E PLURIBUS UNUM

NATIONAL TRA SPORTATIO

N

B OARD

SAFE T Y

N

National Transportation Safety Board 

Washington, D.C. 20594 

Railroad Accident Brief

Accident No.: DCA-06-FR-009 

Location: Queens, New York 

Date: August 5, 2006 

Time: 3:53 p.m. eastern daylight time1

Railroad: Long Island Rail Road 

Property Damage: None 

Injuries: None 

Fatalities: 1 

Type of Accident: Passenger fatality 

The Accident 

On August 5, 2006, about 3:53 p.m., a 5-foot 6-inch, 110-pound, 18-year-old female 

passenger exiting a Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) commuter train at Woodside station in 

Queens, New York, fell through a 7 7/8-inch horizontal gap between the rail car and the station 

platform. (See figure 1.) After falling through the gap to track level beneath the platform, she did 

not follow instructions from the train conductor and her friends to remain still and wait to be 

rescued. Instead, the woman crawled under the platform and into the path of an oncoming 

passenger train. She sustained fatal injuries. Toxicology testing showed that her blood alcohol 

concentration (BAC) was 0.23 gram percent.2 The weather at the time of the accident was sunny, 

clear, and warm. 

The passenger was part of a group en route to a concert on Randall’s Island in New York 

City. Some of the group had met earlier and had begun to drink alcohol before arriving at the 

LIRR Merrick station, where they met with more friends. They planned to travel on the LIRR 

from Merrick station to Jamaica station and then change trains for Woodside station, where they 

would take a bus to Randall’s Island. At Jamaica station, they boarded train 6113 (car 7548) to 

Woodside station. According to witnesses, many in the group had brought alcoholic beverages on 

board and were drinking on the train. 

 1

 All times in this brief are eastern daylight time. 

2

 New York State motor vehicle law treats a BAC of 0.05 to 0.07 as Driving While Ability Impaired, a BAC of 

0.08 or higher as Driving While Intoxicated, and a BAC of 0.18 or higher as Aggravated Driving While Intoxicated. 

NTSB/RAB-09/01 
 Figure 1. Gap into which passenger fell.

The event recorder from the locomotive showed that train 6113 stopped at the Woodside 

station alongside platform B on main line track 3 about 3:52 p.m. Platform B is an open, center, 

high-level platform3

 that allows trains to operate on both sides. (See figure 2.) After the train had 

stopped, the conductor opened the doors and the passengers began to exit. One passenger said 

that she noticed the gap between the car and the platform and yelled to the others, “watch the 

gap.” One of the group of friends traveling together said that as she exited the train, she turned 

and saw the door begin to close and her friend grab the door with both hands to prevent it from 

closing. Passengers on the platform yelled to the conductor to reopen the doors. When the 

conductor reopened the doors, the friend lost her balance and fell forward into the gap and onto 

the ground beneath the platform.4

 

The conductor saw the passenger fall through the gap and called the LIRR’s Movement 

Bureau. The conductor requested that the third rail power be turned off on main line track 3 in 

Woodside and that the police and emergency medical services (EMS) respond. The passenger’s 

friends and the conductor gathered on the platform above her and told her not to move and that 

they would get her out. Instead of remaining still, she crawled through the space below the 

platform toward the opening on the other side and, ultimately, into the path of train 6464 as it 

 3

 A high-level platform, which is generally 4 feet higher than the top of a rail, allows a passenger to move 

directly from a passenger car to a platform without the need for steps. 4

 Two days after the accident, State of New York Metropolitan Transit Authority police, using the accident 

equipment and positioning the train as close as possible to the accident site, measured the gap from the train to the 

platform at 7 7/8 inches. 

2
pulled into the station on track 2. Event recorder data for train 6464 indicated that the train pulled 

into the station about 3:54 p.m. Upon observing the passenger on the track, the engineer of 

train 6464 said that he placed the train into emergency but was unable to stop in time to avoid 

hitting the passenger. 

Figure 2. Center platform under which passenger crawled, crossing into path of 

oncoming train. 

Emergency personnel from the Fire Department City of New York and EMS arrived 

about 4:05 p.m. The passenger was treated at the scene and then transported by ambulance to 

Bellevue Hospital in Manhattan, where she died of her injuries. 

Investigation of Platform Gaps and Equipment on LIRR 

The LIRR has 125 stations, 264 platform edges, and more than 700 miles of track. It 

carries an average of 288,000 passengers each weekday system wide; 5,700 passengers use the 

Woodside station each weekday. The LIRR shares track with New York & Atlantic Railway, a 

freight train operator that serves 53 locations throughout the system. 

The space between the station platform edge and the car threshold is provided to 

accommodate passenger trains, freight trains, and work trains that pass through the station. 

Through-passenger trains may operate at speeds of up to 80 mph and through-freight trains at 

speeds up to 45 mph. 

3
The station platform at Woodside is on tangent (straight) track. However, 101 stations on 

the LIRR are on curved track. Track curvature increases the necessary horizontal gap between a 

platform and a train to allow rail cars to negotiate through the curve. Further, a soft-suspensionequipped car can sway from side to side and cause a car body to move sideways up to 6 inches. 

There were 61 passenger gap incidents on the LIRR system in 2004, 67 passenger gap 

incidents in 2005, and 25 passenger gap incidents between January and July 2006. The data show 

an average of 3.4 passenger gap incidents per year at the Woodside station between 2000 and 

2006: one incident in 2000; three incidents in 2001; seven incidents in 2002; three incidents in 

2003; seven incidents in 2004; no incidents in 2005; and one incident between January and July 

2006. Injuries from these incidents at Woodside station included bruises and contusions, cuts or 

abrasions, and one head injury. The passenger fatality on August 5, 2006, was the first passenger 

fatality on the LIRR system resulting from a gap incident. 

Safety Board staff conducted a survey to determine the gap size at 40 stations and 96 

platforms on the LIRR. These stations and platforms were chosen based on their incidence of gap 

accidents, as well as numbers of passengers. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), the 

New York Public Transportation Safety Board (PTSB), and the LIRR participated in the survey 

with Board staff. The survey identified stations with horizontal gaps up to 13 3/4 inches on 

straight track and up to 15 1/2 inches on curved track. 

The Association of American Railroads has developed clearance dimensions for the 

movement of different classes of rail cars. General equipment rail cars (Plate C) cannot exceed a 

width of 10 feet 8 inches. The LIRR passenger cars used on the day of the accident were 10 feet 

6 inches wide; at the threshold plates, where passengers board and exit the cars, they were 10 

feet 3/8 inches wide. 

The American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association (AREMA) 

Manual for Railway Engineering recommends a minimum horizontal distance of 5 feet 7 inches 

between track centerline and passenger platform edges (on straight track) to allow trains to travel 

safely past platforms.5 The AREMA manual takes into consideration equipment irregularities, 

track variations, and train dynamics. At the time of the accident, the LIRR passenger station 

design guidelines set the distance between track centerline and platform edges at 5 feet 8 inches; 

after the accident, the LIRR changed the guidelines to 5 feet 7 inches. The postaccident trackcenterline-to-platform-edge measurement at Woodside station was 5 feet 8 inches at the location 

of the door where the passenger fell; therefore, the gap size at this location was within tolerances 

expected. 

FRA Guidance 

Following this accident, the FRA established a working group within the Rail Safety 

Advisory Committee to study the passenger train gap issue. As a result of the committee’s work, 

in December 2007, the FRA issued FRA Approach to Managing Gap Safety. The FRA’s 

 5

 The AREMA standard provides an additional 1 1/2 inches of design clearance between the track centerline 

and a station platform edge for every degree of track curvature to accommodate the safe movement of rail cars 

through curves with high platforms. 

4
guidelines recommend that a hazard management team establish gap standards for every station 

using comprehensive hazard analysis and then monitor and update the standards as the situation 

at each station changes. The FRA provided a hazard analysis process, worksheets, and 

instructions for managing gaps at high-level platforms. The FRA also identified four hazard 

mitigation strategies: (1) hardware and technology, (2) policies and procedures, (3) passenger 

outreach, and (4) employee training. Hardware and technology mitigation strategies may include 

lighting, moveable platforms on curved track, platform edge extenders, foldup edges, and rubber 

fingers that extend from the platform to narrow the gap. Motorized threshold plates may be 

attached to a passenger car and extended when a train stops at a station. Policies and procedure 

changes may include restricting the number of doors that open on an outside curve and having 

station attendants monitor passengers entering and exiting trains to identify problem locations. 

The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 requires the U.S. Department of 

Transportation, within 2 years after enactment, to complete a study that determines the most safe, 

efficient, and cost-effective way to improve the safety of rail passenger station platform gaps and 

to minimize the safety risks associated with such gaps for railroad passengers and employees. 

New York State Public Transportation Safety Board 

On October 11, 2006, the PTSB6 recommended that the LIRR augment its efforts to 

reduce the number of gap incidents by displaying pictographs in conspicuous locations and 

adding stencil warnings on platform edges. On April 18, 2007, a special study titled “Managing 

the Risk of Station Platform Gaps” was published by the PTSB. In that study, the PTSB reviewed 

conditions on the LIRR and the Metro-North Railroad, analyzed gap issues, and made 

recommendations. 

The PTSB report stated 

In looking for statistical patterns to explain and understand these events, we learn 

that gap-related incidents appear to be closely related to the volume of passengers 

at certain locations. Major terminals and transfer points, as defined by an 

approximation of passenger usage, are among the most frequent locations for gap 

incidents, especially on the LIRR. The distribution of these incidents by age and 

gender is unremarkable and little can be derived from a review of current 

literature. Current data does [sic] not show a clear connection between the width 

of the gap and accident frequency.... One factor that is repeatedly evident is that 

the majority of the incidents involve distraction of the passenger or rushing, 

running, jumping, or pushing. 

The PTSB noted that the LIRR had a greater number of gap-related incidents than the 

Metro-North Railroad and attributed this to three factors: (1) the LIRR operates considerably 

more passenger trips than the Metro-North Railroad operates; (2) each railroad has different 

equipment and thus different station platform offset standards, creating a 3-inch greater nominal 

 6

 The PTSB is part of the New York State Department of Transportation. The PTSB is responsible for the safety 

oversight of all public transportation systems operating in New York State that receive State transit operating 

assistance. 

5
gap in most locations on the LIRR; and (3) the operating structures of the two railroads are 

different in significant ways. Also, the LIRR has more passengers and a more complex trackand-platform system. 

The PTSB report notes that the passage of a train can induce a dynamic deflection in the 

track structure up to 1/2 inch. Over time, the alignment of the track can become permanently 

deformed, and increase or decrease the gap. The report noted that wheel tracking characteristics 

and suspension variations (such as bearings, center bolster wear, and soft suspensions for 

passenger trains that allow body roll of 8°) can affect the horizontal position of a rail car by up to 

6 inches, although 3 inches is typical. 

The PTSB report concluded 

In adding the worst case scenario of wear in the rail car components, asymmetric 

car loadings, and maximum suspension travel in combination with maximum 

allowable horizontal and vertical track defects, the total variability in the gap 

would appear to add up to 7 1/2 inches. However ... the dimensions provided are 

the extreme limits of the working tolerances for each component and the apparent 

7 1/2 inches of total variability can only be achieved if every component is at its 

extreme limit and all variability is acting in the same direction simultaneously. 

While it is still theoretically possible to strike the platform at the current industry 

standard of 5 feet 7 inches, there is a distribution to the variability in each 

component and some components will cancel out others. 

As part of its study, the PTSB analyzed each carrier’s gap-related accident reporting 

program and found that eight locations accounted for about half of each year’s incidents. The 

number of passengers during rush hour, not the size of the gap, was the controlling factor. 

The PTSB recommended the following three courses of action: 

• Make the public more aware of the problem by using signs, visual cues, pamphlets, 

and announcements and by soliciting customer input. 

• Strengthen inspection and accident investigation protocols by periodically inspecting 

and measuring factors that affect the gaps, by improving data collection about gap 

events, and by periodically evaluating the effectiveness of the program to make the 

public more aware of the gaps. 

• Develop an engineering and operational plan that minimizes gap variability, and 

review practices to better manage passenger risk (such as improving crowd control). 

LIRR Response to Accident 

According to the PTSB, the implementation of its recommendations by the LIRR was 

immediate and thorough. A public awareness campaign was initiated to include greater use of 

5-inch diamond-shaped signs on each door (at least three interior and three exterior decals on 

each car). Additional warnings were placed on platform edges and in bilingual (Spanish and 

6
English) brochures. A Web-based gap awareness video is available in many languages, and the 

LIRR website contains safety information and tips addressing many potential hazards of riding a 

train. “Watch the Gap” audio announcements are being made more frequently both inside and 

outside trains at more stations, and stickers are given to children that state, “I can step over the 

Gap.” A special program was initiated at the LIRR’s Shea Stadium station: “Watch the Gap” 

flyers were placed on train seats on game days, and announcements were broadcast inside the 

stadium and displayed on the scoreboard. The LIRR held a community forum to solicit input on 

a proposal to extend the length of the platform at one station and thereby eliminate stopping 

trains on the curve at the station. 

The LIRR also conducted a systemwide measurement and analysis of every station and 

platform edge. The LIRR identified 154 door locations with gaps greater than 10 inches and 

reports that it has reduced the size of the gaps at 137 of those locations to date. In May 2008, the 

LIRR issued “Project Plan Book for 2008–2012: Gap Mitigation Plan.” The LIRR states that the 

book was prepared “to align the Departments on the LIRR with the initiatives that the 

Engineering Department will implement over the next four years to mitigate the gap.” There are 

several initiatives for this 4-year period, including the following: modifying existing station 

platforms to address the most serious gaps; installing 1-inch edge boards on platforms, which 

will allow the LIRR to revise the 5-foot-8-inch track-centerline-to-platform-edge to a 5-foot-7-

inch standard; and installing 2-inch threshold plates at the doorway of passenger cars to reduce 

the gap by 2 inches.7 

Finally, an LIRR special subcommittee and a hazard analysis consultant now review gap 

incidents. A revised accident report form was created to collect more focused data, including 

information about passenger flow, customer behavior, and platform loading conditions. The 

loading conditions are reviewed to determine the effect of platform and vestibule crowding on 

gap incidents. Quarterly reports are prepared to review existing mitigation programs and to help 

target future actions. 

Probable Cause 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the 

passenger fatality on August 5, 2006, at the Long Island Rail Road Woodside station in Queens, 

New York, was the passenger falling through a gap between the rail car and the platform while 

attempting to disembark the train, not following instructions from the train conductor to remain 

still until help arrived, and then crawling under the platform and into the path of a moving train 

on the opposite side of the platform. Contributing to the accident was the passenger’s alcoholimpaired condition. 

 7

 These actions will reduce the gap size at Woodside station by 3 inches. 

7
BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 

MARK V. ROSENKER ROBERT L. SUMWALT 

Acting Chairman Member 

DEBORAH A. P. HERSMAN STEVEN R. CHEALANDER 

Member Member 

KATHRYN O’LEARY HIGGINS 

Member 

Adopted: March 13, 2009 

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