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43–092 PDF 2009

S. Hrg. 110–723 

ADDRESSING THE U.S.-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC 

RELATIONSHIP 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT 

INFORMATION, FEDERAL SERVICES, AND 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 12, 2008 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, 

FEDERAL SERVICES, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

JOHN KILVINGTON, Staff Director 

KATY FRENCH, Minority Staff Director 

MONISHA SMITH, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 1 

Senator Coburn ................................................................................................. 11 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 11 

Senator Levin .................................................................................................... 32 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY JUNE 12, 2008 

Hon. Russell D. Feingold, a U.S. Senator from Wisconsin ................................... 2 

Donald Camp, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and 

Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State .............................................. 11 

K. Alan Kronstadt, Specialist in South Asian Foreign Affairs, Defense and 

Trade Division, Congressional Research Service ............................................... 23 

Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage 

Foundation ............................................................................................................ 25 

Michael Krepon, Co-Founder, The Henry L. Stimson Center .............................. 27 

Stephen P. Cohen, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings 

Institution ............................................................................................................. 29 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Camp, Donald: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 55 

Cohen, Stephen P.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 29 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 92 

Curtis, Lisa: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 25 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 77 

Feingold, Hon. Russell D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 2 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 53 

Krepon, Michael: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 27 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 84 

Kronstadt, K. Alan: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 23 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 67 

APPENDIX 

Report of Senator Carl Levin and Senator Bob Casey, ‘‘Travel to Pakistan 

and Afghanistan’’ ................................................................................................. 47 

Letter to Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, from Senator Levin, dated 

June 5, 2008 ......................................................................................................... 51 

Questions and Responses for the Record from: 

Mr. Camp .......................................................................................................... 95 

Mr. Kronstadt ................................................................................................... 96 

Ms. Curtis ......................................................................................................... 103 

Mr. Krepon ........................................................................................................ 109 

Mr. Cohen .......................................................................................................... 112 

(1) 

ADDRESSING THE U.S.-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC 

RELATIONSHIP 

THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, FEDERAL SERVICE, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m., in room 

342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R. Carper, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Carper, Levin, Akaka, and Coburn. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. The Subcommittee will come to order. Welcome 

to Senator Feingold and Senator Akaka. We will be joined by a 

number of our colleagues here in a little bit, but I just want to 

thank all the witnesses that are here, especially Senator Feingold 

who has joined us here today. He is going to talk for a little bit 

about his recent visit, he led a CODEL to a number of places, including to Pakistan. 

I understand Senator Feingold serves on three committees. 

Among them are the Senate Intelligence Committee, the Foreign 

Relations Committee, and the Judiciary Committee. And over the 

past recess, he was in both Pakistan and in India? 

Senator FEINGOLD. That is right. 

Senator CARPER. All right. But as I understand, most of your 

time was in Pakistan? 

Senator FEINGOLD. That is correct. 

Senator CARPER. My staff, who visited Islamabad, just missed 

you there, but they came back with press accounts. They said a lot 

of the stories were above the fold, which is not bad for an American 

Senator in a foreign country. 

And I understand that you traveled there because you view Pakistan, as do I, as the central front in the fight against extremism 

and critical to our national security. And while there, I am told 

that Senator Feingold was vocal on the ousting of the Chief Justice 

of Pakistan, noting that this and the reinstatement of other former 

judges is a simple rule of law matter that could jump-start institutional reform in Pakistan. And again, I would concur with that. 

He has also expressed some skepticism about the negotiations 

surrounding the Federally Administered Tribal Areas? 

2 

1The prepared statement of Senator Feingold appears in the Appendix on page 53. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Correct. 

Senator CARPER. OK. And Senator Feingold, we thank you for 

your willingness to stop by today before we kick off this hearing, 

and invite our other witnesses just to share with us your thoughts 

about what our country should be doing with respect to our relationships with Pakistan. Senator, should we just go right to you? 

Take as much time as you wish. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD,1 A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM WISCONSIN 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator 

Akaka. 

This is really very kind of you and I am happy to be asked to 

talk about this issue that I have been thinking about a great deal 

since my trip. 

This hearing is particularly timely given the critical juncture and 

this partnership with Pakistan. Although we have a checkered history with Pakistan, the recently elected civilian government provides an opportunity to develop a sound, comprehensive, bilateral 

relationship that serves the needs and the principles of both of our 

countries while also ensuring our national security and theirs over 

the long term. 

As you said, I recently returned from a four-day trip to Pakistan 

where I had the chance, as, frankly, other Senators did who were 

in the region at the same time, to meet with a broad range of political officials from numerous parties as well as with President 

Musharraf, Pakistani intelligence officials, the ousted Chief Justice—we actually met with him in his home where he had been 

held under house arrest—and representatives of Pakistan’s civil society. I traveled to Peshawar, which lies near the border with Afghanistan and the tumultuous Northwest Frontier Province and to 

Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. 

Senator CARPER. How long were you there? 

Senator FEINGOLD. A total of 3 days. And then in the Kashmir 

area, we were able to visit successful U.S.-funded earthquake recovery programs, which I think would make everybody feel very 

good about the schools and the dairies and the other things that 

we were able to help restore fairly quickly after a disastrous earthquake in an area that, frankly, has not been known for being a particularly pro-American area. So this is a real opportunity. 

I chose to visit Pakistan because it is out of that country, and 

I think obviously the Chairman sees this, as well, that we face our 

most serious national security threat. As the intelligence community has confirmed again and again, intelligence is the central front 

in the fight against al Qaeda. Confronting this threat, which includes addressing the al Qaeda safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, must be our top national security priority. 

That means tracking down Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda 

operatives and working with the Pakistan government to neutralize forces before they plot or carry out attacks against Americans. And yes, as you alluded to in your opening remarks, Mr. 

3 

Chairman, it means making clear to our Pakistani friends that cutting deals with the al Qaeda or the Taliban is simply unacceptable. 

But these cannot be our only goals. The fight is more than a 

manhunt. If we are serious about fighting al Qaeda and preventing 

future generations of bin Ladens from emerging, we also must recognize the needs of the local population and expand our development assistance throughout a country where poverty and antiWestern sentiment is pervasive. 

A key part of this approach will require Pakistan’s newly-elected 

government to rein in the military apparatus, which has historically controlled much of Pakistan’s politics and policies, sometimes 

overtly by a military dictator running the country and other times 

more discretely from behind the screen of a civilian-led government. And as Pakistan’s new government seeks to establish itself, 

we have to find a way to defend our national security interests 

while recognizing that the emergence of a democratic civilian government in Pakistan is in our long-term strategic interests. We 

need the support of the Pakistani people and their democraticallyelected leaders to successfully counter al Qaeda and extremism. 

There is an opening right now for the United States to develop 

a new relationship with Pakistan. This Administration’s reliance 

on a single unpopular leader who came to power through a coup 

was a serious mistake that was inconsistent with our values and 

our national security interests. Now we must end that mistake by 

expanding our relationships and supporting basic democratic institutions. A more inclusive policy will allow our counterterrorism 

partnership to hopefully withstand the frequent turbulence of Pakistan’s domestic policies and help mitigate already high levels of 

anti-American sentiment. 

I have never been to a country, Mr. Chairman, where you ask 

people all over the country who are being very cordial to you, we 

understand there is anti-Americanism here, and they say, ‘‘Yes, 

that is right.’’ They usually try to tone it down a little bit. It was 

not hostile in terms of the comment, it was just, ‘‘That is right,’’ 

and they gave various explanations for it. 

Senator CARPER. That is interesting because in Iran, I am told 

that the feelings toward our country are actually for the most part 

very cordial. 

Senator FEINGOLD. That is an interesting contrast. I think that 

would—yes, you wouldn’t get the same response. 

This Administration’s policies toward Pakistan have been highly 

damaging to our long-term national security. Although Pakistan’s 

domestic politics remain fragile, we must seize this occasion by 

working with those who promote democracy, human rights development, and the rule of law. We must align ourselves with the moderate forces critical to the fight against extremism and commit to 

supporting economic reform, legal political party development, and 

initiatives to integrate the FATA into the rest of Pakistan. This 

will not be easy, but it is long overdue and will help ensure that 

we are using all the tools at our disposal to fight al Qaeda and associated terrorist threats. 

Combatting extremism and denying terrorists the safe haven 

now found in the FATA requires, among other things, creating sustainable development strategies that provide both opportunities for 

4 

the Pakistani people and, again, tangible examples of American 

good will as I saw in Pakistani Kashmir. This must include not 

only traditional development projects, but institution building and 

political engagement in a region long deprived of such opportunities. While we target terrorists and extremists in the FATA, we 

must also make sure that the people of the FATA have economic 

options that can help them resist terrorism and extremism while 

reducing anti-American sentiment. 

Supporting the Pakistani people as they seek to strengthen development initiatives and democratic institutions is not just an outgrowth of our values, it is in our national security interests. This 

is not to say that this process will be free from challenges. There 

are already serious hurdles that must be dealt with, including negotiations in the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province, both of 

which I think are cause for serious concern and skepticism. America’s allies must know that there can be no negotiations with terrorists who have sworn to harm our country. Those who would plot 

against American troops in Afghanistan or Americans here at home 

must be pursued relentlessly. 

We must however recognize that the new leadership was elected 

democratically by the Pakistani people and we must try to work 

with them to advance our mutual interests in fostering security 

and development in the region, and again, Mr. Chairman, I am so 

pleased with your interest and the growing interest in the Senate 

that I think will be very valuable, quite a few Senators and also 

members of the House who really want to work on this PakistanAmerica relationship over the long term. 

Thank you so much for having me. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you very much. Sometimes when Senators testify to lead off a hearing, we don’t ask questions. Would 

you be willing to take a question or two? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Sure. 

Senator CARPER. Senator Akaka, do you have a question or two 

you would like to ask of Senator Feingold, our colleague? 

Senator AKAKA. I don’t have a question but I want to thank Senator Feingold for his statement before this Subcommittee and to 

tell you that I first visited Pakistan 3 months after Musharraf took 

over the country after the coup. I visited with him and felt that he 

had some great ideas for the country and I am glad to hear you 

now say that it is about time that they move on democratically to 

a system. I am very interested in your comments about that. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Senator, we can’t ignore the fact that President Musharraf did side with us and provide help, but the level of 

resentment toward the United States among Pakistani leaders and 

the Pakistani people because we seem to put all our eggs in that 

basket, is a significant part of the anti-American feelings that I 

have described. 

Senator CARPER. Senator Biden, my colleague from Delaware, 

has said to me from time to time that what we have had in Pakistan is not a Pakistan policy, we have had a Musharraf policy, and 

he suggested what we need is a Pakistan policy. 

Had you been there before? 

Senator FEINGOLD. I was there briefly with Senator McCain and 

Senator Clinton—— 

5 

Senator CARPER. That was an interesting group to go over with. 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. In 2005. Yes. The story I like to 

tell is they get off the plane and all the women in the country 

would run up to Senator Clinton, all the military men would run 

up to Senator McCain, and I would hold the luggage. [Laughter.] 

But actually, it was a fabulous trip and we had a very long conversation with Musharraf, and the contrast between meeting with 

him now with his changed political situation and then was really 

striking. 

Senator CARPER. When you look at our policy and the things that 

we are doing as a country in Pakistan now, what makes sense and 

what doesn’t? 

Senator FEINGOLD. In terms of our policy right now? 

Senator CARPER. Yes. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, we have to engage these new political 

leaders. They are impressive people. They include at least two 

major political parties that are a very tenuous coalition. But these 

are strong people—— 

Senator CARPER. Is this a coalition sort of like the coalition governments they put in Israel, or would it be a coalition more like 

putting the Democrats and Republicans together here? 

Senator FEINGOLD. A little bit closer to being the Democrats and 

Republicans being together, although not exactly, but these really 

are political parties that are not terribly similar. They have represented two very different views of the future of Pakistan, two different philosophies. But what they do share is a desire to return 

Pakistan to a democratic system, and they are talented and they 

are interested in our views. 

I also want to add that among the upbeat things I felt in Pakistan was a better attitude about their future relationship with 

India, which has been a source of such difficulty. Now, no one is 

naive to think that is easy, but that was almost an upbeat topic 

and there seemed to be a willingness and an interest in that, which 

I think would be good for us and good for India. 

So to me, we need to engage these folks. On the other hand, we 

can’t say that our relationships with them are more important than 

making sure that the FATA region is not used as either a safe 

haven for al Qaeda or a launching pad for attacks on our troops 

in Afghanistan. That is non-negotiable for us, and I tried to make 

that clear, that is the bottom line for us. They can’t have complete 

internal peace and democracy in Pakistan at the expense of our national security, that the two have to work hand in hand. 

Senator CARPER. Speaking of security, did you get a feel for the 

kind of security that is provided for their nuclear weapons? I am 

told they have anywhere from 50 to 100 warheads or more. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I did not get a detailed feel for that. I actually had longer, more extensive conversations on that with Ambassador Crocker in the previous visit, who at the time was the Ambassador to Pakistan. But I did get some briefings on it, and without getting into any details, there are concerns, but there are also 

some feelings that there are real efforts being made to secure that. 

But that is a matter of great importance. 

Senator CARPER. All right. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much. 

6 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Chairman, may I now ask a question here? 

When I first went there at that time, I was very impressed with 

Musharraf because he told us some things that literally had my 

jaws fall open. One was that he wanted to make Pakistan literate, 

and so he introduced us to a woman who was going to be the Minister of Education and she was going to make it literate. 

Second, he introduced us to his financial person and he said he 

was going to correct the mistakes that they had financially there. 

Secretary of Treasury Rubin at that time told me that they hired 

this person through their firm in New York and that Musharraf 

was taking him there to work there. 

The third was he introduced us to a Minister of Foreign Affairs 

who also worked in the United States and had ideas about relationships. So those were three areas that he said he wanted to really 

improve. Did you have any sense as to these areas and those improvements? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, in fairness to President Musharraf, as 

I understand it, he did pass significant legislation, working with 

the government there to improve women’s rights, which were a serious issue in Pakistan, continue to be, something I pressed him 

on. But I actually had a chance to meet with some civil society 

leaders and a woman who was particularly known for her leadership in that area and she told me that things were somewhat improved. 

In terms of the economy, President Musharraf spoke at length 

about how proud he is of the growth of the Pakistan economy 

under his leadership and his greatest concern was that might be 

slipping under this new government. Now, of course, the new leaders of the new government didn’t agree with that, but he cited 

some of the things that you alluded to, Senator Akaka, as being important results of his presidency and I, of course, can’t deny that 

economic development and the future of Pakistan is a terribly important thing, but it isn’t more important than having a democracy, 

and so the two must work hand in hand. 

Senator CARPER. One last comment and maybe a question. In the 

elections that were held 6 months or so ago, as I recall, the party 

was tending to be supportive of President Musharraf, their turnout, 

their support was greatly diminished. 

Senator FEINGOLD. That is right. 

Senator CARPER. The support of the other two major parties rose 

up dramatically. But as I recall, there were religious parties that 

were involved, as well, and their support turned out to be rather 

small. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, one particularly interesting development was in the Northwest Province, where—I want to be corrected if I get this wrong, but I believe it is right—a more traditional religious hard-line party was defeated—— 

Senator CARPER. Yes—— 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. By a more open-minded, at least 

in my view, party, and I had a chance to meet with some of their 

new officials, and this is out in one of the more conservative areas 

where we were near the FATA. And so that was an exciting development, that instead of a hard-line, sort of narrower approach, that 

actually suggested maybe that people in that region were tired of 

7 

that and that they wanted some hope and economic opportunity 

and a sense of being connected to the rest of Pakistan and the rest 

of the world. So I believe that was one of the encouraging results 

of the election, and they are affiliated, as I understand, with the 

government now. 

Senator CARPER. Well, there is an irony that is not lost on me, 

and probably not lost on the others. I watched a film a couple of 

months or two ago with my older boys and with my wife—‘‘Charlie 

Wilson’s War.’’ At that time, we were using our influence and our 

resources to help destabilize—undermine the Soviet position in Afghanistan and using folks that were pretty much in the Northwestern part of Pakistan to help do that. So we have actually 

seen—I am kind of mixing metaphors here, but we have seen this 

movie before while we were sitting in a different seat when we 

watched it the last time. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And the part of the movie that the Pakistanis 

don’t like is that after we did that, we just took off—— 

Senator CARPER. Yes. 

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. And we didn’t stay committed to 

that region, and so it is not only that we backed Musharraf, it is 

this feeling that we are there when it sort of fits our purposes but 

then we are not around—we don’t have a consistent policy. And so, 

I got one question in Pakistan from people saying, well, why are 

all these Senators running around Pakistan meddling, U.S. Senators, meddling in our affairs? And I said, I take a different view. 

I said, I think it is a big mistake for us not to have this kind of 

exchange. We certainly shouldn’t go over our bounds, but the biggest mistake we could make is to not be knowledgeable and engaged with the Pakistanis. 

So I thought it was great that there were as many as 10 Members of Congress over there during the May break. I hope it is a 

sign in the long run to the Pakistanis that we aren’t going to be 

fair-weather people in terms of being interested in our relationship 

but that it will be maintained, and that is up to all of us to keep 

going there and talking about it and doing exactly what you are 

doing today, Mr. Chairman, which I think is really positive. 

Thanks so much. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Chairman, there is one final question here. 

We are interested in the military because he was General 

Musharraf—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Yes. 

Senator AKAKA [continuing]. And at that time, he had military 

people all over the buildings. And so a question to him was, will 

this be a military government, and his answer was, as soon as he 

could, that he would relieve the place of any military security, and 

I just wondered whether that has happened. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, he didn’t move very quickly on demilitarizing the tone of his regime. In fact, I specifically asked him, as 

many others did, if he would please not be both president and head 

of the army at the same time, which he maintained for a very long 

time, until recently, which was an inappropriate combination. So 

there was an inappropriate connection there that was bad for Pakistani democracy. 

8 

Now that the new government is in place, the military leaders 

of the country are making a concerted effort to show that they are 

not trying to meddle in political affairs. In fact, some of them 

would not meet with some of the Senators, including me, because 

they didn’t think that was appropriate. They did meet, as I understand it, with some of our armed services people, but the message 

I think they are trying to send is that civilian leaders will be your 

contact rather than military leaders in most cases, which I think, 

depending on whether that is really what they are trying to do, is 

probably a good sign of a different approach rather than such a 

heavily military-laden look to the Pakistani government. 

Senator CARPER. We don’t have time to ask these. I wish we 

could get into whether or not the Pakistani leaders with whom you 

might have spoken, if they felt any kind of a sensitivity or understanding with respect to our concern about the safety of our 

troops—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. That was a—excuse me. 

Senator CARPER [continuing]. And the fact that they are not 

doing what they need to do in the Northwestern Region, it puts our 

people more at risk. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I met with the governor of the Northwest 

Frontier Province, a very eloquent man, and he gave a very long 

and very precise explanation of what these agreements were, how 

they are trying to put language in the agreements to make sure 

that it was understood that there should be no border crossings 

into Afghanistan, etc., and he was very precise. 

But after he finished, I said to him, look, there are two things 

you have to understand about the American people. There are two 

things we can’t tolerate. One is Osama bin Laden is in your area, 

not just in Pakistan, he is right here. That is what most people believe, and the others. Second, this is used as a launching pad to 

kill American troops. 

Senator CARPER. We are trying to protect a democratically-elected government in Afghanistan. 

Senator FEINGOLD. That is right. I just said, those two things are 

not acceptable to any people in the world and the American people 

can’t accept it. So we do want you to be able to achieve peace within your region, but not if that is the price that we, as Americans, 

have to pay. So that is a message I tried to convey not only in 

Islamabad, but directly in the region where we are pretty sure 

these folks are. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you so much. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. This is a great opportunity and 

I appreciate it. 

Senator CARPER. We appreciate very much your being our leadoff hitter, a good one, too. Thank you so much. 

I am going to ask our next witness, Donald Camp, to go ahead 

and approach the table. I am going to give a statement while you 

do that and then yield to Senator Akaka for a statement. Then if 

there is no one else who has joined us by that point in time on our 

panel, I will ask you, Mr. Camp, to proceed. 

We are going to have a vote starting around 3 p.m. and we will 

probably have to be over to the floor to vote by about 3:15 p.m.. 

There is a chance that we may be able to get through our opening 

9 

statements and your testimony before that happens, so hopefully 

that is my goal. 

But before I start off, I just want to give special thanks to the 

over 500 men and women serving in the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan. 

Based on a recent visit to Islamabad, my staff tells me that our 

Ambassador there, Anne Patterson, runs a tight, organized ship. I 

understand she is a woman from Arkansas, as is Wendy Anderson. 

We commend our Ambassador for her leadership and all our personnel there for the capable service to our country. 

Political instability, a growing Islamic insurgency, a demoralized 

army, and an intensely anti-American population are the hallmarks, unfortunately, of today’s Pakistan. In fact, most national security experts agree that Pakistan is the most dangerous country 

in the world today. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently called the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and this is his quote, ‘‘the site of planning 

for the next attack,’’ his words, ‘‘on the United States.’’ The region 

is also widely thought to be the hiding place of Osama bin Laden, 

as pointed out by Senator Feingold. 

It has become clear in recent months that the billions of U.S. dollars poured into Pakistan have not helped, unfortunately, to secure 

its borders with Afghanistan, in large part because we failed to 

link assistance to specific policy goals. We also know our policies 

toward Pakistan since September 11, 2001, have failed to stop or 

even to mitigate anti-Western militants or religiously-based extremist elements in Pakistan. 

In fact, a study released by the RAND Corporation says that 

Pakistani intelligence agents have aided both Afghani and Pakistani Taliban insurgents and compromised U.S. military movements. RAND warns that the United States will face, in their 

words, ‘‘crippling long-term consequences,’’ if insurgent strongholds 

in Pakistan are not removed. 

In light of the virulent anti-American Islamic insurgency raging 

on the borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan today, from 

Balochistan to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, FATA, 

and up to the Northwestern Frontier Province, we must decide how 

to effectively move forward with this partnership. 

I think it goes without saying that the safety and security of 

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is of utmost importance. Again, I said 

earlier, anywhere from 50 to maybe as many as 200 warheads are 

involved here. Preventing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and technology from falling into the wrong hands should remain a top priority for all of us. The possibility of al Qaeda or another terrorist 

group acquiring a warhead or enough radioactive material to create 

a dirty bomb is something that we simply cannot leave to chance. 

And while there appears to be a very small chance that Pakistan’s 

nuclear assets could be seized by terrorists or other militant 

groups, the United States should pursue policies that promote the 

safety of Islamabad’s nuclear capabilities. 

These facts lead to a series of urgent questions. If, in fact, the 

mountainous border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan is 

the site of planning for the next attack on the United States, as 

Admiral Mullen has stated, what, therefore, will the United States 

10 

do in the short-term, say between now and January 2009, vis-a-vis 

the lawless region between Afghanistan and Pakistan? 

What are the long-term objectives on how to address this dangerous region? 

The Bush Administration, Congress and the 9/11 Commission 

have recognized that the United States needs a long-term comprehensive plan to address the terrorist threats in Pakistan. Why 

hasn’t the Administration developed such a plan? 

In October last year, the U.S. State Department provided Congress with a report that certified that Pakistan was making significant and sustained progress toward eliminating the safe haven for 

terrorists. However, a recent GAO report noted that there was 

broad agreement, including among the Director of National Intelligence, the U.S. Embassy officials in Islamabad, the Department 

of Defense, and others that al Qaeda had established a safe haven 

in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and reconstituted its 

ability to attack the United States. What was the basis for the 

State Department’s finding that Pakistan was making significant 

and sustained progress? 

The RAND study also reported continued support by Pakistan 

government agencies of the Taliban. Is there any recent evidence 

of the Pakistani intelligence or military officials supporting terrorist elements in acquiring or training to use nuclear, chemical, or 

biological weapon technology? 

What do we know about the Pakistani government’s involvement 

in nuclear missile proliferation activities? How effective has the 

U.S. policy been in stopping or reducing these activities? How credible is the Pakistani’s government’s disavowal of any knowledge of 

former Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan’s proliferation activities, especially in light of his very recent recanting of his confession? How secure are Pakistani government controls on its nuclear 

weapons arsenal and facilities? 

Today, with these questions in mind, I want us to try to do the 

following: First, to accurately assess to date the efforts of the Bush 

Administration, our country’s policy toward Pakistan. I want us to 

discuss the most effective strategic policy options regarding Pakistan, particularly with regards to ensuring the safety and security 

of its nuclear arsenals and addressing Islamic extremism. And finally, I would like to see us solicit some ideas about how Congress, 

how my colleagues and I, can play an active and effective role in 

the path forward. 

If our national security is linked to the success, security, and stability of a democratic Pakistan, I believe the United States has no 

choice but to do more. Dr. Stephen Cohen, one of our witnesses 

today, summed it up well in his written testimony. He said, ‘‘Short 

term measures regarding terrorism and nuclear technology should 

not get in the way of long term strategies to stabilize Pakistan.’’ 

Therefore, we must work with Pakistan and our other allies to 

develop a strategy that creates long-term goals for success. This 

should include providing much more U.S. non-military assistance 

and demanding greater transparency and accountability in U.S. 

military aid to Pakistan, as our colleague, Senator Joe Biden, a 

strong leader on this issue, has asserted. 

11 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Camp appears in the Appendix on page 55. 

Again, we thank all of our witnesses for taking this opportunity 

to talk with us today about the nature of the challenges before us 

and how best to address them. 

Senator Coburn, welcome. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COBURN 

Senator COBURN. Thank you. Given the fact that we have a vote 

on, I concur with a lot of the questions you have asked, and then 

we will get forward to our testimony. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks so much. 

Senator Akaka, would you like to make an opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Chairman, I will submit my statement for 

the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

I’d like to thank Senators Carper and Coburn for holding this hearing. We all recognize the vital importance to American security of maintaining a strong strategic 

relationship with Pakistan. I just have two comments. 

First, I am concerned that Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas remain 

sanctuaries for our enemies. If history is to guide us, there is very little hope that 

this will change. These areas have always been ungoverned except by tribal law. 

I am not fully confident that our strategy to aid Pakistan forces to assert control 

is going to be successful. Our main hope may instead be to contain our enemies in 

this enclave. 

Second, I am concerned that the longer political instability continues in Pakistan, 

the greater the risk that Pakistan’s nuclear program will be infiltrated by al Qaeda. 

To date all indications are that Pakistan maintains firm control over the security 

of its program. But this security could be affected by a breakdown of authority. We 

need to do more, much more, to reinforce Pakistan’s democracy and the rule of law. 

I would again like to thank Senators Carper and Coburn for arranging this hearing and add my welcome to our witnesses. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks so much. 

Mr. Camp, just a brief introduction. He is currently a Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian 

Affairs. From 2006 to 2007, Foreign Policy Advisor to the Chief of 

Naval Operations, and now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Admiral Mike Mullen. And prior to that, I understand, among 

other things, you were Deputy Assistant Secretary and then Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asia from 2001 to 2006. 

You have a long resume and we are grateful that you are here and 

grateful for your service. 

Please proceed. Your entire statement will be made part of the 

record. Feel free to summarize. 

TESTIMONY OF DONALD CAMP,1 PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL 

ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will summarize it briefly. 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here to discuss U.S. strategy with regard to Pakistan. Like 

Senator Feingold, I welcome the growing interest in the Senate in 

our policy toward Pakistan. More than ever, our national security 

12 

is linked to the success, security, and stability of a democratic 

Pakistan. 

We must build a comprehensive, long-term partnership with the 

Pakistan government and people. The February 18 elections provided a new opportunity for us to do so. Our strategic priorities in 

Pakistan include strengthening its democratic civilian institutions, 

enhancing counterterrorism cooperation, particularly in the border 

region, and ensuring its nuclear weapons remain secure and unused. Economic and social development is an essential element to 

achieving each of these strategic objectives. 

Ensuring the success of Pakistan’s democratic transition is a core 

priority. On February 18, the Pakistani people cast their votes for 

moderate leaders, repudiating extremist voices and demonstrating 

that a moderate democratic center prevails as the country’s dominant political force. We are engaging with the new government and 

all the political parties to strengthen participatory democracy and 

to build a broad-based, long-term relationship between our two 

countries. 

We believe that a moderate government with a democratic mandate will be a more effective partner in the fight against terrorism. 

Pakistan is a significant partner on the front line in this war. Pakistan has lost over 1,400 members of its security forces since September 11, 2001. 

Recently, we have heard about the negotiation of peace agreements with certain groups in the Tribal Areas. Negotiations with 

tribes in Pakistan are not a new tactic. We understand that the recent negotiations are part of Pakistan’s hopes for bringing security 

and stability to the Tribal Areas. However, outcomes are what matter. Any agreements must advance the goals of ending al Qaeda 

and Taliban activity, ending suicide bombers, ending cross-border 

attacks. Each agreement must be weighed case by case based on 

results. 

Our efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan are intrinsically linked. 

In order to achieve stability and security in either country, we 

must achieve it on both sides of the border. Our challenge is to 

more effectively coordinate and synchronize operations by both nations and by our coalition partners. 

Let me say a couple of words about nuclear security. Nonproliferation cooperation is another critical aspect of our long-term 

strategic partnership with Pakistan. Pakistan has taken constructive steps to enhance the security of its nuclear materials and assets and to prevent diversion of sensitive items and technologies, 

as occurred with the A.Q. Khan network. We are encouraged by 

Pakistan’s improvements in export controls and its participation in 

the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. We will continue to work with Pakistan to help ensure that its nuclear weapons remain secure. 

On the development side, a sustained commitment to help Pakistan develop its economy is essential to achieving our key strategic 

objectives. It will strengthen Pakistan as a partner with the United 

States and the international community. 

I would like to mention Reconstruction Opportunity Zones as an 

important piece of our long-term strategy. These zones can attract 

domestic and foreign investment and create sustainable employVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:39 Mar 06, 2009 Jkt 043092 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\43092.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
13 

ment opportunities in the FATA. There is a bill before the Senate 

to address these now and we support that bill. 

There is a comprehensive frontier strategy presented by the government of Pakistan which emphasizes economic and social development. The United States has committed $750 million over 5 

years in support of this sustainable development plan for infrastructure development in the territories. 

Additionally, we have partnered with the government of Pakistan in launching the Security Development Plan to enhance its 

ability to secure the border. This involves training the Frontier 

Corps, improving the capabilities of Pakistan’s special forces, and 

constructing Border Coordination Centers. 

In conclusion, for our commitment to Pakistan to be long-term, 

it must also be bipartisan. We appreciate the Congress’s sustained 

commitment to Pakistan, particularly the interest of Members of 

this Subcommittee. I understand that Senator Levin recently returned from a successful trip and that you, Mr. Chairman, are interested in visiting soon. I hope you will do so. We hope that together, Congress and the Administration can establish a new 

framework, a long-term framework for economic and security assistance that can support Pakistan’s democracy. 

In conclusion, our long-term commitment is of immense importance to our partnership with the Pakistan people and their security, as well as to the security of the American people and the 

international community. That is why we need to work together to 

help the newly-elected Pakistan government build strong democratic institutions, combat the threat of terrorism, and ensure the 

security of its nuclear weapons. 

Thank you. I would be happy to take your questions. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you very much for your statement. 

I thought earlier I might just submit questions for the record, 

but I would like to ask some questions, but would you like to lead 

it off, Senator Coburn? 

Senator COBURN. Yes, I will. Thank you, and thanks for your testimony. 

The $1 billion aid package, the FATA development strategy, why 

were there no conditions on that aid package on political reforms 

in the Tribal Regions, such as rule of law reforms, integrating the 

FATA into the Northwest Frontier Province under the full jurisdiction of both the legislature and the judicial system? Why were 

there no strings attached to that that would certainly further our 

interests and their stability with that money? 

Mr. CAMP. Senator, I think that the question, particularly of integrating the Tribal Areas with the rest of Pakistan, is an issue 

that needs to be addressed. It needs to be addressed by Pakistan. 

It is a tough issue. The FATA has been separate for decades. I 

don’t think it is an issue that we can necessarily impose our will 

on Pakistan. There are many voices that have spoken up in favor 

of this integration into the settled areas of Pakistan, as they are 

called, but again, it is not so much for us to condition our assistance, it seems to me. The assistance that we are offering is really 

in our interest, as well, because we have a basic national security 

interest in helping to develop and stabilize the border areas. 

14 

Senator COBURN. The economic package that you have is about 

three-quarters of a billion dollars, $750 million, and in your statement just a minute ago you said outcomes are what matters, except 

on that package there are no metrics. There is nothing with that 

that says how we are going to measure what the outcomes are. 

What are the measurements? How do we know the three-quarters 

of a billion dollars we are going to invest in this economic package 

will work, since the State Department has no metrics to say, this 

is what we conclude is a success? 

Mr. CAMP. Sir, I think that the metrics are basically poverty alleviation, economic development, literacy, raising of literacy rates. 

Literacy rates in the FATA are abysmally low. I have heard the figure of 3 percent for female literacy in the Tribal Areas. Enrollment 

in schools is going up. There is a metric that I think is a useful 

one. 

All of these things will demonstrate that we are achieving success. In the long run, I think we have to look at intangibles, too, 

things like the existence of open democratic elections, which is not 

something that necessarily is susceptible to tangible measurements, but certainly is very important. So I would say that there 

are performance plans. When we put together these assistance programs, we make very clear what the expectations are in terms of 

raising people out of poverty and providing new opportunities, particularly employment opportunities in the FATA. 

Senator COBURN. Balance for me, if you will, if there is not a judicial system, if there is not rule of law, and we are going to invest 

in infrastructure, whether it is clinics or schools or roads, prime 

targets for violence, prime targets if there is no other infrastructure—I guess what I am asking is which comes first and how do 

we measure them. 

And then the second part of the question, in the oversight of this 

investment, where U.S. AID failed in Afghanistan was because 

there was not the security available to U.S. AID to oversee what 

was actually happening. What are you doing in terms of making 

sure the security is there for the investment so that we can see 

what the contractors are doing and making sure when we say a 

school is built, it was built, or a hospital is built, it was built? What 

have we learned from the failures in the investment in Afghanistan? 

Mr. CAMP. Well, in fact, I asked this question of a colleague who 

works for U.S. AID in anticipation of just this kind of question, and 

his answer was rather interesting, and that is to say we have 

learned from—we have moved into the FATA in a rather measured 

way. We understand that there are problems in working in parts 

of the FATA for security reasons, but we do work actually in all 

seven agencies, as they are called, of the FATA. 

What we are trying to do is develop sort of innovative oversight 

techniques. One that he cited, for instance, is building schools. We 

have satellite images. We can verify that schools have been built, 

where they have been built. That is just one example. 

Senator COBURN. Well, the problem was in Afghanistan, we built 

the schools and the first snow, the roofs caved in. So, I guess do 

we have a structure in place so that the overseers of the contracVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:39 Mar 06, 2009 Jkt 043092 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\43092.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
15 

tors can actually get there and see that the investment is what we 

expected it to be? 

Mr. CAMP. I would say that, first of all, we are building up our 

personnel in Peshawar, which is the center of the Northwest Frontier Province, in order to be able to do this. That doesn’t mean that 

Americans will be traveling to Waziristan or one agency to inspect. 

We are working through NGOs. We are working through the government of Pakistan. We are depending on them to do these 

verifications, to do this assessment, basically. 

Senator COBURN. I understand the security risk, but—— 

Senator CARPER. I think we have about seven minutes to go. 

What do you say we recess here and we come right back? 

Senator COBURN. OK. All right. 

Senator CARPER. We have about 7 minutes left. We will be back 

in about 15 minutes or so. We are going to stand in recess now and 

we will be back shortly. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Senator CARPER. Let us resume our proceedings. Thank you for 

your patience. I am going to turn now for further questioning of our 

first witness, Mr. Camp by Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I want to say that I had two concerns and one is that concern about Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas that remain sanctuaries for our enemies. If history is to guide us, there seems to be very little hope to change 

this. 

Also, my other concern is that the longer political instability continues in Pakistan, the greater the risk that Pakistan’s nuclear 

program could be or will be infiltrated by the al Qaeda, and to 

date, all indications are that Pakistan maintains firm control over 

the security of its programs. 

Mr. Camp, Ahmed Rashid’s book, ‘‘Descent Into Chaos,’’ describes 

a double game that Pakistan’s military intelligence agencies have 

been playing. On the one hand, appears to support the Taliban and 

other militias as a weapon against India. On the other, these agencies are working with the United States to counter hostile militias 

in the FATA. Is this true? 

Mr. CAMP. Senator, I would just say that the government of 

Pakistan has been very clear, and President Musharraf, in fact, 

was very clear after September 11, 2001, and has fully supported 

the war on terrorism. The newly-elected civilian government has 

not only reiterated this commitment, but made it very clear that 

they view the war as their war. In other words, it is not just the 

Americans and it is not just about protecting the homeland, but it 

is about protecting Pakistan from people who are their enemies, as 

well. Therefore, I would say that I take with a grain of salt the assumption that Pakistan’s official agencies are playing this kind of 

double game. 

Senator AKAKA. In your testimony, you mentioned that Pakistan’s new export control organization has been reaching out to 

technology holders and law enforcement officials. Is the United 

States providing any assistance to Pakistan’s new export control 

system? 

16 

Mr. CAMP. We have been very supportive of their new laws on 

export control licensing and their enforcement body. We have 

worked with them in things like the Global Initiative, and I think 

really it is probably best to leave that discussion right there. If you 

would like me to get further information on specifically what we 

are doing on export controls, I would be glad to provide that separately. 

Senator AKAKA. I would like to have that information, and to include this one, if you can’t answer it now. Can you identify any instances where enforcement has prevented the proliferation of sensitive exports? 

Mr. CAMP. I will find out if we have such evidence. I don’t have 

it with me right now. 

Senator AKAKA. Fine. We look forward to that information. 

Mr. Camp, the U.S.-Pakistan strategic relationship cannot ignore 

nuclear weapons or India. Recently, India’s prime minister announced that India has no intention of getting rid of its nuclear 

weapons unless other major powers also disarm. In this situation, 

it appears that Pakistan would also be unlikely to disarm. Should 

the United States be encouraging nuclear disarmament in the region, and if so, what should we be doing? 

Mr. CAMP. Senator, I think that, first of all, it is well established 

U.S. policy and certainly something we all believe in that the subcontinent would be far safer, far better without nuclear weapons. 

That said, I think what we can do and what we should do is do 

everything we can to support those two countries developing a better relationship, encouraging them to work independently to develop a more amicable relationship, and I am pleased to say that 

the trend is in that direction, that India and Pakistan both have 

recognized the importance of working together, and I think that 

goes for this newly-elected government of Pakistan, as well, very 

much. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Camp, in Dr. Cohen’s testimony, he argues 

that the United States should also consider a criteria-based nuclear 

deal with Pakistan as a way of encouraging them to limit and secure their existing nuclear weapons. He also suggests that Pakistan might get support for its civilian nuclear program in exchange 

for greater security assurances. What is your opinion of this suggestion? 

Mr. CAMP. I think, Senator, that I will reserve judgment on that 

because that is a new idea that we really don’t have an established 

position on and I would just rather not get into that area, if I may 

respectfully hold back on that. 

Senator AKAKA. All right. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Camp, a couple of questions, if I could. The 

first is a series of three short questions and I am going to repeat 

them maybe twice just to let you think about them. You have lived 

in Pakistan, right? 

Mr. CAMP. I have visited many times. I have never actually lived 

there. 

Senator CARPER. All right. 

Mr. CAMP. I have lived in other parts of the—— 

Senator CARPER. When most recently were you there? 

17 

Mr. CAMP. Two months ago. 

Senator CARPER. All right. What is your broad assessment, 

please, of the outcomes of U.S. policy toward Pakistan since 2001, 

and a couple of follow-ups. One, what aspects of our policy there 

do you think have been most successful in serving, first of all, our 

national interest, but also the national interest of Pakistan, and 

what are some aspects that you might want to change? So if you 

will, again, the broad assessment of the outcomes of our policy toward Pakistan since 2001, what parts or portions of that policy do 

you think have been successful, both for us and for the national interests of the Pakistanis, and what are some aspects that you 

would change? 

Mr. CAMP. I would say that what has been most important is 

that we have been there and we have made the commitment to 

Pakistan that we are planning to be a long-term partner of Pakistan. President Bush, in particular, made a commitment to a 5- 

year assistance program, something that is not something we normally do. It was a 5-year, $3 billion assistance package, evenly divided between security assistance and development assistance. 

That was from fiscal year 2005 to 2009. It has been, I think, successful in demonstrating our commitment in both sides of the equation with Pakistan. 

As we complete that package in 2009, this is the opportunity, I 

think—and this is along the lines of what we should be doing—this 

is an opportunity to renew the long-term strategic framework with 

Pakistan to find a way to make very clear to the Pakistan people 

that the United States and Pakistan have a long-term future, because that is something that is often questioned in Pakistan. 

Senator CARPER. What aspect of our policies would you change? 

Mr. CAMP. I would say, Senator, that we are adapting to a new 

situation—— 

Senator CARPER. Yes, we are. 

Mr. CAMP [continuing]. And very pleased to have a newly democratically-elected government. What we are doing, and this is not 

to say it is a change in policy but it is something that we always 

do, that Ambassador Patterson, whom you mentioned in your opening statement, has been assiduously meeting every political leader 

in Pakistan and making sure that Pakistanis understand that we 

want to work with all the political parties in Pakistan, work with 

the new government, and that includes across the board, including 

the religious parties that have been referred to, as well, and I think 

that is a very important signal for our future relationship with 

Pakistan. 

Senator CARPER. What is the likelihood that the Chief Justice, 

their top judicial leader who was deposed, what is the policy, or 

how would he come to be reinstated? How would that happen? 

Mr. CAMP. There are all sorts of scenarios out there, Senator. It 

is very much tied up in domestic Pakistani political politics at the 

moment—domestic politics at the moment. There are proposals 

to—— 

Senator CARPER. I wonder if their judicial nominating process is 

as convoluted as ours can be here. 

Mr. CAMP. In fact, there is no sort of confirmation process in 

Pakistan that I am aware of. 

18 

Senator CARPER. I wonder if they have a blue slip policy that we 

have here. Probably not. 

Mr. CAMP. They do have a Pakistan Bar Association, which, in 

fact, has been very much involved in the lawyers’ movement. There 

is legislation pending now before the Pakistani Parliament and I 

am confident that the Pakistani parties will work out a way to handle this, but it is very complicated because you have a Chief Justice 

in place at the moment and the proposal is to replace him with the 

previous Chief Justice. 

Senator CARPER. Obviously, there is enormous complexity in 

terms of the groups that are operating in a lawless region northwest of—between Afghanistan and Pakistan. You have different 

groups operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the 

Pakistani Taliban, we have the Afghan Taliban, we have al Qaeda, 

and we have other sectarian groups, as well. Do you believe that 

we, in this country, have a sufficient understanding of just who we 

are fighting? And next, which groups do we work against first and 

how do we go about prioritizing that? 

Mr. CAMP. Sure. I think, first of all, we are dealing with Pakistani sovereign territory, so, in fact, we work with the Pakistanis 

to attempt to address these problems. I think that you are quite 

right. The situation in the Tribal Areas is extremely complicated. 

I think, in fact, outsiders do not probably have a great understanding of tribal dynamics in that region and I think it is—— 

Senator CARPER. Although, again, 20 years ago, or however long 

ago it was when we were fighting Charlie Wilson’s war, I wonder 

if we had a better understanding. 

Mr. CAMP. And again, during that period, we worked through the 

Pakistani government to achieve our aims, and in fact, they were 

our main sort of conduit to the tribes in those days. I think the 

British had a long history in Pakistan and they also, I think, did 

not feel themselves to be experts in the Tribal Areas, which were 

even then an unsettled, relatively lawless area. 

But your question basically is who should we be addressing first. 

Senator CARPER. Yes. 

Mr. CAMP. My answer is we have to focus on all of those groups 

who pose a threat to our coalition forces across the board in Afghanistan. 

Senator CARPER. And among those, who would be first? 

Mr. CAMP. Well, al Qaeda certainly is target No. 1 in my book. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Some analysts argue that the Pakistani military remains wedded to a conventional war strategy and 

we are accused in this country of always fighting the last war and 

maybe not the next war. But apparently it remains focused on figuring out how to fight a conventional war with India and it has 

been slow to reorient itself toward counterinsurgency planning, 

which we feel is more relevant today. To what extent might this 

be a problem in the context of our Nation’s interest in the region? 

And second, how has U.S. military assistance sufficiently strengthened its counterterrorism capabilities? 

Mr. CAMP. The Pakistani military is a large and professional institution with a long and storied history. They have, in fact, traditionally focused most of their effort on their Eastern border, that 

is to say their border with India. They are developing a counterVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:39 Mar 06, 2009 Jkt 043092 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\43092.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
19 

terrorism force. One important way in which we are helping is our 

Foreign Military Financing, which is, in fact, focused on counterterrorism goals and it is going to items like communications, radios 

and the like, TOW missiles and things that are used for 

counterterrorism. In fact, the Congress has mandated, in 2008, 

that FMF should be used for counterterrorism purposes and that 

is what is happening. 

Senator CARPER. In our negotiations with the new leaders of 

Pakistan, the democratically-elected leaders of Pakistan, do those 

discussions include what are their military priorities in terms of 

funding and how are those consistent with our greater interest in 

funding counterterrorism capabilities? 

Mr. CAMP. Yes. We have very broad discussions on both the civilian side and the military side about priorities and about how our 

assistance can be used, and certainly Pakistan understands very 

well what our concerns are and certainly understands Congressional restrictions on the use of FMF funding, which is something 

that is important, as well. 

Senator CARPER. All right, thanks. Dr. Coburn. 

Senator COBURN. Just to follow up, in the self-interest of Pakistan, if we weren’t involved right now, would they be seeing that 

the Northwest Territories were a significant problem for them? 

Mr. CAMP. I believe that they recognize that the areas of the 

frontier are a problem for them, as well, unless that area can be 

brought under Federal control, and I will give you one very good 

example, and that is that the assassination of Benazir Bhutto last 

December is generally acknowledged to have been carried out by a 

member of the Masud tribe located in Waziristan. That in itself is 

an indication of the threat to Pakistan itself from the Tribal Areas, 

and certainly the number of suicide bombings that Pakistan has 

seen in its major cities is another example of the threat that is 

posed. 

Senator COBURN. So they have every indication in their own selfinterest to try to decrease the lawlessness, bring order to the 

Northwest Territories? 

Mr. CAMP. And they have been very clear about that, yes, sir. 

Senator COBURN. Some of the critics of the FATA development 

strategy say the timeline for the strategy to work is 10 to 15 years. 

We talked a minute ago about benchmarks, but how are they 

wrong? What do you expect to see 2 or 3 years from now in an ideal 

world if everything that you all were doing was working appropriately? Describe the situation as you believe it should be if we 

were 100 percent effective in carrying out our aims through the 

State Department with the dollars that are following. 

Mr. CAMP. Well, we are asking for something like $200 million 

per year for training and equipping of the Frontier Corps. This is 

a substantial amount of money and this will train, I would say, 

several thousand members of the Frontier Corps every year. That 

is progress. 

Now, we have to acknowledge that, in fact, this is not a shortterm process, and I think, in fact, Chairman Mullen was quoted 

just the other day as saying this will not be over within a couple 

of years. I think that we have to view this as a process and every 

20 

year that we make the Frontier Corps more capable, we are helping Pakistan and we are helping ourselves. 

Senator COBURN. OK. How often are U.S. AID, the State Department, and the Department of Defense required to report on the implementation of the FATA development strategy? 

Mr. CAMP. I am not sure there is any formal reporting requirement on that strategy for Congress, but certainly we are prepared 

to come and brief on it at any time—— 

Senator COBURN. Well, I am not talking about the Congress. 

How about Condoleezza Rice? Does she get a report from U.S. AID 

on the progress? 

Mr. CAMP. Actually, our embassy in Islamabad sends a report, I 

think it is virtually every week, on what is happening in the FATA 

and our development strategy and our security strategy there, and 

that, of course, is available to the Secretary and we keep her posted, certainly. 

Senator COBURN. OK. I am going to have some other questions 

to submit for the record. One of the things that we saw in Afghanistan is that we used external contractors to measure performance 

of other contractors, and given the security problems within Pakistan, especially in Waziristan and the FATA area, I assume that 

we are going to be doing the same thing again. How do we know 

that the contractors that we hire to oversee the contractors that we 

have paid to accomplish things are reliable if we don’t have boots 

on the ground to check it ourselves? 

Mr. CAMP. Well, I would say, first of all, Senator, that Pakistan 

has some advantages over Afghanistan in that it is a much more, 

how shall I say, developed society. Pakistan itself carries out rather 

detailed surveys of the things you described. We talked about 

benchmarks before—literacy, household—— 

Senator COBURN. In this area? 

Mr. CAMP. Throughout Pakistan. 

Senator COBURN. Including Waziristan and the Northwest area? 

Mr. CAMP. I think they probably have the same difficulties that 

we would in gathering detailed statistics, but yes, in principle, they 

collect on the whole country. 

Senator COBURN. The whole point I am getting at, I don’t want 

us to have a hearing 2 years from now and discover another $3 billion blown down the tube because we are spending money in an effort to help a country and we are not doing good follow-up and 

oversight to make sure that the money was actually spent on the 

people we intended it to help, and I guess that is a question. 

Reassure me that we have some process in place so that we know 

if we are going to spend $750 million, it is actually going to help 

the people of the area and we are going to be able to confirm that 

it did. How are we going to know that? That is my problem. I don’t 

disagree with the strategy. It is how do you measure it and how 

do you know if we are getting value? How does the American taxpayer know the $750 million actually bought $750 million worth of 

stuff? 

Mr. CAMP. I guess I would come back to the fact that U.S. AID 

has very strict procedures and processes that they are required to 

carry out. 

21 

Senator COBURN. No, they don’t. We have had hearings here. 

They don’t. They did not carry them out in Afghanistan. They did 

not. 

[Crowd discourse.] 

Mr. CAMP. Senator, as the FATA becomes more settled, as it becomes more secure, and that is our goal, we will have greater access. We as Americans, we as contractors, and as NGOs, will have 

greater access to the area to verify on the ground what is being 

done. I think if you go to Peshawar and get a briefing on, for instance, the kinds of things that our Office of Transition Initiatives 

is doing, you will see that, in fact, we are verifying—to give you 

an example, the placement of mini-hydroelectric projects in some 

villages, things like that. We can verify. We can take pictures. We 

can come back and say, this is in such-and-such a village. And that 

is some of the verification we can—— 

Senator COBURN. I plan on going there in the near term and 

what I would like for you to do is, after you leave here, answer in 

a way that gives us some assurance that we are not going to see 

a repeat of some of the failures. That is not a reflection on the people, it is a reflection on the system. We didn’t do a good job of being 

good stewards as we invested in many of the projects. As a matter 

of fact, we got pictures from the Afghani government about the 

schoolhouses that weren’t built that were paid for. We have got a 

picture of the slabs that were poured but we didn’t ever get the 

school, but we paid for the school. 

So all I am saying is, please answer back in a formal way to give 

me some assurance. We just had staff over there and visiting with 

U.S. AID, and I have to tell you, based on my staff report, I do not 

have the feeling that we have any metrics or real way to know 

whether or not where that money is going to. It is just a concern 

and I want you all thinking about how we address that, if you 

would. 

Mr. CAMP. We will get back to you on that, Senator. Certainly. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Before we release you, I just want to conclude 

by saying I have approached this hearing in a belief that for a 

number of years, we have been wedded to a Musharraf policy and 

that it is important for us to pivot now and to develop a Pakistan 

policy, and I am encouraged that we are beginning to move in that 

direction and it is evident that we need to continue to do so and 

maybe to accelerate that distance. 

We have at least three major concerns for me, and one of those 

is the safety and the potential success for our troops and allied 

troops in Afghanistan as they attempt to help stabilize the democratically-elected government and to enable them to be successful. 

A very grave concern I have is with respect to those nuclear 

weapons that are in Pakistan and which could fall in the hands of 

people who would use one or more of them to do harm to any number of people, including to us. 

And finally, just feeling concern for the Pakistani people that the 

potential that they may face for a better day, a better future, if 

their latest effort to put in place a democratically-elected government, to make sure that reaches its full potential. Those are at 

least three things that we have in mind as we go forward. 

22 

We appreciate your testimony here today. We would ask that you 

respond for any follow-up questions that Dr. Coburn and myself or 

others would provide. Dr. Coburn. 

Senator COBURN. I just would ask unanimous consent that I am 

going to have questions for the other witnesses. I cannot stay, and 

if I could have those submitted for the record, I would appreciate 

it. 

Senator CARPER. We spoke to the other witnesses before. They 

said they would prefer not to—— 

Senator COBURN. They would prefer not to answer my questions? 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. They said, anything to enable us to avoid answering them in person. We will take whatever he has in writing. 

No, we would be happy to do that, without objection. 

All right, Mr. Camp. 

Mr. CAMP. Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you so much for joining us today, and we 

will invite our second panel to join us, please. 

[Crowd discourse.] 

Senator CARPER. I would just ask that our guests continue to be 

good guests. We appreciate everybody being here, but we would 

like for our guests to remain seated and just to behave with the 

appropriate decorum, please. 

[Crowd discourse.] 

Senator CARPER. I would again ask our guests to please be seated and allow us to proceed. Thank you very much. 

[Crowd discourse.] 

Senator CARPER. I would ask our guests please to—thank you 

very much. 

[Crowd discourse.] 

Senator CARPER. I am going to go ahead and begin our introduction of our second panel. We are led off by Alan Kronstadt. 

Mr. KRONSTADT. Yes. 

Senator CARPER. He is a specialist with the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service, 

where since 2002, he has researched and written on U.S. relations 

with India, with Pakistan, and Sri Lanka for Members of Congress 

and our staffs. I understand he was previously a lecturer at the 

University of Southern California in Los Angeles and worked for 

nearly two decades as an analyst of U.S. foreign policy and international security and have published a number of journal articles 

and book chapters. 

We thank you for the time you spent with our staff on this hearing, and thanks also to Paul Kerr, who I believe is here with you 

today, for preparing my staff, in their recent visit to Pakistan. 

Second, Lisa Curtis. Ms. Curtis is a Senior Research Fellow at 

the Heritage Foundation, where you focus primarily, I am told, on 

India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Previously, you have worked on 

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a professional staff 

member, handling South Asia for a fellow named Senator Lugar— 

a good man. From 2001 to 2003, you served as Senior Advisor in 

the State Department’s South Asia Bureau, where you advised the 

Assistant Secretary on India-Pakistani relations. We are lucky that 

23 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Kronstadt appears in the Appendix on page 67. 

you are here and we appreciate your being here and look forward 

to your testimony. 

Dr. Stephen Cohen joined The Brookings Institution as a Senior 

Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies in 1998 after a career as a professor of political science and history at the University of Illinois, 

in Champaign? 

Mr. COHEN. Correct. 

Senator CARPER. All right. In 2004, he was named by the World 

Affairs Councils of America as one of America’s 500 most influential people. That is a list I have yet to crack. Dr. Cohen is the author and co-author and editor of over 12 books, mostly on South 

Asian security issues, and you have consulted for numerous foundations and government agencies and were a member of the State 

Department’s Policy and Planning Staff from 1985 to 1987. Currently, a member of the National Academy of Sciences Committee 

on International Security and Arms Control and a founder of several arms control and security-related institutions in the United 

States and South Asia. 

And finally, Michael Krepon, founder of the Henry L. Stimson 

Center, a Washington-based NGO focusing on security issues. He 

is also a diplomatic scholar at the University of Virginia. Your area 

of expertise, I am told, includes space and security and nuclear-related issues and regional expertise in South Asia. Previously, I understand that Mr. Krepon served under President Jimmy Carter at 

the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the State Department. He has worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on Capitol Hill handling Armed Services and Defense appropriations matters and has authored numerous books. I 

think you have a new book coming out, don’t you, called Better 

Safe Than Sorry: The Ironies of Living With the Bomb. 

We really want to thank you all for coming today. We will start 

off, if I may, with Alan Kronstadt. Your entire testimony will be 

made a part of the record. If you would summarize for us, that 

would be fine. Five or so minutes would be good. 

Please proceed. Thank you. 

TESTIMONY OF K. ALAN KRONSTADT,1 SPECIALIST IN SOUTH 

ASIAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE AND TRADE DIVISION, 

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

Mr. KRONSTADT. Thank you for this opportunity to address the 

U.S.-Pakistan strategic relationship. 

While not without success, U.S. policies toward Pakistan since 

2001 have largely failed to neutralize anti-Western militants and 

reduce religious extremism within Pakistan, in turn hindering efforts to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan. However, Pakistan’s recent upheavals may offer an opportunity to alter the nature of this 

bilateral relationship. The 2008 elections indicate Pakistanis are 

moderates not driven by extreme militant religious world views. 

Still, anti-American sentiments are widespread in Pakistan, apparently rooted in a general disapproval of U.S. global policies and 

a specific resentment of U.S. policy toward Pakistan itself. Most observers agree that reducing these negative perceptions will be necVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:39 Mar 06, 2009 Jkt 043092 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\43092.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
24 

essary to advance U.S. interests. Many argue that this goal is overshadowed by shorter-term policies that may fuel the very distrust 

the United States seeks to overcome. 

The salience of mutual trust and respect, not only between governments but between peoples, is often understated in assessments 

of the U.S.-Pakistan strategic relationship. In the political realm, 

Pakistanis resent perceived U.S. meddling in their country’s internal politics. In the security realm, many Pakistanis believe the 

United States relies too heavily on military efforts, thereby damaging Pakistan’s legitimate interests in sovereignty. 

Given President Musharraf’s status as a moderate pro-Western 

ally of the United States, his political diminishment and potentially 

ignominious exit from power complicates U.S. policymaking, yet 

these complications may be seen as opportunities for U.S. policy 

makers. Respect of and active support for Pakistan’s democratic institutions and rule of law are explicit non-controversial U.S. policies. There is, however, vigorous debate over whether such policies 

have been manifest in both words and deeds. 

The Pakistani Nation was traumatized by a huge increase in domestic religiously-motivated violence in 2007, with more lives lost 

to Islamist militancy than in the previous 6 years combined. Concurrently, al Qaeda and affiliated groups have resurfaced on Pakistani territory and continue to plot anti-Western terrorist attacks. 

Senior U.S. officials, including President Bush, believe possible future attacks on the U.S. homeland likely would originate from the 

Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. 

For the first time in many years, the United States must deal 

with a political structure in Islamabad that has fundamentally differing views on how to combat religious extremism. Pakistan’s new 

civilian leaders reengaging efforts at negotiation with religious extremists claim that military confrontation has allowed militants to 

become stronger. Most Pakistanis, though not all, appear to welcome this policy shift. 

A key metric for the United States is preventing pro-Taliban 

militants from using tribal regions to plan and launch attacks. So 

far, the indicators are not encouraging. Cross-border raids in Afghanistan reportedly are up significantly in recent months and 

Pakistani officials show signs of diminished concern about this 

issue, perhaps reflecting Pakistani dissent from the multi-national 

strategy being pursued in Afghanistan. Myriad analysts counsel 

U.S. patience. Many insist that only by bringing Pakistan’s Tribal 

Areas under the full writ of the state and facilitating major economic development there can the FATA region problem be solved. 

Decisionmakers in Washington face the difficult task of supporting a holistic long-term Pakistani approach to its militancy 

problem while making clear to Islamabad’s leaders that international jihadis represent a threat that should be neutralized in 

the near term. Reported Predator strikes on Pakistani territory 

may kill al Qaeda operatives, but often take civilian lives, as well. 

Pakistani leaders strongly condemn such attacks, reflecting a widely-held Pakistani view that the United States myopically pursues 

its own national interests. 

Recognition of Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns and interests regarding Afghanistan and active support for warmer PakiVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:39 Mar 06, 2009 Jkt 043092 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\43092.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
25 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Curtis appears in the Appendix on page 77. 

stan-Afghanistan relations are also explicit non-controversial U.S. 

policies. Yet on this topic, too, vigorous debate exists on whether 

the United States is genuinely committed to a long-term role in the 

region that will address Pakistani concerns. 

U.S. public diplomacy gains following the 2005 earthquake were 

measurable, but have since receded. By one accounting, 86 percent 

of Pakistanis believe that weakening and dividing the Muslim 

world is a U.S. goal. A scant 9 percent thought Pakistan should cooperate with the United States in its so-called war on terror. 

These findings may give pause to any observer and serve as a 

stark reminder that the national interest and the human interest 

do not always correspond in the minds of ordinary citizens. U.S. 

interlocutors cannot force upon Pakistanis the notion that the fight 

against religious militancy is in their own best interests. Weakening and dividing the Muslim world is not a goal of U.S. foreign 

policy, as a huge majority of Pakistanis appear to believe. To the 

extent these misperceptions exist, they are likely to create formidable obstacles to a genuine mutually-held trust and respect that 

could benefit the governments and peoples of both countries. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I stand ready to answer any questions you may have. 

Senator CARPER. Great. Mr. Kronstadt, thank you very much. 

Ms. Curtis, I understand that you come late to the game because 

we invited you late. We are just delighted that you were willing to 

make time in your schedule to come and testify. I didn’t have a 

chance to read your testimony, so this will be the first time I have 

heard it, but I very much look forward to it and thank you so much 

for joining us. 

TESTIMONY OF LISA CURTIS,1 SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, 

ASIAN STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Ms. CURTIS. OK. Well, thank you very much for having me here, 

Mr. Chairman. It is very much an honor. I will focus my remarks 

on mainly containing the terrorist threat in Pakistan, which of 

course is critical to the future of Pakistan as well as global security. 

Despite a successful election 4 months ago, Pakistan’s political 

and security situation remains highly unstable and demands close 

attention from U.S. policy makers and legislators. The power struggle at the center among the three main political parties, Asif Ali 

Zardari, Nawaz Sharif, and President Musharraf—Asif Ali Zardari 

leads the Pakistan People’s Party, the main leader in the coalition 

government; Nawaz Sharif leads the Pakistan Muslim League 

Nawaz faction, which is the junior coalition partner in the coalition 

government. There is a power struggle between these three leaders 

that is distracting the new government from coping with the grave 

economic and terrorism challenges that are facing the country. 

A revived lawyers’ movement to restore judges deposed by President Musharraf last year is adding to the political uncertainty, and 

I understand tens of thousands of people are en route from Lahore 

to Islamabad as we speak, so just to give you a sense for the political uncertainty in Islamabad at the moment. 

26 

But perhaps the most worrisome trend in Pakistan is the advance of Taliban militants in the Northwest part of the country 

and the government’s lack of a strategic approach to roll back the 

rising extremist threat. The United States and Pakistan share the 

same objective of uprooting terrorism from Pakistan, but they have 

not yet developed and agreed upon a comprehensive joint plan to 

achieve this goal over the long term. 

Tuesday night’s air strike that killed 11 Pakistani security forces 

along the Afghan border will likely strain U.S.-Pakistan relations 

and create opposition within the lower ranks of the army and the 

Pashtun paramilitary Frontier Corps to any further cooperation 

with the United States. The incident points to the challenges of 

fighting an effective campaign against insurgents who cross freely 

back and forth along a porous border and the confusion that prevails when coalition forces can operate aggressively on one side of 

the border, but must rely on their Pakistani counterparts to control 

the other side. Mostly, the incident highlights the need to improve 

communication between the coalition, Afghan, and Pakistani forces 

along the border. 

In September 2006, Pakistani President Musharraf pursued a 

peace deal with militants in the North Waziristan agency of the 

Tribal Areas. The deal failed by all accounts. Within 2 months, 

cross-border attacks against coalition forces increased by 200 percent, and by the summer of 2007, senior U.S. intelligence officials 

declared that the Pakistani peace deal had allowed the region to 

develop into an al Qaeda stronghold. The extremists also took advantage of the decreased military pressure and instituted strict Islamic edicts in the region, such as closing down girls’ schools, barber shops, and video stores, demonstrating that they could challenge the writ of the government. 

The Pakistani government has once again embarked on a new 

set of peace deals in the region. The government hopes that negotiations will separate tribal leaders from the extremists, but the 

problem is the tribal leaders do not have the wherewithal to confront the extremists. The Pakistani government says that it needs 

time for the negotiations to bear fruit. The danger lies in promoting 

a negotiating process that legitimizes the extremists and increases 

their influence. 

During a recent trip to Pakistan, I was struck by the level of concern expressed about the situation in the Northwest Frontier Province by the people of that region. Pakistanis understand that the 

Taliban militants are competing for political power with the Pakistani State. They do not support the agenda of the militants, but 

they were pessimistic that the government was capable of successfully countering their growing influence. 

The militants almost certainly will use the current law to 

strengthen their ability to fight coalition forces in Afghanistan. The 

United States must encourage Pakistan to go back on the offensive 

with full U.S. support. But military operations alone will not uproot the terrorists’ safe haven in the Tribal Areas, which could take 

several years. It will require a strategic approach that also relies 

heavily on economic development and investment in the region. 

In addition to implementing a large-scale economic development 

program in the FATA, the United States should move forward with 

27 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Krepon appears in the Appendix on page 84. 

Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs), as they are referred to, 

legislation that was introduced in the U.S. Senate on March 13, 

2008. The ROZs are meant to encourage investment near the underdeveloped Tribal Areas by permitting certain products produced 

there to enter the U.S. duty-free. 

And I just want to add, during my recent visit to Pakistan, there 

was a lot of skepticism because this initiative was introduced several years ago. President Bush announced this in March 2006, and 

here we are 2 years later and it is still not implemented. So I just 

want to make the point of how important it is to keep the faith of 

the Pakistanis that we really are truly interested in contributing 

to the development of this region. 

The United States should also speed up its plans to provide 

counterinsurgency training to Pakistan’s paramilitary troops stationed in the FATA. The training of Pakistan’s Frontier Corps, who 

come from the region and are familiar with the culture, is scheduled to begin this summer, but it really should have started long 

ago. 

Washington should also increase efforts to encourage peace building and greater military-to-military cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistani initiatives to bring political reform to 

the FATA could actually strengthen Islamabad’s claim to the region and help dispel any controversy between Kabul and Islamabad 

on the status of their shared border. 

The United States should also make a quiet yet focused diplomatic effort to prod the India-Pakistan peace process. Substantive 

movement on Kashmir is needed to demonstrate that the two countries are truly putting their past behind them and moving toward 

a new era of peace and cooperation in South Asia. 

Finally, the United States should fully support the democratically-elected coalition government. Washington should avoid being 

viewed as meddling in Pakistani internal politics, including working toward the preservation of President Musharraf, whose role 

and influence are declining in Pakistan, which I think many of the 

witnesses have indicated. A policy of clinging to Musharraf in the 

face of Pakistani opposition will only increase hostility toward the 

United States from the broader population and contribute to greater instability within the system. Maintenance of the current coalition government offers the best hope for stabilizing Pakistan as it 

copes with the economic and terrorism challenges that threaten political unrest. 

That concludes my statement. Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you very much. It was worth waiting for. 

Thanks so much. 

Mr. Krepon, you are recognized. Please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL KREPON,1 CO-FOUNDER, THE HENRY 

L. STIMSON CENTER 

Mr. KREPON. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thanks for holding this 

hearing. You have asked me to focus on the nuclear weapons 

issue—— 

Senator CARPER. Yes, sir. 

28 

Mr. KREPON [continuing]. Which I am going to do. The first question, how safe and secure are Pakistan’s nuclear weapons? Nobody 

knows for sure how the current system, which is an improved system, will work under circumstances of great stress. 

Senator CARPER. Excuse me for interrupting, but when you say 

an improved system, improved how recently? 

Mr. KREPON. Well, there was a time, regrettably, when A.Q. 

Khan, who ran one of the major nuclear laboratories, was in charge 

of security at that lab. That was not a good idea. 

Senator CARPER. No. 

Mr. KREPON. But that has changed and now the Pakistan army 

has full control over the security system. It has full control over the 

nuclear weapons system within the country, from soup to nuts. 

But the improvements that they have made, thankfully, have not 

been tested under periods of prolonged great stress. If there is 

great turbulence within the country, and there are possibilities of 

that because of this triangular competition between the political 

big-wig, or big-wigs, the current president of the country, and the 

army chief, that triangular system of control, there is jockeying 

there all the time. But it could get a lot worse. 

A period of prolonged political turbulence where the country’s 

problems grow and divisions within the country grow, that will also 

be reflected in the Pakistan army. The Pakistan army is not some 

foreign culture that has been imposed on Pakistan. It reflects the 

country. And so divisions and grievances, when they grow within 

the country, are also going to grow within the army. 

And the biggest, or one of the biggest threats to the safety and 

security of nuclear weapons in Pakistan is a breakdown of unity of 

command within the army. So unity of command is a hierarchical 

institution. The chief gives orders. The orders are followed. With a 

breakdown of command, orders don’t get followed. So I think that 

is something to focus on. 

We want to prevent a prolonged period of instability in governing 

this country and there is just so much we can do. Our policies 

aren’t determinative, but they do influence outcomes. So worry 

about political instability within the country. 

I also worry about the crisis with India because whenever there 

is a crisis with India, then nuclear weapons which are usually in 

repose, and they are most safely guarded in repose, they move 

around. Some portion of their nuclear arsenal, the launchers and 

the weapons, move when there is a period of significant crisis. The 

reasons are simple. People can look down on this country by means 

of satellites and get the geographical coordinates of where the nuclear storage sites are, where the missile bases are, where the air 

bases are. So all of these are targetable, so you have got to put 

something in motion. When you put something in motion in a crisis, then you are more susceptible to insider threats and you are 

more susceptible to accidents, and if a crisis turns into a limited 

war, then, of course, all of these concerns really grow exponentially. 

So what can the United States do? We can offer assistance for 

nuclear security. The Pakistanis, there is this huge trust deficit 

with the United States and every time there is an incident like yesterday, the trust deficit grows. So they are not going to let us get 

29 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen appears in the Appendix on page 92. 

hands on their crown jewels. They are going to keep us at a safe 

distance. 

Support that can be provided from a safe distance, like our best 

practices, our lessons learned—which, by the way, we have to relearn about nuclear safety and security. But if we can offer assistance that is at a safe distance, chances are, and if it is kept with 

a low profile, the Pakistan army will say yes, as long as they can 

keep us at arm’s length. Those are small things. If we offer big assistance programs for nuclear security, it may make doing smaller 

things even harder. 

And, of course, the other two things, because of my worries, we 

can do crisis management if there is a problem with India. Even 

better, we could do peacemaking, help with peacemaking in a lowprofile way. We haven’t done much of that, unfortunately. 

I agree that these assistance packages are required to help reorient the Pakistan army, Frontier Corps, economic development. You 

will be sorely tempted to walk away from these programs because 

there is going to be so much friction between us and Pakistan in 

so many specific cases. But disengagement doesn’t help. Thank 

you. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you for an excellent statement and for 

responding to the questions that we asked you to respond to. We 

are glad you accepted our invitation and thank you for your testimony. 

Dr. Cohen, you are batting cleanup here. Thank you. Please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN P. COHEN,1 SENIOR FELLOW, 

FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Senator Carper. I am honored to be invited to again speak and offer some advice to the Senate. 

Let me begin my remarks by making two general observations. 

Somebody said earlier these hearings are timely, but they are timely because Pakistan is in a protracted crisis that is measured in 

decades, not just years. So Pakistan is going to be with us in one 

form or another for a very long time. It is not just a sudden event 

that is taking place. 

Second, there is also a great danger of wishful thinking regarding Pakistan, projecting on Pakistan our desires and our belief that 

we have found leadership or a program that actually works, and, 

of course, this is sometimes played back to us, ratifying our own 

imagination. 

When I worked for George Schultz for a couple of years, he said 

to us once, hope is not a policy, so I think we have to bear that 

in mind with regard to Pakistan. I hope that this and that will 

happen in Pakistan, but I think we also have to take a realistic assessment of what is actually going on. 

I will try and summarize some of this because Mr. Krepon has 

said a few things already, but I think there are four nuclear-related 

dangers we have to worry about in this Administration and the 

next and perhaps the one after that. A small but real possibility 

30 

that the next India-Pakistan crisis could lead to escalation to nuclear use. 

Second, Pakistan may decide as a matter of state policy—this is 

looking ahead a couple of years—to extend a nuclear umbrella or 

engage in nuclear sharing with one or more Middle Eastern States, 

especially if Iran acquires a nuclear device. 

Third, there is a hard-to-quantify risk of nuclear theft in Pakistan. Mr. Krepon has talked about that. I won’t repeat it. 

And finally, there is some small chance that should Pakistan unravel—again, it has once already—that its nuclear assets will be 

seized by remnant elements of the army for political, strategic, or 

personal purposes. 

While nuclear proliferation or nuclear theft should not be the 

sole or even the determining element in a relationship with Pakistan, some of these are frightening scenarios. Our policy paradox 

is that we want many things from Pakistan but that we cannot directly address Pakistan’s inability to deliver. We want Pakistan to 

cooperate on terrorism. We want it to normalize with India. We 

want it to control its nuclear weapons. We don’t want it to proliferate. And we want it to transform its domestic order by normalizing the FATA. 

Even if Pakistanis wanted to do some or all of these things, it 

is not certain that they have the capability to do them. So no matter how much money we pour into Pakistan, we cannot expect full 

compliance. We must pick and choose among our policy goals. 

In the case of nuclear security, we should go beyond encouraging 

better safeguards. Within the limits of American law, we are providing technologies to Pakistan and systems to Pakistan to help secure their systems and it may be that China has also done so. I 

certainly hope they are doing that. 

Beyond this, we should consider a criteria-based nuclear deal 

with Pakistan, somewhat different than the one we offered to 

India, which I support, but one in which Pakistan has to meet certain criteria to get assistance as a way of encouraging them to limit 

and secure their existing nuclear weapons. As far as I can see, 

Pakistan is simply going to be building nuclear weapons in large 

numbers as fast as they can indefinitely, something that is not in 

our interest and I don’t think it is in their interest. 

Pakistan could receive support for a civilian nuclear program in 

exchange for greater assurances regarding the security of its nuclear assets and technology and transparency regarding past leakages. 

Finally, we should marginally increase our engagement in the 

India-Pakistan relationship—our involvement in the India-Pakistan relationship, as Mr. Krepon has said. The Pakistan army still 

regards India as its main threat and nuclear weapons as its main 

defense. We need to address their chief incentive to acquire more 

and bigger nuclear weapons. The reason Pakistan is engaged in Afghanistan or allows individuals based in Pakistan to become involved in Afghanistan is not because they have ambitions of expansion themselves. They do not want India to fill the vacuum in Afghanistan. So it is essentially a continuation of the India-Pakistan 

rivalry to Afghanistan that is part of the problem. 

Short-term measures regarding—— 

31 

Senator CARPER. Excuse me, Doctor. Just say that last sentence 

again. 

Mr. COHEN. Pakistani strategists see Afghanistan as a vulnerable spot because of Indian engagement in Afghanistan, and historically there has been an Afghan-Indian alliance or relationship 

because both regarded Pakistan as their major threat. So, in a 

sense, we have to understand this realpolitik balance of power 

issue. From a Pakistani military point of view, they do not want 

to see India establish themselves in Afghanistan, so that is why 

our Pakistan-Afghanistan policy, our Pakistan and our Afghan policies and our India policy are linked at some level, at a strategic 

level, and we must keep that in mind. 

Short-term measures regarding terrorism and nuclear technology 

should not get in the way of long-term strategies to stabilize Pakistan. We should devote as much attention to shoring up Pakistan’s 

broken institutions and helping Pakistanis resolve their permanent 

domestic critical crises as we devote to terrorism and nuclear 

issues, and I think I agree with the rest of the panelists on this 

point. If we fail to do the latter—the former, the latter would certainly become more acute. If we don’t address Pakistan’s coherence 

as a state, it will be a bigger problem regarding terrorism and nuclear weapons. 

Fortunately, there are other states that share this interest with 

us, that want to see a stable Pakistan. These include Saudi Arabia, 

China, India, Afghanistan, the major European powers, and Japan. 

The Chinese and the Indians, in particular, are concerned about 

Pakistan becoming a radical Islamist State. Of course, Saudi, you 

could look at the Saudi view on that several ways, but they share 

with us a concern that Pakistan not be an export center for radical 

Islamic behavior. In a sense, we have some common interest with 

the Chinese and the Indians regarding Pakistan’s stability and normalcy. 

Our Pakistan policy should, therefore, be framed by a regional 

policy that seeks to stabilize relations between Pakistan and its 

neighbors, especially India and Afghanistan, but also Iran. We also 

need to make our support more effective. I won’t go into the details. 

I agree with what others have said about this. 

Finally, I think we should be aware that Pakistan may yet fail 

comprehensively. The state has failed in bits and pieces over the 

last 25 years in civil war, separatism, economic collapse, and the 

rise of a truly authoritarian leader are all possible futures for Pakistan. This is the core argument of the book I published in 2004 and 

I think I would stand by everything I wrote there. It is still a possible future for Pakistan. 

Pakistan should not be written off as a failed state. It is not a 

failed state. It has failed in bits and pieces. But if it cannot take 

advantage of this second-last chance, then its future will be grim, 

and you and other American policymakers should not be taken by 

surprise. 

That concludes my testimony. I would be pleased to respond to 

questions. 

Senator CARPER. Dr. Cohen, thank you. Thank you for your testimony. 

32 

I am reminded as I listened to each of you testify, reminded of 

the words of Thomas Edison, who used to say that sometimes people miss out on opportunity because it comes along wearing overalls and is disguised and looks a lot like work. There is a potential 

for great calamity here, nuclear weapons falling into the wrong 

hands, the Taliban, al Qaeda continue to find refuge and create 

mischief both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, danger to our troops in 

Afghanistan. But there is also real potential here, maybe for getting it right. It doesn’t say it is going to be easy. 

One of the best ways for me to learn, aside from very informative 

panels like the ones that are gathered here, is to actually go to a 

country to visit that country, to talk to the folks who are involved, 

our people as well as the folks who live in those countries. Senator 

Levin has just returned, I believe, from that part of the world. I 

am delighted that he is here. As you know, he Chairs the Armed 

Services Committee and is a very senior member of this Committee, as well. Senator Levin, you are recognized for as much time 

as you wish to consume. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Carper, so much, and thanks 

for holding this hearing. As you mentioned, I just returned with 

Senator Casey from a very brief visit but a very useful visit to 

Pakistan and Afghanistan. I think I changed my mind about a 

number of things just in talking to those leaders and talking to our 

military people during those 3 days. I learned a lot about the border and the problem that border creates for Afghanistan, for our 

troops in Afghanistan because of the flow of Taliban across that 

border and other terrorist forces that emanate from Pakistan, 

where they really have safe havens in a number of areas of Pakistan. 

The fundamental question that we grappled with, Senator Casey 

and I, is to what the real intent or attitude of the Pakistani government is. Do they really want to stop that flow into Afghanistan or 

not? Some argue, particularly in Afghanistan, but some in Pakistan, that if they could buy off some of the groups that are violent 

and persuade them to focus their fire on Afghanistan next door, 

that maybe they can have peace at home in Pakistan, and that is 

a theory which has a lot of support, including some very explicit 

support from some of our diplomats in Afghanistan as well as our 

generals as well as the Afghan leadership that has absolutely no 

confidence in Pakistan’s either intent or capability to stop those 

cross-border movements. 

Now, from a military perspective, there are a lot of issues about 

rules of engagement, what happens when people are being fired at 

on the Afghan side from the Pakistan side. What should be the response? The NATO rules of engagement, surprisingly, do not even 

allow a return of fire across a border after they have been fired at. 

That, to me, is a stunning restriction on what is common sense 

military conduct, which is at least go after the folks that are firing 

at you, but NATO has rules of engagement that says if that attack 

comes from across the border, you cannot respond across the border, even with fire, much less personal activity crossing the border. 

33 

Our rules that we follow in the area that the United States is 

patrolling and has responsibility for militarily, with obviously the 

support of the Afghans, our rules of engagement are not that. We 

will fire back at sources of attack from the Pakistani side of the 

border. But that is a kind of an important issue, but a more military technical issue. 

The big issue for us is what is the intent of the Pakistani government? What do they really intend to do, either in the Tribal Areas 

or south of the Tribal Areas? These peace agreements that are 

being discussed, we heard a lot of promises from the Pakistani 

leader that those peace agreements would have to contain explicit 

commitments which would be enforceable to stop the flow of people 

crossing the border into Afghanistan who intend to attack our 

troops. We have those assurances that come right from the highest 

sources you can get in Pakistan, which are the top elected leaders 

in Pakistan, including the president and the prime minister and 

the heads of all major political parties. 

But then you read about a press conference which is held by the 

head of a tribe whose first name I am afraid I will mispronounce, 

Baitullah Masud. Mr. Masud holds a—he is a very militant man 

who says at his press conference he vows that he will continue the 

jihad in Afghanistan. He has an open press conference in Pakistan. 

Everybody knows where he is. The press knows where he is. He 

makes these vows openly and publicly. He is the man who, by the 

way, many think is responsible for the assassination of Benazir 

Bhutto, and yet he has an open press conference in Pakistan. 

So I guess I would ask Ms. Curtis and Mr. Kronstadt this question, since our other witnesses are on a different part of this subject, but what are, in your judgment, do the Pakistanis have the 

will and have the capability—either or both—of stopping these attacks from these safe havens on the Pakistani side of the border 

into Afghanistan where they are creating huge problems? 

It is our greatest problem, I believe, in Afghanistan, where you 

have got a national army which is committed to defeating the 

Taliban. Their morale is very high in the Afghan army. The capability, at least in terms of intent and will and courage and strength 

of determination, is high in the Afghan army. They don’t have the 

military capability yet. But in terms of the willpower, it is there. 

In terms of the fighting strength, our military leaders tell us that 

the Afghan army has got this kind of a determination, that they 

are willing to do everything they can inside of Afghanistan to stop 

terrorist attacks relative to the border, going back to that. 

Let me start with you, Ms. Curtis. What is the intent, in your 

judgment, of the Pakistan government in terms of stopping these 

incursions from their soil into Afghanistan? 

Ms. CURTIS. Well, let me just start by saying I think it is extremely difficult to judge intent, but what I can say is if we look 

at what has happened in Pakistan over the last year, literally 50, 

60 suicide bombings killing over 1,000 Pakistani civilians and security forces, I think clearly Pakistan wants to stop the terrorists. It 

understands the threats to the Pakistani State. 

In my opening remarks, I pointed out I was recently in Peshawar 

and it was very clear the people of Peshawar are extremely concerned about what is happening. They understand that the Taliban 

34 

militants are competing with the Pakistani authorities for political 

power and they are very alarmed by this. 

So I would say that we really need to think about the issue of 

capability, and I understand the recent RAND study that has come 

out that was mentioned earlier about whether or not Pakistani 

services, intelligence services, were actually supporting the 

Taliban. But I would point out, I think some of this stems from 

some media reporting that we saw last year talking about Frontier 

Corps who were allowing Taliban to cross, and I would say there 

is a difference between allowing or not being able to intercept because of capability and supporting or helping, and we have to keep 

this in mind. It is my understanding that the pickets along the border are often made of up to 10 to 20 Frontier Corps troops and they 

may face a band of militants of 50 or more Taliban. 

So I think we need to look at this question, but I certainly share 

your concern and I think it is something we need to bring up in 

a very forthright manner with our Pakistani counterparts when we 

do have these crossings and we do know that the Pakistani border 

posts are not doing their job. We need to figure out why and we 

need to address that issue. 

Senator LEVIN. We do bring them up forthrightly with the Pakistani leaders. Believe me, we were very direct with them on this 

question and they assure us that, it is their intent. They are not 

going to sign any peace agreements which don’t have explicit language prohibiting it with enforcement mechanisms to carry out 

those commitments. 

But the RAND study that you referred to says something more 

than just people on the border allowing, and I agree with you, 

there is a difference between, a gradation between allowing and 

supporting or assisting. But what the RAND study says is that 

there are a number of instances where Pakistani intelligence 

agents tipped off Taliban forces about the location and movement 

of Afghan and coalition forces, that there was actually an affirmative step that was taken, not just passivity but tipping off Taliban 

forces. 

And there is other evidence, by the way. We talked to one of our 

generals there who reported an incident, if I can quickly find this, 

where there were some people who went over the border from Pakistan into Afghanistan to assist people from—and participated in an 

incursion from Pakistan military into Afghanistan to help them get 

back safely. It was Senator Casey, and I were told by our military 

commanders of a recent incident in which Pakistan Frontier Corps 

forces sent an ambulance in to evacuate wounded militants back 

across the border into Pakistan. 

So these are not just passive actions, failure to act, although that 

is not acceptable, either. These are affirmative actions on the part 

of the intelligence and the part of the Frontier Corps people to help 

militants and to help the Taliban inside of Afghanistan. 

And I agree with your distinction, though, Ms. Curtis. I don’t disagree with that. I am just afraid that there has been much more 

than just passive acceptance. 

Mr. Kronstadt. 

Mr. KRONSTADT. Senator, I would, I think, first of all, agree with 

Ms. Curtis’s emphasis on the capability or capacity question. I 

35 

think it has become clear to most observers that Pakistan’s 

counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts have been hampered by a number of problems, including equipment, training, so 

forth. 

With regard to what you were just saying about the Frontier 

Corps, I might offer that even what we saw on the news yesterday 

calls attention to the problem of training and discipline within that 

organization. Part of the potential benefits of working with the 

Frontier Corps, it seems, are the fact that they are local Pashtun 

ethnicity, often live in the very areas that they are deployed. But 

there is a potential downside to that in terms of concerns about 

sympathies that they may have. It is possible that these concerns 

could be ameliorated by more fully engaging the training and discipline of this force and I think that has been a focus. 

With regard to the intent of the government of Pakistan, I would 

call attention first to the fact that it is a very difficult region that 

is being operated in, and very often when I converse with Pakistani 

interlocutors, they will raise the issue of our border with Mexico 

and the difficulties we find with securing that border, and then go 

on to explain that they are dealing with a much more difficult terrain and an actual division, a Durand Line that was purposefully 

dividing members of the same ethnicity—— 

Senator LEVIN. Yes. The terrain in the north is more difficult, 

but down with the Quetta area, that is not particularly difficult 

terrain. They openly meet in Quetta. They have this press conference that I made reference to, Mr. Masud. It is an open press 

conference. He is the guy who is threatening. He says the jihad in 

Afghanistan will continue. Now, how do we explain that in terms 

of intent? 

Mr. KRONSTADT. I am certainly not in a position to explain that. 

I will call attention to the fact that Deputy Secretary Negroponte 

himself called for the capture and bringing to justice of Baitullah 

Masud, so I think the U.S. Government’s position on so-called irreconcilable elements such as Masud are clear. I can’t explain the 

apparent public appearance of a person like Masud in South 

Waziristan. But again, it is in a Tribal Area and it is useful to separate, as you have done, the Balochistan region and the Quetta 

local region from the Tribal Areas, which are operating under a different set of—the Pakistani government is operating under a different set of constraints there. 

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I don’t want to take up time beyond my allotted amount. You were nice enough not to give me a 

specific time, but I don’t want to abuse your good nature. 

I would just say this in conclusion, I guess. We were notified a 

couple of weeks ago by the Administration that they intended to 

spend $75 million to train and equip the Pakistan Frontier Corps. 

During our recent trip, as I mentioned, we, Senator Casey and I, 

heard from so many officials, Afghan and U.S. commanders, about 

either the failure to prevent activity crossing the board by the 

Pakistan military or actively supporting these cross-border attacks, 

that we are, frankly, troubled by whether or not that money is 

going to be used to stop the cross-border incursions into Afghanistan or to be training a force which doesn’t have the same interest 

and goals that we do. 

36 

1The prepared report of Senator Levin and Senator Casey appears in the Appendix on page 

47. 2The letter to Robert Gates from Senator Levin appears in the Appendix on page 51. 

And so I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that you insert in the record 

two things here. One would be a trip report of Senator Casey and 

myself on our visit to Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is a fairly short 

report, but it does contain some of the questions which you and the 

witnesses and I have raised.1

But I also have a second request, which would be to insert a letter which I recently sent to Robert Gates, the Secretary of Defense, 

raising a question about that $75 million.2 It is not up to us to approve it. We don’t have that power with this particular expenditure. But I do think we have to make a decision fundamentally as 

to whether or not the folks that we are training, equipping, making 

stronger, have the same goal and interest that we do. I don’t think 

we have made that. I haven’t heard a very strong case being made 

that we have confidence that Frontier Corps, in fact, will have its 

mission and purpose the same one that we do. 

And I think there are real questions about it and I think some 

of Ms. Curtis’s earlier testimony about complicated motives—these 

are people who are countrymen. These are people who have a similar—they are part of the same tribe and they have a—there is no 

border for them. I don’t think they even acknowledge a border. It 

is an artificial line. And I just want to make sure that before American taxpayer dollars are spent to equip and arm and train folks 

that they are not going to be turned on us and not going to be helping forces that have a different interest. So thank you. 

Senator CARPER. You bet. Thank you so much for coming and for 

sharing with us your insights, not only from your recent visit, but 

from your years in the Senate and your chairmanship of the Armed 

Services Committee and your role on this Committee. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. You bet. What happens to Musharraf? What do 

you see in his future? I would just ask each of you to share some 

thoughts. Mr. Krepon. 

Mr. KREPON. If you look at Pakistani history as closely as Mr. 

Cohen has, I think it is possible to come to the conclusion that 

when a military strongman really messes up in Pakistan, he is not 

part of the clean-up crew. The clean-up is enhanced by his departure and retarded if he sticks around. Would you agree with that, 

Mr. Cohen? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes. I think that a key element in this will be the 

army’s own views. They will not want to see a former army chief 

disgraced or humiliated in any way, and his major outside supporter seems to be the United States, or elements of the United 

States. So I suspect that as our political system changes, support 

for him may diminish—it has diminished already—and they will 

find a graceful way for him to exit Pakistan. On the other hand, 

he may have hopes that some dramatic reversal will take place 

where he will again be seen as indispensable. But that will depend 

on the army. I think the army is a critical factor here, and they 

will not—but above all, they will not want to see him humiliated 

or the army humiliated by his humiliation. 

37 

Senator CARPER. In some countries, they have a strong chief executive. This country is an example of that. Israel has quite a different situation with the president as a largely ceremonial position. 

Is that a potential graceful way out of this, is for the folks in Pakistan to decide that their president should be a largely ceremonial 

office—— 

Mr. COHEN. Well, that is the way the constitution had it, until 

he changed the constitution. And again, if he would be willing to 

revert to such a ceremonial president, that would be fine, but he 

may be waiting around. Certainly the army is waiting around for 

the politicians to fail to come to an agreement. So if the politicians 

cannot again agree, and we are talking about the two dominant 

centrist secular political parties of Pakistan, if they cannot come to 

an agreement as to the management and the stability of Pakistan, 

he will have a role, no two ways about it. 

Senator CARPER. Who selects the leadership of the military? 

Mr. KREPON. Well, under the current constitution, the president 

chooses, not the prime minister. But this is in play now because 

the new political dispensation has offered some major constitutional amendments. The constitution is not a settled document in 

Pakistan. 

Mr. COHEN. That is why I said Pakistan is in a permanent state 

of crisis because there is no agreement on the fundamental law of 

the land, the constitution, and personality plays a role, outside 

powers play a role. We do. The Saudis do. The Chinese do. So there 

is no political coherence in Pakistan, or it has lost whatever coherence it did have, and I think we can expect this to go on forever, 

indefinitely. 

Senator CARPER. Ms. Curtis. 

Ms. CURTIS. Sir, there has been a fundamental political change 

in Pakistan that I am not sure that the Bush Administration has 

fully absorbed. I think the election showed that the support for 

President Musharraf’s party, the Pakistan Muslim League, KDS 

and PMLQ, did not do very well. In fact, it did a lot worse than 

people expected. So I think this was one indicator that people were 

not happy with some of the things President Musharraf had pursued in the last year, particularly the institution of emergency rule, 

the clamping down on the press, throwing thousands of political 

workers, human rights workers, in jail for a certain period. So I 

think this really needs to be absorbed by the U.S. Administration, 

this fundamental change. 

And one thing that was made clear to me when I was in Pakistan was that Pakistan has traditionally followed the British system where the prime minister does have the majority of the power 

and that there was a sense that many Pakistanis wanted to return 

to that particular mode of government. So I think there is definitely interest in moving in that direction. How quickly it will happen because of all the political instability, because of this three-way 

power struggle that we see, I wouldn’t want to hazard a guess. 

Senator CARPER. Do you want to add anything to that, Mr. 

Kronstadt? 

Mr. KRONSTADT. I would just add that I think it is safe to say 

the default setting for Pakistan since the 1973 constitution is a 

38 

parliamentary system of government where the prime minister 

would be the sovereign and head of government. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. If you look at the level of popularity 

or popular support within Pakistan for President Musharraf and 

you look at the drop in our own support, one seems to mirror the 

other. I wonder if he is bringing us down or if the converse might 

be true or something to both of those. 

Mr. COHEN. There is a relationship, and one of the reasons he 

is unpopular is that he seems to be doing our bidding and that we 

have—there have been American incursions in Pakistan continuously. The recent attack wasn’t the first one. 

Senator CARPER. Yes. I want us to talk about that here, and this 

might be a good place to pivot and to talk about that. It sounds 

like a tragic incident that occurred in the last 48 hours where, I 

believe, weapons delivered by maybe one of our Predators or a 

Predator-like system may have led to the death of a dozen or more 

Pakistani anti-insurgent troops. Any idea how that happened? 

Mr. KREPON. No idea, but I want to lengthen your frame thinking about this problem of hot pursuit and bombing on Pakistani 

soil, because it is not so long ago when it was the Soviet Union and 

Soviet fighters and Soviet bombers were dropping ordinance on 

Pakistani territory, the same area. So Pakistanis—— 

Senator CARPER. Bombing folks that we were supporting? 

Mr. KREPON. Well, when we were supporting the Mujahideen, 

they were using Pakistani territory as safe havens and there were 

plenty of instances where the Soviet Union would just happen to 

strafe and bomb Pakistani soil. So we have—I am in no way paralleling what the Soviets did in Afghanistan and what the United 

States is doing in Afghanistan. Let me be clear about that. But the 

sanctity of Pakistani soil, which doesn’t seem to apply to cross-border incursions by pro-Taliban elements, does apply to bombing 

runs. 

So every time the United States finds it necessary to carry out 

an attack by a drone or by some other mean on Pakistani soil, 

there are huge reverberations within the country and it impacts on 

the nuclear security issue that we were talking about. It impacts 

on U.S. popularity within the country. So we are on the horns of 

a dilemma here, and to my way of thinking, we have to have really 

good intelligence when we pick out a target on Pakistani soil, current intelligence, and we have to have real good communication so 

that Pakistani forces, including the Frontier Corps, are not collateral targets. 

Now, the two of these imperatives can also conflict with each 

other because of problems that Senator Levin was talking about. If 

we give a heads-up, we are not sure that the target will be there, 

and this is really hard. 

Senator CARPER. I agree. Dr. Cohen, and then others. 

Mr. COHEN. I don’t want to sound too cynical, but for a billion 

dollars, you can bomb a country occasionally, which is what we 

have been doing, in a sense. What is remarkable about this last 

bombing is that none of the Pakistani press reports have linked it 

to the actual amount of money we are giving Pakistan, and I think 

the Administration feels and maybe our forces in Afghanistan feel 

that the part of the billion dollar package includes the necessity or 

39 

the ability—I won’t say the right, but allowing us to occasionally 

drop a few weapons into Pakistan, and Pakistanis haven’t protested that since the governor of the Northwest Frontier said, ‘‘If 

you do this again, we will be very unhappy.’’ That struck me as a 

fairly weak response from a state, but it could be that this is part 

of where our money is going, in a sense, to buy goodwill, if that 

is the right term, among Pakistani leaders. 

But in the long term, I agree that it is hurting us among Pakistani people. Imagine how we would feel if we were being bombed 

occasionally by Canadians or Mexicans or any other country. And, 

of course—that was the point I would make. 

Senator CARPER. Does anyone else want to comment on this before we move on? 

Ms. CURTIS. I just think it points to the need for better cooperation, and there have been efforts to move in this direction. The establishment of Border Coordinating Centers along the border, 

which would be manned by Pakistani, Afghan, and coalition 

forces—it is my understanding that the trilateral meetings that 

take place between the three have not been happening as frequently in the last couple months. Perhaps this is because of some 

of the political instability in Pakistan. I am not sure. But I think 

this just shows how important these trilateral efforts are and I 

hope that Pakistan will participate fully in making them successful. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Let me just change our focus just a 

little bit. In listening to your testimony today and in reading your 

testimony and some other materials, it strikes me that in the Pakistanis’ view, India is their major nemesis. They don’t have a very 

fond regard for Afghanistan. It sounds like the folks who voted in 

Pakistan in the last 6 months, they voted to say that they don’t 

want to become an extremist country. They want to basically be a 

modern society and a democratic society, but not one that is governed by religious extremists of any quarter. 

Pakistani people, as I understand it, are concerned with the upsurge of violence, suicide bombs and that sort of thing in their own 

country, so I don’t know if there is a tension that is going on here, 

too. You have got the Taliban or remnants of the Taliban there 

along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan creating mischief over in Afghanistan, which may be to the pleasure of some 

of the Pakistanis, I am not sure. But at the same time, to the extent that the Taliban and al Qaeda elements are in the mountainous region, the remote regions there, they are also in a position 

where they can create mischief for the Pakistanis, too. 

Where do the Pakistanis come down as to what is acceptable and 

what is not, where they are going to have enough or decide that 

it is not—as much as they might like to poke a stick in the eye of 

the Afghanis, the idea of knowing that they are at risk, too, in 

Pakistan is on their minds. 

Also, I look, I think maybe it is not a perfect correlation here, 

but I look at what is happening in the Anbar Province in Iraq, 

where for a number of years there was just a hotbed of violence, 

people killing one another, trying to kill us, the Iraqi troops, as 

well, and the Sunni awakening has emerged, taken root, and you 

have gotten the folks, the people who live—the tribal units who live 

40 

in that province have said, enough. We are going to turn to work 

in concert with the U.S. forces, with the Iraqi forces, and to turn 

against the al Qaeda and Iraq elements. 

Are there any lessons to be learned from what has happened in 

the Anbar province that might apply in some way to Pakistan? I 

am not sure if there are, and I acknowledge it is not a perfect correlation. 

Mr. COHEN. I think in Pakistan, what has happened is that, 

among Pakistani civilians especially in the Eastern part of the 

country where the major cities are—— 

Senator CARPER. Excuse me just for a minute. What we have 

tried to do in Iraq, as you know, we tried to take the lessons from 

Anbar Province and tried to apply them in other parts of the country, and I think with some success. I don’t know if it is 

transferrable from one country to another. 

Mr. COHEN. No, I think much of it is, and in the case of Pakistan, especially the Eastern portions of Pakistan, the civilian population has been repelled by these suicide attacks and they do not 

want to be subject to extremist Islamic rule. They are generally 

secular Muslims. They voted for two major secular political parties. 

And frankly, I was surprised that the election took place relatively 

freely, Musharraf didn’t intervene, but I was not surprised that the 

Islamist parties did badly and the secular parties did well. So in 

a sense, there is hope for Pakistan, and that is where most of the 

people live. 

But there is still ambivalence in the military. They still regard 

India as a major threat and one of the theaters in which they combat India is Afghanistan. So I think you asked what are their intentions in Afghanistan. They want to have it both ways. They 

want our assistance, but they also want to make sure they have 

a hand in Afghanistan because from their point of view, Afghanistan is a critically important backyard for them. It is not that they 

have expansionist plans, but they don’t want to see other countries 

fill into Afghanistan. So you can’t separate the two. 

Let me make a point which hasn’t been made here but I think 

is very important. From an American perspective, neo-American 

perspective, the Taliban is not important. Taliban are not going to 

reach out and hurt us. Al Qaeda can and will and has. It is 

Taliban’s willingness to host al Qaeda that is the danger. So if I 

had a choice of Afghanistan becoming Taliban without al Qaeda, I 

might take it rather than an endless war. So I think you have to 

bear in mind that from an American point of view, neo-American 

point of view, al Qaeda is the real threat. For most Pakistanis, 

also, al Qaeda is seen as an un-Pakistani kind of organization. 

They are seen as foreigners. 

Senator CARPER. That is an excellent point. Thank you for making it. Anyone else on this issue I have raised? 

Ms. CURTIS. Well, I think I have a different view in that I see 

the Taliban and al Qaeda, they have a symbiotic relationship and 

I think that you can’t get rid of one without dealing with the other, 

and I think this has been the fundamental problem because I do 

think that most Pakistanis would not see it that way and they 

have a hope of separating the two. And I think if you look at the 

leadership connections and support for each other, while they 

41 

might have short-term objectives that differ, they certainly support 

each other, they cooperate, and I don’t see that kind of cooperation 

ending any time soon. 

So I think that would be a fallacy and I think that would be a 

mistake because we know—we have seen what happens when the 

Taliban is in power in Afghanistan and we saw Afghanistan become a sanctuary for al Qaeda, for terrorists, and I think it would 

be a mistake if we don’t recognize that fundamental threat. 

And I think what Mr. Cohen just articulated is the Pakistani assumption that the United States is not going to stay in Afghanistan. It is going to turn its back. It is going to leave, and that is 

why Pakistan has to continue to protect its own interests. And I 

think this is something that we need to overcome because this is 

hurting our ability to achieve the aims that we want to achieve in 

Afghanistan. So I think that the more that we remain committed, 

demonstrate we are committed, will commit troops, will commit resources, will keep the international community focused, as well, I 

think we will be able to achieve our objective not only in Afghanistan, but Pakistan, as well. 

Mr. COHEN. Ms. Curtis, I said if we could separate al Qaeda and 

Taliban, but Taliban appear to be the sea in which the al Qaeda 

are swimming. 

Ms. CURTIS. Right. 

Senator CARPER. All right. 

Mr. KRONSTADT. Mr. Chairman, could i just echo what Ms. Curtis was talking about? I want to emphasize, I think, the importance 

of the long-term commitment. It is easy to sit in Washington and 

make conclusions about what is going on there, but for the people 

there and in Pakistan, with the history—experiencing a history of 

seeing the United States seem to abandon the region or become 

disengaged from the region, they have continued to see a friendly 

government in Kabul as being in their very keen interests and that 

becomes a special focus with any signs that the United States 

might not be committed. 

So it is not possible to make a long-term commitment by making 

a long-term commitment. It, of course, has to be lived out that way. 

But I think to the extent that the Pakistanis are reassured in that 

regard, it would serve U.S. interests. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. A couple of short questions and 

then we will call it a day. Thank you for bearing with us. 

Is there any recent evidence of Pakistani intelligence or military 

officials supporting terrorist elements in acquiring or training to 

use nuclear or chemical or biological weapons that you might share 

with us? 

Mr. KREPON. Well, the—— 

Senator CARPER. Or technology relating to those. 

Mr. KREPON. Right. The public record has plenty of evidence of 

technology transfer, no evidence of the transfer of fissile material, 

bomb-making material, no evidence of the transfer of bombs. The 

available evidence in the public domain may grow. We are getting 

little bits and pieces along the way. There is probably much we will 

never know about the complete picture. But A.Q. Khan seems to 

have drawn the line, at least as far as we know, with respect to 

technology transfer. 

42 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Others, please. Dr. Cohen, anything 

you would like to add? Ms. Curtis. 

Ms. CURTIS. You meant technology transfer to terrorist groups? 

Mr. KREPON. Oh, no. Thank you very much for clarifying. These 

are to governments, not to non-state actors. 

Senator CARPER. All right. But the question I was asking— 

maybe I wasn’t clear, but we are looking for evidence that might 

suggest that Pakistani intelligence or military officials may be supporting terrorist elements in acquiring nuclear, chemical, biological 

weapons or weapons technology. 

Mr. KREPON. I know of no such public evidence. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you. Anyone else? Dr. Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. I have never heard of anything. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Ms. Curtis. 

Ms. CURTIS. No, never heard of anything like that, and I just 

wanted to add that also in former Director of Central Intelligence 

George Tenet’s memoirs, he points out that A.Q. Khan rebuffed 

several approaches by Osama bin Laden for access to nuclear 

know-how. So I just wanted to point that out. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. Another question, really 

for all of you, but particularly for the three that I directed the last 

question to. What is the biggest threat to a secure nuclear arsenal 

in Pakistan? For example, is it a threat by terrorists or other militants? Is it a military coup, a leakage of nuclear materials or expertise? I am not sure if it was Mr. Krepon or Dr. Cohen who was 

talking about heightened threat with India. The movement of nuclear weapons pose a greater threat. 

Mr. KREPON. In my judgment, it is not the take-over of the government or a coup within the army leadership by radical Islamic 

elements. It is not that. Pakistan is not that kind of a country. My 

judgment is the biggest threat right now is prolonged governmental 

incoherence. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes. I had four nuclear-related problems or threats. 

I didn’t assign a probability to any of them. I would say that—well, 

and I can’t do that now. It would take a more detailed analysis. 

But I agree with Mr. Krepon that instability in the government 

generally could lead to problems. Another crisis with India might 

force the Pakistanis to put their nuclear weapons on the road 

again, in a sense, disperse them. If that took place simultaneous 

with the domestic political crisis in Pakistan, then you would have 

both opportunity and availability. Again, that is the perfect storm 

of situations to create a nuclear crisis. But again, the possibility is 

low, probability is low, but the consequences would be very great. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. Anyone else? Please. 

Ms. CURTIS. Well, I think another threat would be retired nuclear scientists or retired military terrorists gaining access that 

way. I agree that it is not the overthrow of the government. That 

is highly unlikely to result in such a danger. But I point to something that happened in 2001 where two retired Pakistan Atomic 

Energy Commission officials were found to be meeting with terrorists, I think with Osama bin Laden himself, and this was something that the United States brought to the attention of the Pakistanis. So I think this points out the need for personnel reliability 

43 

programs. It points at the need for the United States continuing to 

help Pakistan in securing its nuclear weapons. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes. Senator, you should know that—I am sure you 

are aware that A.Q. Khan is, in a sense, on the loose again. He visited the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, visited old friends 

there—— 

Senator CARPER. Isn’t he supposed to be under house arrest? 

Mr. COHEN. Oh, no. He has received visitors. He has traveled 

around Pakistan. He has visited the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission headquarters which are in Islamabad, not too far from his 

house, in fact. 

Senator CARPER. And I understand he has recanted some of his 

earlier—— 

Mr. COHEN. Well, and he has also recanted—I think this is an 

unfolding story. I am not quite sure whether he is telling the truth 

now or he told the truth then. I wouldn’t draw conclusions one way 

or the other. You get into the whole classified realm at that point. 

Senator CARPER. All right. OK. The last question I have is how 

credible do you find the Pakistani government’s disavowal of any 

knowledge of Mr. Khan’s proliferation activities, especially in light 

of his recanting of his confession? Any thoughts on that? 

Mr. KREPON. I don’t think these disavowals, blanket disavowals, 

are credible. I do think that each of his activities needs to be looked 

at separately. I see separate motivations, separate rationales, and 

separate possibilities for collusion with certain governmental officials in each of these cases. So I wouldn’t wrap everything together. 

The only general conclusion I would make in answer to your question is that the non-collusion of others is very implausible. 

Senator CARPER. All right. When you look at the relationship between Pakistan and, we will say, North Korea, in terms of the exchange of technology, does it make sense for the Pakistanis to want 

to trade nuclear weapons technology in exchange for weapons delivery technology? Is that a reasonable trade or not? 

Mr. KREPON. No, not now. 

Senator CARPER. No, in the past. 

Mr. KREPON. In the past, Pakistan was in a bind. Pakistan was 

looking at India’s missile programs advancing across a broad front 

and Pakistan was stuck and it needed missiles and it went to two 

countries for help. It went to China for help with respect to solid 

fueled missiles and it got help. And it went to North Korea for help 

with liquid fueled missiles. Pakistan didn’t put all its eggs in one 

basket. What we are trying to get to the bottom of is what the 

basis of the transaction was with North Korea. 

Senator CARPER. Do you think we will ever know? 

Mr. KREPON. Well, there is a new piece that has come into the 

public domain. It does appear that even though North Korea 

doesn’t admit it, that they got some help with respect to centrifuge 

technology, the technology to enrich uranium. Pakistan’s bomb program was going down a separate route, plutonium production, and 

it appears that Pakistan got some help on centrifuges. Now, whether this was a discrete transaction, as has recently been reported, 

we still haven’t gotten to the bottom of it. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Anyone else on this point? 

44 

Mr. COHEN. I would just add that it is my experience that one 

of A.Q. Khan’s great assets was his Rolodex, which he apparently 

has shared with other countries. That is, he knew, and he talks 

about this now, he knew a lot of places in Europe where he could 

buy this stuff, buy the technology, put the pieces together, and so 

presumably he kept it secret by only telling one country at a time. 

Senator CARPER. OK. I am going to do something—I don’t often 

do this, but I am going to ask each of you to take maybe one 

minute. In the House of Representatives—I used to be a House 

member years ago, but we had the opportunity at the beginning of 

business every day when the House opened for business to give a 

one-minute speech on any subject of our choice. I am not going to 

ask you to speak on any subject of your choice, but if there is something that you would like to just reiterate, to underline, or given 

the conversation we have had here today you think is especially 

relevant as a take-away for me and for my colleagues, or anyone 

else that might be following this and interested in this discussion, 

what might be your one-minute speech or your one-minute closing 

comments? Mr. Kronstadt. 

Mr. KRONSTADT. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I, of course, won’t 

have any speech for you, but I would just reiterate a couple of 

points. 

Senator CARPER. Please. 

Mr. KRONSTADT. One is, and I think these have been illuminated 

some at the hearing today, just how complex the situation is in 

Pakistan—— 

Senator CARPER. Well, if nothing else is clear, that is. 

Mr. KRONSTADT. Well, the challenge is clear and I am, I think, 

encouraged by signs that the U.S. Government is focusing more 

clearly on addressing these challenges, and the hearing you have 

called today is evidence of that. 

And I would again call attention to the role of mutual respect 

and trust. Again, long-term commitment is something that everyone agrees the United States is pursuing with Pakistan and the 

proof is in the pudding. As Dr. Cohen mentioned, there are going 

to be times when there will be a reflex to pull back and that can 

be reevaluated in the context of the complexity. 

So I think a lot of the problems that have been raised here today 

can be traced back to a kind of fundamental distrust or trust deficit 

between the two countries and between the governments of the two 

countries, and to the extent this can be ameliorated, it would serve 

us well. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you. Ms. Curtis. 

Ms. CURTIS. I guess I would just say from your doing Congressional oversight, don’t forego the good for the perfect. I have seen 

this happen too many times. Certainly the oversight has to be 

done, but in a case like Pakistan, sometimes you have to move forward if you don’t have all the answers ready before you, and I say 

this reflecting on the FATA development plan and the $750 million 

in assistance that we are now moving forward with. We probably 

should have done it a long time ago. I understand there were a lot 

of questions in Congress. How do we know if the money is going 

to go to the right people? Sometimes you just have to move forward 

and then learn as you go. 

45 

I would just say, I received very good briefings when I was in 

Pakistan on what we are doing with our assistance that has begun 

to flow into the Tribal Areas and I am very encouraged. The program is being conducted very creatively, very professionally. My 

one concern would be that as the plan—the more money goes in, 

big aid goes in, that the same structure is not kept. So I would just 

urge you, your staffers to get the briefing, what is happening now, 

and try to keep that same kind of structure going for as long as 

possible. 

And also on the Reconstruction Opportunity Zone issue, here is 

another issue where something that makes eminent sense, but I 

understand because we are trying to use trade or private investment for really a counterterrorism goal, that is difficult legislatively to do, but it is so incredibly important and, I think, will contribute tremendously to overcoming a lot of the complicated problems that we have been talking about today. So I would just end 

on that note. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you. Mr. Krepon. 

Mr. KREPON. I would like to thank you very much for holding 

this hearing. 

Senator CARPER. No, we are the ones who are indebted to each 

of you. Thank you. 

Mr. KREPON. I would like to leave you with a thought—— 

Senator CARPER. It wouldn’t have been much of a hearing with 

just us. Some of these guys are pretty good. Senator Levin is good 

and Senator Feingold is good, so is Senator Coburn. But it wouldn’t 

have been much of a hearing without all of you. 

Mr. KREPON. I want to leave with you a message that still rings 

in my ear that Richard Armitage talks about. He was the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense in the first Administration. It is awfully hard 

to see how Afghanistan becomes a success story if Pakistan fails, 

and vice-versa. We really—this is doubly hard because we need two 

successes. 

And so this is taking me back to something that Senator Levin 

talked about. The Frontier Corps is a very weak reed and it is not 

clear if they can get the job done. What has been clear so far is 

that the regular Pakistan army has not been able to do very well 

in countering these groups that are causing so much trouble. It is 

going to take a while to get the Pakistan army trained and 

equipped to deal with this problem. It will probably take even 

longer for the Frontier Corps. And it is not clear whether intent 

will be properly aligned with the capability once the capability 

grows. But I am having a hard time seeing what other instruments 

we have got to work with in tackling this problem. 

So what is the right number? What is the right amount of 

money? I don’t know. How do we monitor what is spent? Tough 

problem. But I don’t see a dual success story unless we invest in 

the current direction. So I would ask you, like Ms. Curtis, these are 

very imperfect policy initiatives, but I don’t see something better 

out there. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Dr. Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. I agree that these new initiatives are important and 

I think they should be pursued, and I think that the real problem 

in Pakistan is it is still an unsettled country. But we do have reVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:39 Mar 06, 2009 Jkt 043092 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\43092.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
46 

sources and we have assets and I say the Chinese, we should be 

working with the Chinese to some degree, a considerable degree, 

with India to a degree, to some degree the Saudis. The Chinese and 

the Saudis aren’t interested in promoting democracy anywhere, let 

alone in Pakistan, but clearly they have an interest in the outcomes in Pakistan. 

So I think that I was pleasantly surprised at the way in which 

the election was held, the way in which young people are revitalizing Pakistani politics. Pakistan is—— 

Senator CARPER. Like America. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, there are some analogies. Pakistan is like somebody who is caught in a door. It can’t go forward to democracy, but 

it doesn’t want to go backward to dictatorship. As long as it is 

stuck between there, we are going to have problems with Pakistan. 

So I think we should continue the present programs we have had. 

I think we should make a lot of them conditional. 

Sometimes we give foreign aid for not obvious reasons, and I 

refer to essentially the bombings in Pakistan and obviously that is 

going to take place. But our developmental aid should be seen by 

the Pakistani people as aimed towards their betterment and their 

improvement. In a way, I think we have been very negligent in 

that and I think we have been cynical in the way in which we supported a military leader who is not a great Ataturk—who is not a 

great man—I think he was well intentioned, but not up to the job— 

in lieu of broadening our contacts with the Pakistani people. That 

has changed quickly, but I hope the next American Administration 

changes it even further. 

So I am optimistic about Pakistan in the—I can’t say I am optimistic about Pakistan, but failure would create much greater problems for us and for all of Pakistan’s neighbors. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Well, I am glad we took that extra 

minute or two for each of you. 

I mentioned to Wendy Anderson, who works on our Majority staff 

here, and to Trey Hicks, who works for Dr. Coburn on the Republican side, this has just been an extraordinarily good hearing, starting with Senator Feingold and with Mr. Camp and then finally 

with the four of you. I want to thank the members of our staff for, 

first of all, helping us—members don’t think of all this by themselves and come up with a witness list by ourselves by any stretch, 

as you know. 

But you have provided a great deal of illumination in an area of 

the world in which our policy needs illumination, and have certainly for this Member and think for others helped better inform 

our path ahead. For that, I am very grateful, and speaking for my 

colleagues, we are grateful. They are grateful, as well. 

The hearing record will remain open for two additional weeks. 

During that period of time, some additional questions may be 

raised. Members can offer statements for the record. And I would 

just ask if you do receive a question or two from my colleagues, if 

you would take a few minutes and try to respond promptly to those 

questions so that your response can be submitted for the record, 

too, that would be just terrific. 

With that, this hearing is adjourned. Thank you so much. 

[Whereupon, at 5:21 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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