### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs O ct obe r 25, 200 5 ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E v . C LI F F OR D A . D A V IS Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Humphreys County No. 10601 Robert

E. Bu rch, Judge

No. M2005- 00270-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Janu ary 20, 2006

Th e Ap pe llant, Clif

fo rdA. Da vis , a

pp e a ls the re vo c a tio n of

his pr ob a tio n b y

theHu mph re y s Co un ty Circuit Court. Davis’ re vocation stems from his violation of Rule 7 of the conditions of probation which provide s: “I

ag ree to a search, without a warrant, of m y person, vehicle, prope rty , or plac e of residenc e by

any Probation/Parole offic er or law enf orce ment office r, at a ny

time.” Davis doe s not deny that he re fused his probation officer ’s re quest to sear ch his residenc e. Rather, he arg ues that Rule 7 is unconstitut i o nal in that it infringe s upon his Fourth Amendme nt rig hts. Finding no constitutional error, the judgme nt of the trial court is affirmed.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed
D AVI D G. H AYES , J

. , delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.
Hay le e B ra dle y , A sh la ndCity , T e nn e sse e , f or theAp pe llant, Clif

fo rdA. Da vis

. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; B lind Akr awi, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Da n M. Al so br oo ks , Dis tric t Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l; an d L isa Do ne g a n, As sis ta nt D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the A ppellee, State of Tenne ssee. OP IN ION

P roce dural Hi story
On Octobe r 12, 2004, the Appe llant pled g u il ty to possession of methamphetamine f or re sale, a Class C felony , and possession of marijuana for resa le, a Class E fe lony . Under the terms of the plea a g ree ment, the Appellant r ece ived a f our-y ear sentenc e for the Class C conviction and a twoye ar s e n t e n c e f

o r t h e C l a s s E c o n v i c t i o n
. T h e s e n t e n c e s , w h i c h w e r e o r d e r e d t o ru n c o n c u rr e n t l y, wer e suspende d, and the Appe llant was plac ed on four y ear s supervised pr obation.-2-

Rul e 7 o f the Ap pe llant’ s con dit ion s of pr ob a tio n pro vid e d: “I a g re e to a se arc h, wi tho ut a war rant, of my

person, ve hicle, prope rty

or plac e of r esidenc e by

any Probation/Parole offic er or law e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e r, a t a ny

time.” Th e Ap pe llant’ s p ro batio n o ff ic e r t e sti fi e d th a t hesp e c if ic a lly re vie we d Ru le 7 w iththeAp pe llant b e c aus e , “ I wanted him to un de rs ta ndthat hewa s su bje c t to sear ch. . . .” T he probation office f urther a dvised that Rule 7 was a relatively new rule of probation which wa s implemented by his department in Aug ust 2004.
On Novembe r 3, 2 0 0 4 , the Appellant’ s probation offic er, a ccompanied by two law enfor ceme nt office rs, appe are d at the Appellant’s residenc e and reque sted permission to searc h. The Appellant re fused pe rmission to s ea rc h his residenc e, despite be ing inf ormed that the r efusa l constituted a violation of probation.
At the re vocation hea

ring , both law enf

orc ement officer s testified that shortly afte r the Appellant wa s place d on probation, they rec eived numerous complaints of traf fic in and out of the Appellant’s r esidenc e. B ased upon the se complaints, the off icers b ega n a surve illance of the residenc e and obse rved individuals known to be involved in the manufa cture of methamphe tamine, most of whom had bee n convicted or had ca ses pending , entering theAppellant’s r esidenc e. At the conc lusion of the hearing, t he trial c ourt revoke d the Appellant’ s probation conc luding that the “sea

rch [was] done in g ood faith, not f or malicious or hara ssing purpose [,] but in accor dance with the purpose of R ule 7 of the probation order.” The Appe llant’s orig inal eff ective se ntence of four y ear s was re instated with service in the Depa rtment of Corre ction.
Ana lys is The Appe llant arg ues that Rule 7 of his probation order , which permits a warr antless sea rch as a conditiono f

p r o b a ti o n , is v io lati v e o f th e F o u rthA me n d me n t an d A rti c leI , Se c ti o n 7 o f the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion in that it a llo ws la w e nf or c e me nt to by

pa ss the se arc h wa

rr a nt andpr ob able cause require ments for sea rching a per son’s home, vehicle , and per son. Moreove r, he a rg ues that beca use the rule has potential for abuse, the condition is inhere ntly “unre asonable and unre alistic, harsh, oppr essive and pa lpably unjust.” This issue appea

rs to be one of

first impression in this st ate. In U. S. v . Kn igh ts , 534 U.S. 112, 11 4, 12 2 S. Ct. 58 7, 58 9 ( 20 01 ), theSup re me Cou rt c on sid e re d the c on sti tut ion a lit y of a Ca lif ornia probation orde r which inc luded the condition that the probationer woul d “submit his . . . person, property , place of residence , vehicle, personal effe cts, to sear ch at anytime, with or without a sear ch war rant, wa rrant of arr est or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enf orce ment office r.”
The Court in Kni gh ts observe d:
The touchstone of

the Fourth Amendm en t is reasona bleness, and the rea sonablene ss of a sea

rch is dete rmined “by

assessing , on the one hand, the deg ree to w h i c h i t i n tru d e s u p o n a n i n d i v i d u a l ’ s p r i v a c y a n d , o n t h e o t h e r , t h e de g re e to-3-

which it is neede d for the promotion of l eg itimate g overnme ntal interests.” W yoming v. Houghton , 526 U.S. 295, 300, 143 L . Ed.2d 408, 419, 119 S. Ct. 1297 (199 9). Knig ht’s status as a probationer subject to a se arc h condition informs both sides of that balanc e. “Probation, like incar cer ation, is ‘a form of criminal sanc tion impos ed by a court upon an offe nder after verdic t, finding , or pl ea of g uilty .’” Gr iff in , su pr a at 874 (quoting G. Killinger , H. Ker per, & P. Cromwe ll, Probation and Parole in the Criminal J ustice Sy stem 14 (1976)). Probation is “one point

. . . on a continuum of po ssi blepu nis hme nts rang ing fr om s oli tary c on fi ne me nt i n a

ma xim um-s e c urity fac ilityto a fe w hours of mandatory community service .” 483 US. at 874. I nhere nt in the ve ry

natur e of pr ob a tio n is tha t pro batio ne rs “ do no t e njo y ‘the abs olu te lib e rty to w h ic h e v e r y

c it iz e n is e n ti tl e d

. ’” Ib id

. (q u o t i n g Morrissey v . Brewer , 4 08 U. S. 471, 480, 33 L . Ed.2d 484, 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972)). J ust a s o t h er p u n i s h ments for criminal convictions curta in an offe nder’ s fre edoms, a c ourt g ranting probation may impose rea sonable c onditions t hat deprive the offe nder of some fre edoms enjoy ed by la w- abid ing c iti zen s.
. . . It was rea sonable to c onclude that the sear ch condition w ould further the two primary g oals of probation - - re habilitation and protec ting soc iety from future criminal violations. The probation order c learly expressed the sea

rch c ondition and Kni gh ts was unambig uously informed of

it. The probation condition thus signific antly

diminis hed Knig ht’s rea sonable e x pectation of privacy

. I n assessing the g overnme ntal interest si d e o f the ba lance , it mustbe reme mbere d that “t h e v er y assumption of the institut ion of probation” is that the probationer “is more likely than the ordina

ry citizen to viol ate the la w.” Gr iff in , 483 U. S. at 88 0.

. . . A ndpr ob a tio ne rs ha ve e ve n mo reof a n in c e nti ve to c on c e a l th e ir criminal ac tivi ties and quickly dispose of incriminating evidenc e than the or dinary criminal bec ause pr obationers a re a war e that they may be subject to supervision and fac e re vocation of pr obation, and possible inc arc eration, in proce eding s in which the trial rig hts of a jury

and proof bey ond a rea sonable doubt, among othe r thing s, do not apply , see Minnesota v. M urphy , 465 US. 42 0, 43 5 n.7 , 79 L . Ed. 2d . 409 , 104 S. Ct

. 1136 (1984). . . .
The State ha s a dual conce rn with a probationer

. On the one hand is the hope that he will succe ssfully complete pr obation and be integ rat ed back into the c ommun ity . O n the oth e r is the c on c e rn , quit e jus tif ie d, that hewi ll b e mor e lik e ly to e ng a g e in c ri min a l con du ct th an a n o rd ina ry me mbe r o f the c ommun ity

. . . . Its interes t i n ap p r e h e n d in g v io lato r s o f th e c r im in a l l a w , th e r e b y p r o te c ti n g p o te n tial victims of criminal enter

prise, m ay there fore justifiably focus on pr obationers in a way that it does not on the ordinary citizen.O ur sup rem e c o urt has he l d t ha t w hil e “ t he F o urth A m en d m en t p ro scrib es un rea so na b l e se arc he s and seizure s, 1 i t does not pros cr i be vol un t ar y coop er at i on. ” St at e v. Cox , 17 1 S.W

. 3 d 17 4 , 18 4 (T enn. 20 0 5 ) ( ci t i ng Fl or i da v. B ost i ck , 5 0 1 U

. S. 4 2 9 , 43 9 , 11 1 S. C t

. 23 8 2 (19 9 1 ); S c h n e c k lo th v . B u sta m o n te , 41 2 U

. S. 2 1 8 , 24 3 , 93 S. C t

. 20 4 1 (19 7 3 )) ( hol di ng t hat “ t her e i s not hi ng cons t i t ut i onal l y s us pect i n a per s on[ ] vol un t ar i l y al l owi ng a s ear ch” )

. T he cour t f ur t her
c o n c lud e d tha t t h e sa m e is t ru e un d e r A rtic le I, se c tio n 7 o f o u r o w n c o n stitutio n
. Id

.

In T e n n e sse e , the tria l ju d g e is p ro v id e d d isc re tio n to im p o se c o n d iti o n s o f p ro b a tio n “re a so n a b ly re la te d to 2 the p u rp o se o f the o ff

e n d e r’s se n te n c e .” T .C .A . § 4 0 -3 5 -3 0 3 (d )( 9 ) (2 0 0 3 ); S ta te v . B u rd in , 92 4 S.W

. 2 d 82 , 85 (T enn. 1996)

. I n t h i s c as e, w e con cl u de t h at i n v i ew of t h e Appel l an t ’ s t wo dr u g c on v i ct i on s , t h e con di t i on of pr obat i on per mi t t i n g a w ar r an t l es s s ea r ch of t h e Appel l an t ’ s h ome, v eh i cl e, a n d pe r s on w as r ea s on abl y r el at ed t o t h e pu r pos e of the A p p e llan t’s sen te n c e
. -4- Id . at 11 8-21, 122 S. Ct. at 592. I n view of the Kni gh ts Court’s holding that a war rantless sea

rch c o n d i t i o n o f p r o b a t i o n s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i m i n i s h e s a

p r o b a t i o n e r ’ s r e a s o n ab l e e x p e c t a t i o n o f p r i v a c y, the Court conclude d:

We hold that the b al anceof these c onsiderations re quires no more than rea sonable suspicion to conduc t a sea rch of this probationer’s house . . . . When an of fi c e r h a s r e a so na

blesu sp ic ionthat a

pr ob a tio ne r s ub

je c t to a se arc h c on dit ionis e n g a g e d i n c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y , t h e r e i s e n o u g h l i k e l i h o o d t h a t c r i m i n a l c on du c t is occur ring that an intrusion o n the probationer’s sig nificantly diminis hed priva cy interests is rea sonable.
Id . at 121, 122 S. Ct. at 592.
The condition of probation permitting a war rantless sear ch in the Kni gh ts case , and the issue of the c onstitut ionality

of that provision, are vi rtually identical to those pre sented in this case

. Howeve r, in its holding in Kni gh ts , the Supreme Court found it unnec essary to decide w hether war rantless sea

rche s of probationers ar e pe r se rea sonable under t he Fourth Amendment or w hether a pr ob a tio ne r’ s a c c e ptanc e of these arc h c on dit ionc on sti tut e d c on se nt t o a c omp le te waive r o f h is Fourth Amendment rig hts unde r the consent standards of Sc hn e c k lot h v . B us tam on te , 412 U. S. 218, 93 S. Ct . 2041 (1973). Irre spective of these c oncerns, the Court conclude d that t h e sear ch wa s 1 oth e rw ise re a so na

ble“ un de r the Cou rt ’s g e ne ra l F ou rth Am e nd me nt ‘t ota lit y of thec ir c ums ta nc e s’ approa ch, Oh io v . R ob ine tte , 529 U. S. 33, 39, 117 S. Ct . 417 (1996), with the se arc h condition being a salient c ircumstance .” Kni gh ts , 534 U. S. at 118; 122 S. C t. at 591.
As in Kni gh ts , we find it unne cessa ry to a ddress the broade r issue of the constitutionalityof the war rantless sea

rch c ondition of probation. Nonethele ss, we co n cl u d e that a searc h of the Appellant’s r esidenc e in this case w as permitted because : ( 1) the war rantless sear ch provision was re a so na bly re late d a s a

c on dit ionof

theAp pe llant’ s p ro batio n; a nd(2) th e a tte mpt e d w arr a ntl e ss 2
sear ch of the Appellant’s r esidenc e wa s supported b y re asonable suspicion. Accor dingly , we conclude that the Appellant’ s ref usal to submit t o a sea

rch unde r t hese circumstanc es constituted a violation of the condition of probation.-5-

I n a re lated issue, the Appe llant arg ues that his c onsent to the war rantless sea

rch c ondition was c ontaminated by

duress a nd coer cion. He a sserts that “[b]ybeing p l ac ed in a situation that re qu ir e d the [Ap pe llant] to g iveup his ri g ht t o p ri va c y or g o to priso n, the[Ap pe llant] w a s c e rt a inl y under dur ess, and did not fre ely consent to future sear ches, w hen he sig ned the pr obation order .” A probationer’s waiver of his F ourth Amendment rig hts is no less voluntary than the waiver of rig hts by

a defenda nt who pleads g uiltyto gain the benef it of a plea

barg ain. See B ordenkirche r v. Hay es , 434 U. S. 357, 360-64, 98 S. Ct. 663, 666-68 (1978) . A probationer conse nts to the waiver of his Fourth Amendment rig hts i n exchang e for the opportunity

to avoid incar cer ation. I f a defe ndant who plea ds g uiltyinforms the sentenc ing c o u rt t h at he will not abide by conditions of probation, the c ourt clearl y i s within its authority to deny probation. The c hoice be longs to the de fe nd a nt. Ac c or din g ly , w e se e no re a so n to den y a de fe nd a nt the ri g ht t o w a ivehis F ou rth Amendment rig hts in order to sec ure the benef its of probation. As such, the Appellant’s a rg ument of inv a lidc on se nt i s w ith ou t me ri t. CO NC LU SION
Ba sed upon the for eg oing, the decision of the Humphrey s County Circuit Court revoking the Appellant’s pr obation is affirme d.

___________________________________ DAVID G. HAY ES, J UDGE