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*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

DESHUNA CROSBY,

Appellant No. 231 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of January 10, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0000941-2013

BEFORE: DONOHUE, OLSON AND PLATT,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED OCTOBER 30, 2014

Appellant, Deshuna Crosby,1appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on January 10, 2014, following her jury trial convictions for two 

counts each of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance 

(PWID) and possession of a controlled substance, and one count each of 

endangering the welfare of a child, possession of drug paraphernalia, and 

conspiracy.2 We affirm.

The trial court set forth the facts and procedural history of this case as 

follows:

____________________________________________

1 Appellant was tried jointly with her co-defendant, Michael Ray James. 

James is currently appealing his judgment of sentence in a companion case, 

318 WDA 2014.

2

 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 4304, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903, respectively. 
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On February 12, 2013, Appellant and a co-conspirator, 

Michael Ray James, were found by the U.S. Marshall’s 

Fugitive Task Force in Room 327 of the Wyngate Hotel in 

Summit Township[, Pennsylvania]. The Task Force was 

serving an arrest warrant on James after receiving a tip that 

James was at the hotel.

When the Task Force arrived to serve the arrest 

warrant, the officers knocked and announced their 

presence. After a short delay, James answered the door, 

stepped into the corridor and was placed in handcuffs. 

Still inside the hotel room was Appellant and her fourmonth old infant. James claims to be the father of the 

child. The officers directed Appellant to step into the 

hallway. Appellant initially ignored the request, walked 

back into the room, picked up [a] car seat with the infant 

[in it], a baby bag and a coat. Appellant then exited the 

room with the baby and other items.

Appellant was asked whether she had anything illegal or 

any weapons. Appellant denied possession of anything 

illegal and denied having weapons. Appellant began 

voluntarily emptying her pockets. The officers asked her if 

they could search the car seat. Appellant [] lifted the baby 

from the car seat. In the car seat, the officers found three 

baggies of white and/or tan substances later identified as 

53.6 grams of heroin and 128.9 grams of cocaine. There 

were two bags of cocaine and one bag of heroin.

When James realized the drugs were discovered, he 

exclaimed, “-- those aren’t hers. They’re mine. That’s not 

hers. It’s mine.” At trial, James testified that he knew the 

drugs were in the room and admitted that he was in 

possession of the drugs. James admitted to being a drug 

dealer of marijuana. 

Upon a search of her person, the police found almost 

$2[,]600.00 hidden inside Appellant’s bra. Appellant was 

unemployed. Appellant was in the Erie County Prison Work 

Release Program and only had permission to leave the 

prison to apply for jobs on that day. 
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A digital scale used for weighing drugs and plastic 

baggies used for packaging drugs were found in plain view 

in the hotel room on top of the microwave. No drug 

paraphernalia for immediate use of the drugs was found in 

the hotel room or on the person of Appellant or James. 

Appellant denied using the drugs which were found or 

possessing any paraphernalia for drug usage. There was no 

evidence found to suggest that any other persons had been 

in the room using the drugs as opposed to selling them.

After a [joint] jury trial [with co-conspirator James] on 

November 12th and 13th, 2013, Appellant was found guilty 

[of the aforementioned charges].

* * *

Appellant was sentenced on January 10, 2014 [to an 

aggregate sentence of 71⁄2 - 16 years of imprisonment]. 

Appellant filed a [m]otion to [r]econsider [s]entence which 

was denied by [o]rder on January 13, 2014. A [n]otice of 

[a]ppeal was filed [on] February 6, 2014. Appellant filed a 

[Pa.R.A.P.] 1925(b) [c]oncise [s]tatement of [errors] on 

[a]ppeal on February 25, 2014. 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/25/2014, at 1-3 (record citations omitted).3

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

1. The [trial] court erred in denying [Appellant’s] pretrial 

motions when it ruled that the police did not violate 

[Appellant’s] constitutional rights when the search was 

not based on reasonable suspicion and/or probable 

cause.

2. The verdict in this case goes again[s]t the sufficiency of 

the evidence when the evidence failed to establish that 

____________________________________________

3

 Judge William R. Cunningham authored the March 25, 2014 opinion. On 

March 27, 2014, Judge Ernest J. DiSantis, Jr. authored a supplemental 

opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) addressing Appellant’s suppression 

issue, because Judge DiSantis presided over Appellant’s omnibus pretrial 

motions.
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[Appellant] acted knowingly and/or intentionally for each 

of the criminal charges.

3. The sentence in this case was manifestly excessive and 

clearly unreasonable, especially in its consecutiveness.

Appellant’s Brief at 2 (numbers added and superfluous capitalization 

omitted). 

In her first issue presented, Appellant argues that the suppression 

court erred by failing to suppress the physical evidence obtained by police, 

because “[t]he [o]fficers did not have a legal basis to search [Appellant], her 

car seat or the hotel room.” Id. at 7. She argues that she had an 

expectation of privacy in the baby car seat. Id. at 8. She claims that 

“officers went to the hotel room to execute an arrest warrant of another 

person without reasonable suspicion or probable cause that criminal activity 

was afoot” and “had no reason to believe that [Appellant] was armed at the 

time of the search[.]” Id. at 7. Appellant avers, “[b]oth individuals were in 

custody at the time of the search and neither presented a danger to the 

officers or a flight risk.” Id. at 8. In the alternative, Appellant maintains 

that she “was not under arrest [at the time of the search] and it was not 

until later that the officers were instructed to take [Appellant] to the Erie 

County Prison” for violating the terms of her work release. Id. at 8-9. 

Our standard of review of an order denying suppression motion is wellsettled:

We are limited to determining whether the lower court's 

factual findings are supported by the record and whether 

the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are correct. We may 
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consider the evidence of the witnesses offered by the 

Commonwealth, as [the prevailing party], and only so much 

of the evidence presented by [the] defense that is not 

contradicted when examined in the context of the record as 

a whole. We are bound by facts supported by the record 

and may reverse only if the legal conclusions reached by the

court were erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Landis, 89 A.3d 694, 702 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted).

Here, the suppression court determined the search was constitutionally 

permissible and, thus, suppression was unwarranted. Trial Court Opinion, 

3/27/2014, at 3-7. More specifically, the suppression court concluded that 

prior to executing the arrest warrant for co-defendant James, police had 

information that Appellant was in the hotel room with him and that she was 

in violation of the terms of her work release. Id. at 6-7. Thus, “her 

violation of the work release pass justified the Task Force members to take 

her into custody” and because the officers lawfully arrested her, the search 

was permissible and conducted incident to the arrest. Id. at 7. Moreover, 

the suppression court determined that Appellant voluntarily consented to the 

search. Id. at 6. The suppression court further concluded the narcotics 

would have been admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. Id. at 

7. 
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We agree, albeit on slightly different grounds.4 The police knew that 

Appellant was in an unauthorized location in violation of the terms of her 

work release when they executed the arrest warrant for James. N.T., 

9/30/2013, at 4-6, 8-9, 14-15, 17-22. “[A] participant in [a] work release 

program, [] remain[s] in the official detention of the Commonwealth.” 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 396 A.2d 377, 379 (Pa. Super. 1978). “The 

county jail officials may detain and recommit [a work-release] offender or 

preclude the offender from leaving the county jail if the offender violates the 

conditions set by the jail officials or the court[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9813(c). 

Our Supreme Court has ruled that a person under Commonwealth 

supervision, such as a probationer or parolee (or, in this case, a person 

supervised on work release), enjoys a reduced scope of privacy rights, but 

must still be afforded the protections of the Constitutions of the United 

States and Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 692 A.2d 

1031, 1035 (Pa. 1997). We have previously determined that before law 

enforcement may search a supervisee’s person, the officer must articulate a 

reasonable suspicion that the person violated the terms of her supervision or 

was involved in further wrongdoing. Id. (“A search will be deemed 

reasonable if the totality of the evidence demonstrates: (1) that the parole 

____________________________________________

4 We can affirm the trial court on any valid basis. Commonwealth v. 

Kemp, 961 A.2d 1247, 1254 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2008).
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officer had a reasonable suspicion that the parolee had committed a parole 

violation, and (2) that the search was reasonably related to the parole 

officer's duty.”); see also In re J.E., 907 A.2d 1114, 1121-1122 (Pa. 

Super. 2006). 

Here, prior to the search, the director of the work release program 

advised police officers that Appellant was only authorized to submit job 

applications and that she was not permitted to go to James’ hotel. N.T., 

9/30/2013, at 8, 14- 16. Because “her whereabouts were not known to the 

Erie County Jail[,]” Appellant was in “violation of her work release and not 

abiding by the rules that were set for her when she was released to go and 

apply for positions.” Id. at 14-16. Accordingly, because police articulated a 

reasonable suspicion that Appellant had violated the terms of her 

supervision, the search and her arrest were constitutionally permissible.

We also conclude that the search of the infant’s car seat passes 

constitutional muster. We point out initially that Appellant does not challenge 

the trial court’s determination that she impliedly, voluntarily consented to 

the search. “[A]ctual consent, implied consent, search incident to lawful 

arrest, and exigent circumstances may negate the necessity of obtaining a 

warrant before conducting a search.” Commonwealth v. Riedel, 651 A.2d 

135, 139 (Pa. 1994). “[T]he Commonwealth bears the burden of 

establishing that a consent is the product of an essentially free and 

unconstrained choice—not the result of duress or coercion, express or 

implied, or a will overborne—under the totality of the circumstances.” 
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Commonwealth v. Caban, 60 A.3d 120, 130 (Pa. Super. 2012). Here, 

there was evidence that when asked if police could search her, Appellant 

“voluntarily began to empty her pockets” and she “voluntarily bent over, 

pulled the baby out and let [the officer] look at the car seat.” N.T., 

9/30/2013, at 9. While she did not verbally reply, Appellant’s actions show 

implied consent. Upon review of the certified record, there is no additional 

evidence that Appellant was under undue police coercion or duress at the 

time of the search. For all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s first issue 

lacks merit.

In her second issue presented, Appellant claims the Commonwealth 

did not prove her convictions with sufficient evidence, because the 

Commonwealth did not establish that Appellant acted knowingly or 

intentionally. Appellant’s Brief at 9. The entire sum of Appellant’s argument 

in this regard, is as follows:

In this case, the trial court maintains that while a digital 

scale used for weighing drugs and baggies used for 

packaging drugs was found in the hotel room, no 

paraphernalia for ingesting the drugs was located. Further, 

[Appellant] denied using the drugs. However, since another 

person was present in the hotel room, the evidence in this 

case does not prove that [Appellant] possessed illegal 

substances with the intent to deliver them to anyone else.

Id. at 9. 

Our standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence is well-settled:
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The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at 

trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there 

is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In 

applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence 

and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, 

we note that the facts and circumstances established by the 

Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of 

fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means 

of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the 

above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all 

evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses 

and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe 

all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Cahill, 95 A.3d 298, 300 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted).

Primarily, we note that Appellant sets forth a blanket sufficiency 

challenge to all of her convictions. In Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 

A.2d 1252 (Pa. Super. 2008), this Court reiterated that when challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, Appellant's Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement must “specify the element or elements upon which the evidence 

was insufficient” in order to preserve the issue for appeal. Williams, 959 

A.2d at 1257. “Such specificity is of particular importance in cases where, 

as here, the Appellant was convicted of multiple crimes each of which 

contains numerous elements that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 281 (Pa. 
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Super. 2009). Here, Appellant only specified that “the evidence presented 

was insufficient to establish that [Appellant] acted knowingly and/or 

intentionally for each of the criminal charges that she faced at trial.” Rule 

1925(b) Statement 2/25/2014, at 3.

Further, on appeal, Appellant's sufficiency of the evidence argument is 

underdeveloped. Appellant challenges all of her convictions based upon 

scienter. However, she does not set forth the elements of the crimes she 

was convicted. While Appellant does set out the standard of review for 

sufficiency of the evidence claims, her argument is otherwise without citation 

to any legal authority. For these reasons, we could find the claim waived.

However, the thrust of her argument is clear. Appellant is challenging 

her two PWID convictions. Pursuant to 35 P.S. § § 780-113, the following 

acts are prohibited:

(30) Except as authorized by this act, the manufacture, 

delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or 

deliver, a controlled substance by a person not registered 

under this act, or a practitioner not registered or licensed by 

the appropriate State board, or knowingly creating, 

delivering or possessing with intent to deliver, a counterfeit 

controlled substance.

35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).

“[I]n order to prevail on a charge of possession of a controlled 

substance with intent to deliver, the Commonwealth must prove, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that the accused possessed a controlled substance and

that the accused had the intent to deliver the controlled substance. 
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Commonwealth v. Taylor, 33 A.3d 1283, 1288 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(emphasis in original). 

Regarding possession, a person may have actual or constructive 

possession of contraband. Constructive possession is defined as follows:

[c]onstructive possession is an inference arising from a set 

of facts that possession of the contraband was more likely 

than not. We have defined constructive possession as 

“conscious dominion.” We subsequently defined “conscious 

dominion” as the power to control the contraband and the 

intent to exercise that control. To aid application, we have 

held that constructive possession may be established by the 

totality of the circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Muniz, 5 A.3d 345, 348-349 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation 

omitted). “Additionally, it is possible for two people to have joint 

constructive possession of an item of contraband.” Commonwealth v. 

Hopkins, 67 A.3d 817, 820-821 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). Here, 

the Commonwealth presented evidence that Appellant was holding the 

infant’s car seat from which the narcotics were recovered. Thus, the 

element of possession is clearly satisfied.

Regarding intent to deliver, our Supreme Court has stated:

When the quantity of the controlled substance is not 

dispositive as to the intent, the court may look to other 

factors including the manner in which the controlled 

substance was packaged, the behavior of the defendant, the 

presence of drug paraphernalia, and large[] sums of cash 

found in possession of the defendant. 

Id., citing Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d 1233, 1237–1238 (Pa. 

2007) (brackets and ellipsis omitted).
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Here, the trial court noted:

In this case, the cocaine and heroin were packaged into 

three different plastic baggies. The large quantities of drugs 

found were beyond that needed for personal use. A scale 

for weighing drugs and plastic baggies for packaging drugs 

were in plain view in the hotel room. The purpose of these 

items was to weigh and package heroin for retail sales. 

There was no evidence of any drug paraphernalia used for 

taking drugs. Both Appellant and James were unemployed, 

yet Appellant had approximately $2,600.00 in cash hidden 

on her person.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/25/2014, at 8.

We agree with the trial court that the evidence points unmistakably to 

PWID. Appellant was carrying a sizeable amount of narcotics in a baby 

carrier and $2,600.00 in cash inside her bra. Those items were clearly in 

her possession at the time of the search. Moreover, the narcotics were not 

packaged for individual use and police did not find paraphernalia commonly 

used for personal consumption. The scales and packaging material were 

found inside the hotel room with Appellant and James; thus, Appellant had 

joint constructive possession of those items. These items are used for 

packaging controlled substances for delivery. Based upon a totality of the 

circumstances, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support 

Appellant’s convictions for PWID. As such, Appellant’s second issue is 

without merit.

Finally, Appellant contends that her sentence is excessive. Appellant’s 

Brief at 9-11. We find this issue waived, but otherwise not subject to our 

review. In her Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant claimed that the trial 
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court abused its discretion by sentencing her on the endangering the welfare 

of a child conviction consecutively to her PWID convictions. Rule 1925(b) 

Statement 2/25/2014, at 3. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court 

failed to individualize her sentence and take her age and the fact that she is 

a mother into consideration. Appellant’s Brief at 10. Appellant did not 

present that issue in her Rule 1925(b) statement and cannot raise a new 

theory in support of her sentencing claim on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(vii); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Thus, Appellant has not properly 

presented that issue for our review.

Moreover, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of 

sentencing:

The right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of 

a sentence is not absolute, and must be considered a 

petition for permission to appeal. An appellant must satisfy 

a four-part test to invoke this Court's jurisdiction when 

challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence.

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; (2) whether 

the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a 

motion to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) whether 

appellant's brief has a fatal defect; and (4) whether there is 

a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is 

not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.

Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1265-1266 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (internal citations omitted).

Appellant fulfilled the first two elements by filing a timely notice of 

appeal, and by preserving her claim in a motion for modification of sentence. 
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Appellant also met the third element because her brief contains the 

necessary concise statement of the reasons relied upon for appeal. 

Therefore, we must determine if Appellant's challenge to the discretionary 

aspect of her sentence raises a substantial question.

“Generally speaking, the court's exercise of discretion in imposing 

consecutive as opposed to concurrent sentences is not viewed as raising a 

substantial question that would allow the granting of allowance of appeal.” 

Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 586 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(citation omitted). “[T]he key to resolving the preliminary substantial 

question inquiry is whether the decision to sentence consecutively raises the 

aggregate sentence to, what appears upon its face to be, an excessive level 

in light of the criminal conduct at issue in the case.” Id. at 587. Here, the 

aggregate sentence of 71⁄2 - 16 years of imprisonment is not facially 

excessive for the criminal conduct involved which included two PWID 

convictions, two possession of a controlled substance convictions, and 

individual convictions for endangering the welfare of a child, possession of 

drug paraphernalia, and conspiracy.

Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement alleges that her sentence was 

contrary to fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process because it 

was not “individual.” She also claims that her sentence violated 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9781 since it was clearly unreasonable. We are not persuaded 

that these bald allegations raised a substantial question within the 

contemplation of our prior cases. “An allegation that the sentencing court 
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failed to consider certain mitigating factors generally does not necessarily 

raise a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 

171 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted). “When imposing a sentence, a 

court is required to consider the particular circumstances of the offense and 

the character of the defendant.” Id. (citation omitted). “In particular, the 

court should refer to the defendant's prior criminal record, [her] age, 

personal characteristics and [her] potential for rehabilitation.” Id. “Where 

the sentencing court had the benefit of a presentence investigation report 

(PSI), we can assume the sentencing court was aware of relevant 

information regarding the defendant's character and weighed those 

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Id. (internal 

quotations and citation omitted). Here, the sentencing court had the benefit 

of a PSI report. N.T., 1/10/2014, at 10. Hence, for all of the foregoing 

reasons, Appellant has waived her sentencing challenge and she has failed 

to present a substantial issue to invoke our discretionary review of her 

sentence. Accordingly, Appellant’s third claim does not merit review.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Donohue joins the memorandum.

Judge Platt concurs in the result.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/30/2014