COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Bray and Annunziata 

JOHNNY ROBINSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0459-95-4 PER CURIAM 

 SEPTEMBER 19, 1995 

EALEY, GIBSON, EALEY PLASTERING COMPANY, INC. 

AND 

AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY 

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Michael W. Heaviside; Ashcraft & Gerel, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 (Michael V. Durkin, on brief), for appellees. 

 Johnny Robinson contends that the Workers' Compensation 

Commission erred in finding that his November 16, 1993 change in 

condition application was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 

 Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we 

conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we 

summarily affirm the commission's decision. Rule 5A:27. 

 In AMP, Inc. v. Ruebush, 10 Va. App. 270, 274, 391 S.E.2d 

879, 881 (1990), this Court held: 

 Causation is an essential element which 

must be proven by a claimant in order to 

receive an award of compensation for an 

injury by accident under the Virginia 

Workers' Compensation Act. . . . A final 

judgment based on a determination by the 

commission on the issue of causation 

conclusively resolves the claim as to that 

particular injury. Thereafter, absent fraud 

or mistake, the doctrine of res judicata bars 

further litigation of that claim. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

 In relying upon Ruebush to deny claimant's application, the 

commission found as follows: 

 [T]he claimant here now tries to relitigate 

the question of causation between the 

accident and his degenerative disc condition 

and disc herniation, precisely the same issue 

previously litigated and decided by Deputy 

Commissioner Gorman on August 26, 1993 and 

the Full Commission on April 4, 1994. 

Although the Opinions do not strictly state 

that those injuries were not caused by the 

accident, causation was then an issue and was 

unsuccessfully argued by the claimant. 

Having failed to prove causation regarding 

this injury at the earlier hearing, he cannot 

now revisit and relitigate that issue. 

Stated another way, the claimant may here 

have proved another period of disability, but 

even this period of disability is caused by 

an injury already determined to be unrelated 

to the occupational accident and results from 

a condition that is not the responsibility of 

the employer. 

 In litigating his November 16, 1992 application, claimant 

bore the burden of proving a causal link between his disc 

condition and the October 27, 1992 industrial accident. On April 

4, 1994, the commission rendered final judgment on this issue, 

ruling that claimant did not meet his burden. Claimant did not 

appeal this decision. Thus, it became final. 

 Claimant's November 16, 1993 change in condition application 

requested compensation benefits for disability benefits beginning 

August 28, 1993 resulting from the same disc condition that the 

commission had previously ruled was not causally related to the 

October 27, 1992 injury by accident. In injury-by-accident 

cases, the issue of causation is not subject to change. 
 3 

Therefore, once a final judgment is rendered, relitigation of 

causation is barred by res judicata. Ruebush, 10 Va. App. at 

275, 391 S.E.2d at 881. 

 Based upon this record and Ruebush, the commission did not 

err as a matter of law in finding that the claimant's November 

16, 1993 change in condition application was barred by res

judicata. 

 For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision. 

 Affirmed.