Filed 4/6/23 In re Serenity T. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re SERENITY T. et al.,

Persons Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

 B314686

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 

 18CCJP07071B-E)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

N.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from findings and orders of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County. Hernan D. Vera, Judge. Affirmed.
2

Donna Balderston Kaiser, under appointment by the Court 

of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________

Appellant N.M. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s 

jurisdictional findings regarding her four children and the 

subsequent dispositional order removing them from her custody. 

She argues that both the jurisdictional findings and the removal 

order are unsupported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. The Family and Prior Dependency Case

Mother has four children, Serenity T. (born Dec. 2007), 

Samuel R. (born Sept. 2009), S.R. (born Nov. 2010), and A.P. 

(born Oct. 2018).1

In 2016, mother’s struggles with substance abuse issues

prompted her three eldest children to move to Ohio to live with 

their maternal great-grandmother (great-grandmother).

In 2018, when A.P. was born, mother tested positive for 

amphetamines. In subsequent weeks, she tested positive for 

amphetamine, alcohol, and marijuana. Consequently, the 

juvenile court declared newborn A.P. a dependent of the court 

and removed her from mother’s custody.

2

1 The children’s fathers are not parties to this appeal.

2 In the course of this proceeding, A.P.’s father alleged that 

he had Choctaw ancestry. In accordance with the Indian Child 

Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.), the juvenile court
3

In January 2020, the juvenile court terminated its custody 

over A.P. and returned her to mother. Mother’s three eldest 

children then moved back to Los Angeles to live with Mother and 

A.P.

II. Inciting Incident

On June 6, 2020, the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging 

that mother had reported that the children’s maternal 

grandmother (grandmother) had kidnapped them, which 

grandmother denied. The referral also alleged that the two 

oldest children, Serenity and Samuel, had reported that mother 

had punched them, hit them with a belt, and failed to provide 

them with adequate food.

When contacted by DCFS, mother said that, during a 

recent visit, grandmother had demanded a portion of the 

settlement money that mother had received after being the victim 

of a crime. After mother refused these demands, grandmother 

kidnapped the children and took them to her home in Louisiana.

3

ordered notice sent to the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the three 

federally recognized Choctaw tribes. Two of the tribes informed 

the juvenile court that A.P. was not an Indian child as defined by 

ICWA; the third tribe did not respond. In July 2019, the juvenile 

court found that it had no reason to know that A.P. was an 

Indian child per ICWA.

3 A social worker in Louisiana told DCFS that mother had 

“denied placing a kidnapping report,” and had actually 

“requested that the children stay” with grandmother in 

Louisiana. When the social worker informed mother that it 

would be impossible for the children to stay in Louisiana due to

the kidnapping report, mother insisted that she had never made 
4

Great-grandmother told DCFS investigators that she did 

not understand why mother had accused grandmother of 

kidnapping, as the children stayed with grandmother in 

Louisiana “every summer.” Great-grandmother also reported 

that Serenity and Samuel had told her that mother was “leaving 

the[] [children] alone and . . . drinking alcohol.”

Mother denied hitting any of the children or leaving them 

by themselves, and agreed to submit to drug testing. She 

subsequently tested positive for marijuana and alcohol, with her

blood alcohol content registering at 0.17 percent.

When the children returned to Los Angeles, social workers 

separately interviewed Serenity and Samuel. Serenity said that 

mother had hit her on the arms, legs, and buttocks with a belt 

and the cord of a cell phone charger. She said that the most 

recent episode occurred two months earlier, when mother had 

taken the children with her to Las Vegas and then stayed out for 

an entire night. When mother returned in the morning, Serenity 

and Samuel asked her where she had been; mother became upset, 

told them to “shut the f*** up,” and, when they continued asking 

questions, took her phone charger out of the wall outlet and 

began hitting them with it.

Serenity also reported that mother sometimes left the 

house to go drinking and would not return for a couple of days. 

She complained that there was “never anything for [the children] 

to eat” in the house.

Samuel confirmed that mother sometimes beat him. He 

said that the last time she hit him was after their return from the 

any such report and that she wanted the children to remain with 

grandmother.
5

Las Vegas trip; he had called grandmother to let her know that 

the family was back home, and mother “‘got upset and slapped

[him] in the face with her hand because [he] wasn’t supposed to 

tell anyone.’” Samuel also agreed that mother drank frequently. 

When asked what he needed from mother, Samuel started crying 

and said that he “‘need[ed] her to grow up, stop going out with 

boys she doesn’t know, stop drinking, and stop leaving us at home 

by ourselves.’”

On June 18, 2020, the juvenile court issued an expedited 

removal order. DCFS diligently attempted to serve mother with 

the removal order, but mother could not be reached for two days. 

When DCFS contacted her by phone, mother said that she was at 

a friend’s home and could not give DCFS an address, but 

confirmed that she would meet a social worker at a DCFS office 

that day. She did not appear with the children and failed to 

answer subsequent phone calls. Accordingly, DCFS filed a 

missing persons report with law enforcement to attempt to locate 

mother and the children.

III. Jurisdiction Petition

On June 23, 2020, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,4 alleging that the 

children were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical 

harm based on mother’s physical abuse of Serenity and Samuel 

(counts a-1, a-2, b-1, b-2, j-1, and j-2), substance abuse problems 

4 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
6

(counts b-3 and j-3), and repeated instances of leaving the 

children alone at night without adult supervision (count b-5).

5

IV. Detention and Removal

On June 26, 2020, the juvenile court held a detention 

hearing. Mother and the children failed to appear. The juvenile 

court ordered the children detained from mother, issuing an 

arrest warrant for mother and protective custody warrants for 

the children.

On July 27, 2020, DCFS managed to contact mother and 

convinced her to surrender the children at a DCFS office. The 

arrest and protective custody warrants were subsequently 

recalled.

The children were placed with different nonrelated 

extended family members; Serenity and S.R. went to one home, 

and Samuel and A.P. went to another.

V. Further Jurisdiction and Status Reports

In a subsequent jurisdiction and disposition report, DCFS 

reported that Serenity and Samuel recanted their earlier 

allegations that mother had left the children home alone. 

Serenity said that grandmother had told her to make those 

allegations to increase the children’s chances of being placed with 

grandmother.

Both children repeated their allegations regarding physical 

abuse and substance abuse. Serenity said that mother hit her 

with a belt when she had done something mother did not want 

her to do or to teach her to stop being “disrespect[ful]” to mother, 

and that mother had hit Samuel in the face with her hand. 

Serenity also believed that mother drank “a lot” of alcohol, which

5 The petition also included allegations against A.P.’s father 

based on his substance abuse problems (count b-4).
7

caused her to become “irritated” and “mad” and hit the children. 

Serenity reported seeing mother smoke marijuana and “snort 

some white stuff” on one occasion.

Samuel denied that mother had ever hit him in the face, 

but confirmed that she had “whooped” both him and Serenity 

with a belt. He repeated his earlier statements about mother’s 

drinking.

Serenity and Samuel’s younger sister S.R. claimed that she 

had never seen mother hit her siblings or drink alcohol, and 

denied that mother ever left the children alone.

Grandmother said that Serenity and Samuel had reported 

prior incidents of physical abuse, including hitting Serenity in 

the face and hitting Samuel with a wire hanger. And Samuel and 

S.R.’s father said that both children had told him that mother 

“‘would hit them,’” “‘drink[] around them and get[] drunk,’” and 

“‘leave them home alone.’”

Mother denied ever hitting the children for any reason. 

She blamed grandmother for the current case and the children’s 

removal, accusing grandmother of coaching the children to lie. 

She also blamed her alcohol use on grandmother, claiming that 

she had “relapse[d]” into heavy drinking to cope with “stress”

arising from grandmother’s June 2020 visit. She admitted to 

past cocaine and methamphetamine use, but claimed that she 

had not used any drugs since 2018.

In September 2020, the juvenile court ordered DCFS to 

provide mother with services and granted mother regular 

monitored visitation. However, between October 2020 and 
8

August 2021, DCFS reported that mother had not been 

cooperative or fully engaged with services.6

Mother only had sporadic visitation with the children, and 

often failed to respond to DCFS inquiries about her participation 

in services. She submitted to one drug test in July 2021, and 

tested positive for codeine, morphine, and marijuana. She failed 

to appear for her second scheduled drug test.

VI. Jurisdictional and Dispositional Hearing

On August 20, 2021, the juvenile court held a combined 

jurisdiction and disposition hearing.

At the hearing, mother testified that her positive tests for 

codeine and morphine resulted from prescription medication. 

She said that she had been hospitalized three times in 2021 for 

seizures, for which she was given codeine; she also alleged that 

she was prescribed morphine for high blood pressure. Mother 

denied drinking any alcohol since June 2020, but admitted to 

regular marijuana use.

Mother repeated her earlier kidnapping allegations against 

grandmother. She blamed her inconsistent visitation on moving 

to San Bernardino County, transportation issues, and becoming 

homeless. Mother admitted that she had not participated in any 

services.

The juvenile court sustained counts b-1, b-2, b-3, j-1, j-2, 

and j-3 against mother, finding true the allegations regarding 

mother’s physical abuse of Serenity and Samuel and mother’s 

6 During this time, DCFS investigated reports that Serenity 

and S.R. were being neglected and/or emotionally and sexually 

abused in their current placement. Serenity subsequently

recanted these allegations, saying that grandmother had told her 

to make false reports to facilitate future placement with 

grandmother.
9

substance abuse. Accordingly, the court exercised jurisdiction 

over all four children. Additionally, the juvenile court removed

the children from mother’s custody and ordered reunification 

services for mother, to include drug and alcohol testing and 

treatment, counseling, parenting classes, and monitored

visitation.

VII. Appeal

Mother timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Mother argues that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional 

findings and removal order should be reversed because both are 

unsupported by substantial evidence.

7 For the reasons below, we 

disagree and affirm.

I. Jurisdictional Findings

Mother contends that the evidence was insufficient to 

support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings under section 

300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j).

A. Applicable Law

Under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), the juvenile court has 

jurisdiction over and may adjudge to be a dependent of the court 

7 In her opening brief, mother also argued that the juvenile 

court failed to satisfy its duties of inquiry under ICWA with 

respect to her youngest daughter, A.P. DCFS then requested 

that we take judicial notice of documents from the 2019 

dependency proceeding involving A.P., in which all proper ICWA 

inquiries were made, appropriate notices were sent to the Bureau 

of Indian Affairs and relevant tribes, and the juvenile court 

ultimately found that A.P. was not an Indian child. Mother 

concedes that these documents fully resolve her ICWA argument.

Accordingly, since we granted the request for judicial notice, we 

need not consider mother’s ICWA claims.
10

a “child [who] has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the 

child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of 

. . . [¶] . . . [t]he failure or inability of [his or her] parent . . . to 

adequately supervise or protect the child . . .” 

Jurisdiction also extends, under section 300, subdivision (j), 

to a child whose “sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined 

in [section 300,] subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a

substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as 

defined in those subdivisions. . . .” In determining whether such 

jurisdiction exists, the court must “consider the circumstances 

surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the age and

gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of the 

sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, and any 

other factors the court considers probative in determining 

whether there is a substantial risk to the child.” (§ 300, subd. (j).)

“[S]ection 300 does not require that a child actually be 

abused or neglected before the juvenile court can assume 

jurisdiction. The subdivisions at issue here require only a 

‘substantial risk’ that the child will be abused or neglected. . . . 

‘The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or 

injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to 

protect the child.’” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)

B. Standard of Review

We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for 

substantial evidence—“evidence that is reasonable, credible and 

of solid value. [Citations.] We do not evaluate the credibility of 

witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or 

determine the weight of the evidence. Instead, we draw all 

reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record 

favorably to the juvenile court’s order and affirm the order even if 
11

there is other evidence supporting a contrary finding.” (In re R.V.

(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843.)

C. Analysis

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

jurisdictional findings as to all four children. Regarding the

physical abuse findings, Serenity and Samuel repeatedly said 

that mother hit them with a belt, a cell phone charger, or her 

hand. Although they occasionally recanted some details, they 

maintained that mother “whooped” them with a belt and with her 

hand to discipline them, and that, when drinking, she would get 

“irritated” and hit them. Both grandmother and Samuel and 

S.R.’s father said that the children had reported that mother 

would hit them. This tendency to physically lash out when 

frustrated or upset, especially after drinking, risks not just 

Serenity and Samuel’s safety, but also their younger siblings’.

This evidence is also relevant to the substance abuse 

findings issued against mother. Not only is the record replete 

with evidence of mother’s substance abuse—including multiple 

positive drug and alcohol tests—but Serenity expressly linked 

mother’s inebriation to her short temper and physically abusive 

conduct. Mother admitted that she was prone to excessive 

drinking when stressed, yet made no effort to engage in 

treatment services in the year between the children’s detention 

and the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction. And A.P., 

mother’s youngest child, was only two years old at the time of the 

jurisdiction hearing. (See In re Christopher R. (2014) 

225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1219–1220 (Christopher R.) [children “six 

years old or younger at the time of the jurisdiction hearing” are 

“children of ‘tender years’” for whom “the finding of substance 

abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability of a parent or 
12

guardian to provide regular care resulting in a substantial risk of 

harm”].)

Mother raises three arguments against our conclusions. 

First, she contends that the physical abuse allegations are 

unsupported because Serenity admitted to being coached by 

grandmother to lie about mother’s behavior. However, Serenity 

only attributed grandmother’s coaching to allegations that 

mother would leave the children alone—which the juvenile court 

did not sustain. Serenity did not recant any statements about 

physical abuse. Samuel did attempt to walk back his prior 

statement that mother had hit him in the face with her hand, but 

Serenity consistently repeated her claims that mother had hit 

Samuel with both a belt and with her hand. Viewing the record, 

and particularly the children’s statements, as a whole, 

substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that 

mother had physically abused Serenity and Samuel.

Mother also argues that any alleged hitting, either with an 

object or with her hand, was acceptable discipline rather than 

impermissible physical abuse. We cannot agree. Serenity and

Samuel stated that mother hit them not just to discipline them, 

but also when she was drinking, “irritated,” or “mad.” In one 

instance, mother repeatedly hit the children with a cell phone 

charger to stop them from asking questions about where she had 

been the night before. In another, mother hit Samuel when he 

failed to comply with her instruction to conceal the family’s 

location from grandmother. 

These instances do not fall, as mother argues, “within the 

realm of permissible discipline.” The cases mother cites in 

support of this argument are inapposite. (See In re Joel H. (1993) 

19 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1201 [reversing physical abuse findings 
13

based on the caregivers spanking a child with their hands, when 

such spankings “were the [caregivers’] brand of discipline” and 

“[t]here was no evidence that the [caregivers] struck [the child]

with objects,” such as “a . . . belt”]; In re Isabella F. (2014) 

226 Cal.App.4th 128, 131–132, 139 [reversing physical abuse 

findings where “nothing in the record . . . suggest[ed]” that 

mother’s single physical altercation with her daughter was 

anything other than “an isolated incident”].)

Second, mother argues that no evidence suggests a nexus 

between mother’s substance abuse and a substantial risk of harm 

to the children. Mother correctly states that, in order to exercise

dependency jurisdiction on the basis of a parent’s substance 

abuse, there must be a “nexus” between the parent’s substance

abuse and the risk of harm to the child by virtue of the parent’s 

“failure to ensure [that the child] w[as] safely cared for and 

supervised.” (In re Natalie A. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 178, 185.) 

But “[t]his is not . . . a case involving substance abuse without 

more.” (In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 851.) Indeed, 

mother’s argument ignores Serenity’s explicit statements that 

mother would get “irritated” and hit the children after drinking, 

as well as A.P.’s very young age (see Christopher R., supra, 

225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1219–1220).

Lastly, mother argues that S.R.’s consistent denials about 

mother’s drinking demonstrate that mother never drank to 

excess around the children. This argument ignores contradictory 

evidence from S.R.’s father, reporting that both Samuel and S.R. 

had told him about mother’s drinking, and from Serenity and 

Samuel, who repeatedly attested to mother’s drinking. (In re 

R.V., supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 843 [under our standard of 
14

review, we must “affirm . . . even if there is other evidence 

supporting a contrary finding”].)

II. Removal Order

Mother also challenges the evidentiary basis for the 

dispositional order removing the children from her custody.

A. Relevant Law

Before removing a child from parental custody, the juvenile 

court is required to “make one of five specified findings by clear 

and convincing evidence. (§ 361, subd. (c).) One ground for 

removal is that there is a substantial risk of injury to the child’s 

physical health, safety, protection or emotional well-being if he or 

she were returned home, and there are no reasonable means to 

protect the child. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) “‘Clear and convincing” 

evidence requires a finding of high probability. The evidence 

must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt. It must be 

sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every 

reasonable mind. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Actual harm to a child 

is not necessary before a child can be removed. ‘Reasonable 

apprehension stands as an accepted basis for the exercise of state 

power.’” (In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 154.)

B. Standard of Review

We review a dispositional order removing a minor from 

parental custody for substantial evidence. (In re V.L., supra, 

54 Cal.App.5th at p. 154.) Because the juvenile court must make 

its finding that a ground for removal exists under the clear and 

convincing evidence standard of proof (§ 361, subd. (c)), “the 

question before the appellate court is whether the record as a 

whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact 

finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.” 

(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.)
15

C. Analysis

We find that substantial evidence exists from which the 

juvenile court could find it highly probable that the children were 

suffering a substantial risk of physical or emotional injury in 

mother’s custody, and that there were no reasonable means to 

protect the children short of removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(3).)

The record shows that mother had a tumultuous history of 

substance abuse and unstable parenting. In January 2020, she 

regained custody of all four of her children for the first time in 

over three years, after A.P. had spent the first year of her life in

foster care and the three older children had spent over three 

years in Ohio with great-grandmother. Within five months, 

mother’s substance abuse issues and physical abuse of her older 

children caused the children to be detained from her care.

During this case, mother has demonstrated a pernicious 

instability. She blames grandmother for the family’s troubles

and her own drinking, taking little to no responsibility for her 

own actions—despite the fact that it was mother’s dubious

kidnapping claim that initially brought the family to DCFS’

attention. (In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 

[“One cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge”].) 

Mother’s reported substance abuse and tendency to physically 

lash out at the children when irritated, combined with her 

repeated failures to acknowledge her problematic behavior, 

cooperate with DCFS, and participate in rehabilitative services, 

create a significant safety risk for the children if they remained 

in her custody.

Mother argues that drug and alcohol testing and regular 

social worker visits would obviate the need for removal. But the 

record shows that mother was either incapable or unwilling to
16

submit to regular drug testing, demonstrated by her prior noshow test and by DCFS’ frequent struggle to stay in contact with 

her.

8 And any unannounced visit could “only assess the situation 

. . . at the time of the visit.” (In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 

293.) This is particularly concerning considering A.P.’s extremely 

young age, as children young enough to need constant 

supervision face an “‘inherent’” and substantial risk of serious 

physical harm if their caregiver is engaged in activity that 

renders her less capable of providing the requisite supervision. 

(Christopher R., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1216.)

Mother also argues that DCFS never truly believed that 

the children were in danger while in her custody, because they 

did not remove the children on the same day the expedited

removal order issued. Mother cites no legal authority supporting 

her proposition that this argument fatally undermines the 

juvenile court’s ultimate removal order. (Landry v. Berryessa 

Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699–700 [“When 

an issue is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal 

argument it may be deemed abandoned and discussion by the 

reviewing court is unnecessary”].) 

Nor is the argument factually sound; a cursory review of 

the record reveals that what mother characterizes as DCFS’

delay in executing the expedited removal order actually reflects

mother’s evasiveness and failure to communicate with DCFS. 

DCFS sought an expedited removal order three days after first 

8 Even taking mother’s position that “[i]n the prior 

[dependency] case involving [A.P.], [m]other had worked 

diligently with [DCFS] and complied with services,” mother’s 

actions in this current case do not indicate a present willingness 

or ability to cooperate with DCFS or participate in services.
17

interviewing Serenity and Samuel; attempted to serve the order 

over the next two days, only to be stymied by mother’s 

unreachability and failure to follow through on her promise to 

deliver the children to a DCFS office; and then immediately filed 

a missing persons report in an attempt to locate mother and the 

children. Contrary to mother’s arguments, these actions do not 

belie a lack of urgency or undercut the need for removal.

DISPOSITION

The findings and orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, Acting P. J.

ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

_________________________, J.

CHAVEZ

_________________________, J.

HOFFSTADT