a significant contribution 

is in peacekeeping. I do think, notwithstanding the frustrations 

and difficulties, deployment of UNAMID will make a significant 

difference on the ground. One of the institutional weaknesses is 

that any of the five permanent members can slow and delay and 

create obstructions for rapid movement. We are seeing some of 

that. We’re seeing quite a bit of that. 

But, I also, looking at the tough peacekeeping missions in conflict 

areas, like Sierra Leone, like Timor-Leste, like eastern Congo— 

they are tough missions. And I think the commitment of the Secretary General is going to be enormously helpful, and I’m glad he 

was—he allowed me to meet with him and continue to communicate with him. I think Ban Ki-moon is making a difference in 

those that are working for him. But, it’s frustrating, because it’s 

slow. 

I think there’s no question that the United States cares. You see 

that in the citizen involvement. You see that in the humanitarian 

assistance, that Kate knows better than I. You see that in our effort to try to move the political situation, like the effort of Senator 

Danforth for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. But, it’s devilishly difficult, because there’s bad actors who see the current level 

56 

of violence acceptable. And when you see the victims of this death, 

destruction, devastation, and deep despair, it’s hard to understand 

how any human can be cold to their plight. But, they are. And so, 

we have to try to create different facts on the ground, pressure 

them, change the dynamics so they see it in their self-interest 

they’re better moving toward peace, like they did in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 

But, Senator, I don’t see a short-term victory, but we cannot divert our attention. 

Senator CORKER. I know you took issue—I was—I went out in 

the hallway after questioning the—Dr. Lute, and you said you 

wanted to talk about some of the factual—I know this is all, sort 

of, diplomatic kinds of things you’re talking about now, but, you 

know, this is—seems like such a low-level issue, I hate to keep 

bringing it up, and I wonder whether it’s just a red herring and 

some excuse for some other major issue, but they—just the simple 

things like helicopters and things like this. I mean, could you, just 

very briefly, answer that? And is this just something people keep 

throwing out which matters not? Or, if it does matter, since you’ve 

been assigned to take care of all these things, why hasn’t that, like, 

occurred 3 months ago? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. I don’t know why I couldn’t take care 

of that 3 months ago. No, sir, it’s very—let me first say, the biggest 

problem with UNAMID is not helicopters. And I’ll get to that. It’s 

getting more boots on the ground. And we are doing—— 

Senator CORKER. So, the helicopter issue is, priority-wise, not a 

big deal right now. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. It wouldn’t be in the top three or four 

issues. 

Senator CORKER. OK. So, again, it’s sort of a red herring at this 

moment. I—— 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. It’s a legitimate—— 

Senator CORKER. I assume that’s why—— 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON [continuing]. Question. 

Senator CORKER. I assume it’s not been filled, for that reason, 

and—if people don’t see it as a real need today. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. I think that’s part of it. It’s also because countries like Jordan, which came up with six helicopters, 

and India, that came up with three helicopters, ultimately the U.N. 

rejected, because it didn’t quite fit. We’re encouraging them to be 

more flexible. 

Senator CORKER. OK. So, that really is just a red herring, according to you. And the other—the big issue is getting boots on the 

ground. 

Go back to the issue of the United Nations only spending 26 percent of their money on camps. If you will, expand a little bit on 

that. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Yes, sir. 

They’ve obligated more now, which is a good thing. But, we think 

we have suggested they could be more forward-leaning in using 

that money to construct camps, to be able to create water availability, to work on different aspects of sustainability. And, I will 

say, there has been progress since 3 months ago. I think it’s, in 

part, because of the United States, more because of the joint effort 

57 

of the 14 countries that are friends of UNAMID, and also because, 

instead of talking about generalities, we’ve rolled up our sleeves 

and gotten into each specific item, and then tried to find a solution. 

So, there’s—it’s making progress, but it’s been difficult. A lot more 

needs to be done. 

Senator CORKER. Now, just in closing—I know my time is almost 

up—but, Senator Biden asked the question about the no-fly zone. 

And I guess another solution to—I mean, you seem like a very competent person, and I know you have a very, you know, extensive 

career—it does seem like the—it’s a relevant statement that, in 

fact, they’re all going to be dead, because we continue just to talk 

and talk and talk. I know there are boots on the ground. Hopefully, 

they’re going to occur later this year. But, tangible actions, like nofly zone, like maybe blockades, those are things that we can do. I 

guess I wonder, Why don’t we do those tangible things that might 

actually, now, save lives while we’re doing some of the diplomatic— 

taking care of some of the diplomatic efforts? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. It’s a very fair question. Let me make 

two observations and then defer to Kate, because one of the concerns is humanitarian community, who have been reluctant for us 

to take certain steps, because it would interfere with the delivery 

of humanitarian aid. First—— 

Senator CORKER. That—— 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. I’m sorry. 

Senator CORKER. The blockades would interfere with—— 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. It’s the no-fly zone. 

Ms. ALMQUIST. The no-fly zone. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. The no-fly zone is the concern. But, let 

me—let Kate speak for herself, and let me answer as well as I can. 

I think the array of options that you’ve mentioned, and more punitive steps, are legitimate things. We are trying—I have tried, in 

my new capacity, to move so they’re actionable options for the 

President to consider, from the most muscular to more punishing 

sanctions. As you know, the U.S. has gone further with unilateral 

sanctions, the divestment bill, et cetera. We are trying to explore 

ways to change that behavior and incentives. And I think it’s a dialog that the Congress certainly has a right to express its strong 

views on. 

Senator CORKER. I mean, in fairness, I think the Congress is— 

the dialog is—it almost seems like we have—it’s a waste of time 

to have these hearings, because we constantly are talking about dialog. I know that—when, in essence, it seems like tangible activities are the only thing that are going to bring about less people 

dying and being raped and having no food. But, I know you want 

to say something—my time’s up—Ms. Almquist. 

Ms. ALMQUIST. Thank you. 

I would just like to say that the American people should be terribly proud of the fact that we help keep millions of Darfuris alive. 

It’s through assistance from the United States and the American 

people, in particular, and with the facilitation of the U.S. Congress, 

that we can provide as robust a humanitarian response as we do, 

and that the impact is not far greater than what we see right now. 

The reason why the humanitarian community is very nervous 

about the idea of the no-fly zone and would find it difficult to supVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:47 Mar 05, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\DARFUR MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
58 

port that option is that the Sudanese Government would almost 

certainly see that as a hostile act. If it sees it as a hostile act, we 

could predict that they would act to not cooperate in other areas 

that we are dependent on their cooperation for, and that includes 

the humanitarian operation; 14,000 humanitarian workers cannot 

live and move around Darfur without the Sudanese Government allowing them to be there. And if they decided, for whatever reason— 

and a no-fly zone is a likely reason they would decide that—to shut 

down the humanitarian operation, that lifesaving assistance goes 

away. We depend on our nongovernmental organizations and the 

U.N. agencies to get that aid to IDP camps, and even beyond, to 

rural areas, and it’s exceedingly difficult right now, and it would 

be virtually impossible if the Sudanese Government decided not to 

tolerate it, to facilitate it, support it, going forward. 

Second, I would just offer that, while aerial bombardments are 

very troubling and in clear violation of the N’Djamena Humanitarian Cease-Fire Accord, the Darfur Peace Agreement, and every 

other commitment that the Sudanese Government has made, it’s 

not the most significant factor causing humanitarian displacement. 

It’s a terrible weapon of war, it should not be used, should not be 

tolerated, but it shouldn’t take a no-fly zone to get them to stop. 

In terms of practical impact on the security situation on the 

ground right now, what would really help the humanitarian community are police escorts for the humanitarian supplies. Food, 

namely; but also other sorts of supplies need to be moved out to 

Darfur. That’s within the Government of Sudan’s ability to step up 

and do, and could do, even while UNAMID deployment is taking 

place. 

Nonlogistic military support for signatories of the DPA: One of 

the reasons for the banditry and the lawlessness and the attacks 

on humanitarian convoys is because that’s the only way they can 

supply themselves. And if there were another legitimate nonmilitary means for those who have signed the Darfur Peace Agreement, to—at least to be fed, we would probably cut down on a significant number of the attacks, particularly in north Darfur. 

And then, finally, UNAMID needs a cease-fire commission. In the 

transition from AMIS TO UNAMID, there is no effective mechanism to validate a bombing, an attack, establish culpability, and 

then hold individuals, groups, whoever, responsible and accountable for the insecurity that they have perpetuated. And that, Ambassador Williamson could probably speak to better, but that would 

also significantly help the humanitarian community, going forward. 

Senator CORKER. Well, thank you for your testimony. 

Senator. 

Senator KERRY [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Administrator Almquist, you should know that I think the American people are very proud of the humanitarian efforts, and certainly the risks that many of your people are taking. We’re grateful 

to you for it. 

Your answer really underscores the absurdity of the situation in 

which you’ve been put, and this entire humanitarian effort is put. 

The humanitarian effort is to stopgap a slow genocide that nothing 

else is preventing. And so, we can continue to do that, and people 

will continue to be killed, and the country will continue to be in 

59 

chaos. The bottom line is, there is no leverage. The leverage that 

exists is not being exercised. 

Mr. Ambassador, you said you lie awake and you wonder why 

what is happening is happening, and why we can’t seem to break 

through. I don’t think it’s a mystery at all. What is happening 

there is, to a large measure, the lack of the United States ability 

to lead and follow through on its own statements, its own words. 

And the reason that that exists is just a little thing called Iraq. 

We are overextended, our troops are overextended, our credibility 

is exhausted, our bona fides don’t exist, our leverage is not what 

it ought to be and has been in the past. And so, our ability to lift 

is diminished. Our ability to act unilaterally is diminished. Three 

hundred thousand people have been murdered, 2 million have been 

displaced, 2,700 villages or so have been destroyed. 

In 2004, when I was running for President, I said this was genocide. A few days later, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell followed and said it was genocide. Somewhere around June of the 

next year, President Bush joined the chorus and said it was genocide. Two years later, the President, I believe, on April 17, 2 years 

after that statement about the genocide, stated, at the Holocaust 

Museum, ‘‘The brutal treatment of innocent civilians in Darfur is 

unacceptable,’’ and that America wasn’t, ‘‘going to back down.’’ 

Well, we haven’t even stepped up to back down. And it has been 

acceptable. It’s just going on. In fact, the violence, in many people’s 

mind, is getting worse right now, not better. 

Of the 9,600 people who are on the ground, 7,700 of them were 

already AU forces that were on the ground. They’ve been rehatted 

essentially. This is not some great step up. 

It’s beyond belief to many of us to have to witness the expenditure and the waste that we see in Iraq and the stunning expenditure of treasure and resources and credibility and our leverage and 

place in the world, and then see a slow-motion genocide taking 

place right before our eyes. I don’t think there’s any great mystery 

here about what is happening. 

So, let me ask you, bluntly, What is different about the administration’s current strategy that is going to allow it to succeed where 

the previous months have not? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Thank you for your comments. 

I think the first difference is, we are engaged in a different way, 

both with the United Nations and in training African peacekeepers. 

Before this began, just 21⁄2 months ago, there was no prospect for 

any foreseeable deployment, except a few hundred more. 

Senator KERRY. But, the deployment depends on a government 

that is blocking movement, creating problems about access. The 

very facilitators of the genocide basically have a veto over the ability to be able to move effectively to deal with it. What kind of a 

policy is that? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Sir, I don’t think they can do a veto 

of—— 

Senator KERRY. Well, they—— 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON [continuing]. UNAMID’s ability—— 

Senator KERRY [continuing]. They—— 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. They can create impediments, and 

they have. And we’re working both with them and through the—— 

60 

Senator KERRY. Wait a minute, now. Haven’t they vetoed any 

troops from other than those that they approve of? You’re not allowed to have troops that aren’t signed off on—what’s the delimitation there? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Predominant African Union—African—— 

Senator KERRY. Correct. Non-African units that have been offered have been refused. And now—I understand that there are offers from potential troop-contributing countries that would push 

UNAMID close to the mandated size, most of them are African 

countries, but their deployment has been stalled, too. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Sir, if the last observation is correct, 

I’m unaware of it. 

Senator KERRY. You’re not aware of that? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. I am aware that the—as the chairman 

referred to, the Norwegian and Swedish engineers that would have 

helped speed the deployment were stopped. This was based on an 

agreement in Addis Ababa before the passing the United Nations 

Security Council Resolution for UNAMID. I was not part of those 

talks. I don’t know what went into them. But, there was an agreement, before, that was part of the arrangement for the U.N. Security Council to pass that. 

Is that a problem? Absolutely, sir. 

Senator KERRY. What is it about either the U.N. or the United 

States and China and Russia and other great powers that are sitting there while the complicit players have the ability to say, ‘‘No, 

we don’t accept that,’’ and then the genocide continues? Have we 

lost all ability to leverage common sense, here? Where’s the hue 

and cry? I don’t get it. I don’t think Americans get it. I don’t think 

average folks anywhere in the world understand this reluctance to 

act. 

Of the non-African units that have been offered, I understand 

that Khartoum continually stonewalls the deployment of, say, the 

crucial Nepalese special forces and sector reserves and a Thai infantry battalion. Is that accurate? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. That is right, sir. 

Senator KERRY. Well, how can we accept that? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. United States is trying—— 

Senator KERRY. It sounds to me like we’re backing down. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. The United States is trying to fight 

that. We’ve tried to get the P-5 to agree to be more vigorous to 

force their acceptance. I’ve discussed this with the Government of 

Sudan. I am hopeful that we will get the deployment of the Thais 

and Nepalese. Your criticisms have a lot of merit, and I wish that 

the Addis agreement that gave them unusual leverage on what 

they could accept had not been made. Senator, I was not in Addis, 

I was not in the government during that time. 

Senator KERRY. Let me remind you, sir, that during the Clinton 

administration, when a genocide was beginning to take place in 

Bosnia-Herzegovina, et cetera, President Clinton moved, I might 

add, without the consent of the Congress and without even the 

willingness of a lot of folks in Europe to take part, and ultimately 

that has proven to be an important moment. We saw what happened, where Rwanda, to this day President Clinton regrets that 

61 

we didn’t decide to move. We are building up a very similar historical series of moments of regret here, in what is not happening in 

Darfur. 

I find it stunningly unacceptable. And it’s not your fault. You’re 

put in a tough position, and I’ve talked to Andrew Natsios before 

you, and John Danforth and others, but we have a museum in 

Washington that says ‘‘Never again.’’ And it’s happening. And we 

appear to be impotent or unwilling, or both, with respect to the imperatives here. And I cannot help but believe that we have been 

significantly set back in our ability to do the right thing because 

of the tragedy of the spent bona fides with respect to Iraq and the 

sensitivities now with respect to another Muslim people, and all 

that goes with it. 

This can’t happen from your efforts alone. The President and the 

Secretary of State and a few other folks have got to step up, here. 

Otherwise, Administrator Almquist, you’re just going to run into 

more of those things you just reported to us, the dangers your people are being put under while people carry out their sick will within that tragic nation. And I think all of us are frustrated by watching it. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Senator Kerry. 

Administrator Almquist, did I understand you to say that the 

people in Darfur supported the militia and the rebels because they 

didn’t trust the Sudanese Government? 

Ms. ALMQUIST. The current conflict started with an—a rebellion, 

an outbreak in 2003 by the precursor to the five or so principal 

rebel groups now, but, yes, it started out of frustration over the 

grievances, over the attacks that they were under, and there remains popular support for rebel leaders and rebel movements in 

Darfur. Their grievances, they do not feel, still, have been addressed. 

Senator ISAKSON. Why, then, would those rebels be attacking the 

World Food Programme convoys if they were bringing food to help 

the people that support them? 

Ms. ALMQUIST. First of all, unfortunately, we don’t specifically 

know who is attacking the convoys. We think there are a variety 

of actors involved. Some of them are probably rogue elements from 

rebel movements or part—many of these splinter factions that have 

evolved, especially over the last year and a half. And there are resources they see moving by them on the road in a very resourcescarce environment, and no matter how many times we speak 

about humanitarian principles, those are attractive resources to go 

after. That’s why the point of nonlogistic military support, particularly for signatories to the DPA, for groups who have signed up to 

the cease-fire and to the political framework that is in place right 

now, would be one way of further mitigating banditry and attacks. 

The rebels are not the only group taking advantage of the lawlessness that has now overtaken Darfur. So—— 

Senator ISAKSON. I take it that that really plays into the hands 

of the Sudanese Government, which is reluctant to provide the security for the convoys, is that correct? 

Ms. ALMQUIST. The—I can’t speak to why the Government of 

Sudan hasn’t been to provide more police escorts for WFP convoys, 

62 

for instance, but they are slow in responding to requests for the 

convoys, and, in fact, some of these convoys are 150-vehicle-long 

endeavors, and protecting that is a pretty significant endeavor. So, 

ultimately, we need an environment of security in Darfur to properly continue to get humanitarian aid where it needs to go. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, it makes it quite apparent of the absolute 

tragedy taking place in the Darfur area and the cooperation among 

some very bad people who make folks that are already suffering 

suffer even more. I admire what you do and appreciate what you 

do. 

Envoy Williamson, I want to ask you just one question. You referred to the five permanent members of the Security Council. One 

of those is China. Is that correct? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator ISAKSON. And you referred to them, in some cases, slowing down U.N. efforts in Darfur—‘‘them’’ being the permanent 

members? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator ISAKSON. And I understand that right now there’s a Chinese freighter going up and down the east coast of Africa, trying 

to drop off weapons for Mozambique. Is that correct? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. For Zimbabwe, I think was—— 

Senator ISAKSON. Or, Zimbabwe. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator ISAKSON. And do we know if they’re supplying any weapons in the Sudan? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. We do. 

Senator ISAKSON. That they are supplying some? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Yes. 

Senator ISAKSON. Is there any pressure point on the Chinese? 

They seem to be certainly profiting from the sale of arms in Africa 

and slowing down movement by the U.N. on the Security Council, 

and known to be a supplier within—to the Sudanese army, I suppose. Is there anyplace we can put pressure on that we’re not trying to? Or are we trying to? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Yeah. Can I give you one example of 

the type of problem, just to elaborate on what you’ve raised? 

Yesterday, there was a discussion in the Security Council about 

benchmarks, to put more pressure for more rapid deployment. The 

Chinese position was twofold; yes, it would be good to have more 

rapid deployment, but, no, let’s not put pressure on, benchmarks 

are counterproductive. 

Senator, we need to be forward-leaning within the Security 

Council and elsewhere. Currently, there’s an embargo on weapons 

sales to Darfur. Not to Sudan. So, there are weapon sales. Some 

reports indicate they’ve diminished—but, nonetheless, continue— 

through the Port of Sudan. Once they’re in country, your imagination is as good as mine to where they end up. 

We have a complicated and large and broad relationship with 

China. Speaking for my responsibility, I continue to be disappointed that China doesn’t have greater concern about the people 

that are suffering in Darfur and are not more proactively helpful 

to us. 

63 

I believe the Congress has discussed a variety of things. The administration raises this, and engages with China. And we remain 

hopeful that their behavior will become more proactive and constructive. 

Senator ISAKSON. So, there’s an embargo on sales of arms into 

Darfur, but there’s no embargo on the Sudanese Government? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Yes, sir; that’s my understanding. 

Senator ISAKSON. So, the people that are suffering find it even 

harder to protect themselves, and the people they’re suffering from 

still—have open access to the weapons? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Weapons are available. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, sir. 

Senator FEINGOLD [presiding]. Thank you, sir. 

I’ll start my questions, and then I’ll turn it over to Senator 

Menendez. 

Thank you for being here. I know it’s been a long morning for 

you. 

Mr. Williamson, given the disturbing track record of the Sudanese government, including a long history of going back on its commitments and its horrific record of human rights abuses and, as 

this administration has determined, committing genocide, I have 

very serious concerns about the bilateral discussions you have mentioned in your testimony. 

Will you commit to complete transparency with this committee 

with regard to the discussions that have taken place, the discussions yet to come, and the U.S. position in the negotiations? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Thank you, Senator. 

As the chairman indicated earlier, we offered, and would continue to have an open-ended offer, for a briefing with the committee with the classified documents so you could see them and review them and ask any questions you want. Yes, sir. There’s no 

reason for us not to want that transparency. Indeed, there are reasons for us to want it, because the press report last week is not 

accurate and raised legitimate concerns. If it were accurate, I could 

not defend it and would not have engaged in it. So, transparency, 

where you know what’s going on, is a good thing, so you’re informed. You’re elected representatives with great responsibility and 

should have access. That offer’s been made. It continues on the 

table. And I’ll look forward to—when it is convenient, to provide 

such a briefing, sir. 

Senator FEINGOLD. You acknowledge that you have engaged 

with, ‘‘many bad actors,’’ with a, ‘‘violent history.’’ Can you identify 

those bad actors? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. The bad actors—almost anyone I’ve 

dealt with—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Is our—— 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON [continuing]. Among—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Can you identify—— 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON [continuing]. Among the Government of 

Sudan leadership, have been engaged in supporting—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Can you identify some of the worst of those 

actors? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. I can identify the people I met with, 

if that’s what you are seeking. 

64 

Senator FEINGOLD. Who are they? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Dr. Nafie, Mr. Ghosh, and I can provide you with a list of all the attendees in those discussions. I’ve 

also met with President Bashir. I have had meetings with rebels, 

both leaders and movement. I have not had any contact, and don’t 

know, right now, how I would, with one of the worst bad actors, 

and that is these Arab militias, some of which under the control 

of the government, some of which are not. But, I think, like Jack 

Danforth found, if you’re going to try to see if there’s possibility for 

political dialog in this neighborhood, you’re going to talk to bad actors. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I appreciate your answering that question. And I take it from what you said a few minutes ago, is that 

you have—you are confirming that there’s going to be a classified 

members briefing. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. I’m confirming we’ve made the offer, 

and when it’s accepted, we’ll be here. Yes, sir. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And that you’re working—have people contacted you about your offer? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. There’s been a discussion between the 

committee staff and the State Department, trying to work that out, 

and hopefully we could. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Yeah. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. We had initially suggested right after 

this hearing, but that—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. OK. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. We were told that wouldn’t be—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I appreciate that offer, and I hope the 

committee and staff and everybody will make sure this happens 

and that we have the staff there with appropriate clearance with 

full access to the details of these discussions. 

In your testimony, you say that, ‘‘Some may wonder why the administration is now choosing to accept the Government of Sudan’s 

overture.’’ What has changed, other than that Khartoum has formally asked for carrots, which we presumably could have offered 

them at any time? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. I don’t know what the swing was that 

changed the Government of Sudan to move toward the January 

2005 decision to sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. We can 

speculate, but I don’t know. 

Senator FEINGOLD. How—— 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. I don’t know if this will be such a decision. But, I do think, while we’re pursuing the other things— 

changing facts on the ground with greater security, changing the 

accessibility of humanitarian assistance, trying to create a political 

dialogue, including the rebels, trying to work on the Chad-Darfur 

bleed-in—that if they say, ‘‘This door’s open,’’ we should test it. 

But, it is only in the context of making clear that we’re laying out 

a long and tough and difficult road to any better relations, and only 

changes the facts on the ground will warrant any adjustment—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. And this—— 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON [continuing]. Of that relationship. 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Intended to be part of the broader multilateral peace process, or is it just an ad hoc thing? 

65 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Sir, it’s something—most recently, a 

few hours ago, I talked to Ambassador Jan Eliasson, who’s the 

U.N.—along with Dr. Salim from the AU. It’s something they’re 

aware of and something that, on a relatively frequent basis, probably at least every 2 weeks, we talk about. Before I have discussions like this, I talk to Jan. Before he travels to the region, he 

talks to me. 

Senator FEINGOLD. So, it’s not intended to be ad hoc, it’s intended to be part of a broader process. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Is that correct? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator FEINGOLD. When you first met with us, in February, you 

indicated that your focus has been on Darfur, not on the 20-yearlong North/South civil war orthe Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 

which formally ended that war in 2005. I have said, for a long 

time, that strong support and pressure for the complete implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is essential, not only 

if the fragile peace agreement is to hold, but also to see legitimate 

peace through the whole of Sudan. 

Now, I know you discussed this briefly in your testimony, but 

now that you’ve had a chance to visit Southern Sudan and engage 

with the government and civil society there, what is your analysis 

of the current situation? And what are your priorities with regard 

to advancing CPA implementation and reconstruction efforts in the 

South? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Sure. Sir, as I said earlier, I believe, 

even more profoundly now, that the continued implementation of 

the CPA is instrumental for a chance for any progress in Darfur. 

Furthermore, as you know, that civil war, which began in 1958, 2 

years after independence, and except for an brief intermission in 

the seventies and early eighties, went on for over 50 years and 

killed more than 2 million people and displaced more than 4 million. We cannot—they cannot afford for that to unravel. And, beyond that, sir, I’d suggest to you that that’s one of the achievements of U.S. leadership during the last—during this administration and to Senator Danforth. 

What are the keys? The census was very important. The fact that 

the North and South were able, despite disappointments with respect to the forms that were printed,—insecurity in Darfur, that 

was an important test. A compromise was reached. The census is 

going forward. 

We’re going to have a big test with respect to the 2009 election. 

And, of course, the ultimate issue is the 2011 referendum. 

Meantime, issues of transparency on oil revenue continue to 

plague and cause trouble which isn’t necessary. And, finally, there 

has to be resolution of the Abyei border issue. 

All that said, the good work being done, because of the United 

States people and USAID, to create political institutions in the 

South—and the SPLM’s first convention is going to be in May, and 

the various arms of the National Endowment of Democracy are actively involved in helping that—helping economic viability and 

independence—this is an agriculturally rich area, it should be a 

breadbasket, it should be able to have a certain independence in 

66 

trading with itself, and it doesn’t even have roads. There are things 

we can and should do to strengthen the South, which is part and 

parcel of successful implementation of the CPA, and cannot separated from getting peace in Darfur. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for that answer. 

And I have additional questions, that I will submit to you, having to do with the regional efforts—CAR, Chad, et cetera. 

Senator FEINGOLD. But, Senator Menendez has waited long 

enough, so I’ll conclude and turn it over to him. 

Senator MENENDEZ [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Feingold. 

Thank you both. 

Ms. Almquist, let me say, I was glad to see you again, since we 

presided over your nomination hearing. And our thoughts and 

prayers are with the families of the two AID workers who lost their 

lives. I sent letters to both of their families, and they committed 

the ultimate sacrifice in support of our soft-power initiatives in the 

world. This just shows how dangerous some of the work that our 

people do, and I just wanted to acknowledge that. 

Ambassador Williamson, I sent you a letter, on Monday of this 

week. Maybe you assuaged some of my concerns, based upon your 

response to Senator Feingold. In it, I said that, based upon press 

reports, that the negotiating strategy outlined in those reports that 

suggested placating Khartoum by normalizing relationships with 

the Sudan and removing the regime from the list of state sponsors 

of terrorism was definitely the wrong strategy—in my view—and 

sends the wrong message. 

I appreciated your answer to Senator Feingold, but am I to understand from your answer, that we are not looking to normalize 

relationships, at least at this point in time, with Khartoum, and 

not looking to take them off the list of state sponsored terrorism? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Sir, first let me say we appreciate your 

deep interest, and continued interest, in Sudan and your leadership 

in the Senate. And, in fact, if I were trying to placate the Government of Sudan, I would have agreed with your letter. So, I think 

the concerns you raise are legitimate. 

What we’re pursuing is laying out a long, tough road to better 

relations, which means living up to existing commitments on the 

Joint Communique ́ on Humanitarian Assistance, living up to the 

commitments on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, living up to 

commitments on the Darfur Peace Agreement, living up to commitments they’ve made to the U.N. with respect to deployment of 

UNAMID. Then, and only then, we start going through a list of a 

variety of steps to ensure rapid and full deployment of UNAMID 

so that it can contribute to security on the ground, and a number 

of steps to allow greater access, more security, and improved humanitarian aid getting to those in IDP camps and refugee camps. 

Sir, we have made clear, we will not trade promise for promise. 

We’ve done that before. And the history shows that they cannot be 

trusted. 

We have said, in these discussions, these are specific steps, each 

one of them is verifiable, they have to be performed, and there has 

to be progress on the ground, at which time we’ll address other 

issues. But, it is a long, difficult road, and it has to be traveled before the issues you raised can be seriously discussed. 

67 

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate that answer, because I am concerned that we send the wrong message to Bashir, and we send the 

wrong message to other countries in the world, as well, that the 

way to get a relationship with the United States, and the way to 

get off the list of state sponsors of terrorism is to go ahead and 

have a conflict, and then promise that you’ll do something, and 

then do absolutely nothing, at the end of the day. 

I listened to Ms. Almquist’s statement, and there’s plenty of 

things, right now, that the Sudanese should easily be doing in assisting those convoys, at a minimum. At a minimum. 

So, I have a real problem, if it was different. I appreciate your 

answer, and we’ll have some opportunities, perhaps, to pursue 

some other classified opportunity, as well. 

But, I would be vehemently opposed and do everything I could 

to intercede in any way that was available to an individual Senator, or to, hopefully, a group of Senators, if that was our course 

at this point in time, because there are those who have suggested 

that, in our counterterrorism cooperation with Khartoum. We are, 

of course, interested in anyone cooperating with us on counterterrorism, but, at the same time, these are the same people who are 

responsible, in part—a very significant part—in creating the genocide in Darfur. And I am not one—as much as I want to have efforts on counterterrorism, to be engaged—to be willing to look the 

other way in response for information and assistance on counterterrorism while genocide takes place, and I hope that’s the administration’s view, as well. 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Mr. Senator, first let me say, as you 

know, President Bush wants to help the suffering people in Sudan. 

It’s a deep commitment and strong belief of his, which is why we’re 

initiating so many different avenues to try to make progress. 

Second, you have to understand those with whom you are talking. And I believe we have an understanding of the history, reliability, and experience of those to whom we talk, whether it happens to be members of the Government of Sudan, rebel movements, 

or the South. And to not test an overture that might change the 

dynamic would be a shortsighted decision, as long as we’re disciplined and only act if there are positive results on the ground. 

And, finally, with respect to the state sponsor of terrorism, you 

are absolutely correct, the only criterion on whether a country 

should be on that list or off that list is on the merits of the issue 

of whether or not they’re supporting or engaged in terrorism. And 

that will not change as a result of these discussions. And it’s up 

for the members of our United States intelligence community, who 

I’m sure would be happy to discuss with you their views, but that 

would not be done until they were comfortable that all the substantive criteria had been met. 

We are not going to hold out that, separate from the substantive 

issues that have to be dealt with on whether or not terrorism is 

being sponsored. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you this. I appreciate your comments about how deeply President Bush feels about this. So, how 

many helicopters can we come up with? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Sir, I would suggest—I’m doing what 

I can—I’d suggest you can offer to—— 

68 

Senator MENENDEZ. Can we come—— 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON [continuing]. Ask that question—— 

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Up with eight? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON [continuing]. To the Defense Department. It’s a question I have raised. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Can we come up with six? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Question I’ve raised. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Can we come up with four? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Question I’ve raised. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, the greatest country on the face of the 

Earth, with the greatest military prowess on in the world, and we 

can’t come up, so far, with anything to begin to urge others to act 

in common cause but lead by example. Really hard to believe the 

depth of commitment, then, if we can’t do that. 

Let me ask you this: With reference to our Chinese friends, who 

supplies the majority of the small arms to the Sudan? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Senator, first let me say I think it’s an 

incorrect characterization to say that we’re not doing anything with 

respect to trying to deploy UNAMID, and I’ve tried to outline many 

initiatives. I think your questions on the helicopters are fair, but 

that does not mean we’re not trying to lead and not do anything. 

Second, the major source of small arms, as I understand it, is the 

Chinese. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Yes, the Chinese. As a matter of fact, 90 percent of all of Khartoum’s small arms are—between 2004 and 2006, 

totaling about $55 million, including assault rifles—the most common weapon used in Darfur, come from the Chinese. 

We have a U.N. embargo, right? Originally posed in 2004, expanded in 2005? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. There is an embargo for arms to 

Darfur, yes, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. To Darfur. And it prohibits all Member 

States from selling or transferring arms to Darfur, is that not true? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And the fact that the Chinese arms have 

been well documented in Darfur, and that the Government of 

China has either disavowed their existence, minimized the scope of 

China’s arms trade with the Sudan, or denied that its weapons 

makes a difference in the conflict, shouldn’t that give us cause for 

concern? Isn’t China clearly, by virtue of continuing to provide the 

arms that makes its way to Darfur, and, for that fact, the Sudanese Government, violating the embargo? 

Ambassador WILLIAMSON. That the arms end up, or some of 

those arms end up in Darfur, is a legitimate area of great concern. 

To the best of my knowledge, we don’t have the intelligence of a 

direct transfer of the arms that are sold to the Government of 

Sudan to Darfur. The issue might be, Should that embargo be widened? But, at least technically, they come into the country in sales 

to the Government of Sudan, which is not covered by the embargo. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I think the whole world knows, Ambassador, that these Chinese arms, sold to the Sudanese Government, are making its way to Darfur. The whole world knows that. 

I don’t need to go to an intelligence briefing to find that out. But, 

69 

the bottom line is, something is clearly wrong, the very Sudanese 

Government that we’re talking to in this respect. 

Now, with the Chinese, they have the Olympics coming up. ‘‘One 

world and one dream,’’ that’s their motto, ‘‘one world and one 

dream.’’ You know, it just seems to me, whether it is Tibet, whether it is the genocide in Darfur, that we are allowing the Chinese 

to get away with, incredibly, so much. It may be because they own 

so much of our debt, that we are timid in our responses to them. 

I hope this administration—you know, commitment—I think the 

President—and I often disagree with the President—I’d like to believe the President honestly, honestly feels some degree of passion 

on this issue, but our actions, and notwithstanding the humanitarian part, which is a part to be complimented—but our actions 

in getting to the heart—the humanitarian part is only keeping people alive so maybe they can survive another day, and maybe they 

won’t get raped, and maybe they won’t get killed, but it doesn’t go 

to the heart of the matter of the genocide that is taking place. For 

that, there must be a much more significant commitment by the 

United States to lead the rest of the world to act. And, in the absence of doing that, with all due respect, Ambassador, you will be 

here again and again and again with a report very similar to the 

one you are giving us today. So, I hope you take that back to the 

administration. 

I look forward to trying to challenge the administration, through 

the appropriations process, through the supplementals maybe, to 

see if they’re willing to stand with us and provide the resources 

necessary to change the dynamics so that ‘‘never again’’ really 

means something. Otherwise, it will be a stain on America for continuing to allow a genocide to take place. 

And I wonder—and I’ll just close—I wonder whether, if this was 

happening in Europe, that we’d be acting with much more urgency—wondering if this was happening in some other part of the 

world that isn’t Africa, whether we would be acting with a different 

sense of urgency. 

Thank you for your testimony, and I gather, at this point, that 

the record will remain open for 2 days for members to submit any 

other questions that they may have. 

And, with that, seeing no other members, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:53 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

Additional Material Submitted for the Record 

Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to Special Envoy Richard 

Williamson by Members of the Committee 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LUGAR

Question 1. The peace process for political reconciliation in the Darfur region is 

as important to sustainable peace as it was in concluding the Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement between north and south Sudan. 

(a) Please describe the political process endorsed by the United States relating to 

Darfur. Please include the parties to the process by name and affiliation as well as 

observers to the process. 

70 

(b) Are the parties sufficiently organized and willing to proceed in political discussions to resolve the underlying issues of the Darfur conflict? If they are not, how 

long should we expect it to take before the parties are sufficiently organized and 

willing to proceed politically? 

(c) What efforts have been made to reach non-military/militia leaders? What success has there been in including community leaders and women? 

Answer. The USG and the contact group, the United Kingdom, France, Norway, 

Netherlands, Canada and the European Union, are firmly committed to achieving 

peace throughout Sudan and believe there can only be a negotiated political solution 

to the conflict in Darfur. The USG fully supports the United Nation African Union 

(UN/AU)-led process to bring non-signatories together into the process and broaden 

support for the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). The UN Special Envoy to Darfur, 

Jan Eliasson, AU Envoy to Darfur Salim Salim and the Joint Mediation Support 

Team (JMST) are working closely with the regional partners Chad, Egypt, Eritrea 

and Libya to reach a peaceful resolution to the Darfur crisis. Each country has varying degrees of interest and leverage with both the government and the rebel movements. On August 3-5, 2007, in Arusha, Tanzania, Salim Salim and Eliasson 

brought DPA non-signatories together for the first time since the Abuja Peace talks, 

seeking to unify the various movements behind a single platform. Regrettably, no 

real progress was made on unifying the numerous splintered factions. 

Despite their failure, the talks in Sirte remained an important milestone in the 

process. One of the obstacles to progress in the political process was the number 

of movements and their inability to unify for a common cause due to internal power 

struggles and lack of political will. In November, the Sudan People’s Liberation 

Movement successfully facilitated a unification initiative in Juba that reduced the 

major groupings involved in the peace talks to five (in addition to Sudan Liberation 

Army (SLA), Minni Minawi faction, the only signatory to the DPA). The movements 

vary in military and popular strength; the United Revolutionary Front (URF) for example, is an alliance of various factions including a splinter of Justice and Equality 

Movement (JEM) and SLA factions. The URF cooperates with the JMST even 

though it maintains a separate, credible military force and ties to Chad. The SLA/ 

Unity, the largest and most militarily relevant of the SLA splinters is also engaged 

in discussions while considering merging with other movements. Finally, a group of 

ten movements coalesced around SLA/Abdul Shafie who has limited political or military influence. 

Two movements that are central to long-term peace in Darfur remain on the peripheries; SLA, Abdel Wahid el Nur faction (SLA/AW), predominately Fur, is reported to have the largest following in Darfur. The SLA/AW recently shifted from 

its position of non-engagement to begin tentative consultations with the JMST, although El Nur refuses to engage with the government. The JEM, led by Dr. Khalil 

Ibrahim is the most intransigent anti-government movement and a potential spoiler 

to the political progress. With support from neighboring Chad, where it continues 

to recruit from refugee camps, JEM has carried out attacks against the government 

and has a national agenda including ousting the NCP. 

At a recent international meeting convened in Geneva, it was agreed that prospects for formal talks in the short term were dire. In addition to the Chad/Sudan 

proxy war, which cannot be delinked from the conflict in Darfur, increasing insecurity in Darfur, and the absence of clear strategy from the JMST, disunity and the 

lack of political will among the movements remain a major obstacle. The Juba initiative was a step in the right direction, but much remains to be done before the 

movements will be ready to negotiate with the government. Given internal division 

and competition for leadership, there has been no real progress towards unification 

or discussion on the issues behind which they can form a common consensus. The 

USG continues to engage with the movement leaders to encourage participation in 

a political dialogue. I recently met with the SLA/AW and JEM separately to solicit 

what it would take for these two movements to join the dialogue for peace. Without 

the participation of these two movements in the peace process, any agreement 

reached would be short-lived. 

The United States, along with other members of the Contact Group have also 

been very engaged with the JMST to urge the inclusion of civil society in the formal 

negotiations for an inclusive peace process. The JMST included a small number of 

civil society representatives in the Sirte talks in November 2007 (additional civil society representatives were prevented from attending by the Government of Sudan). 

The UN/AU JMST has formed a Tripartite Steering Committee (TSC) consisting of 

the JMST, UN civil affairs, and the Darfur Darfur Dialogue and Consultations 

(DDDC), that is finalizing a strategy for including civil society and native administration in future talks. The DPA provided for the creation of the DDDC to address 

71 

issues affecting non-combatants among Darfuris. The DDDC preparatory committee 

has already begun holding such consultations, and intends to provide feedback from 

those discussions to the TSC for an inclusive peace process when formal talks resume. 

Question 2. You have met repeatedly with Sudanese officials as well as rebel leaders in the course of your duties as Special Envoy. 

(a) Would you fully describe any significant overtures that President al Bashir or 

his key deputies have made to you or other U.S. officials that you consider noteworthy and signal a genuine readiness to resolve the crisis? 

(b) Have the Darfur rebel groups made any significant overtures that you consider 

noteworthy and signal a readiness to resolve the crisis? 

(c) Has the international community, including the U.S., many any significant 

overtures to President al Bashir or other Sudanese officials over the last several 

years? What has been the reaction of the Sudanese parties? 

Answer. We are deeply concerned about the increased violence in Darfur and the 

lack of progress in achieving a negotiated political settlement to the Darfur conflict. 

The United States continues to engage the Sudanese government diplomatically to 

urge its cooperation in peacefully resolving the crisis in Darfur. We also continue 

to engage the rebel movements, who also must show the political will needed to seek 

a pathway to peace. Recently, during his visit to the U.S., Minister of Foreign Affairs Deng Alor made overtures to Secretary Rice on behalf of his government to 

improve bilateral relations. I traveled to Sudan in late February to meet with officials from the Government of Sudan. During the course of those meetings, he provided the Government of Sudan with a response to their overture, a preliminary 

outline of specific, verifiable steps to be taken by the Government of Sudan (GOS) 

to increase humanitarian relief to the people of Sudan, ensure the rapid deployment 

of the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in order to 

achieve security and stability on the ground, and further the implementation of the 

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Last month, officials from the GOS and the 

United States discussed the Sudanese response to this preliminary proposal for a 

work plan. The discussions addressed matters ranging from multiple re-entry visas 

for staff of nongovernmental organizations to passage of UNAMID equipment 

through the Port of Sudan. 

Some may wonder why the Administration is choosing to accept the Government 

of Sudan’s overture and attempting engagement with the Government of Sudan and 

rebel leaders now, after years of suffering and broken promises. I have been clear 

with the Government of Sudan that the United States will not take any options off 

the table at this point. But, as with the CPA, the Government of Sudan’s engagement may prove critical for progress to be achieved. Instead of standing by as more 

lives are destroyed by violence and displacement, we must seriously consider the full 

range of actionable options, from further sanctions to muscular actions and everything in between. 

This is why I have responded to rebel leaders and to the Government of Sudan 

to determine whether down this road there exists a path to a sustainable peace in 

Darfur. Last month, I met separately in Paris with the Sudan Liberation Movement/ 

AW (SLM/AW) leader, Abdul Wahid el Nur and a seven-member delegation of the 

Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). El Nur, a Fur, commands strong popular 

support within the IDP camps and, until recently, remained outside the peace process laying down untenable conditions such as Janjaweed disarmament, return of the 

IDPs and full deployment of UNAMID. Though his faction is now engaged in consultations with the UN/AU team, el Nur maintains he will only come to the table 

when there is minimum security and the government refrains from bombing civilians. El Nur claims he is nevertheless ready to continue to engage with the U.S., 

other factions and the AU/UN on peace talks. The JEM is the most intransigent of 

the movements with a strong military support and strong ties to Chadian President 

Deby. Though JEM also claimed readiness to continue dialogue with the U.S., it rejects any prospects of talk with the newly formed factions, the government and 

maintains the government of Sudan believes in a military solution to Darfur and 

will continue to carry out attacks in Darfur unless it is countered by a military force 

such as JEM or the U.S. JEM, whose leader in under targeted sanctions by the U.S. 

saw this consultation as a new opportunity to engage with the U.S. The recent attack by JEM on Omdurman reveals its national agenda to seek power in Khartoum 

rather than negotiate for peace in Darfur. The U.S. must remain engaged to ensure 

the rebel alliances being formed are steered towards a pathway for peace. 

72 

We and our allies within the international community will continue to engage diplomatically with the Government of Sudan to resolve the crisis in Darfur and implement the CPA for a democratic and stable Sudan. 

Question 3. The Global Peace Operations Initiative and the Africa Contingency 

Operations Initiative assistance programs have provided millions of dollars for the 

training of African militaries in peacekeeping operations. Per a White House press 

release, Amb. Khalilzad stated ‘‘Since 2005, the United States has trained 34,750 

peacekeepers from 40 countries and has provided $375 million to increase global capacity for peacekeeping in Africa and elsewhere.’’ ‘‘The program, known as the Global Peace Operations Initiative, has developed regional organizations’ peacekeeping 

capacity in Africa, the Asia-Pacific region, South and Central Asia, South and Central America, Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere. One of the roles for the new 

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) is to enhance overall AU peacekeeping capabilities.’’ As the Darfur crisis has unfolded and the international community has responded, the U.S. has provided additional millions of dollars to train the deploying 

African battalions for Darfur. The most recent was $100 million for deploying 

UNAMID peacekeepers. 

(Note from State Department: In the last line above, it would be more accurate 

if the word ‘‘deploying’’ was replaced by ‘‘training and equipping.’’) 

(a) Recognizing the significant increase in demand for peacekeepers over the last 

few years, how many of those nearly 35,000 peacekeepers have ever deployed on a 

peacekeeping mission? Is the United States able to keep track of such activity? 

(b) How many U.S.-trained peacekeepers from the normal GPOI/ACOTA programs-as opposed to the just-in-time training for battalions deploying in the nearterm-are deployed to Darfur? 

(c) What explains the lack of peacekeeper availability following training? What 

can be done to ensure U.S. resources for training are achieving the desired result 

of deploying, especially in African contingencies? 

(d) What is the purpose and mission of GPOI and ACOTA? 

Answer (a). Eighty-five percent, or 29,672 of the 34,750 peacekeepers trained (at 

the time of the press statement) by the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), 

have deployed to 17 peacekeeping operations around the world—mostly in Africa. 

The United States is generally able to keep track of such activity. GPOI has a full 

time metrics/evaluation team which links into Department of State and Department 

of Defense (DoD) assets worldwide to gather auditable, verifiable statistics of this 

nature. 

(b) 3,124 personnel as of May 9, 2008. 

(c) As indicated in the answer to question 3a above, the peacekeepers trained by 

GPOI/African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program in 

Africa have been generally available for deployment after training. This is largely 

the result of careful State/DoD selection of countries that would receive GPOI/ 

ACOTA training. In those cases where fewer peacekeepers were available for deployment, lack of equipment and logistics largely accounted for their inability to deploy. 

To ensure U.S. resources achieve the desired result of deploying fully-trained 

peacekeepers, the United States should continue the careful selection process described above, which focuses on countries with: (1) a strong commitment to peacekeeping; (2) the will to deploy; (3) the capacity or potential capacity to deploy contingents to peace operations; (4) the ability to provide or arrange for the provision of 

sustainment for their peacekeepers; and (5) demonstrated commitment and capacity 

to build on the training that the United States provides. 

(d) GPOI is a peace operations capacity-building program. Its purpose is to: (1) 

train and, as appropriate, equip at least 75,000 peacekeepers worldwide, with an 

emphasis on Africa, from 2005 to 2010 in order to increase global capacity to participate in peace operations; (2) enhance the ability of regional and sub-regional organizations to train for, plan, prepare for, manage, conduct, and obtain and sustain lessons-learned from peace operations through provision of technical assistance, training, and materiel; and support institutions and activities which offer these capabilities to a regional audience; (3) support the G8 Africa Clearinghouse and initiate and 

support a G8++ Global Clearinghouse for peacekeeping capacity-building; (4) support development of a G8 transportation and logistics support arrangement to help 

provide strategic transportation for deploying peacekeepers and logistics support to 

sustain units in the field; (5) provide support to the international Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) in Italy to increase the capabilities and 

73 

interoperability of stability police to participate in peace operations; and (6) conduct 

sustainment/self-sufficiency activities in support of objectives (1) through (5) above 

with a focus on assisting partner countries to sustain capabilities gained in training 

programs. ACOTA, a part of GPOI, is a peace operations capacity-building program 

that focuses mostly on the tactical and operational levels and on training African 

peacekeepers using, inter alia, a train-the-trainer approach. 

Question 4. The European Union (EU) has deployed several thousand peacekeepers in eastern Chad this year. 

(a) How will this force operate and what mandate do they have? 

(b) Is EUFOR experiencing similar problems as UNAMID in deploying personnel 

and equipment? What explains their experience? 

(c) How have the Chadian people, the regional rebels and the Chad government 

responded to the EUFOR deployment? 

Answer. (a) On September 25, the Security Council approved Resolution 1778 to 

establish the European Force (EUFOR) under the framework of the European Security Defense Program (ESDP) and the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) peacekeeping operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) to protect refugees, internally displaced persons, and 

humanitarian operations. UNSCR 1778 authorized MINURCAT up to 300 civilian 

police, who have a mandate to train and advise a special unit of the Chadian National Police to protect vulnerable civilians in eastern Chad. MINURCAT was also 

authorized to establish a multidimensional office of civilian and up to 50 military 

personnel to maintain liaison with host country governments, other UN entities in 

the region, and the EU force. EUFOR is to consist of 3,000-4,000 troops contributed 

by EU countries. While EUFOR has a UN mandate to provide force protection to 

MINURCAT in both countries, EUFOR remains under EU command and control 

and is not paid out of UN assessments. 

(b) Originally a lack of resources and shared willingness of other EU members to 

contribute resources to the mission delayed and complicated EUFOR deployment. 

The French, who were the leaders in promoting the idea of EUFOR, had pressured 

other EU members to share the burden and fill resource gaps with agreement for 

common funding and required equipment and personnel. There was resistance by 

some EU members to invest in the mission given heavy demands for other missions 

(including NATO missions) which had exhausted their deployment capabilities. 

There was also some disagreement among the member states on how high a priority 

this mission was for the EU as a whole. 

The United States demarched several EU countries urging all members to contribute and ensure that the deployment happened quickly and successfully. Ultimately, the mission went forward after the French increased their contribution to 

fill remaining force gaps. Additionally, for the first time, Russia agreed to participate in the mission, contributing four helicopters under the EU chain of command. 

We have provided $2 million to MINURCAT to cover monthly stipends of Chadian 

police trainees. 

(c) Although initially reluctant, by mid-2007 the Chadian government endorsed 

deployment of EUFOR and MINURCAT. Chadian support for EUFOR and 

MINURCAT increased further following the February 2008 rebel attack on 

N’Djamena. In an April 1 letter circulated to the Security Council, Chad asked that 

MINURCAT be strengthened to increase security in the border region, but did not 

provide further details. The Security Council would need to approve a new resolution to authorize MINURCAT to monitor the border or to deploy military observers. 

We will notify Congress formally if the Council considers such expansion. 

Question 5. Describe the degree to which and the substantive changes that have 

occurred, if any, in the Darfur conflict related to the belligerent parties’ goals, targeted groups, purpose of action, as well as their intent. 

Answer. The Government of Sudan continues its efforts to contain opposition in 

Darfur through both violent attacks and political maneuvering. Although the opposition Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) has splintered into a number of factions, 

its overarching goals of improved political and economic conditions in Darfur are 

largely unchanged. The Justice and Equality Movement, led by Khalil Ibrahim, continues to pursue a national agenda, seeking to spread the conflict beyond Darfur to 

South Kordofan and other parts of Sudan in order to effect violent political change 

in Khartoum. However, as with any movement, the personal goals and interests of 

individual commanders and faction leaders may at times diverge from the political 

74 

objectives of the movement, and this poses an additional challenge to the resolution 

of the conflict. 

Though there have not been significant changes in the goals or objectives of the 

parties, the nature of the violence in Darfur has shifted over the past two years, 

with a wider range of groups responsible for instigating violence. While attacks by 

the Government of Sudan and government-sponsored militias continued to take 

place, inter-ethnic violence, including inter-Arab tribal violence, has increased significantly. Arab militias not only support Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) attacks on civilians in Darfur, but also shift alliances, join the rebels, or attack SAF forces in 

retaliation for not being paid. Their services are available to the highest bidder. In 

addition, attacks initiated by rebel factions have dramatically increased since the 

signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006. In the past year, rebel movements 

have frequently attacked commercial traffic, including humanitarian aid shipments, 

and seized goods, vehicles, and persons. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR FEINGOLD

Abeyei 

Question. We discussed the CPA briefly at the recent hearing, but I would like 

to hear from you specifically to know what the U.S. is doing to help achieve implementation of the Abyei boundary commission’s ruling. What particular activities, 

conversations, programs, or initiatives is the U.S. government undertaking? 

Answer. The United States and key international partners were instrumental in 

achieving the Abyei compromise agreement embodied in the Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement (CPA). The agreement called for establishment of the Abyei Boundary 

Commission (ABC), which was tasked to ‘‘define and demarcate the area of the nine 

Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905.’’ The Government of Sudan 

(GOS) rejected the boundary determination of the ABC, arguing that the ABC had 

‘‘exceeded its mandate.’’ 

Resolving the impasse on Abyei is a top priority for the Administration. We continue to make public statements calling on the parties to reach a resolution on 

Abyei, including the establishment of the interim Abyei administration. We also 

raise the issue continuously in bilateral and multilateral forums and are prepared 

to engage further as needed. 

Achieving stability in the Abyei region is critical to the resolution of the dispute. 

For that reason, the U.S. government pressed the Government of Sudan and the 

Government of Southern Sudan to allow the United Nations Mission in Sudan 

(UNMIS) to patrol in the area. UNMIS troops are now deployed north and south 

of Abyei town. The presence of UNMIS is essential to maintaining peace in Abyei, 

and preventing the situation from further deterioration. 

We are also funding programs aimed at fostering dialogue and preventing conflict 

between key tribal groups in Abyei, including the Ngok Dinka, Messeriya, and 

Reizegat. These programs involve training on the rule of law and conflict mediation, 

strengthening political parties and civil society, improving officials’ methods for addressing citizen views, and a civil education campaign on the ABC decision. 

Regional Dimension 

Question 2. As you are well aware, the ongoing violence in Darfur and tensions 

in southern Sudan have a direct impact on surrounding countries. This past February, rebels backed by the Sudanese government attempted to topple Chad’s President Deby, and Khartoum’s known to have supported the Lord’s Resistance Army 

(LRA), a rebel group that has preyed on civilians in northern Uganda and along Sudan’s southern border, as well as in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Central 

African Republic (CAR). What diplomatic efforts have you undertaken to address 

the regional dimensions of the conflicts in Sudan? To this end, how are you working 

with the Tim Shortley, the Assistant Secretary’s Special Advisor for Conflict, and 

key U.S. diplomats in the region? Does the U.S. strategy for Sudan include a plan 

and resources to quell related violence in Chad and the CAR? 

Answer. The United States is deeply concerned about the regional impact of the 

Darfur conflict, particularly its impact on Chad and the Central African Republic. 

The Chad/Sudan border remains one of the most dangerous and inaccessible places 

for humanitarian workers and the recent Chad/Sudan cross-border attacks have contributed to the lack of progress in the Darfur political process as well as increased 

displacements with refugees crossing into Chad from CAR and Sudan and with 

some refugees fleeing into Darfur (250,000 Sudanese refugees along the Eastern 

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Chad borders, 20,000 Chadian refugees in Darfur and 59, 000 CAR refugees in 

South Chad). 

While I am charged with focusing on the situation in Sudan primarily, I am also 

concerned about the regional impact of the Darfur crisis and coordinates closely 

with other U.S. officials working in neighboring countries. I traveled to Egypt in 

March 2008 and plans to visit Libya and Chad in the near future. In addition, I 

raised the issue of Sudan’s support to Chadian rebels with President Bashir during 

his March visit. 

The U.S. continues to engage bilaterally with Chad on political inclusiveness and 

the need to seek a negotiated settlement with the Chadian rebel movements. We 

have encouraged our allies such as France, who have more leverage on Chad, to 

take the lead in ensuring adherence to past agreements. The U.S. supports the 

March 2008 Dakar Accords that commit Chad and Sudan to normalize relations, 

cease all supports to rebels, and establish an international security force along their 

border. The deployment of the European Force (EUFOR) along the borders of Chad/ 

CAR to protect Darfur refugees camps and humanitarian workers and the deployment of the UN Mission to the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) 

are key. 

We continue to encourage Chad to accept the deployment of a follow-on UN operation. The U.S. also has pushed for collaboration between EUFOR/MINURCAT and 

UNAMID, which will facilitate humanitarian operations and peace efforts in the region. The U.S. has provided $2 million to assist in MINURCAT efforts. 

Question 3. Darfur peace negotiations. Given the tumultuous relationship between 

Chad and Sudan and the frequent cross-border skirmishes, do you consider the 

Chadian government as well as the rebels in Chad to be key stakeholders in the 

now stalled Darfur political negotiations or are they outside the scope of that peace 

process? 

Is there a mechanism in place to engage representatives—including from the IDP 

population, community leaders residing in rural areas and Arab community leaders—in the Darfur peace talks, once they are resumed? 

Answer. The joint United Nations/African Union (UN/AU) mediation team has 

made an effort to include representatives of civil society in the Darfur peace talks. 

More than a dozen representatives of civil society attended the last round of formal 

talks in Sirte, Libya in November 2007. Additional civil society representatives were 

prevented from attending by the Government of Sudan. The UN/AU Joint Mediation 

Support Team (JMST) is in the process of drafting a more comprehensive strategy 

for inclusion of civil society in future talks, including the utility of a tripartite committee to address civil society issues, comprised of the JMST, the United NationsAfrican Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Civil Affairs Office, and the DarfurDarfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) body. The DDDC is a product of the 

Darfur Peace Agreement, responsible for holding intra-Darfuri dialogues on issues 

affecting the people of Darfur. The DDDC preparatory committee has already begun 

holding such consultations, and intends to provide feedback from those discussions 

to the mediation team in order to inform the negotiations. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR OBAMA

Question 1. I am encouraged by the portion of your testimony stating that the Administration ‘‘will not rely on promises of future actions’’ as sufficient to trigger an 

improvement in US-Sudan relations. But it does raise the question of just how much 

will be enough to trigger a change in our relationship with the Government in Khartoum. Will individual steps, or action on commitments undertaken long ago by 

Khartoum but still not honored, be sufficient, in the Administration’s view, to take 

steps toward normalization? If so, how do we expect to achieve progress on all of 

the other vitally important issues needed to bring lasting peace and stability to 

Sudan? 

Answer. After Foreign Minister Deng Alor’s discussion in February with Secretary 

Rice regarding a proposal from the Government of Sudan for improving relations between our countries, our discussions with Sudanese officials have outlined a set of 

specific, verifiable steps to be taken by the Government of Sudan to significantly improve the humanitarian situation for the people of Darfur, ensure the rapid deployment of UNAMID in order to achieve security and stability on the ground, and further the implementation of the CPA. We have outlined the long, hard road of required steps that would need to be taken by the Government of Sudan in order to 

move forward. We have continued to make clear to the Government of Sudan that 

76 

commitments on past agreements, such as the Joint Communique ́ on the Facilitation of Humanitarian Activities and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, must be 

upheld and implemented. We conveyed that this alone, however, is not enough to 

warrant an improvement in bilateral relations. We will not rely on promises of future actions, and concrete, verifiable, significant progress in Darfur must be 

achieved on the ground before we can contemplate improved relations. 

Question 2. Can you assure me that the Congress will be meaningfully consulted 

before the Administration makes any commitments to the Government of Sudan regarding normalization of relations? In addressing a crisis of this urgency and magnitude, it would be terribly counterproductive to take action that would lead to a 

situation in which various elements of the U.S. government are arguing amongst 

themselves rather than working together toward the most effective possible policy. 

Answer. We have made clear to the Government of Sudan that there is a long, 

tough road ahead based on verifiable steps and tangible progress on the ground that 

the Government of Sudan must achieve before any commitments are made by the 

United States to normalize relations with the Government of Sudan. If the Government of Sudan takes the series of required steps to improve relations with the 

United States, many of the steps would require Congressional approval. We welcome and appreciate participation from Congress on these issues. The suffering in 

Darfur, the obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and the urgent 

need to push forward on implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 

are matters of great complexity and importance that merit and require the attention, creativity, and resources of both the Administration and the Congress. We are 

committed to engaging the various elements of the U.S. government in order to pursue policies toward Sudan that most effectively alleviate the suffering of the people 

of Sudan and move the country toward peace and stability. 

Question 3. Your testimony vividly described the worsening conditions in Darfur 

over the course of recent months and the Government of Sudan’s obstructionist response to the deployment of UNAMID. What concrete consequences for these developments, in terms of U.S. and multilateral policy responses, have been borne by the 

Sudanese Government in this same timeframe? 

Answer. It is a difficult and complex endeavor to coordinate and deploy a hybrid 

peacekeeping mission in a country with a strong and often uncooperative central 

government. Unfortunately, many of the obstacles presented by Sudan have been 

difficult to pinpoint, and the lack of a ‘‘smoking gun’’ has made it difficult to use 

the UN Security Council to address these problems. 

President Bush has made the full deployment of the UNAMID peacekeeping mission a top priority, and we are working to identify and remove any impediments to 

deployment in order to bring security and stability to Darfur. In conversations with 

officials from the Government of Sudan, we have raised specific problems faced by 

UNAMID. We will continue to work in close coordination with the United Nations 

to address any obstacles to deployment. 

Question 4. Do you believe that you have the resources and support needed to devote sustained attention both to the genocide in Darfur and the fraying North-South 

peace process? Are you satisfied with the lines of authority in the Administration 

as they are currently structured, and are you confident that you have the necessary 

authority and autonomy to be effective in your role? 

Answer. As the President’s Special Envoy for Sudan, I am committed to help 

bring an end to the violence in Darfur, promote implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and bring stability to Sudan as a whole. I am assisted 

in my work as Special Envoy by the Assistant Secretary of African Affairs and staff 

from Sudan Programs Group Office (SPG), the USUN mission in New York, the 

United States Agency for International Development, the National Security Council, 

and the Department of Defense. Our efforts are also supported by the hard work 

of the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, including two Foreign Service Officers located 

in Darfur, and our Consulate General in Juba, Southern Sudan. 

Not only is Sudan USAID’s largest program in sub-Saharan Africa and among the 

largest in the world, but Darfur is currently the largest humanitarian relief operation in the world, and the United States remains the single largest donor. I am 

confident that with these resources we will continue to devote sustained attention 

to activities to end humanitarian suffering and work towards achieving peace in 

Sudan. Because Sudan is a top priority of this Administration, I am devoted to serving the President in his efforts to bring peace, security, and prosperity to the people 

of Sudan. I am working closely with all elements of the Administration involved in 

77 

Sudan to ensure that together we implement the President’s policies and work to 

bring peace and security to the people of Sudan. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CASEY

Question 1. The U.S. is the leading international donor to Sudan, contributing nearly $4 billion for humanitarian programs in Sudan and eastern Chad since FY 

2004. However, as we all know, the U.S. cannot solve this crisis alone. We must 

use the tools of multilateral engagement and work hand in hand with others to 

meet the challenges that the situation in Darfur presents. 

(a) What roles have China and Russia played in efforts to forge peace and security 

in Darfur this year? What steps have you taken to engage Beijing and Moscow, either in a bilateral or multilateral context at the UN? 

(b) China maintains a close defense relationship with the government in Khartoum, despite a 2005 UN-imposed arms embargo. What evidence do we have that 

China or its proxies are supplying military equipment to the Khartoum government 

for use in the Darfur region? What about Russia? 

(c) What is the administration’s position on securing a stronger arms embargo 

against Sudan? 

Answer. (a) I met with the Chinese Envoy in Sudan in February, and encouraged 

China to use its influence in the region constructively to help bring peace and security to Darfur. Deputy Secretary Negroponte and other U.S. government principals 

have also contacted Beijing directly, asking China to exert additional pressure on 

the Government of Sudan on Darfur, provide additional practical support to 

UNAMID, and to halt Chinese arms sales to Khartoum. 

The United States has also engaged Russia regarding the situation in Sudan, including lobbying successfully for Russian (and Chinese) support for UN Security 

Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1769, which established the UN / AU Mission in Sudan 

(UNAMID). China has provided the first non-African personnel to UNAMID, consisting of 140 of an eventual 315 combat engineers, and has provided $500,000 to 

the UN Trust Fund to support AU/UN Special Envoys for Darfur. 

(b) Chinese-origin military equipment has been observed in Darfur, and Chinese 

arms sales and transfers to the Government of Sudan are well recognized. The Chinese government asserts that Chinese companies’ arms sales to Sudan constitute 

normal trade and are not destined for use in Darfur. The United States has observed Chinese arms in Darfur. Several recent NGO reports have also highlighted 

Chinese arms sales to Sudan. Russian attack helicopters and other aircraft provided 

before the 2005 embargo (UNSCR 1591) remain in use in Darfur. 

(c) The United States strongly supports the UN arms embargo imposed in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1556 (2004) against ‘‘all nongovernmental entities and individuals.operating in’’ the states of North Darfur, South Darfur, and 

West Darfur and expanded by UNSCR 1591 (2005) to apply to the Government of 

Sudan in Darfur. The Resolutions call on all member states to take the necessary 

measures to ensure that their arms sales to Sudan are not used in Darfur, and establish a Panel of Experts to investigate any violations. 

The Panel has repeatedly asked countries like China and Russia to explain how 

they ensure that weapons sold to the GOS are not being used in Darfur as required 

by existing resolutions. Our own, bilateral sanctions against the Government of 

Sudan prohibit the sale of weapons to it. I have reiterated that all options remain 

on the table, including additional sanctions and other punitive actions, if the situation on the ground does not change for the people of Darfur. 

Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to USAID Assistant 

Administrator for Africa Katherine Almquist 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR FEINGOLD

Question 1. Humanitarian Situation and Bureaucratic Impediments. Despite the 

Joint Communique ́ signed by the Government of Sudan and the U.N. nearly a year 

ago, the humanitarian community working in Darfur continues to be plagued by direct attacks as well as by a number of bureaucratic procedures imposed by the Sudanese government. What are the prospects for more effective delivery in the near 

term? What can we do to facilitate this? 

78 

Answer. To improve the speed and delivery of humanitarian assistance and to ensure the full implementation of the Joint Communique ́, the U.S. government must 

continue to work with the international community to press the Government of National Unity (GNU) to uphold agreements already made, including the Joint 

Communique ́, and to halt the creation of new impediments to humanitarian assistance. The U.S. government should continue to advocate, along with other donor governments, the European Union, and the U.N., the principles of the Joint 

Communique ́ as well. Sudanese government bureaucratic procedures are not only 

problematic at the federal level, but also at the state and local levels, with state 

and local agencies frequently not adhering to procedures outlined in the Joint 

Communique ́ or supporting documents. In many instances, state and federal authorities have divergent views on how to interact with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and apply the rules set forth in the Joint Communique ́. The U.S. government should continue to participate, as appropriate, along with the GNU and the 

UN in the High Level Committee responsible for implementation of the Joint 

Communique ́. This process allows problems to reach the leadership in a highly decentralized system in order to bring problems to their attention and find solutions. 

Question 2. Civilian Police. At the hearing you discussed the need for greater security in Darfur in order for humanitarian agencies to have full access to their beneficiaries. You suggested this might be accomplished by increasing the number of civilian police in Darfur, including along the routes the humanitarian conveys travel. 

I’d like to clarify this point. Were you referring to Sudanese Government police and, 

if yes, wouldn’t these police be considered partial and therefore not accepted as legitimate security guarantors by either the humanitarian organizations or the people 

of Darfur? If you were referring to UNAMID civilian police, while there are now 

some 1,600 police officers on the ground in Darfur, wouldn’t the demand for more 

police be part of the larger problem regarding UNAMID, which remains stalled? Is 

there some alternative we might consider that would provide greater protection 

without jeopardizing neutrality or getting stuck in the struggle for UNAMID’s full 

deployment? 

Answer. The reference made during the hearing to the need for additional police 

refers specifically to the issue of banditry against commercial trucks carrying U.N. 

World Food Program (WFP) food aid. To date in 2008, bandits have hijacked 60 

WFP-contracted vehicles, with 39 trucks and 29 drivers still missing. Following this 

rash of banditry incidents, which began in late 2007, WFP-contracted transporters 

began refusing to travel along main supply routes from logistical hubs outside of 

Darfur without a Sudanese government police escort. Slow and inefficient police escorts resulted in significant transport delays for WFP-contracted vehicles, causing 

WFP to draw down buffer stocks of commodities in Darfur to dangerous levels and 

necessitating the reduction in food rations for May and June. WFP and the U.S. 

government have called on the Sudanese government to immediately increase the 

number and frequency of police escorts for WFP-contracted transporters so that 

WFP can move additional food stocks into Darfur in advance of the upcoming rainy 

season. In the absence of sufficient United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur 

(UNAMID) capacity, Sudanese government police escorts are required only for commercial convoys traveling from logistical hubs outside of Darfur to WFP warehouses 

in the three Darfur state capitals. WFP uses locally contracted trucking firms, 

which have their own fleets of trucks and do not require a Sudanese government 

escort, for food deliveries to distribution locations within the Darfur states. 

USAID respects and consistently advocates for the political neutrality of all humanitarian agencies, including USAID partners, in Darfur. USAID respects the 

right of the humanitarian community to pursue the most appropriate mechanisms 

to ensure their security. 

UNAMID civil police have made a significant difference in protection where units 

are deployed to date, including at regular patrols in Kalma Camp for internally displaced persons. USAID strongly encourages the full and rapid deployment of the 

UNAMID civilian police units as mandated by U.N. Security Council Resolution 

1769. 

Question 3. Southern Sudan. How best should the United States and the rest of 

the international community support progress when it comes to developing southern 

Sudan? Rather than focusing on USAID’s range of active programs in the south, in 

answering this question please address priorities, sequencing, and both short and 

long term objectives. 

Answer. The best strategy for supporting the development of Southern Sudan is 

for the international community to ensure continued and engaged assistance to the 

implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Timely and bonafide 

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implementation of the Agreement, which aims to address political, social and economic inequalities in Sudan over the long term, will mitigate conflict and the potential for return to war. The return to large-scale war in Sudan would be the single 

largest detriment to ensuring the South’s economic and political prosperity. The financial, social, economic and political costs of watching Sudan slip back into war 

are too great. Therefore, identifying and addressing the short- and long-term potential flashpoints for conflict in Sudan are essential to consolidating the CPA. The 

U.S. and international community can do this through supporting post-conflict reconstruction and laying the foundations for longer term development. 

Given this imperative, Sudan continues to be the United States’ highest foreign 

policy priority in Africa. As the country approaches CPA-mandated national elections in 2009, the risks of returning to war will increase. The United States provides 

targeted and integrated assistance in Southern Sudan based on policy goals and geographic realities that advance the priorities of saving lives and mitigating suffering, building human capacity, creating security, ensuring economic development 

and promoting democracy and governance. 

While all priorities are important, some are more critical as short term goals and 

must be addressed immediately, such as humanitarian assistance. Longer term 

goals for the Unites States include building capacity in people to support and govern 

themselves through ensuring education and training, providing a foundation for economic growth, and creating a deterrent to outside aggression. These priorities 

should be addressed simultaneously as progress in each priority area will spur success in others. Building the capacity of people, providing livelihood and market development assistance and creating stability will ultimately create the space for viable, successful elections in 2009. Without clear evidence that the CPA is working 

to the benefit of the southern Sudanese population with visible, positive changes to 

their environment and circumstances, it is difficult to predict their positive support 

for elections. 

More detail on the priorities of the Unites States in Sudan is as follows: 

• Providing Humanitarian Assistance: The transition to recovery and restoration 

of livelihoods should continue in Southern Sudan. In the next year, the U.S. 

provision of humanitarian assistance will continue to aid vulnerable populations 

in the South. However, opportunities for longer term efforts, such as capacity 

building and reconstruction will be sought to obviate the need for relief assistance. 

• Investing in People: Emphasizing decentralized, community-based provision of 

essential services to engage local stakeholders in development activities, rebuild 

health and education systems, and focus on areas with high levels of returning 

families will lessen the need for long term humanitarian assistance. The United 

States will address priority health threats, strengthen maternal and child 

health services, and reduce the burden of infectious diseases, including HIV/ 

AIDS. The education program will improve access to education through formal 

and non-formal programs focusing on primary and girls’ education, teacher 

training, bilingual curriculum development, and institutional capacity development within the GOSS. 

• Promoting Economic Growth: The United States seeks to address the effects of 

years of war and neglect on infrastructure in southern Sudan and the Three 

Areas by continuing to build roads and bridges to open up the region and link 

it both to northern Sudan and neighboring countries, thereby facilitating trade, 

delivery of services, and effective rule of law. Assistance will focus on building 

roads and providing modern energy services in key towns as part of a more intense effort to create an enabling environment for private sector investment and 

activity that promotes job creation and greater economic opportunities. 

• Governing Justly and Democratically: The next milestone in the implementation 

of the CPA will be the 2009 elections. The Unites States will assist in supporting election capacity building with key stakeholders. The Unites States will 

also continue to support the GOSS by assisting the development of core governmental institutions. 

• Achieving Peace and Security: Promoting this priority entails supporting the 

transition of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) from a guerrilla force 

into a professional military, protecting civilians through the clearance of land 

mines and the destruction of explosive remnants of war, and assisting with law 

enforcement reform and training. 

80 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR OBAMA

Question 1. In your testimony you speak to the importance of a timely census, and 

I certainly agree that timely progress on the census is essential. But it also seems 

clear that census results that have no credibility in the end will worsen the prospects for lasting peace. What steps can be taken to improve the credibility of the 

census process? 

Answer. Sudan’s Fifth Population and Housing Census, which is currently underway, is the first major political milestone critical to the successful implementation 

of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA calls for a population census as the basis for power sharing. The north-south power sharing percentages in 

the executive and legislative branches of the Government of National Unity (GNU) 

will be adjusted based on the census population data. Depending on the type of electoral system which is chosen for the national electoral law, the census data will also 

inform the delimitation of constituencies, and will help in planning for and verifying 

the voter registration for the 2009 elections and subsequent referendum in 2011. As 

a result, the proper technical conduct of the census, concluding in credible results, 

is indispensable for maintaining the integrity of the CPA as the roadmap for Sudan’s peaceful democratic transformation. 

The census is implemented by the Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS) in the 

north and Darfur, and by the South Sudan Commission for Census, Statistics, and 

Evaluation (SSCCSE) in southern Sudan. This division of responsibility has presented many challenges in ensuring uniform monitoring of the census process, from 

preparations to enumeration (the actual process of collecting census information) 

and including post-enumeration data processing and analysis. 

Steps taken to date to improve credibility of the census process (census preparation and enumeration phases): Enumeration just concluded on May 6, 2008, and 

both census agencies are currently working to return questionnaires to their respective data processing centers in Khartoum (northern Sudan and Darfur) and Rumbek 

(southern Sudan), where they will enter and process census data as they move into 

the next phase of census operations. Steps that were taken to enhance credibility 

of the census process in the preparation and enumeration phases included a combination of donor assistance and diplomatic messaging, as follows: 

1. Capacity-Building and Logistical Support: USAID, the UN Population Fund 

(UNFPA), working through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, and other donors supported capacity-building for the census implementing agencies, provided logistical 

support and procured needed commodities during the census preparation and enumeration phases. In terms of U.S. assistance, USAID supported technical assistance 

to the SSCCSE to build its technical capabilities to conduct a credible census operation, embedding numerous short- and long-term advisors in almost every area of 

census operations. Further, USAID coordinated closely, through the interagency 

process, with other U.S. government stakeholders on diplomatic messaging. USAID 

has also coordinated with technical working groups of other donors to promote technical solutions rather than political solutions to technical problems as they have appeared. 

2. Resolution of Questionnaire Quantity Shortage: A months-long dispute between 

north and south over questionnaire quantities to be distributed in each area was 

resolved through close coordination between donors, UN agencies, national authorities, and the CBS and SSCCSE, drawing on well-documented technical justifications 

provided by a USAID-funded advisor. As a result, additional questionnaires were 

printed, delivered and distributed between northern and southern census commissions in time to ensure sufficient stocks of questionnaires were available for enumeration in both the north and south. Without this agreement, shortages would 

likely have occurred, leading to a rejection of census results by at least one party. 

3. Sustained Pressure to Release Delayed Funding: The U.S., in close collaboration 

with UN agencies and donor partners, maintained diplomatic pressure on the GNU 

to meet its commitment to finance the census technical operations throughout 

Sudan. As a result of coordinated and sustained efforts over more than six months, 

sufficient funding was released to prevent further delays of the enumeration itself. 

The diplomatic effort is ongoing, as the GNU has still not released all funds it had 

committed to provide for census operations, and additional funds will be needed 

soon to finance data processing. 

Next steps to improve credibility of the census process (return of census materials, 

data processing and analysis phases and announcement of results): The tasks of preparing for-and conducting-the enumeration have only been one part of the total 

challenge. In the South, it will be necessary to collect, pack and send the forms to 

81 

the SSCCSE data processing center in Rumbek, Lakes State for scanning, editing 

and data processing. In the North, the completed forms will be forwarded to Khartoum for further processing. This post-enumeration processing is estimated to take 

several months and agreement on final results must be endorsed by the CBS and 

SSCCSE as well as the Population Census Council and the GNU Presidency. Steps 

being taken to enhance credibility of the census process following enumeration will 

continue to include a combination of donor assistance and diplomatic messaging. 

Important measures include: 

1. Monitoring of Enumeration: The Monitoring and Observation Committee (MOC) 

is the official Sudanese government body tasked with monitoring the census process. 

Despite efforts by donor government members and the UN to encourage greater 

transparency and participation in the monitoring effort, this body’s plans and operations have not achieved desired levels of transparency. DFID consultants assisted 

in drafting of the MOC’s monitoring work-plan and provided training to international and domestic census monitors prior to enumeration. Although it is still unclear who will be responsible for final drafting of the MOC monitoring report and 

approval of its content, donor members of the MOC have already stated the joint 

position that the report should reflect only the observations of those monitors who 

were openly recruited and trained during the DFID-funded training program. 

2. Measures to Ensure Transparency in Data Processing: The CBS and SSCCSE 

have agreed on two primary mechanisms to ensure transparency of the data processing phase. The first encompasses procedures for questionnaire control that requires each serialized questionnaire to be accounted for and ensures only data valid 

questionnaires are counted. The second is a commitment to exchange raw and edited data files, which will enable each agency to spot check the data processing of 

the other. USAID provided technical assistance to the SSCCSE to ensure international best practices were reflected in the questionnaire control protocol. The U.S. 

will coordinate diplomatic messaging with other members of the international community to encourage both statistical agencies to fulfill these agreements. 

3. Capacity-Building and Logistical Support: USAID, UNFPA, and other donors 

continue to provide technical assistance and logistical support to facilitate return of 

questionnaires, as well as commodities support related to data processing. USAIDembedded advisors will continue to work with the SSCCSE to help the Commission 

with logistics for retrieval of materials, assist it to implement questionnaire control 

protocols that enhance credibility of the final data, and support data processing. 

USAID is also providing commodities support for data processing, including barcode 

scanners, computers, and other technical equipment needed for the SSCCSE’s 

Rumbek data processing center to function. 

4. Diplomatic efforts: Given the political implications of the census and its political 

sensitivities, the U.S. will continue to work closely with other members of the diplomatic community to anticipate and help mediate resolution of any disputes that 

arise over technical processes, validity and use of data, so that both parties to the 

CPA are ultimately able to accept census results and move forward with full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CASEY

Question 1. According to the World Food Program, Darfur represents the largest 

humanitarian emergency in the world. It is also the U.S.’s largest food assistance 

effort. As we have seen over the last few months, we are in the midst of a global 

food crisis, driven by a number of factors including rising prices and increasing demand for commodities, especially food and fuel. The head of the World Food Program has called the global food crisis a ‘‘silent tsunami’’—affecting the world’s most 

vulnerable without regard to geography or traditional borders. 

A report by the UN Secretary General, in January-February 2008, stated that an 

estimated ‘‘54 vehicles were hijacked, including two UNAMID vehicles and 32 World 

Food Program trucks.’’ According to news accounts, 150 trucks carrying food to 

Darfur have been hijacked this year. The World Food Program has announced that 

it is forced to halve rations for up to 3 million people in Darfur because of these 

attacks on supply routes and shortages in its food supply. 

What is the impact of the current global food crisis on U.S. and multilateral assistance to Sudan? 

Answer. Since the USAID Office of Food for Peace (FFP) prioritized contributions 

to Sudan early in fiscal year 2008, as required given seasonal variations in hunger 

82 

periods, FFP was able to provide a significant quantity of food assistance—over 

$350 million to WFP’s operation in Sudan alone—before the full weight of the global 

crisis in food prices became apparent. FFP believes that anticipated cash inflows— 

in particular the money allocated in the Administration’s supplemental request— 

will be sufficient to cover the increase in domestic commodity and freight prices as 

they apply to the Sudan program. To date USAID has provided 316,270 metric tons 

of food commodities to WFP in response to the 2008 appeal for Sudan. These contributions amount to 50 percent of the total tonnage required by WFP to sustain 

the emergency operation. At present, the 2008 appeal for Sudan is nearly 58 percent 

funded. Contributions from other donors comprise approximately 8 percent of all 

confirmed contributions received by WFP to date. 

In addition, as a result of early and significant USAID contributions and timely 

contributions from other donors, the European Commission in particular, WFP has 

sufficient resources committed to the operation—either in Sudan or on the way to 

Sudan—to continue providing food to Darfur into September, with additional contributions from other donors forthcoming. This is assuming, of course, that security 

does not continue to hamper the delivery of resources to people that so critically 

need it (see below).Question: 

Question 2. What is the food security situation in Darfur now? What can be done 

to secure the transportation of food and protect drivers and convoys? 

Answer. Continued conflict, displacement and the erosion of coping mechanisms 

has again complicated the food security situation for millions of Darfuris in 2008. 

At present, commodity prices in many of the main market towns in Darfur are beginning to rise to levels not seen since the start of the crisis. UN agencies and 

NGOs believe that this rise is not significantly related to the global food crisis, but 

rather to poor harvests as a result of erratic rainfall and significant pest infestations during the last cropping season combined with the continued breakdown of 

law and order and violence throughout Darfur. As a result, WFP is targeting over 

1 million non-displaced residents in Darfur with food aid during the annual hunger 

season from June-September. This includes partnerships with other UN agencies 

and NGOs to deliver seed protection rations to many farming communities throughout Darfur in order to help ensure that seeds are planted and not consumed, leading 

to better harvests in the next cropping season. In some of the particularly hard hit 

areas, WFP is looking to begin its ‘seasonal support’ rations to non-displaced rural 

population earlier than normal and/or increase the beneficiary caseload. 

A rash of banditry since late 2007 has pushed WFP’s transport capacity to the 

limit as drivers now refuse to travel without a Government of Sudan police escort. 

However, insufficient escort capacity has significantly reduced commodity dispatches 

to Darfur at a time when WFP should be building up warehouse stocks in advance 

of the rainy season. The decision to reduce rations is meant to stretch stocks of food 

so that WFP can resume full rations during the height of the hunger season (JulyAugust), when food aid needs are highest. 

Barring any significant breakthrough on the peace process and assuming that 

UNAMID capacity will continue to be constrained for the near future, the international community’s options to secure the numerous routes that are used to bring 

food to Darfur are limited. WFP is procuring additional banners to provide to commercial transporters so that vehicles can be clearly marked as carrying humanitarian aid, and has publicized the reasons for the ration reduction in the local press 

in an effort to communicate to the various groups committing the acts of banditry 

the unfortunate impact of their actions on innocent IDPs and other conflict-affected 

populations. 

USAID believes that the only realistic, immediate term option is to continue to 

put pressure on the Government of Sudan to increase the number and frequency 

of police and military escorts for WFP-contracted commercial transport. More frequent and efficient escorts would increase truck turnaround time and minimize convoy backup at logistical hubs. Additionally, more frequent escorts would allow for 

smaller, more secure convoys of trucks, thereby decreasing the risk for many transporters. At this time, the GOS has indicated to WFP and the USG that it intends 

to bolster its capacity in the coming days to be able to provide escorts for convoys 

every 48 hours, which would be a significant improvement if implemented. 

Question 3. What are USAID’s priorities for humanitarian assistance in Darfur? 

Answer. The principle priority for USAID in Darfur is the continued provision of 

live-saving food and non-food humanitarian assistance. According to WFP estimates, 

3.7 million people across Darfur will need food aid in 2008. In response, USAID has 

provided 316,270 metric tons against the 2008 appeal for Sudan. These contribuVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:47 Mar 05, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\DARFUR MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
83 

tions amount to 50 percent of the total tonnage required by WFP to sustain the 

emergency operation. 

In addition, USAID provides support to nine U.N. agencies and 20 non-governmental organizations for the continued provision of water, sanitation, primary 

health care, nutrition, shelter, protection, coordination, relief commodities, agriculture and food security support, income-generation and capacity building activities, and health and hygiene promotion. In Fiscal Year 2008, USAID anticipates 

spending approximately $82.5 million on non-food humanitarian assistance. 

In addition to direct assistance, USAID prioritizes advocacy for humanitarian 

issues in order to increase humanitarian security and access, prevent forced relocation of internally displaced persons (IDPs), provide support for IDP returns, and reduce governmental bureaucratic impediments. USAID continues to lead in addressing the environmental impact of the conflict through encouraging environmentally 

sound humanitarian practices. USAID will also plan and prepare for the transition 

from relief to recovery and development activities as security and the peace process 

progresses. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for holding this hearing today. The crisis 

in Darfur remains one of the greatest humanitarian disasters of our time, and I believe that it is vitally important the United States remains actively engaged in 

bringing to an end to one of the worst acts of genocide since Rwanda. 

For over 5 years now, the people of Darfur have endured repeated attacks from 

Sudanese Army soldiers and irregular forces known as the Janjaweed. Somewhere 

between one quarter and half a million Darfuris have been killed since the outbreak 

of hostilities, and over 2 million more have been driven from their homes and forced 

into refugee camps, many of which are filled beyond their capacity and cannot provide even basic services. Yet, despite the unmistakable signs of a humanitarian disaster, the United States and the International Community has been embarrassingly 

slow in addressing one of the greatest humanitarian challenges of the 21st century. 

What little progress that has been made, Mr. Chairman, has been agonizingly 

slow and inconsistent. UNAMID, the hybrid United Nations-African Union force authorized by Resolution 1769, has been faced with continued opposition from Khartoum, and a shortage of just 24 helicopters has left the force nearly immobile. The 

UNAMID force is plagued by shortfalls in equipment and logistical challenges, while 

violence continues to plague the region. Meanwhile, more than 2 million refugees 

continue to live in harsh conditions in refugee camps. 

While the Bush administration has openly called the conflict in Darfur a ‘‘genocide,’’ it has repeatedly opposed attempts to pressure Khartoum to stop the violence. 

The Bush administration strenuously opposed bipartisan legislation I authored in 

the Banking Committee and passed by Congress that provides a legal framework 

by which state, local governments, and other institutions can divest specific Sudan 

related investments from their portfolios. All of this while our own Justice Department suggested that the Government of Sudan should be treated with ‘‘kid gloves.’’ 

More recently, the New York Times reported that the Bush administration has 

suggested it would normalize relations with Sudan in exchange for Khartoum honoring the mandate of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1769, never mind the fact 

that Khartoum has already promised it would abide by the resolution. How many 

more carrots will be offered, and then rejected by Khartoum as that regime refuses 

to address violence that has propagated within its borders? Where are the sticks? 

Where is the plan B that this committee was promised by the administration over 

a year ago? 

For far too long, the crisis in Darfur has been all but ignored by the United States 

and the International Community, and it has not received the diplomatic attention 

or humanitarian assistance the people of Darfur so desperately need. It is my sincere hope that this hearing will contribute to a fresh diplomatic offensive that can 

bring about a lasting peace to the people of Darfur and the surrounding region. 

I would like to thank the witnesses for appearing before this committee today and 

I look forward to their testimony. 

84 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, 

U.S. SENATOR FOR ILLINOIS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important and timely hearing. All the 

proclamations, the ‘‘Never Again’’ speeches, and the efforts of many around the 

world have as yet failed to stop the 5-year-long genocide in Darfur. The indiscriminate killing, raping, and displacement continue and are escalating. Only decisive 

and concerted action can end this genocide. 

To start, the U.S. must lead in supporting the full and effective deployment of the 

United Nations (U.N.)/African Union (AU) protection force and ensure that the Government of Sudan faces meaningful penalties for obstructing and delaying the deployment of this force. Ambassador Williamson should be commended for his efforts 

to support the rapid deployment of the African Union/United Nations operations in 

Darfur (UNAMID) peacekeepers. But the administration, led by President Bush and 

Secretary Rice, must do more to ensure the U.N. has the necessary equipment—especially helicopter support—to ensure the full mobility and effectiveness of 

UNAMID troops. The U.S. should also press for the unrestricted deployment of 

United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) forces in South Sudan to Abyei to help 

prevent the resumption of fighting in that fragile region where tensions are rising. 

I am deeply concerned by recent reports that the Bush administration is negotiating the normalization of relations and lifting of sanctions against the Government 

of Sudan in exchange for piecemeal and modest action on a narrow set of issues. 

The approach contradicts the resolute and clear policy required to improve conditions on the ground for those at risk. Khartoum has a long history of breaking its 

commitments to its own people and to the international community. There should 

be no reward for bad faith. The U.S. relationship with the Government of Sudan 

can only improve once conditions for the Sudanese people improve. I hope that this 

hearing will provide a clear explanation of how the administration’s current strategy 

adheres to this commonsense principle. 

Those that continue to commit war crimes and obstruct peace and protection efforts must face significant penalties. The U.S. should lead in the U.N. Security 

Council to impose effective targeted sanctions and to curtail violations of the arms 

embargo through the U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee and the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. At the same time, the administration should urge the AU to rebuke Khartoum for its role in the attempted 

coup in Chad. The U.S. also needs to work with the International Criminal Court 

to ramp up the pace of indictments of those responsible for war crimes and crimes 

against humanity, while Khartoum must feel increased pressure to hand over those 

individuals already indicted by the Court. 

Lasting peace in Darfur and South Sudan can only be achieved through the unflagging commitment and cooperation of our government, other interested governments around the world, the U.N., the AU, the Arab League, and the EU, among 

others, and advocacy groups. A more comprehensive, consistent, and robust diplomatic effort is an important part of the way forward. U.S. leadership is urgently 

needed both to help construct a credible peace process for Darfur and to ensure the 

full and fair implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The U.S. must 

work to ensure that a single mediator, actively supported by countries with significant leverage, emerges from the confusion that has characterized the Darfur peace 

process to date. Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s offer to kick-start the process is 

helpful and should be explored. At the same time, Special Envoy Williamson should 

have sufficient staff and support to devote sustained attention to both the genocide 

in Darfur and the fraying North/South peace process. 

85 

I am heartened that citizen pressure and activism all over the U.S. is having an 

impact. Divestment campaigns focused on schools, states, and mutual funds are 

gathering momentum. Well-targeted advocacy related to China’s role in Sudan can 

help promote a more constructive attitude in Beijing. Activists—particularly religious groups—are helping to put the issue of the North/South peace deal back on 

the radar screen. And the antigenocide movement is growing by the day. 

It is long past time for the U.S. to exert effective leadership to end the first genocide of the 21st century and work to ensure that it is the last. 

Æ