NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0139n.06 F iled: Marc h 7, 2008 No. 07-1230 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. J AMES EDWARD THOMSON, J R., De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM T HE UN I TED STA TE S DI STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E WE STE RN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

Be fore : BO GGS, Chief J udg e; and B ATCHEL DER and GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg es PER CU RI AM . Jam e s E dw ard Th oms on , Jr. , a

pp e a ls the se nte nc e imp os e d f or his conviction of be ing a

felon in possession of a f

irea rm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g ), and be ing in possession of the same f irea rm, knowing it was stolen, in violat i o n o f 1 8 U.S .C. § 922(j). Thomson argues that the dist rict court err ed when it counted two of his prior c onvictions for burg lary as “violent fe lonies,” thus incre asing his sentence under th e Ar m ed C are er Criminal Ac t of 1984 (“A CCA”), 18 U.S .C. § 924(e)

. He arg ues t hat t he ACCA’s def inition s hould not cover bur g laries of non-dwe llings. The Supre me Court expli citly declined t o ad o p t such a na rrow de finition, and Thomson presents no compelling argument as to w hy this court should do what the Supreme Court would not. Thoug h we rec og nize that the imposit ion of the mandatory minimum is a harsh se ntenceNo. 07-1230

United States v. Thomson

- 2 - consideringonly

the fa cts of Thomson’s cr imes of conviction, it is n ev er t h el ess t he minimum imposed by

Congr ess, which we are duty -boun d to f o ll o w . We theref

ore a ffirm Thomson’s sente nce. I On Marc h 3, 2006, an ATF ag ent was interviewingAndre w Vallier about a c rime unre lated to this case. In the cour se of the inter view, Vallier sa id that in November or Dec ember

of 2005 he had st olen a .22-ca liber revolver from the hom e of Nelson Rupp. He also told the ATF that he had g iven t h i s revolve r to Thomson to satisfy a debt. The ATF subsequently obtained and e x ecute d a

sear ch wa rra nt for Thomson’s re sidence on April 13, 2006, wher e they found a r evolver . Thomson admitted that he had a cquire d the wea pon as pay

ment of the de bt. There was no a lleg ation that Th oms on c oo pe ra te d w ithVa lli e r i n ste a lin g the re vo lve r or that T ho mso n u se d o r i nte nd e d to us e the weapon i n any crime. Fur thermore , at the sente ncing hear ing, T homson stated that while he ha d ini tia lly a c c e pte d th e re vo lve r, he did no t want to ke e p the we a po n, and ha d ask e d V a lli e r t o ta ke it ba c k. Val lie r a lle g e dly

a g re e d, bu t be fo re he c ou ld d o s o, Va lli e r c omm itt e d th e c ri me that le d to his arre st and interrog ation by the ATF , which in turn led to the ATF ’s investig ation of Thomson. On May 26 , 2 00 6, Th oms on

ple d guil ty

to b e inga

fe lon in p os se ss io n of a fi rear m, i n violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g )(1) , and to beingin possession of the same f irea rm, knowing it was stolen, in violation of 18 U.S.C . § 922(j). The Pre- sentenc e Investig ation Report (PSI R) listed mult iple pr io r c o nv ic tions, including the f o l l o w i n g f

o u r c o n v i c t i o n s f

o r B u r g l ar y: 1. Ap ri l 22 , 1 99 7: T wo c ounts of B ur g lar y /P arty to a Cr ime in v iol a tio n o f Wi s. Stat. §§ 943.10(1) and 939.05.No. 07-1230

United States v. Thomson

- 3 - 2. June 20 , 1 99 7: T wo c ounts of B ur g lary /B uil din g or Dw e lli ngin v iol a tio n o f Wi s. Stat. § 943.10(1)(a ). 3. April 1, 2000: Two counts of Br eaking and Enter ing in violation of Mich. Comp. L aw § 750.111. 4. April 1, 2000: One count of Br eakingand Enter ing in violation of Mich. Comp. L aw § 750.111. The PSI R a lso r ecommende d that Thomson be classifie d as an a rmed c are er c riminal under the AC CA , w hic h w ou ld r e su lt i n a fi ft e e n- y e ar m in imum se nte nc e . T ho mso n o bje c te d to thi s

c la ssi fi c a tio n, arguin g tha t th e tw o 1 99 7 Wisc on sin c on vic tio ns did no t c ount a s “ vio le nt f

e lon ie s” as def in e d in 1 8 U

. S. C. § 9 2 4 ( e ) ( 2 ) ( B )

. B e c a u s e h is ar g u me n t r e li e s o nth e f a c ts o f th e 1997 Wisc on sin

c on vic tio ns , w e br ie fl y

re vie w the m. A. 19 97 Wis c ons in C onv ic ti ons On April 8, 1997, Thomson, who wa s six teen, and three acc omplices broke into the Ravina I nn, a thre e-story

building located in L ake Delton, Wis consin and stole $1,600 to $2,000 in cash, a fi ve -d isc CD pla

y e r, seve ra l bo ttl e s o f a lc oh ol, and a pa ir of bin oc ula rs , to ta lin g a

pp ro xima te ly $4,000 in lost property

and dama g e. Three day s later, on Apr il 11, 1997, Thomson, his y oung er brother, and a third ac complice, br ok e int o th e On e Sto p Co nv e nie nc e Sto re in t he sam e to wn and sto le $2 75 in c a shand

c oin s, approximately

100 lottery

tickets, a box of lighter s, and bee r. The police followed the tra cks fr om the second c rime sce ne to Thom s o n ’s residenc e and found evide nce the re linking Thomson to both of the above b u rgl ar i es and six more. ThomsonNo. 07-1230

United States v. Thomson

- 4 - admitted his involvement in the crimes. On July 2 9 , 1 9 9 7 , Thomson pled no-conte st to the two crimes listed above and the r emaining counts wer e dismissed. B. T he se nt e nc ing he ar ing On No v em b er

1 , 2 0 0 6 , T h o m s o n ap p ea re d fo r s en t en ci n g b ef o re Di s t ri ct J u d ge Qu i s t

. J u d ge Quist informed Thomson that he would likely be sentenced as an ar

med ca ree r cr iminal. Thomson’s counsel re quested the opportunity to br ief the issue of whether Thomson’s 1997 Wis consin Bur g lary convictions qualified a s “violent felonies” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e )(2) (B )(ii). Judge Q uist gra nted this request and both pa

rties filed memora

nda on the issue. Acc ording to the g overn

me nt, T h o ms o n

c o n c e d e d th a t h is p r ior burg laries qua lified as violent felonies unde r 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) at the sentenc ing he aringon Fe bruar y 12, 2007. A close r eading of the tra nscripts demonstrate s, howeve r, that Thomson only conce ded th a

t there w as an unpublished Six th Circuit case, Un ite d S tat es v . O rtk

ie se , 2 08 F . App ’x 43 6 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 6) , th a t “ g oe s a g a ins t [t he] arg ument that [Thoms on’s prior] burg laries may be conside red nonviolent fe lonies for the purp os e of

e nh anc e me nt u

nd e r t he Ar me d Ca re e r C ri min a l A c t.” Th e re c or d d oe s n ot s ho w a fu ll

conce ssion. Af t er ac kn o wl ed gi n g Or tk

ie se , Thomson then adopted a n alternative argument, attempting to convince the court that the f our counts of bur g lary

in Wi sconsin, which ar ose fr om two differ ent char g ing documents, should be consolidated and counted as only a single conviction for the purposes of the AC CA . T he jud g e wa s n ot c on vin c e d, and Th oms on do e s not pur su e thi s argume nt o n a pp e a l. At the conc lusion of the hear ing, the district c ourt ruled that Thomson had bee n convicted of three violent felonies and thus fa ced a 15-y ear mandatory

sentenc e. Thoug h it was clea r that theNo. 07-1230

United States v. Thomson

- 5 - jud g e ha d e xami ne d T ho mso n’ s o the r c on vic tio ns lis te d in the PSI R, h e sp e c if ic a lly me nti on e d o nly the two April 1997 Wisconsi n co n v i ctions and one of the counts of the 1997 Mic higa n burg lary conviction as qua lifying a s violent felonies under the AC C A. Thomson’s Offe nse L evel wa s calc ulated to be 30 a

nd Criminal History

Categ ory to be I V. The resulting SentencingGuidelines rang e wa s 135-168 months. Ne verthe less, the judg e noted that the ma ndatory 15-y ear minimum sentenc e under

the ACCA still applied. B oth J udg e Quist and the pr osecuting attorney ag ree d that the mandator

y minimum was a

“ver y harsh sentenc e” considering the fac ts of Thomson’s case . But Judg e Qu ist

c on c lud e d that the re wa s no wa y that the c ourt , “ in g oo d c on sc ie nc e and c on sis te nt w ith its duty ,” c ou ld n ot i mpo se the mand a tor y min imum. Ac c or din g ly , th e jud g e se nte nc e d T ho mso n to 15 y ear s of imprisonment. J udg e Quist then asked Thomson’s counsel to file a n appea l give n that the “f act of finding these prior

convictions is stil l rattling a round as a

n issue.” Subsequently , Thomson timely filed a notice of appea l, obje cting to the classification of the two 1997 Wis consin convictions as violent fe lonies. II We reviewthe district court’s inter pretation of the ACCA de novo

. United States v. Brady , 988 F.2d 664, 666 ( 6th Cir. 1993). Th oms on argue s th a t th e se nte nc ingjud g e e rr on e ou sly c on sid e red th e two Wis c on sin burg lari e s a s “ vio le nt f

e lon ie s” un de r t

he AC CA

. Th e g ov e rnme nt ar g ue s th a t e ve n if the jud g e did

err , Thomson’s other c onvicti o n s would have still qualified him for the ma ndatory sentenc e

e nh anc e me nt. Ho we ve r, be c a us e the jud g e did

no t mak e fi nd ing s o n th e oth e r c on vic tio ns , w e wi ll

a d dr e s s T h o m s o n ’ s c o n t e n t i o n s d i r e c t l y.No. 07-1230

United States v. Thomson

- 6 - A. The ACCA Th e re le va

nt p or tio n o f t he AC CA , 1 8 U .S. C. § 92 4( e )( 1) , p ro vid e s: I n the ca se of a

person wh o v i o l at es [18 U.S.C . § 922(g )] and has three previous co n victions by

any court re fer

red to in [18 U.S.C . § 922(g )(1) ] for a violent felony or a se rious drug offe n se, or both, committed on occ asions differ ent from one anot h er , s u ch person sha ll be fined unde r this titl e and imprisoned not less than fiftee n y ear s, and, notwithstanding a ny other provisio n of law, the court shall not suspend the sente nce of, or g rant a probationar y sentenc e to, suc h person with re spect to th e c o n v ic ti o nu n d e r

[1 8 U

. S. C. § 9 2 2 ( g ) ]. 18 U. S.C. § 9 24 (e )( 2) (B ) p ro vid e s: [T] he ter m “violent felony” mea

ns any crime punishable by imprisonment f or a te rm exceedingone y ear , or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or ca

rry ing of a f irea rm, knife, or

destructive de vice that would be punishable by imprisonment for suc h term if committed by an adult, that-- (i) has a s an ele ment the use, attempted use, or thre atene d use of p h y s i ca l forc e ag ainst the person of

another ; or (ii) is burg lary , arson, or

extorti on, involves use of e x plosives, or otherwise involves conduct that pr esents a se rious potential risk of phy sical injury to another[.] Notably , the t erm “burg lary” is left undef ined in the ACCA. The ambiguity cre ated by

the absenc e of a definition was resolved by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575 (1 99 0) . T he Court

c on c lud e d th a t: [A] person ha s been c onvicted of bur g lary for purposes of a § 924(e ) enha nceme nt if he is convicte d of any

crime, reg ardle ss of its e x act definition or label, havingthe basic elements of unlawful or unprivileg ed entr y into, or remaining in, a building or structure , with intent to commit a cr ime. Taylor , 495 U.S. at 599. I n S h e p a rd v . U n it e d S ta tes , 5 4 4 U.S. 13 (2005), the Court addr essed “whe ther a

sentenc ing c ourt ca

n look to police repor

ts or complaint app l i ca t i ons to determineNo. 07-1230

United States v. Thomson

- 7 - whether an ea rlier guilty

plea ne cessa

rily admitted, and supported a conviction for, g e n e r ic b u r g la r y .” Id. at 16. The Court c oncluded: We hold that it m ay

not, and that a late r cour t d et er mining the c hara cter of an admitted burg lary is ge nera lly limit ed to examining the statutory definition, char g ing do c ume nt, wr itt e n p le a

a g re e me nt, tr ans cri pt o f p le a c oll oq uy , a nd any e xplic it fac tual finding by

the trial judg e to which the de fenda nt assented. Ibid. Tay lor and Shepard c le arl y bin d s e nte nci ng cou rt s to us e a “ c a te g or ic a l a

pp ro a c h” to deter mine whether an offe nse qualifies as a violent f elony

. United St ates v. Mc Grattan , 504 F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 2007)

. That is, c ourts must “ look only to the fac t of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior of

fense .” Taylor , 4 95 U. S. at 60 2. Cou rt s ma y de pa rt fr om t his a pp ro a c h o nly in the “nar

row rang e of case s” where (1) t he st atutory definition at i ssue i s broade r than the “ g ener ic” definition of burg lary ; and (2) the j ury has been require d to find all the ele ments of g ener ic burg lary or (3) in the case of a g uilty plea, the char g ing doc ument, written plea ag ree ment, transcr ipt of plea colloquy , or any

expli cit fac tual finding by the trial judg e to which the d ef en d an t assented demonstrate that the defe ndant admitted the ele ments of a g ener ic burg lary

. Taylor , 495 U.S. at 602; Sh e pa rd , 544 U.S. at 26.

B. Th e Wisconsin B urglary Statute Wis. Stat. § 94 3. 10 (1 99 7) , w hic h d e fi ne s b ur g lary , p ro vid e s: (1) Whoever

intentionally

enter s any

of the following places without the consent of the per son in lawful pos s es sion and with intent to steal or commit a felony in such p l a c e i s g u i l t y o f

a C l a s s C f e l o n y:No. 07-1230

United States v. Thomson

- 8 -

(a) Any building or dw elling; or (b) An e nclosed ra ilroad ca r; or (c) An enc losed portion of any ship or vessel; or (d) A loc ked enc losed ca

rg o portion of a truc k or trailer ; or (e) A motor home or other motoriz ed ty

pe of home or a trailer home , whether or not any person is living in a

ny such home; or (f) A room within any

of the a bove. Thomson was charg ed with two counts under § 943.10(1). B eca use that statute is broade r than g ener ic burg lary

as def ined in Taylor , under Sh e

pa rd , the sentenc ing court wa s require d to look to the char g ing doc uments, written plea a g ree ment, transcr ipt of pl ea colloquy , or any expli cit fac tual finding by

the trial judg e to which the de fenda nt assented. Sh e

pa rd , 544 U.S. at 16. Thomson pled

no c on te st to co un ts fo ur and fi ve in ca se numbe r 199 7CF 00 01 20

. Th e se c ounts re pr e se nt t he Ap ri l 8, 19 97 , a

nd Ap ri l 11 , 1 99 7, burg lari e s d e sc ri be d a bo ve . Co un t f

our c ha rged Th om so n w ith “intentionally

enter [i ng ] t he One Stop Convenienc e Store, without c onsent, and with intent to stea l.” Count five char g ed Thomson with “intentionally enter [i ng ] t he Ravina B ay Ba r and G rill, without consent, a n d with the intent to steal.” Ibid. Thus, the cha rg ing doc uments clea

rly detailed the elements of Taylor ’ s g e n e r i c d e f i n i t i o no f b u r g l ar y. Thomson acknowle dg es t h at “at f irst gla nce the Appellant’s pr ior Wisconsin convictions appea r to be violent fe lonies beca use they wer e ‘bur g lary ’ co n v i ct i o ns.” Appe llant’s Br . 5. Ne v er t h el es s , T h o m s o nar gu es t h at t h e A C C A s hould disti ngu i s h b u rgl ar i es o f u n o cc u p i edb u i l d i n gs from burg laries using violence or burg laries of

dwelling s and that only the latter two kinds ofNo. 07-1230

United States v. Thomson

- 9 - burg laries should be considered violent felonies. In Taylor , howeve r, the Supreme Court dec lined to adopt such a na

rrow de finition. Af

ter re viewing the leg islative history , the Court noted, “[t] here

never was a ny proposal to limit t he pre dicate of fense to some speci al s u b cl ass of burgla ries that mig ht b e e sp e c ia lly

da ng e ro us , s uc h a s t hose wh e re the of fe nd e r i s arm e d, or

the bu ild ingis occupie d, or the c rime occ u rs at n i g ht.” Taylor , 4 95 U. S. at 58 8. Th e c ourt a lso re a so ne d th a t a

narr o w e r d e f

in it io n o f b u r g la

r y , w o u ld n o t b e “ s u

p p o rte d b y th e la

n g u a g e o f th e s tatute or the leg islative history ” and that the “choic e of la ng uag e indicate s that Congr ess thoug ht ordinary burg lari e s, a s w e ll a s b ur g lari e s in vo lvi ng so me e le me nt m a kin g the m e sp e c ia lly da ng e ro us , prese nted a sufficie ntly ‘ser ious potential risk’ t o count t owar d enhanc ement.” Taylor , 495 U.S. at 589. Despite the Supre me Court’s clea r ref usal to na rrow the g ener ic definition of burg lary and its specific c hoice to include bur g laries of any b u i l d i n g or structure , Thomson argues that the de fi nit ion sh ou ld b e na

rr ow e d to inc lud e on ly

burg lari e s o f d

we lli ng s. He pr e se nts thr e e argume nts , all e qu a ll y f

u ti le

. F ir s t, h e ar g u e s th a t b e c a u s e Wi s c o n s in d is ti n g u is h e s b e tw e e n b u r g la r ies of occupie d an d u noccupie d buildings, fe dera l law should do the same. Sec ond, he notes that the Fe dera l Sentencing Guidelines conta in a def inition of viol ent fe lony

differ ent from that f

ound in the ACCA. Third, Thomson presents thre e ca ses in support of his interpre tation. Al l of Th oms on ’s argume nts are ina pp os ite . A dd iti on a lly , a s T ho mso n is awa re , o ur c ir c uit briefly considere d and dismiss ed a similar a rg ument in Or tk

ie se . Ultimately , Thomson presents no

re a so n w hy

thi s c ourt sh ou ld d o w hat th e Sup re me Court and a pa ne l of our o wn c ir c uit re fu se d to do.No. 07-1230

United States v. Thomson

Th e Ap pli c a tio n N ote 1 to U. S.S. G. § 4 B 1. 4 e ve n h ig hli g hts the dif fe re nc e : 1 This guide line applies in the ca se of a defe ndant subject to an e nhance d sentenc e under 18 U .S.C. § 924(e)

. Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) , a def endant is subject to an enhanc ed sente nce if the instant offe nse of c onviction is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g ) and the defe ndant has at l east three prior convictions for a “violent fe lony ” or - 10 - 1. The Wisconsin disti nction betwee n Class C and Class B fe lonies As note d a b o v e Wis. S tat. § 943.10 (1997), de fines burg lary and cr eate s a distinction between Class C and Class B fe lony burg lar i es . Thomson argues that the “ Wis consin statutes make a distinction between diff

ere nt ty pes of burg laries–bur g lary of an unoccupie d building is treated much le ss s e ve re ly

tha n b ur g laries u sin g vio le nc e or burg lari e s o f d

we lli ng s. ” Ap pe lle e ’s B r. 5. Th is argument is not only

irrelev an t , i t i s al so based on a false pr emise. Wisconsin sim ply does not distinguish betwee n burg laries of unoccupie d b u i l d i ng s and burg laries of dwelling s. Section 943.10(1)( a) c lear ly

place s buildings, occ upied or not, and dw ellings on e qual footing

. Yet, eve n if it did make such a dis tinction, that dist inction would be irre levant under Taylor

. The point of Taylor was to make feder al l aw independent of underlying state law so that diff ere nces in s ta te law tre a tme nt o f t he same c ri min a l c on du c t w ou ld n ot c arr y ov e r i nto fe de ra l la

w, wh ic h is meant to apply

uniformly

acr oss the country . For

this reason, the Court a dopted a g ener ic def inition of burg lary . Taylor, 495 U.S. at 592 (“‘ [B]urglar y ’ i n § 924(e) must have some uniform definition independe nt of the labe ls employ ed by the var ious St ates’ c riminal codes.” ). 2. The F eder al SentencingGuidelines Thomson also argues that the F eder al SentencingGuidelines use a definition differ ent from that found in §924(e) . This is true, but irreleva nt. De fi n i tions of simi lar sounding , but disti nct 1No. 07-1230

United States v. Thomson

“ser ious dr

ug offe nse,” or both, c ommitt ed on occa sions diff ere nt f rom one a nother. The t e r ms “ v io le n t f

e lo n y ” an d “ s e r io u s dr

u g o f f e n s e ” ar e d e f

in e d in 1 8 U

. S. C. § 924(e) (2). I t is to be noted that the definiti ons of “violent felony” and “ser ious drug offe nse” in 18 U.S.C. § 9 2 4 (e )( 2 ) are not identical to the de finitions of “crime of violence” and “c ontrolled substance offe nse” used i n § 4B1.1 ( Caree r Off ender ), nor are the time periods for

the counting of prior sentenc es under § 4A 1.2 (De finitions and I nstructions for Com puting Crimi nal His tory ) applicable to the dete rmination of whether a def endant is subject to an e nhance d sentenc e under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).

- 11 - te rm s n e e d n ot b e c on sis te nt a c ro ss p ie c e s o f f e de ra l le g isl a tio n. As we have no te d be fo re , th e te rm s “cr ime of violence ” and “ violent felony ” h av e dis tinctly differ ent meaning s and ar e not intercha ng eable

. Hornaday v . Lamanna , 2000 U.S. A pp. L EXI S 10785, No. 99- 4196, at *6 (6th Cir. M ay 9 , 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. W ilson , 168 F.3d 916, 928 ( 6th Cir. 1999) and United States v. Olive r , 20 F.3d 415, 417 ( 11th 1994)). 3. Case law Thomson cites three case s to support his contention t hat the ter m “burg lary” under

§ 924(e) sh ou ld b e lim ite d to bur g lary of a dw e lli ng : Un ite d S

tat es v . A rn old , 58 F.3d 1117 ( 6th Cir. 1995); Un ite d S tat es v . Cr owe ll , 997 F.2d 146 ( 6th 1993); and Un ite d S tat es v . Th ro ne bu rg , 921 F.2d 654 (6 th C ir . 1 99 0) . N on e of

the se c a se s are on

po int

. At issue in Ar

no ld wa s w he the r a

prio r T e nn e sse e c on vic tio n f or a ssa ult wi th i nte nt t o commit sex ual battery constituted a “crime of violence” under the “other wise” c lause of U .S.S.G. § 4B1.2( a)( 2) (“ or otherw ise involves conduct that pr esents a serious pot ential risk of phy sical injuryNo. 07-1230

United States v. Thomson

- 12 - to a no the r” ), wh ic h s e ts the sta nd ard fo r d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a no n- e nume rate d o ff

e ns e is a “ c ri me of vio le nc e .” Our c ir c uit

he ld t hat: [i ]f the statute does not clea rly establish that the offense involves the ‘ use, attempted use, or thre atene d use of phy sical for ce,’ the cour t ma y then look at the char g e in the indictment to which the def endant pled guilty

o r wa s ad

j u dg ed g uilty

to determine if the of fe ns e inv olv e d a se ri ou s pote nti a l risk of ph y sic a l injury to o the rs . In th e c a se of a guilty plea, the district c ourt may also consider the plea a g ree ment relating to the prior off ense. Ar no ld , 58 F.3d at 1124. This holding, howe ver, w as limite d t o i n t erpreting the “other wise” c lause of U .S.S.G. § 4B 1. 2( a )( 2) and ha s no be ari ngon ho w c ourt s c ount a

n o ff e ns e that is one of the enumer ated c rimes in § 924(e). I

ndeed, to c onclude otherwise would vastly narr ow the def inition of burgla

ry adopted in Taylor , which require s only “unlawf ul or unprivileg ed entr

y into, or remainingin, a building or structure , with intent to commit a cr ime” Taylor , 495 U.S. at 599. Cro we ll also involved the interpre tation of “cr ime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a )

. The que stion was wheth er a C o l orado c onviction for ag g ravated motor vehicle theft constituted a

“ c r im e o f v io le n c e . ” T h e a g g r a v a te d mo to r v e h ic le th e f

t c o u n t c h ar g e d

Cr o w e ll w it

h ta k in g a taxi “without authorization and by threat and dec eption.” Cro we ll , 9 97 F .2 d at 14 9. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt , howeve r, r el i ed on additional information contained in the indictment shee t, relating to char g es arising from the same set of c ircumstance s, but which wer e ultimately dropped. O ur circ uit held that though a n indictment ma

y be used as evide nce of

the fa cts essential to sustain a guilty plea, it ca nnot be used “ as evide nce that all conduct cha rg ed in the indictment occ urre d.” Ibid. Ag ain, Cro we ll isNo. 07-1230

United States v. Thomson

- 13 - irrele vant because it deals only with the interpre tation of “c rime of violenc e” unde r the Guide lines and dictate s nothing a s to how courts should interpre t the crimes e numerated in § 924(e)

. Thr on e bu rg

involved Michig an’s e ntering without breakingstatute, which provide d, “any pe rs on wh o, wi tho ut br e a kin g , sh a ll e nte r any [bui ldi ng s sp e c if ie d in sta tut e ] wit h in te nt t o c omm it

a fe lony or any larc e ny the re in, sh a ll b e g uil ty of a fe lony punis ha ble by imp ri so nme nt in that st a te prison . .

. .” Mi ch. C omp. L aws § 750.111 (1979). Our circ uit held that “[b] eca

use the Michig an offe nse of e ntering without breakingdoes not requir e an unpr ivilege d entry , i t d o es not qualify as a burg lary under the Court’s definition in Taylor .” Thr on e bu rg , 921 F.2d at 659. Thr on e bu rg

is i na pp os ite be c a

us e the Mic hig an s ta tut e a t is su e wa s b ro a de r t ha n th e g e ne ri c statut e and

the re wa s n o fu

rt he r us a ble inf or ma tio n. As dis c us se d a

bo ve , w hil e the Wisc on sin statut e is also broade r than the g ener ic definiti on of burg lary , the cha rg ing doc uments for the c rimes at issue demonstrate that Thomson pled to all of the eleme nts of a g ener ic burg lary

. III Thomson’s arguments are al l without merit. I n Taylor , th e Sup re me Cou rt sp e c if ic a lly declined to a dopt a nar

rowe r def inition of burgla

ry , and Thomson pre sents no rea son why this court should do what the Supreme Court w ould not. As the district court noted, the 15-y ear sentenc e may be ha rs h g ive n th e fa c ts o f T ho mso n’ s c a se , b ut w e are wi tho ut t he dis c re tio n to de pa

rt fr om a mandatory

sentenc e imposed by

Con gress. W e ac cording ly AFF I RM Thomson’s judgment and sentenc e.