J-S23041-18

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SHANE LUIS SANTIAGO 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2527 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 5, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-15-CR-0004491-2012

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 07, 2018

Appellant Shane Luis Santiago appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County on July 5, 2017, at 

which time he was sentenced to an aggregate term of six and one half (6 1⁄2)

years to thirteen (13) years in prison following his open guilty plea to two (2) 

counts of possession with intent to deliver (PWID)(marijuana), one (1) count 

of criminal conspiracy, five (5) counts of animal fighting, and one (1) count of 

endangering the welfare of children.

1

 Appellant’s counsel also has filed a brief 

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1 35 Pa.C.S.A. § 780-113(a)(30); 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903(c), 5511(h.1)(3), and 

4304(a)(1), respectively. Relevant to our discussion herein is the mandatory 

minimum sentence of two (2) years to four (4) years Appellant received for 

PWID within a school zone pursuant to Section 6317 of the Crimes Code, 18 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 101-9402. 
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pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and its Pennsylvania 

counterpart Commonwealth v. Santiago, 602 Pa. 159, 978 A.2d 349 (2009) 

(hereinafter “Anders Brief”) together with a petition to withdraw as counsel.2 

Following our review, we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence. 

Appellant did not file a direct appeal of his sentence with this Court; 

however, he filed a timely PCRA petition on July 28, 2014. Therein, Appellant

argued the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United 

States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013) rendered unconstitutional the mandatory 

minimum sentence he had received pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6317 for PWID 

within a school zone. A panel of this Court agreed and determined his case

was identical procedurally to and, therefore, controlled by our recent decision 

in Commonwealth v. Melendez-Negron, 123 A.3d 1087 (Pa.Super. 2016) 

(holding the mandatory minimum sentencing scheme set forth in Section 

9712.1 and under which the appellant had been sentenced was 

unconstitutional in light of Alleyne). Consequently, we determined Appellant’s 

sentence was illegal because Alleyne had rendered Section 6317 facially 

unconstitutional and remanded “for resentencing without the consideration of 

the mandatory minimum sentence in Section 6317.” Commonwealth v. 

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2 Anders set forth the requirements for counsel to withdraw from 

representation on direct appeal, and our Supreme Court applied Anders in 

Santiago. 
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Santiago, No. 3449 EDA 2014, unpublished memorandum at 5 (Pa.Super. 

filed December 11, 2015). 

Following remand, a hearing was held on July 5, 2017, at which time 

the Commonwealth requested that the trial court resentence Appellant to the 

sentence he had received previously. N.T., 7/5/17, at 6. The trial court 

indicated that while it was aware Appellant had been doing fairly well in prison, 

it had found particularly concerning and “shocking” the description of the dog 

fighting that Appellant had, himself, provided to police which had been 

incorporated in the Affidavit of Probable Cause. Id. at 6-8, 12. The trial court 

expressed that it was “looking at the entire package of all the charges rather 

than breaking it down charge by charge” and considering whether “the original 

sentence [was] fair, not putting a mandatory[.]” Id. at 12. Specifically, the 

trial court highlighted that:

[He] talks about killing ten dogs, the way they killed them, 

the way he did it and saying if the dog didn’t perform, basically do 

his job, the dog would get killed because the dog’s job was to 

fight. And he did that in a house with small children. And it’s not 

as [the prosecutor] says, or what [Appellant] says, it’s not 

explained culturally. It’s a horrifically cruel thing to do. 

***

[W]hen they go into [Appellant’s] house, they got the things 

commonly used to fight pit bulls, bite sticks, heavy chains, 

treadmills, coats cable tied into a noose, electric cords, one end 

cut off with blood on it, car jumper cables, dog hairs on one of the 

contacts. Your statement to the police is if a pit bull fighting dog 

stops fighting during a match, which you described as quit or 

quitting, the dog that quit would have to be killed.

You say there are multiple ways to kill a dog, including 

shooting the dog, drowning the dog, hanging the dog or 

electrocuting the dog. [Appellant] stated that he personally killed 

at least ten dogs by hanging or electrocution. He described 
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manually electrocuting a dog by using a car battery jumper cables 

by placing one jumper cable on the dog’s tongue and the other 

jumper cable on the dog’s genitalia, and plugging the cut portion 

into a household socket multiple times until the dog died. And 

you’re doing that while you have five children in your house, ages 

three to fifteen years of age. 

I can’t get into Judge Gavin—if I had this case cold that day, 

you would get more than six and a half to thirteen when you put 

aside the marijuana, because it’s just that outrageous. And it’s 

not explained by culture. There is an aspect that is sadsm here, 

that there’s ways to kill things. And you’re equating it, in a sense, 

to like farm animals. They have a job and they don’t do the job. 

But if you’re sticking something into his genitalia and plugging it 

in and shocking it, that’s not on, that’s not cutting something’s 

throat simply because it’s not an effective breeder or doing 

whatever. That’s simply cruel. And that cruelty part of the case 

is what sticks in my groin.

Id. at 8, 27-28. The court also remarked that the prior sentencing court ran 

some of Appellant’s sentences concurrently and deemed the overall sentence 

to be appropriate. Id. at 23. 

After further discussion including references to the presentence 

investigation (PSI) report, the profound affect the animal abuse had had upon 

Appellant’s children, especially his youngest child, and Appellant’s numerous 

write-ups while in prison, id. at 28-36, the trial court ultimately resentenced 

appellant to an aggregate term of six and one half (6 1⁄2) years to thirteen 

(13) years in prison with credit for time served from December 5, 2015, and 

without consideration of the mandatory minimum sentence in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

6317. Id. at 38. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on August 2, 2017, 

and on August 21, 2017, he filed his Concise Statement of Matters Complained 

of on Appeal wherein he raised six claims of error. The trial court filed its 
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Opinion Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925 on October 23, 2017, wherein it addressed 

each of those claims. 

 On February 20, 2018, counsel filed his Motion Seeking Permission to 

Withdraw as Counsel and Anders Brief with this Court. Appellant filed no 

further submissions either pro se or through privately-retained counsel 

following counsel’s filing of the petition to withdraw. The Commonwealth filed 

a brief with this Court on March 22, 2018. 

Prior to addressing the questions raised on appeal, we must first resolve 

counsel's petition to withdraw. Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 

290 (Pa.Super. 2007) (en banc). See also Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 

A.2d 638, 639 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted) (stating “[w]hen faced with 

a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits of the 

underlying issues without first passing on the request to withdraw.”). There 

are procedural and briefing requirements imposed upon an attorney who 

seeks to withdraw on appeal pursuant to which counsel must: 

1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy 

of the brief to the defendant; and 3) advise the defendant that he 

or she has the right to retain private counsel or raise additional 

arguments that the defendant deems worthy of the court's 

attention. 

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en 

banc) (citation omitted). In addition, our Supreme Court in Santiago stated 

that an Anders brief must: 
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(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth 

counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state 

counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. 

Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling 

case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion 

that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, supra at 178-79, 978 A.2d at 361. Counsel also must provide the 

appellant with a copy of the Anders brief, together with a letter that advises 

the appellant of his or her right to “(1) retain new counsel to pursue the 

appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any points that the appellant 

deems worthy of the court's attention in addition to the points raised by 

counsel in the Anders brief.” Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 

353 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citation omitted). Substantial compliance with these 

requirements is sufficient. Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287, 1290 

(Pa.Super. 2007).

Herein, counsel contemporaneously filed his Motion Seeking Permission 

to Withdraw As Counsel and Anders Brief. In his petition, counsel states that 

after a careful and conscientious examination of the record he has determined 

that no meritorious issues exist and an appeal herein is wholly frivolous. See

Motion Seeking Permission to Withdraw as Counsel at ¶¶ 3-4. The petition 

further explains that counsel notified Appellant of the withdrawal request and 

forwarded a copy of the Anders Brief to Appellant together with a letter 

explaining his right to proceed pro se or with new, privately retained counsel 

to raise any additional points or arguments that Appellant believed had merit. 
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See id. at 4-5; see also Anders Brief, “Letter to Appellant” attached as 

Appendix “D.” The petition indicates that a copy of the Motion to Withdraw as 

Counsel, Anders Brief, and notice letter were served on Appellant and these 

documents correctly inform Appellant of his rights. 

In the Anders Brief, counsel provides a summary of the facts and 

procedural history of the case with citations to the record, refers to evidence 

of record that might arguably support the issues raised on appeal, provides 

citations to relevant case law, and states his reasoning and conclusion that 

the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Anders Brief at 14-32. Accordingly, 

counsel has complied with all of the technical requirements of Anders and 

Santiago. 

As Appellant filed neither a pro se brief nor a counseled brief with new, 

privately-retained counsel, we proceed to examine the issues of arguable 

merit identified in the Anders Brief. Therein, counsel presents the following 

issues verbatim: 

1. Did the re-sentencing court improperly consider the case 

docketed at No.: CP-15-CR-0000322-2013 when it 

resentenced Appellant?

2. Did the resentencing court improperly calculate Appellant’s

offense gravity score and prior record?

3. Was the aggregate sentence imposed unreasonable?

4. Did the re-sentencing court improperly think it could 

increase Appellant’s sentence?

5. Did the re-sentencing court fail to consider the facts and 

circumstances of Appellant’s case?
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6. Is Appellant’s sentence illegal because the sentencing court 

sentenced Appellant over the guidelines and failed to specify 

on the record a finding of any aggravating factors?

Anders Brief at 13-14 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). In its Rule 

1925(a) Opinion, the trial court disposed of the aforementioned issues as 

follows: 

In his first issue, [A]ppellant claims that the court 

improperly resentenced him on both cases, even though the 

Superior Court only reversed the sentence as it pertained to the 

PWID charges. While it is true that the Superior Court found an 

error with the sentence appellant received for the PWID charges, 

it cannot be said that the Court "remanded only the present 

matter [4491-12] for resentencing." See Concise Statement of 

Matters Complained of on Appeal. Appellant took issue with the 

entire sentencing scheme and appealed both cases. He did this 

because the court considered both cases together and came up 

with a comprehensive sentence for all charges to which appellant 

pled guilty. When the Superior Court issued its ruling, the entire 

sentencing scheme was affected and both cases were remanded 

back for resentencing. Accordingly, it was both proper and 

necessary to consider both cases during the resentencing hearing.

The court notes that both docket numbers appear on the 

Superior Court's decision, confirming that the Court's ruling 

applied to both cases. Also, in the Court's Memorandum, the Court 

discussed all charges from both docket numbers and the 

aggregate sentence together, further evidencing that the remand 

applied to both cases. In addition, a review of the transcript of the 

resentencing hearing shows that the court, the prosecutor, and 

[A]ppellant's attorney discussed the cases together, as it was 

clear that [A]ppellant had to be resentenced on all charges.

Moreover, even if it is found that the court should not have 

resentenced appellant on the charges under docket number 322-

13, he suffered no prejudice as a result of the resentencing, as he 

received the same sentence that he received previously for those 

charges.

Appellant next argues that the resentencing court 

improperly calculated the appellant's Prior Record Score ("PRS") 

as a five (5), when the score should be a three (3), and improperly
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calculated appellant's Offense Gravity Score ("OGS") as a five (5) 

when that also should have been a three (3). (Appellant's counsel 

states, however, that the PRS may be a four (4). See Concise 

Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal.) The following 

exchange occurred at the resentencing hearing:

MR. NORCINI: The guidelines at the time with an OGS 

of three, I believe he had a prior record score of three at 

the time, so the guidelines would be RS to twelve. And 

that I think is the count to which the Superior Court sent

the case back for resentencing.

MR. BARRAZA: He had a prior record score of five.

MR. NORCINI: I'm sorry.

MR. BARRAZA: That places the guidelines at twelve to 

eighteen months.

MR. NORCINI: I'm sorry. I didn't mean to misstate that.

N.T. 7/5/17, p. 5. The prosecutor then laid out all of [A]ppellant's

prior convictions that were considered when determining 

[A]ppellant's PRS. They included a 1996 conviction for possession

of a controlled substance, a 1997 summary conviction for 

disorderly conduct, a 1998 conviction for possession of a 

controlled substance, a 1998 conviction for possession with intent 

to deliver, a 2000 conviction for possession with intent to deliver, 

a 2002 conviction for theft by unlawful taking, and a 2006 

conviction for terroristic threats. No objections were made at the 

time. Accordingly, he is not permitted to raise one now. It should 

be noted that during the prior sentencing hearing, defense counsel 

at that time also agreed that the PRS and OGS were correct. See 

N.T. 11/13/13, pp. 8-10. See also, prior counsel's Memorandum 

in Aid of Sentencing. In addition, for the reasons discussed below, 

[A]ppellant's new sentence is proper since the sentence received 

was not greater than the lawful maximum.

Appellant next argues that the aggregate sentence imposed 

was unreasonable as the sentence on Count One (1) is above the 

standard range of the Sentencing Guidelines and was imposed 

consecutive to the sentence on Count Two (2). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9721 

sets forth the types of sentences that can be imposed by a court 

in this Commonwealth. It also indicates the factors that should be 

taken into account when determining the appropriate punishment. 

The statute states in relevant part:
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(a) General rule. --In determining the sentence to be 

imposed the court shall, except as provided in 

subsection (a.1), consider and select one or more of the

following alternatives, and may impose them 

consecutively or concurrently:

(1) An order of probation.

(2) A determination of guilt without further penalty.

(3) Partial confinement.

(4) Total confinement.

(5) A fine.

(6) County intermediate punishment.

(7) State intermediate punishment.

*****

(b) General standards. - In selecting from the 

alternatives set forth in subsection (a) the court shall 

follow the general principle that the sentence imposed 

should call for confinement that is consistent with the 

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it 

relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the 

community, and the rehabilitative needs of the 

defendant. The court shall also consider any guidelines 

for sentencing adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission 

on Sentencing and effect pursuant to section 2155

(relating to publication of guidelines for sentencing). In 

every case in which the court imposes a sentence for a 

felony or misdemeanor, the court shall make as a part 

of the record, and disclose in open court at the time of 

sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the 

sentence imposed. In every case where the court 

imposes a sentence outside the sentencing guidelines 

adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing 

pursuant to section 2154 (relating to adoption of 

guidelines for sentencing) and made effective pursuant 

to section 2155, the court shall provide a 

contemporaneous written statement of the reason or 

reasons for the deviation from the guidelines. Failure to 

comply shall be grounds for vacating the sentence and 

resentencing the defendant.

42 Pa.C.S.A. §9721. It should be noted that in this 

Commonwealth:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of 

the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be 
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disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of that 

discretion. However, the sentencing court must state its 

reasons for the sentence on the record, which in turn 

aids in determining "whether the sentence imposed was 

based upon accurate, sufficient and proper information. 

. . ." When imposing sentence, a court is required to 

consider "the particular circumstances of the offense and 

the character of the defendant." In considering these 

factors, the court should refer to the defendant's prior 

criminal record, age, personal characteristics and 

potential for rehabilitation. "It must be demonstrated 

that the court considered the statutory factors 

enunciated for determination of sentencing alternatives, 

and the sentencing guidelines." Additionally, the court 

must impose a sentence which is "consistent with the 

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it

relates to the impact on the life of the victim and the 

community, and the rehabilitative needs of the 

defendant." Where the sentencing judge had the benefit 

of a pre -sentence report, however, it will be presumed 

that he "was aware of relevant information regarding the 

defendant's character and weighed those considerations 

along with mitigating statutory factors."

Com. v. Dotter, 589 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 1991) (citations 

omitted). See also, Com. v. Andrews, 720 A.2d 764 (Pa. Super.

1998) and Com. v. Lawson, 650 A.2d 876 (Pa. Super. 1994).

In the instant case, [ ] [A]ppellant was correctly sentenced 

in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9721 and existing case law. The 

court took into account all relevant factors, including all the 

information provided in the presentence investigation report, and 

considered the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense, 

and the rehabilitative needs of the appellant in order to determine 

an appropriate sentence. Appellant's prior criminal record, the 

failure of all prior efforts at rehabilitation, the seriousness of the 

crimes charged, and all other factors led to the conclusion that 

appellant should have been sentenced to an aggregate jail term 

of 6 1⁄2 to 13 years of incarceration.

The court notes that a sentence for a particular crime can 

be in the mitigated range, standard range, or aggravated range. 

It can also be above the aggravated range, as long as the 

sentence is not greater than the statutory maximum for that 

crime. The court is also permitted to run sentences concurrently 

or consecutively. In order to fashion an appropriate sentence in
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this case, most of [A]ppellant's sentences were in the standard 

range while one was above that. In addition, some sentences were 

run consecutively, while others were run concurrently. Further, 

[A]ppellant received no penalty for some of his crimes. All of the 

sentences received, however, were well within the statutory 

limits. In addition, during the resentencing hearing, the court fully 

explained its reason for sentencing appellant the way it did. See 

N.T. 7/5/17. After properly applying all relevant factors, the court 

decided on an appropriate sentence for the crimes to which 

[A]ppellant pled guilty.

Appellant next argues that the resentencing court 

improperly thought that it could increase [A]ppellant's sentence 

at his resentencing. This argument fails for two reasons. First, the 

court did not increase [A]ppellant's sentence. To the contrary, he 

received the same sentence that he received previously. Second, 

even if the sentence was increased, the court is permitted to do 

so. When a matter is remanded back for resentencing, the slate is 

wiped clean and the court is permitted to evaluate the matter as 

if there was no prior sentencing hearing. The new sentence may 

be longer than the original sentence, shorter than the original 

sentence, or the same as the original sentence. As long as the 

court does not abuse its discretion, the sentence should be upheld. 

Even though [A]ppellant was hoping for a reduced sentence, the 

court did not abuse its discretion for failing to sentence him to a 

shorter period of incarceration.

Appellant also argues that the court improperly failed to 

consider the facts and circumstances of the case when it 

resentenced [A]ppellant. He also claims that the court illegally 

resentenced [A]ppellant as the sentence he received on Count 

One (1) is over the guidelines and the court failed to specify on 

the record a finding of any aggravating factors. Again, these 

contentions are contradicted by the record. A review of the 

transcript from the resentencing hearing shows that the court took 

into account all relevant factors when determining an appropriate 

sentence and it explained specifically why [A]ppellant received the 

sentence he received. The court questioned [A]ppellant about 

misconducts he received while he has been in prison. N.T. 7/5/17, 

pp. 18-22, 25-26. It also carefully considered the nature of the 

crimes to which [A]ppellant pled guilty, which are particularly 

egregious. N.T. 7/5/17, pp. 27-31, 34-38. He admitted to killing 

at least ten (10) dogs by hanging or electrocution. He would 

electrocute a dog by using jumper cables. He would place one 

jumper cable on the dog's tongue and the other on the dog's 

genitals. He would then plug it into a household socket multiple 
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times until it died. His children, ages three (3) and fifteen (15) 

were in the house when this was going on. One of the children 

saw appellant hit a dog with a sledge hammer and she could hear 

screaming coming from inside the house. She is now permanently 

emotionally scarred as a result of what she saw and heard. N.T. 

7/5/17, pp. 27, 30.

With regard to the drug cases, on July 11, 2012, [A]ppellant 

delivered 1/8 ounce of marijuana to a confidential informant. The 

delivery occurred in a playground where his children were playing. 

On July 17, 2012, appellant delivered 2.4 grams of marijuana from 

his home to a confidential informant. His children were present in 

the home when the transaction occurred.

In addition to evaluating [Appellant’s] conduct while in 

prison and the particularly cruel facts of these cases, the court 

addressed the protection of the public, the gravity of the offenses 

and the rehabilitative needs of [ ] [A]ppellant. N.T. 7/5/17, pp.

34-38. Only after considering all circumstances surrounding this 

case and applying all relevant factors, the court sentenced 

[A]ppellant to an appropriate sentence of 6 1⁄2 to 13 years in 

prison.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/23/17, at 2-7. 

In light of the foregoing and following our independent review of the 

merits of the case where we make an independent judgment deciding whether 

the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous, see Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 

A.2d 717, 721 (Pa.Super. 2007), we have found no indication of non-frivolous 

issues. The record supports the trial court’s rationale, and we would have no 

need to disturb it. Therefore, we grant counsel's petition to withdraw and 

affirm appellant's July 5, 2017, judgment of sentence.

Petition to withdraw as counsel granted. Judgment of sentence 

affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/7/18