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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

A Game of Simon Says

Latin America’s Left Turn

and Its Effects on US Security

J. Lee Bennett

Lieutenant Commander, US Navy

Air Command and Staff College

Wright Flyer Paper No. 31

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

May 2008
ii

Disclaimer

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solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US 

government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

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iii

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright Flyer 

Papers series. In this series, the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes our best student research 

projects from the prior academic year. The ACSC research program encourages our students to move beyond the school’s 

core curriculum in their own professional development and in 

“advancing air and space power.” The series title reflects our 

desire to perpetuate the pioneering spirit embodied in earlier 

generations of Airmen. Projects selected for publication combine solid research, innovative thought, and lucid presentation 

in exploring war at the operational level. With this broad perspective, the Wright Flyer Papers engage an eclectic range of 

doctrinal, technological, organizational, and operational questions. Some of these studies provide new solutions to familiar 

problems. Others encourage us to leave the familiar behind in 

pursuing new possibilities. By making these research studies 

available in the Wright Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes to encourage 

critical examination of the findings and to stimulate further research in these areas.

JIMMIE C. JACKSON, JR.

Brigadier General, USAF

Commandant

Abstract

A little over 200,000 votes in Mexico’s 2006 presidential 

election determined whether or not the United States might 

soon share a border with a potentially communist country. 

A closer look reveals Mexico was nearly another domino in 

a rash of leftism that is sweeping through Latin America 

and the Caribbean (LAC). In fact, there are as many leftist 

countries in the LAC region today as there were in Eastern 

Europe at the height of the Cold War. This research will determine why leftism is on the rise and whether US national 

security is being threatened.

The causes are a combination of extreme inequality with 

regards to income per capita, an increased awareness among 

the populace as to its unequal situation, a poor display of US 

foreign policy, and an increase in education levels throughout the region. In short, Latin Americans are smarter, poorer, 

and angrier with the United States for its inattentiveness 

since the end of the Cold War.

The Bush administration’s association of democracies 

with US national security is shown to be questionable. Hugo 

Chavez and Evo Morales were both democratically elected, 

and their associations with known terror organizations and 

rogue states decrease US security. In any case, most new 

leftist governments in Latin America are not true leftists. 

They are called leftist, but their external economic policies 

clearly resemble capitalism. Ironically, the effect on US national security depends upon its own future actions.

Based on these findings, three policy proposals are recommended. First, the United States needs to pioneer fairer trade 

agreements. Second, the United States needs to increase its 

foreign aid, with earmarks for economic investments. Third, 

the United States needs to work harder at being a good 

neighbor. These three steps should pull the region together 

and thereby increase the entire hemisphere’s security.





Introduction

Roughly half of a single percentage point of the 41 million votes cast for president in Mexico’s July 2006 elections 

determined whether or not the United States would share 

an immediate border with a potentially communist country.1

That, to some, is a narrow escape when considering how 

much effort the United States has committed to ensuring 

the containment of communism, particularly in the Western 

Hemisphere, since the end of World War II. However, a closer 

look at the region south of the Rio Grande reveals Mexico 

was almost another domino in what can be described as the 

“second coming of Communism.” Of the 22 most populated 

and sovereign countries that make up the Latin America and 

Caribbean (LAC) region,2 nine now have a leftist executive at 

their government’s head.3 In fact, there are as many leftist 

countries in the LAC region today as there were in Eastern 

Europe at the height of the Cold War.4 Venezuela’s boisterous 

leader, Hugo Chavez, whose recent rhetoric has earned him 

front-page headlines all over the world, has joined forces with 

other like-minded LAC leaders, such as long-time US nemesis Fidel Castro, to form an anti-US coalition of the unwilling. This terminology is fitting because collectively they are 

reluctant to believe a long-promised US-led economic turnaround for the region will ever materialize and are unwilling 

to continue on the present course. From a US standpoint, 

simply throwing money at the problem has failed to create 

the desired effects of economic stability and a strengthened 

friendship with the rest of America. Over the previous 62 

years, the United States has invested, on average, more 

than half a billion dollars per year into LAC countries,5 a 

region that is perennially recognized as one of the poorest 

on earth.6

The United States has prided itself on being able to shield 

Latin American and Caribbean countries from foreign colonialism (Monroe Doctrine) and communism (Truman Doctrine). So why, after years of the United States’ micromanagement of LAC internal politics—using every conceivable 

instrument of power known to the international community—

has a recent rash of leftism swept through the region? Does 

this trend pose a significant threat to the national security 

of the United States? This paper argues that even though 
many administrations in these Latin American countries call 

themselves leftist, they are (for the most part) continuing to 

support free-market theory and free-trade agreements between states. However, a few countries are creating angst 

among the rest of the Americas due to their relationships 

with terrorist organizations and rogue states. Because of 

these factors, the effect of the leftist trend on the national 

security of the United States is yet to be determined. This 

paper concludes with some policy proposals that will help 

ease tensions between the United States and its southern 

neighbors and increase security throughout the region, but 

first we need to discuss what a leftist is exactly.

Left, Lefter, and Leftist

Ask any three Americans what the differences between 

leftism, communism, and socialism are, and you are likely 

to get a confused look in return. In fact, many scholars blur 

the nuances between these forms of government either purposely, in order to avoid the lengthy discussion regarding 

their differences, or accidentally, due to lack of proper research. However, it is essential to the purpose of this paper 

to accurately define and categorize socioeconomic descriptors in order to distinguish between the left and the right. 

Executive administrations are differentiated by their social 

constructs and economic theories; these two attributes will 

serve as the umbrellas under which each brand of government is filed.

A government’s social construct identifies from whom it 

received its authority to govern and to whom the leadership 

is ultimately responsible. In an anarchy there is no legitimate 

government—each individual is guided by self-rule and is 

beholden to no one. Somalia of the early 1990s is the closest 

the world has come to witnessing total anarchy in modern 

times. Democracies, however, have executive branch leaders who are voted into office by an electorate drawn from 

the general population. A democratic or pluralistic society, 

in theory, allows each individual citizen an equal chance of 

becoming its head of state. Moreover, in a democracy, the 

populace has the right to change its leadership with each 

ensuing election if it so chooses. The United States is the 

most obvious example of this type of government, although 
there are many others in the world today. Conversely, an 

autocracy leads by decree, and its leader usually cannot 

be removed from power without force. This type of social 

construct is often called tyrannical, totalitarian, dictatorial, 

or monarchical and allows for the least amount of input 

from the general population regarding the country’s direction. Some autocratic states may hold elections for show 

(e.g., Saddam Hussein’s Iraq), but the results—much like a 

rigged carnival game—are predetermined and always favorable towards the incumbent. This falsely gives the outward 

appearance that the entrenched leaders are adored by the 

people they lead, thus solidifying the authority to govern.7

If we imagine a pyramid structure, an anarchy would be its 

base (little or no vertical rise because no person has official 

authority over another), a democracy would be the centerpiece (gaining power from the electorate to boost freely elected 

officials who can eventually be brought back down), and an 

autocracy would be the apex (power concentrated in a few 

or a single person). Although these types of governments 

describe sources of power, they should not be automatically correlated with those on the left or right of the political 

spectrum based upon their economic disposition.

A government’s established economic theory describes 

its relative position on a linear scale. On the right side of 

this scale is a purely capitalistic society where the state 

has no say whatsoever regarding what products the country 

will make and sell. The government and its economy are 

independent from one another but are also dependent upon 

the other’s existence for survival. It is important to note 

that there are no purely capitalistic societies in existence in 

today’s world. Even the United States’ public exhibition of 

free-market capitalism is not without some governmental 

intervention. The US Postal Service is solely a state-run organization while others, such as Amtrak—the nation’s only 

passenger rail service—are highly subsidized by the federal 

government and are, hence, subject to its oversight. On the 

opposite (left) side of this scale is the economy that is completely state-owned and operated. The government dictates 

who, what, how, when, and to what extent items will be 

made and sold. These types of economies are often practiced in an attempt to equally distribute all of a country’s 

resources among its citizens. Communism, collectivism, 
Leninism, Marxism, and socialism are some of the more 

familiar variants of leftism.8 Most importantly, a country’s 

economic theory and social construct are mutually exclusive 

descriptors, and any correlation between the two should 

never be implied.

Many people automatically (and incorrectly) assume a relationship between a government’s social construct and economic theory. For example, oftentimes a democracy (a freely 

elected government) will be associated with capitalism (a 

free-market economy). Likewise, autocracies are often linked 

with leftism. These types of governments, while traditionally conjoined, are not always together. For example, Hong 

Kong, although a city and not a state, is a prime example of 

how an autocratic capitalist government could exist in modern times. Likewise, democratic socialism is very popular in 

Europe. The United Kingdom’s Labour Party is among the 

largest in existence today, and Sweden can be considered 

a socialist state with a democratically elected government. 

Similarly, many LAC countries are democratically electing 

governments with leftist economic policies, the reasons for 

which are examined in the next few sections.

“Who Lost Latin America?”

An examination of this region’s political history reveals 

that many countries have broken free from the chains of 

colonialism only to have their freedom frequently stymied 

by autocratic or military rule. Of the 22 LAC countries researched for this paper, most have been ruled by a dictator or military junta (or both) at least once since declaring 

their “independence”; and for some, a coup d’état seems to 

be the normal method of transitioning from one executive 

administration to another.9 For example, Panama’s president, Arnulfo Arias Madrid, was democratically elected on 

three separate occasions (1940, 1949, and 1968) but never 

served a full term in office because he was deposed by his 

military each time.10 Some could argue the current leftist 

trend is simply the political pendulum swinging back and 

forth due to the current feelings of the electorate—a temporary motion consistent within most democracies and one 

that will eventually return to the right. However, the region’s historically unstable democracies, combined with the 
inability to differentiate between the economic practices of 

each individual LAC administration, makes this theory of a 

left-right cyclical pattern difficult to prove or disprove. Due 

to time and length limitations, this paper does not include 

data in an attempt to demonstrate the validity of this type 

of model. Moreover, it has recently become commonly accepted among academics and news media that there is, in 

fact, a wave of leftism currently sweeping through the LAC 

region. As one New York Times author declared, “Since a 

bombastic army colonel, Hugo Chavez, won office in Venezuela in 1998, three-quarters of South America has shifted 

to the left.”11 This paper proceeds under that assumption, 

accepting the much ballyhooed trend as fact while answering the question, who lost Latin America?12

Such a movement towards leftism may appear frightening to some ultraconservative capitalists, but in order to 

determine how this swing will truly affect US national security, we must first understand why it is happening. There 

are as many theories accounting for why LAC countries are 

leaning leftward as there are ethnic groups living within 

the region. However, like the descriptors of a national government, most of these theories can be codified into two 

categories: economic and social. Economically, history has 

shown us how extreme inequality between a few rich elitists 

and the majority poor class can lead to a situation where 

a revolutionary shift to a polar opposite style of government may result.13 In addition, US foreign policy decisions, 

such as reducing the amount of foreign aid to the region, 

may have contributed to the turn of public opinion against 

the US government and its policies towards their suddenly 

forgotten friends to the south—thus “pushing” LAC voters 

to find a more appealing candidate on the opposite side of 

the political spectrum. Socially, increased education levels 

may lead to a more intelligent and informed electorate that 

desires to change its station in life through voting. Marta 

Lagos, head of the Chile-based polling organization Latinobarómetro (which surveys social and political attitudes in 

18 Latin American countries), agreed in an interview with 

Miami Herald columnist Andres Oppenheimer, saying that 

“Latin Americans with the highest levels of education tend 

to have the most negative views of the United States.”14

More likely, however, it is a combination of these economic 
and social factors that is setting the Latin American stage 

for silver-tongued populist candidates who are skilled in 

the art of politics and can assemble a following sizable 

enough to sweep them into office. Specifically, these leftist, 

populist candidates are drawing attention to the degree of 

poverty within their countries, the reason for which will be 

discussed next.

“There’s One for You, Nineteen for Me”

To declare that the LAC region is poor is misleading—it 

has wealth and growth, just not for the majority of its 

people. A quick comparison of gross domestic product (GDP) 

per capita (adjusted for purchasing power parity [PPP]) by 

global region shows LAC countries are wedged securely 

between the most economically advanced nations and the 

world’s poorest nations. The LAC’s 2004 figure of $7,964 

per person is less than the per capita GDP-PPP of people 

who reside in the countries belonging to the Organization 

for Economic Cooperation and Development ($27,571) and 

Central and Eastern Europe ($8,802).15 However, this figure is higher than that which is earned in a single year by 

the nearly four billion people who live elsewhere around the 

world and is more than four times the current level found 

in sub-Saharan Africa ($1,946).16 Moreover, the LAC’s GDPPPP per capita growth rate from the end of the Cold War 

until 2004 has been a respectable 1.1 percent, only slightly 

less than the world average of 1.4 percent during that same 

time frame.17

Unfortunately, per capita figures are deceptive in that they 

do not tell the complete story regarding distribution of wealth 

within the area measured. To show this, we must review the 

region’s “Gini coefficient.” A Gini coefficient, named for Italian statistician Corrado Gini, provides a quick reference as 

to how evenly the wealth of a country or region is distributed. 

A coefficient of 1.0 indicates perfect inequality (all the money 

is possessed by a single person), and a coefficient of 0.0 indicates perfect equality (every citizen possesses the same 

amount of wealth). It is with this economic indicator that we 

find our proverbial smoking gun of poverty within the LAC 

context. As one academic demonstrated, “Latin America is 

the most inequitable region worldwide, where no one single 
country reaches even the median level of the Gini of Sub 

Saharan Africa.”18 Moreover, the LAC region has consistently 

had household per-capita- income Gini coefficients greater 

than 0.50 as far back as these figures have been recorded, 

while other regions of the world have never had an average 

break the 0.50 level in any documented year.19 In comparison, most developed countries have a Gini coefficient in the 

0.30 to 0.40 range. To provide context to these figures, note 

that “the richest tenth of the people in the [LAC] region earn 

48 percent of total income, the poorest tenth earn only 1.6 

percent.”20 This equates to a 30-to-1 ratio—a distribution 

more lopsided than even the lyrics from the 1966 Beatles’ 

song “Taxman” envisioned. Alvaro Hurtado of the International Labour Organization states that the problem is only 

getting worse because “the region has shown the most regressive distribution of income of the world throughout the 

twentieth century.”21

Being poor is bad enough, but being poor and knowing 

that your neighbor has more money than he knows what to 

do with can make people jealous and angry and generate the 

urge to “correct” the situation. As a 2001 Latinobarómetro 

poll illustrates, almost 90 percent of LAC citizens think the 

income distribution in their country is either unfair or very 

unfair.22 According to Dr. Anthony Lott, this awareness of 

the inequalities that exist within their countries creates unrest in a way that poverty does not. He states that if all of 

a country’s citizens were poverty stricken (with a Gini coefficient of 0.0), they would not know what benefits increased 

wealth could bring them and, therefore, would not be upset 

by its absence. However, he continues, community members that can visualize their poverty through a comparison 

with the wealthiest 10 percent of their population will be 

much more likely to take action in an attempt to alleviate 

their unnecessary suffering.23 Such a scenario could certainly lead to a shift in the political landscape of a region to 

a party that is more traditionally associated with an equaldistribution-of-wealth platform (i.e., leftism). As Enrique ter 

Horst of the International Herald Tribune states, “The poor 

have also discovered the power of the vote, and developed a 

keen attachment to free elections.”24 To the LAC electorate, 

changing to a leftist government—rightly or wrongly—is 

menos mal (less bad) when compared to the status quo. 
In addition to searching for new leadership to correct the 

region’s wealth inequality, poverty-stricken LAC citizens 

are looking for alternate sources of income. Unfortunately 

for them, however, their once abundant supply of inwardbound foreign aid has significantly decreased as well.

Heavy-Handed Diplomacy

If Latin America’s unequal wealth distribution has provided the force necessary to create kinetic energy for change 

within the populace, then the United States’ foreign policy 

towards the region, specifically the conscious decision to 

lessen its amount of aid, has established direction. The 

resultant vector, however, is away from Latin America’s 

friendship with the United States and towards a leftist-led 

subregional unity. According to the US Agency for International Development’s (USAID) “Greenbook,” between the 

end of World War II and the breakup of the Soviet Bloc, the 

United States gave its fellow Americans more than $26 billion in order to offset pro-leftist funds from the Soviet Union 

and to protect US interests in the region.25 At its peak, the 

United States gave over $1.9 billion to Latin American 

countries in 1990 in order to ensure free-market democracies stayed in power, the eighth consecutive year of providing $1 billion or more. However, Big Brother’s aid dropped 

significantly following the fall of communism in Europe to a 

mere $695 million in 1996.26 Once the financial faucet was 

turned off from the left, it was no longer in the United 

States’ self-interest to supply the LAC countries with counterbalancing funds, especially in an era of competing priorities 

and limited financial resources.

Even worse for future relations, the United States is using its checkbook to coerce LAC leadership into falling in 

line with its own interests. Congress passed the American 

Servicemembers’ Protection Act in 2002 wherein it declared no US military personnel or government employee 

will stand trial in the International Criminal Court (ICC) 

for crimes delineated in the Rome Statute of the same year. 

“The law cuts off . . . aid to countries that are signatories” 

of the statute “unless the country has signed a so-called 

‘Article 98’ agreement, pledging not to seek prosecution of 

U.S. citizens in the ICC.”27 To date, “twelve Latin American 
countries have bucked pressure from the Bush Administration” to sign the immunity agreement,28 and “as a result, Washington has cut the funding it supplies to those 

nations.”29 Latin American nations have responded as one 

might expect to the threat of cuts in aid. Ecuadorian president Alfredo Palacio declared, “Absolutely no one is going 

to make me cower.” Costa Rican foreign minister Roberto 

Tovar called the immunity proposals “offensive” and added 

that “one can be poor, but dignified.”30

As another example of coercive tactics, US officials reportedly threatened to “impose economic sanctions and other 

punitive measures if [Daniel] Ortega was reelected” for another term as president of Nicaragua.31 Nicaraguans failed 

to heed this warning and elected Ortega to the presidency 

in November 2006, possibly as a direct reaction against US 

pressures. These examples of US foreign policy with respect 

to Latin America and the Caribbean are only some of the 

most egregious ones in a long history of heavy-handedness. 

Without recounting history, let it suffice to say the United 

States has been meddling in LAC internal politics since the 

Monroe Doctrine was first established, and the peoples of 

the region are starting to get annoyed by the constant interference coming from their bullying neighbor to the north. 

Columnist Niall Ferguson summed up the relationship very 

succinctly when he wrote, “The only Central American state 

that hasn’t found itself on the receiving end of at least one 

US military intervention is Costa Rica.”32

The United States’ lack of concern for anything other than 

its own self-interests has infuriated some Latin Americans, 

causing them to have a less than favorable opinion of their 

former close ally and financial supporter. A December 2004 

BBC/Globescan/Program on International Policy Attitudes 

poll shows most citizens from the four LAC countries who 

participated in the survey believe the United States has 

a “mostly negative influence in the world” and view Pres. 

George W. Bush’s reelection as “negative for peace and security in the world.”33 Similarly, as a 2006 Latinobarómetro 

poll reveals, “three out of every five Latin Americans distrust 

the United States.”34 However, as previously demonstrated 

with GDP-PPP per capita, dissecting the LAC population into 

the elites and general population exposes a huge division 

between their opinions. A September 2005 Miami Herald/
10

University of Miami Business School/Zogby International 

poll shows that “Latin America’s elites are more critical of 

the United States, and tend to describe themselves as more 

left of center than the rest of the population.”35 This survey 

of government officials, journalists, business executives, 

and academics from six LAC countries (Argentina, Brazil, 

Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela) shows “only one in 

four members of the Latin American elites held a favorable 

view of Bush.”36 A 2004 Latinobarómetro poll of the LAC’s 

general population “found that a majority picked the United 

States” when “asked to name their country’s ‘best friend in 

the world,’ ” compared to only 12 percent of elites who were 

asked a similar question in the 2005 Zogby poll.37 This juxtaposition of data leads the interpreter to conclude that the 

higher-educated elitists of LAC countries “tend to have the 

most negative views of the United States” while, as Marta 

Lagos explains, those with “the lowest education levels still 

believe in the American dream.”38 That being the case, the 

next obvious question needing to be studied is whether education levels in the region are rising or falling.

Knowledge Is Power

Since 1990, education measures of merit for Latin America 

and the Caribbean as a whole have steadily improved across 

the board. The region’s level of education is definitely improving, and in some areas the increases are keeping pace with 

those of the most advanced countries. The average schooling 

years of LAC countries from 1990 to 2000 increased from 5.2 

to 5.9. This increase of 0.7 years is exactly the same as the 

increase witnessed in economically advanced countries during the same period. In fact, LAC average years of schooling 

have increased every decade since 1960. Of the 22 countries 

examined for this research, 20 showed increases in their average schooling years from 1990 to 2000, with Peru being 

the most improved (5.9 years in 1990 to 7.3 years in 2000).39

Similar progress is seen in the region’s literacy rates. Adult 

literacy rates (ages 15 and older) increased in 16 of the 17 

countries where data was available, with Honduras showing 

the most improvement (68.1 percent in 1990 to 80 percent in 

2004) and Jamaica being the only regression (82.2 percent 

in 1990 to 79.9 percent in 2004).40 Likewise, youth literacy 
11

rates increased in all 16 countries where data was available, 

with Nicaragua leading the pack (68.2 percent in 1990 to 

86.2 percent in 2004).41

However, if a government’s expenditure percentage on education is a lead indicator for future education levels, the region may be heading into trouble. When education disbursements are measured as a percentage of total government 

expenditures, only five out of 10 countries showed an increase between 1991 and 2004. Percentages in Chile, Cuba, 

El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Paraguay went up while those in 

Costa Rica, Colombia, Jamaica, Panama, and Uruguay went 

down (no data was available for the remaining 12 countries). 

As a percentage of the GDP, the figures are only slightly better. Education disbursements between 1991 and 2004 went 

up for 11 of the 14 countries where data was available.42

As a region, LAC citizens are getting better educated (for 

now). Armed with this increased knowledge, acutely aware 

of their unequal financial situation, and tired of playing the 

subservient role to the United States’ perceived self-centered 

demands, Latin Americans are turning to new leaders to 

help them emerge from their currently deplorable situation. These populists, with their fresh ideas and sometimes 

strong anti-US rhetoric, are taking advantage of the situation and driving their countries leftward at a potentially 

alarming rate. The question of what this trend means for US 

national security should now be the primary concern for 

anyone who is watching with interest as the dominoes fall 

in Latin America.

“La Roma Americana”

In the cover letter for the 2006 National Security Strategy 

of the United States of America, President Bush wrote, “Our 

national security is founded upon two pillars.” Those pillars 

are then listed as “promoting freedom, justice and dignity” 

and “leading a growing community of democracies.” His 

justification for linking world democracies to US national 

security is that “free governments do not . . . attack each 

other.”43 A similar statement exists in the introduction section to the February 2003 National Strategy for Combating 

Terrorism, wherein President Bush explains that one of the 

keys to defeating terrorism is to “integrate nations and peoples 
12

into the mutually beneficial democratic relationships that 

protect against the forces of disorder and violence.”44 It is 

clear from these documents that the Bush administration 

is linking democratic societies to world peace in general 

and US national security specifically. However, the wave of 

leftism that we are currently witnessing in the LAC region 

is the result of democracy.45 An electorate freely choosing to 

vote anyone into office, even a leftist, is demonstrating democracy in action. As Ferguson explains, “Democracy doesn’t 

always produce liberal governments.”46 As a result, the 

United States’ national security can be described by some 

as being more tenuous today than it was before the current 

trend began. 

The Cuban constitution of 1976 called for the “integration of Latin America and Caribbean nations” against, 

among other things, “imperialism”—or as Cuban Independence hero José Martí quipped, “la Roma Americana.”47

Now, over 30 years later, we are witnessing such a union 

in the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, which was 

“conceived as a much larger process of alternative integration for Latin America and the Caribbean,”48 and the Sao 

Paulo Forum, which is described as “a Castro-inspired international group of rogue states and terrorist groups.”49

Although democratic, this “alternative integration” may be 

translating into a less secure environment for the United 

States through a larger anti-US coalition in Latin America 

that has increased connections with international terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah, and more formal relations with countries that are adversarial to the United 

States, like Iran. 

Hezbollah, the self-proclaimed “Party of God,” is an organization that is well known throughout the world for its 

terrorist intent towards the state of Israel and its Western 

allies, but Hezbollah’s global connections, specifically those 

in the LAC region, may be lesser known. “Its chief sponsor 

is the Islamic Republic of Iran, which provides major financial support as well as weapons and paramilitary training. 

Syria . . . also lends substantial support.”50 Venezuela can 

be added to that list. Hezbollah has “been using Venezuela—mostly Margarita Island and Maracaibo . . . to focus on 

illicit financial dealings and counterfeiting.”51 “After Chavez 

visited Lebanon last summer, a Hezbollah official told an 
13

Indian newspaper, ‘Mr. Chavez is closer to us than any 

other Arab leader’ ”—but Hezbollah is not the only terror 

group Venezuela is engaged with these days.52 According 

to Gen James Hill, former head of the US Southern Command, Margarita Island (Venezuela) is also a known location for other terrorist support cells, such as Hamas and 

Islamiyya al Gammat.53 Another former head of US Southern Command, Gen Gary Speer, testified before the Senate 

Armed Services Committee in March 2002 that he was “very 

concerned about President Chavez [since] the FARC [Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] operates at will across the 

border into Venezuela.”54 The FARC is a guerrilla terrorist 

organization that protects drug cartels and whose ultimate 

goal is to overthrow Colombia’s democratically elected proUS government and replace it with its own Marxist-style 

(leftist) government.55

In addition to providing safe refuge, the Venezuelan government has supplied thousands of national identification 

cards, called cedulas, “to people from Cuba, Colombia, and 

Middle Eastern ‘countries of interest’ like Syria, Egypt, Pakistan and Lebanon that host foreign terrorist organizations.”56

These cedulas can be used to obtain Venezuelan passports, 

which can then be used to obtain travel visas to other countries and thereby possibly avoid red flags during immigration 

checks.57 In February 2003, Hasil Mohamad Rahaman, who 

carried an authentic Venezuelan passport, was arrested at 

London’s Gatwick Airport because he “was caught carrying 

a live hand grenade in his carry-on bag shortly after arriving 

from Caracas. Security experts believe he intended to detonate it aboard the plane or at the airport.”58

Venezuela, unfortunately, is just the tip of the proverbial 

iceberg when it comes to harboring members of international terror organizations in Latin America. “Hezbollah has 

long used parts of South America as a training ground, in 

particular the tri-border area where Brazil, Argentina, and 

Paraguay meet.”59 The tri-border region is a near lawless 

part of the world, “which according to U.S. and Argentine 

officials has an Arab population of more than 20,000.”60 The 

sheer numbers of reported relations between LAC countries 

and terrorist groups is unsettling and raises the level of concern for the overall national security of the United States. 
14

Moreover, the overt agreements between LAC countries and 

states that are seen as rivals with the United States on the 

world stage add another layer of apprehension.

Known by the Company You Keep

Most people would not find it surprising to hear that Cuba’s Castro “maintains close ties with many terror groups 

and rogue states such as Iran and North Korea.”61 However, what might be shocking are the connections between 

the new Latin American leftists and countries that are seen 

as adversaries to the United States. “In 2001, Chavez paid 

state visits to and signed ‘cooperation agreements’ with 

Libya, Iraq and Iran” and “condemned America’s Afghanistan campaign as ‘fighting terrorism with terrorism.’ ”62

These events were in conjunction with his providing “$1 million to al-Qaida soon after the Sept. 11 attacks.”63 During a 

showdown with the United States over making progress in 

the area of nuclear power, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad completed “a whirlwind series of meetings with 

Latin America’s newly inaugurated leftist leaders,” paying 

visits to the leaders of Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and 

Bolivia. During this tour, the Iranian leader pledged “deeper 

ties” and promised “to spend billions of dollars financing 

projects in other countries to combat global influence of 

their common enemy, the United States.”64 Attempting to 

drive a wedge between the United States and the rest of the 

Americas, Ahmadinejad said, “The imperialists don’t like us 

to help you progress and develop. They don’t like us to get 

rid of poverty and unite people.”65 The Iranian president 

appears to be utilizing the media to underscore his discontent with US foreign policies, much like we are currently 

witnessing in the LAC region.

While Iran’s partnerships in the LAC region seem to have 

been designed to gain international attention, China has 

attempted to maintain a low profile while building a supportive coalition based on trade. Noticeably, however, “more 

and more Latin American countries are taking exception 

with Washington’s economic prescriptions and those of 

the International Monetary Fund. Some are strengthening 

ties with China, which is investing heavily in the region.”66

In 2004 Chinese president Hu Jintao paid state visits to 
15

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba “where he signed 16 

bilateral trade agreements.”67 Chinese trade has recently 

expanded in almost every LAC country.68 “Economic necessities have convinced many Latin American and Caribbean 

countries that trade with China provides a good counterbalance to trade asymmetry with the United States.”69

Arguably, simple trade agreements between the region 

and China is nothing for the United States to be worried 

about, but other joint projects (such as military research 

and development) and the building of strong relationships 

that threaten the current balance of power at the United 

Nations (UN) can be reason for concern. Alejandro Kenny 

observes that Brazil and China “work closely in the aerospace arena. They jointly developed and launched two research satellites and plan to launch another two by 2008.” 

Moreover, “Chinese military delegations have visited Latin 

America to gain experience in a number of areas.” Kenny 

adds that the LAC region and China have had several militaryrelated exchanges recently, including visits by ministers of 

defense and other high-ranking military officials, a threemonth military doctrine and national defense course held 

in Beijing, and a seminar in China for high-level military 

officers from Latin America regarding the future between 

China and the region. Additionally, aside from the military dealings, “China’s relations with Latin America support other Chinese goals, such as the diplomatic isolation 

of Taiwan,” and “the significant Latin American voting bloc 

in the U.N. also stirs Chinese interest.”70 A LAC region sympathetic to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) argument 

that Taiwan is part of mainland China could be detrimental to the United States should the need arise to garner 

support at the UN for defense of the island. In addition to 

relationships external to the region, internal controversies 

between governments could destabilize the current level of 

peace and lead to inter-American fighting. 

Regional Destabilization

Although Hugo Chavez is dishing out millions of barrels 

of oil at reduced cost and gobbling up the debt of fellow 

regional leftists (Argentina and Ecuador), he is not as well 

liked outside Venezuela and Cuba as one might be led to 
16

believe.71 Both his actions and his words are beginning to 

wear thin the patience of Americans on both sides of the Rio 

Grande. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called Venezuela’s Chavez a “destabilizing force” within the Latin American 

region.72 Former US intelligence chief, now deputy secretary 

of state, John Negroponte testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he thinks Chavez’s “behavior 

is threatening to democracies in the region.”73 Former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld compared Chavez to “the 

original National Socialist, Adolf Hitler.”74 Significantly, outside the US government the criticisms are similarly harsh, 

and often from fellow leftists. Peru’s president, Alan Garcia, 

said Chavez “speaks under the influence of ‘too much 

rum.’ ”75 Juan Forero writes in the New York Times that this 

followed the decision of Peru’s previous president, Alejandro 

Toledo, to recall his country’s ambassador to Venezuela due 

to “flagrant interference” in Peru’s internal affairs. Former 

Mexican foreign minister Jorge Castañeda agrees, saying 

Chavez “goes around shooting from the hip and shooting 

his mouth off, and that causes tensions.” Peruvian, Mexican, Nicaraguan, and Brazilian officials “have expressed 

rising impatience at what they see as Mr. Chavez’s meddling and grandstanding, often at their expense,” the article 

continues. Moreover, Riordan Roett, the director of Latin 

American studies at Johns Hopkins University’s School of 

Advanced International Studies, believes Chavez “is beginning to overreach, wanting to be involved in everything.” 

Brazil’s foreign minister, Celso Amorim, testified before his 

nation’s senators that Pres. Lula da Silva “had admonished 

the Venezuelan leader in a private phone call” after being 

publicly humiliated, Forero adds.76

It appears Chavez’s regional popularity may be suffering due to the same reasons the United States’ has in 

the past—interfering in a sovereign state’s internal affairs 

tends to make people not like you. These intergovernmental 

disagreements may be translating into a less stable Latin 

America. However, some still tolerate Chavez because he “is 

sitting on top of 6.5% of the world’s proven oil reserves” and 

is willing to share the profits no matter the economic cost 

to his own country—but even those “friendships” may last 

only as long as oil prices are high.77
17

Chavez’s protégé, Bolivia’s leftist president Evo Morales, 

is probably Chavez’s closest ally behind Castro, but even 

Morales is beginning to experience chaffing with fellow leftists over his trade and industry decisions, which may lead 

to an economic downturn for numerous countries in the 

region. Morales won the presidency campaigning on the 

promise to legalize the cultivation of coca (the prime ingredient required for making cocaine) and to take state control 

over the oil and natural gas industry. “Any and all of these 

steps,” write New York Times reporters Juan Forero and 

Larry Rohter, “could unsettle Washington and the region.” 

They note that among the many countries watching this 

development with concern is Brazil since “about half the 

natural gas consumed in Brazil comes from Bolivia,” where 

a state-run oil and gas industry will most assuredly cause 

export prices to rise. Brazil also “worries about rising drug 

and crime problems in its urban slums if Bolivia’s coca crop 

is not controlled.”78 Ferero and Rohter report that Argentina had a long-standing deal with Bolivian governments 

to receive “gas at below market prices,” but Morales said 

recently that he “planned to end that arrangement.”79

Like Chavez, Morales does not seem to care whom he offends with his words. The Bolivian president recently called 

President Bush a “terrorist” and said the United States 

“wants to convert Chile into the Israel of Latin America”—a 

statement that brought ire from all three countries simultaneously.80 A former llama herder and the country’s first 

indigenous leader, Morales believes “the state needs to be 

the central actor to plan economic development.”81 Unfortunately for Bolivians and their neighbors, President Morales 

has experience with neither economics nor diplomacy—two 

things that are essential for good economic planning. If 

there is any silver lining to this leftist cloud hanging over 

Latin America, it lies in the fact that most of the region’s 

leftists are not practicing true leftism—at least in global 

economic terms.

Leftist in Name Only

Besides Latin America’s “Axis of Evil” (Cuba, Venezuela, 

and Bolivia), most of the region’s governments appear to be 

“leftist in name only” (LINO) opportunists who campaigned as 
18

leftists in order to garner support and votes. In the United 

States they would be called “Blue Dog Democrats,” but in 

their home countries they are called populists, democratic 

socialists, or just plain leftists. Latin Americans, despite 

their opinions of President Bush and the United States, 

understand what is needed to get their countries out of 

poverty. According to a Latinobarómetro survey, “63 percent of the citizens in the region agreed that the market 

economy was the only means to develop their countries.” 

Furthermore, two conservative administrations, Colombia and Mexico, and two leftist administrations, Chile and 

Brazil, have all produced “governments that will persist 

on their current path of fiscal responsibility and continued 

integration into the global economy.”82 Chilean socialist Michelle Bachelet has “repeatedly emphasized her commitment to following and expanding the pro-market, free-trade 

economic model pursued by the past three governments,” 

while Brazilian president da Silva “has also proven to be a 

market champion.”83 Brazil and Uruguay “practice the kind 

of fiscal restraints accepted by Wall Street.”84 The “Brazilian Model,” as described by one journalist, “is characterized 

by . . . increasing flows of domestic and foreign investment 

that create well-paying jobs and more exports.”85 Even 

Nicaragua’s leftist president Ortega, a living icon of US intervention into LAC internal affairs, is believed to be promarket these days. Newsweek’s Joseph Contreras writes 

that Ortega has “promised to respect private property” and 

to “keep inflation in check.” Furthermore, a senior policy 

analyst for the Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington-based think tank, agrees that the members of Ortega’s party are “much more centrist and recognize that markets and democracy have their place.”86

As with most of these LINO governments, “Peru has followed the road of political openness and free market reforms for its own good and not to please Washington.”87

However, the executive director of Bolivia’s Democracy Center, Jim Schultz, believes “there’s a common thread that 

runs through [these new leftist governments] to a certain 

degree, and that thread is a popular challenge to the market fundamentalism of the Washington Consensus.”88 These 

governments are making a clear and striking distinction 

between Washington’s view of free trade and that which is 
19

required to pump life back into Latin American economies. 

Long gone are the days when Washington could insist on 

LAC countries signing a trade agreement that showed favoritism to US products. Latin Americans have figured out 

they can trade with each other or with other economies that 

are growing increasingly large (e.g., China and India). When 

the US and USSR foreign-aid spigots ran dry, LAC countries scrambled to find other means of economic flow, and 

they found it in foreign trade. Now, the United States is left 

trying to figure out exactly how to win back the trust of its 

fellow Americans.

Conclusions and Policy Proposals

This paper has demonstrated that Latin Americans are 

increasingly more educated and acutely aware of their extreme 

inequality. In addition, the region’s citizens have taken a 

stance against the arm-twisting diplomatic tactics used by 

the United States. Americans south of the Rio Grande want 

equality, both monetary and social, and they are desperate 

to find the next Simón Bolivar—a liberator who can lead 

them to this ultimate goal.

The effect of this leftward trend on the national security of 

the United States is more complicated and requires a much 

more detailed and lengthy analysis. Venezuela’s Chavez and 

Bolivia’s Morales were each democratically elected but have 

since harbored terror organizations, cultivated relations with 

US adversaries, and created tensions with their neighboring 

countries. From that perspective, the national security of the 

United States is threatened, and it calls into question President Bush’s assertion that democracies increase world peace 

and enhance US national security. However, it is promising 

to note that six of the nine leftist governments in Latin America practice capitalist-like economic policies. These LINO 

governments are creating tighter bonds among many countries in the Western Hemisphere. In spite of Chavez’s rhetoric, even “Venezuela’s own trade with the United States is 

booming like never before.”89 When considering Thomas 

Friedman’s “Golden Arches theory of conflict prevention,” 

the region as a whole may actually be more secure than it 

was before the Bolivarian Revolution began. His theory provides the astute realization that “no two countries that both 
20

had McDonald’s had fought a war against each other 

since each got its McDonald’s.”90 The reason is because globalization, the practice that creates interconnected economies, discourages war due to the effect it has on the global 

economy and, thus, the attacking country’s own economy.91

As a potential threat of nuclear exchange during the Cold 

War brought about the theory of a mutually assured destruction (if either side launched a nuclear strike, both sides 

would be destroyed), war in the era of globalization brings us 

to a mutually assured economic destruction (if any globalized country attacks another globalized country, both will 

suffer economically).

Since the quantification of US national security is beyond the scope of this paper, the impact of these trends is 

left to be determined by future research. Instead, suffice 

it to say the national security of the United States will be 

dramatically affected by its future actions, including in its 

own hemisphere, and it must therefore consider carefully 

the implications of its policies. There are three such actions 

which, if put into practice, should tip the scale in favor of a 

more peaceful and economically profitable hemisphere.

The United States is at least partially responsible for 

the current situation in Latin America and the Caribbean 

through its inattention to the needs of its neighbors. Fortunately, it is not too late to correct these conditions. The steps 

the United States needs to take in order to get back into 

good graces with its neighbors south of the Rio Grande are 

to pioneer better (more fair) trade agreements, attach more 

appropriate stipulations to foreign aid, and work harder at 

creating better diplomatic relations. These actions, in conjunction with Latin America’s continuing commitment to 

equalizing the region’s distribution of wealth, will get Latin 

America back on track to becoming more economically 

sound and solidify the region’s democratic foundation.

There are numerous free-trade agreements either already 

in effect or in the planning stages. The North American 

Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Central American Free 

Trade Agreement (CAFTA), and the numerous smaller ones 

are often chastised by some extreme leftists (i.e., Chavez 

et al.) as having a favorable slant towards the imperialistic 

United States. Subsidies, although a seemingly trifling act 

of nationalism to most US citizens, impact the sale of Latin 
21

American and Caribbean goods more significantly, with 

specificity towards LAC’s poorest workers—its farmers. Redrawing free-trade agreements to include verbiage seeking 

to eliminate all subsidies will create a more level playing 

field for Latin American farmers and assist in increasing 

their wealth. However, given the current state of affairs, 

even a level playing field may not be enough to jump-start 

the economic turnaround required in the poorest sectors 

of Latin America’s economy. Quite possibly what will be required is an agreement that grants a temporary lopsided 

trade balance in favor of the poorer countries—similar to 

parts of the Marshall Plan of 1947. For example, a five-year 

unbalanced trade agreement will give the smaller, poorer 

markets in LAC countries the advantage they need to get 

themselves caught up to the rest of the world with respect 

to infrastructures associated with large-scale economic operations. This initial five-year plan should then be followed 

by a level field for all participants that will carry on until 

the end of the signed agreement (20 years maximum). At 

the conclusion of this 20-year cycle, the countries can then 

assess the effectiveness of their trade agreement and make 

adjustments necessary for future ones. 

Complementary to the new trade agreement, the United 

States needs to restart its foreign aid to the Latin American 

region but with stipulations that are more appropriate than 

those used in the past. Instead of associating monetary assistance with votes for pro-US political parties, these moneys 

should be earmarked for items that will directly affect economic stimulation. For example, foreign aid given to a LAC 

country that will be used for building better roads, bridges, 

seaports or airports, communications, and rail systems will 

pay dividends in two ways. First, it will put people to work in 

the construction of their new infrastructure. Second, when 

completed, these items will increase business productivity 

and allow those citizens who are currently isolated miles 

away from their country’s closest means of exportation to link 

up with the world economy. This is much like Pres. Franklin 

Roosevelt’s New Deal plan, which was a major contributor to 

the United States’ emergence from the depression years. The 

ultimate goal is to perpetuate growth in the region—better 

infrastructure leads to economic development, which leads 

to more jobs being created, which leads to the need for more 
22

and better infrastructures. Additionally, part of that aid can 

be used to assist Latin Americans in getting plugged into the 

World Wide Web where LAC’s entrepreneurs can more easily 

compete for contracts they are currently excluded from due 

to limitations in connectivity.

Lastly, but probably the most important piece to this diplomatic puzzle, the United States needs to work harder at 

being a good neighbor. Hurricane Stan slammed Central 

America in October 2005 during that region’s rainy season. 

Mudslides and severe flooding brought by the hurricane 

combined with the region’s recent earthquakes and volcanic activity to kill nearly 1,000 and displace over one million. Karen Hughes, undersecretary of state for public diplomacy, visited Guatemala, the country hardest hit, shortly 

afterwards “virtually empty-handed,” according to Lisa 

Haugaard in Tarnished Image. The Bush administration 

“did not choose to provide a new, substantial aid package” 

but decided instead to redirect existing aid. This response 

“stood in considerable contrast to the U.S. response to Hurricane Mitch [in 1998] . . . (when aid reached $750 million) 

and did not escape notice in the Central American press,” 

says Haugaard. At a press conference during her visit to 

Guatemala, Hughes denied temporary protected status to 

Guatemalans living in the United States, which would have 

allowed them to send “$2 billion in annual remittances to 

their families . . . thus contributing to the relief effort,” nor 

did she announce any reconstruction aid package. All this 

took place on the heels of Hurricane Katrina when “many 

Latin American nations rushed to offer something, even if 

only symbolic, to their powerful neighbor.”92 Certainly an 

opportunity to give the impression of friendship was lost 

with this display of callousness. Like familiarity, insensitivity breeds contempt. With diplomacy like this, Oppenheimer 

surmises that “you don’t have to be a genius to figure out 

why Washington is losing influence in Latin America.”93

Instead of building metaphorical bridges, the United 

States is spending billions of dollars constructing a barrier 

of steel and concrete between it and the rest of the Americas 

in an attempt to stymie the flow of illegal immigrants across 

the US-Mexican border. Diplomatically speaking, this is a 

slap in the face of every Latin American. Moreover, as evidenced by similar events throughout history (for example, 
23

the walls of Troy, 1200 BC; Berlin Wall, 1962; Gaza Strip, 

1994; and West Bank walls in Israel, 2002), humans are 

intelligent enough to figure out ways around obstacles that 

stand between them and what they strongly desire. Unfortunately, the symbolic nature of the wall, separating the 

“rich Americans” from the “poor Americans,” will only drive 

deeper the existing wedge between the two sides—further 

exasperating any attempt to reunite the Americas. This is 

exactly the type of diplomatic nightmare that is fueling the 

flames of leftism throughout the region, and it is what the 

United States needs to stop doing in order to increase its 

own national security.

One of the widely publicized reasons Latin American immigrants enter the United States is lack of opportunity to 

earn a decent living in their former country. Increasing job 

growth and redistributing wealth within the LAC region will 

help keep Latin Americans at home. Logic dictates that reducing the number of illegal immigrants attempting to enter 

the United States will make it easier for customs officials 

and border patrols to interdict shipments of illegal goods 

and defend against potential terrorist infiltration, thus 

making the United States more secure in the long run. 

It appears as though the self-interest tactics displayed by 

the United States over the previous 50 years have allowed it 

to get its way during small points of contention but lose the 

big picture with regard to its own national security. Diplomatically and strategically, the United States is winning the 

battle but losing the war.

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate 

entry in the bibliography.)

1. Navarrette, “A Tall Order,” 14.

2. For simplification, the scope of this research paper has been limited 

to these countries in the Caribbean, South America, and Central America, 

which are sovereign states and whose population exceeds one million: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican 

Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 

Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

3. These are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela. MSNBC, “Leftward Tilt.”
24

4. These include Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, 

Hungary, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia.

5. US Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans.

6. Yassin, “Impact of Structural Adjustment Policies,” 315.

7. Autocracies are not to be confused with populist governments of 

recent LAC fame whose presidential candidate promises to support the 

poorer citizens in their struggle against privileged elitists.

8. For the remainder of this paper the term “leftism” or “leftist” will be 

used to describe all forms of government that fall on the left side of this 

spectrum and result in a state-run economy.

9. Turner, Statesman’s Yearbook.

10. His last term in office lasted only 11 days (1–11 October 1968).

11. Forero and Rohter, “Bolivia’s Leader Solidifies.”

12. Ferguson, “Want Historic Trouble?”

13. Examples include the French Revolution (1789) and the Russian 

Revolution (1917).

14. Oppenheimer, “Latin American Elites.”

15. These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech 

Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 

Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.

16. Watkins, Beyond Scarcity, 334. The GDP-PPP for East Asia and the 

Pacific is $5,872; Arab States, $5,680; and South Asia, $3,072 (ibid.).

17. Ibid.

18. Yassin, “Impact of Structural Adjustment,” 315.

19. De Ferranti et al., Inequality in Latin America, 416.

20. Ibid., 17.

21. Hurtado, Social Dimension of Globalization, 2.

22. De Ferranti et al., Inequality in Latin America, 407.

23. Lott, “Security Issues in Latin America.”

24. Ter Horst, “Turning Left.”

25. The Greenbook’s official name is The US Overseas Loans and 

Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations; it documents US foreign aid.

26. USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants. The rise in US foreign aid 

to the LAC region following 1996 is due almost entirely to an increase in 

funding for the war on drugs (i.e., Plan Colombia).

27. Haugaard, Tarnished Image, 10.

28. “Of the 22 countries worldwide currently prohibited from receiving 

assistance, twelve are in Latin America and the Caribbean: Barbados, Bolivia, 

Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, St. Vincent and the 

Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela” (ibid., 11).

29. Starr, “How the U.S. Went Wrong.”

30. Haugaard, Tarnished Image, 12–13.

31. Aizenman, “Ortega Set to Reclaim.”

32. Ferguson, “Want Historic Trouble?”

33. Countries with negative views of the United States are Argentina, 

65 percent; Brazil, 51 percent; Chile, 50 percent; and Mexico, 57 percent. 

Those that view President Bush as a negative world influence are Argen-
25

tina, 79 percent; Brazil, 78 percent; Chile, 62 percent; and Mexico, 58 

percent. Haugaard, Tarnished Image, 6.

34. Bachelet, “Bush Aide Seeks Better U.S. Image.”

35. Oppenheimer, “Latin American Elites.”

36. Bachelet, “Bush Aide Seeks Better U.S. Image.”

37. Oppenheimer, “Latin American Elites.”

38. Ibid.

39. De Ferranti et al., Inequality in Latin America, 421. Paraguay is a 

slight exception, dropping from 5.8 to 5.7 years; no data was available for 

Cuba.

40. Ibid. No adult literacy data was available for El Salvador, Haiti, 

Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay. No youth literacy data was 

available for these same countries, plus Jamaica.

41. Ibid.

42. Percentages in Nicaragua, Panama, and Uruguay declined. No data 

was available for the remaining eight countries. Watkins, Beyond Scarcity, 

323–26.

43. Bush, National Security Strategy, cover letter.

44. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 3.

45. The recent election of Hamas as head of the Palestinian Authority 

is another example.

46. Ferguson, “Want Historic Trouble?”

47. Salazar, “Cuba’s Foreign Policy.”

48. Monreal, “Cuban Development.” 

49. Crespo, “Other ‘Axis of Evil.’ ”

50. Emerson, “Blood Money.” 

51. Crespo, “Other ‘Axis of Evil.’ ”

52. Robinson, “Terror Close to Home.”

53. Ibid.

54. Crespo, “Venezuela.”

55. Bennett and Webster, “Inside the Revolutionary Armed Forces.” 

56. Crespo, “Venezuela.” 

57. Ibid.

58. Crespo, “Other ‘Axis of Evil.’ ” 

59. Emerson, “Blood Money.” 

60. Crespo, “Other ‘Axis of Evil.’ ” 

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Carl, “Iran Leader Courts Latin America Allies.”

65. Ibid.

66. Forero and Rohter, “Bolivia’s Leader Solidifies.”

67. Kenny, “China’s Presence in Latin America,” 61. Adm Alejandro 

Kenny, Argentine navy, retired, is the former commandant of the Argentine Southern Naval Zone at Ushuaia, Tierra del Fuego, and is currently 

serving as an advisor on policy and strategy to the Argentine naval and 

combined general staffs.

68. Chinese trade is up 36 percent with Cuba in 2004, up 44 percent with Mexico in 2004, up 69 percent with Brazil in 2003 (China’s 

number-one trading partner), and up 50 percent with Chile in 2004 (the 
26

first Latin American country to sign a free-trade agreement with the PRC). 

Ibid., 61–62.

69. Kenny, “China’s Presence in Latin America,” 61.

70. Ibid., 64, 66.

71. Starr, “How the U.S. Went Wrong.”

72. Forero, “Opposition to U.S.”

73. Reuters, “Chavez Poses Threat.”

74. Carl, “Latin American Leftists.”

75. Oppenheimer, “In Latin America.”

76. Forero, “Seeking United Latin America.”

77. Ferguson, “Want Historic Trouble?”

78. Brazil is the “world’s second-largest cocaine-consuming country.” 

Oppenheimer, “In Latin America.”

79. Forero and Rohter, “Bolivia’s Leader Solidifies.”

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. Sabatini and Farnsworth, “Latin America’s Lurch.”

83. Ibid.

84. Forero, “Elections Could Tilt.”

85. Ter Horst, “Turning Left?”

86. Contreras, “Call of the Radical Center.”

87. Oppenheimer, “Vote on Peru Trade Deal.”

88. Forero, “Elections Could Tilt.”

89. Oppenheimer, “In Latin America.”

90. Friedman, Lexus and the Olive Tree, 248–75. Friedman observes 

that “Argentina didn’t get its first McDonald’s until 1986, four years after” 

it fought the Falklands War against Great Britain (ibid., 249).

91. Ibid., 248–­75.

92. Haugaard, Tarnished Image, 15.

93. Oppenheimer, “Chávez Making Friends.”
27

Bibliography

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