NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of:

TASNEEM HALLOUM, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

ADNAN HASASNEH, Respondent/Appellant

No. 1 CA-CV 18-0353 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2016-095376

The Honorable Rodrick Coffey, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Wees Law Firm LLC, Phoenix

By James F. Wees

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Thomas A. Morton PLLC, Phoenix

By Thomas A. Morton

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

FILED 4-16-2019
HALLOUM v. HASASNEH

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jon W. Thompson delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge James B. Morse, Jr. and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.

T H O M P S O N, Judge:

¶1 This appeal stems from a highly acrimonious divorce 

proceeding. Adnan Hasasneh (“appellant” or “husband”) appeals the trial 

court’s decision denying his motion for new trial. Appellant also appeals 

the trial court’s decision to preclude his expert’s report and testimony as 

evidence, as well as the trial court’s apportionment of marital assets and 

debts. For the following reasons we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Appellant and Tasneem Halloum (“appellee” or “wife”) were 

married September 23, 2012 in Arizona. They share two children together,

aged 4 and 2. While married, the couple owned and ran a furniture store 

located in Chandler, Arizona (the “business”). The couple also kept 

$500,000 cash in the marital residence and wife owned jewelry valued at 

$100,000, which was also kept in the home. 

¶3 On September 7, 2016, following a physical altercation, wife 

sought an order of protection against husband, which required him to move 

out of the marital residence.1 Wife alleged that shortly after she filed the

petition for dissolution of marriage (the “petition”) in September 2016, 

husband began withdrawing money from the business accounts as well as 

moving inventory from the business to his father’s furniture store. By 

January 2017 the business was completely shut-down. Wife also alleged 

that prior to her filing the petition, husband removed the $500,000 cash 

from the home. She further alleged that in October 2016, husband broke 

into the house and stole the $100,000 worth of jewelry. Husband denies all 

allegations.

 

1 Husband also obtained an order of protection against wife. Both parties 

appealed the orders of protection, however husband dropped his appeal, 

wife’s is still pending. Wife obtained a second order of protection after the 

original expired.
HALLOUM v. HASASNEH

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¶4 In February 2017 the court appointed a third-party valuator 

to determine the value of the business prior to husband shutting it down. 

After both parties submitted two possible valuators the court blindly chose 

one, Susannah Sabnekar of Sabnekar & Associates, PLLC, (“Ms. Sabnekar”). 

She determined that the business was worth $1,245,000 which included 

over $500,000 in cash that husband had withdrawn from business accounts. 

Ms. Sabnekar also reported that husband had not been cooperative and had 

failed to provide her with several documents.

¶5 The court set an original date of October 26, 2017 for the 

evidentiary hearing. The court ordered that all disclosures be made by 

September 26, 2017 except for expert disclosures, which were due 60 days 

before the hearing. On September 25, 2017, husband filed an expedited 

motion to continue trial. The court granted the motion and rescheduled the 

evidentiary hearing for January 25, 2018. Husband then disclosed an expert 

report on November 3, 2017. Wife filed a motion to preclude admission of 

untimely report and testimony (“motion to preclude”) and husband filed 

his response. The court granted wife’s motion to preclude, finding that the 

motion for continuation did not automatically extend the disclosure 

deadlines.

¶6 The evidentiary hearing was held on January 25, 2018. The 

court found that husband’s testimony regarding the cash and jewelry was 

not credible and therefore attributed those assets to him. The court then 

awarded the house to wife as well as half the value of the business after the 

cash and taxes were deducted from the total value. Husband filed a motion 

for new trial arguing that the court erred in precluding his expert’s report 

and testimony; attributing the cash and jewelry assets to him; in ordering 

him to be solely responsible for the tax debt; and for attributing $20,000 per 

month income to him when calculating child support. The motion for new 

trial was denied. Husband appealed. 

DISCUSSION

¶7 We review a trial court’s order denying a motion for new trial 

for an abuse of discretion. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Burke, 204 Ariz. 251, 254, 

¶ 10 (2003). “The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to 

grant or deny a motion for a new trial, and we will not overturn that 

decision absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Pullen v. Pullen, 223 Ariz. 293, 

296, ¶ 10 (App. 2009) (citations and quotations omitted). We address each 

of appellant’s arguments in turn. 
HALLOUM v. HASASNEH

Decision of the Court

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I. Expert Report and Testimony

¶8 The trial court has broad discretion when ruling on disclosure 

and discovery matters and this court will not disturb an evidentiary ruling 

absent a clear abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice. Marquez v. Ortega, 

231 Ariz. 437, 441, ¶ 14 (App. 2013); Gemstar Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, 185 Ariz. 

493, 506 (1996). 

¶9 Husband first argues the court erred in precluding his expert

report and testimony. Husband asserts that his disclosure was made 60 

days before the continued trial date and therefore was timely under 

Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure (ARFLP) 49(H). We disagree. 

¶10 The trial court issued an order setting disclosure deadlines in 

June 2017. The order clearly set the deadline for expert disclosures as 60 

days before the hearing date of October 26, 2017. That meant the deadline 

for expert disclosure was August 27, 2017. Husband did not file his motion 

to continue until almost a month later on September 25, 2017. By that time,

he had already missed the deadline for disclosing experts. Husband argues 

that pursuant to Johnson v. Provoyeur, 245 Ariz. 239 (App. 2018) the 

continuance of the trial necessarily continued the deadline for disclosure. 

However, in Johnson, when the trial court continued the trial it also 

expressly reset the disclosure deadline to 60 days before the continued trial 

date. Id. at 241, ¶ 5. The trial court in this instance did not make such an 

order, and a continuation of a trial does not automatically reset disclosure 

deadlines. See State v. Superior Court, 127 Ariz. 175, 176 (1980) (holding that 

the “resetting of a trial date does not change the date by which pretrial 

motions must be filed unless so ordered by the trial court”). If husband 

wished to extend the deadline for disclosures he should have filed a motion 

to extend said deadline, he did not do so. 

¶11 Although husband asserts that wife had notice that he would 

be using an expert and should have expected the report, that argument is 

not supported by the record. Husband points to the affidavit filed by the

parties providing the court with names of possible neutral third-party 

valuators, which included the name of husband’s expert he eventually 

used. However, this is not sufficient notice for wife to know husband would 

be filing a separate expert report. The names provided on that list were for 

the judge to blindly choose from. If we are to follow husband’s logic he was 

also disclosing the other two names as his expert witness.

¶12 Furthermore, husband has not demonstrated prejudice 

resulting from the court’s decision precluding his expert report and 
HALLOUM v. HASASNEH

Decision of the Court

5

witness. The court appointed Ms. Sabnekar as a neutral third-party valuator 

for the business. She provided a detailed report of what the business was 

worth and the related debts. Additionally, husband testified regarding the

business and his personal valuation of it. As such there was no prejudice 

and the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 

II. Division of Community Property

¶13 When dividing community property at dissolution, the trial 

court must divide the property and debts “equitably, though not 

necessarily in kind.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 25-318(A). The trial court 

has broad discretion in apportioning community property between parties 

at dissolution, and we will not disturb its allocation absent an abuse of 

discretion. Boncoskey v. Boncoskey, 216 Ariz. 448, 451, ¶ 13 (App. 2007) 

(citations omitted). The court commits an abuse of discretion if it “commits 

an error of law in the process of exercising its discretion.” Id. (quoting Kohler 

v. Kohler, 211 Ariz. 106, 107, ¶ 2 (App. 2005)). We view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to upholding the trial court’s ruling and will sustain 

the ruling if it is reasonably supported by the evidence. Id.

¶14 Husband argues that the trial court erred when it attributed 

the $500,000 cash and $100,000 in jewelry to him and then awarded the 

marital home to wife. Husband asserts that the trial court’s determination 

that he had the cash and jewelry was not supported by the evidence and 

the trial court incorrectly relied on wife’s testimony. We disagree. 

¶15 The trial court is in the best position to weigh the evidence 

and judge the credibility of the parties and an appellate court should give 

deference to the trial court’s conclusions. See In re Gen. Adjudication of All 

Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 198 Ariz. 330, 340, ¶ 25 (2000) 

(“The trial court, not this court, weighs the evidence and resolves any 

conflicting facts, expert opinions, and inferences therefrom.”); see also Mary 

Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004) (the trial 

court is “in the best position to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of 

the parties, observe the parties, and make appropriate factual findings”). 

¶16 Wife testified that husband kept a large sum of cash hidden 

in the home in a shoe box. Following a physical altercation between 

husband and wife, in which both party’s fathers intervened, wife witnessed 

husband give his father an item wrapped in a shirt. Shortly after witnessing 

this act, wife overheard her father-in-law tell someone that he needed to 

leave because his car was “loaded,” and he was worried about cash. Wife 

then went to check on the cash in its normal hiding place and it was gone.
HALLOUM v. HASASNEH

Decision of the Court

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¶17 Wife also testified that she had gold jewelry worth between 

$150,000 and $200,000 that she kept hidden in the house. Some of the 

jewelry was gifted from husband, who had been a gold dealer prior to the 

marriage, and others were family heirlooms. Wife testified that just before 

the hearing for temporary orders she saw husband driving around her 

neighborhood. She decided to take the children and leave the home. When 

she returned she saw that the front door was open, there was broken glass 

on the garage door and her jewelry was missing. Additionally, according to 

the police report, a neighbor saw a truck matching husband’s parked in the 

driveway the weekend the jewelry was taken. Although husband testified 

that he did not take any cash or jewelry, the trial court specifically found 

that husband’s testimony was not credible but wife’s was.

¶18 The trial court therefore attributed $600,000 to husband in 

cash and jewelry, and then awarded the marital residence worth 

approximately $380,000 to wife. Because the evidence supports the trial 

court’s determination that husband was in possession of approximately 

$600,000 of community property, it did not abuse its discretion in awarding 

wife the marital home, which was valued at less than the cash and jewelry. 

III. Tax Debt

¶19 Husband next argues that the trial court erred in apportioning 

100% of the tax debt to him. This assertion is a misstatement of the trial 

court’s ruling. When dividing the business, the court specifically reduced 

the total value of the business by the $500,000 cash it awarded husband, as 

well as the $138,000 of taxes owed. The court then ordered husband to pay 

wife half the amount of that number. Thus, although husband is solely 

responsible for insuring the tax debt gets paid, wife’s portion of the 

community debt was deducted from her share of the business. Had the 

court truly apportioned the entire tax debt to husband he would have been 

required to pay wife an additional $69,000 for her share of the business. 

¶20 Furthermore, the evidence shows that the distribution of 

property was unequally favorable towards husband. Husband was 

awarded $600,000 worth of community property while wife received the 

marital home worth roughly $380,000. This means husband was awarded 

$220,000 more in community assets than wife. Thus, the trial court did not 

err in its apportionment of the tax debt. 
HALLOUM v. HASASNEH

Decision of the Court

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IV. Income Calculation

¶21 Husband’s final argument is that the trial court erred in its 

determination of his income by attributing his income at $20,000 per month. 

Again, we disagree.

¶22 “Generally, we review child support awards for an abuse of 

discretion.” McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 30, ¶ 6 (App. 2002) (citation 

omitted). We will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are 

clearly erroneous, but “draw our own legal conclusions from facts found or 

implied in the judgment.” Id. (quotations omitted). However, “we review 

whether a court can attribute greater income to a party de novo, because it 

is an issue of law.” Pullen, 223 Ariz. at 295, ¶ 9 (citation omitted). “Questions 

of what factors to apply to attribute income are legal questions.” Id. (citation 

omitted). “[W]hether the trial court properly applied those factors is 

reviewed deferentially.” Id. (citations omitted). 

¶23 Under A.R.S. § 25-320(5)(E) (2019), “if earnings are reduced as 

a matter of choice and not for reasonable cause, the court may attribute 

income to a parent up to his or her earning capacity.” When determining 

whether to use actual income or earning capacity to calculate child support 

the trial court should consider five factors: 

(1) The reasons asserted by the party whose conduct is at 

issue; (2) The impact upon the obligee of considering the 

actual earnings of the obligor; (3) When the obligee’s conduct 

is at issue, the impact upon the obligor of considering the 

actual earnings of the obligee and thereby reducing the 

obligor’s financial contribution to the support order at issue;

(4) Whether the party complaining of a voluntary reduction 

in income acquiesced in the conduct of the other party; and 

(5) The timing of the action in question in relation to the 

entering of a decree or the execution of a written agreement 

between the parties. 

Pullen, 223 Ariz. at 297, ¶ 15 (citation omitted). 

¶24 Husband’s 2015 income tax reports that he had an adjusted 

gross income of approximately $450,000. Additionally, when the court 

entered temporary child support orders in November 2016, it determined 

that husband’s gross monthly income was approximately $29,000. After the 

temporary orders were filed husband shut down the business. He then 

began working at Dillard’s making $2,300 per month. Although husband 

testified that the business took a significant downturn in 2016, and that he 
HALLOUM v. HASASNEH

Decision of the Court

8

would have had to move locations to keep the business open, the only

evidence husband offered for proof of the downturn were notices of late 

and unpaid rent for the business. The court did not find his testimony 

credible.

¶25 The court applied the five factors enumerated in Pullen, and 

made findings as to each factor. As to factor one, the court found that

husband deliberately shut down the business in order to minimize his 

financial obligations to wife. As to factor two, the court determined that 

wife and the children would be significantly impacted if it calculated 

husband’s child support obligation using his retail sales income instead of 

husband’s earning capacity when operating the business. When looking at 

factor three and four the court determined that wife’s conduct was not at 

issue and that she did not acquiesce or agree to husband’s unilateral 

decision to close the business. As to factor five, the court found that 

husband closed the business within a couple of weeks after wife sought 

temporary orders.

¶26 The court therefore found that husband’s change in income 

was not justifiable or reasonable. Nonetheless, the court reduced husband’s 

income by $10,000 to account for the possible increase in rent for the 

business and attributed $20,000 monthly income to husband. After 

calculating child support owed using the child support work sheet, the 

court determined husband owed approximately $2,000 per month.

However, because wife’s pretrial statement indicated that $1,085 was 

enough child support, the court reduced the monthly amount to $1,250.

¶27 The trial court properly applied the five factors in 

determining whether to attribute a greater income to husband and did not 

abuse its discretion in its determination of each. We therefore affirm the 

trial court’s order attributing greater income to husband. 

V. Attorneys’ Fees

¶28 Both parties have requested attorney’s fees and costs. We 

deny husband’s request. We grant wife’s request pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-

324 (2019) in an amount to be determined upon compliance with Arizona 

Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. 
HALLOUM v. HASASNEH

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶29 For the foregoing reasons we affirm the trial court’s ruling

and grant wife’s request for attorneys’ fees.