GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR 667 

West Virginia's Buffalo Creek Flood: 

A Study of the Hydrology and 

Engineering Geology 

West Virginia's Buffalo Creek Flood: 

A Study of the Hydrology and 

Engineering Geology 

By William E. Davies, James F. Bailey, 

and Donovan B. Kelly 

G E 0 l 0 G I C A l 5 U R V E Y C I R C U l A R 667 

Washington 1972 
United States Department of the Interior 

ROGERS C. B. MORTON, Secretary 

Geological Survey 

V. E. McKelvey, Director 

First printing 1972 

Second printing 197 4 

Free on application to the U.S. Geologica~ Survey, National Center, Reston, Va. 22092 
Summary ------------------------------------- Scope of present study ______________________ _ 

Setting ______________________________________ _ 

Geography ---------------------------------

Geology ------------------------------------ History and growth of a coal-waste dam that 

failed ------------------------------------ 1966 inspection of coal-waste bank _________ _ 

Growth of coal-waste banks: 1966 to 1972 

flood -------------------------------------

Source of floodwater --------------------------

Snowmelt ----------------------------------- Precipitation ______________________________ _ 

Pool on Middle Fork ------------------------

Failure of the darn --------------------------- Geologic and engineering evidence __________ _ 

Slumps ----------------------------------

Subsidence ------------------------------- Foundation seepage (piping) ____________ _ 

Flow lines 

CONTENTS 

Page 

1 Failure of the darn-Con. 

2 Geologic and engineering evidence-Con. 

3 Debris lines ------------------------------

3 Eyewitness observations ---------------·-·----

4 Summary of sequence of failure of coal-waste 

darn No. 3 ---------------------------------

5 Analysis of other reported modes of failure __ 

5 Explosions within the darn ----------------

Ditching ---------------------------------

6 Dynamiting ------------------------------

11 Conclusions as to cause of darn failure -------

11 The flood ------------------------------------- 11 Flood conditions in the Guyandotte River basin 

12 Previous floods ------------------------------ 14 The flood on Buffalo Creek _________________ _ 

14 Time of travel of the flood wave _________ _ 

14 Profiles -----------------------------------

14 Depth of flow ---------------------------- 14 Scour and deposition ____________________ _ 

14 References ------------------------------------

ILLUSTRATIONS 

Page 

17 

17 

19 

24 

25 

25 

25 

26 

27 

27 

28 

28 

29 

30 

32 

32 

32 

Page 

FIGURE 1. Map of West Virginia showing location of Buffalo Creek flood area ______________________ 1 

2. Map showing Buffalo Creek valley -------------------------------------------------------- 2 

3. Sketch map of Middle Fork, February 1972, before darn broke ---------------------------- 3 

4. Profile along Middle Fork, Saunders, W. Va.________________________________________________ 6 

5. Reconstructed view of coal-waste banks on Middle Fork, near Saunders, W. Va. ___________ 7 

6. Aerial photograph showing Buffalo Creek area, West Virginia (November 3, 1971) ______ 8 

7. Graph showing gradation curves, coal-waste darn No. 3, Saunders, W. Va. ----------------- 9 

8. Map showing rainfall in southwestern West Virginia, February 24 to February 26, 1972___ 11 

9-12. Graph showing9. Height of the pool behind coal-waste darn No. 3 ----------------------------------- 12 

10. Area covered by the pool behind darn No. 3 ------------------------------------- 12 

11. Increase in volume of water in the pool behind coal-waste darn No. 3 _____________ 13 

12. Rate of inflow to the pool behind coal-waste darn No. 3 ------------------------- 13 

13. Diagram showing plan and cross-section through coal-waste darn No. 3 after failure, on 

Middle Fork, Saunders, W. Va. ------------------------------------------------------- 15 

14-19. Photographs: 

14. Looking upstream at the left abutment of coal-waste darn No. 3 ------------------- 16 

15. Sump near former front of coal-waste dam No. 3 -------------------------------- 16 

16. View across coal-waste darn No. 3 from right abutment ------------------------- 18 

17. Top of right abutment of coal-waste darn No. 3 showing 14-inch-wide water channel 

developed along bulldozer tracks------------------------------------------------ 20 

18. Breach in coal-waste darn No. 2 --------------------------------------------------- 21 

19. View upstream across former clear pond behind coal-waste bank No. 1 ____________ 22 

I I I 
FIGURES 20-23. Photographs-Con. Page 

20. Haul road looking upstream midway along the right edge of coal-waste bank No. L_ 22 

21. View down the canyon cut along the right side of coal-waste bank No. 1 at the mouth 

of ~iddle Fork --------------------------------------------------------------- 23 

22. Face of coal-waste bank No. 1 at the intersection of ~iddle Fork and Buffalo Creek 23 

23. Panoramic view downstream through the breach in coal-waste dam No. 3 _________ 24 

24. Sketch map of ~iddle Fork on February 26, 1972, shortly after dam failure _______________ 24 

25-27. Photographs: 

25. Pool area above coal-waste dam No. 3 following failure of the dam ________________ 25 

26. ~iddle Fork, panoramic vi~w, mine No. 5 to Buffalo Creek, ~arch 5, 1972, and vertical aerial photograph, dam No. 3 to Buffalo Creek, February 28, 197~ _________ 26 

27. Debris from ~iddle Fork deposited in Buffalo Creek, looking downstrean' over former site of Saunders --------------------------------------------------------- 26 

28. Graph showing the sudden high peak of 19.34 feet produced on the gaging station record for 

Guyandotte River at ~an by the flood inflow from Buffalo Creek --------------------- 29 

29. Estimated flood hydrographs for Buffalo Creek below Saunders, below Stowe, above Accoville, and near ~an on February 26, 1972________________________________________________ 30 

30. Graph showing time of travel of the flood wave down Buffalo Creek from ~iddle Fork to 

~an --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------ 30 

31. Profile of the peak flood discharge and of the streambed, Buffalo Creek, ~iddle Fork to Man 31 

TABLES 

TABLE 1. Percentage of coal in composite sample ______ ----------------------------------------------- Page 

9 

10 

28 

2. Unit weights (bulk density) of coal samples _ -----------------------------------------------

3. Floods in southwestern West Virginia, February 25-27, 1972 --------------------------------

IV 
West Virginia's Buffalo Creek Flood: 

A Study of the Hydrology and Engineering Geology 

By William E. Davies, James F. Bailey, and Donovan B. Kelly 

SUMMARY 

On February 26, 1972, the most destructive flood in 

West Virginia's history swept through the Buffalo 

Creek valley in the southwestern COI'ner of the State, 

40 miles south of Charleston (fig. 1). Shortly before 

8:00 a.m., a coal-waste dam collapsed on the Buffalo 

Creek tributary of Middle Fork releasing some 17.6 

million cubic f~et (132 million gallons) of water. The 

water passed through two more piles of coal waste 

blocking the Middle Fork to reach the Buffalo Creek 

valley floor. In its 1-2-mile run from the top of the 

coal-waste dam to the floor of Buffalo Creek, the large 

volume of floodwater dropped in elevation some 250 

feet. The small settlement of Saunders, near the junction of Middle Fork and Buffalo Creek in the shadow 

of the lower coal-waste bank, was completely destroyed 

by the force of the water as were parts of the other 

16 mining camps farther down the valley (fig. 2). 

The 10- to 20-foot flood wave traveled through the 

15-mile Buffalo Creek valley at an average speed of 

about 7 feet per second ( 5 miles per hour) and reached 

the town of Man at the mouth of Buffalo Creek on the 

Guyandotte River around 11 :00 a.m. During those 3 

hours, at least 118 lives were lost, 500 homes were 

destroyed, 4,000 people were left homeless, property 

damage exceeded $50 million and highway damage 

alone exceeded $15 million. Two months after the flood, 

seven people were still reported missing. 

Between February 24 and 26, the National Weather 

Service measured precipitation of 3.7 inches in the 

general area of Logan County and Buffalo Creek. That 

amount of precipitation is about a 2-year rainfall; that 

is southweste1·n West Virginia can expect precipitati~n to equal or exceed 3.7 inches in a 3-day period 

on the average of once every 2 years. Streams similar 

to Buffalo Creek in and around Logan County responded to the 3 days of precipitation with flows 

on the order of a 10-year flood; that is, a flow 

that can be expected to occur on the average of about 

once in a 10-year period. Following the failure of the 

coal-waste dam, flow in Buffalo Creek near Saunders 

jumped from less than a 10-year flood to a discharge 

about 40 times greater than a 50-year flood. The dif1 

ference between the discharge less than a 10-year flood 

and the discharge 40 times greater than the 50-year 

flood reflects the difference between the natural flood 

that would probably have occurred and the flood that 

resulted from failure of the dam. 

Employees of the Buffalo Creek Mining Co., OJlerators of the coal-waste dam that failed, report that water was within 1 foot of the graded crest of the dE.m 4 

hours prior to the flood. Failure of the coal-waste dam 

probably occurred through foundation deficiences, causing sliding and slumping of the front face of the da~. 

The failure was accelerated by the waterlogged condition of the dam. The slumping lowered the top of the 

coal-waste dam and allowed the impounded water to 

breach and then rapidly erode the crest of the dam. 

Upon failure of the dam, the floodwater moved into 

pockets of burning coal waste at the lower coal-waste 

bank and caused explosions. The only signs of bur"'ing 

and explosions were at the lower coal-waste bani-. 

FIGURE 1.-Location of Buffalo Creek flood area. 
81'50' 81'45' 81'40' 

Boundar"' of Buffalo Creek watershed 

--~~ Paved rC'ads G County rood number 

Ro1lroad 

•111 • Butldtngs 

A County road number 

1 School 

i Church 

&(1) lnduect measurements of 

peak d•schorge 

FIGUftE 2.-Buffalo Creek valley, Saunders to Man. 

In their coal-mining operations, the Buffalo Creek 

Mining Co. had built three major coal-waste banks by 

dumping waste rock and coal in the narrow valley of 

Middle Fork (fig. 3). Coal-waste bank No. 1 w~ located at the mouth of the Middle Fork. Banks No. 2 

and 3 were upstream 600 and 1,200 feet from bank 

No. 1 and served as dams prior to the flood. Part of 

the purpose of the dams was to reduce stream pollution by impounding the waste-water from the coal 

washing plant, thus allowing most of the sediment 

to settle. The porous nature of the coal-waste dams 

allowed most of the water normally to filter through 

the dam and this clear water was recycled to the ~ashing plant from decanting basins downstream. 

Although banks No. 2 and 3 were not engineerJd as 

dams and would not be acceptable as dams in an ~ngineering sense, they will be referred to as coal-waste 

dam No. 2 and coal-waste dam No. 3. Coal-waste 1dam 

No. 3 impounded the 17.6 million cubic feet of water 

that produced the flood. A fourth small bank, ~bout 

2,600 feet upvalley from dam No. 3~ formerly served 

as an impounding structure, but the area behind it was 

filled with sediment in 1972. 

SCOPE OF PRESENT STUDY 

Immediately following the flood, employees 

of the U.S. Geological Survey and several members of the West Virginia Geologic and Economic Survey began investigating the physical 

dimensions of the flood: what caused the fldod? 

2 

where did the water come from? why and how 

did the dam fail? and what wer?. the heights 

and discharges of the floodflow along Buffalo 

Creek hollow? The purpose of tre field investigations and of this report is to reconstruct 

the physical facts and events sur~ounding the· 

flood. The Geological Survey released a preliminary report in March 1972 as a contribution 

to the Interior Department Task Force analysis of the failure of the coal-refuse dam at 

Saunders (U.S. Department of Interior, 1972). 

The following were among the initial field 

investigations conducted: a 19-rnile flood profile was surveyed on Buffalo Cree1

'" from above 

Saunders to the mouth at Man ; indirect measurements of peak discharges were made at 

six sites; several aerial photography flights 

were flown and several hundred photographs 

were taken at ground level; the reservoir volume behind coal-waste dam No. 3 was surveyed; geologic mapping was conducted along 

Middle Fork from dam No. 3 to F·.1ffalo Creek; 

eyewitness accounts were collected on the failure of the dam and the passage of the flood ; 

a bucket survey of precipitation vras conducted 

throughout Buffalo Creek hollow; water-qual-
ROAO ON STRIP BENCH 

aoo 1ooo Ft 

FIGURE 3.-Sketch map of Middle Fork, February 1972, before dam broke. 

ity samples of the flood peak were collected at 

Saunders and Latrobe; and coal-waste samples 

were collected at the site of dam No. 3. 

More detailed studies on the physical characteristics of material in the coal-waste dams 

in Middle Fork valley are now underway by the 

Department of Interior and the data cited in 

this report may be altered by these investigations. 

Some of the facts, figures, and photographs 

used in this report were generously supplied 

by residents, newspapermen, and local, State, 

and Federal employees. Their help in producing 

this report is gratefully acknowledged. 

SETTING 

GEOGRAPHY 

From its headwaters on the northern flanks 

of Buffalo Mountain, Buffalo Creek has cut a 

zig-zag valley as it flows west to meet the Guyandotte River at Man in southwestern West 

Virginia. The curves that interrupt the general 

east to west flow of Buffalo Creek mark detours 

where the stream loops north or south around 

the noses and peaks of some of the more resistant ridges. The most prominent loop in the valley is at Stowe, about halfway between Saunders and Man. Here the creek flowf· northwest 

for about 0.7 mile between Lundale and Stowe 

before turning almost due south for 1.3 mi'les 

from Stowe at the top of the loop to Latrobe 

at the bottom. 

The sinuosity of Buffalo Creek, that is, its 

tendency to zig-zag around ridges instead of 

flowing in a straight line, forces the stream to 

flow for 15 miles from Saunders to Man-a 

straight line distance of less than 12 miles. This 

sinuosity also impairs the ability of Buffalo 

c~eek to carry off floodflows ; each bend and 

turn acts as an impediment to flow and l'~cks 

up water and retains any flow longer than a 

straight channel would. 

The flood plain of Buffalo Creek, the narrow, 

valley-bottom flatlands formed from materials 

deposited over the years by the stream, is gen-

,eraHy less than 400 feet wide. People 't~gan 

to use this narrow flood plain for living space 

when mining developed in the region after 

1900. In 1914, the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad completed a spur up the valley, and long 

coal trains began making daily runs dow1 the 

valley to the main line at Barboursville. By 

1920, Buffalo was checkered with smar but 

closely-spaced mining camps, located wher~ the 

flood plain was widest. Towns such as r~unders, Lorado, Craneco, Crites, Amhers':.dale, 

Becco, Accoville, and Crown were built ,~rhere 

the small flood plains of tributary str~ams 

joined the flood plain of Buffalo Creek; and 

towns such as Pardee, Stowe, and Robinette 

were built on the wider flatland around some 

of the loops of Buffalo Creek. 

During the last half-century, the mining 

companies sold most of the houses to individuals, and the camps becam·e independent small 

communities. Before the flood, there were 17 

settlements along Buffalo Creek. By 1972, the 

two-lane Buffalo Creek road had been improved 

3 
and recently resurfaced. Before the flood, the 

road, railroad, and houses filled much of the 

flood plain, leaving only small space for the 

creek. 

Over a long period of time, a stream such as 

Buffalo Creek will just fill its banks without 

overflowing about twice a year. Less often, but 

just as predictably, a stream can be expected 

to overflow its banks and flood the flood plain. 

Jammed between steeply rising valley walls, 

the narrow flood plain of Buffalo Creek offers 

little opportunity to build above the level of 

the 50-year flood. Upstream from Amherstdale, 

the flood plain is less than 400 feet wide and 

above Saunders the flood plain almost disappears. Even downstream from Saunders, the 

valley becomes so narrow in places that there 

is barely room for the railroad and the road. 

At Saunders and Accoville, the ridges rise over 

1,000 feet above the valley floor at an angle 

of about 26°; at Lorado and Amherstdale, the 

rise is even steeper, 30° to 35°, to a ridge that 

runs some 700-900 feet above the flood plain. 

The steepness of the valley walls and the 

thinness of the soil contribute to floodflows in 

the valley. Gentle slopes and thick soils tend 

to slow up and absorb the runoff from heavy 

rains and thus delay and attenuate flood pe~ks. 

Instead of gentle slopes·, the valley walls· act 

more like high-pitched roofs with slopes as 

high as 40° and occasional 50-foot sandstone 

cliffs. Instead of thick soils to abs·orb some of 

the precipitation runoff, soils on the uplands 

and valley walls are- thin ; generally they are 

less than 3 feet thick and seldom are as much 

as 5 feet thick (Latimer, 1915). Furthermore, 

the soils tend to a composition of low perrneability and are dominantly a clayey, silty sand 

with large quantities of stone varying ftom 

small chips to boulders a foot long and cpmmonly underlain by clay layers up to an ~nch 

thick between the base of the soil zone and I the 

under lying bedrock. , 

All these factors-the sinuosity of the ciiannel, the narrowness of the flood plain, the st~epness and height of the valley walls, and ':the 

thinness and relative impermeability of the 

soil-combine to make Buffalo Creek a hollow 

susceptible to natural flooding. During the extreme, nonnatural, flood of 1972, these factors 

also contributed to the flooding but played a 

lesser role to the overwhelming volume and 

force of water involved. 

GEOLOGY 

The ridges, valleys, and mineral wealth of 

Buffalo Creek hollow are a direct reflection of 

the bedrock geology. Buffalo G'.·eek and its 

tributaries are cut into the hig:t plateau that 

forms the western flank of the Appalachians. 

The valleys and hollows in thif area are so 

numerous and well developed trat very little 

remains of the upland of the plateau. As a 

result, the topography is a series of narrow, 

steep, sinuous headwater ridges flanked by 

equally steep and narrow spurs. Each major 

stream is an entity in itself and is separated 

from adjacent drainage basins by uniformly 

crested ridges with few gaps or saddles opening between basins. The remr ants of the 

plateau upland are at 2,400 to 2,€00 feet above 

sea level. The major valleys are about 1,200 

feet below the upland, and tributary hollows 

are as much as 1,000 feet deep. 

The topography around Buffalo Creek reflects the bedrock. Beneath the spurs and ridges 

are coal seams and related sz.ndstone and 

shale, all part of the Kanahwa Series (Pennsylvanian). The Kanahwa Series in this area is 

over 1,500 feet thick and consistE of many repetitive cyclothems formed by sequences of 

coal, shale, sandstone, and clay with occasional 

thin irregular limestone beds (Hennen and 

others, 1914). Along Middle Fork, three cyclothems involving the Cedar Grove, Chilton, 

and Coalburg coals are present. Of these, only 

the Cedar Grove and Chilton are of concern in 

the failure of the dam and the subsequent 

flood; the Coal burg lies near the top of the 

ridges and is a hundred feet or more above the 

floor of Middle Fork. The following sequence 

is exposed in the lower part of the Middle 

Fork: 

4 

Mine No.5. 

Thickness 

(feet) 

Chilton upper coal, with intervening s} ale beds 

and fire clay, coal beds up to 3 feet tlick -------- 15 

Shale and some sandstone ---------------------------------------- 20 

Massive sandstone ---------------------------------------------------- 8 

Chilton lower coal and intervening shale beds, 

coal up to 18 inches thick; coal stripped and 

angered ····----------·-----------------------------------------------·-·-- 5 

Clayey shale ------------------------------------------------------------····· 25 
Thickness 

(feet) 

Slabby sandstone, formed abutment of dam No.3 25 

Little Chilton coal, shale and coal interlayered, 

coal up to 18 inches thick .................................... 20 

Massive gray, slightly micaceous sandstone, 

forms ledge at ponds No. 1 and 2 .................... 40 

Shale and sandstone ............. .. ....................... .. .......... 15 

Massive irregularly bedded sandstone, sheeted 

surfaces ......................................... ... ............ ..... ....... 45 

Olive brown to gray shale ...................................... 20 

Gray, well-bedded sandstone, near level of Cedar 

Grove coal .. ...... ... ................................ ... .. ..... ..... ...... 45 

Base at level of debris in Buffalo Creek. 

The beds dip gently to the northwest about 

66 feet per mile (1.3 percent). Major fractures 

trending N. 80° E. and N. l0°E. cut the sandstone units. Joints at N. 55°W. and N. 30° W. 

are prominent. 

The floors of the narrow, steep-sided hollows contain only coarse stony debris except 

where they have been filled with coal waste. 

The flats along Buffalo Creek are underlain by 

tightly packed, rounded cobbles and pebbles of 

sandstone and by sandy silt up to 1 or 2 feet 

thick. Bedrock in the valley is from 4 to 20 

feet beneath the surface. 

The valley flat along Buffalo Creek has been 

cleared of most of its natural vegetation. The 

valley walls and uplands are covered by continuous but thin growth of second stand timber, 

most of which is· less than 3 inches in diameter 

in the lower trunk. Oak, hickory, honey locust, 

yellow locust, pine, and some hemlock are present. Three strip mine benches interrupt the 

vegetation along both sides of Middle Fork. 

Except where the benches are used as roads, 

they are overgrown with brush and s·mall trees. 

HISTORY AND GROWTH OF A COAL-WASTE DAM 

THAT FAILED 

Mining activities began in Middle Fork in 

1945 when the Lorado Mining Co. opened Mine 

No. 5 and accelerated when the preparation 

plant was completed 2 years later. In 1964, the 

property was acquired by the Buffalo Mining 

Co., which in turn was taken over by the Pittston Co., in 1970 (Park and others, 1972). 

In 1972 the preparation plant, on Buffalo 

Creek about half a mile east of Saunders, was 

handling about 5,000 tons of raw coal.per twoshift day from five mines, a strip bench, and 

two auger operations carried on by the Pittston Company. The preparation plant produced 

about 1,000 tons of solid coal-waste refuse each 

two-shift day and used in its cleaning pro'?.ess 

about a half million gallons of water per day, 

most of which was reused after the solids were 

settled out. 

5 

The Lorado Mining Co., began trucking refuse from the preparation plant to the mouth of 

Middle Fork about 25 years ago, and in the 

process, it built a large waste bank across the 

hollow. By 1966, waste bank No. 1 exterded 

1,500 feet down the Middle Fork and was 200 

feet high at the face qn Buffalo Creek. 

In 1959, the company began pumping waste 

water into the hollow behind the bank to s·~ttle 

out solids from the spent wash water. At first 

the water drained rapidly through the l'"lnk 

in spite of several attempts to create a reservoir for use in dry seasons. However, r.fter 

1960, coal from strip-mine operations was 

processed through the washer. The fine material from the strip mines made the bank less 

pervious, resulting in a large impoundn1ent. 

Water was then decanted from the large settling pool that formed into smaller clear p·:mds 

for recycling in the ,preparation process. Between 400,000 and 500,000 gallons per day containing about 500 tons of solids were punped 

to the settling pool. Before using pools for settlement of waste material, the sludge effluent 

was discharged into Buffalo Creek. When rtate 

regulations concerning pollution of streams 

were enacted in the early 1950's, the company 

chose first to put the sludge undergrouiJd in 

mined out areas and later used impoundment 

and decanting basins as one of several po~·sible 

methods of meeting requirements. 

1966 INSPECTION OF COAL-WASTE BANK 

The Geological Survey first examined the 

coal-waste bank at Saunders· in December 1966. 

On October 21 of that year, a large hillside 

waste bank at Aberfan, Wales (U.K.), slunped, 

sending a mass of liquified coal refuse 1,600 

feet down the hill. Concerned over the prospect that such a thing might happen in the 

United States, the U.S. Bureau of Mines drew 

on the experience of its many mine ins:prctors 

to prepare lists of all waste banks in the Appalachians that, because of their location anc1 size, 
could cause loss of life or property if they slid 

in a manner similar to the bank at Aberfan. 

The lists were supplemented by information 

furnished the U.S. Bureau of Mines by the 

local offices of the United Mine Workers 

Union through their national headquarters. The 

Bureau of Mines called upon the U.S. Geological Survey to assist in examination of each 

waste bank cited in the lists. In late N ovember and early December of 1966, 38 waste 

banks in West Virginia were inspected by William E. Davies, geologist, and John Gallagher, 

hydrologist, both of the U.S. Geological Survey. 

On December 9, 1966, Mr. Tom Gay, of the 

Logan office of the Bureau of Mines, and Mr. 

Davies inspected the single coal-waste bank 

then in existence on Middle Fork at Saunders 

(waste-bank No 1). Several hours were spent 

on the top of the bank, examining the material 

and method of deposition. Additional time was 

spent examining the sides along the haul road 

down to the north face, the large pond behind 

the waste bank, the small dike on the east that 

added to the height of the impounding structure, the north face of the bank, and the seepage issuing near the base of the structure. It 

was concluded that the waste bank at Saunders 

was stable as far as large slides were concerned 

but was subject to large washout on the north 

side from overflow of lake. 

Observations on the engineering geology aspects of coal-waste banks were later des·cribed 

in two reports. The first report covered the 

geological aspects of coal-waste banks and was 

presented on November 21, 1967, to the Annual Meeting of the Geological Society . of 

SE 

RECENT 

I DAM NO 4 

America (Davies, 1967). An exranded report 

with considerable emphasis on the dangers 

from failure of waste banks acting as impounding structures was later present<'d to a meeting of the American Mining Congress (Davies, 

1968). 

GROWTH OF COAL-WASTE BANKS, 1966 TO 1972 FLOOD 

With 1,000 tons of waste dum11ed daily, the 

deposits in Middle Fork grew rapidly. Within 

a year after the 1966 inspection, the waste 

bank had increased in elevation by 50 feet, and 

the pool behind it had been filled with material 

settled from wash water. A second, larger pool 

had been formed in 1967 by a dam created 

from coal waste placed on the older sludge 

(figs. 3, 4, and 5). In 1966, t1'is dam was 

merely a small dump on the left wall of the 

valley about 600 feet upstream from the dike 

at the south end of the waste bank. However, 

in late 1967, this dam was completed and could 

impound water to a depth of about 20 feet 

above the old sludge line of the first pool. This 

dam and the retaining dike at the rear of the 

coal-waste bank were overtopped and partially 

carried away by high water from snowmelt 

early in 1967. A small flood occurred in Buffalo Creek as a consequence. 

Within 2 years, the limit of this second pool 

to settle material from wash water was in 

sight, and a third pool was e~tablished by 

dumping coal waste on the sludge trapped in 

the 1959 and 1967 pools. This cam (No. 3) 

was 600 feet upstream from the dam forming 

the second impounding and begar impounding 

water in late 1969. Dam No. 3 grew both in 

t CLEAR POND W•ter2-Sft cl"p 

• WATER 

r22 SLUDGE .&.NO COAL WASTE 

15! COAL WAITE BANK 

COAL WASTE ~" BANK 

NW 

24001t abo¥e 

2,100 

FIGURE 4.-Profile along Middle Fork, Saunders, W.Va. 

6 
FIGURE 5.-Reconstructed view of coal-waste banks on Middle Fork, near Saunders, W. Va. (Original aerial 

photograph taken after flood by West Virginia Department of Highways.) 

height and thickness, and probably was near 

its final height (but not thickness) in February 1971. 

By early February 1972, dam No. 3 extended 

465 feet across the valley along its front 

(downstream) crest, was 450 feet wide at the 

rear, and up to 550 feet wide along the center. 

From fronf to back along the compacted crest, 

it was 360 feet thick on the right and 480 feet 

thick on the.-left (looking downstream). On the 

right, the compacted crest rose 44 feet, and on 

the left, it rose 60 feet above the level of the 

sludge in pond No. 2. The compacted crest on 

the front (downstream) face was about 10 to 

15 feet lower than the rear (upstream) face. 

Altogether, dam No. 3 contained about 10 million cubic feet of coal waste standing above the 

level of the sludge line of pool No. 2 and 

about 7 million cubic feet displacing the sludge 

below that line. About 800,000 tons of coal 

waste had been dumped to form the dam. The 

front face of the dam sloped 37°, the angle of 

repose for most coal-waste material, and the 

7 

back sloped 32°, the angle of repose for such 

material where dumping was modified by impounded water. The front (northwest) face of 

the dam, based on an aerial photograph taken 

November 3, 1971 (fig. 6), was concave in 

plan and contained four small concave hollows. 

The rear face was nearly straight, except near 

the right abutment where a reentry cut diagonally into the dam. 

Most dams constructed from coal waste impound water only during periods of heavy rain 

or during periods of large volume waste-water 

discharge. However, in the case of dam No. 3, 

there is evidence that a pool with a depth of 

about 30 feet at the dam endured for a long 

period of time. Fine coal and sludge formed 

an extensive terrace at the head of the impoundment area behind dam No. 3, just below 

dam No. 4. These deposits are 15 feet thick at 

the front, 400 feet long grading into the valley 

floor near dam No. 4, and 60 feet wide at the 

lower end. The top of the terrace is flat and 

the deposits have horizontal beds, indicating 
FIGURE 6.-Buffalo Creek area, West Virginia, Nov. 3, 1971. (Aerial photograph by Appalachian Regional 

Commission.) 

deposition in a quiet, steady pool. The top of about 50 feet thick beneath dam No. 3. Only 

the terrace coincides with a distinct line of the abutments of the dams were on bedrock 

black sludge extending along the valley walls or thin soil over bedrock, and in dam No. 3 

to dam No. 3. The terrace and sludge line are these are the only parts that remain. 

about 30 feet above the sludge fill at dam No.3. On February 26, 1972, the compacted crest 

In constructing dam No. 3, the coal waste over which the trucks moved stood 60 feet 

was dumped from trucks in closely spaced above the sludge level on the left abutment and 

piles from 4 to 7 feet high and then graded sloped gradually to 44 feet above the sludge 

in layers 2 to 4 feet thick. The dumping was level on the right abutment. In addition, the 

carried across the dam in the form of "lifts" rear part of the dam, mainly on the right half, 

on successive levels of material 10 to 20 feet was covered with abutting piles of recently 

thick. Once the dam was closed, dumping was dumped but ungraded coal rising 4 to 7 feet 

mainly across the back side of the dam, which above the compacted crest. 

steadily grew upstream. Trees in the path of Based on what remains in the abutments, 

the dam construction were not removed but the material within dam No. 3 was relatively 

were covered by dumping. The pool area also homogeneous. Well-sorted segments consistwas not cleared of vegetation. The sludge on ing primarily of fine coal were confined to diswhich the waste was dumped was only par- continuous layers less than 6 inches thick and 

tially displaced and much of it formed the to pockets and lenses up to 1 foot thick and 

foundation of the dams. It is probable that 10 feet long. No segregation, layering, or zonthe amounts of sludge underneath the dams ing of material to obtain maximum stability 

were proportional to the original thickness of occur in the remnants of the dam, and considthe sludge. Underneath dam No. 2, the sludge ering the method of construction, these feais probably on the order of 100 feet thick and tures were probably lacking in ihe rest of the 

8 
dam. The coal waste forming the dam was 

about 20 percent slabs {up to 2 ft on a side) 

of clayey shale and low-grade (bone) coal, 50 

percent chips and chunks {up to 1 in. on a 

side), and 30 percent fine coal and sludge. Particle-size distribution obtained from one sample in the right abutment, two samples in the 

left abutment, and a sample in a mound heaved 

up at the toe of the front of the dam are comparably homogeneous with a graded distribution ranging from boulders to silt with a mean 

in the 5- to 10-m (fine gravel) category (fig. 

7). The amount of fine coal mixed in the other 

material in the dam varies according to grain 

size and ranged from 24 to 7 4 percent (table 

1). 

Slabs and chips of shale and coal were bonded by clay in the right abutment. This material was high in sulfides, and a light-gray efflorescence of sulfates was deposited along fractures and on faces of slabs and chips. 

TABLE !.-Percentage of coal in co·mposite sa·mple 

[Based on six samples from left abutment; includes only material finer than 32 mm] 

Grain size (mm) Percentage c.f coal 

16 -32 -------------------------- 30.9 

8 -16 -------------------------- 24.7 

4 - 8 -------------------------- 24.0 

2 - 4 -------------------------- 29.6 

1 - 2 -------------------------- 34.2 

.5 - 1 -------------------------- 64.6 

.25 - .5 ------------------------ 74.1 

.125- .25 ----------------------- 69.3 

.063- .125 ---------------------- 61.1 

.063 ----------------------------- 47.8 

The material remaining in the left abutment of dam No. 3 was bonded by clayey naterial but was relatively low in sulfates. Only 

thin, discontinuous effluorescences were present on the upper part of this abutment. The 

shale in both abutments was slaking rapidly 

and breaking down to chips and flakes less 

U S STANDARD SIEVE SIZE 

IOOnTTrTI~~----ri3TINTrrt-r~~~IN __ ITrnNr0~4-rN~O~IO __ ITMn~N0~40~~--~N0~200~-r~-r---n~>T~~~--~ 11 I! I il 

! i !! 1

1 i t! I I l r-- 'I ll 100 10 1.0 01 

GRAIN SIZE IN MIL.L.IMETEAS 

Callnl I Medoum 

GRADATION CURVES, COAL WASTE DAM NO. 3, SAUNDERS, WEST VIRGINIA 

Sample 1, right abutment, front side, 15 feet above base. 

Sample 2, left abutment, rear side, 37 feet above base. 

Sample 3, left abutment, rear side, 10 feet above base. 

Sample 4, mound at former front toe, near left abutment. 

FIGURE 7.-Gradation curves, coal-waste dam No.3, Saunders, W.Va. 

9 

0.01 0.001 
than 1 inch in maximum dimension. The slabs 

remaining in the abutments were randomly 

oriented, and bedding or layering was not discernible. 

Undisturbed samples for use in determining 

bulk density and percent voids could not be 

collected because of the presence of numerous 

large slabs of shale in the dam. Four sam]ples 

weighing 11 to 19 pounds were collected !for 

unit-weight (bulk-density) studies under th'ree 

degrees of repacking (table 2). Observations 

indicate that the materials in the dam have a 

unit weight similar to that of the medium pack. 

Thus specific weight would range from 86 to 

98 pounds per cubic foot, which is significantly 

less than the 112 to 125 pounds per cubic foot 

for soils derived from various Appalachian 

shales and much less than the specific weight 

of compacted fills. Percent of void space of the 

medium pack, interpreted from that in ~the 

solid pack, would be on the order of 20 td 22 

percent, which is up to 50 percent greater than 

that of soils derived from Appalachian shales. 

TABLE 2.-Unit weights (bulk density) of coal samples 

[Values in pounds per cubic foot. Sample locations cited in fig. 7] 

Sample Loose pack Medium Solid Percent voids pack pack solid pack sample 

1 ---- 83.8 94.8 97.3 18.6 

2 80.5 88.0 92.3 18.2 

3 ---- 81.7 86.1 89.9 18.3 

4 ---- 87.3 97.3 102.3 20~8 

Visual inspection indicated that the ooal 

waste in clam No. 3 had undergone little compaction after grading and being crossed by 

heavy trucks. However, compared to most 

waste banks, this small degree of compaction 

appeared to be significantly higher. In addition, the permeability appeared to be less than 

in many similar waste banks. 

Dam No. 3 had no open or overfall type of 

spillway. Excess water was apparently taken 

care of by seepage through the dam and dr~inage was augmented by an overflow pipe :reportedly placed in July 1971 and extend~ng 

from the right rear of the structure diagon~lly 

to near the center of the downstream face. The 

pipe, reported to be 4 to 7 feet below the graqed 

crest, was 24 inches in diameter and made of 

10 

butt-welded 14-inch steel. After the failure of 

the dam, two segments of the pipe protruded 

above the debris. The segment on the right side 

is about 170 feet downstream from the toe of the 

right abutment and 50 feet from tl'~ valley wall. 

It protrudes downstream at a true azimuth of 

350° (azimuth of the axis of the valley is 310°) 

and slopes 12° downwards to tho. south (upstream). The exposed part of the pipe showed 

no damage from movement in th~ flood. Sediment occupied all but 6 inches of the pipe, and 

the top of the sediment fill was flat and parallel to the surface of the pipe. This would indicate the filling was from material carried 

through the pipe and deposited in it while the 

pipe was in a relatively horizontal position. 

The lack of filling from flood debris can be accounted for in that the pipe opening was in 

the direction of flow protecting it from direct 

deposition. This part of the pipE: had a hard 

thin crust of a former fill that occupied about 

half ·of the inner circumference and was not in 

accord with the present fill, indicating that 

the pipe had been cleared previously of an accumulation of sediment and then reset. 

Another segment of pipe is f.xposed near 

the front of the left abutment. A bout 12 feet 

of this pipe protrudes at a truE: azimuth of 

200 o, slopes downwards to the northeast at 

20°, and shows no sign of distortion. Most of 

the fill at the top of this pipe is apparently 

from the flood because the fill occupies almost 

the entire inside and is nearly horizontal with 

respect to the final position of th~ pipe. However, the small part of the second pipe not 

filled with sediments shows evilJence of an 

opening deeper in the pipe similar to that described for the first pipe. 

Whether or not the two parts of pipe are 

continuous cannot be established at this time. 

It is probable that the pipe is not a single unit, 

and the buried part probably is fractured and 

otherwise disrupted. There is no evidence that 

the pipe had a protective collar or facing at its 

upstream end when it was in the c

1 am, nor does 

it appear to have had batHes along it to curtail 

seepage. 

A fourth dam stretches across Middle Fork 

about 2,600 feet upstream from the maximum 

pool impounded by dam No.3. D".m No.4, an 
earthen dam constructed mainly of shale with 

coal waste, rises 25 feet above the bed of Middle Fork. The dam is about 200 feet long, and 

its crest ranges in width from 10 feet near the 

west side to over 40 feet on the east. The area 

behind the dam is filled with silt and coal 

waste and no water is impounded. A spillway 

on bedrock is on the left (west) side of the 

dam. 

SOURCE OF FLOODWATER 

Three possible sources of water could have 

contributed significantly to the Buffalo Creek 

flood: heavy runoff from melting snow, heavy 

runoff from locally intense cloudburst rainfall 

in any of the streams tributary to Buffalo 

Creek, and water released from the reservoir 

on Middle Fork following failure of coal-waste 

dam No. 3. As will be shown, the failure of 

dam No. 3 on Middle Fork contributed almost 

all of the peak floodflow in Buffalo Creek; 

direct runoff from snowmelt or rainfall and 

inflow from tributaries other than Middle Fork 

were not significant. 

SNOWMELT 

Residents of the Buffalo Creek hollow discount the importance of the snow cover in producing the flood flow. They report that by the 

end of February snow cover was limited to 

scattered drifts mainly on the northern slopes 

of the higher hills. According to the National 

Weather Service, the last snowstorm reported 

prior to the flood dropped about 1.5 inches of 

snow at Logan on February 19-20. On February 25, the day before the flood, very little 

snow was visible in the hills. 

PRECIPITATION 

During the 72-hour period immediately preceding the flood, precipitation averaged 3.7 

inches at Logan and at other stations 15-20 

miles south and east of Buffalo Creek, according to the National Weather Service (fig. 8). 

About half of the rainfall (1.9 in.) at Logan 

fell in the 24 hours that preceded the flood. 

Precipitation tapered off to the north during 

the 3-day period, measuring 2.35 inches in 

Charleston. Maximum precipitation during the 

storm was 4.5 inches produced at Williamson, 

22 miles west of Buffalo Creek. A bucket sur11 

FIGURE 8.-Rainfall in southwestern West Virginia, 

Feb. 24 to Feb. 26, 1972. 

vey in the Buffalo Creek hollow conductE.d by 

field parties during the week following the 

flood revealed no catchment of precipitation in 

open cans and other available containers that 

exceeded 3.7 inches recorded at Logan. 

According to National Weather Service estimates, 3.7 inches of rain in 3 days is about a 

2-year rainfall; that is, southwestern West 

Virginia can expect precipitation to equal or 

exceed 3. 7 inches in a 3-day period over a 

long-term average of once every 2 year.:o. In 

fact, precipitation exceeding 3.7 inches in a 

2 or 3 day period has been measured at Logan 

eight times in the last 17 years. Indirect Jneasurements of peak discharges of streams tributary to Buffalo Creek and inspection of streams 

near the Buffalo Creek basin produced no evidence of sudden high flows from cloudburst 

rainfall. 

In conclusion, February was a slightly wetter month than normal; total precipitation at 

Logan during the month was 4.56 inche~, 1.2 

inches above the 30-year average. Altr0ugh 
the storm of February 24-26 dumped most of 

its precipitation during the 24 hours immediately preceding the flood, no evidence was 

found of large cloudburst rainfalls that could 

contribute the large volume of water needed to 

produce the flash flood on Middle Fork and 

Buffalo Creek. The only available source of 

water large enough to produce the flood was 

the pool of water behind coal-waste dam No. 

3 on the Middle Fork. 

POOL ON MIDDLE FORK 

Information on inflow and characteristics 

of the pool behind coal-waste dam No. 3 were 

determined from field surveys and interviews 

with local residents. The pool reached its qtaximum volume, about 17.6 million cubic feet of 

water and sludge, around 8 :00 a.m. on Saturday, February 26 (fig. 9). At that time the 

water-surface elevation had risen to 1,753.1 

feet above mean sea level, and the depth of 

water in the pool just upstream of the coalwaste dam was 4 7.3 feet. The surface area of 

the pool at the time of the dam failure was 

14.2 acres (fig. 10), and the pool extended 

2,100 feet up the Middle Fork valley. 

Slightly less than half the contents of the 

pool was sludge. The top of the sludge line in 

the pool stood at an elevation of 1,733.6 :feet 

_:y ____ _ 

1?48~ 

z 

1746~ 

1744 ~ 

z 

1742 i 

> 

1740 ~ 

z 

0 

1738~ 

1736 w 

2-26-72 

STORAGE IN MILLIONS OF CUBIC FEET 

10 11 12 

FIGURE 9.-Height of the pool behind coal-waste dam 

No. 3 rose to a maximum of 1,753.1 feet. ! 

12 

1760 

1-

w 

w 1750 LL. 

_j 

w 

> 

w 

_j 

<{ 

1740 ~ 

z 

< 

w 

::E 

w 

> 

0 

co 1730 <{ 

z 

2 

SURFACE AREA, IN ACRES 

10 11 12 13 14 

_sz_ __ 

2-26-72 

15 

FIGURE 10.-The pool behind dam No. 3 covered a maximum of 14.2 acres at the time the dam collapsed. 

m.s.l. (mean sea level). At that elevation, the 

volume of sludge was 8.4 million cubic feet and 

the surface area was 10.3 acres. 

There are two known sources of inflow to 

the pool: natural drainage from Middle Fork 

basin, and water pumped from nearby mines 

and from the washing plant loc;;-.ted one-half 

mile east of the mouth of Middle Fork. Inflow 

from natural drainage is the principal source 

of inflow. Information furnished by local residents indicates that pumping, if there was 

pumping during the storm perioi, would not 

contribute significantly to the inflow. As much 

as 25,000 cubic feet per day might be pumped, 

an insignificant amount when compared to total 

pool volume of 17.6 million cubic feet. 

Middle Fork drains an area of 1.18 square 

miles, 1.1 square miles of which is above coalwaste dam No.3. Peak inflow during the storm 

period and rate of rise of pool contents are 

estimated from interviews with n1ine-company 

personnel and from indirect measurements on 
other small drainage areas in the Buffalo Creek 

basin near Middle Fork. 

At 4:00 p.m. Thursday, February 24, a local 

mining-company employee placed a measuring 

stick on the lowest point of the back (upstream) side of coal-waste dam No. 3 so that 

the top of the stick was approximately 1 foot 

below the compacted part of the dam. This 

employee visited the dam frequently between 

4 :00 p.m. Thursday and 4 :30 a.m. Saturday, 

observing the rate of rise of the pool. Analysis 

of the observations indicate a rise of slightly 

less than 1 inch per hour on Thursday afternoon, increasing to about 3 inches per hour 

by 3:00 a.m. Saturday. Using the stage-volume 

curve shown in figure 9 and the observations 

made on the measuring stick, the rate of rise 

of the pool is shown in figure 11. 

Outflow from the reservoir cannot be reliably established from the information available. A 24-inch drain pipe (or pipes) is 

1-

w 

w 

LL 

u 

15 

0 

0 

co 

FE B. 24 

0 0 0 0 ... -a N 0 

0 0 0 0 

0 0 0 0 

N co ... -a N 0 

FEB. 25 FE B. 26 

FIGURE 11.-The volume of water in the pool behind 

coal-waste dam No. 3 increased steadily between 

February 24-26. 

13 

reported to have been in place and carrying 

flow at the time of the dam failure. The exact 

position of this drain pipe in the dam and 

the true head on the pipe have not been ascertained. However, computations based or its 

location as reported by eyewitnesses yield a 

a peak flow through the pipe of about 10 cfs 

( 4,500 gpm). 

Using the rate of change in contents relation developed in figure 11 and adjusting for 

outflow, the inflow graph shown in figuro. 12 

was developed for the period 4:00 p.m. Tl'ursday, February 24, to 4:00 a.m. Saturday, February 26, when observations on the elevation 

of the impounded water were discontinued. 

The inflow curve does not include seepage 

through the dam. Maximum seepage, estimated 

at less than 10 cfs ( 4,500 gpm), would have 

occurred just prior to failure when the hydraulic gradient through the dam was the 

greatest. 

Cl 

z 

0 

-55 

-50 

~ -45 

0::: 

w 

~ -40 

w 

w 

LL 

~ -35 

~ -30 

w 

<.:> 

0::: 

<{ 

I -25 

u 

t/l 

0 

-20 

-15 

-10 

0 

0 

co 

FEB 24 

0 

0 

... 

N 

0 

0 

-a 

0 

0 

g 

FEB 25 

0 

0 

co 

0 

0 

... 

N 

0 

0 

-a 

0 

FEB 26 

FIGURE 12.-Inflow to the pool behind coal-waste dam 

No. 3 from 6:00 p.m. Thursday, February 24, to 4:00 

a.m. Saturday, February 26. 
Peak inflow for the storm is estimated as 70 

cfs (31,000 gpm) on the basis· of yield per 

square mile determined for several small tributaries in the Buffalo Creek basin near Middle 

Fork. Data collected at gaging station$ on 

surrounding streams show peaks on February 

25 and 26 of nearly the same magnitude; ~owever, the peak discharge on Middle Fo~k is 

believed to have occurred on February 26f 

F AlLURE OF THE DAM 

Apparently there was no eyewitness to the 

actual failure of dam No. 3, although a number of people were in the vicinity of the dam 

just before and immediately after the failure. 

However, the evidence discernible in the remnants of the structure combined with reports 

of those at the dam before and after its failure 

serve well to establish the mode and timing of 

the failure. 

GEOLOGIC AND ENGINEERING EVIDENCE 

Slumps 

The large volume of water passing through 

dam No. 3 has removed most of the evidence 

of slumps. However, a large dome-shaped 

mound, not eroded or scoured by water action, 

is at the toe or former front of the dam 

about 120 feet from the left abutment (figs. 

13 and 14). The mound is about 100 feet in 

diameter and is cut by five tension cracks 

one-half inch to 1 inch wide and spaced ~ to 

22 feet apart. The cracks trend 10° to: 20° 

true north azimuth in comparison with i the 

former front of the dam, which trended about 

60°. The mound is apparently a remnant of 

a heave at the toe of a slump that moved diagonally to the left at the front of the dam. 

Obvious large slump features are visible in 

of a series of beds of sludge, and the ridge 

forming units are separated by slippage planes. 

The sludge was apparently forceri against dam 

No. 2 by slump blocks from dam No. 3, the 

remains of which are in the back part of pool 

No.2. 

Subsidence 

The floor of the breach at scour level shows 

two distinct sump features. Two sump holes, 

one about 3 feet in diameter and 2 feet deep 

and the other 6 feet in diameter and 4lj2 feet 

in depth, indicate an outflow of water along 

the foundation or below it in tho. sludge base 

(figs. 13 and 15). These holes contain only 

coarse material; all the fine material has been 

removed by subterranean flow. 

Foundation Seepage (Piping) 

Within a year prior to the failure of dam 

No. 3, an employee of the mining company 

reported sighting black water boiling up from 

the bottom of pool No. 2. This is indicative 

of possible extensive seepage through the 

foundations of dam No. 3. 

A large subsidence feature is ,.,.isible on the 

left front of the former dam (fg. 16). This 

sump, about 80 feet in diameter and over 10 

feet deep, was occupied by a large pool during 

the final stages of draining and is now filled 

with fine material. Both the rim and the outlet 

of the pool contain coarse, water-washed material, indicating that the pool ex~ends into the 

foundation to an unknown depth. The pool 

probably was formed by material being removed in the foundation during failure. This 

large area of subsidence is opposite the mouth 

of a small hollow that drained into the haul 

road at the left abutment. It is possible that 

water from this hollow entered ihe side of 

the remnants of both abutments. In gen¢ral, the dam, causing a large pocket of saturated 

these slumps are related to the final stag~ of material which gave rise to a slump and subfailure, and the fracture lines related to them sidence along the left side of the dam. 

are parallel to the abutments. 

The sludge that formerly underlaid -pool Flow Lines 

No. 2 has been pushed forward against · the Five distinct levels of flow ar~ discernible 

back side of dam No. 2. The sludge now foirms on the left abutment (figs. 13 r.nd 16). The 

a series of serrated ridges up to 10 feet high highest two levels are about 39 feet and 24 

and 20 feet wide separated by elongated de- feet above the bottom of the breach. They 

pressions up to 20 feet wide. Bedding exposed consist of benches about 30 feet wide, sloping 

in the ridges dips gently towards dam No. 3 7° downstream, and ending abruptly at the 

but is highly contorted. Each ridge is formed sump pool near the left abutment where they 

14 
1,800ft 

1,750 

1,700 

A 

sw 

HEAVED 

SLUDGE DEPOSITS 

Spot elevations in feet 

100 

--~;;:~~t~~~!-;~~~~~~~~

Coal woste 

Coal waste and sludge 

100 200 300 

View downstream (Northwest) 

200 Ft. 

1\10 29Q Ft. 

waste 

Right 

Abutment 

500 

Road 

A' 

NE 

FIGURE 13.-Plan and cross-section through coal-waste dam No. 3 after failure, on Middle Fork, Saunders, W.Va. 

15 
FIGURE 14.-Looking upstream at the left abutment of coal-waste dam No. 3. Unscoured mound in center foreground is apparently a heave at the toe of a slump that moved towards the left front on the dam. 

FIGURE 15.-Sump near former front of coal-waste dam No. 3. Hole is 6 feet in diameter and 4% feet deep. 

16 
were cut out by subsequent slumping. The 

third bench is 14 feet above the lowest flow 

line, is level, and is cut by an abrupt scarp 

about 70 feet from the sump pool. The fourth 

bench is 9 feet above the lowest flow line, 

is level, and ends in a cut scarp at the sump 

pool. The fifth bench is broad, covering the 

right half of the total breach, and is 3 to 5 

feet above the lowest flow line. It slopes slightly downstream and is unbroken except by 

gullies at the lower end. 

Debris Lines 

A corridor strewn with slabs of sandstone 

extends from the valley wall at the rear of 

the right abutment diagonally across to the 

large gully at the center of the valley near 

the site of the front toe of dam No. 3. This 

sandstone, torn from the wall of the valley, 

is restricted to a zone 20 to 60 feet wide, is 

not present elsewhere in the debris from the 

dam, and is not covered by other debris. This 

evidence indicates that a strong linear flow 

persisted on the right side of the dam from 

the time the pool was at 48 feet until it had 

been reduced to near 10 feet. Flow through 

and over the rest of the dam was subordinate 

to flow through this opening. 

EYEWITNESS OBSERVATIONS 

Between 6 :00 and 6 :30 a.m. Saturday, one 

witness drove up from Saunders to check the 

water level behind the dam. "The dam was 

moving like a bridge moves under heavy traffic. Water was coming through the dam at 6 :30 

a.m.-not much, but it was causing the lower 

lake to fill up fast. This water had cut the 

road below the dam [at dam No. 2], and 

they had a front-end loader trying to ditch the 

road." He also reported that dam No. 3 had 

sunk in some spots on the right side and that 

there were surface cracks running parallel 

with the face of the dam. 

Another witness was checking the dam between 7 :30 a.m. and 8 :00 a.m. The water was 

coming up between the piles of slate (coal 

waste) that trucks had dumped. "I could see 

it coming into the holes on top of the dam. 

The top of the dam was moving back and 

forth-I could see that the front of the dam 

had broken off and was sliding in on the lower 

side. The dam was settling down and it was 

shoving forward. About 20 feet of the face 

had broken or slid off during the night." According to this witness, "It was like walking in 

soup, it had done gotten real juicy, buddy, all the 

way down. I got in the car and got the hell 

outta there." He reported sinking to his 

ankles in the saturated material on the graded 

crest of the dam. 

Witnesses indicated the dam had a history 

of instability; it had slumped in the past and 

slate had been dumped to fill the low places. 

This was a recurring condition but was not 

considered to be dangerous; the water had 

never before been as high as it was on February 26, 1972. The 24-inch drain pipe placed 

a few feet below the top of the dam was "running full" but was inadequate for the heavy 

runoff of the last few days. 

Another witness who was at dam No. 3 immediately after the failure indicates that water 

was pouring out and cutting away the dam 

from the right side. Then a larger portion 

of the dam broke loose toward the center. This 

break sent a mass of water and sludge onto 

the burning coal-waste bank No. 1, which 

brought on an explosion. 

At the time of the failure, another witness 

was on his way home from the "Hoot Owl" 

shift. It was about 7 :56 a.m. Saturday morning. He was driving down the right side of 

the valley on the lower road above the reservoir 

behind dam No. 3. He had just made the last 

small curve and turned down the slope about 

300 feet above the back side of the dam when 

his car was suddenly showered with black 

water containing fine black material. "My 

windshield and car were completely covered 

with black sludge-! knew she [the dam] had 

gone out! I looked and saw the road was gone 

and things were kicking up. I looked down 

the valley and saw the truck shop toss up and 

over and I saw a Dart [truck] go up and 

over. Then I turned around and went back 

to No. 5 mine to warn the people in the valley 

below. The phone was out." 

A person staying with friends in a twostory frame house 600 feet up Buffalo Creek 

from the burning waste bank reported that 

ashes and coal dust blew down upon them as 

they came out of the back of the house to run 

17 
FIGURE 16.-View across coal-waste dam No. 3 from right abutment. 

up the hill after the burning bank blew up. of water and sludge flowed out into the valley. 

A Saunders resident reported his electric "The wall of sludge and water was boiling up 

power went out at 8:00 a.m. and shortly after, like dry flour when you pour water on it." 

water came out of the lower waste bank and Several eyewitnesses indicated that company 

into the valley. He sent his family up the hill employees planned to place 24-inch metal pipes, 

and he went down to move his car; however, which were on hand at the dam, to drain water 

the water came up too fast and he was forced from the crest of the right side of the dam 

to run back across the railroad track and up to the diversion ditch along the haul road. Howthe hill. He turned and saw his house floating ever, before a bulldozer could be brought in to 

off its foundation. At about this time he saw aid in entrenching the pipe, the dam had 

the burning waste bank blow up. "The ex- failed. 

plosion looked like an atomic bomb and shook Wash from a small hollow was stated to 

the ground." Shortly thereafter the big crest be blocking the haul road and diversion ditch 

18 
at dam No. 2, causing water to cascade on to 

that dam. This wash was pushed aside by a 

front-end loader at 4 :30 a.m., by which time 

the water had risen to within 1 foot of the 

crest of the dam. About the same time, a rubber tire lodged in the overflow pipe of the 

clear pool (No. 1) but was removed before 

overtopping of the impounding s';ructure 

occurred. 

SUMMARY OF SEQUENCE OF FAILURE OF COAL-WASTE 

DAM NO.3 

From eyewitness reports, slumping of the 

face, subsidence of inner parts of coal-waste 

dam No.3, and heaves in pool No.2 below dam 

No. 3, had been recurring features for several 

months before the failure of the dam. The unevenness of the crest was smoothed out by 

dumping coal waste into the depressions resulting from these slumps and subsidences. Because the slumps and subsidences occurred in 

times of both high and low water, it is probable 

that they were related to movement in the 

sludge beneath or trapped within the dam. 

The apparent sequence of events on the night 

of February 25- 26, 1972, summarized below, 

are based on engineering-geology observations 

and eyewitness reports. 

19 
I 

After 4 :30 a.m., February 26, conditions 

within dam No. 3 were such that failure was 

well underway. The phreatic surface (the top 

of the water-saturated material in the dam) 

had been driven forward until its upper surface was near or at the crest of the dam in 

the rear half of the structure. With increased 

head, the phreatic surface rapidly expanded 

and its front slope increased, probably to 6 : 1 

or 7 : 1, and the margin of safety approached 

zero. The increase in head of the pool and in 

pore pressures during the preceding 24 hours 

had caused heaves, blowouts, and slump~ in 

the front of dam No. 3. Between 12:30 a.m. 

and 6 :30 a.m., increased saturation and pore 

pressure probably caused some swelling, uplift, 

and undulation of the surface of the dam. By 

6 :30 a.m., the pressure was probably reduced 

by fracture and upheaval of the dam as indicated by eyewitness accounts concerning the 

undulation of the surface of the dam and its 

soupy condition. Within the next hour, extensive slumping and subsidence apparently set 

in, causing some lowering of the crest of the 

dam. 

At 6 :30 a.m., February 26, water was seeping through the coal piles at the rear of the 

crest adding to the saturation of the upper 

layers of the dam. Several large subsidence 

holes had developed on the crest. Some of the 

water from this upper saturated zone drained 

across the right abutment along bulldozer 

tracks and flowed around the dam and down 

the haul road. In one rut, this flow was up to 

14 inches wide and 1% inches deep (fig. 17). 

Four other tracks within 20 feet of each other 

show somewhat smaller flow. 

By 6 :30 a.m., February 26, seepage through 

the dam and discharge from the overflow pipe 

had filled the pond behind dam No. 2 to near 

its crest. Water was also cascading onto dam 

No. 2 from a small hollow on the northeast 

and from water on the haul road. Wash from 

the hollow had blocked the road at dam No. 2 

until the water was diverted past dam No. 2 

by ditching and bulldozing an embankment 

F'IGURE 17.-Top of right abutment of coal-waste dam No. 3 showing 14-inch-wide water channel developed 

along bulldozer tracks. 

20 
along the road. Reports, however, indicate that 

increased flow from the gradual failure of dam 

No.3 upstream caused overtopping and breaching of dam No. 2 after 7:30 a.m. and before 

the total failure of dam No. 3. The water released from dam No. 2 caused a sudden rise 

in Buffalo Creek. 

After 7 :30 a.m., the top of dam No. 3 was 

cut by cracks extending from abutment to 

abutment parallel to the faces. Water was 

rising to the crest through these fractures and 

other holes. The front of the dam was sliding 

off and the crest was lowering noticeably. Apparently by this time pore pressure had passed 

the maximum, the flow line within the bank 

was near the crest, and the entire right side 

of the dam was buoyant and was being driven 

to the downstream face. The pore pressure 

was further relieved by internal slippage and 

slumping that finally produced total failure 

through overtopping of the slumped blocks. 

Total failure occurred about 7 :59 a.m. when 

the right side of the dam breached along a 

line starting about 120 feet from the front of 

the right abutment and trending diagonally 

towards the valley wall at the rear. Extreme 

turbulence threw coal-laden water 300 feet from 

the dam and splattered cars on the haul road. 

Within seconds, dam No. 2 was topped on 

both the right and left sides, the existing 

breach on its right abutment was enlarged, 

and the sludge behind was thrown into great 

convolutions by the slump blocks (fig. 18). The 

sludge ridges raised by these blocks protected 

the center part of dam No. 2 from overtopping 

and breaching. The clear pool was filled, overtopped, and the small dike on its right side 

breached (fig. 19) , and the shed and transformer pole was destroyed at 8:00 a.m. Water 

pouring through the breach in dam No. 2 rebounded from the sandstone wall and scoured 

the left side of the clear pond (No. 1) cutting 

away most of dam No. 2 and leaving steep 

undercut banks. 

FIGURE 18.-Breach in coal-waste dam No. 2. Most of orignal dam was washed away; parallel ridges of sludge 

behind dam No. 2 were pushed against the dam by slump blocks during the failure of dam No. 3. 

21 
FIGURE 19.-View upstream across former clear pond 

behind coal-waste bank No. 1. Remnants of coalwaste dam No. 2 are visible in the middle ground. 

The torrent of water crossed the haul road 

at the south end of the burning coal-waste 

bank No. 1, but the compacted road bed was 

only slightly eroded (fig. 20). At the lower 

end of the burning coal-waste bank, the water 

increased the hydrostatic pressure within the 

bank, causing explosions of steam and producer-type gas. The three or four explosions 

reported were severe enough to shake the 

ground at Saunders and raise mushroomshaped clouds of ash and smoke. Moments later, 

at about 8:01 a.m., the torrent of water enFIGURE 20.-Haul road looking upstream midway along 

the right edge of coal-waste bank No. 1. The haul 

road served as the initial water gap around the upstream edge of bank No. 1. Height of floodwater is 

shown by bedrock scar on left; haul road itself suffered only slight erosion at this point. 

22 

tered Buffalo Creek. The cascading torrent 

followed an existing depression within the 

coal-waste bank at the front, which curved 

abruptly to the west. This abrupt curve diverted part of the initial surge towards the 

church at the mouth of Lee Fork. 

Another part of the flow followed the haul 

road as far as 100 feet east of the curve at 

the mouth of the hollow, trenching the road 

to a depth of 4 feet, cascading over the slope 

to Buffalo Creek, and carrying away much of 

the soil. The barrier that formed the abrupt 

curve at the mouth of the hollow was quickly 

demolished, and immediately a surge crossed 

the valley of Buffalo Creek and rose 37 feet 

up the north wall of the valley. This sudden 

rise was dissipated within 400 feet downstream and 100 feet upstream. Backwater with 

fine debris flowed about 500 feet east into Buffalo Creek above Middle Fork. After the initial surge, the flow into Buffalo Creek was 

relatively uniform, controlled by the breach in 

dam No. 2 and the constriction between coalwaste bank No. 1 and the valley wall along 

the haul road. In the area of explosions, the 

torrent cut through the haul road forming a 

canyon 40-50 feet deep, 700 feet long, up to 30 

feet wide at the bottom (figs. 21 and 22). 

Meanwhile, at dam No. 3, the torrent from 

the initial linear failure was great enough to 

tear sandstone from the valley walls along 

the rear of the right abutment (fig. 23). The 

failure spread across the dam to the left side 

and large slump blocks were carried away at 

the center of the dam, almost simultaneously 

as the initial linear failure developed. 

Moments after the linear failure developed, 

a large subsidence and slump apparently occurred in the front half of the dam near the 

left abutment. Slumps from this failure rapidly extended across the front of the dam connecting with those in the center. The overflow 

pipe was carried away in these failures; the 

lower (front) end came to rest below the right 

abutment and upper (rear) end moved across 

the site of the dam, ending up near the front 

left abutment (fig. 13). 

By the time the pool had been reduced by 

about 9 feet to the 39-foot level, the water was 

flowing across all but approximately 50 feet 

of the left abutment, and the water-surface 
FIGURE 21.-View down the canyon cut along the right 

side of coal-waste bank No. 1 at the mouth of Middle 

Fork. 

gradient, as indicated by the slope of the water 

planed area at the base of the flow, was about 

7° (figs. 13 and 16). A similar gradient existed when the top of the pool was at a level 

of 24 feet above the bottom. When the pool 

was reduced to the 14-foot level, flow extended 

from the right bank to a point about twothirds of the way to the left bank at a nearly 

level gradient. At this time the narrow defile 

along the haul road at coal-waste bank No. 1 

and the breach on the right and the channel 

on the left side of dam No. 2 were apparently 

acting as controls, and a large sheet of water 

up to 30 feet deep was backed up retarding 

flow through the breach in dam No. 3. 

Flow along the center and right continued 

until the pool was reduced to a 5-foot level 

and the water gradient was level. The final 

discharge from the pool began at the center 

but was diverted to the left abutment by further slump and subsidence along the left front 

and by a heave that had occurred at the toe 

of the lower face near the center (figs. 14 and 

23 

FIGURE 22.-Face of coal-waste bank No. 1 at the intersection of Middle Fork and Buffalo Creek. Canyon 

was eroded in area of explosions on the left. 

16). This final discharge was small and was 

ponded in the subsidence area for some time 

before passing through the slump. 

After the impoundment drained (fig. 25), a 

small stream continued to flow across the center of the rear of the site of the dam and swung 

to the left abutment along the line of the final 

drainage route of the pool (figs. 16 and 24). 

The time needed to discharge most of the 

volume of impounded water through the 

breached dam was on the order of 15 minutes 

or less; most of the water in the pool above 

the height of 15 feet poured out within the 

first few minutes. Drainage of the pool at a 

greatly reduced rate continued until about 

8:30 a.m. 

About 6 million cubic feet of coal waste and 

other debris was carried downstream from 

the breach at dam No. 3 (figs. 26A and 26B). 

Some of this debris was deposited as slumps 

in pool No. 2 in front of dam No. 3. Practically none was left in the clear pool, and over 

90 percent of the debris was carried into Buffalo Creek valley and deposited as far downstream as Pardee, 2 miles below Middle Fork 

(fig. 27). 

A brief but very heavy rainfall apparently 

occurred in the vicinity of Lee Fork, within 

30 minutes after dam No. 3 broke. As a result 

of this rainfall, two debris avalanches, one involving some 225,000 cubic feet and the other 

some 30,000 cubic feet of debris, descended 

into Buffalo Creek from hollows just to the 
FIGURE 23.-Panorama view downstream through the breach in coal-waste dam No. 3. Initial linear breach 

extended into valley wall on right, ripping out sandstone. 

west of Middle Fork; the debris fans formed 

at the bases of the hollows were not altered 

by flow down Buffalo Creek and therefore must 

have occurred after the main flood. A small 

side hollow on the left side of Middle Fork 

at dam No. 3 cascaded a large quantity of 

water over the remnant of the left abutment, 

cutting a large gully in the slumped slopes 

(figs. 13 and 16). 

t DAM NO. 3 

ANALYSIS OF OTHER REPORTED MODES OF FAILURE 

Several other causes of the failure of coalwaste dam No. 3 have been cited elsewhere, 

but eyewitness accounts and geological-engineering evidence refute them. The causes cited 

and refuted are explosions within the dam, 

ditching, and dynamiting. 

'\ I \ 

\ 

200 400 600 800 1,000 Fr. 

Relief by form lines 

Based on Buffalo Creek 1493 a. s. I. 

FIGURE 24.-Sketch map of Middle Fork on February 26, 1972, shortly after dam failure. 

24 
Explosions Within the Dam 

The remnants of the dam show no evidence 

of combustion. No red dog (the common byproduct of burning coal waste) except that derived from wash from the haul road is in or 

directly below the remains of dam No. 3. No 

part of the remains of dam No. 3 was burning 

immediately after the flood. "Smoke" reported 

issuing from the dam at the time of failure 

was probably warm moist air driven from 

the fractures by increasing hydraulic pressure. The explosion that occurred immediately 

following the failure was in the burning coalFIGURE 25.-Pool area above coal-waste dam No. 3 

following failure of the dam. Floor is saturated 

sludge. 

25 

waste bank No. 1 at the mouth of the hollow, 

about 2,600 feet downstream from dam No. 3. 

Ditching 

A witness reported that a company official 

had checked conditions at the dam the morning 

of the failure. The witness was informed by 

the official that "he was ditching around the 

dam and it was safe." Field evidence and eyewitness reports indicate the ditching was done 

on the haul road at the right abutment of 

dam No. 2, which is located below the dam 

(No. 3) that actually failed and released the 

floodwater. This ditching and mounding were 

done by a front-end loader to divert water 

from a side hollow and the haul road around 

dam No. 2. There is no conclusive evidence 

that alteration at the surface of dam No. 3 

was made by ditching or scraping, either during or immediately before the failure of dam 

No.3. 

Dynamiting 

A press story attributed the failure of the 

dam to company personnel dynamiting the top 

of the dam in an attempt to drain off the pool. 

Evidence cited included blasting wire and drill 

holes at the site. All wire seen at the site was 

telephone wire or used waste-blasting wire 

deposited in the banks along with other refuse 

from mines. The drill holes were in sandstone 
SE 

MINE 5 D.Ht '\0. -tA 

FIGURE 26.-Middle Fork, panoramic view (A), mine N:;. 5 to Buffalo Creek, March 5, 1972. Vertical aerial 

photograph (B), dam No.3 to Buffalo Creek, February 28, 1972. 

and were remnants of blasting operations during construction of the haul road several years 

ago. 

Television pictures of the reported site of 

dynamiting were made at the canyon cut in 

coal-waste bank No. 1 and were about 2,600 

feet downstream from the site of the actual 

dam failure at coal-waste dam No. 3. Wire at 

this point shown in the television film is telephone wire; blasting holes were those related 

to building the haul road. 

FIGURE 27.-Debris from Middle Fork deposited in · 

Buffalo Creek, looking downstream over former ite 

of Saunders. Middle Fork enters to the left of the 

photograph. 

26 

CONCLUSIONS AS TO CAUSE OF DAM FAILURE 

Five causes led to the failure of coal-waste 

dam No. 3: 

1. The dam was not designed or constructed 

to withstand the potential head of water that · 

could be impounded. It was primarily a waste 

pile that grew from routine dumping of waste. 

2. Spillway and other adequate water-level 

controls were not in the dam, and no provision 

had been made for removing water once it had 

entered the pool behind the dam. The capacity 

of the 24-inch pipe was too small to handle 

large flows, and the pipe was placed so high 

that water rising to it greatly increased instability of the dam. 

3. The sludge on which the dam was placed 

was inadequate as a foundation. Seepage 

through the foundation gave rise to extensive 

removal of material (piping) . The weak foundations also gave rise to extensive slumps and 

subsidence which led to the initial breach and 

overtopping. 

4. The great thickness of the dam (from 

front to back) in relation to height without 

engineered compaction led to a decrease rather 

than an increase in the stability of the dam. 

The thickness, along with some relatively small 

compaction, impeded seepage through the bank 

and thus produced a higher phreatic surface. 

The high phreatic surface was reflected in sat-
NW 

SITE OF 

DAM "0. 3 

SITE OF BUFFALO 

DAM NO. 2 ('LEAR POOL BURNING COAL WASTE BANK CREEK ~ > 

600 

uration of the dam and the resulting buoyancy 

accelerated the failure. The impediments to 

internal drainage also limited the effectiveness 

of seepage in regulating the height of the impoundment. 

5. The dam was constructed of coal waste, 

including fine coal, shale, clay, and mine rubbish. This material disintegrates rapidly, is 

high in soluble sulfates which reduce bonding 

strength, is noncohesive, and does not compact 

uniformly. A safe, economical dam could not 

be constructed from such material alone. 

The full contribution of the pipe to the 

failure of dam No. 3 cannot be established 

from evidence now available, but the fill found 

in the pipe opens to question the effectiveness 

of the pipe as a drain control, and the lack of 

a collar and batHes greatly increased the chance 

of seepage being carried along the outside of 

the pipe deep into the dam. 

B 

27 

!200ft 

THE FLOOD 

FLOOD CONDITIONS IN THE GUY ANDOTTE RIVER BASIN 

Precipitation occurring February 24- 26 in 

the southwestern corner of West Virginia resulted in slightly higher than bankfull stages 

for most streams and in flows generally bearing recurrence intervals of 10 years or less. 

Peak flows for the storm of February 24- 26, 

1972, were not unusually high, except for sites 

on Buffalo Creek below the mouth of Middle 

Fork (table 3) . 

The gaging station on the Guyandotte River 

at Man, located 500 feet upstream from the 

mouth of Buffalo Creek, recorded peak stages 

of 18.65 feet on February 25 and 19.34 and 

19.02 feet on February 26. The peak discharge 

for February 25 was 29,600 cfs (13 million 

gallons per minute), an 8-year flood. The peak 

stage of 19.34 feet was a direct result of inflow from Buffalo Creek following the failure 
TABLE 3.-Floods'in southwestern West Virginia, February 25-27,1972 

Discharge Date 

Stotion State Nome Period of Drainage Maximum Floods of Record February 1972 Flood (Preliminary) 

Number and Location Record area 

(Sq Mi) Date G. Ht. 

(ft) 

1985 Big Coal River 1908-16 393 8-9-16 36.3 at Ashford 1930-71 

1990 Little Coal River 1930-71 270 2-3-39 30.2 at Danville 

2024 Guyandotte River 1968-71 208 12-31-69 16.22 at Baileyville 

Il24.80 Briar Creek at 1969-71 7.'¥J 12-30-69 5.46 F-..ck 

~(1) North F ark above 

Middle Fork 0.85 

~ (2) Buffalo Creek 

above Middle Fork 3.16 

E) (3) Buffalo Creek 6.05 below Saunders 

~ (4) Buffalo Creek 21.0 

below Stowe 

~ (5) Buflolo Creel. 30.8 above Accoville 

E) (6) Right Fork at 9.49 Accoville 

2030 Guyandotte River 1928-71 762 3-12-63 24.78 at Man 

'¥JJ6 Guyandotte River 1960-71 836 3-12-63 34.98 at Logan 

'¥)~ Guyondotte River 1915-17 1226 3-13-63 43.83 at Branchland 1928-71 

Il70.2 T welvepole Cr. 1928-31 300 2-4-39 below Wayne 1946-71 

2137 Tug Fork at 1967-71 932 3-12-63 44.5 Williamsen 

2140 Tug Fork at 1934-71 1185 3-13-63 45.65 Kermit 

$ Ratio of peak discharge to SO year flood 

R} Corresponds to site number shown on map (fig. 2) 

of the dam on Middle Fork (fig. 28) . The peak 

discharge of 31,600 cfs (14 million gpm) related to this stage may not be reliable due to 

variable backwater. The peak discharge of 

30,700 cfs (13.7 million gpm) occurring at 

gage height 19.02 was the result of natural 

drainage. 

Peak flows, on the order of a 2-year flood, 

were produced on the North Fork above Middle 

Fork, on Buffalo Creek above Middle Fork, 

and on Right Fork at Accoville (table 3). 

These are all streams lying within Buffalo 

Creek basin but outside the influence of the 

large discharge produced by failure of the 

Middle Fork dam. These peak flows suggest 

that yields of from 60-100 cfs per mile of drainage basin could have anticipated on Buffalo 

Creek had the dam on Middle Fork not failed. 

For example, it is estimated that the peak 

flow for Buffalo Creek below Saunders would 

28 

Discharge Recurrence Date G. Ht. Discharv• Recurrence 

cfs interval (ft) cfs interval 

(years) (years) 

35,800 >SO 2-26·72 23.28 Il,600 18 

42,800 >SO 2-26-72 21.45 14,300 9 

16,:nl 2-26-72 17.25 18,500 

485 2-24-72 5.57 512 

2·26-72 5.21 422 

2-26-72 80 2 

2-26-72 200 2 

2-26-72 SO,OOO !U~ 

2-26-72 13,000 !U 4 

2-26-72 8,800 .E) 2 

2-26-72 soo 2 

2-25-72 18.65 29,600 8 49,000 >so 2·26-72 !9.34 31,600 10 

2-26-72 19.02 30700 9 

55,000 >SO 2-25-72 26.31 33,900 10 

2-26-72 27.28 36,100 13 

44,500 27 2-27-72 41.63 ~.800 20 

22,000 >SO 2-26-72 23.19 7,210 2 

2-25-72 29.75 23,000 3 

69,600 so 2-26·72 .cl.25 46,800 8 

have been approximately 400 cfs ( 180,000 

gpm) instead of the 50,000 cfs (22 million 

gpm) that was produced. A peak of this 

order of magnitude would also have been consistent with that produced by surrounding 

basins of the same size experiencing natural 

yields. 

PREVIOUS FLOODS 

Data given in table 3 show that peak flows 

for February 1972 for streams in southwestern 

West Virginia were quite low in comparison 

with previous maximum floods that have been 

recorded. Except for Buffalo Creek, peak discharges for February 1972 at stations in the 

Guyandotte River basin were generally well 

below those experienced in March 1963. 

THE FLOOD ON BUFFALO CREEK 

At about 8 :00 a.m. on February 26, following the failure of coal-waste dam No. 3, 17.6 
1-

w 

17 

~ 16 

~ 

I--

I 

~ w 

I 

~ 15 

< 

~ 

14 

13 

12 

1800 1800 2400 0600 1200 

February 25 February 26 February 27 

FIGURE 28.-The flood inflow from Buffalo Creek produced a sudden high peak of 19.34 feet on the gagingstation record for Guyandotte River at Man at 11 :00 

a.m., February 26. Peak discharge was 31,600 cubic 

feet per second. 

million cubic feet (132 million gal) of impounded water and sludge was released into 

Buffalo Creek. Eyewitnesses repo:L t that the 

contents of the dam were emptied into Buffalo 

Creek in 15 minutes or less. At the time of the 

dam failure, flow in Buffalo Creek was well 

below bankfull stage. 

Indirect measurements were made on Buffalo Creek below Saunders, below Stowe, above 

Accoville and near Man to determine peak 

29 

flows resulting from the release of water following the dam failure (fig. 2 and table 3). At 

Buffalo Creek below Saunders, 4,500 feet downstream from the mouth of the Middle Fork, the 

peak flow was computed as 50,000 cfs (~2 million gpm) . Because this peak was not a 11 atural 

occurrence, comparisons between it and other 

natural occurring flood peaks are not valid. 

However, it is interesting to note that at this 

site, a flood of this magnitude would be approximately 40 times that of a naturally occurring 50-year flood. 

Peak discharges were greatly reduced due 

to valley storage as the flood wave moved 

downstream. This effect is shown in figure 29, 

where flood hydrographs were estimated on 

the basis of peak flow information obtained at 

indirect measuring sites and from flow duration information furnished by local residents. 

Attenuation due to valley storage reduced the 

peak flow to 13,000 cfs ( 5.8 million gpm) by 

the time the flood crest reached Stowe f miles 

downstream from the mouth of Middle Fork; 

although the total discharge past Stow~ was 

slightly greater than the total flow past Saunders, the floodflow took more than thre£ times 

longer to travel past Stowe. The same attenuating effect from valley storage stretch~d out 

the floodflow all the way down Buffalo Creek; 

the floodflow that took only 15 minutes to pass 

Saunders took 2 hours to pass Man. Despite the 

attenuation, peak flow at Stowe was still unusually high, approximately four times that of 

a naturally occurring 50-year flood. 

The effect of valley storage was les~ pronounced above Accoville, 12 miles downstream 

from the mouth of Middle Fork, where the 

peak flow was determined as 8,800 cfs (3.9 

million gpm). A peak flow of this magnitude, 

however, would still be approximately twice 

that of a naturally occurring 50-year flooi. The 

peak flow at Man near the mouth of Buffalo 

Creek was estimated to be 7,500 cfs (3.4 million gpm), slightly greater than the 50-year 

flood. 

Time of Travel of the Flood Wave 

Estimates of time of travel of the flood peak 

were made based on information furnisl'a.d by 

local residents. The flood wave passed tb rough 

the Buffalo Creek valley in almost exactly 3 
FEBRUARY 26 

FIGURE 29.-Estimated flood hydrographs for Buffalo Creek below Saunders, below Stowe, above Accoville, and 

near Man on February 26, 1972. 

hours, reaching the mouth of Buffalo Creek 

at Man at 11:00 a.m. on February 26. The 

traveltime versus distance relation for the 

flood wave is shown in figure 30. 

Mean velocities are estimated at 20 feet per 

second from Saunders to Pardee, 15-20 feet 

per second below Pardee to Lorado, and diminishing to about 10 feet per second near Ac~oville and to 5 feet per second or less near Mttn. 

Profiles I 

Profiles of the flood wave and of the stre~mbed were obtained for the 15-mile reach i of 

Buffalo Creek from the mouth of Middle F@rk 

to Man, from a survey of high-water marks 

at many sites throughout the reach (fig. 31). 

The fall, or total drop in elevation, from Saunders to Man is approximately 750 feet. The 

slope of the flood profile ranges from an average of 96 feet per mile in the reach from 

Saunders to Pardee to 33 feet per mile in the 

reach from Accoville to Man. 

220-

200-

180-

160- II) 

w 

t-

::::> 

z 

i 140-

~ 

w 120- ~ 

;::: 

~ 100- J a.. 

<( 

...J 

w " :g 80-

i 

0 

60- 1 

~ 

40-

20-

8 12 

DISTANCE, IN MILES 

FIGURE 30.-Time of travel of the fio,->d wave down 

Buffalo Creek from Middle Fork to Man. 

30 

16 
1-

w 

w 

u. 

~ 

_j 

w 

> 

w 

..J 

< 

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z 

< 

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~ 

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> 

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Ill 

< 

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0 

i= 

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> 

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rcl 

84 

1-

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~ 

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> 

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> 

0 

Ill 

< 

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0 

i= 

< 

> 

w 

..J 

w 

1450 1300 

80 76 72 

28 24 20 16 

60 56 52 48 

DISTANCE, IN THOUSANDS OF FEET 

-1100 

DISTANCE, IN THOUSANDS OF FEET 

68 64 60 

12 8 

w 

~ 

0 

t;; 

-1050 

0 L-----------~L-____________ L_ ____________ L_ ____________ L_ __ ~~===---L---~--------L-----------~-900 

DISTANCE, IN THOUSANDS OF FEET w 

..J 

..J w 

~ 

0 

1-

<1) 

~ 

0 

..J 

w 

Ill 

+ -10150 

> 

0 

u 

u 

< 

x-->< Profile of stream bed 

o-o Profile of peak flood 

discharge 

DISTANCE, IN THOUSANDS OF FEET 

-700 -900 

-867 

r-------------,-------------.-------------,-------------,-------------,------------,=------------,-850 

48 44 40 36 32 28 24 20 

44 

1-

w 

w 

u. 

~ 

..Jw 

> 

w 

..J 

< 

w 

<I) 

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< w 

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FIGURE 31.-Profile of the peak flood discharge and of the streambed, Buffalo Creek, Middle Fork to Man. 

31 
Depth of Flow 

The depth of flow in the stream channel at 

points along Buffalo Creek can be estimated 

from figure 31 by subtracting the bed elevation 

from the flood profile. The flood plain of Buffalo Creek ranges from 200 to 500 feet wide 

throughout the reach from Saunders to Man. 

Ground elevations on this flood plain can be 

determined by surveying to selected points on 

the flood plain from nearby bench marks. The 

depth of flooding on the flood plain can then be 

estimated by subtracting the ground elevation 

from the flood profile shown in figure 31. At 

the time of the peak, the depth of flow on the 

flood plain was approximately 12-10 feet deep 

from Saunders to Lorado, 9-6 feet deep from 

Craneco to Latrobe, and 5-2 feet deep from 

Robinette to Kistler. 

Scour and Deposition 

An estimated 6 million cubic feet of material was transported from the coal1-waste 

banks in Middle Fork hollow and deposited 

downstream. Most of this material, consisting 

of coal waste, red dog, and slag, apparently 

was deposited in the reach from Saunders to 

Pardee. (The only significant signs of scours 

32 

were also found in this reach, although there 

was evidence of scour at some l'ridge crossings 

farther downstream.) The stream banks and 

overflow plain from Saunders to Man were 

covered with a thin film of black sediment by 

the passage of the sludge-bearing water. 

REFERENCES 

Davies, W. E., 1967, Geologic hazards of coal refuse 

banks [abs.]: Geol. Soc. America, Program 1967 

Annual Meetings, p. 43. 

--1968, Coal waste bank stabr·:ty: Mining Congress Journal, v. 54, no. 7, p. 19-24. 

Hennen, R. V., Reger, D. B., and F~·ice, W. A., 1914, 

Logan and Mingo Counties: Weft Virginia Geological Survey, p. 60-62, 124-125. 

Latimer, W. J., 1915, Soil survey of Logan and Mingo 

Counties, West Virginia: U.S. Dept. Agriculture, 

Bureau of Soils, 30 p. 

Park, W. R., Blankenship, J. C., Jr., Cook, J. 0., Herndon, J. R., Shumate, J. L., 1972, Inte1·im report of 

retaining dam failure, No. 5 Preparation Plant, 

Buffalo Mining Company, Division of the Pittston 

Company, Saunders, Logan Courty, West Virginia, 

February 26, 1972: U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mount 

Hope, W.Va., 12 p. 

U.S. Department of Interior, Task Force to Study Coal 

Waste Hazards, 1972, Preliminary analysis of the 

coal refuse dam failure at Saunders, West Virginia, February 26, 1972: Washington, D.C., 42 p. 

*u.s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 15'74 0-585-468/29