DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2009 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE 

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

ROBERT E. ‘‘BUD’’ CRAMER, JR., Alabama 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

PAUL JUOLA, GREG LANKLER, SARAH YOUNG, PAUL TERRY, KRIS MALLARD, LINDA PAGELSEN, 

ADAM HARRIS, ANN REESE, TIM PRINCE, BROOKE BOYER, MATT WASHINGTON, B G WRIGHT, 

CHRIS WHITE, CELES HUGHES, and ADRIENNE RAMSAY, Staff Assistants 

SHERRY L. YOUNG, Administrative Aide 

PART 2 

Page 

Fiscal Year 2009 Department of Defense Budget 

Overview ................................................................................ 1 

U.S. Marine Corps Readiness ............................................... 83 

Army Readiness ....................................................................... 139 

Missile Defense Agency .......................................................... 189 

Shipbuilding .............................................................................. 291 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with HEARING
PART 2—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2009 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with HEARING
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2009 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE 

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

ROBERT E. ‘‘BUD’’ CRAMER, JR., Alabama 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

PAUL JUOLA, GREG LANKLER, SARAH YOUNG, PAUL TERRY, KRIS MALLARD, LINDA PAGELSEN, 

ADAM HARRIS, ANN REESE, TIM PRINCE, BROOKE BOYER, MATT WASHINGTON, B G WRIGHT, 

CHRIS WHITE, CELES HUGHES, and ADRIENNE RAMSAY, Staff Assistants 

SHERRY L. YOUNG, Administrative Aide 

PART 2 

Page 

Fiscal Year 2009 Department of Defense Budget 

Overview ................................................................................ 1 

U.S. Marine Corps Readiness ............................................... 83 

Army Readiness ....................................................................... 139 

Missile Defense Agency .......................................................... 189 

Shipbuilding .............................................................................. 291 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

46–474 WASHINGTON : 2009 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with HEARING
2 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin, Chairman 

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

JOSE ́ E. SERRANO, New York 

ROSA L. DELAURO, Connecticut 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts 

ED PASTOR, Arizona 

DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina 

CHET EDWARDS, Texas 

ROBERT E. ‘‘BUD’’ CRAMER, JR., Alabama 

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California 

SAM FARR, California 

JESSE L. JACKSON, JR., Illinois 

CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

ADAM SCHIFF, California 

MICHAEL HONDA, California 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas 

JERRY LEWIS, California 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

RALPH REGULA, Ohio 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia 

JAMES T. WALSH, New York 

DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio 

JOE KNOLLENBERG, Michigan 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

ZACH WAMP, Tennessee 

TOM LATHAM, Iowa 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

JOHN E. PETERSON, Pennsylvania 

VIRGIL H. GOODE, JR., Virginia 

RAY LAHOOD, Illinois 

DAVE WELDON, Florida 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas 

MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois 

ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida 

DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 

KEN CALVERT, California 

JO BONNER, Alabama 

ROB NABORS, Clerk and Staff Director 

(II)


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with HEARING
(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2009 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2008. 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET 

OVERVIEW 

WITNESSES 

HON. GORDON ENGLAND, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

ADMIRAL MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF 

STAFF 

HON. TINA W. JONAS, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. MURTHA

Mr. MURTHA. We want to welcome my good friend Gordon England to the Committee; also Ms. Jonas and the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs welcome to the Committee. I want to say, Mr. Secretary, that I am sure that Secretary Gates got good care at Walter 

Reed. And one of the reasons is because when Bill Young was 

Chairman we poured good money into Walter Reed. I remember 

going to Walter Reed years ago, not years ago, I guess a year and 

a half ago, and visited a friend of mine who had cancer. And he 

was in an un-air-conditioned room and they had a temporary airconditioner. And the maintenance was not up to par. And we kept 

asking—Bill Young would ask, and I would ask, Jerry Lewis would 

ask when he was Chairman, What do you need? And they were 

hesitant under the former Secretary in order to answer those questions, because they felt like they would be restricted or constricted 

by the policy. We put the money in anyway. And I think the care 

is much better. I know the facilities—when I visit it now, I see a 

much better facility. 

The amputee center is another example. We put money in, and 

it was a couple of years before we could get the money released in 

order to go forward. And yet they have done as good a job in that 

amputee center as they did in Texas where they spent a lot more 

money. This young major that handled that did a marvelous job in 

handling the overall work of the construction and making sure they 

had it. And, of course, most of the amputees come through Walter 

Reed. 

The concerns that I have is the readiness is slipping and we are 

having to violate our own guidelines. And you have heard me say 

this over and over again. We have had to waive more troops than 

we have ever waived before. We got less high school graduates in 

the system than we ever have before. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
2 

And I heard under the volunteer Army that we needed high 

school graduates. And I know this: that when I left the Marine 

Corps in 1955, and I went back in 1966, there was very little 

change. Today the change is so different. I mean, the technology is 

so great, you have to really be well prepared. I haven’t yet heard 

the same complaints I heard after the Vietnam War where people 

were inadequately prepared. I worry that that is going to happen 

if we continue to reduce the standards. 

At one time we wouldn’t even take tattoos, only high school graduates. Now it went from 94 to 79 percent high school graduates. 

And, of course, we waive twice as many people today with criminal 

records, with drug problems, than we did before. And I hope we are 

not going to get to the point where we were in the Vietnam—or 

after the Vietnam era, where we had to get rid of thousands and 

thousands of people who were inadequately prepared. Admiral 

Mullen remembers this, because I am sure he was part of the establishment that got rid of people during that period of time. 

Now, I received a letter. When Secretary Gates was before the 

committee last year he said, I want to get rid of stop loss. And we 

got rid of stop loss. I am not going to ask you a question now, but 

I know we haven’t gotten rid of stop loss. 

A young fellow wrote to me and he said, I am on my fourth deployment. Yet I asked the staff to check with the Department to 

see how many people hadn’t been deployed and they said 37 percent have not been deployed in the Army. And so he is on his 

fourth deployment. He said he knows somebody else on his fifth deployment. 

One deployment in Vietnam, having been there, I know how 

tough it was on the family, on me. Two deployments, three deployments, we have to get this down so that these folks have some family time. And yet we added money unanimously in this committee 

to take care of the families, and you cut it by 39 percent. 

Now, I know you were under constraints, and you have to make 

a decision based on the amount of money you get. But I see the 

families and I see the kids, I see the children in the schools that 

are suffering from those extended deployments. It is frustrating for 

us who have been in the forefront of trying to make sure you have 

what you need. 

For instance, we put $70 billion in a couple of years ago when 

Mr. Young was the Chairman. We couldn’t even get the Department to tell us how to spend the money. You remember this. We 

had a heck of a fight trying to figure out exactly how to spend the 

money. 

It has gotten better. Secretary Gates is a breath of fresh air. We 

welcome him in. And every time I say that, I get claps from all over 

the place when I am talking to a group because they are so happy 

to see a new face in the Department. 

But our troops deserve better, and I would hope that we can 

work together. We have got two supplementals this year. I am sure 

one is going to be $200 billion and one is going to be $100 billion. 

I am sure we can work together with your advice, with the Chairman of Joint Chiefs’ advice, in coming up with a—not only Iraq, 

but looking beyond Iraq. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
3 

The one thing I am disappointed in is to see the Secretary say, 

well, we haven’t used the F–22 in Iraq and Afghanistan. Well, I understand that, but we have got to look beyond that, and we have 

to decide is there a threat big enough that we need to keep the F– 

22 line going. And I have seen what you have said, but I think we 

have to look at the threat down the road, because some of it is 

going to still be here next year and the year after that. 

I am not predicting that anybody is going to attack us, but our 

committee has tried its best to make sure that it is always bipartisan. The $550 billion we passed for the war, I voted for every 

penny. Even though I disagree with the policy, I still voted for 

every penny. And most of the Members on the Committee have 

voted for every penny of that war. So we may disagree about policy, 

but we certainly want to try to work in a bipartisan manner to 

solve some of these problems. 

With that I recognize Mr. Young for any statement he may have. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I 

want to welcome Secretary England and Admiral Mullen and Ms. 

Jonas for what could prove to be an interesting day. And the reason I say that is because I read your statements last night, statements prepared by Secretary Gates, and also Admiral Mullen. And 

you have touched on not only immediate issues of today, but you 

have talked about requirements, problems, possible solutions into 

the future. And I think that is good because we have a lot of—we 

do have a lot of work to do. 

Once we are not involved with Iraq, or in Afghanistan, we have 

an awful lot of rebuilding to do. And it is essential that we do that 

quickly and it is essential that we do that properly. But we also 

have to do a lot of rebuilding with the most important part of our 

military capability, and that is the men and women who wear the 

uniform and who use the equipment that we are talking about. 

And so we will get into some of the questions on those issues after 

your testimony. 

But I must say that I was just tremendously impressed with the 

depth and the detail that both statements went into as I read them 

last night and earmarked—maybe I shouldn’t say earmarked—but 

I earmarked a couple of the pages that I wanted to come back to, 

and I reread this morning. So I will have some interesting questions about those issues. 

And, Mr. Secretary, if you would please express our condolences 

to Secretary Gates about his accident and his injury, and we hope 

that he recovers quickly. 

We are happy you are here. We appreciate the job that you do 

and your commitment to our young men and women who serve our 

country. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Secretary, if you will, we will put your full 

statement in the record, Admiral Mullen’s full statement in the 

record, without objection. And, Ms. Jonas, summarize your comments for us. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
4 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF SECRETARY ENGLAND

Mr. ENGLAND. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and Mr. 

Young and members of the committee. Mr. Chairman, if I could 

just make a comment, I do have the statement, the verbal statement by Secretary Gates, and I would like to just give that verbatim for him, if you don’t mind. 

I also want to comment on your comments regarding Walter 

Reed. You are right, we did not have that right. I believe we do 

have it right, or close to right, now. And a lot of great work has 

been accomplished this year. But I do thank the committee. 

In a number of areas, by the way, you had it right and we didn’t, 

and I thank you for that. Regarding the Army recruiting and readiness in terms of graduates and waivers, I can tell you this is at 

the very highest level of attention by Secretary Gates. I mean, obviously, we need a high-quality force. Quality is much more important than quantity in this military. And so it has his attention. I 

can tell you he tracks it, monitors, has this discussion regularly, so 

he is exactly where you are on these issues. 

So, if you would allow me. By the way, Mr. Young, you are right. 

I will tell you, more than anyone else in Washington, I am anxious 

for the Secretary to be back on the job. So he definitely has my best 

wishes to get well quickly. 

So with your permission, I would like to read his opening statement, please. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, first let me thank 

you for your continued support of our military for these many 

years. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the President’s defense budget request for fiscal year 2009. 

Before getting into the components of the budget, I thought it 

useful to consider this request in light of the current strategic landscape, a landscape still being shaped by forces unleashed by the 

end of the Cold War nearly two decades ago. 

In recent years, old hatreds and conflicts have combined with 

new threats and forces of instability, challenges made more dangerous and prolific by modern technology. Among them, terrorism, 

extremism and violent jihadism; ethnic, tribal and sectarian conflict; proliferation of dangerous weapons and materials; failed and 

failing states; nations discontented with their role in the international order; and rising and resurgent powers whose future 

paths are still uncertain. 

In light of this strategic environment, we must make the choices 

and investments necessary to protect the security, prosperity and 

freedom of Americans for today and for future generations. The investment in our military being presented to this committee is $491 

billion out of a total Department of Defense request of $515.4 billion. That is because there are some of the moneys under other jurisdictions. When combined with war costs, the total defense budget request is about 4 percent of our gross domestic product. And 

this compares to spending, as you have heard, levels of spending 

of GDP during the Korean War of about 14 percent, and about 9 

percent during Vietnam. So these are large amounts of money, but 

fortunately our economy has grown. So hopefully we are still at an 

affordable level. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
5 

Our fiscal year 2009 request is a 71⁄2 percent increase or $35.9 

billion over last year’s enacted level. When accounting for inflation, 

this translates into a real increase of about 51⁄2 percent. The difference consists of four main categories, which are outlined in more 

detail in the Secretary’s submitted statement. Overall, the budget includes $183.8 billion for overall strategic modernization, including $104 billion for procurement to sustain 

our Nation’s technological advantage of recurrent and future adversaries; about $158 billion for operations, readiness and support to 

maintain a skilled and national fighting force; about $150 billion 

to enhance quality of life, and that is for paid benefits, health care 

and other services earned by our all volunteer force; and approximately $20 billion to increase ground capabilities, and that includes growing the Army and the Marine Corps and that alleviates 

some of the issues that you discussed, Mr. Chairman, in terms of 

growing our forces. It also includes almost $6 billion for military 

construction. And the budget includes new funding for critical ongoing initiatives, such as global training equipped to build the security capacity of our partner nations and security and stabilization 

assistance, foreign language capabilities and our new AFRICOM 

Command. 

In summary, this request provides the resources needed to respond to current threats while preparing for range of conventional 

and irregular challenges that our Nation may face in the years 

ahead. In addition to the base budget, our request includes $70 billion in emergency bridge funding that would cover war costs into 

the next calendar year. And a more detailed request will be submitted later this year when the Department has a better picture 

of what level of funding will be needed. 

Now, the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act requires the 

Department of Defense to provide an estimate of cost for the global 

war on terror, and we would like to be fully responsive to this request. And in fact, last year I was—the Secretary was voluntarily 

responsive to a similar request. 

Now, some have alleged that the administration has taken this 

position in order to somehow hide the true cost of the war, and 

nothing could be further from the truth. The Department has been 

very open about what we know about our costs, as well as what 

we don’t know. So the challenge we face is that a realistic or meaningful estimate requires answers to questions that we don’t know, 

such as when and if the Department will receive the request of 

$102.5 billion balance of the fiscal year 2008 supplemental war request, and for how much. And what, if any, adjustments at troop 

levels in Iraq will result from the upcoming recommendations of 

General Petraeus, Central Command, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

We should also keep in mind that nearly three-quarters of the 

fiscal year 2009 supplemental request will likely be spent in the 

next administration, thus making it even more difficult to make an 

accurate projection. 

I have worked hard during my time in this job to be responsive 

and transparent to the Congress. Nothing has changed. But while 

I would like to be in a position to give you a realistic estimate of 

what the Department will need for the fiscal year 2009 supplemental funds, I simply cannot at this point. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
6 

As I just mentioned, Congress has yet to appropriate the remaining balance of last year’s war funding request. This delay is degrading our ability to operate and sustain the force at home and 

in theater, and it is making it difficult to manage this Department 

in a way that is fiscally sound. The Department of Defense is like 

the world’s biggest supertanker; it cannot turn on a dime and cannot be steered like a skiff. So I urge approval of the fiscal year 

2008 GWOT request as quickly as possible. 

Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, and in closing, I do want 

to take a moment to thank you and the subcommittee. Last year 

and this year, it became clear to me that you had serious concerns 

over how well the Department was dealing with the large presence 

of contractors on the battlefield. A year later, I must tell you that 

most of your concerns were well-founded. We have discovered a 

number of problems, from alleged criminal activity to lax management to inadequate legal and contractual controls. As a result of 

investigations by the IG and the Army, we will increase the number of contracting officers in Iraq from 63 this past fall to over 300 

by this April. Thirteen individuals have been convicted of wrongdoing and 91 additional investigations are ongoing. We are holding 

people in positions of responsibility accountable. I know we have 

been keeping you apprised of our efforts to better manage contractors on the battlefield, and I welcome the opportunity to discuss 

this topic further. 

We have made significant progress in bounding the problem and 

taking concrete action to address resource management and procedural shortfalls. However, credit is due to the many Members who 

raised this issue last year. You properly identified this as an area 

needing my attention, and I thank you. 

And Mr. Chairman, if I can add also, I recall a conversation with 

you where you recommended we add 1,000 contracting personnel, 

and my view was we needed 1,000 acquisition personnel. Well, it 

turned out we were both right. But you are absolutely right; we did 

need more contracting personnel. I just wasn’t aware of it at the 

time. So I thank you for that because we have also addressed that 

issue. 

So I thank you for the opportunity to provide the comments for 

Secretary Gates. Thank you, sir. 

[The statement of Secretary Gates follows:] 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
7 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 16 here 46474A.001
8 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 17 here 46474A.002
9 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 18 here 46474A.003
10 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 19 here 46474A.004
11 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 20 here 46474A.005
12 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 21 here 46474A.006
13 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 22 here 46474A.007
14 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 23 here 46474A.008
15 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 24 here 46474A.009
16 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 25 here 46474A.010
17 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 26 here 46474A.011
18 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 27 here 46474A.012
19 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 28 here 46474A.013
20 

Mr. MURTHA. Admiral Mullen. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MULLEN

Admiral MULLEN. Good morning, Chairman, Representative 

Young, distinguished members of this Committee. Thank you for 

the opportunity to appear before you today. And I, like Secretary 

England, want to just express my great appreciation for all you 

have done and the constancy of your oversight, passion, concern 

and support. It means an awful lot and it has made a big difference. 

I am honored to join—and actually my prepared script here says 

Secretary Gates, who couldn’t be here—but Secretary England and 

two individuals whom I greatly admire and appreciate more than 

words can capture, serving with them in these very, very challenging times and discussing with you the President’s fiscal year 

2009 budget submission, and more broadly, the state of our Armed 

Forces. 

Let me speak for just a moment about the latter. The United 

States military remains the most powerful and most capable military on the face of the Earth. No other nation has or can field or 

put to sea the superb combat capabilities resonant in our Army, 

Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and, I would add, our Coast Guard. 

This stands as a testament, of course, to the brave and talented 

women and men who serve—Active, Reserve, Guard and civilian, 

as well as their families. 

I have been on record as saying they are the finest I have ever 

seen. I meant it then and I mean it now. Each trip to the field, 

each visit to a base and each hospital bed I stand beside only reaffirms that for me. I know many of you have also made such visits 

and can attest to the same. And so I also believe our enormous 

strength speaks well of the hard work of this committee and the 

Congress as a whole, as it does of the American people who 

through you, their elected Representatives, have invested heavily 

and wisely in our national defense. 

We are grateful. We will continue to need that support. For however powerful our Armed Forces may be today, that power is not 

assured for tomorrow. That is why the budget we submitted last 

week contains more than $180 billion for strategic modernization, 

including $3.6 billion for the Army to continue developing the future combat system and $3.4 billion to procure 20 more F–22 fighters and $6.5 billion to fully fund continued development and testing, as well as production of the 16 F–35 joint strike fighters. 

That is why it calls for money to continue building the next generation aircraft carrier and guided missile destroyer, increased 

spending on missile defense as well as the funding to complete the 

stand up of AFRICOM. And it is why we asked for more than $20 

billion to increase the size of the Army and the Marine Corps. 

There are those who say that there isn’t much new in this budget, no big surprises. Maybe so. Quite frankly, we ought to take a 

little bit of pride in that, because it says to me that we looked pragmatically at all of our requirements, we did our homework and that 

from a fiscal prospective we have a good handle on where we want 

to go. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
21 

You know, a reporter recently reminded me, as investments, 

budgets are really a type of strategy. If that is so—and I believe 

it is—this budget reveals great balance in our strategy for the future; a realization that as we continue fighting in this long war and 

developing our counterinsurgency warfare capabilities, we must 

also prepare for, build for, and train for a broad spectrum of traditional warfighting missions. 

A few weeks ago I was called to testify before the House Armed 

Services Committee about our progress in Afghanistan. I told them 

then that we were seeing only mixed progress and that Afghanistan was, by design, an economy of force operation. I told them we 

do what we can there. 

I stand by those comments, even as more than 3,000 Marines 

prepare to deploy there and even as Secretary Gates continues to 

press our NATO allies for more support. 

In Iraq things are going well, no question. Violence is down, business is up. Al-Qaeda is clearly on the run, and the political 

progress is beginning to move forward. Ambassador Crocker and 

General Petraeus deserve a lot of credit for their leadership and 

their results. So do all those men and women who have made a difference. The surge of forces we sent them and their innovative applications of counterinsurgency tactics have markedly improved the 

security on the ground and created the opportunity for progress in 

the economy and on the political front. As both men have made 

clear, this progress is tenuous and must be very carefully watched. 

And I am sensitive to their concerns as we continue bringing the 

surge brigades home. Conditions on the ground count. But tenuous 

too, sir, are the long-term risks we take with our security commitments elsewhere in the world if we do not address the toll ongoing 

combat operations is taking on our forces, our gear, our people and 

their families. The well is deep, but not infinitely so. We must get 

Army deployments down to 12 months as soon as possible. People 

are tired. We must restore our Marine Corps expeditionary capabilities. They are dangerously on the wing. We must stay dominant 

at sea, in space, as well as cyberspace. 

Others are beginning to pace us in the speed of war; likewise, 

they are beginning to pace us in the technology that is being fielded. We must do a better job identifying and treating not only the 

wounds we see, but also the wounds we do not see. Too many of 

our returning warriors suffer in silence. This budget, by the way, 

allocates $41.6 billion to enhance quality of life and provide worldclass health care for the entire force. 

We must honor military families by enhancing GI bill benefits’ 

transferability, broadening Federal hiring preferences for military 

spouses, and expanding child care benefits in appreciation for their 

many sacrifices. And we must remain persistently engaged around 

the globe, building partnership capacity, improving international 

and interagency cooperation and fostering both security and stability. 

That is why I urge Congress to enact the authorities in the Joint 

State Department/Defense Department Building Global Partnerships Act. And that is why I urge this committee to appropriate the 

remaining $102.5 billion of the 2008 GWOT supplemental as soon 

as possible. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
22 

The art of war, not unlike the business of governing, is about 

choices. Military leaders must make hard choices every single day. 

Choices that affect the outcome of major battles, the well-being of 

whole nations, and the lives of potentially millions of people. 

As we head into this new year with fresh assessments of our 

progress in Iraq, a new push in Afghanistan, and our continued 

fight in the long war against violent extremists, as we consider the 

depth and the breadth of traditional capabilities we must improve, 

please know that I and the Joint Chiefs remain committed to making informed decisions, careful choices, and choices which will preserve at all times and in all ways our ability to defend the American people. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The statement of Admiral Mullen follows:] 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
23 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 35 here 46474A.014
24 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 36 here 46474A.015
25 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 37 here 46474A.016
26 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 38 here 46474A.017
27 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 39 here 46474A.018
28 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 40 here 46474A.019
29 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 41 here 46474A.020
30 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 42 here 46474A.021
31 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 43 here 46474A.022
32 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 44 here 46474A.023
33 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 45 here 46474A.024
34 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 46 here 46474A.025
35 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 47 here 46474A.026
36 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 48 here 46474A.027
37 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 49 here 46474A.028
38 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 50 here 46474A.029
39 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 51 here 46474A.030
40 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 52 here 46474A.031
41 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 53 here 46474A.032
42 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 54 here 46474A.033
43 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 55 here 46474A.034
44 

Ms. JONAS. No statement. 

SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING

Mr. MURTHA. Well, I appreciate the comments by the Secretary 

and the Chief. We hope we will have the supplemental ready for 

leadership’s consideration by the end of March at the very latest. 

Well, by the end of February actually. So we hope that—we don’t 

know what consideration it will be because that is a leadership decision, but it will be ready. We are looking at it now. We are working with the Department, trying to come up with what we feel is 

a balanced program for next year. It used to be it was only O&M, 

but now we have gotten into procurement. So it is a little bit different today and it will be a little bit different than you requested. 

Mr. ENGLAND. That would be most helpful, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your speedy action here because this would be most, most 

helpful to the Department. 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, we know how important it is because we 

know from a planning perspective you need the money in place so 

you can fulfill contracts and so forth. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. But you mentioned taking care of the troops; 39 

percent less for the programs which we added last year; taking 

care of counseling, taking care of children in the schools and so 

forth. What do we call that program? Family advocacy. 

These troops not only suffer themselves, but the thing they talk 

about—and when I was in Afghanistan just last weekend, the commander said, We worry about the families. And, as you know, that 

is the major concern of these troops: Are their families being taken 

care of? 

I go down to Bragg, Stewart and some of those places, and they 

tell me the kids are suffering, the hospitals weren’t paying as much 

attention to the families as they should have been. The administrator says they were. Then I went to the wives club, who happened to be meeting, and they said, no, we can’t get in as quickly 

as we would like. So we worked it out with the president of the 

club to call us periodically to make sure we got that worked out. 

So we keep putting money in, trying to make sure they have 

what they need. And we hope the Department will understand that 

those are a priority with us. Not only the troops in the field, but 

the families themselves. And we will add that money back, or at 

least I will make that recommendation to the subcommittee. 

With that I will ask, Mr. Young, any questions? 

WOUNDED WARRIORS

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. The last 20 

years Mr. Murtha was Chairman of this subcommittee, then I was 

Chairman of the subcommittee, then Mr. Lewis was Chairman of 

the subcommittee, and then I was Chairman of the subcommittee 

again. And now Mr. Murtha is Chairman again. But in that time, 

I don’t believe that the Defense Department could tell the difference, because we all worked together to provide what our Nation 

needed and what the members of our military needed, without any 

regard to politics, partisanship or anything like that. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
45 

And I am satisfied that we will do the same thing again this 

year, working with you, Mr. Secretary, and Mr. Chairman, working 

with you to determine what the needs really are and to provide 

them. 

Last year we did have, as Mr. Murtha pointed out, we had some 

policy differences. We may have those policy differences again this 

year. I am not sure of that. But we did have policy disagreements. 

But it did not affect the ability of this Committee to provide what, 

working with you, we determined was needed for the security of 

the country. And we will do that again. The hardware that you 

need, the equipment that you need, training and training facilities 

that you need, we are going to do that. 

But one thing that continues to weigh on my mind, and Admiral 

Mullen made the statement, that our people are tired. A lot of our 

folks have been hurt in Iraq and Afghanistan. And military medicine is really good. We have taken some hits, we have taken some 

complaints about the fact that maybe we didn’t do enough, maybe 

we didn’t do it right. But military medicine is pretty good. And Mr. 

Murtha and I and most of the members of this Committee have visited our wounded warriors at the military hospitals, especially here 

at Walter Reed-Bethesda. My wife, I know she bothers you all the 

time about problems that she finds at the hospitals, but she spent 

a lot of time there and she is really committed to these young kids 

and their families. 

And I wanted to just mention, last week Beverly and I both went 

to Camp Pendleton and we visited the Wounded Warrior Battalion 

at Camp Pendleton. And it was quite an emotional time because 

we found Marines there who were in that battalion that we had 

worked with them and their families when they were in the hospitals here in Washington. And I will tell you, that was quite an 

emotional time. 

But at Walter Reed-Bethesda, the Wounded Warrior Battalions 

and all of this is just really the first step, because when they go 

into the follow-on system, VA system, I am not so sure that the VA 

system was prepared, frankly, to handle the tremendous seriousness of some of these cases. So what I would ask you to do, Mr. 

Secretary, or Mr. Chairman, what about the wounded warriors? 

Tell us—the equipment is worn out, it is going to be fixed, it is 

going to be replaced or reconstituted or reset, as the admiral’s 

statement says. What about resetting and reconstituting the 

human beings who wore the uniform, who made the sacrifices and 

who got hurt? And I know in your heart your commitment. But tell 

us something about what we should expect to hear from you to 

work with you to take care of these wounded warriors. 

Mr. MURTHA. Will the gentleman yield? We have a vote on right 

now. If some of the members will go and vote, we will try to continue the hearing without a pause. But you folks go vote, and then 

I will go over later on. Mr. Young. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Mr. Young, if I could just try first, then I will turn 

it over to the Chairman. Last year we put together, myself and 

Gordon Mansfield put together a group called the Senior Oversight 

Council. We brought in all the senior military people, civilians from 

DoD and also VA. We met literally every week. At that time last 

year, there were eight studies, including Dole-Shalala, which was 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
46 

in the process of coming out. We examined every single recommendation of every single study. And, for example, in the area 

of PTSD and TBI, there were over 300 composite recommendations 

which we went through every single one in detail and used that to 

craft the way forward for both DoD and for VA, so that we would 

have seamless care between the two departments and to make sure 

that we had the right level of care for the departments. 

And this Committee was extraordinarily generous, as I recall, had $900 million they put forward for PTSD and TBI. And Dr. 

Casscells, I know, came up and personally met a number of times 

with Members, et cetera. So I will tell you that this is at the highest level of attention of the Department of Defense and also the 

VA. 

And we have put together programs, care coordinators, for example. Everything recommended by Dole-Shalala, everything that we 

could do ourselves we have implemented or are in the process of 

implementing. So we have worked to have individual care people. 

Of course, we have improved a number of case managers, a number 

of people who take care of everyone. 

We have already started the Center of Excellence for PTSD and 

TBI. And as you know, that will eventually move to the new campus facility. It will be at the Walter Reed-Bethesda new facility. 

Ninety million dollars is being spent by the Fisher Foundation 

because, frankly, we want other investment, we want the American 

people involved. And that will be a center to literally link all the 

VA and all the DoD centers of research and universities and hospitals across the country so that we get the absolute best care the 

Nation can deliver. Not just within DoD, not just within VA, but 

literally across the Nation. 

So we are reaching out to everyone who has worked in this area 

so that we can do the very best the Nation can do for our men and 

women in uniform. Whatever their problem, whether it is physical, 

mental, whatever, I mean we are trying to bring all those resources 

together. 

So I mean, a lot of this started with this Committee a year, 2 

years ago. And I believe that we have responded very positively in 

this regard. And this will be a long-term effort, literally, between 

the Congress, between the best America can provide in terms of 

medical and psychological help, and the VA and DoD. So I believe 

this has the senior attention and we are making significant 

progress for our people. And I will have the Chairman make a comment. 

Admiral MULLEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Young, Secretary Gates has pretty clear guidance. The first 

priority is get the best people, the right people, to the fight. The 

second priority is take care of everybody that is wounded and the 

families. And it has been both within that guidance that an awful 

lot has been—and quite frankly, a view that was expressed by this 

Committee many years ago. I can remember when this war first 

started, actually. And so we have done an extraordinary amount. 

But to me that is a beginning. And this is a long-term, very difficult challenge. And if I were going to lay it out, my view is that 

we need to figure out as a country how to take care of these young 

people whose lives have changed forever in a way that takes care 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
47 

of them for the rest of their lives. These are people who have sacrificed enormously and are looking at decades of challenges in 

many cases. And while it isn’t inexpensive to do this, it is within 

the resources of this great Nation to take care of these people who 

sacrificed so much. 

My concern is as an Active Duty officer, I both know and have 

learned a great deal about our medicine and what happens internal 

to the medical side. But these people I cherish, when they get discharged I pass to another institution, and that is the VA. And I am 

not very knowledgeable about the VA. And then when they pass 

through the VA, they pass back out into our society. And to me the 

connection between when they are fighting and injured and what 

changes they go through when that happens—and again it is certainly those who are injured, but also the families, through the 

military care system into the VA care system and back into our society. 

We won’t have this right until the people of America reach all 

these young people in their community that they care about a lot 

and make sure that their future is as good as it can possibly be. 

When I interact with the injured and their family, they want to be 

the best they can be, they want to be as normal as they can be, 

they want to contribute to society, those that are physically injured 

and those that are challenged because of the psychological trauma 

that they go through. 

So how do we connect from their sacrifice to put them in place, 

in a good place for the rest of their lives? And we have got a long 

way to go in that regard. I as Chairman am very committed to 

that, could care not one wit that they are no longer attached to the 

Active Duty side. And I worry a great deal about the system that 

is to take care of them well beyond my reach. So anything you can 

do to support that, I would greatly appreciate. 

FOLLOW-ON CARE

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, if I can, just one further. Admiral, 

you and I have discussed this particular case numerous times, and 

I am going to mention the Marine’s name, with his approval and 

with approval of the family. But it was a Marine that my wife and 

I met. He is from our area in Florida. And we met him when he 

first came into the hospital at Bethesda as a result of gunshot 

wounds. And he was pretty much in a vegetative state. He really 

had no comprehension at all. And there was a real question whether he was going to survive. But the medical folks made him survive. He lived. 

He went to the end of the VA system and they took good care 

of him, but they decided that he would never get any better and 

they were just going to take care of him for the rest of his life. The 

family wasn’t satisfied with that and they moved him to a private 

facility that you know of in California. And this young Marine now 

is walking, he is talking, he has appeared in court on several important issues to himself and his family, he has made decisions, 

and he is, frankly, living a life. 

He is injured. He will never be as well as he was before he was 

shot. But this is a case—I am not sure that we can do this with 

every similar injury—but this is a case where he was given up, but 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
48 

his family wouldn’t allow him to be given up and he is back among 

the living again. And it is a real miracle. 

What do we have to do to get these kids that kind of care when 

it appears they are at the end of the road? 

Admiral MULLEN. Actually, this is Sergeant Cooley. 

Mr. YOUNG. Yes. 

Admiral MULLEN. And he is one of five Marines that were at this 

facility and who had been in the same kind of state. And it is a 

facility in Pomona, California. And I was told about this from a 

mother who had been living with her very badly injured son for a 

year and a half. And her name is Nalita Bagley, and she is a mother of Jose Pacino, who is a Guard and Marine, former Marine, who 

is a Guard out of—National Guard soldier out of Massachusetts. 

And first of all, we need to talk to the mothers and the spouses. 

They know a lot about our system. And we need to be connected 

to them. Because they—and they don’t mince words either. And so 

we work hard to try get that feedback. And Deborah travels with 

me a lot to talk with spouses. 

I believe the vision is we need to be able to—we need to reach 

to the incredible capabilities that this country has and connect 

again with the local communities who, I think if they know, they 

will reach out. How do we do that becomes a question. I spoke a 

month and a half ago with a group of orthopedic surgeons from all 

over the country here, who were working the physical aspects of 

the injuries, because it is leading-edge stuff with these injuries 

right now. And I asked them to go back and figure out how to 

reach those who are injured in their communities and figure out 

how they can push in as we push out. 

I think it is in that connection that some of this can be solved. 

But mothers and spouses know a great deal about our system. Mrs. 

Pacino knows as much about our system Active, Army, Guard, Marine Corps, VA, as any person that I have met. 

HEALTH CARE CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE

Mr. MURTHA. Let me say that I met yesterday with your top 

medical people. And in line with what Bill Young is asking, I said 

to them, in the psychological side and emotional side we just can’t 

hire enough people to take care of them. And we have so many people that are from the countryside in the individual areas. What we 

need, as much as I dislike contractors, we need to look at what we 

do with TRICARE and have a separate thing for people who are 

in this situation. And they are looking at it. In other words, a case 

worker who knows the same as the mothers and wives know, and 

can direct them to the right place. 

And when you look at the two correspondents that came back so 

well and then you look at the case that he is talking about and the 

cases I know about—well, all of us know about—if somebody pays 

attention they can get the right care. If we don’t, sometimes they 

get lost in the system. That is what we don’t want to happen. 

So I think this new idea that we are promoting with the Center 

of Excellence and spreading it out throughout the country and then 

having case workers take care of the person not only through the 

fact they have been in the military hospital, but through the VA 

system. If they got a problem they can call that person. And they 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
49 

only have maybe 14 or 15 cases, or whatever it is, but they have 

a network of physicians all over the country that they can call on 

to take care of them. 

So I think we are moving in the right direction and I appreciate 

what you are saying and I can see great progress that will be 

made. We are not there yet, but we are making it. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Mr. Chairman, that is the approach that you describe. We now have case workers. They come into our system 

while they are with us in DoD. They are literally assigned for life. 

They know about private institutions, they know about care facilities, they know about VA specialized care, they know about DoD. 

And their role is to work with the families, the person, within the 

system. 

They know about educational opportunities, all the benefit programs in the Federal Government, Labor Department, everything. 

And their role in life is to be one on one and to stay with that person and always be able to provide expert counsel and advice to both 

the wounded warrior and the families so they can provide the best 

care wherever that may be. 

And it transcends DoD. I mean it goes across VA into their community. So they stay with them, I mean, literally, quote, lifetime 

commitment, hopefully the same person, at least for a long time, 

until people change out. So that is it, but we have a test case now. 

I believe we have like 20-some care managers assigned as we expand that this year. 

But that is the approach that we are doing. And by the way, that 

was a Dole-Shalala recommendation, by the way, was to have this 

sort of top-level care case manager for every single person. 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, we appreciate that. Mr. Lewis. 

EARMARKS

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We have an 

adjournment motion on the floor. There is about a minute and a 

half left. Members are beginning to come back. Frankly, I have 

missed an adjournment resolution before. What that has to do with 

I will mention in a moment. 

But as I look at—first off, I miss the Secretary, but I would like 

to have you share with him our concern about his arm and also 

share with him the fact that I came within a fraction, on my patio 

last night, of slipping on the ice as well, and these are dangerous 

times, you know. 

But Secretary England and Admiral Mullen, I can’t help but notice that the Defense Department is very clever in the way they get 

their work done. You have, over time, stolen two of our very, very 

fine women to help care for your work. Tina Jonas is sitting with 

you. Valerie Baldwin was with the Army for a while and has now 

come back to the private sector. 

But it does take talent, and ofttimes these ladies are among our 

best. We don’t like you stealing our good people, however. And so 

I put you on notice, we are going to watch with great care as we 

go forward. 

Having said that, the adjournment resolution involves some of 

the games that sometimes take place in the House when there is 

confrontation between the two sides. But the issue at hand involves 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
50 

the vote, up or down, on FISA, whether we can continue the opportunities we have to protect America by way of intelligence channels. And it is being suggested that the next step will be a motion 

to extend the current law by 21 days. The President has indicated 

that he will veto that. And our people are trying to send a signal 

that we are going to support that veto. 

Frankly, it is really unnecessary in my judgment, but a very, 

very important item. Making sure that you all have the information, in a timely fashion, that comes by way of telephone activity 

in a foreign country, some of it coming through our country, is a 

critical issue. And it is a shame to me that we are wasting our time 

doing this today, but I think it will be settled very shortly. 

Having said that, the work that our men and women are doing 

in the Middle East and around the world is fantastically accelerated by the expansion of the values of two facilities that are very 

near and dear to my heart. The National Training Center for the 

Army, NTC has been in my district up until this last election from 

the time it was organized. The Marine Corps facility, 29 Palms, is 

one of the most important training facilities of the entire country, 

but especially of the Marine Corps. Fabulous advancement has 

taken place there. Much of that advancement has taken place by 

way of a controversial item that is around these days that I would 

hope the Secretary, as well as you gentlemen, would pay attention 

to. 

We have improved money flows available for activity that the Department wasn’t quite ready for by way of a thing called earmarks, 

that dramatically impacted the activities at both the 29 Palms Marine Corps Base and also at NTC. But speaking to what the Chairman had to say earlier, sometimes those kinds of deposits of funds 

do other things that are important to families on those bases. 

For example, for the longest time the first two-thirds of the existence of NTC elementary school children had to be bussed 35 miles 

one way to go to school, and then later in the day come back, obviously putting pressure on those families. It was absolutely beyond 

what should have been reasonably considered okay. It was an earmark that built an elementary school facility at the NTC. And the 

Congress responded by saying this is a family matter that helps us 

attract and keep these families in our service. 

So I just wanted to mention to you, as I run off to try to make 

this vote, that sometimes within your budget priorities you can’t do 

everything that maybe even you would like to do. And sometimes 

people on this committee recognize that even special funding— 

namely, something that the President didn’t ask for or even the 

DoD budget didn’t ask for—can make a big difference in the lives 

of our people. 

So, remember, earmarks have a role to play. It is not just the 

earmark that caused the Predator to be available in Bosnia, not 

just the earmark that affected up-armored Humvees, et cetera, but, 

rather, sometimes for families as well. So maybe you ought to whisper in the ear of some of those people at the highest level that, 

from time to time, the committee actually tries to help in special 

ways. 

So I am going to wander off, Mr. Chairman, and try to make that 

vote and I appreciate you letting me take the time. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
51 

MISSILE DEFENSE

Mr. CRAMER [presiding]. Thank you. Thank you for your comments. Welcome, all three of you, before the subcommittee. You 

know we take our business, our relationship, with you very seriously. And please pass on to the Secretary our concern about him 

and our regrets that he couldn’t be here with us this morning. 

I am going to ask a few questions and then we will go back to 

the regular order of events here. Also, tell the Secretary that I personally appreciate his comments, I believe in Munich, in the last 

few days about NATO particularly. And a number of us have made 

trips to Europe and are trying to interface with the European Parliamentarians, the governments there, to let them know that our 

concern about Afghanistan and NATO’s participation in Afghanistan is so ‘‘harem scarem’’—those are my words—and so 

unstructured, and it needs to be looked at in light of the current 

threat and the current problem there in Afghanistan. 

But Secretary England, I would like to bring you back to missile 

defense, ground-based missile defense, and ask you a series of 

questions. Would you say that the threat to the United States from 

missile attack has increased or decreased in the last 10 years? 

Mr. ENGLAND. I would say it has dramatically increased, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. CRAMER. And I want you now to address the issue of the 

third site. 

Mr. ENGLAND. I am sorry; address what, please? 

Mr. CRAMER. The third site in Europe that can enhance our capability to defend our Nation. There are doubters in the United 

States Congress about that third site. Could you offer information 

to us about that? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Well, I can just comment that it is an important 

site, it is a defensive site, so it is important for Europe in terms 

of defense capability, also important for the United States. So there 

has been continuous dialog with European countries about installing a third site and radar to support that site, because it is important from the total context of missile defense, particularly for 

threats that might originate in that arena. 

So the Department continues to pursue that. It is important as 

part of the total, quote, laydown of the whole missile defense. And 

so it is important, and we do continue to pursue it. It is important 

to America, it is important to our friends and allies. 

Mr. CRAMER. Speaking of MDA, they recently issued an RFI on 

the GMD system. And an MDA spokesman told Jane’s Defence 

Weekly on January 16th of this year, that the Agency was considering breaking the GMD system into as many as eight different 

parts. Why would the Agency try to break apart a system that is 

not broken? If you, Secretary England, can’t answer that, I would 

like information back about that. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Unless the Chairman has some information, that 

is one I would have to get back with you, but I would be delighted 

to do so and will make an appointment to do it with you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

[The information follows:] 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
52 

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) sent out a Request for Information (RFI) to 

industry on November 19, 2007, in which they identify eight potential acquisition 

risk areas associated wtih potential competition as well as potential breakout of various system components. However, the intent of the RFI is not to break the Groundbased Midcourse Defense (GMD) system into eight different parts, rather to gauge 

what, if any, strategies might be available to mitigate those known risks. Further, 

MDA intends to gather sufficient information to determine what, if any, impacts, 

such as unacceptable schedule delays, may result by breaking out activities or components into competitive acquisitions. 

MDA’s current acquisition alternatives include segregating the program into distinct contracts with periods of performance starting in January 2009: (1) Continued 

Spiral Development, System Evolution, and Integration within GMD and into the 

Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS); and (2) Performance Based Logistics 

(PBL) in support of the fielded GMD system. [Note: Each of these contracts will 

serve as follow-ons to the current Boeing GMD contract.] RFI respondents were 

asked to assume these activities are performed as separate contract vehicles. The 

information gained from this exchange of information with industry will better inform the government on the best way forward on spiral development, test, fielding, 

sustainment of the GMD element, and the integration of GMD into the BMDS. The 

government may even consider other acquisition alternatives and suggestions offered by industry. 

No decisions have been made at this time, including the number and types of contract vehicles. Anticipated decision for the agency will occur prior to the contract 

end, December 31, 2008. 

Mr. CRAMER. And then, continuing on to missile defense. Does 

the SECDEF believe the existing inventory of tactical missiles that 

we have are sufficient to address an emerging threat, or emerging 

threats, around the world, such as in North Korea, that continues 

to get a little more sophisticated and antagonistic, and in China 

and Russia as well? 

Mr. ENGLAND. So, again, I will get back to you. We do have 24 

ground-based intercepters. We also have sea-based intercepters in 

terms of what his ultimate number is. And, again, Mr. Chairman, 

I will get back with you on that subject. 

[The information follows:] 

The Department of Defense does not believe the existing inventory of ballistic missile defense interceptors is sufficient to counter the future ballistic missile threat. 

To date, MDA will have fielded 24 Ground-Based Interceptors in Alaska and California; 25 Standard Missiles-3 (SM–3) interceptors on 12 Aegis engagement cruisers 

and destroyers; and 21 SM–2 Block IV sea-based terminal interceptors. This interceptor inventory provides an initial defensive capability to defend the U.S. homeland 

and provides very limited protection for deployed forces and friends and allies. 

MDA has programmed funding to increase the size and capability of its ballistic 

defense interceptor inventory. By 2013, MDA will have fielded 54 Ground-Based 

Interceptors in Alaska, California and Europe; 133 SM–3 interceptors on 18 Aegis 

engagement cruisers and destroyers; 96 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense interceptors in 4 fire units; and 100 SM–2 Block IV sea-based terminal interceptors. This 

interceptor inventory will complete the defense of the U.S. homeland but will be insufficient to fully protect deployed forces and friends and allies from emerging shortto-intermediate range ballistic missile threats. 

The Joint Staff recently completed a comprehensive analysis on the projected ballistic missile threat to determine whether the current planned inventory was sufficient. This analysis called the Joint Capability Mix II (JCM II) found that the Department’s planned ballistic missile inventory was inadequate to meet the future 

threat and recommended the acquisition of additional ballistic missile defense interceptors in the near future. The Department of Defense plans, during the POM 10 

budgetary process, to address the future shortfalls in the ballistic missile defense 

interceptor inventory. 

Mr. CRAMER. Those are my issues, and I thank you for your participation here today. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
53 

Mr. ENGLAND. So, Mr. Chairman, we will make an appointment 

with your office and we will follow up in detail on this topic with 

you. 

Mr. CRAMER. Thank you. Mr. Hobson. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY

Mr. HOBSON. If my Chairman, Mr. Visclosky, is ready, he has a 

series of questions. You are not? Apparently not. Okay. 

I am going to go ahead and ask a question that I had hoped to 

follow in tandem to him, but I am going to ask it now, and then 

I will follow up with Afghanistan later. Mr. Visclosky is Chairman 

now of the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee, I am 

the Ranking Member on Energy and Water. And I think it is incumbent upon the administration to develop an overall strategy for 

nuclear weapons. It must be formed cooperatively with this Congress. And the sooner you do that, the sooner we will be able to 

make the hard decisions about what steps we must take to ensure 

a safe, reliable appropriately sized stockpile of weapons. 

U.S. military strategists and financial people, Tina, have to know 

that our nuclear weapons are going to work. If we accept that confidence drops as our weapons get older, we have to pick a path. 

And I see only three realistic options: maintain a larger stockpile. 

You all know I think we should be able to reduce our current stockpile weapons, and I really don’t like this option, but it is there. 

Secondly, pursue a technological option that improves the reliability of the weapons. And that is what RRW was intended to do, 

as I understand it, but we all have problems with the way the administration has pursued this option. And three, restart nuclear 

testing. 

Right now, our confidence in the current stockpile is based on 

years of test data. But as our weapons get older and older, the test 

data becomes less relevant. Now, I don’t like that option, and we 

have some machines that may be able to do that. Unattractive as 

these choices are, they may be the only ones we can think of. 

Mr. Secretary, are there options that you are considering? Do you 

see a trade-off between stockpile size, nuclear testing, and pursuing 

the technological option? And, third, will you see any need to both 

maintain the current stockpile and build a stockpile of RRWs? 

Mr. ENGLAND. We have pursued the RRW. I am not familiar with 

your comment about all the problems with RRW. I know we have 

not received all the funding we have requested. But obviously, 

going forward, our desires are to develop an RRW, much more reliable warhead. With that, then, I think there are some options 

about potentially reducing the stockpile. But first we need to move 

forward with the RRW. 

So, Mr. Hobson, at least my understanding of this is around the 

RRW as the way forward. 

Mr. HOBSON. You will find a lot of differences within Congress 

in the manner in which both NNSA and the Defense Department 

approached RRW and that is why there is pushback on RRW as 

you see it today. 

But let me ask another question too, because the RRW is really 

not probably something you have worked on, but it is something 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
54 

that really needs to be looked at. What we do with the stockpile 

in the future and how we handle it? 

Over a quarter of the Department of Energy’s budget is focused 

on nuclear weapons activities or dismantling them, monitoring 

them, and extending their lives. I have often wondered if this arrangement made sense. What I mean by that is your Department 

develops the strategy for using these weapons for what their operational requirements are, how many are needed and that sort of 

thing. The Energy and Water Subcommittee is left in the position 

of having to come up with the money to pay for them, often taking 

funding away from energy programs or funding for levees. I have 

heard some complaints that Defense asked for the pie in the sky 

sometimes because they don’t have to pay for them; it doesn’t come 

out of your budget, so ask for everything. 

Do you think this current arrangement makes sense or what, if 

anything, would be lost by requiring the Defense Department actually to pay for what they are requiring? Will we get more bang— 

a kind of bad word—more bang for our buck if we looked at it that 

way rather than having Energy—you guys just say, ‘‘Oh, we want 

this’’ and the guys over at NNSA just kind of bow and scrape and 

say, ‘‘Yeah, because it doesn’t come out of your budget, it comes out 

of their budget,’’ which comes to Energy and Water. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Mr. Hobson, I was not aware that we were not 

paying for these programs with Department of Energy because— 

Okay. I guess that is a surprise to me. I always thought we were 

funding those development programs and funding the DOE labs to 

do work for us. So I thought there was a money transfer to DOE 

to do this. I guess I am surprised. 

Mr. HOBSON. There may be some minor moneys, but the majority 

of money comes out of Energy and Water accounts. You build the 

delivery systems, the weapons. And the weapons development is 

funded by Energy and Water. And those labs are basically funded 

out of Energy and Water. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. If the gentleman will yield. It is a Defense function, but Energy picks up the tab. 

Mr. ENGLAND. So, Mr. Hobson, we will look into that, sir. I 

wasn’t aware of that. 

[The information follows:] 

The question of whether or not the funding responsibility for the Department of 

Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons activities should be transferred to the Department 

of Defense (DoD) has arisen in the past. The National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 1985 (Public Law 98–525) directed the President establish a Blue 

Ribbon Task Group to examine this very subject. The 1985 President’s Blue Ribbon 

Task Group on Nuclear Weapons Program Management concluded that ‘‘the advantages of the current arrangement include checks and balances for nuclear weapon 

safety, security, and control; excellence and vitality of the national laboratories; 

. . .’’ and ‘‘the present relationship between DoD and DOE for managing the nuclear weapon program is sound.’’ Congress subsequently created the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) in 1986 to strengthen the management oversight between DoD 

and DOE on nuclear weapons matters. 

The NWC is a senior-level, interagency body responsible for the oversight and 

management of all matters relating to nuclear weapons. This is the forum where 

requirements from both Departments are discussed, reviewed and endorsed. It is 

also the forum for resolving differences in priorities and reaching consensus on nuclear weapons issues, including questions of budget and program priorities. The 

NWC is also responsible for developing reports associated with management of the 

nuclear weapons stockpile, including the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum 

(NWSM) that specifies the size and composition of the stockpile. This annual plan 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
55 

specifies out-year requirements and is coordinated and agreed to by both DoD and 

DOE and provided to the President. Through the NWC, DOE plays an active role 

in nuclear stockpile decisions. 

Mr. HOBSON. Okay. If I have any time left—do I have any time 

left? 

Mr. CRAMER. One more question. 

AFGHANISTAN POLICY

Mr. HOBSON. Okay. Mr. Murtha and I went to Afghanistan. We 

went about a week or so ago. And we may differ on some things 

about Afghanistan, but I think we are pretty close on most things. 

But I came away very disturbed about Afghanistan. I think Afghanistan is winnable, but the Europeans, in my opinion, are not 

doing their part. Some of them are not. But a number are. The 

Dutch, the Poles, our continent. There are a number of people 

fighting. There are other people with caveats that aren’t fighting. 

And we are spread thin. And we need about 3,000 more people over 

there to make sure that we can get in the humanitarian aid which 

is needed. Because everybody I talked to, including your commander, sir, tell me that beyond the military side, we need more 

people in there doing agriculture types of things. 

For example, they grow vegetables there. Fruits like pomegranates have to be sent to Pakistan to be processed because they 

don’t have the warehouses and the facilities there. We could help 

them. 

We have a great program going to train the police. The Army is 

about 80,000. And every person I talk to says they will fight, especially if we are around. But the police, they have had some problems with. They have got a new program that is working with the 

police. 

The problem is that the European members of NATO, many of 

them will have such caveats on their troops, or have a different 

mission in their mind, that we can’t seem to get it coordinated. 

Now, the Afghan Government turned down Lord somebody, to 

come in and try to be the czar to get this working together. What 

are we going to do? This is a basic managerial problem. General 

McNeal, I think, did a good job. He is frustrated because he 

couldn’t get it all done that he wanted to get done. 

Then the second thing we ran into was the procurement of equipment. We are out there watching some contractors working with 

the police force, and they have got a pistol that everybody says 

doesn’t work. It has got a firing-pin problem, was just one of the 

problems. But we bought it. It is U.S.-made. It was supposed to be 

a copy of something but it doesn’t work right. And we asked, How 

did we buy this? And nobody knows how we bought it, but we have 

thousands of them. 

And if Mr. Murtha comes back, he may get into that question, 

because we were very upset to find out that we are procuring 

weapons that don’t work and giving them to the Afghan police, who 

are trying to change. 

So I would like you to tell me, one, how are we going to solve 

this problem to get more troops in there? How are we going to get 

more people to do the kind of work that they need to build their 

economy back up, which they seem to be willing to do, with help? 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
56 

And thirdly, what are we going to do about procurements on weapons? 

Mr. CRAMER. Before you proceed to answer, we are in the middle 

of a vote now on the floor, 15-minute vote, motion to adjourn, another motion to adjourn. We will keep the hearing going. After the 

answer to this question, Mr. Moran, you will be the next questioner. So if the members could rotate, we will just keep the hearing going. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Sir, nobody has worked harder to try to press the 

NATO allies to provide more capability against what we believe the 

requirements are. We are at least 3,000 short. As you indicated, we 

are going to send 3,200 Marines there. That is a temporary deployment. 

Mr. HOBSON. Seven months. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Yes, sir. It is a combination of both fighting capability as well as training capability. We have got 25 provincial reconstruction teams that do the kind of development work that I 

think we need to do more of. If I were going to pick the center of 

gravity, it would be to train the police and this—I think you are 

talking about this focus district development program. 

Mr. HOBSON. They take the guys out, the whole group out, put 

a new group in. And some of the mayors are saying, Leave me the 

new group. They don’t want their guys back. 

Admiral MULLEN. And we have big challenges there, but we are 

early. This program is fairly new. We are cautiously optimistic, although that program comes by way of a shortfall of not being able 

to get police trainers. So it is a creative, innovative program that, 

quite frankly, Major General Bob Cone put together, who is responsible for that. 

I think the center of gravity is the police. It is two things. It is 

the development piece, as well as the development—the police, 

right—the maturity of the police. As you indicated, this is a country that—this is a country that has been at war for 30-plus years. 

The Afghan Army is a good fighting army. And so the training that 

we are doing with them, we are seeing them produce more and 

more capable both leaders and units, companies, battalions, to 

fight. And I think that is a very positive indicator. 

At the same time, overall, I have called the results mixed because we have got to have more capability across the board. I was 

a NATO commander in 2004–2005. So I understand the frustration. Generating forces is a big challenge. And as Secretary Gates 

has pointed out, many times these countries are coalition governments. 

The comment earlier that was made about dealing with their 

Parliamentarians, I think, is a very positive one. And I don’t know 

how NATO is going to produce more until that connection is made. 

And what I worry about, quite frankly, is more and more of that 

burden just coming our way. 

Mr. HOBSON. But do we have the capability of handling that burden in a timely fashion? Because many people will say that in the 

next 6 months to a year, this is either won or lost. These people 

are going to decide whether it is worth sticking with the new way, 

which is our way—I am talking about the Afghanis—or are they 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
57 

going to slide back to the people they think are going to be there 

later on? Especially if the Europeans don’t step up. 

Admiral MULLEN. First of all, I think to Lord Ashton’s position, 

I think that needs to be filled as rapidly as possible. We need somebody to coordinate all the other aspects of the requirements over 

there. I am not one who believes that in 6 to 12 months this is 

going to be either won or lost. The challenges that are there are 

obviously longstanding. I don’t think we are on a critical edge 

where it goes one way or another. 

That said, as I indicated in my opening comments, this is an 

economy of force. It has been an economy of force. That, by definition, says we need more forces. We don’t need several hundred 

thousand there, but we need more than we have in order to make 

a difference. And we need to have a unity of command that gives— 

I mean, General McNeal is the ISAF commander—a unity of both 

vision and sort of a strategic end state that we are all reaching for. 

And there are disagreements on that right now across NATO and 

all the countries—many countries view it differently. And I think 

bringing that together from the leadership standpoint is equally 

important. 

Mr. HOBSON. The British general told us—who was McNeal’s 

predecessor—that one country sent him tree huggers. He didn’t 

need tree huggers. He needed people who were willing to go out at 

night and do the job. And that was a British general saying that. 

That wasn’t our general. 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir, I understand. I think many of the 

NATO countries went into this looking at this from a stabilization 

aspect as opposed to a security aspect from the standpoint of counterinsurgency. We have got a counterinsurgency there. We have got 

to basically eliminate their effects in order to provide the kind of 

environment that will allow economic and political development 

and maturity to occur. 

PROCUREMENT OF PISTOLS FOR AFGHANISTAN

Mr. HOBSON. Does anybody know anything about the pistols? 

Admiral MULLEN. The only thing I would say, I don’t know anything about the pistols, sir, except we are focusing actually much 

more—and Secretary England specifically leads this—we are focusing much more on the FMS program through which all of—a significant amount of equipment, certainly, that we buy passes. And 

this would be an example of one of the reasons we need the focus. 

But I specifically don’t know how—I can get back to you—how 

we got these pistols, how many we bought or what the problem is. 

Mr. HOBSON. Thousands. 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. But I don’t know how we got there 

and we obviously need to fix that. 

Mr. HOBSON. But nobody else there in country knew either and 

that was a problem. But anyway, I share your optimism about Afghanistan. But I don’t think the Europeans really understand at all 

this dope that comes out over there winds up in their countries, not 

our countries, and more people die in Europe from that dope than 

that they are having killed in Afghanistan where we could do 

something about it. And I think that is something that the administration needs to work on more in getting that done. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
58 

But Jack and I were both there and it is actually different 

than—I have been there a couple of times, and it is actually different in different ways. But the one thing that is there that you 

do sense, there is a willingness to want to do—which is refreshing 

to see, because I have talked to people who have both been in Iraq 

and are there. And the guys that are here have a different perspective about this country than they had about Iraq when they were 

in Iraq. And they think they can get it done. 

So, you know, that is a positive. Thank you very much. 

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Moran. 

TROOP SURGE IN IRAQ

Mr. MORAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Under Secretary 

and Madam Controller. I am sorry for all the disruption, but those 

things happen. It is too bad because you have got a lot to share 

with us. 

I want to get back to Iraq for a moment—because I share Mr. 

Hobson’s view that Afghanistan might be winnable, although I 

think it is becoming less so, and largely because of the political 

considerations in Europe. We have lost, really, the support for military commitment on the part of NATO in Europe, and I understand 

Secretary Gates trying to renew that. But I don’t think it is working with the European people. And we are going to have to—what 

I would expect that the subcommittee would be prepared to send 

more troops over to Afghanistan. 

But that raises the issue of Iraq again. We have now provided $525 billion. The Secretary says there is going to be another $170 

billion necessary. And that brings us up to $700 billion. A lot of 

money, when we were told originally that this was going to be— 

what did they say, $25, $50 billion or something, and that oil would 

pay for it all. I know the Chairman remembers those original numbers. They seem quaint today. 

But this is really serious stuff. Now, Chairman, do you agree 

with what General Petraeus has told us, that a military victory is 

not what we are necessarily seeking nor is it possible in Iraq? 

Admiral MULLEN. Completely. 

Mr. MORAN. So we are not looking for a military victory. 

Admiral MULLEN. No, sir. 

Mr. MORAN. So, given that, the surge has quelled the violence. 

But the real question is, has it achieved the political reconciliation 

that does constitute the victory that we are looking for? I don’t see 

it. I don’t see this Shiite government making the real substantive, 

genuine efforts that are necessary to create an inclusive, stable 

government in Iraq, bringing in the Kurds who are now doing their 

only thing in the north and all they care—they still can’t fly the 

flag up in Kurdistan. And this government doesn’t seem to be 

reaching out to the Sunnis in any truly meaningful way, or even 

releasing the Sunnis that are kept in jail, thousands of them, for 

largely political purposes. So do you see us making real, substantive, political progress, Chairman? 

Admiral MULLEN. Sir, actually over the last year—and I went to 

Iraq—I mean, I have been a number of times, and I went to Iraq 

right after I took over the job in October. And I was back over over 

the holidays, and I go back soon. And what I have seen—and I 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
59 

think this was largely well known—is a fair amount of progress in 

the provinces; in other words, what I would call provincial reconciliation. And that is not going to solve the whole problem, but 

we have been very encouraged by that. And with the space that the 

surge security—the additional security that the surge has provided, 

the development of this concerned local citizens, this 70- to 80,000 

who now are going to provide for their own security and the beginnings of the connection between the provinces politically and the 

central government, which is heretofore—or at least for the last 3– 

12 decades had not existed. Certainly a lot of hard work. 

And in my view, Ambassador Crocker and his team, as well as 

General Petraeus, but particularly Ambassador Crocker working on 

the political aspects. And if we don’t get it reconciled politically, nationally, then I don’t think there is a solution. 

As I indicated, this isn’t about a military victory. They recently 

passed a deBaathification law that will go into effect here within 

a month; literally this morning as I showed up, I was told that the 

national government passed the amnesty law, their budget, as well 

as a Provincial Powers Act. Now, that to me is a lot of progress nationally, given the challenges that they have across the competition 

at that level. So I am actually very encouraged by that. I have 

watched it. They have been working this process very, very hard. 

It is obviously still a new government. Great challenges. 

But the political process appeared to me to be evolving painfully 

slow at times. But literally in the last 24 hours, these three big 

major laws were passed, which I think is clearly a big deal, a big 

step, and made in great part possible by the security that they 

have had in order to be able to do that. 

FUTURE OF IRAQ

Mr. MORAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I know that your commanders 

are reporting back to you on a regular basis and the decision was 

made to arm the Sunni warlords because they are the ones that are 

making the real progress against al Qaeda in Iraq, because the al 

Qaeda, Sunnis, they live in the Sunni neighborhoods. And it is the 

Sunnis that have paid the worst price for their viciousness. 

So the Sunni warlords are now armed. So they are shooting the 

al Qaeda instead of Americans. The problem is once those thousands, or however many al Qaeda leaders have gone, killed, captured or banished, what are they going to do with those arms? 

They are going to turn it back on us? Are they going to turn them 

on the Shi’a government to take back the government? Are they 

just going to foment a more violent civil war? 

Can you address that because it seems to me that ought to be 

a serious concern in the long run. 

Admiral MULLEN. I think it is a serious concern, and in this 

whole counterinsurgency—in the counterinsurgency and what we 

are trying to do, the center of gravity really is the Iraqi people. And 

they will eventually drive the governmental outcome. 

I understand your concerns, sir. But I don’t get that from the 

commanders on the ground, that that is an immediate concern. 

That it would be a possibility? I certainly suppose so, and one we 

would certainly be concerned about. We have made a huge difference with respect to al Qaeda and Iraq and they are very much 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
60 

on the run. Not done. Very violent. You have seen that just again 

recently. So clearly that is going to continue to evolve. 

But I have gotten no feedback from General Petraeus or Admiral 

Fallon that we think that is immediately on the horizon. Is it a 

possibility? I certainly think that is out there as well. But by and 

large, we are optimistic that we are moving in the right direction 

there. To guarantee it will never happen again, I don’t—— 

Mr. MURTHA [presiding]. I am going to interrupt the gentleman. 

We are going to adjourn after—if the next vote is called. 

So, Mr. Frelinghuysen, if you will keep your question to about 5 

minutes, and then we’ll get to Mr. Dicks. And if there is another 

vote, we will adjourn until a future time. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Can I make one comment, Mr. Chairman, just because I think it is really important in this discussion with Mr. 

Moran. 

Mr. Moran, the military is not going to win, but these are counterinsurgency, two sides of the same coin. One side is security and 

the other side is economic development. So you do have to have 

economic development, long term, for security. You need security, 

short term, for economic development. 

I think what is very encouraging is that there is economic development. In the last 2 months, for the very first time, we have foreign direct investment in Iraq. There are now outside companies, 

not countries but companies, that have decided a security bond— 

the security environment is such that they are willing to commit 

their capital. And there are now a lot of companies that are in Iraq 

actually, literally, looking for opportunities for investment. 

For the CLCs, that is very important, these concerned local folks, 

the Sunnis you talked about, because we do have programs to reintegrate them, to train and reintegrate into, literally, the economic 

system. And ultimately that is the most important thing, is developing an economic system that can support democratic—— 

Mr. MURTHA. I hate to interrupt you, Mr. Secretary. Because of 

the time constraints—you know, we have been over this. I said the 

most important part of this was economic development. As a matter of fact, you can look at Afghanistan where the economic investment has been reduced in half, from a billion to 500 million. So it 

is a combination of things, as you know. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. 

But I would like to focus a few minutes, if I may, on our National 

Guard role. We have about 3,200 New Jerseyans that are about to 

deploy to Iraq. They are undergoing training, preparing to deploy 

in June. It’s the single largest deployment of the New Jersey National Guard since World War II. It means half of our Guard will 

be over there, and the rest will be back in New Jersey to get ready 

for whatever might come their way. 

For many of these men and well, these are not the youngest soldiers, but certainly like other members here, I thank all of those 

who serve, all of you for your leadership, all those who are volunteer Guard, Reserve, regular military. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
61 

What should those soldiers see when they get there? And what 

can you say about the issue of predictability, if there is any, about 

the potential for future requirements on their part? I guess that 

would be directed to you, Admiral. 

Admiral MULLEN. Sir, I think for any of them that have been 

there before individually, I think they will see a dramatically different landscape than what they saw the last time. 

Clearly, as was expressed by the Chairman, I am very concerned—and in my remarks—very concerned about the stress on 

the force. We are trying to work the National Guard and Reserve 

rotation back to 1 year deployed and 5 years at home. We are not 

there right now but we are working in that direction. 

I want to commend the National Guard and the Reserve for what 

they have done since this war started, since we were attacked, has 

been truly enormous and we could not be who we are without their 

participation. And in terms of the overall Guard and Reserve posture, I think that is an issue. 

And Mr. Pinero issued a report recently. I felt this way for years, 

that part of what is going to change as a result of this is our posture in the Guard and Reserve for the foreseeable future. We are 

moving so fast, sometimes it is difficult to predict exactly what it 

will look like. But these soldier citizens have made a huge difference and I think will in the future. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Would you comment further on the Pinero 

report? Marine general, obviously. Fantastic credentials. I mean, 

the headlines were that we have appalling gaps, we wouldn’t be 

able to—back home—I come from a 9/11 state. So when I go to 

town meetings, a lot of people, obviously, have angst and anger and 

concern and apprehension about the war, the deployments of Regular and Guard and Reserve. But they are also concerned about 

what is going to be ready as part of our military arsenal in the case 

of natural disasters, or, for that matter, God forbid, some sort of 

a catastrophic event. 

Admiral MULLEN. We have made a lot of improvements. I don’t 

agree that everything that Mr. Pinero put in his report. For me it 

represents the kind of transformational message that I think we 

are going through with our National Guard and Reserve. How that 

exactly is going to come out in the long run, I don’t know. 

Clearly we are concerned about that relationship in terms of providing the capability for the Guard in each State. We have invested 

there some $32 billion over the next—since 2007, I think it is about 

$461⁄2 billion in the Guard. We are coming up in terms of percentage of equipment on hand. We are not where we need to be. For 

the first time, though, that equipment will be the same equipment 

that our Active Duty army has. It will be frontline equipment, so 

they will be able to respond. 

Recently, if I looked at the California fires, there was the team, 

it was the Guard, Reserve, there were Active, led by NORTHCOM, 

and also the entire Homeland Security team that responded very 

well. So certainly there are concerns. 

I think this report should serve as a catalyst for us to have a national debate about what we should do for the future. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Let me credit both Chairman Murtha and 

Mr. Young on the resource issue. This is one where substantial inVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:47 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046474 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A474P2.XXX A474P2

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
62 

vestments have been made. It is the question of where they are all 

going to be sent. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks. And, Mr. Dicks, I have said that the 

next vote, we will go to the very end but then we are going to adjourn the committee. So if you would keep it as concise as possible, 

as you always do. 

F–22 RAPTOR

Mr. DICKS. I will do my best, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Mullen, Secretary England, it is good to see you both. 

Tell us what happened on the F–22? What we are concerned 

about—did the Air Force request advance procurement for additional F–22s be included in the 2009 budget request when it is sent 

to your controller? If so, why did you remove the funding? What 

happened here? Or is there going to be money for four planes? 

There is a lot of confusion. 

Mr. ENGLAND. No. That is not what happened. In the fiscal year 2009 budget, we had $400-and-some million to shut down the line. 

That was the plan. 

Mr. DICKS. What happened to that? That didn’t show up either. 

Mr. ENGLAND. So there was $400-some million to shut down the 

line, was what had been in the program, and there are no airplanes 

in the outyears. And so the decision was to convert that, to take 

that out and not to put the shutdown money in the budget this 

year. So we took that money out and we put it in the O&M account 

so the Air Force would have money to better address the F–15 

issue. So then at that point, the line does not shut down because 

we took the shutdown money out. So it doesn’t shut the line down. 

The Air Force would have liked to have converted that money, 

Mr. Dicks, to a long-lead procurement. On the other hand, there 

are no future airplanes in the budget, so that would have been difficult to do. 

Mr. DICKS. Didn’t you have to do one or the other? Didn’t you 

have to either put in the advance procurement or put in the money 

to shut down the line? 

Mr. ENGLAND. So, instead, what we decided to do was—— 

Mr. DICKS. I like giving the money to the F–15. 

Mr. ENGLAND. So the decision was, instead, that in the past, the 

Congress had not allowed the Air Force to buy replacement airplanes where they wanted to buy F–35s because they were not in 

production. So they have some airplanes that, because of either 

damage or wear-out or whatever, that have been denied. So the decision was this year, since the F–22 was in production, they could 

ask for those replacement airplanes in GWOT because in the past, 

again, they have been denying GWOT because the airplane is not 

in production. This airplane would be in production. That is probably about four airplanes. That would basically keep the line open 

at some very low rate, but it keeps the line open. And, frankly, 

then it defers the decision on the F–22. I mean, basically that is 

what it does; it defers the decision. 

My view was, and I think the Secretary certainly will agree with 

this, is that at this point in time we should not preempt the next 

administration by just literally shutting the line down at this time. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
63 

So that was the decision, that we would not shut the line down. 

We do not have any airplanes in the future years, so this is something that will have to be reexamined. Frankly, my own recommendation is—I mean, my strong feeling is that we have enough 

F–22s and they are designed for a specific mission. We have 

enough to do that mission. And we need to go on with the joint 

strike fighter program, which is the next fifth-generation airplane. 

So the question is, do we continue to buy F–22s for the next administration, or do they do the commitment where we have a lot 

of investment in the joint strike fighter. But, again, it is now a deferred decision. 

I believe it was the right decision to let that on the table and let 

the next administration decide, rather than preempt that at this 

time. 

Mr. DICKS. Admiral Mullen, do you have any comment on that? 

Admiral MULLEN. No, sir. I mean, I am familiar with what happened. Certainly you know, probably better than I, we have certainly had this coming together for years. It is a huge challenge 

just because of all three variants. This isn’t a surprise. We have 

got to have fifth-generation aircraft for the future. I think the question that is out there is how many? This is 183, I think, plus an 

additional 4. And I think this decision needs to be—needs to take 

in effect that we are down 162 F–15s right now. And that was a 

surprise. 

So I think there needs to be a balance here. But I also think the 

future fifth-generation aircraft is the JSF in all three versions. And 

we have got to get that right. That is also a new program. New 

programs sometimes struggle. 

Mr. DICKS. Slip. 

Admiral MULLEN. I mean, that is not uncommon. I think we need 

to approach this from a balanced perspective. 

PROCUREMENT RATES

Mr. MURTHA. If the gentleman would yield, let me add something 

to this. The maintenance costs have gone up for the F–15, 236 percent. The flying hour costs have gone up 87 percent—the F–15, I 

am talking about. And the manhours per depot maintenance per 

airplane has gone up 800. My concern is that we are buying such 

small quantities. And what the Secretary said is absolutely true— 

and I have challenged the Air Force. Tell me what the threat is so 

that we can make a decision about whether we need it. And Secretary Gates and I talked about this very thing. 

The problem I see, though, and I worry about, we produced 

86,000 aircraft in 1943. We produced 30,000 tanks more than Germany produced in the whole 5, 6 years of the war. We are buying 

400 aircraft this year. And we are buying at such a low rate, it 

costs us so much more. So we have got to keep that in the equation 

at the same time. We are trying to come up with an agreement between you folks and us about, okay, what can we buy? How can 

we buy it at a better rate and get rid of some of these? Can we 

get rid of the 15s and put the F–22s, if they can show us what the 

threat is? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Mr. Chairman, I mean, look, I agree completely on 

this. We do have to get the rate up. The economic order decline is 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
64 

the joint strike fighter was one airplane for three services with a 

lot of commonality. If we start eating in the joint strike fighter procurement, we will find ourselves in the same position again, even 

with joint strike fighter. 

Mr. MURTHA. Yeah, well, I understand that concern. But when 

you talk about the number of airplanes we can produce with the 

industrial base we have, this is a concern—past Iraq, I am talking 

about. I am not talking about in Iraq. I am talking about past Iraq. 

But we will talk a number of times about this with the Air Force 

and with the Defense Department. 

Mr. Dicks. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, let me ask the gentleman to yield. 

Mr. DICKS. I yield. 

Mr. YOUNG. Someone listening to this conversation would almost 

get the impression that the joint strike fighter, the F–35, would be 

a replacement for the F–22. That is not the case. The F–22 and the 

joint strike fighter have two different missions. They are two different aircraft. And I just wanted to make sure that there is no 

misunderstanding that when we talk about the fifth generation, it 

is not replacing the F–22. That is a correct statement, isn’t it, Mr. 

Secretary? 

Mr. ENGLAND. It is correct, with a proviso, Mr. Young. The proviso is that the joint strike fighter performance and the F–22 performance is extraordinarily close. So the F–22, of course, was designed many years ago. It goes back to the 1980s in my career, goes 

way back. The joint strike fighter is a much newer airplane, so it 

also has very similar, if not in some cases better performance with 

other attributes. So I believe this is something that is very important that we look at carefully, Mr. Chairman, because it will affect 

the future ofairpower for all of our services. 

AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT

Mr. DICKS. One additional question. Secretary England, is your 

office conducting an analysis to determine the cost/benefit of modernizing the engines on the C–5 versus procuring additional C–17s? 

We have been through a number of these big battles. And over the 

years, the cost of operating the C–5 has been very expensive compared to the C–17. So where are we on that one? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Sir, we are in a Nunn-McCurdy, Mr. Dicks. And 

part of that is to look at costs—— 

Mr. DICKS. This is on the C–5? 

Mr. ENGLAND. C–5. So we are looking at the C–5 in terms of 

Nunn-McCurdy and decisions on C–5 could indeed affect C–17. So 

that is still in the works, but I believe that is within a week of coming out. So very soon that recommendation will be coming out from 

Mr. Young, AT&L. So that will be the result of that study. 

AGING AIRCRAFT

Mr. DICKS. Just one final comment. Again, the aging of the aircraft, all of our aircraft, except for like the F–22 and the C–17s, 

is getting older and older and older. These planes now are 25 years 

old. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
65 

I think we have to worry about the Navy in the same situation. 

They have got—with the F–18, it is a little newer. But aren’t you 

concerned about this aging aircraft issue across the board? 

Mr. ENGLAND. I am. But I will make a very blunt statement 

here. In the case of the Air Force, they have an aging fighter fleet, 

but on the other hand they will spend $65 billion, and we have 183 

F–22s. So I mean, at some point we have to decide not to buy the 

very costly high-end airplane and buy the quantity. And so that— 

and by the way— 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Secretary, we are going to be looking at this. 

And the development costs and the development time is also a concern: 5 years for the 16; 5 years for the 15; 19 years for the 22; 

and I don’t know how many years for the JSF. And these are the 

kinds of things that we will debate and work out. 

Mr. Tiahrt. 

PROCUREMENT REFORM

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I understand you are trying to wrap this up. I would just have two requests, that Secretary 

England or somebody get back on. 

Number one, I would like to appoint a contact for your current 

procurement reform. I know you have assigned somebody to do 

that. And we have some ideas that I would like to share with you, 

and perhaps change because of that. 

[The information follows:] 

Mr. Shay Assad, the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy 

(DPAP), is responsible for procurement reform. Representative Tiahrt’s office has 

been notified with this information. A meeting between them to discuss the issues 

of concern to Representative Tiahrt will be scheduled based on availability in the 

upcoming months. 

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO FIREFIGHTERS

The second thing is that we have been talking to the Forest Service, Mr. Dicks and I, in our Interior Subcommittee. And under the 

fire that was fought in Southern California, we have heard some 

reports that when the Marines were involved with—they brought 

in their light utility helicopters, the new ones, and they were unable to assist the Forest Service because of underperformance. For 

some reason it couldn’t get off the ground. I wonder if there was 

some report that was done at that point in time about the performance of the light utility helicopter during what was called the 

‘‘witch fire’’ in Southern California. And I would like to know if 

there is something that we could read about that. 

Mr. ENGLAND. We will get you data, Mr. Tiahrt. I don’t know. At 

one point there was a question about did we have problems with 

the helicopters. I think it was determined that was not the case, 

but we will get you that data. 

Mr. TIAHRT. All right. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. 

Chairman. 

[The information follows:] 

Marine Aviation units based in Southern California supported fire fighting efforts 

during the October 2007 wildfires with fire suppression, VIP lift, and surveillance. 

Fire suppression was provided by the CH–53E Super Stallion while VIP delegation 

lift and aerial surveillance was provided by the UH–IN Huey. As a light utility aircraft, the UH–1 does not carry a significant payload and would not have been an 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
66 

effective fire suppression asset. Neither aircraft performance nor maintenance was 

a factor for Marine Aviation in support of the Southern California firefighting effort. 

The Marine Corps’ newest light utility aircraft, the UH–1Y model or ‘‘Yankee’’, did 

not participate in the wildfires. The UH–1Y has not been operationally fielded and 

currently has only limited numbers used for training and operational test. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Visclosky. 

RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your appearance today. 

And Mr. Hobson alluded to my line of questioning earlier. On Energy and Water, we have responsibilities for funding the nuclear 

complex, if you would. And in last year’s budget request, the administration had $88.8 million set aside for the reliable replacement warhead in the Energy and Water bill. They had a request 

for $30 million in the Defense appropriations bill. In the end, there 

were no moneys provided in the Energy and Water bill. There were 

$15 million provided in the Defense appropriations bill. 

And not so much a question, although I have a question as to 

why the administration continues to pursue the policy when there 

was pretty clear language last year exhibited in the omnibus as to 

the RRW. My upset, I must tell you, is several-fold. One is that 

over the last year, the progress that I have seen made on behalf 

of the administration—and I use that term generically across the 

board, whether it be Defense, whether it be Energy, whether it be 

State, whether it be the Intelligence Community—the progress we 

made here is on the complex 2030, the whole rationalization of 

downsizing of a nuclear complex. The only progress we made was 

that they took off the 2030 because now they don’t have any time 

frame at all as to when they are going to downsize the complex. 

And the point I would make and that I have been making for the 

last year, Mr. Hobson has been making, and the members of the 

Committee, if we as a Nation—not the Bush administration—if the 

United States of America does not have a policy that has been formulated as to how you are going to use these weapons in the future, how we are going to protect ourselves from these weapons in 

the future and what are we going to have as far as our nonproliferation issue? Why should you proceed with the next generation of weapons? 

I would take the time, if I could, Mr. Chairman, for a couple of 

minutes. The American Association for the Advancement of 

Science—and I would just set the stage with this from their report 

relative to the RRW—said that a panel observes that there have 

been several plants redo the nuclear weapons complex over the 

years, and none have reached fruition, in part because of their 

scope and long time scale. The panel believes that any plan for the 

nuclear weapons enterprise must have a clear rationale and bipartisan basis if it is to be sustained over 25 years, over a generation; 

because once it is in place, obviously conditions change, but administrations and congresses are going to have to live with it. 

There was very clear language in the House report on Energy 

and Water this past year for the fiscal year 2008 bill that the Committee directs the Secretary—and, of course, in this case it is the 

Secretary of Energy—in consultation with the Department of DeVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:47 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046474 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A474P2.XXX A474P2

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
67 

fense and Intelligence Community to submit to the Appropriations 

committees a comprehensive nuclear security plan. 

And if I could for the record, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have 

the contents of that report language included. And the fact is that 

report language was then also referenced in the omnibus language 

in December in which it was stated that Congress agrees to the direction contained in the House and Senate reports requiring the 

administration, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, the 

Administrator of the NNSA, the Department of Defense—including 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Strategic Command and the Intelligence Community and other appropriate independent, nongovernment science and security advisory organizations—to develop and 

submit to the Congress a comprehensive nuclear weapons strategy 

for the 21st century. 

Besides the NNSA, which is not within your particular bailiwick, 

but you happen to be sitting here today and are a part of the issue 

because you are the customer so to speak—besides dropping 2030 

from the nomenclature as far as downsizing the nuclear complex, 

is there any sense on your part that the administration is going to 

follow through on this and begin to look at a long-term national 

strategy so we know what we need a new weapon for? 

And I would also go on, if I could, as long as I have raised that 

issue, with submitting for the record, Mr. Chairman, about six or 

seven quotes from House and Energy Appropriation Committee reports, Senate Energy and Water Committee reports, Senate Armed 

Services Committee report, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

report that says that we need a wider analytic and public debate 

on big nuclear questions, the future role of nuclear weapons, the 

limits of deterrence in the early 21st century; and, finally, Senator 

Nunn, who before our subcommittee, said that on the RRW itself, 

if Congress gives the green light to this program in our current 

world environment, I believe that this will be misunderstood by our 

allies, exploited by our adversaries and complicate our work to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons. 

So to your knowledge, is there any work being done on such a 

strategy so we know why we need a new nuclear warhead? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Mr. Visclosky, I mean, this is sort of a long question here. I think this is going to a take longer answer and one that 

I, frankly, can’t provide to you. So we are going to have to get back 

to you on the subject and talk about it in more detail. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me make sure I understand. Do you want to 

put this in the record, Mr. Visclosky, the reports? I just want to 

make sure—— 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I would just say sections of the report that deal 

specifically with the congressional direction to the administration 

as to what they are going to do. My upset, Mr. Chairman, being 

that after we zero this and add specific directive language, that we 

need a comprehensive, bipartisan generation look at this issue as 

to how are we going to use these. How does this play in—— 

Mr. MURTHA. What I am asking, though, Mr. Visclosky, what do 

you want us to put in the record? I want to make sure they understand what needs to go in the record. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Okay. I would like to know what, in this case, 

the Department of Defense is doing in conjunction with developing 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
68 

and submitting to Congress a comprehensive nuclear weapons 

strategy for the 21st century, which was in the—that was language 

in the omnibus package. 

Mr. MURTHA. Without objection, that will be part of the record. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—The Department did not provide a response for 

the record.] 

Mr. DICKS. If you would yield just for a second. Who at the Department would answer a question like that about nuclear warheads? 

Mr. ENGLAND. It would be our policy department. I mean, our 

policy would pull together all the aspects with the Department of 

Energy and State and work across the administration with the 

Congress. It would be our policy department, Mr. Dicks. 

Admiral MULLEN. The other thing I would say, Mr. Dicks, is I 

know General Cartwright has spent an extraordinary amount of 

time on this as well, so he would clearly be a participant. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. Good. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And I would, as long as the general’s name is 

mentioned, testified before a subcommittee and indicated after an 

extensive dialogue that there was not such a strategy last year. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kaptur. 

GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen. 

Admiral Mullen, today who stands a better chance of making it 

through Basra? An Iranian patrol or an American patrol? 

Admiral MULLEN. I was in Basra over the holidays. It has been 

turned over, by and large, by the British. And I think I guess one 

of the metrics that is very important to me is since the British 

started to do that, the level of violence with respect to them has 

gone down dramatically. Clearly there are challenges there locally 

with respect to how security is going to be maintained in the future. 

The strategy, we believe is, it was time to do that. Certainly the 

British felt that way. And by and large, I think it has worked in 

that direction. That doesn’t mean that we are not going to have significant challenges down the road there. 

You know, we are concerned about the Iranian influence coming—you know, the Iranian Shi’a influence in the south. Clearly I 

think, from that standpoint and the violence that they oftentimes 

both support and foment, and their influence on the jam specifically. And I think that will continue to be a challenge. 

I am not sure I can answer your question from the standpoint 

of specifically who would stand a better chance of survival. The violence down there has also gone down. It is a safer place than it was 

a year ago. But it is certainly not eliminated. And it can be—it can 

still be a very dangerous place. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Some would say that Iraq is a failed state, sir. The 

Sunni, Shi’a and Kurds don’t want to live together, they don’t get 

along. We are asking our military to fill the political gap, and our 

military is doing a phenomenal job of doing what they are trained 

to do. But how long do you think we are going to be required to 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
69 

remain in Iraq with our military serving as the glue that holds the 

place together? 

I believe one of our Senators said 100 years. What is your estimate? Five years, 10 years? What are we talking about here? 20, 

50? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think I have said before, ma’am, it is years, 

not months. Exactly how many, I don’t know. In fact, I am encouraged by the fact that in the last 24 hours that the Iraq Central 

Government has passed three laws that have been a big challenge 

that—I am sorry—their parliamentary body has passed three laws. 

That is a lot of progress, and it has been a challenge. 

I think the security has been—the security environment having 

gotten better put them in a position to be able to do that. The economic development, which has gotten better, needs to continue as 

well. As far as a specific length of time, I couldn’t—I wouldn’t want 

to predict exactly. But I think it will be for a significant period of 

time. 

TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES

Ms. KAPTUR. Could I ask you, Secretary England, there is an author, Clyde Prestowitz, who has written a book, Three Billion New 

Capitalists: The Great Shift of Wealth and Power to the East. And 

in this book he talks about the advanced technologies in the United 

States. Their development has slipped. 

In fact, in 2003, Thomas S. Hartwig, the former scientist at TRW 

and chairman of the Department of Defense Advisory Group on 

Electronic Devices, told Congress that the structure of the U.S. 

high-tech industry is coming unglued, with innovation and design 

losing their tie to prototype fabrication and manufacturing, and 

that advanced semiconductor production needed for a new generation of weapons was migrating to Asia. 

He goes on to say the following: My question really is, who at the 

Department is concerned about this and how are you addressing it? 

Prestowitz makes the point that our country needs to use Russian, Chinese and European rockets to launch space satellites; that 

Boeing’s decisions to outsource production of the wings on its 787 

dreamliner had to be done abroad; The lack of U.S. Firms that had 

the capacity to manufacture the advance systems for military night 

vision capacity; French licensees have sold equipment to China; 

and finally, the U.S. dependence on China for a large number of 

strategic metals, including tungsten, yttrium, magnesium, and 

timonium and indium. They talk about this whole issue of R&D 

and whether we are able to keep up. 

Who at the Department focuses on this? What are your comments on his statements? And how can we best address these concerns? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Also, Ms. Kaptur, a couple of comments. First of 

all, just the day before yesterday, we had a whole briefing dealing 

with technology in the United States, what we call, quote, future 

shocks. I mean, what is going to happen in terms of energy and 

weather? What are the things that can happen, disruptive things 

that can affect us? 

One of them, of course, is this whole area of technology, which 

is a concern of the Department because we rely on advanced techVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:47 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046474 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A474P2.XXX A474P2

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
70 

nology. Obviously, that is what is important to our Nation. It is a 

concern to us—keep in mind that we are a very, very tiny part of 

both our national—it used to be we were dominant in this area. We 

are no longer dominant. Compared to our U.S. economy, we are a 

very small part of the U.S. economy, certainly a small part of the 

world economy, and indeed, as part of globalization, goods and 

services move around the world. 

And so it is of interest and concern to us, and we do try to make 

sure that we have the capabilities we need here in the United 

States. We do have an office within AT&L that looks at this and 

worries about this all the time. And, of course, we also have our 

own institutions like DARPA, who work the front end of this. They 

give us a leading indicator of what is going on in all of these hightech areas. 

So we have our own DARPA, which is a couple of billion dollars 

a year. This year in the 2009 budget, by the way, you will see that 

we have recommended an increased level of R&D in terms of the 

basic sciences, because we feel like we need more work, and Secretary Gates personally asked that we increase those accounts. So 

2009, you will see that we have increased our expenditures in basic 

science and technology; that is, research in important areas to the 

Department of Defense. So I am not sure there is an answer to 

this. I mean, there are huge global trends that we are a part of and 

that we try to work within and moderate to the extent we can. 

But I would tell you, this is an area of great interest to me personally. I came out of industry and did a lot of this work. It is also 

of interest to Secretary Gates, who, of course, came out of the university environment where we do a lot of our S&T-type work in the 

country. And I know it is of interest to our military—I mean, we 

have regular discussions on this subject. 

But, again, I will tell you that at one time we were dominant, 

say, in the semiconductor because we literally bought most of the 

semiconductors. We did a lot of the research. But now we are a 

very, very small part of those enterprises. I mean, we are probably 

1 percent or less in many of those endeavors. So we no longer have 

the leverage we had in the past because of just the growth of the 

economy. 

Mr. MURTHA. The time of the gentlewoman has expired, Mr. 

Boyd. 

ACQUISITION COST ESTIMATING

Mr. BOYD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Chairman, I 

apologize for being late. Everybody has a hearing scheduled today. 

And, Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your service and you being here. 

My question has to do with the Department’s CAIG; that is, the 

Cost Analysis Improvement Group. Are you familiar with that 

group? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Yes, sir, I am. 

Mr. BOYD. That is the group who under the Department’s policy 

is supposed to develop independent estimates for major acquisitions. And it appears to those of us in Congress that that group 

and those estimating procedures by that group are not being used 

and followed by the Department. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
71 

And it also appears that, as a result, many of the programs are 

underestimated and then cause budget problems down the road. 

Would you speak to that? And are these appearances that we have 

from the congressional level true or not? 

Mr. ENGLAND. Mr. Boyd, I would say they are largely not true 

because we actually have—I won’t say a rule—a policy within the 

Department. If we have a CAIG estimate when that goes forward, 

we go with the CAIG estimate. In terms of our funding profiles in 

the outyears, we use the CAIG estimate unless we decide for some 

overriding reason that we shouldn’t use the CAIG. I mean, typically the CAIG estimate will be higher than the military estimate. 

And so we will in almost all cases go with the CAIG estimate unless there is some specific rationale why we believe there was some 

error or some change in circumstances; that is, the historical basis 

that they may use may no longer apply, et cetera. 

So we do try to make this informed. We don’t just follow every 

single recommendation of the CAIG. But by and large, we do rely 

on the CAIG estimates. 

Mr. BOYD. When you don’t use the CAIG estimates to rely on 

those, and you use some other estimate—by your own statement 

there, you said usually that is the lower estimate—do you find that 

those estimates pretty much hit the mark? Or are they low? Do you 

have any historical perspective on that? 

Mr. ENGLAND. I am not sure I have a historical perspective. In 

almost every case, we actually go with the CAIG and in most cases, 

usually it would be long term. So, for example, if there was a whole 

new way of building an airplane—and I would say just take Boeing 

in the commercial sector with their new 787 composite airplane— 

I mean, you would expect that the aluminum airplane building in 

the past probably would not apply in terms of cost estimates to 

build that. Well, if we go to radical changes in our technology such 

that the historical trend may no longer apply, then we examine 

that. But I would say that is an exception and not the rule. 

Mr. BOYD. How long has CAIG been in place, Mr. Secretary? 

Mr. ENGLAND. A lot longer than I have been around. 

Mr. BOYD. Is it part of the problem? I mean, we do have some 

problems, don’t we? 

Mr. ENGLAND. We do. And, look, it is a fair question, because 

here is the debate about the CAIG. If you put a higher in than the 

program manager estimates the program can cost—the program 

manager estimates a certain cost and the contractor—we end up 

with a cost of the program. If we then put in the CAIG estimates 

much higher and if we then program the higher money in the program, then you can be pretty certain that that money will be spent 

on the program. Right? 

So to some extent, people will say it is a self-fulfilling prophecy. 

The CAIG is always right because indeed if you program that 

amount of money, that is what the program cost will be. I mean, 

it is a debatable point in terms of the CAIG. And therefore, I don’t 

think we can just blindly go with the CAIG. I do think you have 

to look at this and at least question this, because otherwise you can 

end up actually spending more money than you would like on some 

of these programs. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
72 

Mr. BOYD. Secretary England, the disruption caused by faulty 

budgeting or estimating is greatly disruptive to your Department 

and the Congress in terms of how we appropriate our dollars, raise 

our dollars, spend them and so on. 

Mr. ENGLAND. Can I make a recommendation? I will tell you that 

my experience is that the most disruptive thing is not knowing 

over a significant period of time what the level of investment will 

be. I mean, we get, by definition, yearly appropriations. You never 

know quite what they are going to be year to year. So contractors 

don’t necessarily invest over a long period of time because they 

don’t know what the outcome will be. 

Multiyear contracts are very good. Stable funding over long periods of time is the best thing we can do to control costs or reduce 

costs. And that is within the Department across—I mean, in every 

enterprise, I think that is the case. 

Mr. MURTHA. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

You could also say that supplementals ought to be inside the regular budget, which gives us a better advantage. You can also say 

that the military estimates in many cases are lower so they can 

sell the program to Congress, and we have to pay the bill in the 

long run. So there are all kinds of ways of looking at this and we 

try to work it out between the committee. 

And Mr. Young and I don’t have any questions, but Mr. Dicks 

has a question. 

DEFENSE CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE

Mr. DICKS. Just one that Ms. Kaptur brought up that I don’t 

think was fully talked about. And that is this question of the quality of the work that is being done out there. I get the impression 

that—I don’t know if we have an aging workforce with these contractors, but we seem to see a lot more problems in terms of ordinary work that ought to be done pretty easily, winding up not getting done right. And delaying the programs and—especially in the 

classified arena. We have seen a number of examples in recent 

years of just shoddy performance. 

Are you worried about this? 

Mr. ENGLAND. I am. And I think it is a systemic issue, not necessarily shoddy workmanship. I think the issue is more of an opportunity to get a lot of experience. You know, again, if it was 

World War II and Mr. Chairman mentioned all—I mean, if you 

graduate as an aeronautical engineer in your lifetime going forward, you could have worked on, like, 100 different airplanes. And 

then in the 1970s it was 80. And now in your lifetime, you work 

on one or two airplanes. 

So how do people get the experience, because literally the number of programs are large but small. So there is not the variety, I 

think, for engineers and managers and everyone else to gain experience along the way. 

And so, yes, I believe that is a concern, Mr. Dicks, but I don’t 

have an answer to that. But I—— 

Mr. DICKS. Is there also an aging workforce out there in these 

contractors? And I thought this point was raised, that we just seem 

to see so many programs in trouble now, and especially in the highVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:47 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046474 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A474P2.XXX A474P2

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
73 

technology area, where we used to be so good in our national technical means, the satellites in particular. 

We seem to see failure, after failure, and it is across the board. 

It is everybody. It is all the big companies. 

Mr. ENGLAND. We may be reaching too far too fast, Mr. Dicks. 

We always want the next technology, so we reach far and maybe 

that is something—and we do—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Secretary, we get estimates which we know 

very well are underestimated, and then they give you a figure of 

what they want to build. And in the end, the design is not completed, whether it is the Navy, the Air Force. And when you were 

the Secretary of the Navy, you got rid of thousands of people in 

order to build more ships. And those ships never got built because 

they stole the money and spent it someplace else. 

We have got all kinds of problems we have got to work out. We 

have an opportunity here in this next budget to straighten out 

some more of these problems, and we appreciate your coming before the committee. We appreciate your dedication and look forward to working with you to come up with a budget we can all live 

with. 

The meeting is adjourned until 2:00. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow:] 

PERSONNEL—RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. A key principle of the U.S. Armed Forces is to attract and retain competent personnel to assure readiness and operational effectiveness. While the services have generally met their aggregate recruiting and retention goals, the GAO reports that the Army and Marine Corps have experienced shortages in mission-critical occupational specialties such as health care, human intelligence collection, and 

explosive ordnance disposal. There is growing concern within the department as to 

how the services can meet current operational demands with what appear to be 

chronic shortages in these occupational specialties. In addition, there is growing concern that recruitment standards may have been relaxed to meet numbers. 

Secretary Gates, the Committee is very concerned regarding the recruitment and 

retention for mission-critical occupational specialties (MOS). For example there continues to be a shortage of nurses in the military and many billets remain vacant. 

Given the wartime environment that we are in, can you explain to the Committee 

what methods are currently available to recruiters to remedy this problem? 

Answer. Each Service focuses on maximizing the effect of its respective recruiting 

programs, advertising campaigns, and retention programs to target critical or hardto-fill skills. Health professional recruiting is especially critical, and the Services are 

placing increased emphasis in this area. We are very appreciative of the new authorities offered by Congress to help us meet these challenges, particularly the increases in bonus limits and the ability to reduce the military service obligation for 

health professionals in critical medical specialties. The Services use a variety of incentives—enlistment bonuses, educational benefits, and college loan repayment—to 

encourage youth to serve in critical military occupations. These incentives are also 

used by the Services to attract high quality youth, even-flow the training base 

through seasonal use, encourage enlistment for longer terms, and reward advanced 

education. Reenlistment and retention bonuses are used to encourage continued 

service while maintaining the desired force profile. 

The Army is experimenting with new incentives under the ‘‘recruiting pilot’’ authorities granted in the Fiscal Year 2006 Defense Authorization Act to expand the 

recruiting market targeting high quality young men and women for service. Additionally, the Army has a special program designed to meet one of its most critically 

short and mission-essential needs—Arab Linguists. This ‘‘09L’’ program has been 

extremely successful in meeting this need, with over 1,000 native-speaking linguists 

recruited and available for the front lines in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The young men and women that enter the armed forces stand among the best of 

American youth, above average in every facet—smart, fit, educated, moral, and reVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:47 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046474 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A474P2.XXX A474P2

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
74 

flective of the society they serve to protect. For over 20 years, the Services have met 

or exceeded the Department’s quality benchmarks for Active duty recruits. Although 

the Army missed its high school diploma graduate benchmark in 2007, the Department of Defense (DoD) met its overall goal: 90 percent of Active duty new recruits 

were high school diploma graduates. This compares favorably to the national average in which about 70 percent to 80 percent graduate from high school with a diploma. In addition, DoD exceeded its aptitude quality benchmark, with 68 percent 

of new Active recruits scoring in the top half of the Armed Forces Qualification Test, 

well above the DoD benchmark of 60 percent. 

Question. Secretary Gates, has the Army and Marine Corps analyzed how these 

occupational specialties have consistently been under-filled, and what is the operational impact of these shortages? 

Answer. Personnel shortages have not, in my tenure, resulted in our failure to 

meet critical mission needs communicated to me by a Combatant Commander. The 

Department uses Joint solutions to address immediate shortfalls through ‘‘in lieu of 

taskings,’’ in which all Services are called upon to meet immediate operational 

shortfalls. The Reserve components also have provided valuable contributions to address specialty shortfalls. 

The Services evaluate their personnel readiness by analyzing how well they are 

matching the requirements of the billets to the Service members assigned to those 

billets—in terms of both skill and grade. Service members in skills that are in short 

supply, either because the qualifying standards are difficult to obtain or the skills 

are in high demand outside of the military, are often called upon to do more frequent rotations in order to ensure units are operationally ready. 

To ensure that high operational readiness can be sustained, the Department, over 

the past five years, has developed a rebalancing effort in the Services that initially 

transitioned 89,000 billets in less-stressed career fields, for example, field artillery, 

to more heavily used specialties, such as Military Police, Civil Affairs, and others. 

As of this year, we have rebalanced about 106,000 billets, and the Services have 

planned and programmed an additional 99,000 billets for rebalancing between fiscal 

year 2008 and 2012. Although the amount and type of rebalancing varies by Service, 

key stressed capability areas include: Engineers, Intelligence, Special Operations, 

Military Police, Infantry, Aviation, Space and Combat Air Superiority. By 2012, we 

expect to have rebalanced about 205,000 billets. Rebalancing is a continuous and 

iterative process. The Department will continue to work closely with the Services 

as they review and refine their rebalancing plans to achieve the right mix of capabilities and alignment of force structure. This will greatly help reduce stress and 

support the Operational Reserve by providing a deeper bench for those skills that 

are in high demand. 

For Service members who are deployed more frequently, compensation programs 

and the authorities provided by Congress give the Department the flexibility to 

package these authorities in the form of special incentive pays to ensure the compensation is fair and equitable. For example, the Department recently established 

the ‘‘Post Deployment Mobilization Respite Absence’’ program which provides administrative absence days for Active component Service members deployed more 

than 12 months in any 36-month period and to Reserve component Service members 

deployed more than 12 months in any 72-month period. The number of administrative absence days depends on how many months beyond 12 months the Service 

member is deployed. An administrative absence is the same as a day of non-chargeable leave. Additionally, Active and Reserve component members deployed to Iraq 

or Afghanistan and involuntarily extended beyond 12 consecutive months, or deployed for 12 months within a 15-month period, still qualify for the $1,000 per 

month compensation for any month or portion of a month served by involuntary extension. Administrative absence recognition is for additional respite and supplements the broader compensation mentioned above. 

Question. Secretary Gates, are you concerned that the strain of multiple deployments will discourage good individuals from joining the Armed Forces or re-enlisting 

and staying in? 

Answer. Recruiting: Today’s military recruiting environment may be the most 

challenging to the all-volunteer force (AVF). Never in the history of the AVF, have 

our armed forces faced a recruiting environment as challenging as they have during 

the past several years. The global war on terror has placed unprecedented demands 

on the Services as our volunteer military is now into its seventh year of a protracted 

war in Iraq and Afghanistan. As such, youth willingness to serve, the heart of our 

AVF, is declining, and influencers of youth (e.g., parents and teachers) are less likely to recommend military service today than in recent years. Despite this, all Services met their numerical recruiting goals in Fiscal Year (FY) 2007, as well their FebVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:47 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046474 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A474P2.XXX A474P2

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
75 

ruary 2008 year-to-date goals, and we project that all Services will meet their numerical goals in FY 2008. 

Retention: We have studied the retention rates of those deployed—the Army’s retention rates of initial term and mid-career soldiers in deploying units has remained 

between 120–140 percent of their goals since FY 2005. 

As of February 2008, the Army and Marine Corps—our most heavily deployed 

Services—have exceeded their year-to-date retention goals; and the Navy met 98 

percent of their aggregate year-to-date goal. The Air Force met 99 percent of their 

mid-career goal, but fell short in their initial (less than 6 years of service) and career (more than 10 years of service) goals. This was due to its force shaping efforts, 

coupled with its FY 2008 funding priorities. 

However, the Army’s increase in end strength, along with its reorganization into 

a modular concept, requires proportionally more mid-grade officers—and so we are 

closely monitoring retention in these grades to assess how much concern is warranted. 

Question. Secretary Gates, please describe the standards by which candidates are 

measured. Have these standards been relaxed in any way to achieve the aggressive 

recruitment goals? 

Answer. The Department has not relaxed enlistment standards. All new recruits 

are carefully screened and qualified for military service. The Department generally 

reports recruit quality along two dimensions—educational achievement and aptitude. Both are important, but for different reasons. 

We value recruits with a high school diploma because years of research and experience tell us that those with a high school diploma are more likely to complete their 

initial three years of service. About 80 percent of recruits with a high school diploma will complete their first three years of service, whereas only about half of 

those who failed to complete high school will make it. Those holding an alternative 

credential (e.g., General Equivalency Diploma) fall between these statistics. The Department’s benchmark for new recruits with a high school diploma is 90 percent and 

it has met or exceeded that benchmark since 1984. 

Aptitude is a separate indicator of quality. All recruits take a written enlistment 

test, the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery. Those who score at or above 

average on four of the subtests measuring verbal and mathematics skills (which 

comprise the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)) are in Categories I–IIIA. We 

value these higher-aptitude recruits because their trainability and job performance 

generally exceeds those in the lower aptitude categories. The Department’s benchmark for new recruits is 60 percent scoring in AFQT Category I–IIIA, and it has 

met or exceeded that benchmark since 1986. 

Question. Secretary Gates, DoD standards on qualification tests call for at least 

60 percent Category 1 to 3 (the higher end of testing) and 4 percent Category 4, 

the lowest end. While the Departments of the Navy and Air Force have followed 

that standard, the active Army chose a higher standard of 67 percent in Categories 

1 to 3, and 2 percent in Category 4. However, now the Army plans to revert to the 

lower standards of the DoD guidelines, which basically lowers the IQ standards for 

recruits. Do you believe that this will reduce the average effectiveness of Army 

units? Do you plan on lowering the DoD standards further to assist the Services in 

meeting their recruitment goals? 

Answer. No, we do not believe this will reduce the average effectiveness of Army 

units. All new soldiers are not only qualified for military service, but meet the 

standards for training in their military occupational specialty. With regard to enlistment standards, the Department has not changed the recruit quality standards 

(benchmarks) since 1993, when those benchmarks were first established, and there 

are no plans to do so. The purpose of the recruit quality benchmarks is to ensure 

that recruit performance is sufficient to complete military missions. ‘‘Recruiting at 

the benchmarks’’ means that we are recruiting cost effectively for the desired level 

of force performance. The benchmarks were originally set to yield the performance 

levels of the force that fought in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. If economic conditions 

are such that recruiting can be conducted above the benchmarks (more Armed 

Forces Qualification Test Category I–IIIAs and more high school diploma graduates) 

at little or no additional cost, that is fine. However, recruiting at the benchmark 

is the target. Although the military recruiting environment is challenging, the Army 

met its numerical recruiting goals in fiscal year (FY) 2007, and in the first quarter 

of FY 2008. With regard to recruit quality, the Army achieved the Department of 

Defense (DoD) aptitude standard in FY 2007, and we expect it to meet that measure 

in FY 2008. Army fell short of the DoD high school diploma benchmark in FY 2007, 

and remains short through the first quarter of FY 2008. Since this educational 

benchmark is used to predict first-term attrition, the Army hopes to ameliorate the 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
76 

effects of not meeting this benchmark by implementing other initiatives to reduce 

first-term attrition. 

Question. Secretary Gates, recruiting and retention goals are often relayed to Congress in the aggregate, providing little or no visibility into how each occupational 

specialty is staffed. Will you provide the Committee with details on recruiting and 

retention by specialty code? 

Answer. The Department examines recruitment and retention data for critical 

skill occupations. The Services use the following criteria in identifying approximately 10 percent of their occupational specialties as most critical for recruiting, 

and 10 percent of their specialties as most critical for retention. 

For purposes of determining if a skill is critical, the following criteria are used: 

• Be, have a history of being, or project to be, short; 

• Requires high training and/or replacement costs; 

• Is in high demand in the civilian sector; 

• Is challenging to recruit into; 

• Is crucial to combat readiness; and/or 

• Is a low density/high demand skill. 

See Tables 1 and 2 for the most recent information. 

TABLE 1: CRITICAL SKILLS FOR RECRUITING ARMY, NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AND AIR FORCE 

[December 2007] 

Specialty 

FY 2008 total 

accession 

requirement 

FY 2008 accession 

mission to-date 

FY 2008 accessions 

to-date 

Percent of YTD 

accessions 

accomplished 

Army Critical Recruiting Skills 

Infantryman ............................................ 11362 1425 1479 104 

Cannon Crewmember ............................. 1879 245 268 109 

Field Artillery Computer Systems Specialist ................................................. 683 117 110 94 

Multiple Launch Rocket System Crewmember .............................................. 280 19 16 84 

PATRIOT Fire Control Enhanced Operator/Maintainer .................................. 419 44 23 52 

Air Defense Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence Tactical Operations Center 

Enhanced Operator/Maintainer .......... 297 38 31 82 

PATRIOT Launching Station Enhanced 

Operator/Maintainer ........................... 666 81 73 90 

M1 Armor Crewman ............................... 1388 100 118 118 

Microwave Systems Operator-Maintainer 224 33 16 48 

Multi-Channel Transmission Systems 

Operator-Maintainer .......................... 783 59 54 92 

Signal Support Systems Specialist ........ 2150 382 386 101 

Military Police ........................................ 3341 382 353 92 

Intelligence Analyst ................................ 598 104 83 80 

Human Intelligence Collector ................. 910 129 131 102 

Signals Intelligence Analyst .................. 372 90 86 96 

Light Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic ........... 2623 435 444 102 

Bradley Fighting Vehicle System Maintainer ................................................. 267 26 25 96 

Health Care Specialist ........................... 3659 489 483 99 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and 

Nuclear Specialist ............................. 787 98 94 96 

Motor Transport Operator ....................... 3098 555 567 102 

Explosive Ordnance Disposal ................. 431 54 49 91 

Petroleum Supply Specialist .................. 2056 303 312 103 

Food Service Operations Specialist ....... 2143 145 141 97 

Parachute Rigger ................................... 618 92 99 108 

Electronic Devices Repairman ............... 387 72 42 58 

Total .............................................. 41,421 5,517 5,483 99 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
77 

TABLE 1: CRITICAL SKILLS FOR RECRUITING ARMY, NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AND AIR FORCE— 

Continued 

[December 2007] 

Specialty 

FY 2008 total 

accession 

requirement 

FY 2008 accession 

mission to-date 

FY 2008 accessions 

to-date 

Percent of YTD 

accessions 

accomplished 

Navy Critical Recruiting Skills 

Nuclear Field .......................................... 2520 610 614 101 

Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) forces ........... 1089 237 252 106 

Special Warfare Combat Crewman ........ 285 55 63 115 

Second Class Diver ................................ 200 39 48 123 

Basic Explosive Ordnance Tech ............. 213 28 28 100 

Cryptologic Technician Interpretive ....... 462 96 63 66 

Enlisted Aircrew ..................................... 613 116 121 104 

Enlisted Aircrew Rescue Swimmer ........ 636 88 63 72 

Total .............................................. 6,018 1,269 1,252 99 

Marine Corps Critical Recruiting Skills 

Aviation Support .................................... 688 126 123 98 

Aircraft Mechanic ................................... 2297 421 554 132 

Air Crew/Flight Mechanic/Navigator ...... 379 69 86 125 

Aviation Operations ................................ 331 61 76 125 

Aviation Electronics Tech ....................... 1286 235 255 108 

Electronics Maintenance ........................ 1095 200 122 61 

Transportation ........................................ 2043 374 276 74 

Fire Direction/Control Specialist ............ 338 62 38 61 

Cryptologic Linguist ............................... 281 51 35 68 

Intelligence ............................................. 715 131 161 123 

Infantry ................................................... 6013 1100 1535 139 

Marine Corps Security Forces ................ 584 107 128 120 

Marine Corps Security Forces (Personnel 

Reliability Program) ........................... 484 89 87 98 

6 yr Infantry Bonus ................................ 300 55 71 129 

5 yr Infantry Bonus ................................ 900 165 90 55 

Reconnaissance Bonus .......................... 399 73 84 115 

Military Police ........................................ 966 177 217 123 

Total .............................................. 19,099 3,496 3,938 113 

Air Force Critical Recruiting Skills 

Airborne Linguist .................................... 174 67 67 100 

Combat Controller .................................. 222 56 56 100 

Intel Applications ................................... 338 78 78 100 

Imagery Analysis .................................... 171 29 29 100 

Linguist .................................................. 480 64 64 100 

Network Intelligence Analysis ................ 226 52 52 100 

Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape .. 189 33 33 100 

Pararescue ............................................. 410 71 71 100 

Internal Avionics System ....................... 326 66 66 100 

Aircraft Structural Maintenance ............ 334 73 73 100 

Fuels ....................................................... 286 77 77 100 

Explosive Ordnance Disposal ................. 174 55 55 100 

Security Forces ....................................... 3786 714 714 100 

Aerial gunner ......................................... 51 8 8 100 

Air Traffic Control .................................. 672 127 127 100 

Tactical Air Command & Control .......... 173 41 41 100 

A–10, F–15 & U–2 Avionic Systems ..... 62 20 20 100 

Munitions Systems ................................. 695 149 149 100 

Armament Systems ................................ 960 227 227 100 

Special Vehicle Operations .................... 23 11 11 100 

Pavements & Construction Equipment .. 147 49 49 100 

Structural Maintenance ......................... 173 62 62 100 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
78 

TABLE 1: CRITICAL SKILLS FOR RECRUITING ARMY, NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AND AIR FORCE— 

Continued 

[December 2007] 

Specialty 

FY 2008 total 

accession 

requirement 

FY 2008 accession 

mission to-date 

FY 2008 accessions 

to-date 

Percent of YTD 

accessions 

accomplished 

Utilities Systems .................................... 121 29 29 100 

Engineering Assistant ............................ 152 28 28 100 

Weather .................................................. 197 52 52 100 

Fire Protection ........................................ 428 65 65 100 

Aerospace Medical Service .................... 636 132 132 100 

Total .............................................. 11,606 2,435 2,435 100 

TABLE 2: CRITICAL SKILLS FOR RETENTION ARMY, NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AND AIR FORCE 

[December 2007] 

Active Army Critical Retention Skills 

Specialty (MOS) Authorized/ 

assigned 

Initial Mid-Career Career 

YTD elig YTD 

retained YTD elig YTD retained YTD elig YTD retained 

Field Artillery Tactical Data 

Systems Specialist .............. 2965/2772 59 49 38 36 11 10 

Field Artillery Radar Operator .. 695/582 14 13 9 8 4 4 

Signal Support Systems Specialist .................................. 7808/7386 190 152 109 94 45 41 

Corrections ............................... 1212/1170 29 23 14 9 12 12 

Intelligence Analyst ................. 4860/5073 133 106 96 84 45 37 

Combat Medic .......................... 18186/17647 349 262 348 335 161 148 

Motor Transport Operator ........ 16750/15702 341 295 212 201 107 102 

Explosive Ordnance Disposal ... 1470/1133 24 18 13 11 7 7 

Petroleum Supply Specialist .... 9956/9663 241 189 133 117 60 59 

Parachute Rigger ..................... 1663/1426 45 40 59 54 17 17 

Active Navy Critical Retention Skills 

Specialty (Rating) Authorized/ 

assigned 

Zone A Zone B Zone C 

FYO8 FYTD 

1st QTR 

goal 

FY08 FYTD 

1st QTR 

reenlist 

FYO8 FYTD 

1st QTR 

goal 

FY08 FYTD 

1st QTR 

reenlist 

FY08 FYTD 

1st QTR 

goal 

FY08 FYTD 

1st QTR 

reenlist 

Nuclear Propulsion ........................... 10811/ 

10996 

168 183 100 87 38 41 

Fleet Marine Force Reconnaissance 

Corpsman .................................... 138/67 2 2 1 3 0 0 

Field Medical Service Technician .... 6772/ 

7747 

51 92 33 70 24 43 

Medical Deep Sea Divine Technician 121/86 1 0 0 0 0 0 

Fleet Marine Force Reconnaissance 

Independent ................................. 51/35 NA NA 0 0 1 2 

Navy Diver ........................................ 1275/ 

1002 

14 15 6 13 5 6 

Cryptologic Technicians Interpretive 

(Linguist NEC) ............................. 999/1757 13 34 11 16 4 9 

Explosive Ordnance Disposal ........... 1064/901 7 10 8 13 3 22 

Fire Controlman AEGIS .................... 2198/ 

1933 

19 46 16 48 3 9 

Special Operations ........................... 2159/ 

1896 

34 41 19 31 21 24 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
79 

Active Marine Corps Critical Retention Skills 

Specialty (MOS) Authorized/ 

assigned 

1st Term Subsequent 

YTD goal YTD 

retained YTD goal YTD retained 

Explosive Ordnance Disposal ............................................ 568/431 23 64 15 60 

Counter Intelligence .......................................................... 675/442 27 47 16 56 

Reconnaissance Marine .................................................... 1630/1215 49 52 19 70 

Intelligence Specialist ....................................................... 1566/1258 32 71 22 94 

Fire Support Man .............................................................. 627/508 12 22 6 24 

Middle East Cryptologic Linguists .................................... 230/200 4 15 3 8 

Asia-Pacific Cryptologic Linguists .................................... 169/97 4 9 2 2 

Artillery Electronics Technician ......................................... 82/65 2 4 1 0 

Aviation Meteorological Equipment Technician ................ 57/49 1 0 1 2 

Light Armor Vehicle ........................................................... 984/992 18 29 8 22 

Question. Secretary Gates, with the increases in reenlistment and enlistment bonuses, do you feel that the funding for recruiting and retention initiatives is sufficient? 

Answer. Yes, we stand by the President’s budget request for bonuses as sufficient 

to sustain strong recruiting and retention. 

Question. Secretary Gates, how do the Army and Marine Corps recruiting commands plan to adapt to meet the new end-strength requirements. What are the 

short- and long-term implications associated with sustaining a heightened endstrength? 

Answer. The Army and Marine Corps’ end strength growth may require increases 

in both recruiting and retention goals. Achieving the higher strength levels will be 

driven by how quickly the Army and Marine Corps programs grow. Continued congressional support of recruiting and retention programs is essential to sustain the 

All Volunteer Force in the midst of its first protracted war. Sufficient resources 

must be committed to sustain military recruiting and retention programs. 

PERSONNEL—DWELL TIME

Question. One essential element in maintaining troop morale during wartime is 

to provide some guarantees that there will be time to rest between deployments to 

combat zones. This rest is officially called ‘‘dwell time.’’ At one point dwell time for 

the U.S. Army was a ratio of 1:2, 12 months in combat, 24 months at home. Due 

to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Army dwell time has evolved to a 1:1 ratio. 

However, on April 11, 2007, Secretary Gates announced a new policy that active 

Army units now in the Central Command area of responsibility and those headed 

there will deploy for not more than 15 months and will return home for not less 

than 12 months. The Marine Corps sends its units to Iraq for seven months, with 

seven months intended at home station. However, because of mounting strain on 

our military from the war in Iraq, dwell time has been reduced. 

Secretary Gates, there have been numerous articles regarding DoD consistently 

reducing ‘dwell time’ for our combat units. Do you expect that ‘dwell-time’ standards 

will be further relaxed or changed? 

Answer. We do not expect to reduce our dwell time standards. In fact, our goal 

is to increase the dwell time for our ground forces by reducing the number of deployed Army Brigade Combat Teams by July of this year and increasing the size 

of the Army and Marine Corps. Even with these plans, we must recognize that the 

operational tempo of our forces is largely driven by the situation on the ground in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Question. Secretary Gates, the Army dwell time ratio at one point was 1:2, then 

1:1, and now its 15 months in theater and 12 months at home, which equates to 

less than a 1:1 ratio. The Marine Corps dwell time is seven months in theater and 

seven months off. Has there been any evaluation as to whose system is better? 

Answer. The various Services deployment paradigms are a function of the mission, culture, and needs of the individual Service. In that sense, the ‘‘best’’ way is 

that which works for each individual Service. These deployment patterns were developed over time to address many factors. For example, the Marine Corps deploys 

forces at and below the battalion/squadron level for seven months at a time, while 

units at higher command levels generally deploy for a year. This deployment pattern aligns with Marine Corps recruiting, retention, and skill training goals. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
80 

The Department-wide goal for all Services, regardless of deployment length, is 

that Active component forces are to attain a dwell ratio of 1:2 and Reserve component forces are to achieve a dwell ratio of 1:5. 

Question. Secretary Gates, during dwell time it is our understanding that in addition to being home, our servicemen and women are also suppose to go through training. However, with dwell time being reduced, what steps are in place to ensure our 

forces get the proper training? 

Answer. Regardless of dwell time, we continue to ensure our forces receive the 

proper training prior to deploying. Deploying organizations receive high quality 

training that is a combat multiplier for our forces. An important component of that 

high quality training for brigade combat teams, battalions, and some enabling units 

is the combat training center rotations at the National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center, and Marine Air-Ground Task Force Training Center. If deploying combat forces are unable to attend the training at the combat training centers due to deployment timelines, the combat training centers have conducted mission rehearsal exercises for the deploying forces at their home station utilizing local 

training areas. For those forces that do not routinely attend combat training centers, other training venues and capabilities are leveraged; but regardless of the 

training venue, the Army and Marine Corps chains of command validate the mental, 

physical, and cultural combat readiness of units prior to deployment. In addition to 

its Pre-Deployment Training Program, the Marine Corps is developing a standardsbased Marine Air-Ground Task Force Exercise program to maintain proficiency in 

core war fighting functions for the future. For routine Navy employment, the Fleet 

Response Plan provides units trained and ready over a longer period of time irrespective of dwell. For Navy support to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, Sailors receive training specified by the theater through the Joint 

Sourcing Training Oversight process administered by United States Joint Forces 

Command in Norfolk, Virginia. Dwell does not impact this training. The Air Force 

ensures similar training and, like the Navy, dwell time does not impact their training. 

Question. Secretary Gates, is the training that the troops are receiving limited to 

the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)? 

Answer. No—The Armed Forces of the United States do train for executing a 

range of military operations. However, given current operational demands, the 

Army and Marine Corps major training venues, the National Training Center, Joint 

Readiness Training Center, and Marine Air-Ground Task Force Training Center, 

are primarily focusing their efforts on the training requirements to specifically prepare forces for the GWOT. The bulk of the Navy and Air Force major training programs support the broader range of military operations; however, Air Force and the 

Navy forces identified to support current operations also focus their efforts on specific training requirements in preparation for GWOT deployments. The Marine 

Corps has reported that heavy training for counterinsurgency, coupled with the 

short dwell time, does limit their ability to maintain proficiency in core competencies. However, they continue to train Marine Expeditionary Units to be proficient in specialized missions in support of their global employment. 

Question. Secretary Gates, how much did last years ‘‘surge’’ effect ‘dwell time’ for 

the Services? 

Answer. The answer depends on the Service. We have seen little, if any, affect 

on individual dwell time for Navy or Air Force personnel. In the Marine Corps, two 

battalions were extended by the surge and this had a small effect on overall Marine 

Corps dwell time. For the Army, we increased both the number of forces and the 

‘‘Boots on the Ground’’ (BOG) time. These individuals are likely to have a BOG-toDwell ratio of less than 1:1. 

Question. Secretary Gates, when dwell time is cut short what steps are in place 

to make sure that our servicemen and women are compensated? 

Answer. On April 18, 2007, the Department established the Post Deployment Mobilization Respite Absence program which provides administrative absence days for 

Active component Service members deployed more than 12 months in any 36-month 

period and to Reserve component Service members deployed more than 12 months 

in any 72-month period. The number of administrative absence days depends on 

how many months beyond 12 months the Service member is deployed. An administrative absence is the same as a day of non-chargeable leave. 

On May 24, 2007, the Department authorized the Secretaries of the Military Departments to pay Assignment Incentive Pay of $200 per day, not to exceed $3,000 

monthly, in lieu of providing administrative absence, to those Reserve component 

members who are also government employees and cannot legally receive their civilian pay during days served on Active duty and who specifically elect the payment 

option. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
81 

Active and Reserve component members deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan and involuntarily extended beyond 12 consecutive months, or deployed for 12 months within a 15-month period, still qualify for the $1,000 per month compensation for any 

month or portion of a month served by involuntary extension. Administrative absence recognition is for additional respite and supplements the broader compensation mentioned above. 

[CLERKS NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
(83) 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2008. 

U.S. MARINE CORPS READINESS 

WITNESSES 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES F. AMOS, DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF 

THE MARINE CORPS FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN G. CASTELLAW, DEPUTY COMMANDANT 

OF THE MARINE CORPS FOR PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MORAN. The Committee will come to order. 

This afternoon we will hold a hearing on Marine Corps readiness. We will focus primarily on near-term readiness issues related 

to personnel training and equipment repair, reset and battle loss 

replacement. 

We are very pleased to welcome two distinguished general officers as our witnesses. Lieutenant General Amos is currently the 

Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration. 

But I understand there is hot news out that you have very recently been nominated to be the number-two, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, which is a big deal. And congratulations, General Amos. 

General AMOS. Thank you. 

Mr. MORAN. Lieutenant General Castellaw, the Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources is our other witness. 

And both officers are well-qualified, obviously, to discuss these 

readiness areas and to answer the questions of the committee. 

Gentlemen, we thank you for being here. 

And the Committee is very much concerned about the readiness 

of the Marine Corps. Our Marines are performing magnificently in 

Iraq, Afghanistan and other difficult places around the globe. We 

are proud of their service, yet we realize the burden that repeated 

deployments places on them and their families. 

In very short order, the committee will be reviewing the requests 

for the fiscal year 2008 supplemental while continuing to review 

the service’s request for fiscal year 2009. So your responses today 

will better help the committee to determine whether adequate resources have been requested for the many programs that support 

the Corps. We look forward to your testimony and to a spirited and 

informative question-and-answer session. 

Before we begin our testimony, though, I would like to call on 

our ranking member, our friend Bill Young, for any comments. 

Mr. Young. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
84 

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

And I want to add my welcome to our distinguished panel, Lieutenant General Amos and Lieutenant General Castellaw. 

Congratulations on your nomination. I hope our brothers and sisters in the Senate will move quickly to confirm that appointment, 

and we look forward to working with you in that new capacity. 

The Marine Corps, as usual, is being stretched pretty thin, and 

you are being asked to send some additional troops into Afghanistan to prepare for this anticipated spring offensive. At the same 

time, the Corps is trying to grow the force to 202,000 active-duty 

Marines by 2011—an aggressive goal by itself when you consider 

all of the challenges of infrastructure, training, resetting some of 

the old equipment that has been worn out, recapitalization. You 

have a big task ahead of you, and the Marine Corps, of course, is 

always ahead of the curve on taking care of their problems. 

And if you can keep my constituent, General Mike Regner, under 

control, you will have really made a major accomplishment. 

I want to welcome you both. 

Welcome, Mike Regner, too—as I said, my constituent. Proud to 

have you here. 

We are proud of the United States Marine Corps, and we look 

forward to your testimony. 

Mr. MORAN. General Amos, if you would like to summarize your 

statement, we can put the entire statement in the record. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL AMOS

General AMOS. That would be great. 

On behalf of General Castellaw and I, we want to thank you for 

the opportunity to tell a Marine Corps story. It is a good one. 

We are here on a mission today, and the mission is on behalf of 

the Marines and our family members that are out there: 186,000- 

plus Marines and over 300,000 family members. 

We want to say thank you to this Committee. We look back over 

the last several years, 41⁄2 years, of really hard combat. This Committee and the members that have gone before you have supported 

us with gusto. And it has paid off. It is paying off in Iraq, it is paying off in Afghanistan, and it is paying off on the home front. So 

we want to thank you for that. 

If you would take our statement, please, our joint statement, and 

put it into the record. And General Castellaw and I stand ready for 

your questions, Mr. Chairman. 

[The joint statement of General Amos and General Castellaw follows:] 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
85 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 158 here 46474A.035
86 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 159 here 46474A.036
87 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 160 here 46474A.037
88 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 161 here 46474A.038
89 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 162 here 46474A.039
90 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 163 here 46474A.040
91 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 164 here 46474A.041
92 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 165 here 46474A.042
93 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 166 here 46474A.043
94 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 167 here 46474A.044
95 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 168 here 46474A.045
96 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 169 here 46474A.046
97 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 170 here 46474A.047
98 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 171 here 46474A.048
99 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 172 here 46474A.049
100 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 173 here 46474A.050
101 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 174 here 46474A.051
102 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 175 here 46474A.052
103 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 176 here 46474A.053
104 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 177 here 46474A.054
105 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 178 here 46474A.055
106 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 179 here 46474A.056
107 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 180 here 46474A.057
108 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 181 here 46474A.058
109 

Mr. MORAN. Thanks, General. Thanks for supporting you with 

gusto, and that was it. 

General AMOS. That was it, sir. I want to thank you, and we are 

ready to take your questions. We are looking forward to it. 

Mr. MORAN. All right. That is fine. 

Would you like to start off, Bill? 

Mr. YOUNG. That would be fine. 

Mr. MORAN. Go ahead. 

BUDGETARY REQUIREMENTS

Mr. YOUNG. In the budget that has been presented now to us— 

and we had somewhat of an overview of that this morning with 

Secretary England and Admiral Mullen—are your needs being 

met? Is the request adequate? Are there things that you need that 

haven’t been requested in the budget? 

General CASTELLAW. Sir, he is getting promoted, and I get to do 

the answering. 

Sir, again, I just want to echo General Amos’s appreciation to the 

Congress, and particularly to this Committee, for the support that 

we have been given. We have had great opportunities within the 

Department in our relationship with the Congress to identify those 

things that we truly need. 

The Marine Corps is proud of our history. And, in fact, what we 

try to do is be good stewards of the Nation’s scarce resources. When 

we talk about that, we are not only talking about the appropriations that we get from the Congress, but we are talking about the 

great men and women who are truly, truly the number-one resource that we have in the Marine Corps. 

We will continue to work within the Department and with you 

to identify those additional items, those additional things that we 

need to take to war with us. And as we identify them and we work 

with you, we will note them and we will appreciate the support 

that you, I am sure, will continue to give us. 

Mr. YOUNG. But, General, with the additional Marines being sent 

to Afghanistan, there will be additional equipment required, personal equipment, body armor, weapons, other types of vehicles. Will 

they be fully equipped when they do deploy to Afghanistan? 

General AMOS. Sir, they will be. As you know, one of the units 

is a Marine expeditionary unit coming off the East Coast. And they 

come with all their equipment anyway. In other words, they were 

already planning on deploying aboard naval shipping. So they are 

coming with everything that they have. 

Now, there is no question they are going to be plussed up with 

what we call enablers. Some enablers are people and different 

kinds of capabilities. But there will also be some equipment: things 

from signals intelligence kind of things, counterintelligence, human 

intelligence, plus-ups and that kind of thing. So they are. 

And the equipment that the battalion that is coming out of 

Twentynine Palms that will go into Afghanistan, we will move 

equipment both from in theater, mostly from in theater, over from 

Iraq, equipment that is not being used that we have forward in 

stores and that type of thing. But they will have everything that 

they need before they go in. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
110 

Mr. YOUNG. So they will take it with them? They will have it 

right with them as they deploy? 

General AMOS. Absolutely, sir. 

TRAINING

Mr. YOUNG. Will they have completed training that you would 

normally want a Marine to have completed before he is deployed? 

General AMOS. They are, Mr. Young. They will leave next month, 

and they will have completed all of what they call Predeployment 

Training, PDT. The battalion was focused primarily into Iraq, and 

they were going to go at a later date, and they have been reoriented. 

So, you know, the command down at Quantico has built a pretty 

rigorous training schedule. And using the model that we have in 

Iraq, but modifying it for Afghanistan with the kind of things they 

expect to be able to do and be required to do, both—not only that, 

training police, things that we don’t typically do—we put that 

whole package together, to include hiring Afghan role-players. 

And they are a Twentynine Palms-based unit, 3rd Battalion, 7th 

Marine. So they are already there, which makes it pretty fortuitous 

for us. We can put them up in the higher parts, the higher elevations of Twentynine Palms, and it is actually almost exactly the 

same elevation in the country that they would be going in, terrainwise. 

WOUNDED WARRIOR BATTALION

Mr. YOUNG. General, a week before last, my wife and I visited 

the Wounded Warrior Battalion at Camp Pendleton, and we had a 

chance to see some of the Marines that we had actually met while 

they were at Bethesda in the intensive care, and worked with them 

and their families at the time. And that was quite an emotional reunion with some of them. 

But I have to tell you, the United States of America is fortunate 

to have the type of Marine that we have, because their attitudes, 

despite their injuries, despite their sacrifices, their attitudes are 

just unbelievable. And you cannot visit with them and not come 

away with a tremendous inspiration and appreciation for the 

United States Marine Corps and the men and women that make 

up the Corps. 

So thank you very much for the good job that you do, and all of 

our Marines, and thank you for being here today. 

And, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

DWELL TIME

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Young. 

I would like to ask questions about another aspect of morale. Obviously, it is critical to be trained and fully equipped. But the 

amount of rest time between combat deployments is also critical to 

maintain morale. It is not in statute. This Committee has tried to 

put it in statute, because DOD has so changed what had been a 

traditional ratio. In fact, used to be a year in theater and then 2 

years at home. The Corps is now deploying, we understand, for 7 

months in combat and 7 months rest time. But we wouldn’t have 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
111 

gotten involved if there hadn’t been such a radical departure from 

the norm to deal with the demands of the Iraq war. 

We asked Admiral Mullen today—and Secretary Gates broke his 

arm, apparently, so he wasn’t able to make the hearing. But we 

were told that DOD is going to try to get back to a more traditional 

dwell time. 

I would like to ask you, either of you, if you think that the Corps 

is going to get back to a more traditional ratio of combat versus 

rest. 

General AMOS. Mr. Chairman, we hope to get there. That is certainly the goal of our Commandant. And that is really one of the 

driving factors between the 202K growth, was to try to get us some 

dwell time. 

As you know, our infantry battalions, we have 26 of them right 

now. We will grow to 27 later on this year. The good news story 

is that the two that we built last year down at Camp Lejeune, one 

deploys next month and the other one deploys in September. So 

having just stood both those battalions up, one of them leaves next 

month to go into combat. So that is designed to relieve some of the 

stress and increase the dwell time. 

But there are other units besides our infantry battalions. Our 

EOD personnel, military personnel, our unmanned aerial vehicle 

squadrons, intelligence communications, our truck companies—almost every one of those units are on what we call a 1-to-1 dwell, 

gone 7 months, home 7 months. And even home 7 months, it is a 

little bit of a misnomer, because you have to leave early enough to 

relieve the unit that you are there with. So there is an overlap. So 

truth in lending, they are probably home 61⁄2 months, maybe 6 

months. 

So the dwell is an issue with our Commandant. The forced 

growth will mitigate that and will give us the opportunity to get 

to a 1-to-2. And that is the goal in the long war. As long as our 

country is engaged in this long war, then our goal in the Marine 

Corps is to get to a 1-to-2. We appreciate your help with your approval of the 202K, the support of equipment and buying people. 

That is our solution, to get to a 1-to-2. Our long-range goal in peace 

time is to get to 1-to-3. 

Mr. MORAN. Is there any compensation, General, for Marines 

that have had their dwell time cut short substantially? I am curious, in order to make this surge work, what is the shortest dwell 

time that a Marine combat unit might have experienced, for example? 

General AMOS. I think, as I look back on the ones that have gone 

through this thing, I think the shortest ones are units like our unmanned aerial—what we call VMU, our unmanned aerial squadrons. They fly our UAVs. They are on about a 1-to-.85. And some 

of our communications battalions are that way, simply because we 

just don’t have enough of them. 

Within the unit—and that is just unit now. Within when you 

start talking individual personnel that have unique skills, we have 

some of those folks that are less than a 1-to-1 dwell as well. 

So I think the average is, if you were to pin me down and say, 

writ large, across the Marine Corps what would it be, it would be 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
112 

slightly better than 1-to-1. But the average combat units that you 

see going over there are about a 1-to-1. 

RE-ENLISTMENT BONUSES

Mr. MORAN. In order to meet your recruitment and retention 

goals, you have had to offer substantial cash bonuses, we understand. Do you happen to know how much you have included in the 

budget for that, for the enlistment and re-enlistment bonuses? 

General CASTELLAW. What we are doing—it has been growing 

each year. But we have had great success. We are maintaining, in 

terms of our enlistments, above 90 percent of high school graduates. The quality has not been impacted. We have continually met 

or exceeded the enlistment numbers. 

And we are exceeding our re-enlistment numbers. In fact, we exceeded in this recent year, in 2007, the amount of accessions and 

the amount of re-enlistments by about a total of 2,500 people, more 

than what we had tagged. So we continue to be successful in doing 

that. 

The numbers, the dollars that we have in bonuses now have 

grown from $200 million, in that neighborhood in 2007, they went 

to about $400 million here in 2008, and we are projecting in the 

neighborhood of about $600 million, a little over that, in 2009. So 

we are seeing an increase in the amount that we are putting into 

those things, monetarily, that encourage Marines to re-enlist. 

What we do is we don’t put a lot on the front end. People join 

the Marine Corps to be Marines. On the back end, we are a meritbased organization, and we look for those individuals who want to 

stay, and then that is where we put our bonus dollars. 

Mr. MORAN. You must lose a number of them, though, to private 

security contractors, because they are certainly offering better benefits and much higher pay. Are you looking into competing with 

other means, obviously, but possibly expanding GI benefits, tuition 

credits, small business loans and so on when they get out, in order 

to keep the best people? Because we are not just talking about 

quantity, we are talking about quality, obviously. 

General CASTELLAW. Sir, again, as I indicated to you, we are 

good stewards of the Nation’s resources. We will continually look 

for those things that fit the Marine Corps and what we need to ensure that we keep those quality individuals. But as I indicated, the 

first-term re-enlistment has been up 10 percent over the last year. 

Mr. MORAN. It has been up 10 percent? 

General CASTELLAW. Yes, sir, first term. 

If you look at the second term—and these are the careers, these 

are the people who have already made the decision to stay in—that 

is up 5 percent. So, with what we are doing and with the incentives 

that we are providing, we continue to meet and exceed what our 

goals are. 

So, again, we will do what is necessary to make sure that our 

people get what they deserve and that we maintain the quality 

that the Nation expects of our Marine Corps. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Lewis. 

TWENTYNINE PALMS MARINE CORPS BASE

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
113 

Gentlemen, we very much appreciate your being here. The quality and capability and the importance of the Marine Corps to our 

national security is, I think, obvious to anybody who will look. But 

congratulations for the fabulous job you all are doing. 

From time to time within the Marine Corps budget, after it gets 

through the DOD process and probably OMB process as well, it 

doesn’t give you everything that you might want. So once in a 

while, there is a need for extra funding. Sometimes that extra 

funding is described as an earmark. And far be it from me to suggest that earmarks are important, but I would like to have you perhaps provide some testimony relative to the value of some earmarks that have affected, I think, directly affected the Marine 

Corps. 

That which has happened in Twentynine Palms, that training facility, in recent years is almost entirely the result of earmarks, now 

in excess of something like $100 million over time, including the 

improvement of the ranges, including the creation of the village 

that the President visited not too long ago—a fabulous, fabulous 

training facility, competing very well with the NTC that is just 

down the road. 

So I, frankly, would like to have you react to the money that this 

Committee has seen fit to put in that direction, specifically at the 

Twentynine Palms Marine base, but otherwise as well. The base 

happens to be in my district, so I have a small little prejudice, but 

otherwise. 

General AMOS. Congressman, you are well-known at Twentynine 

Palms. And I would like to comment about that from the training 

perspective and the value added. And then General Castellaw can 

pile on, as our head money man and resource man. 

I have watched that range at Twentynine Palms change from 

when John and I were Captains and we used to not want to go out 

there. In fact, we looked for reasons to miss deployments when our 

squadrons went out there, because it was just—it wasn’t the austerity and it wasn’t the hardness, but it was kind of a combination 

of everything. 

And I will tell you, the training at Twentynine Palms now, in 

fact, it is my all-time favorite base to go visit and spend time with 

Marines out in the field, because it is a first-class—in fact, I think 

it is world quality. I was over in Israel not too long ago, visiting 

their ground forces, looking through training, and they have some 

great facilities, but they pale in comparison to Twentynine Palms. 

And I would agree with you, I think it easily rivals NTC. It now 

has joint certification from Joint Forces Command; I think you 

know that. That gives us a lot of capabilities to tap into joint capabilities across this country, to include a T10 line which now allows 

data passing in virtual simulation all across America all tied into 

a single command post at Twentynine Palms, if that is where we 

want to put it. 

But the villages, for those of you who haven’t been there, the villages that have been built there, the money that has been given 

to the Marine Corps to hire Iraqi role-players, we have what we 

call a military operations in urban terrain, a MOUT facility, we 

have several of them, where we train our battalions. But we have 

one that is about half done up in the very northern part, as you 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
114 

know. And that has been—we have been the beneficiary of that 

earmark. And that will be—I don’t know what is the largest in our 

country, but I haven’t seen any larger or any more capable than 

that will be. 

So the entire facility at Twentynine Palms is becoming a gem in 

the Marine Corps. And to be honest with you, had it not been for 

this Committee and your strong support, Congressman Lewis, it 

could have just atrophied and been the way it was when General 

Castellaw and I were youngsters. So I think it has been a grand 

slam home run, and it is exciting to go out there. Thank you. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you. 

General CASTELLAW. Sir, I was in Iraq over the holidays, and I 

had the opportunity to go on a patrol with some Marines who had 

benefitted from the training out at Twentynine Palms. And I was 

in a MRAP as we were moving around. And they gave personal testimony—I am a Southern Baptist, so I put a lot into testimony— 

of the training, the use that they got out of that training there. 

So that is what we need to continue to be successful, is to have 

those opportunities and those facilities that are world-class that 

allow us to be successful, just like those people, those Marines and 

Sailors I was with in Iraq. So thank you. 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, we all know the role that the Marine Corps has 

played in theater. They are our point. But in the meantime, when 

it comes to budget time in DOD, oftentimes they end up with the 

short end of the stick. And there are very important items that 

ought to be funded that oftentimes are left off the table, things like 

housing and otherwise. I mean, the work that this Committee has 

done with that facility, beyond the ranges, beyond the village, but 

providing adequate housing, trying to satisfy some of the fundamental needs of the families that are out there really in the boondocks, the Committee has done a good job. So thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Lewis. And you make a very 

good point, that there wouldn’t have to be some of these earmarks 

if the priorities were built into the budget in the first place. And 

this may be one of those case where it should have been. 

Mr. LEWIS. More funding for defense all across the board. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Lewis. 

Mr. Bishop. 

PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT SETS

Mr. BISHOP. Yes, sir. 

Gentlemen, welcome. 

I have a couple of questions. I am interested in the prepositioned 

equipment sets. The Marine Corps drew upon the prepositioned 

equipment sets to sustain your operations in Iraq to outfit the new 

units that were standing up as a part of the end-strength increase. 

And just this past December, our staff visited the Marine 

prepositioning program and viewed the equipment there, and it 

was apparent that the set in Norway is not currently being rebuilt. 

So my questions are, what is the readiness posture of the maritime prepositioning squadrons? What will be the impact of the proposed increase in end strength in the units on the plan to reset the 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
115 

Marine Corps prepositioned equipment sets? What is the timeline 

to have all of the prepositioned sets returned to their desired readiness? And do you have sufficient depot and production capacity 

available? Do you have enough money to do it? And do you intend 

to add the MRAP vehicles to the prepositioned equipment sets? 

General AMOS. Congressman, I will do my best to try to remember all that, but let me start with the ones right on the back side 

of it. 

There is no attempt, there is no plan right now to put the MRAP 

vehicles on prepositioned ships. That doesn’t mean it may not happen, but we are working through exactly what we are going to do 

with our MRAPs to be good stewards of them, where they will likely need to be used around the world. There will be other places 

that MRAPs, I promise you, that MRAPs will be the vehicle of 

choice, the same way they are on the major highways in Iraq right 

now in the very dangerous part. But right now, today, there is not 

a plan to put MRAPs on there. We have three—— 

Mr. BISHOP. Is there a reason why there isn’t a plan for MRAPs? 

General AMOS. Well, there is, sir, because they are very large, 

they take up an enormous amount of room. And when we have an 

MPS ship, that whole squadron, that five—some MPS waters are 

six ships; a couple of them are five—and that equipment is tailored 

for a Marine Expeditionary Brigade that is going to be employed 

coming across the beach in an assault echelon kind of operation, or, 

excuse me, a sustainment kind of operation. 

It doesn’t mean, again, we can’t put it on there, but it does mean 

that we would probably take MRAPs, if I was guessing right now, 

put them on other naval shipping and get them into the theater if 

the theater-specific requirement was there for that. I mean, it is a 

great vehicle. We are very appreciative of it. To date, I don’t believe 

we have lost a single Marine in any of the MRAPs that have been 

attacked. I don’t think we have lost a single one. So it has been 

a huge success story, and we are very grateful. 

The three MPS squadrons’ worth of ships, each with a brigade’s 

worth of sustainment vehicles, equipment, tanks, artillery, water, 

ammunition, engineering supplies, one of them even has Navy Seabees gear on it, we have hospitalization gear in some of them—we 

have three of those. MPS–3, the one in Diego Garcia, is 100 percent. MPS–1, which is sourced off the East Coast, normally in the 

Mediterranean, that is down, as of today, down to around 42 percent. A couple of ships are down at Blount Island right now. The 

remainder of those ships will come in by June, and we expect 

MPS–1 to be back up to about 80 percent of its principal end items. 

So MPS–1 will get up to 80 percent. We would like to get it to 

100 percent, but we are cross-loading equipment, much of which 

you bought for us. 

Mr. BISHOP. Do you have enough money to get it up to 100? 

General AMOS. I don’t think—well, I am going to let John answer 

that. 

Mr. BISHOP. That would help us, I mean, because we want you 

to be reset. And we don’t want to be caught with the proverbial 

pants down in the future. 

General CASTELLAW. Sir, we have benefitted and are benefitting 

and will benefit from approximately $10 billion in each of the last 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
116 

2 years. And when we talk about in the baseline, the money that 

we got for grow-the-force and also the money that has been designated for reset. 

The Marine Corps has a lot of wants and needs, and so what we 

do is we prioritize where we need it to go. So the guy and the gal 

who is in the gun fight gets the stuff first. We give them the best 

that they got. Anybody that goes to Afghanistan or Iraq or Africa 

or deploys with the 31st MEU and the WESTPAC have the best 

equipment that the Marine Corps can provide. Then we go down 

through the other priorities. And as the equipment comes in, then 

it goes to those priorities. 

We stood up, as General Amos indicated, two battalions, infantry 

battalions, last year. And we had other units that stood up, as well. 

This year we will stand up another infantry battalion and other additional units. In the coming, as we grow the force, will, in 2009, 

20 additional units, plus reinforcements. 

Mr. BISHOP. Well, I guess my question really is, do you have the 

resources that you need to make all of those units meet the high 

standards of readiness at the time that they are stood up, or do we 

need to try to look at trying to give some additional resources, 

make some additional resources available for that? 

General CASTELLAW. As we stand up these units, we are matching the equipment. Right now, what we have to look at, in addition 

to getting the money, is whether or not the industry and the others 

can actually provide the equipment. So, right now through 2007 

and 2008 and going into 2009, we have the pipes full. It takes anywhere from 18 to 48 months to deliver equipment. So, right now, 

we are pretty well filled, in terms of the pipes. 

Now, we will continue, as we see what goes on in Afghanistan, 

as we see what goes on in other parts of the world, as we look at 

what attrition we may have on the equipment we got, then we will 

identify those additional assets that we are going to require. 

Mr. BISHOP. But, basically, what you are saying is you have the 

equipment for the deployed forces, and the nondeployed forces, 

though, are not at readiness in terms of equipment? 

General CASTELLAW. We have not filled up all of the equipment 

sets here in CONUS, and we have not completed the reset. Again, 

as the stuff comes in, as I indicated, the guys going to the fight get 

it, and then we are putting it in as we can with the remaining priorities. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

HOUSING CONDITIONS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, let me compliment some of those who support you 

greatly. Your Marine Corps league in my State is second to none. 

And I have Pete Haas as one of my constituents. And some of those 

Marines may be 80 years old, but they would re-up if they could. 

They are enormously proud of their service. 

And I know Congressman Young and Beverly have done some 

fantastic things with the Marines. But the way that you look after 

one another—we have had some losses in our State, and the way 

the Marines wrap themselves around the families of those who are 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
117 

lost, I mean, I wish it could be emulated by some of the services, 

other services. I am not criticizing the other services, but it is truly 

remarkable. 

A couple of questions, not in order of priority. 

A couple of years ago, I was out at Camp Pendleton. Anything 

been done about those gang barracks? I know Marines never complain. I know you have other financial priorities. But some of those 

guys who come back, I was led to believe, and I saw it myself, some 

of those conditions were pretty deplorable. Any improvements that 

you can report? And have we been giving the means for you to take 

care of some of that. 

General CASTELLAW. Sir, that it is a very good observation. In 

fact, even today we had some people praying that the fires out in 

California would take away some of those barracks earlier. 

But the good news is this, is that by 2012 we will have achieved 

our initial goal of the BEQs. And what we are going at is a 2.0, 

we call it, which means that for every two individuals they share 

no more than one head facility. So that process is in work. $2 billion is what we are going to be spending on MILCON this coming 

year. We have projects at every location in the Marine Corps right 

now, in terms of—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I know you never complain. 

General CASTELLAW. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But, you know, having seen it firsthand, 

something needs to be done. I mean, they deserve better. If you are 

married and you have some sort of quarters, that is something else. 

But for some of these people, I mean, full speed ahead. 

General CASTELLAW. Sir, we have 9,000 spots that we need to fill 

in family housing. After this coming year, we will be down to about 

5,000. Our goal—and Commandant is beating us on the head just 

like you are to get the projects under contract and get to this 2.0 

for the enlisted and to get the family housing deficits down to as 

low as possible. 

TRAINING BASE IN GUAM

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. A brief comment. I don’t think Guam will 

know what will happen when—was it 8,000 or 9,000 Marines are 

going to Guam? Could you tell us a little bit about that? They are 

going from Okinawa to Guam. Could you tell us a little bit about 

that move, how you are going to pay for it, you know, what those 

Marines are going to be doing? 

General AMOS. Why don’t I take the first part of that? 

The final details on the plan are not that; they are not finalized. 

It appears that we have a force layout in the Pacific now moving 

a big chunk of Marines and our Sailors that are part of the Marine 

team off of Okinawa and some of them to Hawaii, a large percentage of them, roughly 10,000, to Guam. 

There are training ranges up the Northern Marianas training islands that we are trying to build into a collaborative training base. 

In other words, you could put a couple of battalions’ worth of Marines and an artillery battery and a couple of helicopter or V–22 

squadrons and you may be pretty limited in your ability to be able 

to train there. So you need the ability to get off island to do some 

of that. So we are developing, right now, the training plan on how 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
118 

we would use that. We have yet to begin the environmental studies, which are required, as you know. 

So that is our plan. It does look like we are going to go to Guam. 

It does look like a good fit for us. We will need some help with the 

Northern Marianas training areas for training ranges to develop 

capabilities. But I think we are going to head in that direction, sir, 

but it is not finalized. 

MRAP

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The figures that I heard for all the military 

are in the billions of dollars. And I wasn’t promoting earmarks, but 

obviously it is one of those things that has to be put in the overall 

mix to consider funding. 

I just want to shift just back to what Mr. Bishop sort of was involved in, the MRAPs. I mean, we have thrown our arms around 

the MRAPs for the reasons that have been well-described. They 

have minimized casualties. 

The Army seems to be moving ahead with fairly large buys. How 

would you characterize where the Marines are in that regard? And 

if you aren’t doing it as aggressively, are there strategic and other 

reasons that you are not? 

General AMOS. Sir, again, I want to shout this from the rooftops 

of Congress and say thank you, because I don’t know in 37 years 

of being a Marine I have ever seen anything move either through 

the industrial base or through the Department of Defense or OSD 

or even Congress that has moved as fast as an MRAP has. So it 

has been a tremendously good news story. 

Honest to goodness, Marines love them. They feel very good 

when they are in them. When you think about the casualties we 

suffered with IEDs over the last 3 or 4 years, and we haven’t had 

that. I visited Iraq in November, looked at two staff sergeants and 

a corpsman. And you may have seen the picture of their MRAP. It 

was turned over on its side. It was one of the medium-sized ones; 

it wasn’t a small one. The whole engine was out about 50 yards 

away, the front chassis was blown off, and it was on its side. And 

these were the three lives that were in it, and they stood there 

next to the vehicle and talked to me. They were just completely— 

I mean, they were fine and very appreciative. 

So we love the vehicle. The situation, the Al Anbar province has 

worked in our favor, as you know. And what we found, not having 

deployed MRAPs over there except small numbers on the highways 

for road clearance missions, what we found when we put them 

down to our units, our companies and platoons, and we tried to go 

off road with some of them, you can get stuck. So they are really 

not off-road vehicles. 

And so there is also a piece of this that—I remember going into 

Rawah, and we drove in there on the outskirts of the town, and everybody said, ‘‘Okay, get out.’’ Okay, we are going to get out, and 

we are going to walk on a foot patrol with the platoon that was 

there. And the reason they walked is because they didn’t want to 

send the wrong signal, because the people of the town now believed 

that they were part of the solution and they were part of the family 

to help them. If you drive through there all gunned up and protected, you are sending probably the signal you don’t want to send. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
119 

So that is kind of the chemistry that has happened where we are. 

It is not necessarily that way in other areas of Iraq, as you know. 

So as we took a look at that, we took a look at some of the mobility 

and the off-road mobility. We said, okay, how many do we need? 

And the original buy was 3,700. That is still a program of record 

for us. We are going, as you know, to the JROC to get approval to 

lower that number to 2,225. We have every intention of putting— 

it is a little bit less than 300 of them into what we call our table 

of equipment for our engineers, our EOD folks, explosive ordinance 

disposal, you know, folks that do road clearance. So that will become a permanent part of the Marine Corps and will be an enduring requirement for that. 

The rest, we are going to put some in Afghanistan when we go 

in there next month. And we are working on the exact numbers of 

that right now. We may end up taking a large slice of that into Afghanistan. We have, I think I looked today, and we have something 

around 900 or so MRAPs that have gone into the Marine zone, 919 

as of yesterday. 

So we like them; they are successful. But there are limitations 

on where you can go. Especially in some of the real small urban 

areas, you can’t get around a corner in that thing. 

So I think the next question would be, well, okay, what are you 

going to do with them, Marine Corps? And, first of all, I want to 

promise you that we are going to be good stewards of that, the 

same way we are all the rest of our gear. And I suspect we are 

probably going to take some of these, preserve them, have them 

forward deployed, maybe in the CENTCOM, Central Command, 

area. If we ever go into nasty little places like Somalia again, boy, 

MRAPs would be the one thing that everybody would be clamoring 

for. 

So I think you are going to see some forward and stores kind of 

things, some prepositioned equipment there, and we will bring 

some back to America. But we are going to take good care of them. 

It is yet to be seen exactly what we are going to do with them. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

Mr. Dicks. 

TRAINERS FOR MRAPS

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

And I appreciate your being here, and sorry I couldn’t be here 

for your testimony. 

On the MRAP, when we did the up-armored Humvees and some 

of those things, we bought some trainers. And as I understand it, 

there is only one trainer Marine Corps has for MRAP. And apparently these things are a little, somewhat, as you suggest, a little 

bit difficult to handle. 

Do you think trainers would make any sense here, in order to get 

people prepared to use the MRAP when they are in country? 

General AMOS. Sir, I think I know what you are talking about. 

We had a couple, we call, surrogate vehicles out at Twentynine 

Palms. They look like an MRAP. I am not sure whether they were 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
120 

built by the same company, but they looked and kind of smelled 

like one. But they really weren’t one, in that they weren’t—— 

Mr. DICKS. Actually, I think they do these, kind of, in a trailer. 

And like they do with the up-armored Humvees, they have a trailer, and then the person is in there. 

General AMOS. A simulator. 

Mr. DICKS. Yes, in a simulator. He thinks he is driving the thing. 

And then introduce different scenarios to the driver. 

General AMOS. Congressman, I don’t know of an MRAP simulator, but I know exactly what you are talking about with our 

seven-ton vehicles. They are called MTVRs, our big trucks. And we 

have those; we have them out at Twentynine Palms. And they— 

I mean, that is—because we have rolled some of these seven-ton 

trucks. And you hurt a lot of Marines when you do that. 

And so we absolutely have gotten a lot of value out of that. We 

have bought some. I can’t tell you how many we put, but we put 

some in Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton. I can’t tell you how 

many we have and would it be better to have more. 

Mr. DICKS. Let me send you something on this, just so you can 

take a look at it. 

General CASTELLAW. Thank you. 

V–22

Mr. DICKS. The other thing is, how is the Osprey doing? 

General CASTELLAW. Sir, the V–22 is doing great. I also had an 

opportunity to fly around Anbar in a V–22 that we have deployed 

with the squadron over there. It compresses the battlespace. I am 

an old frog pilot, which is an endearing name for a CH–46, which 

is what the V–22 replaced. The frog does 120 knots; the V–22 does 

240. Plus, it can go anywhere in Iraq without refueling and return. 

Mr. DICKS. I understand General Petraeus wants one, is that 

right? 

General CASTELLAW. Well, sir, we flew him around. He wanted 

to get around and see the troops over the holidays, and there 

wasn’t any other aircraft that could take him in the time allotted 

to the locations he wanted to go. He would have to have done a 

combination fixed wing and rotary wing. With a V–22, you can go 

anywhere in Iraq, as I indicated. 

So the aircraft is being used in all the assault missions that we 

have that type of aircraft for, plus in expanding the usage of it. The 

maintenance man-hours per flight hours is 9. To give you a comparison, the 46 is over 20. The 53 is 40. 

Mr. DICKS. Is that the one that leaked from the ceiling, the oil 

dripped down? 

General CASTELLAW. Sir, if a helicopter doesn’t leak, it doesn’t 

have any oil in it. 

Mr. DICKS. I have been on a lot of Black Hawks. I have never 

been on one that leaked, okay. But I was out there at San Diego, 

and we were on some Marine Corps helicopters about 15 years ago, 

and they were just drip, drip, drip. 

General CASTELLAW. That was probably a 53. They leak more 

than 46s. But yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. I was just concerned. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
121 

General CASTELLAW. As I said, sir, if it is not leaking, no oil. So 

you were all right. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. We did survive. 

General CASTELLAW. But, again, 53 is over 40 maintenance manhours per flight hours. So the reliability and the readiness of the 

aircraft is doing well also. 

We will deploy the second squadron to replace the first squadron 

later on this year. And then the third one will go over after that. 

And so we are well along in the process of transitioning. 

Mr. DICKS. How many of these are we going to buy? How many 

is the Marine Corps going to buy? 

General CASTELLAW. 360 MV–22s. 

Mr. DICKS. Where are we now in that buy? 

General CASTELLAW. We have delivered approximately sixty. 

Mr. DICKS. Sixty? 

General CASTELLAW. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Has anybody ever thought about a multiyear on this? 

General CASTELLAW. Sir, we are that close right now to a 

multiyear. And NAVAIR is negotiating with Boeing. We expect to 

hear any day that we closed the deal on the multiyear. 

In 2009, we are going to thirty. That is the number that we want 

to maintain, thirty aircraft. That will allow us to transition two 

squadrons a year, which is what our goal is. 

Mr. DICKS. I understand one of them had an emergency landing 

due to a hydraulic leak. Do we know what that is all about, and 

can we get that fixed? 

General CASTELLAW. Yes, sir. On one of the control surfaces 

there is an actuator, and there was a leak in that actuator. There 

are three hydraulic systems on the V–22, so you have triple redundancy. Everything worked. But the rules are that if you have any 

kind of a leak or any indication that you may have a problem, then 

you land. And so that aircraft landed at Greenville. It was repaired 

and flew home the next day. 

Mr. DICKS. They say you also had a second one that had the 

same problem, and it had a hard landing a few months ago. Can 

you comment on that? 

General CASTELLAW. Sir, the one I remember that had the hard 

landing, it was not that particular issue. We did have one that had 

a hard landing at Camp Lejeune. And that was the exact reason 

it had the hard landing. Right now it doesn’t appear to be associated with the issue that it was experiencing. 

Mr. DICKS. If we buy these at a rate of 30 a year, can we get 

the cost down even further, do you think? 

General CASTELLAW. Well, that is what we expect to see when we 

get this multiyear signed. Again, 30 is what that will cover. It will 

cover 2008, which we bought 21. And then 2009 and on is 30. And 

the multiyear should bring the cost down. 

Mr. DICKS. So that would be requested in the 2010 budget, do 

you think? Would you request the multiyear next year, or could 

Congress—— 

General CASTELLAW. Sir, you have already approved us going to 

a multiyear. You have already, in your legislation, allowed us to do 

the negotiation. So you are expecting us to close the deal on this 

multiyear. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
122 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Dicks. 

Mr. Tiahrt. 

REMARKS OF MR. TIAHRT

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Last December, the Department of Defense released statistics 

about casualties in Iraq. And this is before we have had such great 

success over the last year in reducing the amount of casualties. 

And they listed them by service. The least amount of casualties 

was the Navy, if I recall correctly, then the Air Force, the Army. 

The most amount of casualties was the Marine Corps. 

But they also put in there the statistics for an African American 

male living in Philadelphia between the ages of 18 and 25. And it 

was safer to be a Marine in Al Anbar province than it was to be 

living in Philadelphia, which I found startling. So I think it is a 

great tribute to the Marine Corps, to the training and the leadership that you guys have provided. 

And while we are mentioning training, General Regner and I 

went to the Philippines back in 2000, I think it was. He was a colonel at that time. When we landed and were trying to get some 

things done, he bumped into a colonel in the Philippine Army that 

he recognized from a class at Fort Leavenworth, which opened a 

lot of doors for us, as I recall. That kind of training I think is very 

important, because you don’t know where this Global War on Terror is going to take us next time. And to be able to get off an airplane and look somebody in the eye and remember his name when 

they serve under another country’s flag is very valuable. So please 

keep that in the budget. 

I think Congressman Frelinghuysen talked a lot about how the 

Marines will do with what they got. And when it comes to housing, 

a decade ago Dave Hobson held hearings in the MILCON Subcommittee, and we brought in your top-ranking sergeant in the 

Corps. And we asked him about military housing, and he kept repeating, ‘‘Sir, we are going to do the best we can with what you 

give us.’’ And, you know, I admire that, but also we need to know 

the truth about where the shortfalls are, because if it is equipment, 

if it is housing, if it is something we can do for the families, for 

the troops, I think we all want to do that. 

One of the things I think we need to do for your boys and girls 

that are coming back is to get some kind of screening for post-traumatic stress syndrome. These kind of things are not well-liked. 

Most people, even if they are suffering from some traumatic event, 

are not going to admit it. So I think you ought to put some kind 

of system in place that gets everybody to take some of the stigma 

away. 

This kind of stuff can fester for years. I have in Wichita, Kansas, 

a VA hospital. There are Vietnam vets that I have met that are 

still suffering from PTSD here some, in some cases, 40 years later, 

30 years later. Some kids it is going to hurt. They come back, and 

it festers. It ends up their families suffer as well. If it is caught, 

I think we can make a difference for these kids. And I think it is 

something you ought to consider. As everybody comes through, take 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
123 

the stigma away, everybody gets a screening, so that we get a 

chance to save them from a life of misery, because that can happen. 

I am also concerned about how we see cities like Berkeley reject 

the Corps, reject the military. The mayor of Toledo did something 

recently to turn down a military exercise for the Marine Corps. I 

know my own cousins that are older than I am that came back 

from Vietnam, some of them were spit on when they came back to 

the country, and they felt that kind of rejection. And I have to 

think that some of the problems that these Vietnam vets have are 

related to that rejection that they felt from their country. And I 

don’t want that to happen again. 

So if there is anything we can do to work out that. I think we 

have great support in this country for the troops. But I am concerned when I see some of these things popping up. And we need 

to figure out a way to work with those cities to make sure that this 

doesn’t fester and become a problem as well. 

I don’t really have a question. I think you guys do a great job. 

I want to thank you for the training, the way you bring as many 

as you can home safe. And I admire the job you do. Thank you. 

General AMOS. Sir, would you mind if I made a comment about 

a couple of those points, if that is all right, Mr. Chairman? 

Commandant Hagee, I guess probably about 3 years ago, made 

the determination with regards to BEQs and how our Marines 

were living, our bachelor Marines. And we had paid bills over years 

with military construction money. And the person that ended up— 

the group of young Marines that ended up being on the receiving 

end of that, negatively, were a lot of our young enlisted Marines 

with building and barracks. And so you are absolutely right to be 

concerned about that. 

But General Hagee, I think it was 3 years ago, said—because 

this plan that General Castellaw talked about, about completing all 

the construction and getting the Marines in the right kinds of 

rooms, was going to go out. I mean, it was out in 2015, 2016, 2017, 

because we just kind of kept shoving it to the right of the FYDP. 

And General Hagee said, ‘‘Drag it in, men.’’ And that is exactly 

what has happened. 

So the decision was made several years ago under General 

Hagee’s leadership, let’s build these out so you have all our young 

E1s through E3s are living two to a room and all our corporals, E4s 

and above, are living in a single room. They have their own head. 

And so that is what is going to be accomplished by 2012. 

Well, in the meantime now, we are going to grow the force, so 

we need more of that. And I think the numbers were, somewhere 

out in 2014, we will have completed the rest of the military construction. 

But I just want you to know that from the building side of the 

house, for our young enlisted Marines, help is on the way. And you 

can see it at places like Camp Lejeune. I haven’t been to Pendleton 

in a while, but I will tell you, when I was at Lejeune as the commander, we broke ground on two battalions’ worth of barracks that 

were appropriated out of this Committee, brand-spanking-new 

ones. And we were gutting and renovating the other ones. So, truly, 

help is on the way on that. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
124 

Regarding base housing—I am at Quantico now. And I had not 

been here for 4 or 5 years. I had been out doing other things in 

the Marine Corps. Came back, and all the, what I consider to be, 

kind of nasty housing that we put our Captains and Majors in 

while they are going to school down there, professional military 

schools, they are all gone. They are living in townhouses that any 

of us in here would go, ‘‘Well, I would like to put my family in 

there.’’ They are absolutely beautiful. I was at Miramar last week 

and saw the new housing that is going up at Miramar. 

So help is on the way, with regards to housing. And our current 

Commandant has got the attention of his three-stars to make this 

happen. So we appreciate your help on getting that. And I think 

it is a good news story. 

The PTSD screening, several years ago we went back in, in 

March of 2004. We didn’t understand it. It was kind of a soft side 

of the Marine Corps that, quite honestly, probably a lot of us just 

went, ‘‘I don’t know that we need to go there.’’ That is not the case 

anymore. We have got programs, our OSCAR program, where we 

are embedding mental health professionals in our deploying battalions, Naval officers that are mental health professionals in our deploying battalions. 

We screen all our Marines, every single one, when they come out 

of Iraq to go to Kuwait for a couple of days to kind of get reoriented, turn their gear in and get cleaned up. And during that period of time, they do their first post-deployment health survey. 

Now, they can lie and cheat on that, I understand that. But what 

we found was we are catching some kids that have some symptoms 

and have some issues, that we are starting to pick it up there. 

What we found, about a year and a half ago, was that some of 

these symptoms didn’t start showing up until sometimes 3, 6, 8 

months later. So we now go out at about the 180-day mark and we 

bring these Marines back in by name, we track them by Social Security number, and we make them do it again. So we are screening 

them. 

There are probably other things we need to be doing. But this 

has caught our attention, because it is real. TBI is real. And my 

sense in the fleet is that we are past the point of manliness on this. 

In other words, we have some great Marines that are very courageous that are feeling the effects of some of this stuff, and they are 

coming forward. And so we are past the point of ‘‘I am a little bit 

ashamed, I have a stigma.’’ I am not saying it is completely gone, 

but I think we are headed in the right direction, sir. 

CONTRACTORS/CONTRACTING

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much. 

And, General, I appreciate your comments on travel by helicopter. On contractor provided services, is there a process or rules 

for as far as a cost evaluation of the discreet services they provide 

that can’t be provided by civilian employees? And the reason I ask 

is that, excepting out inflation, service contracts for these sort of 

services have grown by about 75 percent in the last 10 years. And 

I am just wondering if you could comment on that. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
125 

General CASTELLAW. Yes, sir. Any contracting we do, we go 

through an evaluation process. What we have really tried to do is 

to free up Marines so that we can use them in their primary duties. 

So when we look at any particular areas that we are looking at potentially contracting out, that is the first thing. Are there Marines 

that we can take and we can reassign them and get them into 

units where, again, they use what they signed up to do? We have 

a process also where we continually review that because you get a 

contract to, say, provide the contract for chow hall support at Cherry Point, North Carolina, it is continually reviewed. And if they 

don’t meet the standards, it can be recompeted and we can bring 

somebody else in. So there is a set of standards in place. There is 

a process in place where we try to ensure that we get the best buck 

for the dollar and that, where it is appropriate, that we use contracts. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Is there a determination when you make those 

evaluations as to whether or not you should do it in-house with 

other civilian employees who are on a permanent basis? 

General CASTELLAW. Sir, there is a process called A–76, and you 

are probably at least somewhat familiar with it. And what we look 

to see is whether it is inherently governmental or not. If it is inherently governmental, we are going to continue to do it with Marines 

or with government civilians. If it is not, then we’ll look at contracting it out and using that type of support in order to accomplish the mission. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. So, in a sense, 10 years ago, you had, from what 

you are saying, Marines doing a lot more nongovernmental functions than they probably should have been at that time, and they 

can be replaced by independent service contractors? 

General CASTELLAW. What we did is looked at areas on where we 

could again free Marines up to do their primary MOS. When General Amos and I came in, Marines were doing chow hall duty and 

cleaning plates and carrying out the garbage and doing stuff like 

that. That is one thing that we contracted out. And I haven’t met 

a Marine yet who wasn’t happy that we didn’t do it. So that is 

what we continue to look for, is for opportunities like that. 

Mr. DICKS. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. It also gives the Marines the chance to train in their 

unit and do the thing, as you suggested, that they signed up for. 

This was one of the things, I mean, there was a lot of criticism 20 

years ago in the military reform group about, there were so many 

people doing this other kind of work and that this was a better way 

to go. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Do you find contractors working beside uniform 

personnel in instances doing essentially the same jobs on occasion? 

General CASTELLAW. In most cases, no. Again, I will stay with 

the example of the chow hall. What you will have is you will have 

a Marine that is running the chow hall. He will be in charge. It 

will be usually a senior staff NCO. We will also have cooks there 

that will work alongside the cooks that are from that particular 

contracting organization. Why? It is because when we go to the 

field and when we deploy and when we do our expeditionary thing, 

we need cooks that know how to do that. So there will be cases like 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
126 

this where, yes, they will be working alongside them. But it will 

be for a good reason because we want to use them in our primary 

role which is to be an expeditionary force in readiness. 

DWELL TIME

Mr. VISCLOSKY. On dwell time, apparently the practice of the 

current period of time with the Marine Corps is 7 months and 7 

months. And with the Army, it is about a year and a year. Any reason as to the differential? And do you see benefits with the 7 

months, or is this something particular with the corps that works 

better for you than a year and a year? 

General CASTELLAW. Let me take a shot at that, and then General Amos will jump in. I think it is our view and then both of our 

spouses are heavily involved in working with the families of Marines and Sailors that belong to these organizations. And I can tell 

you that for us 7 month chunks are about right. With 7 months, 

you still have the opportunity to see the light at the end of the tunnel, to come back. And even if you are on a one-to-one—and again 

it is really—most Army units are on a one-to-one, too. Theirs just 

happens to be 12 months or—gone and 12 months back. But what 

we are finding in the Marine Corps is that it is better for us morale-wise and produces less stress on our families. Again, it is our 

culture, because we grew up with all these 6-month deployments. 

For 20 years, I deployed 6 or 7 months at a time aboard ships 

going to the Mediterranean. So that is a type of culture and environment that we understand and we know how to plan our lives 

around. And it continues to work for us. 

General AMOS. Our regimental headquarters, all of the headquarters that are commanded by colonels and generals are there 

for 13 months. In other words, so we rotate the units underneath 

them. The battalions and the squadrons come in for 7 months and 

go out. You know, they are on the 7-month rotation. The only reason why the headquarters are not on 7-month rotations is we want 

continuity. In other words, we don’t want the disruption. We don’t 

want seams that the enemy could exploit. So we put the headquarters—and we just said, you have to suck it up. You are there 

for 13 months. And during that 13 months, they get to come home 

for 2 weeks back in the continental United States. I mean, it is not 

like 2 days traveling, you know, going one way in 2 days instead 

of 3, so you are really home for 10 days. It is when you hit home, 

you hit your home for 2 weeks. Many years ago, in Vietnam, we 

would go over there for 3 months. And that is a long time. I did 

not go to Vietnam, but I got in at the tail end of it. And I was gone 

for 13 months as a young married lieutenant, and it was a long, 

long 13 months. 

As General Castellaw said, 7 months, Marines just appreciate it. 

When the Commandant came out and he kind of dug in on that 

thing and said Marines are going to go for 7 months, you couldn’t 

hear it, but you can imagine the high fives that went up around 

the Marine Corps from all the young corporals and sergeants and 

lieutenants who said, good, the Commandant is taking care of me 

and my family. So it is a morale issue, and it works for us. That 

is probably about as good an answer as I can give you, sir. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. One more question on the same theme—— 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
127 

Mr. LEWIS. That question was great. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I found that the culture had been essentially the 

6-month rotation, but I find that interesting, yeah. On dwell times, 

given the stress and the responsibilities you have, are many of 

those being cut short, or are you seeing in some instances less 

dwell time at home for members of the Marine Corps? And if so, 

how do you try to compensate for that when it does occur? 

General AMOS. Sir, we have units that are what we call one-toone. We have a couple of units that are a little bit less than oneto-one simply because they are one-of-a-kind organizations. For instance, our unmanned aerial squadrons or UAV squadrons, we 

have only got two of them. Now, one of the things that has happened is we are buying more UAVs, and we are going to, 202k 

growth is going to give us some more bodies. So now we will have 

the equivalent numbers of people where we can parcel them out. 

But right now, they are gone for 7 months, excuse me, yeah, gone 

for 7 months and home whatever .85 of 7 is. Something probably 

around 6 months. And then they go again. 

So we do have some units that are less than that. Our explosive 

ordnance disposal, the military police, intelligence, human intelligence, UAV, some of our helicopter squadrons are 1 to 1. Our infantry battalions are 1 to 1.2, yet we still have infantry battalions 

that are home for 1 to 2. But the average across the 26 active battalions we have right now is 1 to 1.2. So there are some that are 

less than one-to-one. We are going to 1 to 2 with the 202k growth. 

When we get up to 202k growth, assuming we don’t spread ourselves real, real thin, much thinner than we are right now, then 

we will find ourselves to a 1 to 2 dwell across the Marine Corps. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you. But we are going to have to start speeding this up a bit because we are told that we may have votes at 

3:20, in about 10 minutes. 

Mr. Kingston. 

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, I wanted to ask you about, and I am not sure who 

wants the question, But in terms of recruiting and retention, I understand that you have met your recruiting and retention goals. 

But the GAO said that there are some shortages in occupational 

specialties, human care, human intelligence collection, explosive 

ordnance disposal. Is that correct? And what is being done about 

that? 

General AMOS. Sir, you are absolutely right. We have met our 

goals. We are ahead of them as a matter of fact. Some of those, like 

linguist human intelligence, explosive ordnance disposal, when you 

become an EOD Marine, you generally go up, you come up through 

the ordnance field. You are doing business in ordnance. And by the 

time you become a sergeant and you have shown a level of maturity that you can go off to school and then become, and if you have 

the inclination, then we will send you off to explosive ordnance disposal school. So it is a little bit like buying vehicles, putting them 

under contract. It takes each unit 36 months before you can finally 

get them out the other end. That is what happens with some of 

these folks. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
128 

Signals intelligence or cryptologists, EOD, that takes a lot of 

schooling. And we generally will put some young guys in every now 

and then, but usually there is a level of maturity that we want to 

have to begin with to go in there, as you might imagine, if you are 

going to go out there and do some of this either intellectually or 

some of the physical things, like our EOD folks. So, there are. The 

202k build when it is done is going to satisfy our requirements for 

what we, all these low density, high-demand kind of MOSs. But the 

truth is, even in 2011, when we finish 202k, there will probably 

still be some shortages in some of those unique MOSs while we 

grow; in other words, while we mature those select kind of Marines 

to go into those fields simply because it takes a lot longer to train 

them and a higher level of maturity than it does for just a basic 

mechanic. 

Mr. KINGSTON. When you recruit someone the first time, what is 

your targeted group? I mean, just generally, to get it, when I say 

‘‘first time,’’ generally to get them in the Marines without any specialty or anything like that? What do you look for? And specifically, 

I am wondering about second-generation service members. If their 

parents were in, does that make the recruit probably more likely 

as a target to join? 

General AMOS. You know, I am a second-generation; my dad was 

in the Navy. He didn’t talk to me for many years when I joined the 

Marines, but he loves me now. I don’t know. My children are not 

and I don’t—I am not a recruiter, so I probably can’t answer that 

precisely. I will tell you, though, that our target audiences, the 

young 18, 20-year-old man or woman, high school graduate and as 

you know, the DOD standard is 90 percent. We are over 95 percent. We recruit a very high mental group. When I say that in public, people look and they go, that is an oxymoron, you are the Marines, what do you mean getting a very high mental group? But we 

do, we do. And we attract a small segment of our society that likes 

physical—you know, they are physically inclined, and they want to 

be challenged. 

Mr. KINGSTON. How does something like what happened in 

Berkeley affect—what is—do you just kind of ignore the City Council and their silliness, or does it just annoy you to the extent that 

you want to react or at least among peers verbally react? 

Mr. MORAN. Let’s make the answer short because we have votes. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, everybody else has been having 10 

or 15 minutes. This is an extremely good question and you know 

it. And it will be my last one. 

Mr. MORAN. How long—— 

Mr. KINGSTON. The Chairman is real interested in this answer. 

General AMOS. Honest to goodness, the—once we kind of—it certainly takes a Marine and immediately, you know, your veins begin 

to pop out, and then you settle down and you take a look. And 

what is interesting for us is there is such a network of former Marines across this country that we never have to say anything. We 

saw it happen with the attorney that defaced our deployment Marine’s car up in Chicago. He ended up in front of a judge; that was 

a former Marine. The prosecutor was a former Marine and the policeman that arrested him was a former Marine. So there is enough 

of us, a connection across the country quite honestly, and the loyVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:47 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046474 PO 00000 Frm 00128 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A474P2.XXX A474P2

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
129 

alty to its Corps by the American people that they kind of take care 

of it. And it seems to be happening that way in Berkeley. So we 

are actually just sitting on the side lines. It is interesting reading 

it in the newspaper. 

Mr. KINGSTON. It is like picking on a Notre Dame fan, Mr. Chairman. You just can’t do it and get away with it. I appreciate it, and 

I yield back. 

Mr. MORAN. Ms. Kaptur. 

REMARKS OF MS. KAPTUR

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Generals, very much and thank you for your service to 

our country. I am curious. In your testimony, where did the phrase 

‘‘the long war’’ come from? Was that your own? 

General AMOS. Ma’am, that was actually coined by, I think, General Abizaid when he was the commander of Central Command. I 

believe he was the one that coined the long war. It has been supported by a whole host of studies. The Commandant has a vision 

group that has been in business now for about a year to try to look 

out on what the world is going to look like in 2025. And it seems 

to support General Abizaid’s thing about generations of warfare of 

the kind we are in right now. 

Ms. KAPTUR. And how long is long? 

General AMOS. I think you are probably talking 20 years. That 

seems to be the default position that I hear as I talk to other Services and think tanks. Probably several generations, but probably 

out for at least another 20 years. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Now, when one discusses the long war as going 

back 5 years, the United States had some allies in this effort. Is 

it your impression that, as we move forward, there are fewer allies 

involved with us? And I am talking about on the ground inside of 

the places in which we are fighting. What is your estimate of the 

allied support for this long war? 

General AMOS. Ma’am, I had 2 years in NATO. And so I was 

there when we went from 16 countries to 19, and I worked alongside our allies. So I think that will be cyclical depending on the 

leadership of the countries that support our allies. I will tell you 

that we have some stalwart allies, like the Australians and the 

U.K., New Zealand. They are right beside us and have been beside 

us and fought alongside of us when we crossed the border in March 

of 2003. So I can’t tell you how the allies are going to work because 

I think that is going to be dependent on the leadership. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Is it not true that foreign forces from many countries have been reduced now to a level around 10,000 from a level 

maybe four or five times that much 5 years ago? 

General AMOS. Are you talking about in Afghanistan, ma’am? 

Ms. KAPTUR. And Iraq. 

General AMOS. I will have to take that for the record because I 

truly don’t know the numbers. 

[The information follows:] 

Currently, there are approximately 10,000 troops from 31 countries serving with 

the United States in Iraq. Coalition Forces in Iraq peaked at just over 25,000 

around December 2004. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
130 

Currently, there are approximately 40,000 troops from 42 countries serving with 

the United States in Afghanistan. 

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. I think my statement is correct. I think 

that it has been reduced by about four-fifths in terms of participation in on-the-ground combat. If you could provide those figures for 

the record, I would be very grateful. Also, our allies were supposed 

to provide funding, and that funding has not materialized. I think 

they paid up about $12 billion. They were supposed to have much 

more than that, four or five times that much in the pot. If you 

could kindly provide for the record the amount of funding that has 

come from other countries and which country, I would be very 

grateful. 

I keep hearing references to World War II. This doesn’t look like 

World War II to me. But maybe somebody has a different take on 

it, and I would be very interested on how they do view it over at 

DOD. Let me just say, Congressman Tiahrt, I’m sorry he is not 

here right now because he referenced my home community of Toledo. I get a little sensitive about that. And he made some statement about our mayor, Carty Finkbeiner, who is a mayor—he has 

been a life-long public official in our area and, I feel compelled to 

ask some questions for the record here. I want to also state that 

our community and region just deployed another 2,500 soldiers to 

Iraq from the Reserve and Guard, the largest deployment since 

World War II. So I don’t think we have anything to apologize about 

for our community and its patriotism. But I have to inquire as to 

how the Marines—and what happened in our community was there 

was a unit that had come from Grand Rapids, Michigan, and deployed in the center part of our city. There was some sort of mix 

up in the city. I don’t know what it was. But normally, Toledo, 

when it sees Marines, it is at Toys For Tots at Christmastime and 

holiday time and Hanukkah time. This was a different sort of presence. And, yes, they had been there before. My question is, can you 

provide me information on—under what authority the Marine 

Corps is taking its Reserve Units and deploying them to American 

cities? I would like to know which cities you are deploying to. I 

would like to know under what terms those units are being deployed. Are they paid—are they paying the city governments or 

local communities for their presence? I would like to know what 

types of weapons they carry and whether those weapons are loaded 

or not. And what are the terms of engagement, both with the local 

community and with the local police or whatever? And could you— 

are you aware of these deployments around the country, these exercises going into civilian communities? 

General CASTELLAW. We have been training in various locations 

throughout this great Nation of ours for years and years. There is 

a process that we have in place where we engage with the local authorities and make plans for doing that. As you indicated, there appears to have been a communications problem that occurred in this 

particular case. But for many, many years now, we have successfully been training in various locations, New Orleans, Charlotte, 

San Francisco, Yuma, Arizona. And again, we think a pretty good 

process for engaging and planning with it and doing those things 

that do not disrupt the local citizenry. So, you know, I think we 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
131 

will all do a post mortem on this and see what the issue was so 

it won’t happen again. I don’t think any of us want that. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I would like a special briefing by whoever is in 

charge of the Reserve Units that developed these plans for around 

the country. Because what happened to our mayor, in my opinion, 

regardless of whoever thinks he is at fault or whatever, for him to 

become the butt of contention on all these shock jock shows around 

the country is unfair to his life because he has been a very dedicated public official and made the butt of jokes across this country. 

And I don’t agree with him on everything, but this is not right. And 

I don’t know quite what happened there, but it is really—for somebody in the political realm to see this happening in their community and not be able to stop it—I got home, all this stuff is all over 

the TV, you know, 3 days before you come over here to make your 

testimony. Maybe it is all just coincidental. But I have to tell you, 

Toledo, Ohio, doesn’t like it because we have very patriotic people. 

We are in all the branches of the service. And for our mayor and 

the highest elected officials of our city to get in a fight over this, 

this is ridiculous. And so I would—are you in a position to come 

and someone see me separately on what actually, not just happened there, but what these plans are across the country? 

General CASTELLAW. Ma’am, it is our duty to make sure that the 

people that we protect in the United States understand what we 

do, and you know, we do not want this to occur just as much as 

you do. And I understand—— 

Ms. KAPTUR. It is a public relations nightmare. 

[The information follows:] 

Lt Gen Bergman, Commander Marine Forces Reserve personally met with Congresswoman Kaptur to discuss the Toledo, OH issue and answer her questions. 

Mr. MORAN. But, General, if you wouldn’t mind perhaps getting 

the appropriate people to discuss the details with Ms. Kaptur, the 

Committee would be appreciative. 

General CASTELLAW. We would love to. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Boyd. 

Mr. BOYD. Mr. Chairman, I will pass. 

Mr. MORAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Boyd. 

Mr. Rothman. 

AFGHANISTAN

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Chairman. 

Generals, thank you for being here. Thank you for your careers, 

your sacrifices and those of your families. I will ask two questions 

so I can get the answers. Hopefully—they are complicated big questions, and I apologize for the small amount of time that I have to 

ask them in. The National Defense Research Institute from RAND 

Corporation did a counterinsurgency study that just came out, a 

public study. And I don’t agree with everything they have in the 

report, but they say that in order to address our counterinsurgency 

needs, we need to, quote, ‘‘reduce reliance on large-scale ground 

presence, to support civil capabilities of the local governments, to 

make more and smarter use of information, to prepare and enable 

local forces and to perform critical military tasks that only our 

forces can perform’’. Do you buy that as your role as Marines? And 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
132 

if so, in whole or in part, does your budget reflect your acceptance 

or rejection of that notion of how you should conduct counterinsurgency? That is question one. And question two, I apologize for putting you on the spot. But I read that the Marine Commandant suggested that it might be a good idea to send Marines to Afghanistan 

to help out and that that proposal was rejected in large measure. 

Can you comment on what difference you think the Marines could 

make in Afghanistan? And what was the basis for that proposal? 

And when we can expect the Marines to be in Afghanistan. 

General CASTELLAW. I will take your second question first to give 

my compatriot there a little bit more time to think about your first 

one. First of all, 3,200 Marines are going to Afghanistan in the 

spring. Our job in the Marine Corps is to provide this nation and 

the leadership options for use of our forces. And certainly we continue to provide those—that advice to the leadership within the 

building, and when appropriate, the Commandant, one of the Joint 

Chiefs, has a responsibility to provide that to the President. And 

he meets with the President on a regular basis and that President 

avails himself of that particular advice. The Marine Corps is an expeditionary force in readiness. We have various capabilities, other 

than our primary role, and we are exercising that now in terms of 

operating in Iraq. But, as indicated, the situation there now continues to improve. I think we have been very successful, and so we 

will continue to look for options for Marines to be used where their 

particular talents may be best utilized, and we will make those recommendations and then the leadership will decide where the Marines need to be. 

The Marines right now on a one-time basis are being ordered to 

Afghanistan. We will send a battalion, as General Amos indicated—I am sorry, sir, I think you weren’t here when General 

Amos talked about it—out closer to the border. We’ll have the Marine Expeditionary Unit, which is a balanced—what we call a 

MAGTF, Marine Air-Ground Task Force which will operate in the 

south. It has helicopters. It has Harriers. It has ground mobility. 

It has combat service support. And it will fill a role in that part 

of the country. So, yes, we are going to Afghanistan. Right now it 

intends to be one deployment. And we think that the situation as 

it exists in Afghanistan right now, that we can make a difference 

there, too. 

HYBRID WARFARE

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, general. 

General AMOS. Sir, I have not read the RAND study, and I 

thought I had read a lot of what was going on with this. So I apologize. But I am just—but if they are dealing with 

counterinsurgencies, and I took notes here as you talked about reduced reliance on large scale forces, there is a fashion that is going 

around that, and I have heard this in other quarters, where we no 

longer need the ability to have what we would typically call traditional, traditional forces, to perform traditional missions because of 

where we are headed. I think there is a piece of that that probably 

is truthful. If you take a look at, and we talked a little bit earlier 

about the long war, what the war is probably likely going to look 

like, the kind of wars we are most likely going to find ourselves inVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:47 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046474 PO 00000 Frm 00132 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A474P2.XXX A474P2

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
133 

volved in, not necessarily wars, but issues, countries, nation building, stateless people moving back and forth across borders driven 

by national disasters in some cases, driven by extremism of one 

kind or another in other cases. And that is the kind of thing that 

we call in the Marine Corps hybrid warfare. And it is—back in 

1996, General Kulak talked about the three-block war where he 

said: Men, you can expect to be handing out candy and food and 

medical supplies in one block, go down to the next block and try 

to get the populace under control in a kind of peace enforcement 

kind of a thing, a little bit like we did in Kosovo. And then in the 

next block, you will find yourself in full scale combat. And all within the same unit, probably all in maybe one day. And that is a little bit what hybrid warfare is like. So if you take a look out, and 

I think that is what RAND is referring to, that kind of future, 

which is not necessarily the most dangerous thing, but it is probably the most likely thing that we are going to be involved in, then 

I would agree that we need to adjust forces and capabilities. And 

I think that is the key, capabilities. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. General, my question was, does your budget reflect the need for this hybrid capability? 

General AMOS. Sir, I am going to say yes because we are building, in this 202k build, we are building capabilities to be able to 

operate successfully in that kind of environment. And what are 

those? Those are people that are military policemen, intelligence, 

reviewing, language training, culture training, both professionally 

here and resident and nonresident. So the answer is yes. I believe 

we are, yes. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, general. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Rothman. 

Mr. Dicks has a follow-up question. 

MARINE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Mr. DICKS. What happened, there were going to be 2,500 Marines into a Special Forces Unit? Is that still going forward? 

General AMOS. Sir, it is called Marine Special Operations Command. It is headquartered down in Camp Lejeune. It comes under 

SOCOM, Special Operations Command, Admiral Olson. And it is 

not 2,500 yet. It is going to be at 2,500. It is at 1,200 right now. 

And as we grow the Marine Corps force, again it is just like equipment. We are sharing assets across the Marine Corps as we cross 

level. So we are doing our best to get that force fleshed out. But 

truth in lending, it will be a couple of years before we reach 2,500. 

But it exists. They have already deployed. And it is under command of a two-star general right now. 

Mr. DICKS. When you come home on these 7-month deployments 

and you are back 7 months, do you have the equipment you need 

to train with or is that an issue like it is for the Army and the 

Guard? 

General AMOS. It is an issue right now. And it is not so much 

an issue, I don’t think, that the money is not there, and General 

Castellaw can talk. I think he will tell you the money is there. It 

is just a function of production. We are spread loading, cross leveling across the Marine Corps the equipment at home station, so 

that when units are deployed, they have got exactly what they 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
134 

need. The units that are preparing to deploy. They have exactly 

what they need. And the units that have just come back, quite honestly, are at a readiness level that is less than the other units. So 

until we get to a point where all the equipment shows up—and 

again, it is, a lot of it is production. It is a function of physics. They 

can’t make it. Some of these lines were closed. And so we have 

asked or we bought new equipment that replaces that. So some of 

our units back home are not at the same level as our deployed 

units. There is no question about it. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Lewis. 

COUNTERBOMBER CAPABILITY

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

One question. It is my understanding, General, that you are 

quite familiar with this effort, maybe in the center of doing it, that 

the Marines are sending this month 12 modern person-borne IED 

suicide bomber detection systems to Iraq which will be integrated. 

And the purpose is to get a better handle on using these systems 

and effectively identifying ahead, with better timing, such devices. 

Can you describe what you are doing there, and what you think the 

potential is? 

General AMOS. Yes, sir. About a year ago, the Commander of Marine Forces Central Command came to me, only because I have got 

the war-fighting level, I have got the experimentation, science and 

technology out of Quantico, and we are plugged into the Office of 

Naval Research. And he said, hey, we need what we call a counterbomber capability. Not so much because we are seeing the suicide 

bombers in the Al Anbar province because, quite honestly, we are 

not relatively speaking. We did before. We had vehicle born folks. 

But we are not seeing it like they are seeing it perhaps in other 

areas and certainly you are starting to begin to see in Afghanistan. 

But he said, let’s see if we can develop one. So we already had 

some techniques and some capabilities. But we went to the Office 

of Naval Research, Admiral Landay. And he has an effort—now it 

is called Naval Innovation Lab. It is called NaIL. And we asked 

him to put $10 million towards the development of a counterbomber capability. And they have done that. Now, I have seen it. 

I have gone out and watched it in action. We are going to deploy 

12 of them. The forces, we have just turned over the forces in Iraq 

just within the last 2 to 3 weeks and the new command from Camp 

Pendleton who, you know, Major General—— 

General CASTELLAW. I just went blank, too. 

General AMOS [continuing]. John Kelly. Excuse me. Don’t tell 

him I couldn’t remember his name. John Kelly just took over, and 

we have trained John’s forces with this equipment. And so we have 

delivered four sets? 

Mr. LEWIS. That is our John Kelly. 

General AMOS. Your John Kelly. That is exactly right. That is 

why I am embarrassed. I will hear about it on an e-mail tonight. 

But we have deployed four sets already. We are deploying another 

four. And this is a manufacturing issue right now. It is not a matter of money. The money is there. And then we are going to deploy 

another four in Afghanistan. This is a radar capability. It shows 

promise. We haven’t deployed it in tough conditions yet in the 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
135 

freezing cold and the 125 degree weather. So it is yet to be seen 

exactly, so we are in the experiential phase. But we decided we are 

going to push this into country to get this. 

Now, this correlates with some other capabilities we have got. 

We have got a thermal imaging capability. We have got backscatter 

vans. I mean, we are trying our best to get ahead of this counterbomber business. But I think right now I am excited about it; I am 

anxious to see how it works. 

Mr. MORAN. The gentleman from Georgia. 

TRAINING

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you. 

General, I just want to associate myself with the words of Ms. 

Kaptur. I don’t understand the Toledo, Ohio, issue either. It doesn’t 

quite seem like the public discussion of it has been accurate. It 

would appear that there was a major paperwork snafu somewhere 

along the line that this wasn’t cleared because I was not aware 

that the Marines were training in cities and urban areas until you 

just said that they were. But when you respond to her, I would like 

to be included in that because it does—I am confused by the whole 

matter. I don’t think the press has given us an adequate explanation. 

General CASTELLAW. Well, good, sir. Again, we will be more than 

happy to provide whatever information we can that you need. But 

we have been training—when I was back in my youth, I deployed 

to New Orleans, and we trained in urban operations in New Orleans, landed 46 on the old Schlitz Brewery right down from the New 

Orleans Picayune newspaper. So New Orleans knew we were there. 

We made appropriate coordination with them. And it is extremely 

valuable training. What we are talking about is getting training 

that allows our Marines and the Sailors that go with them to be 

effective in those type of environments. And training has been extremely, extremely valuable for us. But it is extremely important 

that we maintain the relationship with the local communities 

which gives us our support and of who, of course, our ultimate responsibility for their defense lies. So I am very glad that this issue 

came up so that at least we can talk with you and explain to you 

what is going on to at least allay some of your concerns if you have 

any on that. 

Mr. MORAN. General, do you think they had prior approval of the 

government, the local government? 

General CASTELLAW. Oh, yes, sir. Again, you work with the 

local—for instance, the FBI for a time being provided a liaison that 

worked with the local authorities, and we had the structure set up 

to do this. And as I said, we have been doing this with great success for a long period of time and something happened here. We 

will find out what it is. We do not want to scare the people of Toledo or San Francisco or Yuma, Arizona, or any place like that. But 

most of all, we want their support. We want your support. We will 

find out what went wrong. We will talk with you about it. We will 

explain what happened, and we will go forward because we need 

your help and support to be successful. 

Mr. MORAN. Ms. Kaptur. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
136 

Ms. KAPTUR. I just want to thank the gentleman from Georgia 

for offering, and the General, state for the record what year were 

you deployed to New Orleans? 

General CASTELLAW. Yes, ma’am, New Orleans. 

Ms. KAPTUR. What year? 

General CASTELLAW. This was 1988. 

Ms. KAPTUR. 1988. And how many urban units would you have 

deployed this year, Reserve Units into urban areas? 

General CASTELLAW. Ma’am, I will get the record for that. That 

is not my area of expertise. And again, it is so routine, you know, 

that we really don’t give a lot of notice to it. Let me get the people 

who are responsible for that and along with them, they will come 

and talk with you and explain what we are doing. 

[The information follows:] 

Lt Gen Bergman, Commander Marine Forces Reserve personally met with Congresswoman Kaptur to discuss the Toledo, OH issue and answer her questions. 

Ms. KAPTUR. And I really think that, I mean, at some point, as 

this proceeds, I believe, Mr. Chairman, but our Mayor and our community, we have to repair this. And 2 years ago, we had Sailor of 

the year from Toledo. So we are pretty sensitive. We are a port 

city. We like Marines. But that was really unfortunate. 

POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS

Mr. DICKS. Just on the 7 months in and 7 months out, have you 

done any research to see if the post-traumatic stress—it seems intuitive that it would be less with people that have been there for 

less time, unless they were obviously in very violent combat. Is 

there anything to suggest that that is a positive aspect of this? 

General AMOS. Sir, there has not been any clinical effort done to 

try to determine or make a correlation between lower amounts of 

PTSD and 7-month deployment. The one thing I can tell you, having spent 4 years doing that, that before I came to the job I have 

got, that the morale factor among family members and the willingness for family members to stand by their Marine, whether it be 

a man or a woman, and say goodbye to them and have a smile on 

their face and kind of get through the deployment even during very 

dangerous times, a lot had to do with the fact that they knew they 

were going to be back in 7 months. So, right now, it is intuitive 

goodwill. But there has been no clinical effort. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Boyd. 

READINESS

Mr. BOYD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Generals, both, for your service. I have one brief 

question. One of you answered earlier that one of your roles was 

to give the leaders options for security, and military purposes. It 

is my understanding and this Committee’s understanding it has 

been reported that the Marines that are deployed to Afghanistan 

and Iraq are well equipped and well trained. Would you agree with 

that? 

General AMOS. Sir, they absolutely are. They are every bit 

equipped and well equipped with everything they need to include 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
137 

special things that you would need in Afghanistan that you might 

not need in Iraq. And trust me, they are very well trained. 

Mr. BOYD. Secondly, it is also my understanding from previous 

hearings we have had here that the Marine Corps is almost totally 

focused on Iraq and Afghanistan and would be ill equipped and 

trained to deal with a major contingency in some other part of the 

world. Is that a fair assessment? 

General AMOS. Sir, your first statement that we are almost 

unitarily focused on Iraq and Afghanistan is absolutely correct. The 

size of our force, 187,000 and rotating as we do, we are a singularly 

focused force. And that was the beginning reason and rationale behind the growth to 202,000 by our Commandant. He said we have 

got to be able to do some of the—Congress has tasked us; we have 

legislation that tell us the Marine Corps has to be a forceable entry 

force to come from the sea. We have a directive from the strategic 

planning guidance to be able to put two Marine Expeditionary Brigades ashore from the sea, forceable entry. I mean, that is kicking 

the door down. And we have got, the Commandant has said, we 

have got generations of Captains now that have never been aboard 

a ship. So as we grow the force, we get some more elasticity, more 

dwell time. And then, and it is our responsibility as the leadership 

of the Corps now to make sure we provide the training environment, the shipping. That is why Twentynine Palms is so critical to 

us, to be able to do the fire and the maneuver and the other things. 

Mr. BOYD. So it would be a fair statement to say, if there was 

some major contingency someplace else and the Marines were 

asked to go there, that you would have to adjust that focus? It 

would be a serious adjustment and change? 

General AMOS. Sir, if there was a major contingency, my first 

point would be the Marines would step up to the plate. That is not 

bravado. We have done it. We did it during Korea when we came 

down after World War II. We were down to 27,000 from 300,000 

during World War II. And President Truman and Secretary of Defense Johnson said, you don’t need a Marine Corps anymore. And 

one year later, we are developing plans for Inchon. So the Marines 

will step up to the plate. There is enough experience with some of 

the older guys, the old gunnery sergeants that we could put together a force that could come from the sea and do our Nation’s 

bidding. I promise you that. It would not be without pain. What we 

want to do is get ourselves ready to the point where we can do that 

across the full spectrum of operations all the time the way we have 

always been in the past. But we are solely focused right now, and 

that is why the bill and your support for the bill is so critically important. 

Mr. BOYD. Thank you, Generals, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

TRAINING

Mr. DICKS. Will the General give just one last point for a second. 

The Army is doing counterinsurgency training now. Is the Marine 

Corps doing something different when they are home for 7 months? 

General AMOS. Sir, because of our deployment dwell time, we are 

focused almost solely on what goes on inside of Iraq. In other 

words, counterinsurgency training, operating in that kind of environment, that is why we need to get something—a little more elasVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:47 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046474 PO 00000 Frm 00137 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A474P2.XXX A474P2

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
138 

ticity in there so that we can do the other kind of training, the fire 

and maneuver, bring three battalions to Twentynine Palms. The 

land expansion at Twentynine Palms is critical for that. So we can 

do the kind of training that the Nation expects its Marines to do. 

Quite honestly, we are the only forceable entry force our country 

has, and we want to be able to train in that arena. 

Mr. DICKS. Why not go in with V–22s instead of little boats? 

Mr. MORAN. That will be our final question. 

General CASTELLAW. Sir, a V–22 can go anywhere in the world. 

What happens next is what we have to focus on. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you very much, General Amos. Thank you 

General Castellaw. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
(139) 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2008. 

ARMY READINESS 

WITNESSES 

LT. GENERAL JAMES D. THURMAN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G–3, U.S. 

ARMY 

LT. GENERAL STEPHEN M. SPEAKES, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G–8, 

U.S. ARMY 

LT. GENERAL MICHAEL D. ROCHELLE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G–1, 

U.S. ARMY 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. The hearing will come to order. 

We will start a little earlier. We appreciate that today because 

we may be disrupted to vote. So, hopefully, we will be able to have 

enough time to let you say what you have to say. 

I don’t think there’s any committee that’s ever done more to 

make sure of that readiness is funded. We will work with you and 

let you work with us. I think we can do the best we could with the 

circumstance. 

I welcome you to the committee and ask Mr. Frelinghuysen if he 

has any comments. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. No comments. 

Mr. MURTHA. We will listen to your testimony. If you will put 

your full testimony in the record, we will get right down to questions. 

General Thurman, whoever is first. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL THURMAN

General THURMAN. I will go first. I do have a short opening statement for you, sir, if you will allow me, as you have studied my 

written statement that I have provided. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Young and distinguished members of the House Appropriations Committee, thank you for the opportunity to allow me to speak to you and let my colleagues and 

I come over and talk to you about the state of Army readiness. On 

behalf of the United States Army and all the wonderful soldiers 

and civilians and our family members, I thank you for the continued congressional funding and support that you provided us. 

The readiness of our all-volunteer force depends on your consistent and committed investment in our training, equipment, total 

transformation and our people. Your funding and support also ensures that the Army will achieve the strategic depth needed to successfully execute missions across the full spectrum of operations. 

Before I continue, I would like to introduce members of the Army 

staff who are here with me. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
140 

To my left is Lieutenant General Michael Rochelle, who is the 

Army G–1; and to my right is Lieutenant General Speakes, the 

Army G–8. To my right here is Major General Vinnie Bowles, Deputy G–4. Then to my left here is Ms. Barbara Sisson, who is the 

Director of Installation Services. 

After two deployments in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, I 

now know that the progress never unfolds inevitably. Progress is 

always carried forward by the men and women of this country who 

serve a cause greater than themselves. For that reason, I want to 

publicly thank our soldiers, the true strength of the Nation, whose 

patriotism and courage exemplify all warrior ethos. 

Every soldier has a choice of whether to serve our Nation, especially during a time of war, and that clearly defines their role when 

special services require long separations from their families. 

I must thank the families who have served this country as well 

as anyone who has ever worn this uniform. Families continue to 

show that they too, believe in serving one’s Nation by their numerous sacrifices. And we all know there will be more, and we thank 

them for that. 

Mr. Chairman, our Army has demonstrated extraordinary flexibility in leading the strategic demands posed by globalized asymmetric threats. The total Army is feeling the cumulative effects of 

nearly seven years of war in what we believe is an era of persistent 

conflict. This has led to our Army being out of balance. We are 

stretched; we are not broken. 

Four imperatives will enable the Army objectives to restore balance by 2011, and that’s what the Chief of Staff of the Army has 

placed as our number one priority—getting back in balance—and 

that will allow us to build the required readiness for the future. 

First, we must sustain our soldiers, families and our civilians. 

Second, we are obligated to prepare soldiers for success in current 

operations. Third, we must reset to restore the readiness and depth 

for future operations. Finally, it is critical that we continue to 

transform our Army so that we have full spectrum capabilities to 

meet the demands of the 21st century. 

I would like to state for the record, if you would allow me, what 

we believe we need to do to achieve full spectrum readiness and restore that strategic depth. 

First, we must accelerate the growth that our Army has been authorized, which is more than just increasing manning but, rather 

the growth of personnel, equipment, and facilities. 

Second, we must build sufficient strategic depth for full spectrum 

operations to fulfill increasing global demands in our formations, in 

order to meet combatant commanders’ requirements. 

Third, we must continue to obtain your full support that you give 

us, in a timely manner so we are allowed to transform our Army 

and be ready to meet the current operations and future contingencies. 

Again, on behalf of nearly 1.1 million soldiers, families and our 

civilians, we want to thank all of you for your tremendous support 

that you have given us. It’s not lost on us what you have done, and 

we are grateful for it. 

I will save any further comments on readiness for the question 

and answer period and thank you for allowing us to come over here 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
141 

today and speak to you and respond to your questions. We stand 

ready to answer your questions, sir. 

[The statement of Lieutenant General Thurman follows:] 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
142 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 262 46474A.059
143 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 263 46474A.060
144 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 264 46474A.061
145 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 265 46474A.062
146 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 266 46474A.063
147 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 267 46474A.064
148 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 268 46474A.065
149 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 269 46474A.066
150 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 270 46474A.067
151 

REMARKS OF MR. MURTHA

Mr. MURTHA. All right, well, we appreciate what you have just 

said. 

You know our concern about your readiness. I remember when 

we went to the all volunteer Army, and I voted against it, because 

I felt that we couldn’t sustain a long deployment without a draft. 

We lost that battle, but I remember during that period of time I 

kept hearing we have got to have high school graduates. Well, high 

school graduates dropped from 94 to 79 percent. We didn’t take 

anybody with tattoos for a while. We are now waiving criminal 

records and drug problems. We are waiving twice as many as we 

waived before. I know it’s a very difficult task for you folks when 

you are given a certain number of people you have to reach out to. 

And I can remember when I went into the Korean War, this guy 

next to me, they said, raise his arm; and he raised it about this 

high. That’s fine, they said. So there are different standards at different times when you take people in. 

But what I worry about is that the technology is so vastly different than it was when I was there. I went in 1955, I got out and 

went back in 1966, and the only thing that was changed was the 

alphabet. 

There are some big changes in the last 10 years. Anybody that 

is in the service today has to know a little bit about computers, and 

you have to be educated better than you used to be. 

I went to Aberdeen a couple of years ago, and they couldn’t even 

do one push up. I know you get by with some people not doing one 

push up, but I worry about Afghanistan and Iraq. I was in Iraq at 

Thanksgiving. I was in Afghanistan just last weekend. Two people 

sitting at the same table had diabetes. Now, we had the Surgeon 

General in—no, it wasn’t the Surgeon General but a colonel who 

was an expert in diabetes. We recommend against anybody going 

to the battlefield with diabetes. I don’t know what these people’s 

jobs were, but I hear all kinds of stories of people that should have 

a medical deferment, but they are being sent into combat. 

Of course, I hear the other thing about how hard it is on the families. This administration cut 39 percent of the money out of the 

money that we put in to help with the counseling and taking care 

of family, what we call ‘‘the family approach.’’ We are going to restore that money. We are going to make sure that the medical benefits go to the people who should have them. 

Admiral Mullen gave me a book yesterday about PTSD. This 

goes back to World War II, Korea. I am going to tell you something. 

I remember it just like that. I mean, I know what he is talking 

about, having been there myself. I know how it affects somebody 

who is in combat. The more they go back, the harder it is for them. 

And there will be a long-term impact and cost to the U.S. 

So we need to address this readiness as quick as we can, because 

our procurement is either a $200 or $300 billion supplemental for 

the short term right now. And we better make sure that you work 

with us, telling us what we need so we put the right mix in, because whoever is elected next time, will likely call for a lot of cuts. 

You talk about increasing personnel. Well, you know better than 

anybody else when you start to decrease the budget, personnel 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
152 

costs are the things that come first because they are 100 percent 

outlay in the first year versus procurement, which is 10 percent 

outlay in the first year. 

I am going to go into equipment shortfalls, in the question period, but we have seen it. We are trying to address it. This year, 

we have a lot of help from you. We appreciate that. So we appreciate your coming before the Committee; and the members. I am 

sure, we will be here to ask you the questions that we ask ourselves. 

But we appreciate the work you are doing, and we appreciate 

what the families are doing. I went up to Ft. Drum on Friday to 

talk to them about some of the problems that I have seen in the 

papers. Sometimes it doesn’t turn out to be that way. 

I was pleased when I was in Afghanistan. It wasn’t as bad as I 

was reading the newspaper. I thought it wasn’t going as badly as 

some people were projecting. Of course, this is wintertime. They 

don’t exactly go out and do the fighting in wintertime as far as Afghan goes, but the military is doing their jobs. 

Admiral Mullen said we can’t win this militarily. He agrees that 

you have to get the State Department involved in it. They have 

been hesitant to get involved. We have done everything we could 

to try to shift the responsibility for construction and infrastructure 

improvements and so forth. We haven’t had much success, although it looks like we are starting to get there a little bit, what 

the parliament did and military security being a little better, so 

things look a little better. 

But the American public is speaking and saying we cannot bear 

$343 million a day. We have got to figure out the best way ahead 

this year, because none of us know what’s going to happen next 

year. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

FORCE GENERATION

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, we are enormously proud of you and all those who 

serve under you. I know the chairman and all committee members 

thank you for your service and recognize that we have an all-volunteer Army. 

I should say for the record, Mr. Chairman, I was one of those 

drafted. 

Mr. MURTHA. And he did pretty well for himself. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I did. I had a good life for a draftee. 

I am not sure we need to go back to that system, because, obviously, today we have a military that is highly motivated, well educated and, I think, well supported by this committee. 

General Speakes, you and I have talked; and, as we speak, we 

have about 3,200 New Jersians, a number of the 50th Infantry Brigade Combat Team going to Iraq. On the issue of Army force generation, where do we stand relative to that program? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, what I would like to do is first ask for help 

from General Thurman. He is the G–3. His job is to orchestrate the 

staff and the Army through the ARPERGEN process. My particular 

responsibility, then, is to ensure I follow his guidance when it 

comes to such important issues as equipping. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
153 

So let me ask General Thurman if he would be willing to take 

that question on, and then—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The Army plan was—correct me if I am 

wrong—on one-year deployment? Every five years? 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Obviously, the caveat is in there, but can 

you talk about where we stand? 

General THURMAN. Congressman, if you would allow me, that’s 

a very good question. 

What I would tell you up front, and I would just like to talk 

about where we are up front in terms of our rotational capacity, in 

terms of what the current commands are. 

Currently, for the Active force, we are rotating for every rotation 

down in either Iraq or Afghanistan at about just—as you know, it’s 

15 months down there for Active Army. For the Reserve components, it’s 12. It’s 12 months from total mobilization. 

What we want to get to, our goal, is to get for our Reserve components every year that we are deployed, that would be 12 months, 

and we would like to spend at least five years back in dwell. Now, 

currently, we can’t get there from here. 

DWELL TIME BETWEEN COMBAT ROTATIONS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Tell the committee where we are now. 

General THURMAN. Okay, that is a very good question. 

Where we are right now, for the AC, we are rotating at about a 

one for one-deployment cycle to about 8 months. 

Now, what we have done, if we spend 15 months down range for 

the Active, then we want to guarantee at least 12 months dwell. 

So we are rotating less than really a one-to-one right now, 1 year 

deployed, 1 year back at home. 

For the Reserve components, your combat formations are rotating at about a 1-year deployment mobilization period for them. Because we are in the 12-month mob period, 4 years back home is 

what we got. 

Now, we have some units that are less than that. It’s about a 1- 

year and then a 3.3-year dwell. 

For your specific question on the 50th, we do know about that 

formation. I can get you the exact details of where they stand, 

equipping and personnel, because we have gone forward to the Department to ask that we alert these formations at least 24 months 

out, so we can make sure that they have got the amount of personnel and equipment for the mission set that they have been 

given. We put them on our Army force generation cycle that allows 

us to have X number available at any one time and X number in 

a ready pool and in a reset train. 

But that is what we are trying to do, what you stated up front, 

but we can’t meet that goal right now. 

[The information follows:] 

The 50th IBCT, currently in New Jersey, is scheduled to deploy in late FY08, location: Iraq, Baghdad (T). As a next-to-deploy unit, the 50th IBCT has equipping 

prioritization over AC and RC units not slated for deployment. HQDA ensures their 

equipping needs will be met, given the constraints of competing equipping needs of 

other next-to-deploy units, equipment requirements of units currently deployed, and 

stock levels. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
154 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So the Army force generation model is a 

work in process? 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir. It is a work in process, given the demands that we have. A function of that model is the amount of 

supply that we have, and the demand is greater than supply right 

now. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. How would you characterize the other components besides, obviously, having enough troops to do the job? 

And, obviously, they are motivated. They, obviously, have families 

behind them that are concerned. How about the matching of equipment and training? Where does that fit into the overall equation? 

General THURMAN. Sir, the way we prioritize the manning and 

the equipment is we have a Department of Army master 

prioritization list. I am the guy that has responsibility for 

prioritization of the Army resource priority list that I give to either 

General Rochelle or General Speakes to fill from based on, one, we 

want to make sure that the current force that is deployed has exactly what they need. That is priority one. 

Then that is, for the next priority, or the next deployers, that 

when they fall in that readiness cycle, we start addressing Reserve 

component concerns. At two years out, right now, is when we try 

to take a look at what their overall status is, if they are under title 

32. 

The third priority that we have is our institutional generating 

force capability; fourth priority are folks that are in a reset train. 

Frankly, we do not have enough people and equipment, given how 

we are trying to grow the Army and fill the demands to have everybody up right now. So that is how we have to do that. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Could you tell the Committee what percentage of the force has been deployed once, twice or or three times or 

more? 

General THURMAN. General Rochelle can tell you the exact, by 

component. 

[The information follows:] 

Component 1 

Deployment 

2 

Deployments 

3 

Deployments 

4 

Deployments 

5 

Deployments 

AC ................................................................ 212,369 84,304 19,951 4,018 1,080 

ARNG ........................................................... 118,884 13,702 755 35 3 

USAR ............................................................ 55,552 6,483 536 33 3 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Yes, by component. 

General THURMAN. He can tell you that with the exact numbers, 

by AC that has been deployed for Army National Guard and Army 

Reserve. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And you build into this overall equation— 

as we are working on the next supplemental, you know, you are 

building the needs of what we are talking about into that supplemental? 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir. We are trying to project what we believe is the demand. We meet whatever the COCOM requirements 

are globally, but, in particular with Afghanistan and Iraq, it’s what 

the CENTCOM commander, what they ask for and request for 

forces. We try to anticipate that and build that in the Army force 

generation model. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
155 

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. Let me add to what the gentleman is asking. We 

have been working with the Army. We have found shortages in 

bases for military construction and in the bases for the people that 

returned from Germany and from Korea. They are going to transfer 

I think it’s $2 billion to military construction to take care of the 

shortfall, but they wouldn’t be prepared when they got back, in everything the Army told us. 

The other thing we are looking at, when I was out in Fort Bliss, 

I noticed they had a substantial shortage of military construction 

for medical structures. This has been going on for years. This is 

something that people must make a decision on. Okay, we need 

this. Or We need that. There will be large costs. So we don’t get 

the medical stuff taken care of. That is almost $5 billion. 

We trimmed it down to $4 billion. We are going to try to put $2 

billion in this supplemental and $2 billion in the next one. So we 

will add $2 billion for infrastructure in military construction and 

another $2 billion for medical structures, and infrastructure for the 

services’ bases in the United States. Now we are going to look at— 

and see what they need. 

But our experience has been, when we looked at the hospitals, 

they have been sorely underfunded for a long time; and we want 

to make sure that our personnel get the best medical care wherever 

they go, and the benefits they deserve. 

We also hear from CBO that the $70 billion we have provided, 

has been used in part for ground vehicles, that will be up to date 

a couple more years. So if we robustly fund those products for the 

next two supplementals, we think that you will be in a lot better 

shape. 

Now, still, the Army is in bad shape. You can voice it any way 

you want to, but there is no question, in my mind, when you have 

to send people with diabetes into the area even though the surgeons say don’t do it, when you have people who have been deployed as often as they have been, and when you read this book 

that Admiral Mullen gave me about PTSD, you realize the tremendous pressure on these troops and their families during their period of time. 

So I appreciate what you go through as trying to set the priority. 

We want to work with you; and, as Mr. Frelinghuysen said, we 

want to make sure we do everything we can to get you through this 

period of time and get you back to a stance you can address world 

events in case something happens in the future. This Iraq war is 

one thing. But we also have to worry about what might happen 

down the road and be prepared to deploy; and right now we are not 

ready to do so. 

General THURMAN. We can get those deployment figures from 

General Rochelle at some point. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Do you have those figures? 

DEPLOYMENT DATA

General ROCHELLE. I would be happy to give you those figures, 

sir. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
156 

First, before I do that, though, let me make it clear that at any 

point in time when one looks at the Army, we have to ask ourselves, how many individuals have deployed in the current force, 

the snapshot we see today? How many are coming in through the 

initial entry pipeline who are destined to units who are going to 

deploy? 

Here is the large question that rarely gets asked. How many people have ever deployed by components who have left the force? I 

am afraid I only have one component figure for that latter figure 

that I would like to start with. 

Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation 

Enduring freedom, a little over a quarter of a million people from 

all components who have deployed have left our formations. So, 

with that as a background, let me present you the figures that you 

asked for. 

Mr. MURTHA. You add to that, I think, 37 percent have never 

been deployed, never been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. At 

least, that’s the figure Admiral Mullen gave us yesterday, right? 

General ROCHELLE. That is a correct figure, sir. Again, that is a 

snapshot in time. 

For the Active component, if we take a look at the numbers who 

have deployed, who are currently deployed or have deployed, that 

is 63 percent today. But add to that, add to that another 45,000 

who are pending deployment—meaning they are in units that have 

a deployment order, and they will deploy with that unit—that is 

45,000 more. 

We then aggregate individuals who are in the training pipeline, 

new adds, if you will, new enlistees, new officers. That number 

grows to 80.4 percent of the force, Active component force, that has 

deployed on a deployment order and initial entry training and will 

deploy for the Army or for the National Guard. Thirty-seven percent of the National Guard has deployed. 

What I am afraid I cannot give you on the National Guard is 

those other components, but one can assume that another 10 percent, 20 percent are on deployment orders from the G–3 of the 

Army or in initial entry training. So that that would kick that 

number up, in my estimation, to between 42 and 57 percent. 

The Army Reserve, sir, 32 percent; and, likewise, I would estimate another 10 percent, which would make it in the 42, 45 percent of the Army Reserve has been deployed. It’s a very daunting 

figure. 

What I did not give you, sir, is for those other components that 

are carrying a substantial burden, as you know, the numbers of 

soldiers who have deployed, who have left the formation. But I 

would be happy to provide that. 

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you, sir. 

[The information follows:] 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
157 

Deployed Since 9/11 

Component Losses 

AC ..................................................................................................................... 152,209 

ARNG ............................................................................................................... 45,911 

USAR ................................................................................................................ 34,888 

Total .......................................................................................................... 233,008 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Moran. 

Mr. MORAN. Let me pass for the time being because Mr. Cramer 

was here before me, and then if I could go. 

TACTICAL MISSILES

Mr. CRAMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for being here. 

Yesterday, we had Secretary England and Secretary Gates; and 

I asked about missile research funding trends. The Army has historically spent RDT&E money on the development of missile systems. However, I am getting the impression that the recent plans 

indicate that there is some degree of comfort with the current inventory of tactical missiles. 

I know, General, that you asked for a capability gap analysis way 

out. We have got a number of threats. I don’t know that we are 

ready or can anticipate what the threats will be in years from now, 

but my concern is that if all of a sudden we are only developing 

one tactical missile program, the JAGINT program, is that smart 

for us in the long run? Would you share some of your concerns, 

General Thurman, on that? 

General THURMAN. Congressman, on the 21st of December, we 

sent a request to assess the capabilities. We asked him to assess 

the overall capabilities of gaps on missiles inside the Army. We did 

ask that. 

Now, as we were trying to look to the future is the reason that 

I sent that request down to Lieutenant General Mike Thain to assess our current capabilities and see if, given the operational environments that we may see in the future, if we got that right. 

Mr. CRAMER. How long will that take? 

General THURMAN. I don’t know the exact time, but, what I told 

him yesterday is go assess that capability, go see if we have a gap 

and to come back with me on that estimate, that is what I would 

tell you. 

[The information follows:] 

On 21 Dec 07, the Army G–3 signed a memo directing the Army’s Training and 

Doctrine Command to conduct an Army Missile Capability Gap Assessment that 

looks at future Army missile capability needs in the context of a Joint force. Discussions are underway to ensure assessment scope, use of current analysis results and 

completion date will identify and provide recommendation/direction for any potential 

missile capability gaps. We expect to provide the results by the FY12 President’s 

Budget submission. No Congressional update is currently scheduled. 

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES

Mr. CRAMER. I want to follow up with you on that. I want to 

switch to the MRAPs. How many MRAPs does the Army currently 

have in Iraq and in Afghanistan? 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
158 

General THURMAN. Sir, currently, fielded today—and these are 

today’s numbers, because that changes every day—there are 1,429 

in Iraq. 

Mr. CRAMER. In Iraq alone? 

General THURMAN. Of which 1,175 have been fielded to our soldiers, if we are operating with that. 

For Afghanistan, MG Rodriguez asked for an operational needs 

statement, and their requirement is 615 of the RG–31 Echo Light 

for Afghanistan. We are starting to ramp up. We have got the priorities changed through Central Command, changed the 

prioritization on the Iraq vehicle, and the Joint Staff approved that 

back here. 

We have now diverted 615 that will go into Afghanistan, because 

there was concern with that IED threat in Afghanistan. 

Mr. CRAMER. From here forward, what is your acquisition goal? 

General THURMAN. Sir, as it stands now, the interim requirement that we have right now is 10,000 MRAP. We are studying 

what we need over and above that for the future. That’s the interim requirement. I will let General Speakes speak on that as the 

Army G–8. That is what we are doing right now. We are doing a 

follow-up assessment with the theaters. 

General SPEAKES. Sir, as you know, we are doing this whole 

MRAP process in collaboration with the Army and the Marine 

Corps. At this point—we are doing this by increments. 

Mr. CRAMER. Ten thousand over what period of time? 

General SPEAKES. Ten thousand is our total requirement right 

now, based upon the last JROC validated requirement for the 

Army as a part of the joint picture. The issue in all of thisis that 

it is a continuously evolving picture, so we have a requirement to 

provide an update to the Joint Staff next week. And what that will 

do is lead to the JROC setting a new a requirement for the Army 

that will then go into the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and 

we anticipate about the first week of March that the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense will make the decision on the next increment. 

The Army will be the principal service, we believe, that will be involved in that. So we expect somewhere in early March that the 

Secretary of Defense will announce any adjustments to the current 

MRAP requirements. 

Mr. CRAMER. How have the MRAPs performed? 

General THURMAN. Sir, I would tell you that they have performed 

in a very good manner, and I will just cite a couple of examples. 

In cases with IED strikes, which would have probably destroyed an 

1114 up-armored Humvee, an M–1114 or M–1151, we have seen 

our soldiers walk away from them. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Microphone, please. 

General THURMAN. I am sorry. We have seen our soldiers walk 

away from them. 

The interim response out of our soldiers is they are very pleased 

with the vehicle, because it allows us to move through those areas, 

particularly in Iraq, and move our logistical formations, medical, 

and help them better get through the environment. That is a dangerous environment, as you well know, in Iraq, particularly with 

the improvised explosive devices. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
159 

But that is our initial assessment, and we have got about a 10 

percent initial assessment, but it has been very positive, is what 

I would tell you. 

Mr. CRAMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Hobson. 

AFGHAN POLICE PISTOLS

Mr. HOBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, I have ask so many questions it will take all afternoon, 

but I am just going to start on two. 

Pistols. The chairman and myself were in Afghanistan—maybe 

you anticipated from yesterday I was going to ask pistols again. We 

bought pistols for training the Afghan police. The guy—I won’t use 

the language in here that the guy used with us, but there was a 

trainee there that comes from Pennsylvania, none of them had any 

good things to say about that pistol. It has a bad firing pin, just 

to say one thing. 

Do you have any comment on the pistols? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, let me first provide some background on 

the request that was made in Afghanistan. 

Late in 2007, the Afghan security service requested over 9,900 

M9 Berettas. There was a lack of Berettas in the Army, so what 

the office within the Army that is charged with overseeing this did 

was to go ahead and decide to purchase the M9s as a—— 

Mr. MURTHA. What was the time schedule there? What period of 

time are we talking about? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, this is done in response to a request that 

happened in the late fall time period. I don’t have any specifics for 

that. I can provide them. 

Mr. MURTHA. 2007? 

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir, this is late 2007. 

So, due to a lack of available extra M9s in the Army inventory, 

the decision then was to go ahead and purchase a commercial 

version of the M9 pistol from Beretta. That was the process that 

was gone through, and that is how the Afghan security forces got 

a commercial variant of the M9 pistol. 

Mr. HOBSON. It’s not a Beretta. It is Smith & Wesson. 

General SPEAKES. Sir, that is not my information—— 

Mr. HOBSON. I will tell you, with all due respect, sir, we were 

in Iraq. I saw it. He saw it. It is not a Beretta. That is bad enough, 

because the Berettas didn’t perform either. But this is a variant. 

It is a Smith & Wesson purchased pistol—and we can’t find out 

who purchased it, what office purchased it, or how many of them 

they purchased. 

I am astonished that nobody knows. Nobody knew there. Nobody 

knows here. And they bought thousands, sir. What happened, we 

are told by the guys who use them, that it’s a variant of the Beretta. Actually, it’s a variant of the Glock, I think. And they got 

caught and yelled at by the Glock people, so they modified it some 

more. And when they modified it, it screwed it up. 

So, very bluntly, I don’t think anybody knows what we bought, 

and it is a waste of money, and we are trying to tell these people 

in weapons—first of all, I don’t like the 9-millimeter to begin with, 

but that is another’s story. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
160 

Could I ask one more question, and then I will stop. I will switch 

total subjects, gentleman. 

CAMP MCCOY, WISCONSIN

Some months ago, maybe, or longer, I went up to Camp McCoy. 

I don’t know if any of you know where Camp McCoy is, but it’s—— 

General SPEAKES. Wisconsin, yes. 

Mr. HOBSON. It is a Reserve unit. Some of my kids are up there. 

My TAG caught hell from the Army, because he took me up there 

to see our kids, and I saw the camp as well. 

In 1960, I went to the Volk field across the way and stayed in 

similar buildings that you have got there today. They are all World 

War II barracks, which we put 111,000 plus kids through there in 

training. 

The field training is fine, but they live in outrageous old-type 

conditions. They don’t make it in the line because the Reserve and 

the Army has got so many things that they don’t give them any 

money to fix this place up. I think it’s outrageous that we send 

111,000 kids for training up there, and this is a base that was used 

even before all this up tempo. 

And they can’t get any money except out of hide to do any repair 

up there, and they can’t get any money to build or rebuild new 

stuff up there. It’s not on the FYDP because it is below the line, 

and there are about six other bases like this. This is one I know 

about. This is one I visited. 

Before long, one of those barracks is going to catch on fire, because they have a lot of heavy electrical stuff on them now they 

can’t fix them up fast enough. The chow is right out of World War 

II. It shouldn’t exist in this day’s world. What really ticks me off— 

and I am an Air Force guy. I can go right next door to Volk field 

and it’s all fixed up. And they are just training—they are doing 

Guard and stuff training over there. 

These guys are going out in the field, and they are being treated 

terrible, before they go, in these barracks. I think the big Army 

ought to look at this thing and get something done about it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

GUARD AND RESERVE FACILITIES

Mr. MURTHA. Let me add to what Mr. Hobson said. 

I went to Bragg, I went to Stewart and found the same types of 

facilities for the Reserve and Guard. Now I hope that this money 

that we are putting in will take care of that. 

For instance, the Guard and Reserve came in and had inadequate facilities, to say the least. Mr. Etheridge, who represents 

Bragg and complained for a long time about a sewage line that 

wasn’t taken care of, I think we finally got that taken care of. 

But I know the pressure that is on you folks to spend money on 

the troops in Iraq. But, in the meantime, we have troops that are 

in training that have inadequate facilities. I hope you go back and 

relook at what you already gave us. You gave us an estimate of 

what you needed, and I hope that is in that estimate, because we 

need to make sure that the Guard and Reserve have facilities as 

good as everyone else has. I know we are looking at dual equipment in the next go around for the Guard and the Active Army. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
161 

I know that right now we don’t have the best equipment in the 

training cycles, so they go and have to relearn what they are doing 

when they get to Iraq. 

So we can’t rush over these problems. We have got to really fix 

them. That is what it amounts to. That is what we are here for. 

We have got to hear what the problems are so we can fix them. 

But we can’t fix them if nobody tells us what the hell going on. 

Mr. Hobson. 

Mr. HOBSON. That is what the problem is. That is why this Committee and the ranking member are so good. These guys can’t 

come—if I hadn’t raised heck about this, they wouldn’t have been 

back in to see me. This isn’t even my State. But because I had been 

there and I saw it, I was able to get them in. You have got to use 

us when you can use us. Fortunately, they came back. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Yes, I think it’s changed since Secretary Gates 

came in. I see a new openness here. When I talked to the Secretary 

this morning, asked him how he is feeling, he said he is not feeling 

too well. Broken arm in three places, he not feeling too well. But, 

at any rate, there has been more openness there. 

Mr. Dicks, I am going to go vote, if you will assume the chair. 

Mr. DICKS. I will ask a few questions. 

Mr. MURTHA. You have 10 minutes. 

READINESS

Mr. DICKS [presiding]. Have you talked at all about readiness 

yet, how you measure readiness? 

General THURMAN. Sir, we have not specifically been asked that. 

I haven’t been asked that question of how we measure readiness. 

Mr. DICKS. Why don’t you talk about that a little bit, gentlemen? 

General THURMAN. First off, with our readiness reporting system, 

if a unit that is not assigned a directed mission, we have four levels 

of readiness—or, actually, five levels of readiness in our metrics, 

C–1 through 5. 

Mr. DICKS. But C–1 is the best, right? 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir. That is measured in terms of personnel, equipment, availability, on-hand equipment, equipment 

readiness and training for units that get an assigned mission. And 

we use also a percent effectiveness rating for the mission that they 

have been given when they are deployed into combat, if that formation is going to be used for something other than it was organized, 

designed and equipped for. And so that is how we do it. 

Mr. DICKS. Right now, most of the units are being trained to do 

counterinsurgency, and that is it, right, to the deploy into Iraq? 

General THURMAN. Sir, that is correct, and that is one of the 

things that is a concern of mine as the Army G-3. Because we have 

got to get back to full-spectrum readiness, in my mind, to be able 

to operate across that full-spectrum of conflict. 

Mr. DICKS. Why don’t you describe the things that they would be 

doing if they were trained for full-spectrum? What equipment 

would they train on? What would they be doing for full spectrum 

versus what they are doing now so the committee will understand 

what is and isn’t happening? 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
162 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir. I would be very happy to answer 

that question. 

Across the spectrum of conflict, as you stated, we are primarily 

focused on counterinsurgency operations. So we are not training on 

the high end for major combat operations. 

What am I talking about? If you take an armor brigade combat 

team or one of our transformed brigade combat teams, they are 

task organized to fight on the high end. 

What am I talking about in terms of the business to be able to 

deliver in direct fires? The synchronization that is required for fire 

support, for maneuver—fire maneuver on the high end takes more 

training. It takes more repetition. 

So, given the deployment cycles we have right now, we do not 

have the sufficient time to train across that entire spectrum and 

do all of those tasks collectively to be able to synchronize in a combined arms fashion on the high end of the spectrum of conflict, because we have some units that we are requiring to—for example, 

let’s take an artillery unit. They may be required to go down and 

perform something other than an artillery mission. That goes on. 

So that may be in lieu of formations to fill holes for transportation 

formations or military police. We have had to do that as we are trying to build enough depth back into the force. That is how we 

would explain that by different types of missions that we would 

get. 

Mr. DICKS. So is there anything other than major combat operations that they might be training for, just major combat operations in counterinsurgency? I mean, if you were doing full spectrum, are there other things that you didn’t mention? 

General THURMAN. Sir, across the spectrum of conflict, the way 

we look at that and see the strategic environment right now—if 

you look at from today out through at least 2020, 2025, we have 

done those traditional training missions. We said—and I would tell 

you this as a former division commander. I used to think if I was 

trained on the high end and I could do all that, then I could do everything across that spectrum. 

I don’t believe that any more because now we are forced to operate in and around populations. We are forced to understand cultures. We are forced to understand an enemy that is not a stateon-state enemy. It’s an enemy that uses assymetrical warfare. So 

now we are in—if you look at that strategic environment as a more 

irregular warfare, perhaps disruptive or catastrophic. 

So what we have looked at in the Army is how we focus and 

train these formations to meet the needs of the future. So that 

range across the spectrum is from stable/peace, unstable/peace, uncertainty and general war. 

SUBJECTIVE READINESS RATINGS

Mr. DICKS. Now, I have been concerned about this ability of the 

commanding officer to raise their readiness rate. Can you explain 

to me under what circumstances that occurs? Is there pressure applied from any source for these commanding officers to raise the 

readiness rates? 

Mr. MURTHA [presiding]. Meaning artificially, just give them a 

new—— 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
163 

Mr. DICKS. Well, do commanders make a subjective decision that 

units are really better off than what their equipment and training 

and everything looks like. For example, we probably are a three, 

but they raised it to a two or a one as they deploy into Iraq. 

General THURMAN. Congressman, I can answer that. What I 

would tell you is we measure our readiness—the readiness report 

is an objective assessment, and that is with the personnel on hand, 

the equipment on hand, and the equipment readiness in training. 

We will allow that commander to upgrade or downgrade one level 

of C rating. We have put metrics in place. 

We want them to tell an honest assessment of readiness. We 

want to make sure that we do not mask or exaggerate readiness 

levels, and we look every month at every readiness report because 

now we can see down through all the units with our readiness reporting. 

So we encourage those commanders to call it like it is and tell 

us what their no-kidding state of readiness is. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. I will be back. 

Mr. MURTHA. There has been no individual in the Congress of 

the United States who has worked harder on readiness than Bill 

Young. Health care is his big issue, but readiness comes second to 

health care. He understands how important health care is based on 

readiness and readiness based on health care. So I had to drag him 

from another hearing to make sure he got here to talk to you about 

readiness. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you; and I am going to apologize to you and to our witnesses. The only reason that I was at the 

other subcommittee is that General Peake, whom I am sure you all 

remember from being Surgeon General, was our witness. I really 

felt compelled to be with General Peake because we have an adopted Marine son who was shot in Kuwait. General Peake was there 

at the time and performed the surgery that saved his life. So I really wanted to be there, Mr. Chairman. You know Josh very well. 

Mr. MURTHA. Yes. 

Mr. YOUNG. But on the issue of readiness, Chairman Murtha is 

really right that this whole subcommittee is concerned about readiness. 

I want to go just a little bit beyond today. Operation Enduring 

Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, what is the situation with 

our Army in the event that you had to be deployed, you had to face 

another situation somewhere other than Afghanistan or Iraq? Are 

we able to meet another obligation? 

I know one time we used to talk about two major regional conflicts, that we could handle two without any difficulty. We don’t 

hear that conversation any more today, but what is our situation 

with readiness as it relates to another unexpected or even expected 

eventuality? 

General THURMAN. Congressman Young, first off, are we ready 

for another contingency? As you know or may not know, that we 

have several operational plans that the Joint Staff has for— 

COCOM to respond to whatever the contingency may be. A U.S. response would be joint. It is hard to discuss without getting into a 

classified forum for those types of crises. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
164 

I would tell you, as I stated up front, that our concern is we have 

really eaten into the strategic depth of the Army, and that is why 

we have got to continue our growth. 

Mr. MURTHA. And our forward deployment of supplies? 

General THURMAN. That is correct, sir. 

The other piece of that that is important is our Reserve components. That helps us build back strategic depth and gives us that 

operational force that we need to meet these potential crises. That 

is one of the things that we are concerned about, and we are trying 

to build that back as fast as we can. 

SOLDIER STRESS

Mr. YOUNG. General, we do the best we can to provide whatever 

the Army or the Defense Department-wide advises us that is needed to accomplish the mission and to protect our groups while they 

are performing that mission. We know that we have worn out a lot 

of equipment. We have had to step up to the plate with appropriations to reset Army. We already reset the Marine Corps. 

But, yesterday, Secretary England made quite a statement where 

he and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, were 

there. And Gordon said, our troops are tired. So we are not only 

wearing out our equipment, we are wearing out our troops. If our 

troops are tired, that has got to affect readiness. 

I realize we are trying to grow the size of the Army so that deployments don’t have to be as long. There is more dwell time between deployments. We realize that, and we understand that program. But if we run out of troops, where do we go? 

I mean, these guys are tough. Chairman Murtha and I both see 

them at the hospitals, especially, when they have been wounded 

and they come into Walter Reed or Bethesda. You can be really 

proud of them. They are tough. Their attitudes are just unbelievable. They are a tremendous inspiration. But they are wearing out, 

and there is only so much we can get out of a human being. What 

do we do? 

General THURMAN. Congressman Young, my number one concern 

every day that I work is how we can take the stress off the force. 

What I would tell you, 15 months is too long. We know we need 

to get back to something that is more palatable to our soldiers and 

their families. 

Dependent upon demand, we are doing our very best to look at 

how we do things smarter in terms of how we reset these formations when they return and we take time for soldiers and families 

to reintegrate and give them—take-a-knee-type event, if they could, 

for at least the first six months, and we don’t have any directed 

training. We are working that out right now. 

But that is a concern of ours. We know we have got to reduce 

the amount of boots on the ground and expand the amount of dwell 

time before they are called back. That is something that I have 

worked on. That is my number one priority that the Chief of Staff 

of the Army has given me, to work that and look across the whole 

formation of how we can do that better and smarter. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, sir, I hope I don’t sound critical in my questioning and in my statements, because I think you all have done 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
165 

an unbelievable job, and I think your troops have done an unbelievable job on the ground. We are here to support. 

I think you will find this committee is prepared to provide whatever you identify to us that you need. I am certain the chairman 

has made that commitment over and over again, and I certainly 

make that commitment. So if there is something that you need 

from us, we will provide it. The only thing we won’t provide is if 

we don’t know about it. 

Thank you very much. 

Again, just please pass on to your troops that the members of 

this Committee understand what they go through and we appreciate the sacrifices they make and the really good job that they do. 

Thank you for being here today. 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir, thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Moran. 

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES

Mr. MORAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, yesterday, when we had the Marine Corps testify, 

they said that the current MRAPs in the Iraq theater have substantial challenges navigating urban warfare. They are not designed for off-road expedition, they have to stick to the highways 

and they often get—when it rains, they get stuck in the mud. 

So their conclusion was that this MRAP vehicle that we put so 

much money into, and an enormous amount of money to just fly 

them over there, would be better served for forward positions in 

another area in another region, rather than mission-critical operations in Iraq. Maybe send them to Afghanistan, although I don’t 

even know if they work in Afghanistan. 

I would like for you to respond, because what I have heard is 

fairly positive about the MRAPs, but maybe you are supposed to 

say that. I would like to know what we are going to do with all 

of these MRAPs, plus I don’t know how many more we are sending—how many more, thousands? 

Mr. MURTHA. They said they have 10,000 already produced. 

Mr. DICKS. Will the gentleman yield? 

I think I was at this hearing. I don’t quite remember the tone 

that the gentleman is reflecting here. 

I heard the Marine Corps say, thank God for the MRAPs and the 

lives that have been saved—they haven’t lost a single life since 

they were there. So I don’t remember—this is a much different 

hearing than the gentleman from Washington heard. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, I don’t know what the gentleman from Washington heard. 

Mr. DICKS. I think the staff heard it—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Just a minute, Mr. Moran has the time, but 4,000 

has been sent by the government, according to the staff, and 10,000 

are ordered, is that accurate? 

General THURMAN. That is accurate for the Army, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Moran. 

Mr. MORAN. Do I have my time back here, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. MURTHA. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. You certainly do. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
166 

Mr. MORAN. It turns out they did say that, Mr. Dicks. It’s possible you weren’t there at the time. They said all the things I said, 

not what you said. 

Mr. DICKS. Well—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Would the gentleman from Washington let the gentleman from Virginia—— 

Mr. MORAN. Nevertheless, since it was my time, I am going to 

restate they have difficulty navigating in urban areas. They get 

stuck, and they have to stay on the highway because they can’t go 

off road. 

But my bottom-line question is, what are we going to do with all 

the thousands of MRAPs we have over there when the war in Iraq 

is over? What are we going to do with all of those? 

General THURMAN. Congressman, those are very good questions. 

Your latter question, I will tell you we are looking at how many 

of those we think we need to put in our Army preposition stocks. 

We are evaluating that right now as we look to the future. 

The first portion of your question, it depends on where you are 

at in Iraq. In some of the areas, if you are in a confined area, at 

least in the urban, the roads are in there, and you know there are 

obstructions in there with the way their prior distribution center 

is set up, and it is hard to navigate in and around, just like it is 

for other vehicles. 

But I would tell you, without that—and I will just use a vignette 

that I experienced with what I saw the other day. We had one 

about 600 pounds of explosives, and it tipped the MRAP over and, 

unfortunately, the soldier killed appeared to be crushed, but the 

other three walked away from it. 

It’s that confidence—soldiers have to have confidence in that 

equipment, confidence in themselves, their leadership and know 

that we are going to do everything we can to adapt to that threat. 

But some of the road networks are pretty bad in Iraq. 

SUBJECTIVE READINESS RATING UPGRADES

Mr. MORAN. I understand that, but we were told that they were 

going to be able to navigate all those roads. 

The subjectivity of some of the evaluations of the combat brigades is of concern; and the question has been raised, of the Army’s 

combat brigades reporting the highest level of readiness, how many 

of the Army’s combat brigades would be able to report C-1 if the 

commanders were not allowed to subjectively upgrade their readiness? 

We ask that because we understand that there is a fair amount 

of subjective upgrading. Of course, that impacts on the Army’s 

overall readiness picture and makes it look better, but it is not necessarily consistent with the traditional means of grading a combat 

brigade. 

Can you respond to that? 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir, Congressman. 

For selective upgrade or downgrade, we have metrics—first off, 

that is a commander’s report, and I will tell you I have not seen 

any pressure on commanders to report better than what they are. 

As a matter of fact, we don’t want them to do that. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
167 

With the current metrics that we have from the Department of 

the Army, a unit commander, let’s say a brigade-level commander, 

he can upgrade one level or downgrade. We don’t want to take that 

flexibility away from a commander. There may be cases in terms 

of training where he thinks he has done what he needs to do to 

meet the training requirements. 

If they want to go to a higher level of readiness, then it’s going 

to take the approval of the next higher commander to approve that. 

So we put metrics in place because we want our commanders to tell 

it, to call it like it is, because they know we are going to call on 

them. I feel pretty good that we are not putting that pressure on 

these commanders. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, we have been told, General, that most of the 

combat brigades that have been deployed to Iraq would not be receiving a C–1 rating if it was based on the objective component 

measures, but that it is becoming commonplace for the brigade 

commander to increase to C–1, that it is not necessarily giving us 

an accurate reflection of the readiness. 

Now, that is why we ask these questions, so you can put that on 

the record. 

General THURMAN. Congressman, what I would tell you is, sir, I 

would be more than happy, in a closed forum or classified forum, 

to sit down and give you the status of every Army unit and show 

you who has upgraded and who has downgraded in their overall C 

ratings. 

Mr. MORAN. I don’t think they want the status of every Army 

unit, but it is a concern, and it’s worthwhile to discuss it. I appreciate that. 

I think we are going to need to go vote. 

MRAP

Mr. DICKS [presiding]. You go right ahead. Mr. Murtha and I are 

going to rotate. But if you want to go and vote, that’s fine. 

And just to get back to the point that Mr. Moran made, and he 

was right. They did say they did have mobility problems in getting 

around corners in tight urban situations and they did have issues. 

The thing that I picked up on the positive side was that they 

haven’t lost a single Marine since they have been in the MRAPs, 

and the Marines loved it for that purpose, because they saved lives. 

What is happening with the Army? How effective is the MRAP 

then for the Army? 

General THURMAN. Sir, Congressman, I would tell you it has 

been in our initial assessment very good. We have lost at least one 

that I know of right now that was catastrophic, and I won’t want 

to get into the classification of what actually happened to the vehicle, but it has been very positive as I tell you. I mean, we track 

that on a daily basis. 

Mr. DICKS. So it was a good decision to put MRAP over in Iraq, 

from your perspective. 

General THURMAN. As my perspective, sir, as the Army G–3. Yes, 

sir. 

Mr. DICKS. And we have Humvees, we have Strykers, we have 

the right mix now between the Humvees and the MRAPs—or have 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
168 

you got your requirement, your full requirement of MRAPs yet, or 

do you want a different mix or numbers than you have? 

General THURMAN. Sir, we do not have our full requirement of 

the stated requirement that the theater has asked for. 

Mr. DICKS. What is that? Do you know? 

General THURMAN. The current acquisition number, as we discussed, I believe, earlier, was 10,000. We are evaluating—and I 

went back just this last Saturday and asked the theater to come 

back to us with an operational assessment and tell us, you know, 

one, what is the operational assessment so we know what the future requirements are and how is that vehicle performing and what 

do we need to do with it. That is an ongoing assessment right now. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA [presiding]. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Was it your time that expired? 

Mr. DICKS. No, it wasn’t. I gave him triple time. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, it might be of interest to know that 

Mr. Dicks did acknowledge that the Marine Corps did say that in 

terms of the mobility of the vehicles. 

Mr. DICKS. And they also said, thank God, they liked the vehicles. 

Mr. MURTHA. The Marine Corps has talked to me about the difficulties. You just pointed out the difficulties. I have seen an M-1 

tank where the turret was blown off; and I worry about head injuries, too. They may not have been killed, but we want to look into 

head injuries when these things are blown up. 

So it’s a program where you wanted it, troops wanted it, they put 

the money into it, and it’s probably one of the biggest procurement 

programs in the history, $21 billion. Because the troops wanted it, 

we came up with the money. 

Mr. Rothman. 

TRAINING

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Generals, thank you for your services and your sacrifices 

throughout your career and those of your family. We do appreciate 

it. 

A couple of questions. I know that Mr. Dicks, my colleague from 

Washington, asked this while I was upstairs in terms of what are 

our forces being trained for. Is it strictly limited to the terrain, 

temperature and types of combat that we are experiencing in Iraq 

and Afghanistan or are there other things we are training for? 

In general, I heard there are other things we are training for. Because, yesterday, the Marines were here to tell us that, unfortunately, they were not being trained for anything other than the 

kind of combat that they are going to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan. Could you respond? 

General THURMAN. Congressman Rothman, yes, sir. 

Currently, we are focused entirely on counterinsurgency operations. Once again, it’s the amount of supply that we have in our 

Army forces to meet the COCOM demands. We know we need to 

build that depth back to train for full-spectrum operations. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
169 

Mr. ROTHMAN. General, does your budget request this year provide for funds to expand the training to include other potential theaters? 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir, it does. And our training accounts, 

when we get the amount of time back home, that we can, in fact, 

train for full spectrum. Time is one of the resources that we have. 

Because we have to turn our Active units around with our brigade 

combat team so fast that it takes about 18 months to train for full 

spectrum operations. We are not doing that right now. 

DWELL TIME

Mr. ROTHMAN. In your understanding, is the Army—have they 

announced plans to provide 18 months back home? 

General THURMAN. Sir, we have not announced that. Our goal 

for—rotational goals right now is we would like right now for every 

year deployed, for 12 months, we would like to get back home for 

two, but we can’t meet that right now. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Go away for 12, be back for two? 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Or be back for 12? 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir, right now, our goal currently is one 

to one. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Oh, I see. Go for 12 months, back for 24? 

General THURMAN. Yes, sir, but it’s only one month rotation policy for the AC down in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

FULL-SPECTRUM TRAINING

Mr. ROTHMAN. Well, let me just offer my observation that there 

is something fundamentally wrong with a policy that would not 

allow us to train for other theaters. It simply shows the limits of 

our capability to do the extent we want to stay in Iraq or Afghanistan. 

Something has got to give, but I don’t think it can be facing future threats. As someone once said, that is not planning, that is 

wishful thinking, that there will be no threats for which we need 

to be trained. But that is my observation. 

Unless—so you need to hear from higher ups. You are just waiting for the time to train, but you say there is money in the budget 

to train if you are given the time. Is that correct? 

General THURMAN. Congressman Rothman, if I could just be 

clear, we don’t have any policy that says we won’t train for full 

spectrum. The fact of the matter is, given the current global demand, we cannot—we do not have the time available to train for 

full spectrum operations. That is the current state, given where we 

are with demand. 

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

Mr. ROTHMAN. If I may go on to another subject just briefly, last 

year, the Army testified that the future combat systems program 

is critical to the future capacities of the U.S. Army. Just last week, 

however, the Secretary of Defense said that he had concerns about 

the program in view of the pressures on the defense budget, in 

terms of balancing the budget pressure and the modernization 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
170 

goals which are to be addressed by the future combat systems. Can 

you address the issue of whether you are still pushing for the Future Combat Systems and how you would accommodate this pressure on the budget and these modernization goals? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, I would be glad to discuss that. 

The first point is the Secretary of Defense was asked a hypothetical question. He was asked to project, based upon a budget 

downturn, what the pressures would be on the Department of Defense. The Army recognizes that in the event of a budget downturn 

that everything we do has to be reevaluated. 

The points that I would like to make overall is—the Future Combat System is the centerpiece of our Army modernization. It is the 

way that we take a force that is being trained and shaped to fight 

today and move it to the future. As you have already addressed, 

we don’t want to be focused solely on counterinsurgency operations. 

We want to be full spectrum, as General Thurman has outlined 

earlier. 

To do that then, in our base budget, we have a plan for Future 

Combat Systems. It is a part of our overall investment strategy. 

FCS is never more than one-third of that funding strategy. So the 

point is, it’s affordable, it’s deliberately designed to be the critical 

element that moves us forward, gets us to the next decade with 

critical capabilities and continuously cascades new capability to the 

force. 

The other thing that we think is very important is it is designed 

for how we are seeing the battlefield evolve. It is not last decade’s 

plan for last decade; it is this decade’s plan for the next decade. So 

we are working very, very hard. We are very optimistic. 

If we were to take you to Fort Bliss this summer, you will see 

the lead elements of FCS right now being used by soldiers who are 

evaluating it to see if it has the promise to be brought to the Army 

right away. 

Through spinouts every two years you will see elements of FCS 

hit the force. We are really excited about that. Many of the early 

elements of FCS are already in combat today. 

For example, as you take a look at the frag kit five that is on 

Humvees, that frag kit has elements of the armor solution that will 

be a part of the main ground vehicle. If you take a look at the 

UAVs that are flying overhead, if you take a look at the robotics 

we are using against IEDs, all those are elements we are trying to 

help shape and prepare for the future. 

So FCS is affordable, it’s absolutely necessary, and the Army 

leadership is absolutely committed to it. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me say something about FCS now. You know, 

I have given a challenge to yourself and General Casey. We are 

quite willing if we can see you folks willing to take a short-term 

chance in order to put some money in it. 

He and I talked just yesterday. We sat down and talked about 

how much of a chance he could afford to take in order to come up 

with FCS. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
171 

TRAINING READINESS

What worries me, FCS is one thing. Of course, the money worries 

me too. But when you say 18 months—and I have known this for 

a long time—to train people in conventional type war or what we 

consider conventional type warfare, and we are training them all 

in the type of warfare that we always do. We’re going to make an 

invasion or whatever. It is that we train them for that particular 

task. 

We got a hell of a problem here. When it takes 18 months and 

they are only home 8 months and something happens someplace 

else, everybody in this room can see we have a problem in the future with the number of people we have available to us. 

What I worry about, what is going to come down first thing? 

What is going to come down? Personnel is coming down, because 

that is 100 percent, and the other stuff is 10 percent outlay. 

So I hope that you will come up with something—I hope you will 

come up with the money that adds to that money. And we are not 

going to get this done if we don’t come up in the next 2 or 3 years 

with a big pot of the money. 

What I saw, they weren’t ready to go with a lot of stuff, but we 

ought to get what we are ready to go with. 

Mr. Hobson. 

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Mr. HOBSON. I want to talk about one of the things that you have 

been able to do is attract people. Although when we have talked 

in the past, you have dropped your standards. Good you get into 

that. 

Mr. MURTHA. I did. I talked about the possibility, talked about 

tattoos, I talked about waivers and so forth. I didn’t talk about enlistment bonuses, which breaks my heart we have to pay captains 

and majors to stay in. 

Mr. HOBSON. Do you have any plan? Well, let me go back—— 

Mr. MURTHA. We didn’t have to when he went in. 

General THURMAN. The 1994 Bush administration—— 

Mr. HOBSON. The 1994 Bush administration, but he knew a little 

more on retaining. 

This committee has had an attitude that we will fund if you will 

ask for people. We had a huge spike trying to get the Army figure, 

and we asked the committee to do that. I don’t know the numbers 

or how you are growing them, but I am concerned that the programs for not only retention but for getting this recruitment, which 

I am amazed that you are able to do, but do you have any programs to get away from having to get to pay huge bonuses and 

lessening the standards for the Army as we move forward and we 

can attract people? Because I am concerned with the war coming 

down we have to get people. 

Mr. HOBSON. The heart of the Army, the heart of any group is 

its people and retention of those people. 

What kind of new plans are you all coming up with to make this 

work? Because our objectives—the Chairman gives out the number 

about the number of people from West Point, officers who are leaving. I can tell you that my recruitment—and I have a very strong 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
172 

military, with the Air Force, Wright Patterson in my district—but 

my applications for the first time in the academy have gone down, 

just the number of people coming in to apply for it. 

So we need to reinvigorate this program. Some people are calling 

for the draft. I don’t want to go back to the draft. But do you have 

any programs to change this? 

General ROCHELLE. Congressman Hobson, let me address your 

question as the Army G–1, with a little bit of experience in the 

business of recruiting. 

I will tell you, first of all, that indeed it is challenging at any 

time to recruit for an all-volunteer Army. I have had two tours, if 

you will, in the front lines of recruiting, and I can speak firsthand 

of how challenging it is. But, first of all, I would have to say that 

we are blessed as a Nation that this young generation of 

millennials, as they are commonly referred to, in my estimation, 

really are the next great generation. They are stepping up to the 

plate. 

The Chairman spoke a little bit earlier in his opening remarks 

about high school graduation and expressed a little bit of trepidation. We are concerned about that. But there is a trend that I 

would like to refer to that is much, much larger than the Army, 

and the trend goes a little bit like this: Fifty percent of all the minority youth who enter high school today will not graduate. Seventy percent of every young American who enters high school today 

who is at or below the poverty level will not graduate from high 

school. And across the Nation, 30 percent, irrespective of race or 

ethnicity, irrespective of socioeconomic status, will not graduate 

from high school. 

In spite of that, the Army is still—no, we are not hitting our 90 

percent high school degree grad that is the DOD standard. But in 

spite of that, we are hovering at 80 percent and will not go below 

80 percent high school degree graduates in 2008, fiscal year 2008. 

The key metric, if you may—all are important, but the key metric is the one—those who score in the upper 50th percentile of the 

Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery. Because that, more 

than anything, reflects trainability. The high school degree, which 

was adopted in the 1970s and 1980s, really speaks to stick-toittiveness. 

To your question, it is going to require innovation for us to remain viable and continue to grow the Army. We are on a very, very 

positive track right now for growing the Army ahead of schedule, 

the schedule approved by the President. But it is going to take innovation. We are employing innovation, and I will name just two. 

We recently launched a partnership with the Army National 

Guard called Active First. The National Guard, sir, as you have 

stated and several have alluded to, is ubiquitous across our Nation. 

There are places where it simply would not be profitable to have 

a recruiting station and several recruiters. So the partnership calls 

for a young person to be recruited by the National Guard, trained 

and then employed, upon completion of training, for a period in the 

active force. 

Mr. HOBSON. Let me follow up for just a second, and then I have 

to go vote. The Guard does another thing that is good. In my State, 

we will pay 100 percent for a kid to go to college at a state instituVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:47 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046474 PO 00000 Frm 00172 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A474P2.XXX A474P2

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
173 

tion in the State that is public or the similar amount to a private 

school within the State. That has got us a lot of quality young people. 

The second thing, I don’t know whether you are doing—are you 

doing a GED program for these young people, where you can get 

them a high school equivalency while they are there. I think you 

can help society as a whole with these numbers if you will get them 

GEDs. And if the Army cares about them and you give them structure in their life, these kids can then achieve in the future, not only 

in the Army but elsewhere. 

General ROCHELLE. Sir, you are reading my mind, because that 

was my second point, my second point of innovation. At Fort Jackson, South Carolina, later this year, we will employ and launch a 

program that was designed and will be spread across larger if it 

proves very profitable—and we think it will—which is designed to 

do precisely that. 

Mr. DICKS [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Bishop. 

MODULAR BRIGADE STRUCTURE

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. 

And welcome, gentlemen. And I, too, had conflicting subcommittee responsibilities. 

But following up on Mr. Hobson’s point, let me just say for the 

record I appreciate, General Rochelle, your willingness and the 

willingness of the Army to meet with the Congressional Black Caucus in addressing some of the concerns that were just touched upon 

in your answer to Mr. Hobson’s question. 

I am concerned about some issues regarding modularity. The 

Army is in the process of converting to a modular brigade structure 

while at the same time fighting a war with half of the active component brigades deployed in combat theaters. In fiscal year 2006, 

there were 51 brigade combat teams, and of course, by the end of 

2008, we are expecting to have 69. 

Can you discuss the utility of adding an infantry battalion to 

each of the modular brigades, presumably to increase combat 

power, without requiring increases in command and logistical functions? Do you think that makes sense? And is the Army exploring 

such an idea? 

And tell me what the impact of modularity is going to be on the 

equipment requirements. If additional equipment is required, is it 

funded? Is it fully funded, I might ask? 

And what would you think—and this is probably the more complicated of the questions—what is the desired number of brigades 

in the force-generation pool that will allow us to achieve 1-year 

dwell time and 1-year combat tour? And added to that, what would 

be the number of brigade combat teams necessary to sustain a rotation of 2 years at home for every year that it is deployed? 

Mr. DICKS. Why don’t we let him answer that? I think that is a 

lot of questions. Then you can follow up. 

Mr. BISHOP. Okay. 

General THURMAN. Congressman Bishop, your first question, the 

training and doctrine command is looking at the modular concept 

in terms of do we have the structure right. And, as you know, that 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
174 

would add more spaces to that formation, because with the force 

structure allowance that we have, that we have been authorized to 

grow in the AC, is 547.2. Having fought these formations, we always probably want more, but it gets into what is affordable out 

there and looks at the overall capability we have to have. 

In respect to modularity, I think, as it stands right now, we have 

38 that we have converted on the AC side plus enablers and two 

nonmodular brigades, for a total of 40. 

We are growing the Army as fast as we can. And what we are 

trying to do by fiscal year 2011 is have a total on hand of 76. And 

I can go into detail on the actual force mix. And that is 48 on the 

active, 28 on the reserve components. 

Your specific question on what does it take in the Army force 

generation to have available, as I understand it, at a 1-to-1 ratio 

I believe you asked. That would be 24 brigade combat teams, programmed right now, as we get to 76, and five Army National 

Guard combat teams, for a total of 29. Additionally, that would 

give us a rotational capacity in that program—that is what is in 

the program—of about 236.8K of rotational capacity with enablers. 

And that would be what we would be trying to do to put on that 

force-generation model of what is available, what is ready, and 

what is in the reset trained. 

Now, right now, given our demand, the reset trained and ready 

is compressed, so we can’t get to that. That is why it is so important for us to get as fast as we can to the program growth, so that 

we can get that capability. I will tell you that the capabilities in 

those formations is very good. And you have the combat power in 

there, at least in this environment, that you can rapidly task organize, given that mission, and apply combat power to decisive point 

with that. So I would tell you, I think it is going to take that stress 

off as fast as we can grow it. 

Now, I will defer to General Speakes to answer the equipment 

challenges that we have with modularity. 

Mr. BISHOP. What about the 2-to-1? 

General THURMAN. Oh, I am sorry. To get to a 1-to-2, given a 76 

brigade combat team growth for the AC, that would be 16 brigade 

combat teams. That is what would be on that 1-to-2-cycle, with approximately 106,000 or 107,000 of enabling forces at rotational capacity. And then for a 1-in-4 with our reserve components, because 

they are part of this equation, we would ask them to provide four 

brigade combat teams. That is at the programmed growth of 76 brigade combat teams. And we are trying, by the end of fiscal year 

2011, to have that completed and have grown that capability. 

Mr. MURTHA [presiding]. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Does Mr. Frelinghuysen have any questions? 

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Yes, I do, certainly before Mr. Dicks comes 

back, because he is going to reclaim that time. Before he comes 

back, let me thank you, General Speakes, for the emphasis added 

in response to Congressman Rothman. I mean, it would be catastrophic if we did not continue, even as expensive as they may be, 

our investments in the Future Combat Systems. We might as well 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
175 

put up a white flag. I mean, we would not be able to proceed with 

modernization unless we make those investments. 

Would you make the connection between modularity, the brigades we are sending out in the field now that are modular, which 

are all about flexibility, and the flexibility that will come—are 

there going to be Future Combat Systems modular brigades? Could 

you talk a little bit about that? 

General SPEAKES. Sir, I can. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I know we are spinning the technology out. 

To some extent, the technology is futuristic being put to use. 

General SPEAKES. Right. Sir, what we have been able to do is the 

program that General Thurman just laid out takes and puts the 

modular formations across our Army. And it is magnificent because, as General Thurman said from his personal experience as a 

combat commander, you have the flexibility, the agility and the 

sustainability to be about, to be successful in today’s battlefield. 

What my challenge is right now, I am behind, because, you see, 

what I am doing right now is taking equipment that was designed 

in the 1970s and 1980s, in large measure, and we are adapting it 

and trying to modernize it to try to fulfill this modular vision, but 

we know it is not really what we want. What we really want is 

equipment that is common, that has incredible force protection capabilities, that has much more agility and much more sustainability. 

We are seeing the initial elements of that in these Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, which have a common platform and the ability to almost have a network capability for command and control. 

It gives us a vision of where we are headed. The next step in this 

will be Future Combat Systems, because—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You are marrying future combat system 

technology now to the modular units that you are setting up? That 

is sort of what I wanted—— 

General SPEAKES. Exactly. And then what you will see is all this 

common equipment in the brigades that already have been successful in combat. So instead of using 1970s and 1980s technology, stuff 

that was designed for the Cold War, we will have common platforms, much more survivability, much more lethality, much more 

force protection capability. So those are the things that we are seeing in Future Combat System that we are so excited about. 

Mr. MURTHA. We still have $160 billion to $200 billion which we 

have to find. So you are going to have to do some hustling. 

Mr. Dicks, before we adjourn. 

RESET

Mr. DICKS. Okay. Let me ask you, on this very question, how are 

you going to decide what you are going to fix of all of this equipment that we are bringing back, the so-called reset, and how much 

are you going to just wait to get the new stuff? 

I mean, I hope we don’t go replace all the equipment and then 

buy new equipment. I am sure that is what Mr. Murtha is worried 

about here, accelerating the Future Combat Systems. This is the 

time to fill the holes with the new equipment if it is there. 

General SPEAKES. Exactly. So in the near term, what we have is, 

to fulfill what General Thurman needs, every formation coming 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
176 

back has to be made ready to go again. That is what we are doing 

with reset, thanks to your generous support. So what we are doing 

now is returning formations within a year with equipment that is 

ready to go. And that has been a tribute to the resourcing you have 

given us for reset. 

Mr. MURTHA. What we are saying is, in the future, if you want 

the Future Combat Systems you are going to have to take a chance 

on not resetting and rehabilitating as much as you want to in order 

to get the other, or we are not going to be able to find the money, 

because it is such a big bill. 

MRAP

Mr. DICKS. One final thing. On the MRAP again—and I want to 

say this for the record. There is no MRAP being built in Washington State, but I just want to give a fair hearing here. 

We have done trainers for the uparmored Humvees. They are 

kind of in a container, and these guys go in and train on this thing. 

I am told, General Thurman, there is only one trainer for the 

MRAP. Do you think it would be a wise investment to do some 

more of these trainers, since we are going to be using this thing? 

Mr. MURTHA. Particularly in Washington State. 

Mr. DICKS. No, it has nothing to do with Washington State. 

General THURMAN. Congressman Dicks, sir, what I would tell 

you is that requirement has not been fully brought into me, as the 

G–3. Now, you asked me, do I think we need to have trainers for 

these vehicles? I think we have to evaluate that and look at that. 

Any time that we can substitute a training system out there— 

and that is a trade-off with money now and funding—absolutely. 

You know, we have done that with a lot of our equipment. But 

right now, I have not got the full requirement on that. 

Mr. MURTHA. I appreciate that answer, and we have to go vote 

again. So we will adjourn the Committee until the week after next. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Cramer and the answers thereto follow:] 

MISSILES

Question. The Army has historically spent RDT&E money on the development of 

missile systems; however recent plans suggest the Administration feels comfortable 

with the current inventory of tactical missiles. Tactical missile development is declining in such a manner that in a few years the Department of Defense will only 

be developing 1 tactical missile program, Joint Air to Ground Missile (JAGM)? Does 

General Thurman believe the readiness of our current inventory of missiles is sufficient to address an emerging threat such as North Korea, China or Russia? Does 

the General feel comfortable the United States Army can continue to sustain a 

healthy industrial base for future tactical missile research and development as 

threats emerge and the requirements for Army readiness change? 

Answer. 

(1) Is current missile inventory sufficient to address emerging threats such as 

North Korea, China, or Russia? 

In accordance with guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 

Army requirements are based upon approved scenarios and Defense Intelligence 

Agency Threat Reports. We have not received scenarios or threat reports for all of 

the areas listed. The Army conducted extensive modeling and analysis to determine 

munition requirements for OSD approved scenarios. Based on a comparison of these 

munition requirements and Army inventory, some missile systems fully meet FY15 

requirements while other missile systems require additional procurement to do so. 

However, missiles have a limited shelf life, and Army inventories of critical missiles 

begin to decline without additional procurement in the FY15 President’s Budget reVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:47 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046474 PO 00000 Frm 00176 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A474P2.XXX A474P2

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
177 

quest. Army inventory projections also are predicated upon receipt of FY08 and 

FY09 supplemental funds. 

(2) Does the G–3 feel comfortable the U.S. can continue to sustain a healthy base 

for future tactical missiles? 

The Army recognizes the health of the Missiles Industrial Base is an issue. At 

present, we have an unsurpassed capability in Close Combat, Aviation, Fire Support 

and Air Defense. The result is limited upgrade or develop of new missile systems. 

In response, the Army has initiated a missile capability gap analysis to highlight 

emerging capability gaps, help focus the President’s Budget requests in FY12–17 to 

ensure capability gaps do not develop, and to ensure that the U.S. retains the industrial base capacity to counter emerging threats. 

Question. I have heard rumors that the Army G–3 has requested an Army Missile 

Capability Gap Assessment and is expecting this assessment to address the POM 

2012–2017. Is this Assessment going forward as requested and can this Subcommittee expected to be undated once this assessment is finalized? 

Answer. On 21 Dec 07, the Army G–3 signed a memo directing the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command to conduct an Army Missile Capability Gap Assessment 

that looks at future Army missile capability needs in the context of a Joint force. 

Discussions are underway to ensure assessment scope, use of current analysis results and completion date will identify and provide recommendation/direction for 

any potential missile capability gaps. We expect to provide the results by the FY12 

President’s Budget submission. No Congressional update is currently scheduled. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Cramer. 

Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow.] 

MODULARITY

Question. The Army is in the process of converting to the modular brigade structure, while fighting a war, with approximately half of the active component brigades 

deployed to the combat theaters. In fiscal year 2006, the Army had 51 brigade combat teams. By the end of fiscal year 2008 the Army plans to have 69 brigade combat 

teams. 

Please discuss the utility of adding an infantry battalion to each of the modular 

brigades. The idea is to increase combat power without requiring a significant increase in command and logistical functions. Does this make sense and is the Army 

exploring such an idea? 

Answer. The Army continually assesses the utility of the modular force designs 

and applies changes based on lessons learned and operational experience. The Army 

must balance the strategic risk of preserving the All-Volunteer Force in persistent 

conflict, the operational risk of providing sufficient capacity to support joint force 

rotational requirements, and the tactical risk of maintaining sufficient capability 

within the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to conduct successful full spectrum operations. The current BCT design includes one Recon & Surveillance Squadron with 

three troops and two Maneuver (Combined Arms Battalions) with 4 companies each. 

This design has one more maneuver company than a legacy brigade. Adding a third 

combined arms battalion would make the BCT ‘‘more capable’’ than previous designs, but would increase the size of a Heavy BCT by 812 personnel and an Infantry 

BCT by 848 personnel which would add an additional 56.1K Soldiers at a cost of 

over $4.8B per year across the force. In addition, the increase of 68 Maneuver Battalions would generate an equipping bill of $2.5B. 

Question. What is the impact of modularity on equipment requirements? If additional equipment is needed, is that equipment fully funded? 

Answer. The transformation of our force has driven up the requirements for 

equipping. The current plan from 2005 to 2013 provides $174.9B in procurement 

($41.0B for the Reserve Component ($29.4B to ARNG and about $11.6B for Army 

Reserve) and $133.9B for the Active Component) from the base budget to meet these 

increased requirements; however, because of pre-modularity shortfalls, the Army depends on supplemental appropriations to close the gap between new requirements 

and existing equipment and modernization shortfalls. Our greatest concern would 

be a loss of supplemental funding support for this plan, resulting in an inability to 

fully meet the Army’s equipment requirements across all components and the 

unhinging of the Army’s Equipping Strategy. 

The Army had significant equipping challenges prior to 9/11. Particularly noteworthy were the equipment shortages and lack of modernization in the Reserve 

Components. Because of the need to integrate the Reserve Components to meet the 

demand of persistent conflict, the Army has adopted a new total force operating 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
178 

strategy that resources units based on their deployment window, regardless of component. The previous incremental ‘‘tiered’’ resourcing strategy resulted in late deploying Active and most Reserve Component units being equipped last and with the 

least modernized equipment. Additional funding gained through supplemental 

spending will fill shortages and modernize outdated equipment in the force and fund 

payback plans for diverted Reserve Component equipment. The Equipping Strategy 

is linked to the Army Campaign Plan which reflects the time-phased transformation 

of the Army into the modular force. 

Question. Has the Army been able to meet the schedule for forming modular brigade combat teams? What have been the key challenges in terms of personnel and 

equipment? 

Answer. The Army is on track to complete personnel growth by 2010 and Modular 

BCT growth by the end of FY 2011. The most significant challenges to meeting this 

timeline are: 

(1) Manning: Ensuring manning programs provide for the recruitment, development, distribution, sustainment, retention and associated systems critical to building and maintaining the all volunteer force. Logistics, Military Intelligence, and 

Aviation Captains and Majors are among the major manning challenges. 

(2) Equipping: How to best balance funding to minimize risk to the current force 

and maintaining the momentum in Modernization to ensure the viability of the Future Force. Battle Command Systems, trucks, and night vision devices are three of 

the major equipping challenges for Brigade Combat Teams. 

GROW-THE-ARMY-BRIGADES

Question. Currently, and over the next several years, the Army is adding endstrength and equipment in order to form six new infantry brigades. 

When will the Grow-the-Army brigades be available for combat deployment? 

Answer. As a matter of course, the GTA BCTs will be available for deployment 

one year after they activate. The Army will activate one additional BCT in each 

year from 2008–2010 and three BCTs in 2011. By the end of FY 2011 all GTA BCTs 

will be available for deployment. 

Question. What is the status of manning, equipping and training the Grow-theArmy Brigades? 

Answer. The Army is on track to complete personnel growth by 2010, BCT growth 

by 2011 and equipment growth for the BCTs by 2015. To monitor our progress in 

meeting these goals, the Army conducts a monthly Force Validation Committee 

process to synchronize resourcing functions for select units that will deploy or convert within a given window. This process brings together the Army Staff and supported commands to identify and resolve manning, equipping and training issues. 

Using current readiness data as a baseline, the Force Validation Committee projects 

the status for each unit as it builds to its scheduled deployment or conversion date. 

Units that are not projected to meet stated readiness goals on their deployment or 

conversion date are intensively managed at each level to adjust resources and mitigate shortfalls. 

Question. Is the necessary equipment for the Grow-the-Army Brigades fully funded? 

Answer. The Army’s current program from 2008–2013 provides a total of $68.6B to include $17.0B in procurement to support the Grow the Army plan’s original 2012 

BCT timeline. The Chief of Staff has approved an accelerated Grow the Army Plan 

timeline that will have all BCTs in the force by 2011, and will require an additional 

$2.6B in funding for personnel and training. 

Question. Will all the new brigades be light infantry brigades? 

Answer. The GTA initiative was based on increasing rotational depth and filling 

global operational demands as quickly as possible. The growth of six AC Infantry 

BCTs was the optimal way to accomplish the rapid growth with a structure suitable 

to meeting current operational demands in an era of persistent conflict. This decision is subject to review based on the results of Total Army Analysis and the Quadrennial Defense Review. This process will analyze existing requirements, current 

operational demand, and projected future demand to ensure we have the appropriate mix of Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker BCTs within the force and across the 

Active Component and Army National Guard. 

RESET FUNDING

Question. General, Congress provided $17.1 billion for Army’s reset needs in the 

fiscal year 2007. 

Please update the Committee on the execution of the $17.1 billion provided for 

Reset in fiscal year 2007? 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
179 

Answer. In FY07, the Army executed $16.4 billion of the $17.1 billion provided 

for Reset. The Army was unable to spend the remainder of the funds toward Reset 

due to operational changes in the Theater that resulted in less equipment returning 

to the States than planned. The Army reprogrammed these dollars toward the Mine 

Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, a high priority force protection item. In total, 

the FY07 funds Reset of 25 brigade combat teams: 20 completed during in FY07 and 

5 are completing in FY08. 

Question. What are the key production challenges facing Army Reset in terms of 

industry and depot capacity? Are you facing any major capacity problems? 

Answer. Our primary challenge is the receipt of timely, adequate funding. The Army requires the remaining $7.6 billion in FY08 GWOT procurement no later than 

Memorial Day to remain on schedule for FY08. Timely receipt of these dollars leads 

to maintaining the necessary workforce, procuring of additional spare parts and contracting with our industrial partners which leads to the necessary production. Since 

FY03 the depots have doubled their direct labor hours from 12.5 million to 27.1 million (projected) in FY08, tracked vehicle Reset increased 200 percent, radar and 

Stryker Reset increased 100 percent, and all other systems’ Reset increased 50 percent. Additionally, new procurement increases equipment on hand ratings, allowing 

units to start training earlier and improve the Army’s strategic depth. 

Our depots currently are not operating at full capacity. We currently are at 27.1 

million labor hours and have the capacity to go to 40 million labor hours. We are 

operating at the necessary capacity to meet current requirements with available 

funding. Each depot’s production capacity utilization is being optimized in accordance with the commodity the depot repairs and the Army’s rotation schedules. In 

FY07, 109,249 items were scheduled to be Reset. By the end of FY07, the actual 

Reset completions totaled 123,425 items—30 percent over schedule. In FY08 we 

plan to complete 130,000 items. As Army requirements change, depot production 

will increase as necessary to meet them. Our only requirement is for predictable, 

early funding, which is essential to allow for the timely procurement of repair parts, 

adequate production planning, and the hiring and training of necessary personnel. 

PRE-POSITIONED EQUIPMENT SETS

Question. The Army drew upon pre-positioned equipment sets to sustain initial 

combat operations in Iraq. Some equipment was repaired and replaced in pre-positioned sets only to be dawn out again for the surge. 

What is the readiness posture of Army pre-positioned sets today? 

Answer. The readiness posture of the Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) available 

equipment sets for APS–4 are at 88%–95% of fill. The APS reconstitution plan will 

ensure all the other APS equipment sets will have a readiness posture of 95–100% 

of fill. 

(1) APS–4 in Korea and Japan is available; it is comprised of an HBCT (95%) and 

a tailored Sustainment Bde (88%). APS–4 will be completed by 4th Qtr FY 08. 

(2) APS–3 Afloat has a Port Opening Package capability in Guam AOR at 90% 

of fill. This set consists of a temporary afloat set of 20 units (twelve port opening 

and eight medical units/teams) loaded aboard the USNS Pomeroy. The full 

Sustainment Bde Set will be completed in FY 11. 

(3) APS–5 is issued and is planned for reconstitution when no longer required for 

ongoing operations in accordance with APS Strategy 2015. 

Question. Is additional funding needed to repair and reset pre-positioned equipment sets as the surge brigades depart from Iraq? 

Answer. APS funding has been incorporated in the Supplemental request and 

identified as part of the Reset funding and in Program Objective Memorandum 

(POM) FY 10–15 process. The total cost of APS reset is $8.9 B in both Operations 

Procurement (OPA) & Operations Maintenance and Army (OMA) funds through 

2015. Army will reconstitute APS by 2015 with the continued support of Congress 

to fully resource the budget requests for Army equipment (Supplementals and POM 

10–15). 

Question. What is the time line to have all the pre-positioned sets returned to 

their desired readiness? 

Answer. The APS stocks were used to support Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and to accelerate the build of the Brigade Combat 

Teams (BCTs). The Army has developed an APS reconstitution timeline to support 

the approved Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) Strategy 2015, the FY 10–15 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) (based on equipment availability) and Army 

resource prioritization. 

• Current Year: 

• APS–5: Infantry Brigade Combat Team 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
180 

• Near Term: 

• APS–5: Heavy Brigade Combat Team #1 

• APS–3: Infantry Brigade Combat Team #1, Sustainment Brigade #1 

• APS–2: Heavy Brigade Combat Team 

• APS–5: Infantry Battalion 

• Mid Term to 2014: 

• APS–3: Infantry Brigade Combat Team #2, Sustainment Brigade #2 

• APS–5: Fires Brigade, Sustainment Brigades #1 and #2 

Question. Does the Army intend to add MRAP vehicles to pre-positioned equipment sets? 

Answer. Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAP), will be incorporated 

into APS–5 and APS–3 when no longer required for operational use (variant type 

TBD). MRAP availability will be based on the results of Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) Tactical Wheeled Vechicle Strategy. 

Question. Given the deployment capability of U.S. Forces and the uncertain nature of conventional and unconventional threats, are pre-positioned sets a wise investment? Would it be a wiser course of action to take the equipment from the prepositioned sets and use it to outfit modular brigades and the new Grow-the-Army 

brigades? 

Answer. Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) is a strategic asset that has proven its 

value in every recent major contingency. APS provides the strategic responsiveness 

to deploy globally to any contingency operation. The last four years of the GWOT 

in Iraqi, have demonstrated that the APS program is flexible, responsive, and critical to the Army’s ability to deploy forces in support of the Combantant Commander 

requirements and adapt to changing strategic requirements. APS was used to support Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Diverting the APS equipment to support the building of modular BCTs and Grow The 

Army effort limits the ability to rapidly reinforce forward units by air movement. 

Current operational plans and future planning scenarios to include requirements 

that use APS sets. The Army complies with the National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) 2007 to identify any APS sets utilized and the plans to reconstitute those 

APS sets annually. 

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES (MRAP) 

Question. As the threat from Improvised Explosive Devices and Explosively 

Formed Penetrators grew, the limit of how much armor could be applied to the 

HMMWV was reached. The DoD identified the MRAP-type trucks to provide greater 

force protection. The Army seemed skeptical at first about acquiring MRAPs in large 

numbers. 

General, what is the current Army acquisition objective for MRAPs? 

Answer. The current AAO for MRAPs is 10,000 systems (based on the September 

2007 interim requirement). A new interim requirement for MRAPs of 12,000 systems is currently in staffing. The final requirement is dependent on many factors, 

including future actions taken by the enemy. 

Question. How many MRAPs does the Army have currently fielded in Iraq; and 

how many in Afghanistan? 

Answer. As of 4 March, the Army has fielded 1,333 MRAPs in Iraq and 8 in Afghanistan. 

Question. When do you expect to reach your acquisition goal? 

Answer. The current plan is to procure the 10,000 systems by October 2008 and 

field them by December 2008. If a new interim requirement of 12,000 is adopted, 

it is anticipated that these systems could be produced by February 2009 and fielded 

by April 2009. 

Question. How have the MRAPs been received by soldiers, and how have the 

MRAPs performed in terms of mobility and utility; and how have they performed 

when they have been attacked by various threat weapons? 

Answer. In his initial assessment, LTG Odierno reported the fielding of MRAP vehicles has had a positive impact upon crew survivability in Theater. Although in 

some operating environments, it came at the expense of maneuverability and mobility. Nevertheless, these limitations were expected and most units are ‘‘eagerly 

awaiting additional vehicles.’’ 

Due to the low densities fielded, there has been no opportunity to do side by side 

‘‘best of breed’’ analysis. It is premature to tell which variant of MRAP is superior 

or to provide definitive feedback on performance, final numbers and/or category 

mixes. 

Question. What is the proper mix of HMMWVs and MRAPS? 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
181 

Answer. A two-thirds MRAP to one-third Up-Armored HMMWV fill per Brigade 

appears about right as a fielding plan. However, it is premature to tell which variant of MRAP is superior or to provide definitive feedback on performance, final 

numbers and/or category mixes. 

Question. Is the Army MRAP requirement fully funded? 

Answer. The Army has been funded for 10,000 systems. The Joint Program Office 

reports sufficient funding to procure 12,000 systems for the Army. 

Question. What are your plans for the MRAP vehicles once the war in Iraq is 

over? 

Answer. Training and Doctrine Command is conducting tactical wheeled vehicle 

analyses that include: 1) mission roles and profiles; and 2) threats and capabilities 

of the various fleets including the MRAP, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and 

HMMWV. The initial results of those analyses will influence POM decisions; the 

Force Mix Brief to Congress; and the Combat and Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy 

due to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in JUL 08. The Army’s Tactical Wheeled 

Vehicle strategy is an ongoing effort to ensure our Soldiers receive the best capabilities available in ground wheeled vehicles to meet current and emerging threats. 

CONTRACTORS AND READINESS

Question. The Department of Defense has made a major effort to outsource support functions in order to allow soldiers to remain focused on core military skills 

and duties. The proliferation of contractors performing support functions ranges 

from the dining facility to aircraft maintenance. Contractors are working side-byside with military forces at home station and in the combat theaters. 

What is the commander’s role in defining contractor duties; in supervising contractors; and in disciplining contractors? 

Answer. Primary oversight of contractor performance and conduct falls to the cognizant contracting officer, and is generally dictated by the terms of the Government 

contract. 

Contractor employees are required to comply with all guidance, instructions, and 

general orders issued by the Theater Commander, as incorporated by the Government’s contract, including those relating to force protection, security, health, safety, 

or relations and interaction with local nationals. 

Commanders may refer contractor criminal misconduct to DoD/Department of 

Justice under MEJA, and if jurisdiction is declined, may then consider the exercise 

of jurisdiction under Article 2, UCMJ in coordination with DoD. 

Question. Training scenarios at the National Training Center and at other locations include role players who represent the Iraqi population. Do Army training scenarios include role players for contractors, such as contractor security personnel? 

Answer. Army maneuver Combat Training Centers primarily use personnel assigned to their Opposing Force cadre to replicate the various contractors in theater, 

including private security contractors. In many instances the centers use Arabicspeaking personnel to role-play contractors working on U.S. Field Operating Bases, 

since U.S. forces in theater are in day-to-day contact with Arabic contractors. Army 

maneuver Combat Training Centers are working to integrate into training scenarios 

actual personnel from contracted companies. 

Every Army maneuver Combat Training Center also challenges deploying forces 

to work through Rules of Engagement and Escalation of Force scenarios that involve 

private security contractors in Situational Training Exercises or scripted situations 

during their Mission Rehearsal Exercise. Training of unit contracting officials at 

Combat Training Centers occurs, but is limited due to constrained resources (time, 

expertise and dollars) that are focused on other mission-essential training tasks and 

capabilities. 

At maneuver Combat Training Centers, unit officials are trained on the basics of 

the contracting process from start to finish, and specifically on how to manage Commander Emergency Relief Program (CERP) contracts to completion in coordination 

with role players for ‘‘local contractors,’’ Provincial Reconstruction Team members, 

and representatives of the U.S. Agency for International Development. With the 

Battle Command Training Program, division and corps staff officers discuss best 

contracting practices with actual subject matter experts from theatre. Additionally, 

a Joint Personnel Recovery Activity workshop is given, which discusses the accounting and recovery of contractors on the battlefield. 

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. A key principle of the U.S. Armed Forces is to attract and retain competent personnel to assure readiness and operational effectiveness. While the services have generally met their aggregate recruiting and retention goals, the GAO reVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:47 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046474 PO 00000 Frm 00181 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A474P2.XXX A474P2

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
182 

ports that the Army has experienced shortages in mission-critical occupational specialties such as health care, human intelligence collection, and explosive ordnance 

disposal. There is growing concern within the department as to how the Army can 

meet current operational demands with what appear to be chronic shortages in 

these occupational specialties. In addition, there is growing concern that recruitment standards have been relaxed to meet numbers. 

Gentleman, the Committee is very concerned regarding the recruitment and retention for mission-critical occupational specialties. For example there continues to 

be a shortage of nurses in the military and many billets remain vacant. Given the 

wartime environment that we are in, this Committee is extremely interested in 

what resources are currently available to recruiters to remedy this problem? 

Answer. Specialties such as Special Forces, Explosives Ordnance Disposal, Air Defense and Transport Operators are examples of mission critical occupational specialties that are targeted through a combination of our highest enlistment bonuses and 

educational incentives. Currently, 27 critical skills are at the highest statutory incentives levels, receiving enlistment bonuses of up to $40,000 and the Army College 

Fund of up to $74,000 or loan repayment up to $65,000. 

The NDAA06 raised maximum recruiting bonus limits for all Army components ($40,000 for the Active Components and $20,000 for the Reserve Components) and 

we recently initiated a High School Diploma Grad targeted program, Army Advantage Fund, which will enable many Soldiers to make substantial down payments on 

a home or business in exchange for a service commitment. Recent legislation expanded the student loan repayment program to offer a broader range of loans for 

repayment and enhanced educational benefits for our deployed Reserve Component 

members. We have targeted enlistment and re-enlistment bonuses as well as the 

Army College Fund to our most critical skills and training programs. 

Through targeted re-enlistment incentives, the Army is addressing specialties that 

are currently short due to rapid growth and transformation. The incentives for each 

specialty are adjusted semi-annually using the Selective Re-enlistment Bonus Review Board. Shortages in critical skills such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 

Specialist, Human Intelligence Collector, Motor Transport Operator and some others 

are continually targeted for some of our most robust incentives. 

Question. Has the Army analyzed why these occupational specialties have consistently been under-filled, and what is the operational impact of these shortages and 

what resources are needed to fill these positions? 

Answer. From a recruiting perspective, the Army has conducted internal analysis 

as well as utilized sources such as RAND and the Army research Institute and studies from outside agencies. Factors ranging from the requirements for security clearances, aptitude test scores, difficulty of training and propensity toward military 

service have all been cited. Each critical skill is evaluated at a minimum on a quarterly basis to determine needed changes, receive input from training proponents and 

to develop innovative targeted recruiting initiatives. On February 1st, the Army instituted the Army Advantage Fund as an innovative tool to reach a more diverse 

audience through guaranteed down payments for a first home or small business. 

There is potential to expand into other markets as well. The critical skills are the 

Army’s most expensive recruiting targets and will require continued funding at levels needed to attract and retain these Soldiers. 

The operational impact of Soldier shortages in certain skills jeopardizes the unit’s 

mission and places Soldiers at greater risk. Having the required amount of Soldiers 

in the right skills and grades is essential to ensure units are fully functional and 

have the right leadership, experience, training oversite, can provide for the health 

and welfare of Soldiers. Shortages magnify Soldier stress through longer hours and 

more frequent deployments. 

Question. Is the Army concerned that the strain of multiple deployments will discourage good individuals from joining the Army- or ‘‘re-upping’’ and staying in? 

Answer. There are certainly challenges with recruiting during a period of protracted war with the added strain of multiple deployments. However, we are optimistic about the Army’s ability to find, recruit and enlist the Soldiers we need to 

grow the force. The Army was able to meet or exceed its recruiting goals in Fiscal 

Year 2007 in all of its components. 

Retention is monitored very closely given the high operational demand and multiple deployments experienced by most of our NCOs. Multiple deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq are currently not having an adverse impact on enlisted retention. In FY 2007 the Army achieved or exceeded the retention mission in every component. To date for FY 2008, all components are exceeding their year to date (prorated) missions. The retention rates in deploying units have consistently exceeded 

100% since FY05. For instance, nearly 600 troops reenlisted in Baghdad on Independence Day, this past year. More than 100 Army Reserve Soldiers gathered at the 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
183 

Al Faw palace at Camp Victory, Iraq, January 18, 2008, to reenlist during a ceremony marking the 100th Anniversary for the Army Reserve. Continued high retention rates are a significant indicator of the quality of leadership within our ranks, 

the fact that Soldiers believe in what they are doing and value the traditions of 

service to the Nation. 

Question. DoD standards on qualification tests call for at least 60 percent of recruits to be Category 1 to 3 (the higher end of testing) and 4 percent Category 4, 

the lowest end. The Army had chosen a higher standard of 67 percent in Categories 

1 to 3, and 2 percent in Category 4. However, now the Army plans to revert to the 

lower standards of the DoD guidelines, which basically lowers the IQ standards for 

recruits. Do you believe that this will reduce average effectiveness of Army units? • Please describe the standards by which candidates are measured. • Do you expect these standards to be relaxed further to achieve the aggressive 

recruitment goals? 

Answer. The Army adjusted to the DoD standards in August 2005, in line with 

the rest of the services, of 60% TSC I–IIIA and 4% TSC IV. Prior to that time Army 

had internal a goal of at least 67% Test Score Category (TSC) I–IIIA, and no more 

than 2% TSC IV. The Armed Forces Qualification Score (AFQT) average score has 

ranged between 56.5% and 57% since FY04 so adjusting to DoD standards has not 

affected the quality of the force. 

Applicants are measured based on the percentile in which they score on the 

Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). Test Score Category (TSC) I–IIIA includes 

those applicants who score in the top half (50th percentile or higher). TSC IIIB includes those who score between the 31st and 49th percentile. TSC IV includes those 

who score between the 10th and the 30th percentile, of which the Army typically 

only enlists those in the 21st percentile or higher. The lowest category is TSC V 

(9th percentile or lower). By law, the military does not enlist TSC V applicants. 

The recruiting environment remains challenging and Army remains focused on recruiting a quality force in line with DoD quality mark standards. 

Question. Recruiting and retention goals are often relayed to Congress in the aggregate, providing little or no visibility into how each occupational specialty is 

staffed. Will you provide the Committee with details on recruiting and retention by 

MOS? 

Answer. The Army monitors the strength of each MOS carefully to ensure each 

required skill is properly manned and maintained. Due to several factors, including 

high entrance standards, high volume requirements, and undesirable duties, recruiting and retention is more difficult for some MOS’s. To compensate, the Army uses 

priorities and incentives, both monetary and non-monetary, to shape the recruiting 

and retention efforts by MOS. 

The Active Army is meeting its year-to-date goals for overall recruiting and is 

generally doing well at the MOS level. However, there are a few MOS’s that are 

below their targets, including: Patriot Fire Control Operator/Maintainer (81%), 

Microwave System Operator (49%), Military Intelligence Systems Maintainer (74%), 

and Psychological Operations Specialist (76%). As the year progresses, the recruiting force places special emphasis on these MOS’s to ensure that each critical skill 

is manned to the required levels. One way the Army does this is through the quarterly Multi-component Enlisted Incentives Review Board (MEIRB) which aligns incentives and priorities with the needs of each MOS. For example, Microwave System 

Operator now receives the highest enlistment bonus available to assist in achieving 

its annual target. 

As the Army continues to transform and grow; the Army Retention Program will 

continue to adjust, encouraging the right Soldiers with the right skills to reenlist 

to meet the manning requirements of a growing Army. In a time of war and sustained operational demand, retention is a significant indicator of the quality of our 

leaders and the commitment of our Soldiers. Currently, the Army is meeting or exceeding its objectives in each category (initials, mid-careerist and careerists). 

Through targeted reenlistment incentives, the Army is addressing specialties that 

are currently short due to rapid growth and transformation. The incentives for each 

specialty are adjusted semi-annually using the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Review Board. Shortages in critical skills such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 

Specialist, Human Intelligence Collector, Motor Transport Operator and some others 

are continually targeted for some of our most robust incentives. 

Question. With the increases in reenlistment and enlistment bonuses, do you feel 

that the funding for recruiting and retention initiatives is sufficient? 

Answer. Base funding alone is not sufficient to cover recruiting and retention initiatives. Currently, all three Components rely heavily on the Supplemental to fund 

recruiting and retention programs. In FY08, the Active Component Supplemental is 

expected to account for 68.7% of total Active recruiting and retention funding; the 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
184 

Reserve Supplemental is expected to account for 20.6% of Reserve recruiting and retention funding; and the National Guard Supplemental is expected to account for 

40% of total National Guard recruiting and retention funding. 

Question. How does the Amy recruiting command plan to adapt to meet the new 

end-strength requirements? What are the short- and long-term implications associated with sustaining a heightened end-strength? 

Answer. The Army recruiting command has both increased the number of production recruiters and developed several new recruiting programs in order to meet recruiting goals dictated by the increase in end strength. Two notable programs are: 

Active First, where Soldiers who enlist in the National Guard first serve a tour on 

Active Duty; and the Recruiter Assistance Program, where Soldiers who refer a recruit to the Army are paid a cash bonus if the recruit completes Basic training. In 

addition to these programs, the incentive bonuses offered to Soldiers for both enlistment and reenlistment continue to increase. 

The short-term implication to sustaining increased end strength is that the Army 

must rely on Supplemental funding to meet recruiting and retention missions. The 

long-term implication is that the Base program will need to be significantly increased in order to guarantee continuing success of recruiting and retention incentives and programs. 

GROWTH IN CONTRACTOR-PROVIDED SERVICES

Question. The Army’s obligations on service contracts rose from $3.8 billion in fiscal year 1997 to $22.9 billion in fiscal year 2007. (Per 2009 President’s Budget). This 

is a growth of $19.1 billion, or 500% over 10 years (inflation accounted for 17% of 

this growth). 

Over the same period, the Army’s obligations for civilian pay rose $2.4 billion, or 

51% (pay raise accounted for 30% of this growth). 

Who in the Army has oversight for ‘‘contract services’’? 

Answer. The oversight of services acquisition is the shared responsibility of requiring activities, contracting activities, and the Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) (ASA (ALT)). 

The ASA (ALT) retains responsibility over the acquisition of services. The ASA 

(ALT) delegated authority to review and approve service acquisitions with a total 

planned value of $500 million or more to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 

Army (Policy & Procurement) (P&P). Prior to approving any acquisition of services 

with a total planned value of $1 billion or more, the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) must be notified. 

Acquisition of services with a total planned value of $500 million or more are reviewed by the Army Service Strategy Panel (ASSP), chaired by the P&P. Since April 

2003, twenty-eight (28) Army service acquisitions valued at above $500 million have 

been reviewed under these procedures. These acquisitions represent a total estimated value of over $249 billion. 

Contracting Officer’s Representatives (CORs) provide the day-to-day oversight of 

the contractor’s performance. CORs help ensure the government obtains quality 

services, on time, and at the level and prices specified in the contract. 

As of February 23, 2006, the Secretary of the Army requires Army HQDA Principals and Senior Commanders at Army Command, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units to be responsible for the approval for requirements for contracted services. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and 

Reserve Affairs) reports these requirements directly to the Secretary of the Army. 

Question. How are Army commanders at the various levels of command trained 

to manage contracting out for services? 

Answer. The United States Army has a wide range of schools that its officers attend throughout their career and before they enter into command positions. Examples: 

• Command & General Staff School, Command & General Staff College 

• School for Command Preparation, Command & General Staff College 

• Garrison Precommand Course, Army Management Staff College 

• General Officer Senior Command Course, Army Management Staff College 

The Command & General Staff School provides a core course entitled F–106, Military Contracting and Ethics. This course covers: (1) why and how the Army uses 

contracting to effectively support military operations, (2) considerations and effective 

planning for contracting support, (3) types of contracts—what and how they provide 

support to include their capabilities and limitations, (4) authorities and responsibilities for identifying requirements, drafting statements of work, and overseeing contractor performance, (5) role of the contracting officer’s representative, and (6) obligations and restrictions concerning oversight of contractor personnel. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
185 

In addition, exercise training venues, such as the Combat Training Centers, are 

incorporating realistic contracting training scenarios into operational training. 

Question. The Army is forming a new Contracting Command with a two-star commanding general. Has the general officer been selected yet? 

Answer. No, a general officer has not yet been selected as the commanding general for the new U.S. Army Contracting Command (ACC). The ACC is currently 

being headed by Mr. Jeffrey Parsons, a Department of the Army civilian who is a 

member of the Senior Executive Service. The position will eventually be filled by 

a two-star general. 

Question. The Army now has a Contracting Command located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia and an Army Contracting Agency. Is there a degree of duplication and potential confusion in having two seemingly similar organizations at two different places? 

Answer. The U.S. Army Contracting Agency (ACA) and the various contracting organizations within the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) will be transformed 

into the new U.S. Army Contracting Command (ACC), that will fall under AMC. 

There will be no duplication as the ACA will be disestablished once the new ACC 

becomes operational. The realignment of ACA and the creation of the ACC will provide the most efficient structure to effectively execute installation and expeditionary 

contracting for the Army. This reorganization will help avoid confusion because it 

will provide a centralized capacity to support the warfighter and provide one contracting face to the customer. 

Question. What is the Army doing to increase the number of available contracting 

professionals, and to ensure those professionals have the necessary skills and status 

to be effective? 

Answer. The Army is increasing the number of contracting personnel. In January 

2008, affected Army commands and organizations were tasked to evaluate their 

manning needs and submit concept support to support their personnel requirements. Concept plans are due to the Army G–3 by March 31, 2008. The Assistant 

Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) Contracting Oversight plan has already been submitted to the Army G–3. To date, we have received 

increased requirements for 478 military and 815 civilians. In addition, we are moving forward with the following initiatives aimed at increasing the stature and career 

development of the Army’s contracting personnel: 

• The Army is opening more command opportunities for military contracting officers and we are working on adding five General Officer positions based on the recommendations from the Gansler Commission. 

• We are now capturing expeditionary contracting lessons learned and incorporating them into our doctrine and contingency training system. We are also developing a battlefield contracting community of interest where lessons learned will be 

posted. 

• We are adapting training exercises to stress rapid acquisition, logistics, and contracting in expeditionary operations; include contracting operations and planning requirements in all military exercises. 

• The Army Contracting Campaign Plan task force is exploring ways to foster civilian participation in expeditionary operations, such as: 

• authorizing long-term medical coverage 

• providing civilian medals for service 

• providing optional life insurance for civilian employees 

• removing the need for a waiver to the annual pay cap 

Question. Has the Army accurately determined those functions that are defined 

as core functions, and those that are considered as non-core? 

Answer. The Secretary of the Army’s policy letter of September 4, 2007 states: 

‘‘We must transform to meet enduring requirements in our core competencies with 

Military and Civilian employees, and only use contractors for surge or specialized 

needs.’’ 

The Army has accurately determined those functions that are defined as core and 

non-core based on the applicable Department of Defense (DoD) policy, which provides broad latitude for using military, civilian employee or contract in a given function depending on the facts and circumstances. 

• The Army uses the DoD Manpower Mix Criteria in Department of Defense Instruction 1100.22 to determine what functions are military essential, inherently governmental, exempt from private sector performance (core functions) or available for 

contractor performance (non-core functions). 

• The DoD Manpower Mix Criteria is based on risk considerations, the law of 

war, the statutory definition of inherently governmental, command and control, rotation base and career progression, as informed by applicable Status of Forces 

Agreements, international agreements and other statutes. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
186 

• The characterization of a function under the DoD Manpower Mix Criteria varies 

depending upon the facts and circumstances: • Security functions in a high threat environment are inherently governmental 

except where there are ‘‘rules for the use of deadly force’’ that limit the contractor’s discretion and there is adequate governmental oversight to assure compliance with those rules. 

• Interrogation is inherently governmental but may be contracted under a statutory exception authorizing the use of a personal services contract if there are 

sufficient governmental oversight personnel to limit the discretion of the contractor. 

• Providing advice to governmental decision makers is normally not inherently 

governmental except when the government’s ability to make independent decisions is eroded through the loss of expertise. 

Question. Do you find that contractor personnel generally end up working along 

side of military personnel, doing much the same work, but the contractor costs the 

government three or four times the pay of a lower ranking enlisted soldier. How 

does that make fiscal sense? 

Answer. In many cases, contractor personnel end up working along side of military personnel, doing much the same work, but the contractor costs the government 

three or four times the pay of a lower ranking enlisted soldier. However, the pay 

of a Soldier and the total cost of a contract is not the appropriate comparison. The 

cost of the contractor is the complete cost to the government, but the Soldiers’ pay 

is only one cost component. The full cost of a Soldier includes: non-taxable basic allowance for housing, non-taxable basic allowance for subsistence, health care costs, 

the GI bill, re-enlistment bonuses, the cost to train and recruit a Soldier, permanent 

change of station moves, and retirement accrual. 

The specific difference in cost of a contractor and a Soldier will vary depending 

on the type of work performed, but comparing pay of a Soldier to cost of a contract 

will always overstate the difference, and fails to consider operational priorities and 

limitations. 

The decision to use contractor personnel as opposed to military personnel is based 

on long-term cost rather than per hour cost, as well as availability of military personnel, and prohibitions against using contractors to perform inherently governmental functions. When the decision was made to reduce the size of the standing 

Army as part of the ‘‘peace dividend’’ in the early 1990s, it increased our need for 

contractors to provide non-inherently governmental support and logistics functions 

in order to free up our military personnel for combat operations. The majority of 

the support and logistics functions had to be contracted to free military enlisted and 

officers for the war effort. Each enlisted or officer performing an administrative 

function reduces the available forces. 

In a fiscal analysis, the comparison is between the cost to sustain the Army on 

a war-footing throughout periods of relative peace, while maintaining the capability 

to perform the full range of both military and administrative mission, against the 

cost to sustain the current force structure augmented with contractor personnel. 

MENTAL HEALTH ADVISORY TEAM (MHAT) 

Question. The U.S. Army Surgeon General chartered the Operation Iraqi Freedom 

(OIF) Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) in July 2003. Its mission was to assess 

OIF-related mental health issues and to provide recommendations to OIF medical 

and line commands. The MHAT conducted group interviews and surveys of soldiers. 

Many of the soldiers who participated had been engaged in combat. This was the 

first time in history soldiers were surveyed in this manner regarding behavioral 

issues during active combat. 

On May 4, 2007, DoD released the fourth MHAT study since 2003. MHAT–IV was 

conducted in August and October of 2006 and assessed more than 1,300 soldiers and 

for the first time nearly 450 Marines. The commanding general of Multinational 

Force, Iraq, also requested a first-ever study of battlefield ethics with the participation of soldiers and Marines currently involved in combat operations. Survey participants were not selected to be representative of the entire deployed force. Units were 

specifically targeted for this survey because they experienced the highest level of 

combat exposure. 

Gentlemen, according to the Mental Health Advisory Team report, soldiers who 

deployed longer (greater than six months) or had deployed multiple times were more 

likely to screen positive for a mental health issue. What steps are taken to assure 

that these soldiers get the proper attention? 

Answer. The Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) continues behavioral health research prevalence and intervention studies aimed at reducing mental 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
187 

health problems of Soldiers across the deployment cycle (e.g., Battlemind Psychological Debriefing, and Expressive Writing). Operationally, the Task Force 62 Medical Brigade conducts continuous and ongoing prevention activities throughout the 

deployment cycle in Theater. Depending on OPTEMPO and identified need, Combat 

Stress Control units will deliver customized services to units based on assessed 

needs and requests by the unit commander. 

MHAT V Soldier Survey data further underscores the importance of the 6–12 

month in-Theater timeframe for when Soldiers are most susceptible to behavioral 

health problems. Task Force 62 Behavioral Health personnel are focusing outreach 

for units that have been in-Theater more than 6 months. 

Finally, Army Leadership has mandated that all Soldiers receive Post-Deployment 

Battlemind Training upon return from operational deployment. 

Question. The 2006 adjusted rate of suicides per 100,000 soldiers was 17.3 soldiers, lower than the 19.9 rate reported in 2005, however higher than the Army average of 11.6 per 100,000 soldiers. Does the Army have proper resources to provide 

counseling to soldiers? • When soldiers need counseling who provides this counseling? 

Answer. Yes, the Army has proper resources to provide counseling to the deployed 

force. When required, counseling is provided by forward deployed behavioral health 

providers. There are approximately 200 mental health providers and technicians 

(150 Army and 50 Air Force) deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom; and 

approximately 30 mental health providers and technicians (7 Army, 21 Air Force, 

and 2 Navy) deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. 

In a typical month, over 1,800 new service members are seen in behavioral health 

clinics, and over 3,000 command consultations are conducted regarding the morale 

and mental health of the fighting force. On average over 5,000 behavioral health 

appointments occur per month. There are four restoration centers that provide 3– 

5 day inpatient treatment programs, with a ‘‘return to duty’’ rate of 93%. The corollary outpatient ‘‘return to duty’’ rate is 99%. Less than one half percent of the 

fighting force is evacuated annually for psychiatric reasons. 

Question. The Mental Health Advisory Team found that both soldiers and Marines 

reported at relatively high rates—62 and 66 percent, respectively—that they knew 

someone seriously injured or killed, or that a member of their unit had become a 

casualty. What mental health assistance is available to our soldiers who are still 

in combat? 

Answer. There are approximately 200 mental health providers and technicians 

(150 Army and 50 Air Force) deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); 

and approximately 30 mental health providers and technicians (7 Army, 21 Air 

Force and 2 Navy) supporting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Each brigade 

combat team (BCT) has a behavioral health section assigned directly to them, also 

known as organic assets, and operates in the BCT area of responsibility. In addition, 

OIF has the equivalent of 4 deployed combat and operational stress control (COSC) 

detachments conducting area-wide behavioral health and COSC services. OEF has 

organic BCT behavioral health assets and the equivalent of 1 COSC detachment. 

Traumatic Event Management (TEM) is the approved U.S. Army term used to define any support activities taken to assist in the transition of military units and Soldiers who are exposed to Potentially Traumatic Events (PTEs). The goal of TEM is 

to successfully transition units and individuals, build resilience, promote 

posttraumatic growth (PTG), and increase functioning and positive change after enduring a trauma. 

TEM is taught to Army behavioral health personnel during the COSC course, currently taught 6 times per year at San Antonio, TX. TEM is also published in all 

Army behavioral health field manuals and includes the use of both individual and 

group support activities to address the impact of PTE on units and Soldiers who 

are routinely exposed to it as a result of conducting military operations. 

Both organic behavioral health assets (division) and echelons above division (Task 

Force 62 Medical Brigade) provide services to units and Soldiers after critical incidents such as firefights and improvised explosive device attacks. Also, Chaplains are 

indispensable parts of the team taking care of Soldiers after combat losses. 

Question. According to the Mental Health Advisory Team, approximately 10 percent of soldiers reported mistreating non-combatants or damaging their property 

when it was not necessary and less than half of soldiers would report a member 

of their unit for unethical behavior. Is there any concern that with lower standards 

these incidents could become worse? 

Answer. No, there is minimal concern that these incidents will become worse. 

MHAT V found that unethical behaviors did not change significantly relative to 

2006. Battlefield ethics issues have been incorporated into the AMEDD combat and 

operational stress control (COSC) and into the Battlemind Psychological Debriefing 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
188 

program developed by Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. In addition, Army 

generated a new COSC concept, known as ‘‘remind’’ that addresses threat of dangerousness to others and the risk of unlawful behaviors. This concept is being fielded actively through behavioral health channels and will be published in existing 

COSC doctrine. 

Question. Please explain what the Army has done to address the Mental Health 

Advisory Team findings? Can you provide a list to the committee regarding what 

recommendations were followed and which recommendations were not? 

Answer. MHAT V reviewed all MHAT findings and reported the results for each. 

The review is included in the MHAT V report dated February 14, 2008. The review 

addresses a total of 46 recommendations including 4 redeployment recommendations, 19 deployment recommendations, 4 post-deployment recommendations and 19 

sustainment recommendations. A complete list of recommendations with the status 

of each is enclosed. 

Question. What is the cost of a Mental Health Advisory Team and how many more 

reports do you think there will be? 

Answer. I expect annual MHAT missions will continue as long as combat operations exist in support of the Global War on Terrorism. We have significantly reduced the costs for these assessments in both personnel requirements and expenses. 

MHAT 1 required a 12–member team that remained engaged in the assessment and 

reporting process for approximately 6 months. MHAT V was accomplished with a 

4–member team that produced a final report in about 2 months. I expect future 

MHATs will continue to use this smaller, more financially efficient configuration. 

Regardless of the team’s size, it will still require extensive planning and support. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
(189) 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2008. 

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY 

WITNESSES 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY OBERING, DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL KEVIN CAMPBELL, COMMANDING GENERAL, 

U.S. ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND 

PAUL FRANCIS, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DIRECTOR, 

ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. DICKS. The Committee will come to order. We have a motion 

from Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I move that those portions of the 

hearing today, which involve classified material, be held in executive session because of the classification of the material to be discussed. 

Mr. DICKS. All those in favor of the motion signify by saying aye. 

Aye. Opposed? The motion is adopted. I want to welcome our witnesses today on a hearing on missile defense. We have a very distinguished panel that should give the Committee the benefit of several perspectives on where we are, where we are going, and what 

challenges exist. 

Our panel this morning includes Lieutenant General Henry 

Obering, Director of the Missile Defense Agency; Lieutenant General Kevin Campbell, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Space 

and Missile Defense Command; and Mr. Paul Francis of the Government Accounting Office, where he is the director for acquisition 

and sourcing management. These gentlemen appeared before the 

Committee last April, and we are pleased to have them back. First, 

I would like it congratulate the Missile Defense Agency, in collaboration with the National Reconnaissance Office, on the task last 

week in which a failed U.S. satellite in a decaying orbit was intentionally destroyed using a modified SM–3 interceptor launched 

from an Aegis cruiser. This was great collaboration by MDA, Navy, 

and the NRO. I also would like to point out that in recent years, 

our missile defense programs have made some significant strides in 

fielding missile defense systems to defend the United States. It has 

deployed forces, friends, and allies against ballistic missiles of all 

ranges, in all phases of flight. This progress is the result of the efforts of many people in government and industry, and should be 

noted. This progress also is the result of very substantial investments of tax dollars. 

Since 2002, Congress has appropriated almost $60 billion for 

missile defense, while at the same time, allowing an unprecedented 

amount of flexibility, such as an exemption for many Department 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
190 

of Defense (DoD) acquisition regulations. The fiscal year 2009 

budget requests a further $10.9 billion for ballistic missile defense 

programs. A major responsibility of this subcommittee is to oversee 

the allocations of such funds. You can be sure that we will work 

with the DoD to understand the basis for its request, to take that 

into account as we move forward in the appropriations deliberations. Included in the ’09 request is over 700 million, including 

military construction, for a European site for ground-based missile 

defense to include 10 interceptors and two large X-band radars. 

Last year Congress expressed some reservations about the pace 

and manner in which this initiative was planned. I expect there 

will be further discussions about the European site this year. Other 

areas that are likely to be of interest include the ability of Congress to provide thorough oversight, given the manner in which 

MDA budgets for programs, the lack of independent cost estimates, 

and the comparison between General Accounting Office (GAO) cost 

estimates and MDA estimates, and the future of boost-phase defense. 

Now, I will note that General Obering and MDA has come forward with a new Block approach, which may answer some of the 

issues that have been raised by the GAO. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses, but first want to call on Bill Young, our 

ranking Republican member, and former chairman of this subcommittee and the full committee. Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I 

just want to join in the congratulations for really a job well done. 

It is pretty exciting to see how effective this shot on the satellite 

was. And missile defense is such an extremely important matter. 

This Committee has taken some raps over the years because we 

have strongly supported funding for missile defense, but the importance to our Nation cannot be overemphasized. So just thank you 

very much for a job well done. And I am interested in hearing any 

details about this shoot-down that we might not have seen on television. Thank you for being here. 

Mr. DICKS. And Mr. Young, we are also trying to figure out how 

General Obering is going to get the NRO to pay for this. Maybe the 

GAO can help us on that. General, have at it. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL OBERING

General OBERING. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good 

morning, good morning Congressman Young, and distinguished 

members of the Committee. I want to thank the Committee for the 

support that we received over the years for this critical defense 

program. As Director of the Missile Defense Agency, it is my role 

to develop, test, and field an integrated, layered missile defense 

system to defend the United States, our forces, allies and friends 

against ballistic missiles of all ranges in all phases of flight. For 

2009, we are requesting $9.3 billion. Approximately 75 percent, or 

about $7 billion of this will be allocated to near-term fielding and 

development. To lay the foundation for this request, let me review 

why missile defense is so critically needed. There were over 120 

foreign ballistic missile launches last year, significantly exceeding 

what we observed in previous years. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
191 

North Korea’s development of a long-range missile, their advances in missile technologies, such as solid fuel, and their export 

activities remain troubling. Iran continues to pursue newer and 

longer range missile systems and advanced warhead designs. Their 

actions underscore the need to field and integrate long-range defenses with NATO’s shorter range defenses. As background for the 

2009 request, let me provide an assessment of where we are today. 

Simply said, 2007 was the best year that we have experienced in 

the missile defense program. We had historic accomplishments in 

all aspects of our program, development, testing, and fielding, and 

across all environments, land, sea, and space-based. Thousands of 

men and women across this country in government and industry 

made this achievement possible. We have now fielded a system 

that may be activated on short notice to provide protection in times 

of crisis and, if necessary, defend the United States from longrange ballistic missile attack. 

In addition, we have fielded an initial capability to protect our 

allies and deployed forces from medium and short-range ballistic 

missile attack. We have now emplaced 24 long-range interceptors 

in Alaska and California. We have modified 17 Aegis ships for 

tracking, with nine destroyers and three cruisers capable also of 

engaging shorter range missiles with the 23 Standard Missile–3 

sea-based interceptors that we delivered. And, in collaboration with 

the U.S. Navy, we began upgrading the Aegis weapon system and 

delivered 18 modified Standard Missile–2 Block IV interceptors for 

a sea-based terminal capability. We expanded and improved the 

sensor network to detect, track, and discriminate threat objects. In 

addition to the Cobra Dane radar in Alaska, we completed the testing and integration of fixed radars in California and the United 

Kingdom. We achieved partial mission capability on the very transportable radar in Japan, and delivered another one for testing in 

Alaska. We also conducted sea trials and integration demonstrations with the powerful sea-based X-band radar, now deployed to 

the Pacific Ocean. 

The Agency also developed and tested new command, control, 

battle management, and communications technologies to integrate 

and improve the depth, range, and reliability of our defenses. Our 

increasingly complex and realistic testing has continued to bolster 

our confidence in these capabilities. I also want to highlight that, 

as in the past, we will be spending about $2 billion in 2009 on testing alone. Our very active flight test program in 2007 accomplished 

10 successful intercepts in 10 attempts. This included a long-range 

ground-based intercept, six Standard Missile–3 intercepts of both 

separating and unitary targets, and three THAAD intercepts of 

unitary targets. 

We have now demonstrated hit-to-kill successes in 34 of 42 attempts since 2001, and conducted 26 of 27 successful flights since 

2005. And we do not count the satellite event last week as a test. 

We have now not had a major failure in our system in our testing 

in over 3 years. This year also marked a major success by our allied partner, Japan. In their December test off the coast of Hawaii, 

they successfully intercepted a missile warhead, marking a major 

milestone in our expanding missile defense relationship. Yet the 

system we have today is not sufficiently robust to meet war fighter 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
192 

requirements. Using a new Block structure that you referred to, we 

plan to allocate $1.7 billion in fielding new capability. Over the 

next few ears, we will improve long-range defenses by fielding additional silo-based interceptors in the United States and upgrading 

the early warning radar in Thule, Greenland. 

Upon reaching agreements with the Governments of Poland and 

the Czech Republic, we will begin site construction for a missile 

field and fixed-site radar. We also plan to deploy six more Aegiscapable warships and an additional 36 Standard Missile–3 interceptors, 48 THAAD interceptors in two fire units, and up to 100 

modified sea-based terminal interceptors to protect against short to 

medium-range threats. We are allocating about 2.4 billion in our 

development program to help ensure America’s missile defense capabilities remain effective and reliable well into an uncertain future. 

One of our most critical needs is the ability to deal with complex 

missile threats, which would include multiple warheads, advanced 

decoys, or other sophisticated countermeasures. Therefore, one of 

our highest priorities is the Multiple Kill Vehicle program for both 

land and sea-based interceptors, which will allow us to handle 

these more complex threats. With the launch of two demonstration 

satellites later this year, we will also be able to move forward with 

the Space Tracking and Surveillance System, which would provide 

a persistent global detection, tracking, and fire control capability. 

We are working to give this country its first boost-phase intercept capability, which will enable the warfighter to shoot down a 

missile shortly after it has been launched. The progress made in 

the revolutionary Airborne Laser program has been exciting and 

historic, and is on track for a lethal shoot-down of a boosting missile in 2009. We are also planning the first flight of our Kinetic Energy Interceptor in 2009, which will deliver an alternative boost 

phase capability as well as a midcourse capability. There are several other major efforts underway, to include the U.S.-Japan cooperative development of a follow-on Standard Missile–3 interceptor 

to give the Aegis system an ICBM intercept capability, a more robust sea-based terminal capability, studies of the potential benefits 

of a space-based intercept layer, and our continuing advanced technology efforts, to include our work with Israel to co-develop very 

short-range ballistic missile defenses. 

With our unprecedented success, we have also had some setbacks. This past year we experienced only the second complete target failure in 42 flight tests, but it was enough for me to revamp 

our target program. I have made the transition from the legacy 

boosters to the modern Flexible Target Family a high priority for 

this year. In the Kinetic Energy Interceptor program, we experienced nozzle failures in one of our second stage firings, which is 

under investigation. We also experienced some cost growth in the 

THAAD, Aegis and GMD programs, which is being addressed within the overall missile defense portfolio. 

But as I stated at the beginning, 2007 was an outstanding success, we are making great strides in 2008, and with your support, 

we are looking forward to continued success in 2009. America 

needs this critical defensive capability to protect her people, her 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
193 

forces and her allies from this growing missile threat. I look forward to your questions. 

[The statement of General Obering follows.] 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
194 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 612 here 46474B.001
195 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 613 here 46474B.002
196 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 614 here 46474B.003
197 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 615 here 46474B.004
198 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 616 here 46474B.005
199 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 617 here 46474B.006
200 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 618 here 46474B.007
201 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 619 here 46474B.008
202 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 620 here 46474B.009
203 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 621 here 46474B.010
204 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 622 here 46474B.011
205 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 623 here 46474B.012
206 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 624 here 46474B.013
207 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 625 here 46474B.014
208 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 626 here 46474B.015
209 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 627 here 46474B.016
210 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 628 here 46474B.017
211 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 629 here 46474B.018
212 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 630 here 46474B.019
213 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 631 here 46474B.020
214 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 632 here 46474B.021
215 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 633 here 46474B.022
216 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 634 here 46474B.023
217 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 635 here 46474B.024
218 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 636 here 46474B.025
219 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 637 here 46474B.026
220 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 638 here 46474B.027
221 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 639 here 46474B.028
222 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 640 here 46474B.029
223 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 641 here 46474B.030
224 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 642 here 46474B.031
225 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 643 here 46474B.032
226 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 644 here 46474B.033
227 

Mr. DICKS. General Campbell. 

GENERAL CAMPBELL’S OPENING STATEMENT

General CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Young, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for your ongoing 

support of our warfighters and for your invitation to speak before 

you today. Today, I will primarily address the ballistic missile defense program from an operator’s perspective. I intend to focus my 

remarks on the roles and the contributions the warfighters continue to play in the ballistic missile defense development testing 

process, and provide an assessment of missile defense capabilities 

to meet the present threat. I will also briefly address the Army’s 

integrated air and missile defense construct. As the commander of 

the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile 

Defense, a subordinated command of the U.S. Strategic Command, 

I serve as the joint user representative working closely with the 

Missile Defense Agency, the services, and the various combatant 

commanders to ensure that our national goals of developing, testing, and deploying an integrated missile defense system are met in 

an operationally sound configuration. 

From my role as the user’s advocate, I am able to report with 

confidence that the combatant commander’s input into the ballistic 

missile defense system continues to expand. Last year, I outlined 

a process established by U.S. Strategic Command named the 

Warfighter Involvement Process. As a result of the continued maturity of this program, we are seeing substantial warfighter requested modifications incorporated into the ballistic missile defense 

system. For example, warfighter input led to the Simultaneous 

Test and Operations capability for the ground-based missile-defense system. This capability allows the users to maintain the system in an operational status and conduct essential training while 

the Missile Defense Agency can continue with testing activity. 

Warfighter input has also led to dozens of software modification enhancements to the command and control system. Additional 

warfighter-initiated modifications will continue this year. 

From a program and budget development standpoint, the Missile 

Defense Agency is recognizing the user’s input and including the 

operator’s desired system enhancements and modifications in the 

system development program. As we gain more hands-on experience in understanding of the systems’ behavior, we are simultaneously improving our processes to capture the combatant commanders’ desired changes to the fielded elements and the operational capabilities they need in the near and mid-term. We are 

working with the Missile Defense Agency to ensure those recommendations we make for changes to the systems’ development 

program are adequately addressed in their programmatic decisions. 

The operators have remained fully integrated in the Missile Defense Agency’s test program. Our involvement spans from the development of test objectives to operators sitting at the consoles and 

executing the engagements. Involvement in the testing program allows us to gain more insight into the systems. And with the success 

we have seen, our confidence continues to grow in the elements we 

are currently operating in today. The flight tests attract the most 

attention, but they are just one aspect of a comprehensive testing 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
228 

campaign. Our operators participate in more frequent ground testing hardware-in-the-loop testing. These ground and hardware-inthe-loop tests benefit the warfighter, the Missile Defense Agency, 

as well as the operational testing agencies. Warfighters are able to 

identify more effective methods for employing the systems and assist the testing cadre and developers in identifying problems long 

before we move to expensive flight tests. These tests, in turn, influence further program developments. The point is simply that the 

testing of these systems is a community effort. 

Today there are more than 20 countries with ballistic missile 

technology, and the preponderance of their investment is in the 

short- and medium-range ballistic missile capability. Our operational commanders clearly recognize the threat we face today from 

both short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Today we cannot 

meet all of the combatant commanders’ needs. We work in close coordination with the Missile Defense Agency to ensure that missile 

defense investment portfolio addresses the warfighter needs for the 

near-term threats as well as for the mid- to far-term threats from 

these threat countries. Maintaining a balanced investment portfolio 

is critical. Although we understand the inventories of short- and 

medium-range missiles today are significant, we cannot lose sight 

of the qualitative improvements nations are making to their ballistic missile defense systems. Our investments for both the near 

and far term must be informed by both the quantitative and qualitative advancements our adversaries are making in their programs. 

The users are conducting analyses and presenting the Agency with 

recommendations for adjustments to the development program. 

For example, a recent study not yet approved suggests the need 

for additional THAAD and SM–3 missile inventory to handle today’s short- and medium-range ballistic missile threat. Ultimately, 

these findings will be presented to the Agency and DOD for a program decision. In summary, we certainly recognize the requirement 

to address not only the threat of today, but also the need to develop 

new technologies to deter potential adversaries from their continued investment in more advanced ballistic missile technologies. 

Given the resource realities, I believe the systems developer has 

struck a good balance. 

Turning to my role as the Army’s senior commander for missile 

defense, let me briefly outline our priorities. Our top priority within the Army air and missile defense community is the continued 

development of the Integrated Air and Missile Defense System of 

Systems. This integrated system will link systems such that we can 

improve our capability to execute terminal phase ballistic missile 

defense, cruise missile defense, and force protection. Our objective 

is to network the Army’s air and missile defense systems, such as 

PATRIOT, THAAD, and MEADS so that we can leverage all the 

sensors and shooters we deploy on the battlefield and achieve a 

greater capability against an array of threat systems. 

Mr. Chairman, the Army is a member of the joint team fighting 

an adaptive enemy, while transforming to meet future threats. We 

will continue developing and fielding an integrated missile defense 

for our Nation, for our deployed forces, and for our friends and allies. I appreciate the opportunity to speak on these important matters, ask that my written statement be submitted for the record, 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
229 

and look forward to addressing any questions you or the members 

of the Committee may have. 

Mr. DICKS. Without objection, all the statements will be made 

part of the record. 

Mr. Francis from the GAO. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. PAUL FRANCIS

Mr. FRANCIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Young, members of 

the subcommittee. I appreciate your inviting me here this morning 

to participate in the discussion of missile defense. I am not here 

as a technical expert or as an operator like General Campbell. I am 

the auditor. And we are required by law every year to report on 

the progress MDA has been making on the program. And the material I am going to present today comes from a draft report that we 

have over at the Department right now for comment. And that report will be issued in March 15th of this year. Some of the things 

I am going to say this morning are similar to what I had said last 

year, but I think there is some important new developments regarding oversight. And I think I am going to spend a little time on 

those as well. 

First, I am going to talk about Block 2006 performance and cost. 

Block 2006 is the second increment of missile defense, and it was 

completed in December 2007. And under Block 2006, a number of 

additional assets were fielded. For example, more ground-based 

interceptors, more SM–3 missiles, more Aegis ships upgraded, and 

more radars fielded and upgraded. While there were a lot more assets fielded, not quite as many as were originally anticipated. In 

the area of testing, most test objectives I think for the block were 

achieved. There were some tests that were delayed. And we will 

have to pick them up probably in the next year or so. 

We weren’t able to assess the overall performance of the ballistic 

missile system against its overall objectives because testing done to 

date is still not quite enough to anchor the models and simulations 

that are used to project that performance. And there is not yet 

enough realism in the testing to enable the director of operational 

testing and evaluation to render a determination as to operational 

suitability and effectiveness, so I could not quite address that. In the area of cost, the cost of the block increased by $1 billion. 

And that cost was accommodated by deferring some work out to the 

future and moving THAAD into a different block of missile defense. 

Deferring work does create some accountability problems in that 

work that is deferred is no longer counted against Block 2006. But 

the budgets did anticipate that work being done. So to the extent 

that work is deferred, the link between budget and work done does 

get weakened. And then we are not able to do a total cost estimate 

for Block 2006 because some of the work has moved out. 

So the bottom line on the Block 2006, more capability fielded, not 

quite as much as we thought, and somewhat higher cost. Let me 

move now to the oversight issue. As the chairman noted, that MDA 

does have unprecedented flexibility in its ability to manage the program. And some of these things or indications of flexibility are the 

ability to change goals, they can defer work, missile defense can 

concurrently test and field assets, and it can produce end items and 

field end items with research and development moneys. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
230 

In addition, the decisions that missile defense makes do not have 

to get approved by anyone else in the Department of Defense. 

Other statutes that apply to major weapons system programs do 

not necessarily apply to missile defense. So for example, having a 

firm cost schedule and performance baseline is not a requirement 

for missile defense. Tracking unit costs vis-a-vis Nunn-McCurdy is 

not required. Independent cost estimates are not required, nor is 

independent operational test and evaluation. 

Now, these flexibilities were given consciously to MDA, and they 

enable the Agency to be very agile with its decision-making. And 

I would have to say that Blocks 2004 and 2006 were fielded more 

quickly as a result of having this flexibility. It does create some 

challenges for oversight in that the decisions of MDA are not always as transparent as other programs. And it is more difficult to 

hold the program accountable for its original results. But this is an 

area where I think some real improvements are underway in the 

area of oversight. The new block structure that the chairman and 

General Obering mentioned, I think, is going to be an improvement 

over the previous one. It is more aligned with missions. The quantity and performance goals in the blocks will be baselined. MDA 

will track selected unit costs and report on substantial variances. 

And MDA will no longer defer work out of block. So that is going 

to improve transparency and accountability. There is a new Missile 

Defense Executive Board that has been set up. And I think it is 

more substantive than its predecessors, has higher level individuals on it, and I think a pretty strong charter for providing advice 

and recommendations on investments, strategies, and priorities. It 

does not quite have all of the powers that a defense acquisition 

board would have, for example. It won’t necessarily approve decisions that MDA makes. 

And the final area, I think, of improvement and oversight comes 

with a congressional direction that missile defense is to start using 

procurement funds to pay for operational assets. We think this will 

improve accountability significantly, because when you use procurement funds, you have to fully pay for an asset in the year that 

you start requesting money. And that is going to provide a lot of 

visibility over unit costs. And it is actually cheaper when you fully 

fund. 

And I think fiscal year 2009 was going to be the first year that 

Missile Defense was going to start requesting procurement funds. 

And I think they were going to go for THAADs firing units 3 and 

4. And I have seen the budget that those firing units have been deferred to fiscal year 2010. So at least in my reading of the budget 

I don’t see procurement funds requested yet in ’09. 

I will just wrap up with there is a few things that we think MDA 

can do to further improve oversight of the program. One is while 

certain aspects of blocks will be baselined, the total cost of the 

blocks will not be baselined or independently verified. We think 

that they should be done. Now, I think there needs to be—there is 

some blocks that can reach so far in the future there needs to be 

a reasonable discussion about what you can do in estimating costs. 

I mean you can’t be Draconian about something that is that far in 

the future. But I think a discussion can be had. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
231 

But other blocks are nearer term, and I think those costs could 

be estimated. Second has to do with the unit costs that MDA is 

going to report on. I think MDA will need to tell the Congress, or 

you will have to tell them what assets you want to track unit costs 

on, what criteria you will use to say what is a significant cost increase, and what vehicle MDA will use to tell you about the 

variances it is going to report. 

And the final area, I think, is in testing evaluation. And there 

has been quite a bit done to make tests more operational, more realistic, but we think more needs to be done there. As I mentioned 

earlier, MDA’s testing is fairly concurrent with fielding. And it does 

not provide for separate operational testing. Now ideally, we would 

like to see less concurrency there and more operational testing 

done. But short of that, we have to accept the fact then that the 

testing MDA does is going to serve two purposes: One is developmental. It has to show that the design of the system functions as 

desired. But also operational. There has to be enough information, 

I believe, to allow the director of operational testing and evaluation 

to render a determination of suitability and effectiveness. 

And also the tests have to be robust enough for the models and 

simulations to be anchored so overall performance can be projected. 

So we think more work can be done there. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I would be glad to answer any questions. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you very much. 

MULTIPLE WARHEAD TESTING

Mr. DICKS. One of the things that I remember from a few years 

ago was when we talked about the robustness of the testing was 

a multiple warhead test, where they would launch and we would 

operate against multiple warheads. Have we done that yet? Has 

that been attempted? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. We launched on our Aegis program 

this past November, we launched two targets that were in the air 

simultaneously. And we intercepted them with two interceptors in 

the air simultaneously. So that demonstrated a multiple target capability and multiple interceptor in flight at the same time. In addition, on long range flight tests that we accomplished in September, the way that the target presented itself to the kill vehicle, 

the kill vehicle when it opened its eyes it actually saw multiple objects. It saw the warhead, it saw the third stage of that rocket, it 

saw debris from the separation that looks like very small—could be 

warheads. So we had to go through—it had to vote on what was 

the warhead and what was not. And I can show you video that 

shows it going through that voting routine. And it selected the warhead and hit that. So we feel very confident we are on a very good, 

strong path there with respect to that particular capability. 

Mr. DICKS. Well, as somebody who was here on this Committee 

when President Reagan announced that we are going to have this 

capability, I think for me at least, this is one of the first times I 

really felt that we now have a deployed capability, that there is 

something real with Fort Greely and Vandenberg and all the Aegis 

ships, that we now have a real capability. 

Now you both mentioned, though, that even with this capability 

that we have, that it is not enough to meet what the commanders 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
232 

need, both in terms of short-range and long-range missile defense. 

How long will it take us before we will have a what you consider 

a robust capability for this? And General Campbell, if you want to 

answer this after General Obering. 

SHORT-RANGE AND LONG-RANGE MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITY

General OBERING. Sir, if you look at what we have loaded in our 

budget for after the 2013 time frame, we will have a total of 54 of 

the long range interceptors. Forty-four of those will be based in the 

United States, and hopefully 10 in Europe and Poland. We would 

have about 133 of the sea-based interceptors. We would have 18 

ships from which we could fire those interceptors. We would have 

up to three THAAD firing units, with about 80-plus missiles associated with them. So that would be a good start. Now, one of the 

things I think General Campbell will tell you is they recently conducted a study as to how much more do we need in terms of force 

structure, what they call the Joint Capability Mix Study. And we 

have committed to addressing that increase in numbers. It will 

roughly double the production rates for the THAAD and for the 

Aegis such that we can hopefully get to the numbers that they 

need to get to by the 2015 time frame. So that is what we would 

intend to pursue as part of our POM 10. And Kevin, if you want 

to interject. 

General CAMPBELL. I think if you just add up pure numbers, if 

we look at threat countries we are never going to be in a one-onone state. So what we do, in addition to looking at how many missiles do we need, we look at our offensive capability, we look at intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance and other means of attacking their systems. So it is a total solution. And I think what 

General—— 

GLOBAL STRIKE

Mr. DICKS. Which I think is critical. Deterrence is still a very important capability. Credible deterrence is something that we do 

have. 

General CAMPBELL. Yes, sir. Exactly. And I think if you would 

listen to the commander of Strategic Command, he would tell you 

that he is interested in having a prompt global strike so that we 

can address some of these emerging threats. So it is a total package. And again, we will never be at the point where it is one on 

one or we have the majority of interceptors in our favor. But we 

will have offensive forces. 

Mr. DICKS. When this thing was first started, we talked a lot 

about an accidental launch or two, that kind of a scenario. This 

system we have now would be capable against that kind of a 

threat, would it not? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. 

General CAMPBELL. Yes, sir. Absolutely. 

General OBERING. In fact, we could handle a fairly, I don’t want 

to say substantial, but certainly an attack by let’s say less than a 

dozen missiles from North Korea, the system would be able to handle that. And we do not believe they have those right now. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Young. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
233 

SATELLITE SHOOT-DOWN

Mr. YOUNG. What do we say to the friendly countries that have 

accused us of using the shoot-down of the satellite as a coverup for 

some scurrilous testing for anti-satellite programs? 

So we had to make all those capabilities. But to answer our critics, and I am sure—I am headed to Europe later this week, and 

I am sure I will be asked, we stated all along that while our system 

had an inherent capability, it was not designed for that, and we 

would have to make changes to accomplish this. And frankly, we 

are much more concerned about the ballistic missile threat from 

Iran primarily, and North Korea, which is what the system is designed for. 

EUROPEAN SITE

Mr. YOUNG. I know that people all over the world were really impressed with what you were able to accomplish, and especially for 

those that recognized the tremendous technical challenges that you 

had to face. So congratulations again. I wanted to ask about the 

deployment of radar and interceptor sites in Europe. And I understand that Poland has now made a requirement that if we are 

going to put anything in Poland, we are going to have to agree to 

modernize their military. Is that a new requirement on the part of 

Poland, or is that something we have been dealing with all along? 

General OBERING. Sir, it is a request that the Polish Government 

made of us as part of the missile defense negotiations. There had 

been talk earlier—there were always talk in the back of the negotiations about how are you going to protect this site, especially concern about the fact that they were exposing themselves, as they described it, to the Russians, and some other things. So there was always that talk in the background. But as the negotiations proceeded, and I think a key breakthrough came when their Foreign 

Minister, Radik Sikorski, came over several weeks ago and met 

with Secretary Rice, and they were able to come to an accommodation that said, look, Poland is part of NATO, and they have to remember that. 

So the protection of NATO is part of the Article 5 protection of 

NATO. And I know that that was the gist of the discussion. We 

know we have to protect these sites, and there has to be defenses 

made. And so we agreed to separate that from the missile defense 

discussions. And then that discussion will take place in a separate 

venue. 

Mr. YOUNG. How serious is the Russian objection? 

General OBERING. Sir, when we pulled out of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, the Russians didn’t say a word, not 

a word. And in fact, we were in cooperative development agreements with them in terms of cooperation through the missile defense exercises and other things. When I announced to the Russians, specifically General Brzezinski, back in 2003 and 2004 time 

frame that we had intended to expand our coverage into Europe because we were very concerned about what we saw going on in Iran, 

I did not get any major pushback. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
234 

It was not until we announced it was Poland and the Czech Republic that Mr. Putin raised the flag and started making the objections. I will tell you, and I have been involved, I was in the twoplus-two discussions in Moscow in October, I have been involved in 

the discussions with the Russians, and in fact, just my chief engineer was with the Russians last week in Budapest, they do not 

have a technical objection anymore. They know that their argument about this changes the strategic balance between the U.S. 

and Russia is just not valid. And that has played itself out on the 

NATO stage. It is all geopolitical. That is all it is. And I say all 

it is, that is still significant, but that is what it has boiled down 

to for the Russians. 

We have gone to extreme measures in my mind to address that. 

We stated that we would jointly monitor the threat, meaning that 

we would be willing to have Russians observe what we are observing with respect to the Iranian threat development. And would 

they allow us to have folks at their sites, for example, in Karbala 

in Azerbaijan. We talked about sharing of data between our radar 

systems and their radar systems. 

And we talked about, I would propose that we build out these 

sites, we integrate them and test them, and then we would not 

bring them to an operational status unless the threat emerged from 

Iran. And that argument, which I made to the NATO Council and 

to the NATO-Russia Council, went over very well. And our allies 

very much supported that. But Russia still has not moved off the 

top dead center to try to jump into this cooperation. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, congratulations, again, on the very exciting 

shoot-down of the satellite. That was good news. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

General OBERING. Thank you. 

SATELLITE SHOOT-DOWN—FUEL TANK

Mr. DICKS. I also think, I don’t know if you mentioned this, but 

the hydrazine was frozen. This was another aspect of this. 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. What was so much concern here is 

that the hydrazine was solid as a rock. The whole space craft was 

dead. And they had no communication with it whatsoever. And so 

we did everything we could to try to understand and gain knowledge about it by imaging it and that type of thing with our radars. 

And of course, we did not know where it was going to come back 

in. We had no knowledge. And so but we were able to confirm with 

three different phenomenologies the fact that we did destroy the 

hydrazine tank. So we are very confident of that. 

Mr. DICKS. We were just talking about the fact that you had to— 

didn’t you have to get the satellite warmed up a little bit? 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Moran. 

SPACE TEST BED

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are a number of 

issues. I will try to touch on some that might be less likely to be 

asked. The space test bed, the Congress eliminated that program 

in the last year, and yet you are asking for new money in this 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
235 

year’s budget for it. Can you tell us why, when the Congress removed all the funding for the activity last fiscal year, you are coming at it again? Is it just quixotic or masochistic or programmatic? 

General OBERING. Probably a little bit of all three, sir. It is because we do feel strongly that—first of all, we think that this country needs to look ahead. We cannot always be looking in the 

present, and we have to continue to look ahead. And we think it 

is important that as you have the debate on Capitol Hill here as 

to where this Nation goes with respect to its defense strategy, that 

that debate be informed. And so we were just proposing to have experimentation so that we could understand—you know, we may be 

having a false debate. We may be thinking we can build a capability that, in fact, we cannot because it is technically not achievable. So that was the purpose behind it. 

Mr. MORAN. All right. That is a good answer. 

Mr. DICKS. Would the gentlemen yield for just a second? 

Mr. MORAN. Sure. 

Mr. DICKS. Tell us a little about the space test bed again. 

Mr. MORAN. Take your time, because this doesn’t come out of my 

allocation. 

Mr. DICKS. It does not. An unlimited reservoir. 

General OBERING. There are a lot of unanswered questions as to 

whether you could actually accomplish an intercept from space. By 

the way, just to clarify, we intercept in space all the time. That is 

where we live. Whenever you engage an ICBM, or an intermediaterange ballistic missile, or a medium-range ballistic missile, or even 

a short-range ballistic missile in the mid-course phase, that phase 

is in space, whether you are at 80 kilometers or 380 kilometers. 

So we live in space already with our intercepts. But there is an 

advantage to having a space-based interceptor that would have the 

flexibility and mobility and global coverage, so to speak, so that you 

could address emerging threats where you had not anticipated 

them from before. Now, but there is, like I said, there are questions 

about this. 

First of all, there is long-term storage of propellant on space. 

What is the command and control concept? Could you actually do 

the seeking and the sensing that you need from looking down in 

terms of boosting missiles or for a mid-course intercept. A lot of 

questions. So we were trying to understand what is possible, what 

is not possible so that we can, again, inform this debate as we 

move to the future. Because I do believe that first of all, a lot of 

people do not realize it, but when they swipe their credit card at 

the gas station, that is typically through a satellite. When you use 

your credit card at WalMart, that is typically through a satellite. 

So we rely on space very heavily. And we are a space-faring nation. 

And historically if you look back, nations that do not protect themselves, especially their lines of communication that they depend 

upon do so at their peril. So I think it is important that we continue this experimentation. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Moran. 

THAAD FIRE UNITS

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for that answer. I actually agree with you. I do think that is an important 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
236 

area for research in particular. And so it would be helpful for you 

to keep the Committee informed, assuming that the Committee 

does not try to eliminate it again. But again, looking for inconsistencies, the Congress allowed your agency to continue to use research and development funds in fiscal year 2009 to incrementally 

fund previously approved missile defense assets, and we expected 

that you would continue in other words procurement, spending procurement funds for the THAAD. 

And—but in this budget, there is no money for procurement for 

the THAAD fire units or the Aegis BMD, SM–3 1A missiles. And 

the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act required it, and yet 

there is no procurement funding in this budget. So maybe you 

could clarify that. 

General OBERING. Sir, there is a couple issues. The first one was 

in terms of the THAAD, the procurement—I think the direction 

was after the first two fire units that we procured with RDT&E, 

the next two, 3 and 4, that was delayed because of cost growth in 

the program that I mentioned earlier. We delayed the delivery of 

those units. But more importantly, by the time that we were able 

to build a budget, the ability for us to be able to generate the procurement program elements (PEs), which is not done by us, it is 

done by the comptroller for the Department, it got to be a bridge 

too far in being able to do that for this budget. So our intent is that 

we would package this for the 2010 proposal in terms of what 

would be procurement in the RDT&E. 

Mr. MORAN. So that was a matter of timing? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. It was awfully late when we got the 

direction. And we already built the budget by then. 

GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE SYSTEM

Mr. MORAN. All right. Well, that explains it. I wanted to ask 

about—and I guess this would go to you, too, General, the GroundBased Midcourse Defense System has a rudimentary capability, we 

are told, to defend U.S. citizens against a limited ballistic missile 

attack. Could you give us your assessment of the training and personnel readiness to use such a system in defeating a limited ballistic missile attack against U.S. citizens? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. And Kevin probably could—General 

Campbell could probably step in here. My view of the training and 

readiness from a manpower personnel perspective is it is very, very 

good. The operators know what they are doing. They know how to 

operate the system. We test that in a series of demonstrations, 

readiness demonstrations as well as war games and simulation. 

When we say that we handle a rudimentary capability, what we 

are talking about is we can handle a limited attack. 

And we are going to fly against those. We have flown against 

them in the past, and we are going to fly against them in our next 

flight test for the long-range system. What I am talking about is 

when you get into very complex countermeasures, and I can’t go 

into that level of detail here, but things that really could begin to 

fool the radar and the kill vehicles. That is when we need a combination of the very powerful algorithms that we are building to 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
237 

net our sensors together and the Multiple Kill Vehicle capability so 

that we basically have a shotgun effect on each one of these interceptors. And that is what we are talking about. 

Mr. MORAN. That is good. Could I ask one other quick one? 

Mr. DICKS. Sure. 

ISRAEL MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Israel is currently developing its own program to focus on the same kind of threat that the 

THAAD currently defends against, and I have heard partially with 

our funds, but they say that the U.S. has not shared sufficient information as to the capabilities of THAAD, and so that is why they 

need their own program. Would you explain any legitimate concerns that would prevent the U.S. from disclosing such information? And if so, what would those concerns be? 

Mr. MORAN. Put one of our missile defense—— 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MORAN. Similar to the way we are putting one in Poland and 

Czechoslovakia? 

General OBERING. Well, no, this is temporary, and it is part of 

an exercise. We do this all the time in other areas. 

Mr. MORAN. So it is more mobile. It is not a permanent facility, 

as it is in Europe. 

STANDARD MISSILE–3

General OBERING. Right. And I have had some success in convincing them that they need to look at some of our capabilities, 

that they could use them, for example, our Standard Missile–3 capability and how we could land base that. That would be very powerful for the Israelis. And we are working through the nondisclosure policy, which we do not control, but we have to go through 

that within the building to make sure that any system technology 

can be protected, or at least protected long enough so that it is not 

a threat to the United States. So we are working through that 

right now. But we do not need to be funding a multi-billion dollar 

interceptor development program that we end up funding quite a 

bit of when we have capabilities like THAAD and SM–3 that could 

suffice for that. 

Mr. MORAN. So it is true, we are actually, at least partly or in 

whole, funding their development of an alternative missile defense 

system comparable to the one THAAD we already have. 

General OBERING. That is not my intent to do that. 

Mr. MORAN. I understand. But that is, in fact, what is happening. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Hobson. 

EUROPEAN SITE AND NATO

Mr. HOBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you 

for being here. I have a couple of problems. It looks to me like in 

the European thing, here we go again. We are going to wind up 

paying for it. Europeans are not going to pay for it. NATO is not 

going to pay for it. We are dealing kind of outside of, inside of 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
238 

NATO as we go deal with one NATO country or two. They are not 

really excited about it. But again, we wind up holding the bag protecting Europe when they won’t protect themselves. I have great 

frustrations with them right now in Afghanistan because they are 

not playing their role the way they should. And I do not understand why we keep doing this. 

This is part of one long question, but why not use the SM–3 

Block IIA missile that is under development rather than doing 

this? And why do we not get NATO more involved in what we are 

doing if we are going to be defending them? 

General OBERING. Okay, sir. First of all, let’s go to the solution 

as to why did we select 10 interceptors in Poland and radar Czech 

Republic? Why not used the sea-based capabilities? Two reasons 

primarily. One, the sea-based is not going to be there for several 

years. We would not be able to deploy that until probably 2016 or 

beyond. That is a major development that we are just now kicking 

off. So there is no guarantee that that missile is going to be available. In addition, it will cost more than the 10 interceptors that we 

are talking about in Poland and the radar in Czech Republic and 

the forward deployable radar, it is about double the price because 

of where you would have to put the ship locations. 

Let me give you an example. The interceptors that we have in 

Alaska and California, of which we would have a two-stage version 

for Poland, is about 60 feet long. It is about 55 inches wide. It is 

a very big interceptor. It has a lot of capability. You need that 

when you are going against an ICBM. We would not have had, for 

example, from a Delta, what we call a capability to engage a 

threat, we would not have had the same issue with the GBI that 

we have with these used on the satellite shoot-down because it is 

capable of intercepting those speeds of targets. Now, if I could go 

back, the SM–3 Block IIA missile is 21 inches. So it is less than 

half the diameter, and it is only about 18 feet long. So there is a 

size difference here that matters in terms of its ability to deal with 

the threats. 

So consequently, you have a much more reduced defended area. 

Even if we wanted to use the sea-based SM–3 Block IIA, we would 

still need the radars in the Czech Republic, and much more forward deployed in Southeastern Europe or the Caspian. You have 

to have those or the SM–3 does not have a chance either of being 

able to provide a defended area of significant coverage to even be 

an alternative. So when you go through the calculations, it is more 

expensive, there is no guarantee it is going to be there. The missile 

that we are proposing for Poland, the two-stage version of the 

three-stage we are flying today is a very minor change, it is less 

than a $15 million modification to those interceptors to be able to 

make them into a two-stage version. 

So it was a matter of programmatics in terms of convenience and 

the most cost-effective. Now, to your other point about NATO, we 

are engaged with NATO. I have briefed them probably six or seven 

times, the North Atlantic Council, we are taking our system, our 

command and control and battle management system, and it will 

be integrated with the NATO Air Command and Control System, 

NATO ACCS, that will form the backbone of their NATO Active 

Layered Theater Missile Defense Program. So we are making 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
239 

plans, in fact, we are going to have a demonstration in June to 

pass radar data back and forth between the two systems. 

Mr. HOBSON. But who is going to pay? 

General OBERING. We are paying for the interceptors in Poland, 

we are paying for the radar in the Czech Republic, and the forward 

deployable radar. Now, what do we gain from this? First of all, we 

gain defense of our forces in the region, of which there is substantial number, against this growing Iranian threat. We also are benefitting because we are able to cover the radars in Fylingdales and 

Thule, Greenland, which also provides protection for the United 

States homeland against Iranian attack, and it gives us a third interceptor site from which we can protect the United States as well. 

The coverage from Iran extends all the way for the majority of 

the continental United States. So those are the benefits that we are 

receiving from this arrangement. We are working with NATO, and 

we intend to have this integrated within the NATO architecture 

such that we can take advantage of NATO radars and they can 

take advantage of our radars. 

Mr. HOBSON. I bet we will end up paying for all of it. That is the 

problem I have. Let me ask one other thing. The Russians offered—I mean, it is interesting, you say to me we are willing to 

have the Russians come in and be on our site, and we are willing 

to exchange information with them. The Russians offered that to 

us in doing our thing. And I do not understand what the Russians 

offered to do as an alternative to our situation. We turned that 

down. Would you explain that to the Committee? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. They never offered to participate in 

a what we call a joint regional architecture, which is what we 

would like to do. They never did. What they said was they would 

offer us data from their radar in Quubala to show that the Iranians 

do not have the ability to be able to strike Europe or he United 

States. 

EUROPEAN SITE—JOINT OPERATION

Mr. HOBSON. They never offered you a joint operational situation 

as you offered them? 

General OBERING. No, sir. No, sir. Not to where we would actually have set up a joint regional architecture where we share data 

with them, they share data with us, we actually plug our systems 

together. No, sir, they never did that. And it is very frustrating 

with the Russians. 

Mr. HOBSON. They normally are. 

General OBERING. There was a launch in November that occurred a day before the Russian talks here in Washington. 

A 2,000-kilometer missile which one of the Russian experts even 

admitted that if they had gone that far, they had the ability to go 

much farther. And when we were meeting with them here in Washington, they refused to acknowledge—at the beginning of the talks, 

they refused to acknowledge they had even flown the thing. And 

by the end of the talks they said, well, yeah, we know they flew 

it, but we were not going to tell you. There is a lot of disingenuousness between the Russians and where we are right now. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
240 

Mr. HOBSON. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Ms. Kaptur is recognized. 

MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen. If 

I were to ask you in the offensive missile capability for various 

ranges, what are our most dependable missiles, how would you answer that? 

General OBERING. Offensive? 

Ms. KAPTUR. Offensive. I know you are defensive, but I am just 

asking. If you were to pick your workhorse missiles, what would 

they be? 

General CAMPBELL. I do not know if I am qualified to answer 

that. I have some time at U.S. Strategic Command, but if you look 

at the operational readiness rates of our ICBM force and our submarine force, they are extraordinarily high. 

Ms. KAPTUR. What about the Harpoon? 

General CAMPBELL. I do not know. I would have to get back to 

you, ma’am. 

[The information follows:] 

Harpoon is an all weather, over-the-horizon, anti-ship missile system. The missile 

is capable of being launched from Ticonderoga Class Cruisers, flight one and two 

Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers, F/A–18 aircraft and P–3 aircraft. The Harpoon 

weapon system, a longtime venerable workhorse for the Navy, is currently being upgraded to a Block III configuration. The Harpoon Block III program improves the 

surface warfare mission area with data link and GPS capabilities. The additional 

capabilities further increase Harpoon’s accuracy, target selectivity and provide for 

in-flight target updates. Through the Department’s foreign military sales program, 

approximately 30 foreign nations possess earlier versions of the Harpoon missile 

system. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Offense, I was just questioning. Okay. So then on 

the defensive side, since this is the largest research program at the 

Department of Defense, do we have any capability now? 

General OBERING. Yes, ma’am. We do have. We have the capability on very short notice to activate the system. We have done so 

many times in the past. We can shoot down a missile launched at 

the United States from North Korea. We can destroy that weapon. 

And we are confident that we can do that. 

SEA-BASED CAPABILITY

Ms. KAPTUR. From a sea-based capability? 

General OBERING. No, a land-based capability for a long-range 

missile. That is the only capability we have today. The sea-based 

would be capable of shooting down the shorter range missiles. Let 

me give you an example. When the North Koreans launched the 

seven missiles they did in the summer of 2006, they had a very 

long-range weapon, the Taepo Dong 2, which was multi-stage, 

ICBM-capable, which they did not tell us what was on top of it, 

they did not tell us anything. And that system, had that been a 

threat to the United States, we could have destroyed that with the 

missiles, the interceptors that we have put in Alaska and California. There were shorter-range missiles, though, that were 

launched the day after. 

And you may hear them call an extended-range Scud, a No Dong, 

that type of thing. These are missiles that are within 1,000- to a 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
241 

3,000-kilometer range, in that range. They could have been destroyed by the sea-based missiles, the interceptors that we deployed to the Sea of Japan and in that region. So there is a 

layering that we are doing between our interceptors to try to match 

the offensive capability as well. 

THREATS

Ms. KAPTUR. Okay. Then explain to me in layperson’s terms 

where is our vulnerability? 

General OBERING. Well, first of all, this strictly is geared toward 

a North Korean and Iranian threat. So for example, if you had the 

impression that—— 

Ms. KAPTUR. The issue is range, General? Range? Where is 

the—— 

Ms. KAPTUR. Do they have the range capability yet, Russia? 

General OBERING. Oh, yes. 

Mr. DICKS. They have ICBMs, just like we do. 

General OBERING. Right. We believe that the North Koreans 

have range capability. We believe they have the ability to reach the 

United States. .———. 

Ms. KAPTUR. So the real threat is numbers? 

General OBERING. Numbers, yes, ma’am. 

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. Let me ask you for our current research 

program on the defense side, how do you assure, because you have 

so many contractors, that we actually protect our intellectual property and our security? Dr. Clyde Prestowitz has written quite a bit 

about how some of our most sensitive defense technologies, particularly in rocket boosters and electronic systems have been—we have 

been required to use technologies from other countries and other 

suppliers. How do you assure that we protect the technology that 

we have and the intellectual property that we have? Is this a concern of yours? 

General OBERING. Yes, ma’am, it is. And of course, one thing you 

want to make sure is you are not reliant on a foreign supplier, for 

example, that could be put at risk or could put your program at 

risk. We actually—— 

Ms. KAPTUR. Do we face that in your program? 

General OBERING. Pardon me? 

Ms. KAPTUR. Do we face that in your program? 

General OBERING. There was a gyro, as I recall a laser diode that 

was used in one of our green laser gyros several years back, and 

we discovered that we were relying on a Russian provider for that. 

We qualified an American supplier and came off of that dependence. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Do you monitor your subcontracts carefully to assure that? 

General OBERING. Yes, ma’am. That is part of what we try to do. 

In fact, we have a whole organization set up that looks at 

componentry and production of components in that regard. 

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. So you have a pretty high confidence level 

there? 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
242 

General OBERING. I don’t know if I have a high confidence level 

because you never know what you do not know, but it is something 

we are trying to guard against, yes, ma’am. 

RESEARCH PROGRAMS

Ms. KAPTUR. Okay. So in our research programs they are not infiltrated through the contracting process. You have high confidence 

level in that? 

General OBERING. I would not say high confidence level, because 

again, I do not know what I do not know, but I can tell you we 

try to take safeguards to address that. 

PATRIOT SYSTEM

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. May I ask a question on this when 

Hezbollah was showering Katyusha rockets down on Israel, what 

technology didn’t they have to shoot those down? What was the 

problem there? Too many? 

General OBERING. First of all, the PATRIOT system that they 

have deployed is not effective against a Katyusha because a 

Katyusha is such a short-range rocket that it is not airborne basically long enough, nor is it cost-effective to be engaging a very 

cheap rocket with a very expensive interceptor. 

So one of the ways that—or one of the initiatives that we are 

pursuing with the Israelis is how do we do that? How are we able 

to take out these short-range rockets? And we have a program 

called David’s Sling that we are actually co-managing with the 

Israelis to try to do that. So it is to try to get a very inexpensive 

interceptor that we could use against that type of threat. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I did not hear what you said, sir. What was the 

name of it? 

General OBERING. David’s Sling. 

DAVID’S SLING

Ms. KAPTUR. Oh, sling. David’s Sling program. Can you tell the 

Committee anything you learned about Iran’s capabilities based on, 

as you looked at what happened in Lebanon in terms of their missile capabilities? This is offensive, obviously. 

General OBERING. The biggest lesson that I learned there, frankly, personally is they did not fire—they did not fire—Iran did not 

fire, obviously, any long-range weapons at Israel, anything that we 

would be concerned about. But they did provide Hezbollah with 

missiles, with the shorter-range missiles, and that was very well 

documented in the intel community. And that is of concern. When 

you have a state government providing a nonstate actor, in this 

case, Hezbollah terrorist group, with those missiles what is to stop 

the ranges of those increasing and the capabilities of those increasing? 

One of those concerns is obviously having a very capable missile 

getting in the hands of these type of organizations and being used 

against us, the homeland or against our allies. That is one of the 

things I am very worried about. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
243 

Ms. KAPTUR. I am sure there is a lot of trading that goes on in 

the world in those components, isn’t there, in those not just manufacture, but trading arms trading, right? 

General OBERING. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Missiles of that size. Do I have time for one more 

question, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. DICKS. I think the time has expired. 

Mr. KINGSTON. We have to get everybody through here. 

EUROPEAN SITE—RADAR

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, I wanted to 

ask you in terms of obtaining permission to build the long-range 

interceptors and the fixed radar in Europe, you have to get obviously the people in Poland and Czech Republic to agree to it. 

Where is that in the process? 

General OBERING. Currently, we do not have any more negotiating sessions scheduled with the Czechs because we basically, as 

far as I know, resolved all the remaining issues there. And so I 

would think that an agreement that could be signed by their government and our government would be imminent. 

Mr. KINGSTON. And is that negotiated on kind of an executive 

branch level in both areas? And I know you have to have congressional approval here once that is done, right? 

General OBERING. It is negotiated at the executive branch level, 

so it is—the State Department is leading those negotiations. We 

are just supporting. We are in a support role. The Department of 

Defense is in a support role. The State Department is leading those 

negotiations with the Czech and Polish Government. But the discussions with the Czechs are going very well. The discussions with 

the Poles were going very well. We had the change of government. 

It slowed down the negotiating process somewhat. That has now 

picked up again. So I do believe there is going to be an agreement 

in at least the next couple of months. 

APPROVAL OF EUROPEAN SITE

Mr. KINGSTON. And when you say in your testimony, you have 

to have congressional approval, does the Senate have to sign on or 

does it actually go through both Houses? 

General OBERING. I do not believe there has to be Congressional 

approval, per se. You guys own the budget, the funding of it. That 

is how you approve what we do is through the funds. But this 

would be—and I understand—and I am not an expert here, so you 

probably need to get the expert about what Congressional approval 

would be needed for this agreement. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Is that something, Mr. Chairman, do you know 

does it have to be authorized? Because in your testimony, you say 

assuming we can obtain agreements with Poland, Czech Republic, 

and obtain Congressional approval to proceed. I was just wondering—— 

Mr. DICKS. Staff says the MILCON site has to be authorized. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
244 

EUROPEAN SITE—MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Mr. KINGSTON. So it is a funding issue more than an authorizing? 

Mr. DICKS. Authorizing. You have to authorize it and then fund 

it. 

General OBERING. Yes. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Okay. But there is not—I just wanted to see if 

there was some sort of a vote that took place free-standing or anything like that. 

Mr. DICKS. If somebody offered an amendment or in the Committee or in the full committee or on the floor there could be a vote. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, that might be where Mr. Hobson could have 

a vehicle for discussion of the European gratitude or participation 

or whatever. There would be an opportunity for people of his view, 

which I think a lot of us share, at least partially, to have a bite 

at this apple. 

Mr. HOBSON. If I might add, I am advised that the MILCON part 

is at least $2 billion, so that is a pretty good slice of MILCON. 

Mr. DICKS. Is that accurate? 

Mr. HOBSON. On the low side by MILCON standards. 

Mr. KINGSTON. If you know, for example, an amendment like 

that is going to be offered so there is opportunity to talk about European participation do you have enough, you know, firepower in 

terms of the political scene to come back and make the case as 

strongly as you can? Because frankly, you know, when I listened 

to you, I think you gave a very good answer, but I would also sort 

of love to hear more that, hey, this is all about us a lot more than 

them. 

General OBERING. Well, again, we derive benefit from this, substantial benefit from this. The thing that we do not want to have 

happen that we have already seen is the ability for the Iranians 

to begin to coerce our allies and to start peeling them off from us. 

We saw a little bit of that with respect to al Qaeda and the Spaniards in Iraq. Now imagine if you had that happen on a nationstate scale where you are holding entire cities or nations hostage, 

how that could disrupt the alliance. 

TARGETS

Mr. KINGSTON. General, I want to ask about the number of MDA 

targets for the test program. Do you have enough targets? And 

where do you get them? 

General OBERING. We have enough targets for fiscal year 2008, 

2009. As I mentioned earlier, we have had some difficulties in our 

targets program. We were using—we were trying to save taxpayers’ 

money. We were using the last vestiges of the old Polaris motors 

that you remember from the old SLBM, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile. Now that we are getting to kind of the bottom of the 

barrel there, we were transitioning to a more modern, flexible target family. So we do have enough targets to handle ’08 and ’09. We 

are looking at ’10 and beyond as part of our POM 10 activity and 

how we can even more robust our targets program. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
245 

AEGIS BMD CAPABILITY

Mr. KINGSTON. Okay. I wanted to ask one more question, Mr. 

Chairman. In terms of the Aegis BMD-capable ships, they are all 

in the Pacific, right? 

General OBERING. Currently they are, yes. 

Mr. KINGSTON. And there is two that are going to be upgraded 

in the Atlantic? 

General OBERING. Yeah, but that is not our decision. That is a 

part of the combatant commanders and the Navy’s decision. 

Mr. KINGSTON. But that is because there is so much focus on 

North Korea? 

General OBERING. Right. And you could move those ships if need 

be to the Mediterranean. And we have done that. We have actually 

moved some of these Aegis missile defense-capable ships into the 

Atlantic and the Mediterranean region. 

Mr. KINGSTON. But you are comfortable, and I understand that 

decision is not yours, but that we are okay in terms of the Atlantic 

side. 

General OBERING. Yes, I am. And again, another initiative that 

you may not be aware of is we are funding what we call open architecture, which will allow every Aegis ship to be ballistic missile defense capable. We are doing that with the Navy. So that would tremendously expand the number of ships available to the warfighters 

as we proceed with that. 

Mr. KINGSTON. What kind of ship does it have to be? 

General OBERING. It is an Aegis, we use Aegis both destroyers 

and cruisers. It is a certain configuration for these Aegis ships, the 

18 that we have. 

Mr. KINGSTON. How many potential are there? 

General OBERING. There is more than 80 when we go the open 

architecture. 

Mr. KINGSTON. How long is the conversion? How long does it 

take? 

General OBERING. It would be several years. 

Mr. KINGSTON. How long per ship, though, would it take? 

General OBERING. I would have to take that for the record. I will 

get back to you. 

[The information follows:] 

The Navy and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) are engaged in a joint effort 

to integrate the Aegis BMD capability through the Aegis Modernization Program’s 

Open Architecture (OA) environment. In this collaborative effort, the Navy is responsible for the development of the OA computing environment including replacing 

Military Specification (MILSPEC) equipment with Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 

(COTS) equipment and COTS-based Multi-Mission Signal Processor (MMSP) integration with the SPY–1 radar. The MMSP merges Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) and 

Aegis BMD Signal Processor (BSP) functionality into a single common processor. 

The MDA is responsible for migrating the Aegis BMD 4.0.1 weapon system computer program into an open architecture computing environment and integrating 

BSP functionality into the MMSP, resulting in BMD 5.0 weapon system computer 

program. 

The end result of this joint program is a more robust, multi-mission capability 

fielded in modernized Aegis ships. The Aegis OA program is key to expanding the 

Aegis BMD capability to the entire fleet of Aegis ships, with a proposed eventual 

total of 84 ships. The modernization program also provides the foundation for the 

potential implementation of Aegis BMD in allied navy ships. 

The first Aegis destroyers are scheduled to commence their modernization upgrade in FY 2012. The modernization upgrades include not only OA but also other 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
246 

combat system and engineering improvements funded by the Navy, requiring about 

one year to complete installation. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, thank you. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Boyd. 

MULTIPLE KILL VEHICLE

Mr. BOYD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen. 

I know these are very expensive programs that we are talking 

about. And we really are chasing some technology that leads us 

into uncharted waters in a lot of ways I am sure. I want to focus 

my time on an issue that the Chairman brought up in his opening 

question, and that is the issue of the Multiple Kill Vehicle, the 

MKV. MDA is, as I understand, you explained the deployment, 

operational—I mean, an operational capability in the 2017 time 

frame. 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BOYD. Is that correct? And you have awarded a contract to 

Lockheed Martin to develop a carrier vehicle. And you expect to 

have the research done sometime in the 2010 time frame as to 

whether this technology can be developed? 

General OBERING. Yes. That is about right. 

Mr. BOYD. It is my understanding that—and Mr. Francis, this 

question might be more appropriately addressed to you, that MDA 

has awarded two contracts for the development of the carrier vehicle, but we don’t know—for multi-kill purposes—but we do not 

know yet whether we can—that technology is going to work. What 

is the thought process about awarding two contracts before we 

know whether the technology is going to work or not? 

General OBERING. Let me take that. 

Mr. BOYD. Okay. General Obering? 

General OBERING. That is exactly what you want to do. Let me 

give you an example. When we started the ground-based midcourse 

system, we had two versions of our long range booster. We had an 

orbital version, what we called an OBV, and we had a BV Plus 

version built by Lockheed. The reason we had two is because we 

were not confident that either one of those configurations would 

work. And we wanted to have a fallback position in case one of 

them ran into some trouble. 

Well, sure enough, we ran into trouble on the BV Plus. We had 

an explosion out in Pratt & Whitney Chemical Systems Division in 

California, and it wiped out our inventory of those BV Plus configurations. When we gained enough confidence in the OBV configuration, which we had flown two or three times at the time of the explosion, we were able to jump from that to the OBD configuration. 

The same principle is true here. What you always want to have 

is not have all your eggs in one basket. So if I could have two kill 

vehicle suppliers, in this case, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, because they are the primary kill vehicle suppliers, I can continue a 

competition between those, an ongoing alternative source so to 

speak, and it really motivates each one of the contractors. And we 

have seen that already when we were running into problems with 

the kill vehicle for the long-range system in terms of deliveries, 

supplier management, supply chain management, that type of 

thing. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
247 

As soon as we awarded the Multiple Kill Vehicle to Lockheed, 

the first in a demo contract, we saw the behavior of Raytheon 

change to the good. So we want to continue that behavior with both 

these contractors as we move to the future. 

Mr. BOYD. Okay. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Mr. Boyd, if I may, I think you raised a good question on MKV. And as General Obering said, he is trying to have 

multiple ways to solve a problem and not have all of his eggs in 

one basket. I think the question that you asked, though, is a good 

one in terms of what we can afford and how many options we can 

pursue. Because I think right now we are looking at—I mean we 

do have an EKV that is a unitary system that we are improving 

the discrimination on. In MKV, we are now going to pursue two approaches to that. My understanding, and I will defer to General 

Obering on that, is that it is not necessarily going to be a competition, that we are going to keep both of those going. And if they do 

not work, then we may go back to a unitary system. So I think 

from a capability standpoint you want to keep as many options as 

you can open. But then you have to look at affordability, which how 

many things—how many options can we afford to keep open? 

MISSILE DEFENSE—A BALANCED CAPABILITY

Mr. BOYD. Okay. Thank you. I want to move to sort of a related 

area. And again, I am just baffled by the cost of this. Since 9/11, 

obviously the world has changed in so many ways. And we were 

pursuing these efforts prior to 9/11 and everything was going along 

pretty well, and all of our forces were in—services were in good 

shape. But today that situation is different. 

General Campbell, the Army is in serious, serious need of recapitalizing forces and equipment. Those are well documented, documented every hearing we have in this room. And we all know that 

we face constant evolving and increasing threats. How can we afford the same unconstrained approach to missile defense that we 

did prior to 9/11 that is not possible for the other services? Can you 

speak to that or did I—— 

Mr. KINGSTON. Will the gentleman yield a second? Will the gentleman yield? Because there was, I wanted to say, a lot of criticism 

of the GAO in terms of the accounting, and the fact that so much 

of this is very difficult for Congress to have oversight the way you 

do your, is it element-based accounting or nonelement based? But 

I read some of the GAO comments, and it is very difficult to follow, 

and I just wanted to kind of, you know, underscore what Mr. Boyd 

is saying. 

General CAMPBELL. I am not sure if I understood your question. 

You talked about the Army, and we are out of balance in that we 

are putting everything into counterinsurgency operations and we 

have to bring balance back so that we have a fully capable force 

across the spectrum of conflict. 

Mr. BOYD. That is correct. That is the gist of the question. 

General CAMPBELL. And the Army has done a good job, in my 

view, of balancing their investment portfolio so that we can get 

back to that balance. It is possible to do that. But as far as getting 

into any detail with you, I am not prepared to do that, to talk 

broad general purpose forces. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
248 

ALLOCATING MISSILE DEFENSE ASSETS

Mr. BOYD. And that really the general, the broad area of how we 

allocate our resources given the occurrences and events of the 

last—2001—7 years now almost, or 61⁄2 years, and the circumstances being completely different, and most of our services, 

particularly the Army, in such dire need of reset dollars and those 

kinds of things. 

General OBERING. Could I address that, if you do not mind? I am 

glad you brought up 9/11, because if you look at all the money we 

spent on missile defense, going back to Ronald Reagan in 1983, it 

is about a hundred billion dollars as of last year. The damage 

caused from 9/11 alone to New York was $83 billion. And that 

wasn’t a weapon of mass destruction. That was not SCUD on a tub, 

on a ship off the coast coming into New York City. If we had that, 

it would be in the hundreds of billions of dollars, trillions of dollars, 

and tens of thousands of lives. 

So to protect us against that, I think that spending much less 

than 2 percent of our budget is reasonable in terms of the overall 

strategic view. The other thing, if you stop and think about it, is 

just think what would change if you have a nuclear-tipped Iran 

providing an umbrella. We know they are already sponsoring terrorist forces around the world. We know that. Imagine if they had 

the ability to strike the homeland with a nuclear weapon and how 

that would change some of the calculations that we face in the future and not have a protection against that, which is what we are 

building out to. 

So I think from a strategic view and perspective, I think it is reasonable to spend this amount of money on this protection for not 

only our homeland, but our deployed forces, not the least of which 

the last time we engaged in Iraqi Freedom, for example, we had 

to defend ourselves against these missiles. 

The same thing occurred in the original Gulf War. More and 

more countries around the world are saying ballistic missiles are 

our Air Forces. So I think it is very prudent this Nation invest a 

very small amount in terms of what that is. And if I may to your 

point, sir, I respectfully—and I respect the GAO, but I think that 

we do account for our costs. And we can show you. In fact, the billion dollars that they talk about the growth in Block 2006, that 

represents a 5 percent increase over the life cycle of that. That is 

not significant. In fact, our entire cost variance for all of our programs are less than 6 percent. So there is some that are worse performers than others, like the Space Tracking and Surveillance System, but overall, we account very closely for those. What we are 

trying to do is move through this new Block structure that the 

Chairman talked about. And they actually—they recommended the 

new Block structure last year. We have gone to that now to help 

them understand what our accounting is as well. 

Mr. DICKS. It may help us as well. Mr. Rothman. 

IMMINENT THREATS

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you 

for being here, thank you for your service. You have an awesome 

responsibility, and we appreciate it. Continue the diligence, please, 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
249 

and Godspeed. My first question has to do with the boost phase, 

or the defense against—during the boost phase. The notion being 

that when do you know that you are going to go after a particular 

missile that has been launched and is in boost phase? The problem 

being you can have the greatest weapon in the world, but if you 

do not permit yourself to fire it, there is some deterrence in having 

the greatest weapon, but it loses its deterrent value if everyone 

knows you are going to be so uncertain about using it that you will 

never use it. 

So how do you know, for example—is it the policy, for example, 

that if a missile is launched from Iran that we are going to take 

it out? Or do we first have to determine its trajectory, the object 

that it is supposed to hit, the country it is supposed to hit, and by 

that time, can we hit it in boost phase? 

General OBERING. That is an outstanding question. That is part 

of why we like to lay in what we call knowledge points to determine what is the knowledge that we need to be able to advance our 

programs. But to get to your point specifically, what I envision for 

a boost phase defense is number one, if we get a shot from the blue 

that Ahmadinejad wakes up one morning and says I am going to 

launch a missile to New York City, that would not be a boost phase 

defense in my mind because of all the complications that you just 

talked about, not understanding whether that is a space launch initially or just a test launch or whatever. But very rapidly, we would 

know that it would be—— 

Mr. ROTHMAN. But would he make a public announcement I am 

going to New York? 

General OBERING. No. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. So you wouldn’t even know where it is headed. 

General OBERING. That is right. So for something like a bolt out 

of the blue, I think a boost phase defense would be problematic. 

Where it would be more appropriate is when you have indications 

and warnings that there is activity or that there is hostilities, that 

type of thing, in which you know that there is going to be—you 

know, you can tell, in fact, the way we execute with the Aegis 

ships, for example, is we say, okay, you have to defend this area 

and for any threats come out of this location. Okay. That type of 

thing. 

So there is going to be some indications and warnings, and then 

a boost phase capability can be very effective in being able to destroy those weapons while they are still in boosting phase. There 

is another aspect that there is more telltale signs than you believe. 

For example, one of the things we were looking for out of North 

Korea is the injection angle. If you are going into a space launch, 

for example, that injection angle is very flat. If you think about the 

shuttle when it launches, it rolls over and then it starts immediately to pitch over, because it wants to convert all that energy 

into orbital velocity. 

A ballistic missile does not do that. It goes much steeper. And 

so you get indications very quickly as to whether it is a space 

launch or a ballistic missile launch, and then you can propagate 

those through the command and control system. 

Mr. DICKS. Also we have satellites that let us know almost instantly when a launch has occurred. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
250 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. We do. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. The question was would we attack it without 

knowing where it was headed? But the general was saying there 

are these telltale signs and specific areas of responsibility so to 

speak that—— 

General OBERING. Plus, if we were—let me just use a concrete 

example. The Iranians launch from their northwest to the southeast. That is their typical launch ranges. If we see something coming out of there heading up north over Russia or heading up over 

Europe, we know it is not one of their launches. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Let me ask you this. If we saw a launch from Iran 

and it were not—we determined quickly that it was not launched 

against any of our forces in the region or the United States, are 

there circumstances where we would go after that missile if we determined it was headed against one of our allies? Or—any one of 

our allies? 

General OBERING. Yes. If it was determined to be headed into 

one of our allies, one of our defended areas, meaning Germany or 

Great Britain or Prague, whatever, yes, we would go after it. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Is Israel included in that umbrella? 

General OBERING. Israel would be included in a different umbrella, but still part of the missile defense shield, yes. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. On the Iranian-transferred missiles to Hezbollah, 

part of missile defense presumably is the intelligence work and 

other defensive exercises, endeavors that would, for example, blow 

up the component parts before they ever got assembled, or once 

they got assembled, or once they got to the factory or on the ship, 

et cetera, et cetera. Are you involved in that or is another agency? 

General OBERING. No, sir. I am not involved in that. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. But that is certainly a big—that is, as you fellows 

would say, a robust part of our defense operation, I would assume. 

I would hope. 

General OBERING. I would certainly say that that—you know, if 

you are looking at a holistic approach to missile defense, being able 

to use what we call nonkinetic means are important. 

IRANIAN THREAT

Mr. ROTHMAN. Okay. Why then do we permit, or one would imagine then with our robust intelligence services and all these nonkinetic elements of our defense forces that we would have—and 

satellites and humans, et cetera, we would know when the Iranians 

are literally transporting these devices to Hezbollah or to anybody. 

And so the question is why don’t we ourselves or assist others in 

the destruction of those missiles before they get to the bad guys, 

the other bad guys? 

General OBERING. Sir, that is not my area of expertise, and I do 

know that I believe that the United States has initiatives that we 

are trying to do that type of interdiction. But let me give you an 

example of some of our shortfalls. When the North Koreans 

launched their missiles in the summer of 2006, we had almost 

every intelligence asset known to this country looking at that country, and yet they were able to roll out several of their shorter-range 

missiles and fire them before we ever were able to pick that up. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
251 

So this idea that we have some type of an omnipotent ability to 

interdict in the supply chain or even just before they launch is not 

very proper. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. May I just follow up with that? Do we accept as 

a given that we will always not know what we do not know, and 

never have that complete capability of being able to anticipate a 

launch and then simply rely on other redundant forces or whatever 

to cover that, or is it simply a matter of providing more resources 

in order to address that shortfall? 

General OBERING. Sir, I think you have to do the whole spectrum. I think you have to invest in resources to do that interdiction 

that you talked about. I think you have to invest in other nonkinetic means by interrupting their command and control chains, 

that type of thing. And but you cannot rely on that solely, because 

when you have a warhead in the air, you have got to do something 

about it. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you. Thank, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Bishop. 

ISRAEL AND THAAD

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. Thank you, gentlemen, for 

being here, for sharing your knowledge with us. I am going to 

touch on two areas basically with our relationships with foreign 

governments. Israel, for example, is interested in developing a new 

program to focus on the threat that the Terminal High Altitude 

Area Defense currently defends. One of the issues that they have 

raised is that the U.S. has not shared information with them as to 

the capabilities of THAAD, and thus they do not know if THAAD 

will work for them. 

Can you give us an update on the U.S.-Israeli cooperation and 

tell us to what extent the national disclosure policy is preventing 

us from sharing missile defense information and technology with 

our allies? What is the extent that that national disclosure prevents us from sharing? And tell me whether or not there are legitimate concerns based on that national disclosure policy that would 

prevent us from disclosing certain information and what those concerns would be? 

Mr. BISHOP. What are the concerns that would prevent us from 

disclosing information under the national disclosure policy? 

General OBERING. Well, obviously we have a concern about any 

sharing of information or technology that the Israelis would, in 

turn, share with other countries. That is one thing that is of concern. I know that we are also concerned that their industry may 

take advantage of that technology vis-a-vis our own industry to establish a competitive advantage. So there are any number of reasons why people are concerned. 

Mr. BISHOP. I was wondering what those were. 

General OBERING. Well, there were certain things that we would 

never, I mean, what we call the family jewels we do not share, 

some of the detailed algorithms that we use in our radars to distinguish warheads, some of the algorithms that we use in our kill veVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:47 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046474 PO 00000 Frm 00251 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A474P2.XXX A474P2

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
252 

hicles to do the discrimination that we use today. Those are the 

types of things that we consider to be very sensitive. 

JAPAN COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT

Mr. BISHOP. Okay. With regard to Japan, over the past several 

years the U.S. and Japan have conducted cooperation in the missile 

defense area which has included the deployment of an X-band 

radar in Japan and a joint fifty-fifty cost share development of the 

Standard Missile–3 Block IIA missile. What is the status of our cooperation with Japan and are you considering moving the second 

forward deployed X-band radar to Japan? And thirdly, recently the 

MDA decided to incorporate a modular kill vehicle into the Block 

IIA even though Japan has only agreed to use the unitary warhead. How would that impact our cooperation with Japan? 

General OBERING. I would say our cooperation with Japan is extremely healthy and very robust. As you said, they share, they 

were willing to host the Shariki radar in the Amori district in the 

northwestern portion of the country. That is proceeding very well, 

and we are sharing data from that radar with the Japanese as 

well. With respect to our co-development of these SM–3 Block IIA, 

we have a systems requirement review that is scheduled for this 

March, or next month, that we began the U.S. only requirements 

review for that system. 

And again, that is proceeding very well. There was some concern 

early on by the Japanese about the Multiple Kill Vehicle program 

that you mentioned and whether it would impact our development 

of the SM–3 Block IIA, and I am pleased to report that I just got 

a letter yesterday from the Government of Japan saying that they 

do not have any problem with our approach on MKV. And so I 

think we put that all to bed now in terms of that concern. 

TESTING INFRASTRUCTURE

Mr. BISHOP. Okay. With regard to your testing infrastructure, 

the Committee has been informed that one of the key elements limiting current missile defense test programs is the lack of infrastructure. What specific actions can be taken by us to improve the Missile Defense Agency testing infrastructure and what are the costs 

associated with these steps? 

General OBERING. Sir, first of all, the full support for request for 

the money for our testing targets would be very helpful. And I believe that, as I said, we are going to come back for our next budget 

request in 2010 for our POM and we are going to be focusing on 

targets and the test infrastructure as a priority. But right now, 

many aspects of our test infrastructure are not funding limited, it 

is primarily the fact that we are maxing out the capabilities that 

we have. And just in terms of tempo. 

But targets has been a shortfall. That has been an area that we 

need to invest more in. And that is what I said we are okay for 

’08 and ’09, but starting in 2010, we are going to be requesting 

more emphasis there. 

TARGETS

Mr. BISHOP. How can you improve the number of targets? 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
253 

General OBERING. By increasing the funding for those, for targets. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. And I want to thank Mr. Tiahrt for being 

patient and a good sport and all the other attributes. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Tiahrt. 

AIRBORNE LASER

Mr. TIAHRT. First of all, I want to congratulate you on the tremendous success the programs had as far as ABL especially, but 

the MDA in total. But the ABL, I think, has really now shown all 

the key subsystems are working, and we are looking forward to the 

lethal shot shootdown in 2009. Just talking about open source information, we recently had a decaying orbit on a satellite and we 

used a kinetic capability to try to knock it down or effectively make 

it less dangerous. And I think that we were successful. That kinetic 

capability is sort of a backup for what the ABL is supposed to do. 

And in terms of the launch capability, kinetic as a backup takes 

a long time to get there compared to the speed of light. 

So there is a big difference there. And I think the need was 

verified again by this successful shootdown. But what was not told, 

and just using common sense, the ABL also is a backup for what 

was done by the previous or by the kinetic weapon. So I think 

there is a great capability here that we are developing. And that 

laser just does not point down, it points up as well. And I think 

we kind of forget the real tremendous tool this is to keep our country safe. I am a little concerned about how we are funding it, 

though. And I have some firsthand knowledge, because you know, 

in a typical program you have this big bulge in front of manpower 

and talent, and then as the first product becomes more secure and 

more technically complete, then you start seeing this talent go off 

to other areas. 

And we are experiencing that in the modification area in Wichita, where a lot of the engineers that worked on the first unit and 

have gained a lot of great experience now are being taken to other 

companies, other parts of the country, other parts of the company. 

And those who want to stay are even going to commercial ventures 

because we have not acted on tail number 2. 

And so I am very concerned if you look at the request that we 

made for this program in 2006 versus the request we are making 

in 2009, we are seeing that a lot of the plan that we had to move 

that second tail number in is being pushed way out to the right. 

And I am concerned about that because of the loss of talent. That 

alone will cost the program more money because you have people 

that have to get back up to speed. They are going to be back up 

higher on the learning curve that than they were. And we are 

about 250 million behind this year where we were planning to be 

in 2006. So we have got 3 years more of information, but why are 

we reducing such a big amount on a program that is doing so well, 

and why are we delaying tail number 2? 

General OBERING. Okay, sir. As I stated before, first of all, thank 

you very much for your support for overall program, and especially 

for ABL. We base these programs on knowledge points and their 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
254 

achievement of knowledge points. Airborne Laser has achieved everything that we have asked them to do so far. The big one left is 

to be able to put that high energy laser on the aircraft, which we 

have got the six modules loaded on today at Edwards, and then to 

get all the rest of the installations on board and then get back in 

the air by the end of this year, first part of next year to go forward 

with a lethal shoot-down. 

Now we have already learned, what maybe is not evident is that 

we have a workforce, as you said, in Wichita that did a lot of the 

modifications that supported the flying aircraft for the low power 

flight testing. It is almost unavoidable that we are going to lose 

some of those people in this transitory period. Because we are 

learning tremendous amounts on almost a daily basis, especially 

when we get back into our testing, that is going to indicate that 

we are going to have to go into a transition period not unlike what 

THAAD did. I will tell you I think that is what we are facing right 

now is that we are going to go into a transition period like THAAD 

where we flew in ’99 and 2000, and we stood down for about 4 or 

5 years, and we assembled all that we learned, and we totally remanufactured the THAAD program to where it is today, very successful, very affordable, and moving ahead. And I think that we are 

going to have something similar on ABL. 

So it was premature for us to order tail 2 until we get through 

this period of the lessons learned from the shoot-down, how we can 

do and incorporate those lessons learned into a more affordable design, and a more produceable design as we move out for the fleet. 

So I think it is what I call a transition period. And I wish I could 

say that there is ways we could maintain that workforce, but in my 

mind, it is almost unavoidable because we are not funding paced 

here, we are technically paced. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Well, there is a long lead time on the aircraft, you 

know, just a green airplane, and you have got to get a place in line, 

and then it has to be built, it has to go through flight check before 

it is delivered. 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TIAHRT. If you wait until 2009 to order, you will be sitting 

on your hands that much longer, because there is a demand for 

this aircraft. I am very concerned about that. And I hope you have 

factored into your schedule a second airframe. I don’t see an ability 

right now to change airframes, or a need to. So the airframe itself, 

that long lead time should be calculated into your churning the 

data and coming in, and so—— 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. I understand. The 747 8F is what we 

are looking at. 

Mr. TIAHRT. It is a good airplane, and I think it is a right choice, 

and it provides capability that you need. The GAO ran a report, I 

was not going to mention it, but the gentleman from Georgia did, 

but after going through the report, there is some things that, you 

know, the GAO says this is how we do business according to what 

is written. And in a lot of respects that is old school procurement 

that is out of date and needs to be revised. And some of the things 

I thought they were good, you establish a base line as soon as you 

possibly could, which I think that is good advice. But on some of 

the others, the only—I think one of the comments they made is inVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:47 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046474 PO 00000 Frm 00254 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A474P2.XXX A474P2

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
255 

clude only blocks—include in blocks only those elements that will 

field capabilities during the block. 

Well, if you do that, then you can’t shorten your schedule when 

you have the ability. It is very rigid. And so I think the way that 

you have managed the program is much better than the way—the 

process the GAO wants you to follow would be. So I want people 

to understand that GAO, I have great respect for them as well, but 

they also are very confined in their recommendations to what is 

written. And there is no thought about what it should be. It is 

what it is. 

And I think, you know, quality is a dynamic thing. And improving procurement is a dynamic thing. We can always do a job better. 

And successful corporations in America today do that. They continue to look for a way to do the job better, whether it is a small 

coffee shop or an aerospace company. 

So I want the people to know here that we have I think a good 

management team in place. And I think you are doing a very successful job. One last thing I would like to mention, because I am 

very concerned about this, in delaying this program we continually 

see new people come on not only in the private sector with the engineering staff, but also the public sector. General, you have had 

a great track record here and have done an excellent job, but even 

here on the Capitol on the Hill, we have new staffers that come in 

like in HASC, and they question the program. We have to reeducate them over and over again. 

You know, every year it seems like we have to face somebody on 

an authorization committee that needs to be up to speed on this 

program. And it is a complex program. And it takes a long time to 

get their security clearances, it takes them a long time to understand the program. In the meantime they say, well, we are not 

going to fund this because it is really not that important. And it 

is a very important program. So as this program gets delayed, I 

mean that is another reason for us to keep it moving, keep the momentum up, keep the success going. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Tiahrt. Mr. Bishop has an additional 

question. 

AEGIS BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. I thank the Chairman and 

the Committee for the indulgence. General Campbell, I understand 

that all of the Aegis ballistic missile defense-capable ships are currently assigned to the Pacific. And the Missile Defense Agency only 

plans to upgrade two Atlantic fleet ships to missile ballistic defense 

configuration. 

What is the rationale for that decision, and do you have any 

plans to upgrade additional Atlantic fleet ships? If not, why not? 

And for General Obering, if all of the BMD-capable ships are in the 

Pacific, what is the plan for using Aegis ballistic missile defense to 

defend our troops and allies in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. 

General CAMPBELL. Let me address this by saying no matter 

what asset we are talking about, there is a process within the Department where a combatant commander can come in and request 

a force, whether it is a tank battalion, an Aegis ship. We have a 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
256 

process such that we can shift an asset that is in the Pacific to the 

CENTCOM AOR. So we do that as a routine, sir. So these Aegis 

ships that are in the Pacific, and as General Obering mentioned, 

we have already moved one before into—— 

Mr. BISHOP. There is a time lag in that transition, though, isn’t 

there? 

General CAMPBELL. There is a time lag. It has to transit, obviously. But again, out of context it is hard to answer the question. 

But within the context of I have indications and warnings that I 

need that ship in an AOR, we will begin moving that ship as soon 

as possible to get it to that particular area. 

General OBERING. And sir, one of the things that we could move 

a ship into CENTCOM, and in fact, their area of responsibility, and 

in fact, we have, but I want to use your question, if I may, to make 

a major point. We have asked over the years to fund systems engineering integration. What that means, and I will give you an example, is we know now that if we put a THAAD radar, if the THAAD 

unit that we are going to put in Israel in on Juniper Cobra, if we 

tie that radar to the Aegis ship the way that we tied the radars 

into that Aegis ship to shoot down the satellite, we could actually 

have that ship stand off from the coast outside of Silkworm missile 

range and still protect all of Israel with its SM–3 interceptors. 

That is the power of this integration that we talk about between 

our land and sea-based components. That integration comes at a 

price in terms of our systems engineering and the ability to do 

that. So there is no reason why we can’t take those ships from the 

Pacific and use them in the CENTCOM AOR or the EUCOM AOR. 

And there is no technical limitation there. And we are trying to design the system to integrate it so we can get the most from each 

of these components by doing this integration. 

Mr. DICKS. I think you are concerned about the East Coast of the 

United States. Now, can you explain how the existing system that 

we have deployed can protect the east coast of the United States? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. The SM–3 missile, the PATRIOT missile has the ability to protect the east coast from short range attack. Not from long range attack, but from short range attack. So 

it has the ability to do that today. It is a matter of if we chose to 

deploy them and to do that. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Chairman, can I ask one follow-up question? 

Mr. DICKS. Yes. Mr. Rothman. 

NORTH KOREA AND IRAN

Mr. ROTHMAN. Generals, you have given an extremely impressive 

bit of testimony about our capability to deal with missiles from 

Iran and North Korea and projecting other threats in the future 

such that one would imagine that if the North Koreans and the 

Iranians were rational actors, big assumption, and knew of our capabilities they would be sufficiently deterred from bad conduct. 

And we must plan for then for irrationality, so that is off the table, 

because we will never know whoever has their finger on the button 

whether they are going to be rational or not. But are these actors, 

the Iranians and North Koreans aware of our capability—— 

Mr. DICKS. Oh, yeah. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
257 

Mr. ROTHMAN [continuing]. Such that they understand that there 

would be a very—not only a very limited chance of success of any 

offensive effort on their part, but of course, the devastating response that they would feel? 

General OBERING. I have thought a lot about that. And I will tell 

you my own personal view. You stated initially a very important 

assumption is that if they are rational in their decision-making. 

And one of the things we are counting on, frankly, is that they are 

rational to the extent that if we field effective missile defenses they 

will choose to no longer invest in ballistic missiles because they realize there is a defense against them. I think that has been the 

problem historically is we have not had a missile defense system 

or capability, and therefore countries like Iran and North Korea, 

Libya and others chose to invest in those missiles. We would like 

to be able to defer them or deter them from even investing in those 

missiles to start with in the future. 

But the one scenario I am really worried about is that you have 

a group within Iran or within North Korea, or you could almost 

pick another country that decides that they want to strike a blow 

for radical Islam or whatever, and they are willing to incur the potential retaliation that would come their way and then they launch. 

I mean, that is what—when that happens, you have to have the 

ability to shoot that down. You can’t talk to anybody, you can’t offensively take it out, you have got to have the ability to shoot that 

down. And if we can prevent that from just one American city we 

would pay for this program many times over. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. No questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you. 

STSS

Mr. DICKS. General Obering, please update the Committee as to 

the present cost schedule and technical performance of the STSS 

program. 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. We are launching two what we call 

demonstration satellites this year. It is based on what we call legacy hardware that was left over from the SBIRS low program, 

frankly, from many years ago. I think we are investing about $300 

million, as I remember from the request, the budget request. 

Mr. DICKS. The cost of this program has gone up. Isn’t that 

right? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. There has been some discussion of a Nunn-McCurdy 

breach. I guess maybe you are exempt from that. 

General OBERING. Yes. Well, the cost variance at the completion 

of that particular contract is about 20 percent, which would break 

a Nunn-McCurdy type of a tripwire. But the program that we are 

going to launch this year is not the program that we are going to 

build for that constellation. These are demonstration satellites that 

demonstrate the functionality. If it works, if we can show that we 

can do—and for the rest of this Committee, what this is is right 

now all we do from space is early warning. We get it, we say there 

is a rocket launch, a missile launch, it is headed toward New York 

or whatever. And that is it. We do not have—we do not have any 

precise knowledge of the track. What we want to be able to do is 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
258 

precisely track that missile from space the same way we precisely 

track missiles with a radar. 

And so that will allow us to engage them then. The satellite constellation that we have envisioned after a 90-day study that I had 

chartered says that we can provide—— 

and provide the same coverage that we were originally envisioning 

with the STSS program. And it would be the same functionality 

that we are demonstrating in the satellites this year. So while we 

have had cost, schedule, and performance technical delays with the 

program, it is on track to get in the air this year. And we are restructuring that to take advantage of frankly more modern technology and a more modern approach as to how we do this constellation. 

Mr. DICKS. STSS is basically SBIRS low as you suggested, right? 

General OBERING. That is what is going up this year. 

Mr. DICKS. Now SBIRS high, tell us about that. 

General OBERING. That is not my program. That is an Air Force 

program. 

Mr. DICKS. But I thought you know everything. 

General OBERING. Can I take you to my wife? 

Mr. DICKS. Right. 

General OBERING. SBIRS high is to replace the Defense a Support Program satellites. 

Mr. DICKS. DSP? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. What does SBIRS high provide over DSP? 

General OBERING. That gives us the early warning capability to 

a better degree, and it is much more capable in terms of sensitivity 

and that type of thing, but it still does not get us the precise tracking that we need with the Space Tracking and Surveillance System. 

Mr. DICKS. So we are going to have a follow on to STSS? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. 

KEI

Mr. DICKS. Okay. Now, I want—about the Congressional plus-up 

on the KEI program in ’08. Please tell us what you are doing to 

restore KEI to a full up weapons system and capitalize on the mobility aspects in the program, or are you? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir, we are. In fact, the major knowledge 

point that we had for airborne laser is it has got to go shoot down 

a boosting missile. The major knowledge point that we have for 

KEI is that it has to achieve a very, very high acceleration booster 

flight in 2009. And we had taken that program to a booster-flightonly program, frankly, because we had not gotten the funding support on the Hill in the previous years, and so we had to reduce it 

to that. 

With the plus-up that we got last year, the 115 million net plusup, we are taking about 15 million of that to protect our booster 

flight in 2009 because we ran into some problems on the second 

stage firing, .———. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
259 

But we also took about $40 million of that to reinvigorate the 

weapons system engineering and the mobility options aspect. What 

that means is this is like a PATRIOT or THAAD on steroids. 

So it is a much larger missile. It will still be in a canister. It is 

still mobile. So we are using a lot of that money to be able to do 

the weapons systems engineering. We are also looking at taking 

about $37 million out of it toward the—to accelerate the objective 

design, otherwise how we actually do the land-based version of this 

capability. And then about $20 million out of it goes to a kill vehicle development that Raytheon is under contract for. 

Mr. DICKS. How is Raytheon performing on that particular contract? 

General OBERING. Well, we had actually pulled them back very 

severely when we went to the booster only program. And they have 

not been performing per se on the KV, on the kill vehicle piece of 

that. Now they have responsibilities for the overall interceptor for 

this, and they are the prime contractor for the interceptor, reporting to Northrop, who is the prime contractor for the entire program. So far so good with respect to their performance. But again, 

the jury is still out on the kill vehicle portion. 

Mr. DICKS. We understand that you plan to spend 20 million on 

a kill vehicle for KEI. Is that what you are talking about? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Will that 20 million be under the current KEI contract? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. General, if the KEI program achieves a successful 

booster flight in 2009, will you accelerate the program? 

General OBERING. Yes, sir. I do not know if ‘‘accelerate’’ is the 

proper word, but we would certainly go for the full funding for initially a land-based mobile capability, because we believe that provides the most promise in the near term. And eventually we could 

even sea-base the capability if we so choose to. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Francis, anything else you would like to add 

again? Talk about these blocks again. What again are your concerns? You say they are going part way in the direction GAO 

wants. But if you could convince them to do everything you wanted, 

what would the final two or three things be? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Mr. Chairman, I think that the main thing would 

be to develop a total cost estimate for those blocks that I think are 

close enough along where you could reasonably do that estimate 

and have those estimates independently verified. I also think that, 

as I had mentioned before, for Missile Defense to clarify what unit 

costs it is going to track, what criteria they will use to report on 

those and how it will report. 

And I also think that to help the Missile Defense Executive 

Board out there needs to be some things done on technology development efforts in missile defense, which could comprise about half 

of the budget. Right now they are not amenable to a very strict 

baseline, but we think some things need to be done to help the executive board get a good gauge on not only technical progress, but 

matching technical progress with budget and cost as well. So some 

kind of a construct to facilitate oversight of technology capability. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. You want to comment on that, General? 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
260 

General OBERING. Yes, sir, if I may. First of all, the GAO’s report 

is draft. And we are still commenting on the report that they have 

submitted. And there is a couple of things that we are going to 

comment on. One is we do plan to provide total cost estimates for 

the blocks to include life cycle costs. And in fact, we engaged the 

CAIG, the Cost Analysis Group at OSD to be able to do that. And 

we want to be very careful on how we are reporting out on our unit 

costs primarily because of just like I said before, we want to make 

sure that we continue to do this as an integrated weapons system. 

And so we want to make sure that we do not have the situation 

where we are reporting out on the costs of the tires of an aircraft, 

for example, to put an analogy, as opposed to reporting on the entire aircraft. And so we are going to be careful as to how we report 

that out and what those variances are. But if you will allow me a 

little bit of leeway, I want to proceed carefully with the GAO’s recommendations, because if we are not careful, and Mr. Tiahrt kind 

of alluded to this, we will end up looking like every other program 

in the Department. 

And I do not think that is what we want to do. I think we have 

shown the ability to get things out the door faster. And I think we 

have shown an amount of cost accountancy that is reasonable for 

the Department, and flexibility that is necessary in the uncertain 

future. So I want to be careful as to what we incorporate and what 

we do not. 

Mr. DICKS. Well, and I can understand that. I think in looking 

back on programs that we have done well in the classified area, because a lot of times the flexibility and the ability just to go forward 

and do it, like the F–117 stands out in my mind, is a very important thing. 

Now, General Campbell, in your statement, you talked a little bit 

about the conditions up at, is it Fort Greely in Alaska? 

General CAMPBELL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Tell us about that. What are your troops faced with 

up there in operating that base in the remote areas of Alaska? 

General CAMPBELL. Mighty cold days and cold nights. But if we 

go back—— 

Mr. DICKS. What can we do to help them? 

General CAMPBELL. We have worked with our own Installation 

Management Command on the mission support side. And the one 

lesson I have walked away with as we look at that, when we go 

to Europe that you want to make sure that the mission support 

side of this business is at the same level as the missile defense capability. I think it is foolish not to invest in both. The soldiers, the 

men and women that operate this are just as vital to that system 

as the missile that is in the silo. 

So each time I go up there, we are continuing making progress. 

The missile defense system is in good shape. They are well trained. 

But on the mission support side, we still have a little ways to go 

in providing them with the things that I enjoy in Huntsville, Alabama. It shouldn’t be really any different in Fort Greely, Alaska, 

for that. 

Mr. DICKS. Could you be a little more specific about what the deficiencies are? 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
261 

General CAMPBELL. The type of deficiencies on the support side 

usually relate to soldier care and family care. For example, this 

post was a closed post, Fort Greely, in 1995. It was brought back 

to life so we could support the missile defense complex. So areas 

such as a community activities center for families that had been 

closed years ago, so we have to go in and get money to build a new 

one. 

Mr. DICKS. You have families living up there? 

General CAMPBELL. Absolutely. Yes, sir. On Fort Greely. As well 

as the Missile Defense Agency has folks living right there at Fort 

Greely. So this is a vibrant place. There is a lot of activity there. 

And we have to catch up on the mission support side for these 

folks. 

Mr. DICKS. I take it Vandenberg, that is pretty easy? 

General CAMPBELL. I am not—we have a very small element at 

Vandenberg, on the order of seven soldiers to manage the silos that 

are there. 

Mr. DICKS. Why is that? Why is it different between Fort Greely 

and Vandenberg? 

General OBERING. Colorado Springs is where we have the fire 

control element. That is the backup for Fort Greely. 

General CAMPBELL. Right. 

Mr. DICKS. But you have interceptors there, too, right? 

General CAMPBELL. No. Not at Colorado. 

General OBERING. Just at Vandenberg. We had interceptors at 

Vandenberg and fire control at Colorado Springs. It just so happens 

we have interceptors and fire control at Fort Greely. 

Mr. DICKS. I got it. I got the difference. So the next major test 

for you, General Campbell, will be in this European scenario, if 

that goes forward. And again, give us some ideas—I am on the 

military construction subcommittee as well. Give us some of the 

ideas of what you are going to need over there. 

General CAMPBELL. Yeah. We have taken a look at it. And right 

now, until the negotiation is complete, we envision that we could 

have as few as 33 U.S. soldiers at the interceptor site all the way 

up to 255. And those are estimates based on what we have seen 

at Fort Greely. We do not know yet how much the Poles will assist 

us with base security, for example, or how much they will put into 

support infrastructure on the base for the living quarters and those 

other support activities diction. 

Mr. DICKS. Is there an existing facility there? 

General CAMPBELL. There are buildings there from the Polish 

force on that site. I personally have not been over there yet. I do 

not think we have been on the site at all yet, even the Missile Defense Agency, so we have not had a site survey done to determine 

if we can refurbish those. But again, I will go back to lessons 

learned at Fort Greely, if we find that those are substandard, to 

me it is worth the investment to put in the right barracks, the 

right dining facilities and support facilities for those troops that we 

put there. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. Now, looking out into the future, where would 

you have—where would be the potential place for future bases? I 

mean, you have got Fort Greely, you have got Vandenberg, you 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
262 

have got maybe the European site. What would be out in the future 

in the kind of robust system that you are talking about? 

General OBERING. Sir, I believe that once we get the layer of the 

44 interceptors in the United States in Alaska and California and 

the 10 in Europe, I think that is all we need to do respect to silobased defenses. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. 

General OBERING. I think what we need to invest in, and you will 

see that ramped up more and more in the budget, is in mobile flexible defenses. So KEI, for example, and the ability to move that 

around as you need to, the ship-based SM–3s, and the SM–3 Block 

IBs and IIAs and IIB, frankly, which is that Multiple Kill Vehicle 

variant. Having the flexibility to move these defenses around as 

you need them I think is the way to go. And the Secretary of Defense has asked me that before in the past. 

And I do believe we have enough with the silo-based shield to 

provide that protection, that initial shield in terms of an urgency 

with respect to North Korea and Iran. And then where we may face 

in the future we don’t know. It could be coming from any azimuth. 

And to be able to have that flexibility would be very useful. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Bishop, do you have anything further? All right. 

The Committee will stand adjourned. Thank you very much. The 

Committee is adjourned until Wednesday, the 27th, at 10 a.m., for 

a hearing on shipbuilding. 

General OBERING. Thank you, sir. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow.] 

NRO SATELLITE MISSION

Question. On February 20th, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) shot down a nonfunctioning National Reconnaissance Office satellite. MDA used a network of sensors to track the satellite, and then a modified Standard Missile–3 from the AEGIS 

cruiser, USS Lake Erie. Most of the debris from impact was expected to burn up 

on reentry within 24 to 48 hours and the remaining debris is expected to re-enter 

within 40 days. 

Did this test prove the effectiveness of a U.S. anti-satellite capability? 

Answer. No. The satellite engagement was not a test of an anti-satellite capability. The President decided to destroy the satellite to prevent terrestrial damage 

or loss of life. His advisors presented him with a range of options, including one involving the missile defense system. Existing missile defense capabilities were subjected to an extensive, one-time modification, and were employed in a manner for 

which they were not developed to accomplish the mission. System modifications to 

the Aegis ship used for the test were reversed, and the unused interceptors were 

returned to their BMD configuration. MDA does not maintain, nor is it developing, 

an anti-satellite capability. 

Question. In a briefing to the press, Gen. James E. Cartwright, the vice chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that important elements of the sensors for the nation’s missile defense system had been used. Could you describe the sensors that 

were used to conduct this test? 

Answer. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Sensors program was responsible for 

the BMDS sensor activities conducted during all phases of the NRO Satellite intercept mission, including pre-mission planning and analysis, real-time mission execution, and post-flight hit and kill assessment. MDA sensors directly supported 

STRATCOM during all phases of the mission. Multiple BMDS ground-based and 

mobile assets participated, including 3 AN/TPY–2 X–Band radars, the Sea-Based X– 

Band (SBX) radar, and the Ground-Based Radar-Prototype (GBR–P) X–Band radar. 

The AN/TPY–2 radars provide homeland and regional defense and can be integrated into the THAAD Weapon System. During this satellite intercept, one radar 

participated from Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), CA. A second AN/TPY–2 

radar was located at the Pacific Missile Range Facility where it is currently supVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:47 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046474 PO 00000 Frm 00262 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A474P2.XXX A474P2

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
263 

porting THAAD flight testing. The third radar was located at White Sands Missile 

Range (WSMR) for Limited Environment Testing and New Equipment Training 

prior to fielding THAAD Fire Unit #1. 

The SBX radar is mounted on a mobile, ocean-going platform that was located in 

the vicinity of Hawaii for this mission. The radar provides a unique capability to 

detect, track, and discriminate complex and challenging threats. The radar is currently undergoing BMDS-level testing to demonstrate operational capability. 

The GBR–P was originally developed as part of the three year National Missile 

Defense development phase to support flight testing and system integration. It is 

located at the Reagan Test Site (RTS) in the Kwajalein Atoll. 

The External Sensors Laboratory (ESL) located at the Missile Defense Integration 

and Operations Center was established to take advantage of sensor systems that 

other agencies operate and apply those sensor data to the BMDS mission. During 

this mission, ESL tasked several electro optical sensors to observe the intercept 

point. Based on these observations, ESL was able to confirm the hit within seconds 

of the actual event. Further, the ESL provided some of the first confirming analysis 

that the hydrazine tank had been breached. 

Question. Has the conduct of the satellite shoot down, harmed, in any way foreign 

cooperation with the Missile Defense Agency? 

Answer. There have been no negative impacts on MDA’s foreign cooperation efforts as a result of this satellite shoot down. The Director of MDA briefed information on the satellite shoot down during a 5 March 2008 NATO North Atlantic Council (Reinforced) meeting (Allies reinforced from capitals) and the feedback from the 

Allies was positive. 

Question. Did the Missile Defense Agency have other options for intercepting the 

satellite, and were those options considered? 

Answer. The Missile Defense Agency and the Combatant Commands examined options to include the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) long-range interceptor 

element and also the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) element. It 

was determined that the inherent flexibility of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 

element to place a Standard Missile–3 equipped ship in an optimal position in the 

Pacific Ocean was the best way to effectively engage the de-orbiting satellite. 

Question. What was the relative size of the intended target (tank) on the satellite 

as compared to the ‘‘sweet spot’’ on a ballistic missile warhead? 

Answer. The physical sizes of the satellite’s hydrazine tank and a ballistic missile 

warhead are roughly comparable. The relative size of the sweet spot on a warhead 

is roughly similar to the relative size of the hydrazine tank as part of the larger 

satellite. 

Question. In the event of an incoming missile, about how much time would the 

Aegis program have to be alerted and prepare to fire? About how much time did 

the Aegis program have to prepare to fire on the satellite? 

Answer. The amount of time available for Aegis alertment and firing preps is dependent upon a variety of factors, especially the availability and quality of off-board 

sensor inputs. Available time could range from seconds to hours or days or longer. 

In the case of the satellite, the Aegis units involved had on the order of several 

weeks advance notification of the need to engage, and tens of seconds to actually 

initiate the successful engagement. 

Question. How does the launch window for the satellite differ from the launch 

window for a ballistic missile? 

Answer. The actual launch window to shoot the SM–3 to intercept the satellite 

was not significantly smaller than what would be expected for intercepts of ballistic 

missiles, especially when deployed forward for ascent phase intercepts. 

On the other hand, while the NRO satellite mission was planned in advance, 

there would likely be limited warning and preparation time in the case of a hostile 

ballistic missile launch. 

Question. The Aegis element required modifications before it could fire on the satellite and successfully intercept its target. How long did it take and what was the 

cost of making these modifications? 

Answer. Aegis BMD was assigned the Satellite mission on 4 January 2008 and 

less than seven weeks later the satellite was successfully intercepted. The total cost 

was $112.3M of which $93.4M was for the Aegis BMD Program. 

Question. Please describe the total cost of conducting the mission to shoot down 

this satellite including missiles, modifications to the Aegis and other systems, and 

any other costs directly related to this mission. 

Answer. The total cost of the mission has been assessed at $112.361M and includes expenditures by the U.S. Pacific Fleet, the Aegis BMD Program Office, and 

other MDA radar and test assets. Detailed expenditure information is below. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
264 

Item Description FY08 Cost 

Missile Hardware ............................. Replacement of 1 Production Round ........................................................ $14.100 

Missile Modifications ....................... Modifications; Certification & Simulation; Shipping and Software Analysis.10.675 

Aegis Weapon System ...................... Software Testing; Installation & Checkout; Analysis; Combat System 

Engineering Development Site (CSEDS) Usage.

6.055 

Data Analysis ................................... MDIOC and Aegis BMD ............................................................................. 2.102 

Ship .................................................. Mission Support and Training .................................................................. 1.364 

Pacific Fleet Costs ........................... Fuel, Tanker Availability and Personnel ................................................... 11.300 

Aegis BMD Developmental Program Buy back estimated 2 month schedule delay to Blk IB development 

and increased risk to test program.

59.145 

Sensor/Radar Utilization .................. SBX, TPY–2’s and GBR–P ........................................................................ 2.920 

Airborne Sensor Utilization .............. HALO–I Mission Costs ............................................................................... 2.537 

Other Costs ...................................... Test Range, Situational Awareness and Communications Nodes ........... 2.163 

Engineering ...................................... Lethality Analysis ...................................................................................... ....................

................................................................................................................ 112.361 

U.S. TAXPAYERS PAYING FOR THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE

Question. Based on the Administration’s current plan, it seems that the U.S. taxpayers will be picking up the costs of defending Europe from ballistic missile 

threats. 

Have you discussed this issue with the Europeans? 

Answer. Yes. The Allies are aware of the large financial commitment that the 

U.S. is making to the European deployment, which will also provide additional protection to the U.S. while protecting the European population and also providing protection for our deployed forces in the European theater. 

Question. If so, what type of contribution are they likely to make? 

Answer. The United Kingdom and Denmark (host of the UEWR radars in 

Fylingdales and Thule, Greenland, respectively) as well as Poland (host of the GBI 

site) and the Czech Republic (host of the European Midcourse X-Band Radar) will 

provide a substantial contribution to the U.S. BMDS and the Alliance by hosting 

these missile defense assets on their territory. 

Additionally, NATO Allies already have or are pursuing short- and medium-range 

theater missile defense capabilities that will be integrated into the Active Layered 

Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) Program to protect deployed forces, including acquiring/upgrading PATRIOT PAC 2/3 systems and co-developing the Medium Extended Air Defense System. This will provide a significant contribution to 

U.S and European security. 

Question. How many missiles is Poland planning on procuring? 

Answer. The Ground Based Interceptors deployed in Europe will be procured by 

the U.S. These missiles will provide protection to the European population and additional protection to the U.S. homeland and our deployed forces in the European theater. 

Question. What has NATO agreed to do with regard to missile defense in Europe? 

Answer. NATO Missile Defense Systems. 

NATO agreed to develop the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense 

(ALTBMD) Program that will have a command and control capability to link Allies’ 

short range missile defense assets for protection of deployed forces. In 2011, the 

ALTBMD Program plans to deliver what it calls a ‘‘lower layer’’ capability (i.e., Patriot like system). Future capabilities will include ‘‘upper layer’’ systems like 

THAAD and SM–3. The Final Operational Capability for the ALTBMD systems is 

scheduled for 2017. 

NATO MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES

Secondly, at NATO’s Prague Summit in 2002, NATO Heads of State and Government (HOSG) agreed to conduct a study (the Missile Defense Feasibility Study 

(MDFS)) to examine the feasibility of a system to protect European territory and 

populations from long-range threats. The MDFS was completed in 2006 and concluded that such a system is technically feasible. 

When the HOSG reviewed the MDFS at the Riga Summit in November 2006, it 

was decided that further work was needed to address remaining questions in the 

policy, military, and technical areas of the MDFS. These ‘‘Riga taskings’’ along with 

NATO Defense Ministers’ June 2007 tasking to assess the implications of the US 

European Capability form the basis of a report that will inform the discussion at 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
265 

the Bucharest Summit planned for April 2008. This report on the Riga and Defense 

Ministers’ taskings concludes that the US European Capability will provide substantial coverage for most of NATO territory. 

The NATO Secretary General, Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, attested to the level 

of NATO agreement in his 19 April 2007 remarks: 

‘‘There is absolutely a shared threat perception between the Allies. Allies all agree 

that there is a threat from ballistic missiles.’’ 

‘‘The Allies are united on the issue, on the threat, and on the way ahead.’’ 

EUROPEAN SITE AND NATO ALLIES

Question. Several NATO allies have expressed concern about the Administration’s 

decision to deploy missile defense on a bilateral basis (i.e., with Poland and the 

Czech Republic) rather than through a NATO process. 

Why did the Administration decide to move forward on a bilateral instead of a 

multilateral process with NATO? 

Answer. Forces operating under NATO auspices are not typically NATO assets 

but force/capability contributions made by NATO members. This is the common 

model that the U.S. has chosen to follow for the European Deployment. We held significant discussions with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners on a way 

forward to strengthen Trans-Atlantic unity and improve protection for all NATO 

countries against longer-range missile threats. 

Question. What impact will this decision have on NATO? 

Answer. The European deployment will provide protection to most of Europe from 

the long-range ballistic missile threat posed by Iran. Further, the planned interoperability of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System and the European Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) will greatly enhance the effectiveness of both systems, reaffirms the indivisibility of U.S. and European security interests, strengthens deterrence and promotes regional stability by giving U.S. and 

European leaders more options, limits the ability of hostile governments to coerce 

European allies thereby indirectly holding the United States hostage, and devalues 

the utility of ballistic missiles. 

Question. Could this potentially become a divisive issue within the Alliance? 

Answer. The U.S. is working hard to ensure a common understanding among 

NATO allies of the proposed European deployment. On September 3, 2007, NATO 

Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated publicly that there is ‘‘absolutely 

a shared threat perception between the Allies.’’ At the Bucharest Summit, NATO 

allies are fully expected to reach agreement on a way forward for cooperation between the European Deployment and NATO Missile Defense efforts. 

Question. Could you provide us an update on our consultations with NATO to 

date? 

Answer. Public Diplomacy/Pol-Mil: 

The U.S. has been actively engaged with its NATO partners on this issue in a 

number of fora, both political and technical. We have participated in and briefed on 

the proposed deployment in every North Atlantic Council and NATO Russia Council 

Meeting since February 2007. We have also played an active role within the Executive Working Group as NATO moved forward to develop a position on the proposed 

deployment. 

Technical: 

Under the auspices of the Conference of National Armaments Directors, we have 

played a leading role on the Missile Defense Project Group to ensure that accurate 

and comprehensive reports have been developed for NATO’s decision makers: 

In June 2007, the NATO Defense Ministers tasked the Council of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) via the North Atlantic Council and NATO’s Executive 

Working Group to study the implications of the U.S. proposed European Site. 

In October 2007, the CNAD agreed to a report, the Defended Asset Analysis Report, which indicated that the proposed U.S. European Site provides substantial coverage to the Alliance against ballistic missile attacks. 

In March 2008, the NATO Missile Defense Project Group (tasked by the CNAD 

to lead the June 2007 tasking), issued agreement on the Executive Summary of the 

Report on the Riga and June 2007 Defence Ministerial Taskings on MD and a corresponding Annex with limitations and assumptions of the report and noted the 215 

page report main body. This Executive Summary supports that the European Capability will provide substantial coverage to most of NATO territory. 

Question. Is there currently a formal NATO endorsement or approval of the proposed deployment? 

Answer. The NATO Heads of State will meet in early April in Bucharest. They 

are expected to issue a report that is supportive of the European deployment. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
266 

In June 2007, the NATO Defense Ministers tasked the Council of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) via the North Atlantic Council and NATO’s Executive 

Working Group to study the implications of the U.S. proposed European Site. 

In October 2007, the CNAD agreed to a report, the Defended Asset Analysis Report, which indicated that the proposed U.S. European Site provides substantial coverage to the Alliance against ballistic missile attacks. 

In March 2008, the NATO Missile Defense Project Group (tasked by the CNAD 

to lead the June 2007 tasking), issued agreement on the Executive Summary of the 

Report on the Riga and June 2007 Defence Ministerial Taskings on MD and a corresponding Annex with limitations and assumptions of the report and noted the 215 

page report main body. This Executive Summary supports that the European Capability will provide substantial coverage to most of NATO territory. 

Question. What formal requirements does NATO have for missile defense in Europe? 

Answer. NATO currently has a requirement to protect deployed forces against ballistic missiles with a range of less than 3000 kilometers. 

While NATO currently has this single requirement for protection of deployed 

forces, it is also currently studying architecture options and requirements for the 

defense of territory and population. 

EUROPEAN SITE AND POLISH AND CZECH RELATIONS

Question. Until recently, there had been strong public support in Poland and the 

Czech Republic for deploying U.S. missile defense capabilities in their respective territories. However, over the past several months, public support for the potential deployment has decreased. 

What have been the key reasons contributing to the change in public opinion in 

Poland or the Czech Republic? 

Answer. The U.S. is sensitive to the concerns of the citizens of Poland and the 

Czech Republic and has assisted the host governments, when requested, with information to inform their citizens and provide a better understanding of our plans to 

base U.S. missile defenses in their countries. We are complementing these efforts 

by engaging the wider European community on our missile defense plans to communicate how our efforts contribute to overall regional security. 

Despite criticisms of the proposed deployment by some, the host nation governments continue to support U.S. missile defense basing plans. We are moving forward with plans to complete negotiations in the next few months. These negotiated 

agreements ultimately must be approved by the Polish and Czech Parliaments. 

Question. Have the different political parties in Poland or the Czech Republic 

have an influence over the negotiations? 

Answer. We have enjoyed a productive working relationship with our Czech and 

Polish counterparts regardless of their party. 

Question. What impact will this have on our decision to move forward? 

Answer. It has not impacted our decision to move forward. We have made good 

progress in negotiations with both the Czechs and the Poles. 

Question. What impact do the local entities have over the negotiations (i.e. mayors 

and local politicos) 

Answer. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in both Poland and the Czech Republic 

are responsible for negotiation of these agreements. We are unaware of any direct 

influence from any local entities in either country. 

USE OF THAAD AND AEGIS TO DEFEND EUROPE

Question. One of the Administration’s key rationales for deploying a GMD site in 

Europe is to protect our forward deployed radars in Europe. That said, if Iran decided to attack our European radars they would use medium and intermediaterange missiles, the type of missiles that THAAD and the SM–3 are designed to 

counter. 

Why can’t we use THAAD and the SM–3 missile to protect Europe, especially the 

radars, from medium and intermediate range missile threats? Isn’t that what these 

systems are designed for? 

Answer. Yes, we could use THAAD and Aegis BMD with SM–3 interceptors to 

protect locations in Europe, especially the radar sites, from medium (MRBM) and 

intermediate (IRBM) range missile threats. However, the number of ship stations, 

total number of ships and/or total number of THAAD Fire Units to protect Europe 

on a 24/7/365 force alert posture would be cost prohibitive and could be susceptible 

to increasingly complex threats. Aegis BMD and THAAD are ideally suited as a 

complementary capability option to the European Interceptor Site (EIS) to provide 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
267 

layered defense of key areas, defend the parts of Europe that EIS cannot or provide 

some protection while the EIS is being built. Each is designed for this capability. 

For complete coverage of Europe and redundant coverage of the U.S., the best 

BMDS solution is a mix of THAAD, Aegis BMD and EIS working together with land 

and space based sensors. 

Question. Couldn’t the SM–3 Block IIA missile, which we are currently co-developing with Japan, protect most European population centers from medium and intermediate range missile threats? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. What are the implications for the Navy’s or the Army’s force structure 

requirements if an SM–3 or THAAD alternative were to be pursued? 

Answer. ———. 

TWO-STAGE GROUND-BASED INTERCEPTOR FOR THE EUROPEAN SITE

Question. When MDA submitted its fiscal year 2008 budget, it requested funds to 

continue the acquisition of GBIs for the European site, but this time it stated those 

interceptors would have a two-stage booster. The fiscal year 2009 budget submission 

continues this effort. 

Has MDA conducted a study of the feasibility of using a 2-stage booster at a European site? If so, what were the results of the study? Has MDA conducted a test of 

a two-stage booster? 

Answer. Yes, the MDA has conducted studies of the feasibility of using a 2-stage 

booster at a European site. The results of this study show using a 2-stage vice 3- 

stage booster is required to better defend Europe against Iranian threats. 

The 2-stage booster is being developed primarily to meet the needs of the defense 

of Europe, but also expands protection of the U.S. homeland with its capability to 

intercept long range ballistic missiles targeting the U.S. Its shorter minimum engagement time is better suited to engage threat ranges in the European Theater. 

The European Interceptor Site (EIS), combined with mid-course and forward-based 

radars, provides considerable redundant coverage of the U.S. and, depending on the 

threat, defends Western and Central Europe and most of Eastern Europe. 

The 2-stage booster is a configuration of the currently deployed and flight-tested 

3-stage booster at Fort Greely and Vandenberg Air Force Base. The booster contractor will complete design modifications to eliminate the third stage rocket motor 

and repackage the booster electronics that were located on the third stage. Additionally, navigation and guidance software changes will enable the interceptor to perform mission profiles for two stages of flight versus three. The common components 

between the 2-stage and 3-stage booster have undergone significant ground, flight, 

and qualification testing as part of the 3-stage development effort. Because the 2- 

stage interceptor planned for Europe has fewer components than its 3-stage predecessor, the 2-stage variant is a less complex version of the successfully tested and 

fielded 3-stage interceptor. 

The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) 2-stage development activity has 

started and a Program Critical Design Review is scheduled to occur in December 

of 2008. Two flight tests will be conducted, both from Vandenberg Air Force Base 

in California, prior to the deployment of the interceptors at the European site. The 

two flight tests include a booster verification flight with an Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) mass simulator and an integrated flight test with an EKV and a threatrepresentative target vehicle. These tests are scheduled to be completed in 2009 and 

2010 respectively. The GMD Fire Control (GFC) and Command and Launch Equipment (CLE) software adapted for the 2-stage interceptor will also be included in the 

2-stage intercept flight test. 

MDA has successful prior experience in modifying 3-stage boosters to fly 2-stage 

missions. The Payload Launch Vehicles (PLVs) flown in the GMD program’s first 

ten Integrated Flight Tests (January 1997 through December 2002) were 2-stage 

variants of the standard 3-stage Minuteman boosters. The 2-stage interceptor reliability will be demonstrated through rigorous component qualification, integration 

testing, ground testing and flight testing. 

Question. What is the cost of retrofitting the booster from a three-stage to a twostage configuration? 

Answer. The estimated cost for retrofitting an on-hand booster stack from a 3- 

stage to a 2-stage configuration is $4.5M. The estimated cost for retrofitting an emplaced 3-stage Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) to a 2-stage configuration is $8.83M. 

To date, MDA has not retrofitted a booster from a 3-Stage GBI to a 2-Stage GBI, 

therefore the estimates provided here are based on a combination of actual costs for 

tasks already performed as part of the ongoing 3-Stage interceptor program, engineering estimates and estimates derived from similar activities already performed. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
268 

Additionally, the cost of retrofitting shown below assumes a level of manufacturing 

similar to the current program. If the manufacturing rate drops, retrofit costs could 

be substantially higher. The $4.5M estimate assumes the starting point is a completed 3-Stage booster 

stack on hand at the Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) Missile Assembly Building 

(MAB) at Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), CA. Three additional 2-Stage-related 

hardware items are necessary for the retrofit: • Booster Avionics Module (BAM) adapter ring ($200k) • Wire harness installation modification ($350k) • 2-Stage shroud (with relocated cutouts for the Attitude Control System (ACS) thrusters ($750k) 

The total estimated cost for additional 2-Stage specific hardware is $1.3M. 

Required work at the OSC MAB to convert from a 3-Stage to a 2-Stage booster 

stack includes: 

• Disassembly of the booster stack to remove the third stage ($500k) 

• Reintegration/retesting of the 2-Stage booster stack to include the BAM 

adapter ring and the wire harness installation modification ($2.7M) 

The total cost of the booster stack disassembly and reintegration work at the OSC 

MAB is $3.2M. 

The $8.83M estimate assumes the starting point is an emplaced 3-Stage Limited 

Defensive Capability (LDC) GBI, additional activities are required to complete the 

de-emplacement, retrofit, and re-integration, and re-emplacement of a 2-Stage interceptor. For example, assuming an emplaced Fort Greely, AK (FGA) LDC GBI is the 

starting point, a complete retrofit would incur the following additional costs: 

• Interceptor removal from silo and transportation to the FGA MAB ($150k) 

• De-mate of the 3-Stage booster stack from the Payload Avionics Module 

(PAM) ($100k) 

• Transport 3-Stage booster stack from FGA MAB to OSC MAB ($183k) 

• Upon completion of retrofitting [$4.5M described above], return transportation for the reconfigured 2-Stage booster stack from OSC MAB to FGA MAB 

($183k) [Transportation costs to other re-emplacement sites will vary depending 

on location, with European Interceptor Site (EIS) costs being the greatest; however, EIS transportation costs have not been determined.] 

• Reintegrate booster stack and PAM at FGA MAB ($3.3M) 

• Transportation from the FGA MAB to silo, emplacement, and return to operations ($550k) 

These additional costs total $4.33M. 

NEW BLOCK STRUCTURE

Question. MDA established a new block acquisition approach in response to Congressional concerns about transparency and accountability. Whereas previously 

MDA developed capabilities in two-year increments, it now plans to develop and 

field capabilities based on specific threat sets. Five blocks are currently defined: 

• Block 1—Defend the U.S. from limited North Korean long-range threats; 

• Block 2—Defend Allied/Deployed Forces from short-to-medium-range threats; 

• Block 3—Defend the U.S. from limited Iranian long-range threats; 

• Block 4—Defend Allied/Deployed Forces in Europe from limited Iranian longrange threats; and 

• Block 5—Expand defense of Allied/Deployed Forces from short-to-intermediate-range threats in two theaters. 

In its recent draft report, GAO noted that the new block structure does not address whether the assets included in a block will be transferred at the block’s completion to a military service for production and operation. Officials across DOD recognize that transfer criteria are neither complete nor clear given the BMDS’s complexity. Without clear transfer criteria, MDA has transferred the management of 

only one element—the Patriot Advanced Capability–3—to the military service for 

production and operation. MDA and the military services have been negotiating the 

transition of responsibilities for the sustainment of fielded elements—a task that 

has proven arduous and time consuming. 

How have the block priorities been determined? 

Answer. MDA has three strategic objectives that drive our block construct and 

budget priorities. The five blocks and non-block (Capability Development) funding 

category are associated with the strategic objectives as follows: 

1. Maintain and sustain an initial capability to defend the U.S., allies and our 

deployed forces against rogue nation attacks: 

a. Homeland defense against long-range missiles from North Korea (Block 

1.0—Defense of the U.S. from Limited North Korean Long-Range Threats) 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
269 

b. Develop initial defense for deployed forces and allies in regional conflicts 

(Block 2.0—Defense of Allies and Deployed Forces from Short-to-Medium Range 

Threats in One Region/Theater) 

2. Close gaps and improve this capability against rogue states: 

a. Expand homeland defense against Iran (Blocks 3.0—Expand Defense of the 

U.S. to Include Limited Iranian Long-Range Threats and 4.0—Defense of Allies 

and Deployed Forces in Europe from Limited Long-Range Threats/Expand Protection of the U.S. Homeland) 

b. Defeat larger and more complicated attacks (e.g., decoys, multiple warheads) (Block 3.0 and Capability Development) 

c. Extend deterrence, enhance defenses for deployed forces and allies, and increase international cooperation (Blocks 4.0 and 5.0—Expand Defense of Allies 

and Deployed Forces from Short-to-Intermediate Range Threats in Two Regions/ 

Theaters) 

d. Extend U.S. decision time and complicate enemy planning (Block 4.0 and 

Capability Development) 

3. Develop options to dissuade and stay ahead of current and emerging threats: 

a. Leverage technological advantage to increase defense effectiveness (Capability Development) 

b. Build a foundation for global access and response (Capability Development) 

Question. How is this new block structure reflected in the budget request? 

Answer. MDA’s budget is organized for FY 09 and through the period of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) based on the existing program element (PE) 

structure subdivided according to the new block structure. For example, the BMD 

Midcourse Defense Segment PE has budget projects for Ground Based Midcourse 

Defense (GMD) Blocks 1.0 (Defense of the U.S. from Limited North Korean LongRange Threats), 3.0 (Expand Defense of the U.S. to Include Limited Iranian LongRange Threats), and 4.0 (Defense of Allies and Deployed Forces in Europe from Limited Long-Range Threats/Expand Protection of the U.S. Homeland). 

Also, BMDS program funding that does not fit into existing blocks (1.0 through 

5.0) is assigned to four general categories: • Capability Development—technology programs that are maturing and being 

considered for future blocks (Block 6.0, etc.); for example, the defense of the 

United States against complex countermeasures might draw on multiple kill capabilities from the multiple kill vehicle (MKV) program • Sustainment—operations and support of weapon systems, sensors, and command and control, battle management and communications (C2BMC) components • Mission Area Investment—activities that support multiple blocks and capability development activities and cannot be reasonably assigned to a specific 

block or capability development program (e.g. intelligence and security; modeling and simulation; systems engineering and testing cores; safety, quality, and 

mission assurance) 

• MDA Operations—activities that support the Agency, such as Management 

Headquarters and Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 

Question. How does the new structure meet the stated goal of addressing Congressional concerns? 

Answer. MDA’s new block structure was designed to address Congressional concerns about accountability and transparency and to better communicate to the Congress, Military Departments, GAO, and other stakeholders our plans and baselines 

and the continuing improvements in BMDS capabilities that are expected to be delivered to the war fighter. 

Congressional concerns such as the movement of program content from one block 

to another and our development program being schedule-driven rather than ventdriven are addressed by the new block structure, which has several key tenets: 

• Blocks will be increments of BMDS capabilities—rather than biennial time 

periods—being fielded against particular threats. They will represent a discrete 

program of work. 

• When MDA believes a firm commitment can be made to the Congress, 

blocks will have schedule, budget, and performance baselines. Schedule delays, 

budget increases, and performance shortfalls will be explained as variances. 

• Once baselined, work cannot be moved from one block to another. 

Question. Given that at the end of each block, MDA plans to have fully-mission 

capable components, when does the agency plan to transition and transfer such components to the military service? 

Answer. In accordance with 10 U.S.C. 224, Ballistic Missile Defense Programs, 

minimum criteria for the transfer of responsibility for elements of BMDS from the 

MDA Director to the Secretary of a military department is established by the SecVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:47 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046474 PO 00000 Frm 00269 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A474P2.XXX A474P2

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
270 

retary of Defense. At the very least, the criteria established for such a transfer shall 

address the technical maturity of the program, the availability of facilities for production, and the commitment of the Secretary of the military department concerned 

ensuring procurement funding for that program, as shown by funding through the 

FYDP and other defense planning documents. 

Current status of planned transition and transfer for BMDS components to identified Lead Military Departments is detailed on the attached slide, ‘‘Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense Scorecard.’’ Several dates are currently undefined, as element 

progress is event-based vice time-based. As the BMDS meets MDA Director approved Knowledge Points, it will progress through and be potentially available for 

Early Capability Delivery, Partial Capability Delivery, and Full Capability Delivery. 

After Commander, United States Strategic Command has completed a Military Utility Assessment; USSTRATCOM will declare Partial Mission Capability and Full 

Mission Capability. Actual transfer dates will be agreed upon after close coordination between MDA and the designated Lead Military Department. 

MISSILE DEFENSE FORCE STRUCTURE

Question. What efforts has the Department undertaken to assess missile defense 

force structure requirements? 

Answer. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has initiated a number of analyses, 

embodied in the ‘‘MDA Summer Study’’ effort and elsewhere, to determine what 

baseline force would be required to counter long range ballistic missile (LRBM) 

threats. These studies have been updatd periodically to accommodate changes in the 

potential threat, technology advances, and changes in National guidance. 

Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization, previously named Joint 

Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization, led a Joint Capabilities Mix (JCM) 

Study in 2006 to assess BMD force structure and missile inventory needs in Major 

Combat Operations. This study evolved into the Joint Capabilities Mix Study series, 

an iterative opportunity for the joint communities of interest to explore weapon and 

force structure options for the global BMDS. This effort includes the Services, Joint 

Staff, combatant commands, MDA, Defense Intelligence Agency, OSD Program 

Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), Space and Missile Defense Command, and Program Offices. 

In addition to the Joint Capabilities Mix Studies, MDA, in conjunction with the 

Services, developed the Ballistic Missile Defense System Transition and Transfer 

Plan that specifies the roles and responsibilities of various Defense organizations in 

the development of BMDS force structure requirements, including Memoranda of 

Agreement (MOA) with the Military Departments and Services providing for force 

structure development. This plan includes Annexes for each element of the BMDS 

that specify roles and responsibilities, programmatic linkages, transition and transfer objectives and milestones, and contract status. 

Missile defense force structure is also explored within the Department’s Analytical 

Agenda effort using various Defense Planning Scenarios and Multi-Service Force 

Deployment studies. 

The Department also established the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) to 

‘‘oversee implementation of strategic policies and plans, program priorities, and investment options’’ for the BMDS. 

Question. What are the military’s force structure requirements for current and future missile defense capabilities? 

Answer. Current force structure requirements for missile defense capabilities are 

found in applicable Service source documents, i.e., Navy Activity Manning Documents, Army Table of Organization & Equipment, and the Air Force Definition of 

Operational Capability. Current Service capabilities that map to the applicable 

source documents are Patriot PAC–3, AEGIS Standard Missile 3, Ground Based Interceptor (GBI), Upgraded Early Warning Radars, and the Cobra Dane Radar. Ongoing processes that will help define the requirements for future missile defense capabilities such as the European Component, X-Band AN/TPY–2 Radar, Terminal 

High Altitude Area Defense system, and Airborne Laser are: (1) The Warfighter Involvement Process which provides the important interface between the materiel developer and warfighter identities of missile defense solutions that facilitate effective 

development and employment of missile defense capabilities; (2) The Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) which oversees implementation of strategic policies 

and plans, program priorities, and investment options concerning missile defense capabilities necessary to protect our Nation and our allies from missile attack and 

makes recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense; (3) The Joint Capability Mix (JCM) studies led by the Joint Staff J–8 Joint Integrated Air and Missile 

Defense Organization (JIAMDO) which help inform missile defense force structure 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
271 

requirements for various scenarios and environments; (4) the Commander, United 

States Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) Military Utility Assessment used 

to evaluate the operational effectiveness, interoperability and operational suitability 

of the current fielded system and, (5) the Warfighter Prioritized Capabilities List, 

developed by USSTRATCOM (based on combatant commander input) articulates 

warfighter capability desires and is used to help the materiel developer, the Missile 

Defense Agency, understand the warfighter’s needs. The Missile Defense Agency in 

turn develops the Achievable Capability List which identifies what capability can 

be provided. This exchange informs the materiel decisions that will ultimately impact force structure that is delivered. 

BOOST PHASE DEFENSE

Question. The Department has indicated that it will make a down-select in 2009 

as to whether to proceed with the Airborne Laser (ABL) or the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) as the prime boost phase defense system. 

What specific criteria (e.g., affordability, operational effectiveness, etc.) will the 

Department use to make the down-select decision between ABL and KEI? 

Answer. MDA will consider criteria that will include affordability, operational effectiveness, technology maturity, producability, ground and flight test data, technical performance during build-up activities, and other factors. Data and knowledge 

gathered during the build-up and execution of ABL’s ‘‘shoot-down demonstration’’ 

and the build-up and execution of KEI’s ‘‘high acceleration booster demonstration’’ 

will be used to support any decision. 

Directly comparing the two programs for a down select decision is difficult because each program is designed to satisfy a Boost Phase Defense capability with a 

dramatically different approach. A review will require a very broad Ballistic Missile 

Defense System (BMDS) view that encompasses not only these two programs, but 

also the scope of work and maturity of other related technology and development 

programs within MDA. Other factors external to these programs may influence a 

decision. These factors may include other investment opportunities, program timing, 

total funding availability, BMDS functionality, as well as dynamic warfighter requirements. 

Question. Both ABL and KEI have key milestone tests planned for FY09. If ABL 

fails to conduct the scheduled September 2009 shoot-down demonstration or KEI 

fails to complete its booster flight test, what impact will that have on the down-select decision? 

Answer. A knowledge-based down-select decision is dependent on data and knowledge from each program as well as data from external sources. If either program 

fails to meet its scheduled milestone date, a broader Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) view will be taken to determine if there is sufficient knowledge to 

make a decision at that time. Several outcomes are possible: a decision to maintain 

both programs until sufficient knowledge is obtained from the build-up and outcome 

of the key milestone events, a decision to proceed with only one program based on 

data and knowledge obtained to date, or a decision to proceed with neither program 

due to other external factors such as funding availability, technical viability of a 

third alternative, and dynamic warfighter requirements. 

ASYMMETRIC DEFENSE

Question. General Obering, we are very concerned about the potential threat of 

asymmetric attacks on the U.S. homeland. Based on these concerns, this Committee 

has added funding for the last two years specifically for a review of asymmetric 

threats and our capabilities against these threats. Future opponents will have many 

options for attempting to deter, disrupt, or defeat U.S. use of military power. Four 

broad options could be part of an asymmetric response to current and foreseeable 

U.S. superiority in regional combined-arms warfare capability. An example of an 

asymmetric threat is the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 

long-range ballistic or cruise missiles. Even without operational use, the mere presence of such capability would act as a regional-strategic shadow and might weaken 

the commitment of key allies to any future U.S. military response to regional aggression. 

Please discuss current threats. 

Answer. ———. 

Question. Can you discuss the work you have conducted with these funds? 

Answer. In FY08, the HAC–D provided $10M to MDA to conduct experiments, develop prototypes, test CONOPS, and recommend deployment options for an integrated asymmetric missile defense capability that would protect population centers 

from a ballistic or cruise missile launched from a ship off of the U.S. coastline. PreVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:47 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046474 PO 00000 Frm 00271 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A474P2.XXX A474P2

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
272 

vious funding was received in FY06 ($10M) and FY07 ($4.1M) to address the same 

Asymmetric Defense Issue. Starting in FY06, MDA initiated, with Congressional 

support, a three-phased approach to solving the problem. First the MDA initiated 

an architecture study which assessed existing cruise and ballistic missile capability 

that could be used to augment the existing air defense architecture and provided 

recommendations for further development. Second, MDA leveraged a planned Joint 

Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO) test in the National 

Capital Region (NCR) in June 2007 to evaluate the Lockheed Martin Silent Sentry 

III passive surveillance system against surrogate ballistic and cruise missile targets 

in a realistic urban environment. Third, MDA funded an Operator-In-the-Loop 

(OITL) experiment with participation from NORTHCOM, STRATCOM, JIAMDO 

and the services in order to assess capabilities and develop CONOPS for defense of 

the homeland against the asymmetric threat. 

MDA is using the FY08 funding to build upon previous architecture studies, surveillance prototype testing, and OITL experiments to initiate a multi-year effort to 

design and prototype an Element architecture in the NCR to defend against asymmetric missile attacks. This effort leverages the existing air defense infrastructure 

in the NCR, called the Enhanced Regional Situational Awareness (ERSA) system. 

This year, we are designing an upgrade of the existing ERSA infrastructure to support necessary interfaces to additional sensors and the integration of surveillance 

fusion processing necessary to support surveillance and fire control functions for 

countering cruise and ballistic missile threats. We are also designing threat conditioning and intent assessment logic to assist the warfighter in timely identification 

of positive-hostile threats. We are continuing to conduct experiments and develop 

prototypes of surveillance technologies that will support detection, tracking and fire 

control capability for engagement of ballistic or cruise missile threats. We are continuing associated systems engineering studies and assessments necessary for overall integration and will continue to assess options for future capability spirals. We 

are building upon the OITL experiment completed in FY07 and will jointly fund an 

experiment in FY08 with JIAMDO which builds upon the FY07 experiment to continue assessing architectures and developing CONOPS with warfighter participation. 

MDA has brought together a team of experts from MIT Lincoln Laboratory, 

NORTHCOM, STRATCOM, JIAMDO, as well as the Army and the Navy to assess 

the architectures being developed with this funding. This work is being done in a 

collaborative environment with warfighter and service participation. Additionally, 

MDA has also been requested to write a report summarizing the results of our efforts to date. This report was written in a collaborative fashion with the same team. 

The report is in MDA’s final Staffing process and we expect delivery to Congress 

on or before June 2, 2008. 

Question. What are our current capabilities? What about future capabilities? 

Answer. Shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, an initial air defense architecture, called NORAD’s Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) was established 

in the National Capital Region (NCR). The Command and Control connectivity of 

the IADS sensors and ground based air defense assets is provided by the Enhanced 

Regional Situational Awareness System (ERSA), which is an augmentation of the 

existing Operation Noble Eagle. The details of this system are classified SECRET, 

but will be provided in the Asymmetric Threat report to Congress that will be delivered in June 2008 (please see response to Question 38 for more specifics). In addition to the NCR IADS, a Deployable Homeland Air and Cruise Missile Defense (D– 

HACMD) capability was assembled by NORAD as an extension to Operation Noble 

Eagle. This capability consists of AWACS surveillance aircraft, FAA and Sentinel 

radars, fighter aircraft, Avenger surface-to-air missile systems, and a mobile command and control capability, and, with adequate warning can be deployed to a specific location for a heightened state of alert or National Special Security Event. Integration of Patriot and Aegis into the D–HACMD has also been demonstrated in a 

test event. 

The future capabilities being proposed by the Missile Defense Agency, in conjunction with NORTHCOM and STRATCOM, will leverage the sensor and command and 

control infrastructure that currently exists. We will add sensors for surveillance and 

fire control that will be integrated into the existing IADS system in the NCR. Additional threat conditioning and intent assessment logic will also be required in order 

to assist the warfighter in timely identification of positive-hostile threats that will 

be necessary to support the stressing timelines required for the engagement of a 

short range ballistic or cruise missile threat. This capability, once developed and 

demonstrated in the NCR will form the basis for an architecture used to protect 

other population centers. MDA (in consultation with NORTHCOM and STRATCOM) 

has developed a Tiered structure to characterize the capabilities required to protect 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
273 

a single population center, a region, a coastline, or protection of the entire U.S. (or 

North America). The details of these proposed architectures are classified as SECRET, and will be provided in detail in the congressional report that will be delivered in June 2008. 

Question. How is DoD and MDA countering asymmetric threats? 

Answer. It is assumed that this question is referring to the definition of an asymmetric threat that is provided in the FY08 HAC–D tasking, that being a cruise or 

short range ballistic missile launched from an aircraft or a ship off of the U.S. coastline. 

The Missile Defense Agency is rapidly prototyping, developing, testing and fielding capability to protect the U.S., our deployed forces and allies against ballistic 

missiles at all ranges and in all phases of flight. 

An air defense architecture was established in the National Capital Region (NCR) 

following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to provide a limited defense 

against airborne threats. Currently, this air defense system has very little capability 

against cruise missiles since they can fly low and have small radar cross sections, 

and has no capability against short range ballistic missile threats that could be 

launched off of the U.S. coastline. The Congressional funding mentioned in the response to question #38 has provided MDA with the resources to develop architectures and to prototype technologies and CONOPS that can be used to implement 

a defense against asymmetric cruise and ballistic missile threats, should this requirement become a national priority. The FY08 effort is focused on the design and 

initial prototyping of such a capability in the NCR. The details of this capability are 

SECRET, but will be provided in the MDA’s report to Congress on the Asymmetric 

Threat, which will be delivered in June 2008. 

LACK OF PROGRAM TRANSPARENCY

Question. In its February 2008 report, GAO recommended that to improve the 

transparency of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) program, MDA should 

establish cost, schedule, and performance baselines for those elements in system development and demonstration and report against those baselines. MDA partially 

concurred with this recommendation, but was concerned that an element-centric approach would detract from its efforts to develop a single integrated BMDS. GAO 

continues to support its recommendation because the element-centric reporting approach reflects the way MDA requests funding and contracts for development of the 

BMDS. 

What reporting basis would MDA recommend to provide a similar level of transparency as reporting against element baselines would provide? 

Answer. Pursuant to Section 234 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108–375), MDA established schedule, budget, and performance baselines for each block configuration being fielded (biennial Blocks 04, 06, and 08 under the previous block structure) and reported 

variances annually in the agency’s Statement of Goals (SOG). 

In 2007, MDA established a new block structure to address concerns about transparency, accountability, and oversight and to better communicate to Congress and 

other key stakeholders our plans and baselines and our continuing improvements 

in BMDS capabilities. Blocks will be based on fielded capabilities—not biennial time 

periods—that address particular threats, and each block will represent a discrete 

program of work. When blocks are established, schedule, budget, and performance 

goals will be defined for each block. These goals, revised as necessary, will become 

baselines when MDA can make a firm commitment to the Congress because we have 

a high level of confidence that the baselines can be achieved. 

MDA has established schedule, budget, and performance baselines for Blocks 1.0 

(Defense of the U.S. from Limited North Korean Long-Range Threats), 2.0 (Defense 

of Allies and Deployed Forces from Short-to-Medium Range Threats in One Region/ 

Theater), and Block 3.1/3.2 (Expand Defense of the U.S. to Include Limited Iranian 

Long-Range Threats). We have established goals, not baselines for Block 3.3 (Expand Defense of the U.S. to Include Limited Iranian Long-Range Threats—Improved Discrimination and System Track), Block 4.0 (Defense of Allies and Deployed 

Forces in Europe from Limited Long-Range Threats/Expand Protection of the U.S. 

Homeland), and Block 5.0 (Expand Defense of Allies and Deployed Forces from 

Short-to-Intermediate Range Threats in Two Regions/Theaters). In the SOG that accompanied the President’s Budget for FY 2009, we presented these baselines and 

goals. 

In each subsequent year’s SOG, we will explain any significant variances from 

schedule, budget, and performance baselines and the reasons for re-defining block 

goals. We will also explain changes in year-to-year funding plans for each block over 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
274 

the period of the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). This level of reporting is a 

significant enhancement to transparency. 

MDA has also begun establishing unit cost baseline estimates for BMDS capabilities being acquired and delivered to the war fighter. Our approach is to build these 

estimates from the level of selected components to be fielded (such as the Terminal 

High Altitude Area Defense Fire Unit) to the element (THAAD) level and eventually 

to the block level. This latter calculation will be a full block cost baseline estimate. 

Before establishing cost baseline estimates, MDA will request an independent review by the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG), DoD’s independent cost estimating unit. 

Once the estimates are established, MDA will report any significant cost variance 

to the Congress. This information will supplement the reporting of acquisition cost 

at the BMDS level in the agency’s annual SAR. We are now in the process of determining the thresholds to report such cost variations and will incorporate them in 

a MDA directive. 

While our capabilities-based, spiral development program may not provide the 

identical kind of information and baselines generated under DoD Instruction 5000 

for traditional acquisition programs, our intention is to fully meet the transparency, 

accountability, and oversight needs of Congress and other stakeholders. 

Question. Would MDA adjust its budget requests and contracts to match its reporting approach? 

Answer. We are re-considering the current program element (PE) structure that 

organizes our budget request. As of this time, however, we intend to continue our 

practice of subdividing the existing structure into budget projects tied to the five 

new blocks and non-block Capability Development category. As for contracts, our intention is to restructure contracts as appropriate to reflect the new block structure, 

cost reporting requirements, and the transition to multiple appropriations. 

USE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FUNDS BY MDA TO INCREMENTALLY FUND

PROGRAMS

Question. MDA has approval to acquire assets with research and development 

(R&D) funds, which allows MDA to incrementally fund procurements. This is unlike 

any other program at DOD. 

Has MDA completed analysis to determine the overall effect of incremental funding? That is, has MDA determined whether incremental funding will result in a reduction of financial obligations in the early years, but a greater outlay of funds in 

future years? 

Answer. Yes. MDA has completed an analysis that compares the impact of incremental funding to the full funding required when using procurement funds. The results of that analysis show that in the near term (FY09/10), fully funding the BMDS 

would result in budget shortfalls that would require significant adjustments to our 

program plans that would lead to delays in delivery of missile defense capability to 

the warfighter. Separately, incremental execution fits well with the spiral upgrade 

approach that MDA is employing for BMDS development. 

Question. Is there any reason, other than freeing-up funds for other uses, that 

funding for the GMD interceptor has been stretched from 3 to 5 years? 

Answer. The funding profile for the GMD interceptor has not been stretched to 

free up funds for other uses. Funding has been distributed across fiscal years to fit 

within the available program allocation and at a level to meet program requirements. The extended profile exists because of the duration between the purchase of 

long lead for the initial European Capability GMD interceptor in 4QFY09 and the 

final GMD interceptor emplacement in 2QFY13. This results in a total funding span 

of approximately four years and, from a budgetary standpoint, a funding span which 

includes a total of five fiscal years. During this period, the individual interceptor 

manufacturing time remains at approximately three years and the complement of 

ten interceptors, #45–54, are emplaced in Europe. 

Question. Can you give examples of new threats that MDA was able to address 

because it is incrementally funding fielded assets? 

Answer. The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) program is focused on the 

threat from North Korea and Iran. But the threat can never be predicted with certainty, and MDA has used incremental funding in a flexible ‘‘capabilities-based’’ 

strategy to exploit technological opportunities and place capability in the war fighters’ hands far more quickly than could have occurred under a traditional acquisition 

approach. This strategy has enabled us to field a BMDS capability that currently 

provides a limited defense of the U.S. against intercontinental ballistic missiles from 

North Korea and an initial defense of deployed troops, allies and friends against regional ballistic missile threats. We expect to continue using this capabilities-based 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
275 

strategy to improve the performance capability of the BMDS by fielding additional 

components as they are completed and developing new capabilities to respond to the 

emerging threats of the future. 

GMD FLIGHT TEST DELAYS

Question. LTG Obering, GMD had planned a flight test in December 2006 that 

was delayed until June 2007 based on findings from the September 2006 flight test. 

A ground test was completed in the 1st quarter of 2008 and subsequent tests have 

been rescheduled. 

What happened in September that would drive a delay in the test program? 

Answer. FTG–02 was a successful intercept test conducted in September 2006. 

However, five observations related to the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) were 

subsequently identified that necessitated program attention which resulted in the 

delay of the follow-on intercept mission (FTG–03) until May 2007. The five issues 

involved: (1) EKV discrimination performance, (2) Divert Attitude Control System 

(DACS) rough combustion, (3) sensor debris management, (4) secondary infrared 

focal plane temperature management, and (5) focal plane infrared reflections. After 

extensive ground testing and analysis, all five issues were addressed via an EKV 

software update, a change to the DACS fuel mixture, and a modification to the 

cleaning process for the infrared focal plane cooling system. These mitigation efforts 

were successfully demonstrated during the FTG–03a mission in September 2007. 

These modifications were not exercised in the FTG–03 attempt in May 2007 due to 

a target anomaly during that mission. 

Question. Can you explain reasons behind the rescheduling of the three 3rd quarter 2008 tests? 

Answer. In the April 2007 Integrated Master Test Plan (v.08.05), the test scheduled for the 3rd quarter CY 2008 included the following: • FTG–05 (Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Flight Test) • FTT–10 (THAAD Flight Test) • FTK–01 (Kinetic Interceptor Booster Test) • STSS Space Vehicle Launch (SVL) • GTD–03 (Distributed Ground Test) 

In the March 2008 Integrated Master Test Plan (v.08.10), the tests scheduled for 

the 3rd quarter CY 2008 are as follows: • FTG–04 • FTT–10 • NFIRE–2b (Near Field Infrared Experiment) • GTD–03 

The April 2007 schedule had one GMD flight test scheduled for 3rd quarter CY 

2008, not three. FTG–04 was rescheduled from the 2nd quarter CY 2008 into the 

3rd quarter CY 2008 due to required target hardware modifications and the failure 

of a test-specific component in the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) that prevented the transmission of telemetry. FTG–05 and FTG–06 were rescheduled into 

the 4th quarter CY 2008 and 2nd quarter CY 2009, respectively, due to the rescheduling of FTG–04. FTT–10 is on schedule for execution in the 3rd quarter CY 2008. 

FTK–01 is delayed for 2nd quarter CY 2009 due to Kinetic Interceptor technical 

issues. SSTS SVL is now scheduled for 4th quarter CY 2008 due to schedule issues 

with other non-MDA launches and technical issues with the satellite payloads. 

NFIRE–2b was rescheduled due to higher priority missions and is on schedule for 

execution in the 3rd quarter CY 2008. GTD–03 remains on schedule for execution 

in the 3rd quarter CY 2008. 

Question. What issues remain to be resolved? 

Answer. None of the issues experienced during FTG–02 (September 2006) remain 

unresolved. The mitigation efforts were proven effective on FTG–03a. 

Question. How will this impact the current test plan for GMD? 

Answer. None of the issues experienced during FTG–02 (September 2006) are impacting the current flight test program. The mitigation efforts for the issues experienced during FTG–02 were demonstrated on (September 2007) FTG–03a. 

STRATCOM AND THE NUMBER OF GROUND-BASED INTERCEPTORS

Question. We understand the Missile Defense Agency currently plans to terminate 

production of the GBI interceptors at 54 missiles. 

Is this true? 

Answer. The Missile Defense Agency intends to complete fielding of 54 Ground 

Based Interceptors (GBIs) in 2013, representing the currently planned full complement of operational GBIs. However, manufacturing will continue beyond delivery 

of the 54th operational GBI in order to permit GMD (and overall BMDS) performVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:47 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046474 PO 00000 Frm 00275 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A474P2.XXX A474P2

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
276 

ance and upgrade testing (ground and flight) and stockpile reliability testing 

(ground and flight) in 2013 and beyond. Additional manufacturing is required to ensure adequate spares and line-replaceable units (as part of the refurbishment program). 

Question. If so, what role did STRATCOM play in MDA’s decision to terminate 

production at 54 interceptors? 

Answer. There has been no decision to terminate manufacturing of GBIs. Manufacturing will continue beyond the delivery of the 54th operational GBI. The Missile 

Defense Agency intends to complete fielding of 54 Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) 

in 2013, representing the currently planned full complement of operational GBIs. 

However, manufacturing will continue beyond delivery of the 54th operational GBI 

in order to conduct GMD (and overall BMDS) performance and upgrade testing 

(ground and flight) and stockpile GBIs for reliability testing (ground and flight) in 

2013 and beyond. 

Question. What analysis has STRATCOM done to identify future GBI requirements given current and future threats? 

Answer. STRATCOM conducts an annual Military Utility Assessment (MUA) of 

the fielded Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) against the current enemy 

threat. The MUA identifies the capabilities and limitations of the fielded BMDS, including issues associated with missile inventories. In the MUA 2008, identified limitations are being linked, for the first time, to the recently developed STRATCOM 

Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP). The WIP is the collaborative mechanism by 

which the Warfighter feeds back desired BMDS modifications and future capabilities to the BMDS developer, MDA. 

In addition, NORTHCOM is currently conducting a GBI study. This study contains three phases. 

Phase I—Provide USNORTHCOM/J31 with an analytical basis for recommendations to MDA regarding future GBI-basing decisions at Vandenberg AFB, CA. 

Phase II—Assess performance trade-space between 2 and 3 stage Orbital Boost 

Vehicle GBI based at VAFB and FGA ‘‘what is the right capability mix?’’ 

Phase III—Quantify the operational benefits of an east coast GBI site in the context of the projected 2012–2015 BMDS capability. 

Question. Can you share that analysis with the Committee? 

Answer. Although MDA works with U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) 

and U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) reviewing and conducting analysis 

with respect to Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs), USNORTHCOM is leading the 

study on GBIs. According to USNORTHCOM, the study is not complete and they 

have not drawn any conclusions. We believe USNORTHCOM should provide Congress with the analysis. 

MULTIPLE KILL VEHICLES

Question. MDA is developing the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) to allow a single 

interceptor to engage a number of credible objects that an enemy missile might deploy. The agency expects to deploy an operational capability in the 2017 timeframe. 

In January 2004, MDA awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin to develop a carrier 

vehicle that directs multiple kill vehicles with planned deliveries in 2014. This concept, if successful, would benefit GMD and KEI. MDA also proposed in the FY08 

budget to have Raytheon develop an alternate concept in which a lead kill vehicle 

would direct other kill vehicles. This concept, if successful, would primarily benefit 

SM–3. In the third quarter of fiscal year 2010, MDA will determine whether a carrier vehicle with multiple kill vehicles is feasible or whether the program will move 

forward with a unitary carrier vehicle. 

If MDA finds that multiple kill vehicles are not feasible, how will this impact the 

GMD and Aegis BMD programs and the kill vehicle planned by the KEI program 

since you plan to stop all work on unitary kill vehicle work this year? 

Answer. BMDS Kill Vehicles will deliver both a unitary kill vehicle for the SM– 

3 Blk IIA Cooperative Development missile with Japan and multiple kill vehicle 

payloads for all midcourse weapon systems of the future (Ground Based Midcourse 

Defense, Kinetic Energy Interceptor, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Standard Missile–3 Blk IIB). 

To ensure delivery of kill vehicles to the BMDS, our evolutionary acquisition 

strategy emphasizes use of proven technologies, early development of key components and capabilities, realistic knowledge-point testing and demonstrations. We 

began developing engagement management algorithms, key payload components 

(sensors, divert and attitude control systems), and a hover test bed to prove out 

these key technologies and inform the Missile Defense Agency Knowledge Point deVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:47 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046474 PO 00000 Frm 00276 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A474P2.XXX A474P2

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
277 

cisions. This early component development and testing will mitigate technical, 

schedule and cost risk and prove out the kill vehicle capability. 

If through the component development and testing and knowledge point decisions 

the Agency decides multiple kill capability is not achievable in the near term, we 

will work with the Agency’s System Engineer to determine the best kill vehicle payload for the Ground Based Midcourse Defense, Kinetic Energy Interceptor and Aegis 

Ballistic Missile Defense SM–3 Blk IIB weapon systems until multiple kill vehicle 

is ready. 

KINETIC ENERGY INTERCEPTOR (KEI) COMPARED TO AIRBORNE LASER (ABL) FOR

BOOST PHASE DEFENSE

Question. MDA awarded a contract in December 2003, which was to continue 

through January 2012, to develop and test the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI). At 

that time, MDA stated that KEI was being designed as a mobile capability to destroy intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles during the boost/ascent phase 

of their flight. In 2005, MDA selected the Airborne Laser (ABL) as its primary boost 

phase capability, but continued development of KEI. We understand that a very 

comprehensive study was conducted by DoD’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) that looked specifically at boost phase programs. 

Have there been any studies that conclude KEI is the better choice for a boost 

phase capability? If so, why has MDA chosen to continue to pursue ABL as its primary boost phase capability? Can you provide us with the PA&E study? 

Answer. The MDA submitted a Boost Phase Intercept study Report to Congress 

in April 2006 that described in detail the different boost phase capabilities and limitations of the ABL and KEI. There was no finding in this report that KEI was a 

better choice than ABL as a boost phase capability. The development of this Congressional report included significant interaction with PA&E and a detailed review 

of their independent study results. MDA openly shared our technical and programmatic data with the PA&E team, and we conducted several technical interchanges with them to review and discuss findings. These discussions with PA&E led 

to modifications of the MDA Report to Congress. We recommend that Congress get 

the latest PA&E boost phase study results from the PA&E team, to it is the most 

current and accurate version of their study. 

The ABL is our primary boost phase capability because it is the only capability 

that can intercept all ranges of threat in the boost phase. KEI boost phase intercept 

is limited to long range threats that burnout in the exoatmosphere (greater than 

100 km altitude). The ABL has the potential to greatly augment our ability to defeat 

large raids of short range and medium range ballistic missiles (our adversaries have 

large quantities of these missiles) by significantly thinning that threat in the boost 

phase. 

The 2009 Knowledge Points for ABL and KEI, along with parallel objective BMDS 

engineering and planning work, will provide us with the performance, cost, schedule, and risk information we need to refine our BMDS acquisition strategy for boost 

phase capabilities. 

Question. Has KEI been redefined as a midcourse capability instead of a boost/ 

ascent phase capability? 

Answer. No. The Agency recognizes that booster vehicle performance required for 

boost phase intercepts is more than adequate to provide midcourse intercept capability. KEI’s mobility makes it attractive for both BMDS mission areas. A decision 

on KEI’s role(s) in the BMDS will not be finalized until after its knowledge point 

event (first flight) and the Airborne Laser’s knowledge point event (lethal 

shootdown). 

Question. Will the contract extension increase termination costs should MDA decide to terminate KEI’s contract in 2009 or is contract termination not a possibility 

even if ABL remains the primary boost phase capability? 

Answer. Termination costs will not increase as a result of a contract extension. 

Termination liability will not change in 2009 from the current amount unless contract effort is increased or decreased, in particular the number of contractor personnel performing the contract and amount of material ordered. Potential contract 

termination costs are appropriately tracked and funded not only for the basic contract, but for any and all extensions. MDA plans to continue to execute its evolutionary acquisition strategy for KEI consisting of knowledge point events (the first 

knowledge point: Booster Flight—Development Verification Test scheduled for 

2009). MDA will determine or adjust the future course of KEI based upon outcomes 

of knowledge point events. 

Question. In 2009, the KEI program will flight test the interceptor’s boosters, a 

critical technology, to determine if they will function as intended. In 2009, MDA will 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
278 

use the results of the booster test and the results of ABL’s lethality demonstration 

to decide the future of the KEI and ABL programs. However, in 2005 MDA directed 

the KEI program to incorporate the capability to engage missiles during the midcourse phase of flight and KEI’s contract is being extended until September 2015. 

In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on the fiscal year 2008 

budget, MDA’s Director said that the mission of KEI has not been redefined. KEI 

is still an alternative for ABL should ABL fail in its lethality demonstration. 

Does the FY2009 budget request reflect either the advancement of evolution of the 

KEI program? 

Answer. Yes. The plan in the FY08 President’s Budget request was to conduct as 

booster-only System Design Review in FY2009, but with the additional funding appropriated by Congress in FY08 the KEI program has been adjusted and it will now 

be a full KEI Weapons System Design Review. 

The FY2009 budget request includes two major components; element engineering 

and interceptor. The element engineering work planned for FY2009 is for requirements development for full mobile weapon system for incorporation into the BMDS. 

The FY2009 budget request also includes the effort necessary to complete preparations for and conduct of the KEI knowledge point event (first flight). In accordance 

with the Agency knowledge point acquisition approach, successful completion of the 

knowledge point event will enable the advancement of the system into full mobile 

weapon system development. 

The Agency recognizes that booster vehicle performance required for boost phase 

intercepts is more than adequate to provide midcourse intercept capability. KEI’s 

mobility makes it attractive for both BMDS mission areas. A decision on KEI’s 

role(s) in the BMDS will not be finalized until after its knowledge point event (first 

flight) and the Airborne Laser’s knowledge point event (lethal shootdown). 

KINETIC ENERGY INTERCEPTOR

Question. The FY2009 budget request contains $387 million for the Kinetic Energy Interceptor program, which MDA has designated as a replacement for the current GBI booster deployed in Alaska and California. Previous budgets planned on 

KEI being a boost phase defense platform. 

Why are we planning to replace the GBI when we just began deploying that system 4 years ago? 

Answer. The Agency is not planning on any near term replacements of the GBI 

boosters with KEI boosters. The Agency plan is to pursue GBI booster spiral upgrades in close coordination with the KEI booster development team. The GBI and 

KEI boosters provide different and complementary capabilities to the BMDS. The 

MDA Engineering, GM and KI Program Offices are developing plans for the coordinated acquisition of common, core standards compliant booster avionics for the KEI 

and future GBI capability spirals. This enables us to save significant dollars 

through the integrated development of high cost components needed by both KEI 

and GBI. 

The MDA plan is to efficiently sustain and spiral upgrade the GBI while adding 

new KEI capabilities to the BMDS such as boost phase intercept or mobile midcourse. 

Question. What is the expected lifetime of the GBI? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. In a midcourse role, how much more capability does KEI provide as opposed to the GBI? 

Answer. The high acceleration and mobile KEI complements the GBI by providing 

the Warfighter additional midcourse engagement capabilities in a layered BMDS. A 

forward-based KEI (based closer to threat countries than fixed GBI sites) disrupts 

and limits our adversaries’ ability to selectively time the deployment of countermeasures by expanding the midcourse intercept battlespace to shortly after threat 

burnout. Furthermore, a forward-based KEI with a multiple kill vehicle payload, reduces the number of credible threat objects (and threat complexity) left for the later 

GBI layer to handle. The KEI can be flexibly-based to defend Friends and Allies in 

Japan, Southern Europe (forward of the European Site) or the Middle East against 

medium range ballistic missile threats. The longer burn, silo-based GBI is not designed to counter this threat set. The Agency is focusing the KEI development and 

test program on the realization of layered BMDS capabilities. 

Question. If the objective for KEI is a mobile system, why invest significant resources in a silo-based KEI system? 

Answer. We are not investing significant resources in a silo-based KEI system. At 

this point, silo-basing for KEI is best viewed as a potential capability, much like a 

sea-based KEI is a potential capability. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
279 

Question. If ABL and KEI are supposed to compete as a future boost phase weapon, why have you removed everything but the booster portion of KEI from this 

year’s budget? 

Answer. Boost phase weapon selection is based on two capability demonstrations 

or knowledge point events; the Airborne Laser’s lethal shootdown and the KEI 

booster vehicle’s first flight. The FY2009 budget request for KEI includes funding 

to prepare for and conduct this flight test as well as significant funding for requirements development for the full mobile weapon system for incorporation into the 

BMDS. In accordance with the Agency knowledge point acquisition approach, successful completion of the knowledge point event will enable the advancement of the 

system into full mobile weapon system development. 

AIRBORNE LASER (ABL) COSTS FOR FULL DEPLOYMENT

Question. After a schedule delay, the Airborne Laser is now expected to demonstrate a lethal shoot-down in 2009. Based on the demonstration, you will make 

a decision on development of Tail 2. 

What is the requirement with respect to the number of ABL’s needed? 

Answer. The final BMDS architecture to include number of ABL’s has not been 

defined. This decision will occur subsequent to the knowledge point event (lethal 

shoot-down). 

Question. For 24/7 coverage, how many orbits of ABL’s and how many ABL’s per 

orbit are required? Is this similar to the requirements for JSTARS and AWACS? 

Answer. The number of orbits required will depend on the wartime scenario. According to the Air Force Air Combat Command’s Operational Concept for Airborne 

Laser dated 1 Jan 2007, ABLs will be tasked to engage ballistic missiles originating 

from one or more Named Areas of Interest (NAIs). Once established in theater, the 

ABL will operate one or two Combat Air Patrols (CAP) based on relative size and 

location of the NAIs. Also according to the Operational Concept, five ABL aircraft 

will be able to sustain two near-continuous 24/7 orbits, or three ABLs will be able 

to sustain one near-continuous 24/7 orbit. 

Similar methods are used for JSTARS and AWACS, but because these are sensor 

and command and control platforms, the criteria are different from the ABL weapon 

system. 

Question. What is the basing concept for ABL? What is the plan for delivering the 

chemicals into a forward-based location? 

Answer. According to the Airborne Laser (ABL) Operational Concept, developed 

by the Air Force Air Combat Command, dated 1 January 2007, operational ABLs 

will be primarily based in the Continental United States (CONUS), where the Main 

Operating Base (MOB) will be equipped to handle and service the ABL aircraft and 

its unique weapon system. An operational ABL will be able to deploy to Forward 

Operating Locations (FOLs) world-wide. FOLs can be located at any operational location where heavy cargo aircraft operate. Runways, taxiways, and instrument approach requirements are similar to those for other heavy aircraft. 

ABL will utilize common support equipment available at bases in theater wherever possible to reduce the size of the deployment package. ABL will require peculiar support equipment, such as Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) to service the 

laser weapon. Transport of this equipment will require military airlift. Exact airlift 

needs have not been established. Aircraft hangars will not be required at the FOL. 

Required maintenance will be accomplished on the flight line or in back-shops. Sufficient workspace, shelter, and messing facilities will be required for deployed operations and maintenance personnel. FOL security personnel will be augmented with 

ABL security personnel, as required. The amount of equipment and personnel will 

depend on the operational scenario. 

Pre-positioning of ABL laser fuels at pre-designated FOLs would also hell ensure 

the immediate availability of chemicals upon arrival of ABL aircraft during operational deployments. Air mobility or sea transportation can then be used to replenish laser fuel farm reserves as they are consumed. Options for transportation of 

extra chemicals are currently being explored. Prior to mixing the chemicals and 

loading them on the ABL the shelf life is unlimited. 

Question. Do you have an independent cost estimate for an operational ABL? 

What about the cost of forward basing? 

Answer. The Airborne Laser (ABL) Program Element is a Capability Development 

within MDA. As such, MDA has not requested the OSD Cost Analysis Improvement 

Group to perform an Independent Cost Estimate for ABL. MDA intends to request 

an independent cost estimate for ABL at a later time, when programmatic uncertainties are reduced and prior to a decision to commit resources for procuring and 

sustaining an ABL capability. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
280 

ABL has a comprehensive Program Office Operations and Support Estimate from 

2002. We have worked closely with the U.S. Air Force, Air Combat Command (ACC) 

on the update of their Operational Concept and are in the process of gathering data 

to develop an updated cost estimate for the operational ABL and forward basing. 

Initial estimates will be available later this year. 

Question. Can the taxpayer afford to buy the number of ABL’s required? 

Answer. The affordability of ABL assets, along with the boost-phase defense capability this BMDS Element would provide, will be among the many factors that will 

be weighed by the Department in considering a commitment to including the ABL 

capability in the BMDS. The ABL Element of the BMDS has significant upfront investment costs. However, the engineering estimate indicates a cost per shot which 

will be insignificant relative to the cost of an equivalent missile intercepting and 

destroying an enemy ballistic missile potentially armed with weapons of mass destruction. At this time, however, no conclusive decisions have been made on affordability or other issues associated with ABL. 

AIRBORNE LASER (ABL) AGAINST POTENTIAL THREATS

Question. Even if ABL is successful in its lethality demonstration in 2009, there 

are still many questions about how it would be employed. 

What is ABL’s capability against potential threats from China and Iran with respect to ICBMs? What about other nations? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. What about potential overflight of a hostile nation? 

Answer. Decisions about ABL flights over a hostile nation will be the responsibility of the regional combatant commander with input from the air component commander. This decision will take into effect the operational environment, including 

factors such as hostile air-to-ground defenses, friendly air support, and mission priorities at the time of the potential overflight. 

Question. Are there other programs currently in development at MDA that are 

possible better options for boost phase defense? 

Answer. As part of a layered defense strategy the Kinetic Energy Interceptor 

(KEI) is the only other Element currently in development capable of a Boost Phase 

mission. One additional benefit of the Kinetic Energy Interceptor program is its potential multiple use application. The Kinetic Energy Interceptor could provide the 

Ballistic Missile Defense System a strategically deployable, land and sea-based capability to defeat medium to long range ballistic missiles in the boost, ascent or midcourse phase of flight. However, as a BMDS boost phase defense asset, ABL has several characteristics that are unique. As an airborne asset, ABL can be forward deployed quickly. Once deployed, ABL will also be able to provide missile track information to cue other U.S. and NATO assets. In addition, ABL’s chemical laser provides a relatively low cost per kill (less than $20k per kill). 

Question. Are there other missions for ABL? 

Answer. ABL has the potential to conduct many missions including: Defensive 

Counter Air (DCA), High Value Airborne Asset Protection (HVAA), Cruise Missile 

Defense (CMD), Counter Surface to Air Missile (SAM), Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance (ISR), and Command and Control (C2). 

The ABL program office is developing capabilities to support three adjunct missions: Tracking debris from successful ABL missile engagements, extended ballistic 

missile engagement ranges, and engaging post-boost vehicles. The ABL program 

plans to conduct a series of experiments and demonstrations proving the technical 

feasibility of these adjunct missions following the ABL’s lethality demonstration. 

AIRBORNE LASER (ABL) COUNTERMEASURES

Question. One concern with the deployment of ABL is the potential impact of 

countermeasures that some countries either already have or are developing. 

Can we expect countermeasures to ABL? 

Answer. Any fielded weapon system is likely to cause an adversary to investigate 

potential countermeasures. There is currently little to no evidence that potential 

threat countries have fielded countermeasures likely to impact ABL. MDA is however actively investigating the effectiveness of likely potential countermeasures and 

methods for negating them. The details are protected within special access channels. 

Question. What are the types of countermeasures that countries may develop to 

counter a laser weapon like ABL? 

Answer. In general, adversaries may choose to develop countermeasures that increase a missile’s resistance to heating effects of laser weapon systems. These countermeasures typically decrease the effective range and/or lethality of an adversary’s 

missiles because additional weight is added to shield the missile from laser systems. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
281 

Alternatively, adversaries could attempt to decrease the effectiveness of the ABL’s 

tracking systems. 

Question. Do certain countries already have countermeasures? 

Answer. There is little to no evidence that potential threat countries have fielded 

countermeasures likely to impact ABL. MDA is however actively investigating the 

effectiveness of likely potential countermeasures and methods for negating them. 

The details are protected within special access channels. 

Question. How do we counter the countermeasures? 

Answer. MDA’s investigation of potential countermeasures will determine the effectiveness of those countermeasures and guide the development of any necessary 

counter-countermeasures. The ABL has various options for decreasing the effectiveness of an adversary’s countermeasures. The details are protected within classified/ 

special access channels. 

AIRBORNE LASERBEAM CONTROL/FIRE CONTROL COMPONENT

Question. This year the Airborne Laser program was late in achieving one of its 

knowledge points—a ground test meant to prove-out the operation of the element’s 

Beam Contral/Fire Control component. ABL’s Program Manager signed-off on the 

completion of the test in December 2006 after a 31⁄2 month delay, but he did so with 

two caveats. First, the software was not performing as intended and second, the 

low-power laser, which is a surrogate to the element’s high-power laser in early 

flight tests, did not put enough power on the target. ABL’s Program Manager said 

these problems would have to be corrected before the low-power system integration 

active flight testing begins. The delay in achieving this knowledge point pushed 

ABL’s planned lethality test from 2008 to 2009. Now that we are in the FY 2009 

budget cycle: 

Have the software and low-power laser problems been corrected? If not, when do 

you expect them to be resolved? 

Answer. Yes. During the Low-Power Integration Ground testing, MDA collected 

data which ultimately led to determining the root cause of the issues and correcting 

them. The software was upgraded as required to complete all of the testing with 

no caveats, the surrogate’s high-power laser and other optical components were realigned, and multiple successful aerial engagements were demonstrated. During 

these engagements, adequate laser power was put on target; had the actual High 

Energy Laser been used instead of the surrogate under the same engagement conditions, a missile would have been destroyed. 

Question. Is it likely that ABL’s lethality test will be delayed further? 

Answer. The ABL element is on track to achieve a lethal demonstration in 2009. 

The Airborne Laser successfully completed its Low-Power System Integration flight 

testing in 2007, which culminated in using all three of the aircraft’s laser systems 

to detect, track, and then engage a ‘‘non-cooperative’’ target aircraft. Since then, the 

Airborne Laser element of BMDS and its contractor partners have been aggressively 

refurbishing low- and high-power optics, sensors, and laser systems and installing 

all of the hardware in the Airborne Laser Aircraft required to begin High-Power 

System Integration ground testing in the fall of 2008 and begin High-Power System 

Integration flight testing in early 2009. 

Question. Has MDA determined the cost impact of the recognized delay in the 

lethality demonstration? What is the cost of the delay? 

Answer. ABL rebaselined its Boeing contract in May 07 adding $250M and 1 year 

to the schedule. The program was able to absorb the cost of this delay within the 

President’s Budget by reducing activities that were not directly related to shootdown 

and assuming a higher level of risk for the program. 

Question. Did the contractor’s failure to fully meet the objectives of the 2006 

knowledge point affect the fee awarded to the contractor? 

Answer. Yes. The Airborne Laser element of BMDS award fee plan is structured 

to evaluate contractor program and cost management, mission success, and Knowledge Point execution. Knowledge point execution is weighted the heaviest among the 

three areas. The award fee was adversely affected as the challenges experienced 

during the 2006 Knowledge Point completion were considered in the overall assessment and resulted in a reduced award fee. 

CONTRACTED LOGISTICS SUPPORT

Question. MDA contracts with prime contractors for fielded elements to provide 

logistics support for the elements and to collect and report reliability data, including 

data on the frequency of breakdowns and the cost of repairs. 

What is MDA learning about the cost of sustaining fielded elements? 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
282 

Answer. Sustaining fielded Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) capabilities 

until they are transferred to the Military Services remains one of our highest priorities, and we have learned that sustainment costs are comprising an increasing portion of program funding for each block. As additional elements of the BMDS have 

been fielded (or are planned for future fielding) we are seeing sustainment costs 

grow from about $105 million in FY05 to a projected total of almost $956 million 

in FY13. We have also learned that we can more efficiently manage sustainment 

costs when assets to be sustained are grouped under a single contract vehicle rather 

than separate contract vehicles. This advantage may be diminished or eliminated 

in future fiscal years if the restructuring of contracts is required to accommodate 

the use of multiple appropriations. 

Given these significant costs, we are working through the Missile Defense Executive Board to establish a set of business rules that will govern the smooth transition 

of BMDS capability to the Services. Our goal is to ensure that fielded capability is 

fully sustained during this transition and to work closely with the Combatant Commanders and Services to ensure the Services have significant lead time and program 

information to continue operations and maintenance budgeting requirements for the 

capabilities they will be responsible for operating. 

Question. Is MDA appropriately considering the cost of supporting an element as 

the element is being designed? 

Answer. Yes, MDA does consider the cost of supporting a system during initial 

design and all subsequent associated reviews. Sustainment is a key design element 

in both the System Requirements Review and the System Design Review. Additionally, the early use of Business Case Analyses of test system design and other factors 

for life cycle affordability are part of the process that provides feedback for improvement. Currently, Contractor Logistics Support has been the common strategy for our 

fielded systems. As systems mature, an updated Business Case Analysis is conducted to determine other support strategies. 

Question. How do award fees built into contracts affect support? 

Answer. Award fees are used to influence favorable contractor performance in 

support of MDA’s logistics objectives, and can positively affect targeted support provided by the contractor. In our cost plus award fee contracts, the contractor earns 

a fee only when successfully meeting contract performance objectives pertaining to 

program and cost management, satisfactory accomplishment of key events, and adherence to program mission success before fee can be earned. For example, the 

Ground-Based Mid-Course Defense (GMD) program has established metrics which 

are reflected in its award fee plan to measure performance for system availability, 

cost, training and support to service transition and transfer. The THAAD program’s 

award fee plan includes a key event that requires contracted logistics support products be sufficiently mature to support maintainability demonstration and the 

achievement of user and contractor logistic support test objectives. These features 

incentivize the contractor to provide better than satisfactory logistic support to the 

Ballistic Missile Defense System and its components. 

THAAD AND ENHANCED PERFORMANCE

Question. The Committee understands that THAAD’s performance could be enhanced/increased by adding a second-stage to the current interceptor. 

Have you done any modeling examining the contribution that an upgraded 

THAAD could make to the overall missile defense mission? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. Does MDA plan to put any money into exploring this option? 

Answer. MDA has no present plans to fund any significant upgrades to enhance 

the performance of the THAAD System. 

Question. If not, why? 

Answer. Existing funding constraints have made it difficult to fund enhancements 

to existing development Elements of the BMDS. MDA is provided a ∼$1.5B/yr 

‘‘wedge’’ for fielding and sustaining the BMDS. Fielding and sustainment costs in 

FY09 are estimated at $3.6B, with estimates of ∼$3B/yr over the FYDP. The difference between the estimated fielding and sustainment costs and the wedge reduces the funding available for the further development of Elements. The reduction 

in funding for development efforts makes it difficult to sustain existing efforts, let 

alone provide funding for new BMDS program enhancements and new capability development efforts. 

Question. If performance could be enhanced by this capability, would it decrease 

the number of THAAD Fire Units that would be required? 

Answer. Yes, if the THAAD interceptor was enhanced it would decrease the number of THAAD Fire Units required. However, THAAD enhanced performance is not 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
283 

a substitute or a replacement for the defense provided by the European Interceptor 

Site. 

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES OF TERMINAL HIGH ALTITUDE AREA (T) DEFENSE (THAAD) 

TO ISRAEL AND OTHER COUNTRIES

Question. Israel is interested in developing a new program to focus on the same 

threat that THAAD currently defends. One issue they have raised is that the U.S. 

hasn’t shared information with them as to the capabilities of THAAD and thus do 

not know if THAAD will work for them. 

Can you provide us an update on current U.S.-Israeli Cooperation? 

Answer. There are currently 3 significant US-Israeli initiatives: baseline system 

for defense of Israel (Arrow Weapon System–AWS), defense against short-range ballistic missiles (David’s Sling Weapon System–DSWS), and discussion of an uppertier component of this defense architecture. 

Arrow System Improvement Program (ASIP): The program’s focus is to upgrade 

the AWS to counter evolving longer range and more sophisticated ballistic missile 

threats. In April 2006, Israel declared Block 3.0’s Initial Operating Capability (IOC). 

Block 4 is in the final design stages and is scheduled to be ready for fielding in early 

2009. The current ASIP program ends in FY09; however, due to increased regional 

threats, Israel requires an upper-tier system and received FY08 $20M to perform 

risk mitigation and preliminary design. Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) has proposed an Arrow III. 

Short Range Ballistic Missile Defense (SRBMD/David’s Sling): The 2nd Lebanon 

War between Israel and Hezbollah underscored the strategic effect of short range, 

inexpensive ballistic missiles to civilian populations. In 2006, Israel selected the 

DSWS proposed by Rafael/Raytheon for their SRBMD solution. The goal is $350K 

per missile cost (as compared to the $2–3M per Arrow or Patriot missile). Israel is 

expected to request an additional $28M above the $45M PB09 to accelerate the development and production. MDA plans to aggressively engage Israel to make the 

DSWS a true joint international development program and assess the military utility of this system for the U.S. 

Upper-tier alternatives: Discussions continue which respond to the evolving 

longer-range threat and provide for a layered defense with multiple shot opportunities. Interceptor options discussed with Israel include Arrow III (based on Israeli 

technology), the THAAD missile, and a land-based version of the Standard Missile 

3 (SM–3). Formal approval has been granted (via EXCOM and National Disclosure 

Policy channels) for disclosure of data and possible FMF sale for THAAD baseline 

and extended range to Israel. In addition, sharing of SM–3 data has been authorized 

to facilitate the ongoing discussions toward a possible sale. 

After the data sharing and joint discussions with Israeli, it was agreed that 

THAAD does not met Israel’s Upper Tier Requirements. MDA’s analysis of alternatives shows SM–3 to be the most effective answer, but Israel is pushing for their 

indigenously developed Arrow III solution. At this time, Israel has no interest in 

procuring THAAD FMS. However, from a joint warfighting perspective, the Defense 

Policy Advisory Group for which OSD (Policy) is a chair, directed the creation of the 

Architecture Enhancement Plan that includes the deployment of U.S. owned and operated THAAD in Israel as part of a joint combined missile defense architecture. 

Question. To what extent is National Disclosure Policy preventing us from sharing 

missile defense information and technology with allies? 

Answer. National Disclosure Policy does not prevent us from sharing missile defense information and technology. It does prescribe a process for ensuring appropriate interagency review occurs prior to sharing information in order to protect national security and economic interests. The length of the overall disclosure process 

is increased when a separate LO/CLO (Low Observable/Counter Low Observable) 

EXCOM ruling is required prior to gaining an exception from the National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC). 

Question. What needs to be done to fix this? 

Answer. Advance planning and clear articulation about what we propose to share 

are the most important factors in ensuring timely approvals in support of international programs. As a general rule, review, assessment, and planning for release 

of U.S. systems and technologies to specific partners and allies need to occur during 

the development stage vice production/fielding. 

Question. Are there legitimate concerns that would prevent the U.S. from disclosing certain information, and if so, what would those concerns be? 

Answer. Yes, when advanced systems and technology are being discussed, there 

are legitimate concerns that would prevent the U.S. from disclosing certain information. In order to protect both national security and economic interests, it is necVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:47 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046474 PO 00000 Frm 00283 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A474P2.XXX A474P2

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
284 

essary to ensure that technology is protected and that discussions are tailored to 

support specific military and foreign policy objectives. The concern over the potential 

for reverse engineering of advanced systems and unauthorized third party transfer 

or sale of information and technology guide U.S. technology protection activities. 

TESTING AND LACK OF SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF TARGETS

Question. One of the key limiting factors of MDA’s test program has been the lack 

of sufficient number of missile defense targets. 

Do you currently have a sufficient amount of targets to execute your testing program? 

Answer. Yes. Assuming our target development and production activities proceed 

according to schedule, we plan to deliver sufficient targets to execute the test program as it is laid out in the MDA Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP). Specifically, 

in the MDA/TC Production and Delivery Manifest for BMDS flight tests through 

FY10 there are seven (7) targets for THAAD, five (5) targets for GMD, seven (7) 

for Aegis BMD, six (6) for cooperative tests with Japan’s Aegis BMD capability, four 

(4) for the PAC–3, three (3) in support of the SSTS, three (3) for ABL, and three 

(3) in support of special experiments for BMDS sensor technologies. 

Having additional target inventory or having a spare target available in the event 

of target failure does not mean a test could proceed immediately with the backup 

target. MDA must take the time necessary to conduct a root cause analysis to understand the target failure prior to resuming or re-attempting the test. 

Question. If not, what can we do to improve the number of targets? 

Answer. The FY09 President’s Budget submission represents the best application 

of limited resources to meet the needs of the Missile Defense Agency in providing 

an integrated, layered ballistic missile defense capability to the warfighter. We, 

therefore, support the President’s Budget request. The Targets and Countermeasures Program has limited flexibility to meet short-term, emergent, or contingency planning requirements. Activities that would support a more robust target 

program include the following priorities: 

Priority: 1 

$31.5M (FY09), $12.9M (FY10) 

Implement a rolling spare and maintain minimal inventory as contingency for additional short notice test events for Ground-Based Midcourse Defense. Additional 

spare procurements optimize the manufacturing capability/thru-put. This procurement will include LV–4 ($25.7M), one reentry vehicle ($8.6M), multiple deployables 

and ejector mechanisms ($9.1M), and support equipment ($1.0M). 

Priority: 2 

$7.8M (FY09) 

Implement an Aging Surveillance program to monitor the reliability and 

functionality of inventoried C–4s and Minute Man rocket motors. The Flexible Target Family rocket motors are in DoD inventory with minimal or no ongoing surveillance programs. The Director of MDA is developing long term budgets and plans for 

ongoing surveillance activities that will be prioritized within MDA’s requirements 

as part of future budget development activities. $3.5M would establish the C–4 Rocket Motor composition and characteristics 

baseline through the execution and analysis of static fire testing in support of the 

Aging Surveillance program. $2.2M would be required to develop a C–4 nozzle return and repair capability. 

The C–4 has a defect in the first stage nozzle affecting roughly 60% of the inventory. Residual volatiles in the motor off-gas causing the material to shrink which 

sometimes results in nozzle throat cracks. The C–4 Motors are screened for this Forward Exit Ring Crack (FERC) defect prior to processing. However, this condition 

may worsen over time, affecting larger portions of the C–4 inventory and potentially 

occurring during rocket motor processing prior to target launch. 

$2.1M would be required for the Air Force Aging Surveillance program for Minute 

Man (MM) motors which consists of propellant sampling and testing to characterize 

chemical stability, component testing (e.g., Ordnance Devices) to characterize performance, hot gas generator and motor instrumented static firings, and technical 

analysis of test results. Funding Aging Surveillance program would maintain viability for use of flight-proven assets for future FTF missions and in legacy target designs. MDA previously (FY06 and prior) funded the Air Force Aging Surveillance 

program for these M55, SR19, and M57 motors, but began phasing out funding in 

FY07 (M55 AS discontinued) and FY08 (SR19 unfunded) due to planned timeline 

for FTF implementation and funding constraints. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
285 

Priority: 3 

$25.6 (FY09), $5.6 (FY10) 

Implement a rolling spare and initiate inventory to optimize manufacture flow 

and support potential future short notice requirements in support of AEGIS and 

THAAD program requirements by procuring one (1) 52′′ SR–19 (SR–19/57), one (1) 

MBRV–1, and one (1) Air Launch Carriage Extraction System for Air Launch requirements. 

Question. Would additional funds in this area be helpful? 

Answer. Yes, Funding and maintaining a backup inventory of Flexible Target 

Family hardware components would minimize target cycle time in the event of mission failures, mitigate risk of critical path schedules, and improve the ability to 

meet short-fuse new requirements. As stated previously, additional target funding 

and inventory will not necessarily mitigate all potential delays in testing because 

if a target fails, MDA may need to take the time necessary to conduct a root cause 

analysis prior to conducting a subsequent test. 

AEGIS AND ATLANTIC FLEET SHIPS

Question. Gen. Campbell, I understand that all Aegis BMD-capable ships are currently assigned to the Pacific, and MDA only plans to upgrade two Atlantic Fleet 

ships to BMD configuration. 

What’s the rationale for this decision? 

Answer. U.S. Pacific Fleet is the primary force provider of forward deployed and 

rotational forces for both the Western Pacific and Middle East regions, where the 

preponderance of the current threat resides. 

Today the Navy has 12 Aegis BMD Engagement ships and five Aegis BMD LongRange Surveillance & Track ships that have been upgraded with BMD capability. 

Eighteen Aegis BMD Engagement ships will be available by the end of CY 2008. 

Additionally, the Navy will begin outfitting the Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers with 

BMD capability as part of the DDG Modernization program in FY 2012, expanding 

the number of BMD capable surface ships to 62. The Navy is also examining opportunities to include BMD capability in th Cruiser Modernization program. 

Question. Do you currently have any plans to upgrade additional Atlantic Fleet 

ships? If not, why? 

Answer. The Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) resources provided in the President’s budget will provide for 18 Aegis ships for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), 

including two destroyers in the Atlantic Fleet by the end of CY08. 

In addition, Navy is adding BMD capability on all DDGs through the DDG Modernization program beginning in FY12. 

MDA is working closely with Navy to ensure that future spirals of the Aegis BMD 

capability are compatible with an open architecture. In addition, the Navy is currently considering including this capability in additional Aegis Cruisers as well. 

These upgrades will apply to both Atlantic and Pacific fleet ships. 

Question. Lt Gen Obering, if all BMD-capable ships are in the Pacific, what’s the 

plan for using Aegis BMD to defend our troops and allies in the CENTCOM AOR? 

Answer. I will defer to Commander, U.S. Central Command to discuss plans for 

using Aegis BMD ships to defend our troops and allies in his AOR. From my perspective, I work with the Navy to ensure the ships are as capable and operationally 

flexible as possible to perform BMD missions anywhere in the world. In this regard, 

the Navy is developing an open architecture (OA) for the AEGIS combat system that 

will provide BMD capability at relatively low cost to the rest of the fleet. We closely 

watch the threat, and if the promises of OA do not meet the current schedule MDA 

will work with the Navy to accelerate expanded BMD capability. 

WARFIGHTER INVOLVEMENT PROCESS

Question. I understand that STRATCOM and MDA have developed a new program called the Warfighter Involvement Program (WIP) to ensure warfighter views 

are incorporated into the missile defense development process. 

What are the key elements of the Warfighter Involvement Program? 

Answer. The Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP) has been codified in the US 

Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Instruction SI 538.3, Missile Defense Warfighter 

Involvement Process. This document, closely coordinated between STRATCOM and 

MDA, defines the goals and objectives of the WIP; identifies roles and responsibilities of the key stakeholders; and prescribes the processes for assuring the integration of both near and far term Warfighter needs into Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) development. The key products of the WIP are: 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
286 

• STRATCOM Prioritized Capabilities List (PCL) defines Warfighter desired 

far-term future BMDS capabilities • STRATCOM Modification & Fielding Request List (MFRL) describes 

Warfighter desired changes and additions to the currently fielded BMDS • MDA Achievable Capabilities List (ACL) provides the response to the PCL; 

articulates budgetary, programmatic, schedule, and performance issues, as well 

as external-dependency shortfalls, for each PCL item • STRATCOM Capabilities Assessment Report (CAR), provides the 

STRATCOM assessment of the MDA ACL 

The STRATCOM PCL refines COCOM priorities for potential MDA POM adjustments and the Program Change Board (PCB) institutes the adjustments. The result 

is an integrated BMDS development effort that includes Warfighter-desired capabilities. 

The STRATCOM MFRL communicates to the MDA desired modifications and 

fielding requests after a capability is fielded. Requests are adjudicated through the 

Missile Defense Management Structure (MDMS) and approved by the PCB. The 

Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense monitors the 

MFRL. 

In a parallel effort, MDA is currently developing a WIP Directive and implementing Instruction that codify internal MDA responsibilities and procedures to 

support the STRATCOM WIP. The Directive and Instruction are in the staffing 

process and are due for publication this summer. 

Question. To date, are you satisfied with the Warfighter Involvement Program? 

Answer. Yes. In October 2006, MDA established the Warfighter Support Center 

(MDA/DFO), collocated with the USSTRATCOM Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC–IMD) in the Missile Defense Integration and Operations Center (MDIOC) at Shriever AFB, CO. The mission of MDA/ 

DFO is to provide a direct Warfighter link that ensures consistency and transparency in planning, coordinating, and integrating between the Combatant Commands (COCOM) and MDA. Over the past year this relationship has evolved, matured, and enabled a new and unique MDA-Warfighter synergy, based largely on the 

Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP). 

Within the context of Continuous Process Improvement, the MDA 2007 Summer 

Study analyzed the existing WIP, focusing on the Prioritized Capabilities List 

(PCL), one of the principal WIP products. The PCL, developed by STRATCOM in 

conjunction with the other COCOMS, provides MDA with the Warfighter prioritized 

list of future desired BMDS capabilities, and constitutes a major input to future 

BMDS design and development. The Summer Study WIP focus group developed a 

list of recommended changes to the process that are being considered and implemented, as appropriate, through a new STRATCOM Instruction, SI 538–3, Missile 

Defense Warfighter Involvement Process, and a corresponding MDA Directive and Instruction. 

Over time, implementation of the WIP changes will facilitate integration of 

Warfighter operational requirements and desired capabilities with the MDA system 

engineering process. The net yield will be a more operationally effective and suitable 

Warfighter oriented future missile defense capability. 

Question. What happens if there’s a disagreement between STRATCOM and MDA 

on an issue? How are differences resolved? 

Answer. There are several venues to alleviate disputes existing between 

USSTRATCOM, representing the warfighter community, and the MDA. As described in section 2.3 of STRATCOM’s Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP) directive, the CDRUSSTRATCOM has personal interaction with the Director of MDA in 

addition to using the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) as a means to resolve disagreements. As directed by JROC memorandum 133–03, Commander, 

USSTRATCOM employs the Global Missile Defense Management Structure to integrate community input on operational concerns and issues. Through the management structure and through WIP interactions, many issues are surfaced and addressed from the 0–6-level up to and including the Executive Steering Committee 

at the 3-Star level. 

Additionally, USSTRATCOM participates in MDA’s Program Change Board (PCB) 

and its subordinate supporting group, the Integration Synchronization Group. The 

PCB is the MDA’s single forum for managing the development, fielding, and integration of the BMDS. The PCB, under the authority of the Director, is the sole decision 

authority for establishing and changing BMDS and element program baselines. 

Given its function, it may also be used to resolve differences between the two communities. 

For conflicts between test and operations of fielded systems, there is a rigorous 

asset management (AM) process. Using co-developed instructions, MDA Directive 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
287 

3000.1, BMDS Asset Management Planning, Scheduling, and Execution; and 

USSTRATCOM Directive 538–1, BMDS System Description and Asset Management, 

the community of BMDS stakeholders, including all MDA program offices and all 

Combatant Commands and their Service components, collaboratively plan, schedule, 

and execute all BMDS test, training, exercise, and maintenance events/activity, 

while ensuring missile defense operations can be executed as directed. 

Question. Are there areas where the process could be improved? 

Answer. The 2007 MDA/USSTRATCOM Summer Study established a Warfighter 

Involvement Process (WIP) evolution focus group to study WIP improvements. This 

group, comprised of members from MDA and Combatant Commanders (COCOM), 

reviewed WIP processes and documents to synchronize Warfighter desired capabilities with MDA’s engineering process. The recommendations from the Summer Study 

are being implemented by both MDA and USSTRATCOM, as appropriate. 

The study team made the following recommendations: 

• Restructure the MDA system engineering process (SEP) to incorporate 

warfighter input during appropriate points in system design which includes the 

road mapping and define and design phases. (process, participants, and overarching) 

• Add a new WIP activity encompassing warfighter analysis of quantity, operating locations, and deployment timing of systems prior to fielding. (process 

and product) 

• Restructure the change request process to permit resolution of single element item, fielding, and training requests in addition to system issues. (process 

and participants) 

• Insert the Achievable Capabilities List (ACL) (MDA) and Prioritized Capabilities List (PCL) (USSTRATCOM) into the evolved SEP with the goal of 

achieving consensus. (product and overarching) 

• Modify the PCL to convey both a long-term vision of the objective BMDS 

and more specifically defined capability needs. (product) 

• Modify the USSTRATCOM WIP instruction to account for these identified 

changes in the process and content of WIP products. (documents recommendations) 

STRATCOM CAPABILITIES MIX STUDY

Question. LTG Campbell, STRATCOM recently completed a Capabilities Mix 

Study, which outlines the combatant commander’s future missile defense force 

structure requirements. 

Please discuss potential new requirements outlined in the study that are present 

in the FY2009 budget submission. 

Answer. The Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO) 

briefed the findings of the Joint Capability Mix (JCM) Study to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) on February 21, 2008. On March 25, 2008, the 

JROC endorsed the study findings. The JCM study findings provide for minimum 

quantities for combat operations in certain contingencies in the 2015 timeframe. 

These findings recommend minimum quantities of upper-tier (THAAD and SM–3) 

interceptors, additional THAAD fire units, and modifications to the Forward Based 

Radar (AN/TPY–2) program. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has briefed the 

Missile Defense Executive Board and the JROC on their plan to meet the JCM 

study findings. It is anticipated that the study findings from this recent iteration 

of the JCM will be included in MDA’s Fiscal Year 2010 and out budget submission. 

MISSILE DEFENSE AND SOLDIER TRAINING

Question. LTG Obering, with the continued development and fielding of the 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, DoD may now have a rudimentary capability to defend U.S. citizens against a limited ballistic missile attack. 

What is your current assessment of training and personnel readiness to use the 

system in defeating a limited ballistic missile attack against the U.S.? 

Answer. Assessment of training and readiness is a Combatant Commander responsibility and final say should be theirs. However, MDA does provide initial qualification training and we support proficiency training at the individual, crew, and 

joint levels. We also provide Ballistic Missile Defense System-Level Training and 

Education covering the capabilities, limitations, and employment of the entire system to the Combatant Command staffs—supporting their ability to develop tactics, 

techniques and procedures to defend America. Based on the training that we provide, I believe that the training and readiness of ballistic missile defense personnel 

is excellent. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
288 

MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND TRANSITION TO THE WARFIGHTER

Question. LTG Campbell, ballistic missiles and technology continue to proliferate 

in the world. Some nations are using their developing ballistic missile capabilities 

to threaten their neighbors. Our deployed forces have a missile defense capability 

with PATRIOT and fielding of Standard Missile 3 as the intercept or on the Aegis 

system. Additionally, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) has successfully returned to flight testing and should soon be a deployed missile defense 

asset. 

Looking to the future, how are you working to transition these missile defense capabilities to the warfighters and to determine the appropriate asset mix of PATRIOTS, Standard Missile–3s, and THAAD interceptors. 

Answer. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is developing memorandum of agreements with individual element lead Services to document the transition process for 

procurement and sustainment. The U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is assisting the other Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) with understanding the capabilities and limitations of these systems in development and how they may impact operations until they transfer to a Service. We have several venues to assist the 

COCOM’s in this, including the Operational Readiness & Acceptance Process, the 

BMDS Combined Element Review, and the BMDS Military Utility Assessment to 

name a few. 

We are continuing to refine the force structure requirements through additional 

analysis and inform MDA of future COCOM capability needs through the 

STRATCOM-led Warfighter Involvement Process, the Joint Requirement Oversight 

Council process, and the Missile Defense Executive Board. 

Active defense forces are but one piece of the solution. Combatant Commanders 

integrate attack operations, passive defense, and non-kinetic options to meet the 

threat. 

GAO QUESTIONS FOR MDA 

Question. To carry out its mission, MDA, until December 2007, executed an acquisition strategy in which the development of missile defense capabilities was organized in 2-year increments known as blocks. In 2007, MDA redefined its block construct to be based on fielding capabilities addressing particular threats as opposed 

to the biennial time periods that were the agency’s past approach. MDA’s new block 

construct makes many positive changes such as establishing unit cost for selected 

block assets, including in a block only those elements or components that will be 

fielded during the block, and abandoning the practice of deferring work block to 

block. However, there are remaining concerns with the new structure as several 

issues are left unaddressed. Specifically, the GAO was concerned that there would 

be no block cost estimates. Instead, MDA will include all prior costs for activities 

included in the block and an expected budget baseline for each block activity. This 

will address the six years included in DOD’s Future Years Defense Plan. 

Why can’t cost estimates be made for nearer term blocks like 1.0 and 2.0—they 

have a large percent of work already completion? 

Answer. MDA will build cost baseline estimates for the full costs of all blocks, not 

just Blocks 1.0 (Defense of the U.S. from Limited North Korean Long-Range 

Threats) and 2.0 (Defense of Allies and Deployed Forces from Short-to-Medium 

Range Threats in One Region/Theater). We also intend to request an independent 

review of these estimates by the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG). 

FY2009 THAAD BUDGET REQUEST

Question. In the FY2009 budget submission for THAAD the request is relatively 

the same as last year, just about $1 billion. 

Can you explain how the funding profile has changed for THAAD from FY2008 

to FY2009 budget submission? 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
289 

Answer. 

CHANGES FROM PB08 TO PB09 

FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY08–13 

PB08 .................................... 858.277 897.358 826.654 756.440 583.732 406,379 4,328.840 

PB09 .................................... 867.064 864.899 689.924 619.949 450.639 343.618 3,836.093 

Delta .................................... 8.787 (32.459 ) (136.730 ) (136.491 ) (133.093 ) (62.761 ) (492.747 ) 

The funding profile has changed as a result of the following adjustments: 

1. The FY08 changes were due to the Appropriation Conference addition for the 

Juniper Cobra 09 exercise and various Congressional undistributed reductions. 

2. In the FY09–FY13 budget submission all AN/TPY–2 Radar efforts were consolidated into the Sensors PE (0603884C). Therefore, THAAD transferred all of their 

funding for the Fire Unit Radars and their associated radar program office support 

to the Sensors PE (0603884). 

3. There were also various Department of Defense adjustments and miscellaneous 

internal MDA adjustments. 

The table below provides a detailed listing of the FY08 to FY09 changes. 

DETAILED CHANGES 

FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY08–13 

Add for Juniper Cobra ................. 14.9 ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ 14.9

Congressional Undistributed Reductions ................................... (6.113 ) ................ ................ ................ ................ ................ (6.113 ) 

THAAD Fire Unit Radar Funding 

Transfer to Sensors PE ........... ................. (40.000) (126.700) (126.600) (124.300) (54.600) (472.200 ) 

Radar Program Office Support 

Transfer to Sensors PE ........... ................. (4.949) (5.098) (5.251) (5.408) (5.570) (26.276 ) 

Various OSD PBDs/MDA Adjustments ...................................... ................. 12.490 (4.932) (4.640) (3.385) (2.591) (3.058 ) 

Totals .................................. 8.787 (32.459) (136.730) (136.491) (133.093) (62.761) (492.747 ) 

Question. How can you spend that amount requested funding with the delay of 

the fire units three and four? 

Answer. Following the February 2008 House and Senate Authorization Staffer 

Day briefing, the Agency made additional internal re-alignments which have restored the $65M in FY09 to enable award of the THAAD Fire Units 3&4 long lead 

contract as originally planned. The Agency has confidence that budget execution for 

FY09 funds for the Terminal PE will continue our track record of exceeding obligation and expenditure goals. Program execution in FY09 is paced by the need for 

completing critical activities on the THAAD Development contract, which was the 

rationale for initially delaying Fire Units 3&4. 

Question. Why does the budget submission not show a reduction due to the fire 

units’ delay? delay? 

Answer. There were primarily only re-alignments between Fire Units and Development funding within the Terminal PE to complete critical activities on the 

THAAD Development contract, with no substantial reduction to the total budget 

submission for THAAD. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
(291) 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2008. 

SHIPBUILDING 

WITNESSES 

VICE ADMIRAL BARRY J. McCULLOUGH, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES 

ALLISON STILLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 

(SHIP PROGRAMS) 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. I want to welcome to the Committee Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Ms. Stiller, and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources, Admiral 

McCullough. We are delighted to have you before the Committee 

and look forward to getting some advice about how we can go forward. 

I have been challenging the shipbuilding industry to come in 

with more realistic goals, and they are saying, well, give us a better design or more finished designed, and we will do that. I think 

it is partly the Navy’s fault and partly industry’s fault. But I have 

been challenging everybody. I said, the Committee is no longer 

willing to keep paying for the mistakes that are made by the Navy 

and industry. So I know that we are getting closer, I think, to that 

kind of an agreement. 

But we also need some advice about any additional ships. If we 

took the ships that the administration sent over, we would never 

get to what the Navy is saying that you need; and so we are going 

to try—Bill and I are going to try to convince the Committee that 

we need three or four more ships. I think they finally sent over 

seven this year. We are going to find a way to get to a number that 

will take us to 313 ships in much less years. I think it would take 

50 years the way they were going. 

So we welcome you to the Committee and look forward to your 

testimony. 

Mr. Young. 

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

I want to join the chairman in welcoming you to the Committee. 

We were one of the original—two of the original Ronald Reagan 

600-ship Navy folks. So we are a little disappointed. We are trying 

to attain 313 ships. But we are going to do the very best we can 

to do that. So we are anxious to hear your testimony today. 

We are very specifically interested in the direction of the Littoral 

Combat Ships, since I understand there have been some serious 

changes in what the ship is going to look like and what it will do. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
292 

Anyway, we are looking forward to what you are going to have to 

say to us, and we may have some questions for you. Thanks for 

being here. 

ADDITIONAL REMARKS OF MR. MURTHA

Mr. MURTHA. The Littoral Combat Ships that Mr. Young mentioned I think is a perfect example of what I am talking about. We 

went in with inadequate design. I knew when they said they cost 

$188 million, and I even commented in Committee, that I doubted 

very much they will come in at that price. I realize the first ships 

are going to be expensive because of the changes and so forth. But 

I think a lot of this is solved if we have a better design earlier so 

that industry can make a legitimate design. I know you went out 

to shipyards that don’t normally do Navy work. But they complained about the changes the Navy makes. 

In the past, we have made mistakes by limiting the number of 

changes the services could make, and the perfect example of that 

is the B–1. We made a deal years ago that we would buy 100 B– 

1s for $20.5 billion with Secretary Weinberger. Well, we built the 

B–1s, but they didn’t have any of the things they needed, and they 

sat on the runway during Gulf War 1991. So we all realize there 

has to be some changes, but when you come to 4 or 5,000, just 

seems to me that is excessive. So we need better design work. 

So we look forward to hearing your testimony and any advice you 

have. We want to put at least 10 ships in the inventory for next 

year. 

Secretary. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF SECRETARY STILLER

Ms. STILLER. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Young, it is a privilege for Vice 

Admiral McCullough and me to appear before you today to discuss 

Navy shipbuilding. I request that our written statement be entered 

into the record. 

The Department is committed to build an affordable fleet at or 

above 313 ships tailored to support the National Defense Strategy, 

the recently signed Maritime Strategy, and the 2006 QDR. For the 

first time in a long while, the Navy’s budget does not include any 

lead ships. This year, a total of seven ships are included in the fiscal year 2009 President’s budget: one Virginia Class submarine, 

one DDG 1000 class ship, two LCS, two T–AKEs, and one Navy 

Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). In addition, although not part of 

the Navy’s 313-ship structure, the Navy will procure one JHSV for 

the Army in 2009. 

I will now elaborate on the specifics of our request. 

The Navy is requesting $2.1 billion of full funding for one Virginia Class submarine in 2009, an advanced procurement for the 

fiscal year 2010 boats, an advanced procurement for two boats in 

fiscal year 2011. The Virginia Class construction program is continuing to make progress toward realizing CNO’s goal of buying 

two Virginia Class submarines for $4 billion as measured in 2005 

dollars by fiscal year 2012. 

Because of your support with the addition of advanced procurement funding last year, the Navy has accelerated the production of 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
293 

two Virginia Class submarines per year from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2011. The Navy also requests approval for the next 

multiyear contract, which encompasses eight boats planned in fiscal year 2009 through 2013. 

Two weeks ago, the Navy awarded contracts for the construction 

of the dual DDG 1000 lead ships to General Dynamics, Bath Iron 

Works and to Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding. The fiscal year 

2009 budget request of $2.55 billion provides full funding for the 

third DDG 1000 and advanced procurement for the fourth ship. 

With recent approval from the Defense Acquisition Executive for 

the follow ship acquisition strategy, the Navy intends to utilize 

fixed price incentive fee contracts through a competition for quantity for the remainder of the class. 

The Navy remains committed to the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 

program, and LCS remains a critical warfighting requirement for 

our Navy. The fiscal year 2009 budget includes $920 million for two 

additional LCS sea frames. The Navy also intends to execute the 

fiscal year 2008 appropriation for one seaframe, utilizing the remaining funding and material from the terminated ships. 

Under an acquisition strategy approved in January, the fiscal 

year 2008 and 2009 awards will be for fixed price incentive contracts based on a limited competition between the current LCS 

seaframe contractors. 

The fiscal year 2009 budget also provides for procurement of two 

T–AKEs in the National Defense Sealift Fund. The fiscal year 2009 

funding is for two ships, T–AKE 11 and 12. 

The Joint High Speed Vessel program is currently in the technology development phase. Lead ship award is anticipated in late 

fiscal year 2008, with delivery of the first vessel in fiscal year 2011. 

The fiscal year 2009 budget includes $187 million for construction 

of the first Navy funded JHSV and $173 million for the second 

Army funded vessel. 

We have worked diligently to stabilize our shipbuilding plan and 

move into serial production. The Navy remains committed to ensure fiscal responsibility in shipbuilding acquisition programs, as 

evidenced by the cancellation of LCS 3 and 4 last year. 

Mr. Chairman, we would like to thank you for this opportunity 

to discuss the Navy shipbuilding budget request for 2009. Vice Admiral McCullough would like to remark briefly on a day in the 

Navy. 

Thank you. 

[The joint statement of Vice Admiral McCullough and Ms. Stiller 

follows.] 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
294 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 858 here 46474B.034
295 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 859 here 46474B.035
296 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 860 here 46474B.036
297 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 861 here 46474B.037
298 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 862 here 46474B.038
299 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 863 here 46474B.039
300 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 864 here 46474B.040
301 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 865 here 46474B.041
302 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 866 here 46474B.042
303 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 867 here 46474B.043
304 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MCCULLOUGH

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Chairman Murtha, Ranking Member 

Young, I am honored to appear before you with Ms. Stiller to discuss Navy shipbuilding. 

Before we begin, I would like to share with you what your Navy 

accomplished one day last week on the 20th of February. 

The fleet is 279 ships strong, with 127 ships underway, or about 

40 percent of our fleet. There are over 332,000 Active component, 

70,000 Reserve component, and 177,000 civilians serving in your 

Navy. 

Beginning in the eastern Atlantic, GEORGE WASHINGTON is 

preparing for future forward deployment to Japan, while the NASSAU Expeditionary Strike Group is underway to start its deployment. 

CROMMELIN, SIMPSON, STEVEN W. GROVES, and Navy P– 

3s are in the Southern Command’s area of responsibility conducting counternarcotics operations in the Caribbean and eastern 

Pacific. 

In the European theater, COLE is operating in the Mediterranean with the British, and SAN JACINTO is in the Black Sea with 

NATO and Partnership for Peace Navies. 

Supporting the African Partnership Station off western Africa, 

FORT MCHENRY arrives in Cameroon; and HSV2 SWIFT is in 

the Gulf of Guinea. 

BAINBRIDGE and JOHN HALL are on station to support the 

President’s visit to the continent. 

In the Central Command area of operations supporting Iraqi and 

Enduring Freedom, HARRY S TRUMAN Carrier Strike Group departs Jebel Ali and the TARAWA Expeditionary Strike Group reenters the Arabian Gulf. 

Riverine forces are conducting a variety of missions in country, 

while, in the air, Navy airborne ISR assets are providing critical 

intelligence to the Navy and special operations forces. 

On the ground, 14,000 Sailors are employed as individual 

augmentees. Six Navy led Provisional Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan delivered aid and reconstruction, while more than 3,000 

medical personnel support operations. 

Off the east coast of Africa, CARNEY, WHIDBEY ISLAND, and 

OSCAR AUSTIN are supporting counter-piracy operations with a 

coalition force. 

In the Pacific theater, the NIMITZ Carrier Strike Group is underway in the western Pacific, providing presence while USS 

KITTY HAWK undergoes maintenance. 

ESSEX Expeditionary Strike Group continues exercises with the 

Republic of the Philippines forces. 

The USS OHIO conducts the first-ever SSGN port visit to Busan, 

Republic of Korea. 

Finally, in the Pacific, the USS LAKE ERIE launches a modified 

SM3 missile and successfully intercepts and destroys an inoperable 

satellite containing a toxic hazard. 

These are everyday examples of the balanced capability set the 

2009 fiscal year shipbuilding program will provide to meet the 

challenges the nation faces with a reasonable degree of risk. The 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
305 

Navy’s 313-ship force structure represents the minimum number of 

ships the Navy requires, the minimum capability and capacity, if 

you will, to provide global reach, persistent presence, and 

warfighting effects expected of our Navy forces as outlined in the 

National Defense Strategy, the QDR 2006, and our recently signed 

Maritime Strategy. 

I thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Navy shipbuilding 

program, your support of our Navy, and I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you very much. 

FLEET SIZE

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you very much. 

The one thing that I keep worrying about is the threat down the 

road in looking past Iraq. I have been arguing policy-wise with the 

White House for a long time. But now I am trying to concentrate 

on how we can stabilize the Armed Forces not only to fight a war, 

to prevent a war. 

I look back at Korea when they drew the line underneath Korea, 

and the North Koreans attacked South Korea because they didn’t 

think we had an interest in the area. When they see we are weak, 

or perceive us as being weak, then I perceive a danger out there. 

Intelligence people only spent a very short time on Russia or 

China, and yet it takes us much longer to build ships today than 

it did in the old days because of the sophistication of these ships. 

So I think we have to start now. 

Every time you say you are going to build 313 ships, you come 

to us and you say, the out years are going to make up the difference. Well, we have said, no, no, we are going to start last year; 

and we didn’t get as far as we wanted. But we hope that we can 

come to an agreement with the Navy and the Senate this year to 

build at least 10 ships. 

A couple suggestions staff has made is to take one of the 1000s 

out and put in two more T–AKEs, because they are stabilized platforms. I don’t know if that is the right answer. But we need some 

suggestion from you folks about which direction to go. Our industrial base is so small and there is so little competition that we 

need, obviously, competition. But, on the other hand, we need to 

build as many ships as we can. So we need to look at all the options. 

I have been talking to Gene Taylor and Mr. Young about the possibility of jumping over the 1000 and going to the nuclear-powered 

cruiser. I would hope, and in talking to you privately beforehand, 

I know the Navy is looking at that. 

Finally, I want to compliment the Navy on the shot that you just 

mentioned as if it were a routine thing, shooting down the satellite. 

That was by far not routine. In everything that I have heard, it 

was a complicated thing, and there had to be some substantial 

changes made. And it shows you planning ahead, how important it 

is when something like that comes about. If it hadn’t been for the 

money that was spent in research and providing what was needed 

in that regard—and that started in this Committee, what we called 

defense of individual ships. A guy named Dave Killian came up 

with the idea. We kept putting it in, and the Navy kept resisting 

what we were trying to do, and finally you developed a much more 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
306 

sophisticated system than we ever envisioned. But the point is we 

come up with some pretty damn good ideas which have been very 

helpful in the long run. 

Mr. Young and I worked assiduously over the years trying to 

make sure that you have what you need. I know that you have cut 

back on I think 28,000 personnel in order to build ships. This is 

when England was the Secretary of the Navy. That is what he told 

me he was going to do. I liked that. I said, well, I worry you’re cutting back too many personnel because you lose your flexibility. But, 

on the other hand, we want to start building ships. 

Well, they stole the money. In other words, the money went 

someplace else. 

Well, we are here to change that direction, to stabilize it. We 

hope that the supplementals will become part of the overall picture, rather than being separate from the base bill that has been 

sent over here to us. Both Mr. Young and I have said over and over 

again, put everything together so that we can understand and plan 

ahead and work with you folks, coming up with a viable defense 

or the strength we need to make sure we prevent a war rather 

than get into a war. 

So I appreciate the Navy’s role. There is no other force that can 

project yourself better than you can. 

I worry you are talking about going down to 10 carriers. That is 

the kind of thing that we get into with the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, not having enough people, not being able to deploy with 

the worldwide commitments that we have. 

So I think you have got to rethink these things. I know how expensive they are. But I know lethality is a lot more than it was 

in World War II, and we don’t need quite as many. But, on the 

other hand, you could only force your ships out there so often. You 

are going to have breakdowns, whether it is the air wing or the 

shipbuilding itself. 

So we want to work with you doing everything we can to help 

you get going in the right direction. 

Mr. Young. 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

We are both committed to doing everything we can to make the 

Navy as strong as it needs to be. So Chairman Murtha is a very 

strong leader in making this happen; and the subcommittee is very, 

very supportive. 

He made one point that I think is important, and that is we have 

got to look beyond the conflict that we are dealing with today in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. We have got to look to what might be the 

next event of hostility that we might face. Navy shipbuilding and 

the Navy fleet, of course, is extremely important to that question. 

Let me go to the LCS, because in working with CNOs, the 

present CNO and previous CNOs, LCS was very, very high up on 

their priority list. We started to build two LCSs. One contractor fell 

a little behind, had some problems. The other contractor was quite 

proud of the fact that they were on track, when all of a sudden the 

other contractor wasn’t on track either. So the Navy has decided 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
307 

to change the design, as I understand; and the LCS of tomorrow 

will not be the LCS that we anticipated yesterday. 

Tell us about that. My understanding is that you are going to a 

design that is very similar to a Coast Guard cutter. I am not sure 

if that is accurate or not. I would like to have the answer to that. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir, I will take part of the question; 

and Allison will jump in where she thinks appropriate. 

First, we have not changed the warfighting requirement for the 

LCS program since its inception. As you know, we started to build 

this ship with very little of a firm design, and it was an underestimation on both the part of the government and the contractor on 

what the implementation of the vessel rules—what the effect of 

that would be, if you will. 

Mr. MURTHA. Say that again. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. The implementation of the Naval Vessel 

Rules. When we initially started this contract, the design was immature and the Naval Vessel Rules had not been finalized. 

Mr. MURTHA. How far along was the design? 

Ms. STILLER. When we signed the contract, about 2 weeks later 

the Naval Vessel Rules were firmed up. What we did as part of the 

contract was say we know they are not firmed up so come back in 

and tell us what the implications are. And we did adjust both contracts. 

What Admiral McCullough has pointed out is both sides underestimated the true impact of the Naval Vessal Rules. But the 

Naval Vessel Rules are approved now, approved before we signed 

the contract for DDG 1000, so we don’t feel we will have that situation on DDG 1000. 

I will defer back to you. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. So we haven’t changed the warfighting 

requirements for the LCSs. The LCSs in what we propose in the 

2009 program will be what we call flight zero plus LCSs. They will 

only incorporate the minimum number of safety changes that we 

feel appropriate for that ship. So there is no intent to wholesale redesign any one of the LCSs. 

We will perform sea trials and builders’ trials and take lessons 

learned from both hull forms and decide what changes, if any, need 

to be implemented in the fiscal year 2010 ships. The LCS meets a 

current critical warfighting gap in the areas of mine warfare, response to high-speed maneuvering surface vessels and littoral antisubmarine warfare. The LCS and its mission modules have been 

designed to meet that warfighting gap. 

Sir, I have heard a lot of discussion about national security cutters, but there is currently no warfighting requirement in the 

United States Navy that sees a national security cutter as a solution. 

Mr. YOUNG. Does your funding profile meet the needs of your 

LCS requirements? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Sir, when we revised the program due to 

the cost growth that we saw on LCS 1 and 2 that subsequently resulted in the cancellation of LCS 3 and 4, the profile we have put 

in the budget is to build the number of ships that we can with the 

amount of money that is profiled in the budget. Our commitment 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
308 

is still to build 55 LCSs, and that will require additional funding 

outside the FYDP. 

Ms. STILLER. I would just like to add we also were given a cost 

cap for LCS, and so the budget reflects that cost cap. The provision 

does not allow us to adjust for escalation over time. The cost cap 

is something we are going to come back to Congress and ask to be 

addressed. Because a ship today isn’t going to cost the same as one 

way out there. Obviously, you will have learning on the first ships 

that will counterbalance the escalation impacts. But as you come 

down a learning curve the cost cap may be a challenge. 

Mr. YOUNG. What is the status of LCS 1 and 2 now? What is 

their construction stage? 

Ms. STILLER. Concerning LCS 1, the program office projects it is 

about 79 percent complete. That is as of December 2007. We are 

going to go to builders’ trials when the ice melts and we are able 

to get underway, hopefully this spring. The good news is both diesel engines were lit off, one yesterday, the second one this morning. 

So the ship is in testing right now, primarily, and things are going 

well. 

On LCS 2 we are about 65 percent complete. This is the Navy’s 

estimate. That is also as of December 2007. They hope to launch 

that ship once she is about 80 percent complete, and that is predicted to be sometime this spring. She will also go into test and 

trials as well. Both should deliver this year. 

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

Mr. YOUNG. Let me shift to another issue, Mr. Chairman, if I 

might. 

Submarines. The Chinese have aggressive underwater programs, 

the surprise that they gave the U.S. Navy by surfacing a submarine very, very near one of our large ships. Is this something 

that the Navy is dealing with? Do you have a plan to find out more 

about what the Chinese are doing or how they are doing it? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir, we do. 

The Chinese have approximately 65 submarines. Some of them 

are extremely modern, and some of them are not. We have a variety of programs using distributive arrays that are in research, development and evaluation to help us get at that problem. The program of record for our advanced sonar system for our surface combatants, the SQQ–89, AV–15. We have accelerated in last year’s 

budget to put additional assets on our ships. 

We are working on surface ship torpedo defense. We have successfully demonstrated the guidance package on an anti-torpedo 

torpedo that could be launched from a surface ship. We recently 

completed a demonstration of detection, classification and localization of a five torpedo salvo up in the Pacific northwest. 

We recognize that the Chinese have accelerated development of 

their submarine program, and we have got several programs and 

several research and development projects under way to counter 

that threat, sir. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
309 

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF SONAR

Mr. YOUNG. You mentioned the advanced sonar program. We are 

beginning to hear a lot about sonar and the effect of sonar on sea 

mammals. Are you gearing up for a discussion of that issue? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Sir, I am on the periphery of that discussion with my counterparts on the OPNAV staff. But that is not 

really in my lane. If you will, I would like to take that question 

for the record. 

Mr. YOUNG. I understand that. Since you mentioned sonar, I just 

thought I might take a shot at it. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. I understand. 

[The information follows:] 

The AN/SQQ–89A advanced surface ship sonar program utilizes the existing hullmounted mid-frequency active (MFA) sonar source, the AN/SQS–53. Improvements 

to the system include upgrades to signal processing and displays in commercial-offthe-shelf computers, a new passive multi-function towed array for improved antisubmarine warfare (ASW) performance, and software upgrades include improvements to the acoustic waveforms. 

Because the advanced system will use the same source as the existing active 

sonar system, the AN/SQS–53, the source level will be the same as that currently 

in use. MFA sonar has been linked with only a very small fraction of marine mammal standings in a limited number of geographic areas (specifically the Bahamas, 

the Canary Islands, and Greece). Despite the limited number of strandings associated with sonar, Navy is concerned about the potential for sonar to negatively affect 

marine mammals. Navy is a world leader in funding research on potential acoustic 

effects on marine mammals and is spending approximately $18 million per year on 

research with ocean agencies, academic institutions, and independant researchers 

around the world to better understand what combinations of ocean conditions, geography, and sonar use may lead to marine mammal disturbances. 

For the U.S. Navy, the safety of Sailors and Marines is top priority when carrying 

out our national security mission. A critical part of this mission is defending Navy 

ships from the current and future submarine threat. The only effective way to 

counter this threat is training with active sonar at sea under simulated combat conditions to detect these submarines before they strike. At the same time, the Navy 

goes to great lengths to protect marine mammals and the environment during training exercises. 

The Navy has implemented an At-Sea Policy to guide compliance with environmental laws, regulations and executive orders in the conduct of naval exercises or 

training at sea. The most important element of this Policy involves environmental 

analysis of all reasonably foreseeable training activities on each of 12 range complexes in the United States. The training activities being analyzed includes the use 

of MFA sonar and its potential effects on marine mammals. These analyses have 

also resulted in extensive coordination with other federal agencies including the National Marine Fisheries Service. 

Currently, all major ASW training exercises using MFA sonar incorporate protective measures to ensure there is minimal effect on the marine environment. Protective measures include: posting highly trained lookouts; listening for marine mammals with passive hydrophones; creating buffer zones within which sonar levels are 

reduced if marine mammals are present; and ceasing sonar operations if marine 

mammals are detected within a certain distance of an active sonar dome. 

Mr. YOUNG. I had a chance 2 weeks ago to visit the Marine 

Mammal Training Center in San Diego, and we had a long discussion about the effect of sonar on those sea animals. It is an issue 

that we are going to be faced with I think pretty seriously as the 

days go on. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

DDG 1000

Mr. MURTHA. Would you go through the DDG, what we are looking at here with the 1000? In other words, was it three of them 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
310 

now in line? If we were to take one out, what does that do to the 

shipbuilding distribution here? If we take one out and we go to two 

T–AKEs, what does that do to our distribution of ships and capability to build ships? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. I will answer that from the industrial base 

perspective. 

You are right, the 2009 ship is the third of the DDG 1000s. Like 

I said, we just awarded the two lead ships. The yards that build 

those ships are General Dynamics, Bath Iron Works and Northrop 

Grumman Shipbuilding down on the gulf coast. T–AKEs are built 

by NASSCO in San Diego. We have two T–AKEs in the 2009 budget already, and we feel when we balanced the seven ships that are 

in the plan, we looked at it from an industrial perspective and felt 

that was a good balance both in the warfighting requirement, what 

with the warfighter needed as well as the industrial base. To put 

two more ships at NASSCO, they likely could not execute four in 

one year. They would have to spread them out over time, the deliveries. 

Mr. MURTHA. How long would it take them to build the four? 

That would end the program, right? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir, that would end the program. I would have 

to look at the exact date. I don’t know that off the top of my head. 

But they likely couldn’t execute four in one year. They are only 

building one a year currently, and we felt that could go to two a 

year. That is why we put the two in 2009. But to go to four would 

be quite a leap for them. 

Mr. MURTHA. What we are looking at is if you take one of the 

others out, that funds the LPD 17 and the two T–AKEs. We are 

looking for how we can shift this and not affect shipbuilding. So 

what happens to the shipbuilding industry? How does this affect it? 

What is the problem we will have? 

Ms. STILLER. The issue will be with the surface combatant builders. Granted, you said an LPD, and Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding builds LPDs as well. So, in their case, it is probably not 

as big of an impact as it would be to Bath Iron Works, who is one 

of our two surface combatant providers. So that would be where the 

industrial base would feel it the most. 

Mr. MURTHA. What does it look like, the profile for the 1000? 

Ms. STILLER. DDG 1000, two ships in 2007. They were split-funded between 2007 and 2008; and then one a year through the rest 

of the FYDP, for a total of seven. So one in 2009, one in 2010. 

Mr. MURTHA. What kind of cost are we talking about and what 

do you see as a cost growth? 

Ms. STILLER. Right now, we don’t estimate we have any cost growth. We have about $2.5 billion in 2009 for DDG 1000, with another $51 million for advance procurement for the next—around 

$2.6, and then it goes down to $2.3, in that range through the outyears where we will start to see the learning in the ships. 

COST REDUCTION EFFORTS

Mr. MURTHA. So what is the difference in the platform between 

a submarine and a 1000? They are going to get the submarine 

down to $2 billion. That is what they are committed to, and I think 

the Navy worked on getting them down to $2 billion. What is the 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
311 

difference between a surface ship, this particular ship, and a Virginia Class submarine? 

Ms. STILLER. As you know, sir, the Virginia Class submarine— 

we have already delivered four Virginia Class submarines and are 

continuing on that path. DDG 1000 is several years behind where 

Virginia Class was. Concerning the Virginia Class submarine cost 

reduction initiatives, we made an investment in R&D to get at 

some of these cost reductions to get to the $2 billion submarine in 

2012. 

The luxury here is you have more ships delivered and more 

quantity in the class to get to that $2 billion a year, where you only 

have seven ships in DDG 1000. Certainly, after you get lead ships 

delivered, you can certainly look at cost reduction efforts for the 

later DDG 1000s. But there are not going to be too many to catch 

with only a seven ship class. 

Mr. MURTHA. We are trying to help you with this. We are trying 

to get to the point where people know in the industry, the Navy 

knows what we can afford over here in the Congress. I know COTS 

has been a big part of them getting the price of the submarine 

down and Navy pressure from the submarine. We are doing the 

same thing, I assume, with the surface ships. 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. We are how far along on the design of the 1000? 

Eighty-five percent did you tell me? 

Ms. STILLER. When we start production later this year, they will 

be at 85 percent complete in design. That is very similar to where 

the Virginia Class was when they started production. In fact, they 

were right at 85 percent. 

We also project the carrier CVN 78 will also be in that range. 

That is because we have taken the steps to make sure that we get 

the design mature, where we didn’t have that luxury on the LCS. 

SHIPBOARD MANNING

Mr. MURTHA. One of the other things this Committee has been 

worried about is the number of people on the ships and the fact 

that you are depending on technology to solve some of these problems. Yet, if we have a major disaster, I worry there is not going 

to be enough. I brought this to Admiral Mullen’s attention when he 

was CNO. He understands that, and I know I have harped on that 

for years and years. 

Are we getting down too low in the number of people? I realize 

personnel costs are going to have to come down. If we are going to 

procure and get our military back to the capability it should be, 

and this is the first war in history where we lost capability rather 

than increased capability with all the services. In order to recapture that, we are going to have to cut personnel costs. The Army 

is going to be the one that suffers. The Navy has already lost some. 

The Air Force cut back substantially and is still not buying the airplanes we need. 

But where are we in that regard? Where are we with the numbers of people on these ships in case something happens? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Mr. Chairman, we look carefully at how 

we design the ships to get to the minimum crew that we can to efVerDate Nov 24 2008 03:47 Jan 31, 2009 Jkt 046474 PO 00000 Frm 00311 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A474P2.XXX A474P2

rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
312 

fectively operate the ship and maintain the damage control standards. I think that is what you are concerned about. 

In the LCS, we have a core crew of 40 folks, with 15 folks for 

the mission package and an aviation det of about 20, for a total of 

75 people on the LCS. 

In the DDG 1000, the core crew on that ship is about 114, with 

an aviation det of 28. The technology advances that let us get to 

the 114 folks had to do with human systems integration in the 

ship’s mission center that allowed us to reduce the number of 

watch standers we had in the combat information center; and advances in technology in the fire suppression systems and the flight 

deck fire suppression systems, which let us reduce the number of 

people we had on standby when we did helicopter operations. 

If you visit a surface combatant today, let’s say a CG 47 or DDG 

51 class, and you land in a helicopter, you will see about 25 Sailors 

as part of the rescue and salvage crew in the event that the helicopter crashed. The modifications that we did in the DDG 1000 

allow the firefighting to be done remotely from the helo control station and the need for only two additional folks to rescue the flight 

crew. 

This has been demonstrated in an engineering demonstration 

module, and we have tested it repeatedly. We put up fans to replicate the wind that you would have across a flight deck during a 

helo crash, which is essentially 30 degrees off the center line at a 

speed of 30 knots. 

Additionally, we took an EX 963 class ship to sea and configured 

the general workshop with fire main, because there isn’t any fire 

main in the workshop on the 963. We put in the fire suppression 

system that we will use in the DDG 1000. It involves a series of 

smart valves that have flow and pressure sensors in the control 

system. We put a 1,000 pound warhead in the general workshop 

and detonated the warhead. The fire main reconfigured itself and 

put the fire out in less than 10 minutes. Demonstrated it worked. 

So we feel confident that the damage control safety of both the 

DDG 1000 and the LCS are supported by the crew. Any further reductions in crew size we would have to seriously look at what technology was available. 

As for personnel costs, as you state, the Navy has been coming 

down in size. I said in my oral statement that we were about 

332,000 people a week ago. The goal is for 322,000 people. N1 has 

a very detailed program on that, Vice Admiral Harvey. 

I would tell you, even as we ramp the number of people down, 

our personnel costs went up at about a percent and a half a year. 

So personnel costs are huge to not only the Navy but all the Services. We have to continue to get our arms around personnel costs 

so we don’t severely impact the procurement accounts, as you referenced. 

Mr. MURTHA. I understand what you are saying, and I appreciate—I assume there is redundancy built into this. For instance, 

the exercise you are working, has a redundancy, and you have tried 

to consider all the alternatives. 

We went into Iraq. We had that problem. Many of us thought we 

needed more people initially. The Secretary of Defense disagreed 

with that. He said no, no, technology will take care of this. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
313 

So you are telling me you are convinced that the technology has 

enough redundancy, that no matter what happens, how many people are killed or wounded on these ships, you will still have enough 

to get that ship back. 

I think it was the Cole or the Roberts, I think it was, was hit 

out in the Gulf, and I went out to visit that ship at one of the ports, 

I think it was Dubai, and it was right down at the water level at 

the time. They told me the horrendous stories about how heroic the 

crew had been in getting that ship saved. Because it hit the mine. 

There was a hole as big as a bus on the side of it. It kept coming 

down. But they got it back; and, of course, we brought it back to 

the United States and repaired it. The point was they had enough 

people to take care of it. 

Then the Navy cut out the firefighting, the damage control school 

that they had at Guantanamo at the same time. The captain of the 

ship had written the regulations for this. So you can see our experience is that once you get into a combat situation it is very hard 

to make the changes. 

So I just hope that you are looking at whatever redundancy is 

necessary. I know what you are talking about personnel costs. You 

are going to struggle here for a while. But I just worry we are not 

going to have enough people that, if something dramatic happens 

on those ships, we are not going to have people to take care of 

them. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Mr. Chairman, I will tell you on the 

DDG 1000 and what we have done with technical mitigation in the 

area of damage control, I am confident in the area of redundancy 

and capability that we have built in that ship that allows us to get 

to the 114 core crew. 

SHIPBUILDING FUNDING

Mr. MURTHA. Is there any advanced funding we need to keep this 

shipbuilding going? For instance, any advanced funding we need in 

the supplemental or in the base bill for next year that we need to 

put in to keep any of these programs going? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. I don’t think there is anything that is required in the supplemental or the base program that is required. 

Mr. MURTHA. Advanced funding for the submarine. There is no 

other program that needs any advanced funding. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. The budget lines that we have put in the 

2009 submittal, the President’s budget 2009 contained all the requirements we have for our programs as submitted in 2009, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. The problems we had at the shipyard down there 

in the south from Katrina, are those all worked out now? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. We have re-baselined all the contracts affected by Katrina, finished that the end of last year, so they are 

executing to those new contracts. 

Admiral McCullough and I were talking on the way over, LHD 

8, who is under construction, also lit off diesels yesterday. We are 

making forward progress down there as well. 

We christened LPD 21 on Saturday in Avondale. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Young. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
314 

LPD 17

Mr. YOUNG. Let me go back to shipbuilding now. LPD 17. The 

Marine Corps this year and also last year made this, an additional 

LPD 17, their number one unfunded requirement. They are really 

feeling strongly about this, considering what their missions might 

be in the future years. 

My big question is I think we are going to have to do this for 

the Marines somewhere along the line. But if we don’t do it in 

2009, is the possibility that you will begin to prepare to close down 

that capability of building that particular ship? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. I will take the operational aspect of that, 

Congressman. 

The Commandant of the Marine Corps has stated a requirement 

for 33 ships in the amphibious assault echelon to deliver two Marine Expeditionary Brigades. He specifically requested 11 aviationcapable ships, 11 LSD 41/49 class, and 11 LPD 17s. The CNO has 

concurred. CNO Roughead has concurred with that determination. 

So we understand and agree with the Commandant’s requirement. 

That said, in the 2009 program, given the needs of the entire 

Navy, we could not put an LPD 17 in the 2009 program. Some 

things we have worked at to get at the Commandant’s requirement 

is looking at extending the service lives on some LHA 1 class ships 

and some LPD 4 class ships. While it doesn’t get to the entire requirement, depending on the year and the mix, we get to anywhere 

from 1.86 to 1.92 MEBs based on a 2015 agreed-to MEB baseline 

between the Navy and Marine Corps. We will continue in future 

programs to look at when and if we can put that ship in the program. 

Ms. STILLER. I will just comment from the ‘‘could you execute it 

and where are you in the program’’. We have delivered the first 

three LPDs, and through LPD 25 are under contract. We awarded 

that contract in December, exercised the option on the contract in 

December. That ship doesn’t deliver until February of 2012. 

There is a backlog of LPD work. As we went through the 2009 

budget, we felt from an industrial base perspective we did not have 

to put the ship in the FY 2009 Budget, that they could wait and 

we could revisit as part of the discussions in POM 10. 

Mr. YOUNG. The answer to my question is, if we do not fund the 

additional LPD 17, we will not close down the line. 

Ms. STILLER. That is correct, sir. Yes, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

VIRGINIA CLASS WELDS

Mr. MURTHA. Tell us about the bad welds on the Virginia class 

submarine. I know staff mentioned this to me. What was the problem there? Where was it and what happened and what did you do 

to correct it? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. This was an issue at Northrop Grumman 

Newport News, not an issue at General Dynamics Electric Boat. It 

was a procedural issue and a quality assurance issue and who was 

overseeing what welds. Newport News took immediate action to 

change processes and procedures. We have looked at all of the weld 

issues on the Virginia Class submarine and have come through all 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
315 

that; and, in fact, we just delivered USS NORTH CAROLINA, 

which was a Newport News boat, on the 21st of February. 

I think we have come through the issue. We have put the right 

processes and procedures in place at Newport News. We don’t feel 

that there are any issues that are going to hold up production on 

the future submarines. 

Mr. MURTHA. Tell me how it was discovered, and it must have 

gone a while before you discovered it. I remember years ago going 

out for the first Trident submarine, and it had 5,000 bad welds, 

and General Dynamics said they wanted us to pay for it, and we 

didn’t. They did it themselves. What happened here is that all at 

once we had a lot of bad welds. 

Ms. STILLER. That was a different issue in the Sea Wolf days. 

That was a material issue that caused the problem. 

In this particular case, it was oversight or supervision of journeymen level folks doing welding and what procedures they had to follow to report when they had to rework a weld, and they weren’t 

doing that necessarily. It got caught in a spot check. That is why 

we wanted to make sure we knew how pervasive it was. 

Mr. MURTHA. Were they in the hull or the piping? 

Ms. STILLER. I believe just the hull. But I will get that for you 

for sure, sir. I don’t remember. 

[The information follows:] 

During routine testing of VIRGINIA Class submarines, the Navy learned of weaknesses in non-nuclear pipe welding processes at Northrop Grumman ShipbuildingNewport News. The Navy has thoroughly investigated the problem, taken corrective 

actions, and certified the ships safe for operations. All of the affected welds have 

been pipe welds. An assessment of the potential long-term impact of this issue is 

due from General Dynamics-Electric Boat and Northrop Grumman ShipbuildingNewport News by April 15, 2008. 

Mr. MURTHA. So now there is no possibility of being in a submarine in the Antarctic underneath the ice. I worry about those 

bad welds. That is not a good thing. 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. In any place we felt the weld needed to be 

reworked, it has been reworked. The engineering discipline 

NAVSEA has looked at, the technical authority has looked at it in 

great detail. 

SEALIFT OF MRAP VEHICLES

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kaptur. 

Let me ask one more question before I go to Ms. Kaptur. 

This MRAP thing has always worried me. It took so long for people to recognize the MRAPs overseas. One of the things that I worried about them when I found out we are going to send them by 

air was they cost $150,000 apiece. Now I understand we send them 

by sea. Are those all U.S.-flagged ships that we are sending them 

in? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Any ship that TRANSCOM or 

Military Sealift Command uses has to be U.S.-flagged and U.S.- 

crewed. 

Mr. MURTHA. If you don’t have the figures, I would like to know 

what it costs per MRAP by ship versus by air. It just kind of worried me that we were sending them by Russian air. Or I guess it 

was Russian airplane. I don’t remember where the crew was from, 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
316 

Kiev or someplace, but, at any rate, Russian air. I think you get 

four in there, and none of our airplanes could carry that many, so 

it was cheaper. It just shows you how our capability has been degraded, and we don’t have the things we need out there now in 

order to get things like the MRAP overseas. 

[The information follows:] 

USTRANSCOM uses these planning factors: 

$18,000 via surface ship per MRAP 

$135,000 via air shipment per MRAP (regardless of whether an AN–124 or 

C–5/C–17 is used) 

Ms. Kaptur. 

LEASING OF FOREIGN-BUILT SHIPS

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me a few moments to catch up. I apologize for being late. We have three concurrent hearings on my subcommittees. 

Let me turn to the issue of the leasing of foreign-built ships. We 

have talked about this in past hearings. Secretary Stiller, what are 

the Navy’s long-term plans regarding the practice of leasing foreign-built ships to augment your sealift capacity? 

Admiral McCullough, my question to you along the same lines, 

what would be the impact to the Navy’s mission if Congress were 

to prohibit the Navy’s ability to enter into these leases on foreignbuilt ships? 

Let’s start with Secretary Stiller. 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, ma’am. 

Today, we have 17 long-term leases for foreign-built ships. All of 

these ships are now U.S.-flagged. To get them to U.S. Coast Guard 

standards, work was done in the U.S. shipyard to bring those ships 

to U.S. Coast Guard standards. There are 17 of these long-term 

leases that were foreign built out of 32 leases right now. When I 

talk lease, I am talking greater than 6 months. Nine of these 17 

won’t be rehired at or before when their lease is expired. The Navy 

has in our budget money to buy out five of the MSC leases, two 

in 2008 and three in 2009. 

Two of the vessels that are under long-term charter are High 

Speed Vessels. The Navy and the Army intend to procure Joint 

High Speed Vessels. When those vessels deliver, these leases won’t 

be continued. 

There is also one Air Force container ship that the requirement 

from the Air Force won’t exist when the lease expires, so we won’t 

renew that lease. 

Then there is one undersea surveillance support ship that is 

going to be filled by reactivating a Navy asset. 

Out of the 17, six of the 17 are from long-term leases that were 

authorized for the MPS force back in 1986. But, again, all of them 

have been reflagged to U.S. standards. 

Ms. KAPTUR. You said 32 or 35? 

Ms. STILLER. Thirty-two total. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thirty-two leases? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, ma’am. Thirty-two long-term leases, and 17 of 

those were foreign-built and then converted to U.S. The remainder 

were built in the U.S. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
317 

Ms. KAPTUR. Can you provide for the record what types of ships 

are being leased? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. KAPTUR. The actual type and purpose and which countries. 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. KAPTUR. And how much we are paying for those leases. 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, ma’am. 

[The information follows:] 

The attached spread sheet provides a complete list of the 32 ships currently under 

long-term charter to the Military Sealift Command (MSC), including the type of 

ship, ship mission, country of origin, and chartering costs. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
318 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 901 here 46474B.044
319 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARINGInsert offset folio 902 here 46474B.045
320 

Ms. KAPTUR. Admiral. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Ms. Stiller talked about which leases we 

were buying out and how we were going to replace a lot of those 

ships with LMSR takes from the Army, which are U.S.-built ships. 

The ones that remain as foreign-built, if we were prohibited or required to terminate the lease, are in our maritime pre-positioning 

force. We would have to procure ships to replace those. Those ships 

are not currently planned to be recapped until the mid-2020s. So 

it would be an additional bill that we would have to figure out how 

to fund to replace that capability. 

Ms. STILLER. I would also add, if the lease period was reduced 

from the 5-year, it would also be costly to the Navy. Because when 

an operator or a ship owner decides to lease the vessel, he is trying 

to amortize it over the greatest period possible. Five years would 

give him a better chance of paying off what he spent to build the 

vessel than a 2-year period. The cost would get passed along to the 

Navy as well. 

SMALL BOAT DEFENSE

Ms. KAPTUR. I am interested in smaller vessels. And you may 

know, obviously, I am from a Great Lakes community; and we have 

tried very hard to retain some ship repair capacity on the Great 

Lakes. That is easier said than done. 

I am wondering about your needs for smaller ships within the 

Navy. A few years ago, a Toledoan was Sailor of the Year. We are 

having all kinds of difficulty in our region of the country repairing 

vessels, getting vessels constructed, getting the Navy’s attention to 

our region. 

The Iranians seem to have a capacity to cause a little trouble 

over there in the Strait of Hormuz and in the Persian Gulf. What 

are your small ship needs; and, for a region like ours, what role 

do you see that companies there or interests there can play in helping to supply the Navy? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Ma’am, as you know, we recently stood 

up the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command. We have developed 

three riverine squadrons. The first one is in the process of or has 

recently completed a deployment in the Haditha Dam protection in 

Iraq. There are some small vessels associated with the riverine 

squadrons but only three squadrons’ worth. 

As we look at the requirement for that capability, I have to say 

we were not sure of exactly what we needed. I looked at a myriad 

of small craft options to work in theater security cooperation both 

in the Horn of Africa region, the Arabian Gulf, and in the Gulf of 

Guinea region. 

What we looked at initially is, since we could not define the requirement because we don’t yet fully understand the mission, is to, 

for lack of a better word, service life extend the patrol coastals, the 

Cyclone class ships that we currently have. We have embarked on 

that at the tune of about $12 million dollars a hull. I will tell you 

we continue to look at that requirement; and, as we design it, we 

will better know what our requirements for small ships are. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Chairman, I have to go cast my vote. Are you 

going to continue the session? 

Mr. MURTHA. I think we will adjourn. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
321 

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. 

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you, very much, Secretary and Admiral. We 

appreciate what you have said. 

The Committee will now adjourn until Thursday at 10:00. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Obey and the answers thereto follow.] 

SHIPBOARD CONTROL SYSTEMS

Question. What steps is the Navy taking in the development of the 313 ship fleet 

to increase commonality of equipment across the fleet? 

Answer. The Department continues to strive to achieve commonality at ship, system, and material levels. The Department is analyzing and implementing where 

possible greater modularity, open architecture, commercial technology, and common 

equipment and specifications: 

• The Naval Sea Systems Command is looking for ways to reduce hull types and 

potential Hull Mechanical and Electrical (HM&E) components with the potential to 

garner savings in testing, logistics, supply, and training. 

• The Department is also assessing ship design commonality opportunities, looking at product data interoperability, design tools, Technical Warrant Holder tools for 

certification, and design community tools coordination. 

• The Navy is even examining the possibility of strategic sourcing with the Navy 

setting up commodities contracts which the shipyards may then utilize to purchase 

from vendors. The objective of the effort would be to allow economic order quantity 

purchases, while maintaining multiple sources to ensure competition. 

÷ In the area of combat systems, the Navy continues looking for efficiencies as 

well. Open architecture is helping the Navy evolve, especially over the long-term. 

The Navy has already made a move to increase the use of COTS-based systems. 

Aegis Combat System Baseline 7 Phase one on DDG 91 and follow is a major example. The Navy intends to continue implementing Open Architecture further, by 

working towards adopting Commercial Software Development practices, leveraging 

Open Source Code offerings, and partnering with Small Businesses in harvesting 

the ‘‘best of breed’’ in Software Algorithms. 

Question. With the existing shipbuilding plan, how many unique surface ship machinery control systems is the Navy currently supporting? 

Answer. There are 13 unique machinery control systems in the Surface Fleet 

today. 

Question. What are the plans for converting proprietary legacy hydraulic control 

systems to more modern technology that uses standard equipment? 

Answer. Today there is no formal program to convert legacy hydraulic systems on 

in-service ships. The Navy monitors the supportability of shipboard hydraulic system components and will consider alterations to more modern technology when necessary. The Navy is designing new classes of ships, such as DDG 1000 and CVN 

78, with significant reductions in the use of hydraulic systems where feasible to reduce life-cycle maintenance costs. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Obey. Questions submitted by Mr. Boyd and the answers thereto follow.] 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

Question. What is your best estimate for when the Navy will complete the competition and select a single contractor? 

Answer. It is vital that the Navy continue through first of class construction challenges to complete LCS 1 and LCS 2. The Navy believes that additional design maturity, production progress on LCS 1 and 2, and a competitive contract award between incumbent suppliers will enable the use of fixed price incentive terms for the 

FY08 ship appropriated by Congress and the two FY09 ships that the Navy is requesting. When these ships are delivered, the Navy will be able to better evaluate 

their costs and capabilities, and to make decisions regarding the best manner to procure the remainder of the class. 

Acquisition strategies for FY10 and outyear ships have not yet been formulated. 

OSD will conduct a Milestone B prior to FY10 procurement. The Navy and OSD will 

consider the questions of single seaframe assessment (or not) and the transition to 

full and open competition (or not) as part of the FY10 acquisition strategy deliberations. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
322 

Question. What is your best estimate for when the Navy will accept delivery of 

the first two Littoral Combat Ships from the contractors? 

Answer. LCS 1 (FREEDOM) is under construction at Marinette Marine, 

Marinette, WI. LCS 1 launched in September 2006, and is projected to deliver in 

August 2008. LCS 2 (INDEPENDENCE) is under construction at Austal USA, Mobile, AL. The Navy projects LCS 2 to deliver in December 2008. 

LCS MISSION MODULES

Question. As we understand it now, the first LCS is scheduled to arrive in Panama City in Oct. 2009 and the second LCS in Jan. 2010. From now until then, the 

Mission Packages are scheduled to remain in Panama City, which offers a lengthy 

opportunity to accomplish intermediate testing that could reduce the risk of integration problems when the LCS actually arrives. 

What is the Navy doing during the next 1.5 years to ensure that the integration 

of the Mission Packages to the LCS is successful? 

Answer. The Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program Offices, PMS 420, the 

LCS Mission Modules Program Office, and PMS 501, the LCS Seaframe Program 

Office, are performing several activities to ensure that the Mission Packages are effectively and successfully integrated into the LCS ships. Ongoing integration activities for the next 1.5 years include: 

• Independent validation and verification (IV&V) of interfaces to ensure that 

both the Seaframe and Mission Modules conform to the approved Interface Control Document; 

• Land-based combat system and shipyard Seaframe software testing of the 

Mission Package Computing Environment with the Ship’s Core Mission Systems 

to ensure interoperability between ship and mission modules; 

• Shipboard testing of mission module components to ensure that the launch, 

recovery, and shipboard handling (LR&H) systems can adequately support the 

mission systems and associated mission package equipment. 

Question. What are the current testing plans for the Mission Packages? 

Answer. Each Mission Package has extensive testing plans: 

• Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Mission Package Unmanned Surface Vehicle 

(USV) integration testing is currently underway, and its sweep payload will be installed and tested this spring and summer. The MCM Detachment Sailors will support DDG–96’s Remote Minehunting System (RMS) Technical Evaluation and Operational testing this summer and fall. MCM Mission Package #1 will be tested endto-end in the waters of Panama City, Florida, beginning in the second quarter of 

FY 2009. 

• Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Mission Package in-water integration testing is 

currently underway. Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV) and their sensor payload 

will be tested in shallow and deep water through the spring and summer. This fall 

(first quarter of FY 2009), ASW Mission Package #1 will undergo end-to-end testing. 

• Surface Warfare (SUW) Mission Package will test fire the Gun mission on the 

range at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren this fall. The software for the gun 

will also be integrated and tested at Dahlgren. This includes an end-to-end test firing against small boat targets planned for early FY 2009. The Non-Line of Sight 

(NLOS) Precision Attack Missile mission module will be tested with the Army. Tests 

include: 

• Captive Flight Testing in the Gulf of Mexico during August 2008; 

• Multiple Restrained Firing Tests at Dahlgren over the next 12 months; 

• Guided Flight Testing of missiles in FY 2009. 

Question. What funding is being provided for this and at what level? 

Answer. The mission module level testing is funded through the RDTE,N appropriation PE0603581N, Project 3129, for LCS Mission Modules. The LCS Mission 

Modules Program plans to apply $9.5M in FY08 and $29.6M in FY09 toward testing. 

Question. If the LCS schedule slips what are the Navy’s contingency plans for 

using the Mission Modules? 

Answer. Mission Packages are not procured for a specific LCS hull. They are procured at a rate to provide in-theater operational flexibility for deployed LCS Seaframes and support forward staging of sufficient Mission Packages to meet operational needs, while allowing for a Mission Package maintenance cycle. 

LCS is the ideal platform for deploying the planned operational capability for 

Mine Warfare, Anti-submarine Warfare, and Surface Warfare. The mission modules 

are designed to integrate seamlessly into the LCS via a standard interface. This allows for these modules to be operated from other platforms if a contingency requirement emerged. Currently, there is no requirement for alternative platforms, and 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
323 

there is no other ship in the U.S. Navy that can fully employ all three Mission Package (MP) types. However, some platforms may offer potentially satisfactory contingency capability for elements of individual Mission Packages. 

USD (AT&L) has directed the Navy to conduct analysis on the use of the Mine 

Countermeasures (MCM) Mission Package on alternate platforms. Analysis is currently underway. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Boyd. Questions submitted by Mr. Hobson and the answers thereto follow.] 

SHIPBUILDING

Question. Admiral McCullough, why is the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2009 budget for new ship construction, including T–AKES’s only $12.1 billion? This is $1.2 billion 

below the Fiscal Year 2008 funding for new ships. Is your office not fighting for a 

larger percentage of the Navy budget? Is the Navy being trumped by the needs of 

the Army and Marine ground forces in Central Command and the expense of new 

procurements for Air Force? 

Answer. The Navy’s base program in the Fiscal Year 2009 President’s Budget represents the best balance of warfighting capabilities within fiscal guidelines. The Defense Department also balances capabilities within its base budget to meet 

warfighting requirements. 

Within the Navy budget, some factors pressurizing warfighting procurement include significantly rising manpower and health care costs in MILPERs; increasing 

fuel costs in O&MN; increased material, design and manufacturing costs in ship 

construction; and accelerated depletion of expected service life due to current operations in the Global War on Terror. There are more requirements than Navy has 

resources which equates to taking risk. The Navy’s Unfunded Priority List outlines 

areas where Navy took risks to its base budget in order to balance the overall program. 

Question. How are you going to rebuild a 313-ship Navy if more money isn’t budgeted for shipbuilding? 

Answer. While the Navy’s FY 2009 shipbuilding budget is less in FY 2009 than 

it was in FY 2008 ($12.4 billion versus $12.5 billion), it represents the best balance 

of meeting requirements with the resources available to the Navy at the time. In 

fact, when accounting for the $588 million in Advance SSN procurement in the FY 

2008 budget and the $300 million in the FY 2008 budget allocated for additional 

T–AKE funding, the total funding available to begin procurement of ships in FY 

2009 is actually approximately $13.2 billion. 

It will always be a challenge for the Navy to procure the quality and quantity 

of ships it needs for the future within the resources made available to us—in this 

environment, it is critical that we balance both the shipbuilding requirements and 

those demands of the myriad other programs the Navy must support. As we have 

said from the start, the Navy must provide well defined requirements that do not 

vary over the life of the shipbuilding programs we currently have and the requirements must be based on a solid foundation of analytic rigor that does not allow for 

‘‘what we can do’’ and only supports what we must be able to do. The current Requirements, Resources and Review Board (R3B) process and gate reviews introduced 

by the Secretary are all aimed at meeting this need. The second step is getting in 

assist industry energized to assist in cost control by facilitating capital investments 

aimed at improving their efficiency and effectiveness in building what we say we 

need at a reasonable and affordable cost. Once we can achieve this step, it will permit us to introduce the stability that we all know will achieve additional cost savings. 

Question. Ms. Stiller, the high cost of Navy ships concerns me. I understand that 

35%–55% of the cost of a warship is in the weapon systems, bought directly by the 

Navy and outside the control of the shipyard. 

How much cost control is the Navy placing on this 35%–55% cost? 

Answer. Contracts with values over $50M are written requiring Earned Value 

Management System (EVMS) reporting. Large cost/incentive contracts are required 

to submit EVMS data directly to the Earned Value (EV) Central Repository. This 

EV Central Repository improves data analysis to facilitate timely and effective management action. Cost Control Incentives are being added to contracts, and are focused on objective and measurable results. 

Question. Has there been any reduction in the cost of the weapon systems over 

the past few years? 

Answer. We are establishing a combat system product line approach based on a 

common objective architecture that utilizes Government controlled architecture and 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
324 

authenticated interfaces. This approach facilitates incremental capability introduction, certification, and testing, resulting in shorter timeframes and reduced costs for 

computer program certification, Test and Evaluation. 

Our future Surface Combat Systems will be created from a mix of existing and 

new components, fully leveraging as much capability as possible from previously developed efforts. This approach was chosen to reduce the costs in procurement of 

weapon systems for new classes of ships. 

Question. How do these costs compare with shipyard costs? 

Answer. Shipyard costs represent 72% of the PB09 shipbuilding (SCN) budget, 

warfare systems costs are 18% and other government furnished equipments costs 

are 10%. Most of the complex warfare systems are not procured by shipyards. These 

percentages can vary based on the mix of combatants in any given shipbuilding 

plan. 

LIFE RAFTS

Question. I understand the Navy is procuring life rafts to replace older models removed from service due to age, fleet modernization, or inspection failure. Currently, 

there are 1,200 of these older, MK6 life rafts left in the fleet. It would cost 

$12,000,000 to purchase new rafts to replace the older ones and additional funds 

for periodic servicing and replacements. 

Apparently, the Navy does not budget for these life rafts, but rather makes procurement decisions for this particular item after Congress has approved the Navy 

budget. This unpredictability results in down-time on the production line, erratic 

swings in production, layoffs and re-hiring of trained personnel, and higher per unit 

costs. 

Why doesn’t the Navy include life raft funding in its budget at a stable level? 

Answer. The President’s Budget submission represents the best balance between 

Navy requirements and resources. Although there is no dedicated Budget Line Item 

(BLI) for the purchase of life rafts, the Navy does purchase Mk–7 & Mk–8 life rafts 

for new construction and in-service ships. Life rafts for shipbuilding programs are 

purchased in support of the end item construction of a ship using Shipbuilding and 

Conversion, Navy (SCN) funds and are provided as Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE) by the shipbuilder. Life rafts for in-service ships in need of replacement 

are available from either existing assets removed from decommissioned ships or are 

newly procured via the Navy Supply System using Operation and Maintenance, 

Navy (O&MN) funds. 

Question. Is the Navy considering budgeting for life rafts—both production and 

ongoing maintenance—in its Fiscal Year 2010 budget? 

Answer. Life rafts for shipbuilding programs are purchased in support of the end 

item construction of a ship using Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) funds, 

and are provided as Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE) by the shipbuilder. Life 

rafts for in-service ships in need of replacement are available from either existing 

assets removed from decommissioned ships, or are newly procured via the Navy 

Supply System using Operation and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) funds. The Fiscal 

Year 2010 budget submission is predecisional, and it would be inappropriate for the 

Navy to comment at this time on any changes in our procurement approach. 

Question. If you do NOT include funds in next year’s budget request, how would 

you procure life rafts? Are you relying on Congress? 

Answer. No, the Navy is not relying on Congress for the procurement and replacement of life rafts. Life rafts for shipbuilding programs are purchased in support of 

the end item construction of a ship using Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) 

funds and provided as Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE) by the shipbuilder. 

In-service ships utilize Fleet Operation and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) funds to 

procure replacement life rafts through the Navy Supply System on an as-needed 

basis. 

Question. Finally, if you do NOT budget funds, how would you work with the 

manufacturer to help smooth out the solicitations in life raft procurement? 

Answer. Mk–7 and Mk–8 life rafts are Navy standard stock items. For new construction, life rafts are purchased by the shipbuilder either through the Navy supply 

system or through the shipbuilder’s own contracts and provided as Contractor Funded Equipment (CFE). For in-service ships, replacement life rafts are procured on an 

as needed basis via the Navy Supply System. The Navy Supply System utilizes past 

procurement information to forecast demand and is dependent upon qualified 

sources to fulfill the demand. The Navy Supply System has a Performance Based 

Logistics contract (N00104–05–A–ZE01) in place with RFD Beauford to provide life 

rafts. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
325 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Hobson. 

Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow.] 

DDG 51 DESTROYER PROGRAM

Question. The Navy is completing construction of the 62 ships in the DDG 51 program. The last year that the Committee appropriated funding for the construction 

of new ships was in fiscal year 2005. With the new DDG 1000 program just getting 

off the ground, there is a possibility to procure additional DDG 51 ships to maintain 

the industrial base until the DDG 1000 program ramps up. 

Secretary Stiller, could the industrial base accommodate the construction of additional DDG 51 class ships even though it has been several years since that program 

has had new funding appropriated? 

Answer. The FY05 President’s Budget procured the final three ships of 62-ship 

DDG 51 Class. Additional DDG 51 Class ships would be in excess of that war fighting requirement and are not part of the Navy’s projected force structure. Based on 

current projected workload, either Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB) or General Dynamics Bath Iron Works (BIW) could absorb the workload of additional DDG 

51 destroyers, but numerous Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) and Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE) vendor base issues (including production restart 

of major components, system obsolescence and configuration issues) would need to 

be resolved in order to award and construct additional ships at either shipyard. All 

material for the ships currently under construction has been procured. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, would the idea of constructing additional DDG 51 

ships be a good risk mitigation effort for the industrial base given the maturity of 

the DDG 1000 program? 

Answer. Although there are always uncertainties in shipbuilding, and particularly 

for lead ship combatants, DDG 1000 has been in design, development, and demonstration for almost six years. The Navy has successfully, on cost and on schedule, 

built and tested the ten critical technologies that provide the capabilities future 

ships need. The ship’s detail design effort is also on cost and on schedule, and will 

be more complete at the start of construction next year than any other previous surface warship. The Navy considers the risk in DDG 1000 sufficiently mitigated to 

begin construction. Although proven in production and operation, the Navy does not 

require additional DDG 51 class ships. In addition, there are numerous ship and 

Government furnished equipment (GFE) vendor base issues (including obsolete 

equipment, new main reduction gear supplier, multiple ship configuration issues, 

and production line re-starts) that would need to be resolved in order to award and 

construct additional DDG 51 class ships at either shipyard. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, what is your estimate for how much a DDG 51 ship 

would cost, considering the fact that there has been such a long break in production? 

Answer. The estimated end cost to competitively procure a single DDG 51 class 

ship in FY 09 is $2.1 B. This estimate assumes current ship construction profiles 

in accordance with the President’s Budget request for FY 2009 and the Navy’s Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for 

FY 2009. 

This estimate utilizes the latest audited Forward Pricing Rate Agreements 

(FPRAs) rates. Impacts for production line restart and contractor furnished equipment/government furnished equipment obsolescence are included. Several ship and 

vendor base issues (including equipment obsolescence, main reduction gears, configuration change issues, and production line re-starts) would need to be resolved 

in order to award and construct an additional DDG 51 class ship. 

Question. Admiral McCullough, has the Navy considered extending the production 

run on the DDG 51 program? 

Answer. The Navy long-range shipbuilding plan seeks to ensure the Navy’s force 

structure meets its operational requirement in terms of capability and capacity. This 

plan, consisting of 313 ships, includes a requirement for 62 DDG 51 Class destroyers. The FY 2005 President’s Budget procured the final three ships of the 62 ship 

DDG 51 Class. 

While changes in our overall shipbuilding strategy are always possible, we believe 

the current mix of ships proposed in the FY 2009 budget represent the best mix 

of capability given available resources. 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
326 

DDG 1000 COMBAT SYSTEM

Question. The combat system on the Virginia Class submarine has been extremely 

successful in that it is built on open architecture concepts that can be quickly upgraded to take advantage of technology advancement as the ship ages. The Navy 

calls this concept ‘‘Acoustic Rapid COTS (commercial-off-the-shelf) Insertion 

(ARCI)’’. The Navy claims the DDG 1000 program is being patterned after the Virginia program in its construction phase. It would be extremely forward-thinking to 

also model the combat system after the Virginia Class to ensure the combat system 

stays current throughout the life of the ship. 

Secretary Stiller, the combat system of the Virginia Class submarine program has 

been successful largely due to the concept of Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion. Is the 

DDG 1000 combat system being designed along the same lines such that the combat 

system can be upgraded without major ship modifications? 

Answer. Yes, the DDG 1000 is an open architecture compliant combat system designed to decouple hardware and software developments so improvements can be 

economically incorporated as they develop without major ship modifications. The 

DDG 1000 also isolates the combat system sensors and weapon systems from the 

Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) so that introduction of future sensors/ 

weapon systems do not significantly impact the core combat system hardware or 

software. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, one of the big advantages that the Virginia Class program has is that the combat system can be upgraded fairly easily (relative to legacy 

submarine and surface ship programs). In fact as submarines are delivered to the 

fleet, they come with the most current version of the combat system rather than 

the combat system that was available when construction began. Can the same be 

said for the DDG 1000 ships? How easy will it be to modernize and update the combat system of the DDG 1000 given that electronics become obsolete every two to four 

years? How frequently will modernization occur for this class of ship? 

Answer. DDG 1000 has made substantial investments in Open Architecture which 

provides the ability to isolate the hardware from the software programs and install 

technology updates as needed. DDG 1000 plans to follow similar COTS refresh cycles (hardware upgrades approximately every 4 years) in order to introduce the latest COTS processors and middleware. The DDG 1000 program is working to identify 

the most cost effective timeframe for a COTS technology upgrade that will not impact the shipbuilders’ ability to complete construction and testing. Since the DDG 

1000 employs a Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) that is comprised of a 

homogenous set of COTS processors that meet Open System standards, this will enable efforts to modernize the combat system electronics. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, will the government own the rights to the combat system design or will the software and/or hardware component design be proprietary 

and belong to the contractor? 

Answer. Yes, with few exceptions. The Navy has at least Government Purpose 

Rights (GPR) to the hardware and software components of the combat system design. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, do you envision the DDG 1000 will use commercial offthe-shelf equipment to help drive down the cost of the combat system? If so, will 

this commercial off-the-shelf equipment be proprietary? 

Answer. Yes, DDG 1000 will use commercial off-the-shelf equipment to help drive 

down the cost of the combat system. The DDG 1000 Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) uses a homogenous set of COTS processors and commercial marketplace networking equipment that were competitively selected. The use of mainstream COTS equipment in DDG 1000 will allow the Navy to gain the latest technology benefits and continue driving down cost. DDG 1000 also has moved away 

from custom built middleware to mainstream COTS middleware without sacrificing 

system performance. The commercial off-the-shelf equipment will be delivered with 

any Intellectual Property (IP) rights that the commercial vendors maintain in order 

to protect their company private investments. This is common across most commercial equipment vendors. The DDG 1000 will only use well defined and published 

Open Architecture interfaces which eliminate the potential for vendor lock into a 

specific set of COTS equipment. This approach is inline with the Navy concept of 

Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (ARCI). 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with HEARING
(i) 

W I T N E S S E S 

Page 

Amos, Lieutenant General J. F .............................................................................. 83 

Campbell, Lieutenant General Kevin .................................................................... 189 

Castellaw, Lieutenant General J. G ....................................................................... 83 

England, Gordon ...................................................................................................... 1 

Francis, Paul ............................................................................................................ 189 

Jonas, T. W ............................................................................................................... 1 

McCullough, Vice Admiral B. J .............................................................................. 291 

Mullen, Admiral M. G ............................................................................................. 1 

Obering, Lieutenant General Henry ...................................................................... 189 

Rochelle, Lieutenant General M. D ........................................................................ 139 

Speakes, Lieutenant General S. M ......................................................................... 139 

Stiller, Allison .......................................................................................................... 291 

Thurman, Lieutenant General J. D ....................................................................... 139 

Æ 


bajohnson on PROD1PC77 with HEARING