An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-423

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 21 October 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Richmond County

No. 10 CRS 52627

ALICE DEWANNA GRAHAM

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 6 November 2013 

by Judge Mark Klass in Richmond County Superior Court. Heard in 

the Court of Appeals 22 September 2014.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 

David L. Gore, III, for the State.

Jon W. Myers for defendant-appellant.

McCULLOUGH, Judge.

Defendant Alice Dewanna Graham appeals from a judgment 

entered upon a jury verdict finding her guilty of trafficking in 

cocaine by possession. The trial court sentenced defendant to a 

mandatory term of 70 to 84 months imprisonment. Defendant 

appeals.

At trial, the State’s evidence tended to show that in 

September 2010 law enforcement officers set up a controlled buy 
-2-

of cocaine targeting Anthony McLaurin. On 13 September 2010 an 

informant telephoned McLaurin to set up a drug deal wherein 

McLaurin would supply the informant with several ounces of 

cocaine. The deal was ultimately set to be conducted at a strip 

mall in Rockingham, North Carolina, on 15 September 2010, and 

the informant was instructed to look for a gray Ford Explorer.

Under the surveillance of law enforcement officers, the 

informant drove to the strip mall and entered a gray Ford 

Explorer. Defendant sat in the driver’s seat and was the only 

person in the vehicle apart from the informant. The informant 

briefly exited the Ford Explorer, signaling law enforcement 

officers to move in. Officers took defendant into custody and 

found a package containing nine ounces of cocaine on the front 

passenger floorboard of the Ford Explorer.

Defendant now argues the trial court erred by allowing into 

evidence testimony from the informant that he knew defendant 

from previous encounters where she delivered drugs to him. 

Defendant asserts that the trial court should have excluded the 

testimony because the court had already sustained an objection 

to similar testimony. We disagree.
-3-

During the State’s questioning of its informant, the 

prosecutor inquired as to the informant’s prior acquisitions of 

cocaine:

Q And who normally brings the drugs when you 

order it?

A Well - like bring it?

Q Yes, sir. 

A She brought it to me like –-

Immediately upon hearing the informant implicate defendant as 

the person who had previously brought him the drugs, defendant’s 

trial counsel objected and the trial court excused the jury from 

the courtroom. The court then conducted a voir dire of the 

informant and heard arguments from counsel as to whether it 

should allow the informant’s testimony under Rules 403 and 

404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. The court 

sustained defendant’s objection, whereupon it called the jury 

back into the courtroom and the State proceeded with its 

questioning of the informant.

Shortly thereafter, the informant again implicated 

defendant as the person who brought him cocaine in prior 

transactions:

Q Let’s talk a little about your 

relationship with Anthony McLaurin, who 

was the subject of the drug transaction. 
-4-

How long have you known Anthony?

A It was probably -- When I was in school.

Probably since like 2007.

Q Was it unusual for him to send somebody 

else to bring the drugs when you ordered 

it?

A I used to get it from him. But during that

time he would –-

Q He’d send other people?

A Yeah. He would send her - just her. That’s 

the only other person I seen besides him.

Defendant’s trial counsel did not object to this second 

identification of defendant as the person who would bring 

cocaine to the informant, and defendant now argues it was error 

for the trial court to allow the second identification into 

evidence.

We first address the standard of review under which 

defendant’s argument will be decided. Generally, “[w]here 

evidence is admitted without objection, the benefit of a prior 

objection to the same or similar evidence is lost, . . . [and a] 

defendant is entitled to relief . . . only if he can demonstrate 

plain error.” State v. Berry, 143 N.C. App. 187, 193, 546 

S.E.2d 145, 151 (quotations and citations omitted), disc. review 

denied, 353 N.C. 729, 551 S.E.2d 439 (2001). Defendant, 

however, argues her objection to the first instance in which the 
-5-

informant identified her as a person who brought him cocaine was 

sufficiently contemporaneous with the second instance that she 

was not required to renew the objection to the second 

identification. See State v. Hazelwood, 187 N.C. App. 94, 652 

S.E.2d 63 (2007). However, the first identification of 

defendant by the informant was made before her objection and, 

because she failed to make a motion to strike the testimony 

after her objection was sustained, she waived her objection and 

the testimony remained in evidence. See State v. Price, 301 

N.C. 437, 451, 272 S.E.2d 103, 112-13 (1980); see also State v. 

Gamez, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 745 S.E.2d 876, 877, (“Where 

inadmissibility of testimony is not indicated by the question, 

but appears only in the witness’ response, the proper form of 

objection is a motion to strike the answer, or the objectionable 

part of it, made as soon as the inadmissibility is evident.

When counsel objects after a witness has answered the question 

and fails to make a motion to strike, the objection is waived.” 

(citations and quotation marks omitted)), disc. review denied, 

367 N.C. 256, 749 S.E.2d 848 (2013). Accordingly, regardless of 

whether or not defendant’s initial objection was sufficiently 

contemporaneous to the second identification, defendant waived 
-6-

the objection and this Court will only review her argument under 

the plain error standard of review.

For error to constitute plain error, a 

defendant must demonstrate that a 

fundamental error occurred at trial. To 

show that an error was fundamental, a 

defendant must establish prejudice—that, 

after examination of the entire record, the 

error had a probable impact on the jury’s 

finding that the defendant was guilty. 

Moreover, because plain error is to be 

applied cautiously and only in the 

exceptional case, the error will often be 

one that seriously affects the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.

State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012) 

(citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted); see also 

State v. Jordan, 333 N.C. 431, 440, 426 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1993)

(“Under the plain error rule, defendant must convince this Court 

not only that there was error, but that absent the error, the 

jury probably would have reached a different result.”).

Here, even assuming admission of the second identification 

was error, defendant cannot show the prejudice necessary to 

establish plain error. Defendant waived her objection to the 

first identification by not moving to strike the informant’s 

testimony, and thus evidence that defendant had previously 

brought cocaine to defendant was already before the jury. 

Defendant does not challenge the admissibility of the first 
-7-

identification, and thus we cannot say the second identification 

had a probable impact on the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we 

hold defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial 

error.

No error.

Judges CALABRIA and GEER concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).