[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. O’Neill v. Athens Cty. Bd. Of Elections , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-1476.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -1476
T HE S TATE EX REL
. O’N EILL v . A THENS C OUNTY B OARD OF E LECTIONS
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it

may be cited as State ex rel. O’Neill v. Athens Cty. Bd. Of Elections , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-1476.] Mandamus—Elections—Action to compel board of elections to declare relator an eligible candidate for a primary election for the office of state representative and to include in its offi cial canvass of the primary election the votes cast for relator—Residency—R.C. 3503.02

— Great weight must be accorded to the person’s claime d voting residence—Voting residence— Voter registration—R.C. 3503.01 and 3503.02—Writ granted. (No. 2020-0339—Submitted April 7, 2020—Decided April 14, 2020.)
I N M ANDAMUS

.

__________________ Per Curiam. {¶ 1} Relator, Katie O’Neill, seeks a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, the Athens County Board of Elections, to declare th at she is an eligibleS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 candidate for the Democratic nomin ation to the office of state representative for the
94th Ohio House District and to i nclude in its official canvass of the primary election the votes cast for O’Neill. We grant the writ.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. O’Neill’s Residency in Athens County {¶ 2} O’Neill graduated from Ohio University in Athens County in 2013

. She left Athens County in 2015 to attend Vermont Law School. O n June 29, 2019, her house in Vermont was struck by lightning, and the resulting fire destroyed the building and most of her possessions. O’Neill sent the possess ions she could salvage to her parents’ home in Geauga County, Ohio, where she also temporarily forwarded her mail. She completed the requirements of her law degree on September 1 and then, using her parents’ address, registered to vote in Geauga County on October 4, 2019. {¶ 3} O’Neill then began to look for employment and a place to live i n Athens County. On October 14, she began working in Athens Coun ty collecting signatures for the House Bill 6 referendum campaign. That same day, she began staying in Athens County with a friend while searching for an a partment of her own in Athens County. {¶ 4} On October 31, 2019, she met with Bob Prebe, a representative o f a company that managed an apartment in Nelsonville, Ohio, in Athe ns County. On November 1, O’Neill agreed to a nine-month lease commencing on that date. O’Neill offered to pay the rent and security deposit on Novembe r 2 or 3, but at Prebe’s request, she met with h im on Monday, November 4, when s he made her payment, including three months’ rent, and got the keys to the apartment. That same day, O’Neill began m oving into the apartment.
B. O’Neill’s Candidacy {¶ 5} On November 5, 2019, O’Neill signed the declarations of candida cy on two part-petitions and began collecting signatures to run fo r the DemocraticJanuary Term, 2020

3 nomination to the office of state representative for the 94th O hio House District— which encompasses all of Athens and Meigs Counties and parts of Washington and Vinton Counties. Electors signed those part-petitions between November 5 and November 26. O’Neill signed the declaration of candidacy on a third part-petition on November 20, though no electors signed it until December 3. On December 3, O’Neill updated her voter registra tion to reflect her Athens Co unty address. Thereafter, she signed the declarations of candidacy on five ad ditional partpetitions, and electors signed those part-petitions between Dec ember 4 and
December 17. {¶ 6} On December 18, O’Neill filed her petition, which consisted of eight part-petitions and contained 142 signatures. The board did not check the validity of the signatures on the part-petitions that O’Neill executed i n November; it considered only the signatures on the five part-petitions that she signed after December 3—the date she changed her voter registration to Athen s County. The post-December 3 part-petitions c ontained more than the minimum number of signatures required for O’Neill to qualify for the ballot. Acc ordingly, on December 20, the board unanimously certif ied O’Neill’s name to the prima ry ballot. She was the only Democratic candida te to file for that office. {¶ 7} On January 2, 2020, Keith Allen M onk, a registered Democrat and
resident of the 94th House Distri ct, filed a protest against O’ Neill’s candidacy. On January 14, the board held a protest hearing, after which it ti ed two to two on
whether O’Neill was a resident of the 94th House District and e ligible for the primary ballot under Article II, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitu tion (requiring state representatives to have resided i n their districts for one year next preceding their election) and Article XV, Secti on 4 (requiring office holders t o be qualified electors). {¶ 8} After a second hearing on January 31, the board voted unanimous ly in favor of the protest, ruling that (1) O’Neill was not an eli gible candidate for theS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 Democratic nomination to the office of state representative for the 94th House District because she had not resided in the district for one ye ar next preceding the November 3, 2020 general electi on and (2) O’Neill’s petition wa s invalid because she was not a registered voter in Athens County when she began circulating her part-petitions. O’Neill’s name remains on the primary ballot a s the sole candidate for the Democratic nomination to state representative, but the board has issued notices to electors stating that votes for O’Neill will not be counted. Despite this, O’Neill has provided an affidavit from voter Herman Hill, who s tates that he has already submitted an absentee-ballot vote for O’Neill. {¶ 9} O’Neill asked the board for a written explanation of its ruling , but the
board declined. She submitted a public-records request to the board on February 27 and received responsive records on March 4. O’Neill filed h er mandamus complaint on March 6. She seeks a writ ordering the board to d eclare that she is an eligible candidate and to incl ude in its official canvass of th e primary election the
votes cast for her.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Mandamus Standard {¶ 10} O’Neill is entitled to a writ of mandamus if she establishes by clear and convincing evidence that (1) she has a clear legal right to the relief she seeks, (2) the board has a clear legal duty to provide it, and (3) she lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. See State ex rel. Davis v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections , 137 Ohio St.3d 222, 2013-Ohio-4616, 998 N.E.2d 1093, ¶ 12. Relators in expedited elections actions usually lack an adequat e remedy in the ordinary course of the law due to the proximity of the election

. See State ex rel. Finkbeiner v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections , 122 Ohio St.3d 462, 2009-Ohio-3657, 912 N.E.2d 573, ¶ 18. As extended absentee voting will conclud e on April 28, 2020, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 197, O’Neill lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of the law.January Term, 2020

5 {¶ 11} With respect to the remaining elements, we look to whether the board has “engaged in fraud, corruption, or abuse of discretion , or acted in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions.” Whitman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of
Elections , 97 Ohio St.3d 216, 2002-Ohio-5923, 778 N.E.2d 32, ¶ 11. O’Ne ill does not allege fraud or corruption, so the question is whether the board abused its discretion or clearly disregarded applicable law. A board abus es its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable fashio n. State ex rel. McCann v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections , 155 Ohio St.3d 14, 2018-Ohio-3342, 118 N.E.3d 224, ¶ 12. B. Residency in the District {¶ 12} R.C. 3513.05 required the board, af ter hearing Monk’s protest, to deem O’Neill’s petition valid unle ss it found that (1) O’Neill was not an elector of
the district in which she sought a party nomination or (2) had not fully co mplied with R.C. Chapter 3513. R.C. 3513.05, paragraph 13. One provi sion of that chapter, R.C. 3513.07, required O’Neill to certify in her decla ration of candidacy
that “if elected to said offi ce or position, [she] will qualify therefor.” {¶ 13} Article II, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution requires that “[s]enators and representatives shall have resided in their respective districts one year next preceding their elec tion, unless they shall have been absent on the public business of the United States, or of this State.” (Emphasis ad ded.) We read Article II, Section 3 in pari materia with R.C. 3503.02, which provides rules for determining the residence of a person offering to register or v ote. State ex rel.
Husted v. Brunner , 123 Ohio St.3d 288, 2009-Ohio-5327, 915 N.E.2d 1215, ¶ 29. {¶ 14} R.C. 3503.02(A) states, “That pl ace shall be considered the residence of a person in which t he person’s habitation is fixed and to which, whenever the person is absent, the person has the intention of returning.” While
the remainder of R.C. 3503.02 sets forth additional considerati ons that are applicable in some cases, “[the] statute emphasizes the person’ s intent to make aS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 place a fixed or permanent place of abode,” State ex rel. Duncan v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Elections , 115 Ohio St.3d 405, 2007-Ohio-5346, 875 N.E.2d 578, ¶ 11. {¶ 15} The board abused its discretion a nd clearly disregarded applica ble law by concluding that O’Neill will not have resided in the 94t h House District for one year next preceding the November 3, 2020 general election. Specifically, the
board focused on when O’Neill became a resident of her Nelsonvi lle apartment
rather than when she became a re sident of the 94th House Distri ct. It is true that the record contains some evidence supporting the board’s conclu sion that O’Neill
did not live in the apartment until November 4. However, Article II, Section 3 requires that O’Neill reside in the 94th House District for one year next preceding
her election—not that she reside a t a particular or single loca tion within that district. And there is uncontroverted evidence that O’Neill began residin g in the 94th House District on October 14, 2019. {¶ 16} On that date, O’Neill started living with a friend and working in Athens County while seeking a permanent home there, which she s ubsequently found and rented. She argues in her brief that her “subjective intention was to move permanently to Athens County in October 2019.” Two community m embers, Christine Hughes and Katherine Kay Jellison, testified before t he board that they encountered O’Neill working and attending social functions in A thens during this time period. {¶ 17} We faced a similar fact pattern in State ex rel. Morris v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections , 143 Ohio St.3d 507, 2015-Ohio-3659, 39 N.E.3d 1232. The question in Morris was whether Tom Bernabei, an i ndependent candidate for mayor of Canton, resided in that city on the date that he filed his n ominating petition. One day prior to his filing, Bernabei had moved from his family hom e in Hills and
Dales—outside Canton—into a hous e on University Avenue in Canto n that was owned by a friend. He took some basic furniture with him, but his wife continued
to live in Hills and Dales. Ber nabei and his friend had execut ed a one-month lease,January Term, 2020

7 but his plan from the outset was to reside in the University Av enue house only temporarily. Bernabei owned a house on Lakecrest Street in Can ton that he had
rented to a doctor and his famil y, and he planned to move into that house when the doctor vacated the premises, but it was unknown exactly when th at would happen. Bernabei ended up sleeping in th e University Avenue house for f our nights— including the day he filed his nominating petition—then moving into his Lakecrest
house with his wife. {¶ 18} We held in Morris that the temporary a nd open-ended nature of Bernabei’s tenancy at the Univ ersity Avenue house did not mean that he did not reside in the city of Can ton when he file d his petition. Id . at ¶ 25. Despite the fact that Bernabei’s wife remained in nearby Hills and Dales and R.C . 3503.02(D) provides that “[t]he place where the family of a married person resides shall be considered to be the person’s place of residence,” we held that the candidate’s intention to reside in the city of Canton was controlling, id . at ¶ 26. And we took note of the secretary of state’s determination that it was “ ‘o f little significance’ ”
that Bernabei later moved t o a different home in Canton. Id . at ¶ 21. {¶ 19} As in Morris , the fact that O’Neill’s first abode in the district was temporary and her tenure at tha t home was of an open-ended dura tion pending the availability of a more permanent option does not mean that she was not a resident, given her intention to reside in Athens County. See also R.C. 3503.02(I) (“If a person does not have a fixed place of habitation, but has a she lter or other location at which the person has been a consistent or regular inhabitant and to which the person has the intention of retur ning, that shelter or other lo cation shall be deemed the person’s residence * * *”). {¶ 20} While the board points to evidence of O’Neill’s activities before October 14, 2019, such as attending law school in Vermont and f orwarding her mail to her parents’ home in Geauga County after her house in Vermon t burned down, it has identified no evidence in the record indicating that O’N eill resided or intendedS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 to make her permanent home somew here outside of the 94th House District after October 14. {¶ 21} The board emphasizes the fact that in October 2019, O’Neill was still registered to vote in Geauga County. However, registrati on for voting elsewhere is not one of the factors for determining the place o f an elector’s residence under R.C. 3503.02, whic h furthers the primary purpos e of R.C. 3503.02, to “determin[e] the residence of a person offering to register or vote.” It may be presumed that a person offering to register at a new home might , at that time, remain registered at a previous home. {¶ 22} The board has identified no other R.C. 3503.02 factors that it
believes contradict O’Neill’s st ated intention to make Athens C ounty her residence. Moreover, even when various factors listed under R.C. 3503.02 d o lead to conflicting conclusions, “great weight must be accorded to the person’s claimed voting residence.” Husted , 123 Ohio St.3d 288, 2009-Ohio-5327, 915 N.E.2d 1215, at ¶ 27. {¶ 23} Because Article II, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution requires only that O’Neill reside in the 94th House District for one year nex t preceding the November 3, 2020 general election and because the undisputed ev idence showed that O’Neill began working and living in that district in the m iddle of October 2019, the board abused its discretion and disregarded applicable law by upholding the protest to O’Neill’s candidacy. C. Voting Residence and Re gistration in the District {¶ 24} R.C. 3513.07 provides that the for m of a declaration of candida cy and petition of a candidate for party nomination to office shal l be substantially as set forth in that statute. The form in R.C. 3513.07 requires c andidates to set forth their “voting residence” and to declare under penalty of electi on falsification that they are a qualified elector in the precinct in which their vot ing residence is located.January Term, 2020

9 {¶ 25} The board granted the protest in part because O’Neill was not a registered voter in Athens County when she began circulating he r part-petitions in November 2019. The board argues that (1) O’Neill’s failure to change her voterregistration address before circulating her first part-petition s means that her declaration of candidacy failed to accurately state her voting residence and (2) to be qualified to run for office, a candidate must be registered to vote in her election district when she signs her decl aration of candidacy. The seco nd point actually goes to the requirement that th e candidate be a “qualified elec tor.” The board abused its discretion and clearly disregarded applicable law wh en it rejected O’Neill’s petiti on on these grounds.
1. Voting Residence {¶ 26} “ ‘Voting residence’ means that place of residence of an electo r which shall determine the precinct in which the elector may vot e.” R.C. 3501.01(P). The board argues that because O’Neill was register ed to vote in Geauga County when she executed her first declarations of candi dacy, her parents’ home was her true voting residence. The board has it backward: where a person resides determines where they may register and vote; where the person is registered to vote does not determine where they reside. R.C. 3503.02. T he board’s conclusion would have required O’Neill to state that her voting residence was a
location where she did not reside and to which she did not inte nd to return. This
was an abuse of discretion.
2. Registration in the Election District {¶ 27} The board alludes to a requireme nt that a candidate must be registered in the election district at the time he or she signs a declaration of candidacy. However, the board’s argument is rooted in a statut ory scheme that the General Assembly significantly altered in 1994. The board cite s a passage from
Morris that addresses R.C. 3513.261, which requires independent candid ates to state in the declarations of ca ndidacy on their nominating peti tions, “I am an electorS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 qualified to vote for the office I seek.” R.C. 3513.07’s form declaration of candidacy for partisan candidate s does not include this stateme nt, but both statutes require the candidate to make the similar statement, “I am a qu alified elector in the precinct in which my voting residence is located.” {¶ 28} With respect to R.C. 3513.261’s re quirement that the candidate state that he or she is qualified to vote for the office sought, Morris said, “To be qualified to vote for the office, the prospective candidate must be regis tered to vote at an address within the election district at the time he or she sign s the statement.”
Morris , 143 Ohio St.3d 507, 2015-Ohio-3659, 39 N.E.3d 1232, at ¶ 22. However, as O’Neill points out, this statement was dicta in Morris because the candidate there had provided the board with a cha nge of address before signing his declaration. Id

. at ¶ 10-16. M ore importantly, howeve r, the statement in Morris relied on State ex rel. Walsh v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Elections , 65 Ohio St.3d 197, 203-204, 602 N.E.2d 638 (1992), a case decided under the statutory scheme th at was significantly
altered in 1994. {¶ 29} When Walsh was decided in 1992, R.C. 3503.11(A) provided that any change of address made less than 29 (or 30, depending on wh ether the change was made at a temporary or perma nent registration office and on the type of election) days before the elec tion was invalid for that electio n. The General Assembly removed that language from the statute in 1994, Am.Sub .S.B. No. 300, 145 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2516, 2529. At the same time, it enact ed provisions allowing registered voters to c hange their address on election day and cast a provisional ballot in that electi on—even if moving from one cou nty to another. R.C. 3503.16(A) and (C), 145 Ohio La ws, Part II, at 2536-2539; R.C. 3503.19(A), 145 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 2541-2543. {¶ 30} R.C. 3501.01(N) provides, “ ‘Electo r’ or ‘qualified elector’ me ans a person having the qualifications provided by law to be entitled to vote.” Article V,
Section 1 of the Ohio Constituti on and R.C. 3503.01(A) set fort h the applicableJanuary Term, 2020

11 qualifications, and together, th ey provide that a qualified ele ctor is someone who (1) is a United States citizen, (2) is 18 or over, (3) has been an Ohio resident for 30 days immediately preceding the election, (4) is a resident of t he county and precinct in which he or she offers to vote, and (5) has been registered to vote for 30 days. O’Neill, who registered to vote in Ohio on October 4, met all o f these requirements. {¶ 31} Because O’Neill met the above re quirements, she was a qualified
elector. And because she was a registered voter who resided in the 94th House
District in November 2019 and wa s therefore eligible to vote th ere, she was a qualified elector in that district at the time she signed her first declarations of candidacy. The board therefore abused its discretion by reject ing O’Neill’s petition.
D. Laches {¶ 32} In its answer, the board asserted the affirmative defense of la ches. The elements of laches are “(1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) knowledge, a ctual or constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party.” State ex rel. Save Your
Courthouse Commt. v. Medina , 157 Ohio St.3d 423, 2019-Ohio-3737, 137 N.E.3d 1118, ¶ 17. Despite invoking the doctrine in its answer, howev er, the board presents no argument regarding laches in its brief and has ther efore waived the
defense. See , e.g. , State ex rel. Mun. Constr. Equi p. Operators’ Labor Council v.
Cleveland , 114 Ohio St.3d 183, 2007-Ohio-3831, 870 N.E.2d 1174, ¶ 83 (cl aim raised in complaint is waived i f not addressed i n merit brief). {¶ 33} Moreover, while it is true that O’Neill filed her complaint fou r weeks after the board issued written notice of its decision, the boar d has identified no prejudice resulting from this delay. This case would have been expedited under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08 regardless of any delay. And O’Neill’s name is already on the prepared ballots; the only question is whether votes cast for h er unopposedS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 candidacy will be counted after t he conclusion of absentee voti ng, which has been extended to April 28. Laches does not preclude us from issuing the writ.
III. CONCLUSION {¶ 34} Based on the foregoing, we grant a writ of mandamus ordering th e Athens County Board of Elections to declare that O’Neill is an eligible candidate for the Democratic nomination to the office of state representa tive for the 94th Ohio
House District and to include i n its official canvass of the pr imary election the votes
cast for O’Neill. Writ granted.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F RENCH , D E W INE , D ONNELLY , and
S TEWART , JJ., concur.
F ISCHER , J., dissents, with an opinion.

_________________ F ISCHER , J., dissenting. {¶ 35} I respectfully dissent. I conclude that relator, Katie O’Neill , has not proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent, the At hens County Board of Elections, abused its discretion or acted in clear disregard of applicable law when it ruled (1) that O’Neill was not an eligible candidate for the Democratic nomination to the office of state represent ative for the 94th House Distri ct, because she had not resided in the district for one y ear next preceding the Novembe r 3, 2020 general election, and (2) that O’Neill’ s petition was invalid because s he was not a registered voter in Athens County when she began circulating her part-peti tions. I would accordingly deny the requested writ of mandamus. {¶ 36} To be entitled to the writ of mandamus, O’Neill has the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) that she ha s a clear legal right to the requeste d relief, (2) that there is a clear legal duty o n the part of the board to provide it, and (3) that she lacks an adequate remedy in the or dinary course of theJanuary Term, 2020

13 law. State ex rel. Fockler v. Husted , 150 Ohio St.3d 422, 2017-Ohio-224, 82 N.E.3d 1135, ¶ 8. {¶ 37} With respect to the clear-legal-right and clear-legal-duty elem ents, we must determine whether the board has “engaged in fraud, corr uption, or abuse of discretion, or acted in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions.” Whitman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections , 97 Ohio St.3d 216, 2002-Ohio-5923, 778 N.E.2d 32, ¶ 11. “ ‘An abuse of discre tion implies an unreasonable, a rbitrary, or
unconscionable attitude.’ ” State ex rel. Greene v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of
Elections , 121 Ohio St.3d 631, 2009-Ohio-1716, 907 N.E.2d 300, ¶ 12, quo ting State ex rel. Cooker Restaurant Corp. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections , 80 Ohio St.3d 302, 305, 686 N.E.2d 238 (1997). {¶ 38} I would not conclude that the board’s decision was unreasonable , arbitrary, or made with an unconscionable attitude or that the board acted in disregard of applicable legal provisions. In regard to O’Neill ’s residency, the evidence in this case does not establish a clear, precise date upon which O’Neill
became a resident of the dist rict. R.C. 3503.02(A) emphasizes that when determining where a person resi des, the fact-finder must consid er the person’s intent to make a place a fixed or permanent place of abode. State ex rel. Duncan v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Elections , 115 Ohio St.3d 405, 2007-Ohio-5346, 875 N.E.2d 578, ¶ 11. In making its subjectiv e determination of O’Neill’s intent, the board had to interpret and weigh the various facts before it. The facts in this case are not entirely clear, and in making its determination the board may h ave weighed O’Neill’s credibility, which could have been called into questi on given the misleading nature of her R.C. 3513.07 statement, as discussed b elow. Given that the board could reasonably have questioned whether O’Neill beca me a resident of the district in time to qualify as a candidate, I cannot say th at the board acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in concluding that she was not a resident of the district for the requisite time prior to the el ection in question.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 {¶ 39} In regard to O’Neill’s voter registration in the district, I wo uld not hold that changes to the Revised Code have eliminated the requi rement, noted in State ex rel. Morris v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections , 143 Ohio St.3d 507, 2015-Ohio3659, 39 N.E.3d 1232, ¶ 22, that a prospective candidate must b e registered to vote
at an address within the election district at the time he or sh e signs the R.C. 3513.07
candidate statement. O’Neill is correct that in the Morris decision, the statement setting forth the requirement is dicta; however, it remains sen sible to enforce the requirement. {¶ 40} R.C. 3513.07 requires a prospectiv e candidate to declare “under penalty of election falsificati on” that the prospective candida te is “ a qualified elector in the precinct in which [the prospective candi date’s] voting residence is located.” (Emphasis added.) Signi ficantly, the statute does n ot require the prospective candidate to state only that he or she is a qualifi ed elector or a qualified
elector who will be eligible to vote on the date of the election in the precinct i n which his or her residence is located. Instead, the statute re quires the prospective candidate to be a “qualified elect or in the precinct” at the ti me the statement is
made. While R.C. 3513.07 notes tha t the prospective candidate’ s statement must “substantially” follow the language set forth in the statute, t he requirement that the prospective candidate be a “qua lified elector in the precinct” cannot be completely disregarded. I would accordingly conclude that it was sensible for this court in
Morris to note the requirement that a pr ospective candidate must be re gistered to
vote at an address within the election district at the time he or she signs a candidate
statement under R.C. 3513.07 or R.C. 3513.261. {¶ 41} The per curiam opinion correctly notes that O’Neill was a “qual ified elector” under Ohio law. Majority opinion at ¶ 31. However, e ven assuming that she was a resident of the district, O’Neill was not a “qualifie d elector in the precinct in which [her] voting residence is located” at the time she sig ned the statement on some of her part-petitions. Instead, at that time, she was reg istered to vote inJanuary Term, 2020

15 Geauga County. The fact that she could change her address with the board of elections at any time until the election is immaterial: at the time she signed the statement, she could not vote in Athens County. Thus, because O’Neill had not updated her voter-registration in formation prior to signing her R.C. 3513.07 statement, the board did not a buse its discretion in concluding that her petition was
invalid. {¶ 42} For these reasons, I dissent and would deny the requested writ of
mandamus.

_________________ Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Louis E. Grube, for relator. Keller J. Blackburn, Athens County Prosecuting Attorney, and Za chary L. Saunders, Assistant Prosecutin g Attorney, for respondent.

_________________