The Hon. Harold D. Vietor, United States District Judge for 1

the Southern District of Iowa.

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No. 96-1614SI

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Diana Dodson, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellant, *

*

v. * On Appeal from the United

* States District Court for

* the Southern District

Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner * of Iowa.

of the Social Security *

Administration, *

*

Defendant-Appellee. *

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 Submitted: September 11, 1996

 Filed: November 25, 1996

___________

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

___________

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge.

Diana Dodson appeals a District Court order affirming the

1

Commissioner's denial of Dodson's application for Social Security

disability benefits. We affirm. 
 The Commissioner denied Dodson's application on October 27,

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1993, and again, on reconsideration, on December 3, 1993. After a

hearing in July 1994, Administrative Law Judge Thomas M. Donahue

issued the final decision of the Commissioner, dated September 13,

1994.

 Dodson's counsel filed a motion requesting this limitation.

3

We grant the motion but note that it was not required. Since the

Commissioner awarded Dodson benefits, an appeal of the prior denial

of those benefits is necessarily limited to the time before the

award.

 A protection control technician performs duties such as

4

running computers and high-speed check sorters. Admin. Rec. 48.

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I.

At the time of the District Court's decision, the Commissioner of

Social Security had consistently denied disability benefits to Dodson.2

Since the filing of this appeal, however, the Commissioner has found that

Dodson is disabled and eligible to receive benefits. We therefore limit

our review to the time period between September 12, 1992, when Dodson

alleges her disability began, and March 26, 1996, the date the Commissioner

found that her disability began.3

II.

Diana Dodson is 48 years old and a high school graduate. Her

employment experience includes work as a convenience store assistant

manager, a cashier/checker, a pizza baker, and, most recently, as a

protection control technician in a bank. 4

In a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") at the Social

Security Administration, she listed several health problems which

contribute to her disability. Chief among them were chronic asthma, sinus

infections, recurrent urinary tract infections, chronic irritation of the

bowel, a severely injured ankle, and pain associated with prior back

surgery. Admin. Rec. 40-43. She
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testified that the ankle injury, urinary tract infections, bowel

irritation, and asthma interfered most significantly with her ability to

work. Her leg had to be elevated much of the day, she required rest breaks

when using her inhaler for her asthma, and she had to go to the rest room

once or twice every half hour due to her frequent urination and chronic

diarrhea. Id. at 40, 46-48.

The ALJ, evaluating Dodson's testimony and medical records and the

testimony of a vocational expert, found that Dodson's health problems were

not so disabling as to prevent her from working. Id. at 11. The District

Court affirmed. Appellant's App. 5. We review the District Court's

decision to determine whether the ALJ's decision was supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Baker v. Secretary of

Health and Human Servs., 955 F.2d 552, 554 (8th Cir. 1992).

III.

Dodson challenges the ALJ's finding that her testimony that she was

unemployable was not fully credible. Appellant's Br. 18. Dodson argues

that the ALJ failed to give proper consideration to her subjective

allegations of pain as required by Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1321-

22 (8th Cir. 1984) (subsequent history omitted). Under Polaski, an

adjudicator may not disregard a claimant's subjective complaints solely

because the objective medical evidence does not support them. Id. at 1322.

But after full consideration of all of the evidence relating to subjective

complaints, the adjudicator may discount those complaints if there are

inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole. Ibid.

Dodson's hearing testimony regarding her ability to work was at times

contradictory. Dodson testified that she did not think she could be

employed again in the position she had held at the bank, "because [she]

couldn't do all the running that [she] did before." Admin. Rec. 47.

During the same proceeding, she also
 We recognize that, simply because one employer was tolerant 5

in accommodating Dodson's needs, all employers might not be so

inclined. From her testimony, it appears that the management of

the bank which bought out her original employer was far less

understanding; she said they complained about her frequent trips to

the rest room. The vocational expert testified, however, that a

person in Dodson's condition should qualify for sedentary work.

The ALJ is entitled to evaluate her employability based on all this

evidence, and his finding can be disturbed only if unsupported by

substantial evidence.

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testified that, were the bank still operated by its previous owners, she

was "sure [she'd] still have the job." Ibid. Though she later dismissed

the latter statement as "probably wishful thinking," id. at 49, she also

said nothing new had happened to her physically or mentally since she left

her job that would make work harder for her than it had been when she was

employed. The ALJ concluded that, since Dodson had been able to work while

having the exact same impairments she claimed made her unemployable, she

was "less than fully credible" regarding her inability to work.5

Dodson also challenges the ALJ's decision for "fail[ing] to mention"

important medical evidence corroborating her testimony about her

employability. Appellant's Br. 22-23. The evidence to which Dodson refers

is a one-page form filled out by Dr. R. Hart. Contrary to Dodson's

assertion, the ALJ specifically mentioned this piece of evidence by its

exhibit number in his opinion, noting that it received particular

attention. Admin. Rec. 16. 

Presumably, Dodson means to dispute the ALJ's evaluation of that

evidence. The ALJ wrote that "no medical source ha[d] suggested [the]

notion" that Dodson's ankle condition precluded her from all work. Dodson

insists that Dr. Hart indeed suggested such a notion. The form Dr. Hart

filled out contains the question, "If unable to work, is inability:

temporary [or] permanent[?]" Dr. Hart marked "permanent." Id. at 205.
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The form later contradicts itself. Although Dr. Hart's check mark

in the question quoted above indicates that Dodson was unable to work and

that her disability was permanent, another of his check marks points to a

different conclusion. On the immediately preceding line, beside "work

capacity," Dr. Hart marked "limited work." Ibid. It is impossible to know

what Dr. Hart intended to convey. Considering this ambiguous evidence in

light of all the other evidence, it was permissible for the ALJ to conclude

that Dodson remained able to work. While the ALJ did not accept Dodson's

subjective evaluation of her ability to work, he also did not reject

Dodson's subjective assessment solely because the objective medical

evidence failed to support her claim. See Admin. Rec. 14-17. His

treatment of that evidence was both sensible and proper under Polaski. 739

F.2d at 1322; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

The ALJ also relied upon the testimony of a vocational expert who

appeared at Dodson's hearing. The expert heard all of Dodson's testimony

and had reviewed her file. Relying on Dodson's testimony and referring to

the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT"), the expert testified that

a person with Dodson's employment background and physical limitations could

work, but would be limited to sedentary work. Admin. Rec. 55. 

In the expert's opinion, Dodson could still perform work like that

she had performed at the bank, only "in a way that the DOT normally says

that it is performed" -- presumably, without lifting heavy bags of checks

or traveling very far without rest. See id. at 44, 52, 56. The expert

further testified that Dodson was qualified for several clerical positions

which were classified in the DOT as "sedentary." According to the expert,

Dodson's need to keep her ankle elevated could usually be readily

accommodated in most of these jobs, and most employers normally allowed for

sufficient rest periods.
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That different interpretations of Dodson's ability to work were

possible does not invalidate the ALJ's conclusions. Oberst v. Shalala, 2

F.3d 249, 250 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836,

838 (8th Cir. 1992)). Since we find those conclusions were supported by

medical evidence, the testimony of the vocational expert, and in part by

Dodson's own testimony, we will not disturb the ALJ's ruling. 

IV.

The ALJ's consideration of Dodson's subjective assessment of her

employability was proper under Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1321-22. His conclusion

that Dodson was employable, and therefore ineligible for disability

benefits, was supported by substantial evidence. The District Court was

correct in affirming that decision. We therefore affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.