United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on Military Readiness, Committee on

National Security, House of

Representatives

May 1997 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

FORCES

Opportunities to Preclude

Overuse and Misuse

GAO/NSIAD-97-85

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-276593 

May 15, 1997

The Honorable Herbert H. Bateman

Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

U.S. special operations forces (SOF) are considered highly capable, elite

forces that are trained and maintained to address critical U.S. national

security objectives. SOF’s versatility, speed of deployment, and capabilities

make SOF ideally suited for today’s security environment, where significant

dangers are created by regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction, and transnational threats. Thus, it is important for the

Department of Defense (DOD) to ensure that SOF are ready to perform their

intended missions and are used in ways that capitalize on their unique

capabilities.

During our review, which was done at your request, our overall objective

was to determine whether SOF are being used in a manner that best

supports national security objectives. Specifically, we determined

(1) whether there is general agreement on the priorities for the use of SOF

by the regional commanders in chief (CINC) and SOF unit commanders;

(2) the pace of SOF operations and how SOF units’ senior officers and

enlisted personnel view the impact of that pace of operations on

readiness, morale, and retention; and (3) in those cases where the pace of

operations is perceived to be degrading SOF readiness, whether

opportunities exist to reduce that pace.

The primary bases for the information in this report are our discussions

with and documents obtained from officials at the five major commands,

visits to numerous special operations units, and responses to a

questionnaire from over 200 senior officers and enlisted personnel at CINC

headquarters and SOF units.

Background The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 19871

 called for the

establishment of a joint service special operations capability under a

single command. In April 1987, the Secretary of Defense established the

U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), whose mission is to provide

1

Public Law 99-661 (Nov. 14, 1986), codified at 10 U.S.C. section 167.

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trained and combat-ready special operations forces to the five geographic

CINCs. The law listed 10 activities over which the Command would exercise

authority as they relate to special operations: (1) direct action, (2) special

reconnaissance, (3) unconventional warfare, (4) foreign internal defense,

(5) civil affairs operations, (6) psychological operations,

(7) counterterrorism activities, (8) humanitarian assistance, (9) theater

search and rescue, and (10) other activities as may be specified by the

President or the Secretary of Defense (see app. I). Consequently, SOF are

used for a wide range of military activities and other activities that include

augmenting embassy staffs, conducting counternarcotics activities, and

training local law enforcement and U.S. government agency personnel.

SOF differ from conventional forces in that they are specially organized,

trained, and equipped to achieve military, political, economic, or

psychological objectives by unconventional means. Special operations are

conducted independently or in coordination with conventional forces

during peacetime—operations short of declared war or intense

warfare—and war. Political and military considerations sometimes shape

special operations and often require clandestine, covert, or low-visibility

techniques. Special operations also significantly differ from conventional

operations because of their enhanced physical and political risks,

operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly

support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and

indigenous assets.

USSOCOM comprises a wide variety of units: Army Special Forces (Green

Berets), Rangers, special operations aviation units, civil affairs units, and

psychological operations units; Navy Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) units and Special

Boat units; and an Air Force Special Operations wing and a Special Tactics

Group (see app. II). To create a force capable of proficiency across this

wide range of special activities, USSOCOM provides extensive and expensive

training. Although most personnel entering SOF have already undergone

basic military training, they must be further trained to accomplish special

operations missions. The qualification training for SOF personnel is

provided through USSOCOM’s service component commands. The cost for

such training varies greatly by military specialty. For example, the cost of

SOF qualification for an MC-130H aircrew varies from about $536,0002 for

the pilot to about $181,000 for the loadmaster; the approximate cost of the

entire five-man crew is $1.4 million. Similarly, the cost of SOF qualification

for a six-man MH-53J helicopter crew is about $1.7 million. The estimated

2

This cost includes about $215,000 for aircraft simulator time. Although the other crew members all

receive training along with the pilot, the costs are allocated for pilots only, since they drive the use of

simulators.

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cost of qualifying an Army Special Forces officer was $79,000 in fiscal year

1995, and according to Navy personnel, the cost of the basic training for a

Navy SEAL is about $33,000, exclusive of jump school and SEAL tactical

training. These costs do not include the cost of the continual in-unit

training that takes place once the SOF servicemember is assigned.

With its own budget, which has averaged about $3 billion per year since

fiscal year 1990, USSOCOM manages a force of almost 47,000

personnel—30,000 active duty servicemembers, 14,000 reserve and

National Guard personnel, and 3,000 civilians. Of the 30,000 active duty

servicemembers, 14,000 are special operations qualified personnel

assigned to deployable units. (See app. III.) The rest serve in functional

areas such as maintenance or logistics.

During an average week, between 2,000 and 3,000 SOF personnel are

deployed on 150 missions in 60 to 70 countries and are under the

command of the respective theater CINC. SOF units based within the

continental United States are under the command of USSOCOM and have a

worldwide orientation or are oriented toward a specific theater of

operation. All these forces continuously train to deploy and meet CINC

needs.

To perform missions in support of the regional strategy, the theater CINC

employs SOF that are forward based in the theater or that are in the theater

on routine deployments (the Navy SEALs’ 6-month deployments, for

example). If insufficient forces are available in theater, the CINC will make

a request for USSOCOM forces to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Once a

deployment has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the

Secretary of Defense, specific SOF units or individuals are deployed to the

theater of the requesting CINC and, with a few exceptions, are under the

CINC’s operational control. Upon completing the deployment, the specific

SOF units or individuals return to USSOCOM’s operational control.

Results in Brief SOF are considered an essential element for achieving U.S. national

security objectives. In general, there is a common understanding of and

agreement on primary SOF mission priorities between the CINCs and SOF

unit commanders assigned to each of the CINCs, and the CINCs often

consider SOF their force of choice for many diverse combat and peacetime

missions. However, there is some disparity on the priorities for collateral

activities for SOF, such as embassy support and antiterrorism activities.

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Little reliable data is available on the frequency and types of SOF missions

that would allow an analysis of SOF missions relative to CINC priorities and

regional strategy requirements, and historical data on deployment days for

all SOF elements are not available. Nevertheless, responses to our

questionnaire from almost 200 senior-level officers and enlisted personnel

in SOF units indicated that they believe the deployments of SOF units have

increased to the point that SOF readiness has been, or threatens to be,

degraded. Specifically, 60, 56, and 86 percent of the Army, Navy, and Air

Force respondents to our questionnaire, respectively, said they believe

readiness has been, or threatens to be, adversely affected by the current

level of unit deployments. In addition, SOF unit leaders believe that SOF are

performing some missions that could be handled by conventional forces.

Opportunities exist to reduce the perceived high pace of operations,

according to responses to our questionnaire. There may be opportunities

to use conventional forces instead of SOF for some collateral missions,

such as embassy support, and for missions that are already the

responsibility of conventional forces, such as combat search and rescue.

However, without basic, reliable, quantifiable information on the nature

and extent of actual SOF missions, the way in which SOF personnel are

deployed, and the impact of unit deployments on SOF readiness, USSOCOM

cannot identify such opportunities to achieve the appropriate levels of

deployment and ensure that SOF are properly used. Therefore, we believe

that action is needed to complete a system that will allow (1) the pace of

SOF operations to be measured and assessed relative to national security

objectives and SOF training needs and (2) the identification of the factors

that cause SOF personnel to be deployed in excess of established

deployment goals.

Operations Provide

Valuable Support to

Regional Strategies

SOF are considered to be an essential element for the CINCs’ successful

implementation of U.S. national security objectives. SOF have come to be

the CINCs’ force of choice in many instances. In two of the five theater

commands we visited, CINC officials and SOF unit leaders oriented to those

theaters agreed on the top three mission categories SOF should conduct to

support the CINCs’ regional strategies. There was, however, some disparity

between the views of CINC officials and SOF unit leaders on mission

priorities in the remaining three theaters, and there was less agreement

overall on the priorities of collateral missions performed by SOF, such as

embassy support and antiterrorism activities.

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Officials at the major commands we visited expressed a high degree of

satisfaction with SOF support of their regional requirements. They said the

CINCs consider SOF the force of choice for many diverse combat and

peacetime missions. For example, officials at the European Command said

that SOF are critical to the CINC’s ability to conduct engagement activities

with an increasingly smaller force. For crisis response in the current

low-intensity security environment, the staff considered SOF as the most

important. Officials in both the European and Pacific Commands said they

plan to employ SOF first when a potential crisis develops, forming a joint

SOF task force to assess the situation, advise the CINC, and prepare the area

for follow-on action, if necessary.

More significantly, officials at the Southern Command said that nothing

could be done militarily in the theater without SOF. They stated that the

Command’s area of responsibility, which comprises many countries that

do not commit much funding to their militaries, was “made for SOF.” The

primary activities in this theater are the training of foreign military

officials, counternarcotics operations, and miscellaneous other-than-war

operations—activities in which SOF excel. Officials said that SOF are also

good ambassadors for the United States.

The CINCs use SOF as one of the elements available to them to support their

regional strategies. Because of their extensive training, relative maturity,

and in most cases language skills and cultural orientation, SOF are

well-suited to perform a wide variety of missions, ranging from direct

action, rapid response missions, to foreign internal defense missions3

 that

support the CINCs’ peacetime strategies. Table 1 shows each CINC’s top

three SOF mission priorities, as reported to us, and highlights how

priorities vary among the theaters.

3

These missions include training, advising, and helping host nation military and paramilitary forces to

combat subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

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Table 1: Top Three SOF Mission

Priorities at the Major Commands SOF mission priority

Major command First Second Third

U.S. European

Command

Counterproliferation Foreign internal

defense

Special

reconnaissance

U.S. Pacific

Command

Special

reconnaissance

Counterterrorism Counterproliferation

U.S. Atlantic

Command

Foreign internal

defense

Special

reconnaissance

Counterterrorism

U.S. Central

Command

Counterterrorism Counterproliferation Special 

reconnaissance

U.S. Southern

Command

Foreign internal

defense

Special

reconnaissance

Counterterrorism

Extent of a Common

Understanding of Regional

Priorities for SOF Missions

To ensure that regional priorities are understood and addressed by SOF,

each of the CINCs has a subunified command to serve as an executive agent

for SOF use. The theater Special Operations Commander advises the

geographic CINC regarding SOF use and capabilities and plans and

coordinates joint SOF activities within the command. He also exercises

command and control over the SOF forces assigned, which generally do not

include Army civil affairs and psychological operations personnel. These

assets are generally controlled directly by the geographic CINC.

The theater special operations commanders appear to have had some,

albeit not complete, success in establishing a common understanding of

primary SOF mission4

 priorities in the theaters. Responses to the “primary

SOF missions” segment of our questionnaire show that in the European and

Southern Commands, CINC officials and the leaders of Army SOF units

oriented to those theaters agree on the top three mission categories for

supporting the CINCs’ regional strategies. Our questionnaire results showed

disparities in primary mission priorities in the Pacific, Central, and the

Atlantic Commands, as shown in table 2.

4

Primary missions are those for which SOP were organized, trained, and equipped.

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Table 2: Priorities for Primary SOF Missions

Primary SOF mission

Foreign

internal

defense

Special

reconnaissance

Unconventional

warfare Counterterrorism

CounterproliferationDirect

action

European Command

CINC 2 3 6 4 1 5

10th Special

Forces Group 1 2 4 5 3 6

Pacific Command

CINC 4 1 5 2 3 6

1st Special

Forces Group 1 2 3 4 5 6

Atlantic Command

CINC 1 2 5 3 6 4

3rd Special

Forces Group 1 3 2 6 5 4

Central Command

CINC 4 3 5 1 2 6

5th Special

Forces Group 2 1 3 6 4 5

Southern Command

CINC 1 2 6 3 4 5

7th Special

Forces Group 1 3 5 2 6 4

It should be noted that table 2 displays only Army Special Forces units that

are forward deployed in a theater or oriented to it. The CINCs also have

available to meet their priorities Navy SOF deployed in theater on a rotating

basis, Air Force SOF to support special operations activities in the theater,

and other Army SOF. Additionally, some disparity between CINC and SOF

unit priorities may be attributed to differences in the service’s vision of

mission employment and the larger joint service view of regional

requirements.

Navy SOF unit leaders’ responses also indicated priorities similar to the

priorities indicated by the three CINCs in whose area they are forward

deployed. They did, however, differ on the priorities of foreign internal

defense and direct action missions. For example, the leaders of SEAL units

oriented to the European and Southern Commands reported that foreign

internal defense missions should be low in priority for their units, while

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CINC officials reported that foreign internal defense was a high priority.

Unlike the Army Special Forces, SEALs generally do not receive language or

cultural awareness training. According to SEAL officers and

noncommissioned officers we talked to, potential problems with language

are typically resolved by augmenting SEAL personnel with interpreters.

However, officials from both SEAL Groups expressed concern that

increased involvement in foreign internal defense missions may be having

a detrimental effect on the SEAL community. They said that such

involvement may be altering the expectations of younger SEALs and

causing them to consider leaving the community because SEALs have

traditionally been a direct-action force. They also said they believed that

SEAL units engaged in foreign internal defense activities had lost some

proficiency in war-fighting skills due to a lack of training opportunities

and, because foreign internal defense activities are often done by smaller

contingents, the unit integrity of the SEAL platoon had been disrupted.

Collateral Duties According to responses to our questionnaire, CINCs and SOF unit leaders do

not always agree on the priority of collateral missions5

 that SOF personnel

and units are routinely assigned. For example, CINC officials at the

European Command ranked embassy support as their number two priority

for SOF collateral activities. However, the leaders at the two Army Special

Forces Groups and the Naval Special Warfare Group oriented to the

theater ranked embassy support their number six priority out of nine

collateral activities. Similarly, in the Pacific Command, CINC officials

ranked antiterrorism their number one priority for collateral activities,

while Army and Navy unit officials consider it their number seven and four

priority, respectively. Moreover, leaders at the Special Forces Group and

the Naval Special Warfare Group assigned to the Pacific Command

prioritized personnel recovery activities as numbers one and two collateral

activities, respectively, while CINC officials ranked personnel recovery as

number seven.

Pace of Operations

and the Impact on

SOF Readiness

In 1995 SOF commanders began to express concern about high levels of

unit deployments (referred to as operating tempo, or OPTEMPO) and their

effect on personnel who were repeatedly away from home for prolonged

periods. As one commander stated in a memorandum to his subordinate

commands, these deployments “have an adverse impact on retention,

create problems for families, and erode our ability to maintain the training

5

Collateral missions include activities other than those for which SOF are organized, trained, and

equipped.

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B-276593 

edge required to fight and win on the battlefield.” Accordingly, USSOCOM

initiated efforts to manage OPTEMPO, including efforts to improve usage

data and the development of a system to monitor the extent to which SOF

individuals are deployed away from home (known as personnel tempo, or

PERSTEMPO).

During our review, we obtained data on current PERSTEMPO rates but found

that prior years’ information was not collected or was not maintained. The

data available revealed that PERSTEMPO varied widely among SOF units and

that some military specialties had high deployment rates. Perhaps more

important, however, according to USSOCOM officials, there was no valid

data on OPTEMPO to allow for identification of the factors driving the

deployment rates, that is, what types of activities (for example, training,

exercises, and contingency operations) were increasing and to what

degree.

Although the lack of data did not allow for verification or quantification of

OPTEMPO increases, we did determine that SOF commanders and staff at the

unit level perceive that the increased rate is adversely affecting their units.

In response to our questionnaire, the majority of the SOF commanders,

staff officers, and senior enlisted personnel who responded said they

believe that OPTEMPO increases have caused or threatened to cause adverse

effects on readiness.

Empirical Data on SOF

Activities Is Inaccurate or

Incomplete

Although all commands could provide general information on the types of

missions for which SOF were used, little data were available on the actual

missions and the extent to which they were performed. Officials at

USSOCOM and the service component commands told us they have not

collected and maintained accurate and complete information on the

numbers of actual missions categorized by mission type. Therefore, we

could not analyze actual SOF use relative to CINC priorities.

USSOCOM develops weekly information on the number of personnel

deployed in total and by country. This information is used primarily to

develop status briefings for the Commander, USSOCOM. Officials told us,

however, that data collected prior to fiscal year 1996 were highly

inaccurate due to a lack of consistent definitions for the different types of

missions and incomplete reporting by the SOF component commands.

USSOCOM officials told us they are still working to develop standardized

mission categories for mission reporting.

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Of the three SOF service component commands, only the Army Special

Operations Command maintains force utilization information by mission

type. Officials said they maintain information from 1993 to the present on

the number of deployments by type of mission (for example,

counternarcotics and Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises), personnel deployed

by mission type, and the number of personnel deployed to each CINC.

However, officials told us that inconsistent mission-type reporting has

distorted the categories in which missions are recorded and that trying to

develop a trend on SOF use over time by mission type could produce

misleading results.

Officials at the Navy Special Warfare Command and the Air Force Special

Operations Command said they do not maintain complete information on

the types of missions fulfilled by their personnel. Navy officials told us

they are not required to keep such information, and since their personnel

are under a CINC’s command and control, they had not recognized a need

for this type of information. Air Force Special Operations Command

officials told us their job is to provide the needed support, such as

clandestine infiltration, and they had no need to maintain records on the

overall purpose of the mission.

USSOCOM officials told us they recognize the need for information on SOF

use by mission category, and the Command is developing standard mission

definitions as an essential first step toward quantifying missions and

identifying the mission areas that are increasing. These definitions were

finalized during the second quarter of fiscal year 1997, and USSOCOM

officials said that the first information using these definitions could be

available at the end of the fiscal year.

USSOCOM Has Monitored

Some Deployment

Statistics, but Actual Rates

for Some Personnel Are

Understated

In October 1995, USSOCOM implemented a system for collecting information

on personnel deployment rates. The system requires commanders to

submit quarterly information on officer and enlisted personnel and job

position categories. USSOCOM officials use this data to identify the

personnel categories with higher than desired deployment rates.

The reporting system requires unit officials to determine the total number

of days that personnel in each category were deployed during the quarter

and divide the total by the number of personnel assigned in each category

to derive an average deployment rate for each category. These rates are

compared with USSOCOM and service component deployment goals to

identify personnel groups that have exceeded established deployment

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goals. USSOCOM officials said that the Army’s goal for the maximum number

of days deployed per year is 179, and the Air Force’s goal is 120 days. The

Navy’s goal is 180 days over an 18-month period. USSOCOM has not officially

established a goal, but officials told us that the informal goal was not to

exceed 180 days per year.

The methodology that USSOCOM has directed its units to use in calculating

personnel deployment rates results in an understatement of the actual rate

for some categories of personnel. The figures reported are understated

because they are an average of all SOF personnel, including staff personnel

who do not routinely deploy. For example, through June 30 in fiscal year

1996, the reported average of the number of days officers on one SEAL team

were deployed was 115. However, if only the officers in the operational

platoons are included, the average is 158 days. Similarly, for all enlisted

members, the reported average number of days deployed was 122, while

the average for those assigned to the operational platoons was 163 days.

Ignoring this deficiency, however, the system does provide USSOCOM with

an awareness of deployment activity by specific unit, personnel categories,

and military specialties. However, USSOCOM lacks, as noted above, specific

data on the actual use, which would allow it to determine the causes of

excessive deployments. And unless the causes are identified, it is difficult

for USSOCOM to identify alternatives for alleviating the situation.

Unit-Level Commanders

and Staff Believe Increases

in OPTEMPO Affect

Readiness

Because reliable data on historical OPTEMPO rates were not available, we

interviewed SOF unit leaders and used our questionnaire to determine

whether unit-level commanders and staff believed increasing OPTEMPO

rates had affected, or threatened to affect, readiness, retention, and

morale. The interview results were contradicted by the questionnaire

results. During meetings with unit-level leaders, we were told that OPTEMPO

has historically been high but has not increased significantly in recent

years. According to Army officials, the number of days deployed had

stayed about the same, and the Navy SEALs said that, because their

deployments are for the most part based on long-standing commitments to

the CINCs, the rate had remained fairly stable. Air Force officials said that

OPTEMPO had remained at high levels, especially in units performing

combat search and rescue and in special tactics units.

The results of our questionnaire indicated that some SOF unit leaders held

opinions quite different from those expressed during the interviews. The

results show that the majority of respondents believed that OPTEMPO

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increases had caused, or threatened to cause, adverse effects on readiness.

Table 3 shows the percentage of those responding who believe that

OPTEMPO increases have adversely affected readiness, morale, and

retention.

Table 3: SOF Unit Responses to Our

Questionnaire on the Effect of

OPTEMPO

Percent of responses

Views of SOF commanders and staff Army Navy Air Force

OPTEMPO increases have adversely affected

unit 60 56 86

OPTEMPO has adversely affected readiness 45 44 67

OPTEMPO has adversely affected morale 45 34 86

OPTEMPO has adversely affected retention 40 32 81

Table 4 provides the percentages of responses from particular Special

Operations Forces leaders who believe that OPTEMPO has affected unit

readiness.

Table 4: SOF Unit Responses to Our

Questionnaire on the Effect of

Increased OPTEMPO on Readiness

Unit

Percent of respondents

who said that OPTEMPO

had adversely affected

readiness

Army Unit A 50

Army Unit B 30

Army Unit C 88

Army Unit D 53

Air Force Unit E 50

Air Force Unit F 67

Navy Unit G 58

Navy Unit H 32

Note: The SOF units included are coded to protect the confidentiality of the respondents.

Nothing in our review indicates the extent to which readiness has been

affected, and the impact of the perceived increased OPTEMPO on SOF

readiness is not readily apparent in DOD’s current readiness reporting

system. For example, over the past 3 years, the Status of Resources and

Training System (SORTS)6

 reports submitted by Army SOF unit commanders

have continually reported high levels of readiness. However, SORTS, as we

6

SORTS measures the extent to which units possess the required resources and are trained to

undertake their wartime missions. These measurements, called C-ratings, are probably the readiness

indicator most often cited.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-97-85 Special Operations Forces
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have reported previously and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agrees, does not

capture all the factors that DOD considers critical to a comprehensive

readiness analysis.7

 For example, SORTS does not provide information on

factors such as mobility, OPTEMPO, morale, and leadership. As a result of

the lack of supporting data, we were unable to substantiate the concerns

of unit officials regarding readiness.

SOF unit leaders also believe that increased OPTEMPO has affected personnel

retention and morale. Table 5 shows the percentage of responding SOF unit

leaders who told us that retention and morale had been adversely affected.

Table 5: SOF Unit Responses to Our

Questionnaire on the Effect of

Increased OPTEMPO on Retention and

Morale

Percent of responses

Unit

OPTEMPO has

adversely affected

retention

OPTEMPO has

adversely affected

morale

Army Unit A 65 55

Army Unit B 50 60

Army Unit C 63 63

Army Unit D 33 47

Air Force Unit E 75 75

Air Force Unit F 100 100

Navy Unit G 32 42

Navy Unit H 32 27

Note: The SOF units included are coded to protect the confidentiality of the respondents.

Opportunities Exist to

Reduce SOF

OPTEMPO

Given USSOCOM’s concern about OPTEMPO and the widespread belief that it

is affecting SOF readiness, retention, and morale, we examined the

potential for reducing OPTEMPO. According to CINC and SOF unit officials,

conventional forces could handle many activities routinely assigned to SOF

personnel. These officials generally agreed that the missions that offer the

greatest potential for the use of conventional forces are humanitarian

assistance, embassy support, and support to other government agencies.

Additionally, some SOF leaders told us that the use of SEALs in Navy

Amphibious Ready Groups does not constitute good use of these forces,

and Air Force SOF are used for combat search and rescue missions that are

the responsibility of conventional forces.

7

Army Training: Evaluations of Units’ Proficiency Are Not Always Reliable (GAO/NSIAD-91-72, Feb. 15,

1991); Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Develop a More Comprehensive Measurement System

(GAO/NSIAD-95-29, Oct. 27, 1994); Military Readiness: Improvements Still Needed in Assessing

Military Readiness (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-107, Mar. 11, 1997).

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Because reliable data by type of mission were not available, we could not

determine the magnitude of opportunity offered by these missions.

However, USSOCOM publications and data provided by Joint Chiefs of Staff

officials confirm that SOF personnel are deployed for these types of

missions. For example, in fiscal year 1996, SOF personnel were assigned to

embassy support duties in all theaters of operation and were used on

humanitarian assistance missions in the Pacific and European Commands.

Air Force SOF Are Used

for Conventional Combat

Search and Rescue

Missions

Although conventional combat search and rescue missions are the

responsibility of conventional forces, Air Force SOF have been continually

used for these missions. Currently, Air Force SOF are performing

70 percent of conventional combat search and rescue missions worldwide,

which contributes to the OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO problems experienced by

Air Force SOF units. And as we reported in 1994, these missions also

reduce the readiness of the SOF units involved because crews lose

proficiency due to restrictions imposed by host nations and the lack of

training opportunities.8

The legislation that created USSOCOM identified theater search and rescue

as a SOF activity insofar as it related to special operations.9

 Under joint

doctrine, each service must provide for combat search and rescue in

support of its own operations; however, Air Force SOF are routinely tasked

to perform conventional combat search and rescue operations. SOF assets

have been continually used for these operations since about 1990, and Air

Force Special Operations Command officials told us that they expect that

SOF will continue to be tasked to perform the brunt of the combat search

and rescue mission for conventional forces in the foreseeable future.

Although Air Force SOF are considered extremely capable of performing

these missions, they do so at the expense of unit and joint training in

special operations skills, the availability and sustainability of their limited

forces, and an acceptable OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO. Unit leaders told us that

crews assigned are frequently unable to train in the full range of required

capabilities because they are restricted by host nations. For example, the

flying hours, flight duration, and flight profiles (night and low-level flights,

for example) of the crews deployed to Turkey in support of Operation

Provide Comfort were restricted. One commander told us that his

personnel were limited to a 50-mile training radius. Officials said the host

nations expect SOF to arrive there trained, not to train while there.

8

Special Operations Forces: Force Structure and Readiness Issues (GAO/NSIAD-94-105, Mar. 24, 1994).

9

Public Law 99-661 (Nov. 14, 1986), codified at 10 U.S.C. section 167(j).

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-97-85 Special Operations Forces
B-276593 

Similarly, the availability of assets is limited by a requirement to maintain

an alert posture for combat search and rescue missions. Officials at the Air

Force Special Operations Command in the European Command said that

about 20 percent of their force must be on alert status at all times for

combat search and rescue missions. Further, officials said the SOF crews

assigned to support this conventional mission suffer high levels of

PERSTEMPO, which keeps them deployed near or above the 120-day goal the

Air Force has established.

Who should perform Air Force combat search and rescue missions has

been an issue since 1990 when the Air Force Special Operations Command

was created from the 23rd Air Force, which had been tasked with the

missions. The transfer left the Air Force without the specialized aircraft or

aircrews trained to conduct the missions. The capability to do combat

search and rescue was to be developed within the Air Force’s Air Combat

Command, and the Command was expected to assume the combat search

and rescue role by the end of fiscal year 1994. However, this never

occurred. USSOCOM is presenting a proposal to the Air Force that would

continue to have the Air Force Special Operations Command perform

combat search and rescue missions, but the Air Force would fund them.

Nevertheless, performing these missions will continue to generate high

levels of PERSTEMPO for SOF crews performing these conventional missions.

SEAL Officials Believe

Shipboard Deployments

Adversely Affect

Proficiency and Readiness

At all times, the Navy SEALs have a platoon deployed with each of the three

Amphibious Ready Groups. The Group includes a Marine Expeditionary

Unit and provides the CINC with a mobile, rapid-response force under his

operational control. Both the Marine units and the SEAL platoons rotate to

the continental United States after a 6-month deployment. The SEAL

platoon is intended to provide the Group with a special operations

capability, including the capability to survey and reconnoiter potential

landing sites in a clandestine manner.

SEAL unit commanders told us that they consider the 6-month deployment

to be a “less than efficient” use of the highly trained SEAL platoon. Because

of the limited space and assets on ships, training opportunities are

extremely limited and the platoon loses proficiency. Moreover, the SEAL

unit has to compete for the limited operational opportunities with the

Marines, particularly the Marine Reconnaissance Unit, which possesses

many of the same skills as a SEAL platoon.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-97-85 Special Operations Forces
B-276593 

SEAL officials at the Naval Special Warfare Group and team levels told us

that to reduce OPTEMPO and provide better training opportunities, they have

proposed alternative methods of providing the Group with the SEAL

support, but no action has been taken. They maintain that the Amphibious

Ready Groups’ most pressing need for SEALs is the hydrographic survey of

landing sites and that with today’s air transportation capabilities, SEALs

based in the United States or ashore in a specific theater could be at a

proposed site well ahead of the Group and provide the surveys in a more

timely manner.

Conclusions and

Recommendations

SOF are considered an essential element for the CINCs’ successful

implementation of national security objectives, and in less than a decade

these forces have proven themselves the CINCs’ force of choice for many

types of missions. SOF’s reputation has been earned by their acceptance

and accomplishment of a wide variety of missions.

We cannot determine precise increases in SOF activity due to the lack of

reliable quantitative and qualitative data collected over the years. For the

same reason, we cannot determine the specific ways in which SOF have

been used. Many SOF unit leaders that responded to our questionnaire are

convinced, however, that OPTEMPO has adversely affected readiness,

retention, and morale.

SOF unit leaders also believe that SOF are being used for missions that do

not require their skills and that in some instances degrade their skills. In

addition, unit leaders and CINC officials believe that conventional forces

could fulfill missions routinely performed by SOF. Consequently, USSOCOM

and the services may have opportunities to manage SOF OPTEMPO, with the

CINCs’ concurrence, if conventional units can be tasked to perform those

missions.

To maintain the readiness of SOF to support national security objectives

and help ensure that readiness is not degraded through overuse or

improper use of SOF, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct

the Commander, USSOCOM, to

• complete the Command’s efforts to develop an information system for

monitoring how the Command’s forces are used and establish a

methodology for periodically comparing SOF usage with the CINCs’

priorities and SOF training needs and

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-97-85 Special Operations Forces
B-276593 

• exploit potential opportunities to reduce some SOF deployments that do

not prepare SOF to perform SOF-unique missions in support of national

security objectives and that can be performed by conventional forces.

Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with its accuracy. DOD

stated that the report discusses the various components of SOF in a way

that provides a comprehensive view of the potential for overuse and

misuse.

DOD concurred with both of our recommendations and stated that it has

already initiated actions that focus on deployments for SOF and other 

low-density/high-demand forces. For example, DOD indicated that the

Global Military Force Policy, instituted in July 1996, is expected to help

senior leaders establish peacetime priorities for low-density/high-demand

assets. The first data available for interpretation from the policy is to be

available during fiscal year 1998, according to DOD. Also, DOD stated that

while the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff already reviews the use of

all U.S. forces to ensure proper employment, USSOCOM must retain the

latitude to ensure that SOF users are carefully consulted to preclude

elimination of deployments where SOF involvement could have significant

impact on mission objectives.

Scope and

Methodology

We developed a data collection instrument using the Analytical Hierarchy

Process (see app. IV) to rank the most valuable missions for SOF. The

instrument was distributed to all the theater CINCs’ staffs, the special

operations commanders in each theater, and SOF units worldwide. It was

used to obtain information concerning CINC priorities for SOF activities by

theater of operations, SOF unit-level leaders’ understanding of regional

priorities, perspectives on the best missions for SOF in each theater, and a

prioritization of activities that could be accomplished by conventional

forces. The instrument also included questions to obtain unit-level staffs’

opinions on OPTEMPO increases and the resulting effect on readiness,

retention, and morale in their units.

To obtain additional supporting data, we visited four of the five theater

CINCs, the USSOCOM CINC, the three service component headquarters, four of

five Special Forces Groups, both Navy SEAL Groups, and two Air Force

Special Operations Groups. (See app. V for a complete list of sites we

visited.) We also interviewed officials from the Office of the Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-97-85 Special Operations Forces
B-276593 

and the Special Operations Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Because

we were interested in the extent to which SOF are deployed and how they

are used, our review primarily focused on active duty units, which are

normally deployed first to meet mission requirements. We did, however,

meet with psychological operations and civil affairs personnel from SOF

reserve units during our visits to the European and Pacific Commands.

The purpose of these meetings was to gain an understanding of OPTEMPO

and PERSTEMPO challenges faced by these low-density/high-deploying

personnel.

In addition, we examined the legislation that established USSOCOM, Joint

Chiefs of Staff publications, and historical publications provided by the

services.

Our review was conducted from October 1995 through March 1997 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking

Minority Members of the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

and the Senate Committee on Armed Services; the Secretaries of Defense,

the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commander of the U.S. Special

Operations Command; and the Director, Office of Management and

Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix VII.

Sincerely yours,

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations and

 Capabilities Issues

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-97-85 Special Operations Forces
Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-97-85 Special Operations Forces
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Activities Assigned to

Special Operations

Forces

22

Appendix II 

U.S. Special

Operations

Command’s Major

Subordinate

Commands and Units

24

Army Special Operations Command 24

Air Force Special Operations Command and Forces 25

Naval Special Warfare Command and Forces 25

Joint Special Operations Command 30

Appendix III 

Active and Reserve

Special Operations

Component Forces

Assigned to the U.S.

Special Operations

Command

27

Appendix IV 

Description of

Analytical Hierarchy

Process Model

28

Appendix V 

List of Locations

Visited

29

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-97-85 Special Operations Forces
Contents

Appendix VI 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

31

Appendix VII 

Major Contributors to

This Report

33

Tables Table 1: Top Three SOF Mission Priorities at the Major

Commands

6

Table 2: Priorities for Primary SOF Missions 7

Table 3: SOF Unit Responses to Our Questionnaire on the Effect

of OPTEMPO

12

Table 4: SOF Unit Responses to Our Questionnaire on the Effect

of Increased OPTEMPO on Readiness

12

Table 5: SOF Unit Responses to Our Questionnaire on the Effect

of Increased OPTEMPO on Retention and Morale

13

Abbreviations

CINC Commander in Chief

DOD Department of Defense

OPTEMPO operating tempo

PERSTEMPO personnel tempo

SEAL Sea-Air-Land

SOF Special Operations Forces

SORTS Status of Resources and Training System

USSOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-97-85 Special Operations Forces
Appendix I 

Activities Assigned to Special Operations

Forces

Title 10 U.S.C. section 167(j) lists 10 activities over which the U.S. Special

Operations Command exercises authority as they relate to special

operations. These activities and a brief description of each activity follow:

Direct actions are short duration strikes and other small-scale offensive

actions to (1) seize, destroy, or inflict damage on a specified target or

(2) destroy, capture, or recover designated personnel or material.

Special reconnaissance is conducted to obtain or verify, by visual

observation or other collection means, information concerning the

capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to

secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrological, geographic, or

demographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes target

acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance.

Unconventional warfare is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary

operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by

indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped,

supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It

includes guerrilla warfare and other direct-offensive, low-visibility, covert,

or clandestine operations as well as the indirect activities of subversion,

sabotage, intelligence collection, and evasion and escape.

Foreign internal defense is conducted to assist another government to free

and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

Special operations forces train, advise, and otherwise assist host nation

military and paramilitary forces.

Counterterrorism is the application of highly specialized capabilities to

preempt or resolve terrorist incidents abroad, including (1) hostage

rescue, (2) recovery of sensitive material from terrorist organizations, and

(3) direct action against the terrorist infrastructure.

Civil affairs operations are to establish, maintain, influence, or strengthen

relations between U.S. and allied military forces, civil authorities, and

people in a friendly or occupied country or area.

Psychological operations are to support other military operations through

the use of mass media techniques and other actions to favorably influence

the emotions, attitudes, and behavior of a foreign audience on behalf of

U.S. interests.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-97-85 Special Operations Forces
Appendix I 

Activities Assigned to Special Operations

Forces

Humanitarian assistance is provided to relieve or reduce the results of

natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human

pain, disease, hunger, or deprivation that might present a serious threat to

life or loss of property. This assistance supplements or complements the

efforts of host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the

primary responsibility for providing this assistance.

Theater search and rescue is performed to recover distressed personnel

during wartime or contingency operations.

Other activities are specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense,

such as counterproliferation, which was specified in May 1995.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-97-85 Special Operations Forces
Appendix II 

U.S. Special Operations Command’s Major

Subordinate Commands and Units

Army Special

Operations Command

The Command is responsible for all U.S.-based active and reserve Special

Forces; Rangers; Special Operations Aviation, Psychological Operations,

Civil Affairs, and support units; and selected special mission and support

units assigned by the Secretary of Defense.

Special Forces (Green Berets) are organized into five active and two

National Guard groups. The groups are organized, trained, and equipped to

conduct the five primary special operations missions of direct action,

special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense,

and counterterrorism. Special Forces soldiers train, advise, and assist host

nation military or paramilitary forces.

Rangers are organized into a regiment that contains a headquarters

company and three battalions. There are no reserve Ranger units. The

Rangers are rapidly deployable, airborne, light infantry units that are

organized, trained, and equipped to conduct complex joint strike

operations. These units can also operate as light infantry in support of

conventional missions.

Special Operations Aviation is organized into an active regiment with three

battalions, a detachment in Panama, and a National Guard battalion. These

units provide dedicated specialized aviation support to other special

operations forces. Their missions include armed attack; inserting,

extracting, and resupplying personnel; aerial security; medical evacuation;

electronic warfare; mine dispersal; and command and control support.

Psychological operations forces are organized into one active and two

reserve psychological groups that vary in number and types of subordinate

units depending on their mission and geographic alignment. Their mission

is to study and be prepared to influence the emotions, attitudes, and

behaviors of foreign audiences on behalf of U.S. and allied interests. They

operate with conventional and other special operations forces to advise

and assist host nations in support of special operations missions such as

counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, and civil affairs programs.

Civil Affairs units comprise 3 Army reserve commands, 9 reserve brigades,

24 reserve battalions, and one active battalion. The units’ primary function

is to establish favorable relationships between the U.S. military and

foreign governments and populations. Moreover, civil affairs forces assist

military operations through population or refugee control and support to

other U.S. agencies.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-97-85 Special Operations Forces
Appendix II 

U.S. Special Operations Command’s Major

Subordinate Commands and Units

The reserve civil affairs units provide professional civilian skills such as

police, judicial, logistical, engineering, and other civil functions that are

unavailable in the one active unit.

Air Force Special

Operations Command

and Forces

The Command has one Special Operations Wing, two Special Operations

Groups, and one Special Tactics Group in its active force and one Special

Operations Wing in its reserve force.

The Command’s primary missions are to organize, train, and equip its

units, but it may also train, assist, and advise the air forces of other nations

in support of foreign internal defense missions. The Command operates

uniquely equipped fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft for missions that include

inserting, extracting, and resupplying personnel; aerial fire support;

refueling; and psychological operations. Its aircraft are capable of

operating in hostile airspace, at low altitudes, under darkness or adverse

weather conditions in collaboration with Army and Navy Special

Operations Forces (SOF).

Naval Special Warfare

Command and Forces

The Command has two naval special warfare groups, one naval special

warfare development group, and two special boat squadrons split between

the east and west coasts of the United States. Each special warfare group

includes three Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams and one SEAL delivery vehicle

team. Each squadron includes subordinate special boat units (three on the

east coast and two on the west coast). Naval special warfare forces

deployed outside the United States receive support from permanently

deployed naval special warfare units located in Panama, Germany, Puerto

Rico, Guam, Spain, and Bahrain.

The six active SEAL teams are organized into headquarters elements and

ten 16-man operational platoons. Navy SEALs, like Army Green Berets, are

organized, trained, and equipped primarily to conduct direct action,

special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense,

and counterterrorism missions. They conduct these missions primarily in

maritime and riverine environments. SEALs can also directly support

conventional naval and maritime operations.

Joint Special

Operations Command

This Command is a joint headquarters designed to study special

operations requirements and techniques; ensure interoperability and

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-97-85 Special Operations Forces
Appendix II 

U.S. Special Operations Command’s Major

Subordinate Commands and Units

equipment standardization; plan and conduct special operations exercises

and training; and develop joint special operations tactics.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-97-85 Special Operations Forces
Appendix III 

Active and Reserve Special Operations

Component Forces Assigned to the U.S.

Special Operations Command

aSea-Air-Land units.

Source: Special Operations Command.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-97-85 Special Operations Forces
Appendix IV 

Description of Analytical Hierarchy Process

Model

The Analytical Hierarchy Process model is an organized way to evaluate

research questions. It allows a researcher to divide an issue by its major

elements. These elements are then organized into levels, which move from

the general to the specific. To implement the model in this review, we used

the commercial software package Expert Choice by Expert Choice,

Incorporated, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. This software allows the

researcher to evaluate the respondents’ judgments as to which elements in

the model are more important than others and derives prioritized listings

for elements within each level.

In typical practice, a panel of persons knowledgeable about the subject

under review is asked to evaluate one element against another in paired

comparison fashion. For example, in a three-element evaluation, the

panelists are asked to evaluate A versus B, A versus C, and B versus C. In

other words, regarding the goal, is element A more important, preferred,

or more likely than element B, or is element B more important, preferred,

or more likely than element A? Once the panelists reach consensus on

which element of a pair is preferred over the other, they are asked how

much more important, preferred, or more likely is the dominant element of

the pair over the other. Therefore, both the preference and its intensity are

measured.

Alternatively, the model can be used in a questionnaire mode, which is

how we employed the model during this review. We developed a series of

one-level comparisons to reduce the workload on the respondents.

Convening typical panels would not have been practical because we

wanted to cover as many units and individuals as possible.

For each pair-wise comparison of our questionnaire, we collected our

respondents’ judgments on a coded numerical form that measured not

only the intensity but the direction of the relationship. In other words, if

element A was moderately preferred to B, then the value of that judgment

for that pair for that individual was entered into our database.

To summarize the data, we calculated the geometric mean for each paired

comparison, stratified by SOF units. The geometric mean dampens the

effect of extremely low or extremely high judgments. The resulting

averages were entered into the Expert Choice software, which calculated

the priorities for each set of elements for each Commander in Chief (CINC)

and SOF unit. We printed the results for each set of paired comparisons and

analyzed the differences between units within a service and also between

services.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-97-85 Special Operations Forces
Appendix V 

List of Locations Visited

We visited the following locations during our review of SOF’s activities:

Washington, D.C.,

Area

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low

Intensity Conflict

• Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations Division

• Washington Office, U.S. Special Operations Command

• Naval Sea Systems Command

Fort Bragg, North

Carolina

• Headquarters, Army Special Operations Command

• U.S. Army Special Forces Command

• U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

• Third Special Forces Group

• Seventh Special Forces Group

• 528th Special Operations Support Battalion

Florida • Headquarters, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base

• Air Force Special Operations Command, 16th Special Operations Wing, 8th

Special Operations Squadron, 16th Special Operations Squadron, 20th

Special Operations Squadron, and 720th Special Tactics Group, Hurlburt

Field

• Air Force Special Operations Command, 9th Special Operations Squadron,

Eglin Air Force Base

Coronado, California • Headquarters, Naval Special Warfare Command

• Naval Special Warfare Center

• Naval Special Warfare Group One

• SEAL Teams One, Three, and Five

Virginia • Headquarters, U.S. Atlantic Command, Special Operations

Command-Atlantic, Norfolk

• Naval Special Warfare Group Two, SEAL Teams Two and Four, Little Creek

Fort Carson, Colorado • Headquarters, 10th Special Forces Group

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-97-85 Special Operations Forces
Appendix V 

List of Locations Visited

Fort Lewis,

Washington

• Headquarters, 1st Special Forces Group

• Headquarters, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment

Hawaii • Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command

• Special Operations Command Pacific

• Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Panama • Headquarters, U.S. Southern Command

• Special Operations Command South

Germany • Headquarters, U.S. European Command

• Special Operations Command Europe

• 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group

• Naval Special Warfare Unit Two

• 352nd Special Operations Group

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-97-85 Special Operations Forces
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-97-85 Special Operations Forces
Appendix VI 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 16.

Now on p. 17.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-97-85 Special Operations Forces
Appendix VII 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Sharon A. Cekala

Donald L. Patton

Colin L. Chambers

H. Lee Purdy

Joseph F. Murray

Norfolk Field Office Ray S. Carroll Jr.

James K. Mahaffey

Lester L. Ward

Paul A. Gvoth Jr.

(703112) Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-97-85 Special Operations Forces
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