ARK.] RODGERS V. SOUTHLAND RACING CORP.	

1115 

PORTER RODGERS ET AL V. SOUTHLAND RACING


CORPORATION 

5-5148	 450 S. W. 2d 3 

Opinion delivered February 2, 1970 

[Rehearing denied March 9, 1970.] 

1. STATUTES—REGULATION OF DOG RACING TRACK—VALIDITY OF AMENDMENT.—Statute which permits operation of a greyhound race 

track with pari-mutuel betting which was amended to require 

all officers and directors to be qualified electors of the State, 

to have resided in the county where the track is located for 

at least two years, and maintain their residence in the county 

during tenure of their office h eld valid. 

2. LICENSES—GREYHOUND RACE TRACK, OPERATION OF AS PRIVILEGE—

STATE'S RIGHT TO CONTROL.—Operation of a greyhound race track 

with legalized gambling is a privilege which the State might 

prohibit altogether, and the State may impose conditions upon
1116	RODGERS V. SOUTHLAND RACING CORP.	[247 

the exercise of the privilege beyond those that might be imposed 

upon the enjoyment of matters of common right. 

8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—POLICE POWER OF ErrATE.—Statute reqtdring officers and directors of greyhound race track to be residents 

of the county and State held a permissible exercise of State's 

police power because residence requirements would enable the 

licensing authority to determine whether applicant was of good 

moral character, and maintain necessary surveillanee over conduct of a business that must be closely regulated in the interest 

of the public peace, health and safety. 

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—POLICE POWER OF STATE—PROVINCE OF LEG-. 

ISLATURE.—Residence requirements of the act held not so arbitrary or totally without foundation as to be contrary to the 

constitution because the extent to which gambling establishments should be controlled by law is within the province of 

the legislature, even to the point of total prohibition. 

Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court, Third Division, Kay L. Matthews, Chancellor; reversed. 

Joe Purcell, Attorney General ; Don Langston, and 

Mike Wilson, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellants. 

Wright, Lindsey & Jemings, for appellee. 

GEORGE ROSE SMITH, Justice. The appellee, Southland Racing Corporation, operates a greyhound race 

track in Crittenden county, with pari-mutuel betting, 

under the authority of Act 191 of 1957, as amended. 

Ark. Stat. Ann., Title 84, Ch. 28 (Repl. 1960). In 1969 

the General Assembly amended the law to provide that 

all officers and directors of such greyhound dog tracks 

must be qualified electors of the State, must have resided in the county where the track is located for at least 

two years, and must maintain their residence in the 

county during their tenure in office. Act 285 of 1969 ; 

Ark. Stat. Ann. § 84-2823.10 (Supp. 1969). 

Harry Latourette is Southland's only officer and 

only director who is not a resident of Crittenden county. Southland brought this suit against the members of 

the State Racing Commission and the Attorney General
ARIL] RODGERS V. SOUTHLAND RAGING CORP. 1117 

for a declaratory judgment holding Act 285 to be unconstitutional and for an injunction restraining the Commission from enforcing the act. This appeal is from a 

decree holding the act to be invalid as a grant of special 

privileges and immunities that do not equally belong to 

all citizens upon the same terms. Ark. Const., Art. 2, 

§ 18.

In assailing the validity of the act Southland relies 

not only upon the privileges and immunities clauses of 

the state and federal constitutions, but also upon the due 

process, equal protection, and interstate commerce 

clauses. We shall consider all those constitutional attacks together, for with respect to each one the controlling question is whether Act 285, with its residence requirements, is a reasonable exercise of the state's police 

power. 

We hold the act to be valid. The operation of a dog 

track, with legalized gambling, is unquestionably a 

privilege which the State might prohibit altogether if it 

chose to do so. Fortune telling and the sale of intoxicating liquors fall in that same category and may similarly be prohibited. White v. Adams, 233 Ark. 241, 343 

S. W. 2d 793 (1961) ; Wade v. Horner, 115 Ark. 250, 

170 S. W. 1005, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 167 (1914). That being 

true, the State may impose conditions upon the exercise 

of the privilege beyond those that might be imposed 

upon the enjoyment of matters of common right. As we 

said in the Wade case: "The State has this right, be. 

cause the authority to sell liquor is a mere privilege, 

which the State may grant or withhold, as it pleases, 

or, if it grants this permission at all, it may do so under 

any conditions which it cares to impose ; and this is true, 

as has been stated, even though these conditions are so 

onerous, as to amount to virtual prohibition of that 

traffic." 

Statutes restricting the issuance of liquor licenses 

to local residents have frequently been sustained. Well
1118 RODGERS V. SOUTHLAND RACING CORP.	[247 

reasoned opinions include those in De Grazier v. Stephens, 101 Tex. 194, 105 S. W. 992 (1907), citing other 

cases, and Hinebaugh v. James, 119 W. Va. 162, 192 

S. E. 177 (1937), which we approved in Brown v. Cheney, 

233 Ark. 920, 350 S. W. 2d 184 (1961), cert. den. 369 

U. S. 796. Such a statute is a permissible exercise of 

the State's police power. The reason is that the residence requirement enables the licensing authority to determine in the first instance whether the applicant is of 

good moral character and to maintain thereafter the 

necessary surveillance over the conduct of a business 

that must be closely regulated in the interest of the public peace, health, and safety. 

Those considerations apply with even greater force 

to an establishment, such as a race track, where gambling is permitted. It is common knowledge that underworld racketeers and criminal syndicates are constantly 

seeking to gain control of gambling enterprises and devices, whether legal or illegal. Our lawmakers were certainly justified in believing that a residence requirement 

such as that contained in Act 285 would assist local authorities in the necessary policing of establishments 

such as race tracks. The exact extent to which such establishments should be controlled by law is peculiarly 

within the province of the legislative branch of the State 

government. When we consider the broad power that the 

state has over such enterprises, extending even to the 

point of total prohibition, we certainly cannot say that 

the simple yesidence requirements set forth in Act 285 

are so arbitrary or so totally without foundation as to 

be contrary to the constitution. 

We have not overlooked Southland's further contentions that Act 285 violates the obligation of its contractual franchise and that the act is a local or special 

measure simply because Southland happens to operate 

the only greyhound track in the state. We do not regard 

either contention as having sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion. 

Reversed.