CONTROVERSIES IN 

THE DETERMINATION 

OF DEATH

CONTROVERSIES IN

THE DETERMINATION

OF DEATH

A White Paper of 

the President’s Council on Bioethics 

Washington, DC 

December 2008 

www.bioethics.gov 

CONTENTS 

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL TO THE PRESIDENT........................... ix 

MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS........ xi 

COUNCIL STAFF ............................................................................... xv 

PREFACE ........................................................................................... xix 

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION................................................... 1 

I. The History of the Neurological Standard for 

 Determining Death ........................................................ 2 

A. The Ventilator and the Problem of 

Determining Death.............................................. 2 

B. “Coma Dépassé”—Beyond Coma........................ 3 

C. The Harvard Committee and the President’s 

 Commission .......................................................... 3 

D. The Contemporary Controversy........................ 6 

II. The Aims and Rationale of This Report..................... 7 

A. Educating the Public............................................ 7 

B. Addressing Challenges to the Neurological 

 Standard................................................................. 7 

C. Clarifying the Troubled Relationship 

 Between Determining Death and 

 Procuring Organs................................................. 8 

III. The Organization of This Report................................ 12 

CHAPTER TWO: TERMINOLOGY.................................................... 17 
vi | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

CHAPTER THREE: THE CLINICAL PRESENTATION AND

PATHOPHYSIOLOGY OF TOTAL BRAIN FAILURE ........................ 21 

I. The “Vital Functions” in Health and After 

 Brain Injury..................................................................... 22 

A. Oxygen In, Carbon Dioxide Out....................... 22 

B. The Role of the Central Nervous System 

 and Ventilator Support........................................ 25 

C. Circulation of Blood ............................................ 27 

D. Ventilator Support and Determination 

 Of Death ............................................................... 29 

II. The Diagnosis of Total Brain Failure.......................... 30 

III. Total Brain Failure: Pathophysiology.......................... 35 

IV. Total Brain Failure: “Health” and “Prognosis” ......... 38 

A. “Somatic Health” ................................................. 39 

B. “Prognosis”........................................................... 40 

V. Total Brain Failure and the Vegetative State.............. 42 

VI. Total Brain Failure: From Clinical Presentation 

 and Pathophysiology to the Philosophical Debate.... 44 

CHAPTER FOUR: THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE ........................ 49 

I. Position One: There Is No Sound Biological 

 Justification for Today’s Neurological Standard........ 52 

II. Position Two: There Is a Sound Biological 

 Justification for Today’s Neurological Standard........ 58 

A. The Work of the Organism as a Whole............ 59 

B. Comparison with the UK Standard................... 65 

CHAPTER FIVE: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE .... 69 

I. Rejecting the Neurological Standard: The 

 Implications of Position One ....................................... 69 
CONTENTS | vii 

A. Sever the Link Between Death and 

 Eligibility for Organ Donation........................... 70 

B. Take Vital Organs Only from Non-Heart- 

 Beating Donors (Controlled DCD)................... 72 

II. Affirming the Neurological Standard: The 

 Implications of Position Two....................................... 75 

CHAPTER SIX: NON-HEART-BEATING ORGAN DONATION..... 79 

I. Background ..................................................................... 79 

II. The Rush to Declare Death and the Problem 

 of Irreversibility .............................................................. 83 

CHAPTER SEVEN: A SUMMARY OF THE COUNCIL’S DEBATE

ON THE NEUROLOGICAL STANDARD FOR DETERMINING

DEATH .............................................................................................. 89 

PERSONAL STATEMENTS

 Alfonso Gómez-Lobo, Dr. Phil................................... 95 

 Gilbert C. Meilaender, Ph.D......................................... 103 

 Edmund D. Pellegrino, M.D., Chairman.................... 107 

TOPICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................ 123 

\[

ix

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL TO

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

The President’s Council on Bioethics 

1425 New York Avenue, NW, Suite C100 

Washington, DC 20005 

December 2008 

The President 

The White House 

Washington, DC 

Dear Mr. President: 

I am pleased to present to you a white paper by the President’s 

Council on Bioethics entitled Controversies in the Determination of 

Death. It is the report of an inquiry that was occasioned by another 

forthcoming Council report on ethical questions in organ transplantation. The two reports are linked ethically: most of the organs 

procured for transplantation in this country come from deceased 

donors who have been declared dead in accord with the neurological standard. 

This white paper by the Council is primarily concerned with a careful analysis of the ethical questions raised by the neurological 

standard, i.e., the clinical determination of “whole brain death.” 

This standard was defended in 1981 by the President’s Commission 

for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 

Behavioral Research. In that report, the Commission also proposed 

a model statute to foster uniformity in law and medical practice nationwide. Since then, the neurological standard has been accepted as 

one of two valid standards for determining death and has been 

adopted in many countries throughout the world. (The other accepted standard is the older, traditional cardiopulmonary standard.) 

In recent years, however, controversy has arisen about the clinical 

and ethical validity of the neurological standard. Some think it too 

restrictive to meet the need for transplantable organs; others fear 
x | LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL TO THE PRESIDENT

that “whole brain death” may not be the equivalent of the death of 

the human being; still others believe that, in the face of any uncertainty, it is ethically prudent to re-examine the concept and the 

evidence critically. 

In this white paper, the Council has given careful consideration to 

contending positions in this controversy. After reviewing the relevant literature and the testimony of many experts, followed by 

intensive discussion between and among its members, the Council 

has concluded that the neurological standard remains valid. Some 

Council members, however, believe that a better philosophical rationale than the one proposed by the President’s Commission of 

1981 should be adopted. A few Council members argue that there is 

sufficient uncertainty about the neurological standard to warrant an 

alternative approach to the care of the “brain dead” human being 

and the question of organ procurement. 

The Council presents this study in the spirit of your original Executive Order to “...facilitate a greater understanding of bioethical 

issues.” By re-examining the neurological standard and placing it 

within its clinical, historical, and ethical context and by critically 

analyzing arguments for and against its validity, the Council believes 

it has fulfilled this mandate. The Council also hopes that this white 

paper will help the public and its policymakers to reflect on a matter 

of profound human significance in such a way that the dignity of 

the human person will be preserved. Only in this way can the benefits of modern technology be realized within ethical constraints. 

 Sincerely, 

Edmund D. Pellegrino, M.D. 

Chairman 
xi

MEMBERS OF

THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS

EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO, M.D., CHAIRMAN

Professor Emeritus of Medicine and Medical Ethics, and 

Adjunct Professor of Philosophy, Georgetown University 

FLOYD E. BLOOM, M.D. 

Professor Emeritus in the Molecular and Integrative Neuroscience Department at The Scripps Research Institute 

BENJAMIN S. CARSON, SR., M.D. 

The Benjamin S. Carson, Sr., M.D., and Dr. Evelyn Spiro, 

R.N., Professor of Pediatric Neurosurgery, Director of Pediatric Neurosurgery, and Professor of Neurosurgery, 

Oncology, Plastic Surgery, and Pediatrics, Johns Hopkins 

Medical Institutions 

REBECCA S. DRESSER, J.D., M.S. 

Daniel Noyes Kirby Professor of Law and Professor of 

Ethics in Medicine, Washington University, St. Louis 

NICHOLAS N. EBERSTADT, PH.D.

Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy, American Enterprise Institute

JEAN B. ELSHTAIN, PH.D. 

Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and Political 

Ethics, University of Chicago, and Thomas and Dorothy 

Leavey Chair in the Foundation of American Freedom, 

Georgetown University 

DANIEL W. FOSTER, M.D. 

John Denis McGarry, Ph.D., Distinguished Chair in Diabetes and Metabolic Research, University of Texas 

Southwestern Medical Center, Dallas, TX 
xii | MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS

MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, PH.D.

Director of Sage Center for the Study of Mind, University 

of California, Santa Barbara 

ROBERT P. GEORGE, J.D., D.PHIL. 

McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence and Director of the 

James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions, Princeton University 

ALFONSO GÓMEZ-LOBO, DR. PHIL. 

Ryan Family Professor of Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy, Georgetown University 

WILLIAM B. HURLBUT, M.D.

Consulting Professor, Neurology and Neurological Sciences, Stanford Medical Center, Stanford University 

DONALD W. LANDRY, M.D., PH.D. 

Professor of Medicine, Director of the Division of Experimental Therapeutics, and Chair, Department of Medicine, 

Columbia University 

PETER A. LAWLER, PH.D.

Dana Professor and Chair of the Department of Government and International Studies, Berry College 

PAUL R. MCHUGH, M.D. 

University Distinguished Service Professor of Psychiatry, 

The Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine 

GILBERT C. MEILAENDER, PH.D. 

Richard and Phyllis Duesenberg Professor of Christian Ethics, Valparaiso University 

JANET D. ROWLEY, M.D. 

Blum-Riese Distinguished Service Professor of Medicine, of 

Molecular Genetics and Cell Biology, and of Human Genetics, Pritzker School of Medicine, University of Chicago 
MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHCS| xiii

DIANA J. SCHAUB, PH.D. 

Professor of Political Science, Loyola College 

CARL E. SCHNEIDER, J.D. 

Chauncey Stillman Professor of Ethics, Morality, and the 

Practice of Law, and Professor of Internal Medicine, University of Michigan 

\[

xv

COUNCIL STAFF

F. Daniel Davis, Ph.D. 

Executive Director 

Judith E. Crawford Thomas W. Merrill, Ph.D. 

Administrative Director Senior Research Analyst 

Samuel J. Crowe, Ph.D. David G. Miller, Ph.D. 

Deputy Director Senior Research Analyst 

Diane M. Gianelli Marti Patchell 

Director of Communications Special Assistant to the 

 Chairman 

Ginger Gruters 

Research Assistant Joseph A. Raho 

 Research Assistant 

Emily L. Jones 

Executive Administrator Alan Rubenstein 

 Senior Consultant 

Audrea V. Medina 

Information Technology Adam Schulman, Ph.D. 

Specialist Senior Research Consultant 

\[

CONTROVERSIES IN 

THE DETERMINATION 

OF DEATH 

xix

PREFACE 

he question of how—by what standard—an individual 

should be declared dead is once more a matter of controversy. With this report, the President’s Council on Bioethics 

takes up this controversy and seeks to illuminate the issues at the 

center of the renewed debate about the inherently perplexing problems of determining human death in an age of life-sustaining 

technologies. In the following pages, the President’s Council examines the main lines of criticism and defense of the neurological 

standard, and also explores the ethical concerns engendered by the 

use of the traditional cardiopulmonary standard in the organ procurement practice known as “controlled donation after cardiac 

death.” In so doing, the President’s Council on Bioethics aims to 

apprise the American public of the contemporary state of the debate and to guide the public’s reflections on matters that touch on 

some of society’s deepest human questions. 

\[

T

 

1

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

n the late twentieth century, as a response to certain advances in 

critical care medicine, a new standard for determining death 

became accepted in both the medical and legal communities in 

the United States and many other parts of the world. Until then, the 

prevailing standard was the traditional cardiopulmonary standard: 

the irreversible loss of heart and lung functions signals the death of 

a human being. The new standard, which took its place alongside 

the traditional one, is based on the irreversible loss of all braindependent functions. In most human deaths, the loss of these neurological functions is accompanied by the traditional, familiar 

markers of death: the patient stops breathing, his or her heart stops 

beating, and the body starts to decay. In relatively rare cases, however, the irreversible loss of brain-dependent functions occurs while 

the body, with technological assistance, continues to circulate blood 

and to show other signs of life. In such cases, there is controversy 

and confusion about whether death has actually occurred. 

There is controversy as well about the use of the traditional cardiopulmonary standard in the organ procurement practice known as 

“controlled donation after cardiac death” (controlled DCD). Here, 

too, there is debate about whether, at the time that organs are taken, 

the donor is truly dead. But, with controlled DCD, there is also a 

more acute danger that the quality of end-of-life care for the patient-donor will be compromised. 

The controversies surrounding both the neurological standard and 

controlled DCD are the subject of this report, although the report’s 

primary focus is the resurgent debate about the ethical validity of 

the neurological standard. Forty years after its inception, longI
2 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

standing doubts about the standard’s biological basis, fueled by 

more recent clinical observations about patients diagnosed as “brain 

dead,” have reignited the debate about the standard’s validity. 

I. The History of the Neurological Standard for 

 Determining Death 

It was a key advance in medical technology—the mechanical ventilator—that originally gave rise to the confusions and controversies 

about when death occurs in a critical care setting. A review of the 

history of the neurological standard for death will help to explain 

why. 

A. The Ventilator and the Problem of Determining Death 

The mechanical ventilator externally supports the patient’s breathing

when injury or infirmity prevents the body from doing this vital 

work on its own. The injuries and diseases that might lead to a need 

for such support are many and varied. The incapacity to breathe on 

one’s own is a common endpoint of different ailments and, of 

course, a terminal one unless help can be provided quickly. Although it does not treat the underlying disease, the ventilator may 

stave off death, often for months or even years. 

Soon after the ventilator began to be used in hospitals all over the 

world, a set of ethical and philosophical complexities became evident. One involved the question of whether maintaining a patient 

on a ventilator is always in the best interest of the patient. In many 

cases in which a patient has suffered a devastating injury that leaves 

him or her unable to breathe spontaneously (that is, without external assistance), there is little chance that use of a ventilator will lead 

to much improvement in the patient’s condition. The reason for 

this is that an inability to breathe spontaneously is often the result 

of a very serious injury to the brain. Saving a patient from death 

after such an injury turns out, in many cases, to be an ambiguous 

sort of success. This ambiguity often leads physicians and patients’ 

loved ones to decide that death should be allowed to come even 

when the ventilator is capable of putting it off for a time.1

 
CHAPTER ONE | 3 

B. “Coma Dépassé”—Beyond Coma 

With the introduction of the ventilator, however, a different sort of 

problem emerged as well. Some brain-injured patients, dependent 

on the ventilator to breathe, turn out to be definitively more incapacitated than others who at first seem to be in a similar state. In 

1959, French neurologists Pierre Mollaret and Maurice Goullon 

characterized this condition of maximal incapacitation. The label 

they provided for it was coma dépassé, or “beyond coma.”2

At the same time, other physicians were discovering the same clinical facts about some of their own patients. In response, many 

medical experts concluded that what the ventilator accomplishes in 

these cases is very different from what it accomplishes in cases in 

which the patient is less incapacitated. In their judgment, a patient 

who is “beyond coma” is not being kept barely alive by the machine 

but, rather, is already dead. The machine is, in essence, ventilating a 

corpse—albeit one that in many ways does not look like a corpse. 

Today, other terms are used in place of coma dépassé, including the 

confusing and misleading term “brain death.” The question of terminology will be explored more fully in Chapter Two. 

Those who understood the coma dépassé condition in this way distinguished, therefore, two groups of brain-injured, ventilatordependent individuals. Members of one group of patients are already dead and should therefore be removed from the ventilator. 

The apparent signs of life that remain—a beating heart, warm skin, 

and minimal, if any, signs of bodily decay—are a sort of mask that 

hides from plain sight the fact that the biological organism has 

ceased to function as such. Members of the other group of patients 

are not already dead. For them—but not for the first group—an 

ethical dilemma arises as to whether further medical treatment is 

futile and should be discontinued, thus allowing them to die. 

C. The Harvard Committee and the President’s 

 Commission 

The point of view that accepts this distinction has become the 

dominant one in most parts of the world, including the United 
4 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

States. In 1968, a physician-led committee at Harvard Medical 

School, in an influential paper entitled “A Definition of Irreversible 

Coma,” concluded that patients who meet the diagnostic criteria for 

a certain type of severe brain injury may be pronounced dead before the heart stops beating.3

 In the 1970s, various state legislatures 

and courts acted to turn this “medical consensus” into a legally recognized standard for determining death.*

 Not all states took such 

action; those that did formulated the new brain-based physiological 

standard and its relation to the more traditional cardiopulmonary 

standard in often significantly different ways. In 1981, the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine 

and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (hereinafter “the President’s Commission”) published Defining Death: Medical, Legal and 

Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death. In this landmark report, the 

President’s Commission proposed a uniform statute for determining death by the application of two alternative physiological 

standards: (1) “irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory 

functions” and (2) “irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brainstem.”4

 

The text accompanying the proposed uniform statute clarified the 

relationship between the two alternative standards. It said that in 

almost all cases of human death the traditional standard (i.e., irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions) should 

be used, as it always had been. Only in rare cases in which mechanical ventilation is used to support the breathing of a severely braininjured individual—one who meets criteria similar to those laid out 

 

* Whether it truly was a consensus is a matter of historical debate. Certainly there 

were some prominent physicians and others who did not share the Harvard 

committee’s confidence that those who were properly diagnosed with “brain 

death” (or “irreversible coma,” as the 1968 report called it) were dead as human 

beings. Some discussion of this issue can be found in M. S. Pernick, “Back from 

the Grave: Recurring Controversies over Defining and Diagnosing Death in History,” in Death: Beyond Whole Brain Criteria, ed. R. Zaner (The Netherlands: Kluwer 

Academic Publishers, 1988),17-74; and M. S. Pernick, “Brain Death in a Cultural 

Context: The Reconstruction of Death, 1967-1981,” in The Definition of Death: 

Contemporary Controversies, ed. S. J. Youngner, R. M. Arnold, and R. Schapiro (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999): 3-33. 
CHAPTER ONE | 5 

by the Harvard committee—should a brain-based standard be employed. 

According to the President’s Commission, these latter cases require 

a non-traditional standard because circulatory and respiratory functions cannot and should not be considered signs of continued life if 

they are supported technologically. The Commission proposed a useful 

metaphor for the problem: recognizing death is like looking into a 

room to see if someone is there. When the window that one usually 

peers through is obscured—when the curtain is drawn—one should 

make every effort to find another window. In the case at hand, the 

“curtain is drawn” by the use of the ventilator to support breathing 

and (indirectly) circulation. According to the President’s Commission, the neurological standard of irreversible loss of whole brain 

function—the coma dépassé or “brain death” diagnosis—is a second 

window on the same, biologically real phenomenon of human 

death. Such a standard is needed only when the traditional standard 

cannot be used—only when the curtain is drawn on the first window do we need to look through the second. 

The President’s Commission’s model statute was endorsed by the 

American Medical Association (AMA), the American Bar Association (ABA), and the National Conference of Commissioners on 

Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). The NCCUSL published this statute under the name “Uniform Determination of Death Act” 

(UDDA) and worked to get it passed in all of the states and jurisdictions of the United States. The key section of the Act, Section 

One, reads as follows: 

§1. [Determination of Death]. An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and 

respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all 

functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is 

dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards.5 

Through the NCCUSL’s efforts, a significant increase in uniformity 

has been achieved. Not all U.S. jurisdictions have adopted the exact 

language of the UDDA, but all of them, without exception, have 
6 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

some form of legal recognition for a brain-based standard of death.*

This recognition allows physicians to declare an individual who is 

dependent on a ventilator dead before the cessation of heartbeat 

and respiration if results indicating the coma dépassé or “brain death” 

condition are obtained upon neurological examination. 

The consensus position for using a neurological standard to determine death in the United States may be stated in this way: “Whole 

brain death”—but no other sort of injury that leaves circulation and 

respiration intact—is an appropriate standard for determining the 

death of a human being. 

D. The Contemporary Controversy 

Today, however, the consensus position is subject to a number of 

persistent concerns and novel criticisms. There remains considerable public confusion, both about the meaning of the term “brain 

dead” and about its relation to the death of a human being. There is 

persistent dissent by some clinicians, philosophers, and other critical observers who have never been convinced that “brain death” is, 

indeed, the death of the human being. There are, as well, pressures 

against insisting that declaring death, or at least “organ donation 

eligibility,” requires the irreversible loss of function in the whole 

brain. And, perhaps most important, there are critics who have published evidence of ongoing integrated bodily activities in some 

persons meeting the criteria of “whole brain death” and who have 

claimed that this evidence invalidates the rationale for today’s consensus position. These challenges invite—indeed, they necessitate—

a re-examination of the neurological standard enshrined in law and 

medical practice. In this report, the President’s Council on Bioethics 

offers such a re-examination. 

 

* Forty-five U.S. jurisdictions have adopted a determination of death act that is 

either identical to, or shares basic elements with, the UDDA. For details, see H. 

R. Beresford, “Legal Aspects of Brain Death,” in Brain Death, ed. E. F. Wijdicks 

(Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2001). A few states have no determination of death statute, but rely instead on precedent-setting court cases, some 

of which cite the UDDA in their decisions. 
CHAPTER ONE | 7 

II. The Aims and Rationale of This Report 

A. Educating the Public 

One aim of this report is to illuminate for the American public and 

its policymakers the complexities inherent in the current legal and 

medical understanding of death. Certain questions emerge immediately: What is “whole brain death”? How do clinicians determine 

that such a condition is present in a given patient? What pathophysiological and prognostic facts about the condition support the 

judgment that “whole brain death” is more than just another case of 

human injury—that it is, rather, the death of the human being? 

How can the confusions engendered by the term “brain death” be 

dispelled? 

B. Addressing Challenges to the Neurological Standard 

Another aim of this report is to address various challenges to the 

prevailing view that have emerged over the years. In truth, the clinical and pathophysiological facts about the “whole brain death” 

condition are better understood today than they were in 1968 or 

1981. This improved understanding of the facts invites a reexamination of a standard that crucially depends, for its validity, on 

those facts. Some critics who have undertaken this work of reexamination have concluded that the neurological standard for 

death is not justifiable—that, in light of what we now know, only 

the traditional signs of death are adequate for confidently determining that a human being has made the transition from living body to 

corpse. Such a conclusion is shared also by a minority that has long 

held itself apart from the emerging consensus, doubting whether 

any patient who continues to breathe and whose blood circulates—

even with technological help—can confidently be judged already 

dead. Thus, in this report, the President’s Council also reconsiders 

the philosophical adequacy of the prevailing view on “brain death.” 
8 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

C. Clarifying the Troubled Relationship Between 

 Determining Death and Procuring Organs 

One more critical impetus for this inquiry must be mentioned and 

explored. As previously noted, the “whole brain death” standard for 

determining death has also been challenged by critics interested in 

increasing the supply of organs for transplantation. Additional 

background will be helpful in understanding the nature of this challenge.*

A human being whose death has been determined according to a 

neurological standard is the ideal source of transplantable organs. 

The reason for this is straightforward: with artificial support of respiration and circulation, blood continues to circulate through the 

body, thereby maintaining the vitality of organs targeted for surgical 

removal and thus optimizing their utility for their eventual recipients. If surgeons wait for the more traditional signs of death, the 

organs endure a period of “warm ischemia” during which they are 

deprived of nourishing blood and oxygen. While it is possible to 

procure some organs under these circumstances, concerns about 

ischemic damage make the heart-beating, “brain-dead” donor the 

preferred source of organs.† 

The advantage of the “heart-beating cadaver” for transplantation 

was not missed, of course, by the pioneering physicians and policymakers who advocated early on for the now widely accepted 

 

* A full treatment of the history, practice, and ethics of organ transplantation can 

be found in the Council’s report on that subject, published as a companion volume to this report. The discussion here covers only those facts most relevant to 

the “determination of death” topic. 

† Chapter Six discusses procurement of organs (e.g., kidneys, lungs, livers, hearts, 

pancreata, and intestines) from donors whose death has been determined based 

on the cessation of circulatory and respiratory function. Also, the remarks here 

do not pertain to the procurement of what is commonly referred to as “tissue” 

(as opposed to organs) from a cadaver. In this context, tissue refers to skin, 

bones, heart valves, corneas, tendons, and veins—all parts of the body that can 

be taken from a cadaver and put to medical use for another human being. These 

parts can be taken hours after the heart has stopped beating. 
CHAPTER ONE | 9 

neurological standard. The Harvard committee, for instance, mentioned avoiding “controversy in obtaining organs for 

transplantation” as one of two primary practical goods that would 

come from the new understanding of death.* 

After the Harvard committee released its report, a group of prominent physicians, philosophers, and bioethicists known as the “Task 

Force on Death and Dying of the Institute of Society, Ethics and 

the Life Sciences” (hereinafter “the Task Force”) published an appraisal of the new standard for determining death. In that paper, the 

group made it clear that, although the conclusions regarding a neurological standard would certainly have the effect of creating 

“available organ sources,” the neurological standard was not designed solely to accomplish that end.6

 It should be noted that there 

were some who did not accept the Task Force’s judgment and suspected that the movement for a brain-based death standard was 

driven by the need for transplantable organs. 

Nonetheless, the Task Force’s clarification has largely set the tone 

for all subsequent debate: The question of whether a human being 

in the difficult-to-judge state of “brain death” is alive or dead 

should be answered on its own terms, not with an eye to the practical effects that a new standard for determining death might have. In 

other words, society must first decide how to understand the condition of ventilator-dependent patients who have suffered the most 

debilitating kind of brain injury: Are these individuals dead? Can we 

know that they are dead with the requisite amount of certainty to act 

accordingly? Only after these questions have been answered can the 

matter of eligibility for organ procurement be addressed. 

The Council’s inquiry into controversies surrounding the determination of death is firmly situated in this tradition. The central 

 

* The other good it mentioned was relieving the burden on families and caregivers of providing invasive, expensive, and—crucially—futile medical treatment. 

Today, this problem is less acute since patients and their surrogate decision makers have a greater degree of control over decisions to remove interventions. 

Doing so does not rely in any way on deciding that the patient is already dead. 
10 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

question addressed by the Council is, Does a diagnosis of “whole brain 

death” mean that the human being is dead? That is to say, the central 

question is not, Does a diagnosis of “whole brain death” mean that the human being is eligible to be a heart-beating organ donor? 

Even so, it would be unwise to take up the issue of the “whole 

brain” neurological standard for death without some acknowledgment of the pivotal role that the standard plays in transplantation 

medicine. In its companion inquiry into the ethics of organ transplantation, the Council examines various policy proposals offered as 

solutions to the growing gap between the need for and the supply 

of human organs. It also considers, in particular, ongoing debates 

about the ethics of procuring organs from individuals with various 

degrees of neurological injury, including patients in persistent vegetative states. For this reason, some preliminary discussion of how 

the determination of death fits into the larger picture of organ procurement is warranted. 

Organs can be procured from either the living or the dead, but the 

living donor can only ethically give organs whose removal will not 

adversely affect his or her ability to live in a relatively healthy state. 

All organs and types of tissue that are useful for transplant can be 

taken from the deceased, but only if valid consent has been obtained.*

 To count as “deceased,” an individual must meet one of the 

two standards described in the UDDA. In the majority of cases, the 

standard used to declare death prior to organ procurement is the 

neurological standard; to meet this standard, the patient-donor must 

be conclusively diagnosed with the condition known as “whole 

brain death.”†

 

* For more information on consent policies, see D. Wendler and N. Dickert, 

“The Consent Process for Cadaveric Organ Procurement: How Does It Work? 

How Can It Be Improved?” JAMA 285, no. 3 (2001); and Chapter Three of the 

Council’s report on organ transplantation. 

† Cases where organ procurement occurs after a declaration of death by the 

cardio-pulmonary standard are discussed in detail in Chapter Six. 
CHAPTER ONE | 11 

Some proponents of organ transplantation argue that these ethical 

constraints restrict access to the goods that transplantation makes 

possible: improved health for recipients and the opportunity for 

generous acts by donors and families in the face of loss and grief. 

To increase the supply of organs, they argue, more leeway should be 

given to individuals and families to choose organ donation when a 

human being is, as the law is now construed, near death—that is, 

before the strict neurological standard for death has been met. 

Reforming the practice of organ donation and procurement to 

make more organs available could take two forms: (1) loosening the 

standard for determining death, or (2) abandoning what is known as 

the “dead donor rule”—the requirement that an individual be 

“really dead” in order to be a heart-beating donor of vital organs. 

With the first option, some individuals with brain injuries less severe than “whole brain death” would also be regarded as dead. 

Some advocates of this measure argue that a person is dead when 

certain higher brain functions (or mental capacities) are gone. They 

would endorse changing the legal/medical definition of death to 

encompass this group and, still following the mandate of the “dead 

donor rule,” allow them to serve as heart-beating organ donors.7

The second option would leave the legal/medical definition of 

death as it stands (or even change it to require cessation of circulation), but would allow the removal of organs from brain-injured 

patients who are very close to death (but not yet dead). In this revised scheme, clear consent for organ removal—which would occur 

before death—would be required. Proponents of the second option 

seek to avoid the philosophical tangles of deciding whether a neurological standard for death is justified without losing the benefits that 

come from removing organs from heart-beating patients.8

In this report, the Council will contend that arguments for both reform options are unconvincing. As regards the first option, the 

Council maintains that there is no “looser standard of death” that 

can stand up to biological and philosophical scrutiny. Arguments 

that have been made in support of a looser standard are based on 
12 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

an impoverished view of what it is to be a human being. The Council’s position on this is elaborated in Chapter Four. 

As for the second reform option, that is, abandoning the “dead donor rule” as a guide for practice—the Council believes this is not 

ethically justifiable. If indeed it is the case that there is no solid scientific or philosophical rationale for the current “whole brain 

standard,” then the only ethical course is to stop procuring organs 

from heart-beating individuals. Organ transplantation could continue, but with exclusive reliance on donors whose death is 

determined by the cardiopulmonary standard under a controlled 

DCD protocol (see Chapter Six for details). In the majority view of 

the Council, such a step is not necessary, however, since today’s 

“whole brain standard” is, in fact, conceptually sound. 

III. The Organization of This Report 

The discussion thus far has described the current state of the theory 

and the practice of determining death using a neurological standard. 

A few important points warrant repeated emphasis: First, the central question of this report is, Are patients diagnosed with “whole brain 

death” dead as human beings? A related, secondary question is, How 

should new empirical findings about “whole brain death” be interpreted? 

Chapter Two of this report offers a critique of the term “brain 

death” as a description of the clinical condition of the patients 

whose status as living or dead is at the center of debate. The term is 

problematic. Whether patients in this condition are, in fact, dead, is 

the central uncertainty addressed by this report; therefore, a term 

employing the word “death”—as “brain death” or “whole brain 

death” does—is prejudicial to the aims of an open inquiry. With 

this concern in mind, we propose the term “total brain failure” for 

the clinical diagnosis that underlies the current neurological standard. 

Chapter Three presents a thorough discussion of the clinical and 

pathophysiological details that must be understood in order to 

evaluate the validity of a neurological standard for determining 

death. This chapter has five main parts. Part I is an account of the 

“vital functions” of breathing and circulation, with an emphasis on 

the role of the central nervous system in their operation. The chap-
CHAPTER ONE | 13 

ter then turns to the clinical state, “total brain failure,” that is, the 

condition typically referred to as “whole brain death.” In Part II, 

this clinical state is examined from the standpoint of diagnostics: 

How can clinicians recognize that an injured individual is, indeed, 

properly diagnosed with this condition? In Part III, the condition is 

analyzed from the standpoint of pathophysiology: What is going on 

in the brain and body of a patient with a diagnosis that meets the 

criteria of “total brain failure”? In Part IV, empirical findings about 

the condition that have emerged in recent years are explored. These 

are findings that some consider damaging to the rationale for the 

“whole brain death” standard. The fifth part of Chapter Three is a 

comparison of total brain failure with a state of brain injury with 

which it is often confused—the persistent vegetative state or PVS. 

Chapter Four develops in detail two opposing positions on the central question of the report, Are individuals diagnosed with total brain 

failure—more generally known as “whole brain death”—really dead as human 

beings? The first of these takes a principled, agnostic posture: We 

cannot know with certainty that patients with total brain failure are 

dead or alive and, as a result, such patients should be regarded as 

living until their hearts stop. The second position in Chapter Four 

affirms the current neurological standard, but develops an argument 

for it based on different philosophical premises than those that 

have become commonplace. 

In Chapter Five, we examine the implications for policy and practice of each of the positions described in Chapter Four. We do so 

with a concern both for the needs of organ transplantation and the 

need to respect the dignity of patients at the end of life. 

Chapter Six explores the practice of controlled DCD. This increasingly common practice in U.S. hospitals provides a family with the 

opportunity to donate the vital organs of a terminally injured loved 

one after he or she dies. If the family agrees to donation, then the 

death of a loved one is monitored in a controlled setting that allows 

the transplant team to retrieve the organs from the donor as soon 

as the heart stops. Death is determined by the cardiopulmonary 

standard, but the timing of the determination is dictated by the requirements of successful organ procurement. For this reason, there 
14 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

can be unsettling ambiguities in the line between life and death with 

controlled DCD—and thus ethical concerns that merit thoughtful 

consideration. In Chapter Six, we briefly explore these concerns, 

which the Council also examines in detail in its report on the ethics 

of organ transplantation. 

In the final chapter, Chapter Seven, we summarize the conclusions 

of the Council’s inquiry into current controversies in the determination of death, taking note of its discussions of ethical concerns in 

controlled DCD, but focusing on its debate about the biological 

and philosophical justification of the neurological standard. 

\[
CHAPTER ONE | 15 

ENDNOTES 

 

1 For studies on how often this occurs, see T. J. Prendergast and J. M. Luce, “Increasing Incidence of Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Support from the 

Critically Ill,” Am J Respir Crit Care Med 155, no. 1 (1997): 15-20; and S. P. Keenan 

et al., “A Retrospective Review of a Large Cohort of Patients Undergoing the 

Process of Withholding or Withdrawal of Life Support,” Crit Care Med 25, no. 8 

(1997): 1324-31. 

2 P. Mollaret and M. Goulon, “Le Coma Dépassé,” Rev Neurol (Paris) 101 (1959): 

3-15. For a survey of the early neurological literature regarding this subgroup of 

ventilator-dependent patients, see M. N. Diringer and E. F. Wijdicks, “Brain 

Death in Historical Perspective,” in Brain Death, ed. E. F. Wijdicks (Philadelphia: 

Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2001): 5-27; E. F. Wijdicks, “The Neurologist and 

Harvard Criteria for Brain Death,” Neurology 61, no. 7 (2003): 970-6; C. Machado, 

“The First Organ Transplant from a Brain-Dead Donor,” Neurology 64, no. 11 

(2005): 1938-42; and C. Machado et al., “The Concept of Brain Death Did Not 

Evolve to Benefit Organ Transplants,” J Med Ethics 33, no. 4 (2007): 197-200. 

3 Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition 

of Brain Death, “A Definition of Irreversible Coma,” JAMA 205, no. 6 (1968): 

337-40. 

4 President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 

Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Defining Death: Medical, Legal and Ethical Issues 

in the Determination of Death, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 

1981). Available online at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/past_commissions/ 

defining_death.pdf (accessed Oct. 22, 2008). 

5 The complete text of the act is available online at http://www.law.upenn.edu/ 

bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1980s/udda80.htm. (accessed Sept. 26, 2008). 

6 Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences, Task Force on Death and 

Dying, “Refinements in Criteria for the Determination of Death: An Appraisal,” 

JAMA 221, no. 1 (1972): 48-53. 

7 See, for instance, K. G. Gervais, Redefining Death (New Haven: Yale University 

Press, 1986); R. M. Veatch, “The Death of Whole-Brain Death: The Plague of the 

Disaggregators, Somaticists, and Mentalists,” J Med Philos 30, no. 4 (2005): 353-78; 

and J. P. Lizza, Persons, Humanity, and the Definition of Death (Baltimore, Md.: Johns 

Hopkins University Press, 2006). 

8 See, for instance, R. M. Arnold and S. J. Youngner, “The Dead Donor Rule: 

Should We Stretch It, Bend It, or Abandon It?” Kennedy Inst Ethics J 3, no. 2 

(1993): 263-78; N. Fost, “Reconsidering the Dead Donor Rule: Is It Important 

That Organ Donors Be Dead?” Kennedy Inst Ethics J 14, no. 3 (2004): 249-60; and 

R. D. Truog, “Brain Death—Too Flawed to Endure, Too Ingrained to Abandon,” J Law Med Ethics 35, no. 2 (2007): 273-81. The conceptual case for 

“eligibility for donation without knowledge of death” was described earlier in R. 

S. Morison, “Death: Process or Event?” Science 173, no. 998 (1971): 694-8; R. B. 

Dworkin, “Death in Context,” Indiana Law J 48, no. 4 (1973): 623-39; and A. 

Halevy and B. Brody, “Brain Death: Reconciling Definitions, Criteria, and Tests,” 

Ann Intern Med 119, no. 6 (1993): 519-25.
 
 

17

CHAPTER TWO

TERMINOLOGY

lthough commonly used to identify the neurological standard for determining death, the term “brain death” is 

highly problematic. Three difficulties, in particular, are 

noteworthy. 

First, the term “brain death” implies that there is more than one 

kind of death. This is a serious error, perpetuated by such statements as “the patient became brain dead at 3:00 a.m. on Thursday 

and died two days later.” Whatever difficulties there might be in 

knowing whether death has occurred, it must be kept in mind that 

there is only one real phenomenon of death. Death is the transition 

from being a living, mortal organism to being something that, 

though dead, retains a physical continuity with the once-living organism. Some will argue that such a transition does not occur 

instantaneously or that there are cases in which there is no way to 

know if the transition has, in fact, occurred. But, problems of 

“knowing” aside, there is only one real phenomenon that clinicians 

and families struggle to recognize. 

Second, the term “brain death” implies that death is a state of the 

cells and tissues constituting the brain. In fact, what is directly at 

issue is the living or dead status of the human individual, not the 

individual’s brain. In other contexts, it may be useful to talk about 

the death of parts of the body—the death of a cell, for example, or 

the “death” (irreversible failure) of an organ, such as a kidney or a 

liver. In current law and medical practice, the condition that warrants a determination of death using the neurological standard is not

the “death of the brain” in this sense. 

A
18 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

For this reason, evidence of continued activity of the pituitary 

gland, or of similar residual brain tissue function in patients diagnosed with “brain death,” is not decisive in determining whether 

these patients are living or dead.* The question is not, Has the whole 

brain died? The question is, Has the human being died? This criticism 

can be leveled perhaps even more sharply at the commonly employed phrase “whole brain death,” which, if taken literally, implies 

that every part of the brain must be non-functional for the diagnosis to be made. In reality, and somewhat at odds with the exact 

wording of the UDDA, “all functions of the entire brain” do not 

have to be extinguished in order to meet the neurological standard 

under the current application of the law to medical practice. In 

Chapter Four, we take up the question, “On what grounds might 

we judge the persistence of certain functions (e.g., ADH secretion 

by the pituitary gland) to be less important than other functions 

(e.g., spontaneous breathing)?” 

Third, death itself is not a diagnosis; that is, the phenomenon of 

death and the selection of the appropriate standard for determining 

it are not strictly medical or technical matters. Thus, any term chosen as a label for a medical diagnosis should not contain the word 

“death.” It is not death that is diagnosed but rather a clinical state 

or condition made evident by certain ascertainable signs. Calling the 

condition of the patient who meets a set of diagnostic tests “brain 

death” begs the question of whether this condition does or does 

not warrant a determination that the patient has died. What is 

needed is a separate, non-prejudicial name for the condition that 

describes the state of the patient: a name that does not, by its use, 

commit one to any judgment about whether the death of the human being has occurred. 

Other commentators over the years have noted similar difficulties 

with the term “brain death.” In response, various terms have been 

suggested to replace it as the name for the clinical diagnosis. The 

 

* This evidence is discussed more completely in Part III of Chapter Three. 
CHAPTER TWO | 19 

table below compiles some of these terms, along with references to 

their respective sources in the scholarly literature. 

Table 1: Different Terms for One Clinical State 

Term Sources 

(Whole/Total) Brain 

Death 

Terms most commonly used 

today 

Total Brain Failure Preferred term of this report

Coma Dépassé 

(“Beyond Coma”) 

Mollaret and Goulon, 1959 

Irreversible Coma Harvard committee, 1968 

(Total) Brain Infarction Ingvar, 19711; Shewmon, 

19972

Irreversible Apneic Coma Zamperetti, et al., 20043

Brain Arrest Shemie, et al., 20064

Each term has advantages and disadvantages. Although the choice 

of an appropriate term is important, it is more crucial to maintain a 

distinction between naming the medical diagnosis of a condition 

and declaring an individual dead on the basis of that medical diagnosis. In this report, we will employ the term “total brain failure” 

for the medical diagnosis. The precise meaning of “total” in this 

composite term is discussed in Chapter Three. Here, at the outset, 

we emphasize that total brain failure is, by definition, an irreversible

condition. Thus, to be more explicit one could employ the term, 

“total and irreversible brain failure.” We will use the more familiar 

terms, “brain death” or “whole brain death,” when such use is warranted by the specific context, for example, in describing the history 

of the concept or in referencing works by others who themselves 

use these more familiar terms. 

Because there is no perfect term, the choice of one is necessarily 

somewhat arbitrary. Nonetheless, an exploration of the strengths 

and weaknesses of the different terms can be useful in understanding the relevant clinical and pathophysiological facts. This will 

become clearer in Chapter Three, where we assume different perspectives on the clinical condition that is at the center of the debate. 
20 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

ENDNOTES

 

1 D. H. Ingvar, “Brain Death—Total Brain Infarction,” Acta Anaesthesiol Scand 

Suppl 45 (1971): 129-40. 

2 D. A. Shewmon, “Recovery from ‘Brain Death’: A Neurologist’s Apologia,” 

Linacre Q 64, no. 1 (1997): 30-96. 

3 N. Zamperetti. et al., “Irreversible Apnoeic Coma 35 Years Later. Towards a 

More Rigorous Definition of Brain Death?” Intensive Care Med 30, no. 9 (2004): 

1715-22. 

4 S. D. Shemie, et al., “Severe Brain Injury to Neurological Determination of 

Death: Canadian Forum Recommendations,” CMAJ 174, no. 6 (2006): S1-13. 
 

21

CHAPTER THREE

THE CLINICAL PRESENTATION AND 

PATHOPHYSIOLOGY OF TOTAL 

BRAIN FAILURE

efore we engage the central question—Is a human being diagnosed with total brain failure dead?—we need to recount some of 

the more salient aspects of the clinical presentation and underlying pathophysiology of total brain failure. We begin with a description of the functions of circulation and respiration. Under the 

usual circumstances, the presence of these processes in a body is a 

sure sign of life. Understanding how breathing and circulation operate in normal circumstances will illuminate why this is so—why, 

that is, these are aptly called “vital functions.” 

In patients who are diagnosed with total brain failure and, on this 

basis, are declared dead, these vital functions are dependent on external support from the ventilator. To defenders of today’s 

neurological standard, this means that these apparent signs of life are, 

in fact, artifacts of the technological support—they conceal the fact 

that death has already occurred. To evaluate this argument, the basic facts of technological support for these vital functions must be made 

clear. This clarity can only be achieved if the interrelatedness of the 

three body systems involved in breathing and circulation is understood. The three systems are: 

1. The heart and circulatory system. 

2. The lungs and respiratory system. 

3. The central nervous system and, in particular, the centers involved in breathing. 

B
22 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

After describing these vital functions and clarifying the nature of 

technological support for these functions in Part I, we explain why 

a patient who has the loss of the ability to breathe is not necessarily 

dead. In Part II, we take up the diagnosis of total brain failure and 

explain how patients with this diagnosis are distinguished from 

those with less serious forms of neurological injury. In Part III, we 

turn to the pathophysiology of total brain failure, that is, to the 

processes that unfold with this condition at the level of brain tissues 

and cells. In Part IV, we address two types of medical findings that 

have led some to question the suitability of total brain failure as a 

clinically and ethically valid standard for assessing death. In Part V, 

we compare total brain failure with the vegetative state and survey 

recent discussions of consciousness and functional states of the 

human brain. 

I. The “Vital Functions” in Health and After Brain Injury 

The pathophysiological processes that eventually end in the mortal 

condition we are calling total brain failure engage not only the central nervous system but also the circulatory and respiratory systems 

of the human body. In this account of these systems and the vital 

functions that they make possible—and that eventually fail with 

total brain failure—we begin with respiration. 

A. Oxygen In, Carbon Dioxide Out 

Under usual circumstances, an adult human being inhales and exhales twelve to twenty times per minute. Each inhalation is effected 

by a contraction of muscles in the thorax or chest cavity, the most 

important of which is the diaphragm. These muscles can collectively 

be termed the “muscles of respiration” (See Figure 1). 

The contraction of these muscles causes the lungs to expand and 

the body to take in air from the surrounding atmosphere. This air 

enters through the nose and mouth and travels to the lungs via the 

respiratory tree. At the terminal end of this tree with its multiple 

branches are the pulmonary alveoli, which are small spherical air 

sacs surrounded by tiny blood vessels (See Figure 2). The walls of 
CHAPTER THREE | 23 

the alveoli are extremely thin, formed to facilitate diffusion of gases 

between the sacs and the blood vessels (See Figure 3). 

Figure 1: The Muscles Involved in Respiration 

Figure 2: The Respiratory Tree and Alveoli 
24 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

Figure 3: Detail of Alveoli 

To inhale is to bring air to these terminal nodes where oxygen from 

the atmospheric air is able to move into the blood. Oxygen is critical to the ongoing metabolic work of the millions of cells in the 

body. Without a continuous supply of oxygen, brought into the 

body through inhalations and transported to the tissues by circulating blood, the body’s cells, tissues, and organs would cease to 

function. 

Exhaling is just as critical to the life of a human being or other animal organism. When the cells of the body perform their work—

metabolic and otherwise—they produce waste products, notably 

carbon dioxide (CO2). This CO2 is carried away from the cells by 

the blood that returns to the heart and lungs. In the same act of exchange by diffusion that brings oxygen in at the alveoli, CO2 diffuses 

out from blood to the alveolar cavity (See Figure 3). From the alveolar cavity, air that is now rich in CO2 moves back up the respiratory 

tree and out into the surrounding atmosphere. This expulsion or 

exhalation of carbon dioxide is brought about, mechanically, by the 

relaxation of the muscles of respiration and the subsequent shrinking of the cavities of the lungs. Again, it is vital to the organism as a 
CHAPTER THREE | 25 

whole that this removal of CO2 from the body be continually accomplished. 

Thus, inhaling and exhaling—the process of breathing—facilitate a 

critical exchange between the organism and the world. To put it in 

the simplest of terms: the exchange is one of oxygen in and carbon 

dioxide out, and the purpose of the exchange is to fuel the cellular 

processes of metabolism with oxygen and to rid the body of the 

waste products of those processes. The mechanism of the exchange 

includes the contraction and the relaxation of the muscles of respiration and the diffusion of gases into the blood across the lining of 

the tiny alveoli. 

B. The Role of the Central Nervous System and Ventilator 

Support 

For many years it was not well understood that the Central Nervous 

System (CNS), comprising the brain and the spinal cord, plays a 

crucial role in maintaining an organism’s vital functions. To understand that role, one might begin by pondering how it is that the 

muscles of respiration “know” when to contract. Does this contraction happen in an automatic, periodic fashion or does it happen 

upon receiving some signal from the body’s CNS? The answer is 

this: the contraction of the muscles of respiration is brought about 

by a signal sent from the respiratory center of the CNS. That center 

is located at the base of the brainstem,*

 in a structure known as the 

medulla oblongata (The anatomical references in this and the ensuing discussion are illustrated in Figure 4 on page 26.) 

When sensors in the respiratory center detect a relatively high level 

of CO2 in the blood, a signal is sent to the muscles of respiration, 

spurring them to contract. Each of the twelve to twenty inhalations 

per minute, then, is the body’s response to the accumulation of the 

waste products of metabolism; for life to continue, the CO2 must be 

expelled and new oxygen must be brought in. 

 

*

 On the functions of the brainstem, see Part II below. 
26 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

Other parts of the CNS can also be involved in signaling the muscles of respiration to contract so that oxygen-rich air will be inhaled. 

In what is called “conscious breathing,” a human being can deliberately control the depth and pace of breathing, during which time 

other parts of the brain are involved in controlling the muscles of 

respiration. Changes in the depth and pace of breathing can also be 

brought about without conscious effort: the rate of breathing will 

quicken, for example, during physical exercise or in response to a 

“fight or flight” situation. These changes are directed by changing 

metabolic needs (current or anticipated) throughout the body’s organs and tissues. 

Figure 4: The Brain and Brainstem, with Major Divisions

For the purposes of our inquiry, the crucial fact about the mechanics of breathing is this: When the brainstem’s respiratory centers are 

incapacitated, the organism will not make or display any respiratory 

effort. The chest will remain absolutely still and the body’s need for 
CHAPTER THREE | 27 

oxygen will go unanswered. If the death of the organism is to be 

prevented, some external “driver” of the breathing process—a mechanical ventilator—must be used.*

 

The mechanical ventilator works by increasing and decreasing the 

pressure in the lung cavities so that oxygen-rich atmospheric air will 

travel down and CO2-rich air will travel back up the respiratory tree. 

Gas exchange in the lungs is then possible, although an external 

substitute for the patient’s own respiratory effort cannot manage 

this exchange (and thus maintain ideal blood-gas levels) as effectively as the body free of injury can. The exchange of gases that the 

ventilator sustains will be of no benefit to the patient unless the 

blood is kept moving as well. Incoming oxygen must be transported 

to the tissues that need it, and accumulating carbon dioxide must be 

removed to the lungs for expulsion from the body. In other words, 

the ventilator will help the patient only if another vital organ system 

is operational, comprising the heart, working as a pump, and the 

conveying network of arteries, veins, and capillaries. 

C. Circulation of Blood 

The action of the circulatory system is analogous to the action of 

the external respiratory system.†

 Each system acts to maintain the 

continuous motion of a fluid substance that fuels the metabolic 

work of the organism as a whole. The fluid substance is air in respi-

 

* There is another sort of situation in which a ventilator is required to support 

vital functions: The respiratory center in the brain can be functional while the 

muscles of respiration themselves are paralyzed. This was the case for polio patients in the mid-20th century who were the first wide-scale recipients of 

ventilatory treatment in the form of cumbersome iron lung machines (i.e., negative pressure ventilators). Here, one could say, the CNS signal to take action is 

being sent, but it is falling on “deaf ears.” Alternatively, one may say that the drive

to breathe is present but the ability to turn that drive into action is absent. For 

many polio patients, the paralysis subsided when the virus was defeated and, as a 

result, normal breathing resumed. 

† The external respiratory system is the part of the respiratory system that engages 

the organism with the outside world. By contrast, the internal respiratory system 

functions at the cellular level to assimilate oxygen from the bloodstream and deposit CO2 back into the bloodstream. 
28 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

ration and blood in circulation. Furthermore, in both respiration and 

circulation, the mechanism of action is the periodic contraction of 

muscle—the heart muscle in circulation, the muscles of respiration 

in breathing.* 

There are important differences, however, between the circulatory 

work of moving blood and the respiratory work of moving air in 

the body. The movement of blood occurs only within the body, 

whereas the movement of air is an exchange between the body and 

the surrounding atmosphere. This point will be important to the 

discussion of “Position Two” in Chapter Four. Another difference, 

more relevant to the present explanation of external support of vital 

systems, is the fact that there is no part of the CNS that is absolutely 

indispensable for heart contractions in the way that the respiratory 

center in the brainstem is absolutely indispensable for the muscular 

contractions involved in breathing. 

Again, in healthy circumstances, stimuli from the CNS will alter the 

rate and strength of contractions: the heart rate will change in response to danger, excitement, or other stimuli. But even when there 

is no stimulus whatsoever from the CNS, the heart can continue to 

beat. This property of the heart, known as its “inherent rhythmicity,” has been demonstrated dramatically by experiments in which 

an animal’s heart is taken out of its body and stimulated to begin 

beating rhythmically again. It is also demonstrated by the heartbeat 

of an embryo, which begins before the CNS has developed. 

 

* This description is incomplete insofar as it suggests that the heart is the only 

active part of the circulatory system. In fact, the vessels of circulation, far from 

being rigid “plumbing lines” that passively convey blood pumped by the heart, 

are living tissues that undergo changes (some driven by the CNS) to maintain an 

appropriate blood pressure. Patients who are receiving ventilatory support often 

must also be given drugs (e.g., pressors) to help keep the blood pressure in a 

healthy range. 
CHAPTER THREE | 29 

D. Ventilator Support and Determination of Death 

What, then, does it mean to say that the ventilator “externally supports the vital functions of breathing and circulation?” It means 

that, in the place of the organism’s effort to breathe, stimulated by 

the respiratory centers of the CNS, an external device moves the 

lungs and facilitates the inflow and outflow of needed air. This allows the heart muscle to continue to function, because its cells, like 

all other cells in the body, need oxygen to stay alive. The defense of 

the neurological standard for determining death begins with these 

observations: respiratory motion supported in this way is not in itself a “sign of life.” It is, rather, an artifact of technological 

intervention. Nor is a beating heart, in these circumstances, a “sign 

of life.” It is, instead, merely the continuation of an automatic process that would quickly cease if the ventilator were withdrawn. The 

defense of the neurological standard begins with these points, but it 

does not rest its case there. The loss of the ability to breathe on 

one’s own is not a sufficient condition for declaring that an individual has died. Two other conditions are necessary: (1) other 

functions indicative of life must be lost, and (2) these functional 

losses must be irreversible. Each of these conditions warrants further 

explanation. 

Any doubt that the loss of the ability to breathe spontaneously is 

insufficient for declaring death can be easily dispelled by considering cases of neurological injury that deprive a patient of the ability 

to breathe and yet leave untouched the ability to engage in activities 

dependent on other parts of the CNS. Patients with high spinal 

cord injuries present such a condition: they remain awake and alert 

but dependent upon ventilators for respiratory support. 

Furthermore, even the loss of all functions of the CNS is not a sufficient criterion for declaring death if this loss of function is not 

irreversible. Again, there are critical care cases that demonstrate the 

importance of this qualification—for instance, when a patient is in a 

deep, non-breathing (“apneic”) coma during a critical emergency 

and the support of the ventilator allows time for CNS functions to 

return. In some cases like this, a full recovery of CNS functions occurs. More often, though, the functions that return will only be 
30 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

enough to leave the patient in a “vegetative state” that, if it persists, 

will be labeled a PVS (a persistent vegetative state). PVS will be discussed more fully in Part V, but the point here is that the deep, 

non-breathing coma that the patient was in prior to “waking” into 

the vegetative state could not have been death since the loss of functions proved to be reversible. 

This discussion should make it clear why the condition typically 

called “brain death” and referred to in this report as “total brain 

failure” is called “irreversible apneic coma”* by some commentators. “Apneic” and “coma” describe the critical functional losses 

and “irreversible” adds the necessary qualification to rule out transient losses of these functions. 

In view of these complications, how can a clinician determine 

whether a patient has suffered total brain failure? This question 

concerns the tests that must be conducted to distinguish patients 

with this condition from other brain-injured individuals for whom 

recovery of (at least some) brain functions remains possible. The 

next part takes up this issue directly. 

II. The Diagnosis of Total Brain Failure 

The diagnostic criteria that a physician uses to determine whether a 

patient has suffered total brain failure begin with the obvious but 

important requirement that the patient be in a completely unresponsive coma.†

 This means that the eyes are closed and no 

response whatsoever is made to any verbal or painful stimuli. 

 

* See Chapter Two, Table 1. 

† The discussion of testing for total brain failure in this section is meant only as a 

“layman’s summary.” For a more complete description the reader should consult 

the clinical literature, in particular, American Academy of Neurology, Quality 

Standards Subcommittee, “Practice Parameters for Determining Brain Death in 

Adults (Summary Statement),” Neurology 45, no. 5 (1995): 1012-4; and E. F. Wijdicks, “The Diagnosis of Brain Death,” N Engl J Med 344, no. 16 (2001): 1215-

21. 
CHAPTER THREE | 31 

Another requirement for the diagnosis of total brain failure concerns the patient’s history. The cause of the patient’s brain injury 

cannot be hypothermia, poisoning, drug intoxication, or any such 

cause that brings about metabolic changes that can mimic the effects of total brain failure. The reason that a total brain failure 

diagnosis is ruled out in these cases is plain: A condition like this is 

often transient—it may clear up when the cause of the metabolic 

change passes out of the patient’s system or is otherwise removed.*

If the patient being diagnosed is determined to be in a deep, unresponsive coma and none of the excluding causes just mentioned is 

present, then a battery of further tests must be conducted. These 

tests can be divided into two complementary groups: clinical or bedside

tests and laboratory or imaging tests. The bedside tests are performed 

by trained clinicians, usually neurologists, and do not involve any 

high-tech instruments. The laboratory tests do involve such equipment and are intended to provide a more complete picture of what 

the clinician observes during the clinical examination. 

With the clinical bedside tests for total brain failure, the clinician 

examines the comatose patient for any signs of brainstem function 

(See Figure 4). The functional status of this part of the brain is important for several reasons. First, the functions that depend on the 

brainstem are central to the basic work of the organism as a whole. 

This has already been noted with respect to the brainstem’s (particularly, the medulla’s) involvement in breathing. Brainstem 

function is also critical to an organism’s conscious life. One part of 

the brainstem, known as the “reticular activating system,” is essential for maintaining a state of wakefulness, which is a prerequisite 

for any of the activities associated with consciousness. 

In addition to its significance for the patient’s functional capacities, 

the condition of the brainstem also has a general diagnostic signifi-

 

* For a clinical case study of a patient who showed all the signs of total brain 

failure after a snake bite but then recovered after receiving an antidote, see R. 

Agarwal, N. Singh, and D. Gupta, “Is the Patient Brain-Dead?” Emerg Med J 23, 

no. 1 (2006): e5. 
32 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

cance in most cases, for the brainstem is the most resilient part of 

the brain as a whole. As will be elaborated in Part III, if a brain injury has progressed to the point at which the brainstem retains no 

function, it has probably ravaged the more fragile parts of the brain 

as well. Thus, the bedside tests for brainstem function are tests for 

the extent of destruction both to the brainstem and to the parts of 

the brain “above the brainstem”—the so-called “higher centers.”*

How, then, do the clinical tests determine the status of the brainstem? One marker of brainstem function has already been explored 

in depth: the signal that is sent from the respiratory centers to the 

muscles of respiration. Thus, the patient’s drive to breathe must be 

tested with an apnea test. “Apnea” is the technical term for an inability to breathe. Although all patients who receive ventilator 

support need the machine’s help to breathe, most are not so injured 

that they have no drive to breathe whatsoever. The purpose of the 

apnea test for total brain failure is to establish that the patient has no

drive to bring air into the body even when the sensors in the brainstem are receiving an unambiguous signal that breathing is required. 

Recall from the previous discussion that these sensors serve to trigger movement of the muscles of respiration when high levels of 

carbon dioxide in the blood are detected. In the apnea test, then, 

the ventilator is removed and the level of carbon dioxide in the patient’s bloodstream is permitted to increase beyond the point that 

 

* The exception to the rule discussed in the text is a case where a primary lesion 

of the brainstem leads to the diagnostic signs that usually indicate total brain failure. In such a case, the condition of the brainstem is not itself a reliable indicator 

of the condition of the higher centers of the brain. Among those who accept the 

neurological standard for determining death, there is controversy about the vital 

status of the patient about whom all that is known is the condition of the brainstem. See S. Laureys, “Science and Society: Death, Unconsciousness and the 

Brain,” Nat Rev Neurosci 6, no. 11 (2005): 901-02; J. L. Bernat, “On Irreversibility 

as a Prerequisite for Brain Death Determination,” Adv Exp Med Biol 550 (2004): 

166; and C. Pallis and D. H. Harley, ABC of Brainstem Death, Second ed. (London: 

BMJ Publishing Group, 1996): 11-12. For the purposes of this report, such patients are excluded from the group considered to have “total brain failure.” 
CHAPTER THREE | 33 

would normally trigger inhalation.* If the examining clinicians see 

any signs that the chest is moving, the brainstem clearly has some 

vitality left and thus the patient cannot be diagnosed with total brain 

failure. 

Another set of indicators of brainstem function are the automatic 

responses or “brainstem reflexes.” Elicited by appropriate stimuli, 

these include the gag reflex, the cough reflex, and the reflex to 

move the eyes in certain ways under certain conditions (e.g., when 

the head is moved, which normally causes the oculocephalic reflex 

or doll’s eyes phenomenon, or when cold water is injected into the 

ear canal). The examining clinicians will provide the appropriate 

stimuli to detect the presence or absence of these reflexes. If any 

are present, a diagnosis of total brain failure is ruled out. 

In summary, a diagnosis of total brain failure can be made only 

when each of the following four conditions has been met: 

1. The patient has a documented history of injury that 

does not suggest a potentially transient cause of symptoms, such as hypothermia or drug intoxication. 

2. The patient is verified to be in a completely unresponsive coma. 

3. The patient demonstrates no brainstem reflexes. 

 

* The patient is prepared for this test by receiving, in advance, an elevated level of 

circulating oxygen that will prevent any further damage to tissues while the test is 

being carried out. Some inconsistencies in the way the apnea test is carried out in 

different places—including whether it is required at all in some countries—have 

been documented. For more information, see E. F. Wijdicks, “Brain Death 

Worldwide: Accepted Fact but No Global Consensus in Diagnostic Criteria,” 

Neurology 58, no. 1 (2002): 20-5; R. Vardis and M. M. Pollack, “Increased Apnea 

Threshold in a Pediatric Patient with Suspected Brain Death,” Crit Care Med 26, 

no. 11 (1998): 1917-9; and R. J. Brilli and D. Bigos, “Apnea Threshold and Pediatric Brain Death,” Crit Care Med 28, no. 4 (2000): 1257. 
34 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

4. The patient shows no drive to breathe during the apnea 

test. 

A result indicating that all of these conditions have been met must 

be confirmed with a second examination some hours after the initial 

positive results are obtained. The appropriate length of time between these examinations is a matter of some debate. According to 

a consensus statement developed by the American Academy of 

Neurology in 1995, “[A] repeat clinical evaluation [six] hours later is 

recommended, but this interval is arbitrary.”1 The six-hour interval 

is far shorter than the interval recommended by the medical consultants to the President’s Commission in 1981: they suggested 

twelve hours in cases of a non-anoxic etiology (e.g., head trauma of 

any kind, a stroke) and twenty-four hours in cases of an anoxic origin (e.g., a heart attack that leads to temporary cessation of 

circulation to the brain).2 The standard interval between examinations also varies from one country to another, ranging from two 

hours to twenty-four hours.3

Questions about the appropriate interval between examinations are 

related to questions about what laboratory or imaging tests are 

needed to confirm the clinical diagnosis. These tests include the 

electroencephalogram (EEG), tests for evoked responses (brainstem auditory evoked potentials, somatic evoked potentials, and 

motor evoked responses), and tests for blood flow through the vessels that feed the brain (classic arteriography, radioisotope studies, 

and transcranial Doppler ultrasonography).4

 Standard practice in the 

United States dictates that these tests should be optional, to be used 

by the clinician in difficult cases—for example, when some factor 

interferes with clinical testing or when there is a need to abbreviate 

the interval before a second round of testing. In some other countries, the laboratory tests are mandatory.5

Neurologist James Bernat, a noted expert on the brain and its injuries, has recommended that tests of intracranial blood flow be 

included among the routine tests for total brain failure (or “brain 

death”) in the United States.6

 These imaging tests are particularly 

useful for determining whether the pathophysiological events that 
CHAPTER THREE | 35 

lead to total brain failure have in fact occurred. Those events will be 

described and clarified in Part III. 

First, however, we should make note of some well-known obstacles 

to making the diagnosis of total brain failure in infants and children. 

These obstacles have led to recommendations for longer observation times between clinical examinations, more extensive use of 

imaging tests, and modifications to the tests themselves.7

For both children and adults, some studies have shown that testing 

for the condition known as “brain death” is not always carried out 

in a consistent way from one institution to another.8 In light of the 

very serious consequences of this diagnosis, it is especially important to ensure that variations in practice do not lead to errors or 

abuse. 

III. Total Brain Failure: Pathophysiology 

The question addressed in Part II was, How can the clinician distinguish the patient with total brain failure from other brain-injured 

patients? In this part we turn to the question, What events in the 

brain and body of the patient lead to total brain failure? As we have 

indicated, a diagnosis of total brain failure involves a judgment that 

the brainstem and the structures above it have been destroyed and 

therefore have lost the capacity to function ever again. In most 

cases, however, this destruction did not accompany the initial injury 

to the brain but instead came about through a self-perpetuating cascade of events—events that progressively damaged more and more 

tissue and finally destroyed the brainstem. 

The source of this self-perpetuating cascade of damaging events is 

the rigidity of the skull, which, after injury, can cause elevated pressure in the cranial vault that holds and usually protects the brain. 

Consider the three most common injuries leading to total brain failure. These are (1) head trauma (sustained, for example, in an 

automobile accident or as a result of a gunshot wound), (2) cerebrovascular accident (i.e., “stroke”), and (3) cerebral anoxia 

(deprivation of oxygen) secondary to cardiac arrest. These three different causes have a common effect: severe damage to the cells 
36 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

comprising the tissues of the brain, that is, to the neurons and the 

cellular networks that they form. This damage leads, in turn, to 

edema, the abnormal accumulation of fluid. With little or no space 

in which to expand, the swelling brain suffers steady increases in 

intracranial pressure (ICP). Elevated ICP prevents oxygen-laden 

blood from making its way up and into the cranial cavity and thus 

deprives brain tissues of essential nutrients. This, in turn, leads to 

additional damage, which leads to more edema and swelling. Neurologist Alan Shewmon describes the result: 

A vicious cycle is established in which decreasing cerebral 

perfusion and increasing cerebral edema reinforce one another until blood no longer enters the cranial cavity and 

the brain herniates though the tentorium and foramen 

magnum.9 

The herniation that Shewmon refers to here can crush the brainstem, leading to the functional losses that are revealed by the 

examination for total brain failure. That condition is the end point 

of a vicious cycle—the point at which the brain, including its lower 

centers in the brainstem, has been rendered permanently dysfunctional. 

This description of the physiological events that lead to total brain 

failure shows the utility of yet another term for the clinical state under discussion: “total brain infarction.”*

 An “infarction” is defined 

as a “sudden insufficiency of arterial or venous blood supply...that 

produces a macroscopic area of necrosis.”10 When death is declared 

based on the currently accepted neurological standard, the selfperpetuating cascade of events in the brain following the initial injury has run its full course. “Running its full course,” in this context, 

means that total destruction of the brain has occurred due to infarction or lack of blood supply—hence, “total brain infarction.” 

 

 

* See Chapter Two, Table 1. 
CHAPTER THREE | 37 

Bedside tests that establish loss of all brainstem reflexes can show 

that the destructive storm has indeed run its course, because the 

brainstem is often the last structure to be compromised in this 

process. Confirmatory tests and, in particular, various sorts of angiography (measurements of cranial blood flow) can be very useful 

in confirming that the gross infarction that is required for a diagnosis of total brain failure has actually occurred.11

At this point, it is important to take note of some qualifications regarding the word “total” in the context of total brain failure. One 

medically based objection to the neurological standard for determining death is based on a particular understanding of this word. 

Critics point out that the destructive storm that leads to “total” 

brain failure can leave certain areas of the brain intact. Again, from 

the description provided by Shewmon: 

It should be mentioned that the self-destruction of the 

brain is not complete. Islands of sick but not totally necrosed brain tissue sometimes remain, presumably due to 

inhomogeneities of intracranial pressure and/or blood 

supply from extracranial collateral vessels.12

When the preserved areas of the brain do not support any recognizable function, this lack of total anatomical annihilation is less 

troubling. As the President’s Commission noted in its report, the 

neurological standard for death requires an irreversible loss of all 

brain functions, not complete anatomical destruction of the tissue.13

Isolated metabolic or electrical activity in dispersed cells cannot be a 

sign that a patient is still alive; after all, such activity, supporting no 

function of the whole organism, can continue even in some cells of 

a corpse after the heart has stopped beating. 

As critics have pointed out, however, the physiological facts are not 

so simple.14 In some cases, the preserved tissue in a body with total 

brain failure actually does support certain isolated functions of the 

brain. Most notably, some patients with total brain failure do not 

exhibit the condition known as “diabetes insipidus.” This condition 

develops when a hormone known as ADH (anti-diuretic hormone) 

is not released by a part of the brain known as “the posterior pitui-
38 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

tary.” The absence of diabetes insipidus suggests that the “dead” 

brain is continuing to secrete the hormone; thus, at least with regard 

to this one function, the brain remains functional. It is therefore a 

fair criticism of the neurological standard, as enshrined in the 

UDDA, that “all functions of the entire brain, including the brainstem” are not, in fact, always irreversibly lost when the diagnosis is 

made. *

It may be helpful to emphasize that the word “total” in the 

phrase,“total brain failure,” refers to the fact that the brain injury 

has reached the endpoint of a process of self-perpetuating destruction 

of neural tissue. In any event, whether or not the word “total” is 

justified, the patient diagnosed with total brain failure is in a condition of profound incapacity, diagnostically distinct from all other 

cases of severe injury. Whether this state of profound incapacity 

warrants a determination of death remains a matter of debate, with 

advocates of the neurological standard arguing that it does, while 

critics maintain that it does not. The release of ADH and other 

signs of isolated brain function do not settle the fundamental issue: 

Is the organism as a whole still present? 

IV. Total Brain Failure: “Health” and “Prognosis” 

Contemporary controversies about total brain failure as a suitable 

standard for human death focus attention on certain medical findings and on conclusions drawn from these findings by critics of 

today’s practice. In this part, we will examine two important types 

of such findings which are often cited as highly relevant to the debate. 

 

* Researchers suspect that function in the posterior pituitary is preserved partly 

because its (extradural) arterial source is distinct from that which feeds other tissue of the brain. The damage that is due to the rise in intracranial pressure, which 

leads to total brain failure, can spare these extradural arteries so that a portion of 

pituitary is preserved. For discussion of this point, see E. F. Wijdicks and J. L. 

Atkinson, “Pathophysiologic Responses to Brain Death,” in Brain Death, ed. E. F. 

Wijdicks (Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2001). 
CHAPTER THREE | 39 

A. “Somatic Health” 

The first type of medical finding concerns the “somatic health” of 

the body of a patient diagnosed with total brain failure (or “whole 

brain death”). The appropriateness of the word “health” in this 

context is, itself, a point of contention. If the body is a cadaver 

then, of course, it is no longer fitting to speak about its “health.” 

Nonetheless, something like health is still present in the body of a patient with this diagnosis. This can be seen clearly in the “donor 

management” procedures that are a regular part of organ retrieval 

from heart-beating (“brain dead”) cadavers. These procedures aim 

to maintain the body in a relatively stable state of homeostasis so 

that the patient’s heart does not stop beating prior to surgery and 

the organs procured remain as healthy as possible.15 Thus, there is 

some degree of somatically integrated activity that persists in the 

bodies of patients who have been declared dead according to the 

neurological standard. The bodies of these patients do not “come 

apart” immediately upon succumbing to total brain failure. 

This point deserves emphasis because of the history of the debate 

about the neurological standard for death in the United States. In 

that debate, certain exaggerated claims have been made about the 

“loss of somatic integration” that occurs in a body with a destroyed 

brain. A good example of this can be found in a very influential paper published in 1981 by James Bernat, Charles Culver, and Bernard 

Gert. In that paper, they assert the following: 

This criterion [whole brain death] is perfectly correlated 

with the permanent cessation of functioning of the organism as a whole because the brain is necessary for the 

functioning of the organism as a whole. It integrates, generates, interrelates, and controls complex bodily activities. 

A patient on a ventilator with a totally destroyed brain is 

merely a group of artificially maintained subsystems since 

the organism as a whole has ceased to function.16 

The claim that the body of a patient diagnosed with “whole brain 

death” is a mere “group of artificially maintained subsystems” was 

repeated often enough to become established in the United States 
40 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

as the standard rationale for equating total brain failure with human 

death: patients with this condition are dead because the systems of 

the body do not work together in an integrated way. 

But this standard rationale was soundly criticized in another influential paper, published by UCLA neurologist Alan Shewmon in 2001. 

In “The Brain and Somatic Integration: Insights Into the Standard 

Rationale for Equating ‘Brain Death’ With Death,” Shewmon argues forcefully that patients who are positively and reliably 

diagnosed with “brain death” (total brain failure) continue to exhibit 

many functions that one can hardly avoid calling “somatically integrative.” Examples include the maintenance of some degree of 

hemodynamic stability and body temperature, the elimination of 

wastes, the immune response to infection, the exhibiting of a stress 

response to the incision made for organ retrieval, and others.17

The reason that these somatically integrative activities continue, 

Shewmon rightly notes, is that the brain is not the integrator of the 

body’s many and varied functions. In normal circumstances, the 

brainstem does play an important and complex role in supporting 

bodily integration. But no single structure in the body plays the role 

of an indispensable integrator. Integration, rather, is an emergent 

property of the whole organism—a property that does not depend 

upon directions from any one part, but is the product of the orchestration of multiple parts. 

Based on his critique of the “somatic integration rationale,” Shewmon draws the conclusion that there is no defensible biological 

account to justify the equation of total brain failure with human 

death. As he puts it, “If [brain death] is to be equated with death, 

therefore, it must be on the basis of an essentially non-somatic, nonbiological concept of death.”18 In Chapter Four, we will re-examine 

the medical facts noted here to determine whether Shewmon’s conclusion, repeated often by others, is warranted. 

B. “Prognosis” 

Just as it is paradoxical to talk about the “health” of the body of a 

patient who has been declared dead based on the neurological stan-
CHAPTER THREE | 41 

dard, it is also paradoxical to talk about the “prognosis” of that individual. Only a living creature can have a “prognosis,” strictly 

speaking. Because our concern here is with the question of whether 

the patient with total brain failure is dead or alive, we should avoid 

language that implies that the matter is settled. 

Hence, “prognosis,” here, should be taken to have a very particular 

meaning—it refers to the likely timing of events that will result in 

the total collapse of the body’s systems despite aggressive treatment 

to prevent that collapse. The President’s Commission addressed 

“prognosis” in this sense when it claimed: 

In adults who have experienced irreversible cessation of 

the functions of the entire brain, this mechanically generated functioning can continue only a limited time because 

the heart usually stops beating within two to ten days. (An 

infant or small child who has lost all brain functions will 

typically suffer cardiac arrest within several weeks, although respiration and heartbeat can sometimes be 

maintained even longer).19 

Most neurologists agree with this assessment of how long the body 

of a patient with total brain failure can persist even with aggressive 

treatment. Many have even based their confidence in the suitability 

of the neurological standard on the “fact” that bodies found to have 

no brainstem function will quickly become asystolic (i.e., have no 

heartbeat) no matter what help is given to them. The loss of all 

functions of the brain is typically referred to as a “point of no return,” meaning no amount of medical effort can prevent the body 

from losing its integrity as an entropy-resistant system.20

As skeptics of today’s neurological standard point out, there are two 

problems with this assessment. First, improvements in intensive 

care techniques over the years—prompted in part by the need for 

better “donor management” to procure usable organs—have made 

predictions of maximum survival time for bodies with total brain 

failure uncertain. Second, in practice, there turn out to be very few 

situations in which the truth of this matter can be tested. A diagnosis of total brain failure, when leading to a pronouncement of death, 
42 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

is a self-fulfilling prophesy: The patient with that diagnosis will become an organ donor (and the heart will stop in the process), or the 

ventilator will be withdrawn because it is understood to be “ventilating a corpse.” As the late neurologist Ronald Cranford put it: 

It is impossible to know with certainty the extent of prolonged survival in brain death because a systematic clinical 

study in which the cardiac and circulatory functions are 

sustained for prolonged periods (weeks, months, or years) 

in a large number of patients is morally indefensible, extraordinarily expensive in terms of money and resources or 

manpower and intensive care unit beds, and legally prohibitive.21

For this reason, there is no effective way to determine how many 

patients could be stabilized in the condition of total brain failure 

and for how long. Uncontrolled observations must suffice. Such 

observations have been made in cases of patients who were pregnant at the time of their diagnosis with total brain failure. In some 

of these cases, efforts have been made to keep the body going until 

the fetus reaches viability. Eleven such cases are reported in a 2003 

survey by Powner and Bernstein. According to these authors, no 

descriptions of unsuccessful attempts at fetal support after maternal 

brain death were found. The length of time that support continued 

after “brain death” ranged from thirty-six hours to 107 days.22

These cases justify caution and skepticism toward sweeping claims 

about the total instability of the “brain dead” body and the imminent collapse of the body’s systems. 

V. Total Brain Failure and the Vegetative State 

We conclude this chapter with an attempt to bring some clarity to a 

common misunderstanding of the difference between “whole brain 

death” and the condition known as the “vegetative state.” Such 

confusion is exacerbated by the common and imprecise use of the 

term “brain dead” to describe patients who have clearly not been diagnosed with total brain failure and who do not exhibit the same 

level of incapacitation. Individuals such as Karen Ann Quinlan, 

Nancy Cruzan, and Terri Schiavo have been the subject of legal 
CHAPTER THREE | 43 

disputes and media attention because of family requests to withdraw various forms of life-sustaining treatment. With some 

frequency, these women have been inaccurately referred to as being 

“brain dead,” when in fact they were all in a persistent vegetative state

(PVS). 

The initial clinical state of a patient who is eventually diagnosed 

with PVS may be similar to that of a patient diagnosed with total 

brain failure. But the previously described tests for total brain failure will provide the evidence to discriminate between the two 

groups: only the patient with total brain failure will show evidence 

of a completely destroyed brainstem. In the patient with a lesser 

brain injury, the brainstem, and possibly parts of the brain above 

the brainstem, will be found to be functionally preserved. 

Although he or she might initially be in the same eyes-closed, unresponsive coma as the patient with total brain failure, the less injured 

patient will eventually emerge from this coma and display the typical signs of the vegetative state. These include opening the eyes, 

going through sleep/wake cycles, moving the limbs, breathing 

spontaneously, and, in some cases, displaying a minimal responsiveness to pain stimuli. Because spontaneous breathing, under the 

regulation of the medulla oblongata in the brainstem, resumes, the 

PVS patient will not need the continual support of the ventilator. In 

most cases, however, he or she will need to receive nourishment 

through a feeding tube. If such sustaining treatment and diligent 

nursing care are provided, a patient can survive for many years in a 

vegetative state. 

Because it will be important to the discussion in Chapter Four, the 

question of “consciousness” in the PVS patient should be briefly 

addressed here. The degree of consciousness present in a patient in 

a vegetative state is a matter of some dispute. It is often said that 

PVS patients retain the capacity for wakefulness but have lost the 

capacity to be aware. This latter assertion, however, is increasingly 

controversial in light of recent findings indicating that at least some 

patients in a vegetative state retain a residual capacity for willful and 

consciously aware interaction with their surrounding environment.23
44 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

The cautionary advice of Steven Laureys, an expert on PVS and 

other brain-injured states, should be kept in mind: 

There is an irreducible philosophical limitation in knowing 

for certain whether any other being possesses a conscious 

life. Consciousness is a multifaceted subjective first-person 

experience and clinical evaluation is limited to evaluating 

patients’ responsiveness to the environment. As previously 

discussed, patients in a vegetative state, unlike patients 

with brain death, can move extensively, and clinical studies 

have shown how difficult it is to differentiate ‘automatic’ 

from ‘willed’ movements. This results in an underestimation of behavioural signs of consciousness and, therefore, 

a misdiagnosis, which is estimated to occur in about one 

third of patients in a chronic vegetative state... Clinical 

testing for absence of consciousness is much more problematic than testing for absence of wakefulness, brainstem 

reflexes and apnoea in whole brain or brainstem death.24 

Deciding whether ambiguous signs of wakeful life indicate consciousness is beyond the power of medicine, at least at this time, 

and possibly in principle. Thus, in cases where wakefulness is evident (as it is for PVS patients), there is good reason to be very 

cautious about assuming that conscious life is extinguished. 

VI. Total Brain Failure: From Clinical Presentation and 

Pathophysiology to the Philosophical Debate 

In this chapter, we have sought to explicate and clarify the condition usually called “brain death” or “whole brain death,” 

emphasizing developments in medical understanding since the 

President’s Commission published its seminal work in 1981. In certain respects, the medical facts have introduced complications for 

those who would defend the equation of this condition with the 

death of the human being: Patients diagnosed with total brain failure may retain certain limited brain functions (such as the secretion 

of ADH to regulate urine output), and they certainly retain enough 

somatic integrity to challenge claims that the body immediately becomes “a disorganized collection of organs” once the brainstem is 
CHAPTER THREE | 45 

disabled. In addition, advances in intensive care techniques, displayed in cases of prolonged somatic “survival” after “whole brain 

death,” challenge claims that the body cannot continue in its artificially supported state beyond a short window of time. 

Alongside these challenging findings, however, are facts that confirm the diagnostic and pathophysiological distinctiveness of total 

brain failure. Patients with this degree of injury are, indeed, singled 

out by the battery of tests (bedside and laboratory) first outlined 

and recommended by the Harvard committee in 1968. Moreover, 

no patient diagnosed with “total brain failure” has ever recovered 

the capacity to breathe spontaneously or shown any sign of consciousness—including the minimal and ambiguous signs routinely 

displayed by patients who emerge into the vegetative state. 

Having drawn this detailed picture of the medical facts, we can now 

address the fundamental philosophical question of this report, Are 

patients diagnosed with total brain failure (or “whole brain death”), by virtue of 

this fact, truly dead? 

\[
46 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

ENDNOTES

 

1 American Academy of Neurology, Quality Standards Subcommittee, “Practice 

Parameters for Determining Brain Death in Adults (Summary Statement),” Neurology 45, no. 5 (1995): 1014. 

2 President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 

Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Report of the Medical Consultants on the 

Diagnosis of Death, “Guidelines for the Determination of Death,” JAMA 246, 

no. 19 (1981): 2184-6. 

3 E. F. Wijdicks, “Brain Death Worldwide: Accepted Fact but No Global Consensus in Diagnostic Criteria,” Neurology 58, no. 1 (2002): 20-5. 

4 See F. Plum, “Clinical Standards and Technological Confirmatory Tests in Diagnosing Brain Death,” in The Definition of Death: Contemporary Controversies, ed. S. J. 

Youngner, R. M. Arnold, and R. Schapiro (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999) 34-65; and E. F Wijdicks, “The Diagnosis of Brain Death,” N 

Engl J Med 344, no. 16 (2001): 1215-21. 

5 Wijdicks, “Brain Death Worldwide,” 20-5. 

6 J. L. Bernat, “On Irreversibility as a Prerequisite for Brain Death Determination,” Adv Exp Med Biol 550 (2004): 161-7; and J. L. Bernat, “The Whole-Brain 

Concept of Death Remains Optimum Public Policy,” J Law Med Ethics 34, no. 1 

(2006): 40. 

7 See Report of the Medical Consultants on the Diagnosis of Death, “Guidelines 

for the Determination of Death,” 2184-6; Task Force for the Determination of 

Brain Death in Children, “Guidelines for the Determination of Brain Death in 

Children,” Neurology 37, no. 6 (1987): 1077-8; R. Vardis and M. M. Pollack, “Increased Apnea Threshold in a Pediatric Patient with Suspected Brain Death, ” 

Crit Care Med 26, no. 11 (1998): 1917-9; R. J. Brilli and D. Bigos, “Apnea Threshold and Pediatric Brain Death,” Crit Care Med 28, no. 4 (2000): 1257; S. Ashwal, 

“Clinical Diagnosis and Confirmatory Testing of Brain Death in Children,” in 

Brain Death, ed. E. F. Wijdicks (Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 

2001); and K. J. Banasiak and G. Lister, “Brain Death in Children,” Curr Opin 

Pediatr 15, no. 3 (2003): 288-93. 

8 See R. E. Mejia and M. M. Pollack, “Variability in Brain Death Determination 

Practices in Children,” JAMA 274, no. 7 (1995): 550-3; M. Y. Wang, P. Wallace, 

and J. P. Gruen, “Brain Death Documentation: Analysis and Issues,” Neurosurgery

51, no. 3 (2002): 731-6; M. Y. Chang, L. A. McBride, and M. A. Ferguson, “Variability in Brain Death Declaration Practices in Pediatric Head Trauma Patients,” 

Pediatr Neurosurg 39, no. 1 (2003): 7-9; and D. J. Powner, M. Hernandez, and T. E. 

Rives, “Variability Among Hospital Policies for Determining Brain Death in 

Adults,” Crit Care Med 32, no. 6 (2004): 1284-8. 

9 D. A. Shewmon, “Recovery from ‘Brain Death’: A Neurologist’s Apologia,” 

Linacre Q 64, no. 1 (1997): 30-96. 

10 T. L. Stedman, Stedman’s Medical Dictionary, 26th ed. (Baltimore: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 1995): 868. 

11 Bernat, “Irreversibility as a Prerequisite,” 161-7. 

12 Shewmon, “Neurologist’s Apologia,” 40. 

13 Defining Death, 75-76. 
CHAPTER THREE | 47 

 

14 See, for instance, A. Halevy and B. Brody, “Brain Death: Reconciling Definitions, Criteria, and Tests,” Ann Intern Med 119, no. 6 (1993): 519-25. 

15 A discussion of the physiological consequences of total brain failure from the 

perspective of donor management is provided in R. Arbour, “Clinical Management of the Organ Donor,” AACN Clin Issues 16, no. 4 (2005): 551-80. Also see 

J. M. Darby et al., “Approach to Management of the Heartbeating ‘Brain Dead’ 

Organ Donor,” JAMA 261, no. 15 (1989): 2222-8; and D. Wikler and A. J. Weisbard, “Appropriate Confusion over ‘Brain Death’,” JAMA 261, no. 15 (1989): 

2246. 

16 J. L. Bernat, C. M. Culver, and B. Gert, “On the Definition and Criterion of 

Death,” Ann Intern Med 94, no. 3 (1981): 391. 

17 A. D. Shewmon, “The Brain and Somatic Integration: Insights into the Standard Biological Rationale for Equating ‘Brain Death’ With Death,” J Med Philos

26, no. 5 (2001): 457-78. For a more complete list of integrated functions that 

persist after “brain death,” see Chapter Four, Table 2. 

18 Ibid., 473. 

19 Defining Death, 17. 

20 J. Korein, “The Problem of Brain Death: Development and History,” Ann NY 

Acad Sci 315 (1978): 19-38. 

21 R. Cranford, “Even the Dead Are Not Terminally Ill Anymore,” Neurology 51, 

no. 6 (1998): 1531. 

22 D. J. Powner and I. M. Bernstein, “Extended Somatic Support for Pregnant 

Women after Brain Death,” Crit Care Med 31, no. 4 (2003): 1241-9. This survey 

includes sources for both pregnancy cases and non-pregnancy cases of prolonged 

survival after a diagnosis of “brain death.” 

23 A. M. Owen et al., “Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State,” Science 313, 

no. 5792 (2006): 1402; and A. M. Owen et al., “Using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging to Detect Covert Awareness in the Vegetative State,” Arch Neurol

64, no. 8 (2007): 1098-1102. 

24 S. Laureys, “Death, Unconsciousness and the Brain,” Nat Rev Neurosci 6, no. 11 

(2005): 904-05. Citations omitted. 
 
 

49

CHAPTER FOUR 

THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE 

hy do we describe the central question of this inquiry as 

a philosophical question? We do so, in part, because this 

question cannot be settled by appealing exclusively to 

clinical or pathophysiological facts. Those facts were our focus in 

the previous chapters in which we sought to clarify important features of “total brain failure,” a condition diagnosed in a well-defined 

subset of comatose, ventilator-dependent patients. As a condition, it 

is the terminus of a course of pathophysiological events, the effects 

of which account for certain clinically observable signs (all manifestations of an incapacitated brainstem) and for confirmatory results 

obtained through selected imaging tests. A patient diagnosed with 

this condition will never recover brain-dependent functions, including the capacity to breathe and the capacity to exhibit even minimal 

signs of conscious life. If the patient is sustained with lifesupporting technologies, this condition need not lead immediately 

to somatic disintegration or failure of other organ systems. These 

facts are all crucial to answering the question, Is a human being with 

total brain failure dead? But determining the significance of these facts 

presents challenges for philosophical analysis and interpretation. 

In this chapter, we set forth and explore two positions on this philosophical question. One position rejects the widely accepted 

consensus that the current neurological standard is an ethically valid 

one for determining death. The other position defends the consensus, taking the challenges posed in recent years as opportunities to 

strengthen the philosophical rationale for the neurological standard. 

At the outset, it is important to note what is common to these two 

opposing positions. First, both reject the idea that death should be treated 

W
50| CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

merely as a legal construct or as a matter of social agreement. Instead, both 

embrace the idea that a standard for determining death must be defensible on biological as well as philosophical grounds. That is to 

say, both positions respect the biological reality of death. At some 

point, after all, certainty that a body is no longer a living whole is

attainable. The impressive technological advances of the last several 

decades have done nothing to alter the reality of death, even if they 

have complicated the task of judging whether and when death has 

occurred in particular circumstances. In light of such complications, 

however, both positions share the conclusion that a human being 

who is not known to be dead should be considered alive. 

Second, neither position advocates loosening the standards for determining death 

on the basis of currently known clinical and pathophysiological facts. There is a 

well-developed third philosophical position that is often considered 

alongside the two that are the main focus of this chapter. This third 

position maintains that there can be two deaths—the death of the 

person, a being distinguished by the capacities for thought, reason, 

and feeling, and the death of the body or the organism. From the perspective of this third philosophical position, an individual who 

suffers a brain injury that leaves him incapacitated with regard to 

certain specifically human powers is rightly regarded as “dead as a 

person.” The still living body that remains after this death is not a 

human being in the full sense. Philosopher John Lizza discusses the 

living organism left behind after the “person” has died in the following way: 

Advocates of a consciousness-related formulation of death 

do not consider such a being to be a living person. In their 

view, a person cannot persist through the loss of all brain 

function or even the loss of just those brain functions required for consciousness and other mental functions... 

[W]hat remains alive must be a different sort of being...a 

form of life created by medical technology... Whereas a 

person is normally transformed into a corpse at his or her 

death, technology has intervened in this natural process 

and has made it possible...for a person’s remains to take 

the form of an artificially sustained, living organism devoid 
CHAPTER FOUR| 51 

of the capacity for consciousness and any other mental 

function.1 

Thus, advocates of this third position effectively maintain that in 

certain cases there can be two deaths rather than one. In such cases, 

they argue, a body that has ceased to be a person (having “died” the 

first death) can be treated as deceased—at least in certain ways. For 

example, according to some advocates of this position, it would be 

permissible to remove the organs of such individuals while their 

hearts continue to beat. The patients most often cited as potential 

heart-beating organ donors, based on this concept of death, are 

PVS patients and anencephalic newborns (babies born with very 

little, if any, brain matter other than the brainstem). Organ retrieval 

in such cases might entail the administration of sedatives to the allegedly “person-less” patient because some signs of continued 

“biological life” (such as the open eyes and spontaneous breathing 

of the PVS patient) would be distracting and disturbing to the surgeons who procure the patient’s organs. 

Serious difficulties afflict the claim that something that can be called 

“death” has occurred even as the body remains alive. One such difficulty is that there is no way to know that the “specifically human 

powers” are irreversibly gone from a body that has suffered any injury shy of total brain failure. In Chapter Three, we cited 

neurologist Steven Laureys’s observation that it is impossible to ascertain scientifically the inward state of an individual—and features 

of this inward state (e.g., thinking and feeling) are always cited as 

marks of a distinctively human or personal life. It is very important 

here to recall the marked differences in appearance between the individual with total brain failure and the individual with another 

“consciousness-compromising” condition. The latter displays several ambiguous signs—moving, waking up, and groaning, among 

others—while the former remains still and closed off from the 

world in clinically ascertainable ways.2 

A related problem with this “two deaths” position is that it expands 

the concept of death beyond the core meaning it has had throughout human history. Human beings are members of the larger family 

of living beings, and it is a fundamental truth about living beings 
52| CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

that every individual—be it plant or animal—eventually dies. Recent advances in technology offer no warrant for jettisoning the 

age-old idea that it is not as persons that we die, but rather as members of the family of living beings and as animals in particular. The 

terminus of the transformation that occurs when a human being is 

deprived by injury of certain mental capacities, heartbreaking as it is, 

is not death. We should note, again, that some technological interventions administered to the living might be deemed futile—that is, 

ineffective at reversing or ameliorating the course of disease or injury—and that an ethically valid decision might be made to 

withdraw or withhold such interventions. There is no need, however, to call an individual already dead in order to justify refraining 

from such futile interventions. 

In summary, the two positions that we present in this chapter share 

the conviction that death is a single phenomenon marking the end 

of the life of a biological organism. Death is the definitive end of 

life and is something more complete and final than the mere loss of 

“personhood.” 

I. Position One: There Is No Sound Biological Justification 

for Today’s Neurological Standard 

The neurological standard for death based on total brain failure relies fundamentally on the idea that the phenomenon of death can be 

hidden. The metaphor employed by the President’s Commission and 

cited in Chapter One expresses this idea: When a ventilator supports the body’s vital functions, this technological intervention 

obscures our view of the phenomenon. What seem to be signs of 

continued life in an injured body are, in fact, misleading artifacts of 

the technological intervention and obstacles to ascertaining the 

truth. To consult brain-based functions, then, is to look through a 

“second window” in order to see the actual condition of the body. 

The critical thrust of Position One can be summarized in this way: 

There is no reliable “second window” on the phenomenon of 

death. If its presence is not made known by the signs that have always accompanied it—by breathing lungs and a beating heart—

then there is no way to state with confidence that death has oc-
CHAPTER FOUR| 53 

curred. Only when all would agree that the body is ready for burial 

can that body, with confidence, be described as dead. If blood is 

still circulating and nutrients and oxygen are still serving to power 

the work of diverse cells, tissues, and organ systems, then the body 

in which these processes are ongoing cannot be deemed a corpse. 

Soon after the Harvard committee argued that patients who meet 

the criteria for “irreversible coma” are already dead, some philosophers and other observers of the committee’s work advanced an 

opposing view. The counterarguments presented then by one such 

philosopher, Hans Jonas, are still useful in framing the objections 

raised today against the neurological standard. In his 1974 essay, 

“Against the Stream,” Jonas dissented from the Harvard committee’s equation of “irreversible coma” and death and counseled, 

instead, a conservative course of action: 

We do not know with certainty the borderline between life 

and death, and a definition cannot substitute for knowledge. Moreover, we have sufficient grounds for suspecting 

that the artificially supported condition of the comatose 

patient may still be one of life, however reduced—i.e., for 

doubting that, even with the brain function gone, he is 

completely dead. In this state of marginal ignorance and 

doubt the only course to take is to lean over backward toward the side of possible life.3

With these words, Jonas underscored a point that is pivotal to Position One: There can be uncertainty as to where the line between life 

and death falls even if we are certain that death is a biologically real 

event. In patients with total brain failure, the transition from living 

body to corpse is in some measure a mystery, one that may be beyond the powers of science and medicine to penetrate and 

determine with the finality that is possible when most human beings 

die. 

Have advances in the scientific and clinical understanding of the 

spectrum of neurological injury shown that Jonas’s stance of principled (and therefore cautious) uncertainty was incorrect? Today we 

have a more fine-grained set of categories of, as he put it, “artifi-
54| CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

cially supported...comatose patients”—some of whom meet the 

criteria for total brain failure and others who have hope of recovering limited or full mental function. Only the first group is 

considered to be dead by today’s “brain death” defenders. Even 

with respect to this group, however, there is still reason to wonder 

if our knowledge of their condition is adequate for labeling them as 

dead. If there are “sufficient grounds,” as Jonas put it, for suspecting that their condition may still be one of life, then a stance of 

principled and hence cautious uncertainty is still the morally right 

one to take. 

This line of inquiry brings us to Shewmon’s criticisms, summarized 

earlier in Chapter Three, of the accepted pathophysiological and 

clinical picture of patients with “brain death” (total brain failure). 

Do Shewmon’s criticisms constitute the “sufficient grounds” to 

which Jonas appeals? To answer this question, these criticisms and 

the evidence supporting them must first be considered in greater 

depth. 

In 1998, the journal Neurology published an article by Shewmon entitled, “Chronic ‘Brain Death’: Meta-Analysis and Conceptual 

Consequences.” In that article, Shewmon cites evidence for the 

claim that neither bodily disintegration nor cessation of heartbeat 

necessarily and imminently ensues after brain death.4

 Shewmon’s evidence is drawn from more than one hundred documented cases 

that demonstrate survival past one week’s time, with one case of 

survival for more than fourteen years.* Furthermore, he demonstrates that such factors as age, etiology, and underlying somatic 

integrity variably affect the survival probability of “brain dead” patients. Observing that asystole (the absence of cardiac contractions 

colloquially known as “flatline”) does not necessarily follow from 

“brain death,” Shewmon concludes that it is the overall integrity of 

 

* This patient experienced a cardiac arrest in January 2004, more than twenty 

years after the diagnosis of “brain death.” A report on the case, including the 

brain-only autopsy performed, appears in S. Repertinger, et al., “Long Survival 

Following Bacterial Meningitis-Associated Brain Destruction,” J Child Neurol 21, 

no. 7 (2006): 591-5. 
CHAPTER FOUR| 55 

the body (the “underlying somatic plasticity”) rather than the condition 

of the brain that exerts the strongest influence on survival. These 

facts seem to contradict the dominant view that the loss of brain 

function, in and of itself, leads the body to “fall apart” and eventually to cease circulating blood. 

Critics of this meta-analysis have challenged the data on which 

Shewmon based his conclusions, claiming that many of the patients 

in the cases that he compiles might not have been properly diagnosed with whole brain death (in our usage, total brain failure). 

They also point out the rarity with which such cases are encountered, compared with the frequency of rapid descent to asystole for 

patients accurately diagnosed.* To point out the rarity of prolonged 

survival, however, is to admit that the phenomenon does, in some 

cases, occur. Whether it might occur more often is difficult to judge 

because patients with total brain failure are rarely treated with aggressive, life-sustaining interventions for an extended time. 

If it is possible—albeit rare—for a body without a functioning brain 

to “hold itself together” for an indefinite period of time, then how 

can the condition of total brain failure be equated with biological 

death? Or, to put the question in Jonas’s terms, does this fact not 

give “sufficient grounds” for suspecting that such patients might 

still be alive, although severely injured? The case for uncertainty 

about the line between life and death is further strengthened by 

considering the somatic processes that clearly continue in the body 

of a patient with total brain failure. 

In a paper published in the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy in 2001, 

Shewmon details the integrated functions that continue in a body in 

the condition of “brain death.” Table 2 reproduces a list of somatically integrative functions that are, in Shewmon’s words, “not

 

* Wijdicks and Bernat, in a response to the Shewmon article, commented: “These 

cases are anecdotes yearning for a denominator.” E. F. Wijdicks and J. L. Bernat, 

“Chronic ‘Brain Death’: Meta-Analysis and Conceptual Consequences,” Neurology

53, no. 6 (1999): 1538-45. 
56| CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

mediated by the brain and possessed by at least some [brain dead] 

bodies.”5 

Table 2: Physiological Evidence of “Somatic Integration”6

• Homeostasis of a countless variety of mutually interacting 

chemicals, macromolecules and physiological parameters, 

through the functions especially of liver, kidneys, cardiovascular 

and endocrine systems, but also of other organs and tissues 

(e.g., intestines, bone and skin in calcium metabolism; cardiac 

atrial natriuretic factor affecting the renal secretion of renin, 

which regulates blood pressure by acting on vascular smooth 

muscle; etc.); 

• Elimination, detoxification and recycling of cellular wastes 

throughout the body; 

• Energy balance, involving interactions among liver, endocrine 

systems, muscle and fat; 

• Maintenance of body temperature (albeit at a lower than normal 

level and with the help of blankets); 

• Wound healing, capacity for which is diffuse throughout the 

body and which involves organism-level, teleological interaction 

among blood cells, capillary endothelium, soft tissues, bone 

marrow, vasoactive peptides, clotting and clot lysing factors 

(maintained by the liver, vascular endothelium and circulating 

leucocytes in a delicate balance of synthesis and degradation), 

etc.; 

• Fighting of infections and foreign bodies through interactions 

among the immune system, lymphatics, bone marrow, and microvasculature; 

• Development of a febrile response to infection; 

• Cardiovascular and hormonal stress responses to unanesthetized incision for organ retrieval; 

• Successful gestation of a fetus in a [brain dead] pregnant 

woman; 

• Sexual maturation of a [brain dead] child; 

• Proportional growth of a [brain dead] child. 

Readers not well-versed in human physiology might find this list 

hard to follow. Its significance, however, can be simply stated: It 
CHAPTER FOUR| 57 

enumerates many clearly identifiable and observable physiological 

mechanisms. These mechanisms account for the continued health 

of vital organs in the bodies of patients diagnosed with total brain 

failure and go a long way toward explaining the lengthy survival of 

such patients in rare cases. In such cases, globally coordinated work 

continues to be performed by multiple systems, all directed toward 

the sustained functioning of the body as a whole. If being alive as a 

biological organism requires being a whole that is more than the 

mere sum of its parts, then it would be difficult to deny that the 

body of a patient with total brain failure can still be alive, at least in 

some cases. 

None of this contradicts the claim that total brain failure is a unique 

and profound kind of incapacitation—and one that may very well 

warrant or even morally require the withdrawal of life-sustaining interventions. According to some defenders of the concept of 

medical futility, there is no obligation to begin or to continue treatment when that treatment cannot achieve any good or when it 

inflicts disproportionate burdens on the patient who receives it or 

on his or her family. Writing many years before the somatic state 

and the prognostic possibilities of total brain failure were wellcharacterized, Jonas emphasized the need to accept that sustaining 

life and prolonging dying is not always in the patient’s interest: 

The question [of interventions to sustain the patient] cannot be answered by decreeing that death has already 

occurred and the body is therefore in the domain of 

things; rather it is by holding, e.g., that it is humanly not 

justified—let alone demanded—to artificially prolong the 

life of a brainless body...the physician can, indeed should, 

turn off the respirator and let the “definition of death” 

take care of itself by what then inevitably happens.7

 

To summarize, Position One does not insist that medicine or science 

can know that all or even some patients with total brain failure are 

still living. Rather, Position One makes two assertions in light of 

what we now know about the clinical presentation and the pathophysiology of total brain failure. The first is that there are 

“sufficient grounds” for doubt as to whether the patient with this 
58| CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

condition has died. The second is that in the face of such persistent 

uncertainty, the only ethically valid course is to consider and treat 

such a patient as a still living human being. Finally, such respectful 

consideration and treatment does not preclude the ethical withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining interventions, based on the 

judgment that such interventions are futile. 

II. Position Two: There Is a Sound Biological Justification 

for Today’s Neurological Standard 

Position One is the voice of “principled and hence cautious uncertainty.” We should not claim to know facts about life and death that 

are beyond the limits of our powers to discern, especially when the 

consequence might be to place a human being beyond the essential 

and obligatory protections afforded to the living. The recent critical 

appraisals of total brain failure (“whole brain death”) offered by 

Shewmon and others only underscore the limits to our ability to 

discern the line between life and death. 

Position Two is also motivated by strong moral convictions about 

what is at stake in the debate: The bodies of deceased patients 

should not be ventilated and maintained as if they were still living 

human beings. The respect owed to the newly dead demands that 

such interventions be withdrawn. Their families should be spared 

unnecessary anguish over purported “options” for treatment. Maintaining the body for a short time to facilitate organ transplantation 

is a reasonable act of deference to the need for organs and to the 

opportunity for generosity on the part of the donor as well as the 

family. Notwithstanding this need and opportunity, the true moral 

challenge that faces us is to decide in each case whether the patient 

is living or has died. To help us meet that challenge, the clinical and 

pathophysiological facts that call the neurological standard into 

question should be re-examined and re-evaluated. On the basis of 

such a re-examination and re-evaluation, Position Two seeks to develop a better rationale for continuing to use the neurological 

standard to determine whether a human being has died. 
CHAPTER FOUR| 59 

A. The Work of the Organism as a Whole 

Early defenders of the neurological standard of “whole brain death” 

relied on the plausible intuition that in order to be a living organism 

any animal, whether human or non-human, must be a whole. Ongoing biological activity in various cells or tissues is not in itself 

sufficient to mark the presence of a living organism. After all, some 

biological activity in cells and tissues remains for a time even in a 

body that all would agree is a corpse. Such activity signifies that disparate parts of the once-living organism remain, but not the 

organism as a whole. Therefore, if we try to specify the moment at 

which the “wholeness” of the body is lost, that moment must come 

before biological activity in all of its different cells or tissues has 

ceased. As Alexander Capron, former executive director of the 

President’s Commission, has repeatedly emphasized, the fact that 

this moment is chosen does not mean that it is arbitrary; the choice is 

not arbitrary if it is made in accordance with the most reasonable 

interpretation of the biological facts that could be provided.*

The neurological standard’s early defenders were not wrong to seek 

such a principle of wholeness. They may have been mistaken, however, in focusing on the loss of somatic integration as the critical sign 

that the organism is no longer a whole. They interpreted—plausibly 

but perhaps incorrectly— “an organism as a whole” to mean “an 

 

*Capron comments: “In part, any definition ‘is admittedly arbitrary in the sense of 

representing a choice,’ as the President’s Commission stated in defending the 

view that the brain’s function is more central to human life than are other necessary organs... But the societally determined view of what constitutes death is not 

‘arbitrary in the sense of lacking reasons.’ ...The ‘cultural context’ of the standards for determining death includes the generally held view that human death, 

like the death of any animal, is a natural event. Even in establishing their ‘definition,’ members of our society act on the basis that death is an event whose 

existence rests on certain criteria recognized rather than solely invented by human 

beings.” A. M. Capron, “The Report of the President’s Commission on the Uniform Determination of Death Act,” in Death: Beyond Whole Brain Criteria, ed. R. 

Zaner (The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), 156-57. See, also, 

A. M. Capron, “The Purpose of Death: A Reply to Professor Dworkin,” Indiana 

Law J 48, no. 4 (1973): 640-6. 
60| CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

organism whose parts are working together in an integrated way.” 

But, as we have seen, even in a patient with total brain failure, some 

of the body’s parts continue to work together in an integrated way 

for some time—for example, to fight infection, heal wounds, and 

maintain temperature. If these kinds of integration were sufficient 

to identify the presence of a living “organism as a whole,” total 

brain failure could not serve as a criterion for organismic death, and 

the neurological standard enshrined in law would not be philosophically well-grounded. 

There may be, however, a more compelling account of wholeness that 

would support the intuition that after total brain failure the body is 

no longer an organismic whole and hence no longer alive. That account, which we develop here with Position Two, offers a superior 

defense of “total brain failure” as the standard for declaring death. 

With that account, death remains a condition of the organism as a 

whole and does not, therefore, merely signal the irreversible loss of 

so-called higher mental functions. But reliance on the concept of 

“integration” is abandoned and with it the false assumption that the 

brain is the “integrator” of vital functions. Determining whether an 

organism remains a whole depends on recognizing the persistence or 

cessation of the fundamental vital work of a living organism—the 

work of self-preservation, achieved through the organism’s needdriven commerce with the surrounding world. When there is good 

reason to believe that an injury has irreversibly destroyed an organism’s ability to perform its fundamental vital work, then the 

conclusion that the organism as a whole has died is warranted. Advocates of Position Two argue that this is the case for patients with 

total brain failure. To understand this argument, we must explore at 

some length this idea of an organism’s “fundamental work.” 

All organisms have a needy mode of being. Unlike inanimate objects, 

which continue to exist through inertia and without effort, every 

organism persists only thanks to its own exertions. To preserve 

themselves, organisms must—and can and do—engage in commerce 

with the surrounding world. Their constant need for oxygenated air 

and nutrients is matched by their ability to satisfy that need, by engaging in certain activities, reaching out into the surrounding 

environment to secure the required sustenance. This is the defini-
CHAPTER FOUR| 61 

tive work of the organism as an organism. It is what an organism 

“does” and what distinguishes every organism from non-living 

things.* And it is what distinguishes a living organism from the dead 

body that it becomes when it dies. 

The work of the organism, expressed in its commerce with the surrounding world, depends on three fundamental capacities: 

1. Openness to the world, that is, receptivity to stimuli 

and signals from the surrounding environment. 

2. The ability to act upon the world to obtain selectively 

what it needs. 

3. The basic felt need that drives the organism to act as it 

must, to obtain what it needs and what its openness reveals to be available. 

Appreciating these capacities as mutually supporting aspects of the 

organism’s vital work will help us understand why an individual 

with total brain failure should be declared dead, even when ventilator-supported “breathing” masks the presence of death. 

To preserve itself, an organism must be open to the world. Such 

openness is manifested in different ways and at many levels. In 

higher animals, including man, it is evident most obviously in consciousness or felt awareness, even in its very rudimentary forms. 

When a PVS patient tracks light with his or her eyes, recoils in response to pain, swallows liquid placed in the mouth, or goes to 

sleep and wakes up, such behaviors—although they may not indicate self-consciousness—testify to the organism’s essential, vital 

openness to its surrounding world. An organism that behaves in 

such a way cannot be dead. 

 

* The account here focuses on the details of organismic life that are manifested in 

the “higher animals” or, perhaps more precisely, the mammals. How these arguments might be modified and extended to other sorts of organisms (e.g., bacteria 

or plants) is beyond the scope of this discussion. 
62| CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

Self-preserving commerce with the world, however, involves more 

than just openness or receptivity. It also requires the ability to act on 

one’s own behalf—to take in food and water and, even more basically, to breathe. Spontaneous breathing is an indispensable action 

of the higher animals that makes metabolism—and all other vital 

activity—possible. Experiencing a felt inner need to acquire oxygen 

(and to expel carbon dioxide) and perceiving the presence of oxygen in its environment, a living body is moved to act on the world 

(by contracting its diaphragm so that air will move into its lungs). 

An organism that breathes spontaneously cannot be dead. 

Just as spontaneous breathing in itself reveals an organism’s openness to and ability to act upon the world, it also reveals a third 

capacity critical to the organism’s fundamental, self-preserving 

work: What animates the motor act of spontaneous breathing, in 

open commerce with the surrounding air, is the inner experience of 

need, manifesting itself as the drive to breathe. This need does not 

have to be consciously felt in order to be efficacious in driving respiration. It is clearly not consciously felt in a comatose patient who 

might be tested for a remaining rudimentary drive (e.g., with the 

“apnea” test). But even when the drive to breathe occurs in the absence of any self-awareness, its presence gives evidence of the 

organism’s continued impulse to live. This drive is the organism’s 

own impulse, exercised on its own behalf, and indispensable to its 

continued existence.*

 

* The significance of this account of breathing may be more apparent if we contrast it with the more reductive account provided by Shewmon in his influential 

2001 paper that criticized a “somatic integration rationale” for a whole brain 

standard for human death. Shewmon wrote: 

If “breathing” is interpreted in the “bellows” sense—moving air in 

and out of the lungs—then it is indeed a brain-mediated function, 

grossly substituted in [brain dead] patients by a mechanical ventilator. 

But this is a function not only of the brain but also of the phrenic 

nerves, diaphragm and intercostal muscles; moreover, it is not a 

somatically integrative function or even a vitally necessary one... It is 

merely a condition for somatic integration itself. On the other hand, if 

“breathing” is understood in the sense of “respiration,” which strictly 
CHAPTER FOUR| 63 

As a vital sign, the spontaneous action of breathing can and must be distinguished from the technologically supported, passive condition of 

being ventilated (i.e., of having one’s “breathing” replaced by a mechanical ventilator). The natural work of breathing, even apart from 

consciousness or self-awareness, is itself a sure sign that the organism as a whole is doing the work that constitutes—and preserves—

it as a whole. In contrast, artificial, non-spontaneous breathing produced by a machine is not such a sign. It does not signify an activity 

of the organism as a whole. It is not driven by felt need, and the exchange of gases that it effects is neither an achievement of the 

organism nor a sign of its genuine vitality. For this reason, it makes 

sense to say that the operation of the ventilator can obscure our 

view of the arrival of human death—that is, the death of the human 

organism as a working whole. A ventilator causes the patient’s chest 

 speaking refers to the exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide, then its 

locus is twofold: (1) across the alveolar lining of the lungs, and (2) at 

the biochemical level of the electron transport chain in the mitochondria of every cell in the body. (Shewmon, “Brain and Somatic 

Integration,” 464.) 

In his eagerness to debunk what he considers the myth of lost somatic integration, Shewmon fails to convey the essential character of breathing. We might 

summarize his account of breathing as follows: 

Breathing = Inflation and deflation of a bellows + Diffusion at the alveoli + Cellular respiration

But Shewmon misses the critical element: the drive exhibited by the whole organism to bring in air, a drive that is fundamental to the constant, vital working of 

the whole organism. By ignoring the essentially appetitive nature of animal breathing, Shewmon’s account misses the relevance of breathing as incontrovertible 

evidence that “the organism as a whole” continues to be open to and at work upon

the world, achieving its own preservation. The breathing that keeps an organism 

alive is not merely the operation of a “bellows” for which a mechanical ventilator 

might substitute. Bringing air into the body is an integral part of an organism’s 

mode of being as a needy thing. More air will be brought in if metabolic need demands it and the body feels that need, as for example during exercise or in a state 

of panic or injury. The “respiration” taking place at the cellular level can be understood adequately only in the context of the work of the whole organism—the 

work of breathing.
64| CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

to heave and the lungs to fill and thereby mimics the authentic work 

of the organism. In fact, it mimics the work so well that it enables 

some systems of the body to keep functioning—but it does no 

more than that. The simulated “breathing” that the ventilator makes 

possible is not, therefore, a vital sign: It is not a sign that the organism is accomplishing its vital work and thus remains a living whole.*

We have examined the phenomenon of breathing in order to understand and explain a living organism’s “needful openness” to the 

world—a needful openness lacking in patients with total brain failure. Having done this, however, we must also emphasize that an 

animal cannot be considered dead simply because it has lost the 

ability to breathe spontaneously. Even if the animal has lost that 

capacity, other vital capacities might still be present. For example, 

patients with spinal cord injuries may be permanently apneic or unable to breathe without ventilatory support and yet retain full or 

partial possession of their conscious faculties. Just as much as striving to breathe, signs of consciousness are incontrovertible evidence 

that a living organism, a patient, is alive. 

If there are no signs of consciousness and if spontaneous breathing 

is absent and if the best clinical judgment is that these neurophysiological facts cannot be reversed, Position Two would lead us to 

conclude that a once-living patient has now died. Thus, on this account, total brain failure can continue to serve as a criterion for 

declaring death—not because it necessarily indicates complete loss 

of integrated somatic functioning, but because it is a sign that this 

 

* If the view presented here is correct, that is, if the presence of spontaneous 

breathing truly reveals a persistent drive of the organism as a whole to live, we 

can better understand the force of a rhetorical question sometimes posed to 

those who view the loss of “higher” mental and psychological capacities as a sufficient criterion for declaring death. “Would you,” they may be asked, “bury a 

patient who continues to breathe spontaneously?” Quite naturally, we recoil from 

such a thought, and we do so for reasons that the account given above makes 

clear. The striving of an animal to live, a striving that we can discern even in its 

least voluntary form (i.e., breathing), indicates that we still have among us a living 

being—and not a candidate for burial. 
CHAPTER FOUR| 65 

organism can no longer engage in the essential work that defines 

living things. 

B. Comparison with the UK Standard 

Although the terms may be different, the concepts presented here 

to defend the use of total brain failure as a reasonable standard for 

death are not wholly new. A similar approach to judging the vital 

status of a patient diagnosed as “brain dead,” emphasizing the crucial importance of both spontaneous breathing and the capacity for 

consciousness, was advocated by the late British neurologist Christopher Pallis.8

 His conceptual justification for this argument was 

influential in gaining acceptance for a neurological standard in the 

United Kingdom.*

Like this report’s Position Two, Pallis attempted to strike a balance 

between the need to be “functionalist” and the need to remain 

rooted in the biological facts of total brain failure. He stated in very 

direct terms that the relevant functions that were irreversibly absent 

from the patient with a destroyed brainstem were the ability to breathe

and the capacity for consciousness. When challenged as to why these two 

functions should be singled out, Pallis pointed to what he called 

“the sociological context” for basic concepts of life and death. In 

the West, he maintained, this context is the Judeo-Christian tradition in which “breath” and “consciousness” are two definitive 

features of the human soul: 

The single matrix in which my definition is embedded is a 

sociological one, namely Judeo-Christian culture... The 

“loss of the capacity for consciousness” is much the same 

as the “departure of the conscious soul from the body,” 

 

* Other countries have adopted this conceptual framework as well. The Canadian 

Forum that issued its recommendations in 2006 followed the UK approach in 

adopting “irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness combined with the 

irreversible loss of all brain stem functions, including the capacity to breathe” as 

the definition of neurologically determined death. Shemie, et al., “Neurological 

Determination of Death: Canadian Forum,” S1-13. 
66| CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

just as “the loss of the capacity to breathe” is much the 

same as the “loss of the breath of life.”9

Pallis also pointed to “the widespread identity, in various languages, 

of terms denoting soul and breath.”10 A challenge to this approach 

can be framed with two questions: First, are consciousness and 

breathing the only or the most important culturally significant features 

of the soul? And second, does this argument about traditional beliefs, bound to a particular culture, provide a sufficient rationale for 

a standard applicable to the transcultural, universal phenomenon of 

human death? 

Position Two agrees with Pallis’s emphasis on certain functions in 

preference to others, but it avoids the limitations of his approach, 

that is, its dependence on a particular culture. Position Two does 

this by taking the loss of the impulse to breathe and the total loss of 

engagement with the world as the cessation of the most essential 

functions of the organism as a whole. In this way, it builds upon an 

insight into biological reality, an insight latent in culture-bound notions of “breath of life” and “departure of the conscious soul from 

the body.” It does so by articulating a philosophical conception of 

the biological realities of organismic life. To repeat, an organism is 

the unique sort of being that it is because it can and must constantly 

act upon and be open to its environment. From this philosophicalbiological perspective, it becomes clear that a human being with a 

destroyed brainstem has lost the functional capacities that define 

organismic life. 

On at least one important point, however, our Position Two and 

the UK neurological standard part company. The UK standard follows Pallis in accepting “death of the brainstem,” rather than total 

brain failure, as a sufficient criterion for declaring a patient dead. 

Such a reduction, in addition to being conceptually suspect, is clinically dangerous because it suggests that the confirmatory tests that 

go beyond the bedside checks for apnea and brainstem reflexes are 

simply superfluous. As noted in Chapter Three, it is important to 

seek clarity on where a patient is on the path to the endpoint of total brain infarction. Only if the destructive cycle of infarction and 

swelling has reached this endpoint can the irreversibility of the pa-
CHAPTER FOUR| 67 

tient’s condition be known with confidence. Ultimately, the decision 

to perform these confirmatory tests (beyond those targeted at 

brainstem functions, for example, angiography or EEG) belongs to 

the attending clinician. The counsel offered here is one of caution in 

reaching a diagnosis with such important consequences. Only in the 

presence of a certain diagnosis of total brain failure do the arguments that seek to interpret this clinical finding hold weight. 

\[
68| CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

ENDNOTES

 

1 J. P. Lizza, “The Conceptual Basis for Brain Death Revisited: Loss of Organic 

Integration or Loss of Consciousness?” Adv Exp Med Biol 550 (2004): 52. 

2 S. Laureys, A. M. Owen, and N. D. Schiff, “Brain Function in Coma, Vegetative 

State, and Related Disorders,” Lancet Neurol 3, no. 9 (2004): 537-46. 

3 H. Jonas, “Against the Stream,” in Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to Technological Man (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 138. 

4 D. A. Shewmon, “Chronic ‘Brain Death’: Meta-Analysis and Conceptual Consequences,” Neurology 51, no. 6 (1998): 1538-45. 

5 Shewmon, “Brain and Somatic Integration,” 467. Author’s emphasis. 

6 Shewmon, “The Brain and Somatic Integration: Insights into the Standard Biological Rationale for Equating ‘Brain Death’ with Death,” 457-78. 

7 Jonas, “Against the Stream,” 136. 

8 C. Pallis and D. H. Harley. ABC of Brainstem Death. Second ed. London: BMJ 

Publishing Group, 1996; C. Pallis, “On the Brainstem Criterion of Death,” in The 

Definition of Death: Contemporary Controversies, ed. S. J. Youngner, R. M. Arnold, and 

R. Schapiro (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 93-100. 

9 Pallis, “On the Brainstem Criterion of Death,” 96. 

10 Ibid. 
 

69

CHAPTER FIVE

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

AND PRACTICE

n this report, our fundamental question has been, Are there adequate biological and philosophical reasons for considering patients who have 

suffered total brain failure to be deceased human beings? We have 

sought to respond to this question in a careful, systematic fashion. 

In Chapter Two, we began our re-examination of the neurological 

standard for death by clarifying key terms. In Chapter Three, we 

described the condition of “total brain failure” (commonly called 

“brain death” or “whole brain death”), and we explored certain 

clinical and pathophysiological findings that were unavailable to the 

authors of earlier public accounts of that condition. In Chapter 

Four, we presented two possible answers to the central question of 

the report: first, a position that rejects the neurological standard for 

death on the grounds that it is not possible to know with certainty 

that an individual with total brain failure is truly dead; and second, a 

position that defends the neurological standard, arguing that it is

possible to know that death has occurred in such cases. Also in 

Chapter Four, we sought to support this second position with a 

novel—and, we think, more secure—rationale. Each of the two positions has implications for policy and practice, especially with 

regard to organ procurement. Here in Chapter Five, we offer an 

analysis of these implications. 

I. Rejecting the Neurological Standard: The Implications of 

 Position One 

The neurological standard for death is a well-entrenched standard, 

having been enshrined in law and applied in medical practice for 

I
70 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

more than two decades. To conclude now that this standard is 

flawed and ultimately indefensible would have serious repercussions, especially for the policy and practice of organ procurement. 

No patient whose heart continues beating (and whose vital organs 

thus remain healthy) could be declared dead; there would be no legally recognized “heart-beating cadavers.” In response to such an 

altered approach, one of two paths could be followed: Either the 

link between death and eligibility for donation could be severed, or 

the law could be fashioned so that vital organs are only procured 

from non-heart-beating donors. Both of these possible paths require further elaboration. 

 

A. Severing the Link Between Death and Eligibility for 

Organ Donation 

The first path would entail weakening or abandoning the so-called 

“dead donor rule.” This could be done in such a way that the same 

patients who are currently designated as heart-beating donors could 

continue to be so designated. But they would not be seen as dead in 

the eyes of the law; they would instead be described as living but 

“heart-beating-donation-eligible.” Two steps would be required to 

accomplish this change. 

One step would be to revise the state laws pertaining to the determination of death so that the only recognized standard would be 

the traditional cardiopulmonary standard. The law would then declare that only those individuals who have suffered an irreversible 

loss of cardiopulmonary function (spontaneous or assisted) are 

dead. 

The other step would be to revise the anatomical gift acts that are in 

effect in the various states. These laws specify how individuals can 

express their wishes regarding organ donation if the circumstances 

of their death make them medically eligible. Currently, these laws 

uniformly stipulate that gifts of tissue, organs, or whole bodies 
CHAPTER FIVE| 71 

should take effect “upon or after death.”*

 With the suggested revision, “upon or after death” would be changed to “upon or after the 

point at which donation eligibility is reached.” And “donation eligibility” would be defined as “the point at which, according to 

accepted medical standards, an individual has suffered irreversible 

cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brainstem.” In other words, the language currently found in the various 

determination of death acts (which are modeled on the UDDA), 

would be transferred to the anatomical gift acts, and as a result, a 

patient would not need to be declared dead in order to be declared 

eligible for designation as a heart-beating donor. 

This solution would seem to preserve the integrity of the organ 

procurement system by maintaining the customary boundaries between those who can be used as organ donors and those who, on 

ethical grounds, must be protected from such use. Moreover, it 

would accomplish this while setting aside the dubious claim that 

either clinicians or policymakers know for certain where the line 

between life and death is. 

Despite these attractions, however, this solution is deeply disturbing, for it embraces the idea that a living human being may be used 

merely as a means for another human being’s ends, losing his or her 

own life in the process. For good reason, many recoil from the 

thought that it would be permissible to end one life in order to obtain body parts needed by another. For many observers, organ 

transplantation as practiced today is ethically defensible precisely 

because only those who are already dead are eligible to become donors. In sum, abandoning the “dead donor rule” would entail 

dismantling the moral foundations of the practice of organ donation. 

 

* The legality of donation from a healthy, living donor is not addressed by the 

anatomical gift acts. Yet the practice of living donation suggests a possible “middle course,” not explored in this report, which would permit the removal of a 

single kidney from a donor who is near death—just as it is permissible for an individual to give a single kidney while alive and healthy. 
72 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

This solution is worrisome on other grounds as well. Having created a category of still-living but “heart-beating-donation-eligible” 

individuals, we might have difficulty resisting pressure to expand 

the kinds of patients that could be included in that class. In fact, 

many who support moving away from the dead donor rule argue 

that such a step could be a boon to society by making more individuals available as heart-beating donors. If a patient need not be dead 

in order to be eligible for such life-ending organ donations, where 

would the ethical line be drawn? It has been suggested that the 

moral warrant for the practice could be supplied by ensuring that 

the would-be donor is “beyond harm.”1 In other words, the principle of non-maleficence, of “do no harm,” rather than the dead 

donor rule, would provide the needed ethical safeguards for procuring organs from the living—for example, from patients in persistent 

vegetative states or from infants with anencephaly. 

Yet this proposal is both conceptually suspect and practically dangerous. What exactly does “harm” mean in this context, and how 

do we know who is beyond harm? Might there be a temptation to 

interpret the class of “patients who can still be harmed” more and 

more narrowly in order to increase the number of donation-eligible 

human beings? For very sound practical reasons, the Kantian prohibition against treating living human beings merely as means and 

not also as ends has been fundamental to the ethics of both biomedical research and clinical medicine, at least since the 

promulgation of the Nuremberg Code in 1947. If that principle is 

worth preserving, especially in the context of organ procurement, 

we would do better to restrict donation-eligibility to patients who 

have died, as determined by clinical tests for “total brain failure,” 

more commonly known as “whole brain death.” 

B. Taking Vital Organs Only from Non-Heart-Beating 

 Donors (Controlled DCD) 

In Chapter Six we shall more thoroughly explore the practice of 

controlled donation after cardiac death (controlled DCD), which is 

currently undergoing a resurgence. With this practice, organs are 

procured from non-heart-beating donors who have been declared 

dead in accordance with the traditional cardiopulmonary standard. 
CHAPTER FIVE| 73 

For those who argue that patients with total brain failure cannot, 

with certainty, be declared dead, controlled DCD offers a viable 

alternative source for much needed human organs. 

Today, controlled DCD is offered as an option to families when an 

injured relative does not qualify to be a heart-beating donor—that 

is, as an opportunity to combine the generous act of organ donation 

with the often painful decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment for 

a living, but close-to-death family member. A patient diagnosed 

with total brain failure is considered dead by today’s legal standard, 

and therefore eligible for organ donation immediately; but for those 

who regard such a patient as a still living human being, controlled 

DCD would be the only ethical way for that patient’s organs to be 

donated. From this perspective, an appropriate reform might be, 

not to abandon the dead donor rule, but to require that all injured 

patients for whom organ donation is contemplated become asystolic before allowing organ procurement surgery to begin. 

Two objections have been lodged against this approach. The first 

has to do with the practical consequences of this approach for organ procurement: it is likely that far fewer organs of high quality 

would be recovered. Because organs procured from heart-beating 

donors are less subject to ischemic injury, the claim is often made 

that obtaining such organs is a key factor in successful transplantation, especially in terms of graft survival and patient survival. In 

other words, organs procured from donors who have been declared 

dead in accordance with the traditional cardiopulmonary standard 

are not usually as “healthy” as those procured from heart-beating 

donors, nor do they last as long or permit their recipients to live as 

long. 

Plausible as this claim might sound, however, recent studies have 

put it in doubt it by showing that patient and graft survival rates (at 

one and five years) for kidneys taken from controlled DCD donors 

are comparable to the rates for kidneys from heart-beating donors.2

The same cannot be said of livers obtained by controlled DCD; 

graft and patient survival rates for livers recovered from controlled 

DCD donors are not as good as the rates for livers from heartbeating donors.3

 At this time, hearts, lungs, intestines, and pancreata 
74 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

are only rarely transplanted from patients whose hearts have 

stopped beating; thus, comparisons of these key rates are more difficult to make. In weighing these concerns about the comparative 

healthiness of organs from heart-beating and non-heart-beating donors, it is important to consider one possible result of restricting 

organ procurement to controlled DCD: such a restriction might 

well stimulate research into better methods of procuring and preserving organs and thereby lead to improvements in outcomes 

associated with organs from non-heart-beating donors. 

A second objection raised against an exclusive reliance on controlled DCD as a means to procure organs concerns certain ethical 

and philosophical problems that we shall discuss in greater depth in 

Chapter Six. Here, it is important to mention that restricting organ 

donation to controlled DCD donors would inevitably intensify the 

demands on the physicians, nurses, and other health professionals 

responsible for such organ procurement. They would find it all the 

more challenging to responding, responsibly and compassionately, 

to concerns and needs for palliative care and family support while 

protecting potential donors from abuse. Such a restriction would 

also require wider acceptance of the idea that living individuals can 

and should be designated as organ donors prior to the removal of 

life support; in addition, the death of these donors (and the availability of their organs for transplant) would have to be more 

regularly declared in the expeditious way that this procedure requires.*

 Thus enhanced public education, discussion, and 

deliberation would be crucial prerequisites to any expansion of the 

use of controlled DCD in the ways suggested here. 

 

* The concerns of various sorts of health care providers about DCD practice 

were surveyed in this 2006 report: M. S. Mandell, et al., “National Evaluation of 

Healthcare Provider Attitudes Toward Organ Donation after Cardiac Death,” 

Crit Care Med 34, no. 12 (2006): 2952-8. A useful description of a conscientious 

program of palliative care for DCD donors and their families can be found in: C. 

M. Kelso, et al., “Palliative Care Consultation in the Process of Organ Donation 

After Cardiac Death,” J Palliat Med 10, no. 1 (2007): 118-26. 
CHAPTER FIVE| 75 

II. Affirming the Neurological Standard: The Implications of 

 Position Two 

If the facts and arguments explored in this report lead to the conclusion that the neurological standard of whole brain death is sound 

on biological and philosophical grounds, then there would be no 

need to change the current standard of practice. Organ procurement from donors declared dead in accordance with the 

neurological standard would be unaffected by such a conclusion. 

What would be gained by this exploration, however, is a clearer understanding of the medical facts and ethical arguments supporting 

the practice. We review the most important of these arguments 

here. 

First, what we have called Position Two gives a fair hearing to, and 

addres on their own terms, the challenges posed by advances in the 

clinical and pathophysiological understanding of “brain death.” To 

those who are troubled by doubts about the legitimacy of the neurological standard and the associated practices, Position Two should 

offer substantial reassurance as to the ultimate validity of the standard. To be sure, such doubts are neither entirely unwarranted nor 

easily dismissed. After the most serious sort of brain injury and a 

diagnosis of total brain failure, a patient’s appearance may still engender considerable doubt as to whether he or she is dead or alive. 

Some of the body’s systems may continue to work together in an 

integrated way, and it may be possible to sustain this level of functionality for an indeterminate amount of time. But such life-like 

appearances may fail to convey the true condition of the patient, a 

condition that is obscured by the artificial maintenance of breathing 

and circulation and the limited bodily integrity thus preserved. Many 

years of experience with total brain failure have revealed the truth 

of such a condition: the “brain-dead” patient will never recover the 

essential ability to interact with his or her environment that is characteristic of the living organism. 

Second, a careful examination of the conceptual basis for declaring 

death in the midst of often confusing technological interventions 

invites deeper reflection on the moral obligations that we bear toward those who have crossed the threshold from life to death. 
76 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

Thirty-five years ago, William F. May used the phrase, “the newly 

dead,” to describe the bodies of those who still present the outward 

form of the living human beings they once were, even as mourning 

for their loss has already begun. As May wrote, 

The cadaver is a kind of shroud that now masks rather 

than expresses the soul that once animated it. And yet—

while the body retains its recognizable form, even in death, 

it commands a certain respect. No longer a human presence, it still reminds us of that presence which once was 

utterly inseparable from it.4 

To realize that death has come—even in the midst of technological 

interventions—is to know that the time has come to think and to 

act in different ways toward the newly dead human being. It is time 

to pay the deceased our respects, to mourn their passing—and to 

do so in the presence of, and with careful regard for, their mortal 

remains. It is also time to withhold or to withdraw such treatments 

as would actually constitute mistreatment of the newly dead. Finally, 

depending on the wishes of the patient and the family, it may also 

be time to begin the procurement of organs for the morally defensible purpose of helping the sick. 

This is, perhaps, the most valuable fruit of reflecting on the foundations of today’s neurological standard for death and finding them 

basically sound: The death of a human being is recognized for what 

it is, and those who survive are enabled to accept that death with 

finality and to regard their loved one’s mortal remains with respect. 

\[
CHAPTER FIVE| 77 

ENDNOTES

 

1 R. D. Truog, “Is It Time to Abandon Brain Death?” Hastings Cent Rep 27, no. 1 

(1997): 29-37; Truog, “Too Flawed to Endure,” 273-81; and S. J. Youngner and 

R. M. Arnold, “Philosophical Debates About the Definition of Death: Who Cares?” J Med Philos 26, no. 5 (2001): 527-37. 

2 See M. D. Doshi and L. G. Hunsicker, “Short- and Long-Term Outcomes with 

the Use of Kidneys and Livers Donated after Cardiac Death,” Am J Transplant 7, 

no. 1 (2007): 122-9; J. T. Cooper et al., “Donation after Cardiac Death: The University of Wisconsin Experience with Renal Transplantation,” Am J Transplant 4, 

no. 9 (2004): 1490-4; and A. M. D’Alessandro et al., “Donation after Cardiac 

Death: The University of Wisconsin Experience,” Ann Transplant 9, no. 1 (2004): 

68-71. 

3 See Doshi and Hunsicker, “Short and Long Term Outcomes,” 122-9; P. L. Abt 

et al., “Survival Following Liver Transplantation from Non-Heart-Beating Donors,” Ann Surg 239, no. 1 (2004): 87-92; and D. P. Foley et al., “Donation after 

Cardiac Death: The University of Wisconsin Experience with Liver Transplantation,” Ann Surg 242, no. 5 (2005): 724-31. 

4 W. May, “Attitudes Toward the Newly Dead,” Stud Hastings Cent 1, no. 1 (1973): 

3. 
 
 

79

CHAPTER SIX

NON-HEART-BEATING

ORGAN DONATION

ne of the implications of rejecting the neurological standard, as we saw in Part I of Chapter Five, is that nonheart-beating donors could become the exclusive source 

of organs for procurement and transplantation. In this chapter we 

examine non-heart-beating organ donation—specifically, the practice of controlled donation after cardiac death—in greater depth. 

I. Background 

As was noted in Chapter One, the neurological standard for the determination of death was formulated in the 1960s, in the early years 

of successful cadaveric organ transplantation. Since then, the practice of transplanting organs from the dead has become 

commonplace, in large measure because the “heart-beating cadaver” 

has been accepted as a medical and legal reality. Heart-beating cadavers, however, are not the only source of organs from the 

deceased: Human beings whose deaths have been determined according to the more traditional cardiopulmonary standard may also 

provide organs. The earliest successful organ transplantations from 

cadaveric donors, in fact, made use of the organs of individuals 

whose deaths were determined in this way.*

 

 

* Two useful sources on the early use of non-heart-beating donors are M. A. DeVita, J. V. Snyder, and A. Grenvik, “History of Organ Donation by Patients with 

Cardiac Death,” Kennedy Inst Ethics J 3, no. 2 (1993): 113-129; and C. A. Zawistowski and M. A. DeVita, “Non-Heartbeating Organ Donation: A Review,” J 

O
 80 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

A key challenge to procuring organs from non-heart-beating cadavers is posed by warm ischemic damage, caused by the lack of blood 

perfusion while the organs are still in the body of the newly deceased donor. To prevent or limit this damage, the time between 

the cessation of circulation (“effective asystole”) and the procurement of organs must be minimized. For this purpose, the final 

cardiac contractions must be controlled: In the moments following 

asystole, the body must be prepared for surgeons either to remove 

the organs promptly or to maintain their viability for transplantation 

in the ensuing hours. For the moment of cardiac arrest to be controlled in this way, the prospective organ donor must be a patient 

from whom a ventilator and perhaps other forms of life-sustaining 

treatment will be withdrawn, either in accordance with the patient’s 

wishes or the wishes of a surrogate. In other words, a potential nonheart-beating donor, in the vast majority of cases, is an individual 

who is ventilator-dependent but not yet deceased according to today’s neurological standard.*

 The ventilator is then removed, the 

patient is watched and kept comfortable until the heart stops circulating blood through the body, a waiting period is observed (usually 

two to five minutes), and then the surgical procurement of organs 

begins. 

Procuring organs in this way was very rare until the early 1990s—in 

most transplant centers throughout the United States, only heart-

 

Intensive Care Med 18, no. 4 (2003): 189-97. In addition to kidney transplantations 

from such cadavers in the 1950s and 1960s, the first liver transplantation in 1963 

and the first heart transplant in 1967 were performed by taking the organ from a 

patient after life-support had been removed and the patient had become asystolic. * Many candidates for controlled DCD are patients who are “very close to brain 

dead”—i.e., who are tested for total brain failure but show minimal signs of brain 

function that are nonetheless sufficient to preclude such a diagnosis. There are 

other candidates for controlled DCD, however, who are dependent on a lifesustaining technology for reasons other than a traumatic brain injury, e.g., patients with a high-spinal cord injury or patients at the end-stage of a 

neurodegenerative disease such as amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). For a case 

study of a fully conscious patient who chose to become a controlled DCD donor 

upon removal of the ventilator, see J. Spike, “Controlled NHBD Protocol for a 

Fully Conscious Person: When Death Is Intended as an End in Itself and It Has 

Its Own End,” J Clin Ethics 11, no. 1 (2000): 73-7. 
CHAPTER SIX| 81 

beating organ donors were used.* This restriction meant that some 

individuals who had suffered accidents or injuries that left them 

with little hope of recovery were not eligible to become donors, 

even if a responsible decision to remove life-sustaining interventions was made. In some cases, families who knew that their 

relatives wanted to be donors in the event of an accident were disappointed to find out that making this gift was not possible. This 

fact—along with concerns about the general shortage of available 

organs compared to the growing need among potential recipients—

led some pioneering institutions to develop and implement nonheart-beating donor protocols.†

 These protocols codified the institutional practices for managing the withdrawal of treatment and for 

optimizing the conditions for organ procurement. The early controlled DCD protocols included both logistical procedures and 

ethical safeguards. 

The work of these first institutions raised concerns among some 

ethicists, health care professionals, and members of the general 

public. For the purposes of this report, these concerns can be divided into two categories: concerns about the care of the dying 

patient at the end of life, and concerns about initiating organ procurement before the patient is dead. The second set of concerns is 

treated at length in Part II of this chapter. Regarding the first set of 

concerns, we shall address the principal points here while encouraging the interested reader to consult the companion volume to this 

white paper, Organ Transplantation: An Ethical Inquiry by the President’s 

Council on Bioethics; in Chapter Three of that report, the Council offers a more thorough investigation of these concerns about care of 

the dying patient in the context of organ transplantation. 

 

* One exception is the University of Wisconsin Hospital, where controlled DCD 

has been performed continuously since 1974. See J. Lewis, et al., “Development 

of the University of Wisconsin Donation after Cardiac Death Evaluation Tool,” 

Prog Transplant 13, no. 4 (2003): 265-73. 

† The first modern controlled DCD protocol was instituted at the University of 

Pittsburgh Medical Center in 1992. For details, see M. A. DeVita, J. V. Snyder, 

and A. Grenvik, “History of Organ Donation by Patients with Cardiac Death,” 

Kennedy Inst Ethics J 3, no. 2 (1993): 113-29. 
 82 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

Those who fear that the widespread practice of controlled DCD 

may adversely affect the quality of care at the end of life have raised 

several questions, including whether families offered the option of 

controlled DCD are pressured to make a decision in favor of withdrawal of life support; whether the steps necessary to optimize the 

circumstances of death for transplant purposes interfere with good 

palliative care for the patient in his or her last moments; whether 

the family’s emotional needs will be respected, considering that 

loved ones must be kept “out of the surgeons’ way” immediately 

after the patient’s heart stops beating; and whether the patient’s 

death will be hastened to ensure that the procured organs are 

maximally viable.*

 

In response to such concerns, institutions seeking to expand their 

transplant programs to include non-heart-beating donors have incorporated ethical safeguards into their transplantation protocols. 

To aid institutions in the development of ethically sound protocols, 

two reports by the Institute of Medicine on non-heart-beating donation were published.1

 The Society for Critical Care Medicine also 

published an analysis of the issue, detailing the requirements for the 

practice to be carried out in an ethically sound manner.2 More recently, a report was published by a National Conference on 

Donation After Cardiac Death.3 This report, while supportive of 

the practice, addressed medical and ethical concerns that have 

 

* Some detail about this last concern: The patient who is designated a candidate 

for controlled DCD must not only be ventilator-dependent, but also likely to 

expire (become asystolic) within a short window of time after removal of the 

ventilator. The longer a patient removed from ventilation “lingers” before expiring, the more likely are the organs destined for transplantation to be damaged by 

warm ischemia. Institutional protocols specify the maximum time—generally 

between thirty minutes and two hours—that a patient removed from ventilation 

can linger before the organs are judged to be no longer viable, For a description 

of a technique used to estimate how long a particular patient will take to expire 

(and, thus, whether he or she can be a candidate for controlled DCD) see Lewis, 

et al., “Development,” 265-73. Concerns about the temptation to hasten death 

stem from the fact that hopes are raised and many expensive preparations are 

made on the expectation that death will occur quickly enough to allow procurement of transplantable organs. 
CHAPTER SIX| 83 

arisen as more institutions have started to procure organs in this 

way. 

The practice of controlled DCD has expanded rapidly in the last 

decade. In 1997, for example, there were seventy-eight cases of organ procurement from DCD donors; in 2007, there were 793 cases. 

In 1997, only six organ procurement organizations (OPOs) reported five or more controlled DCD procurements within their 

respective areas; in 2007, forty-one OPOs reported five or more 

controlled DCD procurements.4 This expansion has been aided by 

requirements from such national bodies as the United Network for 

Organ Sharing (UNOS) and the Joint Commission (formerly the 

Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations or 

JCAHO) that hospitals either institute controlled DCD protocols 

or, at the very least, address the practice in their statement of hospital policy.5

II. The Rush to Declare Death and the Problem of 

 Irreversibility 

Are those who donate organs under a controlled DCD protocol 

actually dead at the time of donation? It might seem somewhat surprising that this is a matter of controversy. After all, at the time of 

procurement, the donor’s heart has stopped and he or she is no 

longer breathing—either spontaneously or with ventilator support. 

Thus, the individual would seem to meet the first (more traditional) 

standard for determining death, that is, in the wording of the 

UDDA, “irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions.” 

The difficulty here stems from the crucial requirement that cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions be irreversible. In truth, 

there is reason to doubt that the cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions is irreversible, in the strict sense, in every case of 

controlled DCD. To call the loss of functions irreversible, it must 

be the case that the functions could not possibly return, either on 

their own or with external help. It is often possible, however, to 

cause circulation and respiration to return by administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). If this were attempted after the 
 84 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

“declaration of death” in controlled DCD, some patients would 

indeed regain—for a brief time, at least—a heartbeat and some capacity to breathe. If this were to occur, the patient would certainly 

not have been “resurrected,” but instead would have been (according to the cardiopulmonary standard of death) resuscitated, i.e., 

prevented from dying. Thus, the prior “declaration of death” would 

turn out to be questionable. The patient was, it could be argued, no 

more dead than a person who collapses in his or her home, loses 

heartbeat, and is resuscitated by paramedics who arrive moments 

later. 

It is important to note that this hypothetical scenario of resuscitating a patient who has been prepared for a controlled DCD 

procurement is merely a “thought experiment.” In reality, attempting to revive such a patient would be ruled out ethically because the 

practice of controlled DCD is premised on the assumption that the 

individual’s family has decided to allow withdrawal of life-sustaining 

interventions and would, therefore, want to abstain from any efforts 

to prevent the patient’s death (perhaps by consenting to a “do not 

resuscitate” order). For this reason, many have argued that the word 

“irreversible” in this context should be understood in a weaker 

sense than that spelled out above: It should be understood to mean 

“cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions under conditions 

in which those functions cannot return on their own and will not be 

restored by medical interventions.”* This looser sense of the term 

“irreversible” would seem to be a better fit in this context. 

The problem of ascertaining irreversibility in controlled DCD procurement is illustrated by a series of procurements and transplants 

 

* See, for instance, S. J. Youngner, R. M. Arnold, and M. A. DeVita, “When Is 

‘Dead’?” Hastings Cent Rep 29, no. 6 (1999): 14-21. For the purposes of the argument made here, it is assumed that two to five minutes of waiting time is enough 

to guarantee that the heart will not auto-resuscitate, i.e., that it will not begin to 

beat again on its own. There is insufficient scientific evidence to decide whether 

this assumption is always justified, as has been noted by many commentators, 

including the National Conference on Donation After Cardiac Death. See J. L. 

Bernat, et al., “Report of a National Conference on Donation after Cardiac 

Death,” Am J Transplant 6, no. 2 (2006): 282. 
CHAPTER SIX| 85 

carried out in Denver, Colorado, between 2004 and 2007.6 In each 

of the three procurements conducted under a controversial controlled DCD protocol, the heart was taken from a severely braininjured (but not “brain dead”) infant whose family had authorized 

removal of life-sustaining treatments. In one case, the procurement 

team waited three minutes after cardiac contractions had stopped 

before removing the heart from the donor. In the other two cases, 

they waited only seventy-five seconds—a shorter time than either 

the Society of Critical Care Medicine or the National Conference on 

Donation After Cardiac Death has recommended.7

 In each of the 

three cases, the hearts were transplanted and the recipients were still 

alive six months post-transplant. 

In analyzing these controversial cases, it is important to note that 

the fact that the recipients of these hearts were restored to a state of 

health does do not imply that the donors’ conditions were anything 

less than terminal and dire. To state this another way, the heart, itself, in each of these cases, was healthy enough to become an 

effective organ again in the body of the recipient, even though the 

overall condition of the body of the dying donor made it impossible 

for the donor’s health to be restored. 

The ethically troubling point is brought into sharp relief when we 

think of the moment of procurement. In each case, the heart of the 

infant had stopped. But was the infant actually dead? Because the 

heart tissue itself was not beyond the point of resuscitation once 

transferred to the recipient, it is clear that (as in some other controlled DCD cases) the cessation of cardiac function in these infants 

might have been reversed, albeit only for a short time, had there been a 

desire to do so. What prevented this from occurring was not a certainty that resuscitation attempts on the would-be donor would fail, 

but rather the decision made by the parents that no effort to resuscitate should be made. In short, the donor had only suffered 

“irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions,” if 

the term “irreversible” is taken in the weaker sense that Youngner 

and others have proposed. 

In any event, such debates about the proper meaning of “irreversible” do not address a more pressing ethical dilemma—the question 

of whether there is something wrong with rushing to make a deter-
 86 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

mination of death because of external pressures to procure organs 

as expeditiously as possible. There is reason to worry that this practice—if carried out on a wide scale—could make the donor’s death 

seem like a mere formality, with “patient dies” becoming simply 

another item to check off on a list of events required for a successful controlled DCD procurement. 

There might be something to learn about this ethical concern from 

anecdotes of physicians who are called upon to declare death in 

more routine hospital cases. It is said that experienced physicians 

will take their time in proceeding to the patient’s room to declare 

him or her dead. They may even deliberately linger to give the patient’s body ample time to complete the dying process. This is not 

done, we can imagine, because of a lack of confidence in the physician’s own judgment, but rather out of a sense that, in approaching 

the mysterious threshold between life and death, circumspection 

and caution are required. Rushing to make a declaration as quickly 

as possible is not viewed as respectful or appropriate. Unfortunately, such a deliberate demeanor is harder to maintain if the death 

is going to be “made use of” for the sake of other needy patients. 

Health professionals should help families understand that the process of mourning their loved ones is likely to be disrupted by a 

controlled DCD protocol and that this disruption is part of the sacrifice they are making in giving their loved ones’ organs to the sick. 

They should also help families understand the controversies about 

“irreversibility” that will always be a part of controlled DCD procurement. In addition to such steps that should be taken on a case 

by case basis, there ought to be a broader public discussion and debate about the propriety of controlled DCD as a standard practice 

in hospitals. With the spread of controlled DCD practice to more 

and more hospitals, it is clear that patients and their families will 

need to come to terms with this still novel aspect of end-of-life decision making. 

The integrity of the procurement system has just as much at stake in 

the context of controlled DCD procurements as it has in the context of procurements made after diagnoses of total brain failure. 

The clinical preference for acquiring the most viable organs possible 
CHAPTER SIX| 87 

cannot be allowed to undermine the principle that death should be 

declared only when there are sound medical reasons to do so. In 

light of this, more research should be done to investigate the question of auto-resuscitation (mentioned in the footnote on page 84). 

The assurance that the heart will not restart on its own within the 

relevant time frame, combined with an informed decision by the 

patient and family in favor of controlled DCD, may or may not be 

sufficient as a moral warrant for declaring death, but it is certainly necessary. Again, the principle here is clear: Death should be declared 

on the sole basis of the medical facts of the patient’s case. Since ruling out the possibility of auto-resuscitation is an essential step 

here—a point that has been emphasized by the IOM, the Society of 

Critical Care Medicine, and others—the prediction must be based 

on sound and publicly available evidence. 

\[
 88 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

ENDNOTES 

 

1

 Institute of Medicine, Non-Heart-Beating Organ Transplantation: Medical and Ethical 

Issues in Procurement (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997); and 

Institute of Medicine, Non-Heart-Beating Organ Transplantation: Practice and Protocols

(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000). 

2 Society of Critical Care Medicine, “Recommendations for Nonheartbeating 

Organ Donation,” Crit Care Med 29, no. 9 (2001): 1826-31. 

3 J. L. Bernat et al., “Report of a National Conference on Donation after Cardiac 

Death,” Am J Transplant 6, no. 2 (2006): 281-91. 

4 Institute of Medicine, Organ Donation: Opportunities for Action (Washington, D.C.: 

National Academy Press, 2006), 142-43; Kevin O’Connor, Senior Vice-President, 

New England Organ Bank, Personal Communication, September 12, 2008. 

5 For Joint Commission requirement, see Joint Commission, “2009 Accreditation 

Requirements: Accreditation Program: Critical Access Hospital,” (2008), Standard 

TS.01.01.01, Element 4. Available online at http://www.jointcommission.org/ 

NR/rdonlyres/8093C734-2317-4CDC-A0BF-BFB2DF0FBAD1/0/CAH_All 

Chapters.pdf (accessed Sept.12, 2008). For UNOS requirement, see Appendix B 

to UNOS Bylaws, available online at http://www.unos.org/policiesandBylaws2/ 

bylaws/UNOSByLaws/pdfs/bylaw_31.pdf (accessed Sept. 12, 2008). 

6 M. M. Boucek et al., “Pediatric Heart Transplantation after Declaration of Cardiocirculatory Death,” N Engl J Med 359, no. 7 (2008): 709-14. 

7 Society of Critical Care Medicine, “Recommendations for Nonheartbeating 

Organ Donation,” 1826-31; and J. L. Bernat et al., “Report of a National Conference on Donation after Cardiac Death,” 281-91. 
 

89

CHAPTER SEVEN

A SUMMARY OF THE COUNCIL’S 

DEBATE ON THE NEUROLOGICAL 

STANDARD FOR DETERMINING 

DEATH

s we noted in the Preface and in Chapter One, although 

this report addresses several controversies in the determination of death, including those arising in the context of 

controlled DCD, its primary focus is on the debates surrounding 

the neurological standard for the determination of death. In its deliberations, the President’s Council on Bioethics did, indeed, discuss 

controlled DCD and the traditional cardiopulmonary standard; it 

also voiced concerns about the problem of ensuring adequate endof-life care for the patient-donor. The Council’s principal concern, 

however, was with the question, Does a diagnosis of “whole brain death” 

mean that a human being is dead? In other words, does the neurological 

standard rest on a sound biological and philosophical basis? 

Among members of the President’s Council on Bioethics, the prevailing opinion is that the current neurological standard for 

declaring death, grounded in a careful diagnosis of total brain failure, is biologically and philosophically defensible. The ethical 

controversies explored in this report were first raised for the Council during its inquiry into organ transplantation: as most deceased 

organ donors have been declared dead on the basis of the neurological standard, questions about its validity have an obvious 

relevance for organ procurement. The Council concluded that, despite that connection, the two matters—determining death and 

procuring organs—should be addressed separately. More precisely, 

questions about the vital status of neurologically injured individuals 

A
 90 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

should be taken up prior to and apart from ethical issues in organ procurement from deceased donors. 

Two such questions must be posed and answered in light of certain 

clinical and pathophysiological facts and in light of the competing 

interpretations of those facts. First, are patients in the condition of total 

brain failure actually dead? And, second, can we answer the first question 

with sufficient certainty to ground a course of action that treats the body in that 

condition as the mortal remains of a human being? Most members of the 

Council have concluded that both questions can and should be answered in the affirmative. They reaffirm and support the wellestablished dictates of both law and practice in this area. 

Many members of the Council, however, judge that affirmative answers to these questions must be supported by arguments better 

than and different from those offered in the past. Until now, two 

facts about the diagnosis of total brain failure have been taken to 

provide fundamental support for a declaration of death: first, that 

the body of a patient with this diagnosis is no longer a “somatically 

integrated whole,” and, second, that the ability of the patient to 

maintain circulation will cease within a definite span of time. Both 

of these supposed facts have been persuasively called into question 

in recent years. 

Another argument, however, can be advanced to support the declaration of death following a diagnosis of total brain failure. It is one 

that many members of the Council find both sound and persuasive, 

for it appeals to long recognized facts about the condition of total 

brain failure, while doing so in a way that is both novel and philosophically convincing. According to this argument, the patient 

with total brain failure is no longer able to carry out the fundamental work of a living organism. Such a patient has lost—and lost 

irreversibly—a fundamental openness to the surrounding environment as well as the capacity and drive to act on this environment on 

his or her own behalf. As described in Chapter Four, a living organism engages in self-sustaining, need-driven activities critical to and 

constitutive of its commerce with the surrounding world. These 

activities are authentic signs of active and ongoing life. When these 
CHAPTER SEVEN| 91 

signs are absent, and these activities have ceased, then a judgment 

that the organism as a whole has died can be made with confidence. 

However, another view of the neurological standard was also voiced 

within the Council. According to this view, there can be no certainty about the vital status of patients with total brain failure; 

hence, the only prudent and defensible conclusion is that such patients are severely injured—but not yet dead—human beings. 

Therefore, only the traditional signs—irreversible cessation of heart 

and lung function—should be used to declare a patient dead. Also, 

according to this view, medical interventions for patients with total 

brain failure should be withdrawn only after they have been judged 

to be futile, in the sense of medically ineffective and non-beneficial to the 

patient and disproportionately burdensome. Such a judgment must be 

made on ethical grounds that consider the whole situation of the 

particular patient and not merely the biological facts of the patient’s 

condition.* Once such a judgment has been made, interventions can 

and should be withdrawn so that the natural course of the patient’s 

injury can reach its inevitable terminus. Only after this process has 

occurred and the patient’s heart has stopped beating, is there a 

morally valid warrant to proceed with such steps as preparation for 

burial or for organ procurement. 

With this report, the President’s Council on Bioethics seeks to shed 

light on a matter of ongoing ethical and philosophical controversy 

in contemporary medicine. Knowing when death has come, along 

 

* This understanding of medical futility has been developed in several papers by 

Edmund D. Pellegrino, the Council’s chairman. In these (as well as other) works, 

Pellegrino argues that clinical judgments of the futility of a given therapeutic intervention involve a “judicious balancing” of three factors: (1) the effectiveness of 

the given intervention, which is an objective determination that physicians alone 

can make; (2) the benefit of that intervention, which is an assessment that only 

patients and/or their surrogates can make; and (3) the burdens of the intervention 

(e.g., the cost, discomfort, pain, or inconvenience), which are jointly assessed by 

both physicians and patients and/or their surrogates. For example, see E. D. 

Pellegrino, “Decisions to Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment: A Moral Algorithm,” JAMA, 283, no. 8 (2000): 1065-7; and E. D. Pellegrino, “Futility in 

Medical Decisions: The Word and the Concept,” HEC Forum, 17, no. 4 (2005): 

308-18. 
 92 |CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

with what can and should be done before and after it has arrived, 

has always been a problem for humankind, to one degree or another. But the nature and significance of the problem have changed 

over time, especially in the wake of technological advances that enable us to sustain life, or perhaps just the appearance of it, 

indefinitely. Given these changes and others that are yet to come, 

the Council believes that it is necessary and desirable to re-examine 

our ideas and practices concerning the human experience of death 

in light of new evidence and novel arguments. Undertaken in good 

faith, such a re-examination is a responsibility incumbent upon all 

who wish to keep human dignity in focus, especially in the sometimes disorienting context of contemporary medicine. 

\[
 

93

PERSONAL STATEMENTS 
 
95

PERSONAL STATEMENT OF 

ALFONSO GÓMEZ-LOBO, DR. PHIL. 

he purpose of this statement is to present my personal views 

on three different issues that arise within the debate addressed in the present report. 

Conceptual Issues 

Since the publication of the reports by the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee (1968) and by the President’s Commission (1981), it has 

become commonplace to claim that “the definition of death” has 

been revised, and that, accordingly, the definition “has changed” or 

“has evolved.” It is thus suggested that the medical profession now 

has an understanding of death that is different from the one it had a 

few decades ago. Moreover, the “new definition,” the one that “defines” death as “whole brain death,” is the one that has been 

enshrined in the law. 

In my view, this use of the philosophical term “definition” is inaccurate and all too often seriously misleading. 

To define a term is to provide, in other words, an account of its 

meaning. Thus, if we define “triangle” as “a plane figure with three 

straight sides” and the definition is changed to “a plane figure with 

four straight sides,” then the term “triangle” will no longer single 

out triangles, but squares. In fact, a change in definition usually entails a change in reference. Hence, if the definition of “death” 

changes, we will not be referring to the same natural phenomenon 

we had been trying to identify before the semantic change took 

place. 

T
96 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

If the contemporary dispute about death is to be intelligible, the 

definition of “death” must remain stable. 

A long tradition in philosophy with many contemporary defenders 

points out that there are two kinds of definitions: ordinary language 

definitions and specialized language definitions. Most people understand “water” to mean, roughly, “a transparent liquid that flows 

from the kitchen or bathroom faucet, and is safe to drink.” However, people with some knowledge of chemistry define it as “a 

liquid whose basic molecule is composed of two atoms of hydrogen 

and one of oxygen.” 

Likewise, it is reasonable to expect that there will be two kinds of 

definition for the term “death.” First, “death” as ordinarily understood means “the irreversible cessation of life” and applies to all 

things that have been alive. There is no separate definition that applies, say, only to humans, to the exclusion of animals or plants. 

Nor can life irreversibly cease more than once. Hence, there is only 

one death for each organism. Death, furthermore, is a natural, biological event with social consequences, not a moral, legal, or 

political decision on the part of those observing it. Death itself 

should not be confused with the ruling that death has occurred. 

The definition of “death” as “the irreversible cessation of life” is a 

definition by exclusion. It is a derivative account that is parasitic on 

the more primitive notion of life. A second, specialized language 

definition of “death” would thus have to specify, in the language of 

biology, the essential properties of life. Although progress has been 

made in the understanding of DNA and other driving factors of 

life, we are far from being able to give an essential definition of 

“life” analogous to the H2O definition of “water.” We must resort 

instead to the observable signs of life. These allow us to state 

whether an organism is alive or dead. If a body is able to process 

nutrition, eliminate waste, and exhibit proportional growth, homeostasis, etc., and, moreover, it engages in these functions in an 

integrated manner, we shall correctly deem it to be alive. If it fails to 

do this, and starts to decompose and disintegrate, we will rightly 

judge it to be dead. 
PERSONAL STATEMENTS | 97 

In judging as we have just described, we have adopted observable 

criteria for life. “Criteria” is the plural of “criterion,” a word whose 

Greek roots suggest the idea of separation or distinction. A good 

example of a criterion is a sieve that separates liquids from solids. A 

criterion is thus chosen, and is sometimes even man-made. We decide what we will use as a criterion, that is, as an instrument for 

setting apart the living from the dead. An alternative, synonymous 

expression commonly used to refer to criteria is the word “standards.” 

Thus, the appeal to the traditional cardiorespiratory criterion or 

standard is a choice to determine death by verifying the irreversible 

cessation of heartbeat and breathing. To choose to determine death 

by total brain failure does not change the definition of death. It is a 

decision to use a different standard to determine death. 

A standard is chosen, but the choice can be wrong. It depends on 

what the function of the standard is expected to be. If the goal is to 

separate liquids from sand, a sieve with large holes will be the 

wrong choice. Likewise, if a criterion to determine death is chosen 

that leads us to declare dead certain individuals who continue to 

display the observable signs of life, then that standard will have 

been wrongly chosen. 

The “higher brain death” criterion or standard for death seems to 

be a wrong choice for several reasons: it turns on an unpersuasive 

distinction between the death of plants or animals, and the death of 

a person. Moreover, it requires us to assume that we undergo two 

deaths: the death of the mind and the death of the body (although 

for most people they would be simultaneous events). Furthermore, 

it leaves behind not a cadaver, but an ostensibly living body. 

The choice of a specific criterion or standard is insufficient, by itself, to determine whether someone is dead or alive. A trained, 

experienced eye must observe whether the conditions specified in 

the formulation of the standard are or are not objectively present in 

a patient. To satisfy this diagnostic need, tests are designed to operate under each of the different criteria. To place a stethoscope on 

the chest of a patient in order to verify whether his or her heart has 
98 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

stopped beating is to conduct a test under the cardiorespiratory 

standard. To perform an EEG is to conduct one of the tests to establish total brain failure. 

Tests can be inaccurate and lead to unclear results, that is, to the 

conclusion that we are uncertain whether someone is dead or alive.1

The inaccuracy of tests can also lead to false results, such as declaring dead someone who later recovers. The epistemic question of 

whether we can be certain that someone is dead or alive leads to 

further refinement of our tests, and may play a crucial role in reaching a moral judgment, but it should not be confused with the 

physiological question—whether the brain is the organ responsible 

for the integrated functioning of the organism, so that total brain 

failure is the same as the irreversible cessation of the life of a given 

organism. 

Physiological Issues

During the discussion of the present report, evidence was offered 

that seems to show that survival after total brain failure is not only 

possible, but has been documented in approximately 175 cases. This 

would entail “that the body’s integrative unity derives from mutual 

interaction among its parts, not from a top-down imposition of one 

‘critical organ’ upon an otherwise mere bag of organs and tissues.”2 

In order to disprove this last finding, one (or both) of the following 

two conditions would have to be met: 

First, that the “brain dead” individuals who continue to live are not 

really “brain dead.” That is, they would all have to be cases of misdiagnosis of total and irreversible brain failure. Given the evidence 

adduced (especially the results of a brain autopsy of a patient who 

survived twenty years after the diagnosis of total brain failure due to 

bacterial meningitis),3

 it seems to me that there are credible reasons 

to think that the patients were indeed “brain dead.” 

And second, that the functions exhibited by the patients are not 

indicative of the integrated functioning of an organism. In other 

words, one would have to argue that all observed biological proc-
PERSONAL STATEMENTS | 99 

esses were only lingering activations of some subsystems of the 

body: the body as a whole would not be alive because of its lack of 

holistic properties. This last claim is contradicted by the fact that, 

for example, proportional growth and, more generally, homeostasis, 

and perhaps other observable phenomena, cannot be explained as 

the isolated functioning of a part of the organism. I think it is reasonable to think that these are holistic properties that involve the 

organism as a whole. 

On the basis of the aforementioned findings, I am inclined to hold 

that the choice of whole brain failure as a standard for death is a 

questionable choice, whether it is based on the physiological claim 

that the brain is the integrative organ for the whole organism or on 

the general biological claim that the spontaneous drive to breathe, 

which is dependent on the brain, is necessary for life. The existence 

of conscious, yet apneic, patients allows us to dispose of the latter 

claim. Since some apneic individuals are alive, it follows that it appears to be false that all individuals who lack the drive to breathe 

spontaneously are dead. 

With regard to the role of the brain, there is a further physiological 

consideration to be taken into account. During the early embryonic 

stages of an organism, there is certainly integrated functioning of 

subsystems, and this happens before the brain is formed. This suggests that the brain is not the organ that is responsible for the 

integrated functioning of the organism of which it is a part, but 

rather that it is itself a product of a prior dynamism of the integrated whole. 

From the information presented to me, I am provisionally inclined 

to side with what in the report is called Position One. I am aware of 

its minority status, and that it could be overthrown if new evidence 

shows that either alleged “whole brain dead” patients have been 

misdiagnosed or that the apparent survival of those patients is only 

a lingering preservation of uncoordinated physiological subsystems. 

Ethical Issues 

In my view, the ethical cornerstone of vital organ transplantation is 
100 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

the dead donor rule: no one should be intentionally killed so that 

his or her organs may benefit someone else. To violate this rule is 

to go against the goals of medicine and to violate a basic norm of 

human interaction. 

If a certain standard or criterion, no matter how widely accepted, 

entails the risk of violating the dead donor rule, then it should be 

revised in light of the empirical evidence. If it turns out that the current neurological standard allows, in certain cases, the extraction of 

organs from individuals who are still alive, then the morally right 

thing to do would be to abandon it and adopt a safer criterion. 

\[
PERSONAL STATEMENTS | 101 

ENDNOTES 

 

1 K. G. Karakatsanis. “‘Brain Death’: Should It Be Reconsidered?” Spinal Cord 46, 

no. 6 (2008): 396-401. 

2 D. A. Shewmon. “Chronic ‘Brain Death’: Meta-Analysis and Conceptual Consequences.” Neurology 51, no. 6 (1998): 1538-45. 

3 S. Repertinger, W. P. Fitzgibbons, M. F. Omojola, and R. A. Brumback. “Long 

Survival Following Bacterial Meningitis-Associated Brain Destruction.” J Child 

Neurol 21, no. 7 (2006): 591-5 
 
103

PERSONAL STATEMENT OF 

GILBERT C. MEILAENDER, PH.D. 

 write to underscore a few matters that are, I think, important 

aspects of this white paper’s discussion of controversies in the 

determination of death. 

(1) The Council rejects the view that the criteria for determining 

death should be shaped or determined by our need and desire for 

transplantable organs. We should not create “legal fictions” or “social agreements” whose aim is less an accurate determination of 

death than a ready supply of organs. Whatever else human beings 

may be, they are living bodies, and their death is a biological reality 

that we need to mark as accurately as we are able. 

(2) This does not mean, however, that the determination of death is 

a straightforwardly empirical matter. In order to know when a biological organism—and, in particular, a complicated one such as a 

human being—has died, we need as much philosophical clarity as 

we can manage about what makes a human being a living whole. 

Hence, this document does more than just consider medical and 

biological facts; it also develops a theory of what makes an organism a living organism. 

(3) This theory is, I believe, the most significant contribution of the 

white paper. For decades now the determination of death in many 

cases—and especially in cases where organs have then been taken 

for transplant—has been made on the basis of a neurological standard (commonly referred to as “brain death,” but in this document 

called “total brain failure”). The rationale offered in support of that 

standard has been that a body which has suffered irreversible loss 

of all brain activity (which has lost, so to speak, its “executive” 

power) can no longer function as an integrated whole and hence is 

I
104 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

no longer a living whole. This rationale was never entirely persuasive and has become even less so over time. The Council offers 

here (in Position Two of Chapter Four) what is, in my view, a more 

adequate rationale for continued use of a neurological standard in 

the determination of death: a philosophical rationale that seeks to 

characterize the fundamental work of self-preservation which any 

living organism must carry out if it is to remain alive. 

(4) Chapter Four develops this rationale with admirable succinctness and clarity, and there is no need for me to repeat it. I do, 

however, want to emphasize that the capacities which characterize 

the work by which an organism sustains itself (openness to the surrounding environment, ability to act upon that environment, and 

inner experience of need) may be present even when a human being 

is no longer conscious of self or of the surrounding world. Consciousness is a prominent mode of a living human being’s openness 

to the world, but not the only mode. Its presence is sufficient to 

assure us that a human being still lives. But even its permanent absence is not sufficient evidence of death, for a human being may 

have permanently lost (so far as we can tell) all capacity for consciousness while continuing to be a living organism in the terms 

Position Two sets forth. A permanently unconscious human being 

who breathes spontaneously manifests openness to the surrounding 

environment in its need for oxygen, acts upon that environment by 

breathing to take in the oxygen it needs, and manifests an inner 

drive to breathe. Such a person is surely severely disabled, but is not 

dead. 

(5) A drive to breathe, moved by one’s own inner impulse, is—as 

Position Two notes—not the same as “being ventilated.” A coordinated exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide still takes place in a 

body whose work of breathing has been replaced by mechanical 

ventilation, but this exchange “is not the achievement of the organism or a sign of its vitality.” Nevertheless, the bodies of human 

beings who have suffered total brain failure (and, hence, are dead 

according to the rationale provided by Position Two) may, if ventilated, still exhibit some characteristics that suggest continued life. 

This fact has led some to reject not only the rationale currently used 

to justify a neurological standard for death (i.e., loss of bodily inte-
PERSONAL STATEMENTS | 105 

gration), but also the notion that death can be determined on the 

basis of neurological injury, apart from the familiar signs of stopped 

heartbeat and circulation. These critics hold that death must be determined as it was before mechanical ventilators and the concept of 

“brain death” came upon the scene—namely by observing irreversible loss of heart and lung activity (and this view is developed in 

Position One of Chapter Four). Were this critique accepted, it 

would, of course, create complications for organ transplantation, 

since there would no longer be “brain dead” but still ventilated “cadavers” from whom organs could be taken. These complications 

alone, however, cannot be reason to reject such a view. 

(6) Although I take this critique seriously, it has not persuaded me 

that we must abandon a (suitably articulated) neurological standard 

for determining death. The critics who adopt Position One are still 

overly tied to the language of somatic integration. That is not unimportant, of course, but it does not get to the heart of what makes an 

organism living. So, for example, there is a difference between the 

drive of hunger, which turns an organism toward its environment in 

search of the means of its self-preservation, and the transfer of nutrients in a body—and a difference between the drive to breathe 

and the exchange of gases in a body. In each case the former is the 

mark of a living being, the latter something more like a mechanical 

process that does not indicate the being’s own attempt to engage its 

world. Hence, my own view is that we have good reason to adopt 

the rationale developed in Position Two, a rationale that justifies us 

in using a neurological standard to determine death. I say this not 

because I think organ transplantation unproblematic; I do not. I say 

it only because it seems to me an accurate account of what we mean 

when we distinguish between the living and the dead. 

\[
 
107

PERSONAL STATEMENT OF 

EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO, M.D.

he Chairman’s first obligation concerning any Council report is to ensure that it fairly and accurately reflects the 

opinions of the Council members and that the evidence and 

research supporting those opinions is complete and reliably presented. Having participated personally in the preparation of this 

white paper, I believe it satisfies those conditions. 

Like any Council member, the Chairman is free to express his personal views on the debated issues. To that end, I offer my own 

interpretations of some of the evidence and arguments employed in 

the white paper. I do so in the spirit of “good faith” urged in the 

white paper’s closing exhortation “...to re-examine the human experience of death in light of new evidence and novel argument.” 

 

After extended deliberation, the Council made these recommendations: (1) to reaffirm the ethical propriety of the “dead donor rule” 

(DDR); (2) to reaffirm the ethical acceptability of the neurological 

standard (total brain failure, including the brain stem) as well as the 

cardiopulmonary standard (irreversible cessation of both cardiac 

and respiratory functions); and (3) to reject the use of patients in 

permanent vegetative states as organ donors. 

I am in general agreement with these recommendations, but I differ 

with some of the arguments advanced for them. This contribution 

focuses on four issues: (1) the matter of definitions, (2) the significance of the DDR, (3) the relative merits of the neurological and 

cardiopulmonary standards, and (4) the places of prudential reasoning and futility in remedying some of the problems with both 

standards. 

T
108 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

The Matter of “Definition”

The so-called “definitions” of death fall into two categories: the 

philosophical and the empirical. The first seek a conceptual understanding of the essential differences between life and death. The 

second seek to determine the clinical signs, tests, or criteria which 

separate life and death most accurately. Ideally, a full definition 

would link the concept of life (or death) with its clinical manifestations as closely as possible. So far, this linkage has been the subject 

of controversy because of its pivotal role in ethically justifying the 

removal of vital organs from donors in transplantation protocols. 

Philosophical “Definitions” 

My colleague, Professor Gómez-Lobo, in his personal commentary, 

outlines the requirements for a philosophically valid definition of 

death and the failure of present attempts at definition to satisfy 

those requirements. I agree with Professor Gómez-Lobo’s analysis. 

Here, I need only remind us about the difficulties inherent in all 

definitions. As Aristotle would have it: “Clearly, then, a definition is 

the easiest of all things to demolish, while to establish one is the 

hardest.”1 As the debates in this white paper attest, this is especially 

true for so-called definitions of death and life. Each is defined in 

terms of the absence of the other. Rather than being defined conceptually, each is identified with a set of empirically observable 

criteria. 

Shortly after the proposal of the Harvard criteria for total brain 

death was advanced, the philosopher Hans Jonas described the central philosophical difficulty in this way: 

Reality of certain kinds—of which the life-death spectrum 

is perhaps only one—may be imprecise in itself, or the 

knowledge obtainable of it may be. To acknowledge such 

a state of affairs is more adequate to it than a precise definition which does violence to it. I am challenging the 

undue precision of a definition and its application to an 

imprecise field.2
PERSONAL STATEMENTS |109 

On Jonas’s view, the intrinsic connection between the empirical realities of biological death and its conceptual formulation is too weak 

to support the moral weight required to justify removal of vital organs. Jonas recognizes the logical fact that states of imprecision in 

our perception of reality cannot give rise to precision in our concept of reality. Similarly, states of doubt cannot give rise to 

certitude. 

Aristotle issues the same kind of warning when making ethical 

judgments: 

Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness 

as the subject matter admits of, for precision is not to be 

sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the 

products of the crafts.3

 

This warning is especially relevant for any attempt to arrive at moral 

judgments in the presence of reasonable doubt about the clinical 

criteria for death. 

These same criticisms apply to proposed philosophical definitions 

of death in the absence of indisputable objective signs of death. 

Four such attempts to define death in philosophical terms are considered, i.e., loss of integrative functioning of the whole organism, 

failure to engage the environment spontaneously by respiration, loss 

of consciousness and sentiency, and the separation of some vital 

principle from the body. 

Integrative Functions: Loss of somatic integration of the organism as a 

whole as a result of brain death was proposed nearly thirty years ago 

by the then-President’s Commission.4

 In recent years, this criterion 

has been cast into doubt by a long series of clinical observations. A 

list, from the work of neurologist Alan Shewmon, is presented in 

Chapter Four of the white paper.5 Strenuously debated in the past, 

the criterion of somatic integration enjoys waning support today.6

Engagement with the Environment: The Council’s white paper proffers a 

more attractive, philosophical argument, i.e., loss of the capacity by 

the apneic patient for active spontaneous engagement with the envi-
110 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

ronment through the function of breathing. The patient lacking this 

capacity is said to be “dead,” even if respiratory function and cell 

metabolism are sustained by mechanical ventilation because they are 

not, then, the result of “spontaneous” respiration. However, other 

patients kept alive “artificially”—by pacemakers, defibrillators, 

vasopressors, ventricular assist devices, artificial nutrition and hydration, etc.—are not, by that fact alone, considered to be “dead.” 

Patients with respiratory paralysis due to poliomyelitis or cervical 

spine trans-section have lived with the assistance of respirators for 

many years. Few would embalm or bury these supposed “living cadavers” before their hearts had stopped irreversibly. 

Loss of Sentience and Mental Capacity: Some have proposed a philosophical definition of death based in total loss of conscious mental 

capacity. Mental capacity, it is argued, is a fundamental capability 

specific to human life. If it is completely lost, it is argued, the subject is no longer entitled to the moral status of a member of the 

natural kind we call “human.” “A human body that can only function biologically without inward mental life does not sustain a moral 

agent.”7 This argument, again, identifies death of the organism with 

death of one organ —the brain. The sufficiency of the proposed 

criteria for “death” of the brain is, however, precisely what is currently being debated. 

Separation of Soul and Body: Finally, the metaphysical definition of 

death as separation of the body from its vital principle is still held as 

the authoritative definition by many worldwide. Plato put it most 

bluntly: “Death in my opinion is nothing else but the separation 

from each other of two things, soul and body.”8 No precise congruence of this concept with any observable set of clinical facts has 

ever been agreed upon. 

In the end, attempts at philosophical definitions lack the empirical 

precision required for a definition, as Jonas has pointed out. Until 

an empirically sound criterion for death is found, the lack of a conjunction between concept and reality remains a problem. Most such 

attempts now end in some form of circular reasoning—defining 

death in terms of life and life in terms of death without a true 

“definition” of one or the other. Plato recognized the circular rea-
PERSONAL STATEMENTS |111 

soning in this way: “....about life and death, do you not admit that 

death is the opposite of life?”9 

Each philosophical definition builds on clinical criteria that are still 

debated. While necessary, these criteria are not sufficient per se to define 

death. The search must continue for better physiological criteria if 

there is to be satisfactory closure of the gap between philosophical 

concepts and clinical reality. 

The only indisputable signs of death are those we have known since 

antiquity, i.e., loss of sentience, heartbeat, and breathing; mottling 

and coldness of the skin; muscular rigidity; and eventual putrefaction as the result of generalized autolysis∗

 of body cells.10 There is 

no biomarker to tell us when this trajectory begins. Instead, we 

make judgments that the process of autolysis is underway with sufficient certainty to embalm, dissect, cremate, mourn, and bury the 

body long before signs of putrefaction are evident. 

The possibilities of organ transplantation have forced us to shorten 

the time for observation and deliberation in the interests of preserving the vitality of organs to be transplanted. In place of a prudent 

waiting period, we must declare a donor to be dead as soon as possible, by one or the other of two standards, both of which are 

subject to increasing uncertainty about their validity. Most of this 

debate is covered extensively in the Council’s forthcoming report 

on organ transplantation. Allusion here will be made only to the 

comparative reliability of the neurological and the cardiopulmonary 

standards. 

Preserving the “Dead Donor Rule” 

The DDR has been the anchor for the moral and social acceptability of organ transplantation protocols from their earliest days. This 

rule requires assurance of the death of the donor as the first step in 

 

∗

 “The destruction of cells of the body by the action of their own enzymes.” 

OED.
112 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

any ethically legitimate transplantation protocol (other than those 

involving healthy, living donors). In addition, the death of the patient must not be hastened, nor end of life care compromised in any 

way, to accommodate transplantation protocols. No protocol can 

claim moral sanction without fidelity to this rule. 

Today, as serious doubts about the reliability of brain death criteria 

and the neurological standard persist, some bioethicists are proposing modification or even abolition of the DDR. Robert Truog and 

Franklin Miller hold that since both the brain death and cardiac 

death criteria have “...never been fully convincing,” the only ethically valid precondition for transplantation is the consent of the 

donor or his or her surrogates prior to the withdrawal of life support.11 Robert Veatch also doubts the reliability of both the 

neurological and the cardiopulmonary standards. He proposes that 

donors or families should be allowed to choose the definition of 

death that fits best with their personal values.12

Recently, the DDR has been seriously compromised in three protocols involving infants in which the recommended time after the 

cessation of the heartbeat was reduced from the minimum recommended time of two- to five-minutes to seventy-five seconds.13 This 

is an unacceptably dangerous assault on the DDR. The uncertainties 

of death determination in infants are notoriously formidable. Extrapolations based on these cases are exceedingly perilous and 

border on the irresponsible. 

Also recently, Miller and Truog14 have expanded their attack on the 

DDR, calling for its abolition and replacement by the autonomous 

consent of the donor or his or her surrogate. Their line of reasoning 

is a utilitarian device: They abolish the DDR, replace it with 

autonomous choice, and declare that such a move makes removal 

of vital organs from the donor ethically defensible. Indeed, on their 

view, this revision is ethically laudable because it removes the “veneer” hiding the fact that both the neurological and 

cardiopulmonary standards result in killing donors. They reject using the word “killing” as counterproductive, although they admit it 

could be called killing. Their attempt to justify the taking of vital 

organs from living donors will undoubtedly be seriously debated. 
PERSONAL STATEMENTS |113 

Relaxation of the DDR is a morally unacceptable and logically specious way to deal with the uncertainties of the criteria for death of 

the donor. It leaves the choice of the criteria for death to individual 

preference, amounting to eventual abolition of any stable criteria for 

death. Some additional dangers are: the use of assisted suicide to 

facilitate organ donation; legitimizing the use of patients in permanent vegetative states or of “less-than-perfect” infants as donors. It 

exposes “undeclared” patients to “presumed” consent to donation. 

Given the expanding cultural and ethical pluralism of the U.S. about 

all aspects of life and death, eliminating the DDR promises a future 

of moral and legal chaos. Above all, it exposes the vulnerable or 

gullible patient to an increased danger of exploitation for the benefit 

of others. 

The need for organs, the desire to prolong life, and the potential 

“good” to be done are forces difficult to control when death can be 

defined on one’s own—or one’s guardian’s—terms. As experience 

has repeatedly shown, personal autonomy without moral constraint 

ends in divisive moral atomism. As difficult as the search for a 

common definition of death may be, that difficulty cannot justify 

abandoning the effort to establish a common definition or manipulating the DDR to meet the need for more organs. 

Which Standard Should Be Preferred—the Neurological or the 

Cardiopulmonary? 

Since the 1970s, the dominant criteria for death of the donor have 

been those of the neurological standard (a heart-beating donor). In 

recent years, there has been a resurgent interest in the cardiopulmonary standard (a non-heart-beating donor) under the auspices of 

protocols known as “controlled donation after cardiac death,” protocols that have recently received approval of prestigious medical 

bodies in the United States and Canada.15 The Council’s opinion is 

that both the neurological and the cardiopulmonary standards are 

ethically acceptable, but some Council members have expressed 

reservations about the use of the cardiopulmonary standard in 

“controlled donation after cardiac death protocols.” 
114 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

In my view, the reasons that favor the neurological standard are not 

compelling. The clinical tests and signs that support it are as subject 

to doubt as those of the cardiopulmonary standard. The philosophical arguments for both suffer from the same conceptual and 

empirical difficulties already identified and examined. 

Some favor the neurological standard over the cardiopulmonary 

standard because of the possibility of auto-resuscitation with the 

latter. Auto-resuscitation has occurred in rare instances, but not in 

controlled non-heart-beating protocols if the time after withdrawal 

of respirator support was five minutes or more.16 

Others oppose the cardiopulmonary standard because of doubts 

about possible lack of irreversibility of cardiac function. How, they 

ask, can a supposedly “dead” heart be transplanted from a “dead” 

donor and “revived” to function in a recipient?17 But the fact is that 

the donated heart is transplanted from a physiological environment 

that could not support the metabolism of myocardial cells to a 

physiological environment suitable to cell metabolism. The heart 

from a patient declared dead by the cardiopulmonary standard can 

beat when transplanted because autolysis occurs at different rates in 

different organs. An organ removed when cellular autolysis has not 

yet advanced to a point that would cause organ failure can function 

when placed in a physiologically normal, natural or artificial environment that meets its metabolic needs. 

Furthermore, if valid, the same argument would apply to other organs as well. Kidneys, intestines, lungs, etc., are taken from donors 

pronounced “dead” by both the neurological and cardiopulmonary 

standards. These organs are taken from a supposedly “dead” donor 

in full expectation that they will function in a recipient. 

Taking everything into account, I believe there is as much—or 

more—moral assurance of death of the donor with the cardiopulmonary as with the neurological standard. In fact, with the 

cardiopulmonary standard, there is a higher degree of certainty of 

death than there is with a heart-beating donor, because heart, lung, 

and brain have all ceased functioning. 
PERSONAL STATEMENTS |115 

Can Transplantation Be Ethically Legitimated?

Do the considerable doubts about both the neurological and cardiopulmonary standards make organ transplantation ethically 

indefensible? One way to examine this question is as a problem of 

prudential or practical reason—that is, all things considered, how 

can we act ethically in the face of relative clinical doubt? This is the 

context within which many important clinical decisions must be 

made in modern medicine and have always been made in medicine’s 

past. 

Many, if not most, serious clinical decisions must be made in a matrix of concrete, contingent, and uncertain realities in the present 

and the future. This is why medicine has rightly been called by one 

of its wisest practitioners “...a science of uncertainty and an art of 

probability.”18 The moral danger of removing vital organs from a 

donor whose death is not reasonably certain is significant. However, 

if absolute certainty is not possible, a sufficient degree of moral certainty to warrant such an action may be attainable if the 

requirements for prudent decision-making are satisfied. 

Prudence in both the ethical and clinical aspects of bedside decisions is an indispensable practical virtue for the good clinician. It is 

the capability to choose, in any difficult decision, the means that will 

most closely fit the good intent of the clinical act. Prudence serves 

the first rule of all ethics, to do good and to avoid evil, even in the 

most difficult circumstances. Prudence activates two principles of 

moral action in the face of doubt: the precautionary principle (i.e., 

when in doubt, act to avoid the gravest danger) and the principle of 

proportionality (i.e., properly balance the benefits and the burdens 

of treatment). Prudential reasoning deserves closer attention than it 

has received in the current debate about the determination of death. 

Relative moral certitude does not substitute for scientific certitude. 

But, properly weighed, it can give a legitimate warrant for necessary 

action in the face of unavoidable uncertainty. This is the situation 

within which ordinary decisions in daily life are made. Clinical prudence seeks to avoid both the error of inaction, which would 

deprive the recipient of a needed transplant, and the error of pre-
116 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

mature action, which would deprive the donor of life. Fidelity to 

beneficence and the prudential approach to decisions aim to avoid 

both the paralysis of inaction and the harmful use of ineffective 

medical treatments. Prudence must not be confused with selfprotective cowardice. It is the decision to act for a good end in the 

morally optimal way despite persistent uncertainty about the outcome. 

Futility in the Decision Process 

The moral quality of a non-beating heart donation can be improved 

as can the degree of compliance with the DDR by use of the principle of futility. When considering the moral quality of a decision to 

initiate a donation protocol, the relevance of clinical futility deserves 

attention. Futility is that state in the history of a patient’s disease 

when he or she is beyond medical rescue, i.e., beyond the powers of 

medical technology to help. Clinical futility is present when any 

medical intervention is: (1) ineffective, i.e., unable to change the natural history of a disease or its trajectory towards death; (2) nonbeneficial, i.e., unable to satisfy any good or value perceived by the 

patient or his or her surrogate; and (3) disproportionately burdensome to 

the patient, physically, psychologically, or financially.19 Balancing the 

relationship among those three criteria is at the heart of prudent, 

precautionary, and proportionate action. This formulation accommodates the physician’s expertise with respect to effectiveness and 

the patient’s values with respect to benefits, and it results in shared 

decision-making regarding the proportionality of benefits and burdens. 

Care of the patient is never futile. Provision of comfort, pain relief, 

easing of suffering, and palliative care are always morally mandatory. They are the indispensable and absolute requirements for 

morally valid care at the end of life for every patient. However, under the conditions of ethically legitimate futility, medical 

interventions may be discontinued. Indeed, if continued, clinically 

futile medical treatment can convert beneficence into maleficence. 

Valid use of the principle of futility is not medical abandonment. It 

does include patient participation as well. 
PERSONAL STATEMENTS |117 

When the criteria for clinical futility are properly met and attested to 

by the attending physician together with the family, the patient’s 

life-support can ethically be removed. Following removal of lifesupport and cessation of both respiration and cardiac function, initiation of a “controlled donation after cardiac death” (controlled 

DCD) protocol may begin. 

Ethically sensitive controlled DCD recovery protocols are being 

developed and used by institutions providing transplant services. 

My purpose is not to compare and contrast those protocols or their 

comparative ethical acceptability. Some of the ethical constraints by 

which any transplant protocol may be judged, however, include the 

following: both the prospective donor and the prospective recipient 

must be treated as patients in their own right—each with his or her 

own attending physician whose major concern is the patient’s needs 

and not the needs of the protocol; the donor’s physician must, together with the family, determine whether further treatment would 

be futile; quality of life can be a valid factor only if expressed by the 

patient or the patient’s morally valid surrogate; care and relief of 

pain and suffering are never futile, nor is palliative care. The usual 

ethical requirements for morally and legally valid consent must be 

observed; the declaration of death must be neither premature nor 

overdue. 

The prospective donor and the prospective recipient must therefore 

be treated in accord with the principle of beneficence. If we grant, 

as I do, that Jonas’s judgment about the imprecision of decisions at 

the life-death interface is cogent, then his advice to “lean” in the 

direction of protecting life is ethically sound and grounded in a valid 

precautionary principle. Within these ethical constraints, the dignity 

of the donor and recipient, and the benefits of organ transplantation, can be protected. The act of organ donation could retain its 

moral credibility without compromising care of the donor. 

Remaining Ethical Uncertainties 

Clinical and ethical uncertainties remain with both brain death and 

controlled DCD protocols. When the respirator is removed, there is 

the possibility that electrical activity of the myocardium may return 
118 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

after the prescribed five minute waiting period. Return of electrical 

activity is not synonymous with effective mechanical pumping. 

Nevertheless, some may feel constrained to consider cardiopulmonary resuscitation. This possibility can be anticipated by a prior, 

valid “do not resuscitate” (DNR) order. This order is invoked only 

when medical treatment is truly futile, death is foreseeable within a 

short period, and further cardiopulmonary resuscitation can itself be 

expected to meet the criteria of futility. A valid DNR order implies 

that death is to be allowed to occur naturally as the final event of an 

illness whose inevitable natural clinical trajectory is death within a 

foreseeable interval. Under these circumstances, cardiopulmonary 

resuscitation would not be in the patient’s interest. 

The danger of hastening the decision to discontinue treatment is 

present with both the neurological and the cardiopulmonary standards for determination of death.∗

 In both, the only safeguard 

against such a decision is the ethical fidelity of physicians and families to the patient’s welfare. The decision not to resuscitate must be 

based on the futility of all technical medical procedures, not the 

need, however great, for a transplantable organ by a particular patient. 

Not to be ignored are the social costs of shifting the criteria for organ procurement from brain death to the cardiopulmonary 

standard. Such a move places the good of the dying potential donor 

over that of a dying recipient in need of a life-saving organ. This 

change may result in delays, greater procedural complexity, loss of 

vitality of the more sensitive organs, and, perhaps, fewer organs 

 

∗

 One glaring example is a $1.5 million grant over three years to New York City 

from the federal Health Resources and Services Administration to study the use 

of a special ambulance fully equipped for removal of organs for transplantation. 

This vehicle would be rushed to the site of traumatic incidents, ready to remove 

organs as soon as the donor’s death was declared. (Cara Buckley, “City to Explore a Way to Add Organs” (New York Times June 1, 2008. Available at http:// 

www.nytimes.com/2008/06/01/nyregion/01organ.html. Accessed December 10, 

2008). 
PERSONAL STATEMENTS |119 

available for transplantation. Here, the vexed issue of social versus 

individual good arises and sharp differences of opinion between 

and among interested parties seem unavoidable. 

I have chosen to give priority to the welfare of the patient before he 

or she becomes a donor on grounds that harm must not be done 

even if good comes from it. No person should be sacrificed as a 

means for the good of another. This is a moral precept that recognizes the intrinsic worth of every human being. 

The significant controversies and doubts about when the donor is 

dead cannot justify abandonment of the DDR. Rather, it should 

stimulate research into how to extend the viability of potentially 

transplantable organs. It might also accelerate the process well under way to grow organs extra-corporeally for transplant purposes. 

This has already been done successfully with at least a diseased urinary bladder and a trachea grown from cells from the patient’s 

body. In the case of the trachea, that organ was removed from a 

dead donor, stripped of the donor’s cells, and a new trachea was 

formed using the remaining cartilaginous skeleton and the recipient’s own stem cells. 20 

Ultimately, the central ethical challenge for any transplantation protocol is to give the gift of life to one human being without taking 

life away from another. Until the uncertainties and imprecision of 

the life-death spectrum so clearly recognized by Hans Jonas are dispelled, his moral advice must be our guide for all transplant 

protocols: 

We do not know with certainty the borderline between life 

and death, and a definition cannot substitute for knowledge. Moreover, we have sufficient grounds for suspecting 

that the artificially supported condition of the comatose 

patient may still be one of life, however reduced—i.e., for 

doubting that, even with the brain function gone, he is 

completely dead. In this state of marginal ignorance and 

doubt the only course to take is to lean over backward toward the side of possible life.21
 120 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

ENDNOTES 

 

1 Aristotle, Topics (155a 18-19) in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 

Translation, Vol. 1, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), 260. 

2 Hans Jonas, “Against the Stream,” in Philosophical Essays, From Ancient Creed to 

Technological Man, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp. 132-

140. See also Controversies in the Determination of Death, A White Paper of the President’s 

Council on Bioethics, 33-37. 

3 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (1094b 13-15) in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The 

Revised Oxford Translation, Vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, New Jersey: 

Princeton University Press, 1971), p.1730 

4 President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 

Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Defining Death: Medical, Legal and Ethical Issues 

in the Determination of Death (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

1981). 

5 Cf. D. Alan Shewmon, “The Brain and Somatic Integration: Insights into the 

Standard Biological Rationale for Equating ‘Brain Death’ with Death.” Journal of 

Medicine and Philosophy 26, no. 5 (2001): 457-78. See also D. Alan Shewmon, “Mental Disconnect: ‘Physiological Decapitation” as a Heuristic for Understanding 

‘Brain Death’,” Working Group on the Signs of Death 11-12 September 2006, ed. H.E. 

Msgr. Marcelo Sanchez Sorondo (Vatican City: Pontifica Academia Scientiarum, 

2007), pp. 292-333. 

6 Controversies in the Determination of Death, A White Paper of the President’s Council on 

Bioethics. See also K. G. Karakatsanis. “‘Brain Death’: Should It Be Reconsidered?” Spinal Cord 46, no. 6 (2008): 396-401. 

7 H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., The Foundations of Bioethics, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.242 

8 Plato, Gorgias (524b-c), trans. Robin Waterfield (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 2008), 131. 

9 Plato, Phaedo (71d), trans. R. Hackforth (New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 1972), 64. 

10 See Liang Cheng and David Z. Bostwick, eds., “Decomposition,” in Essentials of 

Anatomic Pathology 2d ed. (Totowa, New Jersey: Humana Press, 2005), 87-92; Arpad Vass, “How Long Does Cellular Metabolism Persist After Death?” Scientific 

American September 2008, p. 116; Cell Death and Differentiation 15, no. 7 (July 

2008). 

11 Robert D. Truog and Franklin G. Miller, “The Dead Donor Rule and Organ 

Transplantation,” New England Journal of Medicine 359, no. 7 (August 14, 

2008):674-675. 

12 Robert M. Veatch, “Donating Hearts after Cardiac Death – Reversing the Irreversible,” New England Journal of Medicine 359, no. 7 (August 14, 2008):672-673. 

13 Mark M. Boucek, Christine Mashburn, et al., “Pediatric Heart Transplantation 

after Declaration of Cardiopulmonary Death,” New England Journal of Medicine 359, 

no. 7 (August 14, 2008):709-714. Special Task Force, American Academy of Pediatrics, “Guidelines for the Determination of Brain Death in Children,” Pediatrics

80 (1987): 298-300. 
PERSONAL STATEMENTS | 121 

 

14 Franklin G. Miller and Robert D. Truog, “Rethinking the Ethics of Vital Organ 

Donations,” Hastings center Report November-December 2008: 38-46. 

15 Institute of Medicine, Organ Donation: Opportunities for Action (Washington, D.C.: 

National Academy Press, 2006; Society of Critical Care Medicine, “Recommendations for Nonheartbeating Organ Donation.” Critical Care Medicine 29, no. 9 

(2001): 1826-31; Joint Commission. “2009 Accreditation Requirements: Accreditation Program: Critical Access Hospital,” (2008). 

16 Bruce Ben-David, et al., “Survival after Failed Intra-operative Resuscitation: A 

Case of the Lazarus Syndrome,” Journal of Anesthesiology and Analgesia 92 

(2001):690-692. See also M.A. Da Vita, “The Death Watch: Certifying Death 

Using Cardiac Criteria,” Progress in Transplantation 11, no. 1 (2001):58-66. 

17 Veatch, “Donating Hearts after Cardiac Death.”

18 William Osler, Sir William Osler Aphorisms; From His Bedside Teachings and Writings, collected by Robert Bennett Bean, edited by William Bennett Bean (Springfield, Ill.: 

Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1968), p.129. 

19 Edmund D. Pellegrino, “Decisions at the End of Life: The Use and Abuse of 

the Concept of Futility,” in The Dignity of the Dying Person (Proceedings of the Fifth 

Assembly of the Pontifical Academy for Life (February 24-27, 1999), ed. Juan De Dios 

Vial Correa and Elio Sgreccia (Citta del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticano, 

2000), 219-241. See also Edmund D. Pellegrino, “Futility in Medical Decisions: 

The Word and the Concept,” Healthcare Ethics Committee Forum 17, no. 4 (December 2005):308-318. 

20 Paulo Macchiarini, et al., “Clinical Transplantation of a Tissue-Engineered Airway,” The Lancet on-line November 19, 2008. 

21 Jonas, “Against the Stream,” 138. 

123

TOPICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 

 

125

TOPICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1 Publications of Government Commissions and 

 Professional Societies 

1.1 Neurological Standard 

Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the 

Definition of Brain Death. “A Definition of Irreversible 

Coma.” JAMA 205, no. 6 (1968): 337-40. 

American Academy of Neurology, Quality Standards Subcommittee. “Practice Parameters for Determining Brain Death in 

Adults (Summary Statement).” Neurology 45, no. 5 (1995): 

1012-4. 

Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences, Task Force on 

Death and Dying. “Refinements in Criteria for the Determination of Death: An Appraisal.” JAMA 221, no. 1 (1972): 

48-53. 

President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. Defining 

Death: Medical, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Determination of 

Death. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 

1981. 

President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Report of the 

Medical Consultants on the Diagnosis of Death. “Guidelines for the Determination of Death.” JAMA 246, no. 19 

(1981): 2184-6. 
 126 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

Shemie, S. D., C. Doig, B. Dickens, P. Byrne, B. Wheelock, G. 

Rocker, A. Baker, et al. “Severe Brain Injury to Neurological 

Determination of Death: Canadian Forum Recommendations.” CMAJ 174, no. 6 (2006): S1-13. 

Task Force for the Determination of Brain Death in Children. 

“Guidelines for the Determination of Brain Death in Children.” Neurology 37, no. 6 (1987): 1077-8. 

1.2 Donation After Cardiac Death 

Bernat, J. L., A. M. D’Alessandro, F. K. Port, T. P. Bleck, S. O. 

Heard, J. Medina, S. H. Rosenbaum, et al. “Report of a National Conference on Donation after Cardiac Death.” Am J 

Transplant 6, no. 2 (2006): 281-91. 

Institute of Medicine. Non-Heart-Beating Organ Transplantation: Medical 

and Ethical Issues in Procurement. Washington, D.C.: National 

Academy Press, 1997. 

———. Non-Heart-Beating Organ Transplantation: Practice and Protocols. 

Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000. 

———. Organ Donation: Opportunities for Action. Washington, D.C.: 

National Academy Press, 2006. 

Joint Commission. “2009 Accreditation Requirements: Accreditation Program: Critical Access Hospital.” 2008. 

Shemie, S. D., A. J. Baker, G. Knoll, W. Wall, G. Rocker, D. 

Howes, J. Davidson, et al. “National Recommendations for 

Donation after Cardiocirculatory Death in Canada: Donation after Cardiocirculatory Death in Canada.” CMAJ 175, 

no. 8 (2006): S1. 

Society of Critical Care Medicine. “Recommendations for Nonheartbeating Organ Donation.” Crit Care Med 29, no. 9 

(2001): 1826-31. 
TOPICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY | 127 

2 Critical Literature: The Neurological Standard for 

 Death 

2.1 Law, Policy, and History 

Bagheri, A. “Organ Transplantation Laws in Asian Countries: A 

Comparative Study.” Transplant Proc 37, no. 10 (2005): 4159-

62. 

Beresford, H. R. “Legal Aspects of Brain Death.” In Brain Death, 

edited by E. F. Wijdicks. Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams 

& Wilkins, 2001. 

Capron, A. M., and F. Cate. “Death and Organ Transplantation.” In 

Treatise on Health Care Law, edited by R. M. Kaufman, M. G. 

Macdonald, A. M. Capron, I. M. Birnbaum. New York: 

Matthew Bender, 1991. 

Diringer, M. N., and E. F. Wijdicks. “Brain Death in Historical Perspective.” In Brain Death, edited by E. F. Wijdicks, 5-27. 

Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2001. 

Lock, M. M. Twice Dead: Organ Transplants and the Reinvention of Death. 

Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. 

Machado, C. “The First Organ Transplant from a Brain-Dead Donor.” Neurology 64, no. 11 (2005): 1938-42. 

Machado, C., J. Kerein, Y. Ferrer, L. Portela, M. de la C. García, 

and J. M. Manero. “The Concept of Brain Death Did Not 

Evolve to Benefit Organ Transplants.” J Med Ethics 33, no. 4 

(2007): 197-200. 

Pernick, M. S. “Back from the Grave: Recurring Controversies over 

Defining and Diagnosing Death in History.” In Death: Beyond Whole Brain Criteria, edited by R. M. Zaner, 17-74. 

Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988. 
 128 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

———. “Brain Death in a Cultural Context: The Reconstruction of 

Death, 1967-1981.” In The Definition of Death: Contemporary 

Controversies, edited by S. J. Youngner, R. M. Arnold, and R. 

Schapiro, 3-33. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 

Press, 1999. 

Wendler, D., and N. Dickert. “The Consent Process for Cadaveric 

Organ Procurement: How Does It Work? How Can It Be 

Improved?” JAMA 285, no. 3 (2001): 329-33. 

Wijdicks, E. F. “The Neurologist and Harvard Criteria for Brain 

Death.” Neurology 61, no. 7 (2003): 970-6. 

2.2 Clinical Guidelines, Practice, and Research 

Agarwal, R., N. Singh, and D. Gupta. “Is the Patient Brain-Dead?” 

Emerg Med J 23, no. 1 (2006): e5. 

Bernat, J. L. “On Irreversibility as a Prerequisite for Brain Death 

Determination.” Adv Exp Med Biol 550 (2004): 161-7. 

Booth, C. M., R. H. Boone, G. Tomlinson, and A. S. Detsky. “Is 

This Patient Dead, Vegetative, or Severely Neurologically 

Impaired? Assessing Outcome for Comatose Survivors of 

Cardiac Arrest.” JAMA 291, no. 7 (2004): 870-9. 

Ingvar, D. H. “Brain DeathTotal Brain Infarction.” Acta Anaesthesiol Scand Suppl 45 (1971): 129-40. 

Karakatsanis K. G. “‘Brain Death’: Should It Be Reconsidered?” 

Spinal Cord 46, no. 6 (2008): 396-401. 

Laureys, S. “Science and Society: Death, Unconsciousness and the 

Brain.” Nat Rev Neurosci 6, no. 11 (2005): 899-909. 

Laureys, S., A. M. Owen, and N. D. Schiff. “Brain Function in 

Coma, Vegetative State, and Related Disorders.” Lancet Neurol 3, no. 9 (2004): 537-46. 
TOPICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY | 129 

Mollaret, P., and M. Goulon. “Le Coma Dépassé.” Rev Neurol (Paris)

101 (1959): 3-15. 

Plum, F. “Clinical Standards and Technological Confirmatory Tests 

in Diagnosing Brain Death.” In The Definition of Death: Contemporary Controversies, edited by S. J. Youngner, R. M. 

Arnold, and R. Schapiro, 34-65. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. 

Powner, D. J., and I. M. Bernstein. “Extended Somatic Support for 

Pregnant Women after Brain Death.” Crit Care Med 31, no. 

4 (2003): 1241-9. 

Repertinger, S., W. P. Fitzgibbons, M. F. Omojola, and R. A. 

Brumback. “Long Survival Following Bacterial MeningitisAssociated Brain Destruction.” J Child Neurol 21, no. 7 

(2006): 591-5. 

Silverman, M. E., D. Grove, and C. B. Upshaw, Jr. “Why Does the 

Heart Beat? The Discovery of the Electrical System of the 

Heart.” Circulation 113, no. 23 (2006): 2775-81. 

Stedman, T. L. Stedman’s Medical Dictionary. 26th ed. Baltimore: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 1995. 

Sundin-Huard, D., and K. Fahy. “The Problems with the Validity of 

the Diagnosis of Brain Death.” Nurs Crit Care 9, no. 2 

(2004): 64-71. 

Waters, C. E., G. French, and M. Burt. “Difficulty in Brainstem 

Death Testing in the Presence of High Spinal Cord Injury.” 

Br J Anaesth 92, no. 5 (2004): 760-4. 

Wijdicks, E. F. “The Diagnosis of Brain Death.” N Engl J Med 344, 

no. 16 (2001): 1215-21. 

———. “Clinical Diagnosis and Confirmatory Testing of Brain 

Death in Adults.” In Brain Death, edited by E. F. Wijdicks. 

Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2001. 
 130 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

Wijdicks, E. F., and J.L. Atkinson. “Pathophysiologic Responses to 

Brain Death.” In Brain Death, edited by E. F. Wijdicks. 

Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2001. 

2.2.1 “Donor Management” 

Arbour, R. “Clinical Management of the Organ Donor.” AACN 

Clin Issues 16, no. 4 (2005): 551-80. 

Darby, J. M., K. Stein, A. Grenvik, and S. A. Stuart. “Approach to 

Management of the Heartbeating ‘Brain Dead’ Organ Donor.” JAMA 261, no. 15 (1989): 2222-8. 

Dosemeci, L., M. Cengiz, M. Yilmaz, and A. Ramazanoglu. “Frequency of Spinal Reflex Movements in Brain-Dead 

Patients.” Transplant Proc 36, no. 1 (2004): 17-9. 

Keep, P. J. “Anaesthesia for Organ Donation in the Brainstem 

Dead.” Anaesthesia 55, no. 6 (2000): 590. 

Saposnik, G., J. A. Bueri, J. Maurino, R. Saizar, and N. S. Garretto. 

“Spontaneous and Reflex Movements in Brain Death.” Neurology 54, no. 1 (2000): 221-3. 

Wace, J., and M. Kai. “Anaesthesia for Organ Donation in the 

Brainstem Dead.” Anaesthesia 55, no. 6 (2000): 590. 

Young, P. J., and B. F. Matta. “Anaesthesia for Organ Donation in 

the Brainstem Dead—Why Bother?” Anaesthesia 55, no. 2 

(2000): 105-6. 

2.2.2 Consistency in Application of Diagnostic Criteria 

Powner, D. J., M. Hernandez, and T. E. Rives. “Variability among 

Hospital Policies for Determining Brain Death in Adults.” 

Crit Care Med 32, no. 6 (2004): 1284-8. 

Shemie, S. D. “Variability of Brain Death Practices.” Crit Care Med

32, no. 12 (2004): 2564-5. 
TOPICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY | 131 

Wang, M. Y., P. Wallace, and J. P. Gruen. “Brain Death Documentation: Analysis and Issues.” Neurosurgery 51, no. 3 (2002): 

731-5; discussion 35-6. 

Wijdicks, E. F. “Brain Death Worldwide: Accepted Fact but No 

Global Consensus in Diagnostic Criteria.” Neurology 58, no. 

1 (2002): 20-5. 

2.2.3 Pediatrics 

Ashwal, S. “Clinical Diagnosis and Confirmatory Testing of Brain 

Death in Children.” In Brain Death, edited by E. F. Wijdicks. 

Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2001. 

Banasiak, K. J., and G. Lister. “Brain Death in Children.” Curr Opin 

Pediatr 15, no. 3 (2003): 288-93. 

Brilli, R. J., and D. Bigos. “Apnea Threshold and Pediatric Brain 

Death.” Crit Care Med 28, no. 4 (2000): 1257. 

Chang, M. Y., L. A. McBride, and M. A. Ferguson. “Variability in 

Brain Death Declaration Practices in Pediatric Head 

Trauma Patients.” Pediatr Neurosurg 39, no. 1 (2003): 7-9. 

Mejia, R. E., and M. M. Pollack. “Variability in Brain Death Determination Practices in Children.” JAMA 274, no. 7 (1995): 

550-3. 

Shemie, S. D., M. M. Pollack, M. Morioka, and S. Bonner. “Diagnosis of Brain Death in Children.” Lancet Neurol 6, no. 1 

(2007): 87-92. 

Vardis, R., and M. M. Pollack. “Increased Apnea Threshold in a 

Pediatric Patient with Suspected Brain Death.” Crit Care Med

26, no. 11 (1998): 1917-9. 
 132 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

2.2.4 Withholding or Withdrawing Life Support and 

 Persistent Vegetative State 

Keenan, S. P., K. D. Busche, L. M. Chen, L. McCarthy, K. J. 

Inman, and W. J. Sibbald. “A Retrospective Review of a 

Large Cohort of Patients Undergoing the Process of Withholding or Withdrawal of Life Support.” Crit Care Med 25, 

no. 8 (1997): 1324-31. 

Owen, A. M., M. R. Coleman, M. Boly, M. H. Davis, S. Laureys, 

and J. D. Pickard. “Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative 

State.” Science 313, no. 5792 (2006): 1402. 

———. “Using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging to Detect 

Covert Awareness in the Vegetative State.” Arch Neurol 64, 

no. 8 (2007): 1098-1102. 

Pellegrino, E. D. “Decisions to Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment: A Moral Algorithm,” JAMA, 283, no. 8 (2000): 1065-

7. 

———. “Futility in Medical Decisions: The Word and the Concept.” HEC Forum 17, no. 4 (2005): 308-18. 

Prendergast, T. J., and J. M. Luce. “Increasing Incidence of Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Support from the Critically 

Ill.” Am J Respir Crit Care Med 155, no. 1 (1997): 15-20. 

Smedira, N. G., B. H. Evans, L. S. Grais, N. H. Cohen, B. Lo, M. 

Cooke, W. P. Schecter, et al. “Withholding and Withdrawal 

of Life Support from the Critically Ill.” N Engl J Med 322, 

no. 5 (1990): 309-15. 

2.3 Ethical Debate 

Bagheri, A. “Individual Choice in the Definition of Death.” J Med 

Ethics 33, no. 3 (2007): 146-9. 
TOPICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY | 133 

———. “Criticism of ‘Brain Death’ Policy in Japan.” Kennedy Inst 

Ethics J 13, no. 4 (2003): 359-72. 

Bartlett, E. T, and S. J. Younger. “Human Death and the Destruction of the Neocortex.” In Death: Beyond Whole Brain Criteria, 

edited by R. M. Zaner. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988. 

Bernat, J. L. “The Whole-Brain Concept of Death Remains Optimum Public Policy.” J Law Med Ethics 34, no. 1 (2006): 35-

43. 

———. “The Biophilosophical Basis of Whole-Brain Death.” Soc 

Philos Policy 19, no. 2 (2002): 324-42. 

———. “Refinements in the Definition and Criterion of Death.” 

In The Definition of Death: Contemporary Controversies, edited by 

S. J. Youngner, R. M. Arnold, and R. Schapiro, 83-92. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. 

Bernat, J. L., C. M. Culver, and B. Gert. “On the Definition and 

Criterion of Death.” Ann Intern Med 94, no. 3 (1981): 389-

94. 

Browne, A. “Whole-Brain Death Reconsidered.” J Med Ethics 9, no. 

1 (1983): 28-31, 44. 

Byrne, P. A., S. O’Reilly, and P. M. Quay. “Brain Death—an Opposing Viewpoint.” JAMA 242, no. 18 (1979): 1985-90. 

Byrne, P. A., S. O’Reilly, P. M. Quay, and P.W. Salsich. “Brain 

Death—the Patient, the Physician, and Society.” In Beyond 

Brain Death: The Case against Brain Based Criteria for Human 

Death, edited by M. Potts, P. A. Byrne, and R. G. Nigles. 

Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000. 

Capron, A. M. “Brain Death—Well Settled Yet Still Unresolved.” N 

Engl J Med 344, no. 16 (2001): 1244-6. 
 134 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

———. “The Bifurcated Legal Standard for Determining Death: 

Does It Work?” In The Definition of Death: Contemporary Controversies, edited by S. J. Youngner, R. M. Arnold, and R. 

Schapiro, 117-36. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 

Press, 1999. 

———. “The Report of the President’s Commission on the Uniform Determination of Death Act.” In Death: Beyond Whole 

Brain Criteria, edited by R. M. Zaner. Dordrecht: Kluwer 

Academic Publishers, 1988. 

———. “The Purpose of Death: A Reply to Professor Dworkin.” 

Indiana Law J 48, no. 4 (1973): 640-6. 

Capron, A. M., and L. R. Kass. “Statutory Definition of Standards 

for Determining Human Death—Appraisal and a Proposal.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 121, no. 1 (1972): 

87-118. 

Charo, R. A. “Dusk, Dawn and Defining Death: Legal Classifications and Biological Categories.” In The Definition of Death: 

Contemporary Controversies, edited by S. J. Youngner, R. M. 

Arnold, and R. Schapiro, 277-92. Baltimore: The Johns 

Hopkins University Press, 1999. 

Chiong, W. “Brain Death Without Definitions.” Hastings Cent Rep

35, no. 6 (2005): 20-30. 

Cranford, R. “Even the Dead Are Not Terminally Ill Anymore.” 

Neurology 51, no. 6 (1998): 1530-1. 

Dagi, F. T., and R. Kaufman. “Clarifying the Discussion on Brain 

Death.” J Med Philos 26, no. 5 (2001): 503-25. 

Doig, C. J., and E. Burgess. “Brain Death: Resolving Inconsistencies in the Ethical Declaration of Death.” Can J Anaesth 50, 

no. 7 (2003): 725-31. 
TOPICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY | 135 

DuBois, J. M. “Organ Transplantation: An Ethical Road Map.” Natl 

Cathol Bioeth Q 2, no. 3 (2002): 413-53. 

DuBois, J. M., and E. E. Anderson. “Attitudes Toward Death Criteria and Organ Donation among Healthcare Personnel and 

the General Public.” Prog Transplant 16, no. 1 (2006): 65-73. 

Dworkin, R. B. “Death in Context.” Indiana Law J 48, no. 4 (1973): 

623-39. 

Eberl, J. T. “A Thomistic Understanding of Human Death.” Bioethics 19, no. 1 (2005): 29-48. 

Emanuel, L. L. “Reexamining Death. The Asymptotic Model and a 

Bounded Zone Definition.” Hastings Cent Rep 25, no. 4 

(1995): 27-35. 

Furton, E. J. “Brain Death, the Soul, and Organic Life.” Natl Cathol 

Bioeth Q 2, no. 3 (2002): 455-70. 

Gaylin, W. “Harvesting the Dead.” Harpers 249, no. 1492 (1974): 

23-28. 

Gervais, K. G. Redefining Death. New Haven: Yale University Press, 

1986. 

Haddow, G. “The Phenomenology of Death, Embodiment and 

Organ Transplantation.” Sociol Health Illn 27, no. 1 (2005): 

92-113. 

Halevy, A., and B. Brody. “Brain Death: Reconciling Definitions, 

Criteria, and Tests.” Ann Intern Med 119, no. 6 (1993): 519-

25. 

Jonas, H. “Against the Stream.” In Philosophical Essays: From Ancient 

Creed to Technological Man. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1974. 
 136 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

Kass, L. R. “Death as an Event: A Commentary on Robert Morison.” Science 173, no. 998 (1971): 698-702. 

Korein, J. “The Problem of Brain Death: Development and History.” Ann NY Acad Sci 315 (1978): 19-38. 

Korein, J., and C. Machado. “Brain Death: Updating a Valid Concept for 2004.” Adv Exp Med Biol 550 (2004): 1-14. 

Lizza, J. P. “The Conceptual Basis for Brain Death Revisited: Loss 

of Organic Integration or Loss of Consciousness?” Adv Exp 

Med Biol 550 (2004): 51-9. 

———. Persons, Humanity, and the Definition of Death. Baltimore, Md.: 

Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. 

May, W. “Attitudes Toward the Newly Dead.” Stud Hastings Cent 1, 

no. 1 (1973): 3-13. 

Meilaender, G. “Terra Es Animata: On Having a Life.” Hastings Cent 

Rep 23, no. 4 (1993): 25-32. 

Morioka, M. “Reconsidering Brain Death: A Lesson from Japan’s 

Fifteen Years of Experience.” Hastings Cent Rep 31, no. 4 

(2001): 41-6. 

Morison, R. S. “Death: Process or Event?” Science 173, no. 998 

(1971): 694-8. 

Nigles, R. G. “Organ Transplantation, Brain Death, and the Slippery Slope: A Neurosurgeon’s Perspective.” In Beyond Brain 

Death: The Case against Brain Based Criteria for Human Death, 

edited by M. Potts, P. A. Byrne, and R. G. Nigles. 

Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000. 

Pallis, C. “On the Brainstem Criterion of Death.” In The Definition of 

Death: Contemporary Controversies, edited by S. J. Youngner, R. 

M. Arnold, and R. Schapiro, 93-100. Baltimore: The Johns 

Hopkins University Press, 1999. 
TOPICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY | 137 

———. “Further Thoughts on Brainstem Death.” Anaesth Intensive 

Care 23, no. 1 (1995): 20-3. 

Pallis, C., and D. H. Harley. ABC of Brainstem Death. Second ed. 

London: BMJ Publishing Group, 1996. 

Potts, M. “A Requiem for Whole Brain Death: A Response to D. 

Alan Shewmon’s ‘The Brain and Somatic Integration’.” J 

Med Philos 26, no. 5 (2001): 479-91. 

Ramsey, P. The Patient as Person. Second ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002. 

Rosen, N. “A Fresh Perspective on PVS and Brain Death.” Paper 

presented at the Annual meeting of the American Society 

for Bioethics and Humanities, Washington, DC, 2007. 

Seifert, J. “Brain Death and Euthanasia.” In Beyond Brain Death: The 

Case against Brain Based Criteria for Human Death, edited by M. 

Potts, P. A. Byrne, and R. G. Nigles. Dordrecht: Kluwer 

Academic Publishers, 2000. 

Shewmon, D. A. “The Brain and Somatic Integration: Insights into 

the Standard Biological Rationale for Equating ‘Brain 

Death’ with Death.” J Med Philos 26, no. 5 (2001): 457-78. 

———. “Spinal Shock and ‘Brain Death’: Somatic Pathophysiological Equivalence and Implications for the IntegrativeUnity Rationale.” Spinal Cord 37, no. 5 (1999): 313-24. 

———. “Chronic ‘Brain Death’: Meta-Analysis and Conceptual 

Consequences.” Neurology 51, no. 6 (1998): 1538-45. 

———. “Recovery from ‘Brain Death’: A Neurologist’s Apologia.” 

Linacre Q 64, no. 1 (1997): 30-96. 

Siminoff, L. A., C. Burant, and S. J. Youngner. “Death and Organ 

Procurement: Public Beliefs and Attitudes.” Kennedy Inst Ethics J 14, no. 3 (2004): 217-34. 
 138 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

Smith, D. R. “Legal Issues Leading to the Notion of Neocortical 

Death.” In Death: Beyond Whole Brain Criteria, edited by R. M. 

Zaner. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988. 

Spike, J. “Brain Death, Pregnancy, and Posthumous Motherhood.” 

J Clin Ethics 10, no. 1 (1999): 57-65. 

Spike, J., and J. Greenlaw. “Ethics Consultation: Persistent Brain 

Death and Religion: Must a Person Believe in Death to 

Die?” J Law Med Ethics 23, no. 3 (1995): 291-4. 

Veatch, R. M. “The Death of Whole-Brain Death: The Plague of 

the Disaggregators, Somaticists, and Mentalists.” J Med Philos 30, no. 4 (2005): 353-78. 

———. “The Conscience Clause: How Much Individual Choice in 

Defining Death Can Our Society Tolerate?” In The Definition 

of Death: Contemporary Controversies, edited by S. J. Youngner, 

R. M. Arnold, and R. Schapiro, 137-60. Baltimore: The 

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. 

———. “The Impending Collapse of the Whole-Brain Definition 

of Death.” Hastings Cent Rep 23, no. 4 (1993): 18-24. 

———. “Brain Death and Slippery Slopes.” J Clin Ethics 3, no. 3 

(1992): 181-7. 

White, P. D. “Should the Law Define Death?—A Genuine Question.” In Death: Beyond Whole Brain Criteria, edited by R. M. 

Zaner, 101-09. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 

1988. 

Wijdicks, E. F., and J. L. Bernat. “Chronic ‘Brain Death’: MetaAnalysis and Conceptual Consequences.” Neurology 53, no. 6 

(1999): 1369-70; Author Reply 71-2. 

Wikler, D., and A. J. Weisbard. “Appropriate Confusion over ‘Brain 

Death’.” JAMA 261, no. 15 (1989): 2246. 
TOPICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY | 139 

Youngner, S. J., C. S. Landefeld, C. J. Coulton, B. W. Juknialis, and 

M. Leary. “‘Brain Death’ and Organ Retrieval. A CrossSectional Survey of Knowledge and Concepts among 

Health Professionals.” JAMA 261, no. 15 (1989): 2205-10. 

Zamperetti, N., R. Bellomo, C. A. Defanti, and N. Latronico. “Irreversible Apnoeic Coma 35 Years Later. Towards a More 

Rigorous Definition of Brain Death?” Intensive Care Med 30, 

no. 9 (2004): 1715-22. 

Zaner, R. M. “Brains and Persons: A Critique of Veatch’s View.” In 

Death: Beyond Whole Brain Criteria, edited by R. M. Zaner, 

187-97. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988. 

3 Critical Literature: Donation After Cardiac Death 

3.1 Law, Policy, and History 

DeVita, M. A., and J. V. Snyder. “Development of the University of 

Pittsburgh Medical Center Policy for the Care of Terminally 

Ill Patients Who May Become Organ Donors after Death 

Following the Removal of Life Support.” Kennedy Inst Ethics 

J 3, no. 2 (1993): 131-43. 

DeVita, M. A., J. V. Snyder, and A. Grenvik. “History of Organ 

Donation by Patients with Cardiac Death.” Kennedy Inst Ethics J 3, no. 2 (1993): 113-29. 

Zawistowski, C. A., and M. A. DeVita. “Non-Heartbeating Organ 

Donation: A Review.” J Intensive Care Med 18, no. 4 (2003): 

189-97. 

3.2 Clinical Guidelines, Practice, and Research 

Abt, P. L., N. M. Desai, M. D. Crawford, L. M. Forman, J. W. 

Markmann, K. M. Olthoff, and J. F. Markmann. “Survival 

Following Liver Transplantation from Non-Heart-Beating 

Donors.” Ann Surg 239, no. 1 (2004): 87-92. 
 140 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

Boucek, M. M., C. Mashburn, S. M. Dunn, R. Frizell, L. Edwards, 

B. Pietra, and D. Campbell. “Pediatric Heart Transplantation after Declaration of Cardiocirculatory Death.” N Engl J 

Med 359, no. 7 (2008): 709-14. 

Cooper, J. T., L. T. Chin, N. R. Krieger, L. A. Fernandez, D. P. 

Foley, Y. T. Becker, J. S. Odorico, S. J. Knechtle, M. 

Kalayoglu, H. W. Sollinger, and A. M. D’Alessandro. “Donation after Cardiac Death: The University of Wisconsin 

Experience with Renal Transplantation.” Am J Transplant 4, 

no. 9 (2004): 1490-4. 

D’Alessandro, A. M., L. A. Fernandez, L. T. Chin, B. D. Shames, N. 

A. Turgeon, D. L. Scott, A. Di Carlo, et al. “Donation after 

Cardiac Death: The University of Wisconsin Experience.” 

Ann Transplant 9, no. 1 (2004): 68-71. 

Doshi, M. D., and L. G. Hunsicker. “Short- and Long-Term Outcomes with the Use of Kidneys and Livers Donated after 

Cardiac Death.” Am J Transplant 7, no. 1 (2007): 122-9. 

Foley, D. P., L. A. Fernandez, G. Leverson, L. T. Chin, N. Krieger, 

J. T. Cooper, B. D. Shames, et al. “Donation after Cardiac 

Death: The University of Wisconsin Experience with Liver 

Transplantation.” Ann Surg 242, no. 5 (2005): 724-31. 

Kelso, C. M., L. J. Lyckholm, P. J. Coyne, and T. J. Smith. “Palliative Care Consultation in the Process of Organ Donation 

after Cardiac Death.” J Palliat Med 10, no. 1 (2007): 118-26. 

Lewis, J., J. Peltier, H. Nelson, W. Snyder, K. Schneider, D. 

Steinberger, M. Anderson, et al. “Development of the University of Wisconsin Donation after Cardiac Death 

Evaluation Tool.” Prog Transplant 13, no. 4 (2003): 265-73. 

3.3 Ethical Debate 

Aulisio, M. P., M. Devita, and D. Luebke. “Taking Values Seriously: 

Ethical Challenges in Organ Donation and Transplantation 
TOPICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY | 141 

for Critical Care Professionals.” Crit Care Med 35, no. 2 

Suppl (2007): S95-101. 

Bernat, J. L. “The Boundaries of Organ Donation after Circulatory 

Death.” N Engl J Med 359, no. 7 (2008): 669-71. 

———. “Are Organ Donors after Cardiac Death Really Dead?” J 

Clin Ethics 17, no. 2 (2006): 122-32. 

Campbell, M. L., and L. J. Weber. “Procuring Organs from a NonHeart-Beating Cadaver: Commentary on a Case Report.” 

Kennedy Inst Ethics J 5, no. 1 (1995): 35-42; discussion 43-9. 

Caplan, A. L. “The Telltale Heart: Public Policy and the Utilization 

of Non-Heart-Beating Donors.” Kennedy Inst Ethics J 3, no. 2 

(1993): 251-62. 

DeVita, M. A., J. V. Snyder, R. M. Arnold, and L. A. Siminoff. 

“Observations of Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment 

from Patients Who Became Non-Heart-Beating Organ Donors.” Crit Care Med 28, no. 6 (2000): 1709-12. 

DeVita, M. A., R. Vukmir, J. V. Snyder, and C. Graziano. “NonHeart-Beating Organ Donation: A Reply to Campbell and 

Weber.” Kennedy Inst Ethics J 5, no. 1 (1995): 43-9. 

Doig, C. J., and G. Rocker. “Retrieving Organs from Non-HeartBeating Organ Donors: A Review of Medical and Ethical 

Issues.” Can J Anaesth 50, no. 10 (2003): 1069-76. 

DuBois, J. M. “Is Organ Procurement Causing the Death of Patients?” Issues Law Med 18, no. 1 (2002): 21-41. 

———. “Intention, Action, and the Dead Donor Rule: Commentary on Spike.” J Clin Ethics 11, no. 1 (2000): 78-84; 

discussion 92-3. 
 142 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

Lynn, J. “Are the Patients Who Become Organ Donors Under the 

Pittsburgh Protocol for ‘Non-Heart-Beating Donors’ Really 

Dead?” Kennedy Inst Ethics J 3, no. 2 (1993): 167-78. 

Lynn, J., and R. Cranford. “The Persisting Perplexities in the Determination of Death.” In The Definition of Death: 

Contemporary Controversies, edited by S. J. Youngner, R. M. 

Arnold, and R. Schapiro, 101-14. Baltimore: The Johns 

Hopkins University Press, 1999. 

Mandell, M. S., S. Zamudio, D. Seem, L. J. McGaw, G. Wood, P. 

Liehr, A. Ethier, and A. M. D’Alessandro. “National 

Evaluation of Healthcare Provider Attitudes Toward Organ 

Donation after Cardiac Death.” Crit Care Med 34, no. 12 

(2006): 2952-8. 

Robertson, J. A. “Policy Issues in a Non-Heart-Beating Donor Protocol.” Kennedy Inst Ethics J 3, no. 2 (1993): 241-50. 

Solomon, M. Z. “Donation after Cardiac Death: Non-HeartBeating Organ Donation Deserves a Green Light and Hospital Oversight.” Anesthesiology 98, no. 3 (2003): 601-2. 

Spike, J. “Controlled NHBD Protocol for a Fully Conscious Person: When Death Is Intended as an End in Itself and It Has 

Its Own End.” J Clin Ethics 11, no. 1 (2000): 73-7. 

Veatch, R. M. “Donating Hearts after Cardiac DeathReversing the 

Irreversible.” N Engl J Med 359, no. 7 (2008): 672-3. 

Van Norman, G. A. “Another Matter of Life and Death: What 

Every Anesthesiologist Should Know About the Ethical, 

Legal, and Policy Implications of the Non-Heart-Beating 

Cadaver Organ Donor.” Anesthesiology 98, no. 3 (2003): 763-

73. 

Youngner, S. J., R. M. Arnold, and M. A. DeVita. “When Is 

‘Dead’?” Hastings Cent Rep 29, no. 6 (1999): 14-21. 
TOPICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY | 143 

Zamperetti, N., R. Bellomo, and C. Ronco. “Defining Death in 

Non-Heart Beating Organ Donors.” J Med Ethics 29, no. 3 

(2003): 182-5. 

4 Critical Literature: The Dead Donor Rule 

Arnold, R. M., and S. J. Youngner. “The Dead Donor Rule: Should 

We Stretch It, Bend It, or Abandon It?” Kennedy Inst Ethics J

3, no. 2 (1993): 263-78. 

Campbell, C. S. “Harvesting the Living? Separating ‘Brain Death’ 

and Organ Transplantation.” Kennedy Inst Ethics J 14, no. 3 

(2004): 301-18. 

Crowley-Matoka, M., and R. M. Arnold. “The Dead Donor Rule: 

How Much Does the Public Care...And How Much Should 

We Care?” Kennedy Inst Ethics J 14, no. 3 (2004): 319-32. 

Fost, N. “Reconsidering the Dead Donor Rule: Is It Important 

That Organ Donors Be Dead?” Kennedy Inst Ethics J 14, no. 3 

(2004): 249-60. 

———. “The Unimportance of Death.” In The Definition of Death: 

Contemporary Controversies, edited by S. J. Youngner, R. M. 

Arnold, and R. Schapiro, 161-78. Baltimore: The Johns 

Hopkins University Press, 1999. 

Kerridge, I. H., P. Saul, M. Lowe, J. McPhee, and D. Williams. 

“Death, Dying and Donation: Organ Transplantation and 

the Diagnosis of Death.” J Med Ethics 28, no. 2 (2002): 89-

94. 

Menikoff, J. “The Importance of Being Dead: Non-Heart-Beating 

Organ Donation.” Issues Law Med 18, no. 1 (2002): 3-20. 

Truog, R. D. “Brain Death—Too Flawed to Endure, Too Ingrained 

to Abandon.” J Law Med Ethics 35, no. 2 (2007): 273-81. 
 144 | CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

———. “Is It Time to Abandon Brain Death?” Hastings Cent Rep

27, no. 1 (1997): 29-37. 

Truog, R. D., and F. G. Miller. “The Dead Donor Rule and Organ 

Transplantation.” N Engl J Med 359, no. 7 (2008): 674-5. 

Truog, R. D., and W. M. Robinson. “Role of Brain Death and the 

Dead-Donor Rule in the Ethics of Organ Transplantation.” 

Crit Care Med 31, no. 9 (2003): 2391-6. 

Youngner, S. J., and R. M. Arnold. “Philosophical Debates About 

the Definition of Death: Who Cares?” J Med Philos 26, no. 5 

(2001): 527-37. 

\[