FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALEX BAKALIAN; ANAIS 

HAROUTUNIAN; RITA MAHDESSIAN,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CENTRAL BANK OF THE REPUBLIC OF 

TURKEY; T.C. ZIRAAT BANKASI,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-55664

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-09596-

DMG-SS

DAVID DAVOYAN, Administrator of 

the Estate of Garbis Tavit Davoyan; 

HRAYR TURABIAN, individually on 

behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

REPUBLIC OF TURKEY,

Defendant,

and

THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE 

REPUBLIC OF TURKEY; T.C. ZIRAAT 

BANKASI,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-55742

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-05636-

DMG-SS
2 BAKALIAN V. CENTRAL BANK OF TURKEY

ALEX BAKALIAN; RITA 

MAHDESSIAN; ANAIS HAROUTUNIAN,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

CENTRAL BANK OF THE REPUBLIC OF 

TURKEY; T.C. ZIRAAT BANKASI,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 13-55765

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-09596-

DMG-SS

DAVID DAVOYAN, Administrator of 

the Estate of Garbis Tavit Davoyan, 

Deceased; HRAYR TURABIAN, 

individually on behalf of all others 

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

REPUBLIC OF TURKEY,

Defendant,

and

THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE 

REPUBLIC OF TURKEY; T.C. ZIRAAT 

BANKASI,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 13-55804

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-05636-

DMG-SS

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding
BAKALIAN V. CENTRAL BANK OF TURKEY 3

Argued and Submitted December 17, 2018

Pasadena, California

Filed August 8, 2019

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Marsha S. Berzon,

and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Hurwitz

SUMMARY*

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act / Statute of 

Limitations

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal as timebarred of claims brought in 2010 against the Republic of 

Turkey and two Turkish national banks, seeking 

compensation for property taken from plaintiffs’ ancestors 

during the Armenian Genocide, which took place from 1915 

to 1923.

The court previously held unconstitutional a California 

statute providing that any limitations period for suits arising 

out of the Armenian Genocide would not expire until 

December 31, 2016. Applying California law, the panel held 

that, in the absence of the invalidated extension statute, 

plaintiffs’ claims, brought under the Foreign Sovereign 

Immunities Act, were barred by the statute of limitations for 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
4 BAKALIAN V. CENTRAL BANK OF TURKEY

claims of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 

humanity.

The panel explained that, because plaintiffs’ claims were 

plainly time-barred, it did not address the substantial legal 

questions the case posed concerning FSIA jurisdiction.

COUNSEL

Kathryn Lee Boyd (argued) and Thomas B. Watson,

McKool Smith Hennigan PC, Los Angeles, California;

Rajika L. Shah, Kristen L. Nelson, Schwarcz Rimberg Boyd 

& Rader LLP, Los Angeles, California; Vartkes Yeghiayan, 

Yeghiayan Law Corp. P.C., Glendale, California; Michael J. 

Bazyler and Kristen L. Nelson, ALC Lawyers PC, Los 

Angeles, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellants/CrossAppellees Alex Bakalian, Anais Haroutunian, and Rita 

Mahdessian.

Mark J. Geragos (argued) and Tina Glandian, Los Angeles, 

California; Stanley D. Saltzman and Adam M. Tamburelli, 

Marlin & Saltzman LLP, Agoura Hills, California; Brian 

Kabateck, Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP, Los Angeles, 

California; Frank Pitre, John Thyken, and Ara 

Jabagchourian, Cotchett Pitre & McCarthy LLP, 

Burlingame, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellants/CrossAppellees David Davoyan and Hrayr Turabian.

Neil Michael Soltman (argued), Christopher P. Murphy, and 

Matthew H. Marmolejo, Mayer Brown LLP, Los Angeles, 

California; David Saltzman, Saltzman & Evinch PLLC, 

Washington, D.C.; Charles Rothfeld, Mayer Brown LLP, 

Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-Appellees/CrossAppellants.
BAKALIAN V. CENTRAL BANK OF TURKEY 5

OPINION

HURWITZ, Circuit Judge:

From 1915 to 1923, in what is often referred to as the 

Armenian Genocide, the Ottoman Empire massacred, 

forcibly expelled, or marched to death 1.5 million of its 

Armenian citizens, seizing the property of the dead and 

deported.1 In 2010, the plaintiffs in these consolidated 

actions, United States residents descended from victims of 

the Genocide, sued the Republic of Turkey and two Turkish 

national banks, seeking compensation for property taken 

from their ancestors almost a century ago.

To avoid a time-bar on claims like these, California 

adopted a statute in 2006 providing that any limitations 

period for suits arising out of the Armenian Genocide would 

not expire until December 31, 2016. Act of Sept. 25, 2006 

(S.B. 1524), ch. 443, sec. 2, 2006 Cal. Stat. 3235–37 

(codified at Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 354.45). Under that 

statute, the complaints in these cases were timely filed. 

However, we subsequently held the California law 

unconstitutional. See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung 

AG, 670 F.3d 1067, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) 

(finding preempted Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 354.4, which 

dealt with claims arising out of the Armenian Genocide 

against insurers); Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank AG, 548 F. 

1 See Comm’n on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and 

on Enf’t of Penalties, Violation of the Laws and Customs of War: 

Reports of Majority and Dissenting Reports of American and Japanese 

Members, annex I at 30, 34–35 (1919); see also Press Release, White 

House, Statement by the President on Armenian Remembrance Day 

2019 (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/statement-president-armenian-remembrance-day-2019/.
6 BAKALIAN V. CENTRAL BANK OF TURKEY

App’x 461, 463 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding § 354.45 

preempted). In the absence of the invalidated extension 

statute, the plaintiffs’ claims are plainly time-barred. We 

affirm the district court’s dismissal of their complaints.

I. Background.

A. Facts.2

During World War I, the Ottoman Empire began forcibly 

relocating its Armenian subjects away from population 

centers and into the desert, causing the deaths of over a 

million ethnic Armenians. The Empire confiscated the real 

property left behind by the victims of the Armenian 

Genocide.

The Republic of Turkey, the successor to the Ottoman 

Empire, commingled proceeds from the sale and use of the 

confiscated property with its general treasury funds. The 

plaintiffs allege that the defendants, the Central Bank of the 

Republic of Turkey and T.C. Ziraat Bankasi (“the Banks”), 

received the commingled funds as deposits from the Turkish 

government and have refused to disgorge them.

B. The California Statute of Limitations.

In 2006, the California legislature determined that 

existing state law did “not provide sufficient relief for 

Armenian Genocide victims whose assets were deposited 

with or held by financial institutions.” S. Judiciary Comm., 

Bill Analysis, S.B. 1524, 2005–2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. at 2 

2 Because the district court granted the Banks’ motion to dismiss, 

we take the well-pleaded allegations in the operative complaints as true. 

Gregg v. Haw., Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 870 F.3d 883, 886–87 (9th Cir. 

2017).
BAKALIAN V. CENTRAL BANK OF TURKEY 7

(Cal. Apr. 26, 2006) [hereinafter “2006 Committee Report”]. 

It therefore passed a law to ensure that actions “brought by 

an Armenian Genocide victim” or her heirs, “seeking 

payment for . . . looted assets, shall not be dismissed for 

failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitation, if 

the action is filed on or before December 31, 2016.” Cal. 

Civ. Proc. Code § 354.45(c). The legislature expressly 

recognized that in the absence of such a statute, such actions 

would be time-barred. See S. Judiciary Comm., Bill 

Analysis, S.B. 1915, 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. at 5–6 

(Cal. May 10, 2000) (discussing “the revival of otherwise 

time-barred suits” under § 354.4).

C. Procedural History.

This appeal involves two actions filed in 2010. In the 

first, Alex Bakalian, Anais Haroutunian, and Rita 

Mahdessian allege the Ottoman Empire expropriated 122.5 

acres of their ancestors’ property during the Armenian 

Genocide. Their suit against the Banks asserts unlawful 

expropriation, unjust enrichment, and statutory interference 

with property rights, and seeks imposition of a constructive 

trust, an accounting of the looted assets, and declaratory 

relief. In the second case, Garbis Davoyan and Hrayr 

Turabian sue the Banks on behalf of themselves and a 

putative class of descendants of Armenian property owners. 

They also seek imposition of a constructive trust and an 

accounting, and assert claims of breach of statutory trust, 

unjust enrichment, and “human rights violations and 

violations of international law.”3

3 Both sets of plaintiffs also sued the Republic of Turkey. Turkey 

initially defaulted, but the district court vacated the default when 
8 BAKALIAN V. CENTRAL BANK OF TURKEY

The complaints assert two broad theories of recovery. 

They first argue that the Ottoman Empire wrongfully 

confiscated their ancestors’ property, depositing the rents 

and proceeds in the Banks, and that a constructive trust 

should therefore be imposed over those assets. 

Alternatively, they allege that the Empire itself held the 

property “in trust and for safekeeping on behalf of the 

rightful Armenian owners” under Turkish “Abandoned 

Property Laws,” and that the Banks have breached that trust 

by not turning the proceeds over to the plaintiffs.

The Banks moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, asserting immunity as instrumentalities of the 

Republic of Turkey under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 

Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). In response, the 

plaintiffs urged that immunity should be denied under the 

expropriation and commercial activity exceptions to the 

FSIA. Id. § 1605(a)(2)–(3). The Banks also moved for 

judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the plaintiffs’ claims 

were barred by the statute of limitations.

The district court dismissed both complaints. It found 

the commercial activity exception inapplicable because the 

Banks’ alleged conduct did not have a sufficiently direct 

effect in the United States. And, because the Armenian 

victims of the Genocide were subjects of the Ottoman 

Empire, the court concluded that the expropriation exception 

could apply only if the Empire had otherwise violated 

international law by committing genocide. But, the court 

held, determining whether the Ottoman Empire had 

committed genocide was a non-justiciable “inherently 

dismissing these actions. This appeal does not challenge the dismissal 

of the actions against Turkey.
BAKALIAN V. CENTRAL BANK OF TURKEY 9

political question.” The court did not reach the statute of 

limitations issue, which had been fully briefed by the parties.

The plaintiffs timely appealed, and we consolidated the 

two cases.

II. Discussion.

We review a dismissal for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction and judgment on the pleadings de novo, 

Arrington v. Wong, 237 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001), 

“accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true and 

drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 

party,” Gregg, 870 F.3d at 886–87 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). To decide whether an action is timebarred under that standard, we “must determine whether the 

running of the statute is apparent on the face of the 

complaint.” Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 

997 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

We have already held, as noted above, that by “providing 

relief and a friendly forum to a perceived class of foreign 

victims,” California Code of Civil Procedure § 354.45 

“intrudes on the federal government’s exclusive power to 

conduct and regulate foreign affairs,” and is therefore 

preempted. Movsesian, 670 F.3d at 1077; see Deirmenjian, 

548 F. App’x at 463. The issue is therefore whether the 

plaintiffs’ claims are facially time-barred in the absence of 

that statute.

A. Choice of Law.

Because the plaintiffs assert statutory jurisdiction under 

the FSIA, we apply federal common law choice of law rules 

to determine the applicable statute of limitations. See
10 BAKALIAN V. CENTRAL BANK OF TURKEY

Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 976 F.2d 561, 564 (9th 

Cir. 1992). We must apply the forum’s statute of limitations 

unless (a) the forum would allow the claim; 

(b) “maintenance of the claim would serve no substantial 

interest of the forum;” and (c) “the claim would be barred 

under the statute of limitations of a state having a more 

significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence.” 

Huynh, 465 F.3d at 997 (quoting Restatement (Second) of 

Conflict of Laws § 142 (Am. Law Inst. 1988)); see also In 

re Sterba, 852 F.3d 1175, 1179–80 (9th Cir. 2017). If the 

forum’s law applies, we also apply its accrual and tolling 

rules. See Hatfield v. Halifax PLC, 564 F.3d 1177, 1184 (9th 

Cir. 2009).

The threshold question is therefore whether California 

law would allow the plaintiffs’ claims. The longest arguably 

applicable California statute of limitations is the ten-year 

statute for claims of genocide, war crimes, and crimes 

against humanity. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 354.8.4 The 

plaintiffs’ claims are thus time-barred unless they either 

accrued in or were tolled until 2000.

4 The Davoyan plaintiffs cite California Code of Civil Procedure

§ 348, which provides no limitation on the time to file a claim to recover 

bank deposits. But, § 348 “does not apply to actions in which the 

underlying debtor-creditor relationship” between a bank and the 

depositing customer “is absent.” Morse v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 190 Cal. 

Rptr. 839, 842 (Ct. App. 1983). This is plainly such a case. Indeed, in 

extending the statute of limitations, the California legislature 

acknowledged that § 348 does not apply to the plaintiffs’ claims. See

2006 Committee Report at 6 (recognizing that “Section 348 does not 

address looted assets,” which were “not necessarily ‘deposited’ by 

customers”).
BAKALIAN V. CENTRAL BANK OF TURKEY 11

B. Accrual of Claims.

“In the case of an involuntary trust the statute of 

limitations begins to run, regardless of repudiation thereof, 

from the time when the wrongful or fraudulent acts are 

performed by the trustee, except that the statute is tolled as 

to the owner of the property until he actually acquires 

knowledge of the wrongful acts, or, by the exercise of 

reasonable care, until he is charged with such notice.” 

Wilkerson v. Seib, 127 P.2d 904, 907 (Cal. 1942) (en banc) 

(quoting Truesdail v. Lewis, 115 P.2d 218, 221 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 1941)). We assume for purposes of our accrual 

analysis the truth of the plaintiffs’ allegations that either the 

Ottoman Empire illegally seized the property of the 

plaintiffs’ predecessors, or the Empire and the Banks placed 

the property in trust under Turkish law but later illegally 

refused to return it. If the initial expropriation was wrongful, 

the plaintiffs’ claims accrued by 1923. If the property was 

placed in trust, the plaintiffs acknowledge that “[l]aws 

passed in 1928 and 1929 formally ended Turkey’s 

disingenuous attempt at the restitution of immovable 

property to its rightful Armenian owners.” Thus, the 

plaintiffs’ predecessors should have known well more than 

ten years ago that Turkey did not intend to return their 

property.

The plaintiffs do not allege that any critical facts about 

the expropriation have been discovered since 2000. See 

Oeth v. Mason, 56 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72 (Ct. App. 1967). Nor do 

they seek the return of a specific piece of personal property. 

This case is therefore distinguishable from actions seeking 

the return of particular items, like paintings, stolen in war 

and only discovered years later in museums. See, e.g., 

Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 680–85 

(2004). Indeed, such actions are governed by a different 
12 BAKALIAN V. CENTRAL BANK OF TURKEY

California statute of limitations. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 

§ 338(c)(3)(A) (“[A]n action for the specific recovery of a 

work of fine art . . . , in the case of unlawful taking or theft,

. . . shall be commenced within six years of the actual 

discovery by the claimant . . . of both:” (i) “[t]he identity and 

the whereabouts of the work of fine art;” and (ii) facts 

indicating “that the claimant has a claim for a possessory 

interest” in the art.).

C. Equitable Tolling.

Because the claims at issue accrued by the late 1920s, 

these suits are timely only if the statute of limitations was 

equitably tolled until 2000—a period of over seventy years. 

Equitable tolling requires: (1) timely notice to the defendant 

of the claim; (2) lack of prejudice to the defendant; and 

(3) “reasonable and good faith conduct on the part of the 

plaintiff.” Addison v. State, 578 P.2d 941, 943–44 (Cal. 

1978).

We have no doubt that the survivors of the Ottoman 

Empire’s atrocities experienced enormous hardships after 

the seizure of their property. Indeed, we take as true the 

allegations in the operative complaints that it “was 

impossible for Plaintiffs’ predecessors to seek compensation 

for their stolen property or focus on anything but rebuilding 

their lives.”5

 But, these suits are brought not by the victims 

of the Armenian Genocide, but rather by residents of the 

United States long removed from its carnage, many of whose 

predecessors relocated to this country decades ago. And the 

5 Although California provides statutory tolling for plaintiffs unable 

“to commence an action” “by reason of the existence of a state of war,” 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 354, that law covers only the period of active 

hostilities or occupation. See In re Caravas’ Estate, 250 P.2d 593, 596–

97 (Cal. 1952) (en banc).
BAKALIAN V. CENTRAL BANK OF TURKEY 13

current plaintiffs do not allege any attempts to pursue these 

claims judicially prior to 2010. See Long v. Forty Niners 

Football Co., 244 Cal. Rptr. 3d 887, 892 (Ct. App. 2019) 

(“Where a claim is time-barred on its face, the plaintiff must 

specifically plead facts that would support equitable 

tolling.”).

It is possible that the plaintiffs believed that any suit 

against the Republic of Turkey or its instrumentalities would 

have been futile until 1976, when Congress adopted the 

FSIA and codified the doctrine of foreign sovereign 

immunity and exceptions to that doctrine. But, even if we 

assume that the plaintiffs’ claims were equitably tolled until 

1976, the plaintiffs do not explain why they should be tolled 

a further twenty-four years. Thus, even under the most 

charitable of assumptions, as the California legislature 

expressly recognized in passing § 354.45, the plaintiffs’ 

claims against the Banks are time-barred.

III. Conclusion.

Because we find the plaintiffs’ claims plainly timebarred, we do not address the substantial legal questions 

these cases pose concerning FSIA jurisdiction. We 

acknowledge the Supreme Court’s directive that the 

substantive issue of foreign sovereign immunity, which 

implicates subject matter jurisdiction, should generally be 

addressed “as near to the outset of the case as is reasonably 

possible.” Bolivarian Republic of Venez. v. Helmerich & 

Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312, 1317 (2017). But, 

we are nearly a decade past the outset of these cases, and the 

Supreme Court has also stressed that “foreign sovereign 

immunity’s basic objective” is “to free a foreign sovereign 

from suit.” Id. That objective is ill-served by continuing a 

difficult exploration—in the context of a clearly time-barred 

action—about whether there is a “genocidal takings” 
14 BAKALIAN V. CENTRAL BANK OF TURKEY

exception in the FSIA and, if so, whether the plaintiffs’ 

claims qualify under that exception. In particular, answering 

that question would require us to decide whether to consider 

the state of international law at the time of the taking or at 

some later point, and whether at the relevant point in time 

either genocide or a genocidal taking was a recognized 

violation of international law. Nor would analyzing the 

district court’s conclusion—that the “political question” 

doctrine prevents us from addressing FSIA jurisdiction in 

light of Turkey’s denial of the Armenian Genocide—free the 

foreign sovereigns from suit as early as possible. The 

political question analysis also turns on a complex issue of 

first impression: whether the FSIA necessarily authorizes the 

judiciary to decide in the first instance whether a genocide 

has occurred even if a foreign state denies that it has.

Article III grants the federal courts general subject matter 

jurisdiction over claims like those presented by the plaintiffs, 

which indisputably “arise under” federal law. Verlinden 

B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 497 (1983) 

(“[E]very action against a foreign sovereign necessarily 

involves application of a body of substantive federal law.”). 

The issue before us is thus only one of statutory 

jurisdiction—the scope of the FSIA—not of Article III 

jurisdiction. See id. at 497–98.

The goals behind the Supreme Court’s general 

admonitions against hypothetical jurisdiction—to avoid 

advisory opinions on the merits and drive-by jurisdictional 

rulings—are best served in this unusual context by resting 

our decision on a straightforward statute of limitations 

determination, rather than addressing the novel and 

important questions of law we would otherwise have to 

decide. Compare Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 

523 U.S. 83, 98 (1998) (warning courts not to “use the 
BAKALIAN V. CENTRAL BANK OF TURKEY 15

pretermission of the jurisdictional question as a device for 

reaching a question of law that otherwise would have gone 

unaddressed”). The Court “appears to allow an exception to 

the rule against” hypothetical jurisdiction “in those ‘peculiar 

circumstances’ where the outcome on the merits has been 

‘foreordained’ by another case such that ‘the jurisdictional 

question could have no effect on the outcome.’” Ctr. for 

Reprod. Law & Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183, 194 (2d Cir. 

2002) (Sotomayor, J.) (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 98); 

see also Sherrod v. Breitbart, 720 F.3d 932, 936–37 (D.C. 

Cir. 2013); Seale v. INS, 323 F.3d 150, 155–57 (1st Cir. 

2003).

Our decision in Movsesian, issued while this litigation 

was ongoing, foreordained the ultimate outcome of the 

plaintiffs’ claims: they are time-barred. A ruling on these 

complex jurisdictional issues would thus in effect be an 

advisory opinion, because this case plainly cannot go 

forward even if there is jurisdiction. See Norton v. Mathews, 

427 U.S. 524, 530–32 (1976) (“We think it unnecessary, 

however, to resolve the details of these difficult and perhaps 

close jurisdictional arguments. The substantive questions 

raised in this appeal now have been determined . . . .”); Sec’y 

of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676, 678 (1974) (per curiam) 

(“[E]ven the most diligent and zealous advocate could find 

his ardor somewhat dampened in arguing a jurisdictional 

issue where the decision on the merits is thus 

foreordained.”).

We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court 

because these actions are time-barred.

AFFIRMED.