UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

MICHAEL S. FREEMAN, II, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

RAYTHEON TECHNOLOGIES 

CORPORATION; U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE; EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION; U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES; LLOYD J. 

AUSTIN, III; XAVIER BECERRA, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 23-1133 

(D.C. No. 1:22-CV-01161-CNS-NRN) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BACHARACH, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Plaintiff Michael S. Freeman, II, proceeding pro se, appeals from a district 

court order dismissing his Third Amended Complaint against Raytheon Technologies 

Corporation (“Raytheon”), the United States Department of Defense (“DOD”) and its 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

May 2, 2024

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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Secretary Lloyd J. Austin, III, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(“EEOC”), and the United States Department of Health and Human Services 

(“HHS”) and its Secretary Xavier Becerra. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291, we affirm.1

 

BACKGROUND2

I. 

In February 2021, almost a year into the COVID-19 pandemic, Collins 

Aerospace hired Mr. Freeman as a schedule analyst manager. Collins Aerospace is a 

subsidiary of defendant Raytheon, a frequent DOD contractor. Later that year, the 

President issued an executive order instructing all federal agencies to insert a clause 

into new government contracts requiring the contracting company to comply with 

COVID-19 guidance issued by the federal government. Around that time, Collins 

Aerospace implemented a policy promulgated by Raytheon requiring all employees 

to be vaccinated against COVID-19 or apply for an exemption (“Covid Policy”). 

1

 Appellant’s Petition for Initial En Banc Review was transmitted to all 

non-recused judges of the court who are in regular active service. No judge 

requested that the court be polled on the Appellant’s request for initial en banc 

review. As a result, Appellant’s petition is denied. The Honorable Timothy M. 

Tymkovich did not participate in the court’s consideration of Appellant’s petition. 

2

 The following facts are taken from the well-pleaded allegations in 

Mr. Freeman’s complaint. See Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc.,

861 F.3d 1081, 1105 (10th Cir. 2017) (“In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim, all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, 

must be taken as true, and the court must liberally construe the pleadings and make 

all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” (Internal quotation 

marks and brackets omitted)). 

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Under the Covid Policy, exempt employees did not have to be vaccinated but were 

subject to other requirements. Unvaccinated employees had to work primarily from 

home, test weekly for the virus, provide a negative test within 72 hours of working 

onsite, and wear a mask while working onsite. Vaccinated employees were not 

subject to these requirements. 

In December 2021, pursuant to a preliminary injunction issued by a federal 

court, DOD instructed its contracting officers not to enforce any COVID-19 clauses 

that had been inserted into government contracts. Collins Aerospace, however, 

retained the Covid Policy. 

Mr. Freeman has Beta Thalassemia, a genetic blood disorder that causes 

anemia like symptoms and increases his risk profile with respect to the COVID-19 

vaccine. Because of this condition, he opted against the vaccine and requested and 

received an exemption. He refused to comply with the Covid Policy requirements for 

unvaccinated employees, however, because he believed the policy was ineffectual 

and discriminatory towards unvaccinated employees. Mr. Freeman made this 

complaint to the Collins Aerospace Human Resources department to no avail. And in 

January 2022, Collins Aerospace fired him for his refusal to comply with the Covid 

Policy. Mr. Freeman subsequently filed a complaint with the EEOC complaining of 

discrimination but withdrew the complaint before the EEOC completed its 

investigation. 

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II. 

A. 

In May 2022 Mr. Freeman filed this action against Raytheon, DOD, HHS, and 

the EEOC as well as the secretaries of both DOD and HHS in their official capacities. 

He did not name Collins Aerospace as a defendant. Shortly after the complaint was 

filed, the district court ordered Mr. Freeman to amend his complaint to comply with 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Mr. Freeman proceeded to amend his complaint 

several times. 

Before this court is the district court’s order dismissing Mr. Freeman’s Third 

Amended Complaint with prejudice.3

 The complaint asserted thirteen claims for 

relief stemming from Mr. Freeman’s termination from Collins Aerospace. Several 

claims were abandoned in the district court and are not at issue on appeal. The 

claims that Mr. Freeman argues were erroneously dismissed can be categorized into 

three groups: (1) employment discrimination claims brought under Title VII and 

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (claims 1 and 2); (2) constitutional claims for violations of the 

First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments (claims 5-7); and (3) claims under the 

Nuremberg Code and various federal regulations (claims 9, 11, and 13).4

3

Throughout this order, we refer to the Third Amended Complaint as simply 

the complaint. 

4

 It is not clear which claims are asserted against which defendants. But given 

the more fundamental deficiencies in Mr. Freeman’s complaint, this lack of 

specificity does not affect our analysis. 

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All defendants filed motions to dismiss. Raytheon, in addition to seeking 

dismissal under Rule 8, argued the employment discrimination claims failed under 

Rule 12(b)(6) because Raytheon was never Mr. Freeman’s employer and could not be 

held liable for the actions of its subsidiary, Collins Aerospace. The federal 

defendants sought dismissal of all claims under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing lack of 

jurisdiction under the theory of sovereign immunity and further argued the 

constitutional claims failed for lack of governmental action. 

On March 23, 2023, the district court, adopting the recommendation of a 

magistrate judge, dismissed Mr. Freeman’s complaint. Although Mr. Freeman had 

brought his employment claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which do not 

cover disability and genetic information discrimination, the court treated 

Mr. Freeman’s employment discrimination claims as if they had been asserted under 

the appropriate federal statutes.5

 The court concluded, however, that Mr. Freeman 

failed to state a claim against Raytheon because his employer was Collins Aerospace, 

and Mr. Freeman had failed to allege facts that would justify piercing the corporate 

veil. The court held the employment discrimination claims against DOD were barred 

by sovereign immunity for the same reason—because DOD was not Mr. Freeman’s 

employer. 

5

 In the “Claims For Relief” section of the complaint, Mr. Freeman alleges 

violations of Title VII and § 1981. Scattered throughout the complaint, however, are 

references to the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Genetic Information 

Nondiscrimination Act. The complaint did not reference the Rehabilitation Act. 

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The claims against the EEOC were based on the agency’s retroactive 

ratification of COVID-19 policies that Mr. Freeman views as ineffectual and 

discriminatory. And the claims against HHS were based on that agency’s issuance of 

allegedly flawed guidance that led to the promulgation of the discriminatory policies 

responsible for Mr. Freeman’s termination. The district court dismissed 

Mr. Freeman’s claims against those agencies for lack of jurisdiction, holding 

Mr. Freeman had failed to cite any caselaw that would support a waiver of sovereign 

immunity under the theories of liability set forth in the complaint. 

The district court dismissed Mr. Freeman’s First, Fourth, and Fifth 

Amendment claims for failure to allege government action under Gallagher v. Neil 

Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442 (10th Cir. 1995), explaining that the federal 

government cannot be held liable for the conduct of a private actor. The court 

reiterated that Mr. Freeman was not a government employee and noted that, by his 

own admission, the COVID-19 contractual provision that had been inserted into 

government contracts was not operable at the time of his termination. Finally, the 

court dismissed Mr. Freeman’s claims under the Nuremberg Code and various federal 

regulations on the grounds the provisions did not provide for a private right of action. 

The district court entered final judgment on March 24, 2023. 

B. 

On April 5, 2023, Mr. Freeman filed a motion to set aside or vacate the 

judgment under Rule 60(a) and (b), which the court construed as also seeking 

reconsideration under Rule 59(e). In that motion, Mr. Freeman requested leave to 

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file a fourth amended complaint and sought recusal of the magistrate judge and 

district court judge under 28 U.S.C. § 455. 

On April 21, Mr. Freeman filed a notice of appeal challenging the district 

court’s March 23 order dismissing his complaint and entering final judgment. 

On June 28, the district court issued an order denying Mr. Freeman’s 

post-judgment motion in its entirety. Mr. Freeman did not amend his notice of 

appeal or file a separate notice of appeal as to the June 28 order. 

DISCUSSION 

I. 

A. Standard of Review 

The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over much of Mr. Freeman’s 

complaint based on sovereign immunity because the federal defendants were not his 

employer and because many of his claims cite provisions that do not provide a 

private right of action. We review those conclusions de novo. See Radil v. Sanborn 

Western Camps, Inc., 384 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2004) (“We review the district 

court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.”). Mr. Freeman 

“bears the burden of establishing [subject matter] jurisdiction as a threshold matter.” 

Id. To the extent the defendants attack the factual basis for subject matter 

jurisdiction, including whether they were Mr. Freeman’s employer, “the court does 

not presume the truthfulness of factual allegations in the complaint.” Id. 

We also review de novo dismissals for failure to state a claim under 

Rule 12(b)(6). Brokers’ Choice, 861 F.3d at 1104. To survive a motion to dismiss 

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under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain enough allegations of fact, taken as 

true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Khalik v. United Air 

Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Jordan-Arapahoe, LLP v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 633 F.3d 1022, 1025 

(10th Cir. 2011) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing a 

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “we accept the well-pleaded facts alleged as true and 

view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Clinton v. Sec. Benefit Life 

Ins. Co., 63 F.4th 1264, 1275 (10th Cir. 2023). But we need not accept “threadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action that are supported by mere conclusory 

statements.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “An allegation is 

conclusory where it states an inference without stating the underlying facts or is 

devoid of any factual enhancement.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

As a pro se litigant, Mr. Freeman is entitled to a liberal construction of his 

pleadings. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 

(10th Cir. 2005). But he must still comply with the same rules as other litigants, and 

we do not act as his “attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” 

Id.

B. Dismissal of Discrimination Claims Against Raytheon 

To survive Raytheon’s motion to dismiss, Mr. Freeman needed to allege 

sufficient facts to allow an inference that Raytheon was his employer or otherwise 

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responsible for the actions of Collins Aerospace. See Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 

162 F.3d 1062, 1069 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining that a prima facie case under Title 

VII requires an employee/employer relationship); Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 

1357, 1361 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Whether Defendant was Plaintiffs’ employer depends 

upon whether Defendant is liable for the acts of its subsidiary.”). We agree with the 

district court’s conclusion that the complaint fails in this regard. We expand on its 

reasoning, however, to address Mr. Freeman’s arguments under the single-employer 

theory. 

The district court dismissed the claims against Raytheon because it concluded 

the complaint failed to allege facts that would justify piercing the corporate veil. 

See R. vol. 3 at 194 (holding the complaint “fail[ed] to show that Defendant 

Raytheon used Collins Aerospace to perpetuate a fraud or wrong that would permit 

Plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil”). We agree with the district court’s analysis as 

far as it went. Piercing the corporate veil requires facts from which to infer Collins 

Aerospace “was used to defeat public convenience, or to justify or protect wrong, 

fraud or crime.” Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 836 (10th Cir. 1995) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The complaint does not allege such facts. Nor 

does it allege facts relevant to whether Collins Aerospace was Raytheon’s alter ego 

or indeed facts relevant to any theory that would justify piercing the corporate veil. 

See Boughton, 65 F.3d at 836 (listing factors relevant to piercing-the-corporate-veil 

analysis). The district court was therefore correct in rejecting the veil-piercing 

theory of liability. 

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But Mr. Freeman’s theory against Raytheon is slightly different. His argument 

focuses on the single-employer theory of liability, which does not depend on a 

showing of fraud. The single-employer theory allows a “plaintiff who is the 

employee of one entity to hold another entity liable by arguing that the two entities 

effectively constitute a single employer.” Knitter v. Corvias Mil. Living, LLC, 758 

F.3d 1214, 1226 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). 

In general, ”[t]he doctrine of limited liability creates a strong presumption that 

a parent company is not the employer of its subsidiary’s employees, and the courts 

have found otherwise only in extraordinary circumstances.” Frank, 3 F.3d at 1362. 

One of those circumstances is where the plaintiff’s immediate employer and its 

parent corporation are integrated to an extent they should be considered a single 

employer for purposes of federal discrimination law. See Lockard, 162 F.3d at 

1069-70 (explaining the single-employer test). To succeed under this theory, 

Mr. Freeman would have to show “sufficient indicia of an interrelationship” between 

Collins Aerospace and Raytheon to justify his belief that Raytheon was jointly 

responsible for the acts of his immediate employer. Id. at 1070. Put another way, 

Raytheon must have exercised a degree of control over Collins Aerospace 

“exceed[ing] that normally exercised by a parent corporation.” Id. at 1071 n.2. In 

considering this question, courts look to the following factors: “interrelation of 

operations, centralized control of labor relations, common management, and common 

ownership or financial control.” Id. at 1069. 

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The complaint does not allege facts to indicate interrelated operations or 

common management between Raytheon and Collins Aerospace. See Frank, 3 F.3d 

at 1362-63 (providing the following examples of facts suggesting interrelated 

operations: the parent keeping its subsidiary’s books, issuing its paychecks, paying 

its bills, and sharing its employees, headquarters, and office space). The complaint 

does include allegations of common ownership, but that, “standing alone, can never 

be sufficient to establish parent liability.” Lockard, 162 F.3d at 1071 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Most importantly, the complaint is devoid of facts relevant to the most critical 

factor—centralized control of labor relations. See Bristol v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 

312 F.3d 1213, 1220 (10th Cir. 2002) (observing that courts generally consider 

control of labor relations “to be the most important” factor); see also Lockard, 

162 F.3d at 1070 (“The key factor of this four-part test is . . . whether the putative 

employer has centralized control of labor relations.”). Centralized control of labor 

relations means the “parent must control the day-to-day employment decisions of the 

subsidiary.” Lockard, 162 F.3d at 1070 (internal quotation marks omitted). Several 

factors inform whether a parent controls a subsidiary’s labor relations, including 

whether the “parent kept [the] subsidiary’s books, issued its paychecks, and paid its 

bills;” whether the “parent and subsidiary had common employees, shared services, 

equipment, employees and office space;” and whether the “parent controlled [the] 

subsidiary’s payroll and benefit program.” Id. (citing Frank, 3 F.3d at 1363). 

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The complaint does not allege facts showing that Raytheon exercised 

day-to-day control over Collins Aerospace. Instead, the allegations focus exclusively 

on a single policy related to the COVID-19 pandemic. We accept as true that 

Raytheon promulgated the Covid Policy. But that is not enough to infer it exercised 

day-to-day control over Collins Aerospace. We have specifically cautioned that “[a] 

parent’s broad general policy statements regarding employment matters are not 

enough to” show centralized control of labor relations. Frank, 3 F.3d at 1363. “The 

critical question is, what entity made the final decisions regarding employment 

matters related to the person claiming discrimination?” Id. (internal quotation marks 

and brackets omitted) (emphasis added). 

In this case, that entity was Collins Aerospace. As Mr. Freeman alleges in his 

complaint, he was hired by Collins Aerospace. When he determined that the Covid 

Policy was discriminatory against unvaccinated employees, he took his complaints to 

the human resources department at Collins Aerospace. And when he refused to 

comply with the Covid Policy, his employment was terminated by Collins Aerospace. 

Raytheon may have promulgated the policy and provided the digital platform for 

employees to record their vaccination status, but there is no allegation from which to 

infer it had any right to fire Mr. Freeman or any other employee of Collins 

Aerospace. See Bristol, 312 F.3d at 1219 (explaining that “[m]ost important to 

control over the terms and conditions of an employment relationship is the right to 

terminate it”). To the contrary, what can be inferred from the complaint is that 

Raytheon was no longer obligated to enforce any vaccine mandate that may have 

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been added to its defense contracts. Because Mr. Freeman has not alleged facts 

leading to the plausible inference that Raytheon and Collins Aerospace constituted a 

single employer, his employment discrimination claims against Raytheon fail. 

C. Dismissal of Claims Against the Federal Government 

Mr. Freeman’s claims against DOD are brought under the joint-employer 

theory of liability. He argues DOD and Raytheon were joint employers because 

Raytheon operated as a defense contractor. The district court dismissed this claim 

outright, and it was right to do so. Sovereign immunity does not bar employment 

discrimination claims against the federal government where the federal government is 

the employer. See Lindstrom v. United States, 510 F.3d 1191, 1195 (10th Cir. 2007) 

(citing Title VII waiver of sovereign immunity set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d)). 

But here the federal government did not employ Mr. Freeman, and this would be so 

even if Raytheon and Collins Aerospace could be considered a single employer, a 

theory we just rejected. 

Under the joint-employer theory, two separate entities may be considered joint 

employers “if they share or co-determine those matters governing the essential terms 

and conditions of employment.” Knitter, 758 F.3d at 1226 (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see id. at 1226-27 (explaining differences between the single-employer and 

joint-employer tests). DOD might be considered a joint employer under this test if it 

exercised “significant control over [Mr. Freeman].” Id. at 1226. In determining 

whether an entity exercised significant control, courts consider many factors, 

including “the ability to promulgate work rules and assignments, and set conditions 

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of employment, including compensation, benefits and hours; day-to-day supervision 

of employees, including employee discipline; and control of employee records, 

including payroll, insurance, taxes and the like.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

ellipsis omitted). Most importantly, however, as with the single-employer test, we 

ask whether DOD had the right to terminate the employment relationship. See id.

at 1228 (emphasizing preeminence of the right to terminate). There is nothing in the 

complaint to indicate DOD had the right to fire Mr. Freeman or anyone else working 

at Raytheon or Collins Aerospace. Moreover, aside from the allegations about the 

unenforced contractual provision inserted into some defense contracts, the complaint 

includes no facts relevant to the significant-control analysis. In short there is nothing 

from which to draw a reasonable inference that DOD was Mr. Freeman’s employer. 

The employment discrimination claims against the federal government were properly 

dismissed. 

D. Dismissal of the Constitutional Claims 

Mr. Freeman claims that being forced to abide by the discriminatory Covid 

Policy under threat of termination violated his rights under the First, Fourth, and 

Fifth Amendments. These claims fail because Mr. Freeman has not alleged facts 

from which to infer Collins Aerospace was a government actor. See Gallaher, 

49 F.3d at 1446-47 (explaining the “essential dichotomy” between governmental 

action, which is subject to constitutional scrutiny, and “private conduct, which 

however discriminatory or wrongful,” is not). Several principles underlie the 

constitutional distinction between government action and private conduct, including 

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the desire to avoid holding the government responsible for conduct beyond its 

control. See id. at 1447. That is precisely what Mr. Freeman seeks to do here in 

claiming the Covid Policy was implemented and enforced at the behest of the federal 

government. Not so. Even if the government initially required that contracting 

employees be vaccinated, it did not promulgate the specific policy at issue, and in 

any event, it had expressly withdrawn its own vaccination mandate by the time 

Mr. Freeman was fired. Collins Aerospace opted to retain its Covid Policy, but 

Mr. Freeman cannot hold the government liable for the decision of a private 

employer to enforce its own employment policies. 

As the federal defendants correctly argue, “the fact that a private entity 

contracts with the government or receives governmental funds or other kinds of 

governmental assistance does not automatically transform the conduct of that entity 

into state action.” Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1448. Mr. Freeman claims Raytheon, and 

by extension Collins Aerospace, had a financial incentive to comply with the 

government’s COVID-19 policies. That is not enough to transform those entities into 

government actors. See Gilmore v. Salt Lake Cmty. Action Program, 710 F.2d 632, 

636 (10th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that “governmental funding and regulation of an 

ostensibly private organization, in the absence of other factors, is insufficient to 

establish governmental action.”); see also Hurst v. McDonough, No. 21-2068, 2022 

WL 1090913, at *4 (10th Cir. Apr. 12, 2022) (holding the Department of Veterans 

Affairs was not a joint employer of federal contractor employee for purposes of 

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Title VII) (unpublished) (cited for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 

10th Cir. R. 32.1(A)) 

Finally, even if Collins Aerospace could be considered a government actor, 

that does not automatically convert its termination of Mr. Freeman into government 

action. See Gilmore, 710 F.2d at 638 (recognizing “that not all actions by state actors 

are state action”). Government action requires, at a minimum, “a showing that the 

deprivation was in some sense attributable to a governmental decision.” Id. Here the 

government affirmatively stated it would not enforce its vaccination mandate against 

government contractors. And there are no allegations indicating a government agent 

participated in any way in the decision to fire Mr. Freeman. Because the complaint 

fails to allege that Collins Aerospace was a government actor and that its termination 

of Mr. Freeman constituted governmental action, the district court was correct in 

dismissing the constitutional claims. 

E. Dismissal of Claims Under the Ninth Amendment, the Nuremberg Code, and 

16 C.F.R. 1028.116 

Mr. Freeman argues the defendants’ conduct violated rights stemming from a 

combination of the Ninth Amendment and the Nuremberg Code and federal 

regulations governing informed consent. But he has cited no authority supporting 

this novel theory of liability. To the contrary, courts have held the Ninth Amendment 

does not create a private right of action. See, e.g., Strandberg v. City of Helena, 

791 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding “the ninth amendment has never been 

recognized as independently securing any constitutional right”). And Mr. Freeman 

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has not identified any statute creating a private right of action for violations of the 

Nuremberg Code or 16 C.F.R. § 1028.116, which sets forth regulations governing 

informed consent in human research. See generally McKenzie v. U.S. Citizenship & 

Immigr. Servs., 761 F.3d 1149, 1157 (10th Cir. 2014) (explaining the Supreme Court 

“will rarely recognize an implied private cause of action arising from a mere 

regulation”). The district court did not err in dismissing these claims.6

 

F. Challenges to the District Court’s June 28, 2023, Order 

We lack jurisdiction to address Mr. Freeman’s arguments concerning the 

district court’s order denying his post-judgment motion because he did not file a 

separate, or amend his existing, notice of appeal to challenge that order. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); Matney v. Barrick Gold of N. Am., 80 F.4th 1136, 

1159-60 (10th Cir. 2023). 

CONCLUSION 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

6

 For the same reason, the district court was correct in dismissing 

Mr. Freeman’s Thirteenth Claim for Relief, which cites various federal regulations 

implementing the Ethics in Government Act. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101, et seq. These 

regulations do not create a private right of action. Id., § 2635.106(c). 

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