U.S. Department of Justice 

NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION
 

PROGRESS REPORT
 

April 2008
 
United States 

Department of Justice 

National Security Division 

PROGRESS Report 

April 2008 
United States Department of Justice
 
 

Message from the Assistant Attorney General
 

March 28, 2008 

Dear Reader: 

The following is a progress report of the new National Security Division, which was established on 

September 28, 2006. This division—the first new Department of Justice division in almost 50 years—was created 

18 months ago to advance the Department’s highest priority: protecting America against international and 

domestic terrorism and other national security threats. This responsibility is borne by the dedicated men and 

women who serve in the entities comprising the new National Security Division—the Counterterrorism Section, 

the Counterespionage Section, the Office of Intelligence, and the Office of Law and Policy—and it is shared with 

countless public officials across all levels of government who devote themselves to protecting our country. 

The period since the establishment of the National Security Division has been one of great change for the 

Department, and we have seen a number of significant national security developments, including the following: 

January 10, 2007 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court) issues orders under 

which any electronic surveillance that was occurring as part of the Terrorist 

Surveillance Program would be conducted subject to the approval of the FISA Court. 

July 13, 2007 The National Security Division, in cooperation with the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, announces its comprehensive oversight program of FBI national 

security investigations. 

August 4, 2007 Congress amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 by passing the 

Protect America Act. 

August 17, 2007 A federal jury convicts Jose Padilla and two co-defendants of providing material 

support to terrorists and related charges. 

October 11, 2007 The National Security Division announces its national Export Enforcement 

Initiative. 

February 11, 2008 The Department of Defense announces Military Commission charges in its 

prosecution of six men for their role in the September 11, 2001, terrorist 

attacks, which is being handled by a joint Department of Defense and 

Department of Justice team of prosecutors and agents. 

My colleagues and I have been proud to play a role in these and many other advances in our national 

security program. The following progress report summarizes these developments and places them in the context 

of the Department’s overall national security strategy. This report also explains the objectives underlying the 

establishment of our new division and the concrete operational and organizational steps we have taken to achieve 

those objectives. It is our hope that this overview will give the reader an understanding of the challenges we face 

and the means by which we are meeting those challenges. 

National Security Division — Progress Report 
United States Department of Justice 

National Security Division — Progress Report 

I would like to express my gratitude to all of my National Security Division colleagues for the outstanding work that is detailed in the following pages. While we all recognize that much work remains to be done, the 

men and women of this division have made great strides and have given much of themselves to enhance our 

national security program. I am very proud to work with such selfless and dedicated public servants. 

I would also like to thank and acknowledge all the personnel outside the National Security Division who 

have worked hard to advance our mission since the establishment of the Division. While our division certainly 

plays a critical role in the counterterrorism effort, we recognize that it is the officers, agents and intelligence analysts who run the investigations and it is the men and women of the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices who handle the 

lion’s share of the prosecutions. We are honored to be their partners in the defense of our national security. 

Finally, I wish to acknowledge George C. Bobb, III, Dean Boyd, Ronnie Edelman, Lisa Farabee, Jamil 

N. Jaffer, Nicholas J. Patterson, Heather Schmidt, and Teresa M. Wilson for their tremendous effort to develop 

and produce this report. It was a challenge to gather, assimilate, and present all the relevant material in a readable 

and comprehensive format. I trust you will find that we have met this challenge and have produced a report that 

captures the breadth, the variety, and the significance of the efforts that are undertaken every day by the women 

and men of the National Security Division. 

Sincerely, 

Kenneth L. Wainstein 

Assistant Attorney General 

for National Security 
Table of Contents
 

Chapter I. Introduction and Executive Summary—Origins of the National Security Division ..........1 


A. Breaking Down the “Wall” Between Intelligence and Law Enforcement....................................1
 

B. Establishing the National Security Division ..............................................................................2
 

Chapter II. The Mission and Objectives of the National Security Division ........................................5
 

A. Mission ......................................................................................................................................5
 

B. Objectives ..................................................................................................................................5
 

1. Centralized Management ......................................................................................................5
 

2. Coordination Across the National Security Spectrum ............................................................5
 

a. Coordination within the Department of Justice ..............................................................5
 

b. Coordination Outside the Justice Department ................................................................6
 

i. Coordination with the Intelligence Community and 


Other Executive Branch Agencies ..............................................................................6
 

ii. Working with Congress ............................................................................................7
 

iii. Coordination with State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal Partners ................................7 


iv. Coordination with Foreign Partners ..........................................................................7 


v. Working with Non-Governmental Entities................................................................8
 

3. National Security Oversight ..................................................................................................8
 

4. National Security Training ....................................................................................................9
 

Chapter III. The Operations of the National Security Division ........................................................11
 

A. The Counterterrorism Section ..................................................................................................11
 

1. Investigating Terrorist Threats..............................................................................................11
 

2. Working with Assistant U.S. Attorneys to Prosecute Terrorists ............................................12
 

3. Combating Terrorist Financing ............................................................................................13 


National Security Division — Progress Report i. 
United States Department of Justice
 

4. Investigating and Prosecuting Detainees in the Military Commissions ................................14
 

5. Reviewing and Authorizing the Use of Particular Tools and Processes..................................14
 

6. Working with Foreign Partners on Investigations and Prosecutions ....................................14
 

7. Overseeing the National Anti-Terrorism Effort....................................................................15 


8. Handling Specially-Assigned Investigations..........................................................................15 


B. The Counterespionage Section ..................................................................................................16
 

1. Espionage Investigations and Prosecutions ..........................................................................16
 

2. Export Controls ..................................................................................................................17
 

a. National Export Enforcement Initiative ........................................................................17
 

b. Export Control Investigations and Prosecutions ............................................................18
 

3. Foreign Agents Registration Act ..........................................................................................19
 

C. The Office of Intelligence ........................................................................................................20 


1. Formation of the Office of Intelligence................................................................................20
 

2. Operations Section ..............................................................................................................21
 

3. Oversight Section ................................................................................................................22
 

a. History of Justice Department Oversight ......................................................................22
 

b. National Security Reviews..............................................................................................22
 

c. Review of Reported Intelligence Oversight Board Violations ........................................23
 

d. Other Oversight Efforts ................................................................................................23
 

4. Litigation Section ................................................................................................................25
 

5. Significant Legal Developments Affecting Our Surveillance Capabilities ............................26
 

a. FISA Court Orders Relating to the Terrorist Surveillance Program ................................26
 

b. Legislation to Modernize the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act................................26
 

D. The Office of Law and Policy ..................................................................................................27
 

ii. National Security Division — Progress Report
Table of Contents
 

Chapter IV. Specific Operations and Efforts ......................................................................................31
 

A. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States............................................................31
 

B. Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism ..................................................................31
 

C. Crisis Management Coordinator Program ................................................................................32
 

Chapter V. Training and Education ....................................................................................................35
 

Chapter VI. Administration ................................................................................................................37
 

A. Administrative Structure............................................................................................................37
 

B. Budget ....................................................................................................................................37
 

C. Continuing Growth ..................................................................................................................38
 

Chapter VII. Important Organizational Events and Milestones ........................................................39
 

Appendix ............................................................................................................................................43
 

A. Major Terrorism Indictments and Convictions..........................................................................43
 

1. International Terrorism Convictions ....................................................................................43
 

2. Terrorist Financing Prosecutions ..........................................................................................46
 

3. Domestic Terrorism Convictions ........................................................................................47 


4. Pending Indictments............................................................................................................48 


B. Major Espionage Indictments and Convictions ........................................................................51
 

C. Major Export Enforcement Indictments and Investigations ......................................................54
 

National Security Division — Progress Report iii. 
“The National Security Division shall consist of the elements of the 

Department of Justice (other than the Federal Bureau of Investigation) 

engaged primarily in support of the intelligence and intelligence-related 

activities of the United States Government, including the following: 

(1) The Assistant Attorney General designated as the Assistant 

Attorney General for National Security under section 507A of 

this title. 

(2) The Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (or any successor 

organization). 

(3) 	The counterterrorism section (or any successor organization). 

(4) 	The counterespionage section (or any successor organization). 

(5) 	Any other element, component, or office designated by 

the Attorney General.” 

—The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005,
 

Pub.L. No. 109-177, Title V, Section 509A(b)
 

(National Security Division), 120 Stat. 192, 249
 

(March 9, 2006)
 
Chapter I. Introduction and Executive Summary—Origins of the National Security Division


I. INTRODUCTION And 

Executive Summary— 

Origins of the National 

Security Division 

The National Security Division (NSD) was launched 

on September 28, 2006, but it has its roots in the tragic events of September 11, 2001, a day that dramatically changed our nation and our government. The 

September 11th attacks prompted our government to 

undertake fundamental changes that would reorient 

the institutions, processes, and resources of our national security apparatus to enhance our ability to defend 

against terrorism. 

While that legislation bolstered our counterterrorism 

capabilities in a variety of ways, its primary contribution 

was to lower the “wall” that had prevented intelligence 

personnel and law enforcement personnel from coordinating and sharing information about the terrorists and 

other national security targets they had in common. 

Over a period of many years, various interpretations of 

the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 

(FISA) had led to the development of internal policies 

and processes that prohibited Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) agents and other Intelligence 

Community personnel who were working on intelligence investigations from collaborating with criminal 

prosecutors and agents who were running criminal 

investigations of the same targets. The USA PATRIOT 

Photo of the Pentagon on 9/11 

A. BREAKING DOWN THE “WALL”


BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND LAW


ENFORCEMENT


The first change came with the passage of the Uniting 

and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 

Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 

of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act) on October 25, 2001. 

Act eliminated the “wall” and authorized the coordination and sharing of information among government 

officials working on intelligence and criminal matters. 

In November 2002, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

Court of Review issued an opinion upholding the elimination of the “wall” and confirming the Justice Department’s ability to coordinate the use of criminal and intelligence tools to prevent terrorism. 

Although dismantling the “wall” quickly prompted 

changes in the way our intelligence and law enforcement personnel conducted investigations, it did not 

produce any immediate changes in the Department’s 

organizational scheme. The Commission on the 

Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (better known as the 

WMD Commission) focused on this issue. While recognizing the important steps taken by the Department 

to improve its national security operations, the 

Commission noted that the Department’s fundamental 

structure had not adapted to promote effective coordination of national security efforts across the intelligence 

and criminal spectrum. Specifically, the WMD Commission noted that the Department’s three primary 

national security components—the Counterterrorism 

Section (CTS), the Counterespionage Section (CES), and 

the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR)— 

remained separated from one another, reported through 

different chains of command, and were located in sepaNational Security Division — Progress Report 1 
United States Department of Justice


rate parts of the Department. The Commission cited the 

Department’s failure to take full organizational advantage of the removal of the “wall” and recommended consolidating these three components into a single division, 

headed by one Assistant Attorney General reporting 

directly to the Deputy Attorney General. 

B. ESTABLISHING THE NATIONAL


SECURITY DIVISION


In response to this recommendation, the Department created an inter-component NSD working group in 2005 

and launched an internal examination of its national security organization. The working group reported to the 

Attorney General that the Department should accept the 

WMD Commission’s recommendation. The Attorney 

General and the President concurred with the working 

group, and thereafter proposed that Congress establish the 

National Security Division by statute. On March 9, 2006, 

Congress formally created the Division as part of the USA 

PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act. 

The National Security Division is led by a presidentiallyappointed, Senate-confirmed Assistant Attorney General 

(AAG) for National Security. Three Deputy Assistant 

Attorneys General (DAAGs) oversee the daily work of the 

Division and report to the AAG. One DAAG leads the 

NSD’s prosecutors in the Counterterrorism and Counterespionage Sections, and focuses on the Department’s 

efforts to disrupt terrorists and other national security 

threats through investigation and prosecution. A second 

DAAG oversees the effort to investigate national security 

threats through the use of intelligence tools, in particular 

those provided under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

Act. The third DAAG heads the new Office of Law and 

Policy that gives legal advice on matters that arise in the 

course of intelligence and investigative activities and that 

formulates policies, strategies, and legislative initiatives 

relating to national security matters. See chart next page. 

These organizational changes facilitate our efforts to protect the nation by providing a single, comprehensive 

approach to national security within the Department. As 

President Bush noted upon signing the USA PATRIOT 

Improvement and Reauthorization Act, the creation of the 

National Security Division “allow[s] the Justice Department to bring together its national security, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and foreign intelligence surveillance operations under a single authority [and] . . . fulfills 

one of the critical recommendations of the WMD 

Commission: It will help our brave men and women in law 

enforcement connect the dots before the terrorists strike.” 

Following Congress’s formal creation of the National 

Security Division in March 2006, the Department dedicated its full resources to establishing the new division. 

In April 2006, the Deputy Attorney General formed a 

National Security Division transition team to prepare 

for the stand-up of the Division. This group of personnel from various parts of the Department worked over 

the next five months to identify and implement the myriad legal, administrative, regulatory, and policy changes 

that were needed to establish the NSD. Thanks to their 

strong efforts, the National Security Division was able to 

commence operations on September 28, 2006, one week 

after Kenneth L. Wainstein was confirmed by the United 

States Senate as the first Assistant Attorney General for 

National Security. 

2 National Security Division — Progress Report 
Chapter I. Introduction and Executive Summary—Origins of the National Security Division


Justice Department National Security Structure 

BEFORE Creation of the National Security Division 

Justice Department National Security Structure 

AFTER Creation of the National Security Division 

Assistant Attorney General 

for National Security 

Attorney General 

Deputy 

Attorney General Office of Intelligence 

Policy and Review 

Assistant 

Attorney General 

Criminal Division 

Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General 

Organized Crime 

& Racketeering 

Section 

Asset Forfeiture & 

Money Laundering 

Section 

Executive Office of the 

Organized Crime Drug 

Enforcement Task Force 

Narcotic & Dangerous 

Drug Section 

Counterespionage Section 

Office of 

International Affairs 

International Criminal 

Investigative Training 

Assistance Program 

Fraud 

Section 

Counterterrorism 

Section 

Appellate 

Section 

Computer Crime & 

Intellectual Property 

Section 

Child Exploitation & 

Obscenity Section 

Office of Special 

Investigations 

Domestic Security 

Section 

Office of 

Enforcement Operations 

Public Integrity 

Section 

Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General 

Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General 

Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General 

Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General 

Attorney General 

Deputy 

Attorney General 

Counterterrorism 

Section 

Counterespionage 

Section 

Office of 

Intelligence 

Office of Law 

and Policy 

Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General 

Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General 

Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General 

National Security Division — Progress Report 3 
“The Department of Justice’s primary national security elements—the 

Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, and the Counterterrorism and 

Counterespionage sections—should be placed under a new Assistant 

Attorney General for National Security.” 

—The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States


Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission),


Report to the President of the United States,


March 31, 2005

CHAPTER II. Mission and Objectives of the National Security Division


II. THE MISSION AND OBJECTIVES 

OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY 

DIVISION 

A. MISSION 

The first priority of the Department of Justice is to 

combat terrorism and other threats to our national 

security. The Department established and designed the 

National Security Division (NSD) to achieve a set of 

organizational and institutional objectives that will 

help us fulfill that critical mission. The primary objectives behind this new division are: 

�The centralization of the management of the 

Department’s national security program. 

�The coordination of operations and policy across the 

national security spectrum. 

�The implementation of comprehensive national 

security oversight. 

�The further development of national security training 

and expertise. 

The following describes the status of our efforts in furtherance of these objectives. 

B. OBJECTIVES 

1. Centralized Management 

Prior to the creation of the National Security Division, 

the Department’s national security operations were 

conducted by several components that worked through 

different chains of command and varied reporting structures. The Counterterrorism Section (CTS) and the 

Counterespionage Section (CES) were located within 

the Criminal Division and reported to that division’s 

Assistant Attorney General through separate deputies, 

while the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review 

(OIPR) was an independent entity, headed by a Counsel 

for Intelligence Policy who reported directly to the Deputy 

Attorney General. The only point of common authority 

between the intelligence lawyers in OIPR and the criminal prosecutors in CES and CTS was in the Office of the 

Deputy Attorney General. While each of these components was supervised by dedicated and effective managers, 

there was no single, clear line of authority and no direct 

management accountability beneath the Deputy Attorney 

General for all matters related to national security. 

Under the NSD structure, all of the national security 

components in Main Justice report up through a single 

management chain. This ensures that the national security mission has a clear voice within the Department 

and that the prosecutorial and intelligence components 

of our national security team are centrally managed. 

2. Coordination Across the National 

Security Spectrum 

The National Security Division is also responsible for 

coordinating the Department’s national security efforts 

among components of the Department, with the 

Intelligence Community and other federal agencies, 

with state, local and foreign governments, and with outside organizations. The Attorney General has directed 

the Assistant Attorney General for National Security to 

establish the mechanisms to ensure this coordination. 

a. Coordination within the 

Department of Justice 

The National Security Division is responsible for ensuring the coordination of all national security matters 

among the various relevant Justice Department components. It coordinates national security matters between 

and among Main Justice and the 93 U.S. Attorneys’ 

Offices—a critical role given that our counterterrorism 

and counterintelligence programs are, by definition, 

national in scope and our investigations invariably 

extend well beyond the geographic confines and the 

interests of a particular judicial district. 

National Security Division — Progress Report 5 
United States Department of Justice


The National Security Division also takes the lead in 

coordinating national security investigations with the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This coordination takes place at all levels. The Attorney General, the 

Deputy Attorney General, the FBI Director, and the 

Assistant Attorney General for National Security meet 

every morning to receive a threat briefing and to discuss 

ongoing investigations and cases. Additionally, the CTS 

and CES supervisors meet regularly with their FBI 

counterparts to discuss pending matters and investigative strategies in particular cases. Similarly, supervisors 

in the Office of Intelligence (OI), the reorganized and 

expanded successor to OIPR, have daily interaction 

with FBI supervisors responsible for the Bureau’s intelligence collection activities. Finally, our line prosecutors 

work in tandem with FBI agents running terrorism 

threat investigations. 

Unlike in the pre-PATRIOT Act era, prosecutors can 

now play central roles in the investigations of our national security targets. This operational role in threat investigations is a tremendous advantage over the days when 

the “wall” kept prosecutors in the dark. It gives investigators access to real-time legal advice on criminal matters 

as they conduct an intelligence investigation; at the same 

time it gives prosecutors insight into the investigation 

that allows them to develop evidence for criminal 

charges that may become necessary to incapacitate a suspect before he undertakes a terrorist attack. 

b. Coordination Outside the Justice 

Department 

The establishment of the National Security Division 

has helped to facilitate more regular and deeper coordination between the Department of Justice and the 

other parties involved in the national security effort. 

i. Coordination with the Intelligence 

Community and Other Executive 

Branch Agencies 

In the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, Congress charged the Assistant Attorney General 

for National Security with serving as the Department’s 

liaison to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) 

and the Intelligence Community, and the NSD has 

made this responsibility a top priority. The AAG and the 

DAAGs in the NSD meet and consult with their Office 

of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) counterparts on virtually a daily basis, and the NSD has 

assigned a detailee to the ODNI to reinforce that collaboration. Since the stand-up of the NSD, the NSD and 

the ODNI have worked jointly on a number of efforts, 

including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 

(FISA) modernization legislation that is the subject of 

active Congressional debate and deliberation at this 

time. NSD attorneys also work on a daily basis with the 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National 

Security Agency (NSA), and other members of the 

Intelligence Community on a range of legal, policy, and 

operational issues and on specific investigations that 

require Justice Department review or participation. 

NSD attorneys also coordinate efforts with a variety of 

other federal agencies that have roles in the national 

security effort, including: 

�The Treasury Department—We assist the Treasury 

Department with its designation of terrorist organizations and in its ongoing work with the Financial 

Action Task Force to identify financing methods 

relating to illegal arms proliferation. 

�The State Department—We coordinate with the 

State Department to provide anti-terrorism training 

and assistance to numerous nations around the globe. 

�The Department of Defense (DOD)—We partner 

with DOD on the prosecution of high value detainees 

under the Military Commissions Act (see below), and 

we regularly provide support to their court-martial 

proceedings against active duty military members 

charged with espionage and related offenses. 

6 National Security Division — Progress Report 
CHAPTER II. Mission and Objectives of the National Security Division


ii. Working with Congress 

National Security Division personnel devote considerable time to briefing Members and staff of the 

Intelligence and Judiciary Committees on national security matters, and we regularly provide technical assistance 

on legislation before Congress. Since the establishment 

of the NSD, the Assistant Attorney General for National 

Security has testified on many occasions about a wide 

range of national security matters, including FISA modernization, the renewal of the Protect America Act that 

amended FISA, and the NSD’s oversight of the FBI’s 

national security investigations and its use of national 

security letters. In addition, NSD Deputies participate in 

regular briefings, such as the semiannual briefings of the 

Intelligence Committees regarding the use of FISA 

authorities and quarterly FBI-led briefings on counterintelligence matters. NSD attorneys have also worked with 

the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Policy to draft 

numerous legislative proposals and to explain those proposals to Congress. 

iii. Coordination with State, Local, 

Territorial, and Tribal Partners 

The Counterterrorism Section oversees the AntiTerrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) program, which is 

designed to provide training, general intelligence, and 

legal guidance to our state, local, territorial, and tribal 

law enforcement partners. The ATAC program is led by 

a national coordinator who, along with six regional 

coordinators, supervises the ATAC coordinators stationed in each of the U.S. Attorney’s Offices across the 

country. These district-based ATAC coordinators, in 

turn, meet regularly with state, local, territorial, and 

tribal officials to share information relating to our 

counterterrorism efforts. In addition, NSD attorneys 

and FBI personnel provide training to prosecutors and 

local law enforcement officials nationwide through 

videos and training programs distributed and coordinated by both the ATACs and the Joint Terrorism Task 

Forces (JTTFs). 

iv. Coordination with Foreign 

Partners 

The National Security Division actively engages with 

our foreign partners to build relationships and to coordinate operations on specific cases and investigations. 

On the relationship front, the NSD leadership works 

closely with the Criminal Division’s Office of 

International Affairs (OIA) and meets weekly with the 

Criminal Division’s Deputy Assistant Attorney General 

responsible for OIA to discuss ways to foster our foreign relationships. The NSD has also provided technical assistance regarding terrorism enforcement capabilities to foreign countries ranging from Panama, the 

Dominican Republic, and Chile in the South American 

and Caribbean theaters; to Rwanda, Benin, Senegal, 

and Kenya in the African theater; and to Malaysia and 

Indonesia in the Asian theater. Additionally, the 

Assistant Attorney General for National Security has 

hosted meetings with dignitaries from numerous counzen, to the United States to face prosecution on charges 

of conspiring to attack Americans in Iraq. Al Delaema 

was originally arrested by Dutch authorities in May 

2005. Following his arrest, Dutch law enforcement and 

prosecution authorities worked with the FBI to investigate 

resents the first United States criminal prosecution arising 

from terrorist activities taking place in Iraq. 

Cooperation with Foreign Partners: 

The Case of Wesam Al Delaema 

The Justice Department’s National Security Division, the 

U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, and 

the Office of International Affairs worked together to 

extradite Wesam Al Delaema, an Iraqi-born Dutch citiAl Delaema’s activities. In September 2005, the United 

States filed a formal request with the Netherlands seeking Al Delaema’s extradition, which was granted by a 

Dutch court and the Ministry of Justice. Al Delaema 

made his initial appearance in federal court in 

Washington, D.C. on January 29, 2007. This case repNational Security Division — Progress Report 7 
United States Department of Justice


tries, and has taken a number of trips abroad to meet 

with officials from the European Union and other 

countries to strengthen ties with our foreign partners. 

NSD attorneys also regularly coordinate specific investigations with prosecutors, agents, and investigating magistrates from foreign countries. For example, NSD attorneys have worked closely with their counterparts in 

Britain to investigate and prosecute those responsible for 

the foiled 2006 plot directed at planes departing 

Heathrow Airport for the United States. Our attorneys 

and prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney’s Office in 

Washington, D.C. also collaborated with Dutch authorities to investigate and extradite Wesam Al Delaema, an 

Iraqi-born Dutch citizen, to the United States to face 

prosecution on charges of conspiring to attack Americans based in Iraq with roadside bombs. 

v. Working with Non-Governmental 

Entities 

Finally, NSD officials routinely meet with non-governmental groups that have an interest in the national security area. NSD officials have met with representatives of the 

defense bar, the American Civil Liberties Union, the 

Heritage Foundation, the American Bar Association, and 

others to discuss emerging national security issues. The 

Assistant Attorney General for National Security and 

other senior Justice Department officials hosted two meetings with leaders of several national privacy and civil liberties organizations to discuss FISA modernization and the 

renewal of the Protect America Act. We appreciate and 

value this interaction with outside groups, as it allows a 

sharing of ideas that helps to test our views and inform our 

decision-making. 

3. National Security Oversight 

While the Department must use its authority to protect 

the nation, we must also comply with the laws, rules, 

and policies that protect the rights and civil liberties of 

the American people. The National Security Division 

has responsibility for overseeing the Department’s foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and other 

national security activities to ensure compliance with 

the Constitution and the protection of civil liberties. 

Upon its establishment, the National Security Division 

assumed a number of specific oversight responsibilities 

that were already in place, including: (1) the review of all 

FBI requests to initiate or continue international terrorism and domestic terrorism enterprise investigations; (2) 

the review of all requests for approval of certain investigative activities under Attorney General Guidelines; (3) 

the implementation and compliance review of FISA minimization procedures in FBI field offices; (4) the review 

and assurance of accuracy in the FBI’s FISA applications; 

and (5) the review of FBI national security undercover 

operations. While these oversight mechanisms were significant, the Attorney General made clear that the 

Division had a mandate to develop a much broader oversight capability. 

Source: National Security Division 

Calendar Years 

Number of Audits 

Annual Number of Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Act (FISA) Minimization Audits 

(2005-2007) 

2005 2006 2007 

0 

5 

10 

15 

20 

25 

30 

35 

8 National Security Division — Progress Report 
CHAPTER II. Mission and Objectives of the National Security Division


In fulfilling that mandate, the National Security Division 

has expanded its national security oversight role well 

beyond the functions it inherited. As described in this 

report, the NSD now also conducts reviews of all FBIreported Intelligence Oversight Board violations, and, 

most importantly, full-spectrum reviews of national security investigations throughout the FBI field offices and 

national security headquarters units. To perform these 

expanded duties, the NSD has created an Oversight 

Section within the newly formed Office of Intelligence 

with supervisors and staff devoted to this critically important mission. With this new section, the NSD has the 

management and organizational structure that will institutionalize this new comprehensive national security oversight function. 

4. National Security Training 

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department 

has prioritized the development of counterterrorism 

expertise within its ranks and among its law enforcement 

partners. The National Security Division has increased 

the quality and caliber of the Department’s training on 

investigative tactics, substantive law, and policies and procedures for national security prosecutors, intelligence 

attorneys, FBI agents, and local police officers. 

2006 2007 

0 

2 

4 

6 

8 

10 

12 

14 

16 

2006 2007 

0 

200 

400 

600 

800 

1000 

1200 

Source: National Security Division 

Fiscal Years 

Fiscal Years 

Number of Attendees 

Number of Conferences & Courses 

National Security Training: 

Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 

11 

886 

1129 

16 

National Security Division — Progress Report 9 
The creation of the National Security Division “allow[s] the Justice 

Department to bring together its national security, counterterrorism, 

counterintelligence, and foreign intelligence surveillance operations 

under a single authority [and] . . . fulfills one of the critical recommendations of the WMD Commission: It will help our brave men and 

women in law enforcement connect the dots before the terrorists strike.” 

—President George W. Bush, upon signing the USA PATRIOT 

Improvement and Reauthorization Act on 

March 9, 2006 
CHAPTER III. The Operations of the National Security Division
 

III. The Operations of the 

National Security Division 

Since its founding, the National Security Division has 

enhanced its operations in a number of ways. It has built 

upon the well-established strengths of its existing components with new initiatives in the Counterterrorism 

Section (CTS) and the Counterespionage Section (CES), 

an expanded mission for the Office of Intelligence (OI), 

and the establishment of new functions and entities 

within the Division, including the Office of Law and 

Policy. The following sections describe these efforts. 

A. THE COUNTERTERRORISM SECTION 

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Counterterrorism Section has spearheaded the development of 

the prosecution strategies supporting the Department’s 

counterterrorism program. CTS attorneys and staff 

pursue this mission by performing the following major 

functions: 

(1) They participate with Assistant U.S. Attorneys 

(AUSAs) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

agents in the investigation of terrorist threats; 

(2) They serve as co-counsel with, and provide subject matter expertise and guidance to, AUSAs in 

international terrorism prosecutions; 

(3) They coordinate the Department’s effort to combat terrorist financing; 

(4) They work with the Department of Defense on 

the prosecution of detainees through military commissions; 

(5) They draft policies and provide guidance to U.S. 

Attorneys’ Offices on the use of criminal and intelligence tools in investigations and prosecutions; 

(6) They review proposed indictments, arrest warrants, search warrants and other types of process, 

and make recommendations for authorization by the 

Assistant Attorney General for National Security; 

(7) They work with foreign partners on international terrorism investigations and prosecutions; and 

(8) They support coordination with our state and 

local partners through the national Anti-Terrorism 

Advisory Council (ATAC) Program. 

1. Investigating Terrorist Threats 

Counterterrorism Section prosecutors work directly with 

AUSAs and FBI agents in the field to investigate potential terrorist threats. This effort marks a significant postSeptember 11th change in the Department’s approach to 

combating terrorism. Before then, most terrorism investigations and prosecutions were reactive, responding to 

events that had already taken place. Once the USA 

PATRIOT Act lowered the “wall” that had effectively 

kept prosecutors out of intelligence investigations, our 

attorneys were able to focus their efforts on the prevention of terrorism before it occurs and the disruption of 

terrorist planning at its earliest stages. As part of this 

effort, CTS attorneys are now centrally involved in terrorism investigations from the outset. 

In addition to their active involvement in specific 

investigations, CTS lawyers also work with FBI headquarters officials to coordinate efforts across investigations. CTS lawyers and FBI supervisors who oversee 

the FBI’s International Terrorism Operations Section 

meet every week to discuss ongoing efforts, share information, resolve outstanding issues, and provide oversight and guidance for pending investigations. 

While the Department’s efforts center primarily on international terrorism, NSD attorneys are also involved in 

the investigation of domestic extremists. As in Europe, 

which is experiencing a growing problem with homegrown terrorists, the line between international and 

domestic terrorists is becoming less distinct within the 

United States. As Deputy Assistant Director Donald Van 

Duyn of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division recently 

National Security Division — Progress Report 11 
United States Department of Justice
 

testified, while the “most dangerous instances of radicalization have so far been overseas, the Islamic radicalization of United States persons, whether foreign-born or 

native, is of increasing concern.” This troubling phenomenon is reflected in the concerted efforts of terrorist 

groups to reach out to disaffected individuals within 

the United States through propaganda and videos disseminated over the Internet. It is also reflected in recent 

U.S. Attorney prosecutions against domestic extremists. In May 2007, for example, five men were charged 

in the U.S. District Court for the District of New 

Jersey for plotting to kill soldiers at the Fort Dix Army 

Base in New Jersey. Similarly, in December 2007, three 

men who were part of a domestic terrorist cell pleaded 

guilty in the U.S. District Court for the Central 

District of California to conspiracy to levy war against 

the Government of the United States in a case involving a terrorist plot to attack military recruiting centers, 

Israeli government targets, and synagogues in the Los 

Angeles area. 

2. Working with Assistant U.S.
 

Attorneys to Prosecute Terrorists
 

While U.S. Attorneys’ Offices indict and prosecute the 

majority of our terrorism cases, Counterterrorism Section attorneys and staff play a significant role in those 

efforts. For example, NSD attorneys provide guidance 

on the important question of when to bring criminal 

charges. The decision to prosecute a suspect exposes the 

Government’s interest in that person and effectively 

terminates covert intelligence investigation. Such determinations require the careful balancing of important 

competing interests: the immediate incapacitation of a 

terrorist suspect and resultant disruption of terrorist 

activities through prosecution, on the one hand, and 

the continuation of intelligence collection about the 

subject’s plans, capabilities, and confederates on the 

other. The National Security Division is well positioned to contribute to that decision-making process, 

by virtue of its role in overseeing both the prosecution 

and intelligence components of the Justice Department’s national security efforts. 

Our attorneys also support field prosecutors with guidance on the many complex and novel legal issues that 

arise in international terrorism prosecutions, such as 

those involving sensitive intelligence sources or foreign 

evidence that is unavailable for introduction at trial. 

They routinely participate in cases that involve litigation under the Classified Information Procedures Act 

(CIPA) over the defendant’s access to—and right to 

introduce at trial—evidence derived from classified 

information. CTS attorneys have assisted in litigation 

regarding CIPA in, among other cases, the prosecutions 

of Zacarias Moussaoui, Jose Padilla, Hamid Hayat, and 

Ahmed Ressam. CTS prosecutors also routinely help U.S. 

Attorneys’ Offices use the material support statutes, which 

National Security Division 

Assistance to Prosecutors 

in the Field: 

The Plot Against John F. Kennedy 

International Airport 

Counterterrorism Section prosecutors from the 

National Security Division worked closely with 

Assistant U.S. Attorneys in the Eastern District of 

New York and investigators from numerous law 

enforcement agencies to investigate and ultimately bring charges in June 2007 against 

Russell Defreitas and three co-defendants in 

connection with a plot to blow up jet fuel supply tanks and pipelines at New York’s John F. 

Kennedy International Airport. A six-count indictment returned on June 28, 2007, charges 

the four defendants with various conspiracies: 

to attack a public transportation system, to 

destroy buildings by fire or explosives, to 

attack aircraft and aircraft materials, to destroy 

international airport facilities, and to attack a 

mass transportation facility. 

12 National Security Division — Progress Report 
CHAPTER III. The Operations of the National Security Division
 

Radicalization in the 

United States: 

The Plot to Attack Soldiers 

at Fort Dix, New Jersey 

In May 2007, five individuals were arrested 

and charged with plotting to kill soldiers at the 

Fort Dix Army Base in New Jersey. A sixth 

defendant was charged with aiding and abetting the illegal possession of firearms by members of the group. The defendants were foreignborn residents of New Jersey and Pennsylvania. 

According to criminal complaints filed in the 

case, members of the group had been plotting 

an attack against Fort Dix since January 2006, 

and two were arrested as they met a confidential government witness to purchase AK-47 

and M-16 assault rifles for the attack. Some of 

the individuals had conducted surveillance of 

Fort Dix as well as Fort Monmouth in New 

Jersey, Dover Air Force Base in Delaware, and 

the U.S. Coast Guard Station in Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania. The co-conspirators had also allegedly conducted small arms training in rural 

Pennsylvania and distributed terrorist training 

videos amongst themselves. 

make it a crime to provide any support—money, property, or services such as lodging, training, or false documents—to terrorists for use in the preparation for or commission of acts of terrorism. Like CIPA, these material 

support statutes raise complex issues that are best handled 

with the input of our prosecutors who have expertise and 

experience applying them in cases around the country. 

Finally, Counterterrorism Section attorneys serve as 

courtroom prosecutors alongside Assistant U.S. 

Attorneys. For example, CTS prosecutors worked with 

AUSAs from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida in the recent successful prosecution of Jose Padilla and two co-defendants for conspiring 

to commit murder and for traveling overseas to receive 

training and to wage violent jihad. One CTS attorney 

served as a full-time member of the prosecution team 

throughout the case, while others helped review intelligence information, handled discovery issues, and 

responded to significant pretrial motions and interlocutory appeals on critical issues. 

3. Combating Terrorist Financing 

The Counterterrorism Section has taken aggressive steps 

to curtail terrorist exploitation of the international financial system to raise and transfer funds. CTS leads the 

Department’s Terrorist Financing Enforcement Initiative 

to identify and prosecute charities and non-government 

organizations (NGOs) that provide financial assistance to 

terrorists and terrorist groups, and it investigates and prosecutes corporations that help finance terrorist organizations. For example, CTS prosecutors participated in the 

investigation and prosecution of Chiquita Brands 

International, Inc. for making regular payments to a 

Colombian terrorist organization, resulting in a corporate 

guilty plea in March 2007 and a $25 million criminal fine. 

The Counterterrorism Section also plays an important 

role in the federal government’s efforts to designate terrorist supporters. CTS recommends potential designees, 

vets other agencies’ recommendations, and provides 

assistance to the Justice Department’s Civil Division in 

its defense of such designations in court. For example, 

CTS supported the Civil Division’s successful effort to 

defend on appeal the designation of the Islamic American 

Relief Agency as an organization that provided significant 

financial support to Usama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and 

other terrorist organizations. 

National Security Division — Progress Report 13 
United States Department of Justice
 

4. Investigating and Prosecuting 

Detainees in the Military Commissions 

Shortly before the creation of the National Security 

Division, President Bush announced that a number of 

high value detainees had been transferred to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and would be considered for 

prosecution by military commission. This group of significant al Qaeda operatives and leaders includes 

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi Binalshibh, Abu 

Zubaydah, and other detainees suspected of involvement in the September 11, 2001 attacks, the 2000 

attack on the USS Cole, and the 1998 East Africa 

Embassy bombings. The Assistant Attorney General for 

National Security has designated one of his senior 

counsels as the main Justice Department liaison to the 

Chief Prosecutor of the Office of Military Commissions. This senior counsel leads a Justice Department 

team of approximately ten experienced prosecutors 

detailed from several U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and from 

the National Security Division, along with a large 

group of FBI agents and analysts. The team is working 

alongside the Department of Defense in assembling the 

evidence and putting together the cases that will underlie the Military Commission charges. For instance, on 

February 11, 2008, a team of Defense and Justice Department prosecutors charged a group of six detainees, 

including Mohammed and Binalshibh, with offenses 

relating to their roles in the September 11th attacks. 

When this case and others go to trial, members of the 

NSD team will serve as co-counsel alongside the 

Department of Defense prosecutors. In addition to 

their work regarding the high value detainees, the NSD 

team also provides significant support to the Department of Defense’s prosecution of other non-high value 

detainees, including reviewing evidence and possible 

charges, assisting with the analysis and drafting of 

pleadings on complex legal issues, and serving as cocounsel in certain instances. 

5. Reviewing and Authorizing the Use of 

Particular Tools and Processes 

Under the provisions of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, U.S. 

Attorneys’ Offices must notify the National Security 

Division when initiating international terrorism investigations and must obtain approval from the Assistant 

Attorney General for National Security before using certain investigative tools or bringing charges in such cases. 

Counterterrorism Section attorneys work with the U.S. 

Attorneys’ Offices to ensure that the proposed investigative tools are justified and that proposed counterterrorism 

indictments are sound, and then recommend and secure 

the Assistant Attorney General’s approval. 

6. Working with Foreign Partners on 

Investigations and Prosecutions 

Counterterrorism Section attorneys work closely with our 

foreign partners on overseas investigations and prosecutions. 

One example of such cooperation is in the British prosecution of Younis Tsouli, also known by his Internet moniker 

“Irhabi 007,” an individual with close ties to al Qaeda in 

Iraq. Tsouli was a “webmaster” for several extremist websites, especially those issuing the statements of the late Abu 

Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq. Tsouli 

posted videos of al Qaeda in Iraq’s attacks on coalition forces 

and the beheading of Western hostages on the Internet. The 

Counterterrorism Section, through the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office for the District of Columbia, obtained criminal 

search warrants of e-mail accounts associated with Tsouli 

and his co-defendants, the fruits of which were passed to 

representatives of the British government. Investigators 

found a computer presentation called “The Illustrated 

Booby Trapping Course” on Tsouli’s laptop computer and 

a film about how to make a suicide vest on a compact disk 

at the home of one of Tsouli’s co-defendants. This information was critically important evidence in the British prosecution, and it helped secure Tsouli’s guilty plea. 

14 National Security Division — Progress Report 
CHAPTER III. The Operations of the National Security Division
 

7. Overseeing the National Anti-Terrorism 

Effort 

Immediately after September 11, 2001, the Attorney 

General issued a directive establishing Anti-Terrorism 

Task Forces (now renamed Anti-Terrorism Advisory 

Councils (ATACs)) in each U.S. Attorney’s Office across 

the nation. These task forces coordinate specific anti-terrorism initiatives, provide training, and facilitate information sharing with state and local authorities in each 

federal district in the country. The ATAC program 

reflects the same impetus that resulted in the creation of 

the National Security Division—a need to bring together resources, people, and information in a joint effort to 

fight terrorism. 

The Counterterrorism Section leads the ATAC program. 

A national ATAC coordinator and six regional coordinators from CTS support the program and work with the 

ATAC coordinators in each district to form a nationwide 

information-sharing network. The regional ATAC coordinators receive regular reports on ongoing terrorism 

investigations from the district ATAC coordinators and 

conversely ensure that all affected districts receive relevant investigative information. 

The ATAC program has also provided guidance to prosecutors on the use of non-terrorism charges to disrupt 

terrorist plots. The attacks of September 11th taught us 

that the Government must use all the tools and statutes 

at its disposal to protect the nation. Frequently, that 

means arresting terrorists or terrorist supporters on nonterrorism charges before their terrorist plots have fully 

matured. These methods can take the suspects off the 

street and disrupt their plans without compromising sensitive sources and methods or revealing classified intelligence information. An example of this approach is the 

prosecution by the Minnesota U.S. Attorney’s Office and 

the Counterterrorism Section of Mohammad Kamal 

Elzahabi, a Lebanese citizen described in a criminal 

complaint as serving in Afghanistan and Chechnya as a 

sniper and training terrorists in Afghanistan and 

Lebanon in the 1990s. While we could not prosecute 

him for these activities for a number of reasons, we were 

able to secure his pretrial detention and eventual conviction on charges based on an immigration fraud scheme 

by which he paid a U.S. citizen to become his bride and 

thereby evaded the immigration laws. 

The ATAC coordinators also have worked with the U.S. 

Attorneys’ Offices to target instrumentalities or specific 

methods that can be used to facilitate terrorism, such as 

identification theft and visa and passport fraud. In addition to direct participation in the prosecutions, CTS 

developed training and disseminated materials to the district ATAC coordinators to assist them in undertaking 

investigations and prosecutions that target these methods and instrumentalities. One such area involved providing guidance on how U.S. Attorneys’ Offices should 

coordinate with officials in other federal agencies, 

including the Department of State and the Social Security Administration, and state Departments of Motor 

Vehicles to target the fraudulent issuance of passports, 

visas, and drivers’ licenses that terrorists use to travel into 

the country and blend into our society. 

8. Handling Specially-Assigned
 

Investigations
 

The National Security Division has also been assigned to 

conduct certain investigations that do not fit within its 

usual caseload of national security prosecutions. We have 

drawn on personnel from CTS and CES to staff those 

special cases. 

The first case is the investigation of the September 16, 

2007 shooting in Baghdad, Iraq in which security contractors from Blackwater USA allegedly killed 17 Iraqi 

civilians. The case was assigned to the National Security 

Division, and we are conducting the investigation in conjunction with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of 

Columbia. Experienced prosecutors from our two offices 

are working closely with a squad of FBI agents to learn the 

circumstances surrounding the shooting and determine 

whether any criminal charges should be pursued. 

The National Security Division also handled the preliminary inquiry into the destruction of videotapes of 

National Security Division — Progress Report 15 
United States Department of Justice
 

detainee interrogations that was publicly announced by 

the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on December 6, 

2007, to determine whether there was a basis for opening a full criminal investigation. Within two days of the 

CIA announcement, a three-person NSD team comprised of a CTS attorney, a CES attorney, and the NSD 

Chief of Staff had joined with personnel from the CIA’s 

Office of the Inspector General and initiated the preliminary inquiry. Applying standards set forth in Attorney 

General Guidelines governing general criminal investigations, they quickly determined that there was a basis for 

going forward with a criminal investigation and recommended that the Attorney General open a full investigation. On January 2, 2008, the Attorney General announced the opening of a criminal investigation and 

appointed a senior Assistant U.S. Attorney from the U.S. 

Attorney’s Office for the District of Connecticut to serve 

as the Acting U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of 

Virginia for purposes of overseeing the investigation. 

B. THE COUNTERESPIONAGE SECTION 

The Counterespionage Section (CES) prosecutes a wide 

variety of national security threats, ranging from spies who 

obtain or disseminate national security information, to individuals who leak classified information, to companies that 

engage in the illegal export of restricted technologies. In 

addition, like the Counterterrorism Section, CES has the 

responsibility to review all prosecutions from around the 

country that involve the statutes it enforces and to provide 

recommendations as to whether the Assistant Attorney 

General for National Security should approve critical steps 

in each prosecution. As with terrorism cases, the process of 

reviewing and authorizing the use of certain tools, investigative steps, and charging decisions is crucial to ensuring 

that national security investigations and prosecutions are 

coordinated nationwide. Finally, CES also handles a number of non-prosecution responsibilities, including operation 

of the office where foreign agents in the United States register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), coordinating cases involving the application of the Classified 

Information Procedures Act (CIPA), and preparing statutorily required reports to Congress concerning cases in which 

prosecution is declined for national security reasons. 

1. Espionage Investigations and Prosecutions 

Espionage continues to be a major, evolving threat to 

national security. Whereas the effort to combat espionage once focused on the Soviet Union and its allies, 

today the United States faces a multitude of espionage 

threats—from stateless international terrorist groups to 

state sponsors of terrorism to foreign intelligence services. 

Despite the end of the Cold War, foreign powers and their 

agents continue to seek information regarding American 

military capabilities, facilities, and systems. 

To combat this threat, the Counterespionage Section 

works with the FBI and other federal agencies to investigate and prosecute espionage cases. Such cases typically 

require extensive coordination among the prosecutors, the 

investigators, and the relevant agencies of the Intelligence 

Community. An example of this coordination is the litigation under CIPA that inevitably arises in cases in which 

we base a criminal prosecution, in some part, on classified 

information or on the sensitive product of intelligence 

activities. CIPA establishes procedures for federal criminal 

cases where there is a possibility that classified information 

may be implicated in discovery or at trial. CES attorneys 

work with their counterparts in the Intelligence 

Community to identify the intelligence issues at stake and 

devise appropriate legal arguments and litigation strategies. This cooperation facilitates both the protection of 

sensitive intelligence sources and methods and the smooth 

presentation of evidence at trial. It also helps us fend off 

the threat of “graymail,” a tactic sometimes employed by 

defendants who attempt to derail prosecutions by claiming that classified records are necessary to their defense and 

must therefore be made available for public use. 

Counterespionage Section attorneys routinely participate in cases that include classified information. For 

instance, a CES attorney played a supporting role in the 

investigation, prosecution, and conviction of FBI analyst 

Leandro Aragoncillo for passing classified information to 

the Philippine government. Additionally, in the recent 

case involving I. Scooter Libby, the former Chief of Staff 

to the Vice President of the United States, CES attorneys 

managed all aspects of the discovery provided to oppos16 National Security Division — Progress Report 
CHAPTER III. The Operations of the National Security Division
 

ing counsel, which included more than 14,000 pages of 

classified and unclassified documents. One CES attorney 

handled the complex matter of substituting unclassified 

summaries for classified information under CIPA, while 

another took the lead in working with the Intelligence 

Community to identify discovery issues and to draft the 

CIPA pleadings. 

Counterespionage Section attorneys also provide advice 

and assistance to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices on cases involving foreign agents who work in secret in the United 

States on behalf of a foreign power. For instance, CES 

The Counterespionage Section’s 

Contributions to the Prosecution of 

Leandro Aragoncillo 

An attorney from the National Security 

Division’s Counterespionage Section (CES) provided substantial assistance to agents and 

prosecutors investigating Leandro Aragoncillo, 

an FBI analyst working at the Fort Monmouth 

Information Technology Center who was formerly employed on the national security staffs 

of Vice Presidents Gore and Cheney. The CES 

attorney reviewed electronic communications 

evidence, facilitated Mutual Legal Assistance 

Treaty (MLAT) requests to the Philippines, formulated a CIPA strategy, helped draft CIPA 

pleadings, and participated in plea negotiations. As a result of the investigation, Aragoncillo 

pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the 

District of New Jersey in May 2006 to providing 

classified information to former and current 

high-level public officials in the Philippine government and was sentenced in July 2007 to ten 

years of imprisonment. 

attorneys assisted Assistant U.S. Attorneys from the U.S. 

Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois in 

their successful prosecution of Sami Khoshaba Latchin 

for acting as a “sleeper agent” for the Iraqi Intelligence 

Service. The Counterespionage Section handled the 

CIPA litigation and participated as co-counsel in pretrial hearings in which an Iraqi defector provided testimony implicating Latchin as an Iraqi agent. 

2. Export Controls 

Foreign states and terrorist organizations actively target 

our government agencies, the defense industrial base, 

private corporations, and universities to steal our most 

sensitive technologies. As FBI Director Robert S. 

Mueller testified in 2006, the FBI has identified foreign 

states that have technology procurement programs 

“aimed at the United States’ most sensitive technologies,” 

such as those related to weapons of mass destruction. 

Over the past few years, the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and 

the National Security Division have handled a steadily 

increasing caseload of prosecutions against defendants 

charged with attempting to acquire and illegally export 

such diverse items as intercontinental ballistic missile 

parts; components for nuclear weapons systems; guidance systems for rockets and missiles; and base ingredients for chemical and biological weapons. 

a. National Export Enforcement 

Initiative 

Given the severity of the threat posed by export control violators, we decided to institutionalize the steady expansion of 

our export control enforcement through a full-fledged 

national prosecution program. On October 11, 2007, the 

Assistant Attorney General for National Security joined 

his counterparts from Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), the FBI, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Defense to announce the 

advent of our nationwide Export Enforcement Initiative. 

This initiative, which was developed in consultation 

with the Terrorism and National Security Subcommittee 

National Security Division — Progress Report 17 
United States Department of Justice
 

of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee, has several different components, including: 

�Expanded export control training for investigators 

and prosecutors around the country; 

�Enhanced guidance on export control enforcement 

for federal prosecutors nationwide; 

�The creation of counter-proliferation task forces in 

federal districts across the country; 

�Coordination with the export licensing agencies to 

facilitate greater communication among the agencies; and 

�The appointment of a National Export Control 

Coordinator to oversee the development, implementation, and maintenance of the initiative. 

The cornerstone of the export enforcement initiative is 

the ongoing formation of Counter-Proliferation Task 

Forces in U.S. Attorneys’ Offices across the country. 

These task forces are building on an inter-agency effort 

initiated last year by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 

Southern District of New York that brought together 

representatives from ICE, the FBI, the Commerce 

Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), 

and relevant investigative agencies within the Defense 

Department. Under the leadership of U.S. Attorneys, 

these task forces foster the type of multi-agency cooperation that is critical to the success of export control investigations and prosecutions. They provide mechanisms 

for member agencies to share investigative information, 

to coordinate investigations, and to receive and follow up 

on actionable intelligence and tips from industry. 

Additionally, the National Security Division has identified 

a number of districts with high concentrations of defenserelated businesses and industry, high-tech facilities, and 

universities that conduct defense-related research, all of 

which are potential targets of illegal foreign acquisition 

efforts. The NSD is working with U.S. Attorneys’ Offices 

to prioritize the creation of task forces in these districts. 

Further, the National Export Control Coordinator is 

finalizing an export control toolkit for use by field prosecutors, as well as a training program designed for those 

U.S. Attorneys’ Offices that do not have extensive experience with such cases. The toolkit and the training conferences discuss the regulatory processes that apply to the 

export of technology and they examine case studies of past 

prosecutions that highlight the complex issues that arise 

from the classified and international aspects of these cases. 

In addition to these training and educational efforts, the 

export control initiative has led to greater coordination 

between the National Security Division and the export 

licensing agencies, particularly the Directorate of 

Defense Trade Controls of the Department of State and 

BIS in the Commerce Department. The NSD has initiated regular monthly meetings with the leadership of the 

enforcement elements of those offices to ensure that 

investigative, prosecution, and enforcement issues are 

discussed among the relevant actors. Also, CES attorneys 

often provide export control lectures for investigative 

agents from ICE, the FBI, the Commerce Department, 

and other agencies. 

b. Export Control Investigations 

and Prosecutions 

The Counterespionage Section continues to work with 

agents and field prosecutors to investigate and prosecute 

those who violate the export laws. There has been a 

steady rise in the number of export control cases, as ICE 

and other federal agencies have increased the tempo of 

their export control operations and Assistant U.S. 

Attorneys have become increasingly familiar with this 

area of the law. The results of this trend are impressive. 

For example, Special Agents of the Defense Criminal 

Investigative Service and ICE and federal prosecutors 

from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District 

of Virginia obtained a guilty plea last year from ITT 

Corporation for violations relating to the illegal export of 

restricted night vision data to the People’s Republic of 

China, Singapore, and an unauthorized facility in the 

United Kingdom. The plea requires ITT to pay $100 

million in fines and penalties, one of the largest amounts 

18 National Security Division — Progress Report 
CHAPTER III. The Operations of the National Security Division
 

Export Control Investigations: 

The Case of Noshir S. Gowadia 

In November 2006, a federal grand jury in the 

U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii 

returned an 18-count superseding indictment 

against Noshir S. Gowadia, charging him with 

designing a stealth exhaust nozzle for a cruise 

missile for the People’s Republic of China. The 

superseding indictment describes six trips taken 

by Gowadia to China for purposes of discussing, designing, and testing the stealth cruise 

missile nozzle. A Counterespionage Section 

attorney from the National Security Division is 

working with the U.S. Air Force and Department of Defense on Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) litigation in this case to 

determine what classified information may be 

used at trial. 

ever imposed in a criminal export control case. Similarly, 

Assistant U.S. Attorneys from the U.S. Attorney’s Office 

for the Central District of California and their FBI colleagues investigated and prosecuted an engineer named 

Chi Mak and a number of his relatives for collecting 

technical information about the U.S. Navy’s current and 

planned warship technologies and illegally exporting it 

to the People’s Republic of China. Mak’s relatives pleaded guilty. Mak was found guilty following a six-week jury 

trial and subsequently sentenced to more than 24 years 

in prison. 

The Counterespionage Section is also playing an important role in this export control prosecution effort. For 

example, a Counterespionage Section attorney is currently involved in the prosecution in the U.S. District Court 

for the District of Hawaii of Noshir S. Gowadia for assisting the People’s Republic of China with the design of a 

stealth exhaust nozzle for a cruise missile. This CES attorney coordinated the use of classified documents; drafted 

much of the indictment, which included several Arms 

Export Control Act violations; and will be prosecuting the 

case along with an Assistant U.S. Attorney from the U.S. 

Attorney’s Office for the District of Hawaii. 

3. Foreign Agents Registration Act 

The Counterespionage Section administers and enforces 

the registration of foreign agents under the Foreign 

Agents Registration Act (FARA). That statute requires 

individuals and companies acting as foreign agents to 

make periodic public disclosures of their relationship 

with their foreign principal, and to describe their activities, receipts, and disbursements arising from that relationship. Disclosure of such information allows the 

Government and the American public to evaluate the 

activities of such individuals in their roles as foreign 

agents. The Counterespionage Section’s FARA unit works 

to ensure public availability of the reported information 

to further FARA’s objective of exposing foreign efforts to 

influence U.S. laws, policy or public opinion. 

Significantly, the Counterespionage Section has deployed 

an Internet-based search tool that permits increased public access to many of the disclosure forms filed by registered foreign agents. Starting in 2005, the Justice 

Department was urged to put the FARA disclosure 

forms on-line, and the FARA unit worked towards this 

goal until May 2007, when the system went live. The 

website gives the public greater access to documents and 

other information related to foreign agent registrations; 

anyone with an Internet connection can now access the 

repository of public documents filed by registered foreign 

agents. This website is a significant step forward in the 

effort to ensure transparency of foreign influence over U.S. 

policy and public opinion. 

The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act, 

signed by President Bush on September 14, 2007, builds 

on the existing searchable database of FARA disclosures 

by calling for the development of electronic forms that 

would allow foreign agents to register on-line. This next 

step is currently in the planning stages and will eliminate 

most aspects of the current paper-based system. 

National Security Division — Progress Report 19 
United States Department of Justice
 

C. THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE 

The Office of Intelligence (OI) ensures that the FBI and 

other intelligence agencies have the legal tools necessary to 

conduct their intelligence operations by representing the 

Government before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

Court (FISA Court) and providing advice and guidance to 

the intelligence community on a variety of sensitive matters. 

The office also conducts oversight of the national security 

activities of the FBI and, in many cases, other agencies in the 

Intelligence Community to ensure adherence to the 

Constitution, applicable laws and regulations, and FISA 

Court orders. Additionally, the office coordinates and participates in a wide range of criminal and civil litigation relating to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and 

other intelligence matters. 

The office has experienced significant change since its 

establishment, including substantial growth in its intelligence operations and an expansion of its oversight mission. While most of the office’s work is classified and cannot be fully described here, the intelligence attorneys and 

staff members in the NSD play an increasingly significant 

role in the Department’s national security efforts. 

1. Formation of the Office of
 

Intelligence
 

One of the National Security Division’s most important initiatives is the formation of the Office of Intelligence, the 

successor to the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review 

(OIPR). From its formation in 1979, OIPR has played a 

critical role in the nation’s effort to prevent acts of international terrorism and to thwart the intelligence activities of 

hostile foreign powers. In the aftermath of the September 

11th attacks, the attorneys and staff members in the office 

have done a heroic job handling the Department’s dramatically increasing volume of FISA work and ensuring that 

agencies in the Intelligence Community have the authority 

necessary to conduct crucial intelligence operations. The 

creation of the NSD presented an opportunity to review the 

OIPR organization and evaluate whether a new structure 

would better support the Division’s mission. The Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General overseeing OIPR met with the 

Source: National Security Division

* Total includes 16 funded positions received in FY 2003

 War Supplemental

Fiscal Years

Total Funded Positions (including attorneys)

Growth in Total Funded Positions at the

Office of Intelligence (2000-2007)

(formerly the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review)

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

29

56

56

82*

82

112

152

182

office’s senior staff, line attorneys, and staff members, as well 

as with attorneys from other components in the Department and officials in the Intelligence Community, to 

discuss ways to build on the office’s strengths. 

Based on this review, the NSD leadership decided to modify the structure of the office. We made that decision for 

several reasons. First, the office’s staff has grown from 

fewer than 20 lawyers in 2000 to almost 100 lawyers 

today, and its operations have grown dramatically with the 

increase in the FISA caseload. Moreover, the office has 

assumed an expanded role in conducting intelligence oversight and in overseeing and coordinating FISA-related litigation. To meet the needs of the expanded staff and mission, we developed a new structure consisting of three sections aligned with our three core functions: operations, litigation, and oversight. Each section will be supervised by 

a chief, who reports directly to the office’s Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General. 

20 National Security Division — Progress Report 
CHAPTER III. The Operations of the National Security Division
 

This approach will help to improve management and 

ensure a greater level of responsibility and accountability 

for each attorney and supervisor. It will also permit 

greater specialization among the supervisors and promote autonomy and responsibility for the line attorneys 

in the office. Further, this structure maintains the tradition of a single entity dedicated to the Department’s 

interrelated intelligence missions, allowing the necessary 

flexibility to allocate staff and resources among the three 

sections to address shifting operational needs. 

The following provides an overview of the purpose, 

structure, and operations of each of the three sections 

of the new Office of Intelligence. 

Structure of the Office of Intelligence

Assistant Attorney General

for National Security

Deputy Assistant Attorney General,

Office of Intelligence

Operations

Section

Litigation

Section

Oversight

Section

2. Operations Section 

The Department’s role in intelligence operations has 

increased dramatically since September 11, 2001. In particular, we are handling more requests for FISA authority 

than ever, while ensuring that applications filed with the 

FISA Court are accurate and adhere to the requirements 

and safeguards of the law. From 2001 to 2006, the annual 

number of FISA applications submitted to the FISA Court 

rose from 932 to 2181 (the statistics for calendar year 2006 

are the most recent numbers available to the public). 

Despite this surge in operations, the office has increased its 

efficiency in preparing and submitting applications to the 

FISA Court. At the beginning of 2007, the office had 

reduced the number of days that it takes to process a FISA 

application by 35 percent compared to the amount of time 

needed for processing at the end of 2004. Further, we had 

reduced the number of FBI FISA applications pending by 

approximately 65 percent during the same period. 

The continued improvement in the efficiency of our 

FISA operations remains one of the National Security 

Division’s top priorities. Through the establishment of a 

separate Operations Section, additional resources, and 

enhanced training, the National Security Division will 

continue to work to make the FISA process more efficient while maintaining the highest standards for our 

work before the FISA Court. 

In addition to handling the increase in the overall number 

of requests for authorization under FISA, the National 

Security Division has applied FISA in new ways to ensure 

that we are using this authority effectively to protect the 

country. Specifically, as discussed below, the Attorney 

General announced in January 2007, that the FISA Court 

had issued orders under which any electronic surveillance 

that was occurring as part of the Terrorist Surveillance 

Program (TSP) would be conducted subject to the 

approval of the FISA Court. NSD attorneys, in coordination with the Office of Legal Counsel, helped to develop the legal arguments and prepare the applications in 

support of these orders, and then devoted substantial 

resources to implement and renew this authority. 

Further, the National Security Division has played a leading role in the implementation of the Protect America Act, 

which Congress enacted in August 2007, to help close a 

gap in our intelligence collection capabilities due to outdated provisions in FISA. The Protect America Act amended FISA to allow the Government to conduct surveillance 

without a court order when the surveillance is directed at 

targets reasonably believed to be located outside the United 

States. On January 15, 2008, the FISA Court, after 

reviewing the Government’s submissions, issued an 

order upholding the procedures the Government uses 

to determine that targets subject to surveillance under 

this authority are reasonably believed to be abroad. In 

general, NSD attorneys and other professionals have 

worked closely with their counterparts in the Office of 

the Director of National Intelligence and other intelligence agencies to ensure that we are making full and 

appropriate use of the Protect America Act. 

National Security Division — Progress Report 21 
United States Department of Justice
 

3. Oversight Section 

In July 2007, the Department announced that a significant new national security oversight and compliance 

effort was being implemented by the Oversight Section 

within the Office of Intelligence. This effort—along 

with the FBI’s new internal compliance program— 

reflects the Department’s enhanced focus on ensuring 

legal and regulatory compliance in our national security investigations. To meet this mandate, Justice 

Department attorneys for the first time have been given 

comprehensive authority to examine the FBI’s national 

security program for adherence to all applicable laws, 

regulations, and guidelines. 

a. History of Justice Department 

Oversight 

To appreciate the significance of the National Security 

Division’s new oversight program, it is important to 

understand the historical context and the extent to 

which this program is a departure from the limited role 

that Justice Department attorneys have historically had 

in the oversight of the FBI’s national security investigations. Justice Department attorneys have traditionally 

played a much more limited oversight role in the FBI’s 

national security investigations than in its criminal 

investigations. Because criminal investigations routinely result in prosecutions—unlike intelligence investigations which rarely do—it has long been understood 

that prosecutors conduct more oversight in criminal 

investigations. For example, in criminal investigations, 

Assistant U.S. Attorneys approve particular investigative steps, such as applications for search warrants, and 

they help oversee the FBI’s use of criminal sources and 

undercover operations through participation on the 

FBI’s Criminal Undercover Review Committee and 

Human Source Review Committee. 

Because intelligence investigations typically focus more 

on identifying and addressing threats than on prosecuting criminals, and because such investigations often 

involve highly sensitive sources and methods, 

Department attorneys have historically exercised less 

regular oversight of the FBI’s national security investigations. The Department’s primary oversight in the 

national security realm has traditionally focused on the 

FBI’s use of FISA and compliance with FISA Court 

orders—a responsibility that derived principally from 

our obligations as the Government’s representative to 

the FISA Court. 

This oversight regime, relatively robust in the FISA area 

but more limited in other areas, was designed at a time 

when the FBI’s national security program was much 

smaller in size and scope. Since the September 11th 

attacks, the FBI has fundamentally transformed itself 

from a law enforcement-focused agency to an agency 

whose top priority is the detection and prevention of terrorist attacks. The increased focus on national security 

operations—and the resultant increase in the FBI’s use of 

investigative tools designed to discover relevant intelligence—has produced the need for a stronger and more 

comprehensive oversight capacity. The National Security 

Division’s new oversight program provides that expanded oversight in the following ways. 

b. National Security Reviews 

In April 2007, we initiated a regular process of conducting 

on-site compliance reviews—called National Security 

Reviews—at the FBI’s field offices and headquarters 

national security components. The goal of the National 

Security Reviews is to ensure that FBI national security 

investigations are in compliance with the Constitution, 

applicable statutes, Attorney General Guidelines, and 

internal FBI policy directives. These National Security 

Reviews are not designed to be inspections or audits; 

rather, they are intended to enable the NSD and the FBI 

to identify recurring issues and areas of operations where 

the Department needs to change or enhance its training, 

policies, or procedures. These reviews are staffed by NSD 

attorneys within the Office of Intelligence, working alongside lawyers from the FBI’s Office of General Counsel. 

Additionally, officials from the Department’s Privacy and 

Civil Liberties Office have accompanied some review 

teams and are briefed on the teams’ findings. 

22 National Security Division — Progress Report 
CHAPTER III. The Operations of the National Security Division
 

The Office of Intelligence determines the staffing needs 

for each review based on an estimate of the number of 

national security investigations to be reviewed. Typically, 

the office designates between three and four attorneys for 

each review, and there have generally been equal numbers of NSD and FBI representatives on each team. One 

experienced attorney leads each review team and is 

responsible for all aspects of the review. This includes 

coordinating with the FBI field office to set up the 

review and ensuring that all preparations are completed; 

managing the workflow and completion of the review; 

and reporting the results of the review. 

During field office reviews, the teams examine a sample 

of the office’s national security investigations. They review 

the case files to ensure, among other things, that there is 

sufficient predication to support the investigation, the 

case was authorized by the appropriate personnel, and 

notice of the investigation was properly provided to the 

National Security Division. The teams also review the 

use of national security letters (NSLs) in these investigations. Specifically, the review teams check for compliance 

with the various statutory authorities and FBI policies 

under which the NSLs are issued, and whether the 

results supplied by service providers comply with the 

request. In addition, the teams meet with FBI personnel 

to resolve questions about particular cases, as well as to 

learn about general practices by that field office in conducting its national security investigations. 

Since the National Security Division started the National 

Security Review process, it has conducted reviews at 

small, medium, and large FBI field offices across the 

country, as well as at FBI headquarters. In 2007, we conducted fifteen reviews at FBI field offices and one FBI 

headquarters component, and we plan to complete another fifteen reviews in 2008. The methodology employed by 

the review teams continues to evolve as lessons from past 

reviews are incorporated into the process, and we will 

adjust and expand the scope of reviews as we identify new 

issues and areas of concern. 

c. Review of Reported Intelligence 

Oversight Board Violations 

The National Security Division plays an important role 

in other areas. At the Attorney General’s direction, we 

review all referrals by the FBI to the President’s 

Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), the standing committee of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory 

Board which reviews intelligence activities that may be 

unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential 

Directive. An FBI referral to the IOB generally arises 

from (1) improper utilization of authorities under FISA; 

(2) failure to adhere to Attorney General Guidelines or 

implementing FBI policy; or (3) improper utilization of 

authorities involving national security letters. We review 

these referrals, each of which includes a description of 

the factual background of the incident, to detect patterns 

of conduct that may indicate that a change in policy, 

training, or oversight mechanisms is required. We report 

to the Attorney General semiannually on findings regarding such referrals, and inform the Department’s 

Chief Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer of any referral 

that raises serious civil liberties or privacy issues. 

d. Other Oversight Efforts 

In addition, the National Security Division’s oversight 

program has responsibility for: 

�Implementation of the Protect America Act of 2007 

(PAA). 

Within 14 days of an agency’s initiation of any 

surveillance activities pursuant to authority 

granted in the Protect America Act, the 

National Security Division, in conjunction 

with the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence (ODNI), conducts a review of the 

agency’s use of such authority. These reviews 

assess the agency’s compliance with the 

National Security Division — Progress Report 23 
United States Department of Justice
 

requirements of the PAA, including the 

procedures by which the agency ensures 

that its surveillance activities are targeting persons reasonably believed to be 

located outside the United States. The 

NSD, together with ODNI, conducts 

subsequent reviews at least once every 

thirty days. 

�Review of national security investigation 

notices prepared by the FBI in order to 

ensure that these investigations are conducted in accordance with the relevant Attorney 

General Guidelines. 

After the September 11, 2001, terrorist 

attacks, the Department of Justice carried out a comprehensive review of all of 

its existing guidelines and procedures 

that related to national security matters. 

This re-examination resulted in the 

issuance of the Attorney General’s Guidelines for 

FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign 

Intelligence Collection, which became effective 

on October 31, 2003. Generally, the Guidelines 

authorize the FBI to investigate and collect foreign intelligence on threats to the national security of the United States and to extend investigative help on these matters to state, local, and foreign governments. Specifically, the Guidelines 

authorize the FBI to conduct three levels of investigations: threat assessments, preliminary investigations, and full investigations. NSD attorneys 

receive and review notices of all of the FBI’s preliminary and full investigations to ensure that 

these notices comply with the Guidelines and 

reflect sufficient predication for each level of 

investigation. 

�Reviews in FBI field offices to ensure compliance 

with court-ordered minimization requirements and 

the factual accuracy of FBI declarations submitted 

to the FISA Court. 

Source: National Security Division

Number of FISAs Approved

FISA Applications Approved (2001-2006)

Calendar Years

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

934

1228

1724 1754

2072 2176

Orders issued by the FISA Court direct the 

Government to follow minimization procedures that are reasonably designed to minimize 

the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the 

dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United 

States persons, consistent with the need of the 

Government to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information. Experienced NSD attorneys regularly travel to FBI 

field offices to conduct minimization reviews. 

During these reviews, the attorneys analyze 

FBI case files to assess whether results of FISA 

Court-authorized electronic surveillance and 

physical searches have been minimized in 

accordance with the procedures set forth in the 

orders of the FISA Court. NSD attorneys advise 

case agents, intelligence analysts, and linguists 

on case-specific issues and provide training to 

those involved in the minimization process. 

24 National Security Division — Progress Report 
CHAPTER III. The Operations of the National Security Division
 

The attorneys also conduct line-by-line 

reviews of selected applications presented to 

the FISA Court to ensure that the FBI possesses supporting documentation for each casespecific fact asserted therein. These accuracy 

reviews help to maintain the accuracy of the 

applications presented to the FISA Court. 

�Review of FBI requests for Attorney General certifications to undertake particular activities with 

respect to undercover operations in the national 

security arena. 

NSD attorneys review FBI requests to conduct 

certain undercover operations in national security investigations. Pursuant to statute, the FBI 

must obtain approval from the Department to 

deposit appropriated funds into banks and 

other financial institutions, to lease property, 

and to use any proceeds garnered from 

approved undercover operations to offset 

expenses incurred in these operations. 

4. Litigation Section 

With the lowering of the “wall” between intelligence and 

law enforcement investigations and the enhanced coordination between intelligence and law enforcement personnel, we are seeing a steady increase in the number of 

requests to use information from FISA-authorized activities as evidence in the criminal prosecution of terrorists 

and spies. As a result, the National Security Division 

established a separate litigation section to ensure that we 

dedicate sufficient resources to criminal and civil litigation involving FISA and to assist federal prosecutors with 

the handling of evidentiary and discovery issues in such 

matters. These efforts cross a broad range of areas. We 

coordinate and prepare requests for Attorney General 

authorization to use information obtained from FISAauthorized surveillance and searches in criminal and noncriminal proceedings. We also draft motions and briefs 

and present arguments to respond to defense motions to 

disclose FISA applications and to suppress the fruits of 

FISA collection. Finally, we work to ensure the consistent 

application of FISA in trial and appellate courts around 

the country. Since 2001, the number and complexity of 

these cases have risen dramatically. The number of 

requests to use FISA information, for example, has 

increased steadily since 2001, with a 40 percent increase 

in the number of such requests between 2005 and 2006 

alone. This trend reflects the growing importance of the 

use of FISA information in terrorism and espionage 

prosecutions. 

We have achieved consistent success in our FISA litigation efforts, working with other Department attorneys 

and with U.S. Attorneys’ Offices across the country to 

obtain decisions in numerous cases upholding key provisions of the statute and rejecting defendants’ efforts to disclose FISA applications, orders, and other related materials. Significantly, two federal district courts have recently 

sustained the constitutionality of FISA under the Fourth 

Amendment, upholding the statute’s “significant purpose” 

provisions. See United States v. Abu-Jihaad, No. 3:07-CR57 (D. Conn. January 24, 2008); United States v. 

Mybayyid, 512 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D. Mass. 2007). These 

provisions, added to FISA in 2001, helped to eliminate 

the “wall” between intelligence and law enforcement 

investigations by making it clear that foreign intelligence 

collection must be a significant—as opposed to the primary—purpose of FISA-authorized activities. These cases 

specifically rejected the holding of an Oregon federal 

court, which issued a judgment declaring the “significant 

purpose” provisions of FISA unconstitutional. See Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Or. 2007). 

This decision is on appeal. 

In connection with our FISA litigation program, in January 2008, the National Security Division developed a 

new policy, approved by the Attorney General, on the 

use by investigators and prosecutors of information 

obtained or derived from FISA collections. This new 

policy includes significant changes from current practice 

and is designed to streamline the process for using FISA 

information in certain basic investigative processes, while 

still ensuring that important intelligence and law 

enforcement interests are protected. The policy continues to emphasize that investigators and prosecutors 

should work closely with the National Security Division 

and Intelligence Community when seeking to use FISA 

National Security Division — Progress Report 25 
 

United States Department of Justice
 

information, but also recognizes that the risks to intelligence interests associated with certain investigative techniques are comparatively low and therefore should be 

subject to a streamlined coordination process. 

In addition to its litigation efforts, the National Security 

Division also has developed a variety of resources to assist 

intelligence lawyers and prosecutors in the field. In April 

2007, the NSD published a primer on FISA litigation 

case law called the FISA Litigation Report, and compiled 

an intelligence attorney’s resource manual to assist with 

training and litigation matters. 

5. Significant Legal Developments 

Affecting Our Surveillance Capabilities 

The National Security Division played a critical role in 

two landmark changes in the law relating to the interplay between FISA and our foreign intelligence surveillance activities. The first was the successful effort to 

obtain FISA Court orders under which any electronic 

surveillance that was occurring as part of the Terrorist 

Surveillance Program (TSP) would be conducted subject 

to the approval of the FISA Court. The second was the 

passage of the Protect America Act (PAA), which returned 

the FISA statute to its original focus on domestic surveillance and clarified that surveillances directed at foreign intelligence targets overseas do not fall within the 

scope of the court approval requirements in FISA. 

a. FISA Court Orders Relating to 

the Terrorist Surveillance Program 

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 

President authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) 

to conduct an intelligence program that is now known as 

the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Under the TSP, the 

NSA targeted for collection international communications into or out of the United States where the 

Government had probable cause to believe that one of the 

communicants was a member or agent of al Qaeda or an 

associated terrorist organization. On January 17, 2007, 

the Attorney General sent a letter to Congress stating 

that on January 10, 2007, the FISA Court had issued 

orders under which any electronic surveillance that was 

occurring as part of the TSP would be conducted subject 

to the approval of the FISA Court. These orders were 

innovative and complex, and it took considerable time 

and effort for the Government to develop the approach 

that was proposed to the Court and for the Judge on the 

FISA Court to consider and approve these orders. A 

number of senior NSD attorneys and managers worked 

with our colleagues in the Office of Legal Counsel to 

develop the legal arguments in the underlying applications and advocate them before the FISA Court. 

b. Legislation to Modernize the 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 

There is a widely held view, that the Department 

shares, that there is a vital need to modernize FISA. 

The Division has played a key role in the interagency 

efforts to achieve that goal. 

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was enacted in 

1978 for the purpose of establishing a judicial procedure 

for authorizing the use of electronic surveillance in the 

United States for foreign intelligence purposes. The law 

authorized the Attorney General to make an application 

to a newly established court—the FISA Court—seeking 

an order approving the use of “electronic surveillance” 

against foreign powers or their agents. The law applied 

the process of judicial approval to certain surveillance 

activities (almost all of which occur within the United 

States), while excluding from FISA’s regime of court 

supervision the vast majority of overseas foreign intelligence surveillance activities, including most surveillance 

focused on foreign targets. 

Due to changes in telecommunications technologies in 

the last 30 years, however, the scope of activities covered 

by FISA has expanded to cover a wide range of intelligence activities that Congress had intended to exclude 

from FISA in 1978. As a result, the Government has often 

needed to establish probable cause and obtain a court 

order before conducting surveillance activities against tar26 National Security Division — Progress Report 
CHAPTER III. The Operations of the National Security Division
 

gets located overseas—a category that Congress had 

intended to exclude from the coverage of the FISA 

statute. In certain cases, this process of obtaining a court 

order slowed, and in some cases may have prevented, the 

Government’s efforts to conduct surveillance of communications that were potentially vital to national security. 

In 2006, Justice Department and Intelligence Community 

representatives began working to develop a proposal to 

remedy the problems the Government faced with FISA. 

After the National Security Division became operational, 

NSD attorneys worked with attorneys from the Office of 

Legal Counsel and representatives from the Intelligence 

Community to draft a comprehensive legislative proposal 

to modernize FISA. In April 2007, the Director of National 

Intelligence submitted that proposal to Congress. After 

submission of the proposed legislation, NSD attorneys 

briefed Members and staff in Congress extensively on the 

proposal and the need to modernize FISA, and the 

Assistant Attorney General for National Security, alongside various members of the Intelligence Community, testified in its support in May 2007, before the Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence. 

In the summer of 2007, after reporting of a heightened 

terrorism threat environment, representatives of the 

Justice Department and the Intelligence Community 

worked closely with Congress to achieve a temporary 

solution that would allow us to close the intelligence gap 

caused by the outdated provisions of the FISA statute. In 

August 2007, with bipartisan support, Congress passed 

the Protect America Act, which allowed the Government 

to conduct surveillance directed at foreign intelligence 

targets located in foreign countries without a court order. 

Within days, the Intelligence Community was able to 

undertake the surveillance it needed to close the gap in 

its foreign intelligence collection. 

The Protect America Act, however, expired on February 

15, 2008. The National Security Division continues to 

take a central role, in coordination with the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and various 

elements of the Intelligence Community, in working 

with Congress to make the Protect America Act authority permanent. The first step toward this goal was ensuring that the Act was implemented in accordance with the 

law. As described above, NSD attorneys were a key part 

of the team that developed the implementation procedures required by the Act. NSD attorneys have also 

taken a lead role in demonstrating to Congress and the 

public that we are utilizing the PAA authority responsibly and conscientiously. In conjunction with ODNI and 

in consultation with the Department’s Privacy and Civil 

Liberties Office, we have developed procedures to subject the use of this authority to rigorous and comprehensive oversight through regular reviews that assess 

compliance with the Act. The National Security 

Division has also provided Congress with substantial 

reporting about collection activities under the Act and 

about our oversight findings. These self-imposed regimes 

of compliance and congressional reporting go well 

beyond the requirements of the statute, and help to 

assure Congress that we can—and should—be trusted 

with this authority on a permanent basis. 

The National Security Division continues to work with 

Congress to make the PAA authority permanent and to 

address other important aspects of FISA modernization. 

In September and October 2007 alone, the Assistant 

Attorney General for National Security testified five 

times in hearings before the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence, the House Permanent Select Committee on 

Intelligence, the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the 

House Judiciary Committee regarding the renewal of the 

PAA. In addition, NSD representatives have conducted 

numerous briefings of Members and their staffs on the 

PAA and the need to modernize FISA. 

D. THE OFFICE OF LAW AND POLICY 

The Office of Law and Policy is a new component in the 

National Security Division and is one of the cornerstones 

of the Division’s mission to unify the Department’s 

national security efforts. The office fulfills a variety of 

functions, including: 

�Providing legal assistance and advice to colleagues in 

the NSD and the FBI and to other Executive Branch 

agencies on matters of national security law and policy; 

National Security Division — Progress Report 27 
United States Department of Justice
 

�Overseeing the development, coordination, and implementation of Department-wide policies with regard 

to intelligence, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and national security matters; 

�Serving as a single point of contact for other Department components and other federal agencies, including members of the Intelligence Community, on 

national security policy matters; 

�Operating as a key point of contact for Congress 

within the NSD and the Department on critical 

national security issues, providing congressional 

briefings on intelligence policy matters, and preparing testimony for the NSD and senior Department 

leadership on various national security matters; and 

�Coordinating the development of national security 

related legislation. 

The Office of Law and Policy has been able to fulfill 

these functions despite operating with only a handful of 

attorneys. As it expands with new hires and detailees 

from other Department components over the next year, 

the office will play an even greater role in developing and 

coordinating national security legal positions and policy. 

Much of the office’s work is sensitive and highly classified, precluding a detailed or exhaustive discussion of the 

office’s accomplishments, but the following are representative highlights of its initial achievements: 

�The office took a lead role in developing and drafting the proposal to modernize FISA that was submitted to Congress in April of 2007. As discussed 

above, that effort culminated in the Protect America 

Act of 2007, which amended FISA to allow the 

Intelligence Community to close critical intelligence 

gaps and provided an effective legal framework for 

the collection of foreign intelligence information. 

The office has also played an important role in the 

interagency effort to implement this new authority. 

It continues to work with Congress and the Intelligence Community to achieve the goal of long-term 

FISA modernization. 

�The office worked closely with NSD attorneys and 

the FBI to draft new standard minimization procedures. These procedures govern the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of U.S. person information 

that is obtained by the FBI through the use of FISAauthorized electronic surveillance. The new procedures were designed to account for advances in technology and the expanded need to share FISA information with prosecutors and other partners. 

�Together with the NSD’s operational components, 

the office developed the NSD’s legislative proposals 

for the 110th Congress to fill gaps in the nation’s 

counterespionage and counterterrorism laws. 

�The office resolved legal issues relating to various 

aspects of FISA, such as the use of FISA-derived 

information in terrorist watch lists. 

�The office led a Department-wide effort to modify 

internal policy with respect to the use of FISA information to obtain and use certain investigative tools 

in order to provide prosecutors and agents with 

more flexibility in their investigations. 

�The office, working with the Counterterrorism Section, drafted guidelines for the dissemination of 

grand jury information relating to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, as allowed by the 

amended Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). 

�The office, together with the Counterterrorism 

Section, worked with the Office of the Deputy 

Attorney General, the Civil Division, and with other 

agencies, including the Department of the Treasury, 

to formulate and implement policies related to combating terrorist financing. 

�The office worked closely with the Office of the 

Attorney General, Office of Intelligence Policy and 

28 National Security Division — Progress Report 
CHAPTER III. The Operations of the National Security Division
 

Review, and the FBI’s Office of General Counsel to 

address issues related to the FBI’s use of national 

security letters. 

�The office, together with the Office of the Deputy 

Attorney General, the Civil Rights Division, the 

Counterterrorism Section, and the FBI, provided policy guidance for community outreach by the Justice 

Department in the context of counterterrorism. 

�The office, along with the Civil Division, the Office 

of Intelligence Policy and Review, and the Office of 

Legal Counsel, participated in litigation related to 

national security issues. For example, in the first 

public FISA Court litigation, the office, working 

with OIPR attorneys, successfully opposed the 

American Civil Liberties Union’s motion for disclosure of certain classified FISA Court orders and 

related pleadings. 

Having developed a strong presence within the 

Department and the Executive Branch since its founding, the Office of Law and Policy is well positioned to 

play an even broader role going forward, and to continue fulfilling the Division’s purpose of merging and harmonizing our national security legal and policymaking 

functions. 

National Security Division — Progress Report 29 
“[T]he protection of the American people from the threat of international 

terrorism is, and must remain, the Justice Department’s top priority.” 

—Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey,
 

Remarks Prepared for Delivery at the Justice Department
 

Oversight Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
 

January 30, 2008
 
CHAPTER IV. Specific Operations and Efforts
 

IV. Specific Operations and 

Efforts 

The National Security Division is responsible for a variety 

of national security related matters that fall outside the 

specific functions of its four major components. These 

operations include the NSD’s role in the interagency 

Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 

(CFIUS), its leadership of the Office of Justice for Victims 

of Overseas Terrorism (OVT), and its Crisis Management 

Coordinator (CMC) Program. 

A. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 

INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 

The National Security Division has taken over primary 

responsibility for carrying out the Justice Department’s 

role in connection with the interagency Committee on 

Foreign Investment in the United States. As a general 

matter, it is the policy of the United States Government 

to promote foreign investment in the United States 

because such investment helps to keep our economy 

strong, vibrant, and integrated with the global economy. 

In certain situations, however, foreign investment can 

pose national security risks, result in unacceptable transfers of sensitive United States technologies, or expose the 

critical infrastructure of the United States to hostile intelligence services and terrorist organizations. To address this 

concern, the United States Government reviews proposed 

acquisitions of certain United States companies by foreign companies. In conducting these reviews, CFIUS 

seeks to balance the interest in promoting foreign investment with the need to protect the national security. 

The National Security Division, working with a dedicated team from the FBI, reviews every proposed transaction, weighing threat assessments from the Intelligence 

Community and assessing vulnerabilities in order to 

determine the risks to national security. In cases where 

there is a potential threat to national security that can be 

addressed through particular terms and conditions, the 

NSD works with other CFIUS members to draft mitigation agreements and to monitor the companies’ compliance with them. 

CFIUS filings have increased dramatically in recent 

years, more than doubling in number from 2005 to 

2007. To keep pace with this expansion in the 

Department’s CFIUS responsibilities, the NSD recently 

formed the CFIUS Team. This team is comprised of five 

NSD lawyers and full-time contractor support; is overseen by a Senior Counsel to the Assistant Attorney 

General for National Security; and reports directly to the 

NSD’s Chief of Staff. 

The CFIUS Team is also charged with responsibilities 

relating to Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 

requests for Executive Branch determinations of the 

national security implications relating to applications for 

licenses under Sections 214 and 310 of the Communications Act of 1934. The FCC must decide whether granting each license application is in the “public interest.” 

When the license will be acquired by a foreign entity, the 

FCC solicits and considers the views of the Executive 

Branch regarding the effects, if any, the transaction will 

have on public safety, national security, and law enforcement. To facilitate formation of those views, the Departments of Justice, Defense, and Homeland Security formed 

an interagency group called “Team Telecom.” Team Telecom reviews such applications to determine if a proposed 

communication provider’s foreign ownership, control or 

influence poses a risk to national security, infrastructure 

protection, law enforcement interests, or other public safety 

concerns sufficient to merit the imposition of mitigating 

measures or opposition to the transaction. 

B. OFFICE OF JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF 

OVERSEAS TERRORISM 

The Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism 

was established in the Criminal Division by statute in 

December 2004, to help ensure that the investigation and 

prosecution of terrorist attacks against Americans abroad 

remain a high priority for the Department. With the creation of the NSD, OVT was transferred from the Criminal Division as part of the consolidation of the Department’s national security efforts. The office’s responsibilities 

include monitoring the investigation and prosecution of 

the perpetrators of overseas terrorist attacks, responding to 

National Security Division — Progress Report 31 
United States Department of Justice
 

Congressional and citizen inquiries regarding the Department’s efforts in this area, and working with the FBI, U.S. 

Attorneys’ Offices, the State Department, and other government agencies to ensure that the rights of victims and 

their families are respected. OVT’s personnel focus on 

conducting outreach to United States victims of international terrorism and their families, identifying their needs, 

and ensuring that victims receive the rights and services 

due under domestic law. 

OVT is also working with other federal officials to institutionalize effective government responses to international terrorism victims. For example, OVT has helped 

found an interagency task force which will ensure an efficient and productive United States Government 

response to American victims of terrorist attacks abroad. 

OVT led the effort to develop a Memorandum of 

Understanding (MOU) between the State Department 

and Justice Department where the agencies committed 

to work together to respond to United States victims of 

international terrorism in a timely and efficient manner. 

Assistant Attorney General Wainstein and Assistant 

Secretary of State Maura Harty signed the MOU on 

September 27, 2007, during a meeting of the Victims of 

Terrorism Abroad (VTA) Task Force. The Task Force, 

which had been meeting on an informal basis previously, was officially established by the MOU. VTA Task 

Force meeting attendees, including leaders of several 

offices within the Justice Department, the State Department, and the FBI, committed to work together to provide victim assistance to Americans in the immediate 

aftermath of terrorist attacks abroad. OVT will continue 

to coordinate the VTA Task Force which will meet on a 

regular basis to address ongoing issues and assistance to 

United States victims of international terrorism. 

In addition, the Department is currently implementing 

the International Terrorism Victims Expense Reimbursement Program, which provides benefits to victims and 

their families to help defray expenses incurred as a result 

of international terrorism incidents. The program began 

making payments to victims in early August 2007. 

Other OVT efforts include the development of specialized training for prosecutors, investigators, and other 

government officials on crime victims’ rights in international terrorism cases; the expansion of public outreach about victims’ issues; and the improvement of the 

process by which we notify victims about developments 

in foreign terrorism cases. Examples of OVT’s outreach 

efforts included meetings in June 2007, in which the 

OVT Director traveled to Israel to meet directly with 

American victims of international terrorism occurring 

in Israel and the Palestinian territories. The OVT Director 

and other FBI and Justice Department staff held two 

meetings with victims, one in Jerusalem and one in Tel 

Aviv, in which they explained how the victims could 

locate resources to help them cope with their victimization, informed the victims of their rights under United 

States law, and solicited their input and concerns. 

In February 2008, OVT helped arrange two meetings 

between the Assistant Attorney General for National 

Security, the Legal Advisor to the Office of Military 

Commissions’s Convening Authority, and representatives from 9/11 victim family groups—spouses, parents, children, and siblings of 9/11 victims—to identify victim concerns and needs in connection with the 

Military Commissions process. OVT also participated 

with NSD personnel in other meetings with individual 

victim representatives. Further meetings are planned for 

New York, Boston, and the Washington, D.C. area, and 

will provide victims an opportunity to meet the prosecution team and learn about plans for victim access to 

the proceedings. 

C. CRISIS MANAGEMENT
 

COORDINATOR PROGRAM
 

In 1996, the Department set up the Crisis Management 

Coordinator (CMC) Program to coordinate our response 

to crises as they arise. The program was established in the 

aftermath of a series of events—the first World Trade 

Center attack, the stand-off at Ruby Ridge, and the 

Oklahoma City bombing—which highlighted the need 

to prepare for such large-scale crises. The CMC Program 

requires the appointment and training of a Crisis 

Management Coordinator in each U.S. Attorney’s Office 

around the country who is responsible for ensuring that 

32 National Security Division — Progress Report 
CHAPTER IV. Specific Operations and Efforts
 

his or her office is capable of providing a timely and 

effective legal response in the face of any extraordinary 

incident—such as a terrorist attack or natural disaster. 

The CMC Coordinators are responsible for preparing 

and carrying out the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices’ Critical 

Incident Response Plans, which require districts to establish a team to provide the legal response to a critical incident and have the procedures, communications, and 

other logistical support in place to aid that response. 

The Department has also appointed a National Crisis 

Management Coordinator within the NSD, who is responsible for a broad range of preparedness issues. The 

National CMC serves as the liaison to individual CMCs 

across the country; gives them input and guidance on 

their Critical Incident Response Plans; and provides them 

with training on the recently revised federal authorities for 

responding to crises and on the requirements of the 

National Response Plan. 

In addition, the National Security Division participates 

in government emergency planning at the policy level, 

as well as with respect to specific domestic and international special events. For example, the NSD recently 

played a key role in the development and implementation 

of the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and 

served as the primary Department liaison with the 

Homeland Security Council on this matter. It also participated in the development and execution of the national 

Top Officials (TOPOFF) Exercise in October 2007, 

which was an exercise of our governmental response to a 

multiple terrorist attack scenario. 

National Security Division — Progress Report 33 
“One of the advantages of placing all three national security components 

[Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, Counterespionage, and Counterterrorism] under a single Assistant Attorney General is that they will see 

themselves as acting in concert to serve a common mission.” 

—The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States
 

Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission),
 

Report to the President of the United States,
 

March 31, 2005
 
CHAPTER V. Training and Education
 

V. Training and Education 

The establishment of the National Security Division is an 

opportunity to develop a strong and growing cadre of 

national security lawyers who “see themselves as acting in 

concert to serve a common mission,” and thereby promote the WMD Commission’s goal for the Department’s 

national security program. The NSD has seized that 

opportunity by substantially enhancing the scope and 

quality of the training programs that develop expertise in 

the investigation and prosecution of national security 

cases. In fiscal year 2007, the NSD increased the number 

of training courses for national security prosecutors by 

more than 50 percent and significantly increased the number of personnel trained. 

National Security Division personnel participate in training efforts on a number of levels. As an initial matter, 

the NSD places an emphasis on preparing its own attorneys, and its components have established systematic 

training programs for their attorneys and staff. These 

programs begin with component-specific orientation 

sessions for new lawyers and the assignment of mentors. 

The programs continue with periodic follow-up training by instructors from the NSD; from other Justice 

Department components including the FBI, the Privacy 

and Civil Liberties Office, and the Professional Responsibility Advisory Office; and from agencies of the 

Intelligence Community. 

Since the National Security Division was created, attorneys from across the NSD’s components have regularly 

participated in the Department’s training seminars and 

conferences at the National Advocacy Center designed to 

assist field prosecutors and agents in developing and 

implementing counterterrorism and counterespionage 

strategies for their districts. By the NSD’s first anniversary, its personnel and the Office of Legal Education 

(OLE) had developed and conducted nine full-scale 

national security conferences, with topics ranging from 

Export Controls and Counter-Proliferation to Terrorist 

Financing. One of those conferences, the National 

Security Training for United States Attorneys, hosted virtually all of the nation’s U.S. Attorneys, featured speeches 

by the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General, 

and focused on the collaboration of the new NSD and 

the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in the national security realm. 

Additionally, the NSD has helped to develop broadcastbased training courses, including over 133 hours of programming over OLE’s Justice Television Network on topics ranging from the historical roots of terrorism to bioterrorism preparedness. 

The National Security Division has also devoted considerable resources to training FBI and other agents in the 

field on the use of FISA as an investigative tool. This 

training has covered standards for FISA applications, 

accuracy and minimization procedures, FISA litigation 

issues, and FISA Court practices and Rules of Procedure. 

Since September 2006, the NSD has conducted training 

sessions in 35 FBI field offices, at two nationwide FBI 

conferences, at a Naval Criminal Investigative Service 

conference, and at a U.S. Army-sponsored intelligence 

law course at the University of Virginia. 

Finally, the National Security Division played a key role 

in implementing the Deputy Attorney General’s January 

2007 directive that all litigators in the Department be 

trained in the identification and utilization of foreign 

intelligence information. NSD attorneys developed a 

model training program that was disseminated to the 

U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for training prosecutors and law 

enforcement partners and to the litigating components of 

Main Justice for the training of their trial attorneys. As a 

result of these efforts, all of the Department’s litigators 

were fully trained in this area within four months of the 

Deputy Attorney General’s directive. 

National Security Division — Progress Report 35 
“No brief has ever been filed, or trial presentation ever done . . . without 

the critical support of administrative, clerical, and paralegal professionals in our Department.” 

—Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip, 

March 10, 2008 
CHAPTER VI. Administration
 

VI. Administration 

The National Security Division is the first new division 

created in the Department of Justice in almost 50 years. 

It was a significant administrative challenge to stand up 

and smoothly transition into the new division. As discussed above, the NSD transition team met this challenge and the NSD became operational one week after 

the Assistant Attorney General for National Security 

was confirmed by the Senate. Since then the National 

Security Division’s Executive Office has taken over the 

task of providing day-to-day support to the NSD’s 

lawyers and staff. 

A. ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE 

The National Security Division’s Executive Office is led 

by an Executive Officer who was appointed on 

November 26, 2006, to oversee all aspects of administrative support. The Executive Office has staff dedicated 

to all core administrative functions: human resources, 

budget, finance, procurement, facilities, security, and 

information technology. The Executive Officer manages 

the office’s staff and activities through subordinate supervisors, one for each of these core areas. Working with the 

Justice Management Division, the Executive Office ensures 

that NSD personnel have the assistance and resources they 

need to carry out the NSD’s mission. 

B. BUDGET 

The three legacy components that initially comprised 

the National Security Division—Counterterrorism 

Section (CTS), Counterespionage Section (CES), and 

Office of Intelligence Policy Review (OIPR)—all operated within their existing budgets on the first day of the 

new division. In addition, Congress funded the expenses related to the NSD’s stand-up with a reprogramming 

of approximately $10 million in FY 2006. These funds 

were used to establish the new front office, the Office 

of Law and Policy, and the Executive Office, as well as 

Source: National Security Division

Office of Law & Policy and OVT do not appear on this chart because

the comparatively small size of their budgets makes them difficult to

represent graphically.

Dollars (Millions)

National Security Division Budget 

(2005-2008)

Fiscal Years

934

2005 2006 2007 2008

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Executive Office

Counterespionage Section

Counterterrorism Section

Office of Intelligence

Office of Law & Policy

Office of Justice for Victims of 

Overseas Terrorism (OVT)

to upgrade and consolidate the operations of CTS, 

CES, and OIPR. For FY 2007, Congress funded the 

President’s request of $66.7 million for the NSD, a significant increase over FY 2006, which permitted NSD 

to expand staffing and continue building a strong national 

program for the present and future. 

National Security Division — Progress Report 37 
United States Department of Justice
 

C. CONTINUING GROWTH 

Executive Office

Counterespionage Section

Counterterrorism Section

Office of Intelligence

Office of Law & Policy

Number of Positions

National Security Division Positions 

(2005-2008)

Fiscal Years

2005 2006 2007 2008

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Source: National Security Division

OVT does not appear on this chart because the comparatively small size of 

its staff makes it difficult to represent graphically.

Office of Justice for Victims of 

Overseas Terrorism (OVT)

38 National Security Division — Progress Report 
CHAPTER VII. Important Organizational Events and Milestones
 

VII. Important 

Organizational Events 

and Milestones 

The following is a sample of important events and milestones for the National Security Division: 

September 11, 2001: Terrorist attacks in New York, 

Pennsylvania, and Virginia kill nearly 3,000 people in the 

United States. 

September 17, 2001: Anti-Terrorism Task Forces, subsequently re-named Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils 

(ATACs), are established in each U.S. Attorney’s Office; 

ATAC Coordinators are appointed in each Office and six 

Regional Coordinators are appointed in the Counterterrorism Section’s predecessor, the Terrorism and Violent 

Crime Section. These changes established a framework 

for the coordination between Main Justice and the U.S. 

Attorneys’ Offices that is critical for a successful national 

effort against international terrorism. 

October 26, 2001: The President signs the USA 

PATRIOT Act into law. Among other things, the legislation eliminates the “wall” between law enforcement and 

intelligence personnel and authorizes the sharing of 

information among government officials working on 

intelligence and criminal matters. 

July 22, 2004: The National Commission on Terrorist 

Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) 

issues its report. The Commission recommends “significant changes in the organization of government” to allow 

the Government to undertake the “quick, imaginative, 

and agile responses” that are central to success in the war 

on terror. 

March 31, 2005: The Commission on the Intelligence 

Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (WMD Commission) issues its report. 

One of its recommendations is to create a National 

Security Division at the Department of Justice, designed 

to strengthen the Department’s core national security 

functions by consolidating the resources of the Office of 

Intelligence Policy and Review and the Criminal 

Division’s Counterterrorism and Counterespionage 

Sections. 

May 6, 2005: The Office of Justice for Victims of 

Overseas Terrorism is established by the Attorney 

General. Congress had directed the establishment of the 

office in the Department of Justice Appropriations Act 

in December 2004. 

March 9, 2006: The President signs the USA PATRIOT 

Reauthorization and Improvement Act, which creates 

the National Security Division. 

March 13, 2006: The President announces his nomination of Kenneth L. Wainstein to serve as the first 

Assistant Attorney General for National Security. 

September 21, 2006: The United States Senate confirms Mr. Wainstein as Assistant Attorney General. Mr. 

Wainstein is sworn in as the first Assistant Attorney 

General for National Security on September 28, 2006. 

The National Security Division commences operations 

upon Mr. Wainstein’s swearing-in. 

November 6, 2006: The Deputy Attorney General and 

the Assistant Attorney General for National Security hold 

a nation-wide conference call with all U.S. Attorneys’ 

Offices in order to solicit nominations for the NSD teams 

that would support the Department of Defense’s military 

commission efforts regarding high value detainees. The 

NSD interviews applicants in the weeks immediately thereafter, and ultimately stands up five teams of investigators 

and prosecutors, including seven Assistant U.S. Attorneys, 

three NSD attorneys, and numerous FBI agents. 

January 10, 2007: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

Court (FISA Court) issues innovative and complex 

orders under which any electronic surveillance that was 

occurring as part of the Terrorist Surveillance Program 

would be conducted subject to the approval of the FISA 

Court. The NSD contributed significantly to the Department’s efforts to obtain those orders. 

National Security Division — Progress Report 39 
United States Department of Justice
 

February 14, 2007: The Attorney General signs an 

order designating and authorizing the Assistant Attorney 

General for National Security to perform the functions 

of the Attorney General under the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), including authorizing 

FISA applications. 

February 19, 2007: The National Security Division 

assumes from the Criminal Division the responsibility 

for serving as the Justice Department’s direct representative to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 

United States (CFIUS), an interagency committee that 

evaluates the national security implications of proposed 

foreign investment in U.S. companies and recommends 

whether the President should permit such transactions. 

March 9, 2007: The Justice Department’s Office of the 

Inspector General releases a report criticizing the FBI’s 

use of National Security Letters. 

March 20, 2007: Assistant Attorney General Wainstein 

testifies before Congress on National Security Letters. 

April 13, 2007: The Director of National Intelligence 

submits proposed legislation to Congress that would 

modernize FISA and that reflects significant contributions on the part of NSD lawyers. 

April 24, 2007: In cooperation with the FBI, the NSD 

begins its first oversight review of FBI national security 

investigations in a particular field office. By the end of 

2007, the NSD completed fourteen additional reviews, 

termed “National Security Reviews,” the goal of which is 

to identify instances of non-compliance with statutes, 

Attorney General guidelines, and internal FBI policy 

directives to enable the NSD to identify recurring issues 

for which corrective action is necessary. 

May 1, 2007: Assistant Attorney General Wainstein testifies in open session before the Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence regarding FISA modernization. Assistant 

Attorney General Wainstein also testifies regarding FISA 

modernization before the same committee in closed session on June 21, 2007. Additionally, Assistant Attorney 

General Wainstein testified before Congress regarding 

FISA modernization on the following other occasions: 

September 6, 2007 (House Permanent Select Committee 

on Intelligence); September 18, 2007 (House Judiciary 

Committee); September 20, 2007 (House Permanent 

Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence); October 31, 2007 (Senate 

Judiciary Committee). 

May 2, 2007: The National Security Division holds a 

national export control training conference at the 

Department’s National Advocacy Center, where federal 

prosecutors from around the country gather to discuss 

export control cases and receive instruction and guidance 

on export control cases. 

May 31, 2007: The National Security Division launches the next generation of the Foreign Agents Registration 

Act website, which provides greatly improved access to 

public information about registered foreign agents and 

their activities in this country. 

July 13, 2007: The National Security Division announces 

a series of comprehensive measures to significantly 

enhance national security oversight, including the establishment of a dedicated Oversight Section and the initiation of a comprehensive program for oversight of the 

FBI’s national security investigations. At the same time, 

the FBI announces its establishment of an Office of 

Integrity and Compliance within the Bureau. 

August 4, 2007: Congress passes the Protect America 

Act of 2007 to modernize FISA and to close a critical 

intelligence gap. 

September 24, 2007: Deputy Assistant Attorney General 

Matthew G. Olsen announces the formation of the Office 

of Intelligence, successor to the Office of Intelligence 

Policy and Review. The Office of Intelligence will consist 

of three sections dedicated to the office’s core functions— 

operations, oversight, and litigation. 

October 1, 2007: The National Security Division assumes 

from the Criminal Division the responsibility for 

responding, along with the Departments of Defense and 

Homeland Security, to requests from the Federal Com40 National Security Division — Progress Report 
CHAPTER VII. Important Organizational Events and Milestones
 

munications Commission (FCC) for agencies’ positions 

on the national security implications arising out of foreign ownership of FCC licenses. 

October 11, 2007: The National Security Division formally announces the launch of the National Export 

Enforcement Initiative, along with partners from the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, Department of 

Commerce, and Department of Defense. 

February 11, 2008: The Department of Defense announces Military Commission charges in its prosecution of six men for their role in the September 11, 2001, 

terrorist attacks, which is being handled by a joint 

Department of Defense and Department of Justice 

team of prosecutors and agents. 

April 28, 2008: The National Security Division officially stands up its new Office of Intelligence, with the 

completion of the assignment of attorneys to the three 

new sections in the office—Operations, Oversight, 

and Litigation—and the selection of supervisors. 

National Security Division — Progress Report 41 
“The United States confronts a very different world today. Instead of facing a few very dangerous adversaries, the United States confronts a number of less visible challenges that surpass the boundaries of traditional 

nation-states and call for quick, imaginative, and agile responses.” 

—Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States (The 9/11 Commission Report), 

July 22, 2004 
APPENDIX


Appendix 

A. MAJOR TERRORISM INDICTMENTS 

AND CONVICTIONS 

1. International Terrorism Convictions 

Former Member of United States Navy Convicted of 

Terrorism and Espionage Charges 

March 5, 2008: Hassan Abujihaad, a former member of 

the U.S. Navy formerly known as Paul R. Hall, is convicted 

in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut of 

providing material support to terrorists and delivering classified information relating to the national defense to persons 

not entitled to receive it. The indictment alleged that 

Abujihaad, while a sailor in the U.S. Navy, provided previously classified information regarding the movements of a 

U.S. Navy battle group to Azzam Publications, a Londonbased organization that is alleged to have provided material 

support and resources to persons engaged in acts of terrorism through the creation and use of various Internet websites, e-mail communications, and other means. Abujihaad 

faces a maximum sentence of 15 years of imprisonment for 

the material support charge and ten years of imprisonment 

for delivering classified information to persons not entitled 

to receive it. He has not yet been sentenced. 

Senior Member of FARC Sentenced for HostageTaking Conspiracy 

January 28, 2008: Juvenal Ovidio Ricardo Palmera 

Pineda, also known as Simon Trinidad, a senior member 

of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or 

FARC, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, is sentenced to 60 years in prison in the U.S. District Court for 

the District of Columbia for conspiracy to engage in the 

hostage-taking of three American citizens in Colombia. 

Jose Padilla and Two Co-Defendants Sentenced for 

Conspiracy and Providing Material Support 

January 22, 2008: A federal judge of the U.S. District 

Court for the Southern District of Florida sentences Jose 

Padilla to 208 months (just over 17 years) of imprisonment, Adham Amin Hassoun to 188 months (just under 

16 years), and Kifah Wael Jayyousi to 152 months (just 

under 13 years). A jury had found the three defendants 

guilty of being part of a North American support cell 

designed to send money, physical assets, and mujahedeen recruits to overseas jihad conflicts. The cell operated from many cities in the United States and Canada, 

and supported and coordinated with other support networks and mujahedeen groups waging violent jihad. 

Al Qaeda Terrorist Sentenced to Life in Prison for 

Plot to Bomb U.S. Embassies 

January 18, 2008: Mohammed Mansour Jabarah is 

sentenced in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 

District of New York to life in prison on multiple terrorism conspiracy counts stemming from his participation 

in a plot to bomb U.S. Embassies in Singapore and the 

Philippines. Jabarah trained in al Qaeda-run terrorist 

camps in Afghanistan and spent time with Khalid 

Sheikh Mohammed and Usama bin Laden, to whom he 

swore al Qaeda’s oath of allegiance. After the U.S. 

Embassy plot in Singapore was exposed, Jabarah was 

arrested in Oman and deported to Canada. He later 

came to the United States voluntarily and agreed to 

cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI). In July 2002, he pleaded guilty to charges stemming from his role in the plot to bomb the U.S. 

Embassies. FBI officials later learned that Jabarah had 

secretly disavowed his commitment to cooperate and 

was, instead, planning to attack federal officials. At that 

time, he was transferred to the Federal Bureau of Prisons. 

Sentences Imposed in Plot to Provide Material 

Support to Tamil Tigers 

January 3, 2008: Thirunavukarasu Varatharasa is sentenced in the U.S. District Court for the District of 

Maryland to 57 months in prison for conspiracy to provide material support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization 

and attempted export of arms and munitions. Varatharasa conspired with Haji Subandi, Haniffa Osman, and 

Erik Wotulo to provide surface-to-air missiles, machine 

guns, night vision devices, and other weapons to the 

National Security Division — Progress Report 43 
United States Department of Justice


Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil 

Tigers), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, in 

Sri Lanka. All four pleaded guilty in connection with the 

scheme. Subandi was sentenced to 37 months in prison, 

while Haniffa Osman and Erik Wotulo have yet to be 

sentenced. Two additional defendants have also pleaded 

guilty to export violations as part of a plot to provide 

arms to the Indonesian military. 

Tenth Defendant Convicted in FARC Smuggling 

and Terrorism Case 

December 7, 2007: Three Colombian nationals plead 

guilty in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 

District of Florida to charges of conspiring to provide 

material support to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 

Colombia, or FARC, a designated Foreign Terrorist 

Organization, and alien smuggling. Seven other defendants have previously been convicted in the case. All the 

defendants were arrested in Colombia in January and 

February 2006 after working with undercover U.S. 

Government informants who posed as FARC operatives 

seeking illicit travel to Miami, Florida, for the purpose of 

laundering FARC drug money from the United States to 

Colombia to finance additional drug and arms purchases for the FARC. 

Michigan Man Pleads Guilty to Supporting 

Hizballah 

November 29, 2007: Fawzi Assi, a former engineer for 

the Ford Motor Company and former resident of Dearborn, Michigan, pleads guilty in the U.S. District Court 

for the Eastern District of Michigan to providing material support to Hizballah, a designated Foreign Terrorist 

Organization. Assi admits that he attempted to board a 

flight from Detroit to Lebanon in 1998 with global satellite modules, night vision goggles, and a thermal imaging camera in his luggage. He was attempting to deliver 

these materials to an individual in Lebanon who was 

purchasing the items on behalf of Hizballah. 

Four Sentenced in New York in Plot to Provide 

Support to al Qaeda and Other Foreign Jihadists 

November 28, 2007: Florida doctor Rafiq Sabir is sentenced in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 

District of New York to 25 years in prison in connection 

with terrorist support charges after pledging an oath of 

loyalty to al Qaeda and Usama bin Laden in a May 2005 

ceremony secretly recorded by an undercover FBI agent. 

Rafiq Sabir and his three co-defendants, Tarik Shah, 

Mahmud Faruq Brent, and Abdulrahman Farhane, were 

charged based on their roles in an overlapping series of 

acts and transactions with a common goal of supporting 

jihadists abroad. Prior to Sabir’s conviction, his three codefendants pleaded guilty. Shah was sentenced to 15 

years in prison on November 7, 2007, Brent was sentenced to 15 years on July 25, 2007, and Farhane was 

sentenced to 13 years on April 16, 2007. 

Nuradin Abdi Sentenced for Conspiracy to Provide 

Material Support to Terrorists 

November 27, 2007: Nuradin Abdi, a Somali man living in Columbus, Ohio, is sentenced in the U.S. District 

Court for the Southern District of Ohio to ten years in 

prison for conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists. Abdi was an associate of Christopher Paul, who 

was arrested and indicted in April 2007 on charges of 

providing material support, conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, and conspiracy to use a weapon 

of mass destruction (explosives) in the Southern District 

of Ohio. Abdi also was an associate of Iyman Faris, who 

was convicted of providing material support and conspiracy to provide material support to al Qaeda. Faris is 

currently serving a 20-year prison term. 

Hamid Hayat Sentenced on Terrorism Charges 

September 10, 2007: Hamid Hayat is sentenced in the 

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California 

to 24 years imprisonment in connection with a series of 

44 National Security Division — Progress Report 
APPENDIX


terrorism charges related to his 2003-04 attendance at a 

jihadi training camp in Pakistan and his 2005 return to 

the United States with the intent to wage violent jihad. 

Hayat was found guilty in 2006 of one count of providing material support or resources to terrorists and three 

counts of making false statements to the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation in matters related to international and 

domestic terrorism. 

Ujaama Pleads Guilty to Material Support 

to Terrorists 

August 13, 2007: Earnest James Ujaama, an associate 

of radical British Islamic leader Abu Hamza Al-Masri, 

pleads guilty in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 

District of New York to providing and conspiring to provide material support to terrorists arising from efforts to 

establish a jihad training camp in Bly, Oregon, and his 

efforts to facilitate violent jihad in Afghanistan. Ujaama 

also pleads guilty to one count of unlawful flight to avoid 

giving testimony, stemming from his previously fleeing 

to Belize in order to avoid giving testimony in this matter. Ujaama was arrested in Belize, and returned to the 

United States to face a violation of his supervised release 

and the additional charges to which he pleaded guilty. 

Ujaama faces up to 30 years in prison. He has not yet 

been sentenced. 

Conviction of American Who Joined Islamic 

Extremist Fighters in Somalia 

April 19, 2007: Daniel Joseph Maldonado, also known 

as Daniel Aljughaifi, is sentenced to the maximum sentence of ten years of imprisonment after pleading guilty 

in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 

Texas to receiving military training from al Qaeda. The 

charges arose from Maldonado’s participation in training 

for violent jihad in Somalia. Maldonado stated that he 

went to Somalia to fight with the Council of Islamic 

Courts in an effort to form an Islamic government in 

that nation. Maldonado attended at least three camps 

where the fighters received physical education, firearms, 

and explosives instruction. The guilty plea was the first 

involving an American citizen who joined forces with 

Islamic extremist fighters in Somalia. 

Benkahla Guilty of Lying to Grand Jury and 

Related Charges 

February 5, 2007: Sabri Benkahla is found guilty in the 

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 

of two counts of making false declarations before a grand 

jury, one count of obstruction of justice, and one count 

of making false official statements. Benkahla was sentenced to 121 months imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $17,500 fine. In finding Benkahla 

guilty on all counts, the jury specifically found that 

Benkahla made false statements about whether he had 

been to a jihad training camp in 1999, whether he had 

fired AK-47 assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades 

while in training, and his connections in Pakistan and in 

the United States, among other things. Benkahla was 

included in the original “Virginia Jihad” indictment in 

which eleven defendants were charged. However, when 

it became apparent that he had actually traveled to 

Pakistan to train in a Lashkar-e-Taiba training camp in 

1999 (at least a year before the other defendants), his case 

was severed. After a bench trial in which Benkahla did 

not testify, he was acquitted of the prior charges in March 

2004 and subsequently appeared before two separate 

grand juries under a grant of immunity where he made a 

number of false statements about his activities. He also 

lied to the Federal Bureau of Investigation during interviews which were covered by his grant of immunity. 

Awan Convicted of Providing Material Support 

and Resources to Khalistan Commando Force 

December 20, 2006: A federal jury in the U.S. District 

Court for the Eastern District of New York convicts 

Khalid Awan of providing money and financial services 

to the Khalistan Commando Force, a terrorist organization responsible for thousands of deaths in India since its 

founding in 1986. Awan was sentenced to 14 years of 

imprisonment and three years of supervised release. 

National Security Division — Progress Report 45 
United States Department of Justice


Yassin Aref Guilty of Material Support and Money 

Laundering Conspiracies 

October 11, 2006: A jury in the U.S. District Court for 

the Northern District of New York finds Yassin Aref 

guilty of terrorism support, money laundering, and false 

statement charges. Mohammed Hossain was also found 

guilty of each of the 27 counts of which he was charged. 

Both defendants were sentenced to 15 years in prison. 

The case arises out of a sting operation in which an FBI 

informant represented to the defendants that the informant needed to conceal the proceeds from the importation 

of a surface to air missile (SAM). The informant further 

represented that the SAM was to be used by terrorists in 

New York City in an operation targeting a Pakistani government official. Hossain agreed to launder the money 

through his business and Aref agreed to witness and 

guarantee the transactions. 

2. Terrorist Financing Prosecutions 

Three Former Officers of Islamic Charity Convicted 

January 11, 2008: A federal jury in the U.S. District 

Court for the District of Massachusetts convicts 

Emadeddin Muntasser, Samir Al-Monla, and Muhamed 

Mubayyid of conspiring to defraud the United States and 

engaging in a scheme to conceal information from the 

United States in connection with a charity called Care 

International, Inc. (Care). Evidence presented during the 

24-day trial proved that the defendants conspired to 

defraud the United States by concealing the fact that Care 

was an outgrowth of, and successor to, the Al-Kifah 

Refugee Center, an organization that was a supporter of 

terrorists engaged in jihad, and that the defendants fraudulently used Care to engage in non-charitable activities 

involving the solicitation and expenditure of funds to 

support and promote violent jihad and mujahedeen 

forces. Further, the Government proved that the defendants conspired to defraud the United States for the purpose of impeding the lawful functions of the Internal 

Revenue Service in its determination of whether Care 

qualified as a charitable organization. The defendants 

have not yet been sentenced. 

Chiquita Brands International Pleads Guilty to 

Making Payments to Autodefensas Unidas de 

Colombia and Agrees to Pay $25 Million Fine 

March 19, 2007: Chiquita Brands International Inc. 

(Chiquita), a multinational corporation incorporated 

in New Jersey and headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio, 

pleads guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District 

of Columbia to making prohibited monetary payments 

over a period of years to the violent, right-wing terrorist 

organization Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia or 

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia. Under the terms 

of the plea agreement, Chiquita’s sentence included a $25 

million criminal fine, a requirement to implement and 

maintain an effective compliance and ethics program, and 

five years of probation. Chiquita also agreed to cooperate 

in the investigation. 

Georgia Imam Sentenced for Providing Material 

Support to Hamas 

February 27, 2007: Mohamed Shorbagi is sentenced in 

the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 

Georgia to seven years and eight months in federal 

prison, to be followed by three years of supervised 

release, for providing material support to Hamas, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. Shorbagi pleaded guilty on October 13, 2006 to providing financial 

support to Hamas and conspiring with unnamed others to 

provide such material support, knowing that Hamas had 

been designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and 

that Hamas engaged in terrorist activity. Shorbagi provided the support through donations to the Holy Land 

Foundation for Relief and Development, knowing that 

some or all of the money was, in fact, destined for 

Hamas. Shorbagi also hosted high-level Hamas officials 

at a Georgia mosque where he served as the imam. 

Shorbagi’s sentence was reduced from the statutory maximum of 15 years in prison because of the substantial 

cooperation he has provided in other terrorism-related 

investigations and prosecutions. 

46 National Security Division — Progress Report 
APPENDIX


Terrorist Transactions, Computer Exports to Libya 

and Syria 

October 13, 2006: The U.S. District Court for the 

Northern District of Texas imposes sentences against 

Infocom Corporation and Bayan Elashi, Ghassan Elashi, 

and Basman Elashi for dealing in the funds of a highranking official of the designated Foreign Terrorist 

Organization Hamas and conspiracy to export computers and computer equipment to Libya and Syria. Basman 

Elashi and Ghassan Elashi were each sentenced to 80 

months of imprisonment and Bayan Elashi was sentenced to 84 months of imprisonment. Infocom Corporation was sentenced to two years of probation. 

3. Domestic Terrorism Convictions 

Three Plead Guilty in Plot to Attack Military 

Facilities, Jewish Targets 

December 14, 2007: Two men who were part of a 

domestic terrorist cell plead guilty in the U.S. District 

Court for the Central District of California to conspiracy 

to levy war against the Government of the United States. 

Kevin James, who formed a radical Islamic organization 

called Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS) while in a 

California state prison, and Levar Washington, who was 

recruited by James while in prison, admitted that they 

had conspired to attack several U.S. military facilities as 

well as Israeli and Jewish facilities in the Los Angeles area. 

A third defendant, Gregory Patterson, pleaded guilty to 

the terrorism conspiracy charge three days later. 

Washington and Patterson conducted roughly a dozen 

armed robberies of gas stations to supply money for the 

group’s planned attacks in the Los Angeles area. In addition to their conspiracy to levy war guilty pleas, 

Washington and Patterson also pleaded guilty to weapons 

charges. The defendants have not yet been sentenced. 

Earth Liberation Front Leader Pleads Guilty 

December 14, 2007: Rodney Adam Coronado, a selfproclaimed leader of the radical environmental group 

Earth Liberation Front, pleads guilty in the U.S. District 

Court for the Southern District of California to demonstrating the use of a destructive device. As part of his 

plea, Coronado admits that at a public gathering in San 

Diego, California, he taught and demonstrated the making and use of a destructive device, with the intent that 

the device be used to commit arson. Coronado demonstrated for the crowd how to make a crude incendiary 

device using a plastic container filled with fuel mixture, 

a sponge, and an incense stick. His comments came after 

he advocated the use of arson as the most effective way 

to advance his radical environmental agenda. Coronado 

has not yet been sentenced. 

Illinois Man Pleads Guilty in Foiled Plot to Bomb 

Shopping Mall 

November 28, 2007: Derrick Shareef, of Rockford, 

Illinois, pleads guilty in the U.S. District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois to planning to set off several grenades in garbage cans at the CherryVale 

Shopping Mall in Rockford, which has approximately 

130 retail stores. Shareef was arrested by agents of the 

Chicago Joint Terrorism Task Force when he met an 

undercover agent at a store parking lot to trade a set of 

stereo speakers for four hand grenades and a hand gun. 

Shareef has not yet been sentenced. 

Evans Pleads Guilty to Plot to Bomb Women’s 

Health Center 

October 19, 2007: Paul Ross Evans is sentenced in the 

U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas to 

40 years in prison after pleading guilty to use and 

attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction. Evans 

pleaded guilty to placing an armed, nail-laden, foot-long 

pipe bomb near the entrance of the Austin Women's 

Health Center, in Austin, Texas. Had the bomb exploded it would have spread nails and shrapnel over 100 feet. 

Operation Backfire 

June 1, 2007: Ten defendants are sentenced in the U.S. 

District Court for the District of Oregon to sentences of 

imprisonment ranging from 13 years to 37 months, with 

each of the leading defendants sentenced to over five 

years of imprisonment. These sentences are part of an 

National Security Division — Progress Report 47 
United States Department of Justice


extensive nine-year joint investigation conducted by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in 

Oregon, Colorado, Washington, and California into 

multiple arsons and acts of vandalism, culminating in 

the arrests of more than a dozen defendants beginning in 

December 2005 and continuing through 2006. The 

investigation involved more than 20 acts of domestic terrorism undertaken on behalf of the extremist Earth 

Liberation Front and Animal Liberation Front over the 

five-year period from 1996 to 2001, including the $12 

million arson of the Vail Ski Resort in Vail, Colorado, in 

1998; the sabotage of a high-tension power line near 

Bend, Oregon, in 1999; and attacks on federal land and 

animal management sites, private meat packing plants, 

lumber facilities, and a car dealership, with total damages 

reaching $80 million. 

Crocker Convicted for Attempting to Acquire a 

Chemical Weapon 

November 28, 2006: Demetrius “Van” Crocker is sentenced in the U.S. District Court for the Western 

District of Tennessee to 30 years in prison after his conviction for attempting to acquire a chemical weapon, 

possession of plastic explosives, and possession of an 

explosive device, in connection with his efforts to acquire 

sarin gas or its precursor. 

4. Pending Indictments 

Islamic Charity Charged With Terrorism 

Financing, Former Congressman Indicted for 

Money Laundering 

January 16, 2008: A federal grand jury in the U.S. 

District Court for the Western District of Missouri 

returns a 42-count superseding indictment that charges 

the Islamic American Relief Agency (IARA) and several 

of its former officers with eight new counts of engaging 

in prohibited financial transactions for the benefit of 

Specially Designated Global Terrorist Gulbuddin 

Hekmatyar. The indictment also charges former U.S. 

Congressman Mark Deli Siljander with money laundering, conspiracy, and obstruction of justice in the case. 

On March 6, 2007, IARA and five of its officers, 

employees, and associates were charged in a 33-count 

indictment for illegally transferring funds to Iraq in violation of federal sanctions. They were also charged with 

stealing government funds, misusing IARA’s charitable 

status to raise funds for an unlawful purpose, and 

attempting to avoid government detection of their illegal 

activities by, among other things, falsely denying in a 

nationally-televised interview that a procurement agent 

of Usama bin Laden had been an employee of IARA. 

Kassir Extradited From Czech Republic on 

Terrorism Charges 

September 25, 2007: Oussama Abdullah Kassir, an 

individual charged in the U.S. District Court for the 

Southern District of New York with, among other things, 

conspiring to provide material support and resources to al 

Qaeda, is extradited to the United States from the Czech 

Republic. The charges relate to his participation in an 

effort to establish a violent jihad training camp in Bly, 

Oregon, and his operation of several terrorist websites. 

Kassir was originally arrested by Czech authorities in 

Prague in 1995 as he was traveling from Sweden to 

Lebanon. A superseding indictment in the Southern 

District of New York against Kassir also charges Mustafa 

Kamel Mustafa and Haroon Rashid Aswat, both of whom 

are detained in England awaiting extradition to the United 

States, on the charges. 

Two Students Indicted on Explosives Charges 

August 31, 2007: Two University of South Florida students, Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed and Youssef 

Samir Megahed, are indicted by a grand jury in the U.S. 

District Court for the Middle District of Florida for 

transporting explosives in interstate commerce without 

permits. Mohamed is also charged with distributing information about building and using an explosive device. 

48 National Security Division — Progress Report 
APPENDIX


Indictment of Specially Designated Global Terrorist 

and Brother 

August 2, 2007: Zulkifli Abdhir, a fugitive Specially 

Designated Global Terrorist who is the subject of a $5 

million reward and is believed to be at large in the 

Philippines, is indicted on terrorism-related charges in 

the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 

California along with his U.S. citizen brother, Rahmat 

Abdhir, who allegedly provided funds and equipment to 

him even as the fugitive evaded capture and battled 

Philippine troops. 

Four Charged in Plot to Bomb John F. Kennedy 

International Airport 

June 2, 2007: Four individuals are charged in the U.S. 

District Court for the Eastern District of New York with 

conspiring to attack John F. Kennedy International 

Airport by planting explosives to blow up the airport’s 

major jet-fuel supply tanks and pipeline. Agents from 

the FBI arrested one of the defendants, former airport 

employee Russell Defreitas, a United States citizen and 

native of Guyana, in Brooklyn, New York. Abdul Kadir, 

a citizen of Guyana who had served as a member of the 

Guyanese Parliament, and Kareem Ibrahim and Abdel 

Nur, citizens of Trinidad, are in custody in Trinidad. 

They have appealed their order of extradition to the 

United States. A six-count indictment charges the four 

defendants with various conspiracies: to attack a public 

transportation system, to destroy buildings by fire or 

explosives, to attack aircraft and aircraft materials, to 

destroy international airport facilities, and to attack a 

mass transportation facility. 

Hashmi Extradited from United Kingdom on 

Material Support Charges 

May 25, 2007: Syed Hashmi is extradited from the 

United Kingdom to the United States pursuant to an 

indictment in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 

District of New York charging him with providing material support to al Qaeda. Among other things, the indictment alleges that he provided military gear, such as night 

vision goggles, to terror cells in Pakistan. Hashmi is also 

alleged to have ties to some members of a British terror 

cell as well as direct ties to admitted terrorist Mohammed Junaid Babar, who has since pleaded guilty and is 

cooperating with the Government. If convicted, Hashmi 

faces a maximum of 50 years in prison. Hashmi’s extradition represented the first time the United Kingdom 

had extradited an individual to the United States on terrorism charges. 

Five Charged in Plot to Attack United States 

Soldiers at Fort Dix 

May 7, 2007: Five individuals—three of them brothers—are arrested and charged in the U.S. District Court 

for the District of New Jersey with plotting to kill soldiers 

in an armed assault at the Fort Dix Army Base in New 

Jersey. The five defendants are Mohamad Ibrahim 

Shnewer, Eljvir Duka, Dritan Duka, Shain Duka, and 

Serdar Tatar. A sixth defendant, Agron Abdullahu, was 

arrested at the same time and charged in the District of 

New Jersey with aiding and abetting the illegal possession 

of firearms by three of the members of the group. On 

October 31, 2007, Abdullahu pleaded guilty to conspiring 

to provide firearms and ammunition to individuals whom 

he knew were illegal aliens. He has not yet been sentenced. 

The arrests of the defendants occurred on the same day as 

two of the defendants met with a confidential government 

witness to purchase three AK-47 semiautomatic assault 

weapons, four M-16 fully automatic machine guns, and 

four handguns to be used in an attack they had been planning from at least January 2006. Five defendants, not 

including Abdullahu, were initially charged with conspiracy to murder members of the uniformed services, which 

carries a maximum statutory penalty of imprisonment for 

any term of years or for life, and were additionally charged 

in a superseding indictment with attempt to murder U.S. 

military personnel, which carries a maximum statutory 

penalty of imprisonment for twenty years. 

Kandasamy Charged with Providing Material 

Support to Tamil Tigers 

April 25, 2007: Karunakaran Kandasamy (Karuna) is 

arrested pursuant to a criminal complaint in the U.S. 

District Court for the Eastern District of New York 

National Security Division — Progress Report 49 
United States Department of Justice


charging him with providing material support to the 

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil 

Tigers), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. 

The complaint alleges that Karuna is the director of the 

American branch of the LTTE, which is located in 

Queens, New York, and operates through a front organization called the World Tamil Coordinating Committee. Karuna oversees and directs the LTTE’s activities in 

the United States, including fundraising. In the summer 

and fall of 2004, the LTTE undertook a major worldwide campaign to raise money for its planned offensive 

against the Sri Lankan government in late 2005. In support of this planned offensive, Karuna held fundraising 

events in November and December 2004 at a church 

and a public high school in Queens, New York, and a 

school in South Brunswick, New Jersey. According to the 

complaint, Karuna also was responsible for arranging 

meetings in LTTE-controlled territory in Sri Lanka 

between LTTE leaders and prominent LTTE supporters 

from the United States. Karuna and his subordinates also 

assisted LTTE intelligence agents in researching military 

technology. Eleven other defendants were indicted in the 

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York 

in 2006 for providing material support to the LTTE. 

Paul Indicted for Conspiracy to Provide Material 

Support to a Terrorist Act 

April 11, 2007: An indictment is returned in the U.S. 

District Court for the Southern District of Ohio charging 

Christopher Paul of Columbus, Ohio, with conspiracy to 

provide material support to a terrorist act; conspiracy to use 

a weapon of mass destruction; and providing material support to a terrorist act. Paul, a Muslim convert who was 

born in the United States, fought in Afghanistan and 

Bosnia. Once he returned to the United States, he operated in a circle of Islamists with similar views in Columbus, 

Ohio, recruiting and preparing them to fight in other overseas conflicts. Paul also provided material support to his 

overseas cohorts, some of whom were in Frankfurt, 

Germany, by exhorting them to violence, procuring and 

providing equipment and money, and providing training 

in explosives, for their use in preparation for conflicts and 

attacks on civilians in Europe and the United States. 

Dutch Citizen Arraigned on Charges of Terrorism 

Conspiracy Against Americans in Iraq 

January 29, 2007: Wesam Al Delaema, an Iraqi-born 

Dutch citizen who was extradited from the Netherlands, 

makes his initial appearance in the U.S. District Court 

for the District of Columbia, to face charges of allegedly 

participating in a conspiracy to attack Americans based 

in Iraq. The case represents the first United States criminal prosecution arising from terrorist activities taking 

place in Iraq. 

Two Charged with Providing Material Support to 

Al-Manar and Hizballah 

November 20, 2006: Javed Iqbal and Saleh Elahwal are 

charged in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 

District of New York in an 11-count indictment with 

providing material support in the form of electronic 

equipment to a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, Hizballah, and its television station al-Manar, as 

well as providing a television broadcasting outlet in 

exchange for thousands of dollars per month. Al-Manar 

is a Hizballah-run television station based in Lebanon 

that was designated as a Specially Designated Global 

Terrorist organization in March 2006. 

Gadahn Indicted on Treason and Material Support 

Charges for Providing Aid and Comfort 

to al Qaeda 

October 11, 2006: Adam Gadahn, also known as 

Azzam Al Amriki, is indicted in the U.S. District Court 

for the Central District of California on charges of treason and providing material support to a Foreign Terrorist 

Organization for making a series of propaganda videotapes for al Qaeda. Gadahn is the first person to be 

charged with treason against the United States since the 

World War II era. The two-count superseding indictment returned by a federal grand jury in the Central 

District of California, also charges Gadahn with providing material support to al Qaeda. Gadahn is a fugitive 

who is believed to be overseas, and has been added to the 

50 National Security Division — Progress Report 
APPENDIX


FBI’s list of Most Wanted Terrorists. The Rewards for 

Justice Program, run by the U.S. Department of State, 

Diplomatic Security Service, is offering a reward of up to 

$1 million for information leading to Gadahn’s arrest or 

conviction. 

B. MAJOR ESPIONAGE INDICTMENTS 

AND CONVICTIONS 

Defense Department Official and Two Others 

Arrested on Espionage Charges Involving China 

February 11, 2008: Tai Shen Kuo and Yu Xin Kang, 

both of New Orleans, Louisiana, and Gregg William 

Bergersen, of Alexandria, Virginia, are arrested on espionage charges related to the passage of classified U.S. 

Government documents and information to the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Both 

Kuo and Kang were charged by criminal complaint with 

conspiracy to disclose national defense information to a 

foreign government. Bergersen was charged in a separate 

complaint with conspiracy to disclose national defense 

information to persons not entitled to receive it. 

According to court documents, Kuo, a naturalized U.S. 

citizen and New Orleans businessman, gathered national defense information on behalf of the government of 

the PRC. Working under the direction of an individual 

identified in the complaint affidavit only as “PRC 

Official A,” Kuo cultivated friendships with Bergersen 

and others within the U.S. Government and obtained 

from them—for ultimate passage to the PRC—sensitive 

U.S. Government information, including classified 

national defense information. Much of the information 

pertained to U.S. military sales to Taiwan. Bergersen, a 

Weapons Systems Policy Analyst at the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency, an agency within the Department 

of Defense, was charged with being the source of the 

classified information collected by Kuo. Kang, a citizen 

of the PRC and a U.S. Lawful Permanent Resident, 

served as a conduit of information between PRC Official 

A and Kuo. Bergersen faces a potential sentence of ten 

years in prison, while Kuo and Kang face potential sentences of life in prison. 

Five Charged With Being Illegal Agents of Foreign 

Government 

December 20, 2007: Four Venezuelans and a Uruguayan 

national are indicted in the U.S. District Court for the 

Southern District of Florida on charges of acting and 

conspiring to act as agents of the Venezuelan government 

within the United States without prior notification to 

the U.S. Attorney General. Moises Maionica, Rodolfo 

Wanseele Paciello, Franklin Duran, and Carlos Kauffman 

were initially arrested on a criminal complaint. Defendant 

Antonio Jose Canchica Gomez, however, remains at 

large. According to the indictment, the defendants coordinated and participated in a series of meetings in South 

Florida with Guido Alejandro Antonini Wilson to procure his help in concealing the source of funds and the 

role of the government of Venezuela in the intended 

delivery of an $800,000 cash contribution confiscated in 

Argentina. In August 2007, Argentine authorities seized 

the $800,000 in cash from luggage in Antonini’s possession as he arrived in Argentina on a flight from 

Venezuela with several others. Antonini later returned to 

his home in South Florida, where according to the 

indictment, he was threatened by the defendants. On 

March 3, 2008, Kauffman pleaded guilty to conspiring 

to act as an unregistered Venezuelan agent. On January 

25, 2008, Maionica pleaded guilty to acting and conspiring to act as an unregistered Venezuelan agent. 

Kauffman and Maionica have not yet been sentenced. 

Former Bechtel Jacobs Employee Charged with 

Violating the Atomic Energy Act 

July 19, 2007: A federal grand jury in the U.S. District 

Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee charges Roy 

Lynn Oakley, a former contract worker at East Tennessee 

Technology Park, with converting to his own use restricted government materials utilized for uranium enrichment and illegally transferring these restricted materials 

to another person, with reason to believe the materials 

would be used to injure the United States and secure an 

advantage to a foreign country. 

National Security Division — Progress Report 51 
United States Department of Justice


Former U.S. Marine Sentenced in Espionage Case 

July 18, 2007: Leandro Aragoncillo, a former member 

of the U.S. Marine Corps who worked at times under 

two administrations in the Office of the Vice President 

of the United States, is sentenced to ten years in prison 

for espionage and other charges for taking and transferring classified information to senior political and government officials of the Philippines in an attempt to 

destabilize and overthrow that country’s government. 

Aragoncillo admitted that he regularly transferred classified national security documents to his Philippine contacts and that the information could be used to the 

injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation. Aragoncillo also stated that some of the classified information he removed from the Office of the 

Vice President included information that related to terrorist threats to United States Government interests in 

the Philippines. 

Former Los Alamos National Laboratory 

Contractor Pleads Guilty 

May 15, 2007: Jessica Lynn Quintana, a former employee of a contractor at the Los Alamos National Laboratory 

(LANL), pleads guilty in the U.S. District Court for the 

District of New Mexico to knowingly removing classified 

information from the national security research laboratory. According to her plea, Quintana was employed by 

a contractor at the Los Alamos research facility to archive 

classified information. On July 27, 2006, while she was 

working on this project in a secure area at the LANL, 

Quintana printed off pages of classified documents and 

downloaded other classified information to a computer 

thumb drive, before putting them in a backpack and taking them home. Quintana stored the pages and thumb 

drive at her residence, which was not an authorized location for the storage of classified information. On 

December 20, 2007, Quintana was sentenced to two years 

of probation. 

Michigan Man Pleads Guilty to Acting as 

an Agent of Iraq 

April 16, 2007: Ghazi Al-Awadi is charged in the U.S. 

District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan with 

acting as an agent of Iraq without first notifying the U.S. 

Attorney General. From 1997 to 2003, Al-Awadi served 

as an agent of the Iraqi Intelligence Service by gathering 

and reporting information about Iraqi opposition groups 

in the Detroit, Michigan area. As part of his intelligence 

gathering activities Al-Awadi reported on friends and 

family and accepted cash payments from the Iraqi government. On July 11, 2007, Al-Awadi pleaded guilty to 

one count of acting as an agent of Iraq. Al-Awadi has not 

yet been sentenced. 

Illinois Man Convicted of Serving as Longtime 

Iraqi Spy in the United States 

April 16, 2007: Sami Khoshaba Latchin, a resident of 

suburban Chicago, Illinois, is convicted of serving as a 

long-time agent of the Iraqi Intelligence Service in the 

United States. He was found guilty of acting as an unregistered foreign agent in the United States, conspiring to 

act as an unregistered foreign agent in the United States, 

violating the International Emergency Economic Powers 

Act, lying to the FBI in an interview, and obtaining 

United States citizenship under false pretenses. Latchin 

has not yet been sentenced. 

Michigan Man Charged with Being Unregistered 

Agent of Iraq 

March 28, 2007: Najib Shemami, of Sterling Heights, 

Michigan, is charged in the U.S. District Court for the 

Eastern District of Michigan in a sealed four-count 

indictment with being an unregistered foreign agent of 

the former Iraqi government, violating the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act, conspiracy, and false 

statements. The indictment against Shemami alleges that 

52 National Security Division — Progress Report 
APPENDIX


Shemami traveled from Michigan to Iraq on several occasions and met with officers of the Iraqi Intelligence Service 

before the March 2003 invasion of Iraq by coalition 

forces. During these meetings, the indictment alleges, 

Shemami reported information relating to the activities of 

Iraqi expatriates in the United States, potential candidates 

for political office in Iraq, and United States and Turkish 

military activities he had observed in Turkey before the 

2003 invasion of Iraq by coalition forces. 

Former Florida Professor Sentenced for Conspiring 

to Act as Cuban Covert Agent 

February 27, 2007: Carlos Alvarez and his wife, Elsa 

Alvarez, are sentenced in the U.S. District Court for the 

Southern District of Florida to 60 and 36 months of 

imprisonment, respectively. Beginning in 1977 and continuing through 2005, Carlos Alvarez acted as a covert 

agent of Cuba by meeting with individuals who worked 

for the Cuban Intelligence Service and gathering information concerning, among other things, prominent 

individuals and groups within the Cuban exile community in the United States. Elisa Alvarez concealed her 

husband’s participation in the conspiracy. 

Korean Man Convicted of Being Iraqi Agent in 

Creation of Oil-for-Food Program 

February 22, 2007: Tongsun Park, a citizen of the Republic of Korea, is sentenced in the U.S. District Court 

for the Southern District of New York to five years 

imprisonment for conspiring to act as an unregistered 

agent of the Iraqi government, in particular, assisting the 

former Iraqi government with respect to the creation of 

the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program. He is also 

ordered to forfeit $1.2 million to the United States and 

pay a fine of $15,000. Park was found guilty by a federal jury on July 13, 2006. Evidence at trial established 

that, beginning in October 2002, Park and another individual agreed to work together on behalf of Saddam 

Hussein’s regime to promote the lifting of the international economic sanctions that had been placed on that 

regime after the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. These 

efforts ultimately led to the adoption of the United 

Nations Oil-for-Food Program, which allowed Iraq to 

sell limited quantities of oil and use the proceeds to purchase humanitarian goods. Park received at least $2 million in cash from the Iraqi government for his efforts. At 

no time during these activities had Park registered with 

the U.S. Attorney General as an agent of Iraq. 

United States Army Contract Translator Pleads 

Guilty to Unauthorized Possession of Classified 

Documents on Iraqi Insurgency 

February 14, 2007: A U.S. Army contract translator 

known as Abdulhakeem Nour pleads guilty in the U.S. 

District Court for the Eastern District of New York to 

illegally possessing national defense documents. In August 

2003, Nour used a false identity to apply for and gain a 

position as an Arabic translator for the L-3 Titan Corporation. Thereafter, during assignments in Iraq, the 

defendant took various classified documents from the 

U.S. Army without authorization. While assigned to an 

intelligence group in the 82nd Airborne Division of the 

U.S. Army at Al Taqqadam Air Base, the defendant downloaded a classified document and took hard copies of several other classified documents. The documents detail 

the 82nd Airborne’s mission in Iraq in regard to insurgent activity, such as coordinates of insurgent locations 

upon which the U.S. Army was preparing to fire in 

January 2004, and U.S. Army plans for protecting Sunni 

Iraqis traveling on their pilgrimage (Hajj) to Mecca, 

Saudi Arabia, in late January 2004. During a later 

deployment to a U.S. Army base near Najaf, Iraq, the 

defendant photographed a classified battle map identifying United States troop routes used in August 2004, during the bloody battle of Najaf, where the United States 

and Iraqi security forces sustained serious casualties. 

Nour has not yet been sentenced. 

Former State Department Official Sentenced for 

Mishandling Classified Material 

January 22, 2007: Donald Willis Keyser is sentenced in 

the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 

Virginia to more than 12 months in prison for the 

unlawful removal of classified material from the 

Department of State and for making false statements to 

the Government. Keyser admitted that he moved classiNational Security Division — Progress Report 53 
United States Department of Justice


fied documents and digital memory devices from the 

State Department to his residence. He also admitted that 

he lied to federal investigators about his relationship with 

an intelligence officer of the government of Taiwan by 

falsely denying that he had engaged in conduct with her 

that might make him vulnerable to coercion, exploitation or pressure from a foreign government. 

C. MAJOR EXPORT ENFORCEMENT 

INDICTMENTS AND INVESTIGATIONS 

U.S. Navy Warship Technology to China 

March 24, 2008: Chi Mak, a former engineer for 

defense contractor Power Paragon, is sentenced in the 

U.S. District Court for the Central District of California 

to 293 months (more than 24 years) in prison for orchestrating a conspiracy to obtain U.S. Navy warship technology and to illegally export this material to the People’s 

Republic of China (PRC). Mak was found guilty at trial 

in May 2007 of conspiracy, two counts of attempting to 

violate export control laws, acting as an unregistered 

agent of a foreign government and making false statements. The investigation revealed that Mak had been 

given “tasking” lists from the PRC that requested specific 

defense information, including U.S. Navy research related to nuclear-powered submarines and other data. Mak 

gathered technical data about the Navy’s current and 

future warship technology and conspired with others to 

illegally export this data to the PRC. After Mak was convicted at trial, his four co-conspirators pleaded guilty. Chi 

Mak’s brother, Tai Mak, and Chi Mak’s wife, Rebecca 

Chiu, are scheduled to be sentenced in April and May 

2008, respectively. Chi Mak’s sister-in-law, Fuk Li, and 

nephew, Billy Mak, were previously sentenced to time 

served and face deportation to China. 

Missile Technology to Indian Government Entities 

March 13, 2008: Parthasarathy Sudarshan, the owner 

of an international electronics company called Cirrus 

Electronics LLC, pleads guilty in the U.S. District Court 

for the District of Columbia to a one-count criminal 

information alleging that he conspired to illegally export 

controlled microprocessors and other electronic components to government entities in India that participate in 

the development of ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, and combat fighter jets. Among the recipients of the 

U.S. technology were the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre 

and Bharat Dynamics, Ltd., two Indian entities involved 

in rocket and missile production, as well as the 

Aeronautical Development Establishment, which develops India’s Tejas fighter jet. 

100,000 Uzi Submachine Guns to Iran 

March 10, 2008: Seyed Mostafa Maghloubi is sentenced in the U.S. District Court for the Central District 

of California to three years and five months in prison for 

attempting to illegally export goods to Iran. As part of 

his August 2007 plea agreement, Maghloubi admitted 

that he had plotted to illegally export as many as 

100,000 Uzi submachine guns as well as night vision 

goggles to officials in Iran’s government. According to 

the facts of the plea agreement, the defendant sought to 

have the weapons shipped from the United States to 

Dubai and later transported over the border to Iran. 

Theft of Trade Secrets on U.S. Space Shuttle for 

China 

February 11, 2008: Dongfan “Greg” Chung, a former 

Boeing engineer, is arrested in Southern California after 

being indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Central 

District of California on charges of economic espionage 

and acting as an unregistered foreign agent of the People’s 

Republic of China (PRC), for whom he allegedly stole 

Boeing trade secrets related to several aerospace and military programs, including the Space Shuttle, the Delta IV 

rocket program, and the Air Force’s C-17 aircraft. Chung, 

who was employed by Rockwell International from 1973 

until its defense and space unit was acquired by Boeing in 

1996, was indicted on eight counts of economic espionage, one count of conspiracy to commit economic espionage, one count of acting as an unregistered foreign agent 

without prior notification to the U.S. Attorney General, 

one count of obstruction of justice, and three counts of 

making false statements to the FBI. According to the 

54 National Security Division — Progress Report 
APPENDIX


indictment, individuals in the Chinese aviation industry 

began sending Chung “tasking” letters as early as 1979. 

Over the years, the letters directed Chung to collect specific technological information, including data related to 

the Space Shuttle. Chung responded in one letter indicating a desire to contribute to the “motherland.” In various 

letters to his handlers in the PRC, Chung referenced engineering manuals he had collected and sent to the PRC, 

including 24 manuals relating to the B-1 Bomber that 

Rockwell had prohibited from disclosure outside of the 

company. Between 1985 and 2003, Chung made multiple trips to the PRC to deliver lectures on technology 

involving the Space Shuttle and other programs, and during those trips he met with agents of the PRC. 

Military and Commercial Aircraft Components 

to Iran 

February 1, 2008: Laura Wang-Woodford, the director 

of a Singapore-based aviation company, is arraigned in 

the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New 

York in connection with charges that she illegally exported controlled U.S. commercial and military aircraft components to Iran. She pleaded not guilty and was ordered 

detained. Wang-Woodford is a U.S. citizen who served 

as the director of Monarch Aviation Pte, Ltd., a company in Singapore that has imported and exported aircraft 

components for more than 16 years. She and her husband, Brian D. Woodford, are charged in a 20-count 

indictment with Arms Export Control Act and International Emergency Economic Powers Act violations in 

the Eastern District of New York. According to the indictment, Wang-Woodford exported controlled U.S. aircraft 

parts from the United States to her company in Singapore 

and then re-exported these commodities to a company in 

Tehran, Iran, without obtaining the required U.S. 

Government licenses. At the time of her December 23, 

2007 arrest in San Francisco, California, Wang-Woodford 

was carrying catalogues from the China National Precision 

Machinery Import and Export Company (CPMIEC), 

which contained advertisements for surface-to-air missiles 

and rocket launchers. CPMIEC has been sanctioned by the 

Treasury Department as a specially designated Weapons of 

Mass Destruction proliferator. 

Military Amplifiers to China 

January 25, 2008: Federal agents arrested Ding Zhengxing and Su Yang in Saipan pursuant to an indictment in 

the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas 

that charged them with Arms Export Control Act violations. A third defendant, Peter Zhu, of Shanghai Meuro 

Electronics Company Ltd., in China, remains at large. 

The indictment alleges that the defendants attempted to 

purchase and illegally export to China amplifiers that are 

controlled for military purposes. The amplifiers are used 

in digital radios and wireless area networks. Zhengxing 

and Yang were arrested after they traveled to Saipan to take 

possession of the amplifiers. 

Arms Exports to Russia 

January 7, 2008: Sergey Korznikov of Moscow, Russia, 

and Mark Komoroski of Nanticoke, Pennsylvania, are 

arrested pursuant to a criminal complaint in the U.S. 

District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 

The complaint alleges that the defendants conspired to 

smuggle military equipment, including rifle scopes, magazines for firearms, and face shields, from the United 

States to Russia to be resold to unknown persons. 

Military Night Vision Goggles and Aviation 

Helmets Illegally Exported Overseas 

December 11, 2007: Jerri Stringer is sentenced to 48 

months of imprisonment and three years of supervised 

release in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 

District of Florida after pleading guilty to several violations in connection with a conspiracy with her son, former U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Leonard Allen Schenk, to 

steal restricted military night vision goggles, aviation helmets, and other equipment from the Air Force and sell 

them to overseas buyers. Schenk was sentenced to 235 

months of imprisonment and three years of supervised 

release after pleading guilty to a 21-count indictment 

alleging the sale of stolen military equipment overseas 

and attempting to hire an undercover agent to kill a 

potential government witness. 

National Security Division — Progress Report 55 
United States Department of Justice


Military Night Vision Camera and Technology 

to China 

December 2, 2007: Philip Cheng is sentenced in the 

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California 

to two years in prison and ordered to pay a $50,000 fine 

for his role in brokering the illegal export of a night vision 

camera and its accompanying technology to the People’s 

Republic of China in violation of federal laws and regulations. Mr. Cheng pleaded guilty on October 31, 2006, to 

brokering the illegal export of a Panther-series infrared 

camera, a device that makes use of night vision technology 

and is controlled for national security reasons. Mr. Cheng 

failed to obtain required U.S. Government authorization 

prior to the export of the camera. 

Military Night Vision Technology to China 

October 31, 2007: Bing Xu, of Nanjing, China, is 

charged by criminal complaint in the U.S. District 

Court for the District of New Jersey with attempting to 

illegally export military-grade night vision technology 

from the United States to the People’s Republic of 

China. According to court documents, Xu arrived in the 

United States from China to pick up the technology a 

day after his Chinese employer wired $14,080 to undercover federal agents as payment for the purchase of the 

restricted equipment. 

U.S. Stealth Missile Data and Military Secrets 

to China 

October 26, 2007: Noshir Gowadia is charged in a second superseding indictment in the U.S. District Court 

for the District of Hawaii with an additional count of 

transmitting classified national defense information to 

the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and two additional counts of filing false tax returns. Gowadia was charged 

in a superseding indictment in November 2006 with 

performing substantial defense related services for the 

PRC by agreeing to design, and later designing, a cruise 

missile exhaust system nozzle that renders the missile less 

susceptible to detection and interception. Among other 

violations, Gowadia was charged in the first superseding 

indictment with willfully communicating classified 

national defense information to the PRC with the intent 

that it be used to the advantage of the PRC or to the injury 

of the United States, as well as unlawfully possessing classified information, and laundering funds paid to him by 

the Chinese government for his illegal defense work. 

Military Accelerometers to China 

October 18, 2007: A federal grand jury in the U.S. 

District Court for the Southern District of California 

returns an indictment charging Qing Li with conspiracy 

to procure the illegal export of military-grade accelerometers from the United States to the People’s Republic of 

China. According to court papers, Li conspired with an 

individual in China to locate and procure Endevco 

7270A-200K accelerometers for what her co-conspirator 

described as a “special” scientific agency in China. This 

accelerometer has military applications in “smart” bombs 

and missile development and in calibrating the force of 

nuclear and chemical explosions. 

Assault Weapon Scopes to Indonesia 

October 11, 2007: Doli Syarief Pulungan, an Indonesian 

citizen, is indicted in the U.S. District Court for the 

Western District of Wisconsin for conspiracy to export 

from the United States to Indonesia defense articles without having obtained from the U.S. State Department the 

required license or written authorization for such export. 

Pulungan is charged with conspiracy to export 100 

Leupold Mark 5 CQ-T Riflescopes for M-16 rifles to 

Indonesia. He is also charged with making a false statement to the FBI. 

Illegal Exports of F-4 and F-14 Fighter Jet 

Components 

October 5, 2007: Abraham Trujillo and David Wayne 

of Ogden, Utah, are charged in the U.S. District Court 

for the District of Utah with attempting to illegally 

export components for F-4 and F-14 fighter jets using 

the Internet. The defendants are charged with attempting to illegally export military cable assemblies, wiring 

harnesses, and other restricted components to Canada in 

2006 and 2007. 

56 National Security Division — Progress Report 
APPENDIX


Illegally Exporting Products with Nuclear and 

Missile Applications to Pakistan 

October 4, 2007: SparesGlobal, Inc., a Pittsburgh, 

Pennsylvania company, is fined $40,000 and sentenced 

to one year’s probation in the U.S. District Court for the 

Western District of Pennsylvania for conspiring to falsify documents and make false statements about a 2003 

illegal export to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that 

ultimately ended up in Pakistan. According to court documents, SparesGlobal exported to a trading company in 

the UAE restricted graphite products that can be used in 

nuclear reactors and in the nose cones of ballistic missiles. The graphite products were routed to Pakistan. 

Sensitive Aircraft Components Illegally Exported 

to Iran 

September 18, 2007: Aviation Services International, a 

Netherlands-based aviation services company, its owner, 

Robert Kraaipoel, and two other Dutch companies are 

charged in the U.S. District Court for the District of 

Columbia with illegally exporting aerospace grade aluminum, aircraft components, and other equipment to 

Iran and the government of Iran. The complaint alleges 

that in 2006 alone, Aviation Services obtained some 290 

aircraft-related components from the United States and 

caused them to be shipped to Iran. Many of these U.S.-

origin goods were sent to Iranian government agencies, 

Iranian procurement agencies or companies doing business in Iran, according to the complaint. 

U.S. Military Source Code to China 

August 2, 2007: Xiaodong Sheldon Meng pleads guilty 

in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 

California to violating the Economic Espionage Act to 

benefit the People’s Republic of China Navy Research 

Center and violating the Arms Export Control Act for illegally exporting military source code. Meng is the first 

defendant in the country to be convicted of exporting military source code pursuant to the Arms Export Control 

Act. The code in question was designed for precision training of fighter pilots. Meng has not yet been sentenced. 

Restricted Technology to China 

August 1, 2007: Yang Fung, the president of Excellence 

Engineering Electronics, Inc., pleads guilty in the U.S. 

District Court for the Northern District of California to a 

charge of illegally exporting controlled microwave integrated circuits to the People’s Republic of China without 

the required authorization from the Department of Commerce. Fung has not yet been sentenced. 

Sensitive Technology to Prohibited Facility in India 

July 30, 2007: Samuel Shangteh Peng is charged in the 

U.S. District Court for the Central District of California 

with illegally exporting sensitive technology to an entity 

in India prohibited from receiving such technology due 

to proliferation concerns. Peng, an international sales 

manager at a California company, was charged with illegally exporting vibration amplifiers, cable assemblies, 

and vibration processor units from the United States to 

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Engine Division, in 

India. In 1998, the U.S. Government designated this 

facility in India as an end-user of concern for proliferation reasons. 

Illegal Exports of F-5 and F-14 Fighter Jet 

Components 

July 19, 2007: Jilani Humayun is arrested in Lynbrook, 

New York, on charges of illegally exporting F-5 and F-14 

fighter jet components. According to the complaint in 

the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 

York, Humayun formed his own company, Vash 

International, Inc., in 2004 to engage in the business of 

export management for defense and logistic support, 

including tanks, guided missiles, and rocket launchers. 

Then, on eleven separate occasions between January 

2004 and May 2006, Humayun, via Vash International, 

exported to Malaysia F-5 and F-14 parts, as well as 

Chinook Helicopter parts. 

National Security Division — Progress Report 57 
United States Department of Justice


Telecommunications Equipment to Iraq 

July 19, 2007: Dawn and Darrin Hanna are indicted 

in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 

Michigan on charges of conspiracy, violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, money laundering conspiracy, and false statements. According to the 

indictment, from 2002 to 2003, the defendants received 

$9.5 million in proceeds to supply telecommunications 

and other equipment to Iraq in violation of the United 

States embargo that existed prior to the invasion by 

coalition forces in March 2003. 

Missiles, Arms to Terrorists in Colombia and 

Armed Factions Around the Globe 

June 7, 2007: Reputed international arms dealer 

Monzer Al Kassar is arrested in Spain and two of his 

alleged associates are arrested in Romania pursuant to a 

terrorism-related indictment returned in the U.S. 

District Court for the Southern District of New York. 

According to the indictment, Kassar agreed to sell millions of dollars worth of surface-to-air missiles, rocketpropelled grenade launchers, ammunition, and machine 

guns to Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, 

or FARC, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, 

between February 2006 and May 2007. Since the early 

1970s, court documents allege, Kassar has been a source 

of weapons and military equipment for armed factions 

engaged in violent conflicts around the world, including 

in Nicaragua, Bosnia, Somalia, Iran, and Iraq. 

F-14 Fighter Jet Components to Iran 

May 8, 2007: Reza Tabib is sentenced to two years in 

prison by the U.S. District Court for the Central District 

of California for violating the International Emergency 

Economic Powers Act in connection with his efforts to 

illegally export military aircraft parts to Iran via associates in Germany and the United Arab Emirates. In 2006, 

federal agents intercepted maintenance kits for the F-14 

fighter jet that Tabib and his wife had sent to Iran. A 

search of their California home led to the seizure of more 

than 13,000 aircraft parts as well as various aircraft part 

“shopping lists” provided to the couple by an Iranian 

military officer. 

Telecommunications Equipment from China to Iraq 

April 10, 2007: Andrew Huang, the owner of McAndrew’s, 

Inc., an international export company, pleads guilty in the 

U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut to one 

count of making false statements to the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation. Huang was charged in 2006 with operating 

as a representative for the Chinese Electronic System 

Engineering Corporation, the technology procurement 

arm of the government of the People’s Republic of China 

(PRC). According to court documents, Huang allegedly 

helped broker the illegal sale and transfer of millions of 

dollars worth of telecommunications equipment from the 

PRC to Iraq between 1999 and 2001. On April 11, 2007, 

the district court sentenced Huang to two years of probation and imposed a $5,000 fine. 

Software to Iran 

April 8, 2007: Mohammad Reza Alavi is arrested on the 

charge of illegally exporting sensitive software to Iran 

without the required authorization from the Treasury 

Department. Alavi, a former nuclear plant engineer in 

Arizona, was charged in a complaint filed in the U.S. 

District Court for the District of Arizona. 

Ballistic Helmets to Suriname 

March 28, 2007: Alpine Armoring, Inc., a Virginia company, pleads guilty in the U.S. District Court for the 

Eastern District of Virginia to the unlicensed export of 

controlled ballistic helmets to Suriname. Fred Khoroushi, 

the president and director of Alpine Armoring, also pleaded guilty to making false statements on an export declaration. Khoroushi and Alpine Armoring have agreed to pay 

$200,000 in criminal fines and civil sanctions. 

$100 Million Penalty in Case Involving Illegal 

Exports of Military Night Vision Technology to 

China, Singapore, and the United Kingdom 

March 27, 2007: ITT Corporation, the leading manufacturer of military night vision equipment for the U.S. 

Armed Forces, agrees to pay a $100 million penalty and 

admits to illegally exporting restricted night vision data 

58 National Security Division — Progress Report 
APPENDIX


to the People’s Republic of China, Singapore, and an 

unauthorized facility in the United Kingdom. The company also pleads guilty to charges that it omitted statements of material fact in required arms export reports. 

The $100 million penalty is believed to be one the 

largest ever in a criminal export control case. As part of 

the plea agreement, ITT Corporation must invest $50 

million of the penalty toward the development and 

deployment of the most advanced night vision systems 

in the world for the U.S. Armed Forces. 

Machine Guns, Arms to Indonesia 

January 18, 2007: Hadianto Djuliarso pleads guilty in 

the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan to conspiracy to violate the Arms Export Control 

Act and money laundering in a scheme to purchase and 

illegally export more than $1 million worth of machine 

guns, sniper rifles, and other weapons to Indonesia. 

According to court documents, Djuliarso also made 

inquiries about purchasing Sidewinder missiles and strafing ammunition for illegal export to Indonesia. Three 

other defendants have pleaded guilty in this case. In May 

2007, Djuliarso was sentenced to four years in prison 

and two years supervised probation for violating the 

Arms Export Control Act. 

Stolen Trade Secrets to Chinese Nationals 

December 14, 2006: Fei Ye and Ming Zhong plead 

guilty in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 

District of California to charges of economic espionage 

for possessing trade secrets stolen from two Silicon Valley 

technology companies. The pair admitted that their 

company was to have provided a share of any profits 

made on sales of the stolen chips to Chinese entities. The 

defendants have not been sentenced. 

Technology with Nuclear Applications to Iran 

November 30, 2006: Juan Sevilla, sales director of 

United Calibration Corporation in California, is sentenced in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 

District of Illinois to five years probation, six months 

home confinement, 100 hours of community service, and 

a fine of $10,000 for attempting to illegally export to Iran 

machinery and related software to measure the tensile 

strength of steel in violation of the United States embargo. 

The technology is on the Nuclear Supplier’s Group 

“Watch List” as a commodity that can make a material 

contribution to nuclear activities of concern. 

United States Military Vehicles to the Middle East 

October 24, 2006: Ronald Wiseman, a former Defense 

Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS) official, is 

sentenced to 18 months in prison for illegally selling militarized vehicles to individuals in Middle Eastern nations. 

A second former DRMS official, Gayden C. Woodson, 

also pleaded guilty in connection with the scheme and was 

sentenced on January 31, 2007, to 33 months in prison. 

Aircraft Parts to Iran 

October 13, 2006: Ernest Koh, doing business as Chong 

Tek, is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 52 months 

by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New 

York for obtaining components that can be used in C-130 

military transport planes and P-3 Naval aircraft, and 

diverting those parts to Malaysia for ultimate transshipment to Iran. In total, the Government’s evidence in the 

case disclosed that between 2001 and 2004, Koh was 

responsible for illegally exporting approximately $2.6 million in aircraft parts to Iran. 

Industrial Furnace to Missile Institute in China 

October 4, 2006: William Kovacs, the owner and president of Elatec Technology Corporation in Massachusetts, is sentenced in the U.S. District Court for the 

District of Columbia to a year and a day in prison for 

illegally exporting a hot press industrial furnace to a 

research institute in the People’s Republic of China affiliated with that nation’s aerospace and missile programs. 

National Security Division — Progress Report 59 

U.S. Department of Justice
 

National Security Division
 

Established September 28, 2006