Comptroller General

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

of the United States

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

The decision issued on the date below was subject to a

GAO Protective Order. This redacted version has been

approved for public release.

Decision 

Matter of: Integrated Management Resources Group, Inc

File: B-400550 

Date: December 12, 2008 

William B. Barton, Jr., Esq., John R. Tolle, Esq., and Bryan R. King, Esq., Barton, 

Baker, McMahon & Tolle, LLP, for the protester. 

Kerry B. McTigue, Esq., and Tamara M. McNulty, Esq., DuaneMorris LLP, for 

Randstand Inhouse Services, L.P., an intervenor. 

Mark L. Hansen, Esq., Andrew J. Seff, Esq., and Dawn M. Conover, Esq., Pension 

Benefit Guaranty Corporation, for the agency. 

Louis A. Chiarella, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, 

GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision. 

DIGEST 

1. Protest challenging the agency’s cost realism evaluation of awardee’s proposal is

denied where the agency’s workpapers demonstrate that the conclusions reached by 

the evaluators were reasonable. 

 

2. Protest challenging the evaluation of technical proposals is denied where the 

record establishes that the agency’s evaluation was reasonable and consistent with 

the evaluation criteria.

3. Protest challenging the agency’s evaluation of past performance is denied where 

the record establishes that the agency properly considered the relevance of the 

protester’s references when deciding what weight, if any, to give each reference. 

DECISION 

Integrated Management Resources Group, Inc. (IMRG), of Lanham, Maryland, 

protests the award of a contract to the Randstad Inhouse Services, L.P. of

Washington, D.C. under request for proposals (RFP) No. PBGC01-RP-08-0004, issued 

by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) for professional pension 

benefit administration support services. IMRG argues that the agency’s evaluation of

its and Randstad’s technical proposals, its own past performance, as well as the 

evaluation of Randstad’s cost proposal, was unreasonable. The protester also

contends that the agency lacked impartiality towards IMRG during the procurement. 
We deny the protest.

BACKGROUND 

The PBGC is a wholly-owned government corporation established to develop and 

administer the pension plan termination insurance program for various defined 

benefit pension plans as provided by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 

(ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).1

 As trustee, PBGC is responsible for 

protecting the pensions of an estimated 44 million workers and retirees in more than 

30,000 private defined benefit pension plans. To fulfill this mission, PBGC relies 

upon contractor-provided professional pension benefit administration support

services, including in the areas of quality assurance initiatives, processing cases and 

participants, building participant databases, data integrity validation, plan closing, 

post valuation, special compliance validation, and special projects, for its various 

offices and divisions. RFP, Performance Work Statement (PWS) §§ C.1 -- C.4. 

The RFP, issued on January 16, 2008, as a small business set-aside, contemplated the 

award of a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for a 4-month base period together with four 

1-year options for the required pension benefit administration services. RFP § B.1; 

amend. 7, at 2-3. In general terms, the PWS required the contractor to provide all 

personnel and material necessary to perform the described services and work

activities in accordance with the RFP’s performance standards. PWS § C.3. 

The solicitation established a two-phase evaluation process. In Phase I, offerors 

were to submit written proposals that the agency would evaluate using two criteria: 

past performance and key personnel. For the offerors whose proposals were found 

acceptable in Phase I, Phase II consisted of supplemental oral presentations. The 

solicitation established five evaluation factors for Phase II: technical approach; 

adequacy of management plan; experience and qualifications of personnel; past 

performance; and cost.

2

 The technical evaluation factors were of equal importance 

and, when combined, were significantly more important than cost. Award was to be 

made to the responsible offeror whose proposal was determined to represent the 

“best value” to the government, all factors considered. RFP § M.2--M.3. 

Three offerors, including incumbent contractor Randstad and IMRG, submitted 

proposals by the February 19 closing date. As part of the Phase I evaluation, an

 1

 As a wholly-owned government corporation, the PBGC is a “federal agency” as 

defined by section 3 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 

40 U.S.C. § 472 (2000), over which GAO has bid protest jurisdiction. See 31 U.S.C. 

§ 3551 (2000); 4 C.F.R. § 21.0(c) (2008). 

2

 The RFP also established five technical approach subfactors, and six management 

plan subfactors. RFP § M.3. 

Page 2 B-400550 
agency technical evaluation panel (TEP) determined that both the IMRG and 

Randstad proposals were acceptable. Agency Report (AR), Tab 26, TEP Competitive 

Range Recommendation Report. The agency then held oral presentations, followed 

by the offerors submitting revised cost proposals by April 1. The TEP evaluated 

offerors’ Phase II proposals using an adjectival rating system, with the final ratings

for Randstad and IMRG as follows: 

Factor Randstad IMRG

Technical Approach Good (+) Good (-) 

Management Plan Good (-) Good 

Experience and Qualifications of

Personnel 

Excellent (-) Good 

Past Performance Good (-) Acceptable (+) 

Overall Good Good (-) 

Cost $22,553,779 $22,256,494

Id., Tab 27, TEP Report, at 2-5. 

The PBGC also performed a cost realism evaluation of the Randstad and IMRG 

proposals. The agency found the costs proposed by each offeror to be realistic for 

the work to be performed, and took no exceptions to the labor rates or the levels of 

effort that the offerors proposed.

3

 Id., Tab 28, Cost Evaluation Report, at 3, 5. 

The contracting officer subsequently determined that Randstad’s technical 

superiority--especially with regard to the experience and qualifications of personnel 

factor--outweighed IMRG’s lower cost, and that Randstad’s proposal represented the 

best value to the government. Id., Tab 29, Source Selection Decision, at 5-6. This 

protest followed. 

DISCUSSION 

IMRG’s protest raises various issues regarding the agency’s evaluation of proposals 

and subsequent source selection determination. IMRG first alleges that PBGC’s cost 

realism evaluation of Randstad’s proposal was improper. The protester also 

contends that the agency’s evaluation of its and Randstad’s technical proposals, as 

well as its own past performance, was unreasonable. Lastly, IMRG protests that

there was a lack of impartiality on the agency’s part towards IMRG during the 

procurement. Protest at 5-9. Based upon our review of the record, we find no merit 

in any of the protest issues raised by IMRG. Although we do not here specifically 

address all of the protester’s arguments about the evaluation of proposals, we have 

 3

 The agency then considered each offeror’s proposed cost to be its evaluated cost

for purposes of the best value tradeoff determination. Id., Tab 29, Source Selection 

Decision, at 5. 

Page 3 B-400550 
fully considered all of them and find that they afford no basis to question the 

agency’s contract award determination. 

Cost Realism Evaluation of Randstad’s Proposal

IMRG protests that PBGC failed to perform a proper cost realism evaluation of 

Randstad’s proposal. The protester contends that both applicable procurement

regulations and the RFP required the agency to perform a cost realism analysis to 

determine the extent to which an offeror’s proposed costs represent what the 

government realistically can expect to pay for the proposed effort. By contrast, 

IMRG argues, PBGC conducted nothing more than a cursory examination of the 

awardee’s proposed costs, and failed to submit any evidence supporting the 

conclusion that no exceptions to Randstad’s proposed direct or indirect labor rates

were warranted. The protester maintains that the agency’s failure to reasonably 

determine Randstad’s realistic costs adversely affected the agency’s resulting source 

selection decision. Protest at 5-6; Comments at 5-7. 

The RFP instructed offerors that their cost proposals were to include breakdowns of

labor hours, direct and indirect labor rates, and other costs, RFP amend. 3 at 1-2; 

RFP amend. 7, at 2-3, and stated that the agency’s evaluation of an offeror’s proposed 

costs would include consideration of the extent to which it reasonably reflected the 

offeror’s proposed technical approach. RFP § M.2. 

Randstad submitted its revised cost proposal by the April 1 closing date. Randstad’s

cost proposal included breakdowns of its labor hours by performance period and 

labor category, labor costs by performance period and labor category, direct and 

indirect labor rates, and its other costs. With regard to its direct labor rates, 

Randstad’s proposal indicated by labor category both the offeror’s current pay rates

for its incumbent workforce as well as its higher, proposed labor rates. For 

example, Randstad’s current direct labor rate for its project manager was 

$[DELETED] per hour, while its proposed pay rate for the new contract was

$[DELETED] per hour.4

 Randstad also included its 2008 budgeted rates in support of

its various indirect rate submissions (i.e., its direct labor fringe rate, its government 

contract overhead rate, and its general and administrative overhead rate). AR, 

Tab 19, Randstad Revised Cost Proposal, at 1-34. 

In preparation for performing his evaluation, the PBGC cost analyst sought and 

received additional cost data information from Randstad, including the offeror’s 

current direct labor rates by labor category, Randstad’s 2008 budgeted overhead

rates, its 2007 actual overhead rates, and its 2008 (1st Quarter) actual overhead rates. 

 4

 Similarly, Randstad’s current average pay rate for its Senior Pension Administrators 

was $[DELETED] per hour, while its proposed pay rate for this same labor category 

was $[DELETED] per hour. 

Page 4 B-400550 
The cost data provided by Randstad was detailed in nature and provided a complete

listing of the accounts within each cost pool and base on which the offeror’s indirect 

rates were based. Id., Tab 55A, Randstad Cost Evaluation Workpapers (Indirect

Rates), at 4-46; Tab 55B, Randstad Cost Evaluation Workpapers (Direct Labor), 

at 4-48. 

The cost analyst then evaluated Randstad’s proposed direct and indirect labor rates

using the additional cost data received. With regard to Randstad’s direct labor rates, 

the cost analyst compared the offeror’s proposed direct labor rates by labor category 

with the current pay rates for the same individuals. The cost analyst found that 

Randstad’s proposed direct labor rates were consistently higher than what it was

currently paying the same individuals and, in light thereof, concluded the proposed 

rates were realistic. The cost analyst also compared Randstad’s proposed indirect 

rates to the offeror’s current budgeted overhead rates as well as its actual 2007 and 

actual 2008 (1st Quarter) overhead rates and concluded that the proposed indirect 

rates were also realistic.5 Id., Tab 28, Cost Evaluation Report, at 1-11, Tab 55A, 

Randstad Cost Evaluation Workpapers (Indirect Rates), at 2-3, 47-49, Tab 55B, 

Randstad Cost Evaluation Workpapers (Direct Labor), at 3-12. 

When an agency evaluates proposals for the award of a cost-reimbursement

contract, an offeror’s proposed estimated cost of contract performance is not

considered controlling since, regardless of the costs proposed by the offeror, the 

government is bound to pay the contractor its actual and allowable costs. Magellan 

Health Servs., B-298912, Jan. 5, 2007, 2007 CPD ¶ 81 at 13; Metro Machine Corp., 

B-295744, B-295744.2, Apr. 21, 2005, 2005 CPD ¶ 112 at 9; see Federal Acquisition 

Regulation (FAR) § 16.301. Consequently, a cost realism analysis must be performed 

by the agency to determine the extent to which an offeror’s proposed costs represent 

what the contract costs are likely to be under the offeror’s technical approach, 

assuming reasonable economy and efficiency. FAR §§ 15.305(a)(1), 15.404-1(d)(1), 

(2); The Futures Group Int’l, B-281274.2, Mar. 3, 1999, 2000 CPD ¶ 147 at 3. 

A cost realism analysis is the process of independently reviewing and evaluating 

specific elements of each offeror’s cost estimate to determine whether the estimated 

proposed cost elements are realistic for the work to be performed, reflect a clear 

understanding of the requirements, and are consistent with the unique methods of

 5

 In its original report to our Office, PBGC included a cost evaluation report which 

indicated the agency had reviewed the cost elements within Randstad’s proposal and 

had taken no exception to the various rates proposed, but failed to show what cost

data had been examined or how the agency had reached the conclusions that it did. 

It was only after the protester’s submission of comments and several conference 

calls with our Office that PBGC supplemented its report and provided the underlying 

contemporaneous documentation and agency workpapers on which its cost 

evaluation report was based. 

Page 5 B-400550 
performance and materials described in the offeror’s proposal. FAR § 15.404-1(d)(1); 

Advanced Commc’n Sys., Inc., B-283650 et al., Dec. 16, 1999, 2000 CPD ¶ 3 at 5. An 

offeror’s proposed costs should be adjusted when appropriate based on the results

of the cost realism analysis. FAR § 15.404-1(d)(2)(ii). Our review of an agency’s cost 

realism evaluation is limited to determining whether the cost analysis is reasonably 

based and not arbitrary, and adequately documented. See Magellan Heath Servs., 

supra. For the reasons set forth below, we find that PBGC conducted a proper cost

realism analysis of Randstad’s proposal. 

 

IMRG argues that PBGC failed to perform a proper cost realism evaluation of 

Randstad’s proposed direct and indirect labor rates. The protester argues that given 

Randstad’s much higher staffing levels than those proposed by IMRG, and the two 

offerors’ nearly equal overall costs, the agency should have been on notice that

Randstad’s costs were probably understated. IMRG also argues that the agency’s 

cost evaluation report merely concludes that Randstad’s direct and indirect labor 

rates are realistic without demonstrating the basis for this conclusion. The fact that

“no exception” was taken by the agency cost analyst, IMRG argues, does not 

substantiate the reasonableness of the agency’s conclusions. We disagree. 

As noted above, while PBGC’s original report to our Office included only its cost

evaluation report which indicated the conclusions reached, the agency later also 

provided the contemporaneous cost evaluator’s workpapers and underlying 

documentation supporting those conclusions. Randstad’s cost proposal set forth its

proposed direct labor rates by labor category. The complete record reflects that the 

agency cost evaluator then compared Randstad’s proposed direct labor rates with

the offeror’s current direct labor rates for the very individuals that Randstad was

now proposing to employ for the contract here. Finding that in each instance 

Randstad’s proposed labor rates were higher than those it was currently paying to

the same employees, the agency reasonably concluded that the proposed direct labor 

rates were realistic. Similarly, the agency compared Randstad’s proposed indirect 

rates with the offeror’s current budgeted and prior actual indirect rates submissions

and found the offeror’s proposed indirect rates to be consistent with these 

submissions. We have no basis to find that the agency’s conclusion that Randstad’s 

proposed indirect rates were realistic ones was unreasonable.6

 

(continued...) 

6

 IMRG also argues that the agency’s cost realism evaluation of offerors’ proposed 

staffing levels was improper--Randstad had proposed [DELETED] full-time 

equivalents (FTE) and [DELETED] hours annually while IMRG had proposed 

[DELETED] FTEs and [DELETED] hours annually--and the incongruity between the 

Randstad and IMRG proposals should have resulted in additional cost adjustments. 

Comments at 7. The protester’s argument here reflects a fundamental 

misunderstanding of what is required as part of a cost realism evaluation. There is

no general requirement that an agency’s cost realism evaluation “normalize” the 

staffing levels that the offerors propose to each other or to government estimates. 

Page 6 B-400550 
Evaluation of Technical Proposals

IMRG also protests the agency’s evaluation of technical proposals. Among other 

things, the protester maintains that two of the perceived advantages of Randstad’s 

proposal--its use of incumbent personnel and a superior performance monitoring 

plan--were not advantages at all. Rather, IMRG argues, its proposal in these specific 

areas was equal or superior to that of Randstad and, thus, should have received equal 

credit for these strengths. IMRG also contends that because the alleged technical 

advantages in Randstad’s proposal were not meaningful, any award decision based 

on these perceived advantages was unreasonable. Although we do not specifically 

address all of IMRG’s arguments regarding the agency’s evaluation of technical 

proposals, we have fully considered each of them and find that they provide no basis 

upon which to sustain the protest.

Relevant to the protest here, among the RFP’s technical approach subfactors was 

one regarding the offeror’s proposed performance measurement and management 

program. Specifically, the solicitation required offerors to describe “all processes,

tools and controls to ensure that accepted quality levels are met or exceeded and 

that timely and accurate reporting of performance metrics is provided to PBGC.”7

 

RFP § M.3. Also, as to the experience and qualifications of personnel factor, the 

agency’s evaluation was to be based on the “extent to which the offeror provides 

qualified and experienced personnel with relevant experience to perform this

contract.” Id.

In its proposal, incumbent Randstad proposed its current workforce for both the key 

personnel and remaining staff positions. AR, Tab 16, Randstad Technical Proposal, 

at 18-32; Tab 18, Randstad Oral Presentation Slides Proposal, at 3-6. Also, with 

regard to the performance measurement and management program subfactor, 

Randstad proposed the development of a web-based “Performance Excellence Tool” 

 

(...continued) 

See, e.g., Metro Mach. Corp., B-297879.2, May 3, 2006, 2006 CPD ¶ 80 at 10; 

Information Ventures, Inc., B-297276.2 et al., Mar. 1, 2006, 2006 CPD ¶ 45 at 9; 

Honeywell Tech. Solutions, Inc.; Wyle Labs., Inc., B-292354, B-292388, Sept. 2, 2003, 

2005 CPD ¶ 107 at 12. Rather, the cost realism evaluation is to ensure that each 

offeror’s proposed costs, including labor hours, are consistent with the unique 

methods of performance described in the offeror’s technical approach. Here, the 

agency found Randstad’s and IMRG’s staffing levels each to be realistic in light of the 

offeror’s technical approach; in fact, the staffing levels in each offeror’s cost 

proposal mirrored exactly what the offeror had proposed to do technically. 

7

 One of the management plan subfactors also concerned the offeror’s ability to 

monitor performance against all performance standards and acceptable quality levels

contained in the PWS. § M.3. 

Page 7 B-400550 
to track metrics, report results, and objectively measure individual and team

success. Id., Tab 18, Randstad Oral Presentation Slides Proposal, at 11, 22-24. 

The TEP evaluated Randstad’s proposal after its submission. The TEP found 

Randstad’s plan to utilize the incumbent staff for the new contract to be a strength

under the experience and qualifications of personnel factor. The agency evaluators

also considered Randstad’s development of a tool designed to monitor the work and 

quality assurance of work products for all staff to be a strength under the technical 

approach and management plan factors. Id., Tab 27, TEP Report, at 2-3. 

IMRG’s proposal also planned to utilize the incumbent Randstad workforce for both 

the key personnel and other staff positions. IMRG represented that, since its

inception, the company had transitioned 98 percent of incumbent employees, and 

established a goal of capturing 98 percent of the incumbent workforce here.8

 Id., 

Tab 20, IMRG Technical Proposal, at 5; Tab 23, IMRG Oral Presentation Slides

Proposal, at 3. IMRG also proposed, with regard to the performance measurement

and management program subfactor, the use of its existing web-based PAR! Tool to 

reflect the RFQ’s quality assurance surveillance plan and evaluate the contractor’s 

performance against the required services and performance standards. Id., Tab 23, 

IMRG Oral Presentation Slides Proposal, at 7.

The TEP considered IMRG’s PAR! tool and quality monitoring program generally to

be a strength under both the technical approach and management plan factors. Also, 

the agency evaluators expressly recognized IMRG’s stated goal of capturing 

98 percent of the incumbent workforce, and considered the offeror’s plan to utilize 

many of the incumbent staff as a strength under the experience and qualifications of

personnel factor. Id., Tab 27, TEP Report, at 4-5. 

After completing its evaluation of each offeror’s proposal, the TEP found Randstad’s

proposal to be technically superior to that of IMRG. The evaluators concluded that 

the largest difference between the proposals was with regard to the experience and 

qualifications of personnel factor, and that Randstad’s proposal was superior 

because: (1) it utilized mostly incumbent personnel; (2) added a Performance 

Control Manager as well as an impressive individual to fill that role; (3) proposed an 

experienced Assistant Project Manager; and (4) planned staffing levels of 

[DELETED] people (by comparison, IMRG’s staffing level was [DELETED] FTEs). 

Id. at 5. The contracting officer subsequently adopted the TEP’s findings and 

conclusions as the basis for her cost/technical tradeoff determination. Id., Tab 29, 

Source Selection Decision, at 5. 

 8

 IMRG’s proposal did not, however, address how it planned to capture 98 percent of

the incumbent Randstad workforce, or what incentives the offeror would commit 

itself to in order to ensure accomplishment of this stated goal. 

Page 8 B-400550 
In reviewing an agency’s evaluation, we will not reevaluate offerors’ proposals; 

instead, we will examine the agency’s evaluation to ensure that it was reasonable 

and consistent with the solicitation’s stated evaluation criteria and applicable 

procurement statutes and regulations. Urban-Meridian Joint Venture, B-287168, 

B-287168.2, May 7, 2001, 2001 CPD ¶ 91 at 2. An offeror’s mere disagreement with 

the agency’s evaluation is not sufficient to render the evaluation reasonable. BenMar Enters., Inc., B-295781, Apr. 7, 2005, 2005 CPD ¶ 68 at 7. Our review of the 

record here shows that the agency’s evaluation of proposals was unobjectionable. 

IMRG argues that the agency improperly judged Randstad’s performance monitoring 

plan, based on a developmental monitoring tool, as superior to IMRG’s performance 

monitoring plan which employed a monitoring tool already in use. Comments 

at 8-10. We disagree. As a preliminary matter, the record clearly indicates that the 

TEP was aware that IMRG was proposing an existing performance monitoring tool 

while Randstad was proposing a developmental performance monitoring tool. 

Contrary to IMRG’s assertion, the agency did not find Randstad’s performance 

monitoring plan superior to IMRG’s. Rather, the agency evaluators considered 

Randstad’s and IMRG’s monitoring plans to be equivalent strengths under the 

applicable evaluation factors. Moreover, the agency did not consider Randstad’s 

monitoring tool to be a discriminator between the two offerors’ proposals when 

making its determination of technical superiority. IMRG essentially argues that the 

agency should have given more weight to an area in which it had a perceived 

advantage over Randstad. This amounts to mere disagreement with the agency’s

evaluation of proposals, which does not make the evaluation unreasonable. See BenMar Enters., Inc., supra. 

IMRG also argues that the agency improperly judged Randstad’s proposal as superior 

as to the experience and qualifications of personnel factor when IMRG also

proposed the use of incumbent personnel. We find no merit to the protester’s

assertion here. As set forth above, the TEP considered each offeror’s proposed use 

of the incumbent Randstad workforce to be an evaluation strength. Nonetheless, 

when determining the relative technical merits of the offerors’ proposals, the TEP 

properly considered the fact that Randstad currently employed the incumbent 

workforce, while IMRG had merely established a stated goal of capturing 98 percent 

of the incumbent workforce. It is reasonable, we think, for an agency to distinguish 

between the actual existing situation (i.e., that Randstad currently employs the 

incumbent workforce) and what an offeror proposes to accomplish. Moreover, the 

fact that the TEP considered both offerors’ planned use of the incumbent Randstad 

workforce to be strengths does not preclude the evaluators from recognizing that the 

offeror’s proposals were not in fact equal in this regard. 

Past Performance Evaluation

IMRG also protests the agency’s evaluation of its past performance. Of foremost 

concern, the protester contends that the evaluation was unreasonable because of 

PBGC’s failure to consider as relevant various past performance references provided

Page 9 B-400550 
by IMRG in its proposal. IMRG argues that had the agency properly evaluated its 

past performance, it would have received a rating that was equal to or greater than 

that received by Randstad. Again, although we do not here specifically address all of 

IMRG’s arguments, we have fully considered each of them and find that they provide 

no basis upon which to sustain the protest.

The RFP required offerors to provide at least three references evidencing past 

performance during the last 3 years that was “the same as, or substantially similar to” 

the services described in the PWS here. RFP §§ L.8, M.3. Among the past

performance information deemed relevant by the solicitation and which offerors 

were required to provide were the dollar value and length of prior contract efforts. 

Regarding the agency’s evaluation of past performance, the RFP also informed 

offerors that, “[w]hen discussing previous Government and/or private sector projects

similar to that proposed, provide sufficient detail to convince evaluators of the 

relevance of the skills and objectives involved.” Id., § M.3. 

IMRG’s proposal contained five past performance references. These were: (1) a 

$19.9 million contract with PBGC for audit support services (of defined benefit

pension plans); (2) a $40.9 million contract with PBGC for pension administration 

support services; (3) a $92,000 contract with the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 

Foundation for financial management and stipend administration services (four 

personnel, in support of an 8-month epidemiological study); (4) a $3 million contract9

with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) for support services (“[t]o 

date, our services have included . . . Senior Librarian, Technical Writer/Editor, 

Information Technology, and Administrative support services”); and (5) a $2,817,343 

contract with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for “communication 

center” (photocopying, shipping and receiving, supplies, ergonomic supplies, and 

mail) services. AR, Tab 20, IMRG Technical Proposal, at 7-18; Tab 38, IMRG Past

Performance References. 

As part of its evaluation of IMRG’s past performance, the TEP first considered the 

relevance of each of the offeror’s references. The agency evaluators concluded that 

IMRG’s first two past performance references were relevant (i.e., the same as or 

substantially similar) to the requirements in the PWS here. By contrast, the TEP 

determined that, based on the size and scope of the work involved, IMRG’s

remaining three references were not relevant to the contract being awarded, and 

gave no weight to these references. The TEP then considered the quality of IMRG’s 

 9

 While IMRG’s proposal represented the contract amount here was $3 million 

(without specifying if that meant annually, total amount to date, or total estimated 

amount), AR, Tab 20, IMRG’s Technical Proposal, at 4, the reference reported that

the contract amount was $300,000 annually for 4 2/3 years. Id., Tab 38, IMRG Past 

Performance References, at 31. 

Page 10 B-400550 
past performance for those references deemed relevant when determining the 

offeror’s past performance evaluation rating. AR, Tab 27, TEP Report, at 5. 

Where a solicitation requires the evaluation of offerors’ past performance, we will 

examine an agency’s evaluation to ensure that it was reasonable and consistent with 

the solicitation’s evaluation criteria and procurement statutes and regulations. The 

MIL Corp., B-297508, B-297508.2, Jan. 26, 2006, 2006 CPD ¶ 34 at 10. When made 

applicable by the solicitation, we review a past performance evaluation to determine 

the similarity or relevance of the past performance information considered by the 

agency. Continental RPVs, B-292768.2, B-292768.3, Dec. 11, 2003, 2004 CPD ¶ 56 at 9; 

CMC & Maint., Inc., B-292081, May 19, 2003, 2003 CPD ¶ 107 at 3. A protester’s mere 

disagreement with the agency’s judgment does not establish that an evaluation was 

improper. See, e.g., Clean Harbors Envtl. Servs., Inc., B-296176.2, Dec. 9, 2005, 

2005 CPD ¶ 222 at 3. As detailed below, our review of the record leads us to 

conclude that PBGC’s past performance evaluation was unobjectionable. 

As a preliminary matter, the agency evaluators properly considered the relevance of 

each of IMRG’s past performance references before deciding what, if any, weight to 

give it. See Chenega Tech. Prods., LLC, B-295451.5, June 22, 2005, 2005 CPD ¶ 123 

at 6. Further, the agency’s decision not to consider relevant the offeror’s CDC 

Foundation, OCC, and EPA references was reasonable. As set forth above, the 

current solicitation involves a wide range of professional pension benefit

administration support services, estimated at more than $22 million over 4 years and 

involving at least [DELETED] personnel. By contrast, the CDC Foundation 

reference was a $92,000, four-person contract for financial management and stipend 

administration services for an 8-month period. Likewise, IMRG’s OCC and EPA 

references involved support services (i.e., librarian, technical writer/editor, 

information technology, and administrative support services) and communication 

center services (i.e., photocopying, shipping and receiving, supplies, mail), 

respectively.10 Quite simply, the agency reasonably determined that IMRG’s 

references here were not similar in scope and/or size to the current solicitation. 

IMRG does not dispute the size and scope of its past performance references. The 

protester instead argues that at least four of its past performance references

(presumably all but the CDC Foundation reference) were comparable in size and 

scope to the work described in the current solicitation. Comments at 8-9. IMRG fails

to show, however, how the services in its past performance references were the 

same as, or substantially similar to, those described in the PWS. In sum, IMRG’s

argument amounts to mere disagreement with the agency’s judgment and, thus, does

not establish that the past performance evaluation was unreasonable. See Ben-Mar 

Enters., Inc., supra. 

 10 Further, IMRG’s OCC past performance reference was estimated at $300,000 per 

year while the current solicitation is more than $5 million annually. 

Page 11 B-400550 
IMRG’s Allegations of Agency Bias

IMRG alleges that the agency lacked impartiality towards it during the procurement 

process. In support thereof, the protester points to an internal PBGC email message 

written approximately 9 months prior to the issuance of the RFP, where the agency’s 

chief administrative officer and procurement department director requested that

planned contract awards to IMRG be first brought to their attention. Protest, exh. 1, 

PBGC e-mail regarding IMRG Awards, Apr. 5, 2007. Based on this email message, 

IMRG contends the PBGC personnel interfered with the agency’s regular 

procurement process and imposed undisclosed, contractor-specific, selection 

criteria on the offeror. 

Government officials are presumed to act in good faith; we will not attribute unfair 

or prejudicial motives to procurement officials on the basis of inference or 

supposition. Saturn Landscape Plus, Inc., B-297450.3, Apr. 18, 2006, 2006 CPD ¶ 70 

at 3; Pride Mobility Prods. Corp., B-292822.5, Dec. 6, 2004, 2005 CPD ¶ 72 at 5. 

Further, where a protester alleges bias, it not only must provide credible evidence 

clearly demonstrating a bias against the protester or for the awardee, but also must 

demonstrate that this bias translated into action that unfairly affected the protester’s 

competitive position. ABIC Ltd., B-286460, Jan. 12, 2001, 2001 CPD ¶ 46 at 7-8; 

Advanced Scis., Inc., B-259569.3, July 3, 1995, 95-2 CPD ¶ 52 at 17. 

IMRG has furnished no evidence to support its allegations here; it merely infers bias 

based on its assumption that the request for a higher-level review of planned 

contract awards improperly skewed the entire procurement process against IMRG. 

Further, the record indicates that neither of the PBGC employees mentioned in the 

e-mail message on which IMRG relies entirely as its proof of bias played a part in 

either the evaluation of offerors’ proposals or the source selection process. 

Contracting Officer’s Statement, May 19, 2006, at 1. The record also indicates that 

most TEP members were completely unaware of this e-mail message; one member 

knew of the e-mail’s existence. We conclude that IMRG has presented no evidence 

that the identified individuals were motivated by bias against it, or that any alleged 

bias was in some way translated into prejudicial action. Finally, as discussed above, 

our review of the record shows that the source selection decision was supported by 

the record and in accord with the selection criteria. 

The protest is denied. 

Gary L. Kepplinger 

General Counsel 

Page 12 B-400550