U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

62–262 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

RETALIATION AT THE DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE

AND ENERGY: DO ADVOCATES OF TIGHTER

SECURITY FOR U.S. TECHNOLOGY FACE INTIMIDATION?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 24, 1999

Serial No. 106–74

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

DOUG OSE, California

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin

JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California

HELEN CHENOWETH, Idaho

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

DAVID A. KASS, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian

CARLA J. MARTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on June 24, 1999 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

McCallum, Lt. Col. Edward, Director of the Office of Safeguards and

Security, U.S. Department of Energy, accompanied by William L.

Bransford, Esq., Shaw, Bransford, Veilleux & Roth, Washington, DC;

Peter Leitner, Senior Strategic Trade Adviser, Defense Threat Reduction Agency; Michael Maloof, Chief of Technology Security Operations,

Defense Threat Reduction Agency; and Jonathan Fox, Esq., Arms Control Specialist, Defense Special Weapons Agency ...................................... 53

Weldon, Hon. Curt, a Representative in Congress from the State of Pennsylvania .......................................................................................................... 25

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State of Indiana:

Letter dated May 28, 1999 ....................................................................... 167

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 6

Fox, Jonathan, Esq., Arms Control Specialist, Defense Special Weapons

Agency, prepared statement of .................................................................... 137

Horn, Hon. Stephen, a Representative in Congress from the State of

California, examples of security incidents .................................................. 205

Leitner, Peter, Senior Strategic Trade Adviser, Defense Threat Reduction

Agency, prepared statement of .................................................................... 78

Maloof, Michael, Chief of Technology Security Operations, Defense Threat

Reduction Agency, prepared statement of .................................................. 123

McCallum, Lt. Col. Edward, Director of the Office of Safeguards and

Security, U.S. Department of Energy, prepared statement of .................. 60

Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Connecticut:

Memo from Johnathan Fox ...................................................................... 142

Memo from Dr. Leitner ............................................................................. 197

Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Indiana:

Information concerning part of the Cox report ....................................... 209

Letter dated May 25, 1999 ....................................................................... 182

Weldon, Hon. Curt, a Representative in Congress from the State of Pennsylvania:

E-mail from Mr. Trulock ........................................................................... 42

Information concerning part of the Cox report ....................................... 44

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 35

(1)

RETALIATION AT THE DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND ENERGY: DO ADVOCATES OF

TIGHTER SECURITY FOR U.S. TECHNOLOGY

FACE INTIMIDATION?

THURSDAY, JUNE 24, 1999

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dan Burton (chairman

of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Burton, Gilman, Morella, Shays, RosLehtinen, McHugh, Horn, Davis of Virginia, McIntosh, Souder,

Scarborough, LaTourette, Barr, Miller, Terry, Biggert, Ose, Ryan,

Chenoweth, Waxman, Lantos, Wise, Owens, Mink, Maloney, Norton, Cummings, Kucinich, Tierney, Ford, and Schakowsky.

Staff present: Kevin Binger, staff director; Barbara Comstock,

chief counsel; David A. Kass, deputy counsel and parliamentarian;

Corinne Zaccagnini, systems administrator; Carla J. Martin, chief

clerk; Lisa Smith Arafune, deputy chief clerk; Scott Feeney, professional staff member; James Wilson, chief investigative counsel;

Michelle White, counsel; Phil Schiliro, minority staff director; Phil

Barnett, minority chief counsel; Kenneth Ballen, minority chief investigative counsel; Michael Raphael, Michael Yang, and Michael

Yeager, minority counsels; Ellen Rayner, minority chief clerk;

Earley Green, minority staff assistant; and Andrew Su, minority

research assistant.

Mr. BURTON. Good morning. A quorum being present, the committee will come to order. Over the past 21⁄2 years, this committee

has focused a lot on the People’s Republic of China. We have looked

long and hard at millions of dollars in illegal contributions that

flowed from China to the Democratic National Committee. One

month ago we heard Johnny Chung testify that the head of the

Chinese military intelligence agency gave him $300,000, which he

said could be given to the President’s campaign, and we heard testimony that others were involved. If anyone ever had any doubts,

it has now become crystal clear that there was a Chinese Government plan to illegally influence our elections.

This is a very serious issue. We have received no cooperation

whatsoever from the Chinese Government. We asked them to let us

travel to China to interview witnesses. They turned us down flat.

They told us they would arrest us if we came over to China. We

asked them to give us bank records from the Bank of China to

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show where the money came from. They gave us nothing. We asked

the Clinton administration to help us through diplomatic channels,

but they haven’t lifted a finger. The President has had three summit meetings with Chinese leaders over the past 2 years, and he

has yet to put any pressure on them to explain what they did.

But this isn’t the only issue that we have with China. We have

some very difficult national security problems as well. A few weeks

ago, the Cox committee report came out. It revealed for the first

time how extensive China’s espionage has been against our nuclear

weapons labs. China’s thirst for our technology is not limited to nuclear bombs. They have also engaged in a massive effort to acquire

sophisticated U.S. technology to modernize their military, everything from supercomputers to milling machines to aircraft technology. Sometimes they do it in an above the board manner; just

as often they do it illegally through front companies and with

phony end users.

It is pretty obvious that China has taken a very adversarial approach toward the United States. The question now is, what have

we done about it? Unfortunately, when you look behind all of the

spin and the PR, the answer is, not very much.

Today we have three witnesses from the Department of Defense

and two from the Department of Energy. They have several things

in common. First, they are all career civil servants. They are not

political appointees. Second, they have all served across more than

one administration, both Republican and Democrat. Third, they

have all worked very hard to try to safeguard sensitive U.S. technology from foreign adversaries or potential adversaries.

Fourth, they have all had to fight with entrenched bureaucracies

to do their jobs. Finally, they have all suffered retaliation and damage to their careers for trying to do the right thing.

Two of our witnesses, who brought serious problems in their

agencies to light, have been accused of violating security rules. In

my opinion, this appears to be harassment, pure and simple. One

of them is Lt. Colonel Edward McCallum of the Energy Department. Colonel McCallum is the Director of the Office of Safeguards

and Security. He is in charge of security at all of the Energy Department’s nuclear facilities. He has held that position for 10 years.

He has worked on security within the Department of Energy for

over 20 years. He is a decorated Vietnam war veteran.

I think the record will show that nobody has fought harder to try

to improve security at the Department of Energy labs than Colonel

McCallum. He has written report after report pointing out the

weaknesses. Year after year, he has fought internal battles to try

to fix the problems. During the Bush administration there were security problems. Colonel McCallum testified before the Dingell committee in 1989. He criticized the Department. After he testified, he

was called into the Under Secretary’s office. Was he punished? Was

he threatened? No. They put him in charge of the Safeguards and

Security Office and told him to fix the problems that he brought

up. He was told to meet with the Under Secretary every week to

keep him up-to-date. There was still bureaucratic resistance, but at

least he was getting high level support.

During the Clinton administration, things changed. Secretary

O’Leary decided to open up the labs and make them more accesVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:27 May 24, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HEARINGS\62262 pfrm06 PsN: 62262
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sible. The number of foreign visitors doubled. Security then took a

back seat. Colonel McCallum’s office lost any semblance of control

over foreign scientists at the labs. Secretary O’Leary placed a new

level of bureaucracy between McCallum’s office and the high level

decisionmakers he used to report to. According to Colonel

McCallum, his relationship with upper management became adversarial.

On April 16, Colonel McCallum was invited to testify before the

Rudman Commission about the problems at the labs. Three days

later, he was handed a memo by the Assistant Secretary of Energy

putting him on administrative leave. She accused him of disclosing

classified information, which is a devastating accusation when you

have to work with classified information every day. It is a career

ender.

Now I am not going to get into the substance of what he is accused of disclosing. I am going to ask other Members to do the

same thing. Until this dispute is resolved, I think it would be prudent to stay away from the substance of the issue. However, in my

view, this smells rotten.

This looks like retaliation against someone who has been a tough

critic of the Department for years. I want to just list a few reasons

why this looks so fishy to me.

First, there is a long history at the Energy Department of retaliating against whistleblowers by threatening their security clearances. John Dingell, when he was chairman, held a number of

hearings on this when he was the chairman of the Commerce Committee. Let me quote you what he said way back in 1984 on this

very subject. This is Chairman Dingell speaking.

This is an insidious time of harassment because it threatens the very livelihood

of an employee. It also dampens the will of the employee to be honest with their

supervisors and to be honest with the Congress of the United States. It is clear that

without a Q clearance, you are out of a job in defense programs at the Department

of Energy.

Second, if someone is suspected of revealing classified information, there is a procedure that has to be followed. It must be followed. It is spelled out in great detail in the Code of Federal Regulations. The employee has a right to a hearing. He has a right to

a lawyer and to present evidence. The Department would not do

this. They broke their own rules, so Colonel McCallum could not

get a fair hearing.

Third, the first thing the Department is supposed to do is ask the

Office of Classification to review the material and determine

whether it is classified or not. Again, they did not do this.

Fourth, we asked the Department of Energy to cooperate with us

as we looked into this. They haven’t. We asked to meet with the

two people who met with Colonel McCallum and put him on administrative leave. The Secretary has refused to let them meet with us.

We sent them a subpoena for documents. It was due over a week

ago. They have not complied. This is unacceptable. Although the

Secretary of Energy is a friend of many of us in Congress, I am seriously considering moving a contempt citation against him if we

don’t get the documents we asked for and to which we are legally

entitled.

4

One of the things I have learned is that when people refuse to

cooperate with a congressional investigation, there is usually a reason, and it is usually not a good one. I find this all very disturbing.

This is a Department that left Wen Ho Lee on his job with his security clearance for 18 months, after the FBI said there was no

reason to do so. But Colonel McCallum has been fighting for tougher security for years, and he is getting pushed out of his job without so much as a hearing. We are going to hear from Colonel

McCallum today and we are going to continue to try to get to the

bottom of this.

We also are going to hear from three witnesses from the Defense

Department. They have been involved in the review of export licenses for dual-use technologies; that is, technologies that are controlled because they have a military use as well as civilian use.

They are not political appointees. They are career civil servants.

They are nonpartisan experts in their fields. They will each testify

that they have tried to stop the export of sensitive technology to

Communist China and other countries. They will describe how they

have been run over rough-shod by a system geared to get licenses

approved with as little opposition as possible.

Dr. Peter Leitner is one of these experts. Dr. Leitner will testify

that he opposed the export of sophisticated computers to India that

they could use in their nuclear program. He was overruled. He opposed the export of aircraft engines to Communist China, engines

that could be modified for using in their Silkworm missiles. He was

overruled. He opposed the sale of machine tools from a McDonnell

Douglas plant to China because he was afraid they would be diverted to a military facility. He was overruled. He learned later

that the machine tools did wind up in a military facility. There is

now a criminal investigation under way regarding that.

According to Dr. Leitner, every time he opposed a license, his

bosses grew more and more frustrated with him. Then earlier this

year, he too was accused of a security violation under very questionable circumstances. Does this sound familiar? Dr. Leitner has

filed a whistleblower complaint to defend his reputation.

One of Dr. Leitner’s colleagues will also testify. Michael Maloof

also has been swimming against the tide trying to stop sensitive

technology exports to Communist China. His career has also suffered. We will also hear from Jonathan Fox. He is an attorney in

the Defense Special Weapons Agency. He was asked to write a position paper on whether China should be certified as a nuclear

nonproliferator. That means not giving nuclear weaponry to other

countries. This decision had important consequences. If China was

certified, they would be eligible to receive civilian technology from

the United States, technology that also had military uses.

There was also a lot of pressure because this was happening 1

week before the President’s first summit meeting with Chinese

President Jiang Zemin. Mr. Fox is an expert in this area. He certified that China is a nuclear proliferator, giving weapons to other

countries. He wrote a memo that said they were giving these weapons to other countries. He was forced to rewrite his memo under

duress to say just the opposite. He testified that he felt his job was

threatened. I want to have a copy of the memo put up on the

5

screen, because I think it is important that my colleagues see what

happened.

You will note in the margins some handwritten notes which directed him about what things to take out of that memo so that it

would look like China was not involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. You can see there the big line drawn through it.

The material that was slashed out showed very clearly that China

was involved in the proliferation of nuclear weaponry.

Now, the facts are the facts. If China is a proliferator, then no

one in the civil service should be told they have to write a position

paper saying that they are not. There is absolutely no reason for

Congress to pass a law requiring the administration to make a certification if they are going to just ignore the facts. If experts in

their fields are going to have their careers threatened for telling

the truth, then there is something seriously wrong. That is what

we are here to find out about.

We are going to have one final witness from the Energy Department, Mr. Robert Henson. We are going to hear him in closed session at the end of the hearing because of some security concerns.

But, again, he is another witness who believes that he was punished because of what he said.

There are two very serious things going wrong here. First, experts in their fields are being ignored on some very serious issues

and our national security is being threatened as a result.

Second, the experts who are fighting to do the right thing are

being punished for their efforts to try to protect this country. These

five people who are going to testify today are risking a lot. They

are already unpopular at their agencies. Their careers have already

suffered. I am going to be watching what happens after this hearing very closely. If there is even a hint of retaliation because they

came here today and told the truth, this committee will not stand

idly by. People will get subpoenas, they will be called before the

committee, and they will be put under oath to explain if there was

any retaliation and why it happened.

People who have followed this committee’s work know I have not

been shy about issuing subpoenas in the past and I shall not be

in the future. What we are talking about here is defending ourselves against Chinese espionage and stopping the transfer of military technology to a Communist regime that is very unpredictable.

We don’t know what the future holds, so that is why this is important. I won’t stand for people being punished and intimidated for

coming before the committee and telling us what they know.

I ask unanimous consent that all Members and witnesses’ opening statements be included in the record. Without objection, so ordered. I ask unanimous consent that questioning in this matter

proceed under clause 2(j)(2) of House rule XI and committee rule

XIV in which the chairman and ranking minority member allocate

time to Members as they deem appropriate for extended questioning, not to exceed 60 minutes, equally divided between the majority and minority.

Without objection, so ordered.

With that, I yield to my colleague from California, Mr. Waxman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton follows:]

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Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have especially strong feelings about the rights and proper treatment of

whistleblowers. Government and corporate whistleblowers are often

courageous individuals who risk everything they have, simply because they want to do the right thing, and they have been responsible for providing key information in many important recent investigations. We have a responsibility to protect these brave men and

women.

There have been, of course, whistleblowers who amounted to little more than malcontents, cranks, or employees who were incapable of doing a competent job. In other cases, the seemingly scandalous story a whistleblower initially tells turns out not to involve

corruption or cover-ups, but simply an honest policy disagreement

between subordinate and supervisor. Since reputations can instantly be destroyed in these fights, most Members of Congress

tend to be very careful in these situations and painstakingly sort

through all the facts before reaching conclusions.

I think Members of Congress should be especially sensitive to the

details in these cases, because we all inevitably face situations in

which we disagree with our staff’s recommendations. We have all

had to choose between our staffs’ conflicting recommendations. I recall many circumstances where I have had staff people come in,

argue opposing points of view, and I have to make a judgment. I

wouldn’t want those with whom I eventually disagreed to then go

out and say that there was some wrong motive on my part because

I disagreed with them.

In all of these cases, it would be easy for one disgruntled staff

member to accuse any of us of making a decision for the wrong reasons and for our integrity to be questioned.

So our job today is to sift through the testimony we receive and

reserve judgment until we have all of the facts.

I do want to note, however, that based on what I know so far,

I am particularly troubled by the treatment Mr. McCallum has received. If it turns out that he or any of the other witnesses have

been the target of retaliation intended to intimidate them from

doing their job competently and honestly, I will ask the chairman

to join me in putting an immediate stop to those tactics and to take

whatever steps are necessary to make sure it doesn’t happen to

others.

I want to welcome our witnesses to the committee. I look forward

to listening to their testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield

back my time.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Waxman. I would ask any other

Members that have opening statements to put them in the record,

with the exception of the chairman of the International Relations

Committee, who has a brief statement.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this

timely hearing today dealing with both the reluctance of the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, to hear the

truth from career professionals about possible nuclear espionage

and current concerns about the lax security in their procedures. I

am gratified and saddened by the report of the Cox Select Committee on United States National Security and Military Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China and the courage

25

of our Nation’s career professionals working at both the Departments of Defense and Energy.

The advances in nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles that

China will reap from their acquisition of American science and

technology directly undermines our fundamental national security.

Regrettably, the administration’s response to this threat to our national interest has been at best anemic. The Congress has a great

deal of work to do to rectify those problems that have been identified by the Cox committee.

Moreover, we are extremely concerned with the retaliation which

has been allowed to take place in both the Departments of Defense

and Energy upon our career professionals. If it were not for these

professionals, we may never have known the truth about nuclear

espionage and the current lax security that still exists today.

I look forward to working with our colleagues on this committee

and with the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon, on legislation to protect our career professionals, working to protect our Nation’s national security. Hopefully the administration will fully cooperate with the Congress in addressing this most distressing and

regrettable chapter in our Nation’s history.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We will now ask our

first witness, Representative Curt Weldon, who served on the Cox

committee and who has done yeoman’s service for this country, to

come forward. Congressman Weldon, we appreciate your hard

work, your diligence, and your concern about our national security.

We welcome you here today. You are recognized for an opening

statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. CURT WELDON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask unanimous

consent to put my statement in the record.

Mr. BURTON. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. WELDON. I would just like to speak to my colleagues and

friends from the heart, because I have been involved with each of

the cases you are going to hear today in one way or another over

the past several years. I think it is most important that I convey

to you in a very personal way my concerns.

I appreciate the comments of the distinguished ranking member,

Mr. Waxman. I know his integrity, and I share his concerns that

before we draw conclusions we should get to the bottom of each individual case and see what the true facts are. I share that sentiment totally.

Mr. Chairman, let me say at the outset that I have been in Congress for 13 years and have served on the National Security and

Armed Services Committee. It has been an area I have tried to specialize in. Defense and security in this Congress has been and is

a bipartisan issue. I am proud of the fact that in the 5 years I have

chaired one of the two most aggressive National Security subcommittees, Military Research and Development—with 28 Members of Congress, we have never had a dissenting vote in 5 years.

I take great pride in the fact that when we do things on security

26

issues, they are bipartisan. We look at these issues in a way of

working together.

As you will hear me explain today, two of the cases you are going

to be confronted with are in fact being worked in a bipartisan way

by Members of both parties. These issues are serious issues and

they reflect national security concerns and must be looked at.

I want to make one other comment, Mr. Chairman. The whole

issue of whistleblowers coming forward is not new. It is not something that just suddenly arose in the past several years. I can remember in the first several terms that I served in Congress, there

were people in the Pentagon who came to us both quietly and before congressional committeess to tell us about illegal expenditures,

inappropriate activities, and investigations that were not properly

dealt with. That was as serious then as it is today. So this hearing

should not be looked at as something that just occurred.

This an issue that needs to be dealt with. You are going to hear

stories today from the witnesses and others that I will discuss that

involve people with classified status. I want you to keep in mind

the protections available to employees of the Federal Government

who are not in classified status, are not necessarily available to

those employees who serve in a classified position. That is extremely unfortunate. I would ask this committee, because it is your

oversight, to look at ways that we can protect these employees.

The stories you are about to hear I think are from great Americans. They are from people who are dedicated professionals. I don’t

know whether they are Democrats or Republicans or even registered. But I know the quality of their work. In fact, in my job as

the chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Research and Development where I have to be able to assess the emerging threats to

us, and then allocate where the dollars are going to meet those future threats. We work in a bipartisan way with the professionals

in the CIA, the DIA, DOE intelligence, the NSA and all the other

security operations to make sure that we are getting the best information to be able to assess accurately whether or not we are putting dollars in the right place, whether the emerging threats are

in fact where we are putting the dollars we have. That is especially

important in this day and age when defense dollars are shrinking

so rapidly. So it is critically important that we understand that

people need to be able to give us honest, professional assessments

without fear of retaliation, without feeling that their examination

and professional judgments must fit with some predetermined policy conclusion. I don’t care whether that policy conclusion is from

a Republican President or a Democrat President. Unfortunately,

you are going to hear some stories today, and some others I am

going to ask you to followup on, that I think present some very real

challenges for us. We need to understand the concerns that people

have.

You are only seeing the tip of the iceberg. I will give you the outline of perhaps 8 or 10 cases. I can tell you there are scores more.

I will tell you of some of the attempts that we made on the Cox

committee to talk to other employees with similar concerns. As you

know, I also served as one of the nine members of the Cox committee, another totally bipartisan effort. We worked hard. The

Democrat members who worked on that committee were absolutely

27

totally effective, equally effective to the Republicans, because national security was at stake. But there were some concerns raised

during our investigation that you need to be aware of, that we

couldn’t deal with in the Cox committee that this committee perhaps can deal with.

Let me just go through several of the examples, Mr. Chairman,

before you call up your expert witnesses.

I want to talk first of all about how this whole process came

about. Five years ago, when I took over the R&D subcommittee, I

felt we would work in a strong bipartisan way to assess emerging

threats. I involved my ranking members, Owen Pickett and John

Spratt, in every meeting, threat assessment briefing we had. A couple of patterns started emerging relative to Russia, and the threats

that we saw increasing in Russia because of the instability within

Russia.

I came to meet a DOE career employee whose name is Jay Stewart. Jay is in the audience today, Mr. Chairman. He is not a witness, but he will make himself available to come in. His career has

been basically, I don’t know whether he will agree with this, but

I think ruined because of simply doing his job.

Now, Jay served as a professional in the Department of Energy

intelligence operation for 16 years. He was given the highest award

that is given by this Government to a career intelligence employee,

the highest award. He was recognized for his expertise as a foreign

intelligence officer in assessing the stability of Russia’s nuclear

stockpile, of assessing Russia’s nuclear program, and whether or

not the internal turmoil in Russia should cause us to be concerned

because that increasing threat might eventually be used against us

or that technology might be transferred to a rogue state or a nation

that perhaps is not necessarily a friend of ours.

Jay headed up a program called Russian Fission. In December

1992, he led a classified conference on this subject matter which

was widely attended by military intelligence and policy communities. In fact, when Hazel O’Leary came in in 1993, he briefed her

in February. He was asked then to go over to NATO and to personally brief the Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Woerner, which

he did. Manfred Woerner was so concerned, but impressed, with

what Jay’s briefing was about, that he sent a classified cable back

to the State Department which this committee can access. It is

available, I will give you the citation, which shows Manfred

Woerner’s concern as the head of NATO about what Jay Stewart’s

operation was telling him.

A short time after Jay briefed Manfred Woerner, he was approached by a new appointed Director of DOE’s Office of Intelligence and Arms Control, Jack Keliher. This was a political appointee. All papers, briefings, agendas, conference video and audiotapes from that conference involving Jim Schlesinger and intelligence agents from the CIA, DIA, and intelligence community were

seized, locked up, and shredded. We have the name of the person

who shredded them, who said that publicly. Keliher said the Secretary told him, the program Russian Fission was ‘‘politically sensitive’’ and could ‘‘embarrass the President.’’ He further went on to

say, ‘‘If any materials from the National Defense University Conference which Jay Stewart ran were ever leaked to the press, someVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:27 May 24, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\62262 pfrm06 PsN: 62262
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body would be fired.’’ He then said Jay Stewart’s work was ‘‘ill informed,’’ contained ‘‘inaccurate assumptions and conclusions,’’ and

could not be referred to because it ‘‘gave the wrong impression of

the situation in Russia.’’

That may be the case, as Mr. Waxman said, but somebody needs

to look at why Jay Stewart’s materials were shredded, why information relative to this classified conference were basically taken

away so that a proper analysis could not occur.

Jay was an outstanding career employee of Energy. He eventually lost his job, he was shifted over, in spite of having been given

the National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Citation, the Presidential Meritorious Executive Rank Award, and ultimately the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal, the highest award

an intelligence officer serving this country can get.

I tried to get an Armed Services investigation of this several

years ago when Jay first approached me. Unfortunately, the Department of Energy found out about that, in my own opinion and

in comments brought to me by some employees. There was a meeting within DOE to kind of circle the wagons and get a uniform response, which may have been the correct response, I don’t know

that. I can tell you three brave DOE employees, and I will give you

their names, who corroborated everything Jay Stewart said.

If you have read the book ‘‘One Point Safe’’ by Andrew and Leslie

Cockburn, one of the chapters in there documents the work by Jessica Stern, one of our key nuclear experts in this administration

and previous administrations. She too documents what Jay Stewart

has said.

Mr. Chairman, someone needs to get to the bottom of the Jay

Stewart case. I want to publicly acknowledge Jay Stewart. He is in

the back of this room, if any of you would like to meet him. He is

not testifying today because your focus is on China, I understand

that, but I would ask you to followup on Jay’s case because it is

something worthy of consideration by this committee.

I followed up in my own committee by having Russians come in.

I first of all had Brookings scholar Bruce Blair. I had a leading

Russian environmental activist, Alexi Yablokov, a personal friend

of mine, testify in Congress. I had General Alexander Lebed, who

is currently the Governor of Krasnoyarsk, and former KGB agent

Stanislav Lunev, each come in before my committee and testify.

They all corroborate the concerns in Russia that Jay Stewart was

trying to warn us about before his operation Russian Fission was

basically eliminated and done away with. By the way, one of Jay’s

assistants during that early process was none other than Notra

Trulock.

Mr. Chairman, the second case I would like to talk about is a national intelligence estimate which focused the debate of this country on emerging missile threats to America in 1995. You may remember there was a lot of contention about whether or not we

faced a threat to our own security at home by a rogue nation such

as North Korea. I asked for an intelligence estimate, along with at

that point the head of BMDO, General Malcolm O’Neill. For a year,

we pressed the CIA to give us that assessment.

For the first time we know of, and this was documented by the

General Accounting Office in a study we had done, the CIA did not

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go through its normal pattern of releasing a national intelligence

estimate. They leaked the result to two Members of the Senate for

use in debate on the Senate floor before the report was complete.

Those two Senators, who are opposed to missile defense, used that

report as the basis for voting against the national defense authorization that year, which was 1995. The President then directly referred to that report when he vetoed the national defense authorization in 1995. For 3 years that report became the basis of the assessment of threats to the United States in terms of long-range ballistic missiles.

We were livid, Democrats and Republicans on the committee, because we knew that the CIA was not looking at the instability in

Russia and we called into question the process they used. The GAO

confirmed in a written report that the process they used for that

NIE was not like any other process that had been used for an intelligence estimate. Certainly the way they released it, in a political

forum, we never release NIEs. That is a classified document. In

this case it was released.

We then as a Congress in a bipartisan vote convened the Rumsfeld Commission, 5 appointees of the Republicans, 4 appointees of

the Democrats, including the former CIA Director under Bill Clinton, Jim Woolsey. They met for a year. They analyzed what the

CIA had done. Their conclusion was unanimous. Just like the Cox

committee, it wasn’t 5 to 4, 7 to 2, it was 9 to 0, including opponents of missile defense on that panel. They all said the CIA was

way off base, that that report was incorrect, that the threat from

North Korea was here today. We saw that verified last August 31

when North Korea shot off the Taepo Dong I three stage rocket

over Japan, which now the CIA publicly acknowledges can hit

America, right now today. The CIA, in an unprecedented event, Mr.

Chairman, reversed themselves.

This was the basis of the debate in this country for 3 years over

whether or not missiles were a threat to our security. This NIE,

the CIA now admits that what was said in 1995 was incorrect. Bob

Walpole, who heads strategic services on ICBMs for the CIA, now

publicly acknowledged the threat is here today.

Because of that challenge of the CIA national intelligence estimates, the flood gates opened. People started to come to us on the

Armed Services Committee expressing their frustration with the

lack of ability of giving honest, open professional judgments about

emerging threats.

One example: I focused on Russia, as many of you know, starting

from the days that I graduated with a degree in Russian studies.

I have been there many times.

I heard about a brief that was available through the Department

of Energy intelligence services by a scientist at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory on continuing research work being done by the

Russians on five technologies that they could break out with that

could harm our security. So as the chairman of the R&D committee, I thought I better get this brief. I called the person working

on this project for 7 or 8 years, in fact I will give you his name.

This individual, who is a scientist at Lawrence Livermore, had

been working on this brief called Silver Bullets for a number of

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years. His focus was on emerging Russian technologies that we

needed to be aware of.

When I called him, he said, ‘‘Congressman, I would love to come

back and brief Members of Congress.’’ I said, ‘‘It is going to be bipartisan.’’ He said, ‘‘No problem, I would love to do it.’’ That was

in July 1996. He said, ‘‘I will go through my chain of command to

come back and brief you and let them know there is a formal request.’’

Mr. Chairman, I never heard anything. August 20, 1996, I got

this letter. This is the envelope it came in. Postmarked 21 August

1996. Can I read the memo?

Mr. BURTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. WELDON [reads]:

Congressman Curt Weldon, 2452 Rayburn Building, House Office Building, Washington, D.C. Dear Congressman, as a concerned citizen, I hope that you will pursue

the briefing with Dale Darling. Dale has been pressured to cancel the briefing. I

would appreciate it if this note was kept confidential to your office. Thank you.

August 20, 1996.

I eventually got the brief, but you know how I got the brief? I

had to hold this letter up in a hearing when Secretary of Defense

Perry came before our committee and I had my 5-minute question

time. I said Secretary Perry, I respect you, you are a good and decent man. Do you agree with Members of Congress being denied

briefings on emerging threats coming from Russia? He said absolutely not, Congressman. I went on to explain this. Secretary Perry

got us the approval 7 months after I requested it to have Dale Darling come in and brief Democrat and Republican Members of the

House.

Dale Darling has been back several times since. We continue to

engage him. We didn’t use that material to go out and create some

scare tactic with Russia, but it was important to the process of us

understanding what is happening in Russia, that all is not rosy,

that there are problems there.

Let me talk about a couple of CIA cases. These individuals are

not here. One will not show because his career is still in jeopardy.

He is a lifetime CIA agent, one of our experts.

He came to me because he has a relative that worked for me. He

is an expert assigned to monitor our policy involving the U.S. involvement in peacekeeping missions. He was assigned to the panel

that drafted the Presidential Decision Directive 25 dealing with the

use of force in peacekeeping efforts. This analyst revealed to his superiors that an intelligence leak was occurring in Somalia that

compromised United States security.

So he did what he was supposed to do. He said we have got to

watch and be careful that we are not giving classified capability to

the NATO countries that could eventually be leaked out and used

against us. He was doing his job. He objected to what was being

done, and instead of being praised for what happened, he was

asked to submit to a drug test, a medical exam for brain tumors,

and a psychiatric evaluation.

Mr. Chairman, I have heard of that kind of activity in Russia,

where they used to charge people with crimes against the state and

commit them to psychiatric institutions. I have never heard of a

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professional intelligence analyst in this country being asked to undergo a psychiatric examination.

Ultimately it took a group of seasoned attorneys, whom I have

met with several times, to bring an abrupt end to his harassment

and ensure his exoneration, which has occurred today. This individual will come before your committee, but only under the conditions of his attorneys. I have given your committee staff his name

and you know the process that this gentleman needs to go through.

I want it to be bipartisan. This is not a partisan issue.

Another example, and this is something that every member of

this committee understands. Remember when Benjamin

Netanyahu told us that he had evidence that Israel had documents

linking up the Russian Space Agency headed by Yuri Koptev and

the Iranians on building medium range missiles? That was a major

national headline in this country.

Well, we had been briefed in the Congress by the then Director

of the CIA Nonproliferation Center, Dr. Gordon Oehler. He came

over and briefed members of the Intelligence Committee, the International Affairs Committee, and the Armed Services Committee

about Russia’s involvement with Iran. He told us that this is a concern, because Iran is going to build a medium range missile that

is going to threaten Israel. The Israelis were absolutely outraged

over this, and so was Congress.

The distinguished gentleman from New York, Ben Gilman, along

with Jane Harman, introduced a bipartisan Iran missile sanction

bill. We went down to the White House twice. I was invited by Al

Gore twice, once before the House vote and once before the Senate

vote. There were 11 Members of Congress there, Senators and

House Members. He pleaded with us not to have this vote come up

on the floor. When he finished, I said Mr. Vice President, it is too

late. The Congress feels we are not doing enough to stop the proliferation from Russia which Netanyahu and Gordon Oehler told us

about.

The House voted 396 in favor of that bill, the Senate voted 96

to 4 in favor of it. The President’s veto could have been overridden,

but Speaker Gingrich didn’t want to bring the bill to the floor in

the September before the elections. A little known fact, but I was

there with AIPAC when AIPAC was talking to the Speaker about

the veto override. It was his choice not to bring the bill up.

But the point is Gordon Oehler had no intention of retiring. But

when he told Congress about the cooperation between Russia and

their space agency with Iran on the Shahab 3, which was supported by the Israeli Government publicly, which they knew about,

he felt so much pressure that he took early retirement. Again, you

might want to talk to Gordon Oehler, recognized in both parties,

recognized by liberal arms control groups as an outstanding expert

on proliferation. He felt the pressure because he was simply telling

us in a private way about problems that were occurring with Russian technology transfers.

Mr. Chairman, let me get to Jack Daly. I work with the military

all the time, I know my colleagues and friends have a high regard

for our military personnel. Lieutenant Jack Daly has served a distinguished career in the Navy for 16 years. He is a Navy intelligence officer.

32

On April 4, 1997, he was flying in a helicopter on an intelligence

mission with a Canadian pilot. They were monitoring Russian

trawlers off the coast of Seattle that we felt were tracking our nuclear submarine fleet, and they knew these trawlers were not

bringing cargo into ports or taking cargo out, so they were highly

suspected of being there for intelligence gathering purposes for

Russia.

In one of their missions on April 4, while flying over this one

trawler, there was a flash of light from the trawler which was later

found out to be a laser. Lieutenant Daly and the Canadian officer’s

eyes were damaged by a laser device being pointed at them in the

helicopter. We don’t know whether that laser was being used to detect the capabilities of that helicopter, and Lieutenant Daly can

give you the reason, and he is willing to come before this committee, by the way. I met with him yesterday again. But the fact

is we had a military officer who was personally harmed by a Russian vessel. I can tell you following Lieutenant Daly’s incident

there was an inspection. The inspection only took place in the public parts of that ship. Up until now and recently, we haven’t been

able to see the classified documents relative to what we did as a

Nation to respond to Lieutenant Daly’s problem.

If you read the book ‘‘Betrayal’’ by Bill Gertz, in the back of that

book, and this is unfortunate that he did it, but Members need to

understand he has released classified documents. The first four or

five classified documents are the internal memoranda from Strobe

Talbott and the current Ambassador for the United States in Moscow, Ambassador Collins, relative to Jack Daly’s case. The highest

level of our government knew the severity of the Jack Daly incident. What did we do? We went after Jack Daly.

Prior to this incident, he had received the highest commendation

a Navy officer can receive in serving his country. On the following

evaluation after this incident, he received one of the lowest commendation levels that can be garnered by a Navy officer.

Let me give you the quote of what his direct superior officer said

to him in the course of following up on this laser incident, ‘‘You

don’t know the pressure I am under to sweep this under the rug.’’

Mr. Chairman, if that is true, that is not America. It is not

America, if Navy personnel doing their job and protecting our people feel that when they come forward and they are injured personally, that they are going to be the scapegoat because of some larger

policy issue.

Mr. Chairman, I can tell you that Jack Daly and the Navy officer

who has never been talked to, never, are willing to come before

your committee, and I would ask you to bring both of them in.

Mr. Chairman, in terms of the other witnesses you are going to

have today, just a couple of comments, because I know their cases,

a couple of them I am working with personally. I want to first of

all acknowledge the distinguished work of our friends, both Fred

Upton and from the State of Pennsylvania, my good friend Ron

Klink. They have taken up the McCallum case, they have written

Dear Colleague letters, they have written to Bill Richardson in a

bipartisan way. They have asked, as Mr. Waxman has, for a full

explanation of why Mr. McCallum has been treated the way he

has.

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I did a special order on Mr. McCallum several weeks ago, and

something came to me through e-mail that kind of surprised me.

I didn’t ask for this, it just came to me. I know the fellow who

wrote it, but it is surprising, because of all the pressure he has

been under and the fact that he has really come out as a champion

for the administration on cleaning up our labs. I would like to read

the very brief e-mail to you.

This is about Ed McCallum’s case.

Thank you for bringing attention to this miscarriage. I have worked with Ed for

several years and have always found him to be professional in every way. The allegations against him by the Department are inexplicable. I have little doubt that the

Department’s actions are part of the broader pattern of harassment and retaliation

against any and all whistleblowers concerned about national security issues. Sincerely, Notra Trulock.

Mr. Chairman, the McCallum case is an example of a system

gone wrong. You are going to follow that up with the witnesses

from DTSA, two outstanding people, Mike Maloof and Dr. Peter

Leitner. These two individuals are career technical experts. Again,

they are not partisan, they are not in favor of any one point of

view. Their job is to assess technologies that come back to harm

us.

If you question them, I ask you to ask Dr. Leitner, and they both

testified before the Cox committee, if he ever had an incident

where a recommendation he made in his computer was changed by

someone above him while he was on vacation from a no recommendation to either a positive recommendation or another recommendation.

Ask him about the changes within the agency and the pressures

brought to bear on them as professionals. Both Mike Maloof and

Peter Leitner are outstanding employees.

Now, I can’t verify all the accuracy of what they are going to say,

but that is what this committee can do. I implore my friends on

both sides of the aisle, this is not a partisan issue. These are security concerns. These need to be issues that we deal with because

I don’t care if the next President is a Republican or a Democrat.

We need to have good solid intelligence information to deal with

threats that we see emerging.

The other cases, I think, are of equal concern, the cases involving

Livermore and the cases involving Los Alamos and the case involving Mr. Fox.

Mr. Chairman, I would just ask you and I would implore the distinguished ranking member and all of the members of the committee to work with us. I think there is some need for some legislative change. I will make two suggestions, and I am not a policy expert in this area. I will let you all decide how to handle it.

My understanding is that today, a Federal employee who has

classified status, cannot take advantage of the Merit Systems Protection Board. They are specifically excluded because they are in a

classified position.

One of the things I would suggest that you might look at is to

ask the Merit Systems Protection Board to set up a separate process just for those employees who have classified intelligence status,

to give them a means of going through a process to protect their

rights.

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Second, I would ask you to consider whether or not it is worthwhile that we put into place legislation requiring every Inspector

General to establish an office of employee advocacy so there can be

a separate office within the IG’s office that would be an advocate

for the employees. I can tell you, if you talk to the employees I

mentioned here today, and the ones that are not here, they are

going to tell you in some cases the IG’s office do not and cannot

do the job. Maybe it is time to put into place a separate internal

entity in each IG’s office just for employee’s advocacy, especially for

those who have classified status.

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, I thank you for your

time. I appreciate the sincerity with which you are taking this

hearing. I have tried to make this as bipartisan and nonpartisan

as I can, because I want to continue to work with friends on both

sides of the aisle to solve these problems. I say again, these problems have existed in previous administrations. Chairman Dingell

did a fantastic job in previous years in exposing problems involving

whistleblowers, and I have applauded him publicly for that. I

would ask this committee to do the same. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Curt Weldon follows:]

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37

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39

40

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Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Weldon, for a very thorough analysis of many problems. You may rest assured that our

legal staff will contact those people and have them come in, and

we will undoubtedly have more hearings on this.

Mr. WELDON. I forgot one other point.

Mr. BURTON. I would ask you to request to put the memo or email from Mr. Trulock into the record.

Mr. WELDON. I ask unanimous consent to put it in the record.

Mr. BURTON. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. WELDON. When you bring up Mr. Maloof and Dr. Leitner, let

me mention this point to you. The bipartisan Cox committee recognized that we had serious problems within DTSA, and wanted to

talk to the employees in that agency. We asked as a bipartisan

committee that we thought maybe these two were just exceptions

and maybe the other employees would discount what they were

saying, which is the point Mr. Waxman raised. Maybe they are examples. So I recommended to the full committee, these are all in

private sessions, that we ask the Department to allow us to bring

in DTSA employees. They said no. I then came back and said can

we do a random selection? Just randomly pick employees and bring

them in for the committee in a classified way to talk to them. They

said no.

On page 213 of the Cox committee report, which all of you got,

I would like to make sure this is in the record, there is a separate

paragraph, and I would like to read just the title of it to you. It

is entitled, ‘‘Inability to Survey Defense Technology Security Administration Employees Regarding Agency Management Issues.’’

We were denied the opportunity to talk to any other DTSA employees besides these two.

Mr. BURTON. Well, we will ask unanimous consent that that part

of the Cox report be included in the record, because it is relevant.

Without objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. I think you covered this, and I will not belabor it

because you covered this very, very thoroughly, but why do you

think, as a person who has analyzed this, why do you think these

kinds of patterns are emerging in these agencies?

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have the long-term answer

to that, but let me just say as a student of Russia who probably

is Russia’s toughest critic but their best friend, who wants Russia

to succeed, and supports every program the administration has,

they call me to get the votes for this and I deliver on this every

year, to support all their initiatives, I want the same objective that

Bill Clinton and Strobe Talbott wants with Russia and China, but

I think there is a fundamental problem here. I think the fear has

been we don’t want to do anything that might be perceived to be

an embarrassment of President Yeltsin or President Jiang Zemin.

Let me give you another example. I was going to mention this

in my testimony, but didn’t. During the last several years, and it

started under the Bush administration, we didn’t want to embarrass Yeltsin with the reforms. So when we caught Russia violating

arms control agreements, which all of us have voted on and supported, we didn’t call into question those violations.

I did a floor speech last July where I documented 37 violations

of arms control agreements by China and Russia. This wasn’t prepared by me, it was prepared by the Congressional Research Service. These were cases where Russia and China were sending off

chemical, biological, nuclear, machine tooling, and other technologies to Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea, India, and Pakistan. Out of the 37 times, we only imposed the required sanctions

twice. We waived the sanctions each time.

I was in Moscow in January the year President Yeltsin was going

to be reelected and was meeting with Ambassador Pickering. The

Washington Post had just reported a front page story about the illegal transfer of Russian guidance systems to Iraq. So I asked the

Ambassador, what was the response when you asked the Russians

about the transfer of accelerometers and gyroscopes? He said Congressman, I can’t ask that question. That has got to come from

Washington.

I came back and wrote to the President at the end of January.

He wrote me a three-page letter in March. He said, Dear Congressman Weldon, these allegations that the Post has raised are serious.

If they are true, they would be a violation of the MTCR and we will

take aggressive action. But we have to have proof. We have to

know it took place.

Now, the Israelis knew it took place, and we knew it took place.

I didn’t know at the time. Our intelligence community had 120 sets

of these devices. Here are two of them. One is an accelerometer and

one is a gyroscope. You want to examine them? They have Russian

markings on them. They were clipped off of Russian SSN–19 missiles. They are long-range missiles that were used in their submarines aimed at American cities. We caught Russia three times

sending these to Iraq. We never imposed the required sanctions.

We were given the assurances, and I can tell you that Gary Ackerman and Tom Lantos and a bunch of Democrats were very aggressively involved in this transfer. We were assured that there

will be an internal investigation done in Russia that will result in

47

criminal prosecutions. That never happened. So Russia transferred

three times these devices that we know of to Saddam Hussein to

improve the accuracy of their missiles.

Mr. Chairman, I just think that we didn’t want to raise that

issue that year because Yeltsin was running for reelection. We

were so concerned over the past 8 years of not embarrassing Boris

Yeltsin that we didn’t call into question when Russia was in violation. We didn’t want issues to surface that would maybe embarrass

Russia.

Mr. Chairman, I am a friend of Russia, and I will go to the wall

with Russia for anybody, but you can’t ignore reality and you can’t

punish innocent Federal employees for doing their job because

what they are saying we don’t want to hear.

That is not the way you base your security policy. Yes, Russia

has problems. It doesn’t mean we want Russia to be the evil empire. China has problems. I am going to vote for MFN for the President. I am going to be opposed by many of my colleagues on our

side. I want to engage China. But our Government has got to set

the tone. We have to understand it is not wrong to be strong and

consistent and transparent with these two countries. I think you

get weaker when you ignore that.

So my bottom line feeling is that we have just been so preoccupied with not wanting to embarrass each country, that we

don’t allow issues to rise that we think may cause problems.

Mr. BURTON. Let me just ask you a real quick question about

these two devices that you have there on the table, because those

are objects that can maybe make the point.

These were given by Russia, sold by Russia, to Iraq?

Mr. WELDON. Given or sold, we don’t know.

Mr. BURTON. Given or sold. But on three separate occasions you

said?

Mr. WELDON. Twice we found them in the Tigres River Basin.

Once with the help of our allies in that area that I can’t name, they

were given to us.

Mr. BURTON. The point is, these were more accurately targeted

missiles——

Mr. WELDON. Against Israel.

Mr. BURTON. And could they be used beyond Israel?

Mr. WELDON. Absolutely. These are long-range guidance systems.

Iraq does not have the capability to build these systems. Neither

does Iran. They have to get this technology from either the United

States, Russia, or now China, even though China got some of its

technology from us. So here you have Russia giving this kind of sophisticated technology out, and we catch them, and we don’t want

to ask them about it. We want to pretend it didn’t happen. You

can’t do that. I am not an enemy of Russia. I am a friend of theirs.

Mr. BURTON. I think you made the point, and I appreciate that.

Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Weldon, what you

had to say was very interesting. I think it is unprecedented, however, that you were given 20 minutes to make an opening statement. I have never seen that happen before, and I hope the chairman will allow all the witnesses to speak as long as they feel they

want to, because otherwise what we will be doing is showing favorVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:27 May 24, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\62262 pfrm06 PsN: 62262
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itism to a Member of Congress and telling witnesses they have to

be restricted in what they want to say.

Mr. WELDON. I apologize. As a teacher I tend to talk too long.

Mr. WAXMAN. But on the other hand, it is impossible, as a former

chairman, to have a hearing where everybody gets to talk as long

as they want to talk. Usually there are time constraints.

You have raised a lot of issues. I have no knowledge about these

cases, and you feel very passionately about them. I hope the chairman will look into them, because if there are situations where people are being retaliated against because they have information that

ought to be made public or ought to be given to the Congress, then

I think that it is of great concern to us. But I just want to raise

some skepticism about an issue, just to point out there may be two

sides to the question.

You said you are going to vote for MFN. Many of your colleagues,

even on the Republican side, may not. Suppose I sat down with my

staff and I said, well, let’s talk about this issue. Should I vote to

continue trade relations with China, as we have had it in the past,

or should I vote to withhold that kind of privilege as a way to protest China’s human rights, China’s activities in proliferation of

weapons, and China’s spying on the United States? How else can

I as a Member of Congress express myself?

I go back and forth with my staff, and one of my staffers decides

when I reach the conclusion that he ought to go public, she ought

to go public, and say I am doing it for the wrong motives? That perhaps I am voting for MFN for China because I don’t care about

human rights, or I am voting against MFN for China because I

don’t care about the economic interests of businesses in the United

States?

Do you think your staff should be allowed to do that?

Mr. WELDON. My staff I hire, and I want them to have their own

opinions. I don’t hire the people in our intelligence community and

they don’t change from administration to administration. I would

assume their loyalty to their job and their professionalism is giving

us their best judgments.

Mr. WAXMAN. I don’t disagree with you. The point also has to be,

how do you run an agency? How do you make any kind of decisions

in an agency on policy matters if everyone is free to go out and express their opinion and accuse those who reach a different opinion

of being disloyal?

Mr. WELDON. You make an excellent point. They shouldn’t do

that and shouldn’t go public, but they shouldn’t be harassed, have

their job ended, be demoted, have their documentation shredded. I

agree with the gentleman.

Mr. WAXMAN. We are obviously arguing on a theoretical level. I

don’t know fully about the individual cases we may hear from

today. But in my mind, there have to be some situations where

people, whether they are career or political appointees, when the

policy is articulated, can’t go out on their own, to criticize it and

then try to have it portrayed as someone being disloyal. I assume

all the points you raised are not just unique to the Clinton administration.

Mr. WELDON. I think I made that point fairly clear in my statement.

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Mr. WAXMAN. People have been criticized by their superiors, in

fact discharged by their superiors, both in the Bush administration

as well as the Clinton administration and the Reagan administration and at other times as well, for the same reasons you have outlined.

Mr. WELDON. In fact, I praised Chairman Dingell for his work.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, as I said in my opening statement, which

was all too brief in comparison to you and the chairman, I had to

say what I had to say and I said it, and that is we need to be protective of whistleblowers, because whistleblowers do give us information that ought to get out, and in many cases they are very courageous, and I fully support that concern. On the other hand, I just

want, as you do, a way to be sure that we are dealing with truth

and not criticizing people because they have taken different policy

positions or are acting improperly as people disagree.

Mr. WELDON. I agree.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am not using my full

5 minutes.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Waxman. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. I just want to publicly say, Curt, I thought your presentation was really outstanding. What I take particular satisfaction

in, is you have been someone who has labored in the vineyard year

in and year out, not just issued press releases, done really substantive work, and we are seeing the fruit of your labor. It is extraordinary in so many areas. You are, for instance, a strong supporter of an alliance, good working relationship with the former Soviet Union. You have more contacts in the Soviet States than most

people in the administration. So as one Congressman to another,

I just want to say to you, I am really in awe of how long you have

labored in this area, how you have kept it to yourself for so long,

not issued press releases, not made an issue of this, just done your

homework like no one else has.

As a result, you know a heck of a lot more than almost anyone

that I know on these issues. So your testimony was very valued.

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Shays. If you will yield to me or

if you will give me time to respond and just say that Steny Hoyer,

who is my co-chair on the Russian initiative, has been laboring

long before I was in Russian relations. It is a bipartisan effort.

We supported the administration. I was proud to go over to Moscow to help the administration convince the Russians that our policy in Iraq was the right one, and the administration knew what

I was doing because I felt it was the right thing.

What we are doing is right for the country and it is not meant

to try to create any undue embarrassment for anybody, but I appreciate your good comments, Mr. Shays.

Mr. BURTON. Does the gentleman yield back his time?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman yields back his time.

Mr. Wise.

Mr. WISE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Weldon, I was interested in your presentation because I

often tell groups at home that the Congress is like a giant university, in the sense that you can’t come here and specialize in everything but you have got to specialize in a few things, and then you

50

develop expertise and people come to respect you. And you certainly have done that in the national security area, and I think

that is very important.

It is just like I learned a long time ago, since most of us have

to stand uphill in West Virginia, I learned not to spend a lot of

time on agriculture and I leaned to others, and by the same token

on national security I look to you and to others on both sides of the

aisle; whereas, I hope to focus on transportation and matters that

are important. But I want to thank you very much for your presentation.

There was one point that you made that I think points out some

complexities, and I wanted to take it up with you for just a second,

if I could. You spoke about, a number of times, where it was observed that Russia is probably involved in selling to Iraq, and the

United States didn’t take action, didn’t impose sanctions.

I, like you, have been a supporter of MFN. I am wondering about

it at this time, because I keep saying each year that I am waiting

to see further progress be made. So I am wondering about MFN for

China.

But it is also the case that I think there are a number of incidents where China clearly, and even some of the investigations

that the chairman and this committee have done, where China

makes you wonder about whether we ought to say no to get their

attention, but we haven’t. And you voted the way you have and I

have voted with you, incidentally, in that area, because we felt that

the complexity was such that while this was bad and we had to call

attention, whether it was human rights or missile proliferation or

whatever it was, that we needed to stay engaged. So that could

also be the administration’s rationale on the Russian situation as

well.

Mr. WELDON. No, I understand. As I said, Mr. Wise, I have supported the administration’s engagement with Russia. In fact, I

have encouraged them to do more. I am trying to get them to help

establish a Russian mortgage housing financing system for the

Russian people. I have been working on that for 21⁄2 years.

I think we have to—I think many of our problems in dealing

with Russia and China are of our own creation. We think we can’t

talk to them—when things occur that they shouldn’t be doing, we

should be confronting them with that; not walking away and pretending it didn’t happen. I think they lose respect for us.

You know, Russians understand when you are honest and open

and tell them what they are doing wrong. They respect you for

that. But when you don’t tell them and when you pretend it didn’t

happen, I think they lose respect. So I support the administration’s

engagement policy. I think it is the right policy. I think in many

cases our own government has failed itself, and I say the Congress

with it. I am not just trying to blame the administration. There are

some times where Members of Congress in both parties have pressured the administration in the case of China to lower the export

controls, you know, but I mean there is a problem here that we

have to understand. As Mr. Waxman said and you said, it is very

complex, it is not easy, but I am convinced that we need to continue to engage both countries.

51

They are not going to go away and it is not going to get better

if we ignore them. I think it will get worse. But we should engage

them on our terms and we should engage them around people like

the two professionals sitting behind me, or the five, to basically tell

us what we can transfer and what we can’t, and when they try to

get stuff that they shouldn’t get, then we hold them accountable,

and when they sell this kind of stuff, we slap their hand.

Mr. WAXMAN. Will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. WISE. Sure.

Mr. WAXMAN. Let’s look at Russia as an example. The United

States could have determined, and probably should have determined, we were better off with Yeltsin winning that election than

Zyuganov winning the election.

Mr. WELDON. Absolutely.

Mr. WAXMAN. And having restoration of the Communist party.

Mr. WELDON. Absolutely.

Mr. WAXMAN. So if the administration sees that there is information, if it is presented in a certain way, could have consequences

in Russia——

Mr. WELDON. Absolutely.

Mr. WAXMAN [continuing]. Aren’t they responsible, as the ones

running our foreign policy, to make sure that we don’t do harm in

Russia? Let’s say someone within the Department, a career person,

wanted to hold Russia accountable, which is proper, but hold them

accountable in a time and in a manner that could have adverse

consequences. He may not/she may not be thinking of the bigger

foreign policy picture and the U.S. policy, which is not set by career

people in the Department, but by the Secretary of State acting

under the President of the United States?

Mr. WELDON. No, I agree with the gentleman. I would say that

is the prerogative of the President and the administration and the

State Department, but this was 4 years ago. The election took place

4 years ago. We never followed through, and the Israelis know this.

We never followed through to hold this agency, these entities, accountable for what they did.

Mr. WISE. Can I get my time back so I can just close up? Thank

you.

Mr. Weldon, I just want to thank you again and just say that I

agree in the case of both Russia and China, they need to be held

accountable. I think what we have both been saying is, maybe in

roundabout ways, there are often other factors that determine how

you hold them accountable and when.

Mr. WELDON. Yes.

Mr. WISE. I appreciate that. Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Horn.

Mr. HORN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to say you have done a brilliant job, as you usually do,

Curt. I have learned in the last 7 years in the House of Representatives where the experts are, and you are truly on the list of the

top three or four, we all know that, and you do operate on a bipartisan basis, and those are the people around here that get respect

and get things done, and I think you have proved this morning you

have both.

52

I think, Mr. Chairman, it is outrageous when professional career

servants who are doing their duty, as they see the right to do that

duty, are squashed by any administration, and I would hope this

committee would treat a Republican administration like they would

treat a Democratic administration.

If the Congress cannot get the information it needs in executive

session or whichever way, then we have got a major problem in

this country. We cannot base our decisions on simply propaganda

from either a Republican or a Democrat administration.

I realize that often there are people more loyal than the king,

shall we say, and that is true. We have seen that over the years,

but we need that information to make judgments. And if we let

that fail and people do get harassed, driven out and even sent off

to what I think the FBI used to do, Boise, ID or Montana or someplace, that is just plain wrong and we have got to make sure that

doesn’t happen.

Thank you very much for coming.

Mr. BURTON. Mrs. Mink.

Mrs. MINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I too want to join my colleagues in commending you, Mr. Weldon,

for your expertise and knowledge that you have brought to this

committee. I think you have raised some very interesting questions

that this Committee on Government Reform must look into.

Saying that, I think I have to concur with the ranking member,

Mr. Waxman, in saying that there is a big difference between a disagreement on policy and the way in which an executive agency

deals with those disagreements in terms of harassment and intimidation and demotions and all sorts of matters that—or manners in

which they can deal with these individuals. And I think that that

is really within the prerogative of this committee to investigate and

correct, if necessary, if these behaviors are a part of the systematic

procedure to try to coerce their experts and their specialists into a

political—a politically correct kind of recommendation or a management decision. Then we would be denying the opportunity to gain

and benefit from expertise if we are conditioning their expertise to

following a particular line that may be the policy line of a current

administration.

So I think that the issues that you bring before us are very important, and I would hope that the committee would pursue those

from that vantage point than an inquiry as to whether the policy

was correct or incorrect.

Mr. WELDON. No, I understand. And I agree.

Mrs. MINK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mrs. Mink.

Is there further questioning of the witness?

If not, thank you very much, Mr. Weldon, for your testimony.

Mr. WELDON. Sorry I took so long.

Mr. BURTON. It has been very, very helpful. We really appreciate

it.

Mr. WELDON. I owe you one, Henry.

Mr. BURTON. We have a vote on the floor. Since we have a vote

on, rather than start with the next panel I think we will go vote

and come right back and we will start with the next panel as soon

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as we return. So please excuse us. We stand in recess until the fall

of the gavel.

[Recess.]

Mr. BURTON. The committee will reconvene. We have members

that will be drifting back in because the vote has just concluded on

the floor on the final passage of the flag burning amendment.

So I would like to have the five witnesses, Mr. Bransford, Lieutenant Colonel McCallum, Dr. Leitner, Mr. Maloof, and Mr. Fox

come forward.

Is Mr. Fox here?

Mr. MALOOF. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. I guess we don’t have it in order here. Where is Mr.

Maloof? Where is Mr. Fox?

Mr. MALOOF. I think he stepped out for a minute, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. We probably ought to wait for Mr. Fox because I

need to have you sworn in.

Everybody run and check the men’s room, or wherever he might

be.

Would you all please stand and raise your right hands, please.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. BURTON. Be seated.

Lieutenant Colonel McCallum, we will start with you. I understand that we are going to allow each one of you 10 minutes because your story is going to take a little bit more time than normal.

So you have 10 minutes to testify.

Mr. BRANSFORD. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Yes.

Mr. BRANSFORD. My name is William Bransford. I am Colonel

McCallum’s attorney and I would request permission to make just

a very brief statement before Colonel McCallum talks.

Mr. BURTON. Proceed.

STATEMENTS OF LT. COL. EDWARD McCALLUM, DIRECTOR OF

THE OFFICE OF SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM L.

BRANSFORD, ESQ., SHAW, BRANSFORD, VEILLEUX & ROTH,

WASHINGTON, DC; PETER LEITNER, SENIOR STRATEGIC

TRADE ADVISER, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY;

MICHAEL MALOOF, CHIEF OF TECHNOLOGY SECURITY OPERATIONS, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY; AND

JONATHAN FOX, ESQ. ARMS CONTROL SPECIALIST, DEFENSE SPECIAL WEAPONS AGENCY

Mr. BRANSFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Yesterday afternoon, I received a surprising fax from Mary Anne

Sullivan, General Counsel to the Department of Energy, a copy of

which I provided to committee staff. I received this fax in the afternoon, even though I had previously notified the General Counsel

that Colonel McCallum’s written testimony was due to the committee before 10 o’clock yesterday morning.

General counsel’s letter limits Colonel McCallum’s ability to respond to the Department of Energy’s charges against him. We interpret the letter as allowing Colonel McCallum to make a general

denial about his disclosure of classified information, but not to reinforce his position by any specific information, even if he can do so

54

with reference to unclassified guides and procedures. We hope the

committee understands Colonel McCallum’s situation.

He has been placed in an untenable position. He is being told he

cannot defend himself; he cannot tell this committee why the Department of Energy is wrong, even though the Department of Energy did not itself follow its own procedures.

Under current law, the Department has unbridled power to make

classification decisions without review and then use that authority

to retaliate against executives like Colonel McCallum who tell

them about specific threats to the health or safety of the American

public.

For these reasons, we have drafted a legislative change to 5

U.S.C. section 7532 that would allow for interagency review of classification issues like those affecting Colonel McCallum. We offer it

for the committee’s consideration.

We hope the committee understands that Colonel McCallum may

have to limit his answers because of the threats in the General

Counsel’s letter, and I would request that the letter from the General Counsel to me yesterday and the draft legislation that we have

prepared be admitted in the record.

Mr. BURTON. Without objection, so ordered.

But let me make sure I understand this. There have been threats

issued in this letter, and I have not yet read it, that will limit the

testimony that is not classified pertaining to what Lieutenant Colonel McCallum is going to tell us?

Mr. BRANSFORD. The letter to me, Mr. Chairman, states that

Colonel McCallum is not at liberty to describe in his testimony his

views of the correct classification of the information in dispute,

even if he can do so by reference to unclassified information. So he

is very much limited in what he can say and we are very much concerned that if he doesn’t limit his testimony, the Department could

take action against him based upon his actions in that regard.

Mr. BURTON. Can he give this information to us in a closed hearing?

Mr. BRANSFORD. Mr. Chairman, I don’t know. It is hard to say

whether he could or couldn’t.

I would think that he could. It is my interpretation of the letter

that he can make a general denial, and I think that is sufficient.

I think the written testimony we provided the committee

yesterday——

Mr. BURTON. All right. We will let him go as far as he can, but

I just want to say that the Department of Energy and Mr. Richardson, the head of the Department of Energy, has done everything

possible in his power to try to stop this hearing today. I have never

seen any kind of pressure exerted like this. I mean, they have gone

to the leadership of the House and everything else to try to stop

this hearing, and now we are getting a letter from the Department

of Energy trying to harness what Lieutenant Colonel McCallum

says. I think it is despicable and I just want the Department of Energy to know this isn’t the end of it. Whoever is here from the Department of Energy, this isn’t the end of it. We are going to pursue

this. This is baloney.

The Congress of the United States has a right to know these

things, and so do the people of the United States, if our national

55

security has been imperiled because of actions that they have taken

or nonactions that they have taken.

Lieutenant Colonel McCallum, you are recognized for 10 minutes.

Colonel MCCALLUM. Mr. Chairman, Congressmen, Congresswomen, thank you for the opportunity today to speak with the committee about lapses in the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Safeguards and Security Program and the Department’s long history of

suppression and reprisal against individuals attempting to do their

jobs.

Mr. BURTON. Would you pull the mic a little bit closer? We want

to make sure we hear everything you say.

Colonel MCCALLUM. DOE’s arrogant disregard for national security is clearly described in the recent report on security at the Department of Energy by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and Congressman Cox’s committee report on espionage

in our national laboratories.

It is clear today that the DOE has sacrificed nuclear security for

other budget priorities and has jeopardized national security by

failing to protect its laboratories against widespread espionage or

against the possibility of terrorist attack.

Over the last 9 years, I have served as the Director of DOE’s Office of Safeguards and Security. In this capacity, I have been responsible for developing the policy that governs the protection of

the Nation’s nuclear assets, including weapons, nuclear materials

from which nuclear weapons are made, highly classified information, and personnel security clearances. My office is also charged

with investigating security incidents involving the possible loss of

nuclear materials and the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

You will note that these authorities did not include implementation at our sites or an oversight responsibility, which are a significant organizational flaw which I describe in my more extensive

written testimony and in some of the reports that have been written for the Department.

As you may know, or as you know now, the Department of Energy placed me on administrative leave on April 19th. Some DOE

officials allege that I committed a security infraction. They claim

that I disclosed classified information during a discussion with a

whistleblower from a DOE site.

This is not true. Based on the Department’s published classification procedures and guides, these allegations are completely unfounded. I have released no classified information. I have been an

authorized classifier in the Department of Energy for over 25

years, and helped develop the first classification guide in the safeguards and security area in the mid-1970’s. I am also the Department’s subject matter expert on the areas of tactics, use of forces

and protection of our facilities.

Yet, it is strange that the Department did not consult my staff,

nor me, before taking this action. They failed to follow their own

procedures in investigating this incident and, indeed, in following

up with an appeal before I was placed on administrative leave. In

fact, the office that is designated by regulation in the Department

56

to adjudicate these issues, the Office of Declassification, was directed not to do their duties and provide the review.

This is incomprehensible. Instead, the Assistant Secretary for

Defense Programs, an organization which my office has been extremely critical of in recent years because of incidents that have become public in recent months, was tasked to do the job. The outcome was not a surprise. Their approach was sophomoric, based on

speculation and supposition and a clear lack of tactical technical

expertise. I believe this action to be a clear and obvious act of retaliation against myself and the office that has tried to bring forward

an increasingly distressing message of failed security at the DOE

laboratories.

The timing of these charges shows a clear attempt to discredit

and intimidate me immediately before I was to testify before the

PFIAB, and most certainly before the Congress, relative to the recent espionage issues at the Department labs. I informed DOE that

I had been asked to appear before Senator Rudman’s panel to discuss DOE security on April 16. I was placed on administrative

leave on April 19th; then called the next day and asked to delay

my appearance before the panel until after Secretary Richardson

could speak to them first.

What is most disturbing, although doubtlessly ironic, is the Department’s defense of its action by invoking the mantra of national

security. The Department has adopted this position and the position that the content of the so-called security infraction is so secret

that neither congressional staffs nor my attorneys can review the

information in question. It is a variation on the old adage, ‘‘I could

tell you all about it but then I would have to kill you.’’

The fact that I must discuss this allegation in such a public

forum is personally and professionally distressing. However, I feel

compelled to do so because this action is one in a long history of

suppression and reprisal against others and myself and, as such,

I feel constitutes a serious and continuing abuse of power. I speak

out in the trust that this committee and other Members of Congress will take the legislative steps necessary to protect individuals

who continue to fulfill their responsibilities.

Many career civil servants and contractors carry on their mission

despite the likelihood that should they become the bearers of bad

tidings they face harassment, open threats, and the loss of their careers and certainly their reputations. These men and women are

sometimes all that stand between callous risk to the Nation’s welfare and individuals who choose to say whatever will deliver the

most favorable spin at the moment.

I am here to tell you that these civil servants and Government

contractors are watching what is happening to me and the other

men at this table today. They are watching because they already

know what has happened to others. Men such as John Hnatio, Jeff

Hodges, Dave Leary, Jeff Peters, and Mark Graff have all had their

careers ruined for coming forward and addressing serious lapses of

security at DOE facilities. Can we continue to allow such intimidation, neglect and indifference regarding these serious matters? I

tell you, the message that our employees have received thus far is,

do your duty but do so at the risk of being smeared, fired, or both.

57

This year, one of our best and longest-serving field Security Directors suddenly retired after attempting to take action against a

contractor employee who willfully violated security procedures and

admitted a Russian visitor with an untested computer to a security

area at one of our facilities.

In January 1997, David Reidenour, head of security for one of

our sites, retired in disgust after only 90 days on the job. Mr.

Reidenour said, ‘‘In my professional life as a military officer, as a

registered professional engineer and as a technologist, I have never

before experienced a major conflict between loyalty to my supervision and duty to my country and the public. I feel that conflict

today.’’ Men like Rich Levernier, Gary Morgan, Don McIntyre, and

Jay Stewart are joined by contractor Security Directors like Bernie

Muerrens and Link White who tried to do the right thing for their

country but were rewarded by replacement or reprisal.

Today, men and women of conscience within the Department of

Energy are falling silent because they do not see support from the

top at a national level, and some simply cannot afford to go without

the income they need to support their families. Mr. Chairman,

these people shouldn’t have to choose between doing the right thing

and supporting their families.

As the Director of the Office of Safeguards and Security, my

team has provided senior DOE management with sound judgment

regarding security at our Nation’s most critical strategic nuclear facilities. We have provided specific action plans to correct shortcomings, sometimes even though much of what we have recommended has not been welcomed nor considered politically correct

now that the cold war is over.

However, the steady decline in resources available to the DOE

Safeguards and Security Programs, as well as a lack of priority, or

indeed in many cases no priority, have allowed the Department’s

security posture to deteriorate to a point where its effectiveness is

highly questionable.

I have included in my written testimony some references to unclassified reports from the Office of Safeguards and Security issued

between 1994 and 1999, which document the reduction in the Department’s nuclear security readiness. These reports are supported

by hundreds of classified reports which provide detailed analysis of

our sites. The information presented in the testimony I submit

today is not new. The message of lax security has been repeated

consistently over the last decade in reports prepared by my office,

such as the Annual Reports to the Secretary in 1995, 1996, and

1997. In fact, these reports were frequently referenced and

footnoted in the PFIAB report. They cite a litany of failed efforts,

such as a computer security regulation that was rejected in 1995

by the laboratories and their DOE program Assistant Secretaries

as too expensive. This change, which would have only required simple firewalls, passwords, and prudent business practices, may have

prevented many of the losses of classified information which we

have reported recently and, in fact, would have been less costly

than the several days of shutdowns at our national laboratories,

which we have already seen executed this year, to try to react to

those losses.

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The 1997 Annual Report to the Secretary points out that most

of our facilities by that time were no longer capable of recapturing

a nuclear weapon or a nuclear facility if it were lost to an adversary, and describes the DOE security force as a hollow force because of excessive reductions in personnel and in training to our security police officers. Storage facilities are seen as aging and inadequate, and security alarm systems increasingly obsolete. These serious deficiencies are described and contrasted against the backdrop of increased openness to our sites, increased openness to our

data, increased foreign visitation to both the sites and the security

areas within the sites; increased declassification of information,

while at the same time facing a 30 percent increase in the amount

of special nuclear material which we were required to store, and a

40 percent decrease in our budget.

External reviews such as the earlier report to the Secretary by

General James Freeze, or the Nuclear Command and Control Staff

Oversight cite similar concerns. There have also been numerous

GAO reports. However, the Department has not chosen to resolve

these serious and longstanding problems.

Secretary Richardson recently announced the selection of a new

security czar. Based on the Secretary’s announcement, many of

these ongoing concerns could be answered. However, the Secretary’s statements and the actual events occurring within the Department are strikingly different. A disturbing document entitled,

‘‘Safeguards and Security Roles and Responsibilities’’ has been circulated by the Under Secretary and some laboratory proponents

that would give the security czar less authority than I had in the

Department for the last 10 years. Specifically, in the proposed

structure, critical approvals would be delegated from the headquarters to the very laboratories that have allowed critical losses.

Important security plans, as well as exceptions to national and departmental regulations, would be delegated to the field. And finally, oversight inspections would be conducted only ‘‘for cause.’’

Based on initial reviews, ladies and gentlemen, this devolution of

the few authorities reserved to the Department is in direct conflict

with the serious negligence identified in both Congressman Cox’s

report and that of the PFIAB. It is the organizational equivalent

of sending the fox in to count the hens. The head of such an eviscerated organization could hardly be called a czar. This proposal

developed by the labs at a cost of almost $2 million is a perfect example of the organizational and policy interference by the labs that

is well documented, I believe, also in the PFIAB report. It begs the

question, who is in charge?

May I have 30 seconds to close, sir?

Mr. BURTON. Yes.

Colonel MCCALLUM. Mr. Chairman, although the DOE security

policy is carefully coordinated with the interagency through the

U.S. Security Policy Board and is consistent with the DOE and

other high security agencies, it has never been fully or successfully

implemented in the DOE.

The arrogant disregard for regulations and contract requirements

and the long history of denial by the laboratories and DOE program Assistant Secretaries, have resulted in an ineffective program

of protection and the loss of our Nation’s most critical secrets.

59

External oversight and separate line item funding—and I would

like to underscore that—external oversight, such as proposed by

the Senate, and separate line item funding for security are essential if the reform which the Department is talking about is to be

effective.

Meanwhile, the Department’s history of harassment and reprisal

has sent a clear warning that the government does not want to

keep or attract its best and brightest. Despite current legislation,

gaps exist in protections where classified information may be part

of the issue. Willful negligence has flourished in the Department

and will continue to do so as long as officials can hide behind capricious and sometimes malicious acts under the mantra of national

security.

While I place no higher value than duty to my country, some

forum must be identified or chartered to assure that everyone has

a fair and impartial hearing when they bring out wrongdoing. All

of us must have the same right to due process which we expect as

citizens and as provided for by our Constitution.

Mr. Chairman, career civil servants are charged foremost with

ensuring the public health and safety and the protection of our environment. However, if civil service is based solely on a personal

or political whim, then the public will be protected and served only

as long as it is politically expedient to do so.

It is time to accept the responsibility that we have for nuclear

and national security, correct past failures and rebuild our programs. Thank you, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Lieutenant Colonel McCallum.

[The prepared statement of Colonel McCallum follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Dr. Leitner.

Dr. LEITNER. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I would

like to express my appreciation for your collective concern over the

mistreatment of career civil servants essentially for speaking

‘‘truth to power’’ concerning the systematic pillaging of the United

States Defense industrial base and our Nation’s most precious military and nuclear secrets by the People’s Republic of China.

Appearing before you today is both an honor and a rather dubious distinction. To be victimized by my own government, particularly the Defense Department, for consistently putting the nearand long-term national security interests of the United States

ahead of all other considerations, is something which I still find astounding to this day. I believe that a deadly combination of corruption, greed, careerism, indolence and possibly darker motives have

brought us to this sad turning point in the nature of the military

threats to the United States and countries along the Chinese periphery, extending from the Central Asian republics through the

Indian Ocean and along the Pacific Rim.

My particular story revolves around my documenting evolving

military threats to the United States spurred by reckless transfers

of advanced Western technology, technology capable of allowing potential military rivals such as the PRC to leapfrog generations of

technological development and trillions of dollars of expenditures

and to field advanced weapons systems faster than our experts

have predicted. I have been systematically penalized for my initiative and efforts.

From 1986 through 1990, I was consistently praised by DOD officials for my effectiveness in documenting and persuasively defending American technology security interests around the world in

international negotiations, but all that changed in 1990. That is

when I authored the memo and charts presented as attachment A

to my written testimony. That memo pointed out dangerous flaws

in the methodology DOD was using in determining which technology to drop from international export control lists. For the mere

act of composing this message for my chain of command, I was

summarily recalled from Paris and ordered to get on the next flight

home, where I was confronted by the first in a series of DTSA managers who place their personal interests and career advancement

ahead of all else. I was told, ‘‘You are to be placed in a position

of least trust in this organization: licensing.’’ A remarkable statement as export licensing is the raison d’etre for the organization.

After my being banished into licensing, I began to detect a disturbing pattern of Indian acquisition of United States and British

parts and components for their attempt to build a so-called indigenous supercomputer. I wrote a paper on this issue that received the

support of the Defense Intelligence Agency and numerous technical

experts. The DOD response: I was barred from looking at export licenses involving India.

After these two incidents, my performance appraisal dropped

from outstanding to an entire grade lower. My supervisor at the

time told me he was ordered by the Director and Deputy Director

of DSIA not to give me an outstanding rating. He then advised me

that he would lower my written communication category because,

after all, it was my memos that resulted in all of this.

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Earlier that year, I had been told I would be given a quality step

increase as a result of my outstanding performance. This was

quickly scrapped and I was denied a $2,600 pay raise. This was to

be the first in a series of retaliatory financial sanctions which, in

my reckoning, has cost my family between $75,000 to $100,000 to

date, and over the course of my lifetime, certainly much more. The

loss of income punishes not only me, but also my wife and four children.

In May 1991, I authored a technical paper entitled, ‘‘Garrett Engines to the PRC: Enabling Its Long-range Cruise Missile Program.’’ The controversy generated by this paper ran well into 1992

but eventually stopped a potentially disastrous technology transfer

from taking place. The new administration was fighting tooth and

nail to approve the transfer of cruise missile manufacturing technology to the PRC. While the technology transfer was prevented

and the potential threat to the United States mitigated, I was

nonetheless punished for my having been right.

In 1994, I wrote a technical paper entitled, ‘‘McDonnell-Douglas

Machine Tool Sales to the PRC: Implications for U.S. Policy,’’ and

refused a direct order to change my denial of the transfer of the

Columbus, OH, B–1 bomber/MX missile/C–17 plant to China. The

incident was the subject of a recent 60 Minutes broadcast.

Later, I co-authored a study entitled, ‘‘Transferring Stealth Technology to the PRC: Three Pieces to the Chinese Puzzle.’’ This paper

revealed how the PRC was targeting United States companies for

technology acquisition with surgical precision.

Late in 1995, a series of events heralded a new round of internal

retaliation against me. First was the publication of my first book,

‘‘Decontrolling Strategic Technology, 1990–1992: Creating the Strategic Threats of the 21st Century.’’ The reaction of DTSA management, after desperate attempts to prevent publication of the book,

was to artificially lower my performance appraisal and insert all

manner of political language into my civil service rating. I appealed

the rating, and while the score was raised somewhat, the political

language was allowed to stand and I was again penalized financially.

In 1997, reprisals began to intensify upon the publication of my

second book and my being invited to appear before the Joint Economic Committee to discuss Chinese economic espionage and strategic technology transfer. Just before the hearing was to convene,

DTSA management held a Directors meeting, where it was announced that no DTSA employees would be permitted to attend

that hearing, and if any applied for annual leave for that purpose,

it would be denied.

It was in December 1997 that a campaign to further isolate me

began; this time to confiscate my office computers, a laptop and a

desktop. I was told DTSA management was afraid that I may use

the computers to write testimony, books, or articles critical of

DTSA actions or policies. Therefore, DTSA management reasoned,

take the computers away and I will no longer be able to write or

testify.

About this time, I began to see and issue denials for a large number of export licenses originating with the DOE sponsored national

laboratories. These licenses were to transfer a variety of high-tech

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equipment with direct applications to nuclear weapons development to Russia and China. I objected then and continue to object

today to these so-called lab-to-lab transfers because there was no

evidence of a security plan to protect U.S. technologies from being

used against us. There was no evidence that the Department of Energy exercised any credible level of control over these activities.

And after meeting with lab officials, it was apparent to me that the

labs had become entrepreneurial and were creating programs, as

much to resolve the loose nukes program, as it was to keep themselves employed and to avoid layoffs.

In 1997, I witnessed the intentional orchestration by the administration of a series of events resulting in the false certification to

Congress that China is not a nuclear proliferant. This provided the

Chinese legal access to many nuclear technologies to complement

that which they were engaged in stealing.

I am proud to have been associated with Mr. Jonathan Fox, who

had the courage to do what extremely few in government appear

capable of doing these days: that is, recognizing and telling the

truth.

In April 1998, I again appeared before the Joint Economic Committee to discuss continuing problems with the growing strategic

threat from China. Next I was subpoenaed to appear before the

Senate Governmental Affairs Committee in June. My Senate testimony resulted in an investigation by the Inspectors General of six

agencies of the management of the export control process.

In August, I was called before the Cox/Dicks committee where I

testified on the PRC threat and worked very closely with that staff,

providing over 18 inches of documents and hours of follow-up interviews with staff.

Ever since these testimonies, I have been subjected to, in staccato fashion, one adverse harassing act after another; the most

prominent of these, further lowering of my performance rating, attempts to isolate me from attending meetings concerning nuclear

exports—particularly when the IGs were visiting the interagency

meetings as part of the followup on the Senate-requested investigations—a trumped-up letter of reprimand; sick leave harassment; a

falsified charge of security violation, Colonel McCallum is well

aware of how that affects you; and implied threats to charge me

with insubordination or defiance of authority.

These actions were deemed so serious that Senator Thompson

twice wrote to the Pentagon, including to Secretary Cohen, expressing concern for his witness. In addition, the Office of Special Counsel has accepted my case for a full investigation of political reprisals and illegal retaliation.

The politization of the career civil service is an extraordinarily

dangerous and insidious process aimed at co-opting, bypassing or

eliminating unbiased professionals. Without a nonpartisan professional civil service, this Nation will be subjected to wild mood

swings and radical policy changes that will wreak havoc. The professional career civil service is, in a manner of speaking, a dampening force, or, the Ritalin in the body politic which prevents dangerous and intemperate initiatives from getting out of control.

DOD routinely engages in two questionable personnel practices:

the militarization of DOD’s civil service, by allowing widespread

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conversions of military personnel to civilian positions; and the inappropriate, possibly illegal use, of the Intergovernmental Personnel

Act to directly appoint individuals without competition and avoid

ceilings on political appointments. In many cases, particularly

within the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, civil servants with

decades of expertise in strategic weapons programs were shoved

aside and demoted, while DOE lab employees were brought in to

fill their posts.

Between downsizing, contracting out, military rehires, and the

abuse of the IPA program, the fundamental relationship and connectedness of government to the general population is being radically altered.

I would like to call upon members of the Civil Service Oversight

Committee to investigate the developments I have just described

and prepare a legislative remedy to ensure that the congressional

vision of the character of the career civil service and its importance

to a free and open society is mirrored by reality.

In the meantime, Congress should act swiftly to ensure that the

pay cap on double dipping by retired military personnel be kept

firmly in place. Removing the dual-compensation ceiling will only

exacerbate the problems I have outlined above.

It has been almost exactly a year to the date, June 28, 1998, that

I gave sworn testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs

Committee on the sad state of the export control process. It was 1

year prior to that testimony when Michael Maloof and I went to

the DOD Inspector General’s office to request a formal investigation of technology transfer to China and the national security

threats it was creating. We were quite surprised when an IG Division Director said he was not interested in what we had to say and

bluntly asked us to leave; simply threw us out.

Is it any wonder that almost 10 months after Senator Thompson

directed the IGs of the Defense, Commerce, State, Energy, Treasury, and CIA to undertake an extensive review of the export licensing process, that the DOD report is very weak? It does not reflect

many of the issues brought up by DOD personnel.

Should I be surprised that of the six IGs directed to followup on

the concerns I expressed to the committee, only one, the DOD IG,

even attempted to contact me? While I spent many hours speaking

to the DOD IG, the reams of evidence I presented were minimized

or shrugged off with statements like, ‘‘It is beyond the scope of our

audit.’’

In fact, the Air Force’s preliminary review of the draft report excoriated the IG on many issues.

Tragically, nowhere in this government are analyses being performed to assess the overall strategic and military impact of these

technology decontrols I described in my testimony before the Joint

Economic Committee. Nor are any analyses being performed on the

impact of the day-to-day technology releases being made by the

dysfunctional export licensing process. Yet it is precisely at the bigpicture level where the overall degradation of our national security

will be revealed. Without such assessments, the government will

continue to blunder along, endangering the lives of our citizens unnecessarily.

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On three separate occasions, I formally recommended the creation of a modeling simulation and research branch which would

be dedicated to conducting such cumulative and tactical impact assessments. To date, the only cumulative impact assessments created within DTSA are those which I undertook independently and

for which I was routinely subjected to reprisal.

It is amazing to me how much time and effort has been spent

on attempts to break or contain me, rather than monitor, analyze

and protect our national security. I cannot begin to count the number of times I have been asked, ‘‘How do you put up with this treatment? How do you manage to survive in that environment?’’ Of

course, the correct question should be: Why are people with such

mean and self-serving agendas allowed to flourish, even be rewarded, for engaging in such ruthless and destructive behavior?

As with the case of the six IGs, where only one deigned to contact me regarding the concerns I expressed to the Senate, why is

it that at no time over these past 9 years has even one DOD official

in my chain of command called me in to hear and perhaps even address the issues I raised? Even though DOD officialdom has been

summoned to testify in open hearings and respond to my congressional testimony, I have yet to be called or invited to speak with

anyone inside the Defense Department. Rather than address the

issues, DOD’s hierarchy appears more comfortable with targeting

me for their minions to exact punishment and penalties, with the

apparent goal of destroying my career.

I am well aware that every move I make is being intentionally

misconstrued by several henchmen within my organization as part

of some next step in the retaliation process. The increasingly politicized and compliant bureaucracy cannot be relied upon to restore

balance to the system. Only detailed and vigorous congressional

oversight is capable of preventing these excesses and the dangerous

legacy from undermining our children’s future. Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Dr. Leitner. Very illuminating.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Leitner follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Mr. Maloof.

Mr. MALOOF. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am appearing today

in response to a subpoena from the committee. My name is F. Michael Maloof. I am Chief of the Technology Security Operations Division in the Technology Security Directorate of the Defense Threat

Reduction Agency in the Department of Defense.

You asked that I address the administration’s effort to curb the

flow of dual-use technology to China and efforts to safeguard

United States facilities. You also asked for my testimony on intimidation or retaliation against government employees who have been

involved in these policy areas and have expressed either reservation or opposition to administration policies. I am not in a position

to discuss the administration’s effort to safeguard U.S. facilities.

However, I can address the issues of dual-use technology flows to

China and intimidation.

By way of brief background, Mr. Chairman, I have been with the

Department of Defense since 1982. I have been a member of the

senior management in the Technology Security Directorate since

the creation of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency last year. Before that, I had been Director, since May 1985, of Technology Security Operations in the Defense Technology Security Administration

when it was in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The duties of my staff are to work with other agencies to monitor

and to act as a catalyst to halt the diversion of sensitive technology

to prescribed destinations, their weapons of mass destruction, and

strategic conventional weapons development programs.

From the data collected and detailed analysis conducted relating

to diversion activity, my staff determines what technologies are

being targeted, and by whom, and then identifies and develops policy issues and appropriate responses.

In this connection, my office also works closely with the intelligence community and enforcement agencies. This was the case

during the cold war during which we were responsible for halting

diversions of sensitive technologies to COCOM proscribed countries

of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, as well as China.

One of our major cases during that period was the highly publicized Toshiba case in which the former Soviet Union illegally acquired militarily sensitive embargoed technology used in manufacturing specially skewed propellers to quiet submarines and thereby

prevent their detection. Our efforts not only included the detection

of this development, but working with the governments of other

COCOM members, we were able to stop further Western assistance

to that program.

During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, my staff, along with a

Naval intelligence reserve unit assigned to our organization, identified, analyzed, and sought to halt Western technologies on which

Iraq depended for its conventional and unconventional weapons development programs. One of those cases involved uncovering the diversion of sensitive night vision devices to Iraq by a Dutch company. The timeliness of this discovery allowed for appropriate countermeasures to be developed and delivered to our troops on the

ground prior to the start of Desert Storm. I like to believe that our

efforts resulted in saving the lives of many of our troops.

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Another case involved the ultimate seizure by United States Customs of a high-temperature furnace which was about to be exported

to Iraq. It was to be combined with a number of other uncontrolled

furnaces to form a complex for the melting of materials essential

for nuclear weapons development.

After the Gulf war, this case served as a basis for expanding export regulations to include a catch-all provision for uncontrolled

technologies with application for chemical and biological weapons

development and their delivery systems.

The duties of my office also include doing end-user and end-use

checks for license applications, whether dual-use or munitions. We

make every effort to apply analysis, information from the intelligence community and enforcement data to every application.

With this background, Mr. Chairman, it was natural for me in

the early 1990’s to raise concerns with my management over what

I would call the beginning of wholesale liberalization and decontrol

of militarily critical technologies without the benefit of thorough

strategic analysis. In my opinion, such sweeping initiatives made

virtually irrelevant any analysis as to their strategic consequence.

Technologies included such areas as machine tools, high-performance computers, telecommunications, propulsion for power projection, stealth and technologies with application for nuclear uses.

Even though we were undergoing a change in policy, it was apparent that it was designed to allow greater technologies to go to

China. This policy change assumed a good end-user/end-use. In

China, that was almost impossible to detail since Chinese officials

had placed a ban on United States officials from undertaking

prelicense and postdelivery shipment checks for sensitive technology exports.

The previous policy, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, had identified six special mission areas for which technologies for any one of them would be subject to close scrutiny, regardless of end-user and end-use.

On a number of occasions, I had suggested to my management

that a policy review of these special mission areas was necessary

to update them and steer away from what I believe was a questionable end-user/end-use approach.

I also expressed concern many times with my front office about

not escalating cases on which we initially would recommend denial

in interagency appeal sessions. All that the other agencies had to

do was wait us out, knowing that our front office would not escalate a serious case to higher level policymakers, and it would be approved.

In addition, I suggested on numerous occasions that we needed

to undertake cumulative impact assessments of those technologies

which had been approved to determine the strategic impact of

those exports.

One of a number of such cases which manifested all of these concerns was the export in 1994 to China of a considerable number of

controlled and uncontrolled machine tools from the McDonnellDouglas facility in Columbus, OH. Dr. Leitner and I recommended

denial on this case.

My concern here was over the potential for diversion of some or

all of these machine tools, and that is exactly what happened. And

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because that case, almost 5 years later, still is under criminal investigation by the Justice Department, I guess it would not be appropriate for me to go into detail of it here.

So it is not surprising that my management would regard me

and my views on China as a ‘‘Cold war throwback who can’t reconcile himself to the inevitable easing of export controls,’’ according

to the attached November 27, 1998, Wall Street Journal.

My concerns, however, were and remain over the strategic impact of these exports, not the commercial advantage they would

give to certain companies.

I can only presume that it is this perspective which led to an

open clash between me and my management over China, beginning

in April 1998, over the Hughes-Loral satellite matter.

A New York Times article had detailed how the administration

was allowing further space activities with China, despite the fact

that a grand jury was meeting concerning the possible illegal release of sensitive technical data to the Chinese.

The technical data involved assisting China in solving certain

guidance problems of rockets used to orbit commercial satellites.

On the day of the New York Times piece, I received a call from Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Ken Bacon. He said

he wanted to know what was behind the story, that the Secretary

of Defense had been having breakfast with reporters and was,

‘‘blind-sided,’’ by events surrounding this story.

I gave him a brief summary. He called back later for more details

and I offered to go to his office to show him what we had on the

case as background for the Secretary. He accepted. I also informed

my front office.

The initial front office reaction was that no materials were going

to be provided to Mr. Bacon. Later, Mr. Bacon called my front office

and it was agreed that my boss would take the meeting with Mr.

Bacon but I was not to accompany him. My boss said that he had

to inform Mr. Bacon of events which were occurring on this case,

but he would not elaborate.

I then received a call from an individual in C3I inquiring about

the background of the news story. That individual did an electronic

mail summary to her boss. My front office obtained a copy. I was

called in, asked why I discussed the issue on something which I

was not working.

I corrected my bosses and informed them that we had been involved earlier in the process and I had some 10 volumes of binders

from the exporters in my office to prove it. The immediate response

was disbelief and a further admonition that I had not been working

on the issue.

This comment was my first indication that issues relating to satellites were being handled but only by a few people in our entire

organization, with my office being bypassed for the most part. Furthermore, my front office accused me of using, ‘‘poor judgment,’’ in

talking to the individual at C3I. This reaction and its vitriolic tone

took me totally by surprise.

I sought to obtain what the New York Times described as a

‘‘highly classified Pentagon report,’’ on the satellite issue, but was

informed that I could not have access to it since I did not have a

‘‘need to know.’’ It is my understanding that the report developed

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in cooperation with the Department of State was very critical of

certain U.S. satellite exporters.

Indeed, in subsequent cases relating to China, my front office

continued to use this mantra of not having ‘‘a need to know,’’ as

justification to keep me from learning details or the outcome of certain China cases, many of which I had worked on at various stages.

I expressed my dismay to the front office over this kind of treatment. I informed them that in all the years I had worked at the

Department of Defense and looked into possible diversions, I never

had been told to refrain from looking into a possible export control

violation.

Despite the admonition not to speak to anyone about the

Hughes-Loral matter, I called our U.S. Customs liaison officer, who

confirmed that there had been an ongoing Justice Department investigation of the case for almost a year. Customs was pursuing the

investigation on behalf of the Justice Department. He further stated that continued approval of satellite exports was damaging the

case. It then became apparent to me that the reason for handling

Chinese satellite issues among a very few people and keeping quiet

any information concerning an investigation was to ensure that

satellite cases continued to be approved, unimpeded.

I can only surmise that my front office recalled previous cases in

which we had suspended all license applications of an applicant

prior to any indictments or convictions even before the completion

of an investigation. There were two other cases, one of which involved the Dutch company diversion of night vision devices to Iraq,

a case I referred to earlier. Given the admonition not to speak to

anyone outside of DTSA about the Hughes-Loral matter, I did not

think such a restriction applied to people within DTSA.

I approached our satellite technical expert who immediately became quite nervous. I specifically wanted to know if we were seeing

any of the Presidential waivers and what technologies they may

have encompassed. The waivers were required because of

Tiananmen Square sanctions to satellite exports to China. The engineer stated that he was under a gag order, had been interviewed

a year earlier by the Justice Department concerning its investigation, and that our boss had known about the investigation for all

that time.

In response, the engineer said that our boss had electronically

‘‘firewalled,’’ any recommendations to the front office that he had

made on the cases so that even he could not retrieve them. In addition, the engineer said that he had been ordered to destroy any

hard copy of his recommendations. As a career employee, I felt

obliged to report this episode to the U.S. Customs agents who were

investigating the Hughes-Loral matter on behalf of the Justice Department. By this time, I had been working with the investigators

to provide background papers and positions on previous cases, all

relating to China. The Assistant U.S. Attorney and Customs investigators interviewed the engineer. He returned after a number of

hours, confronted me and said that the Assistant U.S. Attorney and

Customs agents had identified me as the source of their information. The engineer then proceeded to inform the front office.

All of this took place in April 1998. It was during this period and

succeeding months that all of our records pertaining to China, inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:27 May 24, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00124 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\62262 pfrm06 PsN: 62262
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cluding past cases, were subpoenaed by law enforcement authorities. The same materials were made available in the central reading room, under the control of the Defense Department General

Counsel, to the myriad of congressional committee investigators

from the House of Representatives and the Senate.

I personally received two congressional subpoenas, one from Senator Fred Thompson, chairman of the Senate Governmental Affairs

Committee, and the other from Representative Christopher Cox.

All of my records pertaining to China also were in the hands of the

Cox committee, and I was asked about them in depositions to the

committee staff.

Since then, the front office has systematically isolated me from

any of the major issues with which our organization is involved. In

seeking to find out what those issues are, my bosses interpreted my

inquires as ‘‘spying,’’ and asked me why I wanted to know. In addition, virtually all weekly Directors’ meetings had ceased, which remains the case to this day.

The front office also had created a so-called COMSAT group comprised of representatives from every division within DTSA, except

mine. My staff and I were kept from any satellite discussions.

This also was the period in which job appraisals were due. I was

informed that I would be given an outstanding rating but would

not be given a cash bonus. I later was informed that I was the only

DTSA Director who received an outstanding rating but did not receive any cash bonus.

The reason given was that I needed to do more work in keeping

with senior DTSA management priorities. I asked my bosses how

I could be accused of spying, on the one hand, to determine DTSA

priorities, but be admonished for not following them in view of the

isolation treatment. There was no ready answer.

In my opinion, this act constituted political retribution. The isolation continues to this day. Discussion and action on issues are

conducted by the front office, with the participation of a chosen

few.

In addition, as people have rotated from my staff, the positions

either are not allowed to be filled or the billet is taken away. This

was the case recently when one of my Navy personnel retired. This

billet was transferred to accommodate an increase in satellite monitors. Congress recently authorized some 30-such billets to DTSA.

I then asked if that slot could be returned due to the need we had

to fulfill our analytical and monitoring duties. I never received a

response.

My Deputy of many years recently transferred to another part of

the agency, but to this day the front office has not allowed me to

fill that billet either. Instead, I have had to write a series of memos

to justify the need to fill it. Still, no response. This slow chipping

away comes at a time when we should be doing more analysis and

cumulative assessments of technology transfers and determining

their impact on U.S. strategic capabilities.

In my opinion, this is one of the value-added roles of the Department of Defense in the export licensing process.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Maloof, I am sorry to interrupt you but we are

trying to stay as close to the 10 minutes as we can. Could you wrap

up here? And anything else that you have, we will submit for the

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record. I don’t want to miss any of your testimony, but we do have

to finish.

Mr. MALOOF. OK. Fine.

I would say that in terms of looking for cumulative assessments,

Mr. Chairman, I went ahead and started doing my own cumulative

assessments because we just did not have that kind of information

available over time. I would add that the intelligence community,

in my view, still does not look at technology transfers as they used

to during the 1980’s, and in that context the types of technologies

that we have seen going to the Chinese over time have filled many

areas that we warned about, particularly in terms of ballistic missiles, modernizing its military.

It has also gone for improvement of power projection for surface

fleets, making more proficient fighters and bomber aircraft. And

these advances, Mr. Chairman, happen to coincide with those special mission areas identified early in the mid-eighties by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff to be concerned about regarding tech transfers.

In referring back to what Mr. Ken Bacon said in that Wall Street

Journal article, Mr. Chairman, the Defense Secretary’s spokesman

said in talking to Maloof’s bosses and others, ‘‘We do not believe

we have allowed the transfer of technology to China that presents

national security vulnerabilities.’’

I would suggest that this conclusion is at extreme variance with

the results of the Cox committee study. I have come to realize that

there is little recourse for professionals to sound an alarm when

the system is unresponsive. I am equally dismayed over the magnitude of the strategic contributions from cumulative technology

transfer to China, that they have occurred on my watch, even

though I sought to avoid such a development, but instead was isolated, ignored, and subject to political retribution.

The tragedy is not what is being done to me now. The real tragedy is that we will not realize the full military impact and national

security threat from these technology transfers for another 5 to 10

years. Only then will we understand the extent and true cost for

having mortgaged the security of our children and our Nation’s

well-being.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Maloof.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Maloof follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Mr. Fox.

Mr. FOX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Fox, prior to your comments, let me just say

that I understand that your statement does not go into the October

1997 memo and who asked you to write it and what you wrote and

what happened afterwards. So at the conclusion of your remarks,

I wish you would allude to that.

Mr. FOX. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I certainly will.

Mr. BURTON. I just want to state to all of you prior to your testifying, that if there is any indication of retaliation or reprisals because of your testimony, I want you to immediately contact my office and we will look into it, because I don’t think you or your families should be penalized in any way for doing your duty.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Fox.

Mr. FOX. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Members of this honorable House, I am obliged

to appear before you today by order of subpoena. I have neither

sought nor solicited this honor. It is an obligation on my part which

has arisen through disclosures of a public and independent nature

over which I have had no control or influence. It is an obligation

not without risk, and I would be less than honest if I did not admit

that it is undertaken with no small concern for my personal and

professional future prospects.

Duty compels me to be here today. It is a duty enforced by the

oath I took as an attorney, and as a member of the public service.

In its simplest form, it is the duty to obey the law. It is the obligation to afford the workings of the law and that of a duly constituted

legislative inquiry the utmost respect, and it is the duty to execute

those responsibilities entrusted to me without fear or favor.

It is incumbent upon me to tell the truth. It is a key responsibility of public service. I am prepared to answer whatever questions you may have with candor and honesty. My answers will be

grounded upon direct knowledge, information, and belief. I cannot

speculate upon things of which I have no knowledge and will respectfully decline to do so if called upon. Unfounded speculation

will only hinder the progress and credibility of this inquiry, and my

respect for this House is too great to engage in such conduct.

Two hundred years ago, President John Adams advised his son

John Quincy to ‘‘never let the institutions of polite society substitute for honesty, integrity, and character.’’ My father, a concentration camp survivor, memorized that phrase and taught it to

me when I was very young. I have always tried to comport my career in public service according to that standard. Whether I have

succeeded will be determined to no small extent by the impressions

you carry away from today’s proceedings.

Mr. Chairman, I am the most unlikely rebel. I make no pretensions to any excessive nobility or courage. Whatever distinction I

possess in this area is entirely due to the company I find myself

in today, and I thank Mr. Maloof and Dr. Leitner for publicly

standing by me when few other of my colleagues would.

Mr. Chairman, and members of this committee, this concludes

my formal prepared opening statement. Thank you for your kind

indulgence. I am prepared to answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fox follows:]

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Mr. FOX. I am informed by correspondence from the Office of Secretary of Defense General Counsel that any document requests

arising from my testimony must be referred to them, and therefore

I am not authorized to release any official documents on my own

volition.

Now, to the points that you asked me to raise, Mr. Chairman,

as a supplement to my prepared opening statement.

In October 1997, I served as the DOD technical advisor on behalf

of my then-existing agency, the Defense Special Weapons Agency,

to the Interagency Subcommittee on Nuclear Export Controls. It

was my job, it had been my job since approximately November

1996, to provide technical review to the various proposed nuclear

technology and nuclear material transfer arrangements that are

governed by the Atomic Energy Act and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act.

In October 1997, particularly the week of October 23, 1997, a request for such a review came across my desk. That review concerned a subsequent arrangement of nuclear technology that had

been negotiated or proposed under the 1985 Agreement for Cooperation and the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy negotiated between the United States and China. As part of the implementation

of this agreement, Congress mandated that the President of the

United States must certify that any subsequent reciprocal arrangements or technology transfers, particularly concerning nuclear

technology, concluded under that agreement, must be designed to

effectively ensure that any nuclear materials, facilities, or components provided be utilized solely for peaceful purposes. Congress

also determined that arrangements concerning information exchanges and visits negotiated under that agreement would be

deemed subsequent arrangements, personal intersection 131–A of

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and subject to the required findings and determinations defined under that act.

As the parties to the 1985 United States and Chinese Agreement

for Cooperation on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy were both

nuclear weapons states, diplomatic channels establishing mutually

acceptable information exchange and visitor arrangements were to

be utilized in lieu of bilateral safeguard provisions.

I received the request for this technical review on, I believe, a

Tuesday or a Wednesday. The request had a deadline of that Friday, October 24, 1997, with the proviso that all reviews must be

in, must have been completed, by that date in anticipation of the

arrival of the Chinese Premier for a summit to begin the following

Sunday.

I reviewed the agreement pursuant to a memorandum of understanding which I had written, as a matter of fact, in 1996, a memorandum of understanding which provided technical support for the

Office of Secretary of Defense Policy Division and which allowed

our office—and which provided for our office to provide technical

assistance and evaluative support for such nuclear technology

transfers.

I reviewed the proposed information exchange and technology

transfer agreement proposed between the United States and the

People’s Republic of China and concluded, after my review, that the

statutory and regulatory requirements dictated by the Atomic EnVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:27 May 24, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00143 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\62262 pfrm06 PsN: 62262
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ergy Act and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act had not been met

and that I could not, in good conscience, from a technological viewpoint, certify that the proposed agreement did not pose a risk of

nuclear weapons and nuclear military technology proliferation. The

United States and China had negotiated an information exchange

and technical cooperation reciprocal arrangement. The Department

of Energy requested consultative review of this proposed implementing arrangement, in compliance with the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978.

I conducted my review and I detailed the results of our technical

assessment. The terms of the then-reciprocal arrangement were

relatively simple and direct. The United States and China would

be afforded annual opportunities to send technical experts to each

other’s civil reactor sites, observe operations in reactor fueling, exchange and share technical information in the operation and maintenance of nuclear power generated at associated facilities, exchange detailed confidence-building and transparency information

on the transfer, storage and disposition of fissionable fuels utilized

for ostensibly peaceful purposes, and disclose detailed reactor site

operational data to include energy-generated end-loading.

The criteria that I was authorized to utilize under the support

agreement memorandum of understanding was likewise relatively

simple and straightforward. Section 131 of the Atomic Energy Act

and related legislation such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act required a rather thorough inquiry into such arrangements, such proposed arrangements.

The inquiry had to address whether the contemplated state action will result in a significant increase of the risk of nuclear weapons technology proliferation. It also had to consider whether the information and expertise shared under the proposed arrangement

could be diverted to either a nonnuclear state for use in the development of a nuclear explosive device and whether the United

States could maintain an environment where it would obtain timely wording of the imminence of such diversion.

This process was both objective and subjective to no small extent.

Namely, in light of the answers given to those two preceding questions, would the arrangement as proposed not be inimical to the

common defense and security?

My assessment concluded that the proposed arrangement presented real and substantial risk to the common defense and security of both the United States and allied countries, an assessment

and a conclusion I continue to stand by today.

I further found that the contemplated action proposed in 1997

could result in a significant increase of the risk of nuclear weapons

technology proliferation. I similarly concluded that the environment surrounding these exchange measures could not guarantee

timely warning of willful diversion of otherwise confidential information to non-nuclear states for nuclear weapons development.

Concurrently, the agreement as then presented to both us and as

ultimately presented to the U.S. Congress, could not ensure that

whatever was provided under this reciprocal arrangement could be

utilized solely for intended peaceful purposes.

141

At the time I made this assessment, I was not unmindful of the

political consequences and the political importance attached to this

agreement.

However, the very nature of this contemplated arrangement, in

my opinion, required a significant examination of the past state

practices of the prime beneficiary of what I believed, in final analysis, to be a technology transfer agreement swaddled in the comforting yet misleading terminology of a confidence-building measure. Inarguably I believe that the People’s Republic of China benefited most from what technical information would be generated by

these exchanges. I believed then and I continue to believe today

that a review of state action particularly in technology transfers

concerning nuclear technology and nuclear materials, where the

sole guarantee of nondiversion would be diplomatic representations, required a review of past state actions of a prime beneficiary.

Mr. BURTON. Pardon me for interrupting, Mr. Fox. Mr. Shays is

going to cover some of this in his questioning. So I think what we

will do now, since the time has run out is, we will recognize Mr.

Shays. We’ve got a vote that is going to be 15 minutes, I think you

might be able to conclude your questioning before we do that.

Mr. SHAYS. I would be happy to do that.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. First I thank all of our witnesses, and I know it’s

very difficult for all of you to be here, and when you serve your

country and you serve your country well, to have people question

it, it must, one, boggle your mind, and, two, make you very angry,

and, three, be very hurtful as well.

Mr. Fox, I know you not to be a willing witness in the sense you

would just as soon not be here, and I also know that you have a

spouse who works in the Government, and it is not easy to do

something that might endanger your career or your wife’s career,

and I also know that you’re here to answer, hopefully, the questions that are going to be put before you.

What I would request is that the memo that you sent be put up

on the screen. I believe this is the memo that you wrote. It’s kind

of small up there. Is this the memo that you are referring to in

your testimony? You can see it on the screen.

[The information referred to follows:]

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143

144

145

146

Mr. FOX. Yes, it is. This is a copy of the memo of—a rather poor

copy, but a copy nonetheless, of the memo I wrote.

Mr. SHAYS. And the first page I see on the right, keep. Who is

that? Who wrote that?

Mr. FOX. The notations in the margin are my words. Those are

my notes on the memo, and those originate from a discussion that

I had with my then superior in OSD policy.

Mr. SHAYS. And you need to identify your superior.

Mr. FOX. Mr. Michael Johnson.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, Mr. Michael Johnson had taken a look at this

memorandum that you wrote?

Mr. FOX. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. And had attempted to reach you just casually, or did

he want to speak to you about this memorandum?

Mr. FOX. No, oh, he wanted to speak to me about this. I had completed my memo. I completed my analysis recommending the nonapproval of the Chinese technology transfer.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m going to have you read a paragraph, but the bottom line is, he wanted to speak to you. He contacted you once, he

called again, and you finally called him.

Mr. FOX. Yes. I sent the memo in Thursday night. Friday morning, on my way to the weekly Interagency Subcommittee on Nuclear Export Controls, he attempted to reach me several times and

finally reached me through our divisional secretary.

Mr. SHAYS. And was he pleased with what he read?

Mr. FOX. No. He was quite upset as a matter of fact.

Mr. SHAYS. Why would he be upset?

Mr. FOX. When I finally did get a chance to speak to him, he indicated that this was not what was being looked for. He indicated

that in light of my memo, I would be lucky if I still had my job

by the end of the day. He indicated that.

Mr. SHAYS. Was that with a laugh, you know, ha, ha?

Mr. FOX. No, it was not a joke, I assure you, and it was not communicated to me in a joking manner, and I did not take it in a joking manner.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. He got your attention?

Mr. FOX. Oh, he certainly did. Not being independently wealthy,

any attempt to cut short my income——

Mr. SHAYS. You took him seriously, and he wasn’t happy, and

what did he want you to do, throw away your memorandum?

Mr. FOX. No. He indicated that the matter having been decided

far above our pay grade, he wanted me to change my memorandum

in order to have it reflect a more appropriate conclusion.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And now he’s not even claiming that it was his

decision, he’s saying someone else above his pay level?

Mr. FOX. Yes, and that is why, sir, I have never held the gentleman personally responsible, and I’ve never held any ill will

against him. I believe that this was dictated far above our mutual

levels.

Mr. SHAYS. I don’t have a sense you have any ill will against

anyone at the moment, but what I do understand is that he then,

what, went through the memorandum with you?

Mr. FOX. Yes, he did.

Mr. SHAYS. Paragraph by paragraph?

147

Mr. FOX. Yes, he did.

Mr. SHAYS. So I assume—the ‘‘keep’’ was that he was comfortable—explain what the ‘‘keep’’ means.

Mr. FOX. Yes. What had happened was that we spoke, and ultimately what was decided was that he wanted from the second page

on, the portion with the line drawn——

Mr. SHAYS. Let’s go to the second page, if you can.

Mr. FOX [continuing]. To be deleted entirely of my substantive

judgment.

Mr. SHAYS. Was that your line or his line?

Mr. FOX. That was his line.

Mr. SHAYS. Pretty clear then.

Let’s go to the next page. The third page has another line. So all

of that is highlighting, saying out it goes?

Mr. FOX. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, did Johnson give you any indication of what

outcome he wanted from your memorandum?

Mr. FOX. Yes, he did. What happened was when I was ultimately

counseled by various colleagues to indeed not fall on my sword, but

rather——

Mr. SHAYS. No, I want to know what outcome did he want. You

said this was not a good agreement. What outcome did he want?

Mr. FOX. He wanted the memorandum to reflect that there would

be no inimical impact upon national security.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m going to ask you to read in the second page that

whole paragraph starting with, this assessment concludes.

Mr. FOX [reads]:

This assessment concludes that the proposed arrangement presents real and substantial risk to the common defense and security of both the United States and the

allied countries. It is further found that the contemplated action can result in a significant increase of the risk of nuclear weapons technology proliferation.

The assessment similarly concludes that the environment surrounding the exchange measures cannot guarantee timely warning of willful diversion of otherwise

confidential information to nonnuclear states for nuclear weapons development.

Concurrently, the agreement as presented cannot ensure that whatever is provided

under this reciprocal arrangement will be utilized solely for intended peaceful purposes.

Mr. SHAYS. Now the question is, did you know that there was

supposed to be an outcome before you wrote this?

Mr. FOX. No, I did not.

Mr. SHAYS. So you did what you thought you were supposed to

do, come to an assessment as was your responsibility. What was

your title at the time?

Mr. FOX. My title at the time was arms control specialist; I was

an arms control specialist with this additional duty assigned. My

title was export control coordinator, something of that nature.

Mr. SHAYS. So you were doing your job?

Mr. FOX. I was doing what was assigned to me as well as an additional duty to my primary duties.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, we could have you read other parts of it, but

it’s pretty clear that you were saying this was not an agreement

that should be carried forward. You were being told that they

wanted the exact opposite conclusion.

Mr. FOX. Yes, sir.

148

Mr. SHAYS. So what I would like is, where did they ask you to

insert it? In place of what was crossed out, is that what was asked

to be inserted?

Mr. FOX. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Do you have that in front of you?

Mr. FOX. I certainly do.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, was that something you wrote or something

someone else wrote?

Mr. FOX. This was language that was provided to me by Mr.

Johnson.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, did you feel comfortable signing this?

Mr. FOX. No, I did not.

Mr. SHAYS. Tell me why you didn’t feel comfortable signing it.

Mr. FOX. Because I believed that it was not true.

Mr. SHAYS. You were being asked by your superiors to say something that wasn’t true. In other words, a whole 180 degree turn?

Mr. FOX. Yes, sir, except when this memo was to be—when the

new memo was to be submitted, I was specifically directed not to

sign it, but to have a more senior individual sign it. My signature

on this memo would be too blatant an appearance that I had been

indeed coerced into changing my mind.

Mr. SHAYS. We’re running out of time. I just hope that further

questions just talk about what happened after, to you personally.

Are you still continuing in the same role?

Mr. FOX. No, sir, I am not, and I have not, with one exception,

since October 1998.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I would yield back.

Mr. BURTON. Would the gentleman yield to me real quick?

Dr. Leitner, I understand you were at that meeting.

Dr. LEITNER. Yes, sir; yes, I was.

Mr. BURTON. And you can verify what Mr. Fox is saying?

Dr. LEITNER. Yes, I was there; in fact, Mr. Fox comes——

Mr. BURTON. We’ve got to run and vote. I just want to quickly

ask a couple of questions, then we will come back after we vote.

So the memo regarding our national security, the assessment

was made that this was a risk to our national security, was

changed 180 degrees from somebody higher up above this fellow’s

pay level, because, in your judgment, we have the President of

China coming over the next week, and they didn’t want to upset

the apple cart?

Dr. LEITNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Is that your judgment?

Mr. FOX. I was told that specifically, sir.

Mr. BURTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

We will be back in about 10 minutes.

[Recess.]

Mr. BURTON. We will reconvene. There will be Members coming

back into the room. When we have a vote like this, people get

strung out, so if we can have the witnesses back at the table.

I ask unanimous consent that all exhibits and materials referred

to during the hearing be included in the record, and without objection so ordered.

We will now recognize the distinguished gentleman from California, Mr. Horn, for questioning. Mr. Horn.

149

Mr. HORN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Colonel McCallum, as I recall, you served in Vietnam, and you

were decorated in Vietnam, I believe.

Colonel MCCALLUM. Yes, sir, that’s true.

Mr. HORN. And for your work in intelligence, you also have been

awarded in your civilian capacity; is that correct?

Colonel MCCALLUM. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. HORN. And is this the first time when—the examples that

you’ve shown us and testified on under oath—that you’ve ever had

your work really questioned; is that not correct?

Colonel MCCALLUM. I believe that’s the case, sir.

Mr. HORN. Let me go down the lines of the procedures that the

Department of Energy is supposed to follow in a situation such as

they were creating for you.

There’s—it’s on the various charts over here, and if you don’t

have it—yes, it’s that document in front of you. I just want to go

down the line with a yes/no answer.

Did the Department of Energy in reviewing your situation make

a determination if information in question is properly classified; did

they or didn’t they?

Colonel MCCALLUM. They did not, sir.

Mr. HORN. Did a Security Director interview you, the employee?

Colonel MCCALLUM. I have never been interviewed.

Mr. HORN. The third one is the Director of Security makes a recommendation to the employee’s managers. Did that ever happen?

Colonel MCCALLUM. No, Mr. Congressman, that did not.

Mr. HORN. No. 4, after consultation with the Director of Office

of Safeguards and Security, the manager either terminates the

process in the employee’s favor or begins an administrative review

proceeding. Did that happen?

Colonel MCCALLUM. No, sir, it did not.

Mr. HORN. And presumably within 2 days of beginning such a

proceeding, the manager shall suspend the employee’s security

clearance. That never happened?

Colonel MCCALLUM. That has never happened, sir.

Mr. HORN. No. 5 of their own procedures is the manager gives

an employee a letter of notification explaining why the clearance

has been questioned within 30 days. Did that occur?

Colonel MCCALLUM. It did not, sir.

Mr. HORN. No. 6, employee has a right to a hearing upon written

request. Now, did you make a written request? You hadn’t gone

through the other procedure.

Colonel MCCALLUM. I did not make a written request, Congressman. We were informed at a meeting that we attended that I

would be given no further appeal process.

Mr. HORN. Yes. Because No. 6 is if the employee wanted a hearing, he must request it in writing within 20 days.

Colonel MCCALLUM. Yes.

Mr. HORN. Did that happen?

Colonel MCCALLUM. No, it did not.

Mr. HORN. No. 7, a hearing officer will be appointed from the Office of Hearings and Appeals.

Colonel MCCALLUM. One was not appointed. In our last letter to

the Department, we asked that a hearing officer be appointed from

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an unbiased third agency who could adequately review the documents and review the process and report on an unbiased basis.

That has not been responded to.

Mr. HORN. No. 8 of the Department of Energy’s own regulations,

at the hearing the Department is represented by a departmental

attorney. The employee has the right to an attorney and may

present witnesses and documentary evidence. Did that ever occur?

Colonel MCCALLUM. No, sir, it did not.

Mr. HORN. And No. 9 is a hearing will commence within 90 days

of the employee’s request.

Colonel MCCALLUM. We have had no response to a request for a

hearing at this point.

Mr. HORN. You’re saying they don’t even answer your request

letters?

Colonel MCCALLUM. That’s correct.

Mr. HORN. And they have never gone into any aspect of this

process which presumably is available to all employees in the Department of Energy?

Colonel MCCALLUM. It is, Congressman.

Mr. HORN. Have you ever had any of your staff that were subjected to those particular procedures for reviewing security infractions?

Colonel MCCALLUM. Yes, sir. That happens routinely in the Department, probably 50 or 60 times a year on average.

Mr. HORN. When there’s an infraction?

Colonel MCCALLUM. Yes.

Mr. HORN. And what do they do when it is a first-time infraction

and perhaps been done in innocence?

Colonel MCCALLUM. If an infraction is determined to be not willful and deliberate, our own manuals call for the person’s supervisor

to conduct an interview to determine the reason for the infraction

and instruct the offender in the correct security practice. The offender is then sometimes scheduled for a class in either classification or in security procedures, depending on which of the two components may have been violated.

Mr. HORN. It isn’t on the chart or the board there, but No. 10,

at the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer will issue a

written opinion within 30 days forwarded to the Director of the Office of Security Affairs. And then No. 11, the employee or Department may appeal any finding of the hearing officer to the Director

of the Office of Hearings and Appeals, and the Director will resolve

that appeal within 45 days. And then the final one is, based on the

opinion of the hearing officer, the Director of the Office of Security

Affairs shall make a final decision to reinstate the employee’s security clearance or terminate it. And none of that ever applied to

your case?

Colonel MCCALLUM. Congressman Horn, I’ve seen these procedures implemented in the Department on hundreds of occasions in

the last 25 years. This is the first time I’ve ever seen them not carried out faithfully, the first.

Mr. HORN. You’re the only one in the last two and a half decades

that they have not applied their own due process procedure to your

case?

Colonel MCCALLUM. Yes, sir, that’s true.

151

Mr. HORN. They just made life miserable for you.

Colonel MCCALLUM. Attempted to.

Mr. HORN. And also out of change, in terms of needing to get

your own attorney and so forth.

Colonel MCCALLUM. Yes, sir.

Mr. HORN. I think, Mr. Chairman, listening to all of this this

morning, it’s one of the great outrages I have in Government. We

expect civil servants to be professional. It’s clear that the gentlemen who testified this morning are professionals. And now I’m sure

they would agree that if once they’ve given them the factual information, the political appointees, whether they’re Democrats, Republicans, liberals, conservatives, whatever they are, whether

they’re biased for Asia or biased for Europe, they as the ones in Assistant Secretaryships, Under Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, Secretary, as well as the White House, they obviously can make a different policy judgment.

But the question is, were the facts beyond that policy judgment?

If the executive branch wishes to simply kill off advice coming from

professionals, the Congress certainly has a right to that advice. The

executive branch is not the king, although sometimes we see those

aspects over the last 50 years and even in the last century, and the

question is, what do we do to protect whistle-blowers who obviously

are patriots, obviously are professionals, and who know their business? And it isn’t a question of the administration disagreeing with

them. It’s a question of having them change their basic factual

presentation against their expertise, against their knowledge. It

makes it just plain wrong.

Mr. BURTON. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. HORN. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. Let me just say that the Department of Energy has

deliberately, as I said before, tried to block this hearing in every

way they could, No. 1; No. 2, they have not complied with our subpoena for information pertaining specifically to Lieutenant Colonel

McCallum; and No. 3, I think it will be incumbent upon this committee to find out why that’s the case and ask people from the Department of Energy to come up here and explain why the procedures, which are supposed to be applied to every single employee

when there’s this kind of a question arising, why those—why those

procedures were deliberately circumvented and not applied to Lieutenant Colonel McCallum.

So I appreciate that we will be having a hearing on this, and I

hope the gentleman will be involved in that one as well.

Mr. HORN. I hope you do that because it certainly cries out for

the congressional committee to get them up here, have them give

their side of the story, and if they’re not going to present us with

the written information that we’ve asked for, then a few contempt

of Congress citations shall be taken to the floor. And it’s too bad

if we have U.S. Attorneys sometimes that turn their back the other

way, and we have some in Justice that turn their back, but after

you get the evidence down here, we have a real problem in trying

to deal with people in a violation of their own procedures within

the Department.

Mr. BURTON. Well, if the gentleman would yield further, we said

in our opening statement that if we don’t get the cooperation of the

152

Department that we are entitled to as Members of Congress, we

will probably move a contempt citation. I would rather not have to

do that, but it’s a possibility.

Mr. HORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.

Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate

the testimony of all of our witnesses.

Mr. McCallum, you mentioned retaliation in your statement, and

you’ve discussed it already to some extent. I just want to make

sure that I understand the basic facts. The Energy Department

placed you on administrative leave with pay because they say you

disclosed classified information in a phone conversation. Is that

right?

Colonel MCCALLUM. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. And the conversation at issue which contains the

purportedly classified information was recorded; is that correct?

Colonel MCCALLUM. Congressman Waxman, I’m not sure how far

I can go in discussing the specifics beyond—I think I can say that

those—that it was recorded, but I don’t think I can further identify

it.

Mr. WAXMAN. And it’s my understanding that you don’t dispute

having a conversation and disclosing information, you just maintain that the information was unclassified.

Colonel MCCALLUM. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. It’s my understanding that the Energy Department

had access to the transcripts and could have reviewed them for security violations, long before they became widely publicized; is that

right?

Colonel MCCALLUM. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Something did get the attention of the Energy Department though. It was an article published on the Internet detailing your conversation which was highly critical of security at a

DOE facility; is that right?

Colonel MCCALLUM. The classification officer is pulling my shirttail here. Just a second, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Go ahead and consult with them, yes.

Colonel MCCALLUM. Could you repeat the question, Mr. Waxman?

Mr. WAXMAN. My question is about the Department of Energy—

getting their attention on this article that was published on the

Internet detailing your conversation which was critical of security

at a DOE facility.

Colonel MCCALLUM. I’ve been asked by the classification officer

not to comment on that, because it might further identify the location of information which is contested. I hold it’s not classified, but

there are some people in the Department that believe it is, and—— Mr. WAXMAN. Is it fair to say that there was an article on the

Internet that seemed to catch their attention?

Colonel MCCALLUM. I’ve been advised not to answer that, sir, respectfully.

Mr. WAXMAN. I’m sorry, what did you say?

Colonel MCCALLUM. I’ve been asked by the classification officer

not to answer that.

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Mr. WAXMAN. I don’t want to get you in any trouble. It’s my understanding that there was an article on the Internet which caught

the attention of the Department of Energy, and that this article

was published in mid-April of this year. Now, as you may recall,

April was a pretty bad month at the Department of Energy. As of

then, nine congressional committees were investigating the Chinese

espionage issue. Notra Trulock had testified that he had been

blocked from pursuing security reforms at the Department.

Secretary Richardson had just ordered the computers shut down

at the Federal labs, and Senator Murkowski, the chairman of the

Energy and National Resources Committee complained that ‘‘the

ability to identify accountability in this process is very, very difficult,’’ from Senator Murkowski, and that’s precisely the time

when the story on you describing your alleged classified conversation hit the Internet.

I can understand why you think your suspension was retaliation.

If I were in your position, I would feel the same way. But given

what was going on at that time, isn’t it possible that Secretary

Richardson was told that your case was an example of a DOE employee who disclosed highly classified information, and that if he

failed to act, if he hadn’t suspended you, he would face tremendous

criticism?

Colonel MCCALLUM. Congressman Waxman, I cannot attribute

the reasons for the Secretary’s actions. I think I said in my opening

statement that I believe that it was to discredit and intimidate me

specifically for the reasons which you mentioned, that there were

numerous congressional committees and the President’s PFIAB regrettably who were looking into these issues, and I have the keys

to the skeleton closets.

I will say, however, that I find it hard to believe that you would

take an action like this without going through the formality of the

procedures to review whether there has actually been anything

done wrong in the first place. These procedures are described in detail in not only DOE regulations, but in the Code of Federal Regulations, which have been published. And I know of no other exceptions.

So while it may have been the Secretary’s intention to make an

example of someone, I certainly don’t think that it’s appropriate to

make an example before you determine whether they’re guilty or

not.

Mr. WAXMAN. I’m not asking you to come to that conclusion, but

I’m speculating that a lot of things were going on at the same time,

which might have framed his thinking to act in a way that didn’t

follow the other procedures.

Colonel MCCALLUM. I can only say, Mr. Waxman, Congressman,

that the only thing that the Secretary shared with me during our

meeting, when I walked in the door, before I was given an opportunity to present my case at all, was that I was guilty. I find that

somewhat against the kind of system that I believed, that I had

been taught is the way we’re supposed to act in this country and

in this government. There was no due process. There was no review. There was no interview. There was not even an opportunity

for me to explain why the information was not classified.

154

Mr. WAXMAN. I can certainly understand your feelings. I understand that several qualified officials both inside and outside the

Energy Department have reviewed the conversations at issue.

Do you know—well, I don’t know if you’re permitted to say

whether you know whether that is the case or not. But let me ask

you, do you know who reviewed the conversations and what they

did conclude?

Colonel MCCALLUM. Yes, sir, Congressman Waxman. I can first

tell you who I had review the items in question. When the issue

first came to my attention, I asked several of my most senior managers, two of my division Directors and the person who is most active in this area, the person we turn to as an authorized classifier,

to review the information. All three, two of them in writing and one

not, said they were not classified.

I also asked two officials of the Department of Defense who did

this business whether they thought they were. They both said they

were not, although not in writing. As I said in my testimony, the

Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs brought forth two individuals who thought they were. But beyond that, I don’t think I

can—I don’t want to identify further the information or the criteria

by which it was looked at. I would like to.

Mr. WAXMAN. I understand. I’m sure you understand that we on

this committee are not in a position to review the transcripts and

determine whether they contain classified information. But I think

all of us would agree that there ought to be a fair inquiry by the

appropriate officials and an opportunity for you to be heard.

I understand you’re now essentially in a standoff with the Energy Department on how to resolve the allegations leveled against

you. What is the status of your dispute with the Department of Energy?

Colonel MCCALLUM. Congressman Waxman, I would hope that

we’re not in a standoff. What we have proposed to the Department

is that, since it appears to me and my attorney that this situation

was prejudged before there was any investigation, that I would call

an adequate investigation, on any opportunity for me to present either my case or witnesses or to present my technical argument,

that this—that the Secretary has himself prejudged this case, in

his own words to me. We ask either the Department of Defense or

the U.S. Security Policy Board or some other identified third organization that can review this in an unbiased manner with the right

technical outlook to review it. And I’ve offered to live with whatever decision that they make.

I would hope that’s not considered a standoff. I think that that’s

a fair offer as long as I believe I get some due process and some

review in the situation. I’m willing to argue my case in court.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, I agree that you haven’t been treated fairly,

and I don’t understand why procedures weren’t followed. What I’m

uncertain about is whether this was retaliation or a regrettable

overreaction by the Energy Department, and that’s something I

can’t conclude at this point.

But I sympathize with your situation, because it’s clear that the

Department of Energy did not follow the procedures, and I don’t

think they gave you a fair opportunity to be heard.

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Let me ask some questions of Dr. Leitner. Dr. Leitner, there are

a few areas of your testimony I want to clarify. Your disagreements

with your superiors have not been limited to the Clinton administration, have they?

Dr. LEITNER. No, sir, they’re not.

Mr. WAXMAN. You’ve raised similar concerns about American export control policy during the Bush administration; is that right?

Dr. LEITNER. Yes, I have.

Mr. WAXMAN. And did you feel the Bush administration was too

lax on export control to China?

Dr. LEITNER. Yes. What happened in the Bush administration resulted from a great deal of clouds and uncertainty because of the

end of the cold war, and I believe very strongly that they went too

far, too fast in relaxing export controls.

Mr. WAXMAN. Did you write a memo to that effect that you circulated to many individuals both inside and outside the Department?

Mr. LEITNER. No. As a matter of fact, my memo stayed within

the Department. What I did—the memo that we’re talking about,

I presume, is the one that is attachment A to my testimony, was

an analysis of the cumulative impact of these various controls, decontrol proposals. I tried to show that the methodology being employed was faulty; it was not looking at the system level where the

real impacts would be felt.

Mr. WAXMAN. When you wrote this memo, how was it received;

how were your concerns received by your superiors at the Department of Defense?

Dr. LEITNER. It was interesting, the reception. First I wrote the

memo, and I sent it out for peer review to some of the DOD labs

and also to my colleagues, engineers in my office and other places

all within DOD. And I asked for their comments about the accuracy and the efficacy of the arguments I was making, and what I

was trying to point out. I got a variety of comments, all constructive comments, saying, no, this particular item should be over here,

and pointing to this port of a missile, this part of an aircraft, that

sort of thing.

So I made changes accordingly, and once I had it validated technically, I sent it to my superiors. It was greeted in an interesting

way. My immediate supervisor, the Director of Policy at the time

in DTSA, thought it was terrific, and he was running around making copies, giving it to other people in policy, saying, look, at this

great thing we have.

Mr. WAXMAN. No one took retaliatory action against you?

Dr. LEITNER. Not immediately.

Mr. WAXMAN. William Rudman was head of your office during

the Bush administration; was he not?

Dr. LEITNER. Yes, he was.

Mr. WAXMAN. In the story of the National Journal, Mr. Rudman,

who is a fierce critic of the Clinton administration, called you a

zealot who was ‘‘professionally insane.’’ How do you respond to

that?

Dr. LEITNER. Well, for my response, you can just look at the reporting that has been done on Mr. William Rudman over the years.

You will find that when he was in the Customs Service how he was

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investigated for holding a guy who he accused of being a homosexual at gunpoint, how he was accused of all kinds of violations

of basic human values at the Customs Service when he was there.

And if you look at the investigation that was conducted by the

DOD IG in 1992, an inspection report where they found all kinds

of irregularities regarding Rudman renting a room in an employee’s

basement and filing false receipts for expenditures. Just look at the

IG inspection report. I will be happy to stand in court and compare

character between myself and Mr. Rudman any time, any day.

Mr. WAXMAN. You’re quoted as saying you had reservations not

just about the Bush administration policy, but also about the

Reagan administration. Do you feel that the Reagan administration

was too lax toward China?

Dr. LEITNER. No, the Reagan administration had a different—an

interesting approach. They came up with an approach toward

China known as the green line, where they tried to differentiate between China and Russia in terms of a potential threat, and they

offered China more liberal treatment. At that time, there was a

strategic matrix that they were trying to achieve, and that was to

make the Chinese appear to be enough of a threat to the Russians

during the cold war that the Russians will have to transfer many

troops East of the Urals to the Chinese border so they wouldn’t be

facing NATO and the United States.

There was actually a strategic doctrine that was being employed

as part of this very slow doling out of benefits toward China. Was

I a direct opponent of that? No, I was not.

Mr. WAXMAN. Were you critical of it?

Mr. LEITNER. At times I thought on specific proposals we might

have gone a little bit too far, and I was critical in specific proposals, internally critical.

Mr. WAXMAN. You’ve been fairly vocal in your criticism of your

office and American export policy. How many times have you appeared on television to air your concerns?

Dr. LEITNER. I don’t know, a handful of times, just a few times.

Mr. WAXMAN. How many times have you been printed in a print

publication on export control issues?

Dr. LEITNER. A larger handful of papers.

Mr. WAXMAN. How many times have you prepared papers or

studies at your own initiative criticizing decisions made by your office?

Dr. LEITNER. As a matter of fact, my testimony documents the

major criticism papers that I did that were critical. And I want to

emphasize to you that they were internal documents. I did not go

to the press with these documents. I gave them to my superiors

within the Department.

Mr. WAXMAN. I wasn’t asking you about the documents. I was

asking about public appearances.

Dr. LEITNER. Public appearances, largely congressional testimony, twice before the Joint Economic Committee, once before the

Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, once before the Cox/Dicks

committee and then here today.

Mr. WAXMAN. Have some of your criticisms been directed at decisions made in your office that you were not responsible for reviewing?

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Dr. LEITNER. Not responsible for reviewing? There are many decisions that are made that I’m not responsible for reviewing. As a

matter of fact, that memo that I have in attachment A—the 1990

memo concerned a bevy of decisions that I was not responsible for

reviewing. I tried to do a cumulative assessment of those decisions

and show what the cumulative impact would be.

Mr. WAXMAN. In your written testimony you say that several factors including ‘‘corruption and possibly darker motives, have

brought us to a turning point.’’ Can you tell us what evidence you

have of corruption at the Department of Defense?

Dr. LEITNER. I’m not an investigator who looks at criminal

charges in the Department of Defense. I have seen decisions made

on a regular basis that you have to question the motives of people.

You try not to do that. You try to simply deal with substantive

issues, but there are many actions that take place which just are

very difficult to explain otherwise.

Mr. WAXMAN. What do you mean by darker motives?

Mr. LEITNER. By darker motives, I was referring to what the Cox

committee found at the national labs in terms of possible espionage. I wasn’t limiting myself in that particular comment just to

the Department of Defense.

Mr. WAXMAN. Secretary Cohen is a former Republican Senator

from Maine. As Secretary of Defense, do you believe that he and

other officials of the Department of Defense are deliberately undermining the national security of the United States?

Dr. LEITNER. I have no idea what Secretary Cohen is doing or not

doing. I don’t deal with Secretary Cohen at my level. Whether it’s

intentional or unintentional, I can’t speak to that. I just know the

net result is undermining the national security of the United

States.

Mr. WAXMAN. Is it possible that your disagreements with your

superiors at the Defense Department are no more than legitimate

policy differences between people with strongly held views?

Dr. LEITNER. I would normally think that, and in most cases

that’s usually the case. I don’t deny that there are policy differences, and gentlemen agree to disagree on issues. I know I am

not the be all and end all of licensing. I am not a policymaker, I

am not a political official, but when you do offer an analysis and

then you are retaliated for offering that analysis, that’s where the

line gets crossed into whether or not it’s not just being listened to

and being taken account of, it’s actually being reprised against and

being attacked for your efforts. There may be a difference of opinion where gentlemen might disagree. But gentlemen generally

don’t attack each other for offering a difference of opinion.

Mr. WAXMAN. You talked about a web of corruption at the Department of Defense. Do you think that Secretary Cohen is part of

that web of corruption?

Dr. LEITNER. I personally doubt it. I think Secretary Cohen has

not been involved in the export control process to any great extent.

He was dealing with much larger policy issues. But I have absolutely no way of knowing. I just know from my vantage point.

Mr. WAXMAN. Has the Department been responsive to some of

your criticisms of how your office is run? Have there been changes

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made in the office data base to respond to your allegation of memo

tampering?

Dr. LEITNER. No. Any changes in the data base on memo tampering, such as the time that I went on vacation after denying two

supercomputers to Arzamas–16 and Chelyabinsk–70, in Russia,

and I came back and found out that my position was changed and

my name left on it in the data base. The procedures that allowed

individuals to make those changes have still not been altered. My

positions still get changed. My name is still on cases after repeatedly complaining, after talking about it in public testimony, and

after speaking to the IG about it.

Mr. WAXMAN. We were told in this committee that the data base

has been altered to provide licensing officers with the opportunity

to express their own individual views; is that not the case?

Dr. LEITNER. The structure of the data base has not changed in

years in terms of that. There’s always been a comments section

where you can put a comment in, but it’s been there for years and

years. I haven’t noticed any change at all.

Mr. WAXMAN. Have more regular meetings on export licensing

issues been held in response to your criticism?

Dr. LEITNER. Not that I’ve been made aware of.

Mr. WAXMAN. Has there been wider distribution of internal information in response to your criticism?

Dr. LEITNER. Not that I’m aware of.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Maloof, I want to thank you for your testimony

today. I would like to ask you a few questions to clarify your testimony.

Mr. MALOOF. Yes, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. You testified you feel you are the victim of retaliation from your superiors. Are you familiar with the Office of Special

Counsel?

Mr. MALOOF. Yes, sir, I am.

Mr. WAXMAN. And have you submitted a retaliation complaint to

the Office of Special Counsel?

Mr. MALOOF. No, I have not, because I felt that—judging from

previous experiences of other colleagues, that it would probably be

futile. It was also my impression that after—I also went through

my own system, I went to our Deputy Under Secretary, who immediately referred me back to General Counsel within the Defense

Threat Reduction Agency. I went through that channel. Immediately they felt that given the facts that I presented, there was a

case of retribution.

I then listened to what Dr. Leitner had to say about his experiences with the special counsel, and I just saw one heck of an uphill

battle because of the—of what I perceive to be an approach by

them to favor management. And it would have required an expenditure of tremendous resources on my part, and I just did not have

the time and energy to put into that and at the same time try to

do my job.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I see the red light. Did I have two

10-minutes?

Mr. BURTON. Yes, you had 20 minutes. The time goes by quickly.

Mr. WAXMAN. Then I will catch up on the next round.

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Mr. BURTON. But you have another 10 minutes on your side at

the conclusion.

Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing

today. As you know, Mr. Chairman, I served with the CIA back in

the 1970’s and with the Department of Justice as a U.S. Attorney

back in the 1980’s. And I must say, Mr. Chairman, what we’ve

heard today indicates to me an administration that is so vastly different as to almost be operating in an alien country.

It used to be that spies were prosecuted. It used to be that security measures, polygraphing of employees, regular and very serious

monitoring of data bases, information, activities that might be suspicious were taken seriously, and underlying all of the work that

we did back in the 1970’s and in the 1980’s in these areas was a

notion that our national security, which protected our sovereignty,

was something important. That seems to have been utterly lost by

many in this administration. Maybe it was never there, I don’t

know.

We’ve read books, Gary Aldrich’s books and other gentlemen, and

this gentleman leads a very distinguished, impeccable career in

public service and in law enforcement. We’ve read these books.

We’ve seen these documents. We’ve heard the testimony, and it is

absolutely, Mr. Chairman, chilling, the testimony we have heard

today.

Gentlemen, I appreciate all of you coming forward, the tremendous risk to yourselves and to your careers. The work that you perform, underlying it are several important components of your job

as public servants, the same as ours and mine was when I served

with the CIA and with the U.S. Department of Justice as a U.S.

Attorney: first and foremost to protect the United States of America; second, in the executive branch to serve the President, and in

your capacity you essentially served the President by providing,

within the bounds of the law, information to him so that the policy

decisions that he makes can be based on the very best, most substantive, most objective judgment of professionals. So when he

makes a decision, it’s not just sort of a shot in the dark, it is based

on learned judgment, and one can criticize any President for a policy decision. That’s not your job. As far as I can tell from your testimony, that has not been your job, and that’s not the point of your

being here, criticize policy decisions of the President or others.

But the scenarios that you all have laid out raise several extremely troubling problems. When decisions that you have made

based on your judgment and in furtherance of your job, including

protecting our country, are altered to reflect untruths, to reflect information that you know to be false, to be inaccurate, to be inappropriate. Then one of, I guess, at least three different things is

happening. Either the word is coming down from the President or

from the policymaker to justify a policy decision; or, second, the

word is going up to the President to influence a policy decision improperly. Both of those, of course, are corrupt.

Those—that is a corrupted policymaking process, which is bad in

and of itself, but there’s another scenario that I certainly have no

way at this point—whether this is true or not, that raises the most

serious problems or questions, and that is those that border treaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:27 May 24, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00163 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\62262 pfrm06 PsN: 62262
160

son. If decisions are being made to influence your work, your objective assessment, the data that you have accumulated and put objectively in, substantively into a document, is altered with the purpose of assisting a foreign power to acquire information or data to

which they would not otherwise be entitled, and that raises the singularly most serious question that can be raised about a nation’s

national security, and that is, is it being compromised not because

of internal politics or internal decisionmaking, but because of something external, one of our adversaries is seeking to have a policy

decision made or changed to reflect and to enable them to gather

information, evidence that they would not otherwise be entitled.

So I do not think, Mr. Chairman, that the importance of this

hearing, the importance of the problem, the magnitude of the problem that these witnesses have come forward today could be overstated. I appreciate it very much.

There are a couple of specific questions. Mr. Maloof, you talked

briefly in your—this is in both your written testimony as well as

your oral testimony. On pages 8 and 9, you mentioned an Assistant

U.S. Attorney and a Customs investigator. Who was that U.S. Attorney? What U.S. Attorney’s office was that out of?

Mr. MALOOF. Out of Washington.

Mr. BARR. And who was the Assistant U.S. Attorney?

Mr. MALOOF. Mr. Pelleck.

Mr. BARR. Would you spell that, please?

Mr. MALOOF. P-E-L-L-E-C-K. He was handling our—has been

handling the technology transfer investigation.

Mr. BARR. Thank you.

With regard to Dr. Leitner, you talked at some length about the

changing of your position on your computer when you were out of

town with regard to superconductors being approved to Russia.

How large is the scope of people that would have access to your

computer to be able to make that sort of change?

Dr. LEITNER. Well, it was about supercomputers and not particularly large, it would be just be a handful of people. It’s fairly narrow. It’s on a local area network within the organization.

Mr. BARR. Would you name them, those by name, those people

that would have access to it and the capability to make the change?

Dr. LEITNER. Well, specific authorities give with it the ability to

make changes in the record. I know that at a minimum, people

that have that authority in my office, include Barbara B. Auckland;

my supervisor, Colonel Raymond Willson; and I’m not sure who

else. It would only be a handful of people, but those are two people

who did have that authority or who do have that authority that I

know for sure can make such changes.

Mr. BARR. Is there a difference between the authority and the

power to go into the computer and either add or detract, but certainly designate and make clear that information is being added or

detracted? Does anybody have the authority to go in there in your

name, purportedly in your name, make a change that is reflective

of what your position and assessment will be? I mean, to me that

is criminal, and nobody would have the authority to do that as opposed to going in and adding or detracting information, but making

clear that they are doing it, and they’re not trying to do it in your

name, which would be fraud.

161

Dr. LEITNER. I agree completely, I believe, and I have complained

internally in memos. I’ve complained to the Inspector General’s Office as well that I believe that it is fraudulent. I think there has

been tampering with a data base that is supposed to be the official

DOD record of its transactions in the export control process, and

they were making it appear to be something that it wasn’t. They’re

putting false information in.

Mr. BARR. Has there been, as far as you can tell, any initiation

of a criminal investigation by DOJ of this matter?

Dr. LEITNER. No, there has not been any investigation I’m aware

of.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Barr, we will have a second round here in just

a few minutes, if you would like.

Mr. BARR. Thank you.

Thank you, Dr. Leitner.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Waxman has 10 more minutes on the 30 minutes, so we will now recognize Mr. Waxman and then go to you,

Mr. Souder.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and when

that red light comes on, I’m going to try to conclude my questioning

so we can be fair to everybody on the committee.

Dr. Leitner, you said you were a victim of a manufactured security violation. As I understand it, you claimed that another Defense

Department colleague planted a classified document in your desk

and then executed a surprise inspection of your desk. That’s a serious charge if it’s true. Could you tell us more about that, Dr.

Leitner?

Dr. LEITNER. I would be happy to. It wasn’t a surprise inspection.

There’s no such thing. We’ve never had anything called surprise inspections. What happened, was during a snowstorm in February,

when the Government was dismissed early because of the snow accumulation, I too was dismissed, and went home for the day. Then

I started receiving phone calls from colleagues in my office saying,

hey, something happened this afternoon that’s quite unusual, and

the unusual thing is that my supervisor Colonel Willson did something he never ever does, and that’s conduct the routine doublecheck at the end of the day, where we have safes with classified

information. And basically what the routine is, you——

Mr. WAXMAN. Let me interrupt you because I do have a limited

time. Without going through all the details, you believed that your

supervisor planted a classified document in your desk and then

criticized you for having that document.

Dr. LEITNER. Yes, I believe—it was a set-up, and it was an intentional attempt to delegitimize me and somehow affect my security

clearance and my standing in the office.

Mr. WAXMAN. And did you report this to anybody in law enforcement or anything?

Dr. LEITNER. Yes, sir, I reported it in my chain of command. I

set a memo to the head of DTRA, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Dr. Jay Davis, and in that memo I demanded that the case be

referred to the Defense Criminal Investigative Service for a criminal investigation, because I believe a criminal act was committed

against me.

162

Mr. WAXMAN. You believe you had been passed over for promotions and denied bonuses and merit pay increases as a result of

the hostility of your supervisors?

Dr. LEITNER. Yes.

Mr. WAXMAN. Are we talking about supervisors other than Mr.

Rudman?

Dr. LEITNER. Oh, yes, Rudman is long gone. He was involved

quite a few years ago.

Mr. WAXMAN. His replacement and other supervisors are also

being critical of you?

Dr. LEITNER. Yes.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Maloof, you testified about your efforts to

learn more about the investigations into the Hughes and Loral

Corps. After those companies had been under investigation for

more than a year, when you first read about the investigation in

the New York Times, you received calls from the Public Affairs Office and another office with the Pentagon; is that correct?

Mr. MALOOF. That’s correct.

Mr. WAXMAN. And after your discussion with those offices, your

superiors told you that they didn’t want you involved in the issue;

is that right?

Mr. MALOOF. Yes, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Now, if I understand correctly, you persisted with

your inquiries, right?

Mr. MALOOF. Correct.

Mr. WAXMAN. And you questioned an engineer about the matter?

Mr. MALOOF. That’s correct.

Mr. WAXMAN. I understand you were and continue to be concerned about the office’s approach to export controls and about satellite waivers for companies like Hughes and Loral, but are you

saying that your superiors had no right to limit your role as a point

of contact on this issue within your office?

Mr. MALOOF. I would suggest that to do so was to impede me

from doing my job in this fashion. I look at all export license applications to end user and end uses as part of my duties. We run

those names against data bases, and if there is something out there

that is going on that is potentially criminally wrong, and we’re adding to the capabilities of another country, I needed to know that.

Mr. WAXMAN. Did anyone in your office ever say that you could

not provide information as a witness to law enforcement agencies

investigating the Hughes and Loral matter?

Mr. MALOOF. I was questioned extensively about that participation, but eventually it stopped.

Mr. WAXMAN. It stopped.

Mr. MALOOF. The criticisms and the questioning of my providing

that information.

Mr. WAXMAN. If I understand correctly, after your conversation

with the engineer in your office, you contacted the Customs Service

and reported your concerns that there might be a cover-up of some

kind; is that right?

Mr. MALOOF. Potential cover-up.

Mr. WAXMAN. A potential cover-up. And the Customs Service investigated your allegations. Did anyone else investigate the allegations?

163

Mr. MALOOF. Beyond the Assistant U.S. Attorney, I have no idea.

They were the proper people to conduct the investigation, because

that was part of their responsibility at the time. We certainly could

not do anything internally, and after I talked to the engineer, as

I stated in my testimony, I was barred from talking to anybody else

about the issue, so for me to pursue it independently would have

gotten me even into more difficulty.

Mr. WAXMAN. You concluded in your testimony, ‘‘It became apparent to me that the reason for handling Chinese satellite issues

among a very few people and keeping quiet any information concerning an investigation was to ensure that satellite cases continue

to be approved unimpeded.’’

How did you arrive at that conclusion?

Mr. MALOOF. I arrived at that conclusion because the—for over

that year period, very few people were handling details of the satellite cases. My office, when the satellites were under munitions

control, was totally bypassed. We never even saw those license applications. I’m told even in recent days by engineers that our management has asked the engineers to expedite those cases even now.

Mr. WAXMAN. Someone told you that?

Mr. MALOOF. I heard it from three different sources, and they

were all engineers, Mr. Waxman. And I’m just informed by Dr.

Leitner that he’s heard the same thing.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Fox, I want to thank you for appearing before

us today. As I understand it, you’ve alleged that another DOD official threatened your job unless you reversed a recommendation

concerning a proposed agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation

with China; is that right?

Mr. FOX. Yes, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Let’s step back and look at what you were asked

to do. My understanding was Mike Johnson, who was from a different office, the Office of Nonproliferation Policy, passed on a request from the Department of Energy to review the proposed agreement; is that right?

Mr. FOX. Well, actually, I received the agreement directly from

the Department of Energy, and the procedure with that, I would

write up my technical opinion and then forward it back to Mr.

Johnson, who would then incorporate it within the internal DOD.

Mr. WAXMAN. So your review was supposed to be a technical review?

Mr. FOX. It was, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. OK. And as you know, Mr. Johnson told the committee staff he was upset about your memo because it went beyond

the scope of the technical analysis that he requested. Do you feel

that your memo went beyond the technical analysis that Mr. Johnson requested?

Mr. FOX. No, sir, it did not. I disagree with that completely. As

a matter of fact, that was never even suggested to me at the time,

at the time of this situation. As a matter of fact, sir—— Mr. WAXMAN. Let me ask you, I understand that the chairman

put up the memo and asked you some questions, or at least one of

the Members did. In the memo you write that the end of the cold

war ‘‘has given China little pause for a reflection in the wholesale

rejection of Marxism. It remains committed to a discredited creed.’’

164

How is China’s domestic political situation relevant to the technical

analysis you were asked to prepare?

Mr. FOX. Sir, the record of state action of the recipient of nuclear

technology is a clear basis for determining whether or not the representations given as part of a technology sharing or cooperation

agreement have credibility or reliability.

Mr. WAXMAN. One of the paragraphs struck from the memo, I

understand Mr. Shays read one of them, let me read another.

The post cold war era has given the People’s Republic little pause for reflection

in the wholesale rejection of Marxism. It remains committed to a discredited creed.

The political hierarchy retains power through draconian measures, with little heed

to global repulsion at the excesses imposed upon its own people. It maintains an

expansionist foreign policy and openly covets the reacquisition of now independent

territories. It is in the midst of a decades-long military modernization program

which has an ultimate goal, the achievement of undisputed power projections capabilities. China maintains an active nuclear weapons development program and an

equally energetic foreign intelligence service.

This is your analysis of China itself. I want to know whether you

think that the issues you discuss were beyond the scope of a technical analysis.

Mr. FOX. No, sir, they are not. You cannot consider the transfer

of technology in a vacuum. You must consider all aspects of a technology transfer, and especially where you have a technology transfer agreement that is verified solely by diplomatic representations,

then sir, you must consider state action as part of the overall analysis.

Mr. WAXMAN. Excuse me, I understand what you are saying and

I have to get on to the questions.

I want to ask about your working relationship with Mr. Johnson

at the time you had the dispute with him. Did you and Mr. Johnson work at the same office of the Department of Defense?

Mr. FOX. No. I worked in one office that was supporting him

through a memorandum of understanding.

Mr. WAXMAN. Was he your supervisor?

Mr. FOX. Only under the terms of the memorandum of understanding.

Mr. WAXMAN. Is he in the same chain of command as you?

Mr. FOX. Only in the sense that I served him through a memorandum of understanding as a technical adviser.

Mr. WAXMAN. Did you report to the same political appointees?

Mr. FOX. Only in the circumstances governed by the memo.

Mr. WAXMAN. Did he have the authority to fire you?

Mr. FOX. I think his recommendation in that regard would have

carried substantial weight.

Mr. WAXMAN. Did Mr. Johnson’s immediate superiors have the

authority to have you fired?

Mr. FOX. I think that their recommendation in that matter would

have carried substantial weight with my chain of command, especially my senior management.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BURTON. I will reserve my 10 minutes until others get their

first rounds. Mr. Souder and then Mr. Ose.

Mr. SOUDER. I thank the chairman. Colonel McCallum, in your

statement, and one of the scary things in listening to Congressman

Weldon, the number of people that he referred to in addition to the

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four in front of us, in your written statement I don’t think that you

went through some of these names.

On page 11 you say that one site had five Security Directors in

a little over 2 years and you name Rich Levernier, Gary Morgan,

David Reidenour, Bernie Muerrens, Link White. You also say that

numerous security police officers, men like John Hnatio, Jeff

Hodges, Jeff Peters, and Mark Graff have all had their careers ruined for coming forward and addressing serious lapses in DOE.

One of the reactions that I had to this is that as somebody who

was too young during the McCarthy era to have actually experienced it, but it seems like then there was an abuse of power and

a witch hunt for those who were supposedly Communist. What we

seem to see in this administration is a witch hunt for those who

are anti-Communist. And it is extremely disturbing to see people’s

careers ruined and side-tracked and demotions because their devotion was to freedom and their concern was about the transfer of

power.

Some of us had written a letter—but let me go through a couple

of questions.

I understand you and your counsel had a chance to meet with

Secretary Richardson on May 27, 1999 to discuss your status at the

Department of Energy; is that correct?

Mr. MCCALLUM. Yes, it is.

Mr. SOUDER. We have a letter that I and nine other Members,

Congressman Barr, Congressman Bartlett, Congressman Rohrabacher, Congressman Weldon, Congressman Cunningham, Congressman DeLay, Congressman McIntosh, Congressman Johnson,

and Congressman Forbes, signed expressing congressional concern

about your employment status at DOE, cites your long-standing efforts to enforce and implement the safeguards, and I wondered if

you are familiar with the letter?

Mr. MCCALLUM. Yes, Congressman Souder, I am familiar and I

want to thank you and the other Congressmen that sent that letter

forward for your support and kindness.

Mr. SOUDER. In your meeting with Secretary Richardson, did he

mention this letter to you?

Mr. MCCALLUM. Unfortunately, when I walked in the door, Congressman, he did mention it.

Mr. SOUDER. Can you describe that in any way that you are comfortable?

Mr. MCCALLUM. In front of this august body and rolling cameras,

he was rather angry. It was clear that he was disturbed by the letter. He held it in his hand and flipped it a couple of times and

made the comment that this letter doesn’t intimidate me. I play

basketball with these guys. This is, expletive deleted, and threw it

on the table.

Mr. SOUDER. What do you think that he meant by ‘‘I play basketball with these guys’’? How did you interpret that?

Mr. MCCALLUM. I understood that to mean I know these guys.

I have worked with them and they will play ball with me, and stay

away from the Congress.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you think that that was just bravado or do you

think that anything happened as a result?

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Mr. MCCALLUM. I think it was some bravado. But it was clear

that the Secretary went to the PFIAB and although I was scheduled to testify, my testimony was then delayed and ultimately I did

not appear before the PFIAB. As some of you may know, Congressman Bliley was scheduled to hold hearings on the security at the

Department of Energy last month, and 2 days before the hearings,

based on a visit by the Secretary of Energy, he first delayed and

then canceled the hearings. So I believe the Secretary has had

some impact in the halls of Congress.

Mr. SOUDER. Well, one of my frustrations is that when many of

us in Congress feel something very deeply, and one of the frustrations that we have in this committee, we have seen a lack of responsiveness. And I don’t know Secretary Richardson well, but he

seems like a decent guy, and I don’t play basketball so I have not

been heavily influenced by that. I understand that this is very difficult, but I think it is outrageous to treat a letter from Congress

in this way, including not being responsive to the letter.

I wanted to ask the chairman, I understand that you have a letter also that you have sent to the Energy Secretary, and I wonder

if you have received any response?

Mr. BURTON. We sent a letter to the Secretary after a meeting

we held in my office, during which he tried to discourage this committee from holding a hearing in very strong terms. The letter has

not been responded to, nor has the subpoena we sent to him regarding Lieutenant Colonel McCallum’s employment record, and I

think that is unfortunate and we intend to pursue that, Mr.

Souder.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. I thank the chairman.

One of my frustrations, and anyone watching this hearing has to

feel it is surreal. On the one hand we are trying to talk about how

to apply whistleblowing protections to patriots and people who are

calling attention to these problems, and that is the immediate need

we have in this country. But meanwhile, what we seem to have

seen is nuclear secrets getting into the hands of our enemies, both

through overt spying and through technology transfers, and we are

sitting here holding hearings on trying to get into defending Americans who try to call attention to that who then get punished. Talk

about the world being turned upside down. I understand that there

can be disagreements, and I understand the pressures that are

brought to bear to many Members of Congress, and we feel pressures from supporters and companies back home, but to see memos

being forced to change.

In my second round I would like to get into who some of these

people were, and how we get into that question and the process because I think that the deeply disturbing thing is that it appears to

me that the reactions to the secrets going out has rather been to

punish the people who were trying to warn and do something about

it rather than getting into the problem that we have compromised

our national security. I think this is outrageous, and I thank you

for your willingness to come forward today.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Souder. Mr. Ose.

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Leitner, I want to make sure I understand the surge you

highlighted in your testimony about the computer issues. If I understand the current export regime, we have a limitation of so

many MTOPS on what kind of equipment we can send overseas.

And over time, the cap, if you will, has increased and it is either

currently at 2,000 or it is proposed to go to 2,000 MTOPS, the rationale being that you can acquire that kind of capacity overseas

at present anyway.

Then there is a discussion as to whether or not to take the regime to 7,000 MTOP level at present.

If I understand the Cox report, and the reason that I am asking

this question, I want to understand why the administration

would—or the Department of Energy would, if you will, attempt to

interfere here, with its personnel and what have you. If I understand correctly from the Cox report, the capacity to do theoretical

projections on nuclear weapons is in large degree a function of the

level of MTOPS that you have available in your computer, that

being that the lower the level, the more inaccurate or unreliable

the projections from an analysis within a projected outcome?

Dr. LEITNER. Well, MTOPS is a predictor of more than anything

else speed, not capability in terms of analytical capability. Very

often apples and oranges get mixed up.

You have to wait longer for your answer to a complex problem

with a slower computer, but over the years we have heard justification for allowing more powerful computers to be exported as, one,

they can’t really use them for nuclear simulation and modeling because you need to have real test data or accurate test data.

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Unfortunately, as Lieutenant Colonel McCallum and as Notra

Trulock have reported, and the Cox committee has reported, that

a lot of test data appears to have walked from our own labs.

So when you combine the effect of higher speed computers, higher capability computers with actual real live test data, such as that

stolen by the Chinese and you have an extremely deadly combination. You have the ability to leap frog generations of development

trial and error and come up with virtual simulation of nuclear tests

which helps advance a nuclear proliferation program, help them

develop special effects weapons, et cetera.

Mr. OSE. At some level of speed you can use a two-dimensional

analysis of the projected outcomes, which is relatively inaccurate

compared to three-dimensional analysis above that level, and that

is where the debate occurs, if I understand the Cox report, as to

where that level is at present.

Dr. LEITNER. That is one of the arguments made, but that debate

very often becomes an arcane debate which is intended to create

smoke and mirrors basically. Yes, a three-dimensional model will

yield better, more informative results than a two-dimensional

model. That goes without saying. But how much of that relates to

the actual MTOPS, the processing power, is another story. It is like

looking at an oscilloscope and saying a 2 gigahertz oscilloscope will

really give you some neat test results if you can capture the data

using that sort of device.

But for nuclear test results, 500 megahertz is all you need to

really engage in nuclear testing and analyze the results of nuclear

testing. Two gigahertz is very important but more for telecommunications, fiberoptic, C3I, and satellite communications. It does give

the value added for nuclear testing, no doubt about it, but it is not

essential.

So the lines that get drawn and the arguments that get made are

convenient. They shift like the sands of the Sahara depending on

the political needs of the people making the arguments, and they

are almost always unreliable.

Mr. OSE. One of the points of your testimony is the aggregate impact of the piecemeal transfer, that being you send this piece here

and then they put it together with a piece over here, and all of a

sudden they bring the pieces together and we are no longer three,

four, five generations ahead of them, their equipment becomes comparable to ours.

Was that the substance of your point to leadership that we were

allowing our export in aggregate to develop the technology that

would make them the equivalent of ours?

Dr. LEITNER. Yes, sir, it was.

When I authored that memo attached to my written statement

in 1990, I was basically illustrating that the particular metric that

was being used is not a metric at all but it is a phrase called the

gap closer. You look at these individual technologies, transducers,

resistors, all kinds of A to D converters, they were trying to adjudicate whether or not the decontrol of this particular item, would

have gap closing potential between us and whomever ‘‘them’’ happens to be in the future. The answer almost invariably will be no.

There is no one separate component that is going to make a revolutionary difference. The aggregation of various advances in various

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fields that get integrated at the systems level is what I was showing in that chart that was so violently received when I offered it.

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Ose, for your patience. Did Ms.

Schakowsky leave?

Mrs. Chenoweth.

Mrs. CHENOWETH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I sit here and

listen to your testimony, I am absolutely astounded that we have

Americans like you who are willing to place your personal safety,

your career, and your future in harm’s way to protect my generation, my children, and my grandchildren. I cannot tell you how

deeply grateful I am to you. And I do know how difficult this hearing is for you. But from the bottom of my heart, thank you so

much. And I know that when the chairman says that he will not

be kind and will be protective with regards to any further retaliation, I know he means it and I am sure that this body stands

united behind that position.

Dr. Leitner, I wanted to ask you, you made a very troubling allegation that on one occasion your supervisors actually changed your

technical analysis license position from denial to either no position

or approval. And in the case of the Russian supercomputers being

approved for exports to two known nuclear design facilities, how

did you find out about this?

Dr. LEITNER. It was purely fortuitous. I knew that this position

would be important. They were very important cases and I put in

my position before leaving. I was taking my family to Disneyland

on vacation, which is pretty appropriate given what happened.

And then, when I came back, I decided to just look into the status of those cases. I almost never do that because you get too many

cases to go back and audit the results. Plus I was just curious, I

wasn’t looking for anything. I wouldn’t imagine that somebody

would simply change my position and make it appear as if I entered that position.

When I got back from vacation I opened up the computer and I

looked in there. I was just astounded to find out that it was not

the position that I authored. Before leaving on vacation, I did print

out copies of the position that I put in. And then I forwarded that

along with the revised new position still bearing my name to my

chain of command complaining and demanding an investigation.

I think the data base is corrupt, and God knows how many other

times the same thing has happened. And you wouldn’t know until

something blows up and somebody is doing an after accident report, as happened with Iraq, when Congress subpoenaed thousands

of records of export licenses. Is there an audit trail and who approved what and why, and you have no evidence as the person

doing the position that you did otherwise other than what appears

in the electronic record because everything else is destroyed?

Mrs. CHENOWETH. Precisely what impact did the change have on

the outcome of this case?

Dr. LEITNER. Well, it was pretty funny what happened in a

macabre sort of way.

While the case was still hanging around and a formal denial did

not go out, it was revealed by Gary Mulhollin from the Wisconsin

Project on Nuclear Export Controls that there was a diversion of

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several computers to those same facilities, that they were illegally

acquired in the hiatus between the time I issued my denial and the

case was still languishing. In the meantime, there was a diversion

of computers to Russia right to those same facilities to engage in

nuclear design work. Sixteen of them I am informed by Mr. Maloof,

16 supercomputers, a national security disaster as far as I am concerned.

Mrs. CHENOWETH. Doctor, I wanted to ask you about the McDonnell Douglas machine tools case, which is also very alarming to me.

These tools are the very tools that produce the C–17 military

planes, and you stated that your supervisor actually ordered you to

change your position of denial to an approval because a decision,

apparently from higher up, had been made to approve the case.

Now, did you draft an approval position? Do you know who ordered the approval of this case? Third, who do you think ordered

it?

Dr. LEITNER. I never wrote the approval conditions. I wrote the

three or four page single spaced denial position on the case. Michael Maloof and I worked very closely together on this case and

we were able to find out that the end user that it was alleged that

these machine tools would be going to never existed. We even had

the National Photographic Intelligence Center put together a briefing showing how, during the course of the whole odyssey when the

Chinese were trying to pressure McDonnell Douglas and intimidate

them into providing this facility, there was actually no activity at

the location where these machines were allegedly going to go to,

but instead at a cruise missile factory, there was a new wing being

built, and holes were being dug to receive the machine tools. The

machines eventually were diverted, some of them directly, to that

cruise missile factory.

I was ordered to change my position. I refused to do it. I said

there is no way I am going to do that. The case was taken away

from me, and my supervisor at the time went ahead and put in a

position of approval saying that he was being instructed to. The instructions to my knowledge came from—the chain of command at

the time was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterproliferation, Mitchell Wallerstein, David Tarbell, the Director of

DTSA at the time, and his Deputy, Peter Sullivan. And following

below that, it was either Mike Richey or Jim Woody, the Director

of Licensing, but I don’t remember when they—who was in charge

at that particular moment. One succeeded the other.

As for the real reason for it, I would rather not venture a guess.

I have plenty of theories.

Mrs. CHENOWETH. Thank you, doctor. Mr. Chairman, I see my

time is up, but we will be having a second round of questions.

Mr. BURTON. We will, I know that this is extremely important

what we are hearing today. I would like to tell the Members that

after this panel, we are going to go into a closed door session in

a cleared room for the last person because we are going to have

some classified material. The only people that will be allowed in

that room are Members and staff cleared for top secret.

Mrs. Morella.

Mrs. MORELLA. Thank you, gentlemen, I appreciated your courage and patriotism. I represent a great number of Federal employVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:27 May 24, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00176 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\62262 pfrm06 PsN: 62262
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ees and retirees, and I feel strongly about civil service and how

paramount it is to a good democracy. And I was one of the cosponsors of the Whistleblower Protection Act in 1989 and then the enhanced amendment in 1994.

It just seems to me from what I have read and what I have

heard that it obviously is not working for you. I know that I have

had a recommendation, I think it was Congressman Weldon said

we should do something about it. I want to ask you what we should

do about it.

Is it in your view that we should come out with a piece of legislation that will deal with people in high security to make sure that

they are given the whistleblower protections that they deserve?

Anything else that you think that this Congress can do? My attitude is, what are we going to do about the future? We can go back

and look at the past, but we need to learn from it. I know that this

committee agrees that we want to move ahead and see what we

can do.

The second point, this morning I was chairing a hearing of the

Technology Subcommittee of the Science Committee, and it is interesting, we were discussing what was happening with our security

websites in terms of computer security. And as I am looking at the

reports here, I am noticing that Colonel McCallum, in your testimony, you talk about some of the very things that came out this

morning in our hearing dealing with the concept of computer security. The lament we heard was basically there is no implementation. We can have some policies and we can say agencies should do

this and do that, but there is no implementation and there is that

element of anonymity there which is a real barrier to being able

to follow through. So I am wondering, I feel we should do more

with regard to making sure that agencies, certainly the high security agencies, should have more of a responsibility for implementing the guidelines and the regulations we have.

If you have some suggestions to offer to us at this time and then

maybe later, I would appreciate it. So if you would respond to what

our role can be in computer security and making sure that whistleblower protection is protection and protects all of our people, particularly people in your high security situation, I would value it.

Whoever wants to start.

Mr. MCCALLUM. I can kick it off since I raised the computer security issue. We struggled in the Department of Energy for years

with the separation of classified and unclassified computer systems. I think as far as I know, at least within the Department of

Energy, our high security computer systems have not been penetrated by hackers or others. But with the growth of personal computers and office LANs, networks, and WANs, a different set of

issues developed.

In the eighties the—the National Institute for Science and Technology developed a set of—and it may have been before their name

changed, a set of criteria to provide what I would call prudent business security, the kinds of things that you see banks and the people who have to transfer money implement.

In most of our Federal agencies those programs which have been

required to implement these standards over the years have not

bothered. In the early years, there was some attempt to use the

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budget to assure implementation. Unless you had adequate security plans and elements in place, you couldn’t buy new computers.

Oversight went away over time. When you look at our national laboratories, you find very poor security practices on what is called

unclassified but sensitive material. We have seen in the Department of Energy that it is very easy to take classified material and

walk it across the hall and put it on unclassified systems. Some of

the proposals that we made in the 1995 timeframe included some

simple tasks like the use of different size floppy disks between your

classified and unclassified systems so somebody can’t just avoid the

security practice. There are very simple implementation tools, but

how do we make our laboratories or agencies use them?

One of the levers might be the budget. If you don’t have at least

some kind of a process to review these kinds of things and some

kind of an oversight process, maybe the budget gets hit. I don’t

think that people in this town pay much attention to things other

than budgets, at the implementation level is what I mean.

Another area is the whistleblower protection issue. I was rather

astounded to find that all of the things that we had learned about

people bringing forward problems, and I was very familiar with

these since Secretary O’Leary raised the flag and called whistleblowers in to the table during her reign at the Department of Energy, but I was astounded to find that there is a serious loophole

in the protection system. The Merit Systems Protection Board is—

in some circumstances unable to look at cases where people have

done their job, but an agency can pull a thin guise of national security to halt the process. That is what I meant by national security

metric. It does not necessarily have to be there but they have the

trump card. There should be an impartial third party, an institution, that has the authority to look at these cases. No single organization should be able to by personal or political whim crush ‘‘due

process’’ for any citizen of this country.

Mrs. MORELLA. I think it was again Dr. Leitner’s testimony

where he talks about the IG. I have always felt that IGs should be

involved in this process of ameliorating concerns. If anybody wants

to address that. Mr. Maloof.

Mr. MALOOF. I also raise the IG issue because Leitner and I went

up at the same time, and we were asked and invited.

Mrs. MORELLA. That was in your testimony, right.

Mr. MALOOF. I know your time has just run out, but three recommendations. The ombudsman idea not only for the IG, but also

a mechanism by which people with clearances can go to members

or to staff who are appropriately cleared with proper information

if our system refuses to act on it or is in some way ignoring it. I

think that there is a problem here, that members are not being informed adequately or in a timely way.

Last, curiously, we could not get the Department to give us legal

representation if we sought it, even though we were brought up

here in our official capacity. They represent the Department, they

have made that clear, and I think we may need a mechanism to

allow for representation if under these kinds of unusual circumstances we are invited or subpoenaed up and we request representation, that there is a mechanism to do that.

Thank you.

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Mr. FOX. Ma’am, I would just bring up three points quickly. As

an attorney, nothing breeds personal responsibility like three little

sentences. Personal liability, punitive liability, and mandatory

criminal sentences. I honestly believe that the Whistleblower Act

cannot become effective until you have those types of penalties

made applicable against those who direct retaliation against government individuals, against government officials and public servants who tell the truth. Those three elements.

Mrs. MORELLA. Personal liability?

Mr. FOX. Personal liability. Personal liability where retribution is

shown to be directed by a specific individual. Punitive liability in

some significant multiple of damages suffered. And finally, mandatory criminal sentences. That is a violation. Retribution is a violation of the public trust that we are all sworn to uphold. And where

it effects national security, I contend that mandatory criminal sentences are nothing less than totally appropriate.

Thank you, ma’am.

Mr. BURTON. I thank the gentlewoman. I will now take my time.

First of all, let me say that I have a granddaughter and a grandson, and what I have heard so far today really causes a knot in my

stomach. We found out about Wen Ho Lee, the alleged espionage

person at Los Alamos who was left there for some time, and the

technology transfer. According to many scientists, it was so bad

that the Rosenberg espionage pales in comparison, and yet it appears that the American people do not seem to be that concerned

about it. We all say the cold war is over.

The fact is, we have a monolithic army in China that now has

all of this nuclear technology that we have spent trillions of dollars

developing, and they have the computers and all of the other things

necessary to implement these things and we don’t know how long

it will take. At the very least, that entire part of the world is at

risk and possibly the entire world. We don’t know what the future

holds.

And then we hear from people like Lieutenant Colonel McCallum

that at our nuclear laboratories the security has been cut. The

budget has been cut by as much as 40 percent, that in certain

areas the number of personnel that is supposed to be there to protect the laboratories and protect the supplies has been cut, and the

documents that people use, the passes that people use, the three

colors that they use to get into different facilities was combined

into one so that the people in charge of security cannot tell who is

going in and out.

And then we find out that—from Dr. Leitner that he comes back

from Disney World or Disneyland and he finds that his computer

has been tampered with and that a report that he has done has

been changed 180 degrees. And then, you know, we hear him being

questioned about whether or not he is paranoid about his superiors.

The fact is, as I understand it, your classification was reduced

from five to four about a year before this alleged document was in

your desk and you brought it to their attention when they tried to

pin some kind of security leak on you. So they were already giving

you a hard time before that ever took place. And the only way that

could have taken place in the first place was if you were a security

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risk and they could prove it. I don’t think that that was the case

when they lowered you from class five to class four, was it?

Dr. LEITNER. No, sir.

Mr. BURTON. And Mr. Fox, I read this memo from Dr. Leitner,

and I am going to read just a little bit of it.

Mr. Fox wrote his report. After the report was sent, he was evidently talking to Dr. Leitner and Dr. Leitner records that upon returning, they were having a meeting, upon returning about 15 minutes later Mr. Fox was visibly shaken. He asked what was wrong

and they went into the hallway to confer. He said he was just ordered by Johnson, that is Mike Johnson of OSD and PP, he said

he was just ordered by Johnson to completely rewrite his memo

from one stating that China was a nuclear proliferant to one stating that they were not, a 180 degree reversal. Mr. Fox related in

great detail how he explained to Johnson that such a change would

be false and dishonest. At that point Fox stated Johnson threatened to have him fired unless he made the changes. He said that

Johnson’s manner was very aggressive, abusive, and threatening.

Mr. Fox was quite upset about being blindsided like this. He said

that he cannot afford to lose his job, his family is very dependent

upon him and his income, and he didn’t know what to do. And so

he did what he had to do, he changed the document.

My gosh, we are talking about the security of the United States

of America. And just because a foreign leader is coming over here,

whose country has been involved in espionage at Los Alamos and

Livermore and elsewhere, and because we want to keep trade going

on with him, we start mandating from higher ups, from way above

Mr. Fox’s pay grade, Mr. Johnson, who said that we have to change

the document and lie to the American people and lie to his superiors. The other people who will be reading this document have to

lie about whether or not the Chinese are entitled to more nuclear

technology because they are a nonproliferator, and of course we

know that is not the case. That just boggles my mind. You know,

some people might say you fellows all have an ax to grind and the

gentleman that is going to go into the classified briefing has an ax

to grind, but you are not all together. You are not covering each

other’s backside. By virtue of the fact that you are coming from different areas and different perspectives, it lends more credence to

what you are saying. We have a whole host of people that we are

going to be interviewing who have been held up to ridicule, who

have been penalized because they suffered similar things like you

have. I can tell you that we are not going to let this rest.

The last thing I would like to say before I ask any questions, if

I have any time left, is that the Secretary of Energy, whom I did

play basketball with, and I used to beat him occasionally, Mr. Richardson, when he holds up a letter and says, hey, these guys are

friends of mine and I play basketball with them and this letter

doesn’t mean blank, I want you to know that letter did mean

blank. It meant a lot. And while I have high regard for Mr. Richardson, he went over to Iraq and got our prisoners out of there and

I think he has done some commendable things. But when he came

into my office and indicated that Colonel McCallum was going to

be fired or demoted or reassigned, and tried to persuade me that

we could not hold this hearing under any circumstances, and then

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he and his people went to the Speaker of the House and went to

the majority leader and the majority whip and tried to convince

them that we should not have this hearing, I think that is going

beyond the pale. I am very disappointed in his lack of cooperation

with this committee and his trying to stop this hearing and impede

the congressional process. Now we sent a subpoena to him, as I

stated earlier, and he has not complied with the subpoena and he

has not responded to my letter. He has not responded to Mr.

Souder’s letter. In fact, he is just plain ignoring the Congress of the

United States and this oversight committee. I intend to ask him to

testify before this committee, along with some of the other people,

about some of the things that have happened and we will be doing

that in the near future.

I would like to have from you, gentlemen, before you leave or at

your convenience, I would like to have a list of the people that can

corroborate what you have told us here today, or other people who

may have suffered the same kinds of problems in these various

agencies, particularly the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense. We will investigate those people as well and we

will have them talk to our attorneys so that we can get to the bottom of this because there should be no person in a top secret position in this country, especially where our national security is involved, that is afraid to talk about violations of security.

Every man, woman, and child depends upon all of you and people

like you out there to make sure that our secrets are not given to

potential adversaries where they can use them at some point in the

future to blackmail us and endanger the lives of the people that we

are supposed to represent. I would like to have that information

from you and we want to pursue this. I will work with Connie

Morella to make sure that the whistleblower statute is enhanced

so that there will be protections.

I also don’t believe that you ought to be able to come up here and

be denied legal counsel. If you are coming up here at the request

or subpoena of the Congress of the United States, you should not

have to, out of your own pocket, hire legal counsel because you are

an employee of that agency and you are under a duly authorized

subpoena. I think you should be reimbursed for your legal fees if

you have any, and at the very least we are going to make sure in

the future that you don’t have to deal with that kind of a problem

because we are going to move for legislation to deal with that.

Does anybody seek to have any more of my time?

Mr. SOUDER. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Souder, I yield to you.

Mr. SOUDER. I hope that we can work with the DOE for some

sort of protection. If these gentlemen identify other members of the

anti-Communist cells, it is almost like the early fifties backward.

If people are willing to come forward, that they get some protection

and they are not also singled out because we don’t want to identify

the anti-Communist cells and have them bashed.

Mr. BURTON. Let me ask one question. Mr. Maloof, you referred

to front companies?

Mr. MALOOF. Yes.

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Mr. BURTON. Could you tell us about any front companies that

you are aware of or where they have been used to transmit information or material to a foreign entity or government?

Mr. MALOOF. I think the identity of many of the companies is

something that we can handle in a classified session. Generally

speaking, if a product cannot be obtained legally through a licensing process, it has been my experience to find that that item then

is sought piecemeal or in entire form as part of an indigenous

weapons development program. They may be going through Asia,

Europe, or a combination of countries.

Mr. BURTON. If some of that information is classified, I would

like to officially request it, and we will do that in closed meetings

and we will get together with Mr. Waxman so we have the minority there as well.

Mrs. Morella.

Mrs. MORELLA. Dr. Leitner didn’t have an opportunity to answer

before, and I want to give you that opportunity.

Dr. LEITNER. Thank you. I appreciate that.

One of the things I really recommend be read, since you mentioned the issue of implementation, and how things fail in implementation, is an excellent book written by Abraham Wildovsky entitled, ‘‘Implementation.’’ The whole point of the book is that policy

statements notwithstanding, political statements notwithstanding,

the actual policy is seen in its implementation. If you want to see

what the real policy is, look at what has been implemented because

what is on the ground is what the real policy is. It is a great book,

and I recommend it to any student of political science to read.

One of the things I really would hope that would come out of this

in terms of a regulatory fix that at a minimum, would make the

agencies follow their own rules. We have the example of Lieutenant

Colonel McCallum being victimized by an agency which at its own

discretion applies rules when it suits them.

The same thing is true in the Department of Defense. I have had

the same experience of trying to go through the process of a grievance on an issue, a personnel issue, and find that the entire system

is loaded in terms of protecting management. The individual employee has virtually no rights. The personnel office is generally

there to support management and they tell you this. You ask the

personnel office, will you represent me in this quest for this grievance on this personnel issue, they say we can’t do anything for you

because we are here to represent management. They tell you this

in an unabashed way, and you have no where else to go, even for

an interpretation of the rules. Deadlines, drop dead dates on grievances are strictly enforced when it comes to the complainant. Yet

for the agency, who is the perpetrator of whatever the onerous action is, they give themselves extensions and all kinds of time while

consistently missing their deadlines and the case is not dismissed.

It has been my experience on EEO complaints, on political complaints, or administrative complaints, that the appeals process or

the grievance process is more akin to a gauntlet which an employee

has to run and it is never ending. The people at the beginning of

the line you are going through move around to the end of the line,

and the end never appears. You never see the end of the tunnel.

It is designed, in our collective impression, to enervate the comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:27 May 24, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00182 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\62262 pfrm06 PsN: 62262
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plainant to the point where there is no life left in them if they ever

get to the end of process. I think that is a real problem.

Also, if it can be fixed so that the Office of Special Counsel can

operate and react faster, that would be a great boon because right

now they move in what can be approximated as geologic timeframes. By the time your complainant actually starts getting investigated, you have retired or been fired or so beaten down that you

are compliant.

So I think in a practical sense these fixes really need to be made

because on the ground again where policy really is and its implementation, it is very different than the public statements of the executive branch.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you.

Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. I want to say that I am struck at this hearing by

the differences I see in Lieutenant Colonel McCallum’s case and

that which is presented to us by Dr. Leitner and Mr. Maloof and

Mr. Fox. In Mr. McCallum’s case, I think he was treated unfairly.

I don’t know what the motivation was behind that, but the result

is that he has had to pay a price, and the procedures just were not

followed which put him in the position that he is in today, which

is that he is getting paid, but he is not allowed to do his job. But

the other three are all working. They are all at their jobs. They are

all there. They have not seen any actual consequences from the retaliation except failure to get promotions, failure to get bonuses.

Those are real consequences, but I have to say that I don’t think

from what I have heard today that I am convinced that there was

a wrong done to them. Maybe there was, but I am not convinced

of it as I am that there was to Mr. McCallum.

Dr. Leitner, he was critical of the Bush administration and his

supervisor was very, very strong in his statements calling him a

zealot, and he was asked by his superiors not to work on a particular case so he is off on 60 Minutes and making other appearances, criticizing his agency. I don’t know how a Department is

supposed to work when you have people within a Department, once

a decision is made by those in charge of policy, making critical

statements in the public media and then asking, why was I passed

over for a bonus when I call the people that I work with to such

criticism.

I must say, Mr. Fox, I can’t believe that part of your memo

where you talk about your view of Communist China is a technical

analysis. Maybe if we discuss it further I can come to that point.

I know that you all want personal responsibilities, but one of the

things that this committee ought to look into is how is a Department supposed to run. If somebody on my staff had a policy disagreement with me and then went on 60 Minutes and said the reason that I voted the way that I did was because of a campaign contribution or whatever, we would fire them. No one seems to get

fired for all of these criticisms of what the Department is supposed

to do.

On the other hand, we want to make sure that the people who

are whistleblowers and have different information to give us have

the opportunity to do it.

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Mr. McCallum, I think you are in a completely different category.

Maybe the others are in your situation, but I am not convinced as

I am in your case. I think the Secretary did you a disservice. I am

going to talk to him personally, and I want to find out whether he

reacted in retaliation or whether it was an overreaction on his part

because of other things that were going on. But I think he did a

disservice to you and I want to express that to you and express my

sincere regret over the situation you face.

I don’t think that all these witnesses ought to be lumped together, and I don’t think that the case has been made to do that.

Dr. Leitner, Mr. Maloof, and Mr. Fox all have very strongly held

views. And they weren’t the views of their superiors, and they were

doing things that might not have been their jobs, but they are all

still there. They are all still working, and maybe that is one of the

great things about this country. If you went to Communist China

or Russia, dissenters are treated not with the kind of sensitivity

that we have in this Nation.

Mr. FOX. Mr. Chairman, may I have the opportunity to respond

to the honorable Mr. Waxman’s comment?

Mr. WAXMAN. I didn’t ask you a question, but please go ahead.

Mr. FOX. Is this an appropriate time now, sir? Sir, with all due

respect I believe your comments particularly pertaining to my presence here today are somewhat of a serious mischaracterization, and

I would like the opportunity to explain this.

First of all, sir, please let me explain that the format I established for the review of the subsequent arrangements was utilized

before and after this situation and this was the only time where

Mr. Johnson and I had a disagreement to the point where it was

demanded that a rewrite take place.

Over 400 reviews, sir, I reviewed state action and the history of

state adherence to existing agreements on behalf of a dozen countries, and there was no objection on the part of the Department of

Defense.

In particular, sir, I went through my records yesterday and I

pulled out some illustrative reviews. On May 28, 1997, I reviewed

state action as part of an export to Armenia, an export I recommended approval of, safe and secure nuclear generative technology to replace deteriorating Russian nuclear reactors. And I considered Armenia’s state action in that case. On August 18, 1997,

I did that again. On September 11, 1997, I did——

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Fox, the red light has come on. I have listened

to you and I am open to being convinced otherwise. I am not of the

mind after hearing all of this testimony that you or Mr. Maloof or

Dr. Leitner are in the same category as Mr. McCallum.

Mr. FOX. On February 22, 1999, I was officially prohibited from

any further involvement in the export control area by Mr. David

Tarbell, who was formerly the head of the Defense Technology Security Administration and is now Deputy Director of the Defense

Threat Reduction Agency, Technology Security Directorate. I was

specifically prohibited from any further involvement in that area,

either by employment or detail on the basis of his determination.

Mr. BURTON. I yield to Mr. Souder. I would like to have those

documents submitted for the record so we can show the consistency

of your reports, No. 1.

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Mr. FOX. I will be more than happy to, but yesterday I was informed that the request will have to be made through the DOD’s

General Counsel office.

Mr. BURTON. Then we will make it through the General Counsel’s office, but we would like those so we can show the consistency.

You have been discriminated against because of the report that

you wrote, where you were told by higher ups that you had to

change it 180 degrees. And because you did your job, and you were

ordered to change it because you might be fired if you didn’t, thereby giving a false impression to this country about the security of

the country and about the proliferation of nuclear weapons by the

Chinese Communists and they are Communists, then you were penalized. And I don’t see how that differs a great deal from some

of the others.

Dr. Leitner, of course, came back and had his computer tampered

with and his report was changed. That is just one case.

I think we will have other people up here following the same line

of questioning in the future and we will have people from the Department of Energy up here and the Department of Defense to explain why these things happened. Mr. Souder.

Mr. SOUDER. I want to thank Mr. Waxman about his willingness

to go to the Secretary about Mr. McCallum’s case. I also insert in

the record support for his position from the various unions of government workers because I believe—because he has been placed on

leave, there is a difference in the cases in my opinion, at least the

level of the administration overreaction.

Mr. BURTON. Without objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. I did want to make an additional comment on Mr.

Fox’s case because the ranking member read some of the memo

and I wanted to put a little bit of context on your memo as I understand it.

In the first part of your memo that was labeled ‘‘keep,’’ you basically say it is a fairly straightforward—I think your exact words

are relatively simple and direct. United States and China will be

afforded annual opportunities to send technical experts to each other’s civil reactor sites.

Then there was the section that Mr. Waxman read where you

made a very passionate case about marxism which arguably was

not technical and I say as a passionate anti-marxist it is not technical, but it sets up in your second to last paragraph you close

with, ‘‘Accordingly, unless there exists definite meaningful

verification provisions and grafted upon this diplomatic agreement,

there is no practical way of determining or enforcing adherences to

the admittedly peaceful goals enumerated within the proposed reciprocal agreement.’’

Backing up one paragraph from there, in other words, all of

these other paragraphs were predicates to your final conclusion

which said, while the agreement looks innocuous, it in fact has to

be put in context. You say, in short, we have negotiated a technical

exchange agreement concerning critical nuclear technology with an

aggressive and ambitious proliferant state unrestrained by political

or moral considerations and which discards diplomatic undertakings with studied regularity. Ambiguities and disagreements

under this proposed reciprocal arrangement are by its very terms

to be resolved by diplomatic means. Therefore, establishing why

you have concerns about their ability to follow through unless, in

your second to last paragraph, there are meaningful verification

provisions, what you are in effect saying in the first part of your

memo, while this looks innocuous it in fact is not, and to your concerns which you articulated which can be disagreed about, but it

does relate to the substance of your memo which says there must

be verification.

Mr. FOX. Coming from an arms control background, I pay particular consideration to the verifiability and the credibility of an

agreement, particularly in this instance where we are talking

about the sole verifiability and the sole guarantee of the nondiversion of peaceful, dual use technology and expertise to military purposes is bare bones diplomatic representation.

Mr. SOUDER. Because you can’t make an analysis about the technology, the technical parts, unless there is a verification and in fact

if you just made the assertion at the end, they would have probably

said why did you make that assertion?

Mr. FOX. Absolutely. I knew the seriousness of what I was doing

and I tried to back up as much as I could. Unfortunately this is

concerning intangible technology, the exchange of technical visits.

How do you quantify that? How do you quantify the

unquantifiable? We spent a great deal of time in Vienna exploring

that when I was the DOD representative to the Nuclear Suppliers

Group. How do you regulate expertise? That is where you cross

that fine line from purely technical considerations into technical

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considerations that view things in the context of reality, of real politics. You cannot consider these things in a vacuum.

Mr. SOUDER. And you have disagreements about technical

verification, but you shouldn’t be subject to threatening, firing, or

have a long-term impact occur.

Mr. FOX. This was the only time that this happened. Subsequently and before it never bothered anybody, and subsequently I

was indeed elevated to represent DOD overseas for a year until relieved by my agency’s reorganization. I ended up serving the Department of Defense as DOD representative to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zanger Advisory Committee to the International

Atomic Energy Agency until subsequently relieved.

Mr. SOUDER. I thank the chairman for yielding.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. Fox, early on we looked at your memorandum and in your

memorandum you were told that you could keep certain parts, and

then there was a long line slashed out. Taking out basically half

of your memorandum and inserting in another document. It is your

testimony before this committee that what was taken out was your

determination that this agreement should not go forward and what

was inserted in was the statement that basically said it should go

forward; is that correct?

Mr. FOX. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. So when I read that according—in your memorandum unless there exists a definite meaningful verification provisions graft upon this diplomatic agreement, there is no practical

way of determining or forcing adherence to the admittedly peaceful

goals enumerated within the agreement. Without such bilateral undertakings or unilateral safeguards, the proposal measurement presents such a significant degree of risk as to be clearly inimicable

to the common defense and security. And what was inserted in was

the Defense Special Weapons Agency determines that the proposed

agreement is not inimicable to the common defense of security of

the United States?

Mr. FOX. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. So you came to one conclusion, and in the end you

were asked to come to a totally different conclusion. Whether or not

Mr. Waxman likes the supporting document or not, the fact is that

you came to a conclusion which you were asked to do; is that not

correct?

Mr. FOX. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Your job was to come to a conclusion and you did

your job?

Mr. FOX. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Did you like being the export control coordinator?

Mr. FOX. Even though it added approximately 20 hours a week

onto an already full workweek, I was very happy with the job.

Mr. SHAYS. You were relieved of those duties in October 1998

and transferred back to arms control. Why do you believe you were

relieved of that duty?

Mr. FOX. On October 1, 1998, the Defense Special Weapons

Agency was combined with several other agencies to form the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Prior to that time, several months

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previously, we were encountering significant concern over the retention of any export control responsibilities, particularly in the nuclear area, in our organization. And upon the establishment of the

Defense Threat Reduction Agency, it was determined by my senior

management of the agency that we would lose that mission.

I should point out, and I make no aspersion’s whatsoever, that

I had objected to several technology transfers on behalf of the

United States national labs to the Russian weapons labs and similar proposed transactions with the Chinese weapons labs and that

our present Director is an IPA from a national lab.

Mr. SHAYS. But it is your testimony that if you didn’t change

your memorandum, that you in fact would be fired?

Mr. FOX. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. So at the time you were told you better change it or

else?

Mr. FOX. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Leitner, it is my understanding that you wrote

a memo entitled, subject, China certifications events at the October

24, 1997 meeting, the Subcommittee on Nuclear Export Controls.

Can you put that up. Is that a memo that you in fact wrote?

Dr. LEITNER. Yes, sir.

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Mr. SHAYS. You wrote it to whom?

Dr. LEITNER. Basically for the record. I didn’t send it to anybody.

I wrote it in order to document the extraordinary event which occurred that day and as I was an eyewitness I knew that it would

someday have relevancy to the debate on China.

Mr. SHAYS. Do you have that in front of you?

Dr. LEITNER. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Would you read the last paragraph of page 1?

Dr. LEITNER [reads]:

Upon returning 15 minutes later, Mr. Fox was visibly shaken. I asked what was

wrong and we went to the hallway to confer. He said he was just ordered by Johnson to completely rewrite his memo from one stating that China was a nuclear

proliferant to one stating that they are not. 180 degree reversal. Mr. Fox related

in great deal how he explained to Johnson that such a change would be false and

dishonest. At that point Fox stated that Johnson threatened to have him fired unless he made the changes. He said that Johnson’s manner was very aggressive, abusive and threatening.

Mr. SHAYS. Would you read the next paragraph?

Dr. LEITNER [reads]:

Mr. Fox was quite upset about being blind sided like this. He said that he cannot

afford to lose his job and that his family was very dependent upon him and his income. He didn’t know what to do.

Mr. SHAYS. Why don’t we just stop there. The bottom line to it

is this was an event that you thought was serious enough to document and recall?

Dr. LEITNER. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Fox, have you seen this memo that Dr. Leitner

is referring to?

Mr. FOX. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Is the memo accurate?

Mr. FOX. It is accurate except in one regard. I want to emphasize

here that my immediate chain of command up through and including Dr. Charles Gallaway and up through and including Rear Admiral Jackie Allison Barnes, did not pressure me to change my

mind or opinion in this regard, and that they were all supportive

of me and have continued to be supportive of me. Other than that

respect, the memo was accurate.

Mr. SHAYS. So it wasn’t your immediate chain of command, it

was a bit higher than that, and that was?

Mr. FOX. It was whoever was above Mr. Johnson.

Mr. SHAYS. But Mr. Johnson relayed it?

Mr. FOX. Yes. He relayed it in a manner that indicated that he

was not comfortable doing so, but he did so.

Mr. SHAYS. The bottom line for me is that you are here because

we subpoenaed you. I haven’t seen you on 60 Minutes. You are a

new face to me.

Mr. FOX. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. I think each of you are different and have your own

experience. We can’t lump you all in one pile. You are human

beings and individuals, you are trying to make a living, and frankly you got screwed.

Mr. FOX. Yes, sir, I agree. I want to point out except for this subpoena, I have done everything possible to avoid bringing the disagreements within our organization to light.

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The only reason that I have gone outside of the Defense Threat

Reduction Agency and have pursued my complaints outside of that

is because I have been given no recourse within.

Mr. SHAYS. You owe no one an apology. We make decisions based

on what we think is best judgment, and then we in Congress make

determinations.

I happen to support trade with China, but I have to tell you I

am influenced by what you do, and I want what you do to be accurate.

Mr. FOX. Thank you very much. Sir, I only wish to establish that

for the record that I have no ax to grind.

Mr. SHAYS. Very good, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Horn.

Mr. HORN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple

of short questions, then I will get down to the more substantive

ones.

Mr. Maloof, in your written statement, you refer a number of

times to the front office. Just for the record, could you put the

names to who is the front office for you.

Mr. MALOOF. David Tarbell, the Director, Technology Security,

and his Deputy, Peter Sullivan.

Mr. HORN. You also noted that you visited the Inspector General’s office, and you were just sort of told to go away.

Mr. MALOOF. Yes, sir.

Mr. HORN. Who was telling you to go away?

Mr. MALOOF. I can get that for the record.

Mr. HORN. Get that for the record. Without objection, I would

like that for the record.

Mr. MALOOF. Yes, sir.

Mr. HORN. Now, did you ever have a chance to talk to the Inspector General herself?

Mr. MALOOF. No, sir.

Mr. HORN. OK. Let me ask all of you this question. Was there

a greater number of export licenses coming before you in one way

or the other between January and June 1996 than ordinary, just

computers I’m thinking of that, in terms of sales abroad that might

worry you one way or the other, was it out of proportion in that

period?

Mr. MALOOF. Are you asking me?

Mr. HORN. Yes, out of proportion from say 1995’s export licensing

going through you for computers.

Mr. MALOOF. It depended—well, given the level that was subsequently required by the Defense Authorization Act, we did not see

those computers between the 2,000–7,000 MTOP range, we had no

notification. When the legislation was passed, I believe in 1996, we

then began at least to get a notification, but for the most part,

many of the computers that were going principally to China were

not coming through the licensing process whatsoever.

Mr. HORN. So you didn’t see anything unusual, that happened to

be a Presidential election year, and I’m just curious if that changed

things in any way. So you’re saying you didn’t really see much

change in the request for computers being sold abroad.

Mr. MALOOF. Well, that’s different. There were always computers

at lower thresholds that were coming through, but the higher level

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ones, particularly to China, were not seen until the defense authorization act required notification.

Mr. HORN. And when did that take effect?

Mr. MALOOF. It was fiscal year 1998 I believe.

Mr. HORN. OK. You’re familiar probably with this report. I don’t

know if you’ve had a chance to read it, but the Special Investigative Panel of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,

otherwise known as the Rudman report, entitled, ‘‘Science at Its

Best, Security at Its Worst.’’ I don’t know if you’ve a chance to look

at it. But I want to read a few things into the record that the Senator and his three colleagues have said: ‘‘After review of more than

700 reports and studies, thousands of pages of classified and unclassified source documents, interviews with scores of senior Federal officials and visits to several of the DOE laboratories at the

heart of this inquiry, the special investigative panel has concluded

the Department of Energy is incapable of reforming itself bureaucratically and culturally in a lasting way, even under an act of the

Secretary.’’ A note on page 4 of the foreword, ‘‘Our panel has concluded that the Department of Energy when faced with a profound

public responsibility has failed.’’

On page 5, ‘‘Meanwhile the Department of Energy with its decentralized structure confusing matrix of crosscutting and overlapping

management and shoddy record of accountability has advanced scientific and technical progress, but at the cost of an abominable

record of security, with deeply troubling threats to American national security.’’

And I would like to ask, Colonel McCallum, were you ever asked

to appear before that panel?

Mr. MCCALLUM. Yes, Congressman Horn, I was asked. I believe

on April 16th.

Mr. HORN. Yes. As I understand it, you were contacted by the executive director of that panel, Randy Deitering; is that correct?

Mr. MCCALLUM. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. HORN. Now, as I understand it, you were even scheduled to

testify on April 22; is that correct?

Mr. MCCALLUM. That’s correct.

Mr. HORN. And then by e-mail you notified Mr., is it pronounced,

Mahaley.

Mr. MCCALLUM. Joseph Mahaley.

Mr. HORN. He’s the Director of the Office of Security Affairs. And

you notified him about the request from the Rudman panel?

Mr. MCCALLUM. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. HORN. Did you get any response from him?

Mr. MCCALLUM. I did not.

Mr. HORN. Did you attend that meeting?

Mr. MCCALLUM. No, I did not, sir. I was placed on administrative

leave the following Monday. I was called by Mr. Mahaley the next

day and asked to delay my appearance in front of Senator Rudman’s panel until after the Secretary had a chance to speak with

them. I advised Mr. Mahaley that I thought that if the Secretary

wanted to appear before me it would be appropriate for the Department to ask that question. Mr. Deitering called me back the next

day, asked to delay my meeting with them, and he would call me

and reschedule. I haven’t heard from him since.

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Mr. HORN. He didn’t give you any reason why you should be delayed?

Mr. MCCALLUM. He said they were behind. He said that there

was the 50-year NATO celebration, and they had a number of people to speak to. He said he would call me back when they rescheduled.

Mr. HORN. Now how about Mr. Mahaley, did he call you again?

Mr. MCCALLUM. He did not, sir.

Mr. HORN. As I understand, he called you again around April

20th, and he asked you then what? This is the point where you

might appear before the Rudman panel.

Mr. MCCALLUM. Yes, this is when I was scheduled. Mr. Mahaley

asked me to delay my appearance before the panel until after the

Secretary had an opportunity to speak with them first.

Mr. HORN. And do you know if the Secretary did speak to them?

You were out of it at this point and told not to go there. So was

the reason simply not that the Secretary wanted to precede you?

Mr. MCCALLUM. That’s what I took from that, sir. We were told

in a later meeting with the General Counsel’s office that the Secretary had met with them. As a matter of fact, I believe that Mr.

Eric Figi, the Deputy General Counsel at the Department said that

the Secretary had been successful in having the Senator Rudman’s

committee not speak to me.

Mr. HORN. I’m told here that this is sort of a coincidence here

on the Secretary and you and when you—were you ever talking to

them. As I understand it, the Department of Energy was receiving

the harshest criticism from the media during this period for its

handling of the Wen Ho Lee espionage case at Los Alamos. And

you were put on leave about that time or that exact day, weren’t

you?

Mr. MCCALLUM. It was right about that time, Congressman. I

don’t remember the exact date that Senator Warner held the hearings.

Mr. HORN. Yes, actually the Secretary was having a few media

nightmares that day because the General Accounting Office was

testifying before Congress and dusting off 20 years worth of General Accounting Office reports that had warned the Department of

Energy about the lack of security at their laboratories, and that’s

also when you were put on leave. And 3 days after being asked to

testify before the Rudman panel, that’s when it happened.

So it’s sort of convenient timing as I looked at the dates here.

And I guess I would ask, do you think that the Secretary tried to

dissuade the Rudman panel from hearing your testimony, or do you

have any knowledge of that?

Mr. MCCALLUM. The General Counsel told us in a meeting that

the Secretary had been successful in dissuading them from hearing

my testimony.

Mr. HORN. Let me now move to another thing on the security bit,

and the last question I will have. You mentioned I believe to our

staff the number of things that were going on in some of these laboratories, and there’s—we’ve got here about 10 examples of security

instances involving foreign visitors on Department of Energy sites.

Do you know any of those that were, say, the worst of the lot,

and then I would like the others to be put in the record.

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Mr. MCCALLUM. The worst of the lot, sir, I can’t talk about because they’re still classified. Many are being investigated by the

Federal Bureau of Investigation. Some that were unclassified, that

we wrote a number of reports on within the Department and reported included incidents, one of which I referenced in my testimony, where a Russian visitor took an uncleared laptop computer

in a security area at the Savannah River site, and another incident, a Russian visitor was found digging through a dumpster in

the vicinity of a security area.

Mr. HORN. Were these incidents in areas such as professors or

were they—just what kind of visitors were they?

Mr. MCCALLUM. The one with the computer was a technical visitor who is an expert in nuclear materials controls. The identity of

the individual who was found digging through the dumpster, I cannot recall. I haven’t had access to files in my office for a few

months. But there are a number of incidents like that that have

occurred in our laboratories over the last few years with the increase in foreign visitation. These incidents are regularly reported

up-line through our operations security program.

Mr. HORN. One is here, foreign national discovered illegally wire

tapping a DOE meeting. Mr. Chairman, I would like to put the

whole list in the record at this point.

Mr. BURTON. That would be fine, Mr. Horn. And we will put

those in the record and ask Mr. McCallum or Lieutenant Colonel

McCallum to answer those for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Did you have any questions, Ms. Chenoweth?

Mrs. CHENOWETH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s been a long

day, hasn’t it, gentlemen? I think I’m the last of the Mohicans here.

Mr. BURTON. There’s one more Mohican.

Mrs. CHENOWETH. One more Mohican. I’m struck. Last week I

read where whistleblowers in the Department of Interior received

a reward of $350,000 for whistleblowing, plus one-third of a settlement with oil companies in the future. It strikes quite a contrast

to what I’m hearing today. Mr. Maloof.

Mr. MALOOF. Yes, ma’am.

Mrs. CHENOWETH. I have some questions for you. You described

in your statement that once the satellite waiver case broke in April

1998, the staff was instructed not to discuss the case, even though

it was the subject of a grand jury investigation.

That is the case, isn’t it? The staff was instructed not to discuss

the case.

Mr. MALOOF. Correct.

Mrs. CHENOWETH. Are you aware of any pending Hughes or

Loral export license applications from that time period?

Mr. MALOOF. Yes.

Mrs. CHENOWETH. Was this information considered in the review

of these applications?

Mr. MALOOF. From my vantage point, I don’t think so, and that’s

why I was a little concerned about it. We have had—I to this day

don’t know the context of the Justice Department’s investigation,

where they’re heading with it, but if there was in fact wrongdoing,

then we—as I said in my testimony we’ve had precedent to put a

hold on any further proceedings until it could be clarified.

And I even had a customs agent admit to me that continuing approvals were actually harming their case. And I once again informed our management about that.

Mrs. CHENOWETH. What is DOD policy regarding the review of

applications from a company that is the target of a pending criminal investigation?

Mr. MALOOF. Well, generally we wait for an indictment. We have

imposed penalties in the past on companies by instituting DOD foreign acquisition regulations and in order to—but first we want to

be sure that we’re on solid ground. We’ve also had cases, at least

two that come to mind, where it was so egregious that we immediately imposed suspension of all licenses. In fact, just last week

on another case, we did just that to the tune of some 70 license applications.

Mrs. CHENOWETH. Well, Mr. Maloof, was that policy followed in

this case?

Mr. MALOOF. Not in my opinion.

Mrs. CHENOWETH. Did you attempt to find out why the policy

was different in this case?

Mr. MALOOF. Oh, yes.

Mrs. CHENOWETH. What did you find?

Mr. MALOOF. I found a lot of circumstantial evidence particularly

reading outside, and when you put them in context with what was

occurring at the time, it began to paint a picture. Again, from my

standpoint right now, I can only speculate, although I harbor a lot

of personal opinions about it, but in my opinion, there was increasVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:27 May 24, 2001 Jkt 010199 PO 00000 Frm 00210 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HEARINGS\62262 pfrm06 PsN: 62262
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ing favoritism, there was a rush to push these—given the timeframe in which they occurred, there was a push to look at these

license applications from a political standpoint.

I know our management had visited the facilities a number of

times. We were told previously to expedite those applications. This

was—what I said earlier was not the first time and the fact, too,

that the Chinese were concerned about acquisition of technologies,

and, again, given that time period, we saw that rush.

And if we looked at the time of the waivers that did occur and

you compare them with when there were visiting Chinese, put all

of that information together, it paints a composite that you can’t

ignore, given the information that you’re looking at at the time and

you have to put it into a context.

And that’s part of our job, to look at both classified and unclassified information and bring it together to form a picture, that’s part

of our role that we do in terms of analysis. And when we bring that

to the attention of our management, we expect them to take it seriously and admittedly, I never received responses.

Mrs. CHENOWETH. Well, in fact, you’ve testified that you were

contacted by a Deputy Assistant Secretary public affairs for information regarding the satellite waiver case. Wasn’t it unusual for

someone of his level to contact you or your division regarding a

matter of this magnitude?

Mr. MALOOF. I thought it was unusual. And it sent a signal to

me at least that something was wrong here, that there was something going on, in effect bypassing the process, and I have to say,

in many cases, I have expressed opinions about cases. And I have

been overturned on them.

I don’t go raising Cain about things, but in this case I did inform

our management, and I began to wonder why this Assistant Secretary was coming to me with this question. It was part of that picture of things—of information we were receiving and had already

had.

Mrs. CHENOWETH. Well, when he told you that the Secretary was

blindsided by the events surrounding the story, what was your reaction? I mean, you know, didn’t you think it was strange that the

Secretary didn’t already know about this?

Mr. MALOOF. I personally did. And I know in previous administrations we have informed the Secretary of these kinds of cases.

The priority of technology transfer was considered particularly by

Mr. Weinberger to be held paramount. I was very surprised. And,

in fact, we have not had an export license case actually go to the

Secretary during this administration.

Mrs. CHENOWETH. Thank you, Mr. Maloof. I have a lot more

questions for you, but if the chairman would indulge me I would

like to just submit them in writing.

Mr. BURTON. Without objection so ordered. And we will ask you

gentlemen to respond to the questions that we will submit to you

in writing.

And this last Mohican, would you have any time to yield to me,

maybe 10 seconds or 15?

Mr. SOUDER. Yes, I will try to go fast in my others.

Mr. BURTON. This is the last of the Mohicans, Representative

Souder.

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Mr. SOUDER. The Hoosier Mohican.

A couple of things, one is that Mr. Waxman earlier raised the

very difficult question about how we react with certain members of

our staff, and we’ve dealt with this in the Travel Office in this committee where we heard it was no big deal, but in fact they were

reinstated, but these are nuclear secrets. This isn’t a matter of policy disagreements, as I understand, Mr. Maloof, you are Chief of

Technology Security Operations, Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

Dr. Leitner is Senior Strategic Trade Advisor for Defense Threat

Reduction Agency, Mr. Fox is a Defense Special Weapons Agency

Arms Controls Specialist. Colonel McCallum is Director, Office of

Safeguards and Security.

If you all are having concerns about security, this isn’t just a policy disagreement. And we also have hindsight being valuable here,

the fact that you were right, that in fact the secrets did get out

through visitors, that we in fact have had security lapses. And

looking at this in hindsight, it should get us to look more carefully

at the whistleblowing options, how to have this and, at the very

least, revoke the type of procedures that have been taken.

But there was another thing that intrigued me, Dr. Leitner, and

you made this point several times, and in your testimony, you developed it further about the fact that the United States doesn’t

have a modeling simulation and research branch that would be

dedicated to conducting cumulative and technical impact assessments. That came up quite frankly in Mr. Fox’s memo. That’s the

same type of thing. It looks kind of so this isn’t any big deal in the

trade question.

You also bring the Department of Defense in for some scathing

reviews, and actually were fairly kind to the Commerce Department. But I wanted to read something from the Cox report that I

found—one of the more disturbing things—I mean it’s about every

page is disturbing, this was in volume 3, page 74, 75, and 76 in

this unanimous report, it talks about—Dr. Leitner, in your testimony, you say that 1995 we had these computers suddenly jump

up from 2 to 7,000 that could be moving.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. And interesting in that time period, I think the

President changed it in October 1995, John Huang was actually the

person who was in charge. He was a Deputy Assistant Secretary,

not in charge, as Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Economic Policy, and in the report, which I’m going to read, so I’m not

accused of editorializing, it says ‘‘During the 18 months he was at

Commerce, Huang called the Lippo Bank 232 times,’’ which had

been implicated with China Aerospace and other front organizations, ‘‘in addition to 29 calls or faxes to Lippo Headquarters,’’ and

this isn’t a Republican report by the way, this is a unanimous Republican-Democrat report. ‘‘Huang also contacted Lippo consultant

Maeley Tom on 61 occasions during the same period. Huang’s

records show 72 calls to Lippo joint venture partner C. Joseph

Giroir.’’

Now, on page 75 is my favorite line, it says leading up to this,

‘‘During his tenure at the Commerce Department,’’ while he was

overseeing in the area of the technology transfer, that you all have

been raising concerns about, it says he ‘‘used a visitor’s office

across the street at the Washington, DC branch of Stephens, Inc.,’’

an Arkansas based brokerage firm with, ‘‘significant business ties

to the Lippo Group.’’ Stephens employees indicated that these visits were short in duration. Huang used this office ‘‘two, three times

a week most weeks, making telephone calls and ‘regularly’ receiving faxes and packages addressed to him,’’ and then my favorite

line, ‘‘No one at the Commerce Department, including Huang’s secretary, knew of this additional office.’’

Now, this ought to just panic quite frankly most Americans and

those of you in the security business because you’re seeing this

banged around between the different departments and the security

arrangements. And here we have a person who unbeknownst even

to his office is working in cahoots with another group, we don’t

know whether secrets he was getting in the briefings that you all

were—classified briefings. This company has been linked with the

very companies that you all were sending warnings up about.

And then, Dr. Leitner, you say, but the Commerce Department

was good compared to the Defense Department, and you scared me

to death. Would you——

Dr. LEITNER. I didn’t mean the Commerce Department is good.

I mean that the greatest degree of change that has occured in the

export control process has occurred in the Defense Department.

The Defense Department traditionally has been the conservative

anchor of the process who looked at national security and is indeed

charged with making the national security argument.

It has, and I testified about this repeatedly, it has failed its mission, it does not—it has not safeguarded national security to the

extent it should. The Commerce Department is basically blithering

along and doing the same thing it always has done. The fact that

they had Mr. Huang there is something of great concern. I never

had any contact with him, and I don’t know what he was doing,

what kind of secret offices he had.

But for the aspect that I saw of the process, the greatest degree

of change came in the realm of the Defense Department, and it

came when a whole bunch of people arrived at the beginning of the

215

administration who represented the antithesis of export control.

When they came in, they inherited the process.

They were given power over a program which they didn’t support

even during the height of the cold war. So that’s where the real big

change came, along with spying, you can talk about the role of Ron

Brown as well being so activist and all the rumors about him. But

that’s a separate issue, I think, from the argument I have been

making.

Mr. SOUDER. I thank you all. And my concern is that history will

show you’ve been correct, which is good for all of you. History will

show that you’ve been correct, which is bad for the country. I yield

back the balance of my time.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much, Representative Souder. I

would just like to add for the record one statement. I will read it

quickly, and then we will move to put the committee in executive

session. On May 21, 1999, Colonel McCallum’s counsel, David

Tripp, met with Mary Ann Sullivan, the Department of Energy

General Counsel, who is a political appointee, to discuss

McCallum’s options. She said that McCallum had made things difficult for them by talking to Congress. According to McCallum’s attorney, Sullivan said that if DOE was not able to find McCallum

in violation of rules regarding classified information, that another

way would be found to remove him. Sullivan has refused to be

interviewed by Government Reform Committee staff.

We will talk to Ms. Sullivan at some point in the future about

this.

I now move that the committee proceed in executive session. All

those in favor of the motion will signify by saying aye. All those

opposed signify by saying no. In the opinion of the chair, the ayes

have it, and the motion is agreed to.

So we will proceed in executive session since we will be discussing sensitive information with the witness Dr. Henson. Therefore, I will ask the committee to reconvene in a swept room, room

2247, and only Members and committee staff should attend the executive session and only those who have proper clearance. Thank

you very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the committee proceeded to further

business in executive session.]

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