Supreme Court of Florida

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No. SC16-779

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MATTHEW MARSHALL, 

Petitioner,

vs.

JULIE L. JONES, etc.,

Respondent.

[May 4, 2017]

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner Matthew Marshall has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 

challenging the constitutionality of his death sentence, which was based upon a 

judicial override. See Marshall v. State, 604 So. 2d 799, 802 (Fla. 1992). We have 

jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const. Because Marshall’s sentence 

became final before Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), was decided, he is not 

entitled to relief. See Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016). Accordingly, we 

deny the petition.

It is so ordered.

LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

CANADY, J., concurs in result.
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LABARGA, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, J., concurs.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 

IF FILED, DETERMINED.

LABARGA, C.J., dissenting.

I dissent from the decision of the majority to deny Matthew Marshall habeas 

corpus relief. Although his sentence admittedly became final prior to the issuance 

of Ring, this Court has “the power to reconsider and correct erroneous rulings in 

exceptional circumstances and where reliance on the previous decision would 

result in manifest injustice, notwithstanding that such rulings have become the law 

of the case.” State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 720 (Fla. 1997). Marshall’s death 

sentence, which was based upon a judicial override, constitutes an injustice that 

should be remedied.

The standard for review of a judicial override was articulated in Tedder v. 

State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975), abrogated by Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 

(Fla. 2016):

A jury recommendation under our . . . death penalty statute should be 

given great weight. In order to sustain a sentence of death following a 

jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death 

should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person 

could differ.

This elevated standard “honors the underlying principle that [the] jury’s advisory 

sentence reflected the ‘conscience of the community’ at the time of . . . trial.” 

Keen v. State, 775 So. 2d 263, 283 (Fla. 2000). The key focus under Tedder is 
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whether there exists a “reasonable basis in the record to support the jury’s 

recommendation of life.” San Martin v. State, 717 So. 2d 462, 471 (Fla. 1998). 

This is distinctly different from the weighing process that a trial court performs

after a jury issues a recommendation of death. The recommendation of life 

“changes the analytical dynamic and magnifies the ultimate effect of mitigation on 

the defendant’s sentence.” Keen, 775 So. 2d at 285. For example, with respect to 

the life recommendation in Keen, this Court noted that “[w]hile any of us might or 

might not have come to the same conclusion . . . had we been jurors, that is not the 

legal standard by which we must evaluate the override of the jury’s 

recommendation.” Id. at 286 (emphasis added).

Marshall killed fellow inmate Jeffrey Henry at a correctional facility in 

Martin County. Marshall, 604 So. 2d at 802. Although the jury recommended life 

imprisonment, the trial court overrode that recommendation and imposed a 

sentence of death. Id. The court found four aggravating circumstances: 

(1) Marshall was under a sentence of imprisonment; (2) prior violent felony;1

(3) the murder occurred while Marshall was engaged in the commission of, or an 

attempt to commit, a burglary;2and (4) the murder was especially heinous, 

 

1. Marshall had a “record of violent felonies consisting of kidnapping, 

sexual battery, and seven armed robberies.” Id. at 806.

2. According to the decision on direct appeal:
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atrocious, or cruel. Id. at 802. In mitigation, the trial court found that Marshall 

behaved acceptably during trial, and he entered prison at a young age. Id. The 

court rejected as mitigation that Marshall’s older brother led him astray to “run the 

streets” and engage in illegal conduct, and his mother caused him to believe that 

there would be no negative consequences for his behavior. Id. In overriding the 

jury recommendation, the trial court cursorily stated:

Sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in 

section 921.141(5), and there are insufficient mitigating circumstances 

to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. The facts supporting this 

conclusion are so clear and convincing that no reasonable person 

could differ.

On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Marshall’s death sentence by a bare 

majority vote. Id. at 806. Chief Justice Barkett, in a concurring in part and 

 

Marshall claimed that Henry was a “muscle man” for several inmates 

who operated a football pool. When Marshall tried to collect his 

winnings from the inmates, they told him to get the money from 

Henry. Marshall claims he entered Henry’s cell only to collect his 

winnings but that Henry refused to pay, and that Henry then attacked 

him, so he fought back.

Id. at 802. The Court later stated:

[W]e find the circumstance of murder committed during the course of 

a burglary to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if 

Marshall initially entered Henry’s cell with consent for the purpose of 

collecting a gambling debt, the only reasonable inference apparent 

from Marshall’s reentering the cell was that he intended to resume his 

attack on the victim.

Id. at 805.
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dissenting in part opinion that was joined by Justices Shaw and Kogan, concluded 

that a reasonable basis for the jury’s recommendation of life existed, and the trial 

court abused its discretion when it overrode that recommendation:

In addition to considering the stipulated testimony of 

Marshall’s father, the jury could have reasonably viewed the evidence 

of the murder in a light more favorable to Marshall. In his closing 

argument to the jury, defense counsel conceded that the aggravating 

circumstances of murder committed while under a sentence of 

imprisonment and previous conviction of a violent felony were 

established, but strongly argued against the existence of the other 

aggravators presented by the State. He argued that the death penalty 

should be reserved only for the worst murderers and worst 

aggravation. He pointed out that the evidence showed that Marshall 

and Henry had no prior problems with each other and had socialized 

together at the prison. Defense counsel emphasized that the 

circumstances of the crime indicate no prior plot or plan to kill since 

Marshall entered the cell unarmed and the murder was committed 

with a battery pack belonging to and found within the cell of the 

victim. He argued that offensive wounds on Henry’s hands showed 

that the murder occurred during the course of a fight and that Henry 

was a violent person. He also noted that Henry’s skull was not 

fractured and his facial bones weren’t broken, indicating that Marshall 

did not intend to torture the victim or inflict additional injuries once 

he was rendered unconscious. Defense counsel also pointed out that 

the murder was not committed for financial gain. Finally, defense 

counsel argued that Marshall’s age and background mitigate the 

offense as well. He pointed out that a life sentence of 25 years on top 

of the sentence of 46 years that Marshall was already serving would 

keep Marshall in prison for a substantial period of time.

. . .

While the jury may not have believed that Marshall acted in self 

defense to excuse the killing, it could have reasonably inferred from 

the evidence that a fight erupted between Marshall and Henry and that 

Marshall killed Henry in a fit of rage. It is also likely that the jury 

rejected some of the aggravators found by the judge or assigned them 

minimal weight. Additionally, the jury could have reasonably found 
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mitigation in Marshall’s family background and determined, based on 

the nature of the crime and the circumstances surrounding it, that the 

death penalty was not the appropriate penalty in this case.

Id. at 806-07 (citations omitted) (Barkett, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 

part).

I agree with Chief Justice Barkett’s well-reasoned conclusion that under 

Tedder, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to override the jury 

recommendation. It cannot be said the facts of this case so clearly suggest a 

sentence of death “that virtually no reasonable person could differ.” Tedder, 322 

So. 2d at 910. The fact that three members of this Court dissented to the 

affirmance of the override demonstrates just the opposite is true.

I do not dispute that this was a violent murder. Matthew Marshall may be a 

violent person who deserves to be in prison for the rest of his life. However, in my 

opinion, the trial court failed to conduct the proper analysis under Tedder, and this 

Court failed to honor the “conscience of the community” when it affirmed the 

override in this case. Keen, 775 So. 2d at 283. The time has come to correct that 

erroneous ruling and afford Marshall what he is entitled to under the law—the 

sentence recommended by the jury who heard, considered, and carefully weighed 

the evidence presented.

Therefore, I dissent.

PARIENTE, J., concurs.
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Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus

Neal Andre Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Todd G. Scher, 

Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Jessica Houston, Staff 

Attorney, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, 

Florida,

for Petitioner

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Lisa-Marie Lerner, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida,

for Respondent