NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Diana Caroline Flores

- Serrano; Fernanda Elizabeth Aguilar

- Flores, Petitioners,

v. Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent. No. 21

- 124 Agency No s
. A209

- 300

- 676 A209

- 300

- 677

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 17, 2023 ** Pasadena, California Before: PAEZ, MILLER, and VANDYKE , Circuit Judges

. Diana Caroline Flores

- Serrano and her minor child petition for review of the Board of Immigration A ppeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing their appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAR 21 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 . Where, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision without opinion, we review the IJ’s decision as the final agency action. Tapia v. Gonzales , 430 F.3d 997, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). We review for substantial evidence the factual determinations underlying a denial of asylum and a determination that the petitioner is not eligible for relief under
CAT

. Gui v. I.N.S. , 280 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2002) ( citing INS v. Elias

Zacarias , 502 U.S. 478, 481 (19 9 2)) ; Zheng v. Ashcroft , 332 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003) . W e deny the petition for review.
1. Asylum and W ithholding of R emoval. “To be eligible f or asylum, a petitioner has the burden to demonstrate a likelihood of ‘ persecution or a well

founded fear of persecution on account of . . . membership in a particular social
group. ’ ” Sharma v. Garland , 9 F.4th 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A))

. S ubstantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Flores

- Serrano failed to demonstrate a likelihood of persecution. T he incidents described by Flores

- Serrano do not rise to the level of past persecution contemplated by the
I mmigration and Nationality Act

. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (b) (1)

. Although threats alone can constitute past persecution, “[u]nfulfilled threats are ve ry rarely sufficient to rise to the level of persecution.” Hussain v. Rosen , 985 F.3d 634, 647 (9th Cir. 2021). We are “most likely to find persecution where threats are repeated, specific and combined with confrontation or other mistreatment.” Sharma , 9 F.4th at 1062 (quoting Duran

- Rodriguez v. Barr , 918 F.3d 1025,3 10 28 (9th Cir. 2019)) . Flores

- Serrano did not present such evidence here, especially as it is not clear that the three gang - related incidents to which she testified were in any way related. Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s determination that Flores

- Serrano did not demonstrate a well

- founded fear of future persecution. Although Flores

- Serrano testified credibly and established a subjective fear of persecution, Gui , 280 F.3d at 122 8 , she has not met her burden to show that such fear is “objectively reasonable.” Id. (quoting Ladha v.
INS , 215 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2000)). There is no evidence that gangs are looking for Flores

- Serrano, and her immediate family members in El Salvad or have not faced harassment. Moreover, even if Flores

- Serrano had established a likelihood of persecution, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that she failed to establish that she was persecuted because she is a member of a protected group. She propose d two particular social groups: (1) individuals who oppose gang membership and authority; and (2) individuals who took concrete steps to oppose gang membership and authority. The IJ found that the first group lacked particularity and that Flor es - Serrano did not demonstrate membership in the second group , as she merely avoided confrontations with the gang and filed a police report with the National Civil Police of El Congo, Santa Ana Department, once she reached the United States. See, e.g. , Santos

- Lemus v. Mukasey , 542 F.3d 738, 745

- 46 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the proposed group of “young men in El Salvador resisting gang vio lence [] is too loosely4 defined to meet the requirement for particularity”) , abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez

- Rivas v. Holder , 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) ; Henriquez

- Rivas , 707 F.3d at 1093 (distinguishing “ the very specific situation of testifying against gang members in court ”). Thus, Flores

- Serrano’s claim for asylum fails. H er claim for withholding of removal necessarily also fails. See Lkhagvasuren v. Lynch , 849 F.3d 800,
803 (9th Cir. 2016)

. 2. Convention Against Torture. To establish a claim under CAT, Flores

- Serrano must show that it is more likely than not that she will be tortured if removed to El Salvador. See Zhang v. Ashcroft , 38 8 F.3d 713, 721 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)

. Torture under CAT is “an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment and does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Id. (quoting Al

- Saher v. I.N.S. , 268 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(2)) )

. Becaus e the IJ “could reasonably conclude that [Flores

- Serrano’s] past harm did not rise to the level of persecution, it necessarily falls short of the definition of torture.” Sharma , 9 F.4th at 1067. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that F lores

- Serrano failed to show that she would be subject to torture if returned to El Salvador. The motion to stay removal (Dkt. No. 2) is denied.
PETITION DENIED.