Center for the Study of 

National Reconnaissance

June 2020

ii

Editorial Staff

Editor James D. Outzen, Ph.D.

Managing Editor Patrick D. Widlake

Design and layout Charles P. Glover II

The Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance (CSNR) publishes National Reconnaissance—Journal 

of the Discipline and Practice for the information, education, and use of the broader national security community, 

especially those government and contractor personnel who are involved with national reconnaissance. Our objective 

is to promote dialogue among these professionals and to identify lessons for them by facilitating a synthesis of the 

technical, operational, and policy components that define and shape the enterprise of national reconnaissance.

Disclaimer: The information in National Reconnaissance may not necessarily reflect the official views of the National 

Reconnaissance Office, the Intelligence Community, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government 

entity. Nothing in the content should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government endorsement of the 

factual statements or interpretation.

Contributions: We on the editorial staff invite authors from the NRO and the extended Intelligence Community—

both current government and contractor employees, as well as alums—to submit scholarly articles, commentaries, 

and book reviews for publication consideration. Your articles for National Reconnaissance may address any doctrinal, 

theoretical, operational, or historical aspect of the discipline and practice of national reconnaissance. 

Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance (CSNR): The CSNR is an independent NRO research body 

that reports to the Director of the Business Plans and Operations Directorate. Our primary objective is to ensure 

that NRO leadership has the analytical framework and historical context to make effective policy and programmatic 

decisions. We accomplish our mission by promoting the study, dialogue, and understanding of the discipline, practice, 

and history of national reconnaissance. We chronicle the past, analyze the present, search for lessons for the future, 

and identify models of excellence that are timeless.

Correspondence: You should direct all correspondence related to National Reconnaissance to:

National Reconnaissance Office 

Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance 

14675 Lee Road

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703-227-9368

Internet: csnr@nro.mil

1

THE 4C1000 SEVEN TENETS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

—THE INNOVATION SECRET AT THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE AND SILICON VALLEY

The 4C1000 Seven Tenets for the 21st Century—The Innovation 

Secret at the National Reconnaissance Office and Silicon Valley1

Robert A. McDonald, Ph.D., M. Sam Araki, & Patrick Widlake2

Abstract: The NRO management philosophy of the “4C1000 Seven 

Tenets” (7 Tenets) shaped an environment for creativity and innovation 

that resulted in revolutionary changes in overhead reconnaissance 

during the Cold War—a remarkable paradigm that played a critical role 

in bringing the Cold War to a peaceful end. In this article we selected 

four imagery reconnaissance programs as examples to illustrate this 

point. In Figure 5 of the article you will find a summary timeline graphic 

that illustrates the short time period for development, the innovative 

accomplishments, and the revolutionary impact of these four imagery 

reconnaissance programs that benefited from the principles in the 7 

Tenets. “Silicon Valley companies” subsequently applied these same 

principles, and that resulted in a 21st century technological revolution. 

This revolution created innovative products and services that rapidly 

became interwoven into the daily lives of billions of people worldwide. 

The findings from independent analyses of the principles inherent 

in the 7 Tenets have validated their contributions to innovation and 

revolution changes.

Innovation has been the hallmark of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and 

Silicon Valley. Their successes have been revolutionary, and have changed the world. 

What is the secret of their successes? Is their secret applicable to 21st century challenges? 

The answers: to the first question, their secret was that they embraced the “4C1000 

Seven Tenets” (7 Tenets), and to the second question, definitely yes, the 7 Tenets are 

applicable for the 21st century.

1 All information in this article, including all statements of fact, opinion, or analysis, are the product of independent 

assessments. They may not reflect the official views of the National Reconnaissance Office, the Intelligence 

Community, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the 

contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government endorsement of the Research Note’s factual 

statements and interpretations. The CSNR cleared this article for public release [Insert Date] through the NRO’s prepublication review process.

2 Dr. Robert A. McDonald, Ph.D. is Emeritus Director, CSNR; Mr. M. Sam Araki is retired President of Lockheed 

Martin Missiles & Space; Mr. Patrick D. Widlake is the Deputy Director of CSNR, and Chief of CSNR Research, 

Studies, & Analysis. We thank our reviewers, Dr. James Outzen. Mr. Dennis Adams, and Mr. James Godfrey for their 

insightful comments.

National Reconnaissance – Journal of the Discipline and Practice 

(Advanced pre-print, June 2020) 

Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance
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These tenets are foundational principles that grew out of a competitive, decentralized 

structure for development of Cold War national reconnaissance systems—principles that 

evolved out of practices by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in its development of the 

U-2, the practices by the Naval Research Laboratory in its development of the first signals 

intelligence satellites, Grab, and the practices by the CIA and US Air Force in their joint 

development of the first photoreconnaissance satellite, Corona. During these early days of the 

Cold War the principles became focused and refined in the program offices of the National 

Reconnaissance Office, and the NRO came to symbolize those practices.3

We have called these principles the “4C1000 Tenets” because they reflect the management 

philosophy of this national reconnaissance intelligence organization—an organization that was 

so highly classified during the Cold War, that its name and acronym, National Reconnaissance 

Office and NRO, infrequently were spoken. The NRO typically was referred to by the room 

number of its Director’s office, Pentagon Room 4C1000. Hence, the “4C1000 Tenets.”

The 7 Tenets are an overarching management philosophy and practice that generates an 

environment for creativity and innovation with an appropriate infrastructure to maintain a 

rapid pace. During the Cold War the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) became a focus 

for evolving these principles during its ground-breaking development of America’s space-based 

reconnaissance, along with the associated 

data processing, dissemination, and 

information capabilities. In more-recent 

times, Silicon Valley has become a new 

focus for innovation, and it has been, 

perhaps unknowingly, applying these 

same principles with its explosion of 

21st century technological breakthrough 

companies. These companies have been 

achieving remarkable innovations in the 

world of computer technology, artificial 

intelligence, data processing, and 

communications resulting in the Internet 

revolution. The 7 Tenets are principles 

that we see continuing to be relevant 

well into the 21st century providing 

innovative solutions that can contribute 

to future acquisitions for the national 

security community.

3 The Cold War NRO reconnaissance programs were organized into three collaborative, yet competitive overarching 

program offices formed by three separate organizations, the Air Force for Program A, the CIA for Program B, and 

the Navy for Program C.

4C1000 Seven Tenets

1. Focus on threat-based need

2. Adhere to short timelines

3. Maintain resource stability in funding 

and staffing

4. Rely on small, streamlined, breakaway, 

collaborative team

5. Employ strong systems engineering & 

program management

6. Adapt and draw from the latest 

advances in technology and concepts 

of operation.

7. Establish a short chain of command 

& avoid bureaucracy.
3

THE 4C1000 SEVEN TENETS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

—THE INNOVATION SECRET AT THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE AND SILICON VALLEY

To demonstrate that relevance we need only briefly review some of the innovative 

successes. (While there could be numerous examples from across the intelligence disciplines 

of national reconnaissance, we have limited our discussion to four imagery examples from 

the early years, in part to keep our discussion unclassified.)4 The principles inherent in the 

7 Tenets played essential roles in ensuring the Intelligence Community’s dramatic successes 

during the Cold War successes that resulted in the development of the U-2 reconnaissance 

aircraft, the Corona photoreconnaissance satellite, the succeeding Gambit and Hexagon 

photoreconnaissance satellites, and the subsequent Kennen near-real-time imagery 

reconnaissance satellite. During the turn of the century, the same principles were crucial 

factors at innovative Silicon Valley companies that created a revolution in technology.

The U-2 Reconnaissance Aircraft.

It was a joint CIA and Air Force program team that produced the U-2—an aircraft 

that was technologically innovative, operated at a high altitude, and penetrated Soviet 

airspace to collect vital intelligence. In the course of its development, the program team 

created an organizational structure and managerial model that influenced the subsequent 

NRO successes in developing the Corona, Gambit, Hexagon and Kennen reconnaissance 

satellites. The lessons of the U-2 experience were the foundation for the NRO to develop 

and apply its 7 Tenets (Lewis, 1997, p. 13).

The CIA project leader for the U-2 program was Richard Bissell. He created a small 

break- away team that worked in partnership with Col Osmund Ritland’s Air Force team 

and Clarence “Kelly” Johnson’s streamlined Lockheed Skunk Works®.5 The government 

and contractor collaboration integrated the two operating paradigms, and with their 

short chains-of-command, they cut through the red tape of procurement and made swift 

decisions. This rapid and efficient decision process translated into exceptional project 

execution by both the government and contractor. During program execution, much of the 

decision making actually transferred from government to contractor. The two teams were 

motivated by a sense of national emergency to respond to the nuclear threat of the Soviet 

Union. Bissell and Johnson liberated their team’s talent with an informal environment 

4 One signals intelligence (sigint) example was the application of the 7 Tenets to the Agena Aftrack Project, which was 

initiated in 1959. It was a joint Air Force-CIA series of “experimental systems” where a small, self-contained electronic 

payload was attached to the aft rack of the Agena vehicle that carried the Corona photo-satellite reconnaissance system. 

The payload was capable of detecting electronic signals. Consistent with the 7 Tenets, the project relied on a small, 

streamlined breakaway, collaborative team that did not necessarily conform to all military standards and practices and 

would develop a system in a short timeline of less than nine months. The Aftrack multiple mission project, including a 

series subsats, extended to the end of the Corona missions. The project made major contributions to national security, such 

as identifying a high density of Soviet early-warning radars, identifying the locations of Soviet communications transmitters, and 

monitoring Soviet radar tracking of US reconnaissance satellites (NRO, 1973).

5 The Skunk Works® came into being during World War II when Kelly Johnson established a small break-away Lockheed 

team that was organized unconventionally and typically broke the rules by challenging the bureaucratic system that stifled 

innovation. The name was adapted from Al Capp’s popular newspaper comic strip at the time, Li’l Abner. The strip’s “Skonk 

Works” was a “mysterious and malodorous place deep in the forest.” Lockheed’s adaptation, (i.e., Skunk Works®) is a 

registered trademark of the company (Lockheed, 2019).
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that encouraged risk-taking, innovation, quick decision making, and maintaining a fast 

pace (Lewis, 1997, pp. 15ff; Pedlow & Welzenbach, 1998, p. 61).

The result was the timely delivery of a reconnaissance system that made critical 

contributions to national security. (See Figure 1.) In less than eight months after 

Presidential approval, Lockheed delivered, on 25 July 1955, the first U-2 at a cost that 

actually was under budget.6 The aircraft had a range of 2,950 miles at an altitude of 

72,000 ft., beyond the reach of known anti-aircraft weapons and interceptor aircraft. The 

first official flight was on 8 August 1955, with final testing completed in 1956 and the first 

operational mission on 20 June 1956. The U-2’s reconnaissance exposed the US “bomber 

gap” with the USSR as a myth, and it increased the capabilities of America’s deterrent 

force by providing timely and precise targeting data (Lewis, 1997, pp. 15ff; Pedlow & 

Welzenbach, 1998, pp. 66, 70, 76, 93, 100, 316-317; ).

Figure 1a (left). U-2 Reconnaissance Aircraft (Courtesy, 

CSNR Reference Collection). Figure 1b (right). U-2 

Photograph of Saratov-Engels Air Field at Ramenskoye, USSR, 

1956. (Courtesy, CSNR Reference Collection, via Defense 

Intelligence Journal, Vol. 8 No. 1, Summer 1999.)7

The Corona Reconnaissance Satellite.

The spectacular success of the U-2 project resulted in replicating, for the development 

of Corona, the same kind of break-away, collaborative team approach. After President 

Eisenhower formally endorsed the Corona project in February 1958, CIA’s Bissell 

became the CIA project manager with responsibility for the payload, mission, and 

photo exploitation. The Air Force’s Ritland took charge of the Air Force support, with 

Col Lee Battle guiding the day-to-day Air Force management. Lockheed was the prime 

contractor, with James Plummer the Lockheed program manager who became responsible 

for the engineering and development of the payload, spacecraft, recovery vehicle. As the 

6 President Eisenhower approved the U-2 project in early November 1954, and on 24 November Eisenhower orally 

approved the CIA managing the project with assistance from the USAF. The initial planning document called for 

deploying the aircraft within a period of 20 months at a cost of $22 million (Pedlow & Welzenbach, p. iii, 33, 36-37).

7 The U-2 acquired coverage that demonstrated the Soviet threat was not as great as initial intelligence assessments had 

suggested. During the U-2’s first months of operations it identified less than three dozen Bison bombers at this airfield 

near Ramenskoye. (McDonald, 1999).
5

THE 4C1000 SEVEN TENETS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

—THE INNOVATION SECRET AT THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE AND SILICON VALLEY

prime contractor, Lockheed was responsible for integrating the components from the 

various subcontractors. The break-away teams operated in a very informal manner with 

a high degree of collaboration among the various government and industry components 

(McDonald, 1997a, p 63-64; McDonald, 1997d, p. 148).

The 7 Tenets were emerging during development of Corona, as evidenced in 

Bissell and Battle’s management style, which included an approach that focused on 

selecting a small group of good people, demanding quality performance, focusing on 

mission accomplishments, avoiding busywork, and relying on contractor’s technical 

recommendations. Battle summarized his principles in what he called “Battle’s Laws.”8

Those laws, along with Bissell’s philosophy, Kelly Johnson’s Skunk Works® concept, and 

NRO’s early management style, subsequently evolved into the 7 Tenets (Battle, 2002).

The result was that, 30 months after approval, the Corona program was conducting 

operational missions, and did so for 12 years from August 1960 to May 1972.9 (See Figure 2.) 

With Corona, the U.S. had launched the first camera into space, taking pictures from 100 

nautical miles, ejecting the film back toward earth, snatching the film capsule by an aircraft 

in midair, and acquiring photographs that ultimately had a resolution of 6 1⁄2 feet. During its 

operational life, Corona collected over 800,000 images. This kind of imagery provided US 

policy makers with intelligence not previously available. Additionally, the technology enabled 

the intelligence analysts to demonstrate that the USSR did not have an overwhelming 

number of intercontinental ballistic missile, thereby disproving the myth of a “missile gap” 

between US and Soviet capabilities. More basically, there grew a consensus that Corona was 

instrumental in keeping America from overestimating the Soviet nuclear capability, thereby 

avoiding the US overreacting with an unnecessary nuclear buildup (McDonald, 1997b, p. 8; 

McDonald, 1997c, p. 213; 1997b, p. 8).

8 Col Battle issued his management principles in the form of “Battle’s Laws” (McDonald 1997b).

9 President Eisenhower formally endorsed the Corona project in February 1958. On 18 August Corona was conducting 

an operational mission (McDonald, 1997a, p. 63; McDonald, 1997b, p. 301).
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Figure 2a (left top) Agena-B that served as a spacecraft for Corona (Photo courtesy of Smithsonian, NASM, 

2019). Figure 2b (left bottom). Artist concept of cut-away view of Corona KH-4B camera in flight (Photo 

courtesy of CSNR Reference Collection). Figure 2c (right). Corona photograph showing construction of 

an SS-7 launch site at the Soviet Yurya ICMB Complex, 28 June 1962, Mission 9038.10 (Photos courtesy of 

CSNR Reference Collection, via Photogrammetric Engineering & Remote Sensing, Vol LCL, No. 6, 1995.)

The Gambit and Hexagon Reconnaissance Satellites

The NRO continued to apply the 7 Tenets as it went on to develop two additional 

photoreconnaissance satellites, the Gambit as a companion to Corona, and Hexagon as a 

follow- on for a search mission. These multifaceted programs were highly complex, and—

through application of the principles of the 7 Tenets—the program teams developed, what 

was a novel “systems engineering” approach. This approach uniquely conceptualized and 

integrated all program elements, including distinct spacecraft subsystems, camera optics, 

film, and ground control components, and utilized a “factory-to-launchpad” scheme that 

entailed a strategy to fully test and ensure reliance of all system components (Ragusa, 

2012, p. 81; Araki & Treat, 2012, p. 91, 93).

Some three years after the first Corona successes, the NRO, under the auspices of its Air 

Force Program A, deployed the first of its two high-resolution Gambit photoreconnaissance 

satellites. This first Gambit series of satellites operated for four years from July 1963 to 

June 1967, and provided average resolutions of about 2 to 3 feet. At the same time, the 

NRO, also under the auspices of its Air Force Program A, was developing its second, 

even higher- resolution series of Gambit satellites, which took only 24 months to develop 

10 Corona monitored Soviet activity at this complex, and analysts determined that the Soviets were constructing an 

SS-7 ICBM launch site. As a result of the subsequent 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement on Strategic Missiles, the 

Soviet Union deactivated the site and destroyed its launch facilities. Figures 2a (spacecraft) and 2b (payload) are an 

example of the close teamwork between the CIA, which was responsible for the payload, and the Air Force, which was 

responsible for the spacecraft, as well as the
7

THE 4C1000 SEVEN TENETS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

—THE INNOVATION SECRET AT THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE AND SILICON VALLEY

and then operated for 18 years from July 1966 to April 1984 with a best resolution better 

than 2 feet.11 Together these high resolution Gambit systems gave the U.S. Intelligence 

community a reliable collector of high-resolution technical intelligence for 21 years. They 

provided such significant spatial resolution that photo interpreters were able to conduct 

detailed scientific and technical analyses of Soviet air, naval, and ground equipment, 

including the identification of Soviet armor and artillery down to model. (See Figure 3.) 

A four-month Gambit-3 mission would image 27,652 frames of film and capture 48,372 

intelligence targets (Ragusa, 2012, pp. 78, 82, 83).12

Figure 3a (left). Schematic of Gambit-3 spacecraft (28.6 ft long, 5 feet diameter). Figure 3b (right). 

Gambit image of a Soviet aircraft carrier under construction at Mykolayiv, 4 July 1984. 

(Photos courtesy of CSNR Reference Collection.)

The continuity of personnel, both within the government and within industry, resulted 

in a cadre of experienced engineers and managers who could apply what they learned 

to the new problems and challenges. By the time the NRO began developing Hexagon 

(first under the auspices of the its CIA Program B and then its Air Force Program A), 

the 7 tenets philosophy was so engrained into the program offices that even though 

Hexagon represented a technological leap with an extensive advancement in capability 

and performance, the NRO completed its development in only 36 months. (See Figure 

4.) The Hexagon Program had learned from the Corona and Gambit experiences how to 

refine its systems engineering approach thereby creating a “factory-to-pad” concept that 

integrated spacecraft, launch vehicle, and ground station operations into a sophisticated 

systems engineering approach that enabled the development and operation of a highly 

reliable system free of on-orbit anomalies. The film load went from 100 pounds to two 

thousand pounds; the satellite diameter from 5 feet to 10 feet; the weight from 6,000 

pounds to 30,000 pounds. Its twin panoramic cameras could photograph, in a single 

11 The specific resolution was so good that in 2019, 35 years later, the exact number remains classified, and we cannot 

reveal it.

12 The second Gambit system actually was called “Gambit-3” or “Gambit Cubed” because of how the NRO selected the 

best proposed option for this second, improved Gambit (McDonald & Widlake, 2012, p. 5).
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frame, an area of the earth’s surface that was 300 nautical miles by 16.8 nautical miles 

area, meaning that in one frame it could scan 370 nautical miles covering approximately 

the distance between Washington, DC and Cincinnati, OH. Hexagon satellites operated 

for 13 years (June 1971-April 1984) and provided complete stereo coverage of the denied 

areas in the Sino-Soviet bloc with a ground resolution of 2.7 feet (Araki & Treat, 2012, pp. 

90, 97; McDonald & Widlake, 2012, pp. 40-41).13

Figure 4a (left). Artist Concept of Hexagon Vehicle (60 ft long, diameter 10 ft). Figure 4b (right). 

Hexagon Panoramic photograph of Tyuratam Missile Test Range in Former USSR, August 1984.14

(Photos courtesy, CSNR Reference Collection.)

Together Gambit and Hexagon played a significant role in giving the Nixon 

Administration confidence to begin arms control negotiations. Gambit’s high-resolution 

cameras provided the US with it first-ever close-in satellite surveillance capabilities, which 

enabled analysts to assess U.S. adversaries’ scientific and technical capabilities; Hexagon’s 

camera’s photographed and accurately charted virtually all of the world’s inhabited 

regions. These two NRO reconnaissance systems gave Presidents enough confidence in 

their knowledge of the strategic threat that they were willing to enter into arms control 

agreements with the Soviet Union (McDonald & Widlake, 2012, pp. 39, 42, 48).

13 The Hexagon program actually closed in 1986. However, we used the year 1984 because it reflects the year of final 

Hexagon collection when its operational missions ended. The NRO had launched what was to be one final Hexagon 

mission in April 1986; however, that mission terminated immediately after launch when the titan booster exploded 

shortly after launch. With that final launch in 1986, the Hexagon program closed.

14 Hexagon provided the US with a broad-area search capability that monitored Soviet and other adversaries activities 

in denied areas, giving the US decision makers the confidence to enter into arms control agreements. (McDonald 

& Widlake, 2012).
9

THE 4C1000 SEVEN TENETS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

—THE INNOVATION SECRET AT THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE AND SILICON VALLEY

Kennen Near-Real-Time Space Imaging15

The NRO’s application of the 7 Tenets enabled the NRO, under the auspices of its CIA 

Program B, to develop the Kennen near-real-time imaging reconnaissance satellite in the 

1970s. This satellite system represented a revolutionary transformation in space-based 

imagery reconnaissance, moving from a delayed-recovery, film-based photo reconnaissance 

capability to a near-real-time, electro-optical-based digital imaging system (Outzen, 2019).

In the early 1970s President Nixon assigned a high priority to the NRO for development 

of a near-real-time imaging capability. The United States Intelligence Board had endorsed 

the near-real-time imaging requirement in 1971, and on 23 September 1971 President 

Nixon approved a plan for Kennen development. Presidential advisor, Edwin Land, had 

told Nixon that this system would be a “quantum jump that would give the U.S. an 

unquestioned technological lead in the field.”16 The President set the challenging target 

date of 1976 for initial operations. Some sixty months after Nixon’s approval, the NRO 

met the target date, and on 19 Dec 1976 the NRO successfully launched the Kennen 

electro-optical satellite. On 19 January 1977 former DCI George H. W. Bush signed a 

cable declaring this innovative electro-optical system as operational. This fourth NRO 

satellite imaging system satisfied Land’s straightforward statement of requirements for 

satellite imagery, “See it All, See it Well, and See it Now.” Hexagon saw it all; Gambit saw 

it well; and Kennen saw it now (Outzen, 2012, pp. 117, 130; Perry, 1974, p.20, 132; NRO, 

2011; McDonald, 2002a, pp. 35, 38). 

The NRO’s development and deployment of this revolutionary system created a 

demonstrated need to innovate processing of the image data. The application of the 7 

Tenets led to further innovation during this period, eventually resulting in enhanced 

capabilities in imagery collection, storage, retrieval, and dissemination, as well as the 

development of new signals intelligence collection systems and programs to support 

military operations. America’s fighting forces now had near-real-time access to national 

reconnaissance, and when the first Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) broke out, NRO 

imagery and signals intelligence systems played critical roles in supporting the decisive 

U.S.-led victory (Teets, 2004; Berkowitz, 2011, p. 23). 

15 Former DDNRO Bob Naka selected the Middle English word, “kennen,” to be the program name. In Middle English 

the word meant “to perceive;” the same word in German means “to know” (Hofman, 1971).

16 Edwin Land, among other appointments, chaired the National Reconnaissance Panel of the President’s Science 

Advisor Committee and served as a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (McDonald, 

2002a, p. 27.
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The National Reconnaissance Imaging Programs and the 7 Tenets

The NRO’s experiences in developing Cold War imaging reconnaissance satellites is 

a model that demonstrates the impact and value of the 7 Tenets. This becomes evident 

when we review those experiences within the context of the specific tenets.

For example, for Kennen, one Tenet is especially relevant, Tenet 6 (“Adapt and draw 

from the latest advances in technology”). During Kennen’s development, the program 

office aggressively took advantage of the advancing technology implied in Moore’s Law. 

In 1965 the number of components on a microchip had doubled, and Gordon Moore 

predicted at the time that over the short term that rate could be expected to continue, 

which it did.17 Moore told us that this phenomenon would bring about a proliferation of 

electronics and push science into many new areas. And drawing on that proliferation, the 

NRO was developing its reconnaissance satellites and produced Kennen, the beginning of 

the digital age (Moore, 1965; Smil, 2015).

More broadly, the success of all the NRO programs in our examples can, in large part, 

be attributed to the impact of Tenet 4 (“Rely on small, streamlined breakaway collaborative 

team”), and Tenet 7 (“Avoid bureaucracy and establish short chain of command”). The 

reality is that the NRO and its programs essentially were exempt from most of the review 

and approval processes that were imposed on other intelligence and defense organizations. 

The NRO structure offered a conduit to essentially “bypass” the numerous bureaucratic 

layers of review, approval, and oversight that was imposed on other agencies.

Fundamentally, however, the driving force for the NRO successes was derived from 

Tenet 1 (“Focus on threat-based need”). During the Cold War there was a very real, 

immediate, and overwhelming threat that was clearly ominous--that of a nuclear attack. A 

Soviet nuclear attack could destroy the US. Both the American leadership and population 

knew this. On 7 September 7, 1961, President John Kennedy sent a message to all 

Americans in which he warned, “Nuclear weapons and the possibility of nuclear war are 

facts of life we cannot ignore today . . . The ability to survive coupled with the will to do 

so therefore are essential to our country.” In response, the government was identifying 

public buildings where there could be fallout shelters; individuals were building their own 

private fallout shelters, and the Intelligence Community was developing innovative ways—

through national reconnaissance—to collect intelligence about this threat. By focusing 

on the threat-based need, the NRO found itself, by necessity, adhering to the principle 

of Tenet 2 (“Short timelines”), which is highlighted on the summary timeline in Figure 5 

(Kennedy, 1961).

17 I n the 48 years from 1971 to 2019, “the number of electronic components that can be crammed onto a given area on a chip has 

increased seven orders of magnitude. That corresponds to a doubling about every two years,” which is consistent with Moore’s 

prediction (Smil, 2019). 
11

THE 4C1000 SEVEN TENETS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

—THE INNOVATION SECRET AT THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE AND SILICON VALLEY Figure 5. Results From Applying the Seven Tenets to the Development of Five National Reconnaissance Systems-- Summary Timeline Showing the Impact of the Programs’ Innovations and the Comparative Time for Development.
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But the underpinning of the success came out of applying Tenets 3 and 5 (“Stability 

in funding and staffing with a focus on strong systems engineering and program 

management”). In the first instance, these NRO programs were highly classified and 

compartmented, which afforded them a sustained and protected fiscal commitment.

Perhaps equally, or even more important than the sustained funding was the people, 

where two of the Tenets came into play, Tenet 4 (“Streamlined collaborative team”) and 

Tenet 5 (“Strong system engineering & program management).

The NRO and its industry partners recruited a strong cadre of long-term, highly-skilled 

people who were experts—drawn from across government, industry, and academia. The 

people became a cadre that government and industry were able to retain. Each individual 

was committed to both the challenge of the problem and the task dealing with the threat. 

At the same time, the leadership was committed to protecting and rewarding them 

throughout their NRO career for their contributions.

This resulted in the creation of a series of collaborative government-industry-academia 

teams where each component put forward its best people.18 These collaborative teams had 

a short command chain and almost nonexistent bureaucratic constraints. The teams had 

end-to- end responsibility for the development, production, and operation of the system 

they were developing. As a collaborative group these teams of highly proficient engineers 

and program managers did not merely take on a temporary job, they typically made a 

career commitment to apply their skills not only to the challenge of the initial program, 

but also to draw on their experiences and insights to address the new challenges of future 

national reconnaissance programs. (McDonald, 2002b, pp xxiii-xxxviii)

Silicon Valley Innovations

The NRO has not been alone in creating revolutionary innovations. Like the NRO’s 

innovative successes in foreign intelligence collection, Silicon Valley companies have created 

technology and business successes. Silicon Valley, as a group of high-tech companies, has 

become a global leader in technological innovation and a dominant player in the world of 

information and cyberspace. The “Big Four Tech Companies”– Google, Facebook, Apple, 

and Amazon—have created products and services that are interwoven into the daily lives 

of billions of people worldwide, have created hundreds of thousands of high-paying jobs, 

and have generated over $2.3 trillion in wealth. They have become centers of innovation. 

How were both the NRO and Silicon Valley able to become successful innovators that had 

revolutionary effects (Chander, 2014; Galloway, 2018, p. 1)?

The answer is a common explanation, the principles of the 7 Tenets. An analysis of the 

Silicon Valley companies suggests they intuitively applied those principles. This becomes 

clearer by examining more closely, within the context of the 7 Tenets, one of the “Big 

Four,” namely Google.

18 Companies consistently placed and retained their best people so as to be most competitive to win contract 

competitions, and then ensured these best people were maintained on the team for the duration.
13

THE 4C1000 SEVEN TENETS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

—THE INNOVATION SECRET AT THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE AND SILICON VALLEY

Google co-founders, Larry Page and Sergey Brin set up their company in a garage 

and hired one employee (consistent with Tenet #4, small breakaway collaborative team); 

they did not have a formal business plan or strategy and maintained an informal work 

environment (consistent with Tenet #7, avoid bureaucracy and maintain short chain of 

command); they obtained a stream of funding from venture capitalists and recruited 

bright engineers from the region (consistent with Tenets # 3 and # 7, stable funding/

staffing and strong engineers); they stayed focused on the end users and getting the world’s 

information online, where in the commercial world the market and its threats drive the 

need (consistent with Tenet #1, focus on threat-based need) (Vise & Malseed, 2008).

The result of employing these principles was to create a revolution in the way information 

is made available to the masses and creating a company that became indispensable to 

millions of people. Google became a magical capability that produced speedy, relevant 

answers to queries hundreds of millions of times daily. The company also proved to be a 

remarkable financial success. In its first year as a public company, employees and major 

shareholders sold $3 billion worth of Google shares. In 2016 Google earned $20 billion in 

profits (Vise & Malseed, 2008; Galloway, 2018).

In 1995 the US Government began a program of declassifying imagery and technology 

associated with NRO’s Cold War space reconnaissance programs. This resulted in the 

commercial sector and Silicon Valley taking advantage of the newly-available technology 

and commercializing the realm of acquiring and marketing space imagery. For example, 

Ikonos-2 is a commercial high- resolution imaging satellite that can acquire 1-meter spatial 

resolution imagery.19 The declassification policies and the transfer of previously restricted 

technical information about space imaging shaped a new world in this discipline. There 

was a merging of innovations that had taken place at the NRO and Silicon Valley, and this 

created a pathway that resulted in a 21st century information transformation exemplified 

by Google in its launching Google Earth in 2006. This resulted in what some have called 

the “democratizing access to satellite imagery”—a world where anyone with access to a 

computer or smart phone also has access to overhead imagery of almost any place in the 

world (Denis, Claveri, Pasco, et. al., 2017; ESA, 2019; McDonald, 1997e).

Application of 7 Tenets to 21st Century national security

The 21st century applicability of, and need for, the 7 Tenets is apparent not only from 

examining the successes created by the NRO and Silicon Valley, but also apparent in the 

independent analyses of management practices that echo the principles. Two examples are 

most relevant, the Packard Commission and the Jeremiah Panel.

19 Drawing on its experiences with NRO Cold War project, the Ikonos project was initiated by Lockheed Martin Missiles 

& Space, the same company that was the prime contractor for Corona. (ESA, 2019; McDonald, 1997) 
14

N AT ION A L 

R E C ONN A ISS A NC E 

First, the Packard Commission observed that efficient Defense acquisition in the 

1980s was frustrated by rigid bureaucratic procedures. It concluded that more successful 

management would be in the implementation of short, unambiguous lines of authority 

that could cut through bureaucratic red tape, along with small staffs of highly competent 

professional personnel where there would be an emphasis on innovation, and results 

(White House, 1986, pp. xxii, xxiv, xxv)

Second, and more relevant to the NRO and Intelligence Community are the 1990s 

findings of the Jeremiah Panel. The Panel observed that ever since the NRO’s inception it 

used business practices that increased the likelihood and speed of success. These practices 

included adequate and stable funding, streamlined management, top-quality personnel, 

empowered managers, “cradle-to-grave” management, and acceptance of failure—all of 

which are reflected in the 7 Tenets. The Panel went on to point out that these practices 

have not been unique to the NRO. The Panel saw them reflected in the successes of 

other programs that had extreme national security importance and urgency, such as the 

Manhattan Project’s atom bomb, the Polaris Project’s submarine-launched nuclear missile, 

and the Air Force’s F-117 Stealth Fighter. The success of these programs further endorses 

the validity and justify the continued application of the 7 Tenets (NRO, 1996, p 16).

The NRO and Silicon Valley experiences with the principles of the 7 Tenets created 

environments that encouraged risk-taking and innovation. In both cases, this resulted in 

transformative 21st century changes that are comparable to revolutionary changes of the 

past. In the case of the NRO, its 20th century innovative use of space reconnaissance to 

collect information about the earth’s surface was transformative for the acquisition and 

presentation of spatial information, just as the 6th century B.C. innovative Greek use 

of mathematics in mapmaking was transformative for the representation of the earth’s 

surface at that time (McDonald, 1997b).

In the case of Silicon Valley, its 20th and 21st century technological innovative ways 

of collecting, processing, and transmitting information was transformative for how 

information is made available and transmitted, just as how the 15th century Guttenberg 

printing press created a revolution in making books and scientific tomes affordable and 

widely available to the masses for the first time (Vise & Malseed, 2008).

The 7 Tenets have been and continue to be fundamental to successful, innovative, 

and timely revolutionary advancements that have been transformative. It is out of the 

NRO Cold War projects we discussed in this article that a technological infrastructure 

grew in places like the Boston Route 128 corridor and the Stanford Industrial park-- an 

industrial base that has come to serve as a source of innovation for Silicon Valley and 

the Intelligence Community. Over the years, the NRO has drawn on these tenets to 

consistently make enhancements that have increased its capabilities to expand its mission 

and respond to an ever-growing user base.
15

THE 4C1000 SEVEN TENETS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

—THE INNOVATION SECRET AT THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE AND SILICON VALLEY

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