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47–234 PDF 2008

COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE 

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY’S INITIATIVES FOR PROLIFERATION 

PREVENTION (IPP) PROGRAM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JANUARY 23, 2008 

Serial No. 110–82 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

energycommerce.house.gov 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan, Chairman 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

Vice Chairman 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JANE HARMAN, California 

TOM ALLEN, Maine 

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

HILDA L. SOLIS, California 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

JAY INSLEE, Washington 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

JIM MATHESON, Utah 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana 

JOHN BARROW, Georgia 

BARON P. HILL, Indiana 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

Ranking Member 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

CHARLES W. ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING, 

Mississippi 

VITO FOSSELLA, New York 

STEVE BUYER, Indiana 

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MARY BONO, California 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

DENNIS B. FITZGIBBONS, Chief of Staff 

GREGG A. ROTHSCHILD, Chief Counsel 

SHARON E. DAVIS, Chief Clerk 

DAVID L. CAVICKE, Minority Staff Director7 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

BART STUPAK, Michigan, Chairman 

DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado 

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana 

Vice Chairman 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

JAY INSLEE, Washington 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan (ex officio) 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

Ranking Member 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

JOE BARTON, Texas (ex officio) 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. Bennie Thompson, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Mississippi, prepared statement ......................................................................... 2 

Hon. Bart Stupak, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 4 

Hon. John Shimkus, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois, 

opening statement ................................................................................................ 5 

Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, opening statement ....................................................................................... 7 

Hon. Michael C. Burgess, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas, prepared statement .................................................................................. 8 

Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, 

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 9 

Hon. Jan Schakowsky, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois, prepared statement ..................................................................................... 10 

WITNESSES

Richard Robinson, Managing Director, Natural Resources and the Environment, Government Accountability Office ........................................................... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 14 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 259 

Adam Scheinman, Assistant Deputy Administrator, Office of Nonproliferation 

and International Security, National Nuclear Security Administration ......... 31 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 33 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 261 

Richard Stratford, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation .............................................................. 35 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 37 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 298 

SUBMITTED MATERIAL

GIPP Status Report, March 25, 2008 ..................................................................... 57 

Subcommittee exhibit binder .................................................................................. 58 

(1) 

COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE 

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY’S INITIATIVES FOR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION (IPP) PROGRAM 

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23, 2008 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bart Stupak 

(chairman) presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Stupak, Green, Schakowsky, 

Inslee, Dingell (ex officio), Shimkus, Walden, Burgess, and Blackburn. 

Staff present: Richard Miller, John Arlington, Scott Schloegel, 

John Sopko, Kyle Chapman, Dwight Cates, and Alan Slobodin. 

Mr. STUPAK. This meeting will come to order. 

Today we have a hearing entitled ‘‘Combating Nuclear Proliferation: The Effectiveness of the Department of Energy’s Initiatives 

for Proliferation Prevention Program.’’ Before I begin I would like 

to make two quick comments, if I may. First, I want to welcome 

my good friend John Shimkus as the new ranking member of the 

subcommittee. You inherit a very good staff on the subcommittee 

and we have a distinguished history of working together in a bipartisan manner and I know it will continue with you. I look forward 

to continuing that relationship and working with you in your new 

role as ranking member. 

Second, I would like to take a moment to acknowledge the work 

of Chairman Bennie Thompson of the Homeland Security Committee. The GAO report that is the focus of today’s hearing was 

produced for the Homeland Security Committee, and we appreciate 

the work on this important issue. I would also like to ask unanimous consent to enter into the record a statement from Chairman 

Thompson regarding the GAO report and the IPP program. Without objection, the statement will be entered in the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thompson follows:] 

2 


47234.001
3 


47234.002
4 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BART STUPAK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 

Mr. STUPAK. Each member will now be recognized for an opening 

statement, and I will begin. 

Protecting the United States from a nuclear attack is one of our 

top priorities. Last year this subcommittee examined our ability to 

detect radioactive material being smuggled across our borders. Today’s hearing will examine efforts to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Our subcommittee intends to hold additional hearings this year to explore whether our government is 

doing enough to control, interdict and secure loose nukes and other 

weapons of mass destruction throughout the world. 

There have been several recent examples of nuclear material and 

knowledge falling into the hands of dangerous individuals. In 2007, 

enriched uranium was interdicted in eastern Slovakia and Hungary. In 2006, stolen highly enriched uranium was seized in the 

former Soviet republic of Georgia. Last year North Korea exploded 

its first nuclear device in their continuing quest to develop nuclear 

bombs. Where did North Korea obtain their nuclear expertise? 

From the rogue metallurgists behind Pakistan’s nuclear weapons 

program, Dr. A.K. Khan. Dr. Khan not only sold nuclear technology 

to North Korea but also to Libya, Iran and a fourth recipient whose 

identify has not yet been disclosed. Unfortunately, even though the 

United States provides Pakistan with more than $1 billion per year 

in aid, the Administration has apparently been unable to interview 

Dr. Khan to unlock all the secrets about his proliferation activities, 

information that could prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to 

other nations or terrorists. 

At the end of the Cold War, it was estimated that the Soviets 

employed 50,000 to 60,000 nuclear experts, 65,000 bioweapons professionals and 6,000 chemical weapons experts. After the collapse 

of the Soviet Union in 1991, many of its weapon scientists and engineers suffered significant cuts in pay or lost their governmentsupported work. In response to the national security threat that 

unemployed or underemployed scientists would sell their knowledge to terrorist groups or countries of concern, the United States 

Department of Energy established the Initiative for Proliferation 

Program, IPP, in 1994. The IPP was developed as a means to engage in transit weapons of mass destruction scientists into peaceful 

commercial activities. The State Department operates a parallel 

program by helping former WMD institutes retain Soviet-era scientists in new missions using two science centers, one in Russia 

and one in the Ukraine. Nine years ago the Government Accountability Office (GAO) studied the effectiveness of the IPP program 

and issued a report that was critical of the program. A February 

1999 report found that 63 percent of the money was spent in the 

United States, more than half the money going to DOE national 

labs. Only 37 percent of IPP funding went to Russia’s scientific institutes. Overhead, taxes and fees further reduce the amounts actually received by Russian scientists. 

In response, Congress modified the program capping the spending at the national laboratories to 35 percent and required the Energy Secretary to review projects for commercial potential and terminate those which ‘‘are not likely to achieve their intended comVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:23 Mar 11, 2009 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\110-82 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
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mercial objective.’’ Today we will hear the results of a new 15- 

month GAO follow-up audit. It appears it is even more critical than 

their 1999 review. For example, GAO found that 54 percent of 

those hired on IPP projects it audited did not claim experience with 

weapons of mass destruction, the key goal of the IPP program. 

GAO also found that despite the fact that the State Department 

has graduated 17 institutes from their proliferation program because they determined that these institutes were self-sustaining, 

the DOE has continued to front 35 projects in Russia and the 

Ukraine at those 17 institutes. The GAO investigation questioned 

whether the IPP program may actually be contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction since its funds have been 

used to recruit and retain new scientists who are too young to have 

worked on Soviet-era weapons of mass destruction programs. At 

the same time, GAO also noted that some of the former weapons 

institutes being assisted by IPP are enjoying newfound prosperity. 

One has a marble-lined foyer with an art collection thanks to a gift 

from a former scientist. This begs the question of whether the institutes need U.S. funding to sustain employment for their scientists. 

There are a number of additional questions that I look forward 

to having answered today about the continued need for the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program, whether there is a system in place to adequately evaluate the effectiveness of the IPP 

programs, whether the Russians should assume funding responsibility for the program and whether DOE can evaluate the proliferation threat risk associated with ending funding for IPP. The DOE 

needs to evaluate whether the money spent through the IPP program would be better spent in other parts of the world where local 

economies are not doing as well as in Russia and there may be a 

greater risk or temptation for scientists to sell their knowledge to 

terrorists or countries of concern. 

Let me make this point clear. Cooperative threat reduction programs run by the Department of State and the DOE are valuable. 

The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program in particular 

has given former Soviet scientists a reason not to sell their knowledge to state or terrorist actors who want to develop a nuclear device. While the non-proliferation mission is important, it is imperative that we as Members of Congress assess DOE’s past performance and future strategy to determine whether the projects funded 

by the IPP program are continuing to provide the intended nonproliferation benefits. 

That concludes my statement. 

Mr. STUPAK. I would like to now turn to my friend, Mr. Shimkus, 

for his opening statement, please. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SHIMKUS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is great to be with 

you and your very great staff and I look forward to working with 

you. I also want to recognize Chairman Thompson for asking for 

this report. It has been very valuable and I think it helps lead our 

discussions. 

Today’s hearing will focus on a report by the GAO that has identified several serious problems with the DOE’s Initiatives for ProVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:23 Mar 11, 2009 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\110-82 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
6 

liferation Prevention, or IPP, program. GAO’s findings raise serious 

doubts about the overall benefits of this non-proliferation program. 

GAO will testify that DOE has overstated the accomplishments of 

the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program and has failed 

to develop any meaningful criteria or performance measures to explain whether the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program 

is working. 

We know DOE has funded thousands of Russian scientists but 

DOE has failed to demonstrate that this effort has led to any 

meaningful reduction in the non-proliferation threat posed by the 

former Soviet weapons scientists and what we are addressing today 

is the old trust but verify and let us see the results of the money 

that we are spending. 

Furthermore, GAO has informed us that DOE has even funded 

scientists at Russian institutes who pose no proliferation threat or 

risk and who have no technical background in weapons of mass destruction. More importantly, DOE has overlooked several critical 

opportunities to reduce proliferation risk. For instance, the State 

Department has provided us with a list of 18 critical high-risk Russian institutes where brain drain is a threat. The committee Minority staff compared the State Department’s high-priority list with a 

list of Russian institutes DOE is currently funding. Only three of 

the 18 highest priority Russian institutes identified by the State 

Department are currently funded through DOE’s IPP program. 

GAO’s report shows that DOE has not focused its resources on the 

highest risk institutes in Russian. Only last year, 13 years since 

the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program was created, 

did DOE finally begin to develop a risk prioritization system for 

targeting scientists at the Russian institutes. GAO will also testify 

that there is poor coordination between DOE and similar non-proliferation programs at the Department of State, Department of Agriculture, and I guess there are also programs with the Department 

of Defense and Health and Human Services. With such an apparent duplication of effort and failure to coordinate, we should examine whether these programs could or should be consolidated. Congress appropriated $30 million for the Initiatives for Proliferation 

Prevention program in 2008 in the Omnibus Bill, and of course, 

there is no specific line item but the original budget request was 

around $21 to $22 million. There is an overall increase. We have 

questions on how we are spending the money to begin with. The 

question is, why increase portions of that? 

Who is the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program intended to benefit and why isn’t Russia participating? Does Russia 

share the same concerns about the threat of terrorism and non-proliferation concerns? If they do, then it is time for them to contribute some money to help solve the non-proliferation threat. 

Where is the United States’ return on investment? In coordination 

with the Energy Information Administration Committee, Minority 

staff has calculated that over just the past 3 years the United 

States has imported 150 million barrels of oil from Russia at a 

total of $8.68 billion and we have imported 49 billion barrels of fuel 

oil at a total price of $2.35 billion. This $11 billion in wealth transferred from the United States to Russia is enormous and it is one 

of the reasons Russia is running a budget surplus. Clearly Russia 

7 

can afford to participate in the IPP program. In light of Russia’s 

growing wealth, I think it is clear the Russian government could 

step up to the plate and help address the proliferation threat posed 

by its own scientists. 

If we decide to continue the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program into the future, DOE must first demonstrate that it 

has corrected serious management problems identified by GAO. If 

DOE demonstrates that the program is salvageable, the second 

step would be to get a cost-share commitment from the Russian 

government before we initiate any new Initiatives for Proliferation 

Prevention program projects at Russian institutes. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. I thank the ranking member for his statement. 

I next turn to the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Dingell, 

for an opening statement. I am going to ask Ms. Schakowsky to 

take the chair as I have to testify at another hearing, and I will 

be back as soon as I get done. Mr. Dingell for an opening statement, please, sir. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 

Mr. DINGELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your courtesy and I commend you for holding this hearing on nuclear proliferation. This is a very important subject and it is an issue of 

grave importance, given the continuing political instability in central Asia. 

I want to observe first of all that I watched this program as its 

inception when I visited Russia and the Soviet Union at the time 

of the collapse of the then-Soviet Union. At that time it was a good 

program and it seemed to be focused and that it also seemed to 

have purpose and a sense of administrative solidarity. It has been 

regrettably virtually unreviewed and un-looked at by the Congress 

for a number of years and it is time that it be looked at very carefully to see to it that it has carried out its original purpose and 

whether in fact the program is doing what it should, given the way 

the world works today. 

The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program, IPP, had at 

its inception a noble purpose. It must be noted that the central goal 

of this program was to provide proper incentives to the scientists 

who would be helped by it so that they would direct their expertise 

in peaceful ventures in partnership with private U.S. companies 

rather than to work for rogue states or terrorist groups, a matter 

of great importance then and of great importance now. This is certainly an innovative and useful approach today as it was then, and 

it was useful in preventing the spread of nuclear technologies then 

and now. 

Since that time, however, the landscape has changed dramatically. Russia is now thriving. It is the largest oil producer in the 

world. It is the second largest oil exporter after OPEC. Its economy 

is booming. Unemployment is declining rapidly there. In short, 

given Russia’s economic turnaround, it appears that the time has 

come for the IPP program to show Congress how it works, how it 

is justified, what it is doing and whether or not it has an exit stratVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:23 Mar 11, 2009 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\110-82 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
8 

egy that would be useful in terms of our other policy questions and 

its own concerns. Moreover, there is a serious question as to how 

effective the program has been. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) notes that an audit sample found that more than half 

of the scientists funded by the IPP program may not have had any 

weapons-related experience. In addition, the Department of Energy’s assertions that the program has created thousands of longterm private-sector jobs for former scientists cannot be objectively 

verified. This underscores the basic question of whether the IPP 

program is funding the right people and perhaps whether it can be 

made to work at all. It is also curious to observe that it just might 

be that this is a program which is funding competition for our own 

industry using our taxpayers’ monies. 

I must voice my own skepticism about the efficacy of the IPP program. It is hard to imagine that today’s Russian leaders would 

allow our Energy Department to employ their top weapons scientists. Indeed, DOE’s senior officials informed the committee staff 

that the Russians would never let us anywhere near anyone they 

really care about. The deputy director of the IPP program concurred in that assessment. 

Mr. Chairman, I begin by noting that the program was born, as 

I have said, with a noble purpose and I have no doubt that those 

who run this program do so with the best of intentions. There is, 

however, often a thin line between the noble and the nave. Finally, 

while today’s hearing is focused on nuclear proliferation, I note 

that the IPP program and parallel Department of State programs 

are not limited to scientists who worked only on nuclear weapons 

but may also include scientists working with chemical and biological weapons. The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation has 

already initiated investigation into the proliferation of high-containment bioresearch laboratories with the first in a series of hearings on that subject held in October and more to come in this year. 

I would be interested to learn the extent to which DOE and the 

State Department may be involved in the funding of former biowarfare scientists or the construction of bioresearch laboratories in developing countries. 

Mr. Chairman, you are doing great work and I look forward to 

exploring these issues further in this and in other hearings to 

come. Thank you for your recognition. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY [Presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Dingell. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Walden for an opening statement. 

Mr. WALDEN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I waive my opening 

statement given that we have got votes coming up within the hour, 

and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Burgess—Dr. Burgess. Excuse me. 

Mr. BURGESS. Again, in the interests of time, because we do have 

votes coming up, I will submit my statement for the record and 

wait on the witnesses, and yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burgess follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL C. BURGESS, MD 

Thank you Chairman Stupak. Before I begin my brief remarks I would like to extend a warm welcome to our new Ranking Member, John Shimkus. I believe that 

9 

this is one of the most important subcommittees in Congress, and I look forward 

to working with you on the many important issues that comes before the Oversight 

and Investigation Subcommittee. 

Throughout our nation’s rich history, we have faced many threats to our national 

security, whether it was in the 1700’s from England, the 1800s from the Civil War, 

the 1900’s from the Soviet Union, or in present day, from Al Qaeda. We have endured times of war and proactively sought measures to prolong times of peace. However, as the times and enemies change, so must our strategy. 

It is the duty of Congress, of this subcommittee, to reevaluate and reassess government programs, especially those programs of national security interest. What 

works, what doesn’t? What is the best use of the taxpayer’s dollar? Today, we will 

be discussing the Initiative for Proliferation Prevention Program. The program’s intent, created in 1994, was to reduce the proliferation risk posed by weapon scientists 

in the former Soviet Union. Was this intent fulfilled? Is this program still effective? 

I welcome our witnesses from National Nuclear Security Administration, the State 

Department, and the Government Accountability Office to address these vital questions; and therefore, help to better secure the safety of our nation. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this important hearing, and I yield back 

the balance of my time. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Green? 

Mr. GREEN. Madam Chair, I have a statement I would like to ask 

be placed into the record and just note, this is the second time in 

a decade that we have received a report critical of the IPP program 

and I appreciate the Chair having this hearing today and the oversight, and I will yield back my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. GENE GREEN

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today’s hearing on ′′Combating Nuclear Proliferation: The Effectiveness of the Energy Department’s Initiatives for Proliferation 

Prevention Program.′′ 

Following the end of the Cold War, many believed the threat of attack from the 

Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal was over. 

Little did we know then that these same nuclear weapons would pose as severe 

a threat today as they did at the height of the Soviet Union’s power. 

We no longer face brinkmanship with another world superpower, but 9/11 proved 

just how dangerous weapons can be in the hands of those who despise our nation’s 

way of life. 

Terrorist organizations have declared war against the United States. In this battle, we must assume that no weapon is out of reach, too expensive, or too destructive 

for our enemies to use against us. 

Rouge nations, such as North Korea and Iran, have also shown that they will act 

against the will of the international community to develop dangerous weapon capabilities. 

Our efforts to keep nuclear, biological and chemical weapons out of the hands of 

terrorist organizations or rogue nations have broadened greatly since the passing of 

the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Act in 1991. 

Today Congress spends over $1 billion across three agencies - the Department of 

Energy, Defense, and State - for our nonproliferation efforts. 

One such DOE program, the Initiatives for Proliferation Program, or the IPP program, was created to reduce the threat that scientists with expertise of weapons of 

mass destruction might provide that expertise to states or terrorists to threaten the 

U.S. or our allies. 

It aims to achieve this by focusing on the twin goals of creating nonmilitary work 

and long-term job creation for weapons scientists in Russia and other former Soviet 

Union countries. 

I hope today’s hearing will shed some light on whether or not these goals are 

being achieved. 

For the second time in a decade, the Government Accountability Office has issued 

a critical report on the IPP program and has provided recommendations for improvement. 

10 

Questions continue to loom regarding the program’s lack of clear performance 

metrics and accurate reporting methods. 

Congress has stepped in before to remedy deficiencies in the IPP program, and 

should do so again if the program fails to achieve U.S. nonproliferation and national 

security objectives. 

I welcome our distinguished panel before us today, and I look forward to a lively 

discussion. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Ms. Blackburn? 

Ms. BLACKBURN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I will yield back 

my time. I will place my statement in the record so that we can 

move forward with our witnesses. I think we all have lots of questions. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Let me just say a few words and I will put my 

statement in the record. 

Nearly 14 years have passed since the IPP program began and 

I am just very proud that this committee under the leadership of 

Chairman Stupak is looking into this, and this is exactly what the 

Oversight Subcommittee ought to be doing, looking at programs of 

all sorts, but I think maybe in particular those that are kind of obscure and yet lots of taxpayer dollars are going their way to evaluate those, so this is indeed a very important hearing. 

My task at this point is to swear in our witnesses, so if they 

would—the witnesses are Mr. Robert Robinson, Managing Director 

of Natural Resources and the Environment of the GAO; Mr. Robinson is accompanied by Mr. Glen Levis, Assistant Director of Natural Resources and the Environment; Mr. Adam Scheinman, Assistant Deputy Administrator, Office of Nonproliferation and International Security at the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear 

Security Administration; and Mr. Richard Stratford, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation at the Department of State. I want to welcome the 

panelists, and it is the policy of this subcommittee to take all testimony under oath, so please be advised that witnesses have the 

right under the rules of the House to be advised by counsel during 

their testimony. Do any of you wish to be represented by counsel? 

Then if you would, please rise and raise your right hand to take 

the oath. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Let the record reflect that the witnesses replied in the affirmative, and you are now under oath. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. And now we will begin first with Mr. Robinson.[The prepared statement of Ms. Schakowsky follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAN SCHAKOWSKY

Thank you Mr. Chairman for yielding and for holding this hearing on such an important issue. 

At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is believed that the Soviets employed between 120,000 and 130,000 experts on nuclear and other weapons of mass 

destruction. With the Kremlin disbanded there was real fear that these suddenly 

unemployed scientists would sell their skills to the highest bidder. This fact presented a clear threat to the United States and the rest of the world. To prevent this 

from happening, the Congress created several programs, including the Initiatives for 

11 

Proliferation Prevention (IPP) intended to identify and procure employment for 

these experts in civilian research. 

Nearly 14 years have passed since the IPP program began and yet today marks 

the very first time that Congress has conducted an oversight hearing on its effectiveness. Like many of my colleagues, I think that it was prudent for our government to have been active in ensuring that these brilliant minds did not end up 

working for rogue nations like North Korea or Iran, or terrorist organizations. I also 

believe that it was not the intention of Congress to create an endless source of financing for this program, but rather to provide immediate assistance to help these 

scientists find employment, after which the United States would gradually remove 

itself from the process. Despite this, evidence presented today by the Government 

Accountability Office suggests that in fact, the Department of Energy has ′′not developed an exit strategy for the IPP program.′′ 

I look forward to hearing from our panelists today so that we may learn more 

about the IPP program including whether it has been effective to date and lastly 

whether the program remains necessary in light of the rapidly improving economy 

in Russia. 

I am particularly interested in hearing Mr. Scheinman’s reactions to several findings in the GAO report including the fact that 54 percent of the scientists paid 

through the program claim to have no experience with weapons of mass destruction 

and 60 percent of those audited had not been soviet era scientists. 

These facts seem to indicate that the IPP program may no longer serve its intended purpose and may need to be either reformed or phased out. 

Again Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing and I look forward to hearing from each of our panelists and I yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. And now we will begin first with Mr. Robinson. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD ROBINSON, MANAGING DIRECTOR, 

NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you very much. We are happy to be here 

today. I would want to put into the record that I am pinch-hitting 

today for Gene Aloise, who was responsible for and conducted this 

work under his leadership. He is unfortunately undergoing medical 

treatment and is not able to be here today. 

There are many details that emerge from our analysis of this 

program, Mr. Chairman, and I want to use my 5 minutes to lay out 

a few commonsense observations about the program that led us to 

our conclusion that the program needs to be fundamentally reassessed. I am focusing my remarks here because while DOE largely 

agreed with our recommendations, it disagreed with us on this 

issue. At the outset I want to say and mirror the comments that 

many of you have made that there is no doubt that the program 

has served a very useful purpose in helping us get through a dangerous period of high proliferation risk coinciding with the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. The program helped former Sovietera weapons scientists through a period when they had either lost 

their jobs or suffered significant cuts in pay that could have led 

them to sell their knowledge to other countries or terrorist groups 

trying to develop weapons of mass destruction. Now, however, 14 

years and $300 million later, the circumstances that led to the program’s creation have dramatically changed, most notably, greatly 

improved economic conditions, particularly in Russia where 80 percent of the program’s projects have been directed. With $100 barrel 

oil feeding the thriving Russian economy, the threat that former 

weapons scientists will need to sell their knowledge outside their 

12 

country appears to be significantly lessened. These economic conditions also raise questions about whether the Russian government 

could take on greater responsibility in this area. There are probably pockets of vulnerably at certain weapons institutes but these 

could be identified during the reassessment we called for. Our discussions at numerous institutes across Russia and Ukraine and 

with a senior Russian atomic energy agency official confirm the 

view that the program may no longer be relevant to today’s realities. Many officials told us, in fact, that their bigger fear is that the 

scientists will emigrate to the United States and Western Europe 

and not to countries of proliferation concern. 

Our analysis of the program’s operations provide further support, 

we believe, for the need for fundamental program reassessment. 

Over half of the scientists being funded at the 97 projects we reviewed did not claim any weapon-related experience in the documentation we reviewed. Instead of being used to support former Soviet-era weapons scientists, the authorized design of the program, 

funding is now being used to attract, recruit and retain younger 

scientists that were too young to have had this experience. In this 

way, we may actually be helping sustain the continued operation 

of institute activities or, at a minimum, help the institutes develop 

technical capabilities that we ultimately may have to compete 

against. Ultimately, and importantly, DOE has not updated its 

metrics to judge the extent to which the program is actually reducing proliferation risk, and this is where we want to make sure the 

energy is concentrated here today, or adjust priorities so that funds 

can be targeted to the areas of highest need. 

Just as troubling, there appears to be no exit strategy for the 

program. Unlike the Department of State, which has developed criteria specific in nature to graduate certain institutes from the program, DOE has developed no comparable strategies. As a result, 

DOE continues to support multiple projects that State ceased funding because it concluded that they no longer used U.S. assistance. 

Likewise, DOE is now expanding the program to other countries 

and purposes. It is now providing assistance to scientists in Iraq 

and Libya. The program is also developing projects to support another DOE program, GNEP, aimed at expanding the use of nuclear 

power in the United States and around the world. These efforts 

could very well have a useful national security purpose but it is not 

consistent with the original intent of the program and has occurred 

without a clear mandate from Congress. 

To address these and other concerns, our report presented 11 recommendations, 8 of which DOE concurred with. In particular, they 

agreed with our program management recommendations dealing 

with developing better processes for verifying WMD backgrounds of 

participating scientists, seeking congressional authorization to expand the program outside the former Soviet Union and working 

with the State Department to better coordinate its similar programs. 

As I said earlier, DOE disagreed with our recommendation to 

fundamentally reassess the program but based on the evidence presented in our report and summarized here today, I believe this recommendation is sound and, at a minimum, should include a thorough analysis of risk, a focused prioritization of program resources 

13 

on the highest risks, and a clear exit strategy that includes specific 

criteria for graduating countries, institutes and scientists from the 

program. 

As the Comptroller General has said on many occasions, the Federal Government is on an unsustainable fiscal path, making it imperative that all Federal programs be efficiently focused on the 

highest priorities. There is no reason that this standard should not 

be applied to the IPP program. 

Thank you, and I look forward to the discussion that follows. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Robinson follows:] 

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Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Scheinman. 

STATEMENT OF ADAM SCHEINMAN, ASSISTANT DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF NONPROLIFERATION AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. Thank you, Chairwoman and Mr. Shimkus. Let 

me thank the committee for inviting me to testify today. I certainly 

welcome the opportunity to discuss the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program, which is one of a number of nonproliferation programs under the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Department of Energy. The GAO review of 

the GIPP program raises important questions and offers a list of 

recommendations. As noted, many of those we support, and I look 

forward to sharing our view of the program. 

The need to prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation 

through engagement of weapons scientists, engineers and experts 

has been a consistent policy objective of the United States including successive U.S. administrations. It is a goal in the National Security Strategy issued in 2002 which calls for ‘‘strengthened efforts 

to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, 

technologies and expertise needed for weapons of mass destruction. 

To advance that policy goal, GIPP uses technical expertise within 

the Department of Energy and the national labs to redirect former 

WMD personnel in other countries to peaceful, non-military work. 

GIPP engages directly with personnel in Russia and former Soviet states, many of whom are employed by institutes not yet fully 

enjoying the benefits of Russian economy turnaround. The program 

provides the United States with an established capability to respond quickly and flexibly to emerging risks and opportunities in 

the nonproliferation arena. 

Through GIPP, roughly 115 projects are underway in more than 

100 institutes and facilities in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Georgia and Uzbekistan. Projects were launched more recently 

outside of the former Soviet Union including in Iraq and Libya, as 

has been noted. Taken together, the GIPP has engaged many thousands of WMD scientists and experts, which we view as an impressive achievement that serves our nonproliferation objects and our 

Nation’s security. 

Most GIPP projects involve a U.S. industry partner. Through its 

industry outreach component, GIPP has facilitated partnerships 

that are commercializing technologies that are in use today including landmine detectors, needle-free injectors, prosthetics, 

radioisotopes for cancer treatment and so on. Russian scientists 

and U.S. industry benefit from these partnerships. 

At the State Department’s request, GIPP responded to a nonproliferation imperative in Libya following Libya’s decision to abandon its WMD programs, and we partnered with the State Department in Iraq. We are also prepared to engage elsewhere including 

North Korea if the circumstances warrant it. 

Notwithstanding our limited programs in Libya and Iraq, the 

bulk of GIPP work today remains in Russia. We recognize of course 

that in many respects Russia has changed in 15 years since scientist redirection got underway. Russia’s economy is more stable 

32 

and conditions in the closed cities are certainly improved. Accordingly, the threat of scientist migration is not one that gives us the 

greatest concern today. 

But the absence of high risk of scientist migration doesn’t imply 

zero risk or that the job is done. And in our view, as long as proliferation demand exists, we have a requirement to cooperate with 

others to impede supply, whether that involves improved expert 

controls, better border security or scientist engagement. Absence of 

high migration risk does imply that the manner in which GIPP has 

been traditionally carried out merits recalibration, as noted in the 

GAO report, and this is the path that we are on, started at the request of the NNSA administrator in 2006. 

At the administrator’s request, GIPP conducted an internal assessment much along the lines outlined by the GAO in its principal 

findings. Our conclusion in that assessment was that scientist engagement is contributing to nonproliferation goals and should continue but should be oriented to better meet the current threat. It 

should also contribute to technologies more supportive of the NNSA 

mission, whether that involves technology for nuclear safeguards, 

for nuclear security or proliferation-resistant nuclear energy systems. We certainly want to ensure that our partners have a strong 

security culture and that requires engagement of scientific personnel. 

The conclusion of our internal review was approved by the administrator and endorsed a number of specific outcomes which I 

will highlight here. 

First, in light of the changed threat environment, GIPP would 

adopt a more focused approach, emphasizing those institutes and 

facilities involved with enabling WMD technologies or expertise 

and where the program can provide a stabilizing influence. 

Second, recalibrate the program to advance core NNSA nonproliferation missions, which I outlined a moment ago. Russia will 

be one of our most important partners in the effort to ensure that 

the global expansion of nuclear power is carried out in ways that 

reduce proliferation risks, and that is why we thought it makes 

sense to focus on proliferation resistance of the fuel cycle. Russia 

is a leading supplier and user and has nuclear energy expertise 

and facilities that rival ours in the United States, so we have an 

interest in continuing our engagement with Russia to ensure that 

a fuel cycle that evolves is one that is safer and more secure than 

the current generation. GIPP is one vehicle that can help that process. 

Third, in response to changing requirements and program improvements, GIPP has reduced budget and uncosted balances. Our 

annual appropriation peaked in 2002 when the program was funded at $57 million and is today at roughly $30 million. In addition, 

budget allocations to projects in Russia have been reduced. 

Fourth, the program opted to cancel its Nuclear Cities Initiative. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Scheinman, just to note, you are a minute 

over now, so if you could wrap up? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. I will wrap up. We have canceled programs. We 

have considered transitioning our activity from assistance to partnership as noted in the opening statements, and consistent with 

GAO recommendations, we plan to update program guidance, 

33 

produce a strategic plan and enact a number of other improvements that I will be happy to deal with in the question-and-answer 

period. 

Thank you for your attention, and I look forward to the questions. 

[The prepared statement of Adam Scheinman follows:] 

TESTIMONY OF ADAM M. SCHEINMAN

SUMMARY

•The Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) is a nonproliferation 

program of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Its purpose is to 

advance U.S. policy objectives by impeding access by proliferators to weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD) expertise. The program was established in 1994 to address 

the risk of Russian and Soviet scientist migration, and has evolved to address risks 

in other countries. 

•Given improved economic conditions in Russia, and at the request of the NNSA 

Administrator, NNSA examined and reassessed GIPP in 2006. The assessment concluded that the program should continue, but should be oriented to address the current threat environment and the NNSA nonproliferation and nuclear security mission. The Administrator also endorsed programmatic and management changes to 

strengthen the GIPP program. Specific improvements include: 

Prioritizing engagement with Russian/Former Soviet Union (FSU) institutes and 

facilities involved with enabling WMD technologies; 

•Recalibrating the program to advance NNSA nonproliferation and national security objectives, including technology projects that promote international safeguards, 

nuclear materials security, and proliferation resistance of the nuclear fuel cycle; 

•Reducing budget and uncosted balances; 

•Cancelling the Nuclear Cities Initiative; 

•Promoting the goal of project cost-sharing with partners; and 

•Continuing engagement with new partners (i.e., Libya and Iraq). 

•As noted in the response letter to the GAO, NNSA agrees with many of the report’s conclusions. While we note concerns, the program plans to implement many 

of the recommendations, or is already implementing similar reforms, to ensure a 

more effective program. NNSA will implement these recommendations with the understanding that scientist redirection activities are important to the achievement of 

U.S. nonproliferation goals. 

TESTIMONY

Thank you Chairman Stupak and Mr. Shimkus, and allow me to thank the Committee for inviting me to testify today. I welcome the opportunity to discuss the 

Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program, one of a number of 

nonproliferation programs managed within the Department of Energy’s National 

Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). 

The GAO review of the GIPP program raises important questions and offers a list 

of recommendations, many of which we support. I look forward to sharing our view 

of the GIPP program, especially in relation to the recently released GAO report in 

the course of my statement, which I submit for the record. 

The need to prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation through 

engagement of weapons scientists, engineers and experts has been a consistent policy objective of successive U.S. administrations. The Department of Energy’s program in this area was established in 1994, and it is identified as a goal in the President’s National Security Strategy and National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 

Mass Destruction, both issued in 2002. The National Security Strategy calls for 

′′strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies, and expertise necessary for weapons of mass destruction.′′ 

To advance this policy goal, GIPP uses the technical expertise within the Department of Energy and the national labs to redirect former WMD personnel in other 

countries to peaceful, non-military work. 

GIPP engages directly with personnel in Russia and former Soviet states, many 

of whom are employed by institutes not yet fully enjoying the benefits of the Russian economic turnaround. The program also provides the United States with an esVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:23 Mar 11, 2009 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\110-82 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
34 

tablished capability to respond quickly and flexibly to emerging risks and nonproliferation opportunities in additional countries. 

Through GIPP, roughly 115 projects are underway at more than 100 institutes 

and facilities in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Georgia, and Uzbekistan. 

Projects were launched more recently outside of the former Soviet Union, including 

in Iraq and Libya. Taken together, the GIPP has engaged many thousands of WMD 

scientists and experts - an impressive achievement that serves our nonproliferation 

objectives and our nation’s security. 

Most GIPP projects involve a United States industry partner. Through its industry outreach component, GIPP has facilitated partnerships commercializing technologies in use today: this includes land mine detectors, needle-free injectors, prosthetics, and radio-isotopes for cancer treatment. Russian scientists and U.S. industry both benefit from these partnerships. 

At the State Department’s request, GIPP responded quickly to support nonproliferation priorities in Libya following its decision to abandon all WMD programs. 

We also partner with the State Department in Iraq, and are prepared to engage 

elsewhere, including in North Korea if circumstances warrant it. 

Notwithstanding our limited programs in Libya and Iraq, the bulk of GIPP work 

today remains in Russia. We recognize, of course, that in many respects Russia has 

changed in the fifteen years since scientist redirection work got underway. Russia’s 

economy is stable and conditions in the closed cities are much improved. Accordingly, the threat of scientist migration is not one that gives us the greatest concern 

today. 

But the absence of a high risk of scientist migration does not imply zero risk or 

that the job is done. To the contrary, as long as proliferation demand exists, we 

have a requirement to cooperate with others to impede supply, whether that involves improved export controls, better border security, or scientist engagement. Absence of high migration risk does imply, however, that the manner in which GIPP 

has been traditionally carried out merits some recalibration. 

This is precisely the path we are on, started at the request of the NNSA Administrator roughly 18 months ago. 

At the Administrator’s request, GIPP conducted an internal assessment, much 

along the lines proposed by the GAO in its principal findings. Our conclusion was 

that scientist engagement is contributing to our nonproliferation goals and should 

continue, but oriented better to meet the current threat. It should also contribute 

technologies more supportive of the NNSA mission, whether that involves technology for nuclear safeguards and security or proliferation-resistant nuclear energy 

systems or ensuring that our partners have a good security culture, which requires 

engagement of scientific personnel. 

The conclusion of our internal review was approved by the Administrator. Allow 

me to address a number of specific outcomes, nearly all of which correspond to comments in the GAO report. 

First, in light of a changed threat environment, GIPP would adopt a more focused 

approach, emphasizing those institutes or facilities involved with enabling WMD 

technologies or expertise and where the program could provide a stabilizing influence. 

Second, as I’ve alluded to, GIPP would calibrate the program to advance core 

NNSA nonproliferation and nuclear security imperatives. This includes directing 

new funds towards projects in Russia that support strengthened international safeguards and contribute to sustainable nuclear materials accountability and control, 

a high priority of our bilateral nuclear security agenda with Russia. 

Russia will be one of our most important partners in the effort to ensure that the 

global expansion of nuclear power is carried out in ways that reduce proliferation 

risks. Russia is a leading nuclear supplier and user and has nuclear energy expertise and facilities that rival our own in the United States. Hence, we have an interest in continuing engagement with Russia to ensure that the nuclear fuel cycle 

evolves in ways that are safer, more secure, and less prone to proliferation than the 

current generation of technologies. GIPP is one vehicle that can help that process. 

Third, in response to changing requirements and program improvements, GIPP 

reduced budget and uncosted balances. Annual appropriations peaked in 2002, when 

the program was funded at $57 million. The FY 2008 budget request was $22 million, and we are not planning for significant out-year increases. In addition, budget 

allocations to projects in Russia have been similarly reduced. 

Fourth, the program opted to cancel its Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI), a joint 

program launched during Russia’s economic crisis. The program’s cancellation allowed for a savings of $10 million. 

Fifth, consistent with the trend away from assistance and towards genuine partnership with Russia, GIPP determined that it would promote the principle of project 

35 

cost sharing. This is consistent with a recommendation in the GAO report; we fully 

support it. 

Taken together, these actions represent significant change that will strengthen 

the program. 

They also complement management reforms undertaken over the past few years, 

including those recommended by the GAO in past audits of the program. This includes a new, automated project management system to improve internal record 

keeping; a reduction in the program’s uncosted balances by nearly 50%; and incorporation of a ′′sunset clause′′ in GIPP project approvals to ensure that work gets started promptly and accomplished on schedule. 

As the GAO recommends, there are additional steps the program can take to improve its management and process. Many are underway or will be accelerated. This 

includes streamlining our payment system for scientists that work on GIPP projects; 

updating performance metrics; improving our ability to verify the WMD bona fides 

of participating foreign scientists; and further reducing uncosted balances. 

Consistent with GAO recommendations, by the end of this fiscal year we also plan 

to update our program guidance; produce a strategic plan that will better align the 

purpose and implementation of the program; and more effectively articulate an exit 

strategy. 

In fact, as noted in our response letter published in the GAO report, while we 

have concerns, we say that ′′the report contains useful recommendations,′′ and ′′can be helpful if it helps to spur the implementation of constructive program changes.′′ 

We adhere to that position. 

To be sure, we have not agreed to every recommendation. We do not believe, for 

example, that a fundamental reevaluation of GIPP is merited at this time. Nor do 

we believe that the program has outlived its usefulness, which the GAO report 

seems in places to suggest. 

GIPP is modest in terms of budget - a tiny fraction of the total NNSA nonproliferation budget - but its purpose and need remain: our nonproliferation interests demand that we continue to address the proliferation threat in all its dimensions, including the risk of expertise being sought out and exploited by proliferator 

nations and organizations. Remaining directly engaged with these scientists through 

the GIPP program is an important part of the effort. 

Thank you for your attention and I look forward to our discussion. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you. 

Mr. Stratford. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD STRATFORD, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION 

Mr. STRATFORD. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. At the outset, 

let me make a minor correction to the record. I am not Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau. I am the Acting Deputy 

Assistant Secretary for the nuclear side of the Bureau and I have 

only been doing that for about 3 weeks. In real life, I am the U.S. 

rep. for both the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zanger Committee, and I am also the person who negotiated both the United 

States-India and the United States-Russia Agreements for Cooperation. That is my normal end of the business. 

Today I have a written statement for the record but I just want 

to pick out a few high points for the attention of the committee. 

Most of the statement deals with so-called Science Centers program 

which consists of the International Science and Technology Center 

in Moscow and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, 

which support efforts to reduce the risk of WMD terrorism by engaging and redirecting scientists, engineers and technicians in the 

former Soviet Union who have biological, chemical, nuclear or missile expertise. Now, we do that by approving and funding projects 

that are directed through those two centers. Those projects are reVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:23 Mar 11, 2009 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\110-82 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
36 

viewed in an interagency process to address issues including proliferation risk, consistency with U.S. policy, technical merit and 

market potential. Now, there are annual financial audits of the 

centers’ operations and the Defense Contract Audit Agency and our 

scientists also conduct annual audits of projects. 

One of the things I have heard here so far is about cost sharing. 

We are engaging host states to increase cost-sharing funding of 

projects. We have a memorandum of understanding with Belarus 

where they contribute funds directly to institutes and we are also 

funding projects in Ukraine and Azerbaijan, splitting the cost 50/ 

50. 

Now, there is a slight difference between what DOE focuses on 

and how we focus our program. We are less focused on the individuals than we are on the institutes. We started with about 200 institutes that we thought needed to be made self-sustaining so we focused the projects at the institute and tried to make them self-sustaining in the longer term. Now, one of the other things I heard 

was the need for an exit strategy, and our exit strategy is to make 

those 200 institutes self-sustaining. We hope to do that with about 

20 a year. We hope to be out of this by 2012, which means we have 

a goal to get there from here. I think the program has generally 

been successful. Our overarching goal, as I said, is to help these institutes become self-sustainable, and when they are, we define that 

as ‘‘graduation’’ from the program. 

Now, one of the other things I heard, oh, well, DOE is still funding projects at institutes that have graduated. That is true, but we 

do too. We can make a finding that an institute is self-sustaining 

but then after the fact we may look at the institute and say you 

know what, there is still a residual risk there regardless of whether 

it is self-sustaining and there may be something we can do about 

it through the Science Center program. Regarding the GAO’s recommendations to work with NNSA to develop a joint plan to better 

coordinate the IPP program and our programs, the answer is, we 

concur. We are prepared to try to more closely coordinate program 

elements and will consult with DOE on implementing this recommendation. 

Madam Chairman, let me stop there but let me also say that 

with respect to the Science Center programs, we do have difficulties from time to time, so I don’t want to leave the impression that 

all is sweetness and light. Sometimes Russians can be difficult. 

Right now, for example, they think they have a right to know what 

we pay people that we send to support the institute. They also have 

an issue with appointing a finance officer, who we happen to think 

is necessary. I hope we are going to settle that very shortly. But 

I just want to make clear that there are difficulties from time to 

time and we have to try to sort those out with our Russian host 

government colleagues. 

I am going to stop here and I am very pleased to answer any 

questions the committee might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stratford follows:] 

37 

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD J.K. STRATFORD

INTRODUCTION

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about one of State Department’s successful programs to prevent proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 

(WMD)-related expertise. We believe that the Science Centers program has been effective over the years and we appreciate the support we have received from Congress. We work through two multilateral centers in Moscow and Kyiv to redirect the 

activities of personnel capable of contributing to the development and deployment 

of weapons of mass destruction. This is an era of global terrorist threats that need 

to be met, while at the same time dealing with rising costs and budget constraints. 

These realities require us to continually assess our own efficiency and effectiveness 

while ensuring that important nonproliferation work continues to get done. 

REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS

Let me say a few words about our Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs 

generally. State’s CTR programs have a global mission to redirect weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) expertise worldwide. We do this by coordinating and overseeing 

the U.S. participation in and funding of the Science Centers to engage former Soviet 

Union (FSU) era biological, chemical, nuclear, and missile expertise through the 

centers in Moscow and Kyiv, the International Science and Technology Center 

(ISTC) and Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU), as well as scientist 

engagement efforts in Iraq and Libya. 

State’s redirection effort also includes the Bio-Industry Initiative (BII), which creates international commercial opportunities and public-private partnerships for 

former weapons scientists thereby promoting self-sustainability, reconfigures several 

large-scale former Soviet biological weapons production facilities for civilian biotechnology purpose, and engages self-identified former weapons personnel in 

projects aimed at accelerating drug and vaccine development to combat highly infectious diseases. Finally, State coordinates the BioChem Redirect (BCR) Program, 

which redirects former Soviet chemical and biological weapons personnel into peaceful sustainable civilian work and engages high risk facilities, with participation of 

U.S. experts from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 

Even as we continue to work in Russia and the FSU, State’s CTR programs also 

provide us with the capability to address the new and emerging global WMD threats 

that we face, including in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. State’s Biosecurity Engagement Program (BEP), which seeks to prevent bioterrorism by reducing terrorist 

access to potentially dangerous biological materials, equipment and expertise, initially focused on countries and regions outside the FSU where emerging bioscience 

sectors, highly infectious disease outbreaks, and terrorist threats coexist. Similarly, 

State’s Chemical Security Engagement Program (CSP) engages experts from around 

the world to decrease the chemical threat by improving chemical threat awareness, 

improving chemical security and safety best practices in academia and industry, and 

increasing chemical security and safety by fostering collaborations between chemical 

professionals in academia and industry. 

In addition to meeting critical nonproliferation objectives, these programs advance 

Department of State efforts toward transformational diplomacy by building and 

maintaining ties to regions and countries of U.S. national security interest and by 

helping states, institutes and individuals build the capacity to help themselves. CTR 

programs also promote economic development and self-sustainability for institutes 

and individuals while achieving their mission of reducing the threat of WMD proliferation worldwide. 

U.S. ENGAGEMENT AT INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER (ISTC) 

AND THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER IN UKRAINE (STCU) 

The Science Centers program consists of the International Science and Technology 

Center (ISTC) in Moscow and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine 

(STCU) in Kyiv and supports efforts to reduce the risk of WMD terrorism by engaging and redirecting scientists, engineers, and technicians in the FSU who have biological, chemical, nuclear or missile expertise. In addition to redirecting former Soviet WMD personnel, the Science Centers projects also aid civilian scientific research. Our Science Centers program focuses on evolving the Science Centers in 

Moscow and Kyiv toward partnerships with host governments, and continuing to engage and promote transparency and self-sustainability at high priority former WMD 

institutes. 

38 

The Department of State acts as the U.S. representative in the two international 

science centers, the ISTC and the STCU, as well as our related redirection efforts, 

the BioIndustry Initiative (BII) and the Bio-Chem Redirect Program. Under the direction of Acting Under Secretary John C. Rood, each of these State-led efforts 

meets critical national security goals and is driven by threat information on nonproliferation and counter-terrorism. Thus, we work closely with the entire U.S. 

interagency to identify the most pressing global threats for all of our Global Threat 

Reduction (GTR) programs, including the Science Centers in the FSU. State has authorities for the Science Centers Program through the Nonproliferation, 

Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related programs (NADR): chapter 9 of part II of the 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2349bb et seq.). Additionally, the Science 

Centers support the objectives of the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 

Destruction, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and the President’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. 

U.S. Government funding for cooperative threat reduction activities, including the 

ISTC and STCU, is appropriated by the U.S. Congress to the Department of State, 

Department of Defense (DoD), and the Department of Energy (DOE) as the main 

entities charged with fulfilling the 1992 Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 

Program mandate. Under the Nunn-Lugar Program, the three Departments work 

very closely on complementary efforts to lessen the global threat of WMD materiel 

and expertise proliferation from the FSU. 

FOCUSING FUNDING TO ACHIEVE U.S. NONPROLIFERATION GOALS

While we had heavily funded general science projects with nonproliferation and 

scientific merit in the past, since the beginning of 2007 funding of regular projects 

has instead been concentrated on a small number of institutes that face the most 

important proliferation risks. In 2007, State worked closely with other U.S. agencies, including the Department of Energy, to focus Science Center activities on the 

highest priority institutes in the FSU and to help those institutes become financially 

self-sustainable. We have engaged with the other funding countries at the ISTC and 

STCU in a discussion about how to help institutes achieve those objectives and have 

approved new programs for 2008 at both Centers to achieve institute financial selfsustainability. 

Projects under consideration for funding are reviewed in an interagency process 

to address issues including proliferation risk, consistency with U.S. policy, technical 

merit, and market potential. These reviews also address the risk that the projects 

might inadvertently contribute to increasing the military capabilities of the recipient 

states, including Russia. Reviews are conducted on hundreds of proposals annually 

and there are also annual financial audits of the Centers’ operations and a sample 

of U.S.-funded projects. The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and our scientists also conduct audits of selected projects annually. 

TRANSFORMATION OF THE CENTERS TO MEET GLOBAL NONPROLIFERATION GOALS AND

BECOME SELF-SUSTAINING

In order to address new and emerging global WMD threats, State led discussions 

at the ISTC about exploring opportunities to transform it through joint nonproliferation and counter-terrorism projects, as well as joint projects in countries outside 

Russia and the CIS. State participated in drafting a Strategic Vision document for 

the ISTC outlining graduation, global nonproliferation, and efficiency goals. The 

Russian government is also addressing the question of how to transform the ISTC. 

In 2008, State intends to continue the discussion about transforming the ISTC to 

meet the emerging, new proliferation threats and to inaugurate a similar discussion 

at the STCU, a topic heavily stressed at its September 2007 Advisory Committee 

meeting. 

In addition to funding for regular scientific research and development projects, 

Partner project funding, both from other U.S. Government agencies and U.S. private 

industry, is an increasingly important funding component at both Science Centers. 

Funding for Partner projects from the U.S. and other countries continues to rise and 

is essential for the future of the Science Centers to sustain their important nonproliferation work. For this reason, we have emphasized the importance of expanding efforts to attract global partners to the Science Centers and have contributed 

funding to these efforts towards making the Science Centers self-sustainable in the 

future. 

These objectives contribute to our vision of the transformation and evolution of 

the Science Centers toward a greater partnership between the financing parties, 

member nations, and the Centers to jointly address emerging, global nonproliferation challenges. Evolving cooperation on the redirection of former Soviet defense inVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:23 Mar 11, 2009 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\110-82 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
39 

dustry scientists to peaceful scientific pursuits is an excellent basis for cooperation 

on joint counter-terrorism nonproliferation programs and nonproliferation programs 

in other nations outside the FSU. 

HOST STATE COST-SHARING

State is also engaging host states to increase cost-sharing in the funding of 

projects. In 2007, the ISTC signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Belarus 

wherein Belarus contributes funds directly to its institutes for items such as equipment when projects are funded through the ISTC. State also jointly funded Targeted 

Research Initiative (TRI) projects through the STCU in Ukraine and Azerbaijan, 

splitting the cost 50/50, between the funding parties and the host state respectively. 

For 2008, State aims to continue the tradition of joint-funding TRIs with Ukraine 

and Azerbaijan and hopes to reach an agreement with Moldova on sharing the costs 

of TRIs. State has also encouraged this kind of scientific and nonproliferation cooperation with host states at the ISTC, specifically by requesting Russian funding 

for projects and staff salaries. 

ACHIEVING INSTITUTE FINANCIAL SELF-SUSTAINABILITY

In place of State’s previous levels of regular project funding, the U.S. has focused 

its funds toward specific institutes to achieve self-sustainability and ′′graduation′′ 

from State project funding. We re-evaluated the emphasis on regular project funding 

in favor of multilateral partnerships to meet emerging global nonproliferation and 

cooperative threat reduction challenges and needs. Therefore, we proposed to meet 

this objective by emphasizing scientific institute self-sustainability and ′′graduation′′ 

from U.S. regular project funding. 

Of the thousands of scientific institutes in the ISTC and STCU member nations, 

we categorized approximately 200 core institutes as ′′priority′′ institutes for a selfsustainability/graduation discussion. We determined that many of these institutes 

were already self-sustainable and have grouped the remaining institutes by the year 

in which we believe they can reach financial self-sustainability through ISTC engagement, implementing an institute-specific self-sustainability plan, and by gaining 

enough funding on their own. 

Our over-arching goal to redirect FSU WMD expertise includes giving these and 

other institutes the tools to become self-sustainable - to be able to conduct peaceful 

world-class research and development by attracting national and international funding independent of regular project grants from the U.S. (and perhaps other financing parties) via the ISTC or STCU. We define this as ′′graduation′′ from U.S. regular 

project funding. We will look to the ISTC and STCU to help us to implement this 

vision, but we will continue to work closely with individual institutes and the 

Science Centers to develop individual sustainability plans and a systematic approach to self-sustainability. 

One self-sustainability component has been, and will continue to be, commercialization in its largest sense, meaning greater emphasis on national and international industrial partnerships to develop technologies and entities with market 

potential. Aspects of commercialization are already in place at the ISTC via its commercialization program know called Innovation Initiatives (formerly the Commercialization Support Program) and at STCU through the Targeted Research Initiatives. For both these commercialization initiatives, State has worked with and 

drawn from the Department of Energy’s own commercialization efforts in the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program. 

Regarding the GAO’s recommendation to work with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Secretary of Energy to develop a 

joint plan to better coordinate the efforts of DOE’s Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program (IPP) and the ISTC’s Innovation Initiatives, State concurs with the 

recommendation to more closely coordinate these program elements and will consult 

with DOE on implementing this recommendation. We expect that self-sustainability 

for many institutes will be achieved through contribution to host government peaceful priorities - leading to increased host government funding for the institutes. 

In 2007, State led discussions on creating institute sustainability programs at 

both Centers. A presentation on the need to graduate institutes to self-sustainability 

was given to both Centers’ at their fall Governing Board meetings in 2006, and the 

U.S. hosted a multilateral discussion with participants from both Centers and the 

funding parties on how to create and implement an institute sustainability program, 

as well as discussed what the measures for success would be. For FY2008, State 

has made it a priority to advance the Center’s newly approved programs for institute financial self-sustainability and to contribute significant funding for these programs. For example, the U.S. has added a day of meetings to a routine Coordination 

40 

Executive Committee meeting this March in order to discuss how institute-specific 

sustainability plans at the ISTC will be implemented by the funding parties. Similar 

discussions will also be held at upcoming STCU meetings. In this spirit, State is 

working with the Centers to focus all remaining and additional activities on improving the financial self-sustainability of scientists and institutes. 

EXIT STRATEGY

We have developed an exit strategy for leaving the scientists engaged and the institutions that employ them better prepared to sustain themselves in peaceful work. 

The ISTC and STCU are now major nonproliferation implementation platforms and 

complement other USG programs, including the U.S. Department of Energy’s IPP 

and the U.S. Department of Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, 

and programs of other governments. These coordinated programs engage WMD or 

dual-use scientists in peaceful research and also design and fund services, training, 

and competency building to guide former Soviet WMD/missile and dual-use experts 

toward economic self-sustainability and a permanent transition to stable and peaceful civilian employment. 

The Department of State seeks to ′′graduate′′ to financial self-sustainability approximately 20 former Soviet defense-related institutes across the biological, chemical, nuclear, and missile spectrum per year up to 2012. Also, our discussion on 

transformation of the Centers to address global nonproliferation goals is based on 

the need to position the Centers so that they may continue to sustain themselves 

in their important work as well as engage host states in global nonproliferation aid 

and activities without direct foreign aid from the U.S. and other funding parties. 

Further, by expanding the Partners Program, we hope to increase private investment in the Centers as State gradually reduces funding in order to redirect resources to other State programs which aim to address new and emerging global proliferation threats. 

CHALLENGES

While the Science Centers program has been successful in many areas, State faces 

a challenge as we seek to strategically transform the two centers and our redirection 

efforts through those centers. Our current efforts are targeted at transforming the 

centers to focus on graduation and sustainability, joint nonproliferation and counterterrorism programs, greater financial responsibility on the part of host states, and 

working cooperatively to address the worldwide terrorist threat. State is working 

hard with all the stakeholders, partners, and funding countries to accomplish these 

goals. 

CONCLUSION

We will continue to carefully review DCAA audit reports, taking special note of 

recurring problems, and will follow up with the Centers about those issues. Also, 

we will continue to ensure that 50% of scientists on a project have WMD expertise 

as a guideline for funding decisions. We are also working with the science advisors 

from the national labs to improve the effectiveness of our programs. 

We believe that better cooperation and partnership on nonproliferation issues between all U.S. agencies redirecting expertise in the FSU, and specifically between 

Science Center parties, deepens the bonds between all constituent parties, thereby 

strengthening the shared nonproliferation mandate and contributing to global betterment as well. 

As we continue to address proliferation concerns in Russia and the former Soviet 

Union (FSU), we also must address new and emerging proliferation threats in regions with high terrorist presence and/or activity through other threat reduction 

programs of the Department of State that address chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear (CBRN) threats reduction worldwide. 

Thank you. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you. 

We will begin the questions now. Let me start with a few myself. 

Mr. Scheinman, Mr. Robinson asserted that the DOE disagreed 

with the recommendation to fundamentally reassess the IPP program. Is that accurate, and why would that be? It seems to me that 

in your opening statement that you talked about many things that 

41 

would I think add up to a kind of fundamental reassessment, so 

why wouldn’t we start from the beginning and reassess this program? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. I think the answer is that we feel we have already conducted that fundamental assessment, or reassessment of 

the program, and it was done at the administrator’s direction, and 

if I had to guess, if we were to expand the staff time to do it all 

again, I think we would come to the very same conclusion that we 

reached and that is supported in fact by many of the GAO recommendations, and that is the need to focus on the threat as we 

perceive it today and not necessarily as we saw it 15 years ago. 

The threat has clearly changed. I think our focus has to shift from 

addressing the risk of mass migration to a more focused approach 

and the focused approach is based on our analysis of risk. We are 

doing that, and in fact, we completed our—— 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. You went over many of those. 

If I could ask Mr. Robinson, what about the kinds of changes 

that DOE has already expressed a willingness to do does not comply with this overall reassessment? 

Mr. ROBINSON. Our understanding of the 2004 and 2006 assessments I think Mr. Scheinman is referring to is, it doesn’t quite 

meet what we would be looking for in a sort of fundamental reassessment in that it doesn’t get into a lot of specifics. The 2006 in 

particular seems to be kind of a loosely prepared set of observations, one of which, by the way, seems to conclude that there isn’t 

a heck of a lot of accomplishment so far from the effort. But what 

we would be looking for is something—— 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. You are saying that DOE concluded that 

itself? 

Mr. ROBINSON. Well, I mean, there is an observation in the document that says something to the effect of after 11 years of performance, we are not sure we have actually accomplished any—— 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Anything? 

Mr. ROBINSON. No hard evidence that GIPP or any other scientist engagement in the program has prevented the migration of 

even a single scientist. So, I mean, that is an observation that is 

incorporated in here but, you know, I wouldn’t regard that as the 

definitive observation of this. As I mentioned, it is sort of a loose 

assemblage of information. Now, on the other end, from what we 

understand, DOE is now embarking upon a very precise reassessment of risk which is an outstanding idea. From that, I think we 

would be looking for them to translate that into, you know, specific 

institute-by-institute, person-by-person kind of assessment of 

whether these funds should continue to these locations, and then 

as we have emphasized in the past, how do you know when you 

are finished or is this an open-ended, never-ending insurance policy 

that is sort of broadly cast. So that is the kind of specificity that 

I think we may be somewhat disagreeing with. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you. 

Mr. Scheinman, isn’t it the case that the DOE program guidance 

requires 60 percent at minimum of the scientists have to be employed during the Soviet era? I mean, many of us have noted the 

fact that 54 percent of the scientists paid through the program 

have no experience with weapons of mass destruction. Sixty perVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:23 Mar 11, 2009 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\110-82 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
42 

cent of those audited had not been Soviet-era scientists. So, I mean, 

isn’t this in noncompliance? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. Well, the guidance that is quoted is guidance. 

That is how we attempt to structure and to implement the program. I think our view is that the preponderance of individuals 

that are participants in all GIPP projects are those who have WMD 

background, either related directly to weapons or related to the underlying technologies, and I think what we have come to learn is 

that these programs really only work if we involve not just technologists who were born in the 1930s and the 1940s but younger 

scientists as well can help bring technologies to the marketplace. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you. 

Let me now turn it over to our new ranking member, Mr. Shimkus. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Chairman. It is a great hearing. I appreciate your time. 

Mr. Robinson, the methodology was basically, you followed the 

money, where the money was going, then you looked at the resumes or the background of the people who were receiving it. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. ROBINSON. Our methodology was pretty wide-ranging and 

fairly intensive, but relative to the background issue, which I think 

is probably what you are referring to, the judgment that so many 

of these folks did not claim weapons background, what we did essentially was two-pronged. We asked the laboratories that oversee 

the projects to basically fill out an Excel spreadsheet for us on each 

one of the projects. We then supplemented that information with 

review of records that—DOE’s records on payments and the like 

and so essentially we are using DOE’s own information, either directly provided through an Excel spreadsheet presentation or our 

review of the payment records. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Great. Thank you. 

Mr. Scheinman, you heard the opening statement where I went through the approximately $11 billion of U.S. payments for energy 

resources to Russia. In the Department of State program, they 

have asked for cost share or assistance by governments. Have you 

asked for that from the Russian government? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. I don’t believe we have asked for that to this 

point but one of the outcomes from our assessment that was conducted at the request of the administrator was that we move precisely in that direction. And so as look to projects in fiscal year 

2008, where incidentally we see a shared set of interests between 

what we want and what we think would be in Russia’s national interest, which is nuclear safety, security and better safeguards that 

we can pursue that kind of cost sharing. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. It is my understanding that assessment was done 

2 years ago? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. The assessment was briefed to the administrator in I believe the fall of 2006. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. So the question is, if that was the fall of 2006, we 

have already gone 1 year. Have you asked Russian participation financially in the program in the past year and couple months? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. I am not aware. I will have to—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Let me—— 

43 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. I accept the point. It is time to do that. I would 

note that for the Nuclear Cities Initiative, at the time we were 

thinking about renegotiating the government-to-government agreement which lapsed and which we did not renew as part of our 

drawdown efforts. We did have in there that the condition of continuation with Russia would be cost sharing. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And Mr. Stratford, you mentioned in this line of 

questioning the self-sustaining aspect and that even though it is 

self-sustaining, there may be times to be of assisting. In the selfsustaining analysis, are private-sector entities part of this? In other 

words, it looks like GE and Ford are partners in some of the IPP 

out of the DOE. There is a lot of literature. Eastern Europe is kind 

of a hobby of mine, chairing the Baltic Caucus, following Belarus 

issues, democracy issues there, the Baltic countries. There is great 

movement by—there are great recent stories about IBM being a 

worldwide business company that is looking and hiring in St. Petersburg. A lot of U.S. multinational corporations are there. Is part 

of the self-sustaining aspect the private sector? 

Mr. STRATFORD. Not nearly as much as DOE, and there is a reason for that, which is that we ask our Russian colleagues for examples to suggest projects that they can work on, and if we like it we 

agreed to fund it if we think the lab is the place that something 

needs to be funded. Now, those projects are supervised by people 

from the national laboratories—— 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Sir, let me just try to—I only have 45 seconds left 

and I want to get this last question in because it is really a question based upon our legislative responsibilities. Is there a question 

about the movement of these funds into Libya, the possible use of 

these funds into North Korea should there be changes, Iraq? Is 

there a the clear line of authorization with appropriations based 

upon the initial language? I think it is the DOE program I am talking about and I think your analysis says that we may need to effect 

legislative language to clarify that. Mr. Robinson, is that fair? 

Mr. ROBINSON. I think that is a fair characterization. It would 

be far preferable to have a clear sense of congressional authorization to make this transfer and it is one of our recommendations 

that I think DOE concurs with. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. And as authorizers, I think we as a committee 

would probably like to move in that direction. 

My time is expired. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Walden. 

Mr. WALDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I want to see if I have got this right, Mr. Robinson. Did I hear 

you correctly say we have had 14 years, $300 million and haven’t 

identified one scientist in Russia that we have kept from going out 

of Russia? 

Mr. ROBINSON. What I was doing was quoting one of the documents that the DOE has prepared in doing their reassessment. It 

goes to the fuzzy nature of the program, that it is hard to specifically identify anybody that was prevented from doing something. 

That is correct. 

Mr. WALDEN. And that half of the scientists of the 97 projects 

that were reviewed had no weapons background? 

44 

Mr. ROBINSON. Did not claim any weapons background in any of 

the documentation that either the DOE labs provided or in their 

own documentation submitted to DOE. 

Mr. WALDEN. And then I guess things—you know, obviously this 

program was begun with the best of intentions. I mean, none of us 

wanted at the time of the collapse of the Soviet empire or Soviet 

Union to have these folks just go out to the highest bidder in the 

worst country in the planet, and so I mean, it started with good 

intentions. A lot has changed since then. And is the issue really 

now as much how they transfer information as their physical movements? In other words, we have supplied these institutes with fax 

machines and e-mail and computers they didn’t have before, and 

we know from oversight hearings here on Los Alamos and everywhere else, even here we see secrets that are taken out of secure 

areas to non-secure areas. Is that happening as a result of—are we 

actually investing in the new technology that allows them to share 

without leaving? 

Mr. ROBINSON. I can’t speak to that specifically. I can say that 

the Russians are quite, you know, appreciative of the money that 

is provided because it has enabled them to recruit and retain a 

whole new class of Russian scientists that ultimately could do 

whatever down the road. 

Mr. WALDEN. And isn’t it true that Russia is engaged in nuclear 

commerce with Iran including shipping nuclear fuel to Iran? 

Mr. ROBINSON. I believe that is publicly stated by Mr. Putin. 

Mr. WALDEN. And so isn’t it reasonable to assume that we are 

actually funding with money we are probably borrowing from 

China to give to Russia to train nuclear engineers to help Iran develop its nuclear energy? 

Mr. ROBINSON. I don’t think I have the evidence to either support 

or refute that specifically but I guess—— 

Mr. WALDEN. Can either of our other two witnesses tell me that 

is not happening with certainty? 

Mr. STRATFORD. I don’t think I would put it quite that way. 

Mr. WALDEN. Well, I am sure you wouldn’t but is it happening? 

Mr. STRATFORD. Well, the answer to your first question is, yes, 

Russia is cooperating with Iran in the nuclear area. They have 

transferred the Bushier reactor and they are now in the process of 

transferring the fuel for that reactor and that does not necessarily 

make us happy but that is what they choose to do. Yes, you could 

argue that if you give Russia a dollar for whatever purpose, it frees 

up a dollar that can then be spent elsewhere whether it is a nuclear engineer going to Iran or for other portions of the Russian nuclear program. Yes, you could make that argument. But that having been said, do you want to try to close a proliferation risk. Now, 

State is not normally considered to be a program agency. If there 

was a consolidated program with all of these things together at 

DOE, I suspect we would not be clamoring for money to go to 

science centers. But somewhere 13 or 14 years ago, somebody made 

a decision that that was a good thing for State to do and having 

been handed that task and having been appropriated funds, we are 

going to do the best we can. That having been said, as I said, we 

do have an exit strategy. We would like to be out of this business 

by 2012 and have graduated all of these institutes. 

45 

I heard a line that are we trying to move money from Russia 

over to other threats. Yes, we are. The amount of money that we 

have asked for for the Science Center programs is declining. It is 

going to keep declining. Is the money going to go elsewhere? Yes, 

because we are putting more money into Iraq and we are putting 

more money into Libya. 

Mr. WALDEN. Mr. Scheinman? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. If I may just add to that response, we certainly 

have—I don’t think you were implying we have no evidence that 

any funding that we have provided to support scientist engagement 

has found its way into proliferation transactions, whether that involves information or direct support from Russia to another country, and if anyone does have that information, we would obviously 

be very interested in seeing it. We would make adjustments in accordance with it. I think the other half of my response would be 

that GIPP can be measured in hard objective and tangible ways 

but I think it can also be measured in terms of soft accomplishments, and among those accomplishments are working with Russia 

on preserving a security culture, hopefully improving the ethics of 

scientists who are involved in those programs, and I believe that 

through the access and the transparency that we have, we are 

making a difference, even if I can’t count it on my fingers and toes. 

Mr. WALDEN. I guess we are just trying to figure out this program created with the best of intentions to solve a very real threat 

continues on and I guess we get these GAO reports back, and it 

is hard to go home and defend handing out the money to Russia, 

especially when we are sending them a lot right now through oil 

payments and everything else, so their economy seems to have 

really turned around, a lot of domestic investment there, private 

sector. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. Let me follow up along the lines of 

something Mr. Walden said about, we have this agreement with 

Russia but Russia has other bilateral agreements with other countries such as Iran to develop nuclear, so any agreement under the 

IPP program doesn’t prevent Russia then from turning around and 

transferring technology or information to other countries such as 

Iran that they have an agreement with, is there? Mr. Scheinman? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. No, there is nothing to prevent Iran from doing 

that. There is really no relationship though, as I see it, between 

IPP projects and Russia’s conduct except insofar as our engagement 

keeps Russia focused on nonproliferation projects. 

Mr. STUPAK. Don’t the agreements we have with them to work 

on certain commercial projects, can’t that be a benefit not only to 

Russia but other countries that they may have a bilateral agreement with that we do not, that the United States does not? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. In theory, I suppose if we are working on nuclear energy-related—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, you have all these projects going on, I think 

about 35 of them, that are developing new things including reprocessing of fuel rods and which this country is concerned about because the last 3 percent of reprocessed rods is plutonium, weaponsgrade plutonium. Isn’t that a concern? 

46 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. If we were to transfer technology to Russia related to reprocessing spent fuel, a whole additional set of controls 

are built in as a result of— 

Mr. STUPAK. Between United States and Russia, but not Russia 

and Iran. 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. U.S. controls follow the technology that is either 

replicated or material that is used from technology provided. We do 

not provide that technology to Russia. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, the significance of the program, and as I said 

in my opening, I thought it served a valuable purpose. State said 

they are closing their program down by 2012. DOE continues to 

look for ways, it almost looks to like expand the program. I think 

it is a slush fund for the national labs. That is what I believe this 

program has turned into. But really, how is the program as currently administered going to help when Russian scientists in the 

IPP program receive about $35 a day? Is $35 a day enough incentive to keep Russia weapons of mass destruction from migrating to 

rogue states or to terrorist groups? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. Well, I think I can only answer that question 

with respect to the support that we do have from Russia to engage 

in these programs. They seem as interested in pursuing the cooperative arrangements in partnership with industry or with the national laboratories, so—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, therefore, shouldn’t private labs or national 

labs or Russia take more responsibility? I mean, the program as it 

is currently outlined, $35 a day isn’t going to keep anyone from 

doing anything. 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. Sir, we do believe that the program should transition from one of assistance to partnership and that implies cost 

commitment from Russia, and that is the direction we hope to go. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, then why does the State Department, they are 

going to close theirs down by 2012, and why is DOE still funding, 

as I said, 35 projects at 17 institutes which the State Department 

has already graduated from the Science Centers program? It seems 

like you are just, I don’t want to say duplication but State is winding it down, you are maintaining or expanding. 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. I think we are focused on a different community 

of institutes through our work. The State Department has principally focused in recent years, certainly in the last year, on institutes that are evolving towards self-sustaining capacity whereas 

our programs have been focused on institutes that haven’t reached 

that mark, so there is a community of institutes. We have been focused more on high-risk institutes that haven’t perhaps enjoyed the 

economic recovery of others whereas the State Department has focused on institutes that are in better shape. I note that the State 

Department’s list of high-risk institutes includes those that we are 

involved with, and as Mr. Stratford said in his set of remarks, the 

absence of a cooperative program doesn’t imply no risk. There is 

still risk at a number of these institutes that are in a better economic position just by virtue of the technology and expertise that 

they possess. 

Mr. STUPAK. But GAO also points out that these so-called institutes you are talking about, those scientists who worked in the Soviet era are gone. Now you are training new ones which really sort 

47 

of in a way creates proliferation, not nonproliferation. So do you 

want to comment on the last point about the 17 institutes which 

State has already graduated? Why shouldn’t DOE be graduating 

institutes? 

Mr. ROBINSON. Well, our clear position is that there needs to be 

some very specific criteria for graduation, that these things 

shouldn’t go on into perpetuity, that if you are going to have an insurance policy, it shouldn’t be so completely open-ended, protect 

against every possible risk that might come down the pike. We 

don’t have enough money to do that in the world. So I think what 

we are looking for here is getting a very precise set of graduation 

criteria and then apply them while also focusing whatever program 

activities are conducted at the highest risk, the real risks of proliferation, not training, you know, new scientists to do other things. 

Mr. STUPAK. Are you developing that criteria, specific criteria so 

you can graduate? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. Yes, we plan to do that in the coming year. As 

the GAO recommended, we plan to articulate and implement an 

exit strategy that includes that set of criteria and does provide us 

to wind down in Russia, which we have been doing. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK, you say that. Let me show you tab 3. Do you 

have the binder? Would you hand it to Mr. Scheinman there, 

please? Do you have one in front of you? I think it is tab 3 on the 

table in front of you. It is the IPP program guidance dated 2002, 

which was transmitted to the committee last week, and turn to the 

area of page 78. It should be flagged there for your convenience. 

Because you say that and I am a little concerned because when I 

read it, and I am on page 78 here, and I think it is highlighted 

there for you, ‘‘IPP requires that a preponderance of the staff working on its projects have had weapons of mass destruction relevance 

experience before 1991. The meaning of preponderance is taken to 

be 60 percent as a bare minimum. Two-thirds would be better, and 

anything above that, better still.’’ Then it says, ‘‘Add note for HQ. 

This needs to be changed to read 50 percent once the current GAO 

business is over. The dictionary definition for preponderance includes 50 and above but GAO is right, we should have changed this 

at the point when the practice was modified.’’ Do you see that 

there, Mr. Scheinman? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. Yes. 

Mr. STUPAK. So it looks like you are just going to change the text 

here just to get GAO off your back and you go back to what you 

want to do. 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. That is an unfortunate—— 

Mr. STUPAK. But it accurately reflects the attitude at DOE; let 

us just say what we think we want them to hear, we will say what 

we think they want us to hear and then we will go back and do 

what we always did. 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. No, sir, I don’t believe that is correct, and I 

would refer you back to our assessment that was conducted at the 

request of NNSA Administrator Brooks where we outlined the requirement to change our focus to deal with the threat as we see 

it today and not the threat as we understood it to be 15 years ago, 

and among the recommendations in that report is that we develop 

an exit strategy and implement it, that we focus on the community 

48 

of institutes that might present risk and thereby change our focus 

in the metrics and performance process, instead of counting numbers of people, to count institutes where we understand risk to be, 

number 2, and number 3, to focus our work in areas that are more 

directly supportive of nonproliferation including safeguards, security and proliferation resistance. That is what we are about. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, there is skepticism because it seems like State 

is moving forward with this program that has outlived its usefulness where you guys are still not doing it. Let me ask you one more 

question and then Mr. Inslee showed up, I will turn to him. Nuclear cities—Russia shut down about 10 cities that had nuclear. 

You don’t have any program in those 10 cities, do you? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. Russia didn’t shut down the cities. 

Mr. STUPAK. I didn’t say shut down the cities. I said shut down 

the nuclear program in 10 cities, right? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. Well, no, nuclear programs continue in those 

cities. 

Mr. STUPAK. But there are about 10 of them? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. There are 10—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Do you have programs going for those scientists in 

those cities? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. We do have a number of projects that involve 

those cities but the Nuclear Cities Initiative itself we decided to 

cancel in part because the focus of that program was frankly beyond our means to implement. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, the Nuclear Cities Initiative, you called it, 

right? 

That was one program that came underneath the IPP. That one 

is sort of shut down so why can’t this one be shut down? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. The focus of the Nuclear Cities Initiative was to 

deal with the risk of mass migration and to focus on jobs and defense conversion. Our view of the program following our assessment with the administrator was that that is not the way we need 

to conduct this program, that the risk is not mass migration, the 

risk is that proliferators whether they are countries or terrorist organizations are going to target specific institutes because of the 

technology that they possess, so our program therefore made—our 

objectives made less sense in the Nuclear Cities Initiative context 

and require adjustment in the IPP context where we are going to 

focus not on jobs and defense conversion but on promoting technology partnerships that promote our nonproliferation objectives. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Inslee for questions. 

Mr. INSLEE. Thank you. 

Mr. Scheinman, I am just looking at the—there is a program 

guidance requiring 60 percent at a minimum of scientists who have 

been employed during the Soviet era to be involved but I am advised that that hasn’t been met. Could you comment on that? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. I believe we have engaged certainly more than 

50 percent of former WMD scientists. I don’t know that we have 

attained the goal of 60 percent, which is a goal we still hope to— 

we strive to meet. 

Mr. INSLEE. I should—in fairness, it was a reference to a GAO 

audit of 97 IPP projects and they found fewer than half, I am advised. 

49 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. We don’t agree with that number. Based on our 

records and our checks which we conducted again just after the— 

or as the report was coming forward, our review shows more than 

50 percent of participants have WMD expertise. 

Mr. INSLEE. And it is fair to say you are going to continue that 

effort to boost that, I hope? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. Correct. And I would just add, if I may, that 

based on the direction that I have recommended the program, promoting safeguards, security and related nonproliferation topics, the 

community of experts that we would draw from are more clearly 

related to WMD either expertise and technology or the enabling 

technologies. That is very much what we plan to do. 

Mr. INSLEE. We encourage that. Thank you very much. 

I yield back. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Walden, any further questions? 

Mr. WALDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 

our witnesses and I want to thank the GAO. 

You know, it seems like every year hundreds of scientists retire 

from our own weapons laboratories at Sandia National Lab, Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and the nuclear weapons scientists 

have vast and detailed knowledge regarding our weapons systems 

and capabilities. What do we do? What does the Department of Energy do to make sure that our own retired DOE weapons scientists 

aren’t sharing their knowledge and what are we doing to recruit 

new people into this field so that we are keeping pace with technology? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. That is a good question. I think you will find 

that across the Department of Energy and its national laboratories, 

it is certainly my experience, and I have visited, I think, virtually 

every lab and site, that you will not find stronger patriots than 

those who have gone through our nuclear weapons programs and 

production facilities. That being said, every technology transfer, 

whether that is an e-mail or work that might be conducted for a 

foreign partner, has to run through a rigorous set of export controls 

and internal reviews, so I think we have been in pretty good shape, 

not to say that there hasn’t been hardship in locations where facilities have closed down. 

Mr. WALDEN. But my question was more about our retired scientists and I am not questioning their patriotism at all, but I am 

just saying, some people as we know, we have had intelligence experts in our various agencies that have been on the take and been 

busted but after years of damage to America’s security; do we have 

a plan in place to kind of monitor our former nuclear scientists? I 

mean, we seem to have a lot of plans in place to deal with the Russians. 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. If those programs and plans are in place, I am 

not aware of them. It would be another part of the Department of 

Energy that would take interest. But to answer the other half of 

your question, we certainly are struggling in the United States 

with respect to our own brain drain, not in terms of the transfer 

of information to other countries or organizations but just the mere 

fact that we have been out of the nuclear energy business so long 

that the associated infrastructure associated with nuclear power 

has attritioned and we need to rebuild it, and it is very much one 

50 

of our interests—an interest of my program is to build the next 

generation of safeguards and nonproliferation experts so that we 

can regenerate that level of expertise across our labs. 

Mr. WALDEN. Mr. Robinson? 

Mr. ROBINSON. Just to elaborate and expand upon that, this is 

a significant national issue. It is not just in the weapons side but 

in the nuclear power side if we are going to build, you know, a substantial number of new plants, the NRC side, and it is not just the 

scientists themselves. We have had consultation with a lot of folks 

in academia, and the availability of professors to teach the next 

generation of nuclear scientists is drastically diminished. 

Mr. WALDEN. Good point. 

Mr. ROBINSON. So it is actually slightly better than we might 

have otherwise imagined. 

Mr. WALDEN. And while you have the microphone there, according to GAO testimony, the Department of Energy has wasted a significant portion of the IPP budget due to mismanagement. Now, we 

know at Los Alamos we have experienced countless security incidents that have compromised classified information and frankly 

put the Nation’s security at risk. This oversight committee over the 

last few years has conducted both public and classified and closed 

hearings on this problem. Do you think that the money we wasted 

on the IPP program would be better spent on security improvements at Los Alamos where we know classified information is not 

always handled properly? Do I need to hold up my J-B Weld prop 

again? 

Mr. ROBINSON. Mr. Walden, that is a tough question. The 

amount of money going into this program, the IPP program, is not 

huge. It is almost two different things. It is hard to know exactly, 

you know, how a transfer would—— 

Mr. WALDEN. Well, the question is somewhat rhetorical in its nature. 

Mr. ROBINSON. OK. I took the bait unnecessarily then. 

Mr. WALDEN. No, no, it has a serious piece to it as well, and that 

is—— 

Mr. ROBINSON. Well, no, as you well know—— 

Mr. WALDEN [continuing]. We keep an eye on Los Alamos and 

elsewhere and I think they have made improvements but—— 

Mr. ROBINSON. As you well know, we have done a vast amount 

of work and continue to do a vast amount of work on physical security at Los Alamos. We are doing a huge project right now on cyber 

security, given all the extensive problems that have been experienced. So our investment on that initiative is even much bigger 

than it is on this side of the house, frankly. We are working with 

you on that. 

Mr. WALDEN. Thank you, Mr. Robinson, and gentlemen, thanks 

for your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Robinson, that cyber security at Los Alamos, 

since we have had so many problems, that could be done at a different nuclear lab, right? 

Mr. ROBINSON. I am sorry? 

Mr. STUPAK. The work being done at Los Alamos on cyber security, that could be done at a different lab, could it not? One where 

51 

they have security? Well, we do three hearings a year on Los Alamos breach of security. Some of us think it has outlived its usefulness. Now, I will get myself in trouble and all my New Mexico 

friends will be calling me but—— 

Mr. ROBINSON. I was going to say, there are a great many folks 

in New Mexico on both sides—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Yes, there are. 

Mr. ROBINSON [continuing]. That would object to any comment 

on that. 

Mr. STUPAK. That is true. I won’t put you on that position. 

Ms. Schakowsky, questions, please. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Just a couple of things. I do find it really troubling that one, there is no evidence that any one person could be 

identified, according to the DOE, Mr. Robinson, Mr. Scheinman, 

that actually was deterred from being in a situation that would put 

us at risk, and there is also no evidence, Mr. Scheinman, that it 

has, you said, increased proliferation, which means there is no—I 

don’t know if that means and maybe you can answer me that no 

one has really looked at that. I mean, the whole thing seems to me 

that it has kind of been a little—there has been very little oversight, that it has developed a kind of life of its own. People have 

decided what its mission is from time to time and changed it or expanded it, and that measurements, you talk about soft things, well, 

that is all fine except that, you know, we are talking about a lot 

of money and I think that taxpayers and the Congress would like 

some metrics anyway that would say we know that this program 

is doing what it was intended to do. These are really more in the 

way of comments. 

Let me just ask you this. The current budget now from DOE is 

what? Did you say it is down to 30 something? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. Roughly $30 million. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thirty million, and Mr. Stratford, on the State 

side. How much is that? 

Mr. STRATFORD. For science centers for fiscal year 2008, we have 

asked for and will probably get $12 million total. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. And there are other agencies that are also 

funding certain aspects of this as well, I was told, even agriculture 

or there is other money involved in these programs. So, you know, 

a million here, a million there, it begins to add up, and I just feel 

like—I congratulate the committee and the GAO. I get this feeling 

that there are probably a lot of programs like this that have been 

around for a while and nobody is really looking at them, and the 

fact that the mission has changed and you want it to change pretty 

extensively regarding countries that are involved, I couldn’t agree 

more with Mr. Shimkus, who said I think the Congress needs to— 

if we are going to change this mission, then we better get involved. 

Congress better get involved in deciding whether these resources 

are going to go, and also providing the oversight but you wanted 

to comment, Mr. Scheinman, go ahead. 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. Well, I certainly take all of your points and I 

don’t want to take issue with any of them. I would just—with respect to soft and hard metrics, my point was that only soft metrics 

count. That is clearly not the case. We need to have measurable 

52 

metrics that help guide our priority ranking, that help guide implementation, that—— 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. So in regard to the initial objective, are there 

any metrics that would indicate that this program has been a success? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. I think we can measure the success of the program through the level of engagement. I don’t think we can measure success by absence of an activity. I think we do have information that these programs have made a difference in very real terms 

in terms of institutes perhaps working with us instead of with suspect partners. I would have to provide that information in another 

setting. But we do have the challenge of essentially—— 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. But wait. So you agree that there is—or 

maybe it was you, Mr. Stratford, that there is a relationship with 

Iran that is bilateral and has nothing to do with us, and isn’t that 

in regard to the institutes? 

Mr. STRATFORD. There is a relationship with Iran in terms of the 

Bushier reactor and the fuel for it. Remember, what we are trying 

to do is to get institutes to be self-sustaining, so our metric is simple: have we graduated institutes; have we stopped providing assistance to a particular institute? 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Yes, although you said that having said that 

earlier, that just because an institute has graduated doesn’t mean 

that there aren’t still risks and deserve U.S. dollar support. 

Mr. STRATFORD. That is correct in certain instances. But even if 

we graduated every single institute, I still can’t guarantee that two 

or three scientists from Institute X wouldn’t decide that Iran was 

looking very promising as a place of employment. That can still 

happen. Now, if we thought that was going to happen, I suspect we 

would try to do something about it, and I don’t know whether that 

would be another project at that institute or whether we would find 

some other way to address the problem. The problem doesn’t go 

away. The question for us is, can we make most of it go away by 

reducing temptation and can we reduce temptation by having an 

institute be self-sustaining. We talk about Russia being richer. Yes, 

they are, but that doesn’t mean that the government hasn’t still cut 

loose some of its institutes and left them in a precarious position 

financially. The one other thing I would like to say is, what strikes 

me is that there are other countries who think that the science center idea is a good idea and are putting in money. Staff tells me that 

the annual budget of the Moscow Science Center is about $100 million. All U.S. contributions together are about $50 million of that. 

That means we are getting a one-to-one matching grant just like 

National Public Radio from other countries who have been putting 

in the money to do what we do. So is our $50 million leveraged? 

Yes, leveraged 100 percent because other people think this program 

is worthwhile. I will stop there. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, that is at one institute. Let me follow up Ms. 

Schakowsky’s question this way. Are the institutes being funded by 

DOE or State Department that are also working with Iran? 

Mr. STRATFORD. I don’t know the answer to that question. The 

science center in Moscow funds through projects a lot of institutes. 

53 

The question you are asking is, are any of those who are getting 

U.S. dollars participating in the Iran nuclear program? 

Mr. STUPAK. Right. 

Mr. STRATFORD. I don’t know the answer to that. 

Mr. STUPAK. Wouldn’t we want to know that? How do you know 

that the purpose and intent is what we except it to be than if we 

don’t know where they are working outside of cooperative agreement with the United States? 

Mr. STRATFORD. Well, we do know basically what goes on between Russia and Iran, and I would have to check whether any of 

the institutes that receive project funding from us are connected 

with Bushier or fuel supply. 

Mr. STUPAK. Would you do that? 

Mr. STRATFORD. That is a possibility but I don’t know the answer 

to it but I would be happy to try to provide that for the record. 

Mr. STUPAK. How about you, Mr. Scheinman? Are there any 

DOE institutes working with—— 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. I am not aware of work that we are conducting 

that supports the Bushier fuel supply. We also, with the State Department and the entire U.S. interagency, obviously are looking 

very closely at potential relationships between Russia and Iran and 

we would gauge our decisions on projects based on what we know, 

but I would have to go back and see whether our work involves any 

of the institutes involved in the fuel transfer, the reactor. 

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Well, we would like to have those answers because I was going to ask this question but based on these answers, 

you know, DOE funded a Lawrence Livermore study of 605 Russian scientists to address the brain drain. Now, that was back in 

2002, but 21 percent of those scientists said they would go to rogue 

states such as North Korea, Iran, Syria or Iraq if the project involved significant scientific interest and the compensation was adequate. Well, if we are funding institutes and we don’t know if Russia then has a separate agreement from those institutes we are 

putting money into with countries like Iran, Korea or Syria, that 

would be a cause of concern. And even though if you said well, we 

will give you money, you can come work elsewhere, the Russian scientists, 15 percent of them said they are still willing to go to rogue 

states for compensation or for the scientific challenge. In fact, 70 

percent said their preferred place is Germany, of all places. 

Let me ask you this question, Mr. Scheinman. Isn’t it the case 

that DOE’s Initiative for Proliferation Prevention is funding six 

projects under the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, or GNEP, 

a DOE program to repossess, and I mentioned earlier, spent nuclear fuel and develop fast reactors? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. Yes, we do have a number of projects that are 

supportive of the general purposes associated with GNEP. 

Mr. STUPAK. All right. Did DOE suspend part of its guidance 

that requires an industry partner to participate—you are talking 

about a one-to-one match, Mr. Stratford was, but industry partnership participation which is intended to ensure the commercial application of the projects, correct? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. The requirement in our guidance for industry 

partnership is associated with commercial projects. All of our 

projects are—— 

54 

Mr. STUPAK. So GNEP, there has to be a private industry to 

show some potential for commercial application. 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. I think the level of technology at this stage is 

only of interest to scientists and engineers. It is not at the point 

of being of interest to the commercial market. 

Mr. STUPAK. Right. So why are you funding it then? If it is supposed to be with a commercial partner, why are you funding six of 

them when it is not commerciable and you can’t have a—and there 

isn’t a private partner who will even go along with you and it is 

also the conclusion of the National Academy of Sciences, they 

issued a recent report saying you are funding these six programs 

that have no commercial application, long time coming, why are 

you funding these programs when it won’t be commercialized any 

time soon. 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. I believe one project does in fact have a commercial partner but the reason that we are pursuing this work is 

associated with my earlier comment about focusing our program on 

nonproliferation topics that are of interest to the United States and 

hopefully of interest to Russia and that includes the development 

of a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle which will move us away from 

the current practice which Russia now practices which is to separate plutonium from spent fuel in pure form directly usable in 

weapons, encourage them over time to transition to a system that 

doesn’t separate that plutonium in a pure form. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, is it the Secretary’s responsibility, in this case 

Secretary Bodman, to determine whether or not projects carried 

out under IPP are likely to achieve their commercial objectives? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. Yes, per the law, I believe, the commercial potential is—— 

Mr. STUPAK. There is the point. The law says they are supposed 

to have commercial potential. You say one out of six might, so why 

are we funding the other five contrary to the law? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. At least my understanding is that projects that 

are approved for the purpose of being commercialized require an 

industry partner. Not all of our projects are approved for the purpose of commercialization. They are approved for the purpose of 

pursuing basic or perhaps applied research that we don’t plan to 

pursue as a commercialization—— 

Mr. STUPAK. So then why are we doing it under the IPP program 

then? Why don’t we just do it underneath our national labs? Why 

are you using this program for something that the law says it can’t 

be done for? Why would you go there with it? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. Well, I don’t—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Is it just in the interests of the Secretary or—— 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. No, sir, this is—our position is that the Global 

Nuclear Energy Partnership is one that we should support. It is 

the Administration’s policy, and we have made those decisions internal to our own management certainly with briefings to senior 

management. 

Mr. STUPAK. Yes, right, but isn’t it supposed to—the programs 

you want to run are supposed to be under Congress authorization, 

isn’t it, not what you think might be a good idea? The GNEP program, unless it has commercial application, hasn’t been approved 

by Congress. 

55 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. Well, I think you can look at GNEP in perhaps 

in two ways. One is—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Yes, I look at it underneath the law and not where 

you want to go with. 

In fact, Mr. Robinson, isn’t that one of the weaknesses you pointed out in your report? 

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes, our main issue with this is that it feels a little bit like mission creep, you know, and we have recommended 

that the relationship between GNEP and IPP be clarified and I 

think DOE is embarking upon undoing that, but it is the mission 

creep. What is the—we move the program into infinity and that is 

what is our issue is. We think, you know, this ought to be clarified. 

Mr. STUPAK. Do you want to comment on that at all? 

Mr. LEVIS. No, only to the extent what Bob Robinson says. We 

agree. We raised these questions about what authorization do you 

have to move the program in this direction, what guidance do you 

have, are there industry partners. These are the questions that you 

are raising today. We had the same questions. 

Mr. STUPAK. And as I said in my opening, I am not necessarily— 

I think this program is a valuable program but I think it has to 

be within the confines of what Congress has authorized and how 

we spend money and how the programs are being run. I mean, 

maybe we shouldn’t have an IPP program anymore. Maybe it 

should be a different program for nuclear research or reestablishing the nuclear base and technology and teaching in this country with the goal of nonproliferation. Maybe that is a more sensible 

way to go, at least underneath the authorization of Congress when 

we are spending $40 to $50 million a year. 

Let me ask you one more question if I can, Mr. Scheinman. Turn 

to tab 13 in the binder, please. This is a December 15, 2006, joint 

letter from Secretary Bodman and Director Carichenko directed to 

President Bush and President Bush and it is attached to a U.S.- 

Russian plan of action for implementing GNEP, the global nuclear 

program there. Is this agreement non-public or is it a public document? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. This is currently a non-public document. My understanding is that the office that directed it within the Department of Energy has committed to the Russians that we would seek 

their agreement before releasing it. 

Mr. STUPAK. Right. So before we can release this document, we 

need the Russians to agree with us, right? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. That is my understanding from the sponsoring 

office. 

Mr. STUPAK. Since this is a government-to-government agreement between the United States and Russia, why is it that Russia 

determines whether the U.S. government’s action plan to develop 

GNEP should be kept a secret from the American people? It is government to government. Wouldn’t the government make its own decision? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. I don’t think I would term this a governmentto-government agreement in the classical sense. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, it is President Bush to President Putin. 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. Yes, it is a joint report of ministers to two presidents. I believe the report could be treated as confidential foreign 

56 

government information which I think by its own rules and requirements would provide that Russia would have to agree to its 

release. As I say, I am happy to take this back to the sponsoring 

office and—— 

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. I mean, the assistant secretary for nuclear energy or U.S. Department of Energy signed it and his Russian counterpart did, but transparency is a cornerstone to the U.S. nuclear 

program policy with respect to civilian use of nuclear energy so I 

don’t know how keeping it secret would build the public trust in 

DOE’s plans for GNEP, so we are not going to make it public right 

now but I want to make it very clear that we come back and give 

us an answer to contact the Russian signatories so we can have 

public release of this document. We think it is critically important, 

especially with the GNEP program and the questions I have been 

asking you. 

One more question. A couple years ago, I am still waiting for an 

answer, Secretary Bodman on spent fuels—you know, this country 

doesn’t do it. We are probably about the only one that doesn’t do 

it. We have problems at Yucca Mountain with storage and all this 

other. I asked him to revisit that policy. Has he ever made any recommendations to President Bush to revisit, overturn that policy? 

That policy has been in place since the Carter years. Technology 

has progressed so much. I think it is one of those things we ought 

to look at. Would you please take that message back and see if we 

can get some answers? 

Mr. SCHEINMAN. I can tell you that it is being looked it very actively. 

Mr. STUPAK. Good. I just hate to have all those years of advocacy 

go down the drain. 

I guess that concludes it. I thank all of our witnesses for coming 

today. Sorry I was out for a bit. I was doing some work on the 

Great Lakes so I had to go testify. I am glad to be back. Thank 

you all. Good testimony, interesting issue. We will back with further hearings on this subject. Mr. Scheinman, Mr. Stratford, Mr. 

Robinson, Mr. Levis, thank you very much for your time. 

That concludes our questioning. I want to thank all of our witnesses for coming today and your testimony. I ask for unanimous 

consent that the hearing record will remain open for 30 days for 

additional questions for the record. Without objection, the record 

will remain open. I ask unanimous consent that contents of our 

document binder with the exception of tab 13, the one I just questioned on, with the exception of tab 13, all of the rest of them will 

be entered into the record. Subcommittee staff will work with the 

Department of Energy to find an acceptable copy of tab 13 to enter 

into the record. Without objection, the documents will be placed in 

the record. 

[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing:] 

Mr. STUPAK. That concludes our hearing, and without objection, 

this meeting of the subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:] 

57 

GIPP STATUS REPORT, MARCH 25, 2008 

INTERIM STEPS TAKEN

•Placed on hold projects underway at institutes having involvement in Iran’s nuclear programs; final decisions to be taken following completion of Energy/State 

Terms of Reference. 

•Cancelled 2 projects at one institute of concern. 

•Placed on hold two projects that involve Russia and proliferation-resistance of 

the fuel cycle. 

•Met with U.S. interagency to discuss path forward for GIPP and State redirection programs. 

•Outcome: State/Energy to update Terms of Reference for project reviews to ensure consistent application by IPP and ISTC. Aim is for interagency consensus on 

TOR within a month. 

•Briefed HECC staff on results of classified assessments in response to Committee 

questions. 

PROPOSED PATH FORWARD (SUBJECT TO CONSULTATIONS WITH STAKEHOLDERS) 

•Continue R/FSU projects that involve high-risk institutes. 

•Complete next phase of institute risk assessment to inform future programmatic 

decisions. 

•Gain Russian agreement over next several months on approach to cost-sharing. 

•Wind-down projects by end of FY 2010 that include no institutes rated as ′′high 

risk.′′ 

•Keep option of continuing projects at lower-risk institutes when needed to gain 

participation by high-risk institutes 

•Determine role of industry under a cost-sharing model. 

•Continue programs in Iraq and Libya (do not expect to carry forward with Libya 

beyond 2011). 

•Maintain readiness to support projects in North Korea. 

•Pursue nonproliferation technology projects outside of IPP; shift 2 existing advanced safeguards projects from GIPP to NA-242’s International Safeguards and Engagement Program. 

•Attain intra-Departmental and interagency agreement on approach to advanced 

fuel cycle projects; cost-sharing could be a condition of IPP support for approved 

projects in this area. 

•Shift cost savings to Safeguards/North Korea denuclearization tasks. 

INTERIM FINDINGS REGARDING RUSSIA AND IRAN: 

•The HECC raised concerns over IPP work at certain institutes. We have looked 

closely at these projects and have reached the following conclusions: 

•No payments were made to individuals at institutes under sanctions by the US 

Government. 

•No evidence of U.S. funds or technology supporting Iranian nuclear projects. 

•IPP has funded projects at institutes that have conducted work in Iran, though 

in some cases the reporting was acquired after the IPP projects were complete. 

58 

EXHIBIT BINDER INDEX

INITIATIVES FOR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION ORGANIZATIONAL MATERIALS

1. Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) Organizational Chart 

2. IPP Mission and Program Description 

3. IPP General Program Guidance, March 2002 

4. List of 35 Projects Funded by DOE at the Same Institutes Which Had Been 

′′Graduated′′ by the State Dept. Program in the Current or Previous Fiscal Years 

5. List of Current IPP Projects 

6. Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention—Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Projects 

NONPROLIFERATION STATUTES

7. National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000: Public Law 106-65, Section 

3136—Nonproliferation Initiatives and Activities 

8. FY94 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act: Public Law 103-87, Section 575— 

Ukraine/Russia Stabilization Partnerships 

9. Atomic Energy Act, Section 123 

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORTS AND CORRESPONDENCE

10. ′′Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns with DOE’s Efforts to Reduce the Risks 

Posed by Russia’s Unemployed Weapons Scientist.′′ GAO/RCED-99-54. (Executive 

Summary and Contents only, the full document can be found in the Subcommittee’s 

Files.), February 1999 

11. GAO engagement letter to DOE Secretary Bodman, re: researching IPP program for December 2007 report, 10/11/2006 

12. ′′Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in 

Russia and Other Countries Needs to be Reassessed.′′ GAO-08-189. (GAO Findings 

and Contents only, the full document can be found in the Subcommittee’s files.), December 2007 

U.S.-RUSSIA AGREEMENT

13. Transmittal of the Report of the United States and Russian Federation Joint 

Working Group on the Development of a Bilateral Action Plan to Enhance Global 

and Bilateral Nuclear Energy Cooperation, 12/15/06 

NEWS ARTICLES

14. Global Security Newswire article by Jon Fox, ′′GAO Lashes U.S. Nonproliferation Program.′′ 01/14/08 

15. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Russian) unattributed editorial: Assistance from the 

United States Arrived to Wrong Scientists. Washington is Ready to Turn its Back 

on Russian Closed Towns.′′ 01/17/08 

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ROBERT ROBINSON, RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FROM HON. GENE

GREEN

1. Your study finds that 15% of the scientists hired in the 97 projects reviewed by GAO were born after 1970 and therefore unlikely to have participated in Soviet-era WMD programs. Why does GAO believe this may actually increase proliferation risk? Has any analysis been performed to determine the proliferation risk posed by younger scientists? 

As we noted in our December 2007 report, officials at 10 of the 22 Russian and 

Ukrainian institutes we interviewed said that IPP program funds have allowed 

their institutes to recruit, hire, and retain younger scientists. DOE guidance for the 

IPP program does not specifically prohibit participation of younger scientists in IPP 

projects, but DOE has not clearly stated the proliferation risk posed by younger scientists and the extent to which they should be a focus of the IPP program. We believe that DOE has a mistaken and naive impression of how institutes in the former 

Soviet Union view the benefits of allowing younger scientists to participate in the 

IPP program. DOE’s practice of allowing younger scientists to participate in the IPP 

program has the unintended consequence of allowing former Soviet Union institutes 

to use the IPP program as a long-term recruitment tool and, thereby, may perpetuate the proliferation risks posed by scientists at these institutes. In our view, this 

is a very troubling issue that DOE needs to address as part of a fundamental reassessment of the IPP program. 

We are not aware of any analysis done by DOE to assess the proliferation risks 

posed by younger scientists. 

2. Does the IPP program operate under any strategic plan that understands the threat of WMD knowledge leakage, the final goal of these programs and the strategy used to reach these goals? 

In recent years, DOE has conducted strategic reviews and developed action plans 

for the IPP program, and has commissioned studies to help it better understand the 

threat of WMD expertise proliferation. However, we found that these efforts have 

not produced a more up-to-date and appropriate set of long-term goals and metrics 

for the program. For instance, we found that the IPP program’s long-term performance targets do not accurately reflect the current size and nature of the threat the 

program is intended to address because DOE bases the program’s performance 

measures on a 1991 assessment of the size of the former Soviet WMD scientific community. Moreover, the current program metrics - the total number of weapons scientists supported by IPP grants or employed in private sector jobs - are broad measures of program progress, but are not complete or meaningful indicators of program 

progress in reducing WMD expertise proliferation concerns within specific countries 

and institutes. 

DOE acknowledged these weaknesses in the IPP program strategy, metrics, and 

goals. As a result, we recommended in our December 2007 report that the Secretary 

of Energy, working with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, conduct a reassessment of the IPP program that, among other things, includes (1) a thorough analysis of the proliferation risk posed by weapons scientists 

in Russia and other countries, (2) a well-defined strategy to more effectively target 

the scientists and institutes of highest proliferation concern, and (3) more accurate 

reporting of program accomplishments. 

3. In your testimony, you often mention the Department of State’s strategy to ′′graduate′′ certain institutes from its programs and that DOE has 

not developed its own criteria to determine when participants ′′graduate′′ 

from the IPP program. Do you feel State’s ′′graduation′′ strategy is sufficient to determine if scientists or institutes no longer require assistance, 

and should DOE use State’s ′′graduation′′ strategy as a model for its own 

program? 

We did not specifically take a position on the use of State’s strategy as a model 

for DOE’s development of an exit strategy. However, we believe that State’s graduation strategy for its Science Centers program contains important elements that 

could serve as a baseline for DOE’s development of a transition or graduation strategy for the IPP program. As we stated in our December 2007 report, State used a 

range of factors, such as the institute’s ability to pay salaries regularly and to attract funding from other sources, when making determinations about the self-sustainability of institutes. DOE officials told us that they were aware of State’s approach and had discussed it with State officials. 

4. In your testimony, you state: ′′DOE officials stated that the IPP program metrics are not sufficient to judge the program’s progress in reducing 

proliferation risks. However, DOE has not updated its metrics or set priorVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:23 Mar 11, 2009 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00263 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\110-82 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
260 

ities for the program on the basis of a country-by-country and institute-byinstitute evaluation of proliferation risk.′′ After over a decade in existence, 

why do you believe the IPP program has not yet established adequate 

metrics or program priorities? 

The specific reasons why DOE has not yet established adequate metrics or program priorities are unclear to us. However, in its written comments on our December 2007 report, DOE acknowledged ′′the need to give greater consideration 

to.improving outdated metrics.′′ It should be noted that in its Fiscal Year 2009 Congressional Budget Request, which was published in February 2008, DOE had still 

not updated its metrics for the IPP program to reflect an updated assessment of the 

size of the at-risk population of WMD scientists in the former Soviet Union. DOE’s 

most recent congressional budget justification remains based on a 1991 National 

Academy of Sciences estimation of this population. 

5. In your testimony, you state that ′′the absence of a joint plan between 

DOE’s IPP program and the International Science and Technology Center’s 

Commercialization Support Program raises questions about the lack of coordination between these two U.S. government programs that share similar 

goals of finding peaceful commercial opportunities for foreign WMD scientists.′′ Do these two commercialization programs overlap, and should 

they be consolidated or restructured in any way? 

We did not assess the extent to which these two commercialization programs duplicate one another and offered no opinion on whether or not they should be consolidated or restructured. However, as we noted in our December 2007 report, DOE, 

State, and ISTC officials told us the IPP program and the Commercialization Support Program have a similar goal of finding commercial opportunities for weapons 

scientists in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union. According to 

ISTC officials, a key difference in the programs is that the Commercialization Support Program can support infrastructure upgrades at foreign institutes, but, unlike 

the IPP program, it is not used to support research and development activities. DOE 

and State officials stated that the programs are complementary, but acknowledged 

that they need to be better coordinated. 

At the January 23, 2008 hearing, the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State’s 

International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau testified that ′′aspects of commercialization are already in place at the ISTC via its commercialization program 

know called Innovation Initiatives (formerly the Commercialization Support Program) and at STCU through the Targeted Research Initiatives. For both these commercialization initiatives, State has worked with and drawn from the Department 

of Energy’s own commercialization efforts in the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program.′′ Both DOE and State concurred with our recommendation to more 

closely coordinate these programs. 

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RICHARD STRATFORD, RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FROM HON. BART

STUPAK

Question: 

You testified that the Department of State plans to sunset funding for 

Russian institutes as part of its Science Centers programs by 2012. Why 

doesn’t the State Department view its Science Centers program as a perpetual program? Aren’t the risks from scientist ′′brain drain′′ to rogue nations an ongoing problem which would merit continued funding? 

Answer: 

State’s Global Threat Reduction programs (GTR) are threat driven and worldwide. 

Thus, if State reaches 2012 and has graduated all the priority institutes on our 

Science Centers Program list, but there are still proliferation threats from FSU 

former WMD institutes or WMD experts, State will continue to engage scientists in 

the FSU. It may be the case that in 2012, the threat in the FSU may not still exist, 

and State would then use these funds to engage scientists at risk elsewhere; however, that is years away. For now, State plans to focus on engaging institutes that 

face the most important proliferation risks and to also focus on graduating institutes to financial self-sustainability. 

Question: 

What is the budget for FY2009 for the Science Centers Program? 

Answer: The estimated budget for FY2008 is $12 million shared between the 

International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU). No decision has been made about how to allocate 

our Global Threat Reduction funds for FY2009 among the various program elements 

worldwide. Since CTR’s programs are threat driven, we have been making 20% reductions to the Science Centers Program budget on average per year, and this may 

help estimating the budget for Science Center spending for FY2009. 

Question: 

What criteria does the Department of State use in selecting and graduating institutes from the program? 

Answer: 

Institutes are selected to be on the priority list for graduation based on an interagency review process. We started our graduation process with a list of 200 institutes which we believe need to become financially self-sustainable in order to decrease proliferation risk associated with financial instability. The U.S. considers and 

balances a variety of factors relating to an institute’s potential for financial self-sustainability. Examples of the types of factors utilized by the U.S. in making a determination about where an institute should fall in the graduation continuum are: 

•Ability to secure grant funding from international, non-Science Centers sources, 

•Possession of equipment/training/international certifications required to secure 

outside funding or, alternatively, the ability to meet such requirements through 

short-term, intensive training or equipment provision, 

•Staff ability to write competitive grant proposals for international funding bodies, 

•Ability to publish in international scientific journals, 

•Ability to develop a financial plan for long-term sustainability, 

•Ability to pay staff salaries regularly from host Government or outside (nonScience Centers) funding sources, 

•Capability of leveraging current or past Science Centers funding to increase host 

Government interest and investment in the institute, 

•Ability of institute to provide international access and conduct business in an 

open, transparent manner, 

•Ability to engage in contract research and/or commercial production (Note: For 

many research institutes in the former Soviet Union, the Department of State does 

not expect commercial success to be the most viable self-sustainability solution.), 

•Understanding of intellectual property concerns/requirements, 

•Designation of staff to handle intellectual property issues for the institute as appropriate, 

•Number of international patents/capability of filing records of invention. 

Additional factors that may be taken into account when determining an institute’s 

graduation status: 

•Number of former weapons experts still employed at the institute, 

•Security/location of materials at an institute that could be vulnerable to rogue 

state/terrorist use, 

•Proximity of an institute to a region with terrorist activity. 

Once an institute has been identified as a candidate for graduation, more targeted 

assistance can then be provided to help the institute to meet one or more final objecVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:23 Mar 11, 2009 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00302 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\CWELLS1\110-82 SCOM1 PsN: JIMC
299 

tives to enhance self-sustainability and eliminate the need for U.S. regular project 

funding. The U.S. believes that the Science Centers and ISTC/STCU Parties can be 

instrumental in providing this targeted assistance. The U.S. has also found that capabilities assessments can be helpful as the first step in institute discussions about 

self-sustainability planning as a prelude to graduation. 

Question: 

If an institute becomes financially self-sufficient, but continues to represent a proliferation concern, will the Department of State ′′graduate′′ this 

institute under its criteria? 

Answer: 

State continues to engage institutes that face the most important proliferation 

risks, regardless of their graduation status because residual risk may exist despite 

financial self-sustainability. 

Question: 

Why should the U.S. continue to fund two ′′brain drain′′ programs (Departments of State and Energy) with similar goals and objectives to support weapons of mass destruction scientists who were employed by the 

former Soviet Union? 

Answer: 

The Science Centers Program and Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program 

(IPP) are complementary. Under the Science Centers Program, State acts as the 

U.S. representative in the two international centers in the FSU. State’s programs 

focus on graduation and science projects and are part of our fast-paced and extensive worldwide effort to engage WMD scientists. State also funds initiatives at the 

Centers such as Counterterrorism workshops, business training, science advisory 

council meetings, communication support, etc., to redirect scientists to peaceful, sustainable civilian employment. From our perspective, IPP offers unique commercialization opportunities with U.S. private industry and national laboratory partners. When the programs were created, agencies viewed the Science Centers Program and DOE’s IPP Program as complementary and supplemental. 

Question: 

In terms of the Department of State’s involvement in scientist assistance 

programs in Iraq and Libya, what are the key differences between the approaches used by the Department of State and the Department of Energy 

(DOE)? 

Answer: 

State’s Iraq Redirection Program and the Libya Scientist Engagement Program 

are aimed at redirecting former WMD personnel and those with WMD-related expertise in these countries to peaceful, civilian activities. The Department of State 

has the lead for diplomatic and policy guidance on engaging WMD specialists in 

Iraq and Libya. 

In State’s redirection program in Iraq, we run our own science organization in the 

Red Zone, parts of Baghdad outside the International Zone perimeter, and also work 

to facilitate employment matchmaking, carry out business development and project 

management training, and support conferences and technical programs. DOE does 

not have its own science organization to carry out its work in Iraq. Rather, it partners with an independent regional organization that has a Baghdad branch office 

to provide technical scientific training and research opportunities to Iraqis. 

State efforts are coordinated with IPP through regular meetings and correspondence, participation in weekly Iraq Redirection Program-wide telecons, having IPP 

representation at CTR-sponsored proposal review meetings, and through coordination on strategic planning and upcoming events to ensure effective and united USG 

policy formulation and implementation. 

In Libya, following its historic decision to dismantle its WMD programs, Western 

assistance was requested in engaging Libyan WMD scientists. The Libya Scientist 

Engagement Program responds to this request by redirecting former WMD scientists toward civilian careers that can enhance Libya’s economic development. The 

UK and DOE are partners in these efforts. 

State works very closely with DOE which focuses primarily on nuclear scientists 

in Libya, and we engage the entire population of nuclear, biological, chemical, and 

delivery systems experts. Efforts in Libya are highly integrated and we rely on 

DOE’s technical expertise while we address the broader threat. 

Question: 

What is the Department of State’s view about the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) finding that the Department of Energy is currently 

funding 35 projects at 17 Russian and Ukrainian institutes that the Department of State considers to have ′′graduated′′ from its program? Does this 

make sense from a proliferation perspective? Does the Department of State 

300 

expect that DOE will continue to fund institutes that have graduated? 

What is the logic of this policy? 

Answer: 

State continues to fund graduated institutes that face the most important proliferation risks. Even after an institute has graduated, there may still be residual 

proliferation risk which we have to address through continued engagement. 

Question: 

Please itemize in former Soviet Union countries that are funded in whole 

or in part by the Department of State in 2008, the amounts per institute, 

and the project funded. 

Answer: 

State makes project funding decisions at the Governing Board meetings. At the 

ISTC, State funds science projects during three rounds of funding per year and at 

the STCU, twice per year. For FY2008, State has only funded projects at the ISTC 

and the STCU during one round each. 

At the STCU Governing Board meeting in November 2007, State funded STCU Regular Project #3984 for $199,687. The main institute is Frantsevich Institute for 

Problems of Materials Science of National Academy of Science of Ukraine. The participating institutes include Yuzhnoye State Design Office of NSAU and the Georgian Technical University of Ministry of Education and Science of Georgia. State 

also funded two Targeted Research Initiative (TRI) projects in Azerbaijan. This initiative is aimed to increase host state funding at the STCU. The cost of funding the 

project is split 50/50, between the funding parties and the host state respectively. 

One Azeri TRI was STCU TRI Project #4520 for the amount of $24,966 with the 

Azeri Institute of Physics. The second Azeri TRI was STCU TRI Project #4523 for 

the amount of $24,866 with the Institute of Zoology, Institute of Radiation Problems, and the Institute of Chemical Problems. 

At the ISTC Governing Board meeting in December 2007, State funded ISTC Reg- ular Project #3515 in the amount of $90,000 at the Federal State Unitary Enterprise 

′′Russian Federal Nuclear Center - All-Russian Research Institute of Technical 

Physics named after Academician E.I. Zababakhin (VNIITF). State also co-funded 

ISTC Regular Project #3799 in the amount of $114,000 (half the cost) at the Khlopin 

Radium Institute, St Petersburg, Russia with the supporting institute NPO Mayak, 

Oziorsk, Chelyabinsk region, Russia. 

These represent a small portion of what State intends to fund over the course of 

the fiscal year. 

Question: 

Please describe the nuclear safeguards agreements and verification procedures in place with Russia to protect and prevent the re-export of information related to projects funded under the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership by DOE. 

Answer: 

GIPP/GNEP projects potentially involving export controlled information or technology were structured to ensure that technology flows from Russia to the United 

States. 

Question: 

Does the United States have a ′′123′′ Agreement for Cooperation with Russia at this time? Has one been negotiated and initialed? 

Answer: 

Negotiations with Russia on the text of an Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (′′123 Agreement′′) were essentially completed in April 2007 and the text 

was initialed in Moscow on June 29, 2007. In their July 3, 2007 Declaration on Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation Joint Actions, President Bush and President 

Putin noted the initialing of the text with satisfaction and highlighted their shared 

view that the Agreement, once signed and brought into force, will provide ′′an essential basis′′ for cooperation between the United States and Russia in the field of 

peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 

The remaining statutorily-mandated steps toward securing the President’s approval of the proposed Agreement and his authorization to sign it are pending within the Executive Branch. The Administration has not yet moved the proposed Agreement forward for the President’s approval. 

Question: 

What policy differences are there with Russia which has caused the Department of State to refrain from submitting it to the Congress for review? 

Does this include concerns about the Bushehr reactor in Iran? 

Answer: 

The Administration does not regard Russia’s support for the Bushehr project in 

Iran as in itself a reason to withhold signature of the Agreement and its transmittal 

301 

to Congress. The President has made clear his support for Russia’s supply of nuclear 

fuel to Bushehr because it demonstrates that Iran does not need to possess the complete nuclear fuel cycle - with its latent proliferation risks - to take advantage of 

the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 

For the United States, having an agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation in 

place with Russia would provide a framework for potential commercial sales of civil 

nuclear commodities to Russia by U.S. industry. It would also facilitate U.S.-Russia 

cooperation in developing Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) technologies, 

in particular the development of advanced fast burner reactors, the fuel for which 

would likely be developed in the United States and then be transferred to Russia 

pursuant to the 123 Agreement for test irradiation. 

Question: 

How does the State Department perceive the risk posed by certain institutes and WMD scientists? How does this view differ from that of DOE’s? 

Answer: 

Global Threat Reduction (GTR) programs in the Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction are threat driven. State consults with the entire interagency on the risk 

posed by WMD expertise globally and then target our programs to mitigate these 

threats. CTR continues its redirecting efforts through the Science Centers Program 

because State assesses there is still a risk in the former Soviet Union of WMD expertise transfer to proliferant states or terrorists. 

State defers to DOE to explain its view on how it perceives the risk posed by certain institutes and WMD scientists. 

Question: 

Is there benefit for State and DOE to collectively establish a system for 

evaluating proliferation risk for institutes and scientists to better target involvement in the IPP and ISTC program? 

Answer: 

Yes. As State stated during the Congressional hearing on January 23, we agree 

that we should work more closely to evaluate proliferation risks and will work with 

DOE to that end. 

Question: 

Some believe that due to Russia’s increased financial prosperity, and to 

verbal commitments made by top government officials to help fund WMD 

scientists, that the U.S. should no longer fund the IPP program. Despite the 

rhetoric, has Russia made any tangible commitments to funding its own 

programs? If the U.S. withdrew funding, would Russia fund their own Soviet-era WMD scientists? 

Answer: 

State has been engaged in a dialogue with Russia to increase host state contributions to the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC). The U.S. and Russia have agreed that it is in both of our interests to help institutes reach self-sustainability. Russia is also increasing its own spending in areas that employ former 

weapons scientists. For example, Russian spending on public health spending has 

increased greatly and this trend has greatly contributed to many Russian biological 

institutes becoming financially self sustaining. 

Question: 

Can you further elaborate on State’s ′′exit strategy′′? Is it simply to 

′′graduate′′ institutes to financial self-sustainability? 

Answer: 

Self-sustainability programming is designed to decrease the resources necessary 

to engage WMD expertise in the former Soviet Union by graduating institutes so 

that we can redirect funds to emerging global threats. 

However, State continues to engage institutes worldwide that face the most important proliferation risks, regardless of their graduation status because residual 

risk may exist despite financial self-sustainability. Thus, our exit strategy is to 

make institutes financially self-sustainable by 2012, but if in 2012 we perceive residual risks, we will still continue some level of engagement. 

Æ