RUNWAY SAFETY 

(110–99) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

AVIATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 13, 2008 

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RUNWAY SAFETY 

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RUNWAY SAFETY 

(110–99) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

AVIATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 13, 2008 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Vice 

Chair 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

NICK LAMPSON, Texas 

ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN J. HALL, New York 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

VACANCY 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

TED POE, Texas 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

THELMA D. DRAKE, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

VACANCY 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois, Chairman 

BOB FILNER, California 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

NICK LAMPSON, Texas 

ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

JOHN J. HALL, New York, Vice Chair 

STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

LAURA A. RICHARDSON, California 

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota 

(Ex Officio) 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

TED POE, Texas 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York 

LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

VERN BUCHANAN, Florida 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

(Ex Officio) 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vii 

TESTIMONY 

Barimo, Basil J., Vice President, Operations and Safety, Air Transport Association of America ................................................................................................ 29 

Boyer, Phil, President, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association .......................... 29 

Dillingham, Dr. Gerald, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 4 

Duval, John K., A.A.E., Airport Safety and Security Coordinator, Beverly 

Municipal Airport and Former Deputy Director for Aviation and Operations, Massachusetts Port Authority and American Association of Airport 

Executives ............................................................................................................. 29 

Forrey, Patrick, President, National Air Traffic Controllers Association ........... 29 

Krakowski, Hank, Chief Operating Officer, Air Traffic Organization, Federal 

Aviation Administration, accompanied by Jim Ballough, Director, Flight 

Standards Service, Federal Aviation Administration ....................................... 4 

Kallenbach, T.K., Vice President, Marketing and Product Management, Honeywell Aerospace .................................................................................................. 29 

Prater, Captain John, President, Air Line Pilots Association ............................. 29 

Principato, Greg, President, Airports Council International—North America ... 29 

Scovel, III, Hon. Calvin L., Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation ..................................................................................................................... 4 

Sumwalt, Hon. Robert L., Vice Chairman, National Transportation Safety 

Board ..................................................................................................................... 4 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri ......................................................................... 51 

Cohen, Hon. Steve, of Tennessee ............................................................................ 52 

Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois .......................................................................... 53 

Hall, Hon. John J., of New York ............................................................................ 60 

Mitchell, Hon. Harry E., of Arizona ....................................................................... 61 

Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota ................................................................. 63 

Salazar, Hon. John T., of Colorado ........................................................................ 67 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Barimo, Basil J. ....................................................................................................... 69 

Boyer, Phil ................................................................................................................ 75 

Dillingham, Gerald L. ............................................................................................. 112 

Duval, John K. ......................................................................................................... 227 

Forrey, Patrick ......................................................................................................... 241 

Kallenbach, T.K. ...................................................................................................... 251 

Krakowski, Hank ..................................................................................................... 271 

Prater, John ............................................................................................................. 297 

Principato, Greg ....................................................................................................... 309 

Scovel III, Hon. Calvin L. ....................................................................................... 318 

Sumwalt, Robert L. .................................................................................................. 346 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Dillingham, Dr. Gerald, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office: 

Response to question from Rep. Costello ........................................................... 8 

Response to question from Rep. Richardson ...................................................... 20 

‘‘Aviation Runway and Ramp Safety,’’ United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requesters ....................................... 135 

Page

VI 

Krakowski, Hank, Chief Operating Officer, Air Traffic Organization, Federal 

Aviation Administration: 

Responses to questions from Rep. Duncan and Rep. Richardson .................... 291 

Responses to questions from Rep. Moore via Rep. Petri ................................... 294 

vii 


40816.001
viii 


40816.002
ix 


40816.003
x 


40816.004
xi 


40816.005
xii 


40816.006
xiii 


40816.007
xiv 


40816.008
xv 


40816.009
xvi 


40816.010
xvii 


40816.011
(1) 

HEARING ON RUNWAY SAFETY 

Wednesday, February 13, 2008 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Jerry F. 

Costello [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Subcommittee will come to order. 

The Chair will ask all Members, staff and everyone to turn electronic devices off or on vibrate. 

The Subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on runway 

safety. I will give a brief opening statement and then yield to the 

Ranking Member, Mr. Petri, for his opening statement or any remarks he may have, and then we will go to our first panel of witnesses. 

I welcome everyone to our hearing today on runway safety. This 

hearing highlights the Subcommittee’s responsibility to ensure that 

the FAA is fulfilling its duties to provide comprehensive safety 

oversight in every aspect of the aviation system including runway 

safety. 

While the United States has the safest air transportation system 

in the world, we can’t rely on or be satisfied with our past success. 

We must continue to strive for greater success because one accident 

or near accident is one too many, especially when the FAA is predicting a tripling of passengers and cargo by the year 2025. 

Late last year, the Government Accountability Office, the GAO, 

issued its report on runway and ramp safety which Chairman 

Oberstar and I requested. We will hear from Dr. Dillingham and 

others concerning the GAO report. 

According to the GAO, the rate of runway incursions in fiscal 

year 2007 increased to 6.05 incidents per million operations. This 

is a 12 percent increase over 2006 and the highest since 2001 when 

the rate reached 6.1 incidents per million operations. 

While the number of severe runway incursions dropped from 53 

incidents in 2001 to 24 in 2007, in the first quarter of fiscal year 

2008 alone, there have been 10 severe runway incursions. This is 

simply unacceptable. 

The GAO has stated that the FAA’s lack of leadership on this 

issue, including a director level vacancy in the Office of Runway 

Safety for over two years and an out of date national runway safety 

plan has impeded further progress. While the FAA has finally filled 

its Runway Safety Office Director position, this Subcommittee 

2 

wants to know what the FAA’s plan is on a national level to improve runway safety. 

To ensure this issue remains at the forefront of the FAA safety 

agenda, I want the FAA to provide a progress report to this Subcommittee every three months, detailing each Category A and B 

runway incursion, how the FAA responded and what progress is 

being made to address these incidents and reduce the overall number of runway incursions. 

The GAO also cited controller fatigue as a major factor in runway safety, and I am interested in hearing more from our witnesses including Mr. Pat Forrey, the President of the National Air 

Traffic Controllers Association, on this issue. 

Around the Country, controllers are working longer hours to handle increasingly congested runways and airspace in part because of 

staffing shortages. While the FAA may not admit that there is a 

problem, I can assure you, after talking to all of the users of the 

system, there is a problem. 

In addition to the 10 severe runway incursions in the first quarter of fiscal year 2008, there was also a near miss at the Chicago 

center in December of 2007. This should serve as a wake-up call 

to the aviation community that something needs to be done now to 

avoid a major disaster in the near future. 

Human factors will always be a challenge, but with enough redundancy worked into the system, using technologies like the ones 

we will hear about today, we will be able to mitigate their effects. 

I am interested in learning more about near and long term technologies such as ASDE-X, runway safety lights and low cost surveillance systems. 

In H.R. 2881, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2007 which passed 

the House of Representatives on September 20th of 2007 and has 

yet to be acted on by the Senate, we included provisions to address 

runway safety. H.R. 2881 provides $42 million over 4 years for runway incursion reduction programs and $74 million over 4 years for 

runway status light acquisition and installation. Further, it requires the Administrator to submit a report to Congress, containing 

a strategic runway safety plan and a plan for the installation and 

deployment of systems to alert controller and flight crews to potential runway incursions. 

Safety must not be compromised in an effort to save money or 

because of a lack of resources or attention. The FAA and the aviation community must do better. 

I assure you that this Subcommittee will keep the FAA’s feet to 

the fire to keep safety efforts on track. The American traveling 

public deserves nothing less. 

With that, I will recognize our Ranking Member for his opening 

statement, but before I do I ask unanimous consent to allow two 

weeks for all Members to revise and extend their remarks and to 

permit the submission of additional statements and materials by 

Members and witnesses. Without objection, so ordered. 

At this time, the Chair recognized the Ranking Member, Mr. 

Petri. 

Mr. PETRI. I thank Chairman Costello, and I would like to thank 

our witnesses for appearing before the Subcommittee today to disVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:04 Feb 23, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40816 JASON
3 

cuss the important aviation safety matter that is before us, and 

that is the issue of runway safety. 

Though we are currently in the safest period in aviation history, 

as long as human beings endeavor to take to the skies, there will 

always be the potential for human error and for accidents, but the 

Federal Aviation Administration, this Subcommittee and, in fact, 

the entire aviation community are charged with ensuring the safest 

national airspace system that is humanly possible. 

A recent Government Accountability Office report studied runway incursions as well as runway and ramp safety and found that 

while the rate for most serious categories of runway incursions is 

down from last year, 24 events out of 61 million aircraft operations, 

there was an anomalous uptick in runway incursions in the first 

quarter of this year. Therefore, we need to remain vigilant in our 

oversight of this issue. 

I am looking forward to hearing about the steps that the Federal 

Aviation Administration, airports, airlines, pilots, avionics manufacturers, general aviation users and controllers are taking to reduce the risk for these potentially deadly runway incursions. 

I believe that there are many ways to address runway safety. 

Clearly, there is no silver bullet to eliminate runway incursions. I 

am interested in hearing about the many technologies currently deployed to reduce runway incursions as well as those that are under 

development and may be deployed before long, technologies such as 

runway status lights, ASDE-X, TCAS, low cost surface surveillance, 

all have the potential to drastically reduce the incidence of runway 

incursions. 

In addition to technological innovations, I am interested in hearing about the bricks and mortar type solutions. Crushable concrete 

engineered materials arresting systems that have been installed at 

21 airports have proven effective. Increased painted markings and 

signage improvements at airports are also underway. End-around 

perimeter taxiways have been installed at Atlanta’s airport, reducing runway crossings from roughly 650 to less than 100 per day. 

The Federal Aviation Administration is currently evaluating 

these approaches, and I am interested in hearing from our witnesses what they think about these strategies and from the Federal 

Aviation Administration on their plan to deploy these and other 

measures. 

Beyond the flashing lights, radar, alerting systems and concrete, 

it is important that we address human factors issues that affect 

runway safety. Pilot alertness and situational awareness are critical to safe flights. Also, as we seek to get more information to pilots, it is important that we strike a balance that does not overload 

or distract them. 

Although the National Transportation Safety Board has not cited 

controller fatigue as a factor causing runway incursions that they 

have investigated, including last summer’s tragic incident in Lexington, Kentucky, some have cited controller fatigue as an area of 

concern, and I am interested in hearing about these concerns as 

well. 

However, as with all runway safety issues, it is critical that this 

discussion be based upon data and science. We must be cautious 

4 

when discussing safety to avoid just raising extraneous issues. Otherwise, we won’t achieve the safety benefits that we are all seeking. 

Finally, I am interested in hearing about the FAA’s call to action 

on runway safety. The agency has clearly taken steps to address 

this issue, but it will be important to keep their programs on 

scheduled and to continue to maintain the vigilant oversight that 

we are seeing now. 

The number of enplanements is projected to rise and, of course, 

an increase in runway incursions would be absolutely unacceptable. 

So I appreciate the efforts of all of our witnesses to address this 

important safety issue, and I look forward to your testimony. 

With that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the Ranking Member and, at 

this time, will introduce our first panel of witnesses. As you may 

have noted, we have two panels of witnesses today. 

The first panel: Dr. Gerald Dillingham, who is no stranger to this 

Subcommittee, he has testified before our Subcommittee many 

times, and I have referred to him in our statement concerning his 

runway safety report; Mr. Hank Krakowski who is the Chief Operating Officer of the Air Traffic Organization over at the FAA, accompanied by Mr. Jim Ballough, who is the Director of Flight 

Standards Service for the FAA; the Honorable Robert Sumwalt, the 

Vice Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board; and 

the Honorable Calvin Scovel who is the Inspector General for the 

U.S. Department of Transportation. 

Gentlemen on our first panel, we normally adhere to the five 

minute rule but because the GAO report will be detailed for us by 

Dr. Dillingham, we are going to be liberal with his time but probably enforce your time. So we will give Dr. Dillingham more time 

than our other witnesses. 

Dr. Dillingham, thank you for being here—we thank all of the 

witnesses for being here—and you are recognized. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. GERALD DILLINGHAM, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; HANK KRAKOWSKI, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION, FEDERAL 

AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ACCOMPANIED BY JIM 

BALLOUGH, DIRECTOR, FLIGHT STANDARDS SERVICE, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; THE HONORABLE ROBERT L. SUMWALT, VICE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD; AND THE HONORABLE CALVIN L. 

SCOVEL, III, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

TRANSPORTATION 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Petri, 

Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for permitting GAO to 

provide the background for this important hearing and to present 

the highlights of our testimony in this format. 

At the request of this Subcommittee, Chairman Oberstar and 

Senator Lautenberg, we undertook a study of runway safety. In our 

testimony this afternoon, we will first define and describe some key 

types of incursions. Second, we will present the key findings of the 

GAO study and, finally, we will offer some suggestions for actions 

that we think could be undertaken to address the problem. 

5 

Regarding the nature of incursions, a runway incursion is generally defined as an incident that occurs on the airfield when one 

aircraft comes too close to another aircraft, vehicle or person. It is 

not generally considered an aviation accident, but many aviation 

safety experts consider incursions as precursors or early warnings 

of accidents. 

Incursions can occur in several ways. One of the more typical 

scenarios is shown here, illustrating the path of two aircraft that 

are proceeding towards intersecting runways. A second very typical 

scenario is one in which an aircraft attempts to land as a second 

aircraft taxis onto an active runway. 

Runway incursions are categorized in terms of severity based on 

the distance between aircraft and the possibility of a collision. Categories A and B are the most serious types as both of these categories indicate near collisions. 

The simulation you are about to see is an actual serious incursion that occurred July 11th, 2007 at the Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood 

Airport. In this simulation, you will see a Delta 757 nearly touch 

down on a runway but have to become airborne again when the 

pilot sees a United A320 approaching the same runway. 

[Video shown.] 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. These aircraft missed each other by less than 

a hundred feet. 

This next simulation illustrates the type of incursion that occurs 

when an aircraft attempts a landing on an occupied runway. This 

incursion occurred on July 5th, 2007 at the Denver International 

Airport. You will see a Frontier Airlines A319 having to conduct a 

go-around procedure after seeing another jet on the runway. 

[Video shown.] 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. These aircraft missed each other by about 50 

feet. 

Now I would like to turn to the key findings of our report. In our 

study, we looked back at incursions for 10 years. We found that the 

total number of all categories of incursions peaked in 2001 at 407. 

Between 2002 and 2006, the total number of incursions declined 

and was relatively flat. This relatively flat line still indicates that 

there was at least one incursion some place in the U.S. every day. 

In 2007, the overall incursion rate peaked again and was nearly 

as high as the 2001 peak. 

This next graph shows only the serious incursions. This is Categories A and B. There are two key points that can be taken from 

this data. 

First, the number of serious incursions followed a similar pattern 

as overall incursions with a significant drop in 2002 and a relative 

downward trend to 2006 when there were 31 serious incursions. 

This graph also shows a 24 percent drop in the number of serious 

incursions from 2006 to 2007. 

The second key point is that about one-third of these serious incursions involved at least one commercial aircraft, each of which 

represents a potential catastrophic accident. 

As this next graphic illustrates, this is a problem that will require sustained attention. It shows that in the first quarter of this 

year there were 10 serious incursions. This is five times the numVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:04 Feb 23, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40816 JASON
6 

ber of serious incursions from the same time period from the previous year. 

With regard to the cause of incursions, our study found that over 

half were attributed to pilot error. Slightly more than a quarter 

were caused by controller error, oftentimes involving some kind of 

controller miscommunication between the pilot and the controllers. 

About 15 percent involved a vehicle or pedestrian error such as a 

service truck entering an active runway. 

Turning now to the initiatives to address the incursion problem. 

As Mr. Petri said, there are no silver bullets and, as long as there 

are humans in the loop, there will probably never be zero incursions. 

We think that a multi-faceted, layered approach has the best 

chance of minimizing the problem. Among the initiatives that we 

consider that could be done immediately are to continue the efforts 

that FAA has underway including the training, improving airport 

signage and markings, and individual airport reviews with stakeholders; 

Second, develop and implement the national runway safety plan; 

Third, address human factors issues such as controller overtime 

and fatigue issues and adopt international standards for controller 

communications; and 

Fourth, accelerate the technological remedies such as runway 

status light, low cost surface surveillance systems and the deployment of ASDE-X. 

In addition, we think that initiatives such as the development of 

a confidential reporting system should be expedited and, to the extent it is operationally feasible, runway crossing should be minimized. 

Initiatives for the longer term include making infrastructure 

changes such as the perimeter taxiway that was recently opened at 

Atlanta Hartsfield. Another longer term initiative is the development of moving maps that will allow pilots to know where they are 

located on the airfield as well as the location of other aircraft and 

vehicles. 

The last initiative which will be demonstrated in the next two 

video clips is one that the NTSB has been recommending for almost 10 years. This is an audible warning to the pilots in the cockpit. The first video shows the view from the cockpit, and you will 

hear the audible warning to the pilot about an aircraft approaching 

on a converging runway. 

[Video shown.] 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. The second clip will also be a view from the 

cockpit with the audible warning to the pilot. Take note of the 

arrow in the video that locates an aircraft approaching the runway 

on which another aircraft is about to land. 

[Video shown.] 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. In addition to the audible warning, the advantages of this technology are that it is radar-based and avoids any 

delay or miscommunications between the controller and the pilot. 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, with the current 

situation and forecasted increases in traffic, runway incursions are 

a safety problem that require actions that must be sustained beyond any temporary reduction in the number of incursions. 

7 

Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. We thank you, Dr. Dillingham. We will have a 

chance to come back and ask questions concerning not only your 

PowerPoint but other issues in the report, but let me quickly ask 

you a couple of questions before we move on to Mr. Krakowski. 

The Ft. Lauderdale incident where the two aircraft came within 

100 feet of each other, was that pilot error or was that controller 

error? 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I don’t know the answer to that, but I will get 

back to you, sir. 

[Information follows:] 

8 


40816.012
9 

Mr. COSTELLO. Okay. The second incident in Denver where the 

one plane had to go around, that came within 50 feet, was it controller or pilot? 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I believe that was pilot error where the pilot 

turned onto the wrong runway. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Very good. Thank you. As I said, Dr. Dillingham, 

we will have other questions for you after we hear from the other 

witnesses. We thank you for your testimony and for the PowerPoint 

as well. 

Mr. Krakowski, you are recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Good afternoon, Chairman Costello, Congressman Petri and Members of the Subcommittee. 

I am Hank Krakowski. I am the Chief Operating Officer of FAA’s 

Air Traffic Organization. With me today is Jim Ballough. Jim is 

our Director of Flight Standards Service, specifically working on 

the pilots’ side of this issue. 

I am honored to be here today to discuss ways that everyone can 

work together to improve runway safety. At FAA, safety is our top 

imperative. While 2007 was the safest year yet for aviation, we remain focused to make the safest system in the world even safer. 

Runway safety starts with preventing runway incursions, whether these mistakes are made by pilots, controllers or ground staff. 

Our most recent efforts have made a difference. We have reduced 

serious runway incursions by 55 percent since 2001. 

The next chart breaks down last year’s runway incursions by severity. You will note a change in October when the FAA adopted 

the new international definition from when we began counting 

every single mistake on the runway or taxiway, even if another aircraft was not present. This was not previously done, and it appears 

that incursions are actually rising dramatically. 

Actually, what we are doing is we are counting more incursions 

so we can understand the risks better. So, by getting this additional data of actually treating every single event as a serious issue 

to look at, I think we have a better shot at assessing our safety 

risk. 

The FAA investigates every runway incursion so we can understand what causes it. As you heard, pilot error accounts for approximately 60 percent right now, air traffic controller error around 

30 percent, and the remaining 10 to 15 by ground staff. 

The call to action for runway safety which started last summer 

resulted in specific runway safety improvements at hundreds of 

airports across the Nation. We improved airport signage and runway markings, and our busiest airports have received satellitebased runway surveillance technology to help warn controllers of a 

possible collision. Chicago O’Hare is receiving this system a year 

ahead of schedule. 

For pilots, we have installed runway status lights which were endorsed in the NTSB Most Wanted List. The lights turn red when 

there is traffic on or approaching the runway. Runway status lights 

are preventing potential accidents today and, in fact, just last week 

at Dallas-Ft. Worth, an incursion was avoided because the pilot 

saw the red lights and did not enter the active runway. 

Not all measures to improve runway safety will involve installing 

new equipment, though. FAA runway safety action teams have visVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:04 Feb 23, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40816 JASON
10 

ited 20 of the busiest airports to identify short term fixes such as 

new signs, better markings and, more importantly, training for pilots, controllers and ground staff. Our teams are headed to even 

more airports this year as a result of the success with these first 

20. 

Another critical component, though, of this program is to complete our work with NATCA, the controllers’ union, to implement 

a non-punitive, voluntary reporting system for air traffic controllers, similar to the Aviation Safety Action Programs at the airlines. 

In my previous role as Chief Safety Officer for United Airlines, 

I was responsible for four such programs for pilots, dispatchers, 

mechanics and flight attendants. Because of this experience, I am 

convinced that the information derived from this program will be 

extremely powerful in understanding the human factors involved in 

such errors. 

The entire aviation community has a role in the solutions, and 

I am happy to report that they are stepping up to the plate. 

I welcome the Committee’s assistance in these efforts. This concludes my remarks, and I would be happy to answer any questions 

you may have. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you and now recognizes Mr. 

Ballough. 

Mr. BALLOUGH. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any opening remarks, but I am here to answer questions regarding pilot issues. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Sumwalt. 

Mr. SUMWALT. Thank you and good afternoon, Chairman 

Costello, Ranking Member Petri, Chairman Oberstar and Members 

of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to present testimony on behalf of the National Transportation Safety Board. 

As you know, the Safety Board is charged with investigating accidents and incidents, determining their probable cause and issuing 

safety recommendations to prevent their reoccurrence. 

The Safety Board is especially concerned about runway incursions due to their number and potential severity. In fact, the 

world’s largest aviation disaster was a result of a runway incursion. In that accident in 1977, 583 lives were lost because 2 jumbo 

jets collided on a runway in Tenerife, the Canary Islands. 

Incursions occur because of human error. Pilots make mistakes. 

Controllers make mistakes as do those driving ground vehicles. So 

there is no single solution. 

In 2000, the Safety Board made recommendations to address the 

issue in a variety of ways including procedural changes, educational changes and technological improvements that require a direct warning to the flight crews. This direct warning is critical because it would provide pilots with additional time to react. 

Since 2005, the FAA has been conducting the field tests of the 

runway status lights at the Dallas-Ft. Worth International Airport. 

Initial test results are promising, and the FAA is planning to conduct tests at other airports. 

The FAA has also promoted Automatic Dependent SurveillanceBroadcast, or ADS-B, as a method of mitigating the number and 

severity of runway incursions. For ADS-B to provide the maximum 

safety benefit, the system should support both ADS-B Out and 

ADS-B In. 

11 

With ADS-B In, surface conflict warnings are provided directly to 

the pilots in the cockpit, offering the greatest opportunity for improved situation awareness. The FAA’s NPRM regarding ADS-B 

states that aircraft will be required to be equipped with ADS-B Out 

but not until the year 2020, and moreover the FAA does not plan 

to mandate ADS-B In at all, and this concerns the Safety Board. 

While the Safety Board is encouraged the efforts of the FAA, 

their progress has been slow to responding to recommendations 

issued seven years ago. Further, national implementation of these 

technologies is still years away, and not all airports with passenger 

service would be equipped. 

The FAA has made progress with lighting and improved signage 

at airports, but basic improvements in air traffic control procedures 

are needed. 

The Safety Board has several outstanding recommendations to 

the FAA regarding clearances given to pilots when taxiing across 

runways. Although these recommendations mirror those contained 

in ICAO guidance used internationally for implementing runway 

safety programs, the FAA has not implemented them. If they had 

been implemented, the ComAir accident in Lexington, Kentucky, 

might not have occurred. 

We need the extra protection of additional procedures and advanced technology to compensate for human errors. We strongly 

urge action on these critical safety issues. 

I will now briefly turn to the issue of fatigue. Like runway incursions, fatigue has been on the Safety Board’s Most Wanted List 

since this list was conceived, the inception of this list in 1990. 

We have issued numerous recommendations regarding aviation 

fatigue regarding flight crews, mechanics and air traffic controllers. 

However, to date, the FAA has taken little regulatory action regarding directly related to revising existing regulations and work 

scheduling practices. 

The FAA is in the process of convening a working group to develop scheduling practices that minimize controller impairment due 

to fatigue. The Safety Board supports these efforts and continues 

to believe that further action must be taken, especially in issuing 

scientifically-based duty time regulations and policies that minimize fatigue among flight crews, mechanics and air traffic controllers. Operating or controlling an aircraft without adequate rest presents an unnecessary risk to the traveling public. 

Mr. Chairman, this completes my testimony, and I will be glad 

to answer questions at the appropriate time. Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman and now recognize General Scovel. 

Mr. SCOVEL. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Petri, Chairman 

Oberstar, Members of the Subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity to testify today on runway safety. 

Aviation stakeholders are expressing growing concern over the 

rise in runway incidents. A significant threat to runway safety is 

runway incursions, which are defined as any incident involving an 

unauthorized aircraft, vehicle, or person on a runway. Since 2003, 

the number of runway incursions has begun climbing again, reaching a high of 370 in 2007, a 12 percent increase over the previous 

year. 

12 

While the most serious incidents decreased from a high of 69 in 

1999 to a low of 24 in 2007, during the first 3 months of fiscal year 

2008, 10 serious runway incursions occurred. If that rate were to 

continue, 40 serious incursions could occur before the end of this 

year, which would be the highest level in 6 years. 

Over the last 10 years, our work has shown that a range of actions is needed to enhance the margin of safety on the Nation’s 

runways. We see four specific areas where FAA and other aviation 

users should focus on runway safety efforts. 

First, FAA must implement existing and new systems to improve 

runway safety. New technology is considered by many to be a key 

factor in the mix of solutions for improving runway safety. However, our work on three major FAA acquisitions for improving runway safety has shown significant concerns as to what can be effectively deployed within the next several years. 

For example, ASDE-X, a ground surveillance system that warns 

controllers of possible runway conflicts, may not meet its cost and 

schedule goals to commission all 35 systems for $549.8 million by 

2011. Questions have arisen as to whether it will be able to deliver 

all the planned safety benefits, such as providing alerts at intersecting runways. 

Another promising technology is runway status lights, a ‘‘stoplight’’ system that alerts pilots when a runway is occupied. However, the system is in the very early stages of development, and a 

key issue is that it uses ASDE-X data for its surveillance capabilities. It is therefore dependent on successful deployment of ASDEX. 

One of the most promising technologies on the horizon is ADSB. However, as we testified last October, ADS-B ground infrastructure will not be in place until 2013, and users will not be required 

to equip with some of the needed avionics until 2020. 

Second, FAA must make airport-specific infrastructure and procedural changes. The uncertain timeline and emerging risks of 

FAA’s runway safety technologies underscore the need to explore 

other near-term solutions. Several relatively low-cost, simple, airport-specific changes—such as better signage, improved runway 

markings and lighting, and procedural changes in daily airport operations—can go a long way to improve the margin of safety. 

However, as we reported in May of last year, other than networking, NAS users had no official way to share actions that were 

successful at reducing runway incursions at their locations. 

We recommended that FAA develop an automated means to 

share best practices among all users of the NAS. In response, FAA 

implemented a best practices website for runway safety in December 2007. We will now see how well it is being utilized. 

Third, FAA must reinvigorate its national program for improving 

runway safety. From 1999 to 2001, runway incursions increased at 

alarming rates. To its credit, FAA then took decisive action that 

helped to reduce these incidents. It established regional runway 

safety offices and initiated aggressive educational programs for pilots. 

However, we found that many of those important national initiatives waned as the number of incidents declined and FAA met its 

overall goals for reducing runway incursions. For example, FAA esVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:04 Feb 23, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40816 JASON
13 

tablished the Runway Safety Office in 2001, but until August 2007 

it had not had a permanent director for almost 3 years. FAA also 

stopped preparing its national plan for runway safety, which defined the Agency’s strategy and prioritized efforts to reduce runway 

incursions. 

In response to our recommendations, FAA has begun addressing 

many of these concerns. In addition to hiring a permanent director 

for the Runway Safety Office, FAA plans to reinstate its national 

plan for runway safety. These are good steps, and the key now will 

be maintaining momentum. 

Last, FAA must address controller human factors issues through 

improved training. As we testified last week, controller staffing and 

training will be key watch items over the next 10 years as FAA begins hiring and training 15,000 new controllers. Training new controllers on human factors issues such as fatigue and situational 

awareness will become increasingly important as FAA begins addressing the large influx of trainees. 

FAA has successfully implemented an important initiative to address this type of required training: tower simulators. These simulators provide controllers with a virtual replica of the tower environment. The simulators use real-life scenarios such as day and 

night operations, varying weather conditions, and emergency situations. This is important technology to help new and veteran controllers hone their skills in conditions when runway incursions are 

most likely to occur. 

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy 

to answer your questions or questions from other Members of the 

Subcommittee. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, General Scovel. 

Dr. Dillingham and Mr. Krakowski, let me ask Mr. Krakowski. 

It is clear from reading Dr. Dillingham’s report that in fact he compliments the FAA for taking action in 2001, and then the report 

goes on to state that while the agency recognized when the ground 

incursions and runway safety issues reached their peak in 2001, 

that the FAA took action and they focused on the problem. 

But, however, as the number of incursions started to decrease, 

the FAA took their eye off the ball, went on to other issues and no 

longer considered it a priority until in 2007 when the number of 

incursions reached almost its peak of 2001. 

I think that is demonstrated very clearly by the fact that there 

was a vacancy in the Office of Director of Runway Safety for over 

two years and the safety plan at the FAA, the runway safety plan, 

clearly was outdated as Dr. Dillingham indicated. 

So it is clear to me that when the FAA either recognizes a problem or someone says we have a problem and you need to address 

this, when the FAA acts, then in fact positive results can happen. 

It is only when you take your eye off the ball, the agency takes its 

eye off the ball, that we go back and we run into these problems 

again. 

I was struck last night, reading your testimony, Mr. Krakowski. 

On page three, it says only 8 out of 24 serious incursions involved 

a commercial air flight and none of these 370 incursions resulted 

in a collision. While most of these incursions are Category C incidents, which pose little or no risk to the public, the increase in the 

14 

incursions and the fact that the serious incursions are still occurring prompted the Administrator to issue a call to action on runway safety. 

Two points: One is I question the fact that the Administrator implemented a call to action because of the number of incidents. I 

happen to believe it is because this Subcommittee requested the 

GAO to do a report on runway safety because we were concerned, 

and I think that prompted the agency then to take action in 2007. 

Chairman Oberstar and I were concerned in 2006, and that is why 

we requested the GAO report. 

So I would just say that it is more than a coincidence that we 

requested the report in 2006, and in 2007 the Administrator said 

we better take a look at this and we better do something. 

Having said that, what struck me in your testimony, and I hope 

that you didn’t mean it to come off this way, only 8 of 24 serious 

incursions. It is almost like well, we have these incursions, but 

really there was not a loss of life or a serious disaster. So is it really that big of a deal? 

I just want you to know that we on this Subcommittee and others in the aviation world believe that it is. 

I happen to believe that it, along with runway incursions, along 

with the fatigue factor with pilots and with controllers, are the two 

biggest concerns that I have with safety in the aviation industry 

today. It is fatigue and runway incursions. 

So we hope that you, in fact, are taking action to follow the 

GAO’s plans, and I am going to get to that in just a few minutes. 

Dr. Dillingham, you state in your testimony that the FAA indicates that they want to equip 35 airports with ASDE-X. However, 

the agency has equipped 11 out of the 35 airports that they intend 

to equip, and they have spent almost 60 percent of the allocated 

funds for these 35 airports. 

Given that fact, are they going to be able to reach their goal of 

35 airports, given the fact that they have already spent 60 percent 

of their money on one-third of the airports that they intend to 

equip? 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, it is a concern of ours not only 

in terms of the money spent but the time that it has taken them 

to put out the 11 that they have. The expectation is that the rest 

of them can be put out in half the time it has taken to put out the 

few that have been put out. 

So it is unlikely at this point. At least, we don’t see how this can 

happen on the budget and the schedule that is being presented to 

us. 

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to come back 

to the first question and give you some details on the two simulations that we had. I had to refer to my notes. I am old, you know. 

The Ft. Lauderdale incident, it occurred with visibility of 10 

miles. It was daylight. The airport did not have ASDE-X or 

AMASS. The probable cause according to the NTSB is that the 

flight crew inadvertently entered into an active runway. They had 

missed a taxiway as they were on the airfield. 

On the Denver incident, it was a combination of things. It was 

the fact that the aircraft turned onto the wrong runway, and the 

15 

controllers could not identify them on the AMASS. It was a snowy 

day as such, but it was a combination of things in that case. 

Mr. COSTELLO. You address the issue of fatigue in your report 

and, of course, the NTSB has listed that as a concern for many 

years. I guess since the early nineties. General Scovel has touched 

on it as well. 

What, in your opinion, or what evidence are you seeing that the 

FAA is addressing the fatigue issue with air traffic controllers and 

others in the system? 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. We have had numerous conversations with 

FAA with regard to what can be done about this because we think 

that this is one of the immediate things that needs to be done because it is a matter of moving controllers to these busy places 

where you have these six-day weeks and ten-hour days that you 

can relieve some of that fatigue. 

FAA tells us that they are, in fact, studying where they have 

these few, relatively few places where the controllers are doing 

these six-day, ten-hour work days and intend to address that issue 

immediately. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I recall in your testimony from last week, and you 

correct me if I am wrong, but I think that you cited the issue of 

new controllers as opposed to experienced air traffic controllers. 

You, I think, testified, and correct me if I am wrong, that one facility you looked at where they had a small percentage of inexperienced air traffic controllers new to the job and another facility 

where half—Las Vegas as I recall—where half of the air traffic controllers were inexperienced and new to the job. It was either your 

testimony or General Scovel’s, one of the two. 

We have a problem in the system, and we would hope that the 

FAA will acknowledge the problem and attempt to address it. Now 

I understand that they are now offering bonuses up to $24,000 to 

retain experienced controllers, but there is a problem in the system. 

Finally, before I turn over to my Ranking Member for his questions, General Scovel, would you like to comment on the fatigue 

issue as well? Do you see any evidence that the FAA is addressing 

this issue? 

Mr. SCOVEL. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. 

Fatigue is a concern, and the NTSB has properly highlighted it 

as a concern for many years, specifically when it comes to air traffic controllers. 

By way of tagging fatigue as a direct or contributing factor to an 

aircraft incident or accident, it is my understanding that NTSB has 

not done so, although it closely examined that question in connection with the Comair accident in Lexington, Kentucky, in August 

2006. Controller staffing in the tower at that incident and the degree of rest of the sole controller on duty at the time of that accident were factors that NTSB addressed, and I know Mr. Sumwalt 

can address those in more detail, should you wish. 

One of the key factors that came out of that from NTSB, and 

which we would completely agree with, is NTSB’s recommendations 

to FAA that they undertake these actions: First, that FAA reduce 

the potential for controller fatigue by revising controller work 

scheduling policies and practices and that they modify their shift 

16 

rotations. Second, that FAA develop a fatigue awareness and countermeasures training program for controllers. 

Mr. Chairman, it seems to us that there is a lot of bickering between controllers and the agencies regarding overtime and whether 

it contributes to fatigue. 

It seems, to me at least, a matter within common human experience that if any individual works long hours at a tough and demanding job, that individual at some point may likely get tired. 

The real question is: What are we going to do about it? 

NTSB has offered some very common-sense solutions to this, put 

the ball squarely in FAA’s court, and we would endorse that and 

urge FAA to get on with it. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Krakowski, finally, let me ask you to respond. What is the agency doing? 

You indicate in your testimony that pilot error accounts for 55 

percent of runway incursions, according to your testimony. What is 

the FAA doing to work with the pilot community on training and 

education? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Okay. I will have Jim Ballough actually assist 

me with this, but I would like to respond initially, sir. 

I take these issues very seriously as I did at my airline before 

coming to FAA. The one thing you cannot ever do is let up on safety. You have to constantly keep pressure on it at all times which 

means well-running safety programs, data-driven data collection 

programs with involvement by everybody involved in the system. 

That is what we are trying to construct with the ASAP, with the 

controllers which we hope to sign soon, integrating and the data 

that we are getting from the pilot community and those programs 

as well, as well as some of the other reporting mechanisms through 

the CAST, Commercial Aviation Safety Team and ASIAS work 

which is going to be kind of a center point for FAA and the user 

community to look at data and look for leading indicators. So we 

are doing some very sophisticated technological work with MITRE 

and some others to actually break some new frontiers in this area. 

More immediately, though, on the pilots’ side, the call to action 

last August was also recently supplemented by the Administrator, 

the Acting Administrator calling the CEOs and Chief Operating Officers of all the airlines to raise their alertness that the issue is 

still a concern to us. With the support of the highest level of those 

corporations, the Directors of Safety and the Directors of Flight Operations at those airlines are working on some programs that I will 

have Jim talk about. 

Mr. BALLOUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity. 

As Hank mentioned, this past January, in fact beginning on the 

18th of January, we had an outreach effort with the top officials 

from 116 of the major air carriers. We came together, and myself 

and my deputy personally did the sessions with the executives from 

the airlines, and we identified. 

First, we talked about the issues, showed the data to establish 

why they were there and to establish the concerns the FAA has 

and we all should have as an industry together, to face the issues 

regarding runway incursions, but this effort was focused primarily 

on the pilot deviation aspect. So these are errors made by the pilots 

17 

and, as Hank said, 60 percent of the incursions involve pilots in 

some capacity. 

So we brought the executive together, and we asked them. We 

showed them the data. We went through 11 simulations or examples of runway incursions, some of which you saw here today, and 

we asked them to think about what it is we could do in the short 

term immediately to address the issues in the operational world. 

What we learned from the United incident in Ft. Lauderdale was 

that potentially when you view the tape, it appears as though the 

crew was doing a checklist item with the flight controls. That was 

a distraction. So we have asked the carriers to go back and look 

at their checklists and revise and identify any distractions that 

may occur and then remove those distractions from the checklist. 

We have a number of outreach efforts regarding training. We 

have asked them. There are some very good runway incursion 

training DVDs that are available. We have partnered with AOPA 

to develop some of those as well as ALPA, the Air Line Pilots Association. So those training materials are out there for the 120, for 

the air carrier world. 

For the general aviation world, we have produced numerous 

DVDs as training materials, produced a number of pamphlets, continued to stress with all of our FAA safety team conferences that 

they hold. We have asked them to stress the issue of runway incursions, and we continue to look for new ways to also reach the pilots 

and provide more data to them as well. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I thank you. 

Mr. Krakowski, I appreciate your commitment to never letting 

up. As I said, there has been evidence that the FAA has moved on 

to other priorities in the past, and we are pleased to have you in 

the position that you are in and committed to not letting up. 

With that, I would recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I wondered. I am going to spend my time and there are a number 

of other Members who will be asking broader questions, but my 

Senators in Wisconsin and my colleague, Gwen Moore and Dr. 

Kagen, who is a Member of this Committee from my State of Wisconsin, and several other representatives have been sending letters 

and raising concerns about changes in control of the airspace involving the Milwaukee air traffic control unit. 

I really want to, if I could, Mr. Chairman, have permission to 

submit questions from Representative Moore and myself for a formal response after this hearing. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Without objection. 

Mr. PETRI. Then also to ask if Mr. Krakowski could respond or 

point out to a few areas of concern. What is happened is they are 

evidently consolidating or making changes in the air traffic control 

space which adds some 8,400 square miles to the direct so-called 

enroute aircraft flying through the airspace controlled by the Milwaukee unit. 

I wonder if you could spend a minute describing the planning 

process for this airspace absorption and whether the controllers involved were informed or involved in the planning process and also 

what kind of training the controllers have received or will receive 

to effect this change. 

18 

Also, could you broadly describe what training, staffing and 

equipment needs the FAA has provided to ensure that when the 

switch takes place, air safety will not be compromised in any way? 

And, if there are any benefits from this change, if you could address those, we would appreciate it as well. 

This is a concern, obviously, in our region. People fly in and out 

of that region and, of course, everyone in the aviation community 

is aware that a lot of people fly through that area on their way to 

and from the largest general aviation festival in the world at Oshkosh each summer. So that puts extra strain on this whole part of 

the system. 

I appreciate your addressing that. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. I own a little airplane in Chicago and fly up in 

your airspace quite a bit. So I am intimately familiar with the airspace and the issues up there. 

As you know, O’Hare Airport is under some significant reconstruction and, as a result of that, airspace changes are needed to 

accommodate the evolution of the O’Hare airspace. The determination was made to give Milwaukee more airspace to control which 

is the issue. 

I am going to commit to you, first of all, that we will do it safely. 

We will make sure that we are monitoring the safety of the transition when it occurs and, again, we are not going to let up on that. 

In terms of training, we have sent people to O’Hare to actually 

observe the operation of that airspace that actually is being controlled by Chicago right now. So quite a few of the Members from 

Milwaukee have gone down to O’Hare to actually observe how to 

control traffic. There is a one-day classroom training session. There 

are nine simulations in the radar laboratory that we provide to the 

controllers as part of the training. 

Initially, there will be seven qualified people to man the new positions when we turn the switch. They, in turn, will get the other 

controllers the training and transition that they need to successfully work the airspace. 

So we have a plan. We believe it is a good plan. We believe it 

is a safe plan, and we are going to execute on that. I will be happy 

to give you the details in a written response. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you very much. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from 

California, Ms. Richardson. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Several questions, first of all, Mr. Dillingham, was your 

PowerPoint presentation included in here, the actual PowerPoint? 

I have your written, the other testimony, but is your PowerPoint? 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Ms. Richardson, if it is not included, we did 

bring CDs with that presentation on it. I don’t know if it got included or not. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. If we could, thank you. 

My second question is what is the tenure of air traffic controllers 

at each major airport? 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I really couldn’t answer that at this point, but 

we could certainly provide that for the record. Maybe Mr. 

Krakowski might be in a better position to answer that. 

19 

Ms. RICHARDSON. I would like it in writing for this Committee 

because I think when I listen I see a lot of this going on here, and 

to me it is this for those of you who missed it for the first time. 

We either have people who have the tenure, who have the education, who have the training, who are prepared to work at the 

major airports or we don’t. To me, I think that that is a critical 

piece of this. 

[Information follows:] 

20 


40816.013
21 

Ms. RICHARDSON. On page 10 of your report, what was the reason for the two-year vacancy of the director position? 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. FAA just did not fill the position. It is now 

filled, but it wasn’t filled for almost three years. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. 

Mr. Chairman, some of these things that we are hearing today, 

is there going to be a process of how we will bring forward, potentially, legislation? If the FAA doesn’t feel it is important enough to 

do some things, will we have the ability to talk about what we 

would like to do from a legislation perspective? 

Mr. COSTELLO. I think one of the reasons why we are getting 

some action is I had mentioned earlier concerning the GAO report 

and the attention of the Administrator on this issue is because the 

Subcommittee is beginning to provide aggressive oversight on these 

issues. That is the best function that we can perform here, and 

that is to make sure that the FAA and everyone in the aviation industry, that they are doing their job, in particular the FAA. 

As I indicated, I think that is an indication that we are not here 

to beat up on Mr. Krakowski. He has not been with the agency that 

long. 

But if this runway safety was a priority for the FAA, they would 

not have left that position open for two years and they would not 

have an outdated runway safety plan. So one of the reasons why 

they, I think, have kicked it into gear is because we are providing 

the oversight that needs to be provided. 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Ms. Richardson? 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Yes. 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I can convey to you the response that we obtained when we asked FAA why the position was vacant for so 

long. Basically, FAA told us that they had devolved runway safety 

down to the various lines of business and down further from headquarters. 

Our response to that was that may be okay, but if there is no 

national strategy or national plan, you have a situation where different parts of the agency or different regions may be doing things 

differently. More importantly than that, the lessons that could be 

learned from good practices were not being shared on a national 

basis. 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Thank you. I am glad that you are involved. 

My other question had to do with the deployment of the software 

systems. When I look at, for example, Chicago Midway, they are 

not expected to have scheduled deployment until June of 2010. 

Some of these others on here, when you look at the most runway 

incursions, it seems like some of the biggest airports that are having the problems are still waiting to get this information. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. What I would like to do is respond. 

It is less important to look at necessarily the history of runway 

incursions that have happened. We actually look at the risk, the 

complexity of the operation, the operational tempo at that airport, 

how many runways and taxiways intersect because we believe that 

you prioritize in terms of safety risk, not kind of a historical incident. That is an important component, but it is not the only component. 

22 

Ms. RICHARDSON. Okay. I will hold the rest of my questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentlelady and now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good to have you all with us today. 

When someone mentioned, Mr. Sumwalt, the Lexington, Kentucky accident, was there evidence that the air traffic controller 

mentioned was a victim of fatigue at that time? 

Mr. SUMWALT. Congressman Coble, it is a two-part answer. The 

controller likely was fatigued. We found that he had slept approximately 2 hours in the 24 hours prior to the accident. 

However, in the NTSB’s analysis of that accident, we determined 

that there was no causal relationship between the controller’s fatigue and the accident’s occurrence. 

Mr. COBLE. I got you. I thank you for that. 

I would like for you all to elaborate on the behavioral or the fatigue issue, what contributing factors may be involved. 

Mr. Scovel, you mentioned common sense recommendations or 

suggestions. They were submitted by whom? 

Mr. SCOVEL. By the NTSB, sir. 

Mr. COBLE. What were some of the common sense recommendations? 

Mr. SCOVEL. First—and these arose out of the Lexington accident—that FAA revise its controller work scheduling policies and 

practices in order to provide rest periods that are long enough to 

obtain sufficient restorative sleep. 

Next, that FAA modify shift rotations for controllers so as to 

minimize disrupted sleep patterns and accumulation of sleep debt 

and increase cognitive performance. 

Lastly, it recommended for the benefit of controllers themselves, 

since controllers have a responsibility to take themselves off the 

scope when they feel that they are too fatigued to perform effectively, NTSB recommended that FAA develop for controllers a fatigue awareness and countermeasures training program. 

Mr. COBLE. Now, have those recommendations been embraced or 

in practice? 

Mr. SCOVEL. I will defer to FAA on that, sir. It is my understanding that they are in the process of being implemented. 

Mr. COBLE. All right, sir. 

Mr. Scovel, would you elaborate on in your testimony on the 

FAA’s use of tower simulators for training? Is it your opinion that 

this is an effective way to train controllers and what is the FAA’s 

deployment plan? 

Mr. SCOVEL. I can answer at least part of your question, sir, and 

if you would like I can take the rest for the record, or FAA may 

be able to respond here. 

We consider tower simulator training to be a very effective tool, 

and we would encourage FAA to move out on that as quickly as 

it is able. 

Our estimates are that simulators cost about $500,000 per facil- ity plus approximately another $100,000 for individual software 

packages that may need to be configured for surrounding airports 

where controllers can also receive training on the tower simulator. 

23 

The benefits are that simulators allow evaluation of new operations. They can study alternatives for improving safety, and they 

are of great benefit for both new and seasoned controllers. 

They have been proven in a couple of instances. At Boston Logan 

Airport, sir, a tower simulator was used to aid in establishing safety procedures to be implemented with a newly constructed runway. 

NASA used a tower simulator at Los Angeles Airport to study alternatives for improving runway safety as they looked at options 

for reconfiguring the layout of runways and taxiways at that airport. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you for that, sir. 

Any FAA deployment? Can anybody respond to that? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Yes, Congressman. We have bought 24 of the 

systems. We will deploy 12 this year and 12 next year. I would be 

happy to submit the list of facilities to you formally. 

I just finished a 33-year career as a commercial airline pilot, and 

that is how we trained. We trained in simulators. You have a big 

fan sitting here of this technology for a lot of reasons. So I am looking forward to putting this out to the workforce. 

Mr. COBLE. Well, thank you for that. 

Finally, Dr. Dillingham, in your view of the controller fatigue 

matters, did you find any evidence to support a causal link between 

runway incursions that you studied and controller fatigue? 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Mr. Coble, we did not find a causal link. We 

relied in large measure on the NTSB finding that basically said it 

was possible that it was a contributing factor, but no, we did not 

find a causal link. The NTSB was in reference to only four incidents, as I recall. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you, sir. Thank you all again. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes the other gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hayes. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope people don’t think 

North Carolina is getting an unfair advantage here. 

I will have to admit at the beginning that this is an important 

safety issue, but for others of you in the audience there are other 

far more compelling safety issues. I hope we don’t lose sight of 

them as we focus on this one. 

Mr. Krakowski, what is the maximum allowable overtime for an 

air traffic controller? How many hours? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Ten hours, sir. Ten hours. 

Mr. HAYES. Ten hours a day. How many hours a week? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Well, it would be 50 hours then. One day of 

overtime, I believe. 

Mr. HAYES. So 10 hours in any one day. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. A six-day week. 

Mr. HAYES. Okay. So that would be 60. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Right. You could. Yes, you could. 

Mr. HAYES. How many hours of overtime are being voluntarily 

worked by controllers? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. About 80 percent of the current overtime, which 

is about 2 percent system-wide, is voluntary where controllers sign 

up to do it. 

24 

I have some facilities with virtually no overtime, some as high 

as 9 percent in some areas. Nine percent is too high, and we are 

working to get some staffing in those facilities, sir. 

Mr. HAYES. Being an airline guy, you know it is important. The 

fatigue factor for controllers is important, but it is just as important for the crews in the aircraft, and we haven’t mentioned that 

today. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Yes, and I would like to hand that over to Jim 

Ballough because he is working that issue not just for controllers 

but for the pilot community as well. 

Mr. BALLOUGH. Yes, Mr. Hayes, we are working currently in the 

FAA. The Acting Administrator has asked us to look at this fatigue 

issue not just for controllers or pilots but across the board for mechanics, flight attendants as well. 

We are in the final stages of planning a symposium that should 

be conducted somewhere in the June time frame to where we will 

bring all of the academia together, industry stakeholders together, 

labor and really tee up the issue of fatigue and how we can manage 

it now. 

We know that we think there are science that is out there today 

that makes it doable, and so it is time to bring those parties together and to plan a strategy for how we use the fatigue science 

and apply it. We know that prescriptive flight and duty rules don’t 

work. We know that they have served us well over the years, but 

we know now that we can make further progress to address this 

issue with fatigue. 

So we look forward to working this issue later this year and hope 

to have some very positive results and use that conference as a 

springboard to move forward to address fatigue issues. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you for that. 

I would like to emphasize, as I have many times before, there are 

glide slopes out of service. There are localizers out of service. There 

are AWAS and ADIs and other important day to day, hour to hour 

safety devices and procedures that the FAA is not keeping up with. 

That is troubling me far more than what we are talking about 

today, as important as it is. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the next panel because I want 

to hear. You all don’t care what I think as a pilot as much as I 

want to hear the professionals speak to us from their perspective 

about what a pilot does, can and should do to be the number one 

runway incursion preventer in the whole process because very few 

examples. Tenerife is one example where there was no visibility 

and you could not see and be seen, but for the large majority, 95 

plus percent, clear right and clear left is the number one preventive for runway incursions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes 

the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Because I didn’t get here in time to hear the testimony of the witnesses, I didn’t think I was going to ask any questions, but I have 

a couple of things that I am curious about. 

25 

One is we have all been given a chart, and it says it is from the 

FAA, from the Air Traffic Control Organization, that runway incursions are less than half of what they were in 2001. 

But then, at the same time, we were given a briefing memo that 

says GAO reports that the rate of runway incursions in 2007 has 

increased to 6.05 incidents per million operations. This is a 12 percent increase over 2006 and the highest number since 2001. 

I am a little confused as to which it is. Are the incidents cut in 

half as this chart shows, in other words, meaning that it has gone 

way down, or have they gone way up? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Congressman, relative to the rate, you have to 

remember operations go up too, so rate is reflected against the 

number of operations in the NAS as well. But I think what is important to note on the last bar, the actual number of incidents, 

total incidents is up. 

Mr. DUNCAN. The problem, though, what has confused me is both 

of these things say they are per million operations, both the memo 

and the chart. I don’t know. Anyway, go ahead. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Okay. Well, I am not quite sure how GAO determined theirs. 

Gerald? 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Well, we used the FAA data. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Right, okay. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. DUNCAN. It is quite a difference. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Yes, but these are the serious. These are the As 

and Bs here. These are the most serious runway risks. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right. Well, maybe you could get an explanation 

or figure that out. It might be interesting for us to know which it 

is, whether they have gone way up or way down. 

Then you got my curiosity when, Mr. Sumwalt, I believe it was 

you that said that the controller is Lexington had only slept 2 

hours in the last 24 hours. Was that due to his own personal, private behavior or did the FAA have something to do with that in 

the scheduling they had done? 

If the FAA is responsible for that, then that is something that 

I hope we have eliminated. That shouldn’t happen any place. 

But if it is something that was just a matter on his own private 

time he stayed up, then there is not much we can do about that. 

I just was curious as to which it was. What would have caused him 

to sleep only 2 hours out of the last 24 before that happened, that 

accident happened? 

Mr. SUMWALT. Congressman Duncan, it was a combination of 

both things that you mentioned. 

The scheduling factors, he had worked a shift that had gotten off 

duty earlier in the day, 1:30 or 2:00 in the afternoon. Then he was 

off for his, I guess, eight hours, but then he did personal things 

during that time off, including going out and running and apparently only slept about two hours. Then he showed up to work again 

to work the shift in which the accident occurred, which I think that 

shift started around 11:00 at night. 

So it was a combination of the schedule that he maintained and 

the inability to manage his own personal schedule such that he 

could maximize opportunities for rest. 

26 

Mr. DUNCAN. How common is something like that, Mr. 

Krakowski? Is this an aberration or how common is it that controllers get off and then only have eight hours between when they are 

due at work again? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Let me answer this in a couple ways. If you are 

really going to study fatigue as we were just starting to do that at 

United Airlines before I retired, there is new science that we have 

now that really knows how to look at this in ways that 10 years 

ago we didn’t have. It is applicable to controllers, pilots and everybody. 

If you are really going to study fatigue, it is everything. It is 

scheduling practices. It is what people do with their time off. It is 

how patterns of schedules are put together. That is what this conference that Mr. Ballough will be sponsoring later this spring is 

going to address to really take a scientific look at this. 

The other issue about fatigue that is a bit concerning is there is 

a lot of anecdotal stories about it, but the data are important. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me ask you this. What the staff is telling me 

is they are telling me this comes from a 221 air traffic control 

scheduling practice that the controllers themselves have asked for 

or want or is popular with them. Is that right? 

Is this happening because this is what the controllers want? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. We understand it is a popular scheduling practice, yes, but I think again if we can get into this spring to understand. You know popular scheduling practices, if you know how to 

rest and you know how to use your time off during those periods, 

it may or may not be a risk at all. So that is what we have to get 

into. 

The other part of this, as I mentioned earlier, the Aviation Safety 

Action Program that we want to start with the controllers is the 

kind of mechanism that allow us to take a look at just these sorts 

of issues. So I really hope we get that signed soon. 

Mr. DUNCAN. It seems to me there ought to be more time in between shifts than eight hours unless these controllers are sleeping 

there at the facility because by the time somebody leaves and 

drives home and does all the things that people ordinarily do, you 

could run into some problems there. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I thank the gentleman. 

To clarify a point just so we understand, I know, Mr. Krakowski, 

you are saying that if the person knows how to rest. But if you are 

working 16 out of 24 hours, during that 8-hour period that you are 

off I am sure there are other personal things, family things that 

you have to attend to, that you just don’t go home and get 8 hours 

sleep. 

So, regardless if it is the agency forcing the controller to work 

16 hours in a 24-hour period or if it is on the part of the controller 

wanting to work that schedule, it seems to me that it is an issue 

that needs to be addressed. 

The other point that I would make to Mr. Duncan’s question 

about is this increased or decreased between 2001 and 2006, regardless of how you look at the numbers, we do know for a fact 

that in the first quarter of fiscal year 2008 we have had 10 severe 

runway incursions, just in the first quarter of fiscal year 2008. So 

27 

it is an issue and is a problem, and again we are pleased that you 

are moving forward to make some progress. 

The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Graves? 

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hayes, would like to be 

recognized for a comment. 

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We talked about the situation in Lexington, and I think it is important to understand there is an issue about the controller, but we 

haven’t talked about what happened with the airplane. 

Mr. Krakowski, refer back to the time when you were flying in 

the line so that members of the panel and the audience can understand. When that aircraft pushed back, the first officer and the 

captain, how would they brief each other? 

I mean I know, but I think it is important for the record. This 

is not just about controllers. What did the pilots do that led them 

to take off on an unlighted short runway? 

Here is Lexington. Long runway, short runway. Lighted, unlit. 

What happened when they pushed back? What did they say to each 

other? Where did this go wrong? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. So I would say that based on what I know of, 

and I think Mr. Sumwalt actually would be able to give you the 

detail on this. So I will defer to him. But I think the cockpit did 

have some distraction going on. 

Robert? 

Mr. HAYES. Well, before you answer, let me ask the question a 

different way. When done right, what would the brief between the 

captain and the first officer have sounded like to get to the correct 

runway and to make the right decision? Obviously, that came 

apart. 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. A crew has to work together. The captain is in 

command of the aircraft. The captain sets the atmosphere in the 

cockpit for running your checklist, doing your briefings efficiently 

and making sure you are going in the right direction. 

At least at my company, you had the taxi chart in front of you. 

You briefed these routes. You validated that the heading of the aircraft was on the assigned runway before you actually took off. 

So that is how you do it right. You have really good cockpit procedures reinforced by training and reinforced by good training and 

good checking standards. 

Mr. HAYES. But that obviously broke down. 

Do you want to comment, Mr. Sumwalt? 

Mr. SUMWALT. I would, Congressman, because I am just a neophyte compared to Captain Krakowski. He had 33 years with the 

airline. I only had 24, most of which were based in Charlotte Douglas International Airport. 

So the NTSB did determine the probable cause of the Comair accident was to be the failure of the flight crew to use available cues 

and aids to identify the airplane’s location on the airport surface 

during taxi and their failure to cross check and verify the airplane 

was on the correct runway. 

Contributing to the accident was, in fact, distractions that the 

crew enabled themselves to get into due to violations of the sterile 

cockpit rule. We also did take an opportunity to point out that if 

the FAA had required that all runway crossings be authorized by 

28 

specific air traffic control clearances. We listed that as a contributing factor as well. 

Mr. HAYES. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think it is just important to know what that part of it is. If 

there are two pilots, they are going to say: Where is the runway? 

How are we going to get there. That is just common language, and 

that is where we had a major breakdown. 

The controller issue is a part of it, but again that is critically important. 

Once you get where you think you are supposed to go, the number on the end of the runway should correspond with your magnetic compass which, oh, by the way, you are going to check with 

your directional gyro which should be the same number. If any of 

the three don’t agree, something is wrong here. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The final comment or question is the other gentleman from North Carolina. North Carolina is getting a lot of time 

today. 

Mr. COBLE. You are very generous to us, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. 

I want to be very brief. I want to extend the gentleman from 

Tennessee’s questioning regarding facilities for berthing. 

I complete my tour, and I get eight hours off. My house is 2 miles 

away. Do I have facilities on board to sleep before I stand my next 

watch? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. Typically, no, sir. 

Mr. COBLE. Typically, no? 

Mr. KRAKOWSKI. At the facilities. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks the gentleman and thanks all 

of the witnesses on our first panel. 

Mr. Sumwalt, you had a final comment? 

Mr. SUMWALT. I would, sir, and thank you for the extra time. 

The question has come up, has the NTSB established a causal 

link between certain runway incursions and fatigue? 

In fact, in our April 10th safety recommendation letter that we 

issued the recommendations that General Scovel mentioned, we did 

point out four runway incursions, four runway incidents that provided clear and compelling evidence that controllers are sometimes 

operating in a state of fatigue because of their work schedules and 

because of their poorly managed utilization of rest periods between 

shifts. 

So we have found runway incursions that we have attributed to 

controller fatigue. 

Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you and thanks all of you on 

our first panel for being here and testifying, for your testimony 

today. Thank you. 

The Chair will now ask the members of the second panel to come 

forward in just a few minutes. I will do the introductions right 

now. 

We are expecting in about 15 minutes a vote on the Floor of the 

House. I don’t know how many votes. So we will try and get our 

29 

second panel at the witness table. I will do introductions now as 

we are making the transition. 

The first witness that I will introduce is Captain John Prater, 

the President of the Air Line Pilots Association; Mr. Patrick 

Forrey, the President of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association; Mr. Basil Barimo who is the Vice President of Operations 

and Safety at the Air Transport Association of America; Mr. Greg 

Principato, the President of the Airports Council InternationalNorth America; Mr. John Duval, who is the Airport Safety and Security Coordinator for Beverly Municipal Airport; Mr. Phil Boyer, 

President of AOPA; and Mr. T.K. Kallenbach, who is the Vice 

President at Honeywell Aerospace. 

Mr. Prater, your time is up. No. I am just kidding. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Prater, you are recognized under the fiveminute rule. Please begin your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN JOHN PRATER, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE 

PILOTS ASSOCIATION; PATRICK FORREY, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION; BASIL J. 

BARIMO, VICE PRESIDENT, OPERATIONS AND SAFETY, AIR 

TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA; GREG PRINCIPATO, 

PRESIDENT, AIRPORTS COUNCIL INTERNATIONAL—NORTH 

AMERICA; JOHN K. DUVAL, A.A.E., AIRPORT SAFETY AND SECURITY COORDINATOR, BEVERLY MUNICIPAL AIRPORT AND 

FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR AVIATION AND OPERATIONS, MASSACHUSETTS PORT AUTHORITY AND AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF AIRPORT EXECUTIVES; PHIL BOYER, 

PRESIDENT, AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND PILOTS ASSOCIATION; 

T.K. KALLENBACH, VICE PRESIDENT, MARKETING AND 

PRODUCT MANAGEMENT, HONEYWELL AEROSPACE 

Mr. PRATER. Thank you and good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, 

Ranking Member Mr. Petri, Members of the Subcommittee. Thank 

you for the opportunity to provide the pilots’ perspective on runway 

safety. 

As you know, our pilots operate in complex airport environments 

every day. They fly in all types of adverse weather and with limited visibility conditions. They complete the demanding task of a 

safe landing over and over, often after being on duty for more than 

16 hours and being awake for more than 20 hours. 

All of these tasks demand vigilance and high situational awareness. These are the challenges we face every day in delivering our 

passengers safely to their gate. 

But the risk for a runway incursion in this environment is constantly increasing. It is an issue that must become a national aviation safety priority and ALPA thanks the Chairman for putting it 

onto the Subcommittee’s agenda. 

According to the FAA’s statistics, during the last three months 

of last year, there was an average of 2.5 runway incursions every 

day in the United States, providing the potential for a catastrophe. 

The FAA categorizes this risk as unacceptable. 

We agree, but I am taking it a step further. This rate of occurrence is inexcusable. 

30 

The FAA categorizes runway incursions as either a pilot deviation or an operational error, but those classifications don’t tell the 

whole story. While it may be convenient to assign blame due to the 

pilot or the controller, it doesn’t address the root of the problem. 

We must understand why these runway incursions take place and 

then put mitigations into the system so that we can help pilots and 

controllers avoid these errors. 

Dozens of experts in several countries have studied the runway 

incursion risk over the years and devised mitigations that can 

greatly lessen the risk in ground operations today. In fact, according to the Commercial Aviation Safety Team, the problem can be 

reduced by as much as 95 percent with the implementation of new 

technologies, new training and operational techniques that increase 

both pilots’ and controllers’ situational awareness. 

Technological solutions include cockpit moving map displays 

similar to the GPS device that many people have in their cars 

today, the integration of ADS-B to enable pilots and controllers to 

track all aircraft and vehicles on the surface and up to 1,000 feet 

above ground level, automatic runway occupancy alerting and digital datalink clearances that are then displayed on the cockpit moving map. 

Most airline pilots, however, are still flying aging airlines with 

none of this technology available to them. 

Other ALPA-recommended improvements include the installation 

of red runway status and hold lights. These simple and inexpensive 

lights automatically provide direct indication of runway status and 

warn pilots of landing and departing aircraft. With ALPA’s help, 

the MIT Lincoln Laboratory tested this system at the Dallas-Ft. 

Worth International Airport and, since its implementation in 2005, 

runway incursions there have decreased by 70 percent. 

Not all runway safety solutions involve high tech gadgets. Some 

low tech solutions involve something as simple and cheap as a can 

of paint which can be used to improve our runway and taxiway 

markings. 

The FAA issued an advisory circular in 2005, requiring that the 

75 busiest airports enhance their taxiway centerline markings near 

runway intersections by June of this year. All but four of these airports have completed that requirement. 

But our pilots and our passengers fly to hundreds of airports, 

and ALPA strongly recommends that these airport surface markings become standard for all Part 139 airports. That is a total of 

566 airports. 

Sixty-two of these airports have voluntarily made these improvements, unfortunately, some spurred by fatal accidents. That still 

leaves roughly two-thirds of America’s airports that need better 

ground markings for pilots. 

Some airports have found that installing perimeter taxiways also 

reduces runway incursion risk. Atlanta Hartsfield is a good example of that. They have eliminated 600 runway crossings a day and 

reduced delays by 60 percent. 

Our union is doing its part for runway safety. ALPA is reaching 

out to our 60,000 pilots in both the United States and Canada 

through a new communications initiative that we call for Hold 

31 

Short for Runway Safety. It is designed to educate pilots on what 

we can do now to prevent runway incursions. 

Our initiative includes a web site, educational material, a series 

of newsletters going out, starting this Friday, and we will keep 

them sending them out to try to keep the focus on runway safety. 

In coordination with the FAA, ALPA and United Airlines produced a video for a training video to highlight the problems and 

how we can reduce operational errors. 

But in order to adequately prepare for the increase in airport operations and the increased runway incursion risk, ALPA urges the 

government to commit proper funding to improve our National airspace System. Every stakeholder and every passenger deserves it. 

They deserve it now. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, Captain Prater. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Forrey under the five-minute rule. 

Mr. FORREY. Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri and the 

distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, let me begin by first 

thanking the leadership of the Transportation Committee in passing a comprehensive FAA reauthorization bill and package in a 

timely fashion, moving it through the House last September and 

the bipartisan support of 267 Members of this House. 

I further applaud your efforts earlier this week in passing a 

short term extension rather than putting this important legislation 

off until next year. 

It is NATCA’s hope that the Senate will yield to the House and 

forego efforts to move an extension that goes beyond June 30th. 

Our fear is that doing so would undermine the hard work this 

Committee as well as of the Senate Finance and Commerce Committees and fail to address the immediate and future needs of the 

National Airspace System. 

Aviation is vital to this Nation’s economy, and H.R. 2881 maintains important provisions to keep our system the safest and most 

efficient in the world. 

NATCA urges the Senate to take FAA reauthorization out of a 

holding pattern and act swiftly on passing a comprehensive long 

term bill. 

Turning to the topic of today’s hearing, NATCA’s mission is to 

preserve, promote and improve the safety of air travel within the 

United States and to serve as an advocate for air traffic controllers 

and other aviation safety professionals. 

Air traffic controllers and pilots, more than anyone else here 

today, are responsible for the safety of the runways at America’s 

airports. 

NATCA has been trying to direct attention to the decreasing 

safety margins in our skies and on our runways for years. We are 

no longer alone. In the past few months, a host of independent Federal watchdogs have joined the chorus of rising concerns about 

aviation safety. 

In November, the GAO issued a report that warned of a high risk 

of a catastrophic runway collision occurring in the U.S. In December, the Transportation Department Inspector General launched an 

investigation on the role that workplace conditions played in several close calls at the FAA facilities in Illinois. And, the NTSB reVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:04 Feb 23, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40816 JASON
32 

cently added runway incursions and incidents caused by air traffic 

controllers fatigue to their 2008 list of most wanted aviation safety 

improvements. 

In addition, last April, NTSB Chairman Rosenker called on both 

NATCA and the FAA to work together to combat controller fatigue. 

NATCA’s response was to welcome that recommendation and to 

work with the agency and offered our assistance to help the FAA 

to make our runways safer. The agency’s response, however, was 

to not follow the NTSB’s Chairman’s recommendation to work with 

the controllers but rather to create a working group that didn’t include NATCA. 

Despite the FAA’s sound rejection of our input, NATCA offers its 

recommendations for improving runway safety today to the Aviation Committee: 

First, because each airport represents unique challenges which 

negate the usefulness of broad, universal solutions, NATCA recommends the creation of a runway incursion prevention committee 

for each airport. These groups would be comprised of the local 

stakeholders including pilots, air traffic controllers, airport management, vehicle driver operators and the FAA. 

Second, NATCA recommends that controller staffing at our Nation’s FAA facilities be adequately addressed. Today, there are 

1,500 fewer fully certified controllers than there were on 9/11, leaving fewer eyes to watch more planes, and the result is increased 

controller fatigue. 

If the FAA would return to the bargaining table where the parties left off and negotiate in good faith with NATCA, the effort 

would make staying in the FAA more attractive to both newly 

hired controllers and those eligible for retirement. Unfortunately, 

the current rate of controller attrition is 6.2 a day, and the system 

can’t sustain that rate much longer. 

Third, NATCA’s recommendation that the FAA work in cooperation with the union in the development of deployment of new technology. Under the liaison program, the FAA and NATCA work side 

by side in creation of new technologies. ASDE-X, an effective surface surveillance system is a product of that collaboration. 

NATCA recommends the deployment of this technology in all airports throughout the Country with mid to high traffic density. 

NATCA further recommends that the liaison program dismantled 

by the FAA in 2005 be reinstituted. 

Fourth, because runway incursions often occur when the layout 

of a taxiway forces aircraft to cross runways on route to a second 

runway or gate, NATCA recommends that end-around taxiways be 

constructed and utilized at all airports where such construction is 

possible. 

Mr. Chairman, NATCA is not alone in sounding the alarm on 

passenger safety. The NTSB and the GAO have determined that 

the threat of controller fatigue is real. 

The increase in runway incursions is real too. There have been 

12 serious A and B runway incursions in the first 4 months of fiscal year 2008 compared to 3 during the same time last year. 

The warnings of the GAO, the IG and the NTSB should not go 

unheeded. NATCA stand ready, willing and able to offer real solution. We can only hope that the FAA is really listening. 

33 

I, once again, thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity to testify here today. I look forward to answering whatever questions you 

might have. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you, Mr. Forrey. 

Mr. Barimo, do you think you can get your testimony in, in five 

minutes? 

Mr. BARIMO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Very good. You are recognized. 

Mr. BARIMO. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

Subcommittee. My name is Basil Barimo, and I am the Vice President of Operations and Safety at the Air Transport Association of 

America. Thank you for the opportunity to join you today and discuss runway safety issues. 

Airlines have been focused on reducing runway incursions since 

well before it was in vogue and appreciate the Subcommittee’s interest in this matter. Runway incursions are a serious threat to 

civil aviation safety both to airlines and to general aviation, but we 

are making progress. 

I would like to concentrate my remarks today on three areas: 

first, on the data as it pertains to serious commercial incursions, 

you heard the definitions earlier; second, on our strategy for 

achieving these improvements; and third, actions that are underway to reduce the risk of incursions. 

Before proceeding further, though, I would like to mention that 

we have only yesterday reemphasized our commitment to improve 

safety in the airport operating environment. On Tuesday, ATA 

member airlines, ALPA, FAA and other interested members of the 

aviation community held a Runway Safety Awareness Day. Roughly 70,000 pilots represented by 50 airlines received a letter from 

senior management, reinforcing the industry’s collective commitment to improving runway safety. 

As a starting point in this discussion, what do the FAA data tell 

us? According to the FAA, the frequency of serious runway incursions, A or B, have decreased steadily since 2001 with commercial 

operations accounting for approximately a third of the total. The 

chart on page two of my written statement depicts this data. 

But narrowing the focus further, the number of serious incursions involving commercial operations that were attributable to 

pilot deviation has also declined. 

How did we achieve these improvements? In this, as with so 

many other safety-based endeavors, the aviation community looks 

to data to identify what aspects of a problem it needs to concentrate on. We can call upon multiple sources of safety-related information like ASAP and FOQA and CAST and ASIAS to better 

understand the nature and the extent of the risks that confront us. 

Our analytical abilities have advanced to the point where we can 

assess future vulnerabilities and therefore don’t have to rely exclusively on what has happened in the past. This means that in the 

context of airport surface operations, we cannot only spot overall 

trends but can pinpoint specific locations that are prone to incursions. 

The decline in serious runway incursions is a result of well 

thought out collaboration among stakeholders. Recognizing this 

achievement, of course, does not mean that we should be satisfied 

34 

with it. We most emphatically are not. But it does give us the confidence to work toward greater improvements. That is the task before us. 

What actions are underway to reduce the risk of incursions? Because of the data evaluation efforts, we understand far better the 

airport surface operating environment than we ever have. 

The more informed perspective has resulted in an array of initiatives designed to decrease runway incursion risk, including elevating the awareness of risks, reducing flight-crew distractions during the taxi phase of flight, emphasizing the use of standardized 

ATC verbiage and clearances, enhancing pilot training, leveraging 

the work of the existing Runway Safety Action Teams, enhancing 

signage, lighting and markings, reconfiguring taxiways to eliminate 

confusing intersection and runway crossings. 

In addition to these initiatives, several emerging technologies 

will improve the operating environment, things like ASDE-X, cockpit moving map and head-up displays, automated lighting systems 

and, finally, we all look to ADS-B to provide greater airport surface 

safety improvements. Each of the foregoing is an important initiative that will contribute to improving safety. 

However, we believe that three items are worthy of special attention as short-term, high priority initiatives, and they are: 

Continuing to eliminate cockpit distractions for crews during the 

taxi-out and taxi-in phase; 

Continuing to eliminate confusing taxiway and runway intersections, adding signage and lighting, and introducing technologies 

that link ASDE-X to TCAS and put the warning directly into the 

flight deck; and 

Finally, tapping into critical safety information by implementing 

an ASAP program for air traffic controllers, similar to those used 

so effectively within the airline community. 

These three initiatives can be accomplished in the short run and 

promise to improve the safety of the airport and operating environment. They shouldn’t be regarded as supplanting the other initiatives that I have mentioned but are worthy of further immediate 

emphasis. 

The Subcommittee’s interest in the issue of runway incursions is 

always welcome and always timely. The threat is real. The need for 

continued action is indisputable. The aviation community remains 

ready and committed to reducing the risk of runway incursions. 

Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, Mr. Barimo. 

We have four to five votes on the Floor right now, which means 

that the Subcommittee will stand in recess until we would ask you 

to be back by 4:20, 20 minutes after 4:00. 

So if you want to get a cup of coffee, we will be back here at approximately 4:20. We would ask you to be here. We would ask our 

witnesses to stay, to those of you who have already given your testimony, so that Members have the ability to ask questions. 

The Subcommittee will stand in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Subcommittee will come to order. 

35 

First, let me say we thought we would be back by 4:20, but 

strange things happen when you are having fun. We had a couple 

of extra votes that we didn’t count on. 

The Chair now recognizes, under the five-minute rule, Mr. 

Principato. 

Mr. PRINCIPATO. Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri, 

thank you for allowing ACI-North America the opportunity to participate in this important hearing on runway safety. 

As you know, I am Greg Principato, and I am the President of 

Airports Council International-North America. Our 360 member 

airports enplane more than 95 percent of the domestic and virtually all of the international passenger and cargo traffic in North 

American, and nearly 400 aviation-related businesses are also 

members of ACI. 

We applaud the Committee for its tireless work on H.R. 2881. 

The resources the bill provides will fund many critical projects to 

bring important safety benefits. We thank you for your leadership 

and commitment to both airports and the aviation industry, and we 

commend both you and the House of Representatives for passing 

this bill. 

In fiscal year 2007, the FAA reported 24 serious runway incursions out of more 61 million operations. Although the Nation’s airport runways remain safe, reducing the risk of runway incursions 

is a top priority. Airports have taken a particularly aggressive 

stance in addressing this safety concern. 

Last August, more than 40 aviation leaders including ACI-North 

America, participated in the call to action. The purpose of the call 

to action was to reach consensus on a number of short, medium 

and long term initiatives that could be undertaken to further improve the safety of operations at America’s airports. 

By June 30th, 2008, the FAA was requiring 75 large and medium 

airports to paint red markings on the taxiway hold line to identify 

the approach of a specifically marked runway. FAA is also requiring these airports to improve centerline painting and markings on 

all airport taxiways to give differential color distinctions to ensure 

taxiways are easily seen by taxiing pilots at night or under poor 

weather conditions. 

To date, actually, the number is 72 out of 75. Another has complied. Airports have completed this, and three airports will be finished by May, ahead of the deadline. 

Now the FAA is not requiring new taxiway painting and markings for smaller airports certificated under Part 139. However, the 

call to action plan calls on those smaller airports to voluntarily do 

so, and I am pleased to say that by the end of this year 251 will 

have done so. 

Midterm runway safety actions specific to airports include the accelerated installation of runway status lights, which use runway 

and taxiway centerline illuminated lights to warn pilots of potential runway conflicts and prompt them to notify the tower before 

proceeding if a contradicting clearance has been issued. 

The FAA has tested runway status lights at Dallas, and a DOT 

Inspector General report or audit showed that runway incursions 

on that test runway at DFW decreased by 70 percent after runway 

status lights were installed. Due to this success, in early December, 

36 

DFW began construction of runway status lights on two additional 

runways. 

Additional midterm action includes final approach runway occupancy status lights. FAROS is a test concept that flashes the existing lights to give direct notification to the pilots that the runway 

is occupied and unsafe for landing. Test airports include Dallas and 

Long Beach. 

Longer term actions include full deployment of ASDE-X by 2010, 

moving map displays in cockpits, ADS-B In and Out as well as 

cockpit display of traffic information, things you have heard about 

already today. 

Independent of the FAA requirements and technological evaluations, airports are taking independent action to enhance runway 

safety. Last year, Atlanta completed its end-around perimeter taxiway, essentially eliminating 650 daily runway crossing, 650. Minneapolis, Grand Rapids and Pittsburgh have constructed tunnels 

under their respective runways to eliminate the need for vehicles 

to cross runways on the surface. 

Airports also continue to provide recurrent training for all airport employees who operate vehicles on the movement area of the 

airfield. 

In addition to airport-specific actions, we recently joined the 

Commercial Aviation Safety Team, or CAST, which was discussed 

earlier, a cooperative voluntary partnership consisting of all commercial aviation stakeholders with a mission to increase safety, 

using an integrated, data-driven approach based on analyzing accident causes, identifying ways to make positive changes and implementing improvements to help address runway safety and incursion issues. 

Before wrapping up, let me also say we have heard a lot about 

various systems that I have just mentioned and earlier people have 

mentioned. I think it is important that down the road we look for 

consistent applications and uniform deployment of those systems. 

Pilots work in a lot of different airports. They don’t just work in 

one airport. They go from airport to airport. It is particularly important that when they come to an airport, what they see is consistent from airport to airport eventually, especially a lot of focus 

on the larger airports. But a lot of regional pilots will fly back and 

forth between a large hub and a smaller non-hub, six or seven or 

eight times a day, and having that consistency is important. 

So I conclude by thanking you for holding this hearing and allowing us to participate. 

Mr. COSTELLO. We thank you for being here and giving us your 

testimony today. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Duval. 

Mr. DUVAL. Thank you, Chairman Costello, Ranking Member 

Petri and Members of the House Transportation and Infrastructure 

Subcommittee on Aviation. Thank you for inviting me to participate in this hearing on runway safety. 

I am John Duval, the Airport Safety and Security Coordinator at 

Beverly Municipal Airport, a GA airport and a reliever airport located approximately 22 miles north of Boston. I am testifying today 

on behalf of Beverly Airport and the American Association of Airport Executives. 

37 

Mr. Chairman, before I proceed, I would like to thank you and 

the other Members of this Committee for your leadership on H.R. 

2881, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2007. Airports are particularly grateful that the bill would raise the PFC cap to $7 and increase AIP funding by $100 million a year. These two funding provisions will help airports improve safety, prevent runway incursions and accommodate increasing demand. 

Since the Senate has yet to complete its action on a multi-year 

FAA reauthorization bill, I would also like to thank you for helping 

to pass a short term extension bill yesterday. 

As Members of this Subcommittee well know, AIP contract authority has already expired and the aviation excise taxes are slated 

to expire at the end of this month. I hope the Senate will follow 

your lead and approve H.R. 5270, so airports can begin to receive 

the funds that they need for critical safety projects. 

Today, we are here to focus on runway safety. As passenger numbers continue to rise and takeoffs and landings increase, it is imperative that we redouble our efforts to improve runway safety. I 

would like to describe just a few of the steps that airports are now 

taking to improve runway safety and some of the technology that 

could help prevent further runway incursions. 

Airports around the Country are using the enhanced taxiway 

centerline markings and surface hold position signs to prevent runway incursions. Commercial airports with more than 1.5 million 

enplanements per year are required to have these markings installed by June 30th. 

Standardization, as you have already heard, as long been a crucial tenet at all of our commercial airports, and I commend the 

FAA for recently issuing a draft advisory circular that would extend these enhanced surface markings to all Part 139 airports. 

Airports are also beginning to add perimeter taxiways to reduce 

runway crossings and the potential for runway incursions. The Atlanta Airport installed an end-around taxiway earlier this year, 

and according to the FAA the new taxiway is expected to eliminate 

nearly 700 runway crossings per day. 

DFW is also engaged in a perimeter taxiway project that will include perimeter taxiways in all four quadrants of the airport. The 

first one is expected in the southeast quadrant to be completed by 

the end of this year. When all four are completed, this will eliminate as many as 1,700 runway crossings per day at DFW. 

Both taxiway projects will help to prevent runway incursions at 

two of the busiest airports in the United States. 

The FAA points out that training is one of the keys to reducing 

the severity and frequency of runway incursions. I agree, and I am 

very proud of the computer-based interactive employee training 

system that AAAE has developed to better train airport and airline 

employees and other airport tenants. AAAE has delivered nearly 1 

million training sessions at 55 airports around the Country. 

IET training programs are highly effective in training because 

employees receive a video component that features the actual work 

environment at their airport. Some of the topics include movement 

and non-movement driver training area as well as airfield safety 

and incursion prevention. 

38 

One of the most promising technology improvements to prevent 

runway incursions is the runway status light system. The system 

uses radar to anticipate the use of a runway by an arriving or departing aircraft and then controls a series of lights to provide information to pilots and vehicle drivers regarding the runway status. 

The FAA has been testing this at DFW and San Diego. Runway 

incursions, as you have heard, in the test case has decreased by 70 

percent on the test runway at DFW. I hope that FAA will continue 

to work with airports and other aviation stakeholders in an effort 

to expedite the deployment of this system. 

We should also use new technology to improve runway safety at 

smaller airports. Toward that goal, the FAA is testing two low cost 

ground surveillance systems at Spokane Airport that could improve 

runway safety at small to medium size airports. One uses millimeter wave sensors. The other uses X-band radar to detect motion 

on the airports runways and taxiways. 

I am encouraged by reports that these systems are effective, relatively inexpensive and easy to install. I hope the additional evaluations will yield positive results and that the FAA will be able to 

expedite the deployment of this system as well. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Aviation Subcommittee, 

thank you again for inviting me to attend today’s hearing on runway safety, and I look forward to answering any of your questions. 

Mr. COSTELLO. We thank you, and the Chair now recognizes Mr. 

Boyer under the five-minute rule. 

Mr. BOYER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

the witness rest period. I must admit that I did not sleep or use 

it for personal time, but if I am a little incoherent, that is probably 

the reason. 

I am here today, unlike usually, to represent not only AOPA, of 

which I am the President, but the AOPA Air Safety Foundation. I 

can think of no single organization outside of government, perhaps 

in government when I am through here, that has spent more time, 

energy and materials and dollars on runway safety. 

First of all, we haven’t talked at all about GA statistics. So I am 

not going to spend a lot of time. It is in our testimony. I just want 

to put up one graph. 

With all due respect to the end of the table, this isn’t a competition, but just to put it in perspective. You have been hearing a lot 

about air carrier airports and airline pilots. There are about 79,000 

airline pilots, 273 pilot deviations during the three-year period covered by the FAA numbers. 

There are almost a half a million GA pilots and, yes, there are 

more deviations, about 580. But if you look at the ratio of GA pilots, it is a group that has a lower propensity to this kind of an 

accident and many times due particularly to the types of airports 

they use. 

One runway incursion, whether it be by an airliner, a GA airplane or a combination or a ground vehicle, I have to say, 800 Independence Avenue, we, and I put in that everyone at the table—airports, ground operators, airline pilots, airlines themselves—we do 

have a problem because the statistics should be at zero if they 

could be, and that is what we all strive to do. 

39 

I want to concentrate on just one area, and that is FAA leadership. It came out in the IG. It came out in the GAO testimony you 

heard. 

I am going to go off this slide just a little bit and talk about 1997 

when then-FAA Administrator Jane Garvey called me when she realized this was one of the five top issues she had to deal with during her administration and said, ‘‘Phil, can you do something? 

AOPA can work so much faster than the FAA.’’ 

We stepped in at that time, and we did a lot of things. I provided 

a packet for the Committee of all those things we have done. 

I have to tell you, the Administrator at that time, the late nineties, she formed a taskforce. I was on it. The head of ALPA was 

on it. Others were on it. 

She met with us personally almost every single month. We 

looked at the metrics together. 

She said, what are you doing? I don’t want to hear the BS. I 

want to know what you are actually doing. 

The FAA embarked on what I would say in my 18 years was the 

biggest effort on safety that I have seen them undertake. The program was well funded. Other divisions of FAA, and they will tell 

you this today, were jealous of the kind of money this project was 

given. 

Regional meetings were held around the Country with the airports that my two friends here to the right represent, with the airlines, pilots that went to those airports—I remember Los Angeles 

which had a language problem, et cetera—and with the GA community. 

But it all boils down to just what you and Chairman Oberstar 

said in your rebuttal to the USA editorial today. It is not about 

aviation infrastructure having a lack of money. You were talking 

about and the words were FAA leadership. 

I can even remember the name of the person who headed the 

program back in 1997. 

But then it sort of dropped off the radar map. Frankly, as a 

group that has done a lot with aviation and runway safety, when 

you are not being prodded, when you are not being asked for more 

like we were for those five years, it went off the table. 

So what have we done? Well, we have educated our pilot members on, hey, the House bill is a good bill for the FAA financing. 

The Senate bill has a few problems. We have been spending our 

time at things like that. 

Well, you refocused them with the GAO study. The FAA got your 

attention again, but frankly let’s call a spade, a spade. We haven’t 

had the FAA’s leadership on this issue and, believe me, industry 

is ready to go. We have been ready to do all kinds of things. 

I want you to look, as you look at the solution list, at the low 

tech things. You have heard a lot of high tech things that will take 

years to happen. There are a lot of low tech things too. 

We need those AIP funds that you have put in your bill. This is 

just a shot of taxiway. If you look below there in the lower right, 

no one with a propeller or a turbine aircraft wants to go across fog 

like that, and they are waiting for AIP funding to become available. 

Hopefully, the Senate matches what you did. We can get some of 

that started. 

40 

In the end, I just want to say we are here. We are ready to help. 

We are ready to take all the things we have done, like our magazine where we bound in 400 runway safety brochures in the past. 

We certainly are getting the message now from your Committee, 

and we certainly see now that the FAA in the earlier panel will respond. 

Thank you. 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair thanks you and recognizes Mr. T.K. 

Kallenbach. 

Mr. KALLENBACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr Boyer, I think you got plenty of rest. You didn’t appear fatigued to me. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Petri, Members of 

the Subcommittee. Good evening. 

My name is T.K. Kallenbach. I am the Vice President of Marketing and Product Management for Honeywell Aerospace, and my 

responsibilities include development and deployment of safety technologies for Honeywell. 

Runway safety is not a new concern, but as our Nation’s skies 

and runways become more crowded, one that absolutely requires 

new solutions. We can build on existing technologies to implement 

these solutions both in the short and long terms. This will require 

active and vigorous support from the FAA, aircraft operators, airports and manufacturers, and perhaps most critical will be your 

continued oversight and vigilance to hold everyone’s feet to the fire 

to get this done in a timely fashion. 

Mr. Chairman, I come before you representing Honeywell’s history of addressing NTSB safety recommendations, and we are 

proud of those accomplishments, proven solutions that have saved 

lives. 

From the 1970s through the 1990s, the leading cause of aviation 

accidents was controlled flight into terrain or CFIT. Since the introduction of our Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System, or 

EGPWS, CFIT accidents have dropped over 500 percent and, most 

importantly, not one aircraft operating with our system has been 

involved in a CFIT accident. 

Today, I want to show you that similar solutions are available to 

address runway safety issues and endorse some of the technology 

comments from NTSB, GAO and FAA. There are a couple of solutions available now that assist pilots in tracking their position on 

the airport surface. 

One solution is Honeywell’s Runway Awareness and Advisory 

System, or RAAS. RAAS provides verbal announcements over the 

cockpit’s audio system, indicating the aircraft’s position relative to 

the runways, allowing pilots to remain heads up and visually alert 

to immediate surroundings. RAAS is a software upgrade to the 

EGPWS computers that are installed in over 95 percent of the commercial aircraft. 

RAAS is FAA-certified and has been incorporated in over 2,000 

aircraft that have already been upgraded. You heard RAAS announcements on the GAO video that was used earlier. 

Another short term solution is moving map displays. They provide pictures of the airport’s runways and taxiways with a symbol 

indicating where the airplane is located. Like RAAS, airport movVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:04 Feb 23, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40816 JASON
41 

ing maps improve pilots’ situational awareness and the systems are 

complementary with RAAS providing verbal cues and the moving 

map matching them up with a picture of their position. 

Short term solutions help pilots avoid placing their airplane in 

runway incursion situations. The longer term objective is to provide 

pilots with better information about what other aircraft are doing 

and warn pilots and controllers simultaneously when a collision is 

imminent. We call this breaking the chain of events that could ultimately lead to an accident. 

Today’s surface detection systems generate alerts only for air 

traffic controllers. With the aircraft traveling at high rates of 

speed, the seconds needed for the verbal relay between controller 

and pilot can be the difference between a catastrophic collision and 

safe resolution. Consider that an aircraft on approach covers a 

quarter mile in six seconds. 

Honeywell and Sensis Corporation, the FAA’s supplier for ASDEX, have worked in partnership to develop an integrated alerting solution. In our prototype system, as you saw in the testimony from 

Dr. Dillingham from GAO, alerts are provided directly and automatically to pilots, maximizing the time available to resolve the incursion before an accident. This technology was successfully demonstrated to senior FAA and NTSB officials in the summer of 2007 

in Syracuse, New York. 

Another longer term solution involves the deployment of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast, or ADS-B. As more aircraft are modified to broadcast and receive this information, the 

ability to identify potential conflicts becomes viable. 

While the FAA’s currently proposed rule doesn’t require aircraft 

to broadcast their ADS-B information until 2020, FAA’s traffic information service can accelerate the practical use of aircraft-based 

incursion detection alerting. 

Mr. Chairman, I described a series of short and long term solutions for improving runway safety. The key question is: When? 

Accelerating the deployment requires a cooperative effort among 

a number of stakeholders, and Honeywell recommends this Committee aggressively pursue the following three actions: 

One, strongly encourage the adoption of better pilot situational 

awareness capabilities including the preparation of certification criteria and financial incentives for equipping. 

Two, accelerate the implementation of traffic information service 

at airports throughout the National Airspace. 

Three, require regulatory and procedural changes that will allow 

ASDE-X to broadcast alerting signals for use in the cockpit. 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you again 

for the opportunity to present our recommendations to address 

aviation safety. 

Mr. COSTELLO. We thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. Prater, I have a few questions. Then I will turn it over to 

Mr. Petri. 

In your testimony, you talk about a mitigation strategy in order 

to avert runway incursions. You talk about moving maps as an important part of that strategy. I wonder if you might elaborate a little bit on that. 

42 

Mr. PRATER. Well, I would compare it most to the GPS in your 

car that would show intersections. You could easily place the crossings, the runway crossings, the potential caution areas so that they 

are more easily seen and recognized from inside the cockpit instead 

of depending just upon the exterior cues, the limited markings that 

many places have, especially in low visibility conditions. 

It would certainly increase the situational awareness. A problem, 

of course, is driving the airplane, taxiing along at 20, 25 knots 

while observing it. 

So one of the basic mitigations that we spoke about earlier is 

much simpler. It is to slow down. It is to slow down. It is do the 

same thing we teach our kids at the railroad crossings. Stop, look, 

and listen. 

We need to slow it down once in a while when these airports get 

too crowded, when too many operations are taking place. That will 

help just as much as the high tech solutions. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you. 

Mr. Boyer, you are exactly on point, and I am in total agreement 

with you. I gather that you picked that up earlier in my comments 

about a lack of leadership at the FAA. 

Up until 2001, they had their eye on the ball. They engaged with 

the users of the system and made them participants to try and 

come up with a system to reduce runway incursions. When the 

numbers started coming down, the FAA went off and concentrated 

on other things. 

It is unfortunate, but we know that when you leave the director’s 

position open for over two years and you have a runway safety plan 

that has not been updated since 2002, we know that it is not a priority for the agency. 

I hope that Mr. Krakowski, his testimony here today. He is committed. He has over 30 years experience in the cockpit. We hope 

that that will change. 

Let me ask you. You mentioned what you had done with your 

membership, with the foundation in developing educational materials for general aviation pilots. How closely have you and the foundation worked with the FAA concerning the Runway Office and development in order to get this information out to the pilots? 

Is it strictly AOPA doing this or are you coordinating this with 

the FAA? 

Mr. BOYER. That is a very good question. I guess the first five 

years, it was in total cooperation. The brochures that we submitted, 

I think, to the Committee have the FAA and AOPA Air Safety 

Foundation logos on them. Then, it has been pretty much unilateral. 

Actually, after the Lexington accident that you have already 

talked about today, which was an air carrier problem, but you 

know could happen to any general aviation pilot. Actually, it did 

happen last week in St. Augustine. They only had a 300 foot runway, so the situation was even exacerbated which was left. 

But we put out 200,000 CDs of our course on runway safety after 

that accident at our expense and mailed them to members to call 

attention to runway safety. 

I think now, boy, this week a lot has gone on. We have been getting calls. Yet, still, there are people in the Runway Safety Office 

43 

today that yesterday called our office and said, we didn’t know you 

folks did a CD with the airlines on runway safety, and it was funded by the very office that was calling. So, no coordination 

Mr. COSTELLO. It is a consistent pattern here that concerns me, 

and I am not here to beat up on the FAA. I am just here to look 

at the facts and try and make certain that the system gets better. 

We have found a lack of communication, coordination and reaching out to the users of the system, and that takes me to the question of the air traffic controllers. I want to ask Mr. Forrey. 

We understand that we don’t want to renegotiate the contract 

here today, and we understand that there is a large divide between 

where NATCA is and where the FAA is, but earlier we heard the 

NTSB testify that after the accident occurred in Lexington the FAA 

said that they recognized. I don’t know if they said they recognized 

it, that there is a fatigue issue and that they were working with 

NATCA concerning controller fatigue. 

I just wonder what action has the FAA taken to reach out to 

your controllers to address the issue of fatigue. 

Mr. FORREY. Mr. Chairman, the NTSB made two recommendations to the FAA and to us to look at the fatigue issue and controller scheduling and things of that nature. We wrote a letter to 

the Administrator, Blakey at the time, and said we would be more 

than happy to do that. That was probably in 2007, May of 2007, 

somewhere in that time frame. 

We did not hear back from the Administrator until September 

where she said she would like to do that at some point in time and 

they would let us know what kind of requirements or subject matter experts they would like from us to participate. 

In the meantime, they had sent a letter to the Chairman of the 

NTSB, stating that we were working together, sometime in August. 

The agency has created their own work group. They are already 

doing investigations on, I would imagine, scheduling or controller 

scheduling. They have not included us all in those subjects or those 

discussions. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Hayes and I had talked about NextGen many 

times. You have heard, many of you, in testimony in hearings that 

we have had here in this room last year of the need, both Mr. 

Dillingham and the Inspector General encouraging the FAA to 

work with user groups to get their input. 

Obviously, they have dropped the ball regarding what you are 

doing at AOPA with your foundation, that they are not working as 

closely as they have in the past. Obviously, if they say they are 

working with NATCA to try and address these issues and they 

have not, it is an issue. 

It brings up not only runway incursion and safety issues but also 

NextGen, where we are going with NextGen. 

As I said today in the USA op-ed is that my concern is about a 

leadership. It is not about money. I mean we provide more money 

in the FAA Reauthorization Bill than the Administration calls for 

in its own proposal. 

My concern is not what we are getting in the end but how we 

get there so that we don’t spend a lot of money and go back and 

say, oh, we have to retrofit this now and go back and backtrack. 

44 

My concern about that is the users of the system are not being 

consulted and ample input is not being given through JPDO and 

the FAA. 

A final question and then I will let you, Mr. Forrey, since there 

was talk about the fatigue issue not only on the part of the controllers but also the pilots. So I will ask you to quickly summarize, Mr. 

Forrey, and you, Mr. Prater. 

Mr. Forrey, on the issue of staffing, understaffing and the additional hours that controllers are being forced to work, some would 

have us believe that these hours are forced on them. Others would 

have us believe that this is of their choosing, that they choose to 

work the overtime. I want to know your response. 

Mr. FORREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to answer that question. 

The facility manager calls in overtime because they require overtime to work the shift. It is not because a controller wakes up in 

the morning and says, you know what, I feel like working overtime 

today. I will tell the manager I will be in to work. 

That is not how it works. 

That is just a way of controllers deciding how they are going to 

work overtime. If they volunteer for it, they will call them first. If 

they don’t, they assign it. 

There are many facilities in this Country where they are signing 

that overtime. Southern California TRACON, Atlanta Tower and 

TRACON, Miami Center, just to name a few. Those people are 

forced to work. 

What that does is because they are working short shifts, controllers are working positions, combined positions that would normally 

take two or three people to work. That means they are working 

more traffic. They are working more frequency. They are working 

more airplanes. There has to be a greater situational awareness. 

That kind of wears you out, especially if you are working six 

days a week or you are working ten hours in a day. That is the 

impact of working overtime and the fatigue that it creates. 

Now the agency likes to plump in these numbers, that it is only 

2 percent of the entire Country. They like to generalize in that respect. 

But the fact of the matter is at some of our busiest airports and 

some of our busiest facilities in the Country, there is a lot of overtime being worked and there is a lot of tired controllers. That is 

the opportunity to make mistakes. 

As Captain Prater stated, you have inexperienced pilots now infiltrating the system and they are working 16 to 20-hour days. 

Even though they are not flying it, they are still busy doing something for that period of time. 

Someone is going to make a mistake. We rely on each other, pilots and controllers, to catch each other when we make mistakes. 

In most cases, it works. Like in Ft. Lauderdale, the pilot made a 

mistake, and the controller caught it. In LaGuardia, the controller 

made a mistake. The pilot caught it, and they avoided near disaster. 

That is the kind of system we have in place, but when you start 

reducing that or you start lowering the experience levels of the peoVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:04 Feb 23, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40816 JASON
45 

ple working it, like the agency is doing right now, it is a recipe for 

disaster. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Captain Prater, would you like to comment on 

pilot fatigue? 

Mr. PRATER. Very briefly, even though I would like to talk for 

about 16 hours which is what the FAA says a standard duty day 

can be for an airline pilot, I will try to keep it a little shorter than 

that. 

But the fact is we can do 16 hours followed by 8 hours away from 

the airplane. Go through the airport. Find a hotel. Get a couple 

hours rest and come back 8 hours later. Go through security. All 

of you travel well, so you know it is going to be 20 or 30 minutes. 

Walk through the airport. Then start another 16-hour duty day. 

At the end of several of those, you are making the most important decision of your life every day. You are landing an airplane 

full of passengers, full of cargo, in the weather, and the fatigue 

catches up with you. 

What we have seen more since 2001 is that we are seeing many 

pilots flying longer days, being pushed to those maximums. Some 

of it is economics. Some of it is shortage of pilots. Some of it is because there is not enough pilots staffed to fly that full schedule. 

We are seeing the cumulative effects, and I can say easily in my 

35, 36 years flying, I have made a few mistakes. Other people have 

caught them: the first officer, a controller. We do depend upon each 

other, but we also depend upon trying to be as rested as possible. 

Congressman Hayes, I think talked about it earlier. A well rested, well experienced, well trained pilot is how we prevent incidents 

from happening. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr. Petri. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. 

I have a couple areas to explore. I happened to have the opportunity to get a briefing from something I guess is referred to as the 

NextGen Institute that is a kind of industry-community consortium 

to help plan and think through. It has a series of working groups 

for doing NextGen as effectively as possible. 

One of the, I think, nine working groups they have is a safety 

working group. I am just curious to know if any of the organizations that you are involved with are involved with that or if you 

could discuss that, if you are being consulted, if there are problems 

with it or if it can be improved or how that all stands. 

If any of you would care to address that, I would be happy. 

Mr. FORREY. I just started getting involved about a year ago with 

NextGen. 

The problem with the IMC, the Institute Management Council, 

is that industry are the people that make up these subgroups. So 

they have to take people from their companies to try and work and 

volunteer while they pay them while they do that to work on certain projects. 

I can’t pull people out of the FAA facility to go do that, so I am 

kind of limited on what we can do based on what staff I have available nationally. It is a good concept. Just, we don’t get that much 

participation other than the main group. 

46 

Mr. PRATER. From the airports’ side, we have been very involved 

from the beginning. Phil is actually the co-chair of the IMC, so 

maybe I should let him talk in greater detail. 

But from the airports’ side we have been very involved. Like Pat 

said, you have to go out and get some folks from airports and so 

forth to participate in some of the groups. 

I have to say it got off to a slow start, but over the last year or 

so, it has gotten a lot better. I think Charlie Leader has done a 

good job of moving it along. So we have been involved in it from 

the beginning. 

Mr. BOYER. I would like to talk as a co-chair, and my other cochair is a strange bedfellow, the head of the airlines association, 

but we do take this pretty seriously. 

Greg is right. We were off to a slow start. I think it is still fairly 

slow. I mean for you in Congress to be able to articulate what it 

is going to cost, what it is going to be, what it is going to do in 

capacity, you could hold hearings after hearings right now and you 

wouldn’t get there. 

The thing that I have sort of adopted and actually the airlines 

have jumped on this. So, once again, we are together on this too. 

We need a little NowGen, and that is what we were talking about 

here. Not NextGen, not 2025, 2020 for ADS-B or some of the other 

things. We need to take some practical solutions as are happening 

now with runway safety because of your interest in the subject. 

We need to also look at what we can do for your constituents in 

your districts who travel on the airlines, travel in general aviation, 

that we can do now at low cost, no cost, and there are plenty of 

things. I think that is what the industry—and that are safe—will 

be working on also. 

You are going to hear that term emerge in the coming weeks, not 

only NextGen but NowGen. 

Mr. PETRI. Just one other area, maybe two, that I was kind of 

curious about. You would expect—but it may not be right—that 

with a global aviation environment, people flying to a lot of airports, say into Milwaukee International Airport or whatever, to Toronto and so on, that there could be problems in communication or 

safety and runway collisions that occur because of people being relatively less familiar with how people interact and all that. 

Is there any variation on international flights to the United 

States or is it as safe? Is that really not a factor? Is it so obvious 

that people have dealt with it successfully? 

Secondly, how do we compare, if anyone has any information, on 

airport runway safety here in the United States, the dominant 

market for aviation, compare with other countries around the world 

in safety? 

Our pilots fly all over the world. It is something that is of concern to us for them and so do our citizens. How are they doing 

when they land in London or in Ankara or somewhere? 

Mr. PRATER. Congressman, I know Pat will want to weigh in on 

this because communications are key to safety. 

There are requirements for improved or enhanced English language. There is also an ICAO standard that we have not yet adopted fully in this Country, and it may have prevented one of the most 

47 

recent accidents just to use it as a point. It is the use of standard 

language, standard phraseology. 

In the case of ICAO, which we are used to operating under in 

most foreign countries, specific ATC clearances would be required 

to cross a runway. So we would never be given clearance to cross, 

to taxi out, cross one or two runways and take off on another runway. 

It might have prevented Lexington because that crew would have 

been cleared to the first runway and held short and would not have 

been able to misidentify it for the active runway, the lighted runway. But that is not used here. 

Overseas, we fly to many airports, and it can be a challenge. 

There are many times going into an airport like de Gaulle or 

Gatwick or Rome. If we have problems, what do we do? What did 

he say? 

Query the co-pilot. What did he say? Wait a minute, let’s just 

stop until we find out what the instructions are. Sometimes the 

controller there will slow down and make sure that we are able to 

understand the direction. 

So I think the key to it is taking the time, standard phraseology, 

the ICAO standards. I think we would see an increased runway 

safety environment back here in the States if we did it. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. PRINCIPATO. You had asked, Congressman, about airports. 

We are part of a global organization, Airports Council International, and they did a global survey of this kind of thing. I think 

we provided the information to the staff, but it showed that this 

region has the best rate or the lowest rate of these incidents of any 

of the ACI regions. 

Just one other thing that might be worth thinking about if you 

are looking at the global industry is in other parts of the world. 

The U.S. airlines typically do their ground handling. Here, the airlines do the ground handling. In other parts of the world, airports 

typically do it, and so there is a difference. If you look at apron 

safety and so forth, you might find some things overseas that don’t 

stack up quite as well either. 

I think we do a pretty good job here. 

But we did provide the international information to the staff, and 

we would be happy to elaborate on it if you like. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, 

Mr. Hayes. 

Mr. HAYES. Back again. 

Captain Prater, President Forrey, is there any formal or informal 

along the lines of runway incursion prevention talk between controllers and pilots? 

They have the best perspective of anybody. Are there any talks 

going on or any plan there? 

I am lucky. I have you all come and see me all the time, so I 

can talk about it. But is there something happening there? 

Mr. PRATER. Well, there is, but again it is between our two 

unions. NATCA conducts a Communications for Safety seminar 

ever year that we are proud to participate in. Some of the regionals 

are starting to have more air traffic control-pilot interaction. 

48 

We used to get to see our controllers a lot more because they had 

the right to ride our jumpseat, and that is a real serious safety tool 

that we no longer enjoy. 

Controllers, probably, and pilots have the same type of relationship maybe as doctors and nurses at times. There might be a little 

bickering, but they straighten us out and we listen to them. 

When they can ride our jumpseat and see the view from the cockpit window and we can talk about problems, it used to be a pretty 

good safety tool. FAA took it away from us. We need that back, sir. 

Mr. FORREY. Mr. Hayes, I would say that what we have started 

doing, because the agency doesn’t want to include us, is we have 

reached out to industry and, of course, our fellow union brothers 

and sisters in the pilots association. 

We have started meeting in major hubs now. We just started this 

year with our safety committee and their safety committee, and we 

are trying to explain the airspace to these guys and gals, understand what they are going through and what they can expect, and 

we are just starting to build those relationships. It is quite impressive what these people are doing. 

So we are creating that dialogue ourselves. We are reaching out 

and doing that. It is important, and it is something we should have 

been doing a long time ago. 

Mr. HAYES. I think it would be very important to Phil and everybody else at the table if you would come back to the Committee 

with some practical things. We sometimes get paralysis by analysis 

around here, but to me that would be very, very helpful. Watch out 

for Congressional fatigue as we deal with some of these issues. 

That is also an issue. 

Let me switch over to Mr. Kallenbach. 

You have a multi-tasking guy sitting beside you. He can go 

steam gauge or he can go technology. Honeywell is obviously an innovator as are many with gadgets. Sam understands, and it is second nature to him but a little bit foreign to me. 

Once you go into the development stage, we are going to switch 

over to ADS-B in a minute, how do you take information from the 

field and translate that into technology to solve problems and make 

things safer? Kind of give us your perspective on how that works. 

Mr. KALLENBACH. Okay. 

Mr. HAYES. Lessons learned, if you will. 

Mr. KALLENBACH. Sure, I would be happy to. 

Maybe one of the best examples is a recent product we have 

come out with called Synthetic Vision which by taking information 

that we have in our terrain database, our EGPWS database. We 

take that information and we fuse that graphically and portray 

that on your primary flight display, still the same primary flight 

display information that has always been in the cockpit. By doing 

this, what we have been able to do is give the pilot better situational awareness inside the cockpit. 

The methodology is that we basically sit with pilots, crew, controllers, members of NTSB, for instance, to try and understand 

what is the problem we are trying to solve in the case of pilot 

awareness. Through a series of interviews, we develop a voice of 

the customer and kind of an assessment of what really would help 

them solve their problem. So you don’t want to give them too much 

49 

information. You want to just give them the exact relevant information they need at the time. 

Then we develop a prototype. That prototype then becomes something we can test with similar or same groups. Take it flying. Take 

it into a pre-production phase and ultimately, working with the 

FAA and the certification authorities, globally come up with a certified system. 

In general, that process can take anywhere from three to five 

years. 

Mr. HAYES. Good point. There are so many things that are available now that enhance safety and make flying easier. The more 

communications we have within interested groups, the better off 

we are going to be. 

Taking all that and putting it in a nice round package, what do 

the industry and all the groups at the table and the FAA going to 

do to bring the advantages at a reasonable price to the flying public, be it airlines or general aviation, with ADS-B? 

I mean that is just sitting there, waiting to happen. If we would 

get all the folks to really give it their best effort, that could be implemented and technologically a lot of our issues would be dealt 

with. Any thoughts on that, Phil or Mr. Kallenbach or anybody? 

Mr. BOYER. I think, first of all, I want to go on the record in answering the question you asked earlier with Prater and Forrey. 

Pat was very instrumental. Actually, I think he attended and 

worked with a couple of them. A seminar series our Air Safety 

Foundation did around the Country and still is doing, called ATC 

and You, and it was done in conjunction with NATCA. Pat had 

some of his controllers each evening. 

This was put on around the Country, and this was probably the 

biggest audience-drawing set of seminars we have ever done because of the interest of the pilots in hearing and being able to talk 

directly with Pat’s membership. 

But in answer to your question, I think we have to get into what 

needs to be certified by the agency and what is supplemental to flying the airplane. 

We sit today in most of our GA planes that are new with the plot 

of the runway environment and the taxiways in the airplane on 

them, so that we can taxi at busy airports. Prater would be jealous 

of this today, but it is the certification level. In a Part 91 operation, 

it is supplemental. 

So what needs to go through years and years of study to say isn’t 

the GPS in the car good enough to know we are coming on this 

street, we are coming up on this taxiway or this runway. 

So a lot of the slowdown is trying to channel the FAA into saying 

everything that is in the cockpit that is for the safety of flight, the 

basic safety of flight, yes, needs to be certified. 

But supplemental information like datalink radar, like the moving map displays, don’t really need to go through that same level 

of certification if you still have a paper chart. You still have a copilot. You are still looking out the window. This is just that extra 

information like it is on your car GPS. 

Mr. HAYES. Great point. 

I have used up all my time, Mr. Chairman. 

50 

But, again, thank you. You all hit on some really good things. I 

know Captain Prater would love to have NEXRAD. 

Anyway, take your controller out to lunch. That works. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. COSTELLO. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

Missouri, Mr. Graves. 

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to have to 

bolt real quick. I have to handle a bill panel over on the Floor, but 

just a comment. 

I would love to explore some things in this, and I do want to applaud, obviously, Honeywell for the technology you are working on. 

I don’t know if it can be afforded by GA pilots. It probably can’t, 

unfortunately. 

But it goes back to and it kind of dovetails on what Mr. Prater 

said and Mr. Boyer just said, and we all learned it in basic flight 

training. You have to look out the window. That is the bottom line. 

You have to look out the window. All the technology in the world 

isn’t going to replace that simple thing. 

When we took advanced flight training and when I have taken 

advanced flight training, you learned to bury your head in the 

panel, but it is that basic flight training stuff when you are on the 

ground. Slow down, but you have to look out the window and see 

what is coming and what is out there. 

Too many times we do just exactly what I said. We bury our 

heads in the panel and aren’t paying attention. It goes for the controllers too. That is the reason the tower is so tall, so you can look 

out the window and see what is going on. 

I know I am oversimplifying this to a great deal, but the fact of 

the matter remains that is simple technology. Enhanced runway 

markings work. The stop lights work. But look out the window. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you. 

That concludes the testimony of our witnesses. 

The hearing went on a little bit longer than we anticipated because of votes on the Floor, but we appreciate all of our witnesses 

staying here to answer questions from members of the panel. 

I can assure not only our friends at the FAA but all of you and 

everyone in the industry that we are going to continue to provide 

aggressive oversight to make certain that the FAA is moving forward and doing everything they possibly can do, working with all 

of the stakeholders so that we can improve the runway incursions 

that we have recently seen and have experienced. 

That concludes this hearing. Again, we thank you very much. 

The Subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:50 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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