[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State v. Harrison , Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-4465.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2021-O HIO -4465
T HE S TATE OF O HIO , A PPELLEE , v . H ARRISON , A PPELLANT
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State v. Harrison , Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-4465.]
Criminal law—Arrest warrant—Fourth Amendment—Crim.R. 4—Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed and cause remanded to the trial court. (No. 2020-1117—Submitted June 29, 2021— Decided December 22, 202 1.)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Logan County, No. 8-19-48, 2020-Ohio-3920.

_________________ D ONNELLY , J., announcing the judgme nt of the court. {¶ 1} This appeal asks us to decide whether it was unlawful to arrest appellant, Kandale Harrison, on an arrest warrant for which pro bable cause to arrest had been found but which had not been signed by an authorized c ourt officer. We conclude that if (1) a court o fficer documents a finding of pro bable cause to believe that an identified criminal offense was committed by the defend ant named in a sworn criminal complaint and accompanying affidavit and (2) an arrest warrant isS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 attached to and expressly incor porates the complaint, then a va lid arrest warrant has been issued under Crim.R. 4(A)(1) and 4(C)(1). The absence of a signature on the arrest warrant itself does not negate the warrant’s validity. An arrest predicated on
that warrant therefore does not violate either Crim.R. 4 or the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We accordingly affirm the c ourt of appeals’ judgment, albeit for a different reason than the one expressed in its opinion, and we
remand this cause to the court of common pleas for further proc eedings.
I. FACTS {¶ 2} On February 2, 2018, Brent Joseph, a detective with the Logan C ounty Sheriff’s Office assigned to the county’s Joint Drug Task Force , supervised a controlled drug buy of cocaine by a confidential informant (“CI ”) from Harrison. Detective Joseph listened to reco rded telephone calls between H arrison and the CI regarding their arrangements t o meet for the buy. The CI was a lso outfitted with a recording device that enabled De tective Joseph to listen to the February 2 transaction. After the buy, the CI provided the drug, which wa s confirmed to be cocaine, to Detective Joseph and s tated that it was sold to him by Harrison. {¶ 3} On February 13, Detective Joseph executed an affidavit labeled Exhibit “1” that recited the foregoing facts. That same day, h e appeared before a Logan County Common Pleas Court judge and executed an applicati on for the
installation and use of an elect ronic tracking device on the mo tor vehicle that Harrison had used during the February 2 controlled drug buy. See Crim.R. 41(A)(2). The judge granted the tracking application that day, and a tracking device was placed surreptitiously on Harrison’s vehicle. The Logan Co unty Joint Drug
Task Force monitored the vehicle’s movements in furtherance of their investigation. {¶ 4} On February 27, Detective Joseph appeared before Karla Stevens,
clerk of the Bellefontaine Munici pal Court, to swear out a one- page complaint against Harrison for trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C . 2925.03(A)(1) andJanuary Term, 2021

3 2925.03(C)(4)(a) in connection with the February 2 controlled d rug buy. See Crim.R. 4(A)(1). A blank warrant authorizing the arrest of “th e Defendant * * * named in the foregoing complaint” was attached to the complaint . The detective’s two-page affidavit identified as Exhibit “1” and dated February 13, reciting the facts of the controlled drug buy, was also attached to the complaint and blank arrest

warrant. {¶ 5} Stevens testified that after she signed the complaint sworn to by Detective Joseph, she delivered t he complaint, a blank arrest w arrant, and the
affidavit marked Exhibit “1” to municipal-court Judge Ann Beck. Judge Beck reviewed the paperwork and placed a stamp on the complaint’s co ver page that stated, “Hearing Held 2/27/2018” and “Probable Cause Found.” S he placed her initials “AB” on the line designa ted “Judge.” The arrest warra nt attached to the complaint, however, was not si gned or dated by anyone. Stevens acknowledged that it had been the court’s practice not to sign or enter arre st warrants into databases
unless and until the arrest warrant had been executed to avoid the risk of prematurely divulging informati on that could compromise an ongo ing undercover criminal investigation. Detective Joseph subsequently picked up the paperwork reflecting the judge’s finding of probable cause to arrest and the blank arrest

warrant. {¶ 6} On March 5, Detective Joseph saw Harrison’s vehicle traveling f rom the Columbus area to Logan C ounty through GPS tracking. After obtaining visual
confirmation of Harri son driving the vehicle and trailing the v ehicle for a period of time, Detective Joseph instructed Joe Layman, who was then a pa trol deputy, to initiate a traffic stop of Harrison’s vehicle so that Detective Joseph could execute the arrest warrant. As Deputy Layman approached the driver’s s ide of Harrison’s stopped vehicle, Detective Joseph a pproached the passenger’s si de. When Deputy Layman had Harrison step out of the vehicle, Detective Joseph j oined them on the
driver’s side and informed Harrison that he was under arrest. Harrison was takenS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 into custody without incident. A search of the vehicle inciden t to the arrest resulted
in the seizure of inc riminating evidence. {¶ 7} On March 6, after learning of Harrison’s March 5 arrest, a Bellefontaine Municipa l Court deputy clerk formally filed and d ocketed Detective Joseph’s sworn complaint with the Exhibit “1” affidavit. The d eputy clerk also signed and dated the attach ed arrest warrant. {¶ 8} On April 10, Harrison was indicted on multiple felony counts in the Logan County Court of Common Pl eas. Harrison moved to suppress the evidence seized in the search incident to arrest on the ground that the arrest warrant was unsigned at the time of his arrest. The trial court granted Ha rrison’s motion to suppress on the basis that the uns igned arrest warrant was not a valid warrant. The trial court further rejected the state’s reliance on the good-f aith exception to the exclusionary rule, determining th at the unsigned arrest warrant was so facially defective that the arresting officer could not reasonably have presumed it was valid. {¶ 9} The court of appeals reversed t he trial court’s judgment after first determining that it did not need t o decide whether the unsigned arrest warrant was valid. 2020-Ohio-3920, ¶ 27. The cour t of appeals ruled that under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, it was objectively reasonab le for Detective Joseph to believe that he ha d a valid arrest warrant. Id . at ¶ 32-33. {¶ 10} We accepted jurisdiction over Ha rrison’s discretionary appeal, 160 Ohio St.3d 1459, 2020-Ohio-5332, 157 N.E .3d 788, which raises t wo propositions
of law for our review:

1. An arrest warrant that is not signed by a judge, magistrat e, clerk of court, or officer of t he court designated by the judge , does not comply with Criminal Rule 4.January Term, 2021

5 2. A law enforcement officer’s reliance on an arrest warrant that is not signed pursuant [t o] Criminal Rule 4 does not quali fy for the good faith exception to t he exclusionary rule.

II. ANALYSIS {¶ 11} We address the propositions of law separately, being mindful th at appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of
fact and law. See State v. Burnside , 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. A reviewing court must accept the trial court’ s findings of fact if they are supported by competen t, credible evidence. Id. , citing State v. Fanning , 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). Questions of law are reviewed de novo
without deference to the lower court’s legal conclusions. Id

. A. The Validity of the Unsigned Arrest Warrant {¶ 12} The Fourth Amendment to the Un ited States Constitution proscrib es unreasonable searches and seizures , declaring that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and part icularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seize d.” Consistent with that constitutional command, Crim.R. 4 sets forth the process a nd procedures generally applicable to the issu ance of arrest warrants under O hio law. {¶ 13} Harrison contends that the unsigne d arrest warrant did not comp ly
with Crim.R. 4 and was therefor e invalid. By implication, he a rgues that the trial court correctly determined that his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment and that the evidence seized incident to his arrest was properly suppres sed by application of the exclusionary rule. Before considering the merits of these contentions, however, we must first address the state’s alternative argument that no arrest warrant was required under the circums tances of this case.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 1. The State’s Alternative Argum ent for a Warrantless Arrest {¶ 14} The state argues that even if the arrest warrant at issue here was invalid, Detective Joseph could have made a warrantless arrest pursuant to R.C.
2935.03 and 2935.04. 1 A warrantless arrest that is based on probable cause and occurs in a public place does not violate the Fourth Amendment. State v. Brown , 115 Ohio St.3d 55, 2007-Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶ 66, citing United States v.
Watson , 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). Although the state has maintained consistently that there was probable cause to ar rest Harrison, it conceded at oral argument that it did not argue in the lower co urts that no arrest warrant was required and that Harrison could have been subject to a warrantless arrest under this line of authority. {¶ 15} “In accordance with the general rule of appellate procedure thi s court will ordinarily refuse to consider questions which were not rai sed in the courts
below.” Drain v. Kosydar , 54 Ohio St.2d 49, 55, 374 N.E.2d 1253 (1978), fn. 4. See also Hospitality Motor Inns, Inc. v. Gillespie , 66 Ohio St.2d 206, 208, 421 N.E.2d 134 (1981), fn. 2. We dec line to consider the state’s a lternative argument
in this case for three reasons. {¶ 16} First, the state’s failure to raise the warrantless-arrest argu ment in the trial court deprived Harri son of the opportunity to oppose that contention and develop a record that coul d be reviewed on appeal. See Giordenello v. United
States , 357 U.S. 480, 487-488, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958) ( declining to consider government’s belated w arrantless-arrest argument becau se petitioner had no opportunity to contest that argument at trial).

1. Certain designated law-enforcement officers shall arrest and detain, until a warrant can be obtained, persons who are found violating a law of this state, R.C. 2935.03(A)(1), and persons who committed a felony drug-abuse offense, R.C. 2935.03(B)(1). Und er R.C. 2935.04, any person without a warrant may arrest another person whom he has reasona ble cause to believe is guilty of having committed a felony and may detain that person until a wa rrant can be obtained.January Term, 2021

7 {¶ 17} Second, the state’s entreaty tha t we address whether a warrantl ess arrest could have been made effectively asks us to render an ad visory opinion in this case. We do not indulge in a dvisory opinions on issues th at are not properly
before us. See State ex rel. Davis v. Public Emps. Retirement Bd. , 120 Ohio St.3d 386, 2008-Ohio-6254, 899 N.E.2d 975, ¶ 43; State ex rel. White v. Kilbane Koch , 96 Ohio St.3d 395, 2002-Ohio-4848, 775 N.E.2d 508, ¶ 18. {¶ 18} Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, this case arises from an arrest that occurred after Detective Joseph applied for—and by all accounts
received what he believed to be— a warrant to arrest Harrison. It is the validity of
that warrant that is at issue here. We will therefore decide t his case based on what did occur, rather than on what could have occurred under altern ative facts. 2. Compliance with Crim.R. 4 {¶ 19} Before we address the processes and procedures that govern the issuance of warrants under Crim.R. 4, we must briefly review th e rule that sets those processes and procedures in moti on—Crim.R. 3. Crim.R. 3 define s a complaint as a written statement of the essential facts constituting the off ense charged; it must include the numerical designati on of the applicable statute or ordinance and be made upon oath before a ny person authorized by l aw to administe r oaths. {¶ 20} The issuance of an arrest warrant upon a sworn criminal complai nt is governed by Crim.R. 4(A)(1). State v. Hoffman , 141 Ohio St.3d 428, 2014-Ohio4795, 25 N.E.3d 993, ¶ 14. Compare State ex rel. Boylen v. Harmon , 107 Ohio St.3d 370, 2006-Ohio-7, 839 N.E.2d 934, ¶ 10 (“Crim.R. 4(A) app lies when
affidavits are filed with a vali d criminal complaint under Crim .R. 3. R.C. 2935.10 governs the procedure when only affidavits have been filed unde r R.C. 2935.09.”) Crim.R. 4(A)(1) provide s in part as follows:

If it appears from the complaint, or from an affidavit or affid avits filed with the complaint, that t here is probable cause to belie ve thatS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 an offense has been committed, and that the defendant has committed it, a warrant for the arrest of the defendant, or a s ummons in lieu of a warrant, shall be i ssued by a judge, magistrate, c lerk of court, or officer of the court designated by the judge, to any law
enforcement officer a uthorized by law to execute or serve it.

As we said in Hoffman at ¶ 14,

[T]he purpose of a complaint or affidavit is to set forth suffi cient
information to enable the deci sionmaker to personally determine from the facts whether it is likely that an offense has been co mmitted by the named individual. A mere conclusory statement that the person whose arrest is sought has committed a crime is insuffic ient to justify a finding of probable cause. It is also not enough that probable cause may later be determined to exist. A neutral and detached magistrate or other person authorized under Crim.R. 4(A)(1) must make a probable-cause determination before an arre st warrant can be issued. See Coolidge [ v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443, 450-451, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.E.2d 564 (1971)].

{¶ 21} Thus, under Crim.R. 4(A)(1), an arrest warrant (or a summons in lieu of a warrant) shall issue if a neutral and detached judge, magi strate, clerk of court, or officer of the court designate d by the judge finds from the sworn complaint and any supporting affidavits that there is probable cause to belie ve that the defendant identified in the complaint committed an identified criminal of fense. Compare
State v. Hobbs , 133 Ohio St.3d 43, 2012-Ohio-3886, 975 N.E.2d 965 (person act ing in dual capacity as county deputy s heriff and municipal court d eputy clerk in same county was not neutral and detach ed magistrate capable of deter mining whetherJanuary Term, 2021

9 probable cause existed to issue arrest warrant) with Shadwick v. Tampa , 407 U.S. 345, 348-350, 92 S.Ct. 2119, 32 L.Ed.2d 783 (1972) (upholding a rrest warrants issued by municipal-court clerks , observing that the United Sta tes Constitution’s warrant requirements turn not on the label of the issuing party but on whether the issuing officer was (1) neutral and independent from the invest igation and prosecution of crime and (2) capa ble of determining whether pro bable cause existed for the requested arrest or search). {¶ 22} In this case, there is no dispute that Detective Joseph appeare d before Stevens on February 27, 2018, at which time he signed and she n otarized a onepage complaint charging Harrison with the offense of traffickin g in cocaine on February 2 in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and 2925.03(C)(4) (a). There is also no dispute that a one-page blank arrest warrant was attached to the complaint. And there is no dispute that Detective Joseph’s two-page February 1 3 affidavit labeled Exhibit “1” that recited the facts of the February 2 controlled drug buy was also attached to the complaint. {¶ 23} Further, there is no dispute that Stevens delivered this paperw ork to Judge Beck for her consideration. There is also no dispute tha t when Judge Beck returned the paperwork to Stevens that same day, she had dated and initialed the complaint and stamped it “Hearing Held” and “Probable Cause Fou nd.” Finally, there is no dispute that the one-page arrest warrant attached t o the complaint remained blank, with no date or signature. {¶ 24} Harrison acknowledged at oral ar gument that the sworn complaint and accompanying affidavit estab lished probable cause to believ e that he had committed the offense of trafficking in cocaine on February 2 i n violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and 2925.03(C)(4)(a). And he does not dispute th at Judge Beck, a
neutral and detache d judge, found that probable cause existed o n February 27. {¶ 25} Harrison maintains, however, that the arrest warrant itself was facially defective and void ab initio because it was not signed . To address thatS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 issue, we turn to the minimum requirements for a valid arrest w arrant under Ohio
law. {¶ 26} Crim.R. 4(C)(1) provides:

The warrant shall contain the na me of the defendant or, if that is unknown, any name or description by which the defendant can be
identified with reasonable certain ty, a description of the offe nse charged in the complaint, whethe r the warrant is being issued b efore the defendant has appeared or wa s scheduled to appear, and the numerical designation of the app licable statute or ordinance. A copy of the complaint shall be attached to the warrant.

Notably, Crim.R. 4(C)(1) does not e xpressly require that the wa rrant be signed by a judge or any other authorized court officer. 2 {¶ 27} The arrest warrant at issue in this case contained the followin g language:

WARRANT

TO ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER: You are hereby commanded to arrest the Defenda nt, named in the foregoing complaint, and bring said Defendant without unnecessary delay before the Bellefontaine Municipa l Court or any other Court of Record having jurisdiction of the offense, to be dealt with acc ording to law.
DATED: __________________

__________________ Clerk/Deputy Clerk

2. By contrast, Fed.R.Crim.P. 4(b)(1)(D) states expressly that an arrest warrant must “be signed by a judge.”January Term, 2021

11 {¶ 28} The trial court noted that th e warrant contained language incorporating by reference the a ttached complaint and thus sati sfied the requirements of Crim.R. 4(C)(1). To the extent that the arrest warrant attached and incorporated by reference Detec tive Joseph’s February 27 sworn complaint and the complaint contained Harrison’s name, described the charged offe nse as trafficking in cocaine, indicated that he was to be taken into immediate cu stody, and identified
the state statutes he was char ged with violating, Harrison’s ar rest warrant contained all of the elements that Crim.R. 4(C)(1) prescribes. See generally Groh v. Ramirez , 540 U.S. 551, 557-558, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004) (warrant may be construed with reference to a supporting document “if the warra nt uses appropriate words of incorporation, and if the supporting document accompan ies the warrant”). {¶ 29} Harrison nevertheless insists th at the arrest warrant was void ab initio because it was not signed by a judge. He relies on our decision in State v.
Williams , 57 Ohio St.3d 24, 565 N.E.2d 563 (1991), in which we held tha t a search warrant is void ab initio if it is not signed by a judge prior to the search. Harrison’s reliance on that case is misplaced. {¶ 30} We note initially that as addressed in Williams , Ohio law vests only judges with the authority to issue search warrants. See Crim.R. 41(A) (search warrant or tracking-device warra nt may be issued by a judge of a court of record); Crim.R. 41(C)(2) (judge shall issu e search warrant if satisfied that probable cause exists); R.C. 2933.21 (judge of a c ourt of record may, within h is jurisdiction, issue search warrants); R.C. 2933.24(A) (search warrant shall require executing officer to search the place or person named or described for the proper ty and bring the person before judge or magistrate). See also State v. Commins , 12th Dist. Nos. CA2009-06-004 and CA2009-06-005, 2009-Ohio-6415, ¶ 19-23 (searc h warrant issued by magistrate was void). By contrast, Ohio law allows a rrest warrants to beS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 issued by a judge, magistrate, clerk of court, or officer of th e court designated by the judge. See Crim.R. 4(A)(1). {¶ 31} We further note that no procedural rule or statute expressly re quires the judge’s signature on a search warrant. See Williams at 28 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“There is no ‘signatu re requirement’ for search wa rrants provided by statute in Ohio, by Constitution or by rule, and such signature must be considered as only ministerial in nature”). 3 Nevertheless, this court ha s held that “[t]he signing
of a search warrant is the onl y identifiable objective manifest ation of a judge’s subjective intent to issue a se arch warrant. * * * Without havi ng the signature of the authorizing magistrate [4] affixed to the warrant, a c itizen is left to guess whether such a warrant has validity.” Id. at 25. Indeed, “the signatu re requirement provides both protection and assurance to property owners faced with the threat of a search of their property, in that they m ay review the document and det ermine whether or not they are required to allow o fficers to conduct the search.” Id . at 26. {¶ 32} Like a search warrant in which the breadth of the search and se izure is limited by the terms expressly approved by the authorizing j udge, an arrest warrant limits the scope of the seizure by naming (or adequatel y describing) the person charged with committing an identified criminal offense i n either the warrant or an attached complaint. But unlike a search warrant in which prompt judicial review and relief may not be imme diately available, an arrest a nd detention set the judicial machinery in motion, a llowing for disputes as to the l awfulness of the arrest to be addressed promptly through pr eliminary judicial proceedin gs.

3. While R.C. 2933.25 does set forth an acceptable form of a search warrant that includes the name and perhaps space for the authorizing judge’s signature, that s tatute does not purport to set forth the substantive contents necessary for a search warrant, which are set forth in R.C. 29 33.24.

4. See Commins , 2009-Ohio-6415, at ¶ 21-23 (explaining that the definition of “magistrate” when used in relation to the issuance of a search warrant under R.C. Chapter 2933 “refers to elected officials who act in a judicial capacity * * * not to an appoin ted official” as defined by Crim.R. 2(F)).January Term, 2021

13 {¶ 33} We readily agree that a signature on search warrants and arrest warrants is “the best device for safeguarding an individual’s r ights.” See Williams , 57 Ohio St.3d at 26, 565 N.E.2d 563. But our decision in Hoffman recognizes that the primary if not fundamental safeguard of an arrest warrant i s that probable cause
must be found before the warrant may be issued. See Hoffman , 141 Ohio St.3d 428, 2014-Ohio-4795, 25 N.E.3d 993, at ¶ 14. {¶ 34} In the instant case, there is no doubt that probable cause to a rrest Harrison was found before the arr est warrant was issued. The r ecord here contains an affirmative indication that Judge Beck found probable cause to issue an arrest warrant on February 27, using a bl ank arrest warrant that expre ssly incorporated an attached sworn complaint. T hough far from ideal, the judge’s a ffirmative documentation on the complaint that probable cause was found su fficed to confirm
that the court issued the arre st warrant based on that finding. {¶ 35} We therefore conclude that the arrest warrant at issue here adequately complied with the re quirements of Crim.R. 4 notwiths tanding the absence of a court official’s signature on the warrant . But finding that the arrest
warrant did not violate Crim.R. 4 does not end our inquiry, for the trial court
determined that the absence of a signature on the warrant made this an unreason able
seizure in violation of the Four th Amendment. We turn now to c onsider that issue. 3. Compliance with the Fourth Amendment {¶ 36} As indicated previously, the F ourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oat h or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the p ersons or things to be seized.” But nothing in the tex t of the Fourth Amendment expre ssly conditions the validity of a warrant on it being signed. See United States v. Cruz , 774 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th Cir.2014); United States v. Lyons , 740 F.3d 702, 724-727 (1st Cir.2014). And more specifically, “[n]othi ng in the Fourth Amendment requi res a judge’s signature on an arrest warrant.” Aaron v. United States , M.D.Fla. Nos. 3:15-cv-S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 629-J-34JBT and 3:12-cr-170-J-34JBT, 2018 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 95885 , *25 (June 7, 2018). In Lyons at 726, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit declined to find that the lack of a signature on the se arch warrant was a reason for suppression under the F ourth Amendment “[g]iven the clear and contemporaneous evidence that the state justice made a proper p robable cause determination and appro ved the issuance of a warrant for execut ion.” {¶ 37} Indeed, the only substantive requirements that the Fourth Amendment imposes before a warrant shall issue is that the warr ant must (1) be “based upon probable cause,” (2) be “ supported by Oath or affirmation,” (3) “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched,” and (4) “pa rticularly describ[e] * * * the persons or things to be seized.” See Groh , 540 U.S. at 557, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068. And as we have noted in this case, the re is no doubt that Judge Beck found probable cause, that her finding was based on Detective Joseph’s sworn complaint and accompanying affidavit, and that the arrest warrant and incorporated complaint particularly described the person to be seized. Measured against the Fourth Amendment, Harrison’s arrest warrant complie d with its requirements. {¶ 38} For its part, the trial court conc luded that an arrest warrant that is unsigned has not been “issued” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Acknowledging that Crim.R. 4(A) does not require that an arrest warrant be signed,
the court reasoned:

[C]ommon sense and experience w ould lead to the conclusion that without the signature of an authorized person there is no warra nt to be issued. The finding of probable cause to issue a warrant is not the functional equivalent of the issuance of the completed docu ment. * * * As a judgment is not complete without the signature of th eJanuary Term, 2021

15 judge, so is a warrant not complete without the signature of th e judge or other authorized signer.

State v. Harrison , Logan C.P. No. CR 08 03 0091 (Oct. 3, 2019). But by its term s, the Fourth Amendment prescribes the substantive conditions that are necessary before a warrant shall “issue.” It does not prescribe the spec ific form of the warrant. {¶ 39} Moreover, the verb “issue” does not connote any specific techni cal requirements. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “issue” in part a s “[t]o send out or distribute officially.” Black’s Law Dictionary 996 (11th Ed.2019). Webster’s Dictionary similarly defines “issue” as “to appear or become av ailable through being officially put forth or di stributed or granted or proclai med or promulgated” or “to go forth by authority.” Webster’s Third International Dictionary 1201 (2002). In short, a warrant sha ll issue, i.e., be officially s ent out, so long as the substantive requirements of the Fourth Amendment have been sati sfied. And a signature on the warrant itsel f is not a constitutional require ment. {¶ 40} Having said that, we emphatically echo the note of caution expr essed by the United States C ourt of Appeals for the First Circuit:

The presence of a signature provides easy and reliable proof th at a warrant was in fact issued. An officer who observes that a war rant is unsigned might not be assure d that it was actually issued, a nd might execute it at his peril if he has no other good reason to believe the warrant was issued. And when, as here, the warrant is not signed, proof of issuance become s more involved and less certai n. In many circumstances, the magi strate or judge may not recall reviewing or issuing the warrant by the time his belated signat ure is sought. For these reasons, we are confident that police will c ontinue to have ample incentive to secure signatures.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

16 Lyons , 740 F.3d at 726. To be direct, a signature on the warrant is strongly advised
even it is if not cons titutionally required. {¶ 41} We further acknowledge that this is not a case in which the abs ence of a signature on the warrant was the result of an inadvertent oversight. Instead, the absence of a signature on this arrest warrant was the resul t of a deliberate if not misguided court practi ce intended to delay making the issuance of the warrant known or a matter of public record. But the desire to maintain the confidentiality of the warrant so as not to comp romise the integrity of the cri minal investigation or the CI’s identity was a matter that the court could have adequa tely addressed through better internal court prot ocols. It did not require th e withholding of an authorized signature on the arre st warrant that needlessly expo sed the warrant to doubts over its validity and year s of contested litigation. 5 {¶ 42} Notwithstanding the absence of a signature on Harrison’s arrest warrant, we are nevertheless convinced from our review of the r ecord that the requirements of Crim.R. 4(A)(1) a nd 4(C)(1) and the Fourth Amen dment were satisfied in this case. The record shows that the judge docume nted her finding of probable cause to believe that an identified criminal offense h ad been committed by the defendant named in the sworn criminal complaint and acco mpanying affidavit and that the complaint was attached to and expressly incorporated into the arrest warrant. Consequently, a valid arrest warrant was issue d under Crim.R. 4(A)(1) and 4(C)(1) and the absence of a signature on the arres t warrant itself did not negate the warrant’s validity. The arrest predicated on th at warrant and the

5. We are somewhat mollified by the state’s representation that the municipal court changed its policy, now signing the warrants when they are issued but keepi ng them out of the court’s computer system. We strongly encourage courts throughout the state of O hio to review their practices and make any necessary changes that will avoid the uncertainty gene rated by unsigned warrants.January Term, 2021

17 search incident to arrest therefore did not violate either Crim .R. 4 or the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
B. The Good-Faith E xception to the E xclusionary Rule {¶ 43} Contesting the specific basis fo r the court of appeals’ judgmen t, Harrison’s second proposition of l aw contends that a law-enforc ement officer’s
reliance on an arrest warrant tha t is not signed pursuant to Cr im.R. 4 does not qualify for the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The court of appeals side-stepped whether the unsigne d arrest warrant was valid and instead applied the good-faith exception, seemingly on the unstated supposition tha t the arrest warrant was invalid. We disagree with t he appellate court’s approach t o this issue, as it essentially puts the car t before the horse. {¶ 44} The “exclusionary rule” is a judicially created sanction design ed to compel respect for and deter viol ations of the Fourth Amendment

. See Davis v.
United States , 564 U.S. 229, 236-237, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) ; Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U.S. 643, 656, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). The “good-faith exception” to this rule is likewise a judicially cr eated exception that renders the exclusionary rule in applicable when, for instance, law-enforcement officers act in objectively reas onable good-faith reliance on a search warrant that is later determined to be invalid, see , e.g. , United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard , 468 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984), or on an arrest warrant that has been recalled or quashed or is otherwise no longer active, see, e.g. , Herring v. United States , 555 U.S. 135, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009); Arizona v. Evans , 514 U.S. 1, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995). {¶ 45} In this case, however, we do not have an invalid or otherwise i nactive arrest warrant, and Harrison’s ar rest pursuant to the warrant d id not violate the
Fourth Amendment. Because there was no legal basis to apply th e exclusionary
rule to the evidence seized at the time of Harrison’s lawful ar rest, there was no legalS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

18 basis to consider application of the good-faith exception to th at rule. Further,
because we are not confronted with an invalid arrest warrant in this case, we need
not decide whether it would be objectively reasonable for law-e nforcement officers to rely on an invalid arrest warrant, and we expr ess no opinion on that issue here.
III. CONCLUSION {¶ 46} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed, albeit for a different reason than was expressed in its opinion, and the cau se is remanded to the court of common pleas for further proceedings. Judgment affirmed
and cause remanded.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and F ISCHER , J., concur.
S TEWART , J., concurs in judgment only.
B RUNNER , J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion.
D E W INE , J., dissents, with an opinion joined by K ENNEDY , J.

_________________ B RUNNER , J., concurring in judgment only.
I. INTRODUCTION {¶ 47} The majority in this case affirms the judgment of the court of appeals, with the lead opinion st ating that an unsigned arrest warrant is valid and
not a violation of the Fourth Ame ndment to the United States Co nstitution if the surrounding circumstances show that a judge considered the unde rlying facts and found probable cause for the arrest. The lead opinion states t hat the good-faith exception need not be considered in this case. I agree with th e lead opinion that the Fourth Amendment was not violated, and I agree fully with the l ead opinion’s
determination that neither the exclusionary rule nor the good-f aith exception are applicable. I concur in the majority’s judgment, but because t he arrest was accomplished in public, which may be done without a warrant, I would not address the validity of the warrant.January Term, 2021

19 II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY {¶ 48} I agree with the lead opinion’s recitation of facts and history of the case, finding them t o be well stated.
III. CONSTITUTIO NAL ANALYSIS {¶ 49} The Fourth Amendment to the Un ited States Cons titution provides :

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures , shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon pr obable cause, supported by Oath or affirm ation, and particularly descr ibing the place to be searched, and t he persons or things to be seize d.

Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution contains a nearl y identical provision
that is often considered to be coextensive with the Fourth Amen dment. State v.
Jones , 143 Ohio St.3d 266, 2015-Ohio-483, 37 N.E.3d 123 ¶ 12, citing State v.
Smith , 124 Ohio St.3d 163, 2009-Ohio-6426, 920 N.E.2d 940, ¶ 10, fn. 1. Thus, under the Ohio Constitution, “the police must, whenever practic able, obtain advance judicial approval of s earches and seizures through the warrant procedure.” Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), citing Katz v.
United States , 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); Beck v. Ohio , 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); and Chapman v. United
States , 365 U.S. 610, 81 S.Ct. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828 (1961). The result of a constitutional violation is generally exclusion. 6 See Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471, 487-488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

6. However, an exception may exist when an officer executes a search or seizure based on goodfaith reliance on a facially valid warrant, United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), on binding caselaw that is later found to b e erroneous, Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011), on law th at is later overruled, Illinois v.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

20 {¶ 50} In this case, the defense sought to have excluded evidence that was obtained from the search incident to an arrest that was made ba sed on probable cause established during a contro lled buy of cocaine. A warran t for Harrison’s arrest was sought based on that p robable cause, but the reviewi ng judge did not actually sign the warrant—instead, the complaint to which the w arrant was attached was stamped and initialed by the reviewing judge, indicating th at a hearing was held and probable cause found. The lack of a signature from a judicial official on the warrant is essentially a red herring, in my view, because t he question whether a warrant is valid is subsumed by whether the warrant was necessa ry in the first instance. Here, caselaw shows it was not necessary; hence, we need not wade into the waters of its validity. {¶ 51} An officer may make a warrantless arrest in public for an offen se committed in the officer’s presence. Atwater v. Lago Vista , 532 U.S. 318, 328-345, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (discussing at length th e historical basis
of warrantless arrests for misdem eanor offenses that stop short of involving violence or threats of violence); see also Virginia v. Moore , 553 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008). Moreover, under the federal and state Constitutions, there is no explicit requirement that an officer seek a warrant for a public arrest,
even when the circumstances affo rd the officer the opportunity to do so. State v.
Jordan , ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2021-Ohio-3922, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 2; see also United
States v. Watson , 423 U.S. 411, 423-424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed. 598 (1976); State
v. Brown , 115 Ohio St. 3d 55, 2007-Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶ 66. {¶ 52} In this case, Brent Joseph, a de tective with the Logan County Sheriff’s Office assigned to the county’s Joint Drug Task Force , saw Harrison commit a felony on February 2, 2018, when he supervised a contr olled drug buy using a confidential informant. Though he did not immediately arrest Harrison

Krull , 480 U.S. 340, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987), or on a mistake of law, Heien v. North Carolina , 574 U.S. 54, 135 S.Ct. 530, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014).January Term, 2021

21 (because of a desire to preserve the confidential informant’s s afety and his identity as an informant), Detective Joseph had probable cause to arrest Harrison. He relied not only on his own judgment that his witnessing the controlled drug buy constituted probable cause, but he tested that judgment twice—o nce when he applied for and received a GPS warrant to keep track of Harriso n and again when he submitted a complaint, blank arrest warrant, and supporting affidavit to a judge who applied a “Probable Cause Found” stamp and her initials to the complaint. Without question, Detective Jose ph had probable cause to arrest Harrison—a fact twice confirmed to him by neutral judges—and the arrest occurre d in public. Hence, the arrest fully complied with both the federal and stat e Constitutions. This case is, above all, a suppression case and the primary question , therefore, is whether any defect in the arrest and searc h incident to arrest results in exclusion. {¶ 53} The lead opinion does not address the fact that a warrant was n ot legally necessary, because it states that specific issue was no t raised before the trial and appellate courts. The lead opinion states that the argumen t was not clearly presented until briefing before this court, which is a fair cha racterization, 7 and “[a]s a general rule, this court will not consider arguments that wer e not raised in the
courts below.” Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners’ Assn. v. R.E. Roark Cos.,
Inc. , 67 Ohio St.3d 274, 279, 617 N.E.2d 1075 (1993), citing State v. 1981 Dodge
Ram Van , 36 Ohio St.3d 168, 170, 522 N.E.2d 524, 526 (1988). But it i s also true that, “if we must resolve a legal issue that was not raised bel ow in order to reach a legal issue that was raised, we will do so.” Id. {¶ 54} Here, the legal issue raised is whether Harrison’s arrest, made with probable cause and in public but without a signed warrant, viol ated the United States and Ohio Constitutions, thus requiring exclusion. The p arties have mostly

7. The issue was anticipated and argued by the defense in the trial court when the defense observed that arrests made in public based on probable cause are constit utional but that this arrest required a warrant given the length of time between the development of pro bable cause and the public arrest.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

22 focused on the warrant’s lack of a signature, but in order for that issue to be dispositive, a warrant would need to be constitutionally necess ary in the first
instance. It was not. Jordan , ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2021-Ohio-3922, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 2. There is therefore no reason to address the valid ity of the arrest warrant at issue in this case, a nd I would decline to do so.
IV.CONCLUSION {¶ 55} Under the circumstances of this case, it is our duty to rightly apply the law. Once an issue is raised (here, the constitutionality of the arrest), even if no party correctly articulates wha t the law requires, and even if the lower court erred or failed to consider a relevant legal principle in analyzing t he case, we must still follow where the law leads us—that is, after all, why we review legal issues de

novo. See, e.g. , Gembarski v. PartsSource, Inc. , 157 Ohio St.3d 255, 2019-Ohio3231, 134 N.E.3d 1175, ¶ 26; State v. Belton , 149 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-1581, 74 N.E.3d 319, ¶ 100; Ohio Academy of Nursing Home s v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs. , 114 Ohio St.3d 14, 2007-Ohio-2620, 867 N.E.2d 400, ¶ 12, fn. 4;
Rohde v. Farmer , 23 Ohio St.2d 82, 89, 262 N.E.2d 685 (1970). Despite the defense’s framing of the issue, we should first consider the ne cessity of a warrant before opining on its validity. Because the lead opinion does not, I concur in judgment only, for the reasons expressed in this opinion. I ag ree, however, with the lead opinion’s conclusion that when a constitutional violat ion has not first been found, there is no reason to consider the good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule.

_________________ D E W INE , J., dissenting. {¶ 56} At a recent United States Supreme Court oral argument, Justice Alito posed this hypothetical to one of the advocates: an expert witn ess is asked “if aJanuary Term, 2021

23 centaur smokes five packs of ci garettes every day for 30 years, does the centaur run the risk of getting lung cancer? W hat would the medical expert say to that?” 8 {¶ 57} Justice Alito’s point was that the question asked of the doctor was difficult to answer because it rested on a faulty premise. Thi s case presents a question of a similar ilk. We are asked to decide whether evid ence obtained from Harrison’s arrest on a public h ighway should be suppressed beca use there was no signature on a warrant that was issued for his arrest. But jus t as centaurs don’t exist (at least as far as we know), there is no requirement for an ar rest warrant when an arrest based on probable cause is made in a public place. {¶ 58} Indisputably, the police did not need a warrant to carry out Harrison’s arrest. As we recently reiterated, “This court has held, consistently with United States Supreme Court precedent, ‘A warrantless arrest th at is based upon probable cause and occurs in a public place does not violate th e Fourth
Amendment’ to the United States Constitution.” State v. Jordan , ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2021-Ohio-3922, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 2, quoting State v. Brown , 115 Ohio St.3d 55, 2007-Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶ 66. Everyone agrees that there was probable cause for Harrison’s arrest and that it happened on a public highway. Thus, regardless of the validity of the arrest warrant, Harriso n was not subjected to an unlawful arrest. And because Harrison was lawfully arrested , the police were
entitled to search his vehicle. See Virginia v. Moore , 553 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008). {¶ 59} But even though the validity of the arrest warrant did not affe ct the lawfulness of Harrison’s arrest, the lead opinion undertakes to determine whether the (unnecessary) arrest warrant was valid. In doing so, it po ints out that the state

8. Supreme Court of the United States, Transcript of Oral Argum ent, Thompson v. Clark , No. 20- 659 (Oct. 12, 2021), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/ oral_arguments/ argument_transcript/2021 (accessed Nov. 30, 2021) [https://perm a.cc/WKG6-8KU7].S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

24 failed to assert in the lower courts that an arrest warrant was not required. And it cites our longstanding rule that we do not decide issues that w ere not raised below. State v. Wintermeyer , 158 Ohio St.3d 513, 2019-Ohio-5156, 145 N.E.3d 278, ¶ 1 (“It is * * * a familiar principle of law that a party who does not raise an issue in the trial court may not ordinarily raise that issue for the fir st time on appeal”). {¶ 60} I agree that we ought not decide i ssues that were not raised by the parties in the courts below. But I also think we ought to be c autious about deciding abstract issues that are divorced from the realities of particu lar cases. The ultimate issue presented by Harrison’s s uppression motion was whether hi s arrest was valid. Due to some questionable lawyering, though, what has been litig ated in this case is
whether Harrison’s arrest warrant was valid. That’s an issue t hat, on the facts in front of us, shouldn’t matter. Eve n if we were to decide that Harrison’s arrest warrant was invalid, that conclusion would not be sufficient to support exclusion
of the evidence obtai ned as a result of H arrison’s arrest. See Virginia

. {¶ 61} Furthermore, it is a long-standing principle that “[c]onstituti onal judgments * * * are justified only out of the necessity of adju dicating rights in particular cases.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma , 413 U.S. 601, 611, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973), citing Marbury v. Madison , 5 U.S. 137, 178, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). To this end, courts traditionally “refus[e] to decide constitut ional questions when the record discloses other grounds of decision, whether or not they have been properly raised before us by the parties.” Neese v. S. Ry. Co. , 350 U.S. 77, 78, 76 S.Ct. 131, 100 L.Ed. 60 (1955) (per curiam). {¶ 62} These considerations make this case a poor candidate for our re view. I am always reluctant to exercise our authority to dismiss a ca se as improvidently allowed after the parties have p resented briefing and oral argu ment. But, in my view, the unusual problems presented by the posture of this cas e make such a step appropriate. Doing so would leave in place the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the suppression motion— a judgment that was inarguably correct, thoughJanuary Term, 2021

25 perhaps arrived at on the wrong basis. In addition, to prevent further confusion, I
would order that the court of appeals opinion not be cited exce pt by the parties
herein. {¶ 63} Because I would dismiss this case as improvidently allowed, I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the majority.
K ENNEDY , J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.

_________________ Eric C. Stewart, Logan County Pro secuting Attorney, for appelle e. Triplett McFall Wolfe Law, L.L.C., Tina M. McFall, and Marc S. Triplett, for appellant.

_________________