*The HONORABLE JOHN B. JONES, United States District

Judge for the District of South Dakota, sitting by

designation.

 The Honorable Dean Whipple, United States District Judge for 1

the Western District of Missouri.

___________

No. 95-2416

___________

Frank O. Mapes, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Western District of Missouri.

Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner *

of the Social Security *

Administration, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: January 11, 1996

 Filed: April 29, 1996

___________

Before BEAM and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and JONES,*

District Judge.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Frank O. Mapes appeals the district court's order affirming the

1

Social Security Commissioner's denial of his application for disability

insurance benefits. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Mapes applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the

Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et. seq., on October 23, 1991. He

alleged a disability onset date of January 1, 1986. The Social Security

Commissioner (Commissioner) determined that
 In order to be eligible for disability insurance benefits, a 2

claimant must establish the existence of a disability on or before

the date on which his or her insured status expires. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.131. The Commissioner calculates a claimant's insured status

pursuant to a formula set forth at 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(3)(B) and

423(c)(1)(B) and corresponding regulations. 

 Dilantin is an antiseizure medication used for the control of 3

grand mal and temporal lobe seizures. Physician's Desk Reference

1832 (49th ed. 1995).

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Mapes met disability insured status requirements through September 30,

1990. After Mapes's application was denied initially and on

2

reconsideration, he requested and was granted a hearing before an

administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ found that Mapes was not disabled

on or before September 30, 1990, and therefore denied Mapes's application.

The Appeals Council denied review, and Mapes filed this action in district

court. Each party then moved for summary judgment. The district court

concluded that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's decision, and

therefore granted the Commissioner's motion. Mapes now appeals.

At the time of the ALJ's decision, Mapes was 42 years old. He has

a high school education and has worked as a coal miner, machinist, window

assembler, and kitchen steward. His most recent work consists of odd jobs,

including lawn and garden work.

Mapes complains of lower back and leg pain and of rheumatoid

arthritis in his hands and joints. He also suffers from a seizure disorder

as a result of a fall he suffered in 1983, but his seizures are now

infrequent and controlled by medication. In addition to these physical

impairments, Mapes alleges anxiety, depression, and memory loss. He

acknowledges a long history of alcohol abuse, but he testified at the

hearing that he had given up hard liquor and only occasionally drinks beer,

in part because of the alcohol's effects when mixed with his prescription

medication. Mapes takes dilantin for his seizure disorder, ansaid for

3

back
 Ansaid tablets contain a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory agent 4

and are prescribed for rheumatoid arthritis and osteoarthritis.

Physician's Desk Reference, supra note 3, at 2520-21.

 Librium is a drug prescribed for management of anxiety

5

disorders or for the short-term relief of symptoms of anxiety.

Physician's Desk Reference, supra note 3, at 2073.

 Trazodone is a drug prescribed for treatment of depression

6

with or without prominent anxiety. Physician's Desk Reference,

supra note 3, at 520.

 In this sequential analysis, the ALJ must first determine

7

whether the applicant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity"

as defined by the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If the

answer is yes, the applicant is not disabled and the analysis need

go no further; if the answer is no, the ALJ must determine whether

the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits his

or her ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If a severe

impairment is present, the ALJ then considers whether the

claimant's impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed

in Appendix 1 to Part 404 of the Social Security regulations. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If so, the claimant is presumptively

disabled. Id. If the claimant's impairments do not meet or equal

the listings, the ALJ must determine whether, despite those

impairments, the claimant can return to past relevant work or, if

not, whether the claimant can perform other jobs in the national

economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) & 404.1520(f).

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pain and arthritis, librium for anxiety, and trazodone for depression. 4 5 6

In evaluating Mapes's claim, the ALJ applied the familiar five-step

analysis prescribed in the Social Security regulations. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The ALJ determined that although Mapes's impairments 7

were severe, none of them met or equalled a listed impairment. Relying in

part on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ then found that,

although Mapes was not able to return to his past relevant work, he

possessed the residual functional capacity to engage in a full range of

light, unskilled work existing in significant numbers in the national

economy.

The overriding issue in this case is whether the ALJ properly

considered Mapes's mental impairments in deciding that Mapes was
 The Psychiatric Review Technique Form is a standard document 8

which generally must be completed when a claimant alleges a mental

impairment. See Pratt v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1992)

(per curiam). The PRTF mirrors the listings for mental impairments

set forth in the Social Security regulations. See 20 C.F.R. pt.

404, subpt. P, app. 1, pt. A § 12.00. These listings usually

consist of two parts: (1) a set of clinical findings (paragraph A

criteria), which establish whether a medically-determinable mental

impairment exists; and (2) a set of functional restrictions

(paragraph B criteria), which detail the impairment's effect on

four areas of function deemed essential to work. See generally

Pratt, 956 F.2d at 834-35 & nn.7-9. 

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not disabled. Mapes contends that the ALJ erred in failing to set forth

Mapes's mental impairments and related functional limitations in the

hypothetical question he posed to the vocational expert at Mapes's hearing.

He further argues that the ALJ did not properly consider Mapes's physical

and mental impairments in combination so as to determine their cumulative

effects on Mapes's residual functional capacity to work.

II. DISCUSSION

Our task on review is limited to a determination of whether the

Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record

as a whole. See, e.g., Delrosa v. Sullivan, 922 F.2d 480, 484 (8th Cir.

1991). In making this determination, we consider not only evidence

supporting the Commissioner's decision but evidence which fairly detracts

from its weight. Id. It is not our task, however, to review the evidence

and make an independent decision. If, after review, we find it possible

to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those

positions represents the Commissioner's findings, we must affirm the denial

of benefits. Siemers v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 299, 301 (8th Cir. 1995).

A. The Hypothetical Question

Mapes first alleges that the ALJ improperly formulated the

hypothetical question to the vocational expert. Specifically, Mapes notes

that in completing the Psychiatric Review Technique Form (PRTF) the ALJ

8

found that Mapes exhibited medically
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determinable signs of depression (Listing 12.04), anxiety (Listing 12.06),

and substance addiction (Listing 12.09). The ALJ then rated the degree of

functional loss resulting from these impairments and determined that Mapes:

(1) has moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning, (2) often

has deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace resulting in failure

to complete tasks in a timely manner, and (3) has once or twice had

episodes of deterioration or decompensation in work or work-like settings

causing him to withdraw from that situation or to experience exacerbation

of signs and symptoms. The ALJ did not, however, mention these mental

impairments or functional losses in his hypothetical question to the

vocational expert. Mapes argues that these omissions were error, and

therefore the expert's answer to the hypothetical question cannot

constitute substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's decision.

In order to properly address Mapes's concerns, it is necessary to

examine the PRTF in context with the full extent of the ALJ's findings.

In so doing, we discern that critical qualifications were placed on the

findings detailed in the PRTF. Although Mapes correctly observes that the

PRTF records Mapes's depression, anxiety, and substance addiction, he

overlooks the ALJ's written decision in which the ALJ concludes that these

mental conditions are largely the outward manifestations of Mapes's

substance abuse rather than impairments existing independently of Mapes's

use of
 The PRTF section corresponding to Listing 12.09 is a

9

reference listing which directs the ALJ to analyze the secondary

physical or mental effects of substance abuse. Thus, the ALJ's

completion of that section indicates that the ALJ considered the

anxiety and depression consequences of alcohol use. In addition,

the ALJ stated in his decision that Mapes's anxiety and depression

are "coupled with claimant's alcohol abuse," and that Mapes's

alcohol abuse "results in a diagnosis of an affective disorder and

of an anxiety disorder." Tr. at 19, 24. 

 We recognize that recent amendments to the Social Security

10

Act signed into law on March 29, 1996, eliminate alcoholism or drug

addiction as a basis for obtaining disability insurance benefits.

Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121,

110 Stat. 847 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)). Because we find

that the ALJ correctly denied benefits under the standards in place

at the time of Mapes's hearing, we need not address the effect of

the new amendments on Mapes's application. 

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alcohol. Similarly, the ALJ specifically found that Mapes's functional

9

losses were present only when Mapes was drinking. 

The ALJ's determination that Mapes's mental impairments and resulting

functional limitations were the products of his alcohol abuse is not

without significance, for although we have held that an ALJ's hypothetical

question must include all of the claimant's impairments found credible by

the ALJ, Chamberlain v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 1489, 1495 (8th Cir. 1995), we

have also held that the mere presence of alcoholism is not necessarily

disabling. See, e.g., Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1186 (8th Cir.

10

1989). In fact, the burden for establishing disability due to alcoholism

is a high one, requiring the claimant to show: "(1) that he has lost selfcontrol to the point of being `impotent to seek and use means of

rehabilitation,' and (2) that his disability is encompassed by the Act."

Metcalf v. Heckler, 800 F.2d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting Adams v.

Weinberger, 548 F.2d 239, 245 (8th Cir. 1977)). In each case, the

claimant's capacity to control his use of alcohol must be considered in the

context of his ability to engage in substantial gainful activity. Lubinski

v. Sullivan, 952 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1991). Guided by these

principles, we find that we
 A finding that Mapes's alcohol intake was within his

11

voluntary control is clearly implicit in the decision. Moreover,

in a case involving substance abuse, the claimant bears the burden

of establishing lack of control. Here, we find no evidence that

Mapes lacked the ability to curb his use of the substance.

 With one exception not relevant to these issues, the records 12

from the Center are the only records which cover periods prior to

the date Mapes's insured status expired.

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may properly uphold the ALJ's omission of the mental impairments and

functional limitations in his question to the vocational expert if

substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Mapes's alcoholism was

controllable and, when controlled, Mapes's mental impairments and

functional limitations were not present.

After carefully reviewing the testimony and the medical evidence, we

find substantial evidence supporting these findings. The record shows

11

that Mapes received inpatient and outpatient treatment for alcohol

dependence at the Bill Willis Community Health Center (the Center) from

June 1990 to June 1991. Treatment notes from the Center indicate that

12

Mapes was aware of the need to confront his alcohol problem and to take

steps to resolve it. To that end, Mapes participated in group therapy and

attended regular meetings with his physicians at the Center. Although the

records indicate that Mapes's progress was difficult, Mapes nevertheless

remained sober for long periods of time.

This evidence showing Mapes's ability to control his alcoholism is

strengthened when viewed in light of his capacity to engage in substantial

gainful activity. Although Mapes worked only intermittently during the

relevant time period, there is no indication in the record that alcohol

abuse was the cause of his work interruptions. Indeed, Mapes has

consistently maintained that he became unable to work because of his

various physical impairments. Therefore, while we do not deny that Mapes

had a drinking problem during the period at issue, we conclude that
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Mapes's alcohol problem was controllable and did not preclude substantial

gainful activity. See Starr v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1006, 1008 (8th Cir.

1992).

We also find substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's determination

that Mapes's anxiety and depression were generally present only when Mapes

was drinking. Several of the treatment notes from the Center reveal that

although Mapes complained of anxiety and nervousness, he sought treatment

out of the need to control his drinking. Moreover, Mapes's anxiety

appeared to lessen when he did not drink--a fact confirmed by Mapes at the

hearing. His depression followed this same course, with physicians

indicating that it was controllable when Mapes stayed sober. There is no

indication that Mapes ever sought psychiatric treatment or counseling for

these problems. Although Mapes was eventually treated with prescription

medications for both anxiety and depression, these medications were

prescribed well after the time period at issue in this case and therefore

do not significantly detract from the evidence supporting the ALJ's

conclusions. At best, this evidence demonstrates that Mapes's mental

impairments may have worsened over time but nevertheless can be controlled

by medication and therefore cannot be considered disabling. See Stout v.

Shalala, 988 F.2d 853, 855 (8th Cir. 1993).

Further evidence supports the ALJ's finding that the corresponding

functional limitations listed on the PRTF were present only when Mapes was

drinking. As the ALJ noted, intelligence tests indicate that Mapes's

intellectual functioning is in the average range. A consultative

psychological evaluation performed by Dr. Richard R. Christy corroborates

the test results. According to Dr. Christy, Mapes possesses a good ability

to understand, remember, and carry out complex job instructions. He is

able to relate appropriately to coworkers and to maintain attention and

concentration. The strongest evidence to the contrary is contained in two

reports appropriately discounted by
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the ALJ as conclusory and dated significantly past Mapes's insured period.

Accordingly, there is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion

that Mapes's functional limitations were simply side effects of his

drinking problem, at least during the period before Mapes's insured status

expired.

In summary, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination

that Mapes's mental impairments and functional limitations were alcoholrelated, and that Mapes's alcohol problem was within his control. Under

these circumstances, the ALJ did not err in omitting the findings on the

PRTF when he formulated the hypothetical question to the vocational expert.

B. Residual Functional Capacity

Mapes also argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider his

physical and mental impairments in combination in assessing his residual

functional capacity to work. As Mapes correctly points out, our cases

require an ALJ to consider a claimant's impairments "in combination and not

fragmentize them in evaluating their effects." Delrosa, 922 F.2d at 484.

In addition, when mental impairments are alleged, an ALJ must determine

whether those nonexertional impairments further limit the exertional tasks

the claimant is deemed capable of handling. Tucker v. Heckler, 776 F.2d

793 (8th Cir. 1985). Mapes contends that the ALJ ignored Mapes's mental

impairments in determining Mapes's residual functional capacity.

This contention lacks merit. The ALJ's opinion contains a thorough

discussion of Mapes's physical impairments, mental impairments, and

complaints of pain. The ALJ determined that Mapes's mental impairments did

not restrict his residual functional capacity below the level of light

exertional activity because they did not affect Mapes's abilities when his

alcohol intake was
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controlled. As explained above, substantial evidence in the record as a

whole supports this finding. 

III. CONCLUSION

We find substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's determination that

Mapes is not disabled. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.