United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

February 1997 FORCE STRUCTURE

Army Support Forces

Can Meet Two-Conflict

Strategy With Some

Risks

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-97-66

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-272600 

February 28, 1997

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

This report discusses how the Army determines its support force requirements, and the results

of its most recent process for allocating support forces, known as Total Army Analysis 2003. It

also discusses the Army’s progress to streamline its infrastructure or institutional force

structure. We are sending this report to you in response to a provision of the fiscal year 1996

National Defense Authorization Act requiring us to review these issues and report our results to

Congress by March 1. The information in this report should be useful to your Committees in

their deliberations on the future size and composition of the Army. This report contains

recommendations to the Secretary of the Army.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and

the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on

request.

If you or your staff have any questions on this report, please call me on (202) 512-3504. Major

contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis
Executive Summary

Purpose In the last 2 fiscal years, the Army has drawn down its active military

forces from 540,000 to 495,000. A key issue that has evolved is whether the

Army’s active end strength should be reduced to achieve savings to help

pay for force modernization. In 1996, Congress established an active Army

military personnel end strength floor of 495,000 out of concern that further

downsizing would impair the Army’s ability to support the national

military strategy of responding to two nearly simultaneous major regional

conflicts (MRC), as well as deploying to operations other than war (OOTW).

As the first of a series of congressionally required reviews of Army end

strength issues, GAO reviewed (1) the extent to which the Army’s process

for assessing its active and reserve support forces resulted in sufficient

support force structure to meet the requirements of the two-MRC scenario

and OOTWs; (2) whether the Army’s streamlining initiatives have identified

opportunities to reduce Army personnel resources devoted to institutional

functions; and (3) the feasibility of reducing active Army end strength, a

matter Congress will review when it deliberates future Army end strength

authorizations.

Background Most of the active Army is divided between operational (63 percent) and

institutional forces (25 percent), with the remainder of the force in

temporary status, such as students (12 percent). Historically, these

percentages have remained relatively constant. Operational forces are

generally those forces that deploy to MRCs and other military operations.

The operational force is further divided into the 10 war-fighting divisions

and 2 armored cavalry regiments, and the deployable combat support and

combat service support units needed to sustain this force in wartime.

Combat support includes such specialties as chemical, engineering,

military intelligence, and military police, while combat service support

includes specialties such as transportation, medical, finance,

quartermaster, and ordnance. The institutional force, called the Table of

Distribution and Allowances (TDA) force, provides generally

nondeployable support to the Army infrastructure, including training,

doctrine development, base operations, supply, and maintenance.

The Army uses different processes to determine requirements and allocate

resources to each portion of the active Army. Combat forces are

determined by defense guidance, which establishes the number of

divisions, and Army doctrine, which establishes the number and type of

forces dedicated to those divisions. The Army uses a process known as

Total Army Analysis (TAA) to determine the number and types of support

units needed to support the Army’s combat forces and to allocate

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Executive Summary

personnel authorizations to required units. TAA results are determined

biennially. For example, TAA 2003, which was completed in January 1996,

projects requirements through the year 2003. Resourcing decisions made

as a result of TAA are used to develop future Army budgets. Requirements

for the Army’s institutional forces are determined outside the TAA process

and are allocated largely at the major command level.

In 1995, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), motivated by a need

to identify additional funds for Army modernization, directed the Army to

reduce its end strength to 475,000 by 1999 based on the potential for

achieving efficiencies under the Army’s Force XXI redesign initiative.1 OSD

projected this lower Army end strength by 1999 in the Fiscal Year 1997

Future Years Defense Program. The Future Years Defense Program is an

authoritative record of current and projected force structure, costs, and

personnel levels that have been approved by the Secretary of Defense. The

Army was opposed to reducing its active end strength by 20,000 and was

permitted to reallocate funds in its proposed budget for fiscal years 1998

through 2003 to remain at an active end strength of 495,000.

Results in Brief It does not appear feasible to have a smaller active Army support force at

this time because this could increase the Army’s risk of carrying out

current defense policy. However, new initiatives being explored by the

Army regarding its combat and institutional forces could lead to a smaller

active force in the future. Further, improvements in the requirements

determination process for both support forces and institutional forces

could provide greater assurance that the size and composition of the Army

is appropriate to meet war-fighting needs.

On the basis of TAA 2003 results, the Army believes it can deploy sufficient

support forces to meet the requirements of two nearly simultaneous MRCs

with moderate risk. The Army’s assessment of risk is based on several

factors. First, because it lacks adequate active support forces and must

rely on reserve forces that take more time to be readied to deploy, an

estimated 79,000 support forces needed in the first 30 days would arrive

late. Second, support forces needed for the second conflict would consist

of only 12-percent active forces. High reliance on reserves for use in the

second MRC may entail risk if the second MRC occurs without warning, or if

mobilization is delayed. Third, existing active support units are short

1

The Army’s initiative to redesign its combat divisions and incorporate information age technology on

the battlefield is known as Force XXI. As part of Force XXI, the Army is also examining ways to

streamline and re-engineer its institutional force.

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Executive Summary

another 19,200 required positions and some required support units exist

only on paper.

However, TAA 2003 had some limitations and the Army’s risk assessment

depends largely on the assumptions and model inputs that were adopted

for TAA 2003. The Army used many favorable assumptions that, although

consistent with defense guidance, understated risk. For example, it

assumed that forces committed to OOTWs would be immediately available

to redeploy and U.S. forces would have immediate access to overseas

ports and airfields. Less optimistic assumptions would have led to higher

support requirements. On the other hand, the Army did not use all

available resources to satisfy its unmet support force requirements, such

as support forces that currently exist in the Army’s eight National Guard

divisions and the active Army’s institutional forces, and support available

from outside contractors and defense civilians. The Army could have used

these personnel to meet some of its requirements for later deploying units

that exist only on paper. Nonetheless, considering these assets would not

solve the Army’s shortage of active support forces to meet its

requirements during the first 30 days of the first MRC.

The Army’s recent efforts to streamline the institutional active Army by

identifying better ways to organize and adopt more efficient business

practices have identified up to 4,000 military positions that the Army plans

to use to offset active support shortfalls. Moreover, the Army is continuing

its streamlining efforts and may reduce the number of major commands,

which could result in some additional force savings in the future.

However, the Army’s efforts to make its institutional force more efficient

and potentially smaller are hampered by long-standing weaknesses in its

process to determine institutional force requirements. Specifically, many

of the Army’s institutional requirements are not determined through an

analysis of workload to include analyzing what work needs to be done

based on mission and assessing how processes can be improved. Such

analysis, when combined with the Army’s efforts to re-engineer its overall

organization through functional assessments, would help the Army

determine how big its force needs to be and allocate resources efficiently

toward its highest priority institutional needs.

GAO’s analysis indicates that the Department of Defense (DOD) has not

supported its proposal to reduce the active Army to 475,000 by 1999 with

sound analysis. Neither TDA streamlining nor the Army’s ongoing Force

XXI combat forces redesign initiative will achieve sufficient end strength

savings to permit a 20,000-cut by 1999. However, the Army might be able to

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Executive Summary

achieve efficiencies and further reduce the size of its active institutional

force in the future by reducing the number of major commands and

adopting workload-based requirements. Moreover, the Army’s combat

redesign effort may eventually reduce requirements for active combat

forces by capitalizing on digital technology and more efficient logistics

concepts. Other options to restructure the Army’s combat forces also

exist. For example, some variant of the former reserve round-out concept,

perhaps at the battalion level rather than brigade level, could reduce the

number of active personnel committed to combat divisions. DOD has an

opportunity to explore these and other alternatives during its Quadrennial

Defense Review of defense strategy and force structure mandated by the

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997.

Principal Findings

The Army Can Support

Two MRCs With Moderate

Risk

TAA is the Army’s process to determine the number and types of support

units it needs to execute the national military strategy and to allocate the

Army’s personnel authorizations, both active and reserve, among these

support force requirements to minimize war-fighting risks. The Army

defines war-fighting risk as

• forces needed in the first 30 days of the first MRC, which would arrive late;

• insufficient active component support forces for the second MRC;

• required units for which no personnel have been authorized or required

units that exist, but have been allocated fewer positions than required; and

• the number of anticipated casualties for a given force.

Based on TAA 2003 results, the Army believes it can provide support forces

for two MRCs at a moderate level of risk. However, moderate risk means

that about 79,000 support forces needed in the first 30 days of the first MRC

would arrive late because the Army lacks sufficient numbers of active

support forces to meet its requirements and must rely on reserve forces

that generally require more than 30 days to mobilize and deploy. Late

support forces represent 30 percent of the 260,000 total authorized Army

force needed during this time period, and 42 percent of the Army support

forces required. DOD officials believe that even if it were possible to

replace reservists with active support personnel during the first 30 days,

some forces would still arrive late due to strategic lift constraints during

that time frame.

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Executive Summary

The Army also found that support forces required for the second MRC will

consist of only about 12 percent of the active forces compared with 

47 percent in the first MRC. The risk of late arrival would apply here if

mobilization of reserve forces was delayed. In addition, existing active

units have been authorized 19,200 fewer positions than Army wartime

needs require because total Army requirements exceed authorized

personnel. Also, units required by Army doctrine totaling 58,400 support

positions were not allocated any personnel and exist only on paper. The

Army estimates that support from host nations could meet over 14,000 of

this shortfall, reducing the Army’s shortage to about 44,000. The Army also

plans to implement an option developed by the Army National Guard

Division Redesign Study to convert 42,700 Army National Guard combat

division positions to required support positions. This option would

eliminate most of the remaining shortage, but will cost up to $2.8 billion

and could take many years to complete. Finally, TAA modeled risk in terms

of expected casualties. (Casualty numbers are classified.)

Some Modeling Assumptions

Understated Support

Requirements

During TAA, many of the Army’s key assumptions in modeling the two MRCs

were identical or similar to assumptions cited in defense guidance. Some

of these assumptions were favorable; that is, they minimized risk to U.S.

forces. If less favorable assumptions were used, force requirements would

be even greater. For example, TAA 2003 assumed

• immediate access to all ports and airfields in the theater of operations,

• rapid decision-making by the national command authorities to mobilize

reserve forces and activate the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, and

• limited use of chemical weapons employed against U.S. forces.

Support force requirements also would have been higher had the Army

considered support force requirements for coalition partners.

Also, TAA 2003 requirements do not adequately reflect the U.S. role in

OOTWs. The Army bases its force structure on fighting two MRCs and

assumes those forces will be adequate to support OOTWs. This is consistent

with defense guidance. As a result, the Army assumed that it could extract

as many as 15,000 troops engaged in an OOTW and redeploy them so that

they would be available for the early phases of an MRC. Commanders in

Chief of the European, Central, and Atlantic Commands, as well as some

Army officials, are concerned that not allowing for delays associated with

the extraction and redeployment of these forces, as well as a degradation

in capability from OOTWs is unrealistic. However, unless defense guidance

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Executive Summary

changes, the Army has no plans to change its approach to OOTWs in TAA

2005, which is now underway.

Available Support Personnel

Were Excluded From TAA

Process

TAA does not include all available personnel in arriving at its resourcing

decisions, missing opportunities to mitigate risk. For example, the Army

did not include support forces in the eight Army National Guard divisions

that the Army does not envision using during a two-conflict scenario. In

1995, GAO recommended that as part of TAA 2003, the Army identify the

specific unfilled support requirements that could be met using the support

forces embedded in these divisions and develop a plan to employ this

capability.2

 Army officials indicated that the Army would use these

personnel if needed, but to date, they have not been considered in the TAA

process. The Army also did not include the potential use of TDA military

personnel (with the exception of medical forces) or defense civilians, even

though, in some instances, these personnel can and do deploy, sometimes

on very short notice. Finally, TAA did not determine how much of the

Army’s requirement could be met through the Logistics Civil Augmentation

Program, which the Army has been using to provide logistical and

construction support to overseas operations. However, most of the above

personnel would not be available in the first 30 days of the first MRC.

Therefore, the Army will not be able to rely on them to meet its early

deployment needs.

TAA is an analytically rigorous process that relies on extensive modeling

and the judgment of senior Army officials to derive the composition of the

Army’s support force. However, some aspects of TAA’s methodology could

be improved. For example, not all TAA model inputs were scrutinized to

ensure they were free from error; the process does not easily

accommodate changes that occur during its 2-year implementation cycle;

and senior leaders do not prioritize deficiencies that remain and develop

action plans to mitigate risk. In addition, TAA models are run in the early

stages of the process using the required force structure to fight the war.

The Army does not rerun its models at the conclusion of the requirements

determination phase to further assess how mobility limitations affect risk.

2

Force Structure: Army National Guard Divisions Could Augment Wartime Support Capability

(GAO/NSIAD-95-80, Mar. 2, 1995).

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Executive Summary

The Army Plans to

Eliminate Some

Institutional Military

Positions but Is

Constrained by a Weak

Requirements Process

About 25 percent of the Army’s active positions are allocated to the Army’s

institutional force. However, long-standing weaknesses in the institutional

force requirements determination process leave the Army unable to ensure

that military personnel are being used efficiently and assess what risks

would be assumed by eliminating TDA positions. Also, allocating positions

based on available budgets, without defining workload requirements, leads

to across-the-board cuts that reduce funds available to all commands

irrespective of relative need. Senior Army officials acknowledged that the

Army’s limited progress in defining TDA in terms of workload remains a

weakness, and GAO found varying levels of compliance with

workload-based standards at the major commands that GAO contacted.

Senior Army officials are taking steps to promote workload-based

requirements by increasing its review of major commands’ requirements

determination processes and establishing a methodology to analyze what

work needs to be done based on mission and how to improve processes

through better methods, benchmarking, capital investment, automation,

and improved facilities. The Army is also pilot testing an automated

system to collect and analyze workload information and monitor

efficiency. However, the long-standing weakness with the Army’s process,

despite numerous efforts to improve it, suggest that a higher level of

reporting and oversight may be warranted. The Army has not reported its

historic lack of compliance with its workload-based allocation policy as a

material weakness under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act

(P.L. 97-255). Policy implementing the act requires agencies to report

material weaknesses that significantly weaken safeguards against waste.

The Army could potentially transfer up to 4,000 authorized positions from

its institutional force to its support force as a result of its initial

institutional streamlining initiatives and some recent policy decisions. TAA

2003 had anticipated shifting 2,000 of those positions to offset unmet

support requirements. Army officials said that the remaining positions will

also be transferred to fill support force shortfalls, but they could not

specify which units. However, many of the potential transfers are based on

plans that have not been finalized and cannot be counted on with

certainty.

Some potential to further reduce institutional forces may exist but is

difficult to quantify. As part of its continuing redesign effort, the Army is

evaluating several options to reduce the number of major commands and

align their responsibilities according to core processes such as training

and requirements development. These options are intended to eliminate

duplication, establish clearer lines of authority, and streamline resource

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Executive Summary

management, and could result in fewer TDA positions. However, such

efforts will be weakened without a requirements determination process

based on workload. Such a process, when combined with the Army’s

efforts to re-engineer its overall organization through functional

assessments, would help the Army allocate resources efficiently toward its

highest priority institutional needs.

The Army must also consider legislative, regulatory, and budgetary

constraints in its efforts to streamline the institutional Army. These

actions can influence the size and composition of the institutional Army

force, but are outside the Army’s span of control. For example, although

GAO has identified some military positions that could be converted to

generally less expensive civilian positions,3 DOD’s planned civilian

drawdown may make such conversions difficult to implement. Further,

commanders are reluctant to replace military personnel with civilian

personnel because military personnel are funded from the Army’s

centralized military personnel account, while civilians are funded from the

command’s operations and maintenance account. This reluctance stems

from the fact that operations and maintenance funds are more likely to be

cut and result in insufficient funds to hire civilian replacements. Finally, by

2001, 37 percent of the Army’s TDA positions will be controlled by either

legislative mandate, DOD directive, or other agencies. For example, about

5,000 TDA military personnel are required for positions in joint

organizations such as OSD and the war-fighting commands’ headquarters.

A Smaller Active Army

Support Force Does Not

Appear Feasible at This

Time, but a Smaller

Combat and Institutional

Force May Be Possible in

the Future

OSD did not support its plan to reduce the Army’s active end strength with

detailed analysis. OSD’s March 1995 directive to reduce the Army to 475,000

by 1999 cited the Army’s Force XXI redesign initiative as a basis for the

decrease. However, the results of the Army’s Force XXI redesign of its

combat forces will not be known for years, and this initiative is not

specifically intended to identify how to make the Army smaller. Although

the institutional force redesign component of Force XXI has identified a

potential to reduce up to 4,000 active military positions, the Army plans to

use these savings to meet existing active support force shortfalls identified

in TAA 2003. Further, OSD’s recently completed assessment of TAA 2003 did

not examine active Army end strength issues, assess the risk associated

with different end strengths, or justify force reductions. OSD believes the

Army’s overall operational force requirements may be overstated based on

its analysis of selected model inputs and the results of a recent war game

3

DOD Force Mix Issues: Greater Reliance on Civilians in Support Roles Could Provide Significant

Benefits (GAO/NSIAD-95-5, Oct. 19, 1994).

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Executive Summary

and has recommended that the Army further review issues related to

casualty estimates, fuel consumption, and host nation support. These

studies are ongoing.

Options may exist to reduce active Army end strength if the Army were to

restructure its active combat and institutional forces to achieve

efficiencies and reap the benefits of new technology. TDA streamlining may

identify additional opportunities to reduce active TDA personnel by

reducing the number of major commands, while broader use of

workload-based requirements could ensure that military personnel are

used efficiently. Force XXI’s emphasis on digital technology and more

efficient logistics practices may result in smaller combat divisions in the

future. Other options to restructure combat forces include reassessing the

mix of heavy and light divisions and assigning reserve forces a role in later

deploying active divisions. For example, as a result of the Bottom-Up

Review and the Army’s experience in Desert Storm, the Army discontinued

its use of reserve component round-up or round-out brigades. However,

options may exist to adopt some variant of this concept, such as

integrating reserve forces at the battalion level. The upcoming

Quadrennial Defense Review, mandated by the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, tasks DOD to examine a wide range

of issues that could impact future Army end strength, including changes to

the national military strategy and force structure.

Recommendations To improve TAA’s ability to accurately project war-fighting requirements

and allocate the Army’s personnel resources, GAO recommends that the

Secretary of the Army

• reexamine key model inputs to ensure they are accurate and consistent

with war-fighting scenarios;

• perform analysis to determine how multiple OOTW support force

requirements might differ from support force requirements based on two

MRCs and bring any variances to the attention of the Secretary of Defense

so that he can consider them in developing defense guidance;

• perform sensitivity analyses on significant model inputs, assumptions, and

resourcing decisions to determine their impacts on war-fighting risk. For

example, although the Army used assumptions established by defense

guidance, determining the implications of less favorable conditions, such

as delayed call-up of reserves, would provide the Army with additional

information on which to base its assessment of risk;

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Executive Summary

• rerun TAA models with the required force to assess the impact of force size

on mobility requirements; and

• determine how support units resident within the eight National Guard

Divisions, TDA military personnel, contractor personnel, and DOD civilians

can be used to fill some support force requirements.

To improve the management and allocation of personnel resources to the

institutional Army, GAO also recommends that the Secretary of the Army

• report to the Secretary of Defense the Army’s long-standing problem with

implementing workload-based analysis as a material weakness under the

Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act to maintain visibility of the issue

and ensure action is taken and

• closely monitor the military positions the Army plans to save as the result

of Force XXI initiatives and have a contingency plan in place in the event

that these savings do not materialize.

Agency Comments DOD generally agreed with the report, fully concurring with six of the

recommendations and partially concurring with one. DOD noted that the

Army has already planned some actions to resolve issues GAO presented in

a draft of this report. Specifically, the Army plans to (1) scrutinize key

model inputs in preparation for TAA 2005, (2) conduct additional analyses

involving OOTWs, (3) conduct sensitivity analyses and excursions in TAA

2005 beyond those required by current defense guidance, and (4) rerun TAA

models with the required force to improve its analysis of risk. However,

DOD only partially concurred with our recommendation to consider other

personnel resources in filling its support force requirements. The Army

plans to consider some types of Army National Guard Division assets to fill

support force shortfalls where the capabilities are nearly a match, such as

aviation assets. The Army also plans to further analyze how to use its

institutional force structure to meet both OOTW and war-fighting

requirements. However, DOD differs with GAO on recognizing civilian

contractor personnel in TAA. The Army believes that while contractor

personnel enhance the Army’s capabilities, they should not be considered

an available resource in TAA since contractor personnel are not funded in

the outyears of the Program Objective Memorandum. The Army also

expressed concern about its ability to provide security to contractors in an

MRC environment. Because contractor personnel have historically been

used by the Army to provide support in many different types of overseas

environments, both OOTWs and MRCs, GAO believes that, as a minimum, the

Army could treat contractor personnel in the same way it treats host

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Executive Summary

nation support—as an offset to unmet requirements. The Army can make

assumptions concerning the funding of the Logistics Civil Augmentation

Program, just as it makes assumptions about such issues as the availability

of host nation support, the size of the active Army force, or the level of

modernization of the force in future years.

DOD agreed with both of GAO’s recommendations relating to the

institutional Army, including GAO’s recommendation that the Secretary of

the Army report its long-standing problems in managing its institutional

personnel as a material weakness under the Federal Managers’ Financial

Integrity Act. DOD’s comments on a draft of this report are reprinted in

appendix I.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

18

Active Army Has Been Downsized and Restructured in

Accordance With the BUR

18

Not All Army Forces Deploy 19

Total Army Analysis Is One of Several Army Resourcing

Processes

21

DOD’s 1997 FYDP Reduces Army End Strength While Increasing

Modernization Funding

23

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 23

Chapter 2 

Army Can Support

Two MRCs With

Moderate Risk

26

TAA Process Balances War-Fighting Risk With Resource

Constraints

26

Army Assesses Its War-Fighting Risk as Moderate 27

Some Modeling Assumptions Lead to Understated Requirements 32

TAA Requirements Do Not Adequately Reflect U.S. Role in

OOTWs

35

Available Support Personnel Were Excluded From TAA Process 38

Some Aspects of TAA’s Methodology Could Be Improved 40

Conclusions 43

Recommendations 44

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 45

Chapter 3 

The Army Plans to

Eliminate Some

Institutional Military

Positions but Is

Constrained by a

Weak Requirements

Process

47

Institutional Requirements Are Not Well Supported 47

The Army Is Streamlining Its Institutional Force 51

Division Between TOE and TDA Is Becoming Less Distinct 56

Conclusions 57

Recommendations 57

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 57

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Contents

Chapter 4 

A Smaller Active

Army Support Force

Does Not Appear

Feasible at This Time,

but a Smaller Combat

and TDA Force May

Be Possible in the

Future

59

OSD Did Not Base Its Plan to Reduce the Army’s End Strength on

Detailed Analysis

59

OSD Assessment of TAA 2003 Did Not Address Active Army End

Strength

61

Quadrennial Defense Review May Impact Army Active Military

Personnel Requirements

63

Conclusions 63

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 64

Appendixes Appendix I: The TAA Process 66

Appendix II: Reserve Mobilization Process 70

Appendix III: Comparison of TAA 2001 and TAA 2003 Unmet

Requirements Data

72

Appendix IV: Key Assumptions Used in TAA 2003 73

Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Defense 76

Appendix VI: Major Contributors to This Report 81

Tables Table 1.1: Comparison of Fiscal Years 1994 and 1996 Active Army

Force Structure

19

Table 1.2: Breakdown of Fiscal Year 1998 Total Army End

Strength by Type and Resourcing Process

22

Table 2.1: Calculation of TAA 2003 Shortfall 30

Table 2.2: Major Category Adjustments to Authorized Positions 31

Table 3.1: Distribution of Authorized TDA Military Positions for

Fiscal Year 1998

48

Table 3.2: Core Competency, Capabilities, and Processes of the

Institutional Army

53

Table 3.3: Comparison of “Fenced” TDA Positions, 1991 and 2001 55

Figures Figure 1.1: Percentage of the Army’s Forces Represented by TOE,

TDA, and TTHS Forces, Fiscal Years 1988 Through 2001

21

Figure I.1: The TAA Process 67

Figure II.1: Reserve Mobilization Timeline 71

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Contents

Abbreviations

AFPDA Army’s force planning data and assumptions

BUR Bottom-Up Review

CINC commander in chief

DOD Department of Defense

FASTALS Force Analysis Simulation of Theater Administration and

Logistics Support

FYDP Future Years Defense Program

MRC major regional conflict

OOTW operations other than war

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

TAA Total Army Analysis

TDA Table of Distribution and Allowances

TOE Table of Organization and Equipment

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

TTHS trainees, transients, holdees, and students

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Chapter 1 

Introduction

The Army has completed its drawdown of active forces in accordance with

the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) force structure and defense guidance calling

for a force of 495,000. To ensure that the Army will be able to maintain the

minimum strength necessary to successfully respond to two nearly

simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC), Congress established a

permanent legislative end strength floor of 495,000 in its fiscal year 1996

National Defense Authorization Act. However, the Department of

Defense’s (DOD) fiscal year 1997 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)1

reduced active Army end strength 20,000 below the congressionally

mandated floor by 1999. A key impetus behind this plan is the concern

within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) that funding the

existing active Army force level of 495,000 will prevent the Army from

buying the new equipment it needs to modernize the active force for the

21st century.

Active Army Has Been

Downsized and

Restructured in

Accordance With the

BUR

The BUR strategy called for a force of 10 active Army combat divisions and

2 active armored cavalry regiments to fight and win 2 nearly simultaneous

MRCs. This force was far smaller than the Cold War Army, which

comprised 18 active divisions and 770,000 personnel in fiscal year 1989, as

well as the Base Force, which in fiscal year 1994, consisted of 12 active

combat divisions and 540,000 active personnel.

Following the BUR, the Army reorganized its active combat division

structure. Two division headquarters were eliminated, thus reducing the

number of active divisions from 12 to 10 as specified in the BUR. Another

significant change was that the Army discontinued its reliance on reserve

component “round-up” or “round-out” units to bring the active divisions to

full combat strength for wartime deployment. Instead, the Army

determined that each of the remaining 10 combat divisions would

comprise 3 fully active ground maneuver brigades. This decision was

endorsed by the Secretary of Defense during development of the BUR out

of concern that relying on reserve brigades could slow down a U.S.

response to aggression. Therefore, as a result of the BUR, only two active

maneuver brigades were eliminated from Army force structure—

12 combat divisions with a combined total of 32 active brigades were

reduced to 10 divisions with 30 active brigades. Also, the Army decided

that all 10 remaining divisions would be authorized 100 percent of their

wartime military personnel requirement.

1

The FYDP is an authoritative record of current and projected force structure, costs, and personnel

levels that have been approved by the Secretary of Defense.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
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Introduction

Overall, the reduction in forces, when combined with the force reductions

resulting from the withdrawal of 20,000 military personnel from Europe

between fiscal years 1994 and 1995, brought the force level down to within

10,000 of the fiscal year 1996 end strength goal of 495,000. The remaining

personnel reductions came from the institutional portions of the active

Army. No cuts were made in “non-divisional” level support forces that

would deploy with combat divisions,2

 since the Army had previously found

that support shortages already existed in these forces. A comparison of

fiscal years 1994 and 1996 active Army force structure is shown in 

table 1.1.

Table 1.1: Comparison of Fiscal Years

1994 and 1996 Active Army Force

Structure

1994 1996

• 540,000 end strength. • 495,000 end strength.

• 12 combat divisions. • 10 combat divisions.

32 active maneuver brigades. • 20,000 troops from Europe reduced from

the force.

• Some divisions have fewer than three

active brigades. Reserve personnel meant

to fill the remainder of maneuver and

divisional support requirements. These are

referred to as “round-up” or “round- out”

units.

• All active divisions have three maneuver

brigades. After restructuring divisions, only

two division headquarters and two full

brigades had to be eliminated

(16,000-18,000).

• Some maneuver brigades authorized at

less than 100 percent of requirements.

• All maneuver brigades authorized at 

100 percent of requirements.

• Remaining personnel reductions taken

from the nondeployable Army.

Source: Department of the Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

Not All Army Forces

Deploy

The active Army force of 495,000 is comprised of both deployable and

nondeployable forces. The deployable force (63 percent) includes the

combat divisions, separate brigades, armored cavalry regiments, and

special forces groups, as well as the Corps level combat support and

combat service support forces that would accompany them to the war

fight. Taken together, these deployable operational forces are organized

according to Army Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) and are

commonly referred to as TOE forces. Combat forces are referred to as

“above-the-line” TOE, and combat support/combat service support forces

are referred to as “below-the-line” TOE. Combat support includes such

specialties as engineering, military intelligence, chemical, and military

2

A Corps provides non-divisional support for two to five combat divisions.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
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Introduction

police, while combat service support includes specialties such as

transportation, medical, finance, quartermaster, and ordnance.

The generally nondeployable portion of the Army (historically about

25 percent) is often referred to as the “institutional” force that supports

the Army infrastructure by performing such functions as training, doctrine

development, base operations, supply, and maintenance. These forces are

organized according to Army Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA)

and are simply referred to as TDA forces. Another 12 percent of the active

Army force is in a temporary status at any given time and is referred to as

“trainees, transients, holdees and students” or TTHS. These forces are also

considered to be nondeployable. Historically, the percentages of the active

force devoted to TOE, TDA, and TTHS have remained relatively constant. (See

fig. 1.1.)

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
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Introduction

Figure 1.1: Percentage of the Army’s

Forces Represented by TOE, TDA, and

TTHS Forces, Fiscal Years 1988

Through 2001

1988 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

In percent

TOE TDA TTHS

Source: Department of the Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

Total Army Analysis Is

One of Several Army

Resourcing Processes

The Army uses different resourcing processes for each portion of the

active Army (see table 1.2). Defense guidance specifies the number of

active divisions the Army must have in its structure. The elements of these

divisions are sized according to Army doctrine. The Army’s 10 divisions

range in size from 10,000 to 15,000 active personnel, depending on mission

(e.g., light and heavy) and type of equipment. The Army uses a biennial

process known as the Total Army Analysis (TAA) to determine the number

of support units needed to support these combat forces, and how available

personnel authorizations will be allocated to these requirements. TDA

resources are allocated in a separate resource management process,

primarily driven by the Army major commands but subject to some

Department of the Army headquarters oversight. TTHS is essentially an

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
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Introduction

allocation rather than a managed resource, although Army policy

decisions can influence its size.

Table 1.2: Breakdown of Fiscal Year 1998 Total Army End Strength by Type and Resourcing Process

Initial resource

allocation Force type Resourcing processa Active National Guardb Reserve

Directed by the Army

Chief of Staff

TOE combat Defense planning

specifies 10 and

two-third active

divisions and 15

National Guard

enhanced brigades.

Division and brigade

size determined by

Army doctrine.

176,000 191,000 to

203,000

2,000

TOE support TAA determines the

Army support structure

needed to execute the

two-MRC scenario.

136,000 136,000 to

162,000

137,000

TDA Department of the

Army Headquarters

allocates TDA to major

commands, based on

their inputs.

124,000 40,000 69,000

TTHS Set aside. 59,000 Not applicable Not applicable

Total component

end strength

495,000 367,000 to

405,000

208,000

Total Army end

strength

1,070,000 to

1,108,000

aBecause TAA 2003 provides the force structure for the 1998-2003 Army Program Objective

Memorandum, the Army uses fiscal year 1998 end strength goals as the starting point to

determine requirements and make resourcing decisions.

bThe 1998-2003 Army Program Objective Memorandum is built on the following end strength

assumptions: (1) 495,000 active end strength and (2) 575,000 reserve end strength (up to

208,000 reserve and up to 367,000 National Guard). However, Congress allows the National

Guard force structure to be larger than its authorized end strength to provide the necessary

organizational framework to support the division headquarters.

Source: Department of the Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

TAA determines the number and types of support units needed to support

war-fighting missions, regardless of whether active or reserve positions

would be used to meet these requirements. The process then allocates

forces from the active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army

Reserve to fill those requirements. The results of TAA 2003 were reported in

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
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Introduction

January 1996 and fed into the 1998-2003 Army Program Objective

Memorandum.3

 A detailed discussion of the TAA process, assumptions, and

results can be found in chapter 2. Chapter 3 discusses the TDA

requirements process.

DOD’s 1997 FYDP

Reduces Army End

Strength While

Increasing

Modernization

Funding

Although Congress established a permanent active Army end strength

floor of 495,000 in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

1996, DOD’s fiscal year 1997 FYDP reduced active Army end strength below

this level beginning in fiscal year 1998. Congress established a permanent

end strength floor to ensure that each service, including the Army, had the

minimum force necessary to fulfill the national military strategy. However,

DOD may reduce forces below the floor if it notifies Congress and may also

increase authorized end strength as much as 1 percent in any given fiscal

year. According to the 1997 FYDP, DOD intends to keep Army military

personnel appropriation dollars relatively flat from fiscal years 1995 to

2001. Because these appropriations will not sustain a force level of

495,000, DOD planned to reduce the Army’s end strength by 10,000 in fiscal

year 1998 and an additional 10,000 in fiscal year 1999.

DOD’s 1997 FYDP increases the percentage of the Army budget devoted to

procurement from 10 percent in 1995 to 16 percent by 2001. This increase

is consistent with DOD’s view that modernization is key to long-term

readiness. In his March 1996 testimony, the Secretary of Defense said that

in recent years, DOD had taken advantage of the drawdown and slowed

modernization in order to fully fund those expenditures that guarantee

near-term readiness, such as spare parts, training, and maintenance. As a

result, modernization funding in fiscal year 1997 was said to be the lowest

it had been in many years, about one-third of what it was in fiscal 

year 1985. To reverse this trend, DOD plans to increase funding to procure

new equipment, including funding for “everyday equipment” ground forces

needed in the field, such as tactical communications gear, trucks, and

armored personnel carriers. Likewise, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

has expressed concern about the future readiness of Army forces given

reduced levels of modernization funding.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

1996, we reviewed (1) the extent to which TAA 2003 resulted in sufficient

combat support/combat service support force structure to meet the

3

The Army Program Objective Memorandum is a biennial publication that defines Army programs for 

6 years into the future and tabulates funding anticipated for these programs.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
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Introduction

support requirements of the two-MRC scenario and also operations other

than war (OOTW), (2) whether the Army’s streamlining initiatives have

identified opportunities to further reduce Army personnel resources

devoted to institutional Army (TDA) functions, and (3) the feasibility of

further reducing active Army end strength.

In conducting our assessment, we did not examine DOD’s rationale for

requiring 10 active combat divisions or the Army’s rationale for using three

full active brigades per division instead of round-out or round-up reserve

brigades. We also did not fully assess ongoing studies concerning the

future use of reserve forces or analyze potential changes to the current

national military strategy. Since much of the Army’s analysis in TAA 2003 is

based on the combat forces assigned to it by the BUR and the then current

defense planning strategy, any changes in this guidance would likely alter

Army support force requirements.

To determine the extent to which TAA 2003 resulted in sufficient combat

support/combat service support force structure to support the two-MRC

scenario and OOTWs, we reviewed the Army’s documentation on TAA

processes, assumptions, and results. We interviewed Army officials at

Department of the Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Concepts

Analysis Agency, Bethesda, Maryland; U.S. Forces Command, Fort

McPherson, Georgia; and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC), Fort Monroe, Virginia, and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Our review of TAA 2003 included analyses of the risks associated with the

number and type of active and reserve support forces allocated to support

war-fighting requirements; how the Army’s assumptions compared to

those in defense guidance, previous TAAs, or used in other DOD, Army, or

external defense studies; and how the major assumptions used in TAA can

affect force structure outcomes (including measures of risk). We also

examined TAA processes to determine if the Army (1) obtained adequate

participation by stakeholders in the process, including major commands

and commanders in chief (CINC) and (2) scrutinized data inputs used in its

war-fight models to determine if they were free from error. In addition, we

discussed TAA 2003 results and methodology with OSD officials. Further, to

better understand how the requirements of the joint war-fighting

commands are considered in the TAA process and how CINCs are affected

by TAA results, we requested information and received formal responses

from the CINCs of the U.S. Atlantic Command, the U.S. Central Command,

the U.S. European Command, and the U.S. Pacific Command.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
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Introduction

To assess Army streamlining initiatives and their potential for reducing

military personnel devoted to institutional Army functions, we obtained

documentation and held discussions with officials from the Office of the

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; the

Army’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation; the Army Budget

Office; Department of the Army Headquarters; the U.S. Army Force

Management Support Agency, Washington, D.C.; U.S. Army Forces

Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; U.S. TRADOC, Fort Monroe, Virginia,

and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; the U.S. Army Medical Command, Fort

Sam Houston, Texas; and the U.S. Army Materiel Command’s Management

Engineering Activity, Huntsville, Alabama. We reviewed major commands’

TDA requirements processes and discussed proposals for increased use of

workload-based management to assess the TDA requirements

determination process. To assess TDA streamlining, we identified and

reviewed Army streamlining studies, including Force XXI, major command

reengineering, and Army headquarters policy initiatives that resulted in

reductions in military and civilian resources, as well as budgetary savings.

We also assessed limitations to further streamlining of the TDA force due to

legal, cultural, and operational requirements. We did not review the

justification for TDA positions that are required by law or controlled by

other agencies.

To assess the implications of DOD’s planned reduction in active Army end

strength, we examined the objectives and implementing guidance for the

Army’s Force XXI campaign,which DOD cited as justification for the

reduction, and the personnel reductions realized or anticipated as a result

of these initiatives. We also considered OSD’s internal assessment of the

Army’s TAA 2003 process and the potential for changes in defense strategy

resulting from the Quadrennial Defense Review. Lastly, we considered the

current status of TDA streamlining and the results of TAA 2003.

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. These comments

are discussed and evaluated in chapters 2 and 3 and are reprinted in

appendix V. Additional comments from the Army are discussed and

evaluated in chapter 4.

We conducted our review from September 1995 to October 1996 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
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Army Can Support Two MRCs With

Moderate Risk

The Army believes that it can provide support forces for two MRCs at a

moderate level of risk. However, in assessing risk, the Army found that

42 percent of all support forces required in the first 30 days of the first MRC

would be late arriving to theater because they cannot mobilize and deploy

in time. The Army also found that it would have very few active support

forces available to send to the second MRC—only 12 percent of the total

support forces needed. In addition, the Army did not authorize 19,200

positions that are needed to bring some existing units up to their full

required strength. Finally, units totaling 58,400 positions were not

authorized any personnel because the Army’s total wartime support

requirement exceeds available personnel authorizations.

The Army’s risk assessment depends largely on the assumptions and

model inputs that were adopted for TAA 2003. Some of these assumptions

were favorable in that they minimized risks to U.S. forces. For example, to

be consistent with defense guidance, TAA assumed that U.S. forces had

immediate access to ports and airfields in the theater of operations, faced

limited chemical attacks, and were immediately available for

redeployment if previously committed to OOTWs. Less optimistic

assumptions would have led to higher support requirements. On the other

hand, the Army did not consider all available resources to satisfy its unmet

support force requirements, such as some support force capabilities that

currently reside in the Army’s eight National Guard divisions and the TDA

force, and support available from outside contractors and defense

civilians. Also, while TAA is an analytically rigorous process, some aspects

of its methodology could be improved. For example, TAA lacks

mechanisms for adjusting to change during its 2-year cycle; some model

inputs, such as consumption of fuel and water, were not sufficiently

scrutinized; and sensitivity analyses were generally not used to measure

the impact of alternative assumptions and resourcing decisions on risk.

Changes to any of the key assumptions or other model inputs could

produce significantly different force structure requirements than those

determined in TAA 2003, and potentially different risk levels.

TAA Process Balances

War-Fighting Risk

With Resource

Constraints

Based on defense guidance, other Army guidance and inputs, wargaming

assumptions, unit allocation rules,1

 and logistical data, TAA determines the

number and type of support units the Army needs to execute the national

military strategy. TAA then allocates Army personnel authorizations, both

active and reserve, among these support force requirements to minimize

1

Unit allocation rules quantify each type of support unit’s capability, mission, and doctrinal

employment as applied to specific wartime scenarios.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
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Army Can Support Two MRCs With

Moderate Risk

war-fighting risk. TAA is an advance planning tool that tries to anticipate

potential war-fighting scenarios and personnel availability approximately 

9 years in the future.

TAA consists of a series of campaign simulation models and force structure

conferences attended by representatives from key Army staff offices and

commands, as well as the unified commands. A strategic mobility analysis

is performed to determine the arrival times of Army forces in theater and

identify shortfalls. This is followed by a theater campaign analysis to gauge

force movement and unit strength over time, as well as personnel and

equipment losses. Outputs from these models, along with approved unit

allocation rules and logistics data, are input into the final Army model,

Force Analysis Simulation of Theater Administration and Logistics

Support. This model generates the required support forces by type and

quantity, and specifies when they are needed in theater and what their

supply requirements would be. The support forces identified by the model

are then matched to actual Army support units.

At this point, priorities are established among the competing requirements,

and approaches are discussed to mitigate the risks of unmet requirements.

One approach has been to authorize fewer personnel to some units than

are required to meet their full wartime requirement. Additionally, the

active/reserve force mix is examined on a branch by branch2

 basis to

assess whether sufficient active forces are available to meet early

deployment requirements. The approved force structure is forwarded to

the Army’s Chief of Staff for final approval as the base force for

programming Army resources for the next Program Objective

Memorandum. A more detailed description of the Army’s TAA process is

provided in appendix I.

Army Assesses Its

War-Fighting Risk as

Moderate

The Army concluded that its authorized support forces, resulting from TAA

2003, were consistent with the moderate risk force delineated in the

October 1993 BUR. This force, among other things, must be able to fight

and win two MRCs that occur nearly simultaneously. To assess the risk

level associated with its support forces, the Army employed four

measures: late risk, second MRC risk, unmet requirements risk, and

casualty risk. Each of the risks was quantified; however, their collective

impact on the war fight was not modeled by the Army. Rather, the Army’s

overall assessment of moderate risk is based on military judgment.

2

Individuals in the Army are assigned to specialties or branches of the Army according to the functions

they would perform in combat or in support of the combat units.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
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Army Can Support Two MRCs With

Moderate Risk

42 Percent of Required

Support Forces Arrive Late

TAA stipulates that support units needed in the first 30 days of the first MRC

should be drawn from the active force because of the time needed to

mobilize, train, and deploy reserve units. This is consistent with defense

guidance. However, TAA 2003 found that about 79,000 of the more than

188,000 support force positions required in the first 30 days of the first MRC

do not arrive on time because the Army lacks sufficient numbers of active

support forces to meet these requirements and must rely on reserve forces

instead. This represents 30 percent of the 260,000 total authorized Army

force needed during this time period, and 42 percent of the Army support

forces required. Branches with the most late arrivals include engineering,

transportation, quartermaster, and medical—branches with high

concentrations of reserve personnel. This risk is exacerbated when the

Army relies on reserve forces during the first 7 days of the war fight.

Almost one-quarter of the reserve support forces assigned to meet

requirements during the first 30 days (19,200 positions) are needed in the

first 7 days of the MRC.

The 30-day time frame to mobilize and deploy reserve support forces is

substantiated in classified studies by the RAND Corporation that

examined the availability of reserve forces and by Army officials

responsible for reserve mobilization activities. The Army estimates that

mobilizing reserve forces, from unit recall to arrival at the port of

embarkation, takes about 15 days for a small support unit and 31 days for

a large unit. Personnel may be transported by air, but their equipment

likely will be shipped by sea. Depending on whether the equipment sails

from the east or west coast and to which theater, it will take an additional

12 to 30 days to arrive, unload, and assemble the equipment. Therefore, a

small reserve unit will be available for the war fight no earlier than 27 days

after call-up, and a large reserve unit will require at least 43 days. 

(See app. II for a listing of mobilization tasks and the time required to

complete them.)

OSD officials believe that if it were possible to reduce late risk by making

more active forces available during the first 30 days, strategic lift

constraints would limit the number of active support forces that could be

moved to theater. Army officials noted that to the extent that any active

support personnel are available to replace late reservists and could be

moved, the Army’s risk of late arrivals would be lower.

Few Active Support Forces

Available for Second MRC

The availability of active support forces for the second MRC was another

risk measure used in TAA 2003. Specifically, as the availability of active

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
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Army Can Support Two MRCs With

Moderate Risk

forces declined—and with it a corresponding increased reliance on

reserve forces—risk was assumed to increase. The second MRC will have

access to relatively small numbers of active support forces, most of them

having deployed already in support of the first MRC. Consequently, the

Army must rely on reserve component forces to meet most of its

requirements in the second MRC. Only 12 percent of the support forces

needed in the second MRC are active, compared with 47 percent in the first

MRC. Branches with low representation of active forces in the second MRC

include engineer, transportation, quartermaster, and artillery. High

reliance on reserves for use in the second MRC may not entail greater risk

assuming there is adequate warning time and mobilization has already

occurred. The same risk of late arrival would apply if mobilization was

delayed.

Units Totaling 58,400

Positions Exist Only on

Paper, and Some Active

Units Are Allocated Fewer

Positions Than Required

An objective of TAA is to allocate resources among competing support

force requirements. In the case of TAA 2003, the Army’s force structure

requirements initially exceeded its authorized positions by 144,000

positions. At the conclusion of TAA, units totaling 58,400 positions were not

allocated any positions and exist only on paper, and other existing active

units were allocated 19,200 fewer positions than needed to meet mission

requirements.

Table 2.1 illustrates the Army’s approach to allocating its resources in TAA

2003. Drawing from its active, National Guard, and Reserve forces, the

Army identified 528,000 authorized TOE positions that it could apply to its

672,000 Army requirement to fight two MRCs, leaving an initial imbalance of

144,000 positions. The Army’s total TOE force is actually higher than

528,000 positions (see table 2.1), but some resources are excluded from

consideration in TAA, such as the eight National Guard divisions the Army

considers as a strategic hedge, and forces needed to perform unique

mission requirements.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
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Army Can Support Two MRCs With

Moderate Risk

Table 2.1: Calculation of TAA 2003

Shortfall

Description of Army action

Action to

reduce TAA

shortfall

TAA 2003

remaining

shortfall

Army TOE requirement to fight two MRCs (including

both combat and support forces)

Less: Available Army position authorizations 

Initial shortfall calculated by TAA

672,000

528,000

144,000

Less: Positions converted from lower priority units

to other types

Remaining Shortfall

Comprised of:

Units totally unstaffed

Understaffed active support units

66,000

78,000a

58,400b

19,200

aRounded.

bHost nation support reduces the Army’s shortfall to about 44,000.

Source: Department of the Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

The Army then analyzed all of its support forces at Corps level and above

to determine how it could reduce the risk associated with its shortfall.

This resulted in the Army shifting about 66,0003

 active and reserve

positions from support units excess to the war fight to higher priority

support units. Units providing fire fighting, engineering, and medical

support were among those selected for conversion. After these

conversions, the Army was left with a shortfall of about 78,000 positions.

This shortfall was allocated as follows. Some existing active support units

were authorized fewer positions than are needed to meet their full

wartime requirement.4

 In TAA 2003, these amounted to about 19,200

positions. The expectation is that these understrength units would be

brought up to full strength before being mobilized. These additional

personnel would come from the Individual Ready Reserve5

 or new

recruits. The remaining shortfall of 58,400 positions represents units that

3

Converting these 66,000 active and reserve support positions to different positions will cost an

estimated $2.6 billion.

4

The Army allocates authorized positions to units commensurate with their mission and when they are

scheduled to deploy. A unit allocated its full wartime requirement has an authorized level of

organization of one, whereas a unit authorized to fill 80 percent of its required positions has an

authorized level of organization of three.

5

The Individual Ready Reserve is a manpower pool of pretrained individuals who have already served

in active units or in the reserves and may have some part of their military service obligation remaining.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
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Army Can Support Two MRCs With

Moderate Risk

are needed to meet a wartime requirement but have not been allocated any

position authorizations, that is, units that exist only on paper. Table 2.2

shows how each of the Army’s major support branches will be affected by

the conversions and where the remaining 58,400 positions in vacant units

reside.6

 Among the branches benefiting most were quartermaster and

transportation, which accounted for more than half of the initial shortfall

in totally vacant units.

Table 2.2: Major Category Adjustments

to Authorized Positions

Branch

Initial shortage of

authorized positions

Shortage of authorized

positions after TAA

adjustments

Chemical 1,100 700

Engineer 4,400 2,900

Artillery 1,200 1,200

Medical 12,400 2,000

Ordnance 3,700 100

Quartermaster 31,600 21,300

Signal 3,800 4,000

Personnel service support 1,200 300

Armor 1,100 1,100

Military police 2,400 0

Special operations 1,700 0

Air defense 4,600 4,300

Headquarters 300 200

Transportation 45,100 20,400

Logistics 500 0

Total 124,800a 58,400a

aDoes not add due to rounding.

Source: Department of the Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

Two additional actions were taken by the Army to mitigate the risk

associated with its remaining unmet requirements. The Army estimates

that host nations will be able to provide the equivalent of over 14,000

positions to offset some requirements, leaving a shortfall of about 44,000

positions in vacant units. The Army also plans to implement an option

developed by the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study to convert

42,700 Army National Guard combat division positions to required support

positions—eliminating most of the remaining vacant units. However,

6

For many years, the Army’s support force requirements have greatly exceeded the number of support

forces authorized. See appendix III for a comparison of TAA 2003 and TAA 2001 unmet requirements.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
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Army Can Support Two MRCs With

Moderate Risk

according to the study, these conversions will cost up to an additional

$2.8 billion and could take many years to complete.

Expected Casualties Are

Another Measure of

War-Fight Risk

The Army computes the number of casualties expected for each MRC as

another measure of risk.7

 Casualties are computed through a model that

uses the Army’s full two-conflict requirement of 672,000, rather than the

528,000 authorized Army positions to meet that requirement. The number

of casualties is a function of the population at risk, which is reflected in

defense guidance; the wounded in action rate, which is calculated in the

TAA modeling; and the disease, nonbattle injury rate, which is established

by the Army Surgeon General. Campaign simulations generate the

combatant battle casualties, which accounts for about 80 percent of all

casualties. The remaining 20 percent are extended to support forces with

algorithms. Variables that are considered in arriving at casualty estimates

include the battlefield location (e.g., brigade area, division rear, and

communications zone); intensity of the war fight (e.g., defend, attack, and

delay); and the weapon systems involved. The Army uses a high-resolution

model that pits individual weapon systems against one another to project

equipment and personnel killed or injured for a multitude of platforms

(e.g., 12 different types of tanks, light armored vehicles, and helicopters),

according to their lethality under various conditions (e.g., moving,

stationary, and exposed).

Once the Army computes its casualties for each MRC, it does not increase

its force requirements to provide casualty replacements. Otherwise, its

personnel requirements would be much higher and shortfalls would be

greater. The Army reasons that given the anticipated short duration of the

MRCs, there will be little opportunity for significant replacements of

individuals killed or otherwise unavailable for duty. However, if a need

arose, individual replacements likely would be drawn from soldiers who

had just completed their introductory training or by mobilizing the

Individual Ready Reserve.

Some Modeling

Assumptions Lead to

Understated

Requirements

Some of the assumptions and model inputs adopted for TAA 2003 lead to

understated support force requirements. Without rerunning the theater

campaign models with different assumptions and model inputs, the Army

cannot determine the impact of changes in most of these assumptions,

such as delaying the call-up of reserve forces on force requirements.

However, some assumptions lend themselves to estimable force level

7

Casualty numbers are classified.

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equivalents, such as coalition support requirements. To the extent that less

favorable assumptions would increase the Army’s support requirements,

the risks associated with the current force may be higher than suggested

by TAA 2003 results.

TAA 2003 Used Many of

the Same Favorable

Assumptions Cited in

Defense Guidance

During TAA, the Army used many key assumptions in modeling the two

MRCs that were identical or similar to assumptions cited in the defense

guidance then in effect. Some of these assumptions were favorable, that is,

they tended to minimize risk to U.S. forces and objectives. These included:

• Immediate access to ports and airfields. TAA assumed that U.S. forces

would have immediate, unobstructed access to ports and airfields in the

theater of operation. An adverse case excursion was modeled in which

immediate access to primary ports and airfields was denied in a one-MRC

scenario. This excursion reflected a requirement for additional positions

above that needed for two nearly simultaneous MRCs when it was assumed

that immediate access would be available. Over 90 percent of this

additional requirement was for transportation and quartermaster

positions—positions already in short supply. However, in stating its

requirements for TOE forces, the Army used the base case requirement of

672,000 positions.

• Timely decisions by the National Command Authorities. TAA assumed that

the call-up of reserve forces coincided with the day U.S. forces deploy to

the first MRC and that the activation of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, civilian

aircraft that augment the military in wartime, occurs early.8

 For the

reserve call-up to occur on the same day as the first deployment of U.S.

forces assumes that it occurs at the earliest feasible opportunity.

• Limited chemical use. TAA assumed limited use of chemical weapons by

enemy forces in each of the MRCs. Because of the constrained amount of

chemical weapons modeled, some TAA participants did not believe the

scenario provided a realistic representation. A more intensive chemical

attack was modeled in a single MRC adverse case excursion. Results of this

excursion indicated a requirement for additional support forces, but this is

not reflected in the overall TAA base case requirement of 672,000 spaces.

For example, casualties resulting from chemical attacks were not modeled

in TAA 2003 to identify the medical support requirement.

Changes to any of these assumptions would have resulted in higher force

requirements than those determined in TAA 2003. However, rather than

8

Under 10 U.S.C. 12304, the President can activate up to 200,000 reservists for not more than 270 days,

without a declaration of war or other national emergency.

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present a range of requirements to reflect the results of less favorable

assumptions, the Army focused solely on the base case in arriving at the

results of TAA 2003. A list of the key assumptions used in TAA 2003 is

provided in appendix IV.

Other Assumptions Also

Resulted in Lower Force

Requirements

Support force requirements would also have been higher had the Army not

taken steps to eliminate some workload requirements from consideration

in TAA. For example, no requirements were added to support coalition

partners, although historically the Army has provided such support. OSD

officials estimate that support to coalition partners would result in an

additional requirement of from 6,500 to 20,000 spaces.

Also, support force requirements were determined based on a steady state

demand rate, which does not account for above average periods of

demand. This approach, called smoothing, disregards the cumulative

effect of work backlogs. Smoothing can be problematic for units whose

resources are based on the amount of workload to be performed, such as

transportation, fuel supply, and ammunition supply units.9

 For example,

fuel off-loaded onto a pier will remain on the pier until transportation is

available to move it. With smoothing, this backlog of fuel is forgotten; no

resources are applied toward it because the Army model does not take

into account workload that was not performed previously. Rather, the

model considers each time period during the operation as a discrete,

independent event.

The effects of smoothing tend to diminish over time. However, for

relatively short wars, such as those envisioned in illustrative planning

scenarios contained in defense guidance, the impact can be significant.

For TAA 2003, the effect of smoothing understated the support force

requirement by more than 28,000 positions, according to Army officials.

The branches most affected by smoothing were transportation (more than

18,400 positions) and quartermaster (more than 3,800 positions), the two

branches with the highest number of unmet requirements, smoothing

notwithstanding. Army officials told us that the requirement for cargo

transfer and truck companies during the first 30 days of the first MRC is

almost twice as great (183 percent) when the requirement is not smoothed,

and three times as great over the entire conflict.

9

Exceptions are medical and some combat engineer units. Their requirements were not smoothed, but

rather computed to handle peak requirements.

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TAA Requirements Do

Not Adequately

Reflect U.S. Role in

OOTWs

Since TAA 2003 requirements are based on the two-MRC scenario, some

officials have questioned whether the Army has given adequate attention

to the role of OOTWs in the post-Cold War period and the demands these

operations place on Army forces. In particular, some DOD officials,

including CINCs, have concerns that the Army has not adequately

considered delays or degradation in capability resulting from the

extraction of forces from an OOTW to an MRC, or to the potential demands

on supporting forces resulting from multiple OOTWs. Despite these

concerns, the Army has no plans to change its approach to OOTWs in the

currently ongoing TAA 2005.

Army Follows Defense

Guidance on OOTWs but

Could Experience

Shortages in Some Types

of Units

Defense guidance directed the Army to base TAA 2003 requirements on

either two nearly simultaneous MRCs or on one MRC and one OOTW,

whichever produced the greater requirement. To make this assessment,

the Army modeled the force structure requirements of four individual

OOTW excursions using defense illustrative planning scenarios and

supporting intelligence and threat analysis information. These included

requirements for a peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance,

peacekeeping, and a lesser regional contingency operation.

Based on its modeling results, the Army concluded that requirements for

one OOTW plus an MRC was less than the two-MRC war-fight requirement. In

fact, the Army found that the aggregate support requirements of all four

OOTWs were less than the support requirements for one MRC. Accordingly,

the Army believes the needs of OOTWs can be satisfied by fulfilling the MRC

requirements.

The Army also observed that OOTWs could stress certain support

specialties and used its excursion results to help “sharpen its assessment”

of how Army resources should be allocated. For example, the Army

conducted quick reaction analyses of the operational concept for

employment and support of forces under the four defense planning OOTW

scenarios. Among other results, these analyses identified a need for

additional active Army support specialties, including transportation and

quartermaster capability. The Army also found these specialties to be in

short supply when it examined the impact of redeploying forces from an

OOTW to an MRC. During OOTWs, the Army relies on active support forces

and reserve volunteers, prior to a presidential call-up of reserve forces. To

help mitigate this risk, Army officials told us they decided, to the extent

possible, to redistribute resources during TAA to help overcome these key

shortfalls. As shown on table 2.2, the Army shifted positions from other

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lower priority requirements to both the transportation and quartermaster

branches in TAA 2003, although shortages remain and these branches are

still heavily reliant on reserve forces.

TAA Assumes That Forces

Assigned to OOTWs Can

Readily Redeploy to MRCs

In the event the United States becomes involved in a major conflict,

defense guidance assumes that the Army will withdraw its forces

committed to OOTWs to respond to an MRC. Neither the Army nor the

defense guidance acknowledges any potential for delays or degradation of

mission capability of forces previously assigned to OOTWs in determining

the Army’s support force requirements. However, both the Army’s own

analyses and comments from the CINCs question this assumption.

For example, as part of its risk assessment for TAA, the Army conducted an

excursion to determine whether involvement in a significant OOTW would

result in insufficient support force structure for the first 30 days of an MRC.

The Army analysis found that about 15,000 active support forces

participating in a sizable OOTW were required for this first MRC. The Army

assumed it could extract these forces from the OOTW without delays or

degradation in capability, but it provided no analysis to support this

position. In contrast, TRADOC Analysis Center, in conducting a classified

study on strategic risks, assumed as a given, that 20,000 Army active

component resources would be committed to one or more OOTWs and

would not be available to participate in the two-MRC war fight. Another

TRADOC analysis has highlighted the reconstitution challenges encountered

when moving support forces from an OOTW environment to an MRC, where

personnel and equipment requirements frequently differ. During the

planning phase of TAA 2003, the Forces Command commander

recommended that the Army first determine the level of force structure it

was willing to commit to OOTWs and then exclude this OOTW force from

participating in the first MRC war fight. Both the TRADOC Analysis Center

and the Forces Command commander were acknowledging that

extraction from OOTWs could not be performed without consequences.

CINCs also expressed concern regarding the Army’s handling of OOTWs in

TAA 2003. For example, the CINC, U.S. Atlantic Command, stated that his

major concern was in transitioning from an OOTW to an MRC, especially in

the case of units with unique or highly specialized training and/or

equipment. Similarly, the CINC, U.S. European Command asserted that

some allowance must be developed in TAA to account for OOTW-type

requirements, considering (1) their impact on a heavily committed

resource base (i.e., active Army combat and support personnel) and

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(2) the time necessary to extract the troops from such missions if U.S.

forces must be shifted to contend with an overwhelming threat to U.S.

strategic interests. The CINC believes this is particularly important because

U.S. commitments to these operations are significant and the trend to

involve U.S. forces in such operations is on the rise.

Our past review further supports the CINCs’ concerns. We reported that

critical support and combat forces needed in the early stages of an MRC

may be unable to redeploy quickly from peace operations because certain

Army support forces are needed to facilitate the redeployment of other

military forces.10 In addition, our follow-on peace operations study cited

this deficiency as significant, because in the event of a short-warning

attack, forces are needed to deploy rapidly to the theater and enter the

battle as quickly as possible to halt the invasion.11

Multiple OOTWs Could

Add to Army Risk

As part of its analysis of the four OOTW excursions, the Army developed

troop lists and overall size estimates for each type of OOTW. These force

size estimates suggest that multiple OOTWs could result in a major

commitment of personnel resources—resources that have not been fully

evaluated in the TAA process. This is the view of the current CINC, U.S.

European Command, based on his expanded troop involvement in Bosnia,

Macedonia, Turkey, and Africa. The CINC asserts that essential support

personnel have been stretched to the limit for resourcing the above

military operations in his area of geographic responsibility, including those

associated with providing fuel supply and distribution capacity, heavy

truck transportation, military police, fuel handling, and communications

repair. By their nature, these operations tend to be manpower intensive.

Thus, the CINC stated that the next TAA process should consider how to

include specific operational scenarios of a lesser regional scale (i.e.,

OOTWs), in addition to the two MRCs.

The Army lacks the quantitative data to assess how such potentially

burdensome and repeated deployments of support troops in OOTW-like

operations impact the Army. However, comments from both the CINCs and

some Army officials suggest the need for improved force structure

planning for such contingencies. Army officials responsible for TAA

responded that the Army must assume that the forces needed for

OOTW-type operations will come from the same pool of forces identified for

10Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions (GAO/NSIAD-95-56, Jan. 31, 1995).

11Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts

(GAO/NSIAD-95-51, Mar. 8, 1995).

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use in the event of one or more MRCs, because this is a defense guidance

requirement. As a result, the Army plans no future changes in how TAA

approaches multiple OOTWs and their resourcing implications. This

includes TAA 2005, which is now underway.

Available Support

Personnel Were

Excluded From TAA

Process

In resourcing the Army’s support requirements for fighting two MRCs, the

Army did not consider all available personnel at its disposal. By better

matching available personnel with its requirements, we believe the Army

could mitigate some of the risks disclosed in TAA 2003 results. Specifically,

TAA did not consider support capabilities that currently exist in the

National Guard’s eight divisions, civilian contractor personnel, TDA military

personnel, or civilian defense personnel. Considering these personnel,

most of which would be suitable to meet requirements for later deploying

units, could enable the Army to somewhat reduce its shortfall of support

personnel. However, it would not resolve the Army’s shortage of active

support personnel to meet requirements in the first 30 days. TAA gave

limited recognition to some host nation support to reduce the number of

positions in unresourced units to 44,000, but is reluctant to place greater

reliance on this resource until DOD resolves major issues as to when and

how much support host nations will provide.

Army National Guard In TAA 2003, the Army did not consider how to use the support capability

that currently exists in the eight Army National Guard divisions that the

Army does not envision using during a two-conflict scenario. Based on the

Army’s analysis, some support capabilities in the National Guard divisions

are similar or identical to support units in short supply. In our March 1995

report,12 we found that personnel in these divisions could be used to fill

100 percent of the vacant positions for 321 types of skills, including

helicopter pilots, communications technicians, repair personnel, military

police officers, intelligence analysts, and fuel and water specialists. In

response, DOD formally concurred with our recommendation that the Army

identify specific support requirements that could be met using National

Guard divisional support units and develop a plan for accessing that

support capability. This capability was not considered in TAA 2003 and we

know of no plans to consider it in TAA 2005.13 Army officials advised us that

12See pp. 5-7 of our report, Force Structure: Army National Guard Divisions Could Augment Wartime

Support Capability (GAO/NSIAD-95-80, Mar. 2, 1995).

13These National Guard support capabilities exist today —they do not hinge on the Army’s action to

convert 42,700 combat positions to support positions at a cost of $2.8 billion, as detailed in a May 1996

National Guard division redesign study.

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while the National Guard units have specific personnel and equipment that

could be used in wartime, the units do not clearly correlate with support

units, and would likely deploy piecemeal rather than as full units, as the

Army prefers. For this reason, Army officials advised us that there are no

efforts underway to consider these personnel in TAA, as we recommended,

even though in a wartime situation, the Army would, in fact, make use of

these resources as a “fallback.” Since Army officials agreed that in some

cases (for example, transportation), there may be potential for deployment

to MRCs, planning how to access these forces in advance could reduce the

number of unfilled positions in TAA. However, it would not reduce the

Army’s late risk (i.e., the risk that forces might not arrive in the first 30

days of the first MRC), since these forces could not be mobilized, trained,

and deployed in time.

Civilian Contract

Personnel

Contract personnel were also not considered in TAA 2003. The Army is

already making greater use of contract personnel to provide many of the

support services typically provided by its combat service support

personnel. For example, through its Logistics Civil Augmentation Program,

the Army has used contractor personnel to provide base camp

construction and maintenance, laundry, food supply and service, water

production, and transportation. In terms of timing, the Army’s current

contract calls for logistical and construction support to be initiated within

15 days of the Army’s order. Among the most recent operations using

contractor personnel are: Operation Restore Hope (Somalia); Operation

Support Hope (Rwanda); Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti); Operation

Joint Endeavor (Bosnia); and Operation Deny Flight (Aviano, Italy).

Civilian contractors were also used extensively in both the Korean and

Vietnam wars to augment the logistical support provided to U.S. forces.

However, the Army made no assessment in TAA 2003 to determine how

much of its unresourced requirement could potentially be offset by

contractor personnel.

TDA Personnel TAA 2003 also did not consider the potential use of TDA military personnel

(with the exception of medical) and civilians, even though, in some

instances, these personnel can and do deploy—sometimes on very short

notice. Chapter 3 will discuss the need to unify the Army’s separate

processes for allocating personnel to TOE and TDA, so that personnel who

perform similar functions are considered together.

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Host Nation Support

Reduces Unmet

Requirements

Another potential resource pool the Army could consider to a greater

extent is host nation support. To minimize war-fight risk, the Army does

not use host nation support to offset requirements without a signed

agreement from the host nation, and then only in cases where the joint

war-fighting command is confident the support will be provided when and

where needed. Host nation support that meets this test is only used to

offset requirements for units that were not allocated any positions in TAA.

In TAA 2003, host nation support offset over 14,000 of these positions.

OSD officials who have reviewed TAA 2003 suggested that the Army place a

greater reliance on host nation support by relaxing the requirement that

the United States have formal agreements with the host nation to provide

the support. OSD estimates that the Army could reduce its support force

shortfall by as much as 42,000 if it were to count on likely host nation

support even though formal agreements may not be in place. However, the

Army’s current position is consistent with that of the Secretary of Defense,

as reported in the Fiscal Year 1995 Annual Statement of Assurance to the

President and Congress, under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity

Act. In that statement, the Secretary cites a material weakness in the

Central Command’s program for validating quantities of wartime host

nation support presumed to be available for use by U.S. forces, but not

documented by formal agreements.

The Central Command’s corrective action plan requires that lists of

commodities and services required from the host nations be organized by

location and time of availability and that the host nations’ political and

military leaderships agree to these lists. We followed up with the Central

Command to determine the status of their corrective action plan and were

told that while efforts were underway to obtain such agreements, nothing

was definite. Chapter 4 addresses further actions under way to respond to

OSD’s analysis.

Some Aspects of

TAA’s Methodology

Could Be Improved

While TAA is an analytically rigorous process, it is not an exact science.

There are many assumptions and uncertainties involved in sizing Army

support forces, and seemingly small changes can dramatically alter its

final outcome. Among TAA’s strengths are that it bases many of its

decisions on established Army doctrine, involves senior leadership

throughout the process, and includes consensus building mechanisms

among the branches. On the other hand, the Army may be able to improve

some aspects of TAA’s methodology. For example, not all TAA model inputs

were scrutinized to ensure they were free from error; the process does not

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easily accommodate changes that occur during its 2-year implementation

cycle; TAA’s transportation model is not rerun with the required force; and

the Army does not prioritize deficiencies that remain and develop action

plans to mitigate risk.

Participants Questioned

Validity of TAA Model

Inputs

Participants’ exposure to TAA modeling was limited and focused on the

results of the war gaming, not its methodology and detailed assumptions.

Nonetheless, in TAA 2003, participants detected errors in model inputs late

in the process, after the models had been run and requirements had been

identified. While allocating positions, participants began to question

whether fuel and water consumption rates had been understated. Since

the TAA process had already been delayed as the Army considered how to

account for OSD’s planned 20,000 reduction in end strength, the Army had

an opportunity to convene a supplemental conference to allow time to

rerun the models with revised inputs. The result was an additional support

requirement of 48,000 positions. This experience caused some participants

to question the degree to which the Army had scrutinized its planning data

and assumptions. It also provides an illustration of how changes in the

model inputs can dramatically alter the final results of TAA.

In another example, the Army was able to reduce its medical-related

support requirements in TAA 2003 by reducing the medical evacuation time

from 30 to 15 days. Previously, the policy was 15 days within the first 30

days of the conflict and 30 days thereafter. This one change, which was

supported by the Army’s medical branch, reduced the need for hospital

beds in theater by 35 percent. This change led to reductions in branches

like engineer and quartermaster, and in some types of medical units. Both

OSD and Army officials agree that key model inputs, such as those for fuel,

ammunition, and medical, need to be reviewed and validated because they

can have such a significant impact on TAA results.

The Army is responsible for providing certain logistics support to the other

services during the two MRCs. TAA acknowledged the need for Army

personnel to support the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps forces,

and the Army solicited their wartime requirements through the

war-fighting CINCs. For example, in TAA 2003, the Army’s assistance

consisted primarily of providing overland transport of bulk fuel and

ammunition. Based on CINC inputs, the Army added about 24,000 support

positions to assist the other services in these areas, meeting 79 percent of

their requirements. According to a Forces Command official, during a war,

the war-fighting CINCs determine where to allocate these personnel.

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Additionally, some Army officials believe that some of the logistical

support requirements such as those for transportation may be understated

because the Army typically receives a poor response from the CINCs

concerning the other services’ requirements. The Army acknowledges it

needs more accurate estimates of the other services’ needs.

TAA Results Can Be

Overtaken by Events

Because of the time needed to complete a full TAA cycle, almost 2 years,

the Army may find that key assumptions or data inputs, while valid at the

time, have essentially been overtaken by events. TAA has a limited ability to

accommodate changes in strategy or key assumptions that occur beyond

its initial planning phase. This inability to accommodate change undercuts

the Army’s case that TAA is focused on the future, that is, Army force

structure required 9-years out. The following examples in TAA 2003

illustrate this point.

• First, soon after TAA 2003 was completed, the Secretary of Defense issued

new guidance reflecting a significant change in scenarios. TAA 2003

assumed that the MRCs would be sequenced differently, consistent with

earlier guidance. A subsequent analysis by the Army showed that if the

more current guidance had been used, an additional 40,000 warfight

support positions would have been required. TAA 2005 could also be

impacted by changes in defense strategy since the Army plans to run its

models based on the existing two-conflict strategy. The ongoing

Quadrennial Defense Review could change this strategy and lessen the

usefulness of the Army’s TAA results.

• Second, in the middle of the TAA 2003 process, OSD issued a directive for

the Army to reduce its active end strength by 20,000 toward a goal of

475,000 as early as practical, but no later than 1999. Army officials told us

that TAA could not accommodate this change since it could not anticipate

what parts of its force would be affected by the mandated cut, and any

changes to its combat forces would affect how the Army fights. This, in

turn, would result in changes to various inputs to the war fight model

itself.

TAA Transportation Model

Not Rerun With Required

Force

The TAA process could be enhanced if additional analyses were conducted

to reveal the impact of force size on the movement of forces to fight two

major conflicts. The Army could have refined its mobility assessment by

running the TAA 2003 required force through its transportation model,

rather than exclusively relying on the earlier TAA 2001 required force. TAA

models were run in the early stages of the process using a prior TAA (i.e.,

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TAA 2001) generated force structure to establish a baseline for flowing

forces into theater and to fight the war. At the conclusion of this phase of

TAA, the Army determines its total war-fighting requirement. However, the

Army does not rerun its models with this “required” TAA 2003 force to

assess the impact of this larger force on moving forces to theater. Army

officials agreed that rerunning its transportation model using the required

force would improve TAA, and the Army is currently considering how to

use its iterative modeling capability to its best advantage in TAA 2005.

Remaining Deficiencies

Are Not Prioritized

The Army does not prioritize force deficiencies that remain after TAA is

completed and all force structure decisions are made, nor does it indicate

what is being done to mitigate war-fighting risks. Examples of risk

reduction measures include: use of new technology to overcome

personnel shortages; new training initiatives (e.g., cross training personnel

to perform more than one function); changing doctrine where appropriate;

or drawing on other resource pools not addressed in TAA (e.g., civilians,

reserves, and contractors). Although not formally documented in the TAA

2003 process, the Director of Army Force Programs told us that he is

identifying actions to further mitigate the risks identified in TAA 2003. The

Director cited studies on the feasibility of home station deployment and

having unequipped reservists falling in on prepositioned equipment

located in counterpart active Army units (e.g., the Army’s truck fleet could

handle a greater workload if it had more drivers to take more shifts). In a

period of declining resources, actions such as these could help the Army

use its available resources more efficiently.

Conclusions While the Army believes it can support two MRCs, given existing force

levels, and 10 fully active divisions, it has accepted some risks—most

notably the lack of sufficient active support forces during the first 30 days

of an MRC. TAA results indicate that 42 percent of all required support

forces needed in the first 30 days of the first conflict will arrive

late—about 79,000 soldiers. These late arrivers are tasked to provide

essential services such as medical, engineering, transportation, and

quartermaster support. The Army is also counting on the arrival of about

15,000 predominantly support personnel previously deployed to OOTWs

during the first 30 days, even though CINC and Army officials question their

availability and readiness during this time frame. Further, because the

Army discounts peaks in demand in establishing its requirements through

a technique called “smoothing,” actual workload for some types of units

during the first 30 days is actually much higher than TAA 2003 requirements

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reflect—almost twice as high for some transportation units. Finally, TAA

results reveal that the Army will have few active support forces—about

12 percent of total support forces required—available to support the

second MRC and that 19,200 required active support positions in existing

units are not authorized to be filled. Moreover, units totaling 58,400

positions are not authorized any personnel at all because the Army’s total

wartime support requirement exceeds available personnel authorizations.

The Army plans to mitigate this risk by relying on host nation personnel

and converting some Army National Guard combat forces to support

forces. These conversions are not yet funded and could take many years to

be accomplished.

Our examination of TAA assumptions and model inputs found that the

Army used many favorable assumptions that may have understated risks

to U.S. forces, such as limited chemical use by the enemy, assured port

availability, and no delays in the call-up of reserves forces. In particular,

the Army does not appear to have adequately considered delays or

degradation in capability resulting from the extraction of forces from an

OOTW to a major conflict, or to the potential demands on support forces

resulting from multiple OOTWs. War-fighting commanders believe that such

multiple OOTWs will add to the Army’s war-fighting risk. Since the Army

does not conduct sensitivity analyses to assess the impact of less favorable

assumptions, it does not know the extent to which changes in these

underlying assumptions would increase Army support requirements and

related risks. On the other hand, the Army could mitigate some risks by

expanding its resource pool to include support capabilities that currently

exist in the National Guard and TDA forces, as well as contract

services—resources that, with the exception of medical, are presently

excluded from TAA.

While TAA is an analytically rigorous process with extensive modeling and

wide participation by key Army personnel, some aspects of its

methodology could be improved. Some participants questioned whether

the Army had sufficiently scrutinized key model inputs, such as

consumption factors for fuel and water. In addition, by not rerunning the

campaign models with its required force, the Army missed an opportunity

to fully assess how mobility limitations affected risk.

Recommendations To improve TAA’s ability to accurately project war-fighting requirements

and allocate the Army’s personnel resources, we recommend that the

Secretary of the Army

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• reexamine key model inputs to ensure they are accurate and consistent

with war-fighting scenarios;

• perform analysis to determine how multiple OOTW support force

requirements might differ from support force requirements based on two

MRCs and bring any variances to the attention of the Secretary of Defense

so that he can consider them in developing defense guidance;

• perform sensitivity analyses on significant model inputs, assumptions, and

resourcing decisions to determine their impacts on war-fighting risk. For

example, although the Army used assumptions established by defense

guidance, determining the implications of less favorable conditions, such

as delayed call-up of reserves, would provide the Army with additional

information on which to base its assessment of risk;

• rerun TAA models with the required force to assess the impact of force size

on mobility requirements; and

• determine how support units resident within the eight National Guard

divisions, TDA military personnel, contractor personnel, and DOD civilians

can be used to fill some support force requirements.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report DOD fully concurred with four

of our recommendations and partially concurred with one (see app. V).

DOD noted that the Army has already planned some actions to resolve

issues we identified. For example, DOD stated the Army is closely

scrutinizing its model inputs for TAA 2005, beginning with a rigorous review

of all 3,000 allocation rules, and major studies to review fuel consumption

factors and casualty rates. The Army also plans to analyze the impact of

multiple OOTWs on support requirements and agreed that the current

assumption that all units involved in OOTWs will be immediately available

for the war fight is flawed and overly optimistic. The Army also plans to

conduct other sensitivity analyses and excursions in TAA 2005, beyond

those required by defense guidance. Further, the Army will rerun TAA

models with the required force to provide the force flow data needed to

improve its analysis of risk.

However, DOD only partially concurred with our recommendation to

consider other personnel resources in filling its support force

requirements. The Army plans to consider some types of Army National

Guard Division assets to fill support force shortfalls where the capabilities

are nearly a match, such as aviation assets. The Army also plans to further

analyze how to use its TDA structure to meet both OOTW and war-fighting

requirements. In the future, deployable TDA forces will be considered part

of the Army’s operating force. However, DOD differs with us on recognizing

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civilian contractor personnel in TAA. The Army believes that while

contractor personnel enhance the Army’s capabilities, they should not be

considered an available resource in TAA since contractor personnel are not

funded in the outyears of the Program Objective Memorandum. The Army

also expressed concern about its ability to provide security to contractors

in an MRC environment. Because contractor personnel have historically

been used by the Army to provide support in many different types of

overseas environments, both OOTWs and MRCs, we believe that, as a

minimum, the Army could treat contractor personnel in the same way it

treats host nation support—as an offset to unmet requirements. The Army

can make assumptions concerning the funding of the Logistics Civil

Augmentation Program, just as it makes assumptions about such issues as

the availability of host nation support, the size of the active Army force, or

the level of modernization of the force in future years.

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Despite numerous Army initiatives to improve its TDA requirements

determination process since the late 1970s, the Army cannot allocate its

TDA personnel based on the workload required to complete TDA missions.

As a result, the Army does not have a tool to prioritize TDA functions and

has made across-the-board cuts in TDA that are not analytically based.

Ongoing command and Army-wide initiatives to manage TDA based on

workload, to include analyzing what work needs to be done and assessing

how processes can be improved, will require senior Army leadership

support for successful implementation.

The Army has reviewed some TDA functions and identified a potential to

reduce its TDA by up to 4,000 military positions as a result of its initial

streamlining efforts. However, the Army’s end strength will not be

reduced; rather, the positions will be used to offset shortfalls in TOE

support forces. Plans for some of these initiatives, however, have not been

finalized and it is difficult to definitively quantify some savings. Army TDA

streamlining will continue through 2007. The Army is evaluating several

options to consolidate its major commands, which could further reduce

TDA requirements for active military personnel and introduce more

efficient business practices. However, such a reorganization could be

hampered without workload-based requirements. The Army’s potential for

streamlining TDA will also be limited by several laws and regulations, such

as civilian downsizing and TDA positions that are protected from Army

force reduction initiatives.

Finally, some personnel in TOE and TDA units perform similar functions

which calls into question the need for separate resourcing processes.

Some features of the Army’s process for using TDA medical personnel to fill

positions in TOE medical units may provide a model for other functions

with both TOE and TDA missions.

Institutional

Requirements Are Not

Well Supported

Weaknesses in the Army’s ability to fully define force requirements for the

institutional Army in terms of workload are long standing and have been

reported by us and the Army since the late 1970s. Workload-based

management is designed to help managers determine the resources

needed to complete a job and logically respond to resource cuts. For

example, using workload-based management, a manager could determine

how many trainers would be required to train a certain number of students

in a specified period of time. Weaknesses in its program leave the Army

unable to analytically support its TDA requirements or define the risks of

reducing this portion of the Army forces. Further, a weak requirements

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process prevents the Army leadership from making informed choices as to

possible trade-offs among TDA functions and commands based on highest

priority needs.

According to Army regulation and policy, force requirements are to be

logically developed from specific workload requirements derived from

mission directives. Responsibility for allocating personnel resources to

fulfill TDA missions belongs to the major commands. For fiscal year 1998,

the Army projects its TDA force at over 123,000 military positions and over

247,000 civilian positions. Although TDA functions are carried out by

military and civilian personnel depending on the type of mission, our focus

was on the active military Army. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of active

military TDA positions for fiscal year 1998.

Table 3.1: Distribution of Authorized

TDA Military Positions for Fiscal Year

1998

Command Military TDA Positions

Training and Doctrine Command 44,823

Medical Command 25,229

Forces Command 13,278

Intelligence and Security Command 6,303

Army Materiel Command 3,057

U.S. Army Europe 3,025

Special Operations Command/ Special Operations Forces 2,812

U.S. Army Pacific 2,499

Eighth U.S. Army 1,429

Military District Washington 1,381

Personnel Command 1,112

U.S. Military Academy 928

U.S. Army South 528

Corps of Engineers 505

Criminal Investigation Command 390

Othera 16,148

Total Authorized TDA Positions 123,447

aCategory includes positions allocated to the Army National Guard, field operating agencies, and

Joint and Defense agencies.

Source: Army force structure database as of November 1996.

In response to our 1979 report criticizing the Army for its lack of

workload-based information on which to determine personnel

requirements, the Army developed a workload-based personnel allocation

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system, known as the Manpower Staffing Standards System. This system

was intended to determine minimum essential requirements to accomplish

TDA workload and identify operational improvements to increase

efficiency and effectiveness. However, command officials told us that this

process was time consuming and labor intensive, taking as long as 3 years

to analyze a single function, and that the standards generated by it were

often obsolete by the time they were issued. In 1994, the Army Audit

Agency found that, as a result of these problems and lack of management

tools to collect workload data, managers were not able to effectively

determine or manage their TDA workloads and thus could not be assured

that limited personnel resources were being distributed to the highest

priority functions.

Commands Employ

Varying Levels of

Workload-Based Analysis

During our review, Army headquarters officials acknowledged that the

Army cannot articulate its TDA force structure in terms of workload, and

we found varying levels of compliance with the Army’s workload-based

management regulation at the major commands we contacted. The

Intelligence and Security Command, with a 1998 TDA active end strength

authorization of over 6,000, does not have a formal manpower study

program due to downsizing and changes in workload. Allocation of TDA

resources is done based on command guidance with functional staff’s

input. An official at Forces Command, which has a 1998 active component

TDA of about 13,000, told us that workload-based manpower management

had not been a high priority in recent years because of turmoil in the

workforce caused by downsizing and reallocation of workload due to base

realignments and closures. Forces Command has a plan to conduct a

comprehensive manpower assessment at each of its installations by the

year 2000. This assessment will include validating work requirements,

developing manning levels based on workload, and using cross-installation

comparisons of functions to establish a model for future manpower

requirements determination.

TRADOC, the Medical Command, and the Army Materiel Command had

more extensive workload-based management processes. Both the Medical

Command and TRADOC employ workload-based standards for about

60 percent of their TDA positions and have processes to review workloads

and resource allocations according to established requirements. The Army

Materiel Command, which has a largely civilian workforce, began a review

of all of its functions in March 1995 and completed this review of over

60,000 authorized military and civilian positions in January 1997. The

review includes validating units’ requirements, analyzing and projecting

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workload, and applying available resources to that workload. Having

visibility over the workload and the resources needed to complete it gives

commanders greater control over their resources and enables them to

identify inefficiencies. For example, at the Medical Command, the Surgeon

General holds “bankruptcy hearings” for units that exceed established

workload benchmarks.

Army Secretariat Is

Promoting

Workload-Based

Management

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs

has developed a new methodology for workload-based management that is

intended to address concerns that the Army does not know how big its

institutional force needs to be to satisfy its requirements. The Army’s

methodology includes an analysis of (1) the work that needs to be done

based on organizational mission, (2) how to improve processes through

better methods, benchmarking, capital investment, automation and

improved facilities, and (3) the most appropriate technique for linking

people to work. In addition, the Army is pilot testing an automated system

for collecting and analyzing workload information and monitoring

efficiency based on time spent completing functions. Army officials told us

that the system could provide managers at all levels significant visibility

over TDA resources and could ultimately be used to make trade-offs among

TDA functions Army-wide. The Assistant Secretary’s office is also

increasing its review of major commands’ requirements determination

processes.

Differing management philosophies on the use of workload-based

requirements could challenge the Army-wide adoption of workload-based

management. For example, one resource management official told us that

he preferred across-the-board percentage cuts rather than cuts weighted

according to workload, because this allows the commanders more

autonomy in how they allocate their resources. In October 1996, the

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs stated

that a challenge to adopting workload-based management will be changing

the perspective of resourcing officials from a philosophy of managing

personnel resources based on budget to managing personnel resources

based on workload.

Although managing to budget allows commanders to allocate resources

based on available budgets, we believe that using it as the sole-allocation

process does not provide the commander a vision of what cannot be done

as a result of declining budgets and may discourage commands from

identifying efficiencies if they know they will be receiving a cut regardless.

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In addition, managing to budget does not provide an analytical basis on

which to make trade-offs among TDA workload priorities. For example,

during deliberations for TAA 2001, which was completed in 1993, an

attempt by major command representatives to allocate a cut in TDA

positions among their commands ended in gridlock, in part due to the lack

of an analytical basis on which to divide the resources. The result was that

each command’s TDA military positions were cut by 7.5 percent, regardless

of its individual missions or requirements. Such a cut impacts some

commands more than others. For example, Intelligence and Security

Command officials told us that 75 percent of its officers were controlled

by other agencies; therefore, it could not eliminate any of these positions.

As a result, an across-the-board 7.5 percent reduction applied to

Intelligence and Security Command officers fell disproportionately on the

remaining 25 percent of its officers that the command had authority over.

Efforts to allocate resources based on workload will require the support of

the Army leadership to be successful. The long-standing weaknesses with

the Army’s process, despite numerous efforts to improve it, suggest that a

higher level of reporting and oversight may be warranted. However, the

Army has not reported its historic lack of compliance with its

workload-based allocation policy as a material weakness under the

Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act (P.L. 97-255). Policy

implementing the act requires agencies to establish internal controls to

provide reasonable assurance that programs are efficiently and effectively

carried out in accordance with applicable law and policy. One criterion for

determining whether an internal control weakness is material is if it

significantly weakens safeguards against waste. If lack of workload

analysis, which does not comply with Army policy and does not safeguard

against waste, was reported to the Secretary of Defense as a material

weakness, the Secretary of the Army would be required to develop a

corrective action plan with milestones for completion. As required by OSD

guidance, responsible OSD officials would then need to assess whether this

problem is a DOD-wide systemic weakness and whether it is a weakness of

sufficient magnitude to be reported in OSD’s annual statement of assurance

to the President and Congress.

The Army Is

Streamlining Its

Institutional Force

Despite the lack of workload data to define specific requirements of the

TDA force, the Army is re-engineering its processes and redesigning the

overall TDA organization through a series of streamlining initiatives.

Although these efforts have some aspects that are similar to workload

analysis, these are one-time, Army-wide assessments intended to provide a

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forum for re-engineering many Army functions. The Army defines

re-engineering as a “fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of

business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical,

contemporary measures of performance.” In contrast, workload

management is a tool for conducting more micro-levels of analysis on a

unit-by-unit basis.

The streamlining and re-engineering effort, known as the Force XXI

Institutional Army Redesign, is one component of the overall Force XXI

redesign. The other two components are the redesign of the combat forces

and an effort to incorporate information age technology into the

battlefield. The institutional redesign will take place in three phases to

correspond with presidential budget cycles. Phase I, completed in

March 1996, resulted in modifications to the 1998-2003 Army Program

Objective Memorandum. Phases II and III will be completed in time to

update the 2000-2005 and the 2002-2007 budgets, respectively.

As a result of the phase I reviews of TDA missions, to include acquisition,

training, mobilization, recruiting, personnel management and redesign of

the Department of Army Headquarters, the Army eliminated 13

headquarters offices, realigned a major command, and identified almost

4,000 active military positions that will be cut from TDA and transferred to

the TOE end strength between 1998 and 2003. Before the TDA cuts were

identified, TAA 2003 applied 2,000 TDA positions to unmet support force

requirements in anticipation of the streamlining results. Officials told us

that the remaining 2,000 positions will also be transferred to the

deployable portion of the force to fill shortages in units that are at less

than full strength, although they could not specify the units. Furthermore,

many of the 4,000 positions that are being shifted are based on initiatives

that have not been fully tested or approved. Thus, the expected savings are

not assured.

The largest single planned transfer of 2,100 positions is the result of an

Army proposal to replace active TDA military assigned to the Senior

Reserve Officer Training Corps with reserve component,

noncommissioned and retired officers. This proposal is being studied by

TRADOC and would require a change in legislation to authorize the use of

retired and additional reserve personnel, according to the Army. If pilot

testing shows the concept is infeasible, or if the legislative enabler the

Army is proposing is not passed, the Army would need to find a means to

accomplish this function since it has already taken these TDA reductions. In

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another example, the Army anticipates reducing attrition,1 thereby freeing

up 750 TDA positions associated with training and recruiting. The Army’s

plan to reduce attrition is based primarily on establishing an advisory

council to provide commanders with attrition statistics and review policies

that impact attrition. As a result, the Army cannot be certain that the

anticipated TDA transfers can be realistically accomplished.

Ongoing Organizational

Reviews Could Reduce

TDA Positions

The Army’s efforts to streamline its institutional force are linked to a

conceptual model delineated in a draft Department of the Army Pamphlet,

100xx entitled “Force XXI Institutional Force Redesign.” The model

identifies the core competency of the TDA force, divides this competency

into 4 core capabilities, and divides the 4 capabilities into 14 core

processes, as shown in table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Core Competency,

Capabilities, and Processes of the

Institutional Army

Core competency Core capabilities Core processes

Create, provide and sustain

the land component of the

combatant commander’s

joint/multinational force

Direct and resource the

force

Planning and policy

 development

Direction and assessment

Financial management

Information management

Develop the force Develop doctrine

Devevelop requirements

Acquire and sustain

 individuals

Identify and develop leaders

Generate and project the

force

Tailor, mobilize and project

 land power

Support organizational

 training

Sustain the force Acquire, maintain, and

 sustain equipment

Maintain and sustain land

 operations

Acquire and sustain facilities

Operate installations

Source: Department of the Army Pamphlet 100xx (final draft as of October 15, 1996).

The Army plans to align its organizations around the core capabilities and

core processes, so that there would be one office with lead responsibility

for each process. For example, under the current structure, several

commands, including TRADOC, the Intelligence and Security Command, and

U.S. Army, Europe, have responsibility to develop Army doctrine. Under

1

Attrition is defined as a soldier leaving the Army before his or her term of enlistment has expired.

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the streamlined model, TRADOC would have the lead responsibility for

doctrine writing.

The Army will use this framework to align the TDA organization with core

processes. The Army has developed three organizational models that

would reduce the number of major commands and are intended to

eliminate duplication, establish clearer lines of authority, streamline

resource management, and could further reduce TDA military personnel.

For example, one model would reduce the Army from its current structure

of 14 major commands to a total of 10 commands, with 3 major commands

and 7 Army service component commands to support the CINCs. The three

major commands would be aligned to the “Develop the Force,” “Generate

and Project the Force,” and the “Sustain the Force” core capabilities with

the Department of the Army Headquarters assuming responsibility for the

“Direct and Resource” capabilities. However, these models are illustrative

and were presented as a starting point for further discussion and do not

directly address shortfalls in defining requirements based on workload. As

such, officials said they could not provide a specific date on which any of

these models would be in place or estimate how many positions might be

saved through streamlining.

Army Must Consider

Legislative and Regulatory

Guidance When

Streamlining TDA

Additional streamlining of the Army’s TDA force must accommodate

limitations from legislative, regulatory, and budgetary guidance. These

actions can influence the size and composition of the institutional Army

force, but are outside the Army’s span of control. For example, DOD’s

ongoing civilian drawdown limits the Army’s ability to convert military

positions to generally less expensive civilian positions. In 1994 and 1996,

we reported that there were opportunities for the Army to convert certain

enlisted and officer support positions from military to civilian status, but

to overcome impediments to conversion, the Secretary of Defense would

need to slow the civilian drawdown, or the Congress would need to

reprogram funding.2

 Further, officials in the commands we visited pointed

to budgetary challenges to converting military positions to civilians. First,

the commands are reluctant to convert military positions to civilian

positions because they cannot be assured that operations and

maintenance money, which funds civilian pay, will be available to hire a

new civilian. Officials told us that the transfer of a military position to a

civilian position is authorized years before the civilian is hired and

sometimes by the year of execution, inadequate operations and

2

DOD Force Mix Issues: Greater Reliance on Civilians in Support Roles Could Provide Significant

Benefits (GAO/NSIAD-95-5, Oct. 19, 1994) and DOD Force Mix Issues: Converting Some Support

Officer Positions to Civilian Status Could Save Money (GAO/NSIAD-97-15, Oct. 23, 1996).

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maintenance funding prevent the command from hiring a new civilian.

Second, local commanders have a disincentive to civilianize because

civilian positions are paid in full from the installation’s budget while

military personnel are paid out of the Army’s centralized military

personnel budget.

Also, some active military TDA positions are required by law or controlled

by other agencies. As a percentage of the active component TDA force,

these positions, sometimes referred to as “fenced” positions, will have

increased from 29 percent in 1991 to a projected 37 percent in 2001. For

example, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991

restricts the Secretary of Defense from reducing medical personnel

without providing certification to Congress that the number reduced is in

excess of that required and that the reduction would not cause an increase

in costs to those covered under the Civilian Health and Medical Program

of the Uniformed Services. Positions controlled by other agencies include

those assigned to the National Foreign Intelligence Program. Under

executive order, these positions are required and budgeted by the Director

of Central Intelligence and cannot be reallocated without his permission.

Table 3.3 summarizes the major categories of fenced positions and the

change from 1991 to 2001.

Table 3.3: Comparison of “Fenced”

TDA Positions, 1991 and 2001 1991 End strength 2001 End strength

Category

Number of

TDA

Percent of

TDA

Number of

TDA

Percent of

TDA

National Foreign Intelligence

Program

11,276 7 7,719 6

Special Operations Forces 2,326 1 2,863 2

Joint 5,108 3 5,039 4

Defense Health 30,123 18 25,096 20

Active Component Support to

the Reserves

0 0 5,000 4

Total fenced positions 48,833 29 45,717 37

TDA 169,605 100 125,120 100

Source: The 1991 and 1997 Army submittals to President’s Budgets.

Although fencing ensures that selected high-priority missions are

adequately staffed, to the extent positions are fenced, the Army must

disproportionately reduce other non-fenced TDA categories to absorb

across-the-board reductions.

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Division Between

TOE and TDA Is

Becoming Less

Distinct

The distinction of a deployable TOE force and a nondeployable TDA force is

becoming less clear and calls into question the necessity of maintaining

separate processes to allocate personnel resources. The draft Army

Pamphlet 100xx acknowledges a blurred distinction between operational

and institutional forces because institutional forces are increasingly being

called on to perform tactical support functions in areas such as

intelligence, communications, transportation, logistics, engineering, and

medical support. For example, an Intelligence and Security Command

official told us that all of its TDA military personnel along with almost 600

civilians at the command are considered deployable. At Forces Command,

we were told that TDA personnel assigned to directly support a TOE unit are

expected to deploy with that unit. Another example is military police. In

recognition of historical deployments of TDA military police to support law

and order operations in theater, the Army plans to convert 1,850 TDA

military police positions to TOE. The initiative would establish modular

military police organizations that would be designed to provide

capabilities in peace, conflict, and war.

However, with the exception of medical, TDA specialties with potential use

in a deployment are not considered available to be distributed among

requirements in the TAA process. TAA does not model the relative risks of

reducing TDA units compared to reducing below-the-line support TOE units.

Nor does it consider trade-offs between below-the-line support units and

support units embedded in combat divisions. Thus, the Army could

overstate the risk of shortages in a below-the-line TOE branch, when in

practice, TOE support units in combat divisions or TDA personnel are

capable of performing similar functions. A unified resourcing process

would give the Army visibility over all capabilities available to complete its

missions, regardless of their classification as TOE or TDA.

The Army’s process for handling medical requirements may provide a

model for functions that are resident and required in both TOE and TDA

forces. During peacetime, some deployable hospitals are maintained by a

small cadre of personnel. During deployments, these hospitals are filled in

with designated TDA medical personnel whose peacetime TDA mission is to

staff Army medical treatment facilities. Medical reservists are in turn

called up to back fill the medical treatment facilities. In TAA 2003, about

5,000 requirements were filled with predesignated TDA medical positions.

While it may not be feasible to back fill certain specialties with reservists,

two features of the medical model could be reviewed for broader

application. First, the medical model formally recognizes and quantifies

the dual duties of personnel assigned to TDA functions in peacetime but

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expected to deploy in operations. Second, it gives visibility to all medical

assets, regardless of their classification as TOE or TDA forces.

Conclusions Army initiatives to analytically define and allocate TDA resources according

to workload have not been effective. Although ongoing initiatives show

some promise, they will require significant support by the Army

leadership. If implemented, workload-based management could identify

opportunities to streamline TDA functions and ensure that active military

positions are allocated most efficiently.

Of the potential 4,000 required positions for transfer to TOE by the Force

XXI institutional redesign, many are contingent on Army plans that have

either not been finalized or that are difficult to quantify. As a result, the

anticipated reallocation should be viewed with caution. There is potential

for further savings as the Army streamlines its TDA by aligning the

organization with TDA core processes; however, streamlining may be

limited by legislative, regulatory, and budgetary guidance.

The reliance of TOE units on TDA personnel to complete missions calls into

question the need for separate resourcing processes. A more unified

process would permit the Army to consider how it can best meet

requirements from a wider range of personnel at its disposal. In addition, it

would allow for better management of personnel resources—one of the

Army’s most expensive budget items.

Recommendations To improve the management and allocation of personnel resources to the

institutional Army, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army

• report to the Secretary of Defense the Army’s long-standing problem with

implementing workload-based analysis as a material weakness under the

Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act to maintain visibility of the issue

and ensure action is taken and

• closely monitor the military positions the Army plans to save as the result

of Force XXI initiatives and have a contingency plan in place in the event

that these savings do not materialize.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD’s comments on these recommendations appear in appendix V. DOD

agreed that the Secretary of the Army should report its long-standing

problems in managing its institutional personnel as a material weakness

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under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act and develop a sound

basis for allocating resources to these functions. As part of this effort, the

Army intends to assess the potential benefit to the Army of new

workload-based management tools being pilot tested by an office of the

Assistant Secretary of the Army. DOD also concurred with our

recommendation that the Secretary of the Army closely monitor the

military positions saved under Force XXI. The Army’s intent is to apply

any such savings to authorization shortfalls in existing support units.

However, the Army acknowledges that it is too soon to speculate on the

size of any future savings.

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A Smaller Active Army Support Force Does

Not Appear Feasible at This Time, but a

Smaller Combat and TDA Force May Be

Possible in the Future

Reducing active Army support forces does not appear feasible now based

on TAA 2003 results, which show that the Army cannot meet its early

deployment needs. But a smaller combat and TDA force may be possible in

the future, based on ongoing Army initiatives and efforts under way to

review U.S. defense strategy and forces.

Nevertheless, OSD’s current position on active Army end strength was not

supported by detailed analysis. OSD cited potential end strength savings

from the Army’s Force XXI streamlining initiatives as a basis to reduce the

Army’s end strength to 475,000. However, while Force XXI’s emphasis on

digitization and more efficient logistics practices may achieve end strength

savings in the long term, these savings do not appear likely to occur by

1999, the time frame OSD established to achieve the 20,000 position

drawdown. Following its decision to reduce the Army by 20,000 positions,

OSD reviewed TAA 2003 results. OSD’s study questioned the Army’s

determination of its support requirements but did not examine downsizing

of the active Army.

OSD’s assessment of the appropriate size of the active Army could change

as a result of the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review.

DOD is expected to assess a wide range of issues, including the defense

strategy of the United States, the optimum force structure to implement

the strategy, and the roles and missions of reserve forces. The number of

divisions required or the mix of heavy and light divisions may change if a

new strategy is adopted. Also, options may exist for restructuring the

Army’s active divisions by integrating some reserve forces. Options to

expand the role of the reserves would have the effect of reducing

requirements for active combat forces.

OSD Did Not Base Its

Plan to Reduce the

Army’s End Strength

on Detailed Analysis

In April 1995, to free resources for modernization programs, OSD directed

the Army to reduce its end strength by 20,000 no later than 1999. This

guidance was reflected in DOD’s 1997 FYDP, which reduced the Army’s

active force by 10,000 positions in both 1998 and 1999, along with related

military personnel funding. However, in March 1996, the Army Chief of

Staff testified that the active Army should not get any smaller. Instead, the

Army planned to identify savings within its own budget sufficient to avoid

the 20,000 position reduction.

A memorandum from the Secretary of Defense cited the Army’s Force XXI

initiative as the means by which the Army would identify efficiencies to

reduce the force. However, according to Army documentation, Force

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XXI’s primary focus is to increase capability by leveraging technology, not

to attain specific end strength reductions. The Army is experimenting with

ways to streamline its TOE forces through its Force XXI redesign of its

combat divisions, known as Joint Venture. For example, Joint Venture’s

focus on increasing situational awareness by digitizing the battlefield and

better managing logistics could reduce the size of Army divisions.

However, the division redesign is not yet finalized and will not be fully

implemented until 2010. The Army’s streamlining of its TDA force under

Force XXI has identified about 4,000 excess active military spaces, but the

Army plans to reallocate those spaces to fill unmet requirements in active

TOE support forces.

The Army’s efforts to streamline TDA under Force XXI, and additional

streamlining initiatives and policy changes proposed by Army leadership,

enabled the Army to increase its military personnel account throughout its

fiscal year’s 1998-2003 Program Objective Memorandum to pay for the

20,000 spaces eliminated in DOD’s 1997 FYDP. Based on Army projections,

we estimate that from 1998 to 2003, the Army will need about $3 billion in

savings to pay for the 20,000 positions. The Army has identified almost

$9 billion in savings over that same period, but considers only about

$2 billion of those savings as finalized; the remaining $7 billion will require

coordination and oversight among several Army organizations to be

realized. For example, recommendations to reduce logistics costs,

including reductions in acquisition lead time and spare parts inventories,

account for over $2 billion in savings and will result in overhead cuts to

the logistics community. The benefit of the overhead cuts will be realized

by the commands through lower logistics costs. An Army official told us

that such a disconnect between the entity doing the cutting and the entity

receiving reductions in cost could make some of the initiatives difficult to

manage. Further, some of the savings are based on across-the-board cuts

to headquarters overhead that are not analytically based.

As discussed in chapter 3, the Army has identified a potential to reduce its

TDA force by 4,000 active military positions as a result of its initial Force

XXI streamlining initiatives. Ongoing streamlining initiatives could further

reduce TDA requirements for active military personnel.

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OSD Assessment of

TAA 2003 Did Not

Address Active Army

End Strength

As a separate initiative, OSD reviewed TAA 2003’s methodology and results,

but did not examine the issue of active Army end strength. OSD questioned

whether the Army’s 672,000 TOE requirement was high based on its analysis

of selected TAA assumptions and model inputs, and its comparison of Army

support requirements based on TAA to those used in a 1995 DOD war game

known as Nimble Dancer. OSD’s assessment was limited to an analysis of

TOE forces, both active and reserve, and did not consider the question of

availability of reserve forces during the first 30 days of a conflict, as did

the Army’s TAA analysis. Nor did OSD assess another risk factor the Army

deemed important, availability of active forces for the second MRC. The OSD

study did not recommend a smaller Army, but did ask it to study some

issues that affect the size of its TOE force.

OSD Questioned TAA

Model Inputs and

Assumptions

The Army did not agree that its support force requirements were high.

However, at the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Army

did agree to review model inputs and assumptions that OSD questioned and

to determine the impact of any changes on the size of the Army’s support

forces. The Army also responded that it would make adjustments to TAA

2003 results if any errors were identified. Among OSD’s principle concerns

were the following:

• Casualty estimates. OSD questioned whether the TAA models produced valid

casualty estimates because of variances between Army casualty estimates

and actual casualties experienced in battles dating back to World War II.

Army casualty estimates are not used to size the Army medical force, but

do influence support requirements in the theater of operations such as for

quartermaster and engineer branches.

• Fuel consumption. OSD questioned whether Army fuel consumption rates

were high based on a review of actual fuel issued to units during the Gulf

War.

• Host nation support. OSD believed the Army could reduce its active support

requirements by placing greater reliance on support from host nations.

Currently, the Army reduces its unmet requirements by the amount of host

nation support it expects to receive, based on signed agreements. (See

chapter 2 for a discussion of material weaknesses in DOD’s host nation

support program.)

The Army has arranged for an independent analysis of its casualty

estimation methodology and has asked the Director of the Joint Staff to

query the CINCs concerning the availability of additional host nation

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support. The Army is conducting its own detailed analysis of its fuel

consumption rates.

OSD Believes TAA

Requirements Are High

Compared to Nimble

Dancer

OSD used the 1995 DOD war game Nimble Dancer to evaluate the

reasonableness of the Army TOE requirements. By comparing the Nimble

Dancer Army force level requirement of 457,000 TOE spaces to the TAA 2003

Army-generated war fight requirement of 672,000 TOE spaces (195,000

combat and 477,000 support forces), OSD identified a potential

overstatement of 215,000 spaces. After adjusting for different assumptions

used in TAA 2003 and Nimble Dancer, OSD concluded that the Army TAA

2003 requirements were high.

While there may be insights to be gained by analyzing some aspects of the

Nimble Dancer war game, we believe comparing the Army’s TAA 2003 force

requirements against the Nimble Dancer force is problematic. In Nimble

Dancer, DOD identified the availability of sufficient support forces as

critical to the outcome of the conflict and determined that shortages could

delay the start of the counterattack in the second MRC. However, as we

noted in our June 1996 report on Nimble Dancer,1 DOD did not model or

analyze in detail the sufficiency of support forces during the war game.

For purposes of its baseline modeling, DOD assumed that support forces

would accompany combat units when they deployed. Game participants

held discussions concerning the impact of support force shortfalls, but

deferred further analysis to the Army’s TAA 2003. The 457,000 spaces OSD

used as a baseline for comparison to TAA 2003 was a notional Army force

based on TAA 2001 and its purpose was to assess mobility, not end

strength, requirements. Only the combat forces were played in the war

game itself. Given the limited consideration given to support forces in

Nimble Dancer, we do not believe comparisons with Army TAA 2003 are

meaningful.

Although OSD asserts that Army support requirements are high, it endorsed

the concept of converting reserve positions from combat to support to fill

the Army’s unmet requirements. These conversions were recommended by

us in past reports, the Commission on Roles and Missions and most

recently in a National Guard Division Redesign Study.

In addition to the studies previously mentioned, the Deputy Secretary of

Defense directed OSD analysts to assess whether DOD has sufficient

1

Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of DOD War Game to Test Key Assumptions (GAO/NSIAD-96-170,

June 21, 1996).

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mobility assets to move (1) the Army’s full TOE requirement of 672,000, and

(2) the force actually planned in the Army’s fiscal year’s 1998-2003

Program Objective Memorandum. In particular, the Deputy Secretary is

interested in how scenario timelines would be affected if mobility assets

are constrained to those actually planned. During TAA 2003, the Army

relied on the Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update to

establish available lift to move forces to theater. This was consistent with

Secretary of Defense guidance.

Quadrennial Defense

Review May Impact

Army Active Military

Personnel

Requirements

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 requires DOD

to conduct a Quadrennial Defense Review by May 15, 1997. An

independent panel of defense experts will submit a comprehensive

assessment of DOD’s report and conduct an assessment of alternative force

structures by December 1, 1997. In conducting its review, DOD must assess

a wide range of issues, including the defense strategy of the United States,

the force structure best suited to implement the strategy, the roles and

mission of reserve forces, the appropriate ratio of combat forces to

support forces, and the effect of OOTWs on force structure. The number of

Army divisions or the mix of heavy and light divisions may change as a

result of this study, particularly if a new strategy is adopted. For example,

a strategy that places more emphasis on OOTWs might result in an active

Army that has fewer heavy divisions and assigns a higher percentage of its

active forces to support units. The review will also provide an opportunity

to reassess the role of the Army’s reserve forces. For example, as a result

of the BUR and the Army’s experience in the Persian Gulf War, the Army

discontinued its reliance on reserve component “round-up” and

“round-out” brigades to bring the active divisions to full combat strength

during wartime. However, options may exist to adopt some variant of this

concept, such as integrating reserve forces at the battalion level or

assigning reserve forces a role in later deploying active divisions. Options

to expand the role of the reserves would have the effect of reducing

requirements for active combat forces.

Conclusions OSD did not support its plan to reduce the Army’s active end strength with

detailed analysis. OSD’s assessment of TAA 2003 identified issues worthy of

further analysis, but did not draw conclusions about the size of the active

Army.

Future active Army end strength will likely be affected by several ongoing

Army streamlining initiatives, and potential changes to military strategy

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Smaller Combat and TDA Force May Be

Possible in the Future

and the role of reserve forces resulting from the upcoming Quadrennial

Defense Review. TDA streamlining may identify additional opportunities to

reduce active TDA personnel by reducing the number of major commands

and adopting broader use of workload analysis. Force XXI’s emphasis on

digital technology and just in time logistics may result in smaller combat

divisions in the future. Other options for restructuring combat forces

include reassessing the mix of heavy and light divisions and assigning

reserve forces a role in later deploying active divisions. However, given the

risks the Army has accepted in its active support forces, we do not believe

it is feasible for the Army to reduce its active support forces at this time.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In addition to DOD’s official agency comments (see app. V), the Army

provided technical comments on a draft of this report concerning the role

of reserve forces in any new strategy proposed by the Quadrennial

Defense Review. The Army believes that the use of round-up/round-out

brigades is a Cold War concept not viable for an early response power

projection force. However, the Army says it is currently studying options

to employ “multi-component” units, that is, combining an active unit with

an associated reserve unit that is organized with fully trained personnel

and minimal equipment. Upon mobilization, associate units would deploy

and augment the active component unit, or earlier deploying reserve

component units, increasing their capability by adding qualified personnel.

Our report does not recommend a return to the round-up and round-out

concept used in the past. Rather, our intention was to suggest that there

may be a variant of this concept that would allow the Army to make

greater use of its reserve forces. The Quadrennial Defense Review

provides an opportunity for such new concepts to be considered. We have

not reviewed the multi-component concept currently being analyzed by

the Army, but agree that new approaches that better integrate the Army’s

active and reserve forces and optimize the use of available equipment

should be explored.

Page 64 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Page 65 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Appendix I 

The TAA Process

The Total Army Analysis (TAA) is a phased force structure analysis process

that the Army conducts biennially to determine its support force

requirements. TAA does this by modeling a theater-level war fight for a

combat force. This combat simulation considers and generates

information on a multitude of planning factors and consumption rates,

including ammunition, equipment repair, and casualty rates; unit arrival

dates; and geographical characteristics of the theater. Military judgment

then is applied to this quantitative analysis to produce the Army’s support

force required to (1) execute the national military strategy as set forth in

the defense guidance, (2) compare the program force to war-fight

requirements, and (3) enable the Army to make force programming

decisions which balances war-fighting risk and resource constraints.

Initial broad guidance for TAA is provided by the Office of the Secretary of

Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff. This guidance includes the number, size,

and type of combat forces; troop strength levels in Europe and Korea;

Army funding levels; and representative war-fight scenarios. The focus of

TAA is primarily to support the theater war fight outlined in the defense

guidance MRC scenarios. No allowances are made for other contingency

requirements, such as Bosnia, or training, mobilization, and deployment

requirements.

There is substantial qualitative review of model results in the form of

Army-wide conferences. These conferences are attended by colonel- and

general officer-level representatives from the Army Staff, the major

commands, schools and integrating centers, the war-fighting CINCs, the

National Guard Bureau, and Office of the Chief of the Army Reserves. This

broad participation is intended to ensure accuracy, credibility, and

acceptance of TAA results throughout the Army. The final product of TAA is

the approved force structure baseline of the Army, the Army’s Program

Objective Memorandum force. TAA consists of four phases: Phase I, Force

Guidance; Phase II, Quantitative Analysis; Phase III, Qualitative Analysis;

and Phase IV, Leadership Review and Program Objective Memorandum

Development. These phases are depicted in figure I.1.

Page 66 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Appendix I 

The TAA Process

Figure I.1: The TAA Process

Unit

allocation

 rules

Defense 

guidance

Logistics data

 and

consumption

factors

Force

Structure

Conference I

General Officer

Steering Committee I

Phase I Force Guidance

AAAAAA

Force

requirements

Campaign simulation modeling

Resourcing

Force

Structure

Conference II

Phase II Quantitative Analysis

General

Officer

Steering

Committee II

Senior

leadership

review

Phase III Quantitative Analysis Phase IV Leadership Review

Budget

submission

Phase I, Force Guidance Phase I is the forum where all model input and planning assumptions are

reviewed and approved. Two key data sources are the Army’s force

planning data and assumptions (AFPDA) and unit allocation rules. The AFPDA

is a single-source document that the Army relies on for developing

planning factors for its theater-level studies such as TAA. The AFPDA

contains logistics data and information on consumption rates for all

classes of supply based on the intensity of the war fight. Data regarding

threat and allied forces, support to and from other services, and other

planning factors crucial to force structure development also are

considered. Unit allocation rules translate the capabilities of specific

support units into quantitative statements of a unit’s capability, mission,

and doctrinal employment as it applies to a specific scenario. Over 1,500

different allocation rules were applied in TAA 2003 for each theater.

Page 67 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Appendix I 

The TAA Process

The three principal unit allocation rules are existence, workload, and

manual. An existence-based rule allocates units depending on the

existence of other units. For example, for each division in a corps there

are two military police companies. A workload-based rule ties unit

requirements to a measurable task. For example, for every 30,000

personnel there is one post office. Workload driven requirements can vary

according to the nature of the threat, the environment (e.g., arid

conditions require more water for consumption), lines of communication,

and other factors. A manual-based rule allocates units without a standard

basis, to reflect a theater’s physical or organizational structure. For

example, allocating a number of units to link communications systems

based on a theater’s geographic characteristics and the number of

headquarters needing such connectivity. Phase I does not differentiate

between active and reserve forces when establishing the force

requirements.

Phase II, Quantitative

Analysis

During phase II, the Army employs a suite of campaign simulation models

to estimate the number and type of support forces required to sustain the

combat force, unconstrained by available resources. A strategic mobility

analysis is performed to determine the arrival times of Army forces in

theater and identify strategic mobility shortfalls. This is followed by a

theater campaign analysis to gauge force movement and unit strength over

time, as well as personnel and equipment losses. Outputs from these

models, along with approved unit allocation rules and logistics data, are

used to determine support force requirements using the Force Analysis

Simulation of Theater Administration and Logistics Support (FASTALS)

model. FASTALS generates the required support forces by type, quantity,

when they are needed in theater, and their supply requirements. The

support forces identified by FASTALS are then matched to actual Army

support units using other models. The matching process contains an

embedded logic that guides unit assignment. For example, it ensures that

active units are applied to forward stationed requirements. Army units are

applied toward requirements until the unit inventory is exhausted. The

difference between the required force and the inventory of actual Army

units is evaluated during phase III.

Phase III, Qualitative

Analysis

During phase III, the initial Army Program Objective Memorandum force is

developed, constrained by upfront end strength and fiscal guidance.

During this phase, the FASTALS-generated support force requirements and

the analysis of those requirements are validated. Units that cannot be

Page 68 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Appendix I 

The TAA Process

matched to war-fight requirements are characterized as either (1) strategic

reserve (such as the 8 Army National Guard divisions and certain

enhanced brigades); (2) unique (such as units in Europe and Panama that

perform unique strategic, allied, or national missions, and the Old Guard);

or (3) excess forces that do not match up with a war-fight requirement.

Where possible, these excess forces are converted to match a

corresponding war-fight requirement. Each specialty is analyzed to

determine the effect of resourcing units at less than their full requirement,

and the active reserve force mix is examined on a case-by-case basis.

Conference participants discuss approaches to mitigate risk and establish

priorities among competing requirements for limited resources.

Phase IV, Leadership

Review and Program

Objective Memorandum

Development

During phase IV, a force program review is convened to resolve any

support force resourcing issues not resolved in phase III. This review is

chaired by the Army Vice Chief of Staff. The approved force structure is

forwarded to the Army Chief of Staff for final approval as the base force

for programming resources for the Army’s Program Objective

Memorandum.

Page 69 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Appendix II 

Reserve Mobilization Process

The Army estimates that mobilizing reserve forces, from unit recall to

arrival at the port of embarkation, takes about 15 days for a small support

unit and 31 days for a large unit. Representative tasks associated with the

mobilization process follow. The time it takes to complete them are

presented in figure II.1.

• Pre-mobilization phase

• Maintain personnel mobilization packets.

• Ensure medical and dental examinations are current.

• Ensure personnel have required security clearances.

• Complete family care plans.

• Screen personnel for members not available for mobilization.

• Prepare and maintain a unit alert roster.

• Establish liaison with the mobilization station.

• Ensure continual maintenance of all equipment.

• Alert phase

• Coordinate mission related travel.

• Identify advance party members.

• Screen and promote eligible personnel.

• Order unit members to active duty.

• Respond to press inquiries.

• Prepare and submit property requisitions.

• Prepare and assemble logistics documentation.

• Request convoy movement frequencies.

• Home station phase

• Identify medically disqualified personnel.

• Verify financial and insurance options.

• Conduct personal affairs briefing.

• Prepare unit status report.

• Conduct physical inventory of all assigned property.

• Prepare security clearance rosters.

• Process record of emergency data.

• Verify identification cards and tags.

• Mobilization phase

• Move personnel to the mobilization station.

• Conduct medical and dental exams.

• Ensure all administrative and finance matters are in order.

• Conduct training assessment and schedule training.

• Perform individual and unit level training.

• Perform theater-specific and new equipment training.

• Perform required maintenance of unit equipment.

• Pack and load.

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Appendix II 

Reserve Mobilization Process

• Port of embarkation phase

• Move equipment to the seaport of embarkation.

• Move unit to the airport of embarkation.

Figure II.1: Reserve Mobilization Timeline

-10 -5 M +5 +10 +15 +20 +25 +30 +35

Pre-mobilization and alert phases

Home station phase

Mobilization station phase

Port of embarkation phase

M Mobilization day

Small

Large

Support unit size

Days

Page 71 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Appendix III 

Comparison of TAA 2001 and TAA 2003

Unmet Requirements Data

Units required that exist

only on papera Total Positionsa

Branch TAA 2001 TAA 2003 TAA 2001 TAA 2003

Quartermaster 209 158 11,749 21,295

Transportation 230 122 30,244 20,370

Air Defense 31 10 8,604 4,266

Signal 12 16 3,958 4,084

Engineer 323 759 2,720 2,860

Medical 32 39 1,231 1,986

Artillery 26 2 2,379 1,150

Armor 0 2 0 1,100

Chemical 3 4 327 674

Special Operations Forces 20 0 3,660 0

Personnel Service Support 82 104 1,180 347

Theater/Corps Headquarters 104 94 276 188

Ordnance 184 22 2,965 102

Aviation 1 0 298 0

Combat Service Support 1 0 193 0

Military Intelligence 3 0 444 0

Military Police 1 0 176 0

Multifunctional Logistics and

Headquarters

1 0 115 0

Totals 1,263 1,332 70,519 58,422

aTAA 2001 and TAA 2003 were developed using different defense guidance and end strength

numbers, thus their results cannot be directly correlated.

Page 72 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Appendix IV 

Key Assumptions Used in TAA 2003

TAA 2003 assumption Army rationale

Active Army end strength will be 495,000. The Army reached its 495,000 active end strength target in fiscal

year 1996 and assumed that this end strength would be

maintained through fiscal year 2003. Since OSD announced its

intention to reduce Army end strength by 20,000 during the TAA

2003 process and did not provide guidance on the composition of

the proposed 475,000 active force, the Army opted to retain its

495,000 active end strength for TAA 2003.

The Army will have 10 active Army combat divisions, 15 National

Guard enhanced brigades, and 8 National Guard divisions, as

specified in defense guidance.

The Army will employ all 10 of its active divisions and some

enhanced brigades in the two-MRC scenario.

TAA 2003 requirement for two MRCs will consider only those units

with a war-fight mission, which can reasonably be expected to

deploy to theater.

Army National Guard divisions and remaining enhanced brigades

are considered a strategic reserve to respond to adverse

situations.

TOE requirements (both combat and support) are based on units

resourced at 100 percent of their personnel authorizations (full

authorized level of organization).

Doctrinally correct TOEs for combat and support forces were

modeled in TAA 2003. However, adjustments were made,

reducing TOE requirements from 690,000 to 672,000.

Units due to arrive in theater in the first 30 days of the first MRC will

be predominantly in the active component.

This is consistent with defense guidance. The Army determined

that time delays associated with the call-up and mobilization of

reserve forces generally preclude their arrival in theater in the first

30 days. The Army estimates that a large support unit would be

available in 31 days after mobilization, and a small support unit

would be available in 15 days. This does not count transit time to

the theater for personnel and equipment.

Operations other than war (OOTW) force requirements will not be

added to the two-MRC force requirements. Rather, adjustments will

be made within the two-MRC requirement to satisfy the needs of

OOTWs.

According to defense guidance, the Army can base its TOE

requirements on either two nearly simultaneous MRCs or on one

MRC and one OOTW, whichever produced the greater force

requirement.

There will be no force requirement for casualty replacements. Although the Army does not include casualty replacements in

calculating its force requirements, the TAA war-fight model

estimates their numbers. If individual replacements were needed,

they would likely be drawn from active soldiers who had just

completed their introductory training or from the Individual Ready

Reserves.

Host nation support will be considered if stipulated in signed

agreements with the host nations’ military/political leadership. This

support is considered in the resourcing phase of TAA, not in

requirements determination. An exception to this rule is positions

attributed to pipeline usage and the handling of some enemy

prisoners of war. These positions are assumed to be filled by host

nations and are not given visibility in either requirements

determination or resourcing.

The Army wants assurances that its support needs in the early

stages of the war fight will be met and is unwilling to accept the

risk that the host nation may not make that support available in the

time frames required. In the absence of formal agreements, the

Army will consider some host nation support as offsets to unfilled

requirements during the TAA resourcing phase. 

The TOE requirement for two MRCs will be based on the use of

uniformed military personnel (active and reserve) only. TAA 2003

will not consider the potential use of contractor personnel.

The Army is reluctant to offset its TOE requirements with

contractor personnel because it cannot foresee the status of

contracts 9 years into the future.

All of the modernization force enablers identified in defense

guidance will be available on time and in the quantities

programmed.

These force enablers include strategic lift, additional

prepositioned equipment in theater, and increased stocks of

antiarmor precision-guided munitions.

(continued)

Page 73 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Appendix IV 

Key Assumptions Used in TAA 2003

TAA 2003 assumption Army rationale

The Army will have immediate access to ports and airfields in the

theaters of operation.

Defense guidance assumes U.S. forces will have immediate

access to ports and airfields. An excursion run in TAA 2003 in

which immediate access was denied indicated additional support

force requirements.

There will be no delays or degradation of capability resulting from

the transfer of support forces from an OOTW to an MRC.

Defense guidance assumes that U.S. forces assigned to an

OOTW are immediately available to redeploy to an MRC. An

excursion was run in TAA 2003 in which the Army tested whether

it has sufficient active support force structure for the first 30 days

of an MRC while involved in a significant OOTW. Results indicated

that force requirements do not increase significantly.

No additional requirement will be provided for post-hostility

operations.

This is consistent with defense guidance. The Army assumed that

the forces needed for post-hostility operations would be drawn

from the force structure needed to execute the two MRCs.

Medical support requirements will be based on casualty and

disease, nonbattle injury rates and on the theater medical

evacuation policy.

The TAA war-fight model generated casualty estimates for combat

troops; algorithms were used to apply casualty rates to support

personnel. Disease, nonbattle injury rates were set by the Army

Surgeon General.

Unique force structure requirements outside of the two-MRC

scenario will not be included in the 672,000 TOE war-fight

requirement.

The Army allocates resources to unique force structure

requirements and then applies remaining resources to the

war-fight requirement.

Active units will arrive in theater on time. The Army assumes that strategic lift force enhancers have been

implemented on schedule, thus permitting active forces to arrive

on time.

No force requirements will be added for support to coalition

partners.

The Army did not add force requirements to support coalition

partners in TAA 2003 because it cannot quantify their needs.

Historically, the Army has provided support to coalition partners.

Requirements for the first MRC will be determined without

foreknowledge of the second MRC.

This is consistent with defense guidance. It precludes reserving

forces and assets for the second MRC.

The MRCs will occur in the sequence established by defense

guidance published in May 1994.

Defense guidance used for TAA 2003 reversed the order of the

MRCs modeled in TAA 2001.

Separation time between the two MRCs will be consistent with

defense guidance.

The Army followed defense guidance.

The Army will begin the counteroffensive phase of an MRC when

adequate support forces arrive in theater.

The counteroffensive in the second MRC occurs later in TAA 2003

than in the DOD wargame Nimble Dancer. Nimble Dancer did not

analyze support forces in detail and initiated the counteroffensive

before adequate support forces arrive.

A 15-day theater medical evacuation policy will be used. MRCs are estimated to be high intensity and of short duration.

Casualties unable to return to duty within 15 days are not

expected to be needed for the war fight. By reducing the

evacuation policy from 30 days to 15 days from TAA 2001 to TAA

2003, the Army was able to reduce the number of hospitals

needed in theater and the related transportation and other

support requirements associated with those hospitals.

TDA medical personnel will deploy to the MRCs. In TAA 2003, active TDA medical personnel deploy to meet

war-fight requirements. TDA personnel who deploy are replaced

with reservists.

Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up occurs on the day U.S.

forces deploy to the first MRC.

This is consistent with defense guidance.

(continued)

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Appendix IV 

Key Assumptions Used in TAA 2003

TAA 2003 assumption Army rationale

Theater stockage policy will be 30 days of supply. This is consistent with current Army policy.

U.S. Army forces in Europe and the Pacific will be available to

deploy to an MRC.

There is a legislative mandate to maintain overseas troop

strengths of 65,000 and 26,000 forces in Europe and the Pacific,

respectively. Forces which deploy to an MRC may be replaced

with reserve forces based in the United States.

Adversaries will not use nuclear or biological weapons and will use

a limited amount of chemical weapons.

This is consistent with defense guidance. An excursion was run in

TAA 2003 in which the amount of chemical weapons was

increased. Excursion results indicated additional support force

requirements.

Army forces will not swing from one MRC to the other. This is consistent with defense guidance.

All units will have a readiness rating of C-3 or better before

deploying.

This is consistent with defense guidance.

Page 75 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 76 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 45.

Now on p. 45.

Page 77 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 45.

Now on p. 45.

Now on p. 45.

Page 78 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 57.

Now on pp. 57 and 58.

Page 79 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Appendix V 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 80 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
Appendix VI 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Carol R. Schuster, Associate Director

Janet A. St. Laurent, Assistant Director

Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, Evaluator-in-Charge

Joseph J. Faley, Senior Evaluator

Margaret A. Klucsarits, Senior Evaluator

Marc J. Schwartz, Senior Evaluator

Joseph W. Kirschbaum, Evaluator

(701065) Page 81 GAO/NSIAD-97-66 Force Structure
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