* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 30, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-10530

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CARLIE PENNY,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

No. 4:06-CR-47-ALL

--------------------

Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Carlie Penny appeals the sentence of 24 months in prison and

12 months of supervised release imposed following revocation of his

term of supervised release. The district court also imposed certain conditions of supervised release related to sex offenders but

did not require that Penny register as a sex offender. Penny argues that the sentence is unreasonable or plainly unreasonable because it exceeds the advisory guideline range and was imposed without the court’s issuing a detailed statement of reasons. 
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The district court may impose any sentence that falls within

the appropriate statutory maximum term of imprisonment allowed for

the revocation sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The sentence imposed in Penny’s case, though in excess of the range indicated by

the policy statement, is within the statutory maximum term of imprisonment that the district court could have imposed. See id.

Penny has not shown that his sentence was unreasonable or plainly

unreasonable in length. See United States v. Hinson, 429 F.3d 114,

119-20 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1804 (2006).

Furthermore, the court explicitly stated that it had considered the advisory guideline range and found it to be inadequate.

The court imposed the 24-month sentence to give Penny time to participate in a residential drug treatment program. The need for

medical care or other correctional treatment is one of the factors

a district court must consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The record demonstrates that the court considered the relevant sentencing

factors and articulated sufficient reasons to support the sentence.

See United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 518-19 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 126 S. Ct. 43 (2005).

Penny contends the district court abused its discretion in imposing the special conditions of supervised release relating to sex

offenders. He argues that the court erred in finding that he had

committed a sex offense and that the conditions related to sex offenders were overbroad and not reasonably related to any of the

statutory sentencing goals of § 3553. We review the imposition of
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discretionary conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ferguson, 369 F.3d 847, 852 (5th Cir.

2004). “A district court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an error of law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the

evidence.” United States v. Castillo, 430 F.3d 230, 238 (5th Cir.

2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The district court’s determination that Penny had previously

committed a sex offense “is plausible in light of the record read

as a whole.” See United States v. Lopez-Urbina, 434 F.3d 750,

766-67 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 672 (2005). Therefore,

we “may not reverse” that finding even if we might “have weighed

the evidence differently.” See United States v. Charon, 442 F.3d

881, 891 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 260 (2006). The special conditions of supervised release are not overbroad and are

reasonably related to the sentencing goals of § 3553. See

§ 3583(d)(1); see also United States v. Prochner, 417 F.3d 54, 58-

64 & n.7 (1st Cir. 2005).

AFFIRMED.