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The Wright Flyer Papers

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AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

Cleared to Engage

Improving Joint Close

Air Support Effectiveness

Michael H. Johnson

Major, USMC

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 35

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

June 2008
ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US 

government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are 

available electronically at the Air University Research 

Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU 

Press Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.
iii

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright 

Flyer Papers series. In this series, the Air Command and 

Staff College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes our best student research projects from the prior academic year. The 

ACSC research program encourages our students to move 

beyond the school’s core curriculum in their own professional development and in “advancing air and space power.” 

The series title reflects our desire to perpetuate the pioneering spirit embodied in earlier generations of Airmen. Projects 

selected for publication combine solid research, innovative 

thought, and lucid presentation in exploring war at the operational level. With this broad perspective, the Wright Flyer 

Papers engage an eclectic range of doctrinal, technological, 

organizational, and operational questions. Some of these 

studies provide new solutions to familiar problems. Others encourage us to leave the familiar behind in pursuing 

new possibilities. By making these research studies available in the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes to encourage 

critical examination of the findings and to stimulate further 

research in these areas.

JIMMIE C. JACKSON, JR.

Brigadier General, USAF

Commandant

Abstract

The importance of close air support (CAS) has markedly 

increased over the last five years in Operations Enduring 

Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Ground forces have increasingly relied on the effects that airpower provides and will 

continue to do so in the foreseeable future. This has occurred 

while CAS doctrine and execution have undergone radical 

changes. While the fundamentals of a serviceperson with a 

radio calling in air support have remained relatively constant 

since World War II, the level of mission complexity has 

steadily increased. Digital communications, precision-guided 

munitions, collateral damage considerations, effects-based 

operations, and a “joint” battlefield have placed increased 

requirements on terminal attack controllers and CAS aircrew. 

CAS has been a heavily debated topic within the services 

for decades. CAS doctrine and training issues have affected 

aircraft procurement, interservice relationships, and the 

application and effectiveness of airpower on the battlefield. 

This has produced numerous Congressional inquiries and 

service introspection on how to “get it right.” While much 

progress has been made since 2001, the services must continue to make CAS more effective. On the modern battlefield, the joint application of firepower is a reality, not a 

concept. It is time to “engage” the doctrinal and training 

challenges facing our services in order to increase the effectiveness of our aviation forces in the CAS arena.





Joint Close Air Effectiveness

Close air support (CAS)—the term evokes scenes from 

the movie Platoon where a ground commander is exhorting 

aircraft to “drop all remaining on my pos [position]” to avoid 

being overrun by enemy forces. In the current context, CAS 

has evolved into much more. This seemingly simple, yet 

complex, mission has been at the heart of airpower debates 

for decades. CAS, it can be argued, is the most difficult mission flown by an air platform on today’s battlefield.1 CAS 

requires the highest level of integration with ground forces, 

indirect fires, and other assets.2 In most cases, it also requires the greatest precision due to proximity to friendly 

forces. Finally, it has the highest potential for negative ramifications if something goes wrong, such as fratricide, civilian deaths, or the overrunning of ground forces. 

The importance of CAS has markedly increased over the 

last five years in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Ground forces have increasingly relied on the effects airpower provides and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. The percentage of 

missions classified as CAS during Operation Desert Storm 

was 6 percent and zero in Operation Allied Force (due to 

no terminal attack controllers on the ground in Kosovo).3

In OEF and OIF, this increased drastically. During Operation Anaconda, nearly all such missions supported ground 

forces in the Shah-e-Kot Valley.4 During the push to Baghdad in 2003, 75 percent of Navy and Marine air involvement 

consisted of CAS missions.5 In the Central Command Air 

Force (CENTAF) report OIF: By the Numbers, 79 percent of 

targets struck during the campaign fell under the killbox 

interdiction/close air support (KI/CAS) category.6 In current operations in OIF, almost all air missions require positive control to engage ground targets. 

Recent combat operations have also become increasingly 

joint in nature. For example, Air Force F-16s and Army AH64s provide CAS for Marine battalions; Marine AH-1s support Army brigades; and Navy F-18s support special forces. 

This increased joint interaction, coupled with differences in 

each service’s approach to doctrine and training, has decreased the effectiveness of CAS. 
The increased requirement for CAS, along with numerous problems noted during execution, prompted the Government Accounting Office (GAO) to submit a report to the 

Congressional House Committee on Armed Services on 

CAS training and equipment issues in May 2003. Several 

recommendations were provided in this report, many of 

which have been implemented.7 Joint CAS (JCAS) has also 

been one of the main areas of responsibility of Joint Forces 

Command (JFCOM) since 1999.8 While much attention has 

been focused on CAS and its intricacies, there are lingering issues that still inhibit the effectiveness of CAS. The 

question, therefore, is how do we overcome these remaining 

hurdles to increase CAS effectiveness and achieve a truly 

joint system?

Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, 

and Procedures for Close Air Support, lists eight conditions 

for effective CAS: (1) effective training and proficiency; (2) 

planning and integration; (3) command, control, and communications; (4) air superiority; (5) target marking and acquisition; (6) streamlined and flexible procedures; (7) appropriate ordnance; and (8) favorable weather.9 Current 

doctrine and training issues impact all of these except air 

superiority and favorable weather. This paper addresses 

the question of improving CAS effectiveness by focusing on 

these two areas. Improvements in the services’ approach to 

doctrine and training will enable airpower to become more 

effective at CAS. Service differences in the approach to 

doctrine and training are a key limiter in JCAS execution. 

Problems in these areas will be highlighted with recommendations on how the military can improve the current JCAS 

construct and increase battlefield effectiveness. 

Close Air Support Doctrine

Doctrine—Fundamental principles by which the 

military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives.

––Joint Publication 1-02

––Department of Defense Dictionary

––of Military and Associated Terms
CAS has its roots in the early decades of the twentieth 

century. The advent of the airplane quickly led to its application in strafing and bombing on the European battlefields in World War I. Marine aviators developed a form of 

CAS in the 1927 Nicaraguan civil war.10 These early uses 

of airpower in support of ground troops gradually matured 

through World War II, Korea, and Vietnam to the doctrine 

we have today.

Service viewpoints on CAS diverged after World War II. 

Many Air Force proponents viewed airpower in broader 

terms based on the results of strategic bombing during the 

war. CAS was deemed “a maximum waste of firepower” by 

Air Force leadership.11 The Army viewed airpower in terms of 

supporting a ground campaign. These viewpoints have continued within the two services in some form to the present 

day. The Key West Agreement of 1948 attempted to clarify 

service relationships while also tasking the Air Force to provide CAS to the Army.12

The underlying tension regarding the two services’ differing viewpoints on CAS affected interservice relationships and 

aircraft procurement throughout the 1960s. The JohnsonMcConnell Agreement of 1966 further delineated the Air 

Force’s role as the sole provider of fixed-wing CAS to the 

Army, while recognizing that Army helicopter missions included fire support.13 This agreement, along with the subsequent 1975 letter outlining the Air Force and Army understanding of airpower use, shaped the Army’s doctrinal stance 

on CAS that has continued to this day.14 Army leaders first 

used the term direct aerial fire support to describe helicopter 

CAS and attached a definition that would not antagonize the 

Air Force: “fire delivered by aerial vehicles organic to ground 

forces against surface targets and in support of land operations.”15 This evolved into close in fire support16 and, currently, close combat attack. 

The United States Marine Corps views CAS through a 

much different lens. The Marine approach to warfare 

stresses combined arms fires. Aviation fires have been an 

integral part of the plan since the development of CAS tactics 80 years ago during campaigns in Latin America. In 

1935 the Marine Corps established aviation as an independent section “primarily for the support of Fleet Marine 

Forces in landing operations and in support of troop ac-
tivities in the field.”17 Indeed, the construct of combat units 

is based on the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), 

where an aviation element is tasked to provide support to 

ground forces. This air-ground approach endured due to a 

historically lighter force. Marine units typically deploy with 

fewer artillery assets than the Army because of their amphibious background. This has cemented the requirement 

for aviation fires to provide that additional support. Additionally, Marine aviation historically focuses on the tactical level. Having no strategic bombers, the Marine Corps 

avoided the debate within the Air Force on the most efficient application of airpower. However, this contributes 

to problems with joint integration, as Marine leadership is 

constantly at odds over the right mix of providing aircraft 

for a joint air campaign while maintaining the direct support capability of Marine aviation upon which the MAGTF 

was established. 

Current Close Air Support Doctrine

JP 3-09.3 governs CAS procedures. The JCAS publication, revised in 2003, has two major conflicts from which 

to draw lessons learned. Current doctrine has addressed 

many problems that were inherent with the old “positive 

control” and “reasonable assurance” doctrine. Many of the 

problems that remain, however, deal with different service 

approaches to CAS and understanding of the doctrine.

First are the Air Force and Army approaches to CAS. Service parochialism significantly motivates the differing viewpoints. The argument of whether or not CAS constitutes an 

effective use of airpower is beyond the scope of this paper. 

The underlying debate, however, drives both services’ mindset and approach to the mission.

Helicopter development provided Army ground commanders with an organic air platform to provide fire support.18

This fire support was deemed necessary due to a perceived 

lack of support from the Air Force, whose focus was on 

the strategic bombing mission. This development, unfortunately, also involved the use of semantics and wordsmithing 

to avoid an “encroachment” on the Air Force’s responsibility of providing CAS to the Army. This tit for tat over CAS 

has resulted in an almost superstitious avoidance of using 
the term within Army circles or implying that Army aviation 

performed the mission. A letter from the Army and Air Force 

chiefs of staff to the chairman of the House Armed Services 

Committee in September 1975 defined the role of the attack 

helicopter as “integral to the Army ground maneuver unit 

and . . . an extension of organic firepower.” The two services 

agreed “the attack helicopter does not perform CAS but is 

intended to complement Air Force CAS capabilities.”19 Army 

helicopters do conduct CAS, but under the guise of calling it 

another name. The following is an excerpt from the Army’s 

Field Manual (FM) 3-04.111, Aviation Brigades, dated August 2003, regarding close combat attack (CCA): 

For aviation units, close combat attack (CCA) is defined as a hasty or 

deliberate attack in support of units engaged in close combat. During CCA, armed helicopters engage enemy units with direct fires that 

impact near friendly forces. Targets may range from a few hundred 

meters to a few thousand meters. CCA is coordinated and directed 

by a team, platoon, or company-level ground unit using standardized 

CCA procedures in unit SOP [standard operating procedures].

Effective planning, coordination, and training between ground units 

and armed aircraft maximize the capabilities of the combined arms 

team, while minimizing the risk of fratricide. The key to success for 

enhancing air/ground coordination and the subsequent execution of 

the tasks involved begins with standardizing techniques and procedures. The end state is a detailed SOP between air and ground maneuver units that addresses the CCA situation. This procedure is best 

suited for units that maintain a habitual combined arms relationship 

during training and war.

The CCA briefing follows the joint standard nine-line format with 

minor modifications for Army helicopters. The briefing provides 

clear and concise information in a logical sequence that enables aircrews to employ their weapons systems. It also provides appropriate 

control to reduce the risk of fratricide. 

Before the armed helicopter team engages, the target must be 

confirmed by the aircrew and friendly unit in contact. During engagement, open communication and continuous coordination with 

friendly ground elements are required to ensure the desired effect. 

Coordination of the direct and indirect fires from all participants 

produces the most efficient results in the least amount of time, with 

the least risk to all. This coordination includes CAS and any nonlethal methods that may be employed.20

Compare this excerpt with the current JCAS definition of 

CAS: “air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against 

hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces 

and that require detailed integration of each air mission 
with the fire and movement of those forces.”21 CCA goes so 

far as to utilize the JCAS nine-line briefing format that is 

the accepted standard, but instead calls it the “close combat attack briefing.”22

This approach had minimal impact on joint operations 

prior to OEF and OIF, when Army helicopter units generally supported only Army ground units. After 9/11, however, 

Army attack helicopters have provided CAS for special forces 

and Marine ground units. Army pilots encountered problems because they were not well versed in CAS procedures 

as outlined in JP 3-09.3.23 Command and control and forward air controller procedures were adjusted when AH-64s 

supported Marine units based on this doctrinal issue.24

On the Air Force side, there is a persistent perception 

that CAS is a lower-priority mission or a less-effective use 

of airpower than interdiction or strategic bombardment.25

Current Air Force doctrine perpetuates this perception. 

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.3, Counterland Doctrine,

states that the “benefits of CAS must be weighed against the 

other, potentially more effective, uses for CAS-capable assets such as air interdiction (AI) or even strategic attack.”26

This approach inhibits effectiveness because units spend 

less time on training for CAS. This viewpoint, in some cases, 

gives pilots the false impression that CAS is somehow a less 

complex mission than other mission taskings they routinely 

practice. Prior to OEF and OIF, this was not a big issue as 

A-10 aircraft provided the preponderance of CAS sorties 

and were generally well versed in CAS procedures. Other 

Air Force assets did not execute the mission as often and 

rarely flew in support of other services on missions involving CAS. Technology and an increase in CAS taskings have 

changed this drastically during OEF and OIF. Advances in 

weapons and sensors allow many different aircraft to perform the CAS mission. Nearly all fixed-wing platforms capable of dropping a bomb have been employed in a CAS 

role, to include B-52 and B-1 strategic bombers.

This shift in CAS support coming from other aircraft traditionally not tasked for the mission has resulted in aircrews 

supporting the mission that have little or no understanding of 

the ground scheme of maneuver or intricacies of an integrated 

fire-support plan. A common approach seen in these situations is the “bomb on coordinate” mentality. The aircrew fo-
cuses on target coordinates for a precision-guided munitions 

delivery and misses the importance of an assigned final attack 

heading or a time on target (TOT), which to the ground unit 

or controller is also a critical piece of the mission. Perhaps the 

final attack heading was given to keep the aircraft from delivering ordnance over the top of friendly positions, or the TOT 

was assigned because helicopters are landing in a zone near 

the target one minute after bomb impact.27

Doctrinal differences concerning CAS and fire-support 

coordination measures are also a factor. Much discussion 

and research have been accomplished on the fire support 

coordination line (FSCL) emplacement and utility. The FSCL 

discussion is also beyond the scope of this paper; however, 

it does impact the effectiveness of CAS. Nowhere in the 

JCAS manual does it state that CAS is tied to a specific firesupport-coordination measure. Specifically, it says that the 

FSCL “does not divide an area of operations by defining a 

boundary between close and deep areas or create a zone for 

CAS.”28 Misunderstanding of this basic CAS premise has 

put undue restrictions on aviation fires and unnecessarily required CAS control for missions that meet the definition of interdiction. Understanding of what CAS “is” and “is 

not” still varies within the branches.29 Briefs given at the 

2004 JCAS conference described Scud-hunting missions in 

the western desert of Iraq during OIF as CAS.30 Confusion 

over the difference between CAS, interdiction, and terminal 

guidance operations has also led to recommendations to 

call operations something else, such as battlefield air interdiction or ground-aided precision strike.31

Another shortfall of current CAS doctrine is it focuses 

almost exclusively on fixed-wing tactics, techniques, and 

procedures (TTP). Six pages in the current JCAS publication are allotted to cover rotary-wing CAS employment, control points, tactics, and weapons. This is due, in part, to the 

fact that the Army, while owning the preponderance of helicopters in the military, does not conduct CAS or forward 

air controller (airborne) (FAC[A]) missions. However, Marine 

Corps attack helicopters routinely execute these missions. 

During Operation Anaconda, Marine Cobra helicopters were 

underutilized in the FAC[A] and strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR) role due to a lack of understanding 

within the joint task force (JTF) chain of command of the 
helicopter’s capabilities.32 This is through no fault of the 

Army commanders whose exposure to rotary-wing attack 

aviation in most cases was limited to AH-64s, which do not 

routinely perform those missions. Target sets during Anaconda included cave entrances and camouflaged bunkers in 

rugged terrain. These targets were often very difficult to acquire from fixed-wing aircraft and intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms operating at medium-tohigh altitude. Low-altitude platforms such as helicopters 

were ideal for target location in this instance. This lack of 

knowledge of helicopter CAS and FAC[A] capabilities leads 

to inefficiency in employment of rotary-wing assets. This 

problem also affects training, as service FAC[A]s (with the 

exception of the Marine Corps) rarely control helicopters 

during FAC[A] training.33

There is also a lack of understanding of current types 

of CAS control and employment of FAC[A] platforms by 

ground commanders. Change 1 to the JCAS publication 

disseminated in September 2005 attempted to clarify the 

definitions and procedures for the three types of CAS control.34 This has helped, but there are still occasions where 

ground commanders remain hesitant to use Type 2 or 3 

control due to a perceived increase in risk. Commanders 

have also been hesitant to employ FAC[A] platforms due to 

a lack of familiarity or a developed relationship with a particular unit or platform.35

Technology has had a dramatic impact on doctrine. CAS 

doctrine has not been able to keep up with the pace of technological advancements. The increased use of precisionguided munitions (PGM) has shifted how air attacks are 

executed during CAS. The increased stand-off and delivery 

ranges of PGMs, such as the Hellfire missile or Joint Direct 

Attack Munition (JDAM) in many cases, require a ground 

controller to authorize a pilot to deliver the weapon without first seeing his or her aircraft. In some cases, the pilot 

may not acquire the target prior to weapons release. This 

requires a higher level of confidence by the ground commander in his or her air controller and the CAS platform. 

Use of video feeds such as the remotely operated video 

enhanced receiver (ROVER) has also affected CAS doctrine.36 Joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC) can now 

view unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and aircraft sensors 
on a computer screen to aid in targeting. This has both 

benefits and drawbacks. JTACs no longer have to see the 

target with their eyeballs to engage it, and in many cases, 

no longer have to be in the same geographic location as the 

target. Unfortunately, in some cases, this has led to micromanagement of tactical attacks by the chain of command.37

Commanders now have a bird’s eye view of an engagement 

and feel the need to step in vice letting the tactical operators execute the mission based on their knowledge of the 

situation. CAS doctrine is a step behind on this issue and 

has not addressed it sufficiently. 

Tied to this problem is the increasing use of UAVs during CAS. UAV usage has far outpaced the ability to define 

doctrine and TTPs for these systems during CAS missions. 

The growing proliferation of these systems has many ramifications for CAS, to include clearance of fires, UAV control 

authority, airspace deconfliction, and target handoff, just 

to list a few. 

Airborne target coordinate generation/designation and 

digital communications are two other areas that doctrine 

must sufficiently address. Advanced targeting pods have 

provided greatly increased capability to many platforms. In 

some cases, these pods are capable of obtaining extremely 

precise coordinates for weapons such as JDAM. Currently, 

there is limited data and information on the capabilities of 

the several different pods and the fidelity of these systems 

on specific platforms.38 The Air Force developed some information on its systems, but other services have not. Digital 

communication TTPs are also lacking in current doctrine. 

There are several systems in operation, each with its own 

requirements and procedures. The JCAS publication provides some basic procedures for digital CAS, but falls short 

of the detail needed. 

Technological advances, in many cases, have increased 

the effectiveness and efficiency of CAS; however, the requirements on terminal attack controllers have also increased. The JTAC is no longer the person seeing the target 

or marking the target. He or she may be coordinating target 

acquisition through one air platform via a video feed while 

another aircraft marks the target via a laser designator. He 

or she may be delivering clearance to fire via a computer 

keystroke instead of talking on a radio. Doctrine currently 
10

lacks the detail that allows him or her to harness this technology most efficiently during CAS. 

Many of the doctrinal problems outlined affect CAS training as well. CAS training has varied between the services 

and between conflicts. Standardization has occurred for 

terminal attack controllers, but there are many areas in 

CAS aircrew training that need improvement. 

Close Air Support Training

In professional sports, teams do not develop a game plan 

during practices and then execute something completely 

different on game day. Teams may have to make adjustments based on their opponent, but they still execute the 

basic procedures of their game plan. In CAS operations, 

however, aircrews and controllers often improvise during 

execution based on a lack of practice or training in CAS 

procedures. All members of the military have heard the oftrepeated expression: “train like you fight and fight like you 

train.” Nowhere is this more important than in CAS. The 

JCAS publication lists effective training and proficiency as 

one of the eight conditions for effective CAS.39 Several initiatives have been incorporated over the last five years that 

attempt to standardize JCAS training. The JTAC Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed in 2004 standardized 

CAS training for terminal attack controllers at the service 

schoolhouses.40 The joint forward air controller (airborne) 

(JFAC[A]) MOA does the same for services and platforms 

that conduct the FAC[A] mission.41 This training standardization has focused on the terminal-controller end of CAS. 

CAS aircrew standardization varies between services and 

units; thus there are still hurdles to overcome in CAS training to make it more effective.

The first hurdle is the lack of joint training. This was 

one of four main areas for improvement highlighted in the 

GAO report on military readiness in May 2003.42 Recent 

initiatives, such as the joint national training capability by 

JFCOM, are attempting to address this problem.43 While 

this is a good first step, service-specific taskings and lack 

of a central authority to oversee joint training continue to 

be a problem. Training requirements and high operational 

tempo often force units to forego joint training in lieu of 
11

higher-priority taskings within their own service. Additionally, while JFCOM is a joint training facilitator and can provide incentives, such as funding for exercises, they hold no 

authority to compel units to participate. Thus, while units 

such as an Army Attack Aviation battalion may know that 

they will be supporting Marine infantry units in Iraq, geographic location within the continental United States and 

limited training time may prevent them from conducting 

joint training prior to deployment. This is a problem even 

within the Marine Corps, which generally performs airground integration well. There is a tendency to train with 

Marine air platforms rather than other service aviation assets due to a familiarity between Marine air and ground 

units.44 This inhibits Marine controllers and aircrews from 

becoming more knowledgeable and familiar with joint air 

assets that they might work with in-theater. 

Another hurdle is the lack of emphasis within some units 

on CAS training. Some unit commanders have focused unit 

training on other mission sets, such as air-to-air training 

or interdiction, despite the low probability of these missions 

occurring, especially in current Iraqi operations.45 While it 

is understood that units must maintain proficiency and 

competency in all unit taskings and missions, it is unfathomable to neglect training in one of the most likely areas of 

employment in-theater. 

The fluidity of recent operations also in some ways contributes to CAS training issues. Many sorties during the 

Iraqi ground campaign in 2003 were rolled to provide CAS 

from other mission taskings once airborne. This prevented 

effective premission planning and integration from being 

conducted, another listed condition for effective CAS.46 This 

has perpetuated the mind-set that CAS is a pickup mission that can be executed on the fly; thus less emphasis is 

placed on it in the training environment. 

The previously mentioned Air Force and Army mind-sets 

toward the mission are at the core of CAS training issues. Air 

Force emphasis on other missions, such as strategic attack 

or interdiction, tacitly allows squadrons to focus on these 

areas during training instead of CAS. The Army’s refusal to 

acknowledge that their attack aviation assets conduct CAS 

provides them with a loophole to forego CAS training. 
12

Other external requirements also impact training. The 

Army restructuring has placed greater demands on the Air 

Force for terminal attack controllers.47 More controllers 

mean more training requirements with the same amount 

of aviation support. The Marine Corps faces a similar situation with the stand up of the single-seat FAC[A] program 

within fixed-wing units.48

Technology has also played a part in inhibiting CAS 

training. Advances in weapons and sensors have outpaced 

doctrine. In many cases, this forces CAS aircrews and controllers to develop ad hoc TTPs. Failure to capture TTPs at a 

central point and disseminate them leads to varying degrees 

of proficiency and different procedures from unit to unit.49

In some cases shortages of systems, such as advanced targeting pods, preclude aircrews training with them prior to 

deployment, which can lead to less effective use during CAS 

operations in-theater. Technology has also impacted range 

training due to the fact that range regulations have not kept 

up with the pace of precision-guided munitions and CAS 

control procedures. This unnecessarily restricts ground 

and aviation units from training effectively.

The issues outlined in doctrine and training have in most 

cases not prevented US forces from receiving CAS. The 

United States is without a doubt the world leader in applying 

military power, and this holds true in CAS as well. The implementation of the following recommendations will increase 

effectiveness across all services and make CAS truly joint. 

Recommendations

Knowing is half the battle.

 ––GI Joe

Discussion of an issue without a recommendation is merely 

a history lesson. Each service has its own CAS shortfalls to 

work through with the goal to make a more effective product 

for the user—the serviceman or servicewoman on the ground.

Doctrine

Many of the CAS issues outlined have been highlighted in 

other theses, articles, and books. Recommendations in this 
13

thesis focus on the areas of doctrine and training highlighted 

at the beginning and address the specific issues outlined.

1. Acknowledgement by Air Force and Army Headquarters that Army Attack Aviation Performs Close Air 

Support

This recommendation lies at the heart of the Air Force 

and Army’s relationship regarding CAS. Employment of 

airpower in combat has continued to evolve over the last 

three decades since the two services agreed that attack 

helicopters “do not perform CAS.”50 It is reprehensible to 

allow such a myopic view to continue forward in light of 

continued proof. Otherwise, both services readily agree 

that the Army relies on external support for fixed-wing 

CAS, and the preponderance of this support comes from 

the Air Force, based on historical precedent and agreements. It should also be agreed upon that the attack 

helicopter is a viable platform for providing CAS as demonstrated for over 35 years by the Marine Corps and by 

the Army in recent operations in OEF and OIF. Acceptance of this fact in no way impacts each service’s mission sets or support. Army attack aviation can still perform as maneuver elements and conduct other missions 

such as deep attack. This proposal merely formalizes 

what is already happening. This would also require a 

change in Army doctrine that would remove CCA as a 

mission and incorporate CAS. A method to do this is to 

make the JCAS publication the service CAS doctrine. 

This is what occurred within the Marine Corps in 2003. 

Prior to 2003, the Marine Corps published Marine Corps 

Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-23.1, Close Air Support.

51 With the publication of the updated JCAS manual 

in 2003, the Marine Corps rescinded MCWP 3-23.1 and 

now solely references JP 3-09.3 for CAS. Acknowledgement that the Army does CAS is crucial because Army 

aviation is actively involved in providing CAS to Army, 

Marine, and Special Forces units in OIF and OEF. This 

requires pilots to be trained and familiar with CAS procedures. A Casey-Moseley agreement52 similar to JohnsonMcConnell or the one between Gen David C. Jones, Air 

Force chief of staff, and Gen Frederick C. Weyand, Army 

chief of staff, in 197553 would reaffirm the Air Force’s 
14

commitment to providing fixed-wing CAS for the Army, 

while acknowledging that Army attack aviation has a 

role in CAS and FAC[A].

2. Stand up an Army FAC[A] Program

a. An Army rotary-wing FAC[A] program offers many 

advantages. It would provide Army commanders 

with an increased capability to call in aerial fires. 

FAC[A]s are trained and operate under standardized procedures as outlined in the JFAC[A] MOA. As 

the Army restructures under the brigade concept, 

having this capability could ease the requirement 

for additional JTACs. This would also aid in familiarizing Army pilots in CAS TTPs. Army attack aviation has practiced many FAC[A] functions for years 

under the joint air attack team (JAAT) concept.54

In Vietnam, controllers routinely flew in Army helicopters. More recently in Iraq, terminal attack controllers were put in the right seat of OH-58 scout 

helicopters of the 101st Airborne Division.55 The 

Marine Corps already employs its Cobra and Huey 

helicopters as rotary-wing FAC[A]s. 

b. Proof of concept training occurred in January 2006, 

when four AH-64D pilots from the 1st Battalion, 

227th Attack Regiment, received FAC[A] familiarization training. The FAC[A] academic course, taught by 

the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Pacific, 

provides academic instruction and field training for 

all Marine forward air controllers and FAC[A] aircrews. The pilots then spend two weeks flying rotarywing FAC[A] missions with Marine Aviation Weapons 

and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1). MAWTS-1

provides tactical standardization and advanced-level 

training for all Marine Corps aviators. MAWTS-1 AH-

1W FAC[A] instructors flew in AH-64D aircraft and 

provided live-fire instruction in rotary-wing FAC[A] 

procedures. The pilots on average executed 32 fixedwing controls of Air Force and Marine jet aircraft. The 

conclusions affirmed that the AH-64 is an extremely 

viable and capable platform to conduct FAC[A] and 

that senior Army attack pilots proficiently conducted 
15

FAC[A] following the academic and live-fire training.56 The current hurdle for the Army is determining 

whether it should develop a formal FAC[A] program 

for Army aviation. Granted, there are support issues 

that must be addressed before this happens, but the 

decision should be made on the honest analysis of the 

increased capability that the program would bring to 

Army ground forces and not traditional rice bowls of 

the mission within the services. 

c. Many of the requirements are already in place to make 

the program happen. The Army is already a signatory 

of the JFAC[A] MOA, which outlines certification standards and requirements. Rotary-wing FAC[A] TTPs are 

already established and used by attack helicopters 

within the Marine Corps and could be quickly incorporated into Army aviation doctrine and publications.57

Initial training of Army pilots could leverage Marine 

Corps rotary-wing FAC[A] instructors at MAWTS-1, 

under a “train the trainer” concept, to stand up an initial cadre of Army FAC[A] instructors who could then 

continue the training for Army units. 

3. Services Place Greater Emphasis on the Close Air 

Support Mission

Emphasis on the CAS mission has improved since 9/11; 

however, the advent of advanced sensors and PGMs 

thrusts many platforms into the CAS role in combat 

without a solid foundation of CAS training. Standardization initiatives have focused on the terminal attack 

controller and neglected aircrews and units performing 

CAS. This is most needed in units that have just recently begun employing their platforms in the CAS role 

and have traditionally been focused on other missions. 

Emphasis on the mission by service headquarters will 

drive these units to increase their focus on CAS, thereby 

increasing standardization and effectiveness.58

4. Institute Changes in Services’ Doctrinal Approach to 

Fire Support Coordination and Close Air Support

The lessons learned from CAS operations supporting 

V Corps and I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) dur-
16

ing OIF show joint air operations were more effective 

in I MEF’s area of operations.59 Personnel manning 

the battlefield coordination detachment, air support 

operations center, or direct air support center must 

have a thorough understanding of what CAS “is” and 

“is not,” and how management of fire-support coordination measures and fires is critical to the effectiveness of CAS. Ground commanders at all echelons 

must understand that CAS employment principles are 

crucial to the effectiveness of air-delivered fires.60

5. Expand Detail in Close Air Support Doctrine on Helicopter Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

Expansion of Army attack aviation into CAS and 

FAC[A] roles requires more detail incorporated into 

CAS doctrine on helicopter TTPs. Knowledge of helicopter CAS TTPs varies greatly within fixed-wing units 

and the services. Marine fixed-wing attack pilots generally are the most knowledgeable regarding helicopters due to a habitual relationship with rotary-wing 

units within the MAGTF construct. Lack of its own 

attack helicopter assets limits Air Force exposure to 

helicopter employment during CAS, although some 

units are familiar with Army attack helicopter TTPs 

based on JAAT operations.61 Other units’ experience, 

however, is limited to academic classes and simulation of rotary-wing assets during FAC[A] and CAS missions.62 A concerted effort must be made to incorporate more information and TTPs regarding helicopter 

operations into doctrine. The JCAS publication is the 

best source and has a wider dissemination than servicespecific manuals. 

6. Promote Better Understanding of Close Air Support 

Control Types and Forward Air Controller (Airborne) 

Utilization by Ground Commanders

A better understanding by ground commanders of the 

types of CAS control and utilization of FAC[A] platforms 

benefits CAS effectiveness. Over the last five years, understanding of the types of CAS control and their application has improved. Continued education and inclusion of ground commanders in JCAS will improve that 
17

process. Offering a CAS “primer” course at the services’ 

commanders courses would better familiarize incoming 

commanders with JCAS and FAC[A] TTPs.63 Greater integration of ground officers into forums such as the 

JCAS and JFAC[A] conferences would prove beneficial, 

since their participation at these two conferences is 

usually limited. Most participants are from aviation or 

terminal-controller backgrounds. 

7. Incorporate Latest Close Air Support Tactics, Techniques, 

and Procedures with Regards to Technology

Finally, CAS doctrine must catch up to technology. There 

is a wealth of field expertise from CAS aircrews and controllers who have developed procedures out of necessity 

in combat that need to be filtered and codified into JCAS 

doctrine. TTPs must be expanded in detail on PGM targeting and delivery, video feed usage, and UAV integration. Subject-matter experts at the Joint Unmanned 

Aerial Systems Center of Excellence at Creech AFB in 

Indian Springs, Nevada,64 must stay engaged in incorporating UAV TTPs into CAS doctrine.65 There needs to 

be continued discussion on the UAV role in CAS, to include possible joint fires observer and/or FAC[A] training for UAV operators. Digital communication TTPs are 

constantly evolving as well. Incorporation of the latest 

information into JP 3-09.3 will ensure a baseline level 

of knowledge reaches all controllers and aircrews rather 

than remaining at a unit or service level. 

Training

The more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed 

in war.

––Hyman G. Rickover

Commanders and units must constantly emphasize 

training that routinely exercises CAS tactics, techniques, and procedures. Successful CAS training 

will result in safe and effective CAS employment.

 ––Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-3.1

 Close Air Support
18

Doctrinal changes will have little effect unless accompanied by improvements in training. Joint training does occur 

to varying degrees, but it is on an ad hoc basis and most 

times through the buddy system via phone conversation 

or e-mail between squadrons. For example, Marine Cobra 

squadrons may call an Air Force F-16 squadron and set 

up CAS sorties to fulfill AH-1W FAC[A] training. While this 

accomplishes the training requirements of the squadron, it 

is an informal method and neither squadron gets credit for 

joint training. The lack of joint training can be approached 

in many ways.

1. Establish a Joint Training Requirement

a. The idea of levying an additional requirement on 

units would not be a popular one based on the current services’ operations tempo and deployment 

cycles; but, realistically, it would allow units to increase joint interaction. It is critical, however, to 

apply a common-sense approach to minimize the 

impact on overburdened units. Geographic location is a major consideration. Aligning units to joint 

training opportunities within reasonable distance 

to their home station would be ideal.

b. Joint tasking requirements should also be a key 

factor in determining unit participation. For instance, Marine rotary-wing units that will operate in an Army area of operations should align to 

train with Army brigade combat teams (BCT) that 

will be there during the same period. In December 

2005, an Army National Guard UH-60 squadron 

was tasked to deploy to OIF in support of the 3rd 

Marine Aircraft Wing and to participate in Desert 

Talon, a Marine Corps predeployment training exercise in Yuma, Arizona.66 This joint training should 

also count towards service-specific predeployment 

training requirements. 

c. This recommendation requires expansion of the Air 

Force-sponsored Integrated Training Initiative.67

While this initiative includes joint training opportunities, it is Air Force-centric and needs increased 

participation from the other three services. Align-
19

ment of units to joint exercises based on mission 

requirements and deployment cycles would greatly 

increase the effectiveness of units conducting JCAS 

operations. Additional benefits include meeting the 

increased requirements for training of CAS controllers and FAC[A] aircrews. By aligning units based 

on training requirements, you get more “bang for 

the buck” and provide a more efficient use of aviation assets during training. 

2. Increase Joint Interaction between the Services’ Weapons Schools

Joint interaction at the services’ weapons schools has 

improved in recent years, but participation is often limited to high demand/low-density platforms such as the 

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), Joint 

Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS), 

or EA-6B Prowlers. Joint CAS aircraft participation 

should be increased and include conferences on tactics and lessons learned. The JCAS and JFAC[A] conferences are excellent joint forums for discussing TTPs 

and lessons learned, but greater interaction at the tactical level during other forums such as the Air Force 

weapons and tactics conference (WEPTAC) would be 

ideal.68 Platforms from all services would benefit from 

many of the CAS and FAC[A] lessons learned and TTPs 

at a joint WEPTAC. Cross-training of service CAS and 

FAC[A] subject matter experts is also extremely beneficial. Familiarization flights with other service CAS or 

FAC[A] platforms provide great benefit to all involved.69

This joint interaction gives greater understanding of the 

employment TTPs of different platforms, sensors, and 

weapons, which leads to more efficient execution the 

next time those two platforms or units work together. 

3. Establish Close Air Support Mission Essential Task 

List and Incorporate into Training of all Aircraft Performing the Mission

A baseline CAS mission-essential task list (METL) 

should be established similar to ones established for 

JTAC and JFAC[A] training.70 This baseline level of 

CAS knowledge would increase the effectiveness of 
20

CAS platforms by laying the framework of what is expected from a CAS platform by a terminal controller. 

Much of this standardization is already in place with 

the JTAC and JFAC[A] MOAs. Service and platform 

CAS experts can modify the existing standards to define the aircraft-specific requirements, including UAV 

controllers who provide fires in support of CAS. Leveraging current CAS syllabi from like fixed- and rotary-wing 

platforms will provide information for units expanding 

or creating a CAS training syllabus. 

4. Elevate the Importance of Close Air Support in the 

Air Force

The Air Force must attach greater importance to the 

CAS mission than it has historically. In the past, issues arose over the capabilities of aircraft to perform 

the CAS mission. Advancements in targeting pods 

and precision weapons now allow many different aircraft to acquire and engage targets in support of a 

CAS mission, but CAS training has not advanced with 

these capabilities. Until CAS is regarded as a mission 

of at least equal importance with air interdiction or 

strategic attack, units will view it as a secondary mission and attach less importance to training for it.71

Many platforms have missions that focus on areas beyond CAS, but some baseline of standardized training 

is needed for each platform to perform effectively in 

the CAS role. As US military doctrine moves toward 

lighter and more maneuverable ground forces, the requirement for airpower to provide CAS continues to 

increase. This has been borne out in OEF and OIF. 

5. Incorporate Close Air Support Training into Army Attack Aviation Training Syllabi

The Army mind-set toward CAS training must also 

change. An increase in training must accompany acceptance of CAS as a rotary-wing aviation mission. 

Training syllabi for OH-58 and AH-64 pilots must incorporate CAS academics and flight training. Standup of a FAC[A] program also requires more training. 

Current training on CCA can be adjusted to incorporate JCAS procedures. Marine AH-1W and UH-1N syl-
21

labi can be reviewed to develop a satisfactory syllabus 

to sufficiently prepare Apache and Kiowa pilots in CAS 

and FAC[A] TTPs.72

6. Create an Army Weapons School

a. Currently, Army aviation standardization resides 

at Fort Rucker, Alabama, with the Directorate of 

Evaluation and Standardization (DES), while the 

Directorate of Training and Doctrine is responsible 

for doctrinal literature and standardization of tactical operations.73 The Army has no weapons and 

tactics course where pilots receive advanced training. These “patch wearers” in the other services are 

considered the subject-matter experts of weapons 

and tactics for their respective platforms.74 The 

Army has a wealth of knowledge and experience in 

its aviation corps, but the lack of a weapons and 

tactics “center of excellence” prevents the Army 

from effectively harnessing and institutionalizing 

this pool of knowledge. 

b. This proposed “Army Aviation Weapons and Tactics 

Squadron (AAWTS)” could be based on a construct 

similar to MAWTS-1, the Marine Corps weapons 

school. Army helicopter missions most closely 

align with the Marine Corps, so this would be a 

logical choice. While DES would still be responsible 

for unit and pilot flight standardization and training, AAWTS would assume responsibility for the 

tactical standardization and advanced-level training of Army aviation. This would include functions 

similar to what MAWTS-1 performs: advanced-level 

training such as FAC[A], tactical publication production, doctrine input, and test and evaluation of 

emerging technology or procedures. 

c. The Army’s Yuma Proving Ground (YPG) complex in 

Arizona would serve as an ideal location for AAWTS. 

It provides access to several aviation training ranges 

for flight instruction and is centrally located to the 

Air Force Fighter Weapons School at Nellis AFB in 

Las Vegas, Nevada; Luke AFB in Phoenix, Arizona; 

the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in 
22

Twentynine Palms, California; and MAWTS-1 in 

Yuma, Arizona. This location would allow AAWTS to 

leverage the Air Force and Marine Corps weapons 

schools as it stood up. Additionally, the location 

promotes synergy by increasing joint training for 

all services. The AAWTS instructor courses would 

provide the ability for Army helicopters and aircrews to participate in joint training during Marine 

weapons and tactics instructor courses or Air Force 

fighter weapons school courses. This concept could 

easily be integrated into the JFCOM’s Joint National Training Capability. The benefits of standing 

up AAWTS reach beyond Army aviation and would 

positively affect all services. 

7. Address Technological Impact on Training

Technology can have both a positive and negative impact on training. Advancements allow aircrews and 

controllers to perform functions faster and better. If service personnel do not have exposure to that technology 

during training, it may negate its positive effect in combat. Service procurement programs will always pursue 

different systems based on specific requirements, but 

all should pursue common capabilities to increase the 

effectiveness of JCAS. At a minimum, this should include a video link capable of transmitting and receiving, an interoperable digital communications capability, and continued procurement of precision weapons 

capable of employment on a variety of target sets under 

varying conditions. Greater interaction among the services will also pay dividends in this arena. Familiarity 

with other services’ weapons and sensor systems will 

not only increase effectiveness when employing those 

systems, but may be of benefit to a particular service 

(e.g., UAV employment with Block III AH-64Ds and the 

tactical video link on the AH-1W).75

Conclusions

Close air support is good for your morale; it’s really, really bad for the enemy’s. I think the confidence of the 0311 that’s behind the mortar hole, 
23

with RPGs [rocket propelled grenades] (bouncing) 

off sandbags, I think it’s good for him when a five 

hundred pound bomb drops in the vicinity of where 

he was just taking fire. It’s certainly good at the 

company level and it’s certainly good at the battalion level, as in, ‘we’re in control here, we can take 

this over at any time we want to.’ HUMINT [human 

intelligence] reports were (that) it was devastating, 

absolutely devastating to them.

––Interview with 22-MEU FACs, 5 Jun 2004

The United States is without peer in the CAS arena. The 

nation’s foes truly fear the capabilities of our airpower more 

than our ground forces. The evolvement of warfare since 

Desert Storm has thrust CAS into an increasingly prominent 

role on the battlefield. This increased requirement is being 

met by expanding joint support across the services. Marine 

FACs are currently just as likely to have Air Force F-16s 

support them as Marine F/A-18s. Marine infantry battalions 

are receiving rotary-wing fire support from Army AH-64s in 

Al-Anbar province as this is written. 

The majority of issues outlined in this paper are not new. 

A review of CAS literature over the last 30 years reveals these 

same issues in one form or another. The question becomes, 

then, what is the impetus for resolving these issues? The 

answer lies in the conflict we face in the global war on terror 

and the realities of limited resources. JCAS is a reality. The 

services must embrace this fact to become more effective. 

Approaching JCAS from a system standpoint, we have 

made improvements in many areas. Technology has allowed 

us to utilize air assets in the CAS role in ways that 20 years 

ago would have been unthinkable. Terminal attack controller standardization and doctrine updates have allowed us to 

more effectively apply those technologies during CAS missions. The last area not addressed within the system is aircrews and units performing the mission. The outlined doctrine and training recommendations will complete that step. 

Ideally, a day will come in the future where the support pro-
24

vided to the JTAC will be uniform regardless of the platform 

or service providing it.

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate 

entry in the bibliography.)

1. Reed, Army’s Transformation Impact, 8. Reed stated that the joint 

tactical air control (JTAC) mission “is highly demanding and often complex.”

2. Deptula and Dahl, “Transforming Joint Air-Ground Operations,” 4. 

Deptula and Dahl stated that “it takes advanced situational awareness 

and weapons systems knowledge to both ‘rack-and-stack’ multiple flights 

of attack aircraft and choose the correct delivery system and ordnance for 

desired effects.”

3. Grant, “The Clash about CAS.” 

4. Ibid., 5.

5. Brill, “Close Air Support.” 

6. US Central Command Air Forces, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 5.

7. Government Accounting Office (GAO), Military Readiness: Lingering 

Training and Equipment Issues, 35. 

8. Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team (JFIIT) Web 

site. Oversight of joint close air support (JCAS) operations is now the 

responsibility of JFIIT.

9. Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures for Close Air Support, I-6.

10. Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation, 25.

11. Campbell, The Warthog, 39.

12. Ibid., 31.

13. Wolf, The United States Air Force, 379.

14. Ibid., 403.

15. Cooling, Case Studies, 455.

16. Lawing, “American Armed Forces’ Service Culture,” 4.

17. Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation, 32.

18. Keener, The Helicopter Innovation, 13.

19. Wolf, The United States Air Force, 403.

20. Field Manual (FM) 3-04.111; and Naval Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures (NTTP), Q-15.

21. JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air 

Support, I-1.

22. FM 3-04.111, NTTP, Q-16.

23. Lt Col Jim Adams (Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-

1 [MAWTS-1] operations officer), interview by author, March 2005. Lieutenant Colonel Adams served as aircraft maintenance officer for Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron-266, the aviation combat element for the 22nd 

Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU-22), which conducted combat operations 

in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in the Tarin Kowt region of 

Afghanistan, April­­–July 2004. During these operations, AH-64s were tasked 

to support MEU operations on several occasions.

24. Grice, “AH-64 Apache Attack Helicopters,” 27–30.
25

25. Lawing, “American Armed Forces’ Service Culture,” 3.

26. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.3, Counterland Operations, 36.

27. Author served as a forward air controller and forward air controller 

(airborne) instructor with MAWTS-1.

28. JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air 

Support, III-22.

29. Deptula and Dahl, “Transforming Joint Air-Ground Operations,” 4.

30. Author attended the 2004 JCAS conference. 

31. Theisen, Ground-Aided Precision Strike, 1.

32. Author served as flight lead during Operation Anaconda, 4-26 

March 2002. 

33. Airborne forward air control (FAC[A]) representatives, interview 

by author, 2005 Joint Airborne FAC (JFAC[A]) Conference, Yuma, AZ, 

December 2005. 

34. JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air 

Support, iii, iv.

35. FAC[A] representatives, interview by author, 2005 joint airborne 

FAC (JFAC[A]) conference, Yuma, AZ, December 2005.

36. The receive-only video enhanced receiver receives camera images 

from nearby aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and integrates 

them with other US positioning and targeting software to allow the JTAC 

to view the target from the aircraft sensor perspective.

37. Briefing, Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron-773 (HMLA773), subject: Lessons Learned, MAWTS-1, May 2005. HMLA-773 deployed 

in support of OEF, October 2003–March 2005. 

38. FM 3-04.15, NTTP, II-20. This publication contains target location 

error categories which refer to the capability of a system to generate target 

coordinates. The Air Force has derived accuracy estimates based on these 

categories for various platforms and targeting systems (e.g., F-16 with 

Sniper pod). These numbers are classified. 

39. JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air 

Support, I-6.

40. JCAS Action Plan (AP) Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 2004-01, 

Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) (Ground), 2.

41. JCAS AP MOA 2004-02, Joint Forward Air Controller (Airborne), 2.

42. GAO, Military Readiness Lingering Training and Equipment Issues, 2.

43. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Web site.

44. Author served as AH-1W division operations officer during Weapons 

and Tactics Instructor courses and Desert Talon exercises with MAWST-1, 

June 2004–June 2005. 

45. MAWTS-1 F/A-18 instructors, interview by author, during training 

and readiness manual revisions, 2005. 

46. Millen, “Improving Detailed Integration,” 50.

47. Reed, Army Transformation’s Impact on Close Air Support Terminal 

Attack Control, 1.

48. Two-seat F/A-18D aircraft previously were the only fixed-wing 

aircraft in the Marine Corps inventory to practice the FAC[A] mission. In 

2005, the FAC[A] mission was added to the AV-8B and F/A-18C, both single 

seat aircraft, training and readiness manuals. 

49. Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, two “Quick Look” reports, 
26

7. AV-8B pilots from Marine Attack Squadron-513 expressed the need for 

more predeployment training on procedures for employing their targeting 

pods to detect potential improvised explosive devices. 

50. Wolf, The United States Air Force, 403. 

51. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-23.1, Close Air Support. 

52. Named after the current Army and Air Force chiefs of staff, 

respectively. 

53. Wolf, The United States Air Force, 405.

54. FM 90-21, JAAT Multi-Service Procedures. Joint air attack team operations are defined as coordinated attacks by rotary­- and fixed-wing aircraft, 

normally supported by artillery or naval surface fire support. 

55. Pirnie, Beyond Close Air Support, 72.

56. Author served as rotary-wing FAC[A] subject-matter expert for 

MAWTS-1. 

57. NTTP 3-22.3-AH1W, Combat Aircraft Fundamentals, AH-1W (U). Chapter 11 of this tactical manual covers rotary-wing FAC[A] tactics, techniques, 

and procedures for Marine Corps AH-1W and UH-1N helicopters.

58. None of the 2006–2007 Air Force-sponsored research topics deal 

with close air support. The 2006–2007 list of topics from the Combined 

Arms Center for Army Command and General Staff College and the School 

for Advanced Military Studies included “Air-Ground Integration in COIN 

[Counterinsurgency] Operations.” 

59. Col David Larivee notes, in Roberts, Ground Truth, 88. 

60. Roberts, Ground Truth, 16. Roberts notes that during the first five 

days of operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the V Corps commander was 

hesitant to open killboxes short of the fire support coordination line for fixedwing interdiction even though there were no friendly forces in the killboxes.

61. FM 90-21, JAAT Multi-Service Procedures, I-2.

62. Author served on Joint FAC[A] Training and Standardization Board, 

Yuma, AZ, December 2005. 

63. Each service has a program designed to provide information to 

prospective commanders. The Marine Corps Commanders’ Program provides 

information and a course of instruction to enhance their performance as 

commanders. http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/mcu/catalog/21cdrprog.pdf.

64. Briefing, Joint Unmanned Aircraft System Center of Excellence, 

National Defense Industrial Association, 26 October 2006. 

65. Ibid., slide 13. UAVs in JCAS operations is currently issue no. 9 for 

the JCAS Executive Steering Committee. 

66. Roach, “Virginia Blackhawks.” 

67. Air Combat Command (ACC) Integrated Training Initiative (ITI) 

Web site. The ITI is a single-source forum to combine tactics, training, 

and scheduling from all weapons systems from all joint and multinational 

services. The ITI consists of both this scheduling Web site and a quarterly 

conference. The Integrated Training Conference accomplishes training 

efficiency through a “bottom-up” strategy of comparing/linking schedules 

from all fighter, bomber, command and control, intelligence, surveillance, 

reconnaissance, combat search and rescue, tanker, distributed mission 

operations, air defense artillery, and other assets. In this process, areas of 

commonality are identified and subsequently “synchronized” into a single 

training event.
27

68. ACC Web site. The Combat Air Forces (CAF) Weapons and Tactics 

Conference is an annual two-week event that brings together hundreds of 

war fighters from the CAF to discuss current issues, to look at future issues, 

and to provide solutions for joint employment of forces. New technology is 

a key area. Attendance is primarily Air Force personnel, but there has been 

an increasing amount of participation from the Army, Navy, and Marines. 

The movement focuses on joint war fighting.

69. Author served as MAWTS-1 instructor and flew in AH-64D, F/A-

18D, F-16DG, and AH-6M aircraft. This experience provided invaluable 

insight and experience as a CAS and FAC[A] instructor in the AH-1W. 

70. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual, Universal Joint Task 

List, 3500.04C. Joint mission-essential task lists are developed for units 

performing specific missions. 

71. One pilot interviewed admitted to having never read the JCAS 

publication while acknowledging that his platform conducted CAS, albeit 

not as a primary mission.

72. Training and readiness manuals outline the academic and flight 

training requirements for Marine AH-1W and UH-1N pilots performing CAS. 

http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/atb/Training%20and%Readiness.htm. 

73. “Directorate of Evaluation & Standardization,” Fort Rucker Command and Directorates Web site.

74. After attending the Air Force Fighter Weapons School or the Marine 

Weapons and Tactics Instructor course, graduates receive a patch to wear 

on their flight suits signifying that they have completed the course.

75. Osborn, “Army Tests Apache Networking.” http://www.armytimes

.com/news/2007/10/defense_apache_071013/. In recent tests, the Army 

successfully beamed video from unmanned aerial vehicles to an Apache 

AH-64 Block III attack helicopter in a demonstration. The Tactical Video 

Link is a similar system tested and approved for funding on the Marine 

Corps AH-1W.

29

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———. Web site. http://www.acc.af.mil/library/weaponsand 

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Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1. Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003.

———. AFDD 2-1.3. Counterland Operations, 11 September 

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Briefing. Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 

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———. Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron-773 (HMLA773). Subject: lessons learned, MAWTS-1, May 2005. 

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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04D, 

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