U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

61–296 CC WASHINGTON : 1999

Y2K AND NUCLEAR POWER: WILL THE REACTORS

REACT RESPONSIBLY?

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,

INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 22, 1999

Committee on Government Reform

Serial No. 106–58

Committee on Science

Serial No. 106–55

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform and the

Committee on Science

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

DOUG OSE, California

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin

HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

DAVID A. KASS, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian

CARLA J. MARTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY

STEPHEN HORN, California, Chairman

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

DOUG OSE, California

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin

JIM TURNER, Texas

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

J. RUSSELL GEORGE, Staff Director and Chief Counsel

MATT RYAN, Senior Policy Director

BONNIE HEALD, Communications Director/Professional Staff Member

CHIP AHLSWEDE, Clerk

TREY HENDERSON, Minority Counsel

(III)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HON. F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., (R–Wisconsin), Chairman

SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York

LAMAR SMITH, Texas

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

JOE BARTON, Texas

KEN CALVERT, California

NICK SMITH, Michigan

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan*

DAVE WELDON, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

THOMAS W. EWING, Illinois

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

MERRILL COOK, Utah

GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR., Washington

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin

STEVEN T. KUYKENDALL, California

GARY G. MILLER, California

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

JACK METCALF, Washington

RALPH M. HALL, Texas, RMM**

BART GORDON, Tennessee

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

LYNN N. RIVERS, Michigan

ZOE LOFGREN, California

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas

DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina

NICK LAMPSON, Texas

JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas

VACANCY

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland, Chairwoman

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota*

THOMAS W. EWING, Illinois

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

MERRILL COOK, Utah

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin

STEVEN T. KUYKENDALL, California

GARY G. MILLER, California

JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan**

LYNN N. RIVERS, Michigan

DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts

BART GORDON, Tennessee

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

EX OFFICIO

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR.,

Wisconsin+

RALPH M. HALL, Texas+

(V)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on October 22, 1999 .......................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Beedle, Ralph, senior vice president and chief nuclear officer, Nuclear

Energy Institute ............................................................................................ 51

Miraglia, Frank, Deputy Executive Director for Reactor Programs, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission ................................................................. 30

Rhodes, Keith, Director, Office of Computer and Information Technology

Assessment, Office of Management and Budget ........................................ 28

Willemssen, Joel, Director, Civil Agencies Information Systems, U.S. General Accounting Office .................................................................................. 8

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Beedle, Ralph, senior vice president and chief nuclear officer, Nuclear

Energy Institute:

Nuclear utility readiness information ..................................................... 78

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 53

Horn, Hon. Stephen, a Representative in Congress from the State of

California:

Letter dated December 18, 1998 .............................................................. 328

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 3

Miraglia, Frank, Deputy Executive Director for Reactor Programs, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, prepared statement of .......................... 33

Rhodes, Keith, Director, Office of Computer and Information Technology

Assessment, Office of Management and Budget, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 9

Turner, Hon. Jim, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 5

Willemssen, Joel, Director, Civil Agencies Information Systems, U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared statement of ........................................... 9

(1)

Y2K AND NUCLEAR POWER: WILL THE

REACTORS REACT RESPONSIBLY?

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1999

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON GOVERN- MENT REFORM, SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT MAN- AGEMENT, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY, JOINT

WITH THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

TECHNOLOGY, Washington, DC.

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:13 a.m. in

room 2318, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen Horn

(chairman of the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology) presiding.

Present from the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology: Representatives Horn, Turner, Mink,

Biggert, Kanjorski, Ryan, Davis, Ose, and Maloney.

Present from the Subcommittee on Technology: Representatives

Morella, Bartlett, Capuano, Baird, Gutknecht, Ehlers, and Udall.

Staff present from the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology: George Russell, staff director

and chief counsel; Matthew Ryan, senior policy director; Bonnie

Heald, communications director and professional staff member;

Chip Ahlswede, clerk; P.J. Caceres and Deborah Oppenheim, interns; Trey Henderson and Michelle Ash, minority counsels; and

Jean Gosa, minority staff assistant.

Staff present from the Subcommittee on Technology: Jeff Grove,

staff director; Ben Wu, professional staff member; Joe Sullivan,

staff assistant; Michael Quear, professional staff member; and

Mary Ralston, staff assistant.

Mr. HORN. A quorum being present, we will begin the hearing.

There are more than 430 nuclear power plants in the world, including 103 in the United States. Domestically, nuclear power

plants provide an estimated 20 percent of the Nation’s power supply. Regardless of the year 2000 computer challenge, safety has

historically been a paramount concern at all U.S. nuclear facilities;

however, the risk of even one failure at one plant is one too many.

Today we will hear from a panel of witnesses who will describe

the work that has been done to mitigate the risk of a nuclear accident related to the year 2000 computer problem.

In December 1998, I and my colleagues, Congressman Dennis

Kucinich, the former ranking member of the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology, and Congressman Donald Manzullo wrote to the former chairman of the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission expressing our concern over the Nuclear

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Regulatory Commission’s plan to perform detailed audits on only

10 percent of the Nation’s 103 nuclear facilities. Because of the potentially devastating consequences of a nuclear accident, we strongly recommended that the audits be performed on all nuclear facilities. Our recommendation was rejected.

Today we want to be assured that the Nation’s nuclear facilities

are free of year 2000 risks. We want to provide an accurate portrayal of nuclear year 2000 readiness.

I welcome our panel of expert witnesses and look forward to their

testimony.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Stephen Horn follows:]

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Mr. HORN. Mr. Turner has official business that he’s working on

right now, and when he comes back his statement during the question period will be automatically part of the record.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Jim Turner follows:]

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Mr. HORN. Are there any statements that any of the Members

would like to say at this time?

[No response.]

Mr. HORN. None. The vice chairman, Mrs. Biggert, the gentlewoman from Illinois.

Mrs. BIGGERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We have reached that critical point, with just under 70 days left

before the new year, when systems work drills and contingency

plans should be complete, but, as we are going to hear today, that

might not be exactly true in the case of all the Nation’s nuclear

power plants, which is why this hearing on year 2000 nuclear

power is so timely.

We have discussed Y2K’s impact on commerce, government services, transportation, and life at home, but even if we address potential Y2K problems in these areas, none of these systems will work

without electricity. By providing 20 percent of this country’s electricity without contributing any air pollution, our nuclear power

plants are vital to the stability of our electricity supply and the environment.

The issue of Y2K and nuclear power is particularly important to

my home State of Illinois. There are about a dozen nuclear reactors

located throughout the State, 10 of which serve the northern 20

percent of Illinois, including Chicago.

Commonwealth Edison, the owner of the 10 reactors serving

northern Illinois, came before the Government Reform Committee’s

subcommittee at a field hearing in July in the district that I represent and reported that all nuclear stations were Y2K ready in

July. So none of these plants are on the NRC’s short list and never

were, but we must remain concerned about the nine systems and

seven reactors that aren’t currently in compliance, and we must

also be concerned about other sources of electricity.

American nuclear power plants don’t operate in a vacuum. Commonwealth Edison admits that a failure at one of their surrounding

utilities could have some impact on their systems.

So I want to thank the panelists for coming here today and updating us on the final preparations for Y2K, and I thank you, Mr.

Chairman, for holding this hearing.

Mr. HORN. Thank you very much.

Does any other Member have an opening statement? The gentleman from Pennsylvania, the acting ranking member.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous

consent that the statement of Mr. Turner be entered in the record.

Mr. HORN. Without objection, it will be placed in the record between my own opening statement and the vice chairman’s opening

statement.

Well, no other statements, let me now swear in the witnesses.

[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.]

Mr. HORN. Note that all four witnesses have affirmed.

The way we work is when we introduce you, your full statement

is automatically in the hearing record. We’d like you to summarize

it, not read it word for word, because we can read—but if you summarize the high points, that will give us more time for a dialog

among the panel, as well as between the Members and the panel.

So we will start with Mr. Willemssen, who is our regular presenter,

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and the first one doing it. The U.S. General Accounting Office does

a wonderful job for this subcommittee and all committees in the

House.

Mr. Willemssen, it is good to see you. We have seen you all over

the country this year, and we are glad to see you here in Washington.

Please give your presentation.

STATEMENT OF JOEL WILLEMSSEN, DIRECTOR, CIVIL AGENCIES INFORMATION SYSTEMS, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING

OFFICE

Mr. WILLEMSSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the

subcommittees. Thank you for inviting GAO to testify today. As requested, we will summarize our statement.

Our Nation’s nuclear power plants continue to make progress on

their readiness for Y2K. Even with this progress, some risks remain. These risks include not knowing the current Y2K status of

all 14 decommissioned plants with spent fuel, the lack of information on the consistency and extent of independent reviews of Y2K

testing and emergency Y2K exercises, and the lack of requirements

for day one planning, which is that series of events that should be

planned for the end of December and the beginning of January.

To address these risks, we have developed a set of suggested actions for NRC to consider.

First, it is important that NRC know the status of all 14 decommissioned plants with spent fuel and report their status.

Second, NRC should determine what independent verification

and validation efforts have been completed at nuclear power plants

and determine whether additional reviews are needed.

Third, NRC should identify whether emergency contingency exercises performed by nuclear power plants have incorporated Y2K

scenarios.

And, finally, we think it is especially important that NRC ensure

that all facilities have developed day one plans. We have recently

issued guidance in this area, which OMB has encouraged Federal

agencies to use.

Let me next turn to Mr. Rhodes, GAO’s Director for Computer

and Information Technology Assessment, who will provide you with

some detailed information on the risks of nuclear plants using a

Powerpoint presentation.

Mr. Rhodes came to GAO from the Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory, one of two U.S. nuclear design labs. Since joining GAO,

he has been heavily involved in nuclear energy issues such as

stockpile stewardship, nuclear material tracking, and non-proliferation. So I will turn it over to Mr. Rhodes and we will see if we can

have our slide show.

In addition, we have hard copies of the slides if the Members

would like to follow along.

Mr. HORN. We would like to have those, and the clerk will get

them and pass it out to the Members.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Willemssen and Mr. Rhodes follows:]

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STATEMENT OF KEITH RHODES, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF COMPUTER AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Horn, members of the subcommittee, thank you

very much for inviting me here today. I would just briefly like to

discuss a few slides that can help illustrate some of the issues we

discussed in our testimony.

The first slide shows the distribution of U.S. domestic nuclear

power plants and their associated fabricationsites. The blue dots

are the plants themselves, and the green squares are the fabrication sites.

The difference is that a nuclear plant generates electricity, while

the fabricating plant generates fuel used by the power plant.

As of last Friday, there were only two plants, according to the

Nuclear Energy Institute, that are not Y2K ready. One is Peach

Bottom and the other is Farley. Peach Bottom is currently going

through their final testing. Farley is in an outage now and they are

doing their Y2K remediation and should be done by December.

Mr. HORN. Where are those plants located?

Mr. RHODES. Peach Bottom is in Pennsylvania and Farley is in

Alabama. If I can point it out on the large board, you see Peach

Bottom at the top in Pennsylvania and Farley unit No. 2 is down

in Alabama.

The next slide shows a typical nuclear power plant. We are talking about the plant here, as opposed to the reactor, itself. This is

actually a pressurized water reactor, but there are also boiling

water reactors and other kinds of reactors—light water, heavy

water.

The areas that have to be watched under any circumstances, not

just Y2K, are as follows.

The grid itself, which brings in offsite power. In nuclear terms,

a failure here is called a ‘‘LOOP,’’ a loss of offsite power, and is

very important because it is the main power source for the plant

to keep their systems running.

Backup diesel generators are important, since if a LOOP occurs

the generators need to kick in to provide backup power to run the

plant. There are typically two diesel generators, although a few

plants have hydroelectric sources for backup. This gives a higher

degree of assurance that if one generator fails the second one can

take over. It is a redundancy in their diesel systems.

There has been much discussion about the reliability of these

emergency diesel generators. Some claims are that the generators

do not even meet 70 percent reliability, let alone their design requirement of 97.5 percent; however, according to a study by the

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the generators meet their

97.5 percent requirement, and the lower reliability ratings are due

to anomalous conditions occurring during routine maintenance—

that is, while you have taken the generator off-line, then you have

a power need, and that is why you are getting these lower reliability percentages. Sometimes people will come in and say they

are only 70 percent reliability.

Routine maintenance—we have had discussions with both power

plants as well as NRC and NEI. Routine maintenance is not going

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to occur on the roll-over date, so our assumption is that the 97.5

percent reliability will be met by the diesel generators.

Next in the cycle of importance are the pumps, themselves. The

pumps are a key system, since they make certain that the water

is flowing throughout the plant to keep the reactor itself cool, as

well as the support systems for electricity generation. You see

there are pumps throughout the system.

The reactor itself, of course, is a key system, and its security systems are key, since that is the site of the fission reaction that generates the heat. Circulating water that continuously transfers heat

from the core to the steam generation system cools the reactor core.

Finally, the spent fuel pools need to have a continuous source of

water, since the spent fuel does not cool down immediately and

continues to fission at some low level for a long time after it has

been removed from the reactor, itself.

Again, to reiterate, the next slide shows those plants that are not

yet Y2K ready, and that is as of Friday. NEI reported that D.C.

Cook one and two are now ready, and that Farley and Peach Bottom—Peach Bottom, as I stated, is currently going through its testing, and Farley is in an outage and being renovated.

The next slide shows a simple risk assessment box, four quadrants that show the relation between probability of failure and impact of failure. As you can see, the upper right-hand quadrant is

rated as high/high—high probability of failure and high impact of

failure.

If you have devices that are sitting up in the upper right-hand

corner, the objective is to drive those devices down into the lower

left-hand corner into a low probability of failure and low impact of

failure.

You reduce the probability of failure by doing remediation and

replacement of the system, and you reduce the impact by doing

contingency and continuity of operations planning, the objective

being to move those systems into the low/low quadrant so that

there is low impact and low probability of failure.

Any risk assessment and risk management process, not just Y2K,

is going to attempt to drive the risk from high to low, both in terms

of probability and impact. The probability is reduced, as I said,

through remediation and replacement, and the impact is reduced

through contingency and continuity planning.

Turning to international nuclear power, as you can see from this

chart, if you have very good eyes, the United States leads the world

in nuclear power plants, even though we do not get as high a percentage of our domestic power from nuclear as other countries such

as France.

The point here is that not just the United States has to be Y2K

ready, the world has to be Y2K ready.

Finally, this slide shows the distribution of nuclear power plants

worldwide. As you can see, some plants are in rather remote locations, but most are not.

As you are well aware, the former Soviet Union countries are the

most worrisome to nuclear power experts, myself included.

That concludes my, unfortunately, a little longer than brief introduction. I would appreciate any questions the committee has.

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Mr. HORN. Actually, we will wait until we complete the whole

panel and then we will start asking questions.

We now have a key witness from the Nuclear Commission, and

that is Mr. Frank Miraglia, Deputy Executive Director for Reactor

Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Mr. Miraglia.

STATEMENT OF FRANK MIRAGLIA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR REACTOR PROGRAMS, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Mr. MIRAGLIA. Thank you, Chairman Horn and members of the

committee. I’m pleased to be here today on behalf of the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission to report the year 2000 readiness of the

Nation’s nuclear power plants.

Based upon our review of the responses from the nuclear power

industry concerning year 2000 readiness, our independent inspection efforts at all 103 operating plants, and our ongoing regulatory

oversight activities, we have concluded that the year 2000 problem

will not adversely affect the continued safe operation of the Nation’s nuclear power plants.

Starting in December 1996, we engaged our industry stakeholders on the development of guidance to deal with the year 2000

problem. The draft guidance was issued for comment. The GAO reviewed the draft guidance and provided comments. Their comments

were particularly helpful, many of which were considered in the

NRC’s endorsement of the final guidance.

These industry guidelines were endorsed and subsequent NRC

audits and inspections of our licensees’ programs enabled us to

independently assess the effectiveness of year 2000 readiness at

each nuclear power plant.

Regarding our highest priority, the uninterrupted performance of

plant safety systems, all 103 nuclear power plants report that their

Y2K readiness efforts are complete.

As of October 20th—there will be some difference in numbers,

based upon the dates—99 of these plants also determined that all

of their computer systems that support plant operations are Y2K

ready and that contingency plans were in place. The remaining

four plants have additional work on non-safety-related systems.

As you heard Mr. Rhodes say, NEI has reported that the Cooks

units are completed. We haven’t formally received a letter, but we

understand that is the status of the Cook stations.

These plants are on target to complete the remaining modifications in advance of the year 2000 transition period.

Based on our information as of November 1st, only one plant will

have year 2000 readiness work remaining. That station is Farley

Two located in Alabama. That plant entered a shut-down on October 15th. It will have the modifications installed and off-line testing completed by mid-November. In order to declare total readiness, it will be waiting startup, which is projected for mid-December.

The work remaining involves non-plant support systems and an

outage, as required. These outages are scheduled, the readiness

has been planned, and the work has been successfully completed on

a sister unit.

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During late 1998 and early 1999, the NRC conducted audits of

plant-specific Y2K programs and contingency plans at our licensees’ facilities. Based upon these audits, we developed an inspection

protocol in which all 103 reactors with Y2K programs would be reviewed.

Based on these oversight activities, we have not identified any

issues that would preclude licensees from achieving year 2000

readiness. We will continue to monitor nuclear power plant readiness as year 2000 approaches.

Concerns have been expressed about the inability or loss of electrical distribution grid during Y2K critical dates. According to the

North American Electric Reliability Council, NERC’s latest report,

more than 99 percent of the Nation’s electricity supply is classified

as Y2K ready, or Y2K ready with limited exceptions.

NERC states that the Y2K transition should have minimal impact on electrical systems operations in North America and that

widespread, long-term loss of the grid as a result of Y2K-induced

events is not likely.

Notwithstanding, the NRC has focused its attention on assuring

reliable emergency power would be available to nuclear power

plants. The scope of our licensees’ Y2K programs, including contingency planning, covers the onsite power and other emergency

power systems, such as the electrical diesel generators.

NRC audits and inspections have verified licensees’ considerations of those systems, and no associated Y2K issues related to

onsite or emergency power systems have been identified.

Regulatory requirements provide high confidence in diesel generator operability, availability, and reliability. Additionally, diesel

generator reliability in emergency situations has been high, as

demonstrated during weather-related power upsets.

We have also focused on spent fuel cooling systems to assure

cooling of spent fuel stored at shut down facilities. The majority of

spent fuel cooling systems are based on analog controls, and therefore not subject to Y2K problems.

At the shut down facilities, only 14 have spent fuel remaining onsite. The heat generated by this spent fuel reduces with time, thus

increasing the time available for operators to take actions to mitigate any off-normal circumstances.

Existing procedures and operator training at these facilities

allow the licensee to deal with normal and off-normal situations

such as loss of offsite power, and the plant staff would have time

to control these functions.

Notwithstanding these preparations, nuclear power plant licensees have developed contingency plans for each plant to cope with

year 2000 problems.

Based upon our inspections and audits, we have determined that

all power plants have also developed day one strategies as part of

the development of their year 2000 contingency plan.

The NRC has also developed an agency contingency plan to respond to unforeseen events related to year 2000 problems that

could potentially affect one or more of our licensees. The plan has

been coordinated and communicated with other Federal agencies,

as well as provided to the public for comment.

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We conducted a full-scale exercise on October 15th involving 11

nuclear power plants and three fuel facilities to further validate

the NRC’s contingency plan. The exercise was a success, and we

gained valuable insights to further improve our readiness for the

potential year 2000 transition.

The NRC remains committed to keeping our stakeholders and

the general public informed. We have posted our generic communications, audits, and reports on our external-internal website for

access by members of the public.

In conclusion, we have been active in addressing the year 2000

problem, both internally and with our licensees. We will continue

to work both nationally and internationally to promote awareness

of Y2K problems. Our efforts have established a framework that

appreciably ensures that the Y2K problem will not have an adverse

impact on the ability of the nuclear power plants to safely operate

or safely shut down during the year 2000 transition.

Thank you. That completes my statement.

Mr. HORN. Thank you very much. That is a very helpful statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miraglia follows:]

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Mr. HORN. Our last panelist is Ralph Beedle, the senior vice

president and chief nuclear officer for the Nuclear Energy Institute.

Tell us a little bit about the Nuclear Energy Institute. I assume

it is the trade association.

STATEMENT OF RALPH BEEDLE, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT

AND CHIEF NUCLEAR OFFICER, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE

Mr. BEEDLE. Chairman Horn. Thank you for the opportunity to

testify today.

The Nuclear Energy Institute is a member organization consisting of over 275 companies. Every nuclear operating utility is a

member of the Institute. We establish policy and set practices for

the nuclear industry as a whole.

I applaud the efforts of the joint committees to monitor the status of year 2000 readiness across the spectrum of American industry. In the past 2 years, the Nuclear Energy Institute has developed and implemented a comprehensive year 2000 readiness program. As a result of the tremendous effort of the thousands of professionals in the industry at our 103 reactors, I am proud to report

that the U.S. nuclear power plants have demonstrated that all

safety systems are year 2000 ready.

Since I last spoke to you in May 1998, over 200,000 systems and

equipment have been reviewed for year 2000 readiness, and as of

this morning, the 101, as previously mentioned, are Y2K ready.

The two remaining facilities are in the process of making modifications during maintenance periods that are currently in progress.

The industry’s nuclear power plants are well prepared for year

2000 and beyond.

The comprehensive year 2000 program developed by NEI in 1997

looks at all equipment that is important to plant operations, not

just a few critical systems. The program is embodied in two documents, ‘‘Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness’’ and ‘‘Year 2000

Readiness Contingency Planning.’’ We supplemented these with

training sessions for our project managers, conducted workshops to

exchange year 2000 related information, and established an on-line

bulletin board to speed the sharing of the most effective Y2K solutions.

Throughout the process, NEI has carefully monitored and reported the status of nuclear industry preparation to the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, as well as the North American Electric

Reliability Council.

Safety is the nuclear energy industry’s top priority, and with this

in mind the first systems to undergo evaluation were those related

to plant safety.

The industry has worked closely with the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission in an open process that facilitates meaningful oversight of the industry’s program. After careful assessment and evaluation, industry experts are confident that the nuclear utilities will

continue to produce safe and reliable electricity without being affected by year 2000 computer problems.

NEI and our member utilities have worked closely with the

North American Electric Reliability Council. As large-scale electric

generating units, nuclear power plants are an important element

in the overall stability of our Nation’s electric transmission grid.

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Data reporting, testing, and exercise participation are all part of

the FERC program to ensure that generation, transmission, and

distribution of electricity will continue to be reliable.

Recognizing the apprehension that many people have concerning

this issue, the nuclear industry has prepared a Y2K contingency

plan. Additional personnel, backup communication systems, and response strategies have been developed for each reactor facility. This

advanced preparation will reduce the likelihood that even a minor

problem will cause a disruption in power generation.

Be assured, however, that any problem that could compromise

safety would result in placing the plant in a safe shutdown condition.

Before I conclude, let me address the subcommittee’s request for

information regarding the nuclear industry and the international

year 2000 readiness.

The U.S. Department of State serves as the lead entity in providing assistance to other nations on Y2K issues in conjunction

with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The readiness program developed by NEI that I mentioned earlier is used as a basis

for the IAEA international efforts. I’m certain that the State Department and the IAEA would be glad to provide you with additional details on their activities.

In conclusion, the nuclear utilities have reviewed, tested, and resolved equipment problems and are ready for year 2000. Consumers can approach the transition of year 2000 with confidence

that the Nation’s 103 nuclear plants will provide 20 percent of the

electricity in a reliable and safe manner.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. HORN. Thank you very much. That is a helpful document you

have submitted and I appreciate your summary.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Beedle follows:]

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Mr. HORN. We have a number of members here from both the

Science Technology Subcommittee, as well as Government Reform’s

Government Management, Information, and Technology Subcommittee. We will now go into questioning. Everybody on the

panel, including myself, will be limited to 5 minutes until everybody else gets through. We have about 10 Members present, so it

will take an hour for the questioning.

But let me start out, based on the letter we wrote in December

1998 to Chairman Jackson when we asked her about the audit on

the year 2000 readiness of all domestic nuclear power plants and

facilities.

We were told that, ‘‘Well, we really don’t have to worry that

much. American reactors are different than French reactors,’’ and

so forth. And in February 1999, the NRC did respond finally to our

letter and said 42 or 41 percent of the 103 nuclear power plant

units were included in the NRC sample audits of 12 utilities.

What I’d like to know is: how did you develop that sample? Was

that based on different reactors within the universe, or what?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. Yes, sir. I will be happy to respond to that.

In terms of your letter—we did respond in February—there were

12 licensees that were examined in terms of the audit, and they

covered 42 units. The units were picked on a number of criteria—

the age of the plant, multiple units, single unit, different regions

of the country, boiling water reactors, pressurized water reactors.

And the 12 utilities did represent 42 plants, which was a unique

representative mix of the 103 facilities.

In addition, we did six audits of the contingency plans at six licensees other than the 12, and that covered another 18 units.

These were detailed audits where we used as the basis of the review the guidelines Mr. Beedle reviewed with you. Those guidelines

were endorsed by the NRC as being appropriate guidelines to follow for Y2K remediation and assessment, as well as contingency

planning.

Based upon those reviews, sir, we did develop an inspection protocol and came up with an inspection protocol that was completed

by our inspectors at each of the 103 facilities, based upon the insights of those audits.

Through subsequent conversations and discussions, we did exactly what you originally had asked us in terms of where we stand

today.

Mr. HORN. Well, can you say that the 103 are Y2K compliant?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. In terms of the safety systems, they were reported

as Y2K ready on July 1st, and we have confirmed that by independent inspections and followup inspections. As I have indicated

in my testimony, right now, as officially reported by us, there are

four that we consider to have some additional work in non-safety

systems. Three of those are expected to be completed by the end

of the month, and that one unit, Farley 2, would be Y2K ready by

December.

Mr. HORN. In terms of the use of computers in relation to the reactors, what do we know and what did the inspectors find out? Did

they try a pilot where they advanced the date to January 1, 2000?

And, if so, what happened?

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Mr. MIRAGLIA. In terms of the inspection guidelines that were

endorsed, there were a number of aspects of that plan in terms of

how to assess the impact of potential computer problems and how

to remediate and how to test. The testing could be roll-back, as you

suggest, or roll-forward, as well as working with vendors to modify

the programming within the systems.

An important point that should be made is that there are not

many digital control systems within the nuclear power plants’ safety systems, so the scope of those kinds of activities is reduced.

Mr. HORN. What do you know about the nuclear plants abroad?

Is there a relationship between your commission in terms of loaning expertise on this? And what is your feeling as to what is happening there?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. We have worked through the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as the Nuclear Energy Agency, which is

part of OECD, the European economic community, and have provided what we have done in this country, in terms of the guidance.

And, as Mr. Beedle has indicated, that guidance has been utilized

by a number of foreign countries to review and remediate their facilities.

As Mr. Rhodes has indicated, there have been concerns expressed

relative to the Russian facilities. We don’t have direct involvement

and other than providing information and sharing what we have

done here and what our regulatory processes are.

Mr. HORN. My understanding on the Russian facilities is that

one is very close to Alaska, in terms of at least the islands and

reaching out to the Bering Strait. Is that a problem at all? Do we

know anything from the Russians on that?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. I couldn’t address that question.

Mr. HORN. OK. Let me ask—because I have got about 40 seconds

left—GAO, did you look at the sample? Did you have any concern

about the sample they took and the way they did it?

Mr. WILLEMSSEN. The concerns that we would have had, Mr.

Chairman, were really parallel to the ones that you pointed out in

your letter. Subsequent to the letter, as NRC has pointed out, there

were additional evaluations done. As we mention in our testimony,

a 452-question check list was administered to all plants.

In addition, we are aware that many of the plants did have independent verification and validation efforts performed; however, we

are not clear on the exact nature of those IV&V efforts. One of the

suggestions that we have for NRC is to be clear and precise on

what was done and how consistent it was across plants so that, if

there is additional IV&V needed at plants, there is still a couple

months to do that.

Mr. HORN. My time is up, so I’m going to yield 5 minutes to Mr.

Kanjorski, acting for the minority.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Just in regard to the Peach Bottom plant in Pennsylvania, by the

end of November you anticipate they will be in compliance, or the

end of October?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. The end of October, sir.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Is there any reason why they are running late

compared to the other 100?

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Mr. MIRAGLIA. In terms of some of the remediation that has to

be done, it requires an outage. Nuclear power plant outages are

traditionally spring and fall. They completed the outage, the spring

outage, on one unit and made the remediations. They are just in

their fall outage, and the remediation is underway and expected to

be completed by the end of the month, sir.

Mr. KANJORSKI. The entities that have the spent fuel, are there

any that are at total capacity? And, if you can tell me, what type

of manual backup is there if the computer system fails to keep the

spent fuel secure.

Mr. MIRAGLIA. As I indicated in my oral and in my written testimony, most of the systems at these facilities are analog and do not

have much digital and computer controls. The 14 decommissioned

facilities that one is talking about, the fuel has been in the pool for

in excess of 2 years, and therefore the decay heat is significantly

reduced. This would allow operators a significant amount of time,

on the order of hours, to restore and to make up water and to replenish water, and that could be easily done manually.

In addition, they do have emergency supplies that they can line

up, as well.

Mr. KANJORSKI. It seems to me that, when you look at the number of plants in the world, the United States has about a third of

the nuclear plants, and we could rest assured they are in pretty

good shape. The other two-thirds, do you all have opinions as to

what status they are? And is there a possibility that they could go

to a critical point and, if so, cause a disaster such as we recently

almost had in Japan, or something that you really have a reaction?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. That would be purely conjecture on my part, but

my view would be that the concern, as Mr. Rhodes indicated, is directed at perhaps some of the facilities in the former Soviet Union,

and that the concern there is perhaps not just directed at the

plants as much as perhaps the reliability of the grids in those countries.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Backup systems for power?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. Maintaining power to the plant to assure safe operation, and I think there’s little known. And I think, because of

what is known in terms of real facts makes it difficult for one to

make conjectures in that regard.

Mr. KANJORSKI. If there were failures in some of these other

countries, particularly in the former Soviet Union, do we have a

national policy or international policy of forming a response team

to get in there before something would become critical, or are we

just waiting under normal processes, if a disaster occurred, to then

put together a response?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. I believe there is activity underway in terms of

perhaps Department of Energy providing more assistance, but that

is all I could say. I think the government is trying to provide assistance to these facilities.

Mr. KANJORSKI. But that is assistance now in helping them get

to compliance. I’m talking about if something happens after January 1st and we say a week period of time or 2-week period of time.

Do we have something that we can lend the best expertise and a

response team very quickly to get into those areas?

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Mr. MIRAGLIA. A very good example of that, sir, would be the

events that did occur in Russia in 1986, and that the Federal Government does have a response plan and we would be prepared to

interact, and that would involve a large number of agencies, of

which NRC is just a part of what that response would be.

Mr. KANJORSKI. I notice on the list here plants, Korea. Is that

South Korea, or North Korea, too?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. Most of the plants are in South Korea in terms

of power plants.

Mr. KANJORSKI. But there are some power plants in North

Korea?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. You are stretching my knowledge now. I believe

there are some smaller reactors within North Korea.

Mr. KANJORSKI. The whole panel, if you can, more on the international problems, the other 66 percent, what do you think the degree of reliability is at this point? Is it that there are no problems

out there that could be serious for other countries or for the world,

as a whole, for something critical?

Mr. RHODES. In terms of the former Soviet Union, leveraging off

of what the NRC has said, again, the concern—for example, let’s

take South Korea. Well, South Korea’s reactors are CANDU reactors. They are Canadian light-water reactors, so the design is understood. When I was in Ottawa, Canada, in February at the International Nuclear Power Preparedness Conference, the Canadian

Atomic Energy Control Board was there. They did meet with the

South Koreans and they are helping them.

We had the developers from Czechoslovakia, who built most of

the Russian reactors, who were there. They have a few reactors

themselves, and there was a good exchange.

The concern that we had at that time, which stands today, is

that the Russian nuclear power plant industry is still in what we

would all describe as the ‘‘awareness phase.’’ When you are talking about a graphite-moderated light water reactor of the Chernobyl type—it is called an RBMK—the concern

again is not so much with the reactor itself as it is with the instability of the grid, the instability of diesel backup, and the fact that

you are talking about a country that has a struggling economy.

There are always anecdotal stories about people selling the diesel

fuel as currency. I mean, you are moving into a barter environment. That is the concern. It is a concern that Lawrence Gershwin

of the intelligence community voiced several times now over the

last year, in that it is not with the reactor itself so much as it is

with the stability of the grid.

The United States is providing actual technical support, but we

can’t solve every problem for all the reactors in the former Soviet

Union because we don’t have the resources to do that unless we

draw resources away from solving our own problem.

That is the concern that I and other people who are tracking

international nuclear power have. It is no so much our domestic it

is not ourselves or Canada or Great Britain or even France as

much as it is the former Soviet Union. And it is not so much the

reactor as it is the stability of the grid.

Mr. HORN. The time is up. We will now start on Ph.D. row to

my left here. Mr. Ehlers is a physicist. We will go to Mr. Bartlett.

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With two degrees, you are Dr. Dr. Bartlett, I guess. Go ahead, Roscoe.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

Are the nuclear reactors isolated from the grid, so if the grid fails

there is not a problem with the functioning of the reactors?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. In terms of the design of our reactors, sir, we are

concerned about the grid in two ways. First is the impact of the

grid on the plant, itself. Second is the loss of the plant being a

large power supply and what effect that may have on the grid.

The plant can be isolated from the grid and operate on emergency diesel in isolation from the grid, but in that condition the

plant is in a shut-down mode and maintaining itself in a safe shutdown condition.

Mr. BARTLETT. I have a lot more confidence in the integrity of

the nuclear power plants in Y2K than I do in the continuity of the

grid.

Are plants prepared, if the grid goes down, to immediately isolate

themselves so that there is no fall-back problem?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. In terms of even prior to the grid—the concern

about Y2K, the loss of offsite power is a design basis event that the

plants are evaluated and can cope with in terms of its design, and

so the answer to that question would be yes, sir.

Mr. BARTLETT. Let me ask a policy question. I suspect that our

nuclear reactors are going to behave flawlessly in Y2K. I do not

have that same degree of confidence for the grid and the other

power plants. Will this give us an opportunity to help educate the

American people as to the safety of the nuclear power generation

so that we might be able to expand that contribution to our electricity production in the future?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. That would be conjecture on my part, sir, but,

since you have asked for a personal view, I would give it. I think,

as indicated here, 20 percent of our electrical supply is nuclear.

The expectation is that the grids will remain whole and that the

nuclear power plants would safely go through that transition.

As to whether that would be renewed interest in nuclear power

I think that would remain to be seen.

Mr. BARTLETT. I would like us to be prepared to exploit what I

think is going to be a meaningful opportunity here.

We have 2 percent of the known reserves of oil. We use 25 percent of the world’s oil. That is a prescription for disaster and an

obvious indication that we ought to be looking for alternative ways

of producing our energy, and nuclear is certainly one of those.

The big impediment to using more nuclear power has been one

of education and the perception by the public that somehow this is

not safe, although I think it has been the safest type of power generation that we have had.

I hope that the Administration and others are looking for the opportunity of educating the American people so that they will be

more comfortable with nuclear power. They are not now accepting

of nuclear power. If we don’t do something, the 20 percent electricity we are now producing by nuclear power will shrink to zero.

All the while, we are using up even more of the small amount of

oil that we have remaining.

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As I said, although we have only 2 percent of the known reserves, we use 25 percent of the world’s energy.

Certainly, of all the countries in the world, we ought to be looking more aggressively at nuclear power, and we are actually turning away from it. As far as I know, no new plants are going to be

licensed.

I just hope that we will exploit the opportunity I’m quite sure we

are going to have in Y2K for educating the American people as to

the safety, the reliability of nuclear power plants so that we can

hopefully move forward on that front.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. Thank you very much.

We will now ask Mr. Baird from Washington, 5 minutes on questioning.

Mr. BAIRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have just two fairly brief questions.

First of all, we focused a lot on power generation. What about the

waste storage programs around the country? What reviews have

been put in place for that?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. Most of the spent fuel, sir, is at the operating reactors, and it is either stored in spent fuel pools, and those systems

were examined in the context of 103 operating reactors.

As indicated, there are 14 facilities that are being decommissioned and no longer generating power, but they are maintaining

the fuel in water pools. There are five facilities that have fuel either shipped offsite or in dry cask storage, which is a passive type

system.

Those systems and those facilities are being—maintaining cooling is the primary objective. The plant procedures are such that the

operators are trained in taking appropriate response to those

events. As I have indicated, most of the fuel in the pool is 2 years

old or closer to 3 years old, and so the heat load is fairly low and

there is significant time for the plants to deal with any contingency

that might arise with respect to Y2K.

As I indicated, most of the systems are analog and not Y2K

prone, in many cases.

Mr. BAIRD. In one of the testimonies it discussed a Y2K exercise,

in which NRC conducted a table top exercise with Baltimore Gas

and Electric. It sounds, from reading this, like it went pretty well

and that people are well prepared.

Was it your impression that people were well prepared because

they knew they would be part of this exercise, or if we were to, say,

randomly drop in tomorrow at some community that is near a nuclear reactor and say, ‘‘What would happen? Would they be as well

prepared?’’ Mr. MIRAGLIA. I think, in context, the regulatory structure that

exists and has existed prior to the Y2K issue always had emergency preparedness as a key centerpiece in defense and depth concept; therefore, there are emergency plans. We work with FEMA,

our sister Federal agency. FEMA coordinates the offsite response

to State and locals are prepared to respond to events at the nuclear

facilities.

We work with the utilities to assure that their emergency response plans are coordinated with the State and local officials.

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So that infrastructure existed. The existing table top brought the

local facilities and local counties in and around Calvert Cliffs together, along with the utility, as well as State, FEMA, and us, and

walked through scenarios to say, ‘‘If this happens, how are we

going to augment communications? How are we going to communicate?’’ That was the kind of exercise that was conducted in terms

of the table top, which was July, and that went very well.

There were lessons learned, in that communications need to be

compatible so one needs to talk to one another and say, ‘‘What are

your plans,‘‘ and that activity was ongoing.

In addition, we did a drill on October 15th where we exercised

our contingency plan and dealt with 11 nuclear power plants and

three fuel facilities. Some of those facilities were exercising their

contingency plans with the State and locals at that time, as well.

Mr. BAIRD. From listening to that, though, I’m hearing about 12

plants where some sort of exercise has been done. To what extent

has this been recreated across the broad spectrum?

The nightmare scenario, of course, and not to be alarmist, of

course, is an accident at a plant and simultaneously the grid goes

down, communication is disrupted, transportation is disrupted,

other problems. I mean, I’m not an alarmist with that, but it is

worth saying. To what extent have other communities around nuclear plants within this country taken a very serious look at, if that

scenario were to play out with the disruption of communication,

power, transportation, et cetera, how would they cope with it? To

what extent have they done that?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. In terms of the guidelines, the guidelines addresses those types of issues. Many of the utilities participated in the

September 9, 1999, drill that was conducted with NERC in terms

of exercising their plans, as well. So there were those kinds of exercises, as well, across the country, not only at the nuclear power

plants, but most generating stations.

In terms of our own contingency plans, we are going to have a

resident or inspector stationed at the facility during the rollover in

the transition. They will be familiar with the contingency plans at

the licensees’ facilities. They will be equipped. We have provided to

each site, each inspector that is going to be at the facility, with satellite communications, so there is guaranteed communications between the facilities and our operations offices here in headquarters,

as well as our regions.

Mr. BAIRD. One last question. My understanding is that the

French have distributed iodine to their residents as just a precautionary note, not in relation to Y2K. They did this some time

back. Is there any thought about doing that?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. In terms of the use of potassium iodine for occupational workers, that is a part of most emergency response plans.

The issue is a more widespread distribution of KI, and that policy

matter is under review.

Mr. BAIRD. It seems like it might be a fairly prudent prophylactic

just in case, you know. To have it around anyway might be useful,

but certainly in the off chance there would be a Y2K problem.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. Thank you very much.

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We now yield 5 minutes to the vice chairman of the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology, the gentlewoman from Illinois, Mrs. Biggert.

Mrs. BIGGERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Miraglia, in the international activities, you mentioned the

Y2K early warning system, and I understand that that will allow

the U.S. nuclear power operators to monitor the status of the foreign nuclear power plants similar to their own, and that would give

us about 12 to 15 hours that this will be ahead so that our plants

will know if something is happening. But is there a similar system

that would allow the U.S. nuclear plants, kind of looking across the

United States, where there will be some in the west coast that will

be following on later? Is there a plan in each of the plants in the

different time zones to be able to know immediately if there is a

problem?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. Yes. The ‘‘YEWS’’ system, the Y2K early warning

system, is an Internet-based system. We have worked through

NEA in trying to get foreign governments to subscribe to that system. At this time, there are about 25 countries that will be providing information. That information will be provided on a readonly basis to all of the nuclear power plants. We have indicated

how they could subscribe and have access.

That information would also be shared with the Information Coordinating Committee of the President’s Y2K Council to share that

information throughout the community.

It is approximately a 17-hour head start if you go all the way to

Australia and New Zealand and come across.

Mrs. BIGGERT. Then each one will have a contingency plan that

will be based on—let’s say, the communication, as Mr. Baird mentioned, would shut down. Is there a contingency plan that they

would still be able to know?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. In terms of the ‘‘YEWS’’ system, that is a source

of information to say what is happening elsewhere and can we

glean some knowledge so we would be better prepared.

The contingency plans for the individual facilities are in place,

and it would perhaps better prepare them to manifest for some potential impact. It should be within the context of the existing plans

already, ma’am.

Mrs. BIGGERT. And you said that all of the 103 domestic plants

are Y2K compliant. How was the verification of that compliance

done?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. We said Y2K ready. There is a slight difference

between compliance and ready.

In terms of the 103, we looked at the guidance documents that

we endorsed, and in the context of those guidance documents and

the audits that we did, we did focus inspections on the elements

of that guidance.

GAO has indicated that it was a 450 question checklist, but in

order to complete those lists you went and looked at individual,

specific attributes of the guidance.

For example, five to six software systems and modifications were

examined. Were they independently verified? Was there a peer review or was their quality assurance done on those aspects? And so

those questions led to specific focused activities by the inspectors

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to look at the various elements and were they complying with the

guidance that we developed and endorsed. That would give us the

confidence to say that appropriate assessments had been made, appropriate remediation had been done, appropriate testing and contingency planning had been completed.

Mrs. BIGGERT. Then was there a certification that they were compliant?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. In terms of our inspection activities, we would indicate in our inspection reports that were docketed for each of the

facilities that we have completed those inspections and have concluded that they implemented the guidance and the guidance documents that would give us confidence in saying there is reasonable

assurance of Y2K readiness of those facilities.

Mrs. BIGGERT. So are there remaining risks to our domestic nuclear facilities?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. In terms of absolute guarantees, they are very difficult. There are many computer systems, many embedded chips.

The systems that we used and the guidance that we provided we

believe provided a framework to appropriately assess, remediate,

test, and have contingency planning, and we believe that we have

a basis for reasonable assurance.

Mrs. BIGGERT. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. Thank you very much.

We now move to—well, I see there is a pass down there, so we

will begin the round again.

Mr. Beedle, when I was at the beginning of the first question, I

think you had something you wanted to add to it. This is your

chance.

Mr. BEEDLE. You had asked a question, Mr. Chairman, concerning audits of the plants, and I wanted to point out that each

one of these utilities has had at least three audits of one variety

or another, consisting of self audits by their own QA organizations,

which are rather extensive, audits of one utility against another

one, and then third party audits, where we bring in contractors.

That gives us a great deal of confidence that the effort on the part

of the utilities has been detailed and thorough in their examination

of the Y2K issues.

Mr. HORN. When the Federal Government and the executive

branch looked at the September 9, 1999, bit, there didn’t seem to

be much of a problem. Was there any problem in any of the nuclear

reactors on that?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. Nothing was reported that was related to any

Y2K event at any nuclear facilities, sir.

Mr. HORN. There are about 300 foreign nuclear power facilities,

and often the so-called ‘‘facilities’’ and their safety standards don’t

meet the U.S. standard. Getting back to where are we in some of

the international bit, what is your feeling on that? Have you been

called upon for technical expertise by the International Atomic Energy Commission?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. Yes. We have provided, in terms of participating

in workshops, we have participated in workshops on the guidance

that was developed here. That was shared.

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As NEI has indicated in their testimony here today, sir, that

guidance has been used by a number of foreign countries to examine the Y2K issues.

We have participated in discussing Y2K contingency planning.

I’m scheduled to participate in an IAEA workshop next week in Vienna to discuss what we have done relative to the contingency

planning here in the United States, so there has been that type of

activity.

In addition, we have worked through the Nuclear Energy Agency

in developing the Y2K early warning system, and that has been another vehicle for us to indicate interest in activities that we have

been engaged in.

Mr. HORN. Mr. Rhodes, we have read articles, we have heard

people say that nuclear weapons have no Y2K problem; that is,

that the weapons, themselves, have no dates or clocks, and therefore there really wouldn’t, in relation to time. Is that really true?

Mr. RHODES. Yes, it is. We performed an audit of the nuclear

weapons stockpile. I led the team. GAO went out from one of our

sister divisions that handles the stockpile stewardship issues, and

we did a complete design review of the nuclear weapons, themselves, what’s called the ‘‘physics package,’’ the actual weapon, and

in the process walked through every electronic component, every

design. I even did code walk-throughs.

In terms of time and a nuclear weapon, you are talking about a

stop watch. Even those weapons that have chips in them, the chips

don’t have time. They get time from an external oscillating crystal,

and that is just giving them a time interval. It is just a vibration,

and they get an electrical impulse out of that vibration.

So all they are doing is counting up time. And, while they are

counting up time, certain events are taking place.

So, I give you my professional opinion, and we have issued a letter stating that we have found that the U.S. domestic—well, the

entire nuclear stockpile for the United States is not a Y2K issue.

They operate on what is called ‘‘fiducial time.’’

Mr. HORN. Well, without objection, we will put the letter and any

summary you have of the review in the record at this point.

Mr. RHODES. I will make certain it gets to you.

Mr. HORN. I assume it isn’t classified?

Mr. RHODES. No. There were many classified discussions, but it

is an unclassified, public document.

Mr. HORN. Last month, Congress set up the National Nuclear Security Administration, which is being formed to run the Nation’s

nuclear weapons laboratories. In your opinion, GAO’s, how should

this organization work with the Department of Energy to manage

our nuclear weapons, assets, and security measures? Has GAO

done any work in that area?

Mr. RHODES. We haven’t done any formal work on it, but we

have worked on discussions about security at the Department of

Energy, and one of the points, key points, I would want to make

about the oversight that is being brought to the Department of Energy is—and being someone who has come out of the weapons complex, it is very hard for the complex itself to assess its own risk,

and what it considers to be valuable may be different than what

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the Department of Energy considers valuable may be different than

what nationally is of value.

If the external structure that is being applied to the Department

of Energy can assess the value of the assets regarding the nuclear

weapons, that would be of great value. That would be of great importance to the agency. And that would be one of the key—I think

one of the key tasks at hand is to make certain that everyone understands the export value of super computer equipment, the domestic development of certain materials, et cetera, and how they

should be handled and safeguarded.

Mr. HORN. Well, continuing the second round, I will yield to Mr.

Kanjorski, the ranking member.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Since all four of you gentlemen are experts, and

since obviously the American people may be seeing this testimony,

I would sort of like each one of you to render your expert opinion

based on reasonable certainty of your various disciplines as to what

your professional opinion is as to the safety of the nuclear industry—and stockpile system is included, just so that you get a shotgun starting off, Mr. Willemssen.

Mr. WILLEMSSEN. Well, as mentioned earlier by the NRC, there

is no way we can give an absolute guarantee, but I think, through

the efforts of NRC and the licensees, they have significantly reduced the remaining risk that is there.

We have some additional steps that we think the NRC can take

to further reduce that risk to even a more microscopic level along

the lines of what we have talked about today, for example, additional information on independent verification and validation. We’d

also like to see some additional evidence of detailed day one planning at each of the nuclear plants—that is, the series of steps that

they plan to take at the end of December and early January in the

unlikely event that there are problems.

Mr. RHODES. Let me expand on one point that Mr. Willemssen

touched on.

If you take an existing nuclear reactor and you look at a pump

and you are basing your risk assessment and the emergency procedures based on the mean time between failure and the mean time

to repair of an individual pump, you are taking a very large sample

of equipment and you are trying to figure this probabilistic curve,

and you say this individual pump failing has a probability of some

value, some very small point. That is a probability based on standard manufacturing requirements.

The point that I would make in amplifying Mr. Willemssen’s

point about day one planning is that you go to any nuclear power

plant and there are literally rooms filled with operating procedures.

The people are well trained. You cannot become a senior reactor

operator without tremendous training, tremendous background, recertification.

However, if that operator is operating according to normal emergency procedures where the probability of something going wrong

may change because of an instability in communications or a perceived instability in the grid, then the point that Mr. Willemssen

is making about that detailed day one planning, it is day one planVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:36 Jul 23, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\61296 pfrm06 PsN: 61296
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ning in light of the probability of a Y2K failure. It is not day one

planning in light of the mean time between failure of a normal

pump or the mean time between failure of a diesel generator or the

mean time between failure of the grid.

Now you have a very focused event, you have a very focused bit

of data that you are supposed to capture, and that is the basis for

our recommendation about formal day one planning.

But I do concur that there is an extraordinarily low risk associated with nuclear power failure right now.

Mr. MIRAGLIA. In terms of the completeness of what we have

done, if you look at the existing regulatory structure and what we

have done to address the Y2K problem—and by the ‘‘we,’’ I mean

the efforts of the industry and the agency, itself—I think we have

reasonable assurance of continued safe operation of the facilities

through the transition.

With respect to the points and suggestions made by GAO, I

think, in terms of the independent verification and validation efforts, I believe, if one looks at the guidelines, the audits that we

have completed, and the inspections, I think we have, in looking at

that entire framework, addressed some of those suggestions.

With respect to the contingency plan, as Mr. Rhodes picked out,

the uniqueness about the Y2K issue is that it is an event whose

date is set. We know it is going to happen.

In terms of the contingency planning guidance that we have provided and endorsed via the industry guidelines, it does address the

topics and the issues that are outlined in GAO’s letter of October

13th to the Federal agencies with respect to staffing, with respect

to consumables, with respect to having additional contractor help,

and security and those kinds of aspects are built into the guidelines

for the contingency planning.

I think, in terms of what we have in place and what has been

developed, it addresses those issues such that it complements and

supplements the normal processes and procedures.

As Mr. Rhodes has said, the remediation and assessment addresses our attempt to try to keep the frequencies of failure to

what is normally perceived by addressing the Y2K issue, and also

designating specific contingency planning to assure that there is

additional help and support during the transition.

So, with respect to the suggestions, we believe that we have encompassed most of those.

In your question, sir, you also asked for an opinion relative to the

weapons stockpile, and I just want to say that I am not expert in

that area and I would not offer an opinion.

Mr. BEEDLE. With regard to the operation of these plants, we

daily train, daily operate and maintain these plants. Yes, equipment fails on occasion. The operators are prepared to deal with

that.

We don’t see that the Y2K is going the present any different situation for the operator than they would on a normal operating day,

but we recognize the vulnerability of the Y2K, and, as a result of

that, we have tested, as I indicated, some 200,000 pieces of equipment and systems in these plants. We have had to remediate about

10,000 throughout the industry.

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So we are talking about roughly 100 pieces of equipment or systems in each one of these plants that has been remediated, and

they range from things of valve controllers, where we have embedded systems, to data collection and monitoring systems on these

plants.

There are relatively few systems in these plants that are actually

controlled by computers. They are all controlled by individuals,

human beings that are at the control switches. For the most part,

these systems monitor and provide indication of plant performance,

rather than actual control of the equipment.

We have tested and verified that these systems will be ready for

Y2K. We don’t see that the vulnerability and risk to the plant is

significantly different than the normal routine operational capabilities that we have with these plants today.

I, like Mr. Miraglia, really don’t have any opinion with regard to

the weapons programs.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. Thank you very much.

I now yield to the chairman of the House Science Technology

Subcommittee of House Science, the gentlewoman from Maryland,

who is co-chairman of the select task force of her committee and

my committee.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. You take as much time as you would like.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you.

I apologize to this expert panel for not being here earlier, but I

was involved with a great technology and education event in Montgomery County, MD, which is where NRC is located, Mr. Miraglia,

as you know, in that beautiful White Flint Building.

I do appreciate the testimony that has been given. I also appreciate the fact that I understand, Mr. Miraglia, that you commented

on the fact that, of 103 operating nuclear plants, all but seven, I

think, are Y2K compatible.

Mr. MIRAGLIA. That was updated during the testimony. There

are four remaining.

Mrs. MORELLA. Only four remaining?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. Yes, ma’am.

Mrs. MORELLA. Maybe by the end of our hearing it will be down

to one.

But I do appreciate the fact that this has been done. I’m certainly very laudatory about those efforts.

I guess the line of questioning that I would have would deal with

how does your contingency plan at NRC differ from other contingency plans you might have. How does it differ from your usual

emergency situation? I mean, do you have more safety people? How

do you link up with coordinating with command control? Tell me

what the difference is.

Am I explaining that clearly enough?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. I believe I understand your question, Madam

Chairman.

Mrs. MORELLA. What new elements do you need and do you

have?

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Mr. MIRAGLIA. As I indicated earlier, there is an existing regulatory infrastructure for emergency response for off-normal circumstances.

Mrs. MORELLA. Right.

Mr. MIRAGLIA. As a result of Y2K, we have developed guidelines

for the industry to develop additional contingency planning. That

would supplement those kinds of activities.

In addition, our agency has augmented our own contingency

plans and developed a Y2K contingency plan and provided that for

comment, and we have coordinated with our other Federal agencies

to indicate how we are going to operate during the transition period.

We will have inspectors at each of the 103 reactors during the

transition. We are developing procedures and processes for them to

look for, things to look for.

We have equipped each of those inspectors with satellite communications to maintain communications with our response center,

which is located in White Flint. In addition, we have response centers at all four regional offices.

We will have additional staff at our response center in Washington. We would have a staff of 40 folks during the transition. We

will have a smaller team manning the response center, about six

on New Year’s Eve, to start looking at the reports from across the

international community and to monitor the transition within the

facilities.

Each of our regional offices will have a team—regional administrators, senior managers, as well as a support team in each of our

regional offices.

We have also planned, in the unlikely event if we lose communications with the headquarters response center, that that could be

turned over to our region four office, which is in Arlington, TX. It

is in a different time zone, it is on a different grid.

And we have exercised that contingency plan this past October

and it was a very successful drill, notwithstanding we have learned

some things to improve our ability during the transition.

So we are going to have additional staff and folks at the facilities, as well as our response centers.

Mrs. MORELLA. Is it important to let the community around

these 103 operating nuclear plants know of the fact that you are

prepared, and just to kind of assuage any concerns they may have?

In other words, do you have any kind of a public relations outreach

plan?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. In terms of the agency itself, through the Y2K

President’s Council we have participated, there have been the community outreach issues. Our sister agency, FEMA, has had regional meetings in and around certain of the nuclear power plants

that the NRC has participated in. As discussed earlier here today,

Madam Chairwoman, we did a table top exercise with the Baltimore Gas and Electric utility with their local representatives and

implementers of the emergency plan, as well as the State.

We have encouraged the industry, through NEI, to inform the

local community in what its state of readiness is, not only at the

nuclear power plant but to also assure themselves that the teleVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:36 Jul 23, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\61296 pfrm06 PsN: 61296
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communications and electrical supply and the reliability of that in

the vicinity is known to them as well as to the local community.

Mrs. MORELLA. And, finally—because my time is expiring—what

plans do you have for alternative energy if there are difficulties,

breakdowns with the nuclear power? Isn’t it 20 percent of our energy emanates—electrical energy emanates from nuclear power?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. In terms of the issue of reliability and the independent nature of our regulatory, statutory framework, our goal is

to maintain the plants in a safe condition. Notwithstanding that,

the Y2K issue does present a unique challenge to us. It is also important to maintain the facilities such that it doesn’t adversely impact the grid.

The plants are designed to tolerate a loss of offsite power. There

are emergency diesels onsite. Those are under normal maintenance

and surveillance programs, they are tested. As part of the contingency planning, there will be no surveillance tests during the transition period. Fuel tanks would be topped off and things of that nature would occur.

So, in terms of maintaining a power supply available at the facility to maintain itself in safe shutdown, it will be done.

Without the grid, the plant cannot generate power to the grid,

so the objective is to keep the plants in safe shutdown.

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Chairman, would you indulge me just one

final question for the group?

Mr. HORN. Certainly. You may have all the time you wish.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you.

Let me ask our GAO people, Mr. Willemssen and Mr. Rhodes, do

you feel pretty good that they are following your suggested actions?

Would you have any final comments to make? I mean, should we

feel comfortable that everything is proceeding as it should with the

countdown of so few days?

Mr. RHODES. The point that I would make, as I mentioned earlier

about the—you design emergency procedures in a nuclear power

plant based on probability, and there are some very, very fine probabilistic analysts that work at all of the nuclear power plants.

But the probability today of the grid going down or the probability today of communications failing is different than when we

hit the roll-over.

Our concern and our suggestion is based on, one, the independent validation and verification that, as Mr. Miraglia has pointed out, there has been either a peer review, a quality assurance

analysis, or an independent validation and verification done at all

the plants.

The point we would make is that NRC should take steps to make

certain that a peer review, a quality assurance, and an IV&V are

all equivalent.

Second point is that that gives you the basis for understanding

what the probability of failure is going to be. If the probability of

failure is actually going to be unique at that time, you need to extract from these huge, huge volumes of operating procedures and

emergency procedures the exact set of steps that you think you are

going to probably need to take for day one.

Now, that would affect, as you pointed out, staffing, consumables,

et cetera. That would be the single point that we would make is

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that, until we know that the peer review, the quality assurance,

and the independent validation and verification are equivalent and

complete, and that, as a result of those analyses, someone didn’t

decide that they needed to have independent testing of a device, or

something like that, then saying that this room full of emergency

procedures is going to cover all contingencies is probably true, but

making certain that you are ready for the most probable failures

is where our suggestion comes in.

Mrs. MORELLA. Did you agree, Mr. Willemssen?

Mr. WILLEMSSEN. Yes. I totally concur with Mr. Rhodes’ comments.

Mrs. MORELLA. And, Mr. Miraglia, you do too?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. In terms of what I indicated, Madam Chairwoman, previously, is that in the content and scope and the concepts being offered, we agree. And I think our view is the steps and

the framework that we have in place has addressed the issues

raised by GAO.

Notwithstanding that, we appreciate the views that are expressed and we will look at those suggestions to determine if additional things need to be considered.

I think, in terms of the IV&V and the day one planning, when

one looks at where we are and what we have done, I think we have

essentially complied with the suggestions.

I think, in terms of what GAO may be indicating during their review, they were perhaps able to ascertain exactly what we had

completed.

Mrs. MORELLA. Would you like to add anything, Mr. Beedle?

Mr. BEEDLE. Yes, I would, Chairwoman.

In developing this contingency plan that we provided to the utilities for implementation at each of the facilities, we have consideration for increased staffing, increased allocation of consumables in

the event that you had some transportation problems. We wanted

to make sure that you had adequate supplies and stocks.

We think that we have addressed each of the issues that the

GAO has pointed out, and, in fact, we have had the GAO review

this document and provided valuable input in the construction of

this plan.

So everything that Mr. Rhodes is talking about is certainly valid,

and, as Mr. Miraglia indicates, the NRC and I would add that the

utilities, the licensees, are prepared to deal with those.

A failure at the plant is a failure that results in action by people,

and we have people trained and prepared to deal with these issues.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the panelists.

Mr. HORN. Without objection, that document will be put in the

record at this point.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. HORN. Also in the record will be the letter of February 25,

1999, to Chairman Jackson, and the response that was the response from there and our letter from December 17, 1998 earlier

when it was mentioned in the record. Without objection, it will be

there.

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Mr. HORN. I now yield to the ex-ranking member, Mrs. Maloney,

if she has any questions.

Mrs. MALONEY. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. OK. Do we have any from the vice chairman of the

Government Management, Information, and Technology Subcommittee?

[No response.]

Mr. HORN. How about Dr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

Since most embedded chips will not know what time zone they

are in, if they were to fail, when should we expect them to fail?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. In terms of the guidance, sir, we recognized that

some of them may be on Greenwich Mean Time, so, in terms of the

contingency planning, it is to look for failures across that spectrum.

And, in terms of the assessment and the remediation, that was recognized, as well. It depends on the embedded chip and the functions that it performs.

Mr. BARTLETT. Greenwich Mean Time midnight would be when

here?

Mr. RHODES. 7 p.m. Eastern time.

Mr. BARTLETT. 7 p.m. So if embedded chips are going to cause

problems, we could expect that to perhaps start happening about

7 p.m.?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. And, as I indicated, we are manning our response

centers, sir, at 6 p.m.

Mr. BARTLETT. You are an hour ahead of the curve?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. Hopefully, sir.

Mr. BARTLETT. Hopefully. Let me ask, are there, to your knowledge, any countries with nuclear power plants who have not been

cooperating so that we do not know the status of their readiness?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. In terms of what I understand the primary assessor of the international Y2K readiness is the International Atomic

Energy Agency, and they have been conducting assessments at the

various countries. I am not aware of any such issues, but that is

the extent of my knowledge.

Mr. BARTLETT. As far as the panel knows, all countries with nuclear power generating facilities have been inspected and are cooperating?

Mr. RHODES. I cannot say that they have been inspected. I can

say they are providing information. The information, however, is

self-reported and some of the official positions that are given, as we

were discussing earlier about the former Soviet Union, are not very

encouraging.

Mr. MIRAGLIA. I would offer the same answer, sir. I know the

IAEA has gone to a number of the countries to make assessments

and suggestions and the like, and the President’s Y2K Council has

been very active through the U.N. and encouraged information

sharing and providing information flow and that kind of thing, but

as to whether each plant has been inspected or not, I can’t answer

that question, either.

Mr. BARTLETT. I thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. On that question, a few weeks ago we had a hearing

here that related to the International Civil Aviation Organization

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that is a similar organization to the nuclear one in Europe, and

there were about 35 countries that hadn’t released the information.

Well, our hearing got them to release them, so that was Friday,

and Monday morning we had them.

But the question would be to the Nuclear Commission, the U.S.

version, which you represent: do you have access to the documents

they would have filed with the international agency? And I think

some of you were dubious if they have filed. Granted, it is self-reported, but so are what the executive branch here that we look at

every quarter. That is all self-reported, and the only time we will

know if those data were proper and reliable will be on January 1,

2000, wherever the time zone is.

Mr. MIRAGLIA. In terms of our agency and access, as I said, we

have been cooperating and we do get reports via the IAEA.

We are an independent regulatory agency, and perhaps the Department of Energy would have even more direct access, but we do

get reports on the assessments being done by IAEA and have a

general knowledge and awareness of the kinds of discussions and

findings that they have.

Mr. HORN. One of our worries is, with the power needs, we look

at Japan. We are worried about that. We look at Italy. We are worried about that. We know there are some central European and

eastern European countries that haven’t really taken the energy

and the focus that you have had in this country. That is what worries us.

Is that a correct worry?

Mr. MIRAGLIA. I think your representation reflects the degree of

knowledge that we have, as well, sir, as the concerns overseas.

Mr. HORN. Well, let me ask you gentlemen if there are any questions you would make or any points you would make that we didn’t

get out of you in the question period.

Mr. Beedle.

Mr. BEEDLE. I’d like to make a comment concerning Mr. Bartlett’s question, ‘‘Does this offer an opportunity to underscore the

value of nuclear in this Nation’s energy mix?’’

This Y2K situation is rather interesting. About 2 years ago the

focus was on, ‘‘Let’s shut all these plants down because we are not

sure they are going to be safe.’’ Now the emphasis is, ‘‘Keep them

running, because we need the energy.’’

So I would say to Mr. Bartlett we do have an opportunity to underscore the value that these nuclear plants provide to this Nation

of ours. They do present 20 percent of the electric generation, it is

clean, it is reliable, and I think we are well prepared to deal with

Y2K.

Mr. HORN. OK. It looks like there are no more questions.

Mr. MIRAGLIA. Might I comment on the last comment, sir, in

terms of the posture of the NRC with respect to that? The NRC

was created back in 1975 from the perspective of being an independent regulator, and, as such, we are not a promoter of the use

of nuclear energy, so to take an active role in the promotion, sir,

that is not a particular statutory mandate we have. That rests

more with the executive branch and the Department of Energy.

336

Notwithstanding that, our job is to assure that if nuclear power

is used in this country, it is used safely, and that is our goal and

our mission, and that we should also not be an impediment.

The former chairman and present commissioners have indicated

that we should have the right kind of regulation for each of the activities that we regulate.

Our posture and goal is to make our regulatory process an efficient one, and, in terms of public outreach, we have an obligation

in establishing public confidence in that we are doing our job of

protecting and providing reasonable assurance for the public health

and safety, and so in that sense we have that type of obligation,

and we recognize it, sir.

Mr. HORN. Well, on that point, the two reactors you mentioned

at the beginning of your testimony I take it will conform with your

safety standards on this subject.

Mr. MIRAGLIA. In terms of the two remaining ones?

Mr. HORN. Right.

Mr. MIRAGLIA. Yes, sir. We will followup.

Mr. HORN. In other words, you are telling us you don’t have to

worry about 103, they are all going to be OK.

Mr. MIRAGLIA. That is a reasonable assurance of that expectation, sir.

Mr. HORN. OK. Good.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to ask about, speaking of international, my understanding is that there is going to be a command

center right in Washington, DC, that is going to be monitoring

what happens in New Zealand. Are you all going to be connected

to that? Maybe GAO would know the total structure of it.

Mr. WILLEMSSEN. I can comment on the Information Coordination Center from a more broad perspective.

FEMA will be a key part of the Information Coordination Center

that, and through its regional offices will be gathering information

on what is happening in States and localities, and that information

will flow up to the ICC.

In addition, each of the major Federal agencies will have their

own command/coordination center and report into the ICC.

I anticipate that NRC will have a similar mechanism. We have

briefly looked at the NRC’s day one plan and note that they have

begun efforts to do that internally, and I have heard in the testimony today additional planned efforts from an oversight and an external perspective.

I look forward to the detail in their plans on how exactly that

will be carried out.

Mr. MIRAGLIA. If I may add to that, Madam Chairwoman, in

terms of our contingency plan, it does include an element of participation in the coordinating center.

In part of the contingency plan that we exercised on October

15th, we simulated our ICC cell. I, personally, will be at the ICC

during the turn-over, with some additional staff, having communications to our central response center.

As Mr. Willemssen has indicated, it is to be a central flow of information.

337

In addition, the Y2K early warning system data is being provided

to the ICC, as well, so we will have an involvement.

And, as Mr. Willemssen has said, the existing Federal response

plan, overall response plan, is FEMA, and all of that is coordinated

with many, many sister Federal agencies.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. Well, thank all of you, because I think this has reassured a lot of us. We had been very worried when you hadn’t been

looking at all of the reactors, and now you have taken that view,

and I’m very impressed with the testimony we have received today

and I thank all four of you for giving us that information. That is

most helpful.

Let me thank the majority and minority staff that prepared this

hearing. J. Russell George is back there in the corner, staff director

and chief counsel; to my immediate left, your right, Matt Ryan,

senior policy director on Government Management, Information,

and Technology, prepared the hearing; Bonnie Heald, our communications director and professional staff member against the wall

there; Chip Ahlswede, our clerk; and P.J. Caceres, a faithful intern;

and Deborah Oppenheim, the other faithful intern. And from the

Technology Subcommittee of the House Committee on Science, Jeff

Grove, staff director; and Ben Wu, professional staff member; Joe

Sullivan, staff assistant. And from the minority staff, Trey Henderson, minority counsel, and Jean Gosa, staff assistant. And from the

Technology Subcommittee, Michael Quear, professional staff member; and Mary Ralston, staff assistant. And our court reporter is

Ruth Griffin.

So thank you all, and with that we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:59 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.]

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