[Cite as State v. E.G., 2019-Ohio-3531.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF MEDINA ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

E.G. 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 18CA0109-M 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

MEDINA MUNICIPAL COURT 

COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO 

CASE No. 18CRB01317 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: September 3, 2019 

 

CALLAHAN, Judge. 

{¶1} Appellant, E.G., appeals her conviction for domestic violence by the Medina 

Municipal Court. This Court reverses. 

I. 

{¶2} On September 3, 2018, E.G.’s stepdaughter contacted law enforcement to report 

an argument between her father, G.G., and his wife, E.G. A Medina County Sheriff’s deputy 

responded to the call, and after speaking with G.G. and the stepdaughter, he learned that E.G. 

had slapped G.G. with an open hand, leaving a red mark on his face. The deputy sheriff arrested 

E.G., and she was charged with domestic violence. E.G. pleaded not guilty, and the trial court 

set the case for a bench trial on October 3, 2018. The State moved to continue the trial to a date 

after October 9, 2018, because a witness was unavailable. On September 26, 2018, the trial court 

granted the State’s motion, and the bench trial was rescheduled for October 17, 2018. 
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{¶3} Seven days before the trial date, E.G.’s attorney filed a motion to continue the 

trial date, arguing that he had a previously scheduled conflicting court appearance. The next day, 

the trial court denied the motion, noting that the “[bench trial] was set before conflicting matters” 

and that “dates in conflicting matters were set ‘at the request of the [defendant].’” On the day of 

trial E.G.’s attorney orally requested a continuance on three grounds: he had just received the 

case from his partner and was “ill-prepared to go forward,” it was “kind of a conflict of interest,” 

and his client was prepared to accept a plea offer made by the State. The trial court denied the 

motion without further inquiry and declined to accept the negotiated plea, noting that by local 

rule, plea agreements that involved changing the charged offense had to be completed two days 

before trial and emphasizing that defense counsel had not mentioned either the conflict of 

interest or his preparedness for trial in his written motion. The trial court also emphasized that 

the trial had been previously continued, but did not ask the State to respond to the request for a 

continuance. 

{¶4} Following the bench trial, the trial court found E.G. guilty of domestic violence, 

fined her $300, and ordered her to serve one day in jail. E.G. filed this appeal. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1 

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED 

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING DEFENSE COUNSEL’S MOTION TO 

CONTINUE THE TRIAL FILED A WEEK BEFORE THE TRIAL. 

{¶5} In her first assignment of error, E.G. argues that the trial court erred by denying 

her attorney’s request for a continuance. Although her assignment of error is framed in terms of 

the written request for a continuance that counsel filed seven days before trial, the substance of 
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her argument focuses on the oral request for a continuance that defense counsel made on the day 

of trial. 

{¶6} Because the decision to grant or deny a continuance is one that is generally 

entrusted to the discretion of the trial court judge, this Court reviews such a decision for an abuse 

of discretion. State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65 (1981), syllabus, 67. An abuse of discretion is 

present when a trial court’s decision “‘is contrary to law, unreasonable, not supported by 

evidence, or grossly unsound.’” Menke v. Menke, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27330, 2015-Ohio-2507, 

¶ 8, quoting Tretola v. Tretola, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-24, 2015-Ohio-1999, ¶ 25. 

{¶7} When considering a request for continuance, trial courts should consider 

the length of the delay requested; whether other continuances have been requested 

and received; the inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the 

court; whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons or whether it is 

dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; whether the defendant contributed to the 

circumstance which gives rise to the request for a continuance; and other relevant 

factors, depending on the unique facts of each case. 

Unger at 67-68. Although entrusted to the discretion of the trial court, the denial of a motion for 

a continuance can have grave consequences, particularly when the motion is related to counsel’s 

ability to mount a defense on the client’s behalf. See State v. Sowders, 4 Ohio St.3d 143, 144 

(1983). In this respect, the denial of a request for a continuance can be “so arbitrary as to violate 

due process.” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964). “There are no mechanical tests” for 

determining whether the denial of a continuance rises to this level, so a reviewing court must 

consider the circumstances of each case, “particularly * * * the reasons presented to the trial 

judge at the time the request is denied.” Id. 

{¶8} In this case, counsel’s motion for a continuance on the day of trial raised two 

issues of grave concern: his admitted lack of preparation for trial and the possibility of a conflict 

of interest in his representation of E.G. Perhaps understandably, the trial court responded with 
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frustration that counsel’s previous motion, filed just seven days earlier, did not raise either of 

these issues. Nonetheless, the trial court should have inquired about the nature of the potential 

conflict of interest and counsel’s level of preparedness so that it could undertake the 

determination contemplated by Unger instead of summarily denying the continuance. See Unger

at 67-68. See also Ungar at 589. The trial court’s failure to do so, under the facts of this case, 

constituted an arbitrary denial of E.G.’s request for a continuance and, therefore, an abuse of 

discretion. See id. E.G.’s first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2 

THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL WHEN HER ATTORNEY SHOWED UP FOR TRIAL 

UNPREPARED, HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY MET WITH THE CLIENT, HAD 

NOT FILED A JURY DEMAND, AND VIOLATED THE CLIENT’S RIGHT 

TO EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION UNDER THE SIXTH AND 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3 

THE TRIAL COURT’S JUDGMENT FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY OF 

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE WHERE APPELLANT’S HUSBAND WAS THE AGGRESSOR, 

APPELLANT’S HUSBAND ACTED IN A THREATENING MANNER, AND 

APPELLANT HAD A REASONABLE BELIEF THAT SHE NEEDED TO 

SLAP HER HUSBAND IN THE FACE TO DEFEND HERSELF AGAINST 

THE IMMINENT USE OF UNLAWFUL FORCE BY HER HUSBAND. 

{¶9} E.G.’s second and third assignments of error argue that she received ineffective 

assistance of counsel at trial and that her conviction for domestic violence is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. These assignments of error are moot in light of this Court’s resolution of 

her first assignment of error. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
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III. 

{¶10} E.G.’s first assignment of error is sustained. Her second and third assignments of 

error are moot. The judgment of the Medina Municipal Court is reversed, and this matter is 

remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Judgment reversed 

and cause remanded. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Medina Municipal 

Court, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellee. 

 

 LYNNE S. CALLAHAN 

 FOR THE COURT 

TEODOSIO, P. J. 

HENSAL, J. 

CONCUR. 
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APPEARANCES: 

DAVID SHELDON, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

J. MATTHEW LANIER, Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.