If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

HILLGER ENTERPRISES, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

and

RIG PROPERTIES 2, LLC, and SOUTHTRACK 

MANAGEMENT 2, LLC,

Plaintiffs,

UNPUBLISHED

November 12, 2020

v No. 350170

Wayne Circuit Court

CITY OF DETROIT, LC No. 18-009417-CZ

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and CAVANAGH and BORRELLO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff1appeals by right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of 

defendant. We affirm.

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2017, defendant gave plaintiff conditional zoning approval to operate a Medical 

Marijuana Caregiver Center (MMCC).

2

 Also in 2017, the Michigan Department of Licensing and 

 

1 Plaintiffs Rig Properties 2, LLC and Southtrack Management 2, LLC voluntarily dismissed their 

claims against defendant with prejudice in the trial court, and are not parties to this appeal.

2

1984 Detroit Zoning Ordinance § 61-16-131 defines a “medical marihuana caregiver center” as 

“[a] medical marihuana business operated by a registered primary caregiver that distributes 

medical marijuana, in a manner authorized by the [Michigan Medical Marihuana Act, 
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Regulatory Affairs (LARA) issued several emergency rules pertaining to the Medical Marihuana 

Facilities Licensing Act (MMFLA), MCL 333.27101 et seq. Emergency Rule 19 provided that an 

applicant who had applied no later than February 15, 2018 for a state license3to operate a 

“proposed marihuana facility” under the MMFLA could “temporarily operate” a facility “that 

would otherwise require a state operating license” if certain other criteria, not relevant to this 

appeal, were met.4 Before that deadline, plaintiff submitted to LARA an application for a license 

to operate a commercial marijuana facility; specifically, plaintiff applied for a “Class C grow 

license” to operate a marijuana growing facility. On February 12, 2018, the city clerk for defendant 

approved an “Attestation E” form submitted by plaintiff. The Attestation E, signed by both the 

city clerk and a member manager of plaintiff, authorized plaintiff, as “the applicant for a state 

operating license as named below in part B,” to “temporarily operate a proposed marihuana facility 

as provided in the LARA . . . Emergency Administrative Rules filed with the Sec. of State . . . .”

On April 9, 2018, defendant’s law department submitted a memorandum to its city council 

addressing medical marijuana. The memorandum stated that defendant “was willing to authorize 

temporary operation for the approximately 70 MMCC locations that had previously received 

zoning approval as a MMCC. As required by [LARA], the Detroit City Clerk’s office executed a 

form called Attestation E for 57 locations, which constitute the only facilities that are currently 

allowed to be operating as a dispensary in Detroit.” Plaintiff was one of the 57 entities 

“authorize[d] for temporary operation . . . .”

According to plaintiff’s complaint, officers from the St. Clair Shores Police Department 

executed a search warrant on June 14, 2018 at 661 Hillger Street in Detroit and seized and 

destroyed plaintiff’s property at that location. On June 15, 2018, defendant sent plaintiff a letter 

informing plaintiff that its planned use of its site at 661 Hillger Street as a marijuana growing 

facility was not authorized. Plaintiff stated in its complaint that it ceased all operations on June 

19, 2018.

On August 2, 2018, plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiff 

sought a declaratory judgment from the trial court that “Attestation E is a license to temporarily 

operate a MMFLA facility” and that “Defendant issued Attestation E to Plaintiffs and cannot 

revoke it without due process of law.” Plaintiff also sought “an Injunction enjoining Defendant 

 

MCL 333.26421 et seq.], to registered qualifying patients as defined by the Act, or performs other 

activities pertaining to medical marihuana authorized by the Act.”

3 The MMFLA requires state licensure to operate as a marijuana “grower,” “processor,” “secure 

transporter,” “provisioning center,” or “state compliance facility.” MCL 333.27102(ff). Although 

by convention the various marijuana acts in Michigan use the term “marihuana,” in this opinion, 

apart from direct quotation, we will employ the more common spelling “marijuana.”

4 See Rule 19. Temporary operation; limited circumstances; conditional. 

https://www.michigan.gov/mra/0,9306,7-386-83994-454538--,00.html (last accessed October 21, 

2020).
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from any further attempts to rescind Plaintiff[’s] Attestation E.” Plaintiff withdrew its application 

for a Class C Grower license from LARA in November 2018.

After defendant answered the complaint, plaintiff moved to amend, seeking to add claims 

for monetary damages. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion. Defendant subsequently filed a 

motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and MCR 2.116(C)(10). Defendant 

argued that while plaintiff was permitted to operate a MMCC, it was not permitted to operate a 

marijuana growing facility. Defendant also argued that the case was moot because plaintiff had 

withdrawn its application for a Class C grower license with LARA. The trial court held that 

plaintiff had only been authorized to operate a MMCC, not a growing facility, and that the case 

was moot in any event, and granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition. This appeal 

followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court did not specifically state which subrule(s) it relied upon in granting 

defendant’s motion. Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(8) if “[t]he 

opposing party has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted.” An issue is moot if “an 

event occurs that renders it impossible for a reviewing court to grant relief.” B P 7 v Bureau of 

State Lottery, 231 Mich App 356, 359; 586 NW2d 117 (1998). Therefore, mootness is an 

appropriate ground for granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). We review de 

novo the trial court’s determination that a case is moot, Garrett v Washington, 314 Mich App 436, 

449; 886 NW2d 762 (2016), as well as its decision on a motion for summary disposition under 

MCR 2.116(C)(8), Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).

III. ANALYSIS

The trial court concluded in part that because plaintiff withdrew its application for a Class 

C Grow license in November 2018, the case was moot. We agree.

“In order to appeal, a party must be an aggrieved party.” Garrett, 314 Mich App at 449 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). “On appeal, the litigant must demonstrate that he or she 

is affected by the decision of the trial court.” Id. at 450 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“An issue becomes moot when a subsequent event renders it impossible for the appellate court to 

fashion a remedy.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

For a trial court to grant a request for declaratory judgment, there must be an actual 

controversy between the parties. MCR 2.605(A)(1) (“In a case of actual controversy within its 

jurisdiction, a Michigan court of record may declare the rights and other legal relations of an 

interested party seeking a declaratory judgment, whether or not other relief is or could be sought 

or granted.”). “In general, ‘actual controversy’ exists where a declaratory judgment or decree is 

necessary to guide a plaintiff’s future conduct in order to preserve his legal rights.” Shavers v 

Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 588; 267 NW2d 72 (1978).

In its complaint, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the “Attestation E is a license 

to temporarily operate a MMFLA facility” and that “[d]efendant issued Attestation E to Plaintiff[] 

and cannot revoke it without due process of law.” Plaintiff also sought an injunction “enjoining 
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Defendant from any further attempts to rescind Plaintiff[’s] Attestation E.” As stated, plaintiff 

sought to amend its complaint to add claims for monetary damages, but the trial court denied its 

motion; on appeal, plaintiff does not challenge that denial.

Evaluating plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief requires that we interpret 

the language of Attestation E. Attestation E is a document generated by LARA as authorized by 

the MMFLA. Generally, principles of statutory interpretation apply to language used by 

administrative agencies. See, e.g., City of Romulus v Mich DEQ, 260 Mich App 54, 65; 678 NW2d 

444 (2003). If such language is “unambiguous on its face, the drafter is presumed to have intended 

the meaning plainly expressed and further judicial interpretation is not permitted.” Id.

The plain language of Attestation E is that an “applicant for a state operating license” may 

operate a temporary facility under certain conditions, provided that the applicant meets certain 

other criteria and complies “with the Emergency Administrative Rules and the MMFLA.” When

plaintiff withdrew its application for a license under the MMFLA, it was no longer an “applicant 

for a state operating license.” The plain language of Attestation E therefore prevented the trial 

court, at the time it interpreted plaintiff’s Attestation E, from granting plaintiff any of its requested 

relief; indeed, once plaintiff withdrew its license application, an order granting the relief would 

have had no practical effect. Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that plaintiff’s case 

was moot. B P 7, 231 Mich App at 359; Garrett, 314 Mich App at 450. Because we agree with 

the trial court’s determination of mootness, we do not address plaintiff’s other arguments 

concerning the trial court’s determination that it was only authorized to operate an MMCC, not a 

marijuana growing facility.

Affirmed.

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello