Air University

Stephen R. Lorenz, Lt Gen, Commander

Air War College

Stephen J. Miller, Maj Gen, Commandant

Kurt Schake, Col, Dean

Lawrence E. Grinter, PhD, Series Editor

Alvin M. Lowry Jr., Col, Essay Advisor

Air University Press

Terry L. Hawkins, Interim Director

Bessie E. Varner, Deputy Director

Jerry L. Gantt, Content Editor

Lula Barnes, Copy Editor

Mary P. Ferguson, Prepress Production

Daniel Armstrong, Cover Design

Demorah Hayes, Quality Review

Please send inquiries or comments to

Editor

The Maxwell Papers

Air War College

325 Chennault Circle, Bldg. 1401

Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6006

Tel: (334) 953-7074

Fax: (334) 953-1988

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-mxwl.htm
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR WAR COLLEGE

Impact of Foreign Ownership

on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet

Donald M. Schauber Jr. Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 42

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2008
ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US 

government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Maxwell Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the Air University Research Web 

site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press 

Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.
iii

Foreword

The United States Air Force vision of “Global Vigilance, 

Reach, and Power” is undoubtedly one of the most powerful 

statements in the world today. What makes these five words 

so powerful? Many would argue their strength resonates in 

the underlying distinctive capability of “Rapid Global Mobility,” 

the true means to fulfill America’s global engagement strategy. 

Without the ability to rapidly deploy and sustain our forces, the 

foundation of our global engagement strategy is jeopardized. 

As such, a robust strategic airlift force capable of global power 

projection is a critical prerequisite. Besides our military airlift 

assets, the US commercial air carriers provide a unique and 

critical enabler that helps us meet our mobility requirements 

in the form of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). 

Since 1951, the CRAF has augmented military airlift by 

providing passenger, cargo, and aeromedical airlift capabilities during times of national emergency. For the past 

57 years, the CRAF has not only proven its capability, but 

currently is responsible for approximately one-third of the 

Department of Defense (DOD) wartime airlift requirements. 

As the United States continues its “global engagement” 

strategy and the world becomes more interdependent, the 

DOD and US commercial air carriers are each beginning to 

face dramatic changes. While the DOD is currently strained 

from over 17 years of uninterrupted engagement, shrinking 

defense budgets, decreasing overseas infrastructure, and 

shortfalls in manpower and aircraft, the US commercial air 

carriers continue to struggle financially, never fully recovering from 9/11 or the recent skyrocketing fuel prices. The 

financial insecurity of the US air carriers coupled with a 

healthy global market has generated a push to change the 

current laws, allowing increased investment opportunities 

for foreign companies/investors into US commercial air 

carriers. 

Colonel Schauber contends that changes allowing increased foreign ownership or control opportunities would 

threaten our national security by jeopardizing the DOD’s accessibility to CRAF assets. Although the CRAF has formally 

been utilized only twice, its importance and our reliance on 

it cannot be overstated. This research is very timely given 
iv

that the US military has been running on a wartime surge 

since 9/11, many of our current military airlift platforms 

are struggling with poor mission capability rates, and these 

resources continue to be utilized in multinational and humanitarian operations. These recent proposals to relax foreign ownership of US airlines are a serious concern, and the 

DOD, Department of Transportation, and civilian air carriers 

must work together to find a balance between economic stability and national security. 

As with all Maxwell Papers, this study is provided in the 

spirit of academic freedom, open debate, and serious consideration of the issues. We encourage your responses.

STEPHEN J. MILLER

Major General, USAF

Commandant, Air War College
v

About the Author

Lt Col Donald “Moose” Schauber Jr., USAF, is a graduate 

of the Air War College, Class of 2008. Previously, he served 

as the deputy group commander of Squadron Officer School 

and commander of the 35th Student Squadron, Squadron 

Officer College, all at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He also completed tours at Offutt AFB, Nebraska; Dyess AFB, Texas; 

Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota; and Minot AFB, North Dakota. 

Colonel Schauber entered the Air Force from Officer Training School in 1987 following graduation from Montana State 

University. He is a command navigator with more than 2,400 

hours in the B-1B, B-52G, B-52H, T-43, and T-37. He was 

a distinguished graduate of initial qualification training and 

was qualified as an instructor navigator/weapons systems 

officer/flight examiner in both the B1-B and B-52. He was 

selected as a joint specialty officer following his assignment 

at US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), where he culminated his tour as executive officer for the USSTRATCOM 

commander. He holds the Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies degree from the Naval War College, 

Newport, Rhode Island, and is a graduate of the Naval Command and Staff College, Newport, Rhode Island. 

Following graduation from Air War College, Colonel 

Schauber was selected as the air attaché to the US Embassy, Lima, Peru.

vii

Abstract

Since the beginning of manned flight, the movement of 

personnel and equipment by air has been critical to US national security. This realization led to the establishment of 

the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) in 1951 to augment the 

military airlift fleet in times of national emergency. In the 

56 years following its inception, the CRAF has proven itself 

numerous times as a critical enabler to US military strategy. Recent changes within the military and trends toward 

a globalized economy have placed the Department of Defense and US airlines on diverging paths. The purpose of 

this paper is to examine these changes and their possible 

impact on US national security. Following a basic overview 

of the CRAF and its criticality, the paper examines the conflict of interest between the national economy and national 

security regarding the push to liberalize airline ownership 

and control. The paper concludes by examining possible 

options and recommendations that help address these concerns to ensure that the CRAF program remains a viable 

and integral part of the US military capability. 



Impact of Foreign Ownership 

on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet

We have learned and must not forget that, from 

now on, air transport is an essential of airpower, 

in fact, of all national power.

—Gen Hap Arnold

Introduction

The 2004 National Military Strategy is based on continued 

US engagement and leadership abroad and calls for “rapidly 

deployable, employable, and sustainable forces that can defeat a wide range of adversaries.”1 Currently, two sources of 

strategic airlift—the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and the 

organic (military) fleet—are critical enablers in meeting this 

strategy. The CRAF was developed to supplement organic 

airlift with civil passenger, cargo, and aeromedical capabilities during times of national emergency. The latest planning factors state that the Department of Defense (DOD) 

relies on the CRAF to handle approximately one-third of its 

wartime airlift requirements.2 Most recently, the long-range 

passenger segment of the CRAF was activated for Operation 

Iraqi Freedom (OIF), reinforcing DOD reliance on the CRAF 

and the impact of the CRAF on national security. 

As the United States remains the dominant nation in a 

world that continues to “globalize,” many dramatic changes 

are occurring within the DOD and the US commercial air 

carrier industry. The DOD continues to deal with shrinking 

budgets, downsizing, decreasing overseas infrastructure, 

and an increased ops tempo for manpower and equipment. 

The commercial air carriers face economic uncertainty as 

they struggle to recover from the aftermath of 9/11 and 

skyrocketing fuel prices. These concerns, coupled with a 

national and military strategy based on global engagement 

and an increasingly interdependent global community, continue to make the DOD increasingly dependent on CRAF 

assets. At the same time, globalization and international 

financial interdependence have sparked a push for US air 

carriers to seek new partnerships, markets, and sources of 

financial capital from foreign investors. This combination 
of globalization, economic pressure, and military change 

could easily disrupt the delicate balance that currently exists between the DOD and CRAF participants. 

Recently the Department of Transportation (DOT), with 

the backing of the president and members of the European 

Union (EU), proposed new legislation to ease restrictions 

that limit foreign investors’ ability to obtain and exercise 

control over US commercial air carriers. While there are 

clearly foreseeable economic benefits in allowing increased 

foreign investment, the issue remains that many of those 

who advocate relaxing foreign ownership restrictions are 

doing so from a strictly economic standpoint. This shortsightedness is dangerous and could place the nation’s economic stability at odds with its military security. This study 

contends that changes to allow increased foreign ownership and/or control of US commercial air carriers would 

threaten US national security strategy by impacting the 

military’s accessibility to CRAF assets. 

This study begins with a brief background of the CRAF 

program, discussing current laws and requirements for the 

CRAF, then transitions to the issues and concerns of foreign ownership of US air carriers. It concludes by examining possible recommendations and options that provide 

the DOD with continued CRAF support while allowing increased foreign ownership and control opportunities. 

The scope of this study is to present a brief overview of the 

CRAF foreign ownership issue in hopes of providing a singlesource primer to help others better understand what the author considers the most critical threat to US strategic mobility 

and the well-being of the CRAF program since its inception. 

CRAF Overview

The United States’ reliance on civilian airlift can be traced 

back to World War II when commercial carriers voluntarily 

transported soldiers into the European theatre. Recognizing our strategic need and dependence on supplemental 

airlift, President Truman issued an executive order in 1951

that established the CRAF, specifically designed to augment military airlift during times of national emergency. 

Under the CRAF program, US air carriers voluntarily enter 

into agreements that contractually commit them to supply 


aircraft in support of DOD airlift requirements in times of 

national emergency in return for peacetime business.3

Since its beginning, the program has maintained 100 

percent enrollment, with 34 carriers and 1,364 aircraft enrolled as of May 2007. Enrollment in the program entitles 

the air carriers a share of the DOD’s yearly passenger and 

cargo airlift contracts. The guaranteed contracts available 

for 2007 totaled over $379 million, with Air Mobility Command (AMC) estimating the possibility of an additional $2.1

billion in “non-guaranteed” contracts that are necessary 

to fulfill unscheduled transportation requirements.4 Along 

with enrollment, the air carrier is placed under the oversight of AMC, which performs semiannual reviews and inspections of a carrier’s safety, maintenance, financial, and 

contractual performance.5

The CRAF is divided into three segments depending on carriers’ capabilities and assets: National (subdivided into domestic 

and Alaskan), International (subdivided into short-range and 

long-range), and Aeromedical Evacuation as illustrated below. 

The National section was specifically designed to provide the 

DOD with airlift primarily within the United States and more 

specifically to Alaska. The International section was designed 

to augment the C-5 and C-17 fleet in providing transoceanic 

capabilities (long-range) and “near offshore” capabilities. The 

Aeromedical Evacuation section consists of Boeing 767 aircraft 

that are converted to air ambulances to transfer wounded.6

Cumulative number of CRAF aircraft by segment (May 2007)

Segment     No.

NATIONAL

Domestic

Alaskan

37

4

INTERNATIONAL

Short-Range

Long-Range

283

990

AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION 50

                    TOTAL 1,364

Adapted from DOT, Transportation Emergency Management, 1, http://www.dot.gov/

ost/oet/craf/index.html.

Once a carrier is registered into one of these segments, it 

is subject to activation in one of three progressive and tai-
lored stages depending on the level of crisis. Stage I (Committed Expansion) is designed for small, regional conflicts; 

Stage II (Defense Airlift Emergency) is tailored for a major 

regional conflict; and Stage III (National Emergency) is utilized during a declaration of national emergency.7 Following approval from the secretary of defense, activation for 

all three stages of the CRAF falls under the authority of the 

commander, US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), 

where the activation is tailored to the specific requirements 

as requested by AMC. Appendix A provides additional details on CRAF carriers, aircraft types, and numbers.

Criticality of CRAF

Although formal activation of the CRAF has only occurred 

twice, it has been an integral force multiplier in every major 

US conflict since its inception.8 Besides WWII, mentioned 

above, the CRAF voluntarily moved 67 percent of all DOD 

passengers and 56 percent of DOD cargo requirements during the Korean War.9 The CRAF again voluntarily stepped 

in during the Vietnam War and transported over 11 million 

soldiers and over one million tons of cargo.10

It was not until the early 1990s that the CRAF was formally 

activated during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm 

(ODS), where both Stage I and Stage II were activated. To highlight the capabilities of the CRAF, during ODS the activated 

CRAF aircraft accounted for 67 percent of the passengers and 

25 percent of the cargo during the deployment phase and 85 

percent of the passengers and 42 percent of the cargo for the 

redeployment phase.11 Viewed in a historic perspective, the 

airlift in ODS was equivalent to repeating the Berlin airlift, a 

56-week operation, every five weeks.12 The most recent activation occurred for OIF from 8 February to 18 June 2003. A 

select group of 51 Stage I aircraft was activated and flew 1,625 

missions, accounting for the transportation of 254,143 passengers, or 78 percent of the deploying troops and 85 percent 

of the redeploying troops during this period.13 Finally, recent 

data indicates 70 percent of sustainment flights into US Central Command’s (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) is 

provided by commercial carriers.14

In March 2001, USTRANSCOM released the results of its 

comprehensive study detailing the wartime airlift require-
ments, “Mobility Requirements Study 2005” (MRS-05). Per 

MRS-05, the current wartime airlift requirement is 54.5 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D—the ability to move one ton 

of cargo one million miles in a day or one million tons of cargo 

one mile in a day). Of this 54.5 MTM/D, the CRAF is responsible for 20.5 MTM/D or approximately 38 percent of the total 

DOD requirement. With MRS-05 released early in 2001, it is 

obvious the planners did not foresee the attacks of 9/11 and 

the ongoing operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, so a new 

airlift requirements study, referred to as the Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS), was ordered to account for the changes 

required to meet the expanding national security strategy.15

Initially briefed to Congress early in 2006, the MCS fell 

under extensive criticism for its methodology. The primary 

issue was that instead of measuring airlift requirements 

by MTM/D, it looked at current and projected organic aircraft capabilities and determined that US capabilities were 

sufficient, assuming differing levels of “risk.”16 Given the 

tempo of overseas operations, the increasing age of aircraft, 

and changes to US engagement strategy, many planners 

thought the gap between MRS-05 and current requirements would be at least 10 MTM/D, with some speculation 

upwards of 22 MTM/D.17 Due to concerns and shortfalls of 

the study documented by the Government Accountability 

Office (GAO), many have called for an independent followon study to clarify/resolve DOD airlift requirements.18

From the examples above, it should be intuitively obvious, 

despite the difficulty of forecasting future mobility requirements, that the US military is very dependent on civilian airlift 

during times of conflict. With an approximate cost of $379 

million to the taxpayers in 2007, the CRAF program offers an 

avenue for the military to obtain a large portion of critical lift 

capability at a minimal cost. This avenue becomes increasingly important as the military continues to work with shrinking budgets and decreased overseas bases while transforming 

to an expeditionary force where engagements throughout the 

globe will undoubtedly continue to rise along with the need for 

strategic lift. A 1999 congressional report estimated it would 

cost over $50 billion to procure an organic fleet equivalent to 

the capabilities provided by the CRAF fleet plus approximately 

$1–3 billion annually to operate it.19 In other words, it costs 

the military approximately $152 to move one ton-mile per day 
with its organic fleet while the CRAF cost is less than $12.20

These numbers are stark reminders of the US reliance on the 

CRAF and its vital importance to supplement military airlift 

requirements, a vital element of national security.

Specific CRAF Requirements and Restrictions

Due to the importance and monetary value of the CRAF 

program, many eligibility requirements and prerequisites 

must be met to participate. For this study, only a few specific requirements related to the foreign ownership issue are 

discussed. First, a carrier must commit at least 30 percent 

of its CRAF-capable passenger fleet and 15 percent of its 

cargo fleet. The air carrier must also maintain and commit 

a minimum of four complete crews for each CRAF-dedicated 

aircraft.21 Current requirements include that each crew 

member must be a US citizen and able to obtain a security 

clearance to the minimum level of Secret.22 Finally, and most 

importantly, the air carrier must be US registered.23

Defining a “US registered” air carrier requires looking back 

to 1926 when Congress first enacted citizenship requirements 

with the introduction of the Air Commerce Act. The Air Commerce Act required that for an air carrier to operate within the 

United States, US citizens must own the carrier. Also, at least 

51 percent of the air carrier’s voting stock must be owned or 

controlled by US citizens to be registered in the United States. 

In 1938, Congress raised that percentage from 51 percent to 

75 percent to mirror the Shipping Act of 1916 that required 75 

percent US control and ownership, precluding what Congress 

believed an “inadequate cushion” against foreign ownership 

and control.24 Current law also specifies for air carriers incorporated in the United States, the company president and at 

least two-thirds of the board of directors must be US citizens. 

Finally, it is critical to understand that the DOT defines the or

language in “owned or controlled” as meaning and.

25 Thus, to 

meet the US citizenship requirements, 75 percent of the voting interest must be owned and controlled by US citizens. 

Foreign Ownership and the CRAF

 According to a 1992 GAO report, the United States has 

limited the ownership and control of US airline companies 
to only US citizens for four reasons: (1) the protection of 

the US airline industry, (2) the regulation of international 

air service, (3) concern about foreign access to US airspace, 

and (4) DOD reliance on civilian carriers’ supplemental airlift.26 In the early 1990s there was a renewed push by the 

DOT to ease foreign ownership investment restrictions. The 

DOT proposed legislation raising the foreign ownership restriction from 25 percent ownership to 49 percent.27 This 

initial proposal was primarily focused on easing the financial losses suffered by US carriers during this time frame. 

Congress rejected these proposals, and the issue remained 

fairly dormant until 2003.

In 2003 the DOT, with the backing of the Bush administration, once again submitted formal proposals that 

would amend legislation to relax the restrictions on foreignowned voting stock of US airlines from 25 to 49 percent.28

Recently, the EU had been applying pressure to the DOT, 

insisting that the United States must increase the percentage of foreign ownership of US airlines to match EU ownership requirements of 49 percent.29 Ongoing negotiations 

concerning the “open skies” agreements are designed to 

increase air transportation between the United States and 

the 27 EU members by replacing many of the restrictive bilateral arrangements, most made during WWII.30 Although 

foreign ownership is not currently part of “open skies,” the 

EU stated that “ownership and control of US airlines would 

be an essential element for the deal to be completed.”31 The 

DOT’s proposal was rejected by both houses of Congress. 

In an attempt to circumvent Congress, the DOT issued a 

notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on 7 November 2005 

that would overturn the current policy prohibiting foreign 

carriers from gaining “actual control” of US airlines. According to the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), although 

the NPRM would leave the 25 percent limit unchanged, the 

language would increase “control” opportunities for foreign 

investors to make economic, fleet planning, route structure, pricing, and marketing decisions.32 While the NPRM 

would keep safety and security under US citizen “control,” 

it is intuitively obvious that in such an industry it would be 

impossible to isolate safety and security from the financial 

and managerial decisions.33 Again, pressure from the EU 

seems to be the driving factor behind the proposal. 
Members of the US House of Representatives quickly responded to the proposal in a letter of protest stating, “We 

believe that the Department has overstepped its authority in 

this proposal with its revised interpretation of ‘actual control’ as it relates to the citizenship of a US airline, and we 

urge the Department to withdraw the NPRM.” The Senate 

also sent a letter of objection that stated, “Any changes to 

current law on ownership and control of US airlines would 

require extensive review and public debate . . . to consider 

the impacts any proposed changes to current law would 

have on US jobs, our national defense, homeland security, 

and the financial stability of the US airline industry.”34 With 

congressional protests failing to quell the DOT proposal, 

both houses of Congress introduced legislation (H.R. 4542 

and S.R. 2135) that banned the DOT from finalizing any 

changes without congressional review. 

In an attempt to address congressional concerns, the DOT 

issued a “supplemental” NPRM in May 2006. Again, both 

houses of Congress overwhelmingly passed amendments prohibiting any funds to be utilized to implement any changes 

to foreign control rules and sent a letter to the secretary of 

transportation calling for the immediate termination of the 

DOT’s current pursuit to change US airline foreign control 

rules.35 Despite the DOT’s stubbornness toward the foreign 

ownership issue, pressure from Congress has not only postponed the DOT’s push for changes, but maybe more importantly, highlighted to the DOT the seriousness and potential 

effect on the airline industry and more importantly, national 

security. Capt Duane Woerth, ALPA representative, stated 

that the strong support by both houses of Congress was an 

“undeniable signal that Congress is united in opposing this 

radical change because of its implications for our country’s 

airline industry, national defense, and jobs.”36

National Security Concerns with

Foreign Ownership

The CRAF issue presents a definite conflict of interest 

between the national economy and national security. Although it may be economically beneficial to allow foreign 

ownership and provide US airlines more access to global 
markets, the fact remains that the US military has become 

dependent on US airlines for a critical portion of its strategic airlift capability in times of national emergency. 

A 1993 GAO report identified five key issues affected by 

liberalizing airline ownership and control: (1) domestic competition, (2) national security, (3) employment, (4) safety, 

and (5) international competition.37 The DOD must focus 

on national security in regard to the CRAF. Within national 

security are five subissues of primary concern which fall 

within the scope of this study: (1) political and national interests, (2) legal leverage, (3) meeting CRAF timelines, (4) 

crew security clearance requirements, and (5) safety. 

Subissue 1: Political and National Interests

The first and most important underlying subissue is the 

alignment or, more appropriately, the mismatch between 

political and national security interests. When the CRAF is 

required for activation, the United States will be engaged in 

a conflict with a foreign adversary during a time of global 

instability. Given these conditions, how could the DOD not 

have reservations concerning CRAF participation if foreign 

ownership were allowed? The relationships between foreign 

airlines and their home governments are often fundamentally different from the relationship between US airlines 

and the US government. 

Unlike the United States, many foreign countries have a 

very limited number of airlines operating within their borders, with the majority having only one. Being a single carrier within a foreign country makes that carrier very susceptible to political pressures from the government.38 So 

the primary concern is if the United States were to enter 

into an “unpopular” conflict, could a foreign-owned carrier 

be counted on to participate if it or its respective government disagreed with US actions? This concern is illustrated 

in the following account of a seminar discussion at the Fifth 

Worldwide Air Transport Conference, with the topic of OIF 

as a backdrop:

[T]he seminar discussion said [the effect of] unrestricted foreign ownership of a US airline would be minimal on the Defense Dept.’s Civil 

Reserve Air Fleet program. An airline with a majority of investment 

from overseas would most likely be operated as a US subsidiary, 

he said, subject to the same responsibilities as any other flagged 
10

carrier. Concerns could be allayed by applying existing regulations 

such as those related to licensing.

Discussions on this issue prompted the seminar chairman . . . to 

question whether Air France, if it owned a US subsidiary, would 

permit the subsidiary to operate supply missions to the Middle East. 

The query caused a wave of laughter through the hall packed with 

600 participants.39

Subissue 2: Legal Leverage

Many argue, and this author agrees, there are adequate 

laws and regulations in place to ensure current (US) CRAF 

participants meet contractual obligations during activation, 

such as the Exon-Florio provision that blocks financial transactions and investments of those refusing to participate. The 

US government has strong leverage (legal, economic, and 

political) over US-owned carriers to compel them to carry out 

their CRAF commitments. If a US carrier refuses to fulfill 

its obligation during activation, the DOT has the authority 

to regulate commercial air transportation to ensure that 

the security needs of the country receive priority. The first 

probable action would be to revoke the carrier’s operating 

certificate, essentially shutting it down. Although the carrier 

could appeal, it is unlikely the courts would side with the 

carrier during a time of national emergency. In an extreme 

case, the DOD could seize and utilize its resources under the 

powers of the Defense Production Act. Although able to seize 

aircraft only, the DOD would likely utilize its National Guard 

and reserve pilots to fly the seized aircraft. Besides seizing 

assets under the Defense Production Act, the government 

could also sue corporate officers and members of the board 

of directors individually for their noncompliance with CRAF 

obligations. As a final possibility, the US government could 

invoke the “Trading with the Enemies Act” that would allow 

the confiscation of all corporate assets.40

The same is not true of the US government’s influence 

or leverage over a foreign carrier enrolled in the CRAF. Currently, the only leverage the United States would have over a 

carrier is the suspension of its operating permit. Suspending 

a foreign carrier’s operating permit would mean it cannot 

operate within the United States, but it would still be able to 

operate in other countries. Besides limited US government 

leverage, foreign carriers could legally invoke the well-estab-
11

lished “sovereign compulsion” defense to refuse their CRAF 

obligations due to their government’s “compulsion.”41 Another concern with foreign ownership is the possibility that 

a foreign carrier refuses to participate due to fear of terrorist 

reprisals due to its partnership with the United States in 

providing assets to the CRAF.42 This is a result of the ongoing global war on terror and the multitude of countries and 

organizations with anti-American sentiments. Adding credibility to this concern are the photos below, which illustrate 

the damage to a DHL Airbus A300 that was struck by an 

SA-7 surface-to-air missile six miles from the Baghdad International Airport in November 2003.

43 With the cost of these 

limited assets so high, this argument cannot be ignored. 

SA-7 damage to DHL Airbus A300, 22 November 2007 (Reproduced 

from David D. Banholzer, “The Civil Reserve Air Fleet: A Vulnerable National Asset,” Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2006, 6.)

Finally, a worst-case scenario—a foreign carrier, following activation, withdraws from the CRAF altogether and 

“reflags” its aircraft to its country of origin.44 The best explanation of the legal concerns of US government leverage 

over foreign carriers was expressed by an aviation lawyer 

who stated that “in a game of poker, the US government has 

all the cards when playing with a US carrier. The game is 

entirely different when there is a foreign airline aligned with 

its government.”45 Beyond mere speculation, our military 

has firsthand experience with foreign carriers unwilling 

to participate or to fulfill their commitments. In both ODS 

and OIF, there were instances where committed foreign sea 

and air carriers either refused or caused critical delays in 

the delivery of cargo into the AOR. A stark example during 
12

ODS followed the initial Stage I activation when the combination of CRAF assets and organic capability was insufficient to meet requirements.46 The call went out from the 

Mobility Airlift Command (MAC) seeking additional air carriers. Remember that ODS was a coalition force, backed 

by the United Nations. Early volunteers included Kuwait 

Airways, JAL (Japanese Airlines), and KAL (Korean Airlines). Repeated attempts and requests for additional foreign carrier assistance, especially from the European allies, 

were unsuccessful.47 Of special note, although JAL agreed 

to provide aircraft, its aircrews refused to fly. In total, of 

the 5,061 sorties flown commercially during ODS, only 185 

were flown by foreign carriers.48

Subissue 3: Meeting CRAF Timelines

A third concern is the ability of foreign carriers to meet 

the CRAF activation timelines. Currently all CRAF-committed aircraft, upon notification of a call-up, are required to 

have their aircraft stateside and ready for a CRAF mission 

within 24 to 48 hours depending on which stage is being 

activated. These strict timelines are primarily for two reasons. First, if the CRAF is activated, the US military is in 

dire need of airlift to get either troops or equipment when 

and where needed. Second, these timelines are critical to 

the strategy and capability factors utilized by our military 

planners to make critical assumptions. With foreign carriers, their geographical locations could add hours to this 

critically time-sensitive requirement.49

Subissue 4: Crew Security Clearance Requirements

The fourth issue concerns foreign-owned airlines meeting crew and security requirements mandated by the CRAF. 

Airlines participating in the CRAF agree to supply a minimum of four fully qualified crew members per CRAF-committed aircraft. Each of these crew members must be able 

to obtain a US Secret security clearance. That requirement 

is necessary primarily because crews need access to Secret 

aircraft identification security codes, devices capable of encoding and decoding messages, and secure communication 

equipment. Since current restrictions do not allow foreign 
13

carriers to meet these requirements, the usefulness of foreign CRAF participants would be very limited without major 

changes to security procedures.50

Subissue 5: Safety

Many safety concerns are raised regarding foreign ownership within the CRAF. Besides regulatory oversight, a 

primary safety concern mentioned in a GAO report is that 

transferring large numbers of foreign aircraft to US registry would overwhelm the already “thinly stretched” Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA) safety inspection workforce, 

thus endangering the overall health of the nation’s air carrier 

system.51 This burden would also impact the DOD survey 

teams required to perform comprehensive, on-site inspections of every carrier’s aircraft, training facilities, maintenance procedures, quality control measures, and financial 

status before a carrier is approved for use in the CRAF.52

Finally, and most disturbing, while a Brattle Group foreign 

ownership study admits the safety issue would be a challenge, FAA officials stated that decisions on this issue should 

be based primarily on economic policy, not safety.53

Foreign Ownership

Options/Recommendations

No one can deny that the world is experiencing a shift to 

a global economy where almost every nation and business is 

interdependent with one another. The US military has also 

seen a shift from a containment strategy to one of global 

engagement. Unfortunately, as the military strategy of global 

engagement unfolds, the military continues to face shrinking 

budgets and a fleet of organic aircraft insufficient in number 

to meet these requirements. With the ever-changing nature 

of war, evolving requirements, and unknown threats, planning and forecasting future airlift requirements are difficult, 

to say the least. This issue is too important, too complicated, 

and lacks sufficient study for an educated, well-informed 

risk assessment to be made. Opening US air carriers to foreign investment is easy; guaranteeing that they will fulfill 

their CRAF obligation is the hard issue. Unless Congress 

stands firm on a “US only” CRAF program, the challenge for 
14

the DOD will be to develop, convey, and execute workable 

solutions that minimize the risks to national security while 

improving its relationship with both the DOT and civilian 

air carriers. This author believes there are options that, if 

executed properly, may permit increased foreign ownership 

and/or investment opportunities without jeopardizing the 

fundamental principal of the CRAF or US national security. 

Recommendation/Option 1: Conduct Formal

Survey and Open Dialogue 

As mentioned throughout this paper, foreign ownership 

within the CRAF is a very complicated issue with numerous 

players on a global scale. The first recommendation would 

be to formally survey foreign and domestic carriers to assess their willingness to participate in the CRAF, relay their 

concerns, and evaluate compatibility. A formal survey would 

establish a baseline and a better understanding of the issues 

for the DOD, DOT, and both domestic and foreign carriers. 

Such a survey would help define, identify, and clarify the 

full range of CRAF-specific contractual and activation concerns while examining both national and international laws 

and policies that may impact CRAF participation. It would 

help the DOD, DOT, and other appropriate agencies formulate specific guidelines and establish laws to ensure that if 

foreign investment in the CRAF program were allowed, the 

United States could continue to meet the requirements for 

air mobility without jeopardizing its national security.54

Recommendation/Option 2: Modify Current

Policies/Laws 

As discussed earlier, the United States faces a double standard in terms of legal leverage over US versus foreign carriers. 

Understandably, if the DOD is to be comfortable with foreign 

carriers in the CRAF program, the United States must have 

the same legal and regulatory authority over a foreign carrier 

as it does over a US carrier. Legal leverage with meaningful 

political or financial consequences is mandatory. One possible solution is US incorporation. Although not totally risk free, 

incorporation would provide better protection to the CRAF 

program by giving the US government similar legal leverage 

over foreign-owned carriers and US carriers by nullifying the 
15

“sovereign compulsion” defense.55 This is the key to CRAF and 

foreign involvement. Unless the US government can negate 

the concept that foreign ownership equates to sovereignty and 

circumvent the regulatory authority of foreign governments, 

there are no options that would guarantee reliance on foreignowned carriers during CRAF activation. 

Recommendation/Option 3: Make CRAF Participation 

Mandatory for Foreign Investors

No one disputes that CRAF participation places numerous 

financial burdens and risks upon carriers. So why should US 

carriers bear this burden alone? This proposal would make 

it mandatory for foreign carriers (or US carriers accepting 

foreign investment) to participate in the CRAF. Mandatory 

participation, backed by new and improved laws/policies, 

would help ensure that foreign investors truly understand 

the consequences of the CRAF and are willing to accept the 

associated risks inherent to the program. On the other side, a 

close look at how domestic carriers might react is warranted 

since this change may have unintended consequences. Because CRAF participation is very risky, some domestic carriers may opt not to renew their CRAF contracts in order gain a 

competitive advantage by avoiding possible CRAF activation, 

the burden that their new competitors must maintain.56

Recommendation/Option 4: Compromise on 

Foreign Ownership Restrictions

According to a transportation group study, raising the investment opportunity to 40 percent would show good faith 

while still allowing US majority control.57 Besides good faith, 

this could also provide critical income to economically struggling US airlines, which lost an estimated $42 billion in the 

first five years of this century alone.58 However, raising the 

investment opportunity also increases the risk factor for the 

investor while providing no increase of authority.59

Recommendation/Option 5: Require the DOT 

to Adopt National Security Criteria

This option goes right to the heart of the argument that 

DOD has been somewhat remiss in its involvement concern-
16

ing the foreign ownership issue within the CRAF. The concept behind the national security criteria is that the DOD 

would have a consultative role in either denying or revoking 

an airline’s authority due to its inputs.60 A recent GAO report 

stated that the DOD must become more involved in shaping 

US foreign investment policy. Of course there are differing 

opinions between the DOD and DOT on interpretation of 

policy and coordination procedures regarding foreign ownership and potential CRAF implications. In a perfect world, 

the DOD should be notified by the DOT whenever a review 

arises concerning a CRAF issue/asset. According to the GAO 

report, the DOT does not currently solicit DOD inputs on 

foreign ownership issues. This is understandable since there 

is currently no provision that allows the DOT to deny or revoke an airline’s authorization due to national security.61

Although the DOD is a member of the Committee on Foreign 

Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which can make 

recommendations to the president on foreign investments, it 

still lacks that national security consultation piece. 

Recommendation/Option 6: Adopt the Voluntary

Intermodal Sealift Agreement 

The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) was 

established in 1997 and was benchmarked from the CRAF 

program. Basically, VISA is a seagoing CRAF (cargo only) 

that ensures the DOD has US-flagged vessels during times 

of national emergency.62 While there are similarities, they 

are superficial. Besides the huge difference in delivery time 

(three to four weeks vs. two days), activation is different. 

With the CRAF, the entire asset (aircraft) is activated and 

under the control of the DOD. On the other hand, VISA is 

capacity-controlled—the carrier can combine military cargo 

with commercial cargo. Another reason the United States 

utilizes foreign-flagged ships that meet US “citizenship” requirements is that, unlike the thousands of US aircraft, the 

majority of civilian-owned ships are foreign flagged.63 Other 

differences that have considerable impact involve the basic 

logistics of sealift versus airlift. Sealift can function somewhat autonomously, avoiding many of the political barriers 

such as airport restrictions, international overflight clearances, crew security, and communication requirements. 
17

The VISA concept was first utilized during ODS. While 

considered a success, USTRANSCOM’s sealift experience 

during this period illustrates the risks associated with foreign carriers “balking” during wartime. During the conflict, 

13 foreign-flagged vessels carrying critical wartime cargo either delayed or refused to deliver their cargo.64 Finally, there 

has been some recent turbulence between foreign carriers 

and Congress concerning contractual terms and control issues, many similar to those currently facing the CRAF.65

Recommendation/Option 7: Maintain the Status Quo

Many believe the laws enacted almost 70 years ago are 

obsolete in today’s global economy, and to a certain degree 

our airlines are already operating with foreign partners. 

With this perception, many foreign and domestic airlines 

are actively campaigning for increased liberalization of foreign investment restrictions while at the same time exploring ways to work around current laws. An October 2007 

article in the Salt Lake Tribune reported that foreign and 

domestic airlines are beginning to form alliances in a sort 

of “end-run” around foreign-ownership laws. Most recently, 

Delta and Air France–KLM formed an alliance that will allow 

them to share an estimated $8 billion in revenues in transAtlantic flights. Airline analyst Michael Derchin stated this 

is as close to a merger as you can get, with the airlines now 

able to sit down and legally collude pricing, scheduling, and 

marketing.66 Although the US airlines are not legally owned 

or controlled by foreign companies, these alliances, mergers, agreements, and code sharing are a clear indicator of 

future trends in commercial air transportation. 

While maintaining the status quo is an option, the United 

States’ position as the global hegemon puts it in a unique 

situation where national security considerations must come 

before economics. As civilian carriers continue to press for 

liberalization, they fail to realize that they are jeopardizing the 

very blanket of security that they rely on for their survival.

Recommendation/Option 8: Reduce CRAF 

Dependency

In a worst–case scenario where increased foreign ownership restrictions are lifted by the DOT and Congress does 
18

not block this move, how can the US military mitigate the 

risk of insufficient airlift capabilities, or more importantly, 

how does it wean itself from dependency on the CRAF? 

A recent congressional report on strategic airlift provides 

multiple options worth mentioning. 

First, modernize the aging organic mobility assets and/or 

purchase additional C-17s.67 Of course, as mentioned above, 

the cost of procuring and operating the required number of 

aircraft to fill the CRAF gap, in today’s budget, would be cost 

prohibitive. A second option is to seek new alternatives to commercial and organic aircraft. An area of study that has shown 

great promise for moving large payloads over long distances 

is the hybrid airship.68 Recent developments and advances 

in technology make hybrid airships a promising alternative, 

with payloads ranging from 500 tons and speeds exceeding 

100 miles per hour. Not bound by expensive or specialized 

infrastructure needed for aircraft, airships could deliver large 

payloads closer to the fight and with greater flexibility, to include landing on water in support of the Navy.69 A third, and 

arguably the most commonsense, option is to reduce airlift 

requirements.70 All services must continue a concerted effort 

to explore options that reduce their airlift mobility footprint. 

This can be accomplished with either increased prepositioning or by reducing weight, size, or equipment requirements. 

It is imperative that the military continue to study and focus 

on speed, agility, and flexibility. Examining ways to improve 

in these areas should help lead to reductions in airlift deployment requirements. A final option offered by the congressional report is for the military to operate solely within its organic 

airlift capability.71 The report debates whether the current requirements in MRS-05 are realistic, as it is based on a worstcase scenario. This option will require a huge “assumed risk” 

factor and a monumental effort from military planners to reevaluate and replan mobility requirements. 

Conclusion

The issue of foreign ownership and its impact on the 

CRAF should be a major concern for the DOD. The multitude of reasons why this problem is not going away includes 

slow recapitalization of aircraft, an aging mobility fleet, decreasing budgets, changing force structures, expanding 
19

missions, and the global security and economic environments, to name just a few. The United States has been in 

conflict for the last 17 years, with estimates of at least 10 

more years of sustained involvement in the USCENTCOM 

AOR alone.72 At best, the DOD is in a reactive mode, as 

major decisions on foreign ownership have already been 

set in motion and one GAO report goes so far as to say 

our senior military leadership has “no official position” on 

the subject.73 Widespread acceptance that globalization is 

unavoidable, combined with the military’s increasing appetite for and reliance on civilian airlift, means that the DOD 

must find ways to manage and mitigate the inherent risks 

associated with foreign ownership within the CRAF. These 

concerns are warranted, but no problem is insurmountable 

with creative thinking, additional research, and proactive 

consultation among principles. The United States can ill 

afford to have its national security jeopardized by adopting 

policies based on untested, economically based initiatives. 

Finally, the primary key to successful resolution of the 

CRAF issue is a stronger working relationship between the 

DOT and DOD. The DOT and DOD must work together to 

resolve and balance the US military and economic health—

the nation’s future depends on it. 

Notes

1. Gen Richard B. Meyers, USAF, ed., The National Military Strategy of 

the United States of America (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), 23.

2. Christopher Bolkcom, ed., Strategic Airlift Modernization: Background, Issues and Options, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report 

to Congress (Washington, DC: CRS, 2005), 3.

3. David Graham, Sustaining the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2003), 1.

4. Air Mobility Command (AMC), U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet: Civil Reserve 

Air Fleet, 1, http://www.amc.af.mil/library/factsheets.

5. Christopher Bolkcom, ed., Civil Reserve Air Fleet, CRS Report to

Congress (Washington, DC: CRS, 2006), crs-1.

6. Ibid. 

7. Graham, Sustaining the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program, 3.

8. Michael Spehar and Kevin Spradling, “White Paper on Increased 

Foreign Ownership of U.S. Airlines” (Scott AFB, IL: AMC, 2007), 1.

9. Ronald N. Priddy, A History of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet in Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Desert Sortie (Washington, DC: DOD 
20

Policy Board on Federal Aviation, Volpe National Transportation Systems 

Center, 1994), 13.

10. Congressional Budget Office, Moving U.S. Forces: Options for Strategic Mobility (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], 1997), 1.

11. Graham, Sustaining the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program, 3.

12. William R. Tefteller, “Strategic Airlift Support for U.S. Forces Deployment to Operation Desert Shield” (Washington, DC: Industrial College 

of the Armed Forces [ICAF], 1991), Abstract.

13. Maj David D. Banholzer, USAF, “The Civil Reserve Air Fleet: A Vulnerable National Asset” (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2006), 3.

14. Marty Kauchak, “Filling the Gaps,” Military Logistics Forum 2, no. 1

(February 2007): 2, http://www.military-logistics-forum.com/article.cfm?Doc 

ID=2066.

15. House Armed Services Committee (HASC), Air Force and Army Airlift 

and Aerial Re-Fueling Fixed-Wing Aircraft Programs, 2007, 7. 

16. Ibid.

17. John A. Tirpak, “The Airlift Gap,” Air Force Magazine, October 2004, 1.

18. HASC, Air Force and Army Airlift and Aerial Re-Fueling Programs, 8.

19. HASC, Seapower Committee, Force Structure Impacts on Fleet and 

Strategic Lift Operations, 13 October 1999, 6.

20. James P. Sturch, “Strategic Airlift: Strengths and Weaknesses” 

(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 1999), 12.

21. AMC, Fact Sheet, 2.

22. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Airline Competition: Impact of Changing Foreign Investment and Control Limits on U.S. Airlines

(Washington, DC: GAO, 1992), 62.

23. Graham, Sustaining the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program, 1.

24. Christopher Furlan, Air Cargo Foreign Ownership Restrictions in the 

United States (Miami, FL: University of Miami School of Law, 2006), 2.

25. Spehar and Spradling, “White Paper,” 4. 

26. GAO, Airline Competition, 12.

27. GAO, Issues Relating to Foreign Investment and Control of U.S. Airlines (Washington, DC: GAO, 2003).

28. Furlan, Air Cargo Foreign Ownership Restrictions, 16.

29. ICAF, 2004 Transportation Industry (Washington, DC: ICAF, National Defense University, 2004), 12.

30. Jeff Mason, “EU Backs ‘Open Skies’ Pact,” Reuters, 22 March 

2007.

31. Diane M. Grassi, “EU Renews Pressure over U.S. Airline Ownership,” 

Newsback (5 November 2006): 2, http://www.newsback.com/forums/news 

-5570.

32. ALPA, “Timeline of Opposition to Foreign Control of U.S. Airlines,” 

1, http://www.alpa.org/desktopmodules/alpa_documents. 

33. DeFazio, Peter, “Lawmakers Urge Administration to Drop Proposed 

Foreign Ownership of Port Operations & U.S. Airlines,” press release, 3

March 2006.

34. ALPA, “Timeline of Opposition,” 2. 

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., 3.

37. Furlan, Air Cargo Foreign Ownership Restrictions, 17.
21

38. GAO, Airline Competition, 50.

39. Spehar and Spradling, “White Paper,” 7.

40. Boaz Moselle et al., The Economic Impact of an EU-US Open Aviation 

Area (Washington, DC: Brattle Group, December 2002), 7–15. 

41. Ibid. 

42. GAO, Airline Competition, 52.

43. Banholzer, “Civil Reserve Air Fleet,” 6.

44. Moselle et al., Economic Impact, 7–11.

45. Ibid., 7–9.

46. Priddy, History of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, 221.

47. Ibid., 234.

48. Ibid., 238.

49. Spehar and Spradling, “White Paper,” 2–3.

50. GAO, Airline Competition, 62–63.

51. Ibid., 65.

52. Spehar and Spradling, “White Paper,” 3.

53. Dorothy Robyn, James Reitzes, and Boaz Moselle, Beyond Open Skies: 

The Economic Impact of a US-EU Open Aviation Area (Washington, DC: Brattle 

Group, 2002), 70, http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/open_skies.pdf.

54. L. Nicholas Lacey, Robert Agnew, and Larry Knickerbocker, Alternatives to Sustain the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (Alexandria, VA: Institute for 

Defense Analyses, 2003), A-18. 

55. Moselle et al., Economic Impact, 7–11.

56. GAO, Airline Competition, 57–58.

57. ICAF, 2004 Transportation Industry, 14.

58. HASC, Subcommittee on Aviation, Current Situation and Future Outlook 

of U.S. Commercial Airline Industry, 1st Session, 28 September 2005, 1.

59. Graham, Sustaining the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program, B-32.

60. GAO, Airline Competition, 65. 

61. Ibid., 59. 

62. Daniel V. Coulter, “The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement: 

Strategic Transportation for National Defense,” Transportation Journal, 22 

September 2000, 1, http://www.allbusiness.com/operations/shipping/ 

716306-1.html.

63. Moselle et al., Economic Impact, 7–14. 

64. James K. Matthews, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast, 4th ed. 

(Washington, DC: GPO , 1996), 136. 

65. Moselle et al., Economic Impact, 7–13.

66. “Air France, Delta Fly High under Open Skies,” Salt Lake Tribune, 

20 October 2007, 1, http://sltrib.com/ci_7235900.

67. Bolkcom, Strategic Airlift Modernization, crs-3.

68. Ibid., crs-4.

69. Ibid., crs-5. 

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., crs-6.

72. HASC, Hearing on Air Force Strategic Initiatives, 24 Oct 2007, 1.

73. GAO, Issues Relating to Foreign Investment and Control of U.S. Airlines (Washington, DC: GAO, 2003), 6.

May OFFICE OF EMERGENCY TRANSPORTATION Enclosure 1

2007 CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET (CRAF) MONTHLY ALLOCATIONS

INTERNATIONAL LONG-RANGE PASSENGER (ILP) INTERNATIONAL SHORT-RANGE PASSENGER (ISP)ILP Segment AAL AMT COA DAL HAL NAO NWA OAE RYN UAL USA WOA TOTAL ISP Segment AAL ASA AMT BSK CCP COA DAL GWY JBU RYN SCX SWG SWI UAL TOTALA-300 Series 34 9 43 A-319 0A-330 Series 26 26 A-320-200 21 21DC-10-30 9 1 10 B-727-200/B 8 8B-747-200 3 3 B-737 Series 52 12 6 4 74B-747-400 16 30 46 B-757-200 16 73 89B-757 Series 123 10 48 5 2 84 272 MD-80 Series 50 15 65B-767-200ER 71 14 4 2 1 92 TOTAL 50 67 28 6 8 0 73 0 21 0 4 0 0 13 270B-767-300 Series 29 7 1 23 60B-767-400 21 21 INTERNATIONAL SHORT-RANGE CARGO (ISC)B-777-200 47 8 52 107 ISC Segment ABX DHL EIA LYC NAC XNA TOTALL1011 Series 4 4 A-300-B4F 9 9MD-11 6 6 B-727-100F 0

 TOTAL 275 14 62 58 7 10 45 11 2 189 10 7 690 B-727-200F 1 1

B-737-200 1 1

INTERNATIONAL LONG-RANGE CARGO (ILC) B767-200 1 1ILC Segment ABX APW ATN CKS DAL DHL EIA FDX GCO GTI MUA NWA PAC SOO UPS WOA TOTAL DC-9-33F 0DC-8-62 CB 3 3 L-100-30 1 1DC-8-63 F 3 3 1 7 TOTAL 2 9 0 1 1 0 13DC-8-70F Series 15 8 1 24DC-10-10C/F 19 19 NATIONAL- DOMESTIC (DOM)DC-10-30F 2 7 2 11 DOM Segment AWE FFT MEP SWA TRS TOTALB-747-100F 6 5 2 13 A-319-100 3 3B-747-200F 10 8 14 14 9 3 58 A-320-200 7 7B-747-300F 1 1 B-737-300 23 1 24B-747-400F 11 6 17 B-757-200 1 1B-767-200SF 11 11 MD-80 Series 2 2B-767-400ER 0 TOTAL 8 3 2 23 1 37L-1011-200F 0MD-10/11F-CF 118 4 9 5 136 NATIONAL-ALASKA (AAC)

 TOTAL 14 5 18 16 0 8 13 137 11 26 2 14 6 9 14 7 300 AAC Segment LYC NAC TOTAL AEROMEDICAL (AERO)

DC-6 Series 2 2 AERO Segment AAL DAL UAL USA TOTALL-100-30 2 2 B-767-200ER 9 0

 TOTAL 2 2 4 B-767-300ER 29 12 9

0 29 12 9 9

CARRIER LEGEND

AAL - AMERICAN AIRLINES COA - CONTINENTAL JBU- JET BLUE SCX - SUN COUNTRY AIRLINES SUMMARYABX - ABX AIR DAL - DELTA AIRLINES LYC - LYNDEN AIR CARGO SOO - SOUTHERN AIR Past CurrentAMT- ATA AIRLINES DHL - DHL AIRWAYS MEP- MIDWEST AIRLINES SWA - SOUTHWEST Mo. Mo.APW - ARROW AIR EIA - EVERGREEN MUA-MURRAY AIR SWI - SUNWORLD INTERNATIONAL April Change May ASA - ALASKA AIRLINES FDX - FEDERAL EXPRESS NAC - NORTHERN AIR CARCO UAL - UNITED AIRLINES ILP 690 690ATN - AIR TRANSPORT INTL FFT - FRONTIER AIRLINES NAO - NORTH AMERICAN AIRLINES UPS - UNITED PARCEL ILC 299 1 300AWE - AMERICA WEST AIRLINES GCO - GEMINI AIR CARGO NWA- NORTHWEST USA - U.S. AIRWAYS ISP 270 270BSK - MIAMI AIR INT'L. GTI - ATLAS AIR OAE-OMNI AIR INTERNATIONAL WOA - WORLD ISC 12 1 13CCP - CHAMPION AIR GWY - USA 3000 AIRLINES PAC - POLAR AIR CARGO XNA - EXPRESS.NET DOM 37 37CKS - KALITTA AIR HAL - HAWAIIAN AIRLINES RYN - RYAN INTNL AIRLINES AAC 4 4

AERO 50 50

NEW CARRIER in BOLD **= CARRIER DROPPED OUT TOTAL 1362 1364

U.S. DOT, Office of the Secretary of Transportation

TOTAL

Appendix

CRAF Monthly Allocations - May 2007

Reproduced from DOT, Transportation Emergency Management, 1.

25

Bibliography

“Air France, Delta Fly High under Open Skies.” Salt Lake 

Tribune, 20 October 2007. http://sltrib.com/ci_723 

5900.

Air Line Pilots Association. “Timeline of Opposition to Foreign Control of U.S. Airlines.” http://www.alpa.org/

desktopmodules/alpa_documents.

Air Mobility Command (AMC). U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet: Civil 

Reserve Air Fleet. http://www.amc.af.mil/library/fact 

sheets.

Banholzer, David D. “The Civil Reserve Air Fleet: A Vulnerable 

National Asset.” Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2006.

Bolkcom, Christopher, ed. Civil Reserve Air Fleet. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report to Congress. 

Washington, DC: CRS, 2006.

———. Strategic Airlift Modernization: Background, Issues 

and Options. CRS Report to Congress. Washington, 

DC: CRS, 2005.

Congressional Budget Office. Moving U.S. Forces: Options 

for Strategic Mobility. Washington, DC: Government 

Printing Office (GPO), 1997.

Coulter, Daniel V. “The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement: Strategic Transportation for National Defense.” 

Transportation Journal, 22 September 2000. http://

www.allbusiness.com/operations/shipping/716306-

1.html.

DeFazio, Peter. “Lawmakers Urge Administration to Drop 

Proposed Foreign Ownership of Port Operations & U.S. 

Airlines.” Press release, 3 March 2006. http://www

.defazio.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&t

ask=view&id=43&Itemid=65.

Department of Transportation.Transportation Emergency 

Management. http://www.dot.gov/ost/oet/craf/index.

html.

Furlan, Christopher. Air Cargo Foreign Ownership Restrictions in the United States. Miami, FL: University of Miami School of Law, 2006.

Government Accountability Office (GAO). Airline Competition: Impact of Changing Foreign Investment and Control 

Limits on U.S. Airlines. Washington, DC: GAO, 1992.
26

———. Issues Relating to Foreign Investment and Control of 

U.S. Airlines. Washington, DC: GAO, 2003.

Graham, David. Sustaining the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 

2003.

Grassi, Diane M. “EU Renews Pressure over U.S. Airline 

Ownership.” Newsback, 5 November 2006. http://

www.newsback.com/forums/news-5570.

House Armed Services Committee. Air Force and Army Airlift and Aerial Re-Fueling Fixed-Wing Aircraft Programs, 

2007.

———. Hearing on Air Force Strategic Initiatives, 24 October 2007.

———, Seapower Committee. Force Structure Impacts on 

Fleet and Strategic Lift Operations, 13 October 1999.

———, Subcommittee on Aviation. Current Situation and 

Future Outlook of U.S. Commercial Airline Industry, 1st 

Session, 28 September 2005.

Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF). 2004 Transportation Industry. Washington, DC: ICAF, National 

Defense University, 2004.

Kauchak, Marty. “Filling the Gaps.” Military Logistics Forum

2, no. 1 (February 2007). http://www.military-logistics

-forum.com/article.cfm?DocID=2066.

Lacey, L. Nicholas, Robert Agnew, and Larry Knickerbocker. 

Alternatives to Sustain the Civil Reserve Air Fleet. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2003.

Mason, Jeff. “EU Backs ‘Open Skies’ Pact.” Reuters, 22 

March 2007. http://uk.reuters.com/article/topNews/

idUKL2227299520070322?feedType=RSS.

Matthews, James K. So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast. 4th 

ed. Washington, DC: GPO, 1996.

Meyers, Richard B. The National Military Strategy of the 

United States of America. Washington, DC: Department of Defense (DOD), Office of the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004.

Moselle, Boaz, James Reitzes, Dorothy Robyn, and John 

Horn. The Economic Impact of an EU-US Open Aviation Area. Washington, DC: Brattle Group, December 

2002.

Priddy, Ronald N. A History of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

in Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Desert 
27

Sortie. Washington, DC: DOD Policy Board on Federal 

Aviation, Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 1994.

Robyn, Dorothy, James Reitzes, and Boaz Moselle. Beyond 

Open Skies: The Economic Impact of a US-EU Open 

Aviation Area. Washington, DC: Brattle Group, 2002. 

http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/open_skies.pdf.

Spehar, Michael, and Kevin Spradling. “White Paper on 

Increased Foreign Ownership of U.S. Airlines.” Scott 

AFB, IL: AMC, 2007.

Sturch, James P. Strategic Airlift: Strengths and Weaknesses. 

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 1999.

Tefteller, William R. “Strategic Airlift Support for U.S. Forces 

Deployment to Operation Desert Shield.” Washington, 

DC: ICAF, 1991.

Tirpak, John A. “The Airlift Gap.” Air Force Magazine, October 2004. 

Westenhoff, Charles M. Military Airpower: A Revised Digest 

of Airpower Opinions and Thoughts. Maxwell AFB, AL: 

Air University Press, 2007.