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39–487 PDF 2007

S. HRG. 110–205

NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC POLICY OPTIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 21, 2007

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

(

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia, 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

MICHAEL V. KOSTIW, Replublican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

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C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC POLICY OPTIONS

MARCH 21, 2007

Page

Drell, Sidney D., Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Professor Emeritus, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University ........................................ 5

Payne, Keith B., Professor and Department Head, Graduate Department 

of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University .......................... 54

Gallucci, Robert L., Dean, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, 

Georgetown University ........................................................................................ 76

(III) 

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NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC POLICY OPTIONS 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:37 a.m. in room 

SR–222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson, Reed, E. Benjamin Nelson, Sessions, and Thune. 

Committee staff member present: John H. Quirk V, security 

clerk. 

Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican 

staff director; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Jill L. 

Simodejka, research assistant; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff 

member; and Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Jessica L. Kingston. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher Caple and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben 

Nelson; and Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN 

Senator BILL NELSON. Good morning, and thank you all for coming. You all are specialists in the area that we want to examine. 

Dr. Drell, I want to particularly thank you for coming all the way 

from California to be with us. 

Dr. Drell, Dean Gallucci, and Dr. Payne, you all have prepared 

statements. We’re going to put them in the record, and I’m going 

to ask if you all would just talk to us. That’ll save a lot of time 

and we can have a conversation. 

We are here today for a much-needed discussion on nuclear and 

strategic policy. We are on the verge of several key decisions with 

respect to nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapons complex, and 

it’s going to have a huge impact on the direction that our country 

is going to take. 

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which was the 

last nuclear weapons treaty between the U.S. and the Soviet 

Union, is going to expire in 2009 unless both sides agree to extend 

all or part of it. It’s been 15 years since the end of the Cold War, 

and the executive branch is now proposing to begin a new nuclear 

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warhead program and to consolidate and modernize the nuclear 

weapons complex. So, it’s time for us to have new ideas and to ask, 

do we need to modernize? If so, how and by how many? 

[The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

Good Morning. I would like to welcome our witnesses this morning. I would also 

like to thank you all for being here this morning. None of you are government witnesses and as a result you are all volunteers taking time out of your real jobs to 

share your thoughts with us. Dr. Drell, I particularly want to thank you for coming 

from California to be here this morning. 

Dr. Drell, Dean Gallucci, and Dr. Payne, I know that you all have prepared statements and Dr. Drell, you have an article that you would like included in the record, 

and without objection we will include those documents. Dr. Payne, in your prepared 

statement you mentioned that you also had an article that you would like included 

in the record. If you have a copy of that article, we would be happy to include that 

as well. 

We are here today to have a long delayed, but much needed discussion on nuclear 

and strategic policy. The United States is on the verge of several key decisions with 

respect to nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapons complex, which will have an 

impact for many years to come. 

Today we stand at something of a crossroad. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the last nuclear weapons treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, 

now Russia, will expire in 2009, unless both sides agree to extend all or part of that 

treaty. It has been more than 15 years since the end of the Cold War, and the executive branch for the first time since then is proposing to begin a new nuclear warhead program, and to consolidate and modernize the nuclear weapons complex. 

It is time to start afresh and ask what are nuclear weapons for and how many 

is enough?

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Sessions, any opening comments? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I do think you’re correct. I do believe that we’re in a different 

strategic situation than we were during the Cold War, and we’re 

making some decisions—some of those are being executed today—

about our capacity and strategic weaponry. So, we need to continue 

to work on that. 

We used to think of strategic weapons as silo-based missiles, submarines, and B–52 bombers, and the nuclear weapons they contained. Today, those strategic forces must not only be thought of 

as nuclear in capability, I believe, but as a broad array of capabilities intended to deal with today’s new threats, which tend to be unpredictable, politically undeterrable, sometimes, and extremely violent. 

The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) established a conceptual framework for today’s strategic posture. That new posture is 

predicated on the belief that deterrence concepts and force structure of the Cold War must now be tailored to fit the reality of today’s strategic environment. 

While the NPR recognized that our new relationship with the 

former Soviet Union made possible a significant reduction in the 

size of our nuclear arsenal, it also pointed out the need to bolster 

our strategic capabilities by adding conventional strike forces, missile defenses, and responsive nuclear infrastructure. 

So, I would just conclude and note that, by the time we achieve 

compliance with our Moscow Treaty obligations in 2012, we will 

have the smallest nuclear stockpile we’ve had since the Eisenhower 

3

administration. I’ll be interested to learn from our witnesses 

whether or not they believe our current strategic posture of reducing weapons has caused aggressive states to reduce or delay implementing their own nuclear program, and how the reality is perceived out there, how the world is actually acting, in a real way, 

to our actions. 

So, Mr. Chairman, this is a time for a good, thoughtful discussion. We have a good panel, and I look forward to it. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Sessions follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

We meet today to receive testimony from Dr. Keith Payne. Dr. Sidney Drell, and 

Ambassador Robert Gallucci on the future of United States Strategic Policy. During 

the Cold War, the term ‘‘strategic forces’’ almost always meant silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and long-range B–52 

bombers—all armed with nuclear weapons. The purpose of these forces was to help 

contain the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and, ultimately, to deter Soviet nuclear 

weapons use against the United States and its allies. 

Today, however, strategic forces must no longer be thought of only as nuclear deterrents, but as a broad array of capabilities intended to deal with today’s new 

threats—which tend to be unpredictable, potentially undeterable, and extremely violent. If the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact threat helped define both the mission 

and the force structure of our Cold War strategic capabilities, what are the central 

new threats to the United States and its allies that should help guide today’s strategic forces? It’s a reasonable question to ask, because without a clear understanding of the nature of the strategic threats we face, we risk sustaining or building strategic capabilities that will not serve us well, if at all. 

NEW STRATEGIC THREATS

Arguably, the preeminent threat today is terrorism—fostered by violent Islamic 

radicalism—followed closely by the ongoing development of dangerous weapons and 

delivery systems by states that either support this ideological movement or believe 

they can benefit from the disruption to regional or global stability caused by these 

extremists. These new, unprecedented threats to the United States are further complicated by the concern that we are just not certain whether traditional deterrence 

strategies will work against these potential enemies. Will the threat of punishment 

make a terrorist think twice? Can we stop a rogue state from blackmailing us if 

they are, ultimately, able to strike us—or our allies—with nuclear weapons? The 

point is, we need to plan as if deterrence will not work, and therefore acquire strategic capabilities able to eliminate these threats before they can be used against 

us—or defend against those threats should deterrence fail. 

This was the logic of the Bush administration’s 2001 Nuclear Posture Review 

(NPR) which, while recognizing that nuclear forces remain a bedrock of our deterrence capabilities, emphasized the importance of improving our ability to counter 

post-Cold War threats by, among other things, adding conventional strike capabilities and missile defense to our arsenal of ‘‘strategic capabilities.’’ The NPR also 

mandated significant reductions in the level of U.S. nuclear warheads down to 

1,700–2,200. By the time we achieve compliance with our Moscow Treaty obligations 

in 2012, we will have the smallest nuclear stockpile we have had since the Eisenhower administration. 

PROMPT CONVENTIONAL LONG-RANGE STRIKE

The ability to hold at risk high value targets in the war against terrorism, weapons of mass destruction caches, and mobile ballistic missile launchers is a capability 

any commander in chief should want to have in this day and age. We might be able 

to interdict these types of threats with covert operatives, strike aircraft, or cruise 

missiles, but this assumes we have the necessary forces in place and that they can 

reach the target in time. What if this were not the case, or the target was heavily 

defended? Wouldn’t we want the capability to strike this target from afar using a 

non-nuclear weapon that would reach the target in hours, rather than days? Longrange prompt conventional strike capabilities also could be used early in a crisis or 

conflict to deter aggression, or stop aggressors in their tracks until other forces can 

be brought to bear. Non-nuclear strategic forces could be particularly useful for demVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:38 Dec 10, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\39487.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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onstrating U.S. and allied resolve during a crisis, and thereby act as a deterrent 

to further escalation. 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Recent ballistic missile testing by North Korea and Iran, coupled with the use of 

over 4,000 short-range rockets by Hezbollah against Israel, suggests that unfriendly 

regimes continue to view ballistic missiles, and their shorter-range variants, as a 

means to off-set the conventional superiority of adversaries—making them potential 

weapons of influence, blackmail, and terror. 

The U.S. ballistic missile defense program is designed to thwart this potential terror weapon, and thereby strengthen U.S. diplomatic and deterrence options for dealing with these new threats to our security. Over the past 12 months, the United 

States has demonstrated through realistic testing the ability to shoot down

short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles using interceptors based on land 

and at sea, to include a September 8, 2006, intercept of a long-range ballistic missile 

warhead by the ground-based midcourse defense system. These new missile defense 

capabilities now contribute to the mix of policy options available to the President 

in his conduct of foreign policy. 

This is why U.S. plans to deploy a ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) site 

in Europe are so important. By providing protection for NATO nations on both sides 

of the Atlantic against long-range ballistic missiles, plans for a GMD site in Europe 

support NATO’s ongoing diplomatic efforts to end Iran’s nuclear weapons program. 

Should Iran nevertheless develop the capability to place nuclear weapons on its ballistic missiles, NATO will be glad it has in place another means for deterring this 

potential threat—and to defend against it should deterrence fail. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

While we address these emerging threats and develop capabilities in response, we 

continue to maintain our current nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, it has become apparent that this work is carried out in a nuclear weapons complex that is neither 

responsive in its capabilities, nor sized appropriately. As we develop, and fund at 

significant expense, the scientific tools to understand and certify the safety and reliability of our legacy weapons in the absence of nuclear testing, the Nuclear Weapons 

Council is examining whether limits may exist in our ability to extend perpetually 

the life of current warheads. 

Earlier this month, the Council approved a design for a joint program between 

the Department of Energy and the U.S. Navy to provide a replacement warhead for 

a portion of the Nation’s sea-based nuclear weapons. Although this announcement 

does not represent a decision to deploy a replacement warhead, it does mean that 

the military and scientific experts charged with the stewardship of our nuclear 

weapons are now evaluating whether our current path is sustainable over the longterm. 

The Department of Energy is also evaluating options for the future of the nuclear 

weapons infrastructure through its Complex 2030 Environmental Impact Statement. 

The objective of Complex 2030 is a nuclear weapons complex that is sized appropriately for the smaller stockpile of the future and that has the capabilities to support that stockpile. The evaluation is still in its early stages, but I am concerned 

that the options being evaluated will modernize the complex we have now. I am not 

yet convinced that the Department of Energy is genuinely considering the realignment, consolidation, or closure of facilities that are excess to mission need. I will 

be pursuing this issue in other hearings the subcommittee will hold this spring. 

CONCLUSION

In closing, I might note that during the Cold War, we built strategic nuclear 

forces that we hoped would never be used—because if they were to be used, we 

risked unimaginable destruction. Today, however, while we must maintain nuclear 

strategic forces that contribute to deterrence on a daily basis through the fact of 

their existence, we must also build non-nuclear strategic forces that we surely intend to use, because if we don’t use them, it might mean that an adversary could 

inflict upon us blows of unimaginable consequences—perhaps far worse than the 

events of September 11. 

I look forward to hearing the views of our witnesses on these and other important 

strategic forces issues.

5

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. I would say to my colleagues, I’m 

going to defer my questions until the end, so that you all can have 

a chance to have your questions. 

Dr. Drell, why don’t you start first, and then Dr. Payne and 

Dean Gallucci. 

Dr. Drell? 

STATEMENT OF SIDNEY D. DRELL, SENIOR FELLOW, HOOVER 

INSTITUTION, PROFESSOR EMERITUS, STANFORD LINEAR 

ACCELERATOR CENTER, STANFORD UNIVERSITY 

Dr. DRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senators, for the opportunity to be here. 

We are here, in my mind, at a dangerous time. I view us on the 

precipice of entering a new and more dangerous nuclear era, with 

the spread of technology, which means that, in particular, the enrichment of uranium, which makes it possible for more societies to 

enter the nuclear club and that raises a danger of nuclear weapons 

getting in the hands of terrorist groups, others unrestrained by the 

norms of civilized behavior, as we know it; and, therefore, these 

weapons become more likely to be used. 

I think that, in these circumstances, reliance on nuclear weapons 

for deterrence—which was so essential during the Cold War—is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective as the 

prospect of proliferation of nuclear weapons grows increasingly ominous. 

In terms of the size of the stockpile, we still have, as a result of 

the START, although the Cold War has ended, something like 

5,000 nuclear warheads in each of our arsenals, the United States 

and Russia, with approximately—close to, anyway—2,000 on ballistic missiles, many on prompt-launch procedures, which present 

risks of accidental or unauthorized launch. Why we’re retaining 

such a force of that type is not clear to me. 

I see this situation as presenting us with two major challenges. 

The first one is the immediate one, to develop a strategy to try and 

head off the loss of the nonproliferation regime, and to save the 

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The longer-term one is perhaps fanciful, but, I believe, important, and that is to try to rekindle the 

vision, the bold vision, of Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev 

when they came to their remarkable summit at Reykjavik in 1986 

to seek to rid the world of nuclear weapons and to escape from the 

nuclear deterrence trap. As far as the immediate problem, and preserving the NPT in force since 1970, this requires supplementing 

that treaty with intrusive inspection measures so that we can 

make sure of compliance with its provisions. 

Important agreements have been reached in this regard, and 

we’re trying to bring into practice things like the additional protocols and the Proliferation Security Initiative to monitor these kinds 

of actions. I think it’s also true to say that the nuclear weapons 

states, as we seek these more intrusive measures, have to be careful to offer incentives and to show restraints in our own programs 

to the non-nuclear countries with whom we need to cooperate in 

order to have an effective inspection regime and enforcement of the 

NPT. 

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Now, to my view, the two recent proposals by the United States 

to build new nuclear weapons were not wise. They were reviewed, 

globally, as counter to the efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation 

regime. I’m talking about the proposed high-yield bunker-buster for 

destroying deeply buried, hardened, underground targets. The second was the so-called very low-yield new-concept weapon to destroy 

deadly biological and chemical agents in shallow underground 

bunkers without dispersing their deadly effect. Fortunately, from 

my point of view, both proposals were rejected by Congress after 

careful independent analyses showed that their potential military 

value was quite limited, and marginal, in fact, and less compelling 

than the likely harmful effect that those new programs would have 

on the nonproliferation regime and our overall security thereby. 

You are now debating, as you mentioned in your opening remark, 

the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program designed to 

transform our aging nuclear complex, and also some of the weapons 

themselves in the current stockpile. There is, in my mind, a need 

to modernize parts of the complex that date back to World War II, 

for reasons of safety, efficiency, and flexibility. As long as the 

United States has nuclear weapons, which is likely to be for some 

time, we do need to be able to maintain them in our shrinking 

stockpile, to be safe and reliable. However, a clear decision on our 

long-term nuclear policy, which you alluded to our needing, is needed in order to decide the appropriate size and scope of that new 

complex. I think this does call for a fresh look at the role of nuclear 

weapons in our defense planning, and similarly for the Russians. 

We are the two countries with more than 90 percent of the nuclear 

weapons in the world. We are formally, now, declared to be allies 

against terrorism, the new threat we both face, and not adversaries, as we were in the Cold War. 

On this point of a new look, former Ambassador James Goodby 

and I analyzed this question of, ‘‘what are nuclear weapons for?’’ 

in a report of that same title, which I have submitted for the record 

of these hearings. We considered present and prospective threats, 

and concluded that the strategic arsenal required by the United 

States can be reduced considerably to smaller numbers, carefully 

assuming that the Russians come down in a similar way that we 

do. In fact, as a first step, we recommended reducing our force 

structure to 500 operationally-deployed nuclear warheads, plus 500 

in a responsive force. I can go into the details of that in the conversation. But this is a cooperative venture on both sides. 

Turning to the other part of the RRW, and that is the transformation of the weapons, the stated goal of RRW is to increase 

confidence in their long-term reliability, safety, and use control—

that’s very important—and to do that without requiring underground explosive tests. That’s the legislation. This presents, to my 

mind, a daunting technical challenge, to determine whether design 

changes or modifications to meet those ambitious goals can be certified and deployed without underground explosive testing. I believe that, at present, we do not know the answer to that question, 

but I do believe it is a worthwhile question to try to answer. 

I think a sensible approach to it would have three elements: 

The first one is to proceed carefully with research on proposed 

changes, subject to independent outside scrutiny, to determine 

7

whether it is possible to build a strong consensus and confidence 

that the proposed changes are mutually compatible and have the 

appropriate pedigree from our past test program. It is not a question of changing an individual component that’ll work. It is a question of putting together a complicated system, and having system 

reliability. 

The second point, I would say, is to recognize there is no timepressing urgency in implementing the changes. The legacy stockpile is strong and reliable, in my judgment. The pace of the work 

on RRW should not consume human and budgetary resources to 

the extent of savaging the important ongoing, highly successful 

stockpile stewardship and life- extension program. 

The third point is to recognize the importance of being clear 

about the limited goal of what we intend to do with the RRW Program, so as to avoid potentially harmful impact on our nonproliferation goals. 

We have to recognize that many non-nuclear weapon states, 

whose cooperation we require, remain concerned about the seriousness of the commitment of nuclear powers to limit their nuclear efforts, and they are restive under the discriminatory features of the 

treaty. 

Let me just very briefly close with a remark about—with the second challenge, or opportunity, that I mentioned, and that is to rekindle the bold vision that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev brought to Reykjavik in 1986 to rid the world of 

nuclear weapons and escape the deterrence trap. They came close, 

with that summit, but they failed. However, they did succeed in 

turning the arms race on its head at Reykjavik. They initiated 

steps leading to significant reductions in deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, including the removal of an entire 

category, the intermediate nuclear forces, from Europe. To mark 

that event, former Secretary of State George Shultz, who was with 

President Reagan at Reykjavik, and I organized a conference at 

Stanford’s Hoover Institution on the 20th anniversary, last October, and we reviewed the impact of Reykjavik and its relevance for 

today’s world. We came out with a list of 10 steps, which we 

thought were practical, to define a path for accomplishing progress 

toward that goal, steps which, in and of themselves, will help reduce the nuclear danger. Those steps appear in the Wall Street 

Journal piece published January 4, with four headline signatories: 

Secretary Shultz, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 

former Defense Secretary William Perry, and former chairman of 

this committee, Sam Nunn. I’ve introduced that for the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

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Dr. DRELL. Let me end my short time by saying, I think that intensive work with leaders of other countries with nuclear weapons 

to make this a joint venture would be an important step forward. 

The steps themselves, you can read about or we can discuss. Let 

me end just by saying that the advantage of having that vision, reasserting a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons; and taking 

practical measures toward achieving the goal, could have, I believe, 

a profound positive impact on the security of future generations. 

Without that bold vision, the actions that we recommend, and the 

steps that one takes to reduce nuclear danger, will not be perceived 

as fair or urgent; they will still be viewed as retaining the discriminatory nature of the nuclear world as it is now. Also, without the 

vision, the actions will not actually be very practically achieved in 

any timeframe. 

So, thank you for allowing me to express my views. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Drell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. SIDNEY D. DRELL

The existing international regime, grounded in the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) for preventing new nuclear weapon states, reducing existing nuclear arsenals, and controlling the spread of nuclear technology and material, is seriously endangered. 

The spread of technology, particularly uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology for civilian energy, creates the danger of more states with nuclear 

arms and fissile material. In turn, it provides more opportunities for theft or sale 


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to terrorist groups or other societal units unrestrained by accepted norms of civilized 

behavior, thereby increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. 

Beyond North Korea and Iran more than 40 nations already have taken substantial steps forward in nuclear technology. Even more have indicated interest in developing such technology for civilian power. Once you can enrich uranium for a civilian 

power reactor—you are well on the way. Without a change of course, the United 

States and the world soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will 

be more precarious and economically costly than was Cold War deterrence. 

During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining international security because they were a means of deterrence. Sixteen years ago the 

Cold War ended with the demise of the Soviet Union, and with it, the doctrine of 

mutual Soviet-American deterrence became obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a 

relevant consideration for many states with regard to threats from other states. But 

reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous 

and decreasingly effective as the prospect of nuclear proliferation grows increasingly 

ominous. 

Nevertheless U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles remain bloated. In 2012, more 

than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and Russia, 

each, will still have approximately 5,000 nuclear bombs and warheads in their arsenals, close to two thousand of which will be deployed on ballistic missiles, many on 

prompt launch procedures presenting unnecessary risks of an accidental or unauthorized launch. Why are we still retaining such large nuclear arsenals as a legacy 

of the Cold War? What are these weapons for? 

This situation presents us with two major challenges—and opportunities. The first 

is to develop a strategy for dealing with the world as it is today, starting with steps 

to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. The second is to rekindle the bold 

vision that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev brought to their remarkable summit at Reykjavik in 1986: ridding the world of nuclear weapons and 

escaping from the nuclear deterrence trap. Although they failed in the end, they did 

succeed in turning the arms race on its head. They initiated steps leading to significant reductions in deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, including 

the elimination of an entire class of threatening missiles—the INF missiles in Europe. 

Can we rekindle their vision? Can we escape from the nuclear deterrence trap before it is too late? 

To face the first challenge, and deal with the world as is, we must save and 

strengthen the nonproliferation regime based on the NPT of 1970. In view of the 

continuing spread of nuclear weapons technology, the NPT will need to be supplemented with intrusive new inspection rights for monitoring compliance with its provisions and detecting covert efforts by a would-be proliferator to evade them. Important agreements have already been reached to bring such provisions into practice. 

It is not necessary to look abroad for challenges to the present nonproliferation 

regime. Nonnuclear weapon states repeatedly emphasize their concerns about the 

ongoing weapons programs of the nuclear powers. We are urged to honor the NPT 

by formalizing the current moratorium on underground bomb testing into a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons; and 

substantially decreasing their numbers more rapidly. Recent efforts by Washington 

to build two new nuclear warheads for new military missions were viewed widely 

as counter to global efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. One new warhead was a high-yield bunker buster for destroying deeply buried, hardened underground targets, and the second was a very low yield ‘‘new concept’’ weapon to destroy deadly biological and chemical agents stored in shallow underground bunkers 

without dispersing them. Fortunately both proposals were rejected after several 

years of debate in Congress. Rejection was based on a judgment that benefitted from 

careful independent technical analyses that concluded their potential military value 

was marginal and less compelling than their likely harmful impact on the nonproliferation regime and U.S. overall national security. It was also a ringing rejection of the dangerous idea of lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons in 

limited military strikes. 

Currently Congress is debating whether or how to proceed with a Reliable Replacement Warhead Program designed to transform both our aging nuclear infrastructure and the weapons in our current stockpile. There is a need to modernize 

parts of the complex that date back to World War II for reasons of safety, efficiency, 

and flexibility. As long as the United States has nuclear weapons, we need to be 

able to maintain the warheads in the shrinking stockpile to be safe and reliable. 

But a clear decision on our long-term nuclear policy goals is needed in order to decide on the appropriate size and scope of the new complex. This calls for a fresh 

look at the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense planning. The United States and 

13

1S. Drell and J. Goodby: ‘‘What Are Nuclear Weapons For?’’ (Report for the Arms Control Association, April 2005). It is published on their website and reprinted in ‘‘Nuclear Weapons, Scientists, and the Post-Cold War Challenge’’ by S. Drell (World Scientific Press, Singapore, 2007). 2 ‘‘A World Free of Nuclear Weapons’’ signed by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, and endorsed by the conference participants who also signed on. 

Russia have now officially adopted a policy of cooperation against the new threats, 

faced by both nations, of terrorists and unstable or irresponsible governments acquiring nuclear weapons. This replaces the former adversarial relationship of nuclear deterrence based on mutual based destruction. As stated in the Joint Declaration of Presidents Bush and Putin of November 13, 2001: ‘‘The United States and 

Russia have overcome the legacy of the Cold War. Neither country regards the other 

as an enemy or threat.’’ What then are the anticipated missions and targets for the 

thousands of nuclear warheads remaining in their arsenals? 

Ambassador James Goodby and I analyzed this question of ‘‘What Are Nuclear 

Weapons For’’ in today’s world in a recent report1 that I have submitted for the 

record. Based on our analysis of the present and prospective threats that define missions for U.S. nuclear weapons we conclude that the strategic arsenal required by 

the United States can be reduced to considerably lower numbers. We recommend 

as a first step reduction to a U.S. force structure of 500 operationally-deployed nuclear warheads, plus 500 in a responsive force. The United States and Russia should 

cooperate to achieve this in the coming decade, engaging the other nuclear powers 

for proportionate reductions. 

As to the transformation of the weapons with the stated goal to increase confidence in their long-term reliability, safety, and use control, we still face a daunting 

technical challenge to determine whether new designs to meet those ambitious goals 

can be certified and deployed without underground explosive testing. I don’t believe 

that, at present, we know the answer to that question. But I do believe it is worthwhile to try to answer. A sensible approach to it should: 

1. Proceed carefully with research on modifications or a new design that meet the 

stated requirements, before moving ahead to development and manufacture. Necessary are detailed analyses subject to fully independent scrutiny to determine 

whether it is possible to gain confidence and build a strong consensus that the proposed changes are mutually compatible and have the appropriate test pedigree from 

our previous work. It is not a question of the individual components working, but 

of the system—in fact a system of systems—being reliable. 

2. Recognize that there is no pressing urgency in implementing changes—the legacy stockpile is strong—the pace of the work should not consume human and budgetary resources to the extent of savaging the important ongoing and highly successful Stockpile Stewardship and Life Extension Program. 

3. Recognize the importance of being clear about the limited goals of what we are 

doing so as to avoid potentially harmful impacts on the nonproliferation goals of this 

country and beyond, globally. Concerns by the many nonnuclear weapon states, 

whose cooperation we require, about the seriousness of the commitment of the nuclear powers to limit their nuclear efforts in accord with the NPT cannot be ignored, 

denied, or dismissed as irrelevant. They registered such concerns strongly in negotiations at the U.N. on continuing the NPT into the indefinite future, and called on 

the nuclear powers to restrain their nuclear programs and ratify a CTBT. 

An important action to address these concerns would be a commitment by the 

United States to face the second challenge: to rekindle the vision of Reykjavik and 

develop a strategy to achieve it. This was addressed at a conference that George 

Shultz, who participated at Reykjavik as President Reagan’s Secretary of State, and 

I organized at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution this past October marking 

the 20th anniversary of that remarkable summit. Ever since Hiroshima at the dawn 

of the nuclear era a number of studies and conferences have addressed the challenge 

of ridding the world of nuclear weapons. Renewed interest in achieving this goal has 

been generated by the realization that the world is approaching the precipice of the 

new and even more dangerous nuclear era with the spread of nuclear technology 

that is threatening the nonproliferation regime. Moreover at present we lack a global strategy and vision commensurate with the tremendous dangers ahead. 

At the Stanford/Hoover Conference we reviewed the impact of Reykjavik and its 

relevance for today’s world. We formulated what we considered a set of practical 

steps to define a path for accomplishing the goal of ridding the world of nuclear 

weapons. Our conclusions and recommendations were summarized in a recent article that appeared in the Wall Street Journal 2 on January 4, 2007. 

First and foremost, intensive work with leaders of the countries in possession of 

nuclear weapons will be required to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise, and create a working mechanism for accomplishing this 

14

goal. Such a joint enterprise would lend additional weight to efforts already under 

way to avoid the emergence of a nuclear-armed North Korea and Iran. 

Specific actions were also proposed:

• Changing the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons to increase 

warning time and thereby reduce the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon. 

• Continuing to reduce substantially the size of nuclear forces in all states 

that possess them. 

• Eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed. 

• Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate, including understandings 

to increase confidence and provide for periodic review, to achieve ratification of the CTBT, taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states. 

• Providing the highest possible standards of security for all stocks of 

weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and highly-enriched uranium everywhere in the world. 

• Getting control of the uranium enrichment process, combined with the 

guarantee that uranium for nuclear power reactors could be obtained at a 

reasonable price, first from the Nuclear Suppliers Group and then from the 

International Atomic Energy Agency or other controlled international reserves. It will also be necessary to deal with proliferation issues presented 

by spent fuel from reactors producing electricity. 

• Halting the production of fissile material for weapons globally; phasing 

out the use of highly-enriched uranium in civil commerce and removing 

weapons-usable uranium from research facilities around the world and rendering the materials safe. 

• Redoubling our efforts to resolve regional confrontations and conflicts 

that give rise to new nuclear powers. 

• Addressing the requirements for effective measures to impede or counter 

any nuclear related conduct that is potentially threatening to the security 

of any state or peoples.

Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal could have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations. Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived 

as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic 

or possible. 

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54

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Dr. Drell. 

Dr. Payne? 

STATEMENT OF KEITH B. PAYNE, PROFESSOR AND DEPARTMENT HEAD, GRADUATE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND 

STRATEGIC STUDIES, MISSOURI STATE UNIVERSITY 

Dr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s a privilege to be here 

this morning, and I thank you for the invitation to speak here. 

I’m happy to shorten my prepared statement and enter the full 

statement for the record. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Yes, all of the statements are entered in 

the record, so, if you would just talk to us, that would be great. 

Dr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you. 

Dr. PAYNE. During the Cold War, deterrence was typically considered an easy matter, posing a nuclear retaliatory threat to the 

Soviet Union and Soviet targets. Unfortunately, today, most of 

what we believed we knew about deterrence during the Cold War 

is of extremely limited value. 

Today, there are no certainties about deterrence. Our traditional 

deterrent may not work against opponents who are willing martyrs, desperate gamblers, incommunicado, miscalculating, or selfdestructive. The painful contemporary truth, I’m sorry to say, is 

that confident assertions about how deterrence will work, and how 

many forces will ensure deterrence, are guesses. No one knows 

whether, or how, deterrence is going to work across the spectrum 

of opponents we now face and the spectrum of contexts in which 

we now want to deter. 

That particular conclusion doesn’t suggest that we discard deterrence. Far from it. It does, nevertheless, explain why our deterrence focus needs to change from that of the Cold War with regard 

to: to whom is our deterrent directed, how do we deter, and with 

what do we try to deter? 

In some cases, nonmilitary options may be best for deterrence. In 

other cases, conventional, or even nuclear, threats may be necessary for deterrence. In some cases, we may simply have opponents, or confront components, who are beyond deterrence, whatever capability we might bring to the table. 

To understand which is the case, we need, first, to understand 

the opponent’s mindset and behavioral style. I believe that deterrence now, in this post-Cold War era, is, first and foremost, a matter of intelligence. It requires a much more focused and dedicated 

intelligence effort for this purpose than was typical in the past. 

There is simply no substitute now for trying to understand the specific hows and whys of opponents’ decisionmaking. That’s true 

whether the opponent is a state leadership or the leadership of a 

terrorist organization. 

With regard to the deterrence of terrorists—this is an important 

new topic—let me note that I strongly disagree with the common 

notion that all terrorists are undeterrable. The historical record on 

terrorists, anarchists, and other extremist groups is sufficient for 

us to conclude that they may be deterrable, depending on the context and circumstances. That’s all we can say about state leaderships, as well. 

55

What are the implications of this new uncertainty of deterrence 

in the post-cold-war period? First, I think, and foremost, is that defensive capabilities—the ability to limit damage to the United 

States, our allies, our friends, and our forces—takes on a much 

higher priority. Why? Simply because we can no longer rely on deterrence working reliably to provide that protection. A popular line 

during the Cold War was that defenses are unnecessary and useless, because our ‘‘assured destruction’’ capability would provide deterrence and perfect protection. It needs to be recognized now, in 

the post-Cold War period, that deterrence can, and probably will at 

some point, fail unpredictably, and our only option in that case will 

be to defend, as well as possible, our society, our forces, our friends, 

and our allies. This is why I believe that various forms of strategic 

defensive capability, particularly against weapons of mass destruction, have become such an important priority, more so than during 

the Cold War. 

The Bush administration’s 2001 NPR sought to assess how the 

dramatic geopolitical changes since the Cold War should transform 

how we think and how we practice deterrence. I’ve included, for the 

record, a short article on the goals of the NPR, which, I’m sorry to 

say, still remains widely misunderstood. But with regard to nuclear 

weapons, the NPR concluded that they, in fact, remain essential to 

any prudent approach to deterrence, but that nuclear weapons 

alone are unsuited for many of the type of deterrence contingencies 

that we are going to confront in the 21st century. Having a broader 

array of deterrent threats, particularly including non-nuclear capabilities, should better enable us to adapt our deterrence to a whole 

range of different opponents and contexts. Consequently, one of the 

thrusts of the NPR was to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons 

and to place greater reliance and emphasis on non-nuclear capabilities. 

The NPR also concluded that the immediate requirement for U.S. 

nuclear weapons could be met with far fewer deployed nuclear 

forces, and that the requirement for deployed nuclear forces may 

recede further as our advanced conventional forces mature and as 

our defenses mature. That conclusion, by the way, was a basis for 

the deep reductions of the 2002 Moscow Treaty. 

The NPR also focused on the need to assure allies, particularly 

through the extended U.S. nuclear umbrella. Most recently, some 

very close allies have openly questioned whether the longstanding 

U.S. ‘‘nuclear umbrella’’ commitment for their security remains 

credible and viable. A 2006 study, for example, led by former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone, concluded that Japan should study 

the nuclear issue to be prepared in the event of tremendous future 

change. Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone noted that Japanese security is dependent on U.S. nuclear weapons, and that the 

future of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent is uncertain. Such 

Japanese concerns are obviously understandable given the North 

Korean nuclear and missile programs. I should note that allies and 

friends in the Middle East are expressing similar concerns as Iran 

moves towards a nuclear capability and expands its missile arsenal. 

What’s the implication of that set of circumstances? What’s the 

significance of that? Well, first, it’s to note that our extended nuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:38 Dec 10, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\39487.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
56

clear deterrent is perhaps the most important, and the least recognized nuclear nonproliferation tool in existence. To risk understatement, nuclear proliferation will accelerate dramatically if our close 

allies continue to lose confidence in the U.S. extended nuclear 

guarantee. This point has been made explicit by Japanese officials 

in recent conversations. 

As various nuclear reduction and disarmament proposals emerge, 

I think we need to be conscious of this continuing importance of 

our nuclear forces for extended nuclear deterrence and, in effect, 

for nonproliferation. 

There are three contemporary strategic programs that I believe 

are particularly important for the future of deterrence, extended 

deterrence, and the assurance of U.S. allies. Let me briefly mention 

these. One is the RRW, which Dr. Drell has mentioned already. 

The second program, or set of programs, are strategic and regional 

ballistic missile defense capabilities. The third is a new capability 

for non-nuclear prompt global strike. 

The RRW Program is intended to provide safety and security improvements in the nuclear arsenal, provide the potential for longterm increased confidence without nuclear testing, cost savings, the 

potential for long-term cost savings, and to sustain the U.S. nuclear, technical, and engineering communities. 

Let me add that there is some urgency with regard to this particular program because as we look at the retirement rate for people who have been involved in the design of nuclear weapons, it’s 

estimated that the vast majority of them will have retired within 

the next 5 years. If we want to be able to have that group of experienced weapon designers offer their experience to a new cadre, a 

new generation, of weapon designers, we need to move forward in 

this program, I think, speedily. 

The RRW will also support the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent, 

and, thus, our nonproliferation goals, by helping to sustain the confidence that our allies have had in our nuclear umbrella. 

Also, second, in the era of deterrence uncertainty, strategic and 

regional ballistic missile defense are important for our own protection and for the assurance of our allies and friends who are subject 

to these emerging nuclear threats and missile threats. 

During the Cold War, many considered ballistic missile defense 

and deterrence to be mutually incompatible. Now they are fully 

compatible, and continued support, particularly for sea-based defenses, the multiple kill vehicle program, and a new third site in 

Europe, I believe to be very important. 

Finally, progress toward a non-nuclear strategic capability for 

prompt global strike has been slow, and, in general, progress towards non-nuclear strategic capabilities has been slow. At this 

point, the only U.S. global strike option now available is nuclear. 

The U.S. capability to strike with non-nuclear forces against highvalue or fleeting targets is very important. I believe it would make 

a significant contribution to deterrence, and, again, the assurance 

of our allies, and also to counterproliferation. 

In conclusion, there’s been a significant shift away from the Cold 

War balance-of-terror concept and the policies that were aligned 

with that. That shift is important and makes sense because of the 

dramatically different geopolitical environment we find ourselves 

57

in. It is true that all the details of that shift have not been worked 

out, and its implementation is not mature. But let me note that it 

took us 25 years of intense debate before we came to a consensus 

on our Cold War strategic policies. We probably don’t have 25 years 

of safety to reach a consensus on our post-Cold War policies. So, 

my final comment is that we need to move forward thoughtfully, 

but also quickly, towards that consensus. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Payne follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. KEITH B. PAYNE

The rise of hostile rogue states, new terrorist threats, and the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction have all highlighted our continuing need to deter attack. The importance of deterrence has survived the Cold War. The fundamental 

question now is how to deter new threats in a new strategic environment? 

During the Cold War, deterrence typically was considered a relatively easy matter 

of posing a nuclear retaliatory threat to Soviet targets. Many officials and commentators mechanistically equated deterrence to our ‘‘Assured Destruction’’ nuclear 

capability. We hear echoes of this today, confident claims about deterrence linked 

to some specific number of weapons. 

Unfortunately, most of what we believed we knew about deterrence during the 

Cold War now is of limited value. Today, there are no certainties about deterrence. 

Our traditional deterrent threat may not work predictably against opponents who 

are willing martyrs, desperate gamblers, incommunicado, misinformed, miscalculating, self-destructive, or motivated by unalterable, intangible goals such as honor, 

or ideological or religious devotion. 

The list of provocations and opponents we now hope to deter has expanded, and 

the contexts within which we hope to deter them are far more variable. But the 

painful contemporary truth is that confident assertions about how deterrence will 

operate are guesses, usually poorly informed; no one knows whether or how deterrence will work across a wide spectrum of opponents, stakes and contexts. 

This conclusion does not suggest that we discard deterrence. It does, however, explain why our Cold War views of deterrence ‘‘stability’’ based on offensive nuclear 

forces must be reconsidered. Our deterrence focus now must be broadened with regard to whom, how and with what we try to deter. In some cases, non-military approaches to deterrence may be adequate, in others, conventional or nuclear threats 

may be necessary; and in some cases, opponents may simply be ‘‘beyond deterrence’’ 

regardless of our threats. 

To understand which may be the case for any contingency, we need first to understand the opponent’s mind-set and behavioral style, and the different ways opponents can perceive and respond to our deterrence threats. Deterrence now is first 

and foremost a matter of intelligence. It requires a much more focused, dedicated 

intelligence effort for this purpose than has been the case in the past. There is no 

substitute for understanding the specific how’s and why’s of opponents’ decisionmaking; we no longer can presume to know the boundaries of their possible behavior. This is true whether we seek to deter the leadership of a rogue state or a terrorist organization. 

With regard to the deterrence of terrorists, I strongly disagree with the common 

notion that all terrorists are undeterrable. The historical record on terrorists, anarchists, and other extremist groups is sufficient to conclude that they may be deterred, depending on the context and circumstances, which is all that can be said 

of state leaders. 

Defensive capabilities must take on a new, higher priority when deterrence is recognized to be uncertain. Why? Because we can no longer rely on deterrence working 

reliably to provide protection. A popular Cold War line was that defensive capabilities were unnecessary and useless because deterrence was ensured by our ‘‘Assured 

Destruction’’ offensive nuclear threat. It should be recognized now that deterrence 

can fail unpredictably, and our only option may be to defend as well as possible our 

society, our expeditionary forces, and our allies. This is why various forms of strategic defensive capability against mass destruction weapons are now so important. 

President Bush’s decision to deploy strategic ballistic missile defense (BMD) against 

limited offensive missile threats was a reflection of this shift away from the old balance of terror deterrence policy. Much more remains to be done in this regard. 

The Bush administration’s 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) sought to assess 

how the dramatic changes since the Cold War should transform how we think about 

58

1Keith B. Payne, ‘‘The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight,’’ The Washington 

Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Summer 2005), pp. 135–151. 

deterrence. This can be seen in its emphasis on having a much broader range of 

deterrent threat options than we inherited from the Cold War, and having the flexibility and knowledge of opponents necessary to tailor our deterrent efforts to a 

range of contingencies and opponent. I have included for the record a short article 

on the goals of the NPR, a document that remains widely misunderstood.1

With regard to nuclear weapons, the NPR concluded that they remain essential 

in any prudent approach to deterrence; but, nuclear weapons alone may be unsuited 

to many of the deterrence contingencies of the 21st century. Having a broader range 

of threats, including non-nuclear options, should better enable us to adapt our deterrence policies to a much wider range of opponents and contexts. Consequently, a 

major thrust of the NPR was to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and place greater weight on non-nuclear capabilities. 

The NPR also concluded that the immediate requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons could be met with far fewer deployed nuclear forces, and that our nuclear requirements may recede further as advanced conventional weapons and defenses mature. That conclusion was a basis for the deep nuclear reductions of the 2002 Moscow Treaty. 

The NPR also focused on the need to assure allies, including via the extended U.S. 

‘‘nuclear umbrella.’’ Most recently, some close allies have openly questioned whether 

longstanding U.S. extended deterrence guarantees remain credible. A 2006 Japanese 

study headed by former Prime Minister Nakasone, for example, concluded that 

Japan, ‘‘should study the nuclear issue to be prepared in the event of tremendous 

future change. . .’’ Mr. Nakasone noted that Japanese security is dependent on U.S. 

nuclear weapons, but that the future of the U.S. extended deterrent is unclear. Such 

Japanese concerns are understandable given North Korean nuclear and missile programs. Allies and friends in the Middle East increasingly express similar concerns 

as Iran moves toward a nuclear capability and expands its missile arsenal. 

Immediately following North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006, Secretary of 

State Rice traveled to Tokyo to reaffirm the U.S. nuclear commitment to Japan. Our 

extended nuclear deterrent is perhaps the most important and least recognized nuclear nonproliferation tool in existence. To risk understatement, nuclear proliferation will accelerate dramatically if close allies continue to lose confidence in the U.S. 

extended nuclear deterrent. This point has been made explicitly in recent conversations with Japanese officials. As various nuclear disarmament proposals emerge, we 

need to be conscious of this continuing importance of our extended nuclear deterrent. 

Despite the NPR’s call for more diverse U.S. capabilities to meet the needs of a 

new geopolitical environment, much remains to be done. There are three contemporary strategic programs that are particularly important to deterrence, extended 

deterrence and the assurance of U.S. allies: these are the Reliable Replacement 

Warhead (RRW); strategic and regional BMD; and, a new capability for non-nuclear, 

prompt global strike. 

The RRW Program is intended to provide safety and security improvements in the 

nuclear arsenal, the potential for increased long-term confidence without nuclear 

testing, long-term cost savings, and to sustain the U.S. nuclear technical and engineering communities. It will also support the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent and 

thus our nonproliferation goals by helping to sustain the confidence of our allies in 

our nuclear umbrella. 

In an era of deterrence uncertainty, strategic and regional BMD are important for 

our own protection and for the assurance of key allies increasingly subject to emerging nuclear and missile threats. During the Cold War, many considered deterrence 

and BMD to be incompatible. Now, they are fully compatible, and continued support 

for our sea-based defenses, the multiple kill vehicle, and a new defensive site in Europe are particularly important. 

Finally, progress toward non-nuclear strategic capabilities has been slow; the only 

prompt, U.S. global strike options now available are nuclear missiles. The U.S. capability to strike with non-nuclear weapons against high value or fleeting targets at 

global ranges could contribute significantly to deterrence, the assurance of allies, 

and directly to counterproliferation. I agree strongly with General Cartwright that 

it is important to move forward on a non-nuclear capability for prompt global strike. 

In conclusion, there has been a significant shift away from the Cold War balance 

of terror concept consistent with a dramatically different geopolitical environment. 

It is true that all the details of this shift in thinking about deterrence and its implementation are not mature. But, recall that it took 25 years of intense debate before 

we achieved a working consensus on our Cold War strategic policies. We may not 

59

have 25 years of relative security to achieve a new working consensus this time 

around; we need to move forward thoughtfully and quickly. 


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Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Dr. Payne. 

Dr. Gallucci? 


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76

STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. GALLUCCI, DEAN, EDMUND A. 

WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 

Dr. GALLUCCI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to 

join this discussion of the future of our strategic nuclear forces. 

Mr. Chairman, let me start by providing what I think is my bottom line, and then work backwards to it. I think the bottom line 

for me is that the lower the level of our strategic forces, the better. 

The fewer, the better. If we can avoid qualitative augmentation of 

our forces, that would be better, too, for at least three reasons: 

The lower the number of nuclear weapons and delivery systems 

we have, the cheaper; the easier it is to secure these forces, the less 

likely we’ll have a case of unauthorized or accidental use. This is 

all assuming that the reductions are accomplished together with 

the Russians, as Dr. Drell said. 

Second, if we can, in fact, lower force levels, we, and others who 

are nuclear weapons states, will more easily meet our obligations 

under the Nuclear NPT to engage in serious disarmament, and 

that is good for our efforts to discourage the spread of nuclear 

weapons. 

Third, and most important, and it is a theme for me, if we can 

continue to lower, to the absolute lowest levels, our nuclear forces, 

and avoid qualitative augmentation, we send a signal of 

delegitimizing nuclear weapons as an element in our force structure. That, over the long-term, is, in fact, I think, the most important thing that we can do. 

Let me go to the question of what we might use nuclear weapons 

for these days, because these days are different than past days. If 

I had two boxes, and in one box, I were going to put the threats 

that come from nuclear weapons, and then another box, threats 

that come from other sources that might require the use of our nuclear forces, let me say that, in the first box of nuclear threats, I 

can think of three, in descending order of importance, that you 

ought to consider. The first is the possibility that some terrorist 

group would acquire a nuclear weapon and use it against an American city. The second is that there might be an accidental or unauthorized launch of a nuclear weapon at the United States or an 

American ally. Third, that there might actually be the 

premedicated attack on the United States or an ally by a nuclear 

weapons state. Those are the three threats that I would propose to 

address. 

The first, the most likely, is that a terrorist group, al Qaeda or 

an al Qaeda cousin, would acquire a nuclear weapon and introduce 

it into the United States. It seems to me that that is a threat 

against which we have neither a defense nor a deterrent. It is unlikely that we’ll, either now or in the near future, develop much 

confidence in our ability to interdict the unconventional delivery of 

a nuclear weapon crossing our border—by a shipping container, a 

truck, or a boat—that we will have that kind of control over our 

borders seems implausible to me. So, interdiction is unlikely. 

Deterrence, if your enemy values your death more than his life, 

is very difficult. So, neither defense nor deterrence seems like a 

way to deal with the most likely threat we confront over the next 

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sources and energy into figuring out how to prevent these groups 

from getting either a manufactured nuclear weapon or the fissile 

material to produce one. 

That seems to me to lead us in a direction not only of trying to 

secure fissile materials, but also trying to figure out what we might 

use our nuclear forces for in connection with this threat. 

It seems to me that it is possible, if we are able to do two 

things—one is to attribute a nuclear weapon, either before it is detonated or after it is detonated, to its source—the weapon, or, more 

likely the fissile material—then we have the possibility of trying to 

persuade or convince any state that might consider providing that 

material not to do it, in order to avoid retaliation from the United 

States. 

Now, there are two scenarios that immediately occur in this connection, and one is that the material was actually transferred by 

a country that decided to sell or transfer it. Candidates might be 

North Korea or, in the future, Iran. The other case, perhaps more 

likely, is where there’s not actually an intentional transfer, where 

there is what you might call ‘‘leakage.’’ Material comes out of Russia, or it comes out of Pakistan. These cases present different sorts 

of problems. 

In the first case, I think a good old-fashioned classical deterrent 

threat is in order. That is to say that if we discover that a country 

has purposefully transferred fissile material or a nuclear weapon to 

a terrorist group, we ought to be telling them in advance that we 

will treat them as though they were the one who launched the attack, and they should expect devastating retaliation. In the other 

case, it’s a bit more difficult, but I would suggest, as a matter of 

policy, that we say, if a country is found to have been the source 

of the material, even if it did not purposefully transfer it, but if it 

had, in a negligent way, failed to secure that material, that we will 

do the same thing; that is to say, to treat it as though it had 

launched the attack. The objective here is obviously to provide a little bit more incentive for that country to secure those materials. 

In neither case would I suggest we be promising a nuclear retaliatory response, but that response ought to be available to the 

President of the United States, and it ought to be credible. 

One more point on this most difficult case, and that is that it 

suggests the possibility that we might want to, at some point, consider a pre-emptive or preventive strike. Now, unlike retaliation, I 

don’t believe—if we get into the world of needing to strike in a preemptive or preventive way—I don’t believe that the use of a nuclear weapon would be appropriate. I think we ought to have a conventional force structure that permits us to launch such a strike 

in a conventional way. Even then, of course, it should be as truly 

a last resort. The first case. 

The second case, which I regard as not very likely, but plausible, 

is an accidental launch or an unauthorized launch. All I would say 

about that is that we should work harder in order to increase the 

amount of time it takes to launch a strike, to, in other words, 

change the alert status of our deployed forces so that this unauthorized or accidental launch becomes even less likely. 

The third case is the one that we typically use to size our forces 

and that is the need to have a deterrent to deal with the possibility 

78

of a premedicated strike on the United States or one of its allies. 

It is, to me, a very unlikely development, because I do believe deterrence has worked, and will work. All I will really say about this 

is that I would associate myself with Dr. Drell’s comments. It 

seems to me hard to understand why we could not reduce our strategic nuclear forces to maybe half of what right now is the bottom 

number under the START arrangement with the Russians, which—

I believe that number is 1,700—why some hundreds of nuclear 

weapons deployed aboard submarines, while maybe reducing the 

fractionation of the individual missiles to increase the survivability 

of the submarines even further, and continuing to maintain the 

ICBM force at lower levels, and continuing to maintain a bomber 

force, with both ALCMs and gravity bombs, and the Reserve Force 

comparably configured and sized, wouldn’t be enough for this mission; and it would then go in the direction that I initially suggested 

would be good for lots of reasons, which is to say, to reduce substantially the amount of forces that we actually deploy. 

If it’s the other box, though—if those are the three nuclear 

threats, there are other threats which this administration has alluded to in various statements and publications, and they go to 

other threats that the United States may be subjected to, particularly with WMD, that are non-nuclear—in other words, the biological or chemical weapons threats—where the United States might 

wish to use nuclear weapons. 

I am quite suspicious of this argument. I find all this suspect as 

an argument. Before one would use a nuclear weapon for these 

missions, one would have to have extraordinary confidence in our 

intelligence about these facilities and their status. After more than 

20 years in government, focusing on just these problems, I rarely 

saw such a thing. I wonder whether we will, in fact, see such a 

thing. 

Then there’s the question of why we would want to have specialeffects weapons beyond those low-yield weapons which we now 

have. Presumably, we would want to have them, because they 

would enhance the credibility of our use, because an enemy, if I understand this correctly, would, in a sense, be trying to figure out 

our tolerance for collateral damage. The less collateral damage we 

anticipated, the more likely they would conclude it would be that 

we would use these weapons; therefore, the more credible the 

threat, if I have all this right. This seems quite a reach, to me. It 

is a reach, in a number of ways, about whether we could, in fact, 

develop smaller-yield nuclear weapons that meet both tests—i.e., 

do better at the destruction of these sites than do our current 

small-yield weapons—and which still do not produce the collateral 

damage that we would find so politically and ethically unacceptable. 

Now, on balance, when I look at the arguments, I am not persuaded that it is worth the cost to us, politically, in fielding new 

special-effects weapons. The costs in having us move away from the 

de-emphasis on nuclear weapons and move in a direction of trying 

to demonstrate to the world that they are, in fact, quite usable, if 

you’re lucky enough to legitimately own them. That’s not, in my 

view, a very good message to send. 

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Finally, with some reluctance, I do want to make a comment or 

two about the idea of developing a new RRW. 

As I’ve understood this, this goes to the question of the durability 

of our confidence in the reliability of the current stockpile. It is, 

based upon my experience, passing strange that we would propose 

to improve this confidence by deploying a warhead, which we have 

not tested, to replace those warheads which we have tested. Now, 

if there are components that need to be replaced, and, therefore, 

the system, as Dr. Drell said, would not have been tested with the 

new component, I can understand that, to some degree. But I do 

ask the question of when, in fact, these components need to be replaced, and I do wonder what this program that we have spent so 

much money on, which I had understood was designed to put us 

in a position to have confidence in our stockpile in a no-test environment, actually accomplished. 

If, ultimately, we deploy a weapon that we have not tested and 

would find necessary to test to have adequate reliability, then I do 

believe we would have the worst of all worlds, and we would have 

demonstrated that we wished to, again, put a special-effects weapon, in a sense, in our inventory, and we would have to consider the 

prospect of testing, which I think would be truly damaging to the 

message which is most important to convey. I say again, that message is that we wish to de-legitimize the use of nuclear weapons, 

the possession of nuclear weapons, and that message is something 

that we should seek to preserve. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gallucci follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ROBERT L. GALLUCCI

I want to thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to address some of the 

issues related to policy options for the future strategic nuclear force posture of the 

United States. I would like to begin by addressing three types of threats from nuclear weapons, in descending order of importance, that confront our country: first, 

the threat of a nuclear weapon delivered by a terrorist group and detonated in an 

American city; second, the threat of an accidental or unauthorized strike on the 

United States by a nuclear weapons state; and third, the threat posed by a premeditated attack on the United States or one of its allies by a nuclear weapons 

state. 

The most likely threat comes from a terrorist group such as al Qaeda. If al Qaeda 

could acquire a nuclear weapon, few doubt that it would try to use it. Since it would 

deliver such a weapon by unconventional means—such as a boat, truck, or shipping 

container—we should not have much confidence in our ability to interdict this kind 

of a border crossing now or in the near future. Since al Qaeda members are known 

for valuing our death more than their life, neither should we expect to deter them. 

Lacking either defense or deterrence against this threat, we should put our energy 

and resources into preventing al Qaeda from acquiring either a manufactured nuclear weapon or the fissile material to make one. This means that we must persuade 

those countries with nuclear weapons or fissile material to secure them against unauthorized transfer—which we might call ‘‘leakage’’—and deter them from any authorized sale or transfer. 

For a variety of reasons, when it comes to leakage, we ought to be particularly 

concerned about Russia and Pakistan, and when it comes to intentional transfer, 

two different countries appear most worrisome, North Korea and, eventually, Iran. 

The question, then, is what policies should we adopt to persuade some countries to 

secure nuclear weapons and materials to our standard, and deter others form deciding to sell such weapons or materials. The first part of the answer is that we must 

develop the capability to identify the source of a nuclear weapon or the fissile material at its core, whether we should find it before detonation or have only the debris 

it produces to analyze after detonation. If we can accomplish this attribution with 

high confidence, through a combination of scientific forensic analysis and intelVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:38 Dec 10, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\39487.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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ligence collection and analysis, and we can convince other countries that we can do 

this, then we can take the next step in persuasion and deterrence, that is, making 

a credible threat of retaliation. For those states that would intentionally transfer 

a nuclear weapon or fissile material, the deterrent threat is relatively straight forward, that is, to treat those countries as though they had launched the attack and 

to pose to them the prospect of devastating consequences, without excluding the use 

of nuclear weapons, if the United States or one of it allies should be the victim of 

a nuclear attack. 

For those states that we are concerned might leak a nuclear weapon or fissile material to a terrorist group, and fail to take actions that we regard as reasonable and 

prudent to secure their weapons and material, we should warn them also that we 

will treat them as though they were negligent and thus as though they had 

launched the attack. The American public would demand no less. In neither the case 

of transfer nor leakage would our response necessarily involve nuclear retaliation, 

but in both cases the President should have the option of a precise nuclear response 

with as little collateral damage as possible. Obviously, if we are to gain the advantage of what may be called ‘‘expanded deterrence’’ to prevent leakage, countries such 

as Russia and Pakistan must be told that we have adopted this posture. 

Beyond the missions of deterrence and expanded deterrence, we should also consider the force requirements of pre-emption and preventive war to deal with this 

threat. In contrast to a retaliatory strike, there is no reason to create the option 

to use a nuclear weapon to strike another country in order to prevent the transfer 

of fissile material or a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group, or to stop a country from 

even acquiring the capability to accumulate such weapons or material. But there is 

every reason to maintain the capability for pre-emptive or preventive strikes in our 

conventional force structure, even though we should see such options as a last resort. 

This brings us to the second type of threat posed by nuclear weapons, that from 

the accidental or unauthorized launch of a nuclear weapon against the United 

States. Although this threat may arise from more countries in the future, for now 

it is almost exclusively one that is posed by Russian strategic nuclear systems. The 

best way for the United States to reduce the risk of such a launch would be to seek 

agreement with Moscow to measures that would, for both countries, reduce the alert 

status of our delivery systems, increasing the time required to launch strategic nuclear weapons. 

The third type of threat, a pre-meditated nuclear attack on the United States or 

one of its allies by another nuclear weapons state, is the least likely event, but the 

one which guides our thinking in determining the basic size and character of our 

nuclear forces, just as it did decades ago when we confronted a hostile Soviet Union 

with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. Today, and for the foreseeable future, 

the only country against which our deterrent could conceivably be tested is Russia, 

and neither that country’s intentions nor capabilities would seem to require the 

number of warheads and delivery systems which we plan to deploy and hold in Reserve in the future in order to maintain a high level of confidence in our deterrent 

capability. It is hard to understand why it would not be enough to have some hundreds of warheads on deployed systems—Trident submarines, with a reduced number of warheads per missile in order to increase range and survivability, silo-based 

intercontinental ballistic missiles, and bomber aircraft with gravity bombs and airlaunched cruise missiles—in addition to Reserve Forces of comparable size and composition. In short, this classic threat would arguably require less than half the 1,700 

warheads permitted by the lower end of the range of deployed strategic nuclear warheads allowed under the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty. Those who argue 

that more is required of our strategic forces for this mission should be made to justify the assertion, without reference to any additional missions for our strategic nuclear forces. 

None of the three nuclear threats just identified justify increases in our nuclear 

forces, and indeed I am suggesting that they may be accomplished at lower levels 

of forces. If we can substantially reduce force levels, there are real benefits to the 

national security to be realized, particularly if matched by Russia, and eventually 

by others. Let me identify three such benefits. First, the fewer the warheads and 

delivery systems that are deployed and maintained in Reserve, the easier it would 

be to secure them against theft and against accidental or unauthorized launch, and 

the less the need for fissile material to field them. Second, if nuclear forces can be 

reduced, it would help address the obligation of the United States and other nuclear 

weapons states party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to engage in serious 

disarmament. Third, and most important, lowering the level of nuclear forces demonstrates a reduced dependence on nuclear weapons to achieve legitimate security 

81

objectives, which in turn contributes to a critical international norm of delegitimatizing the acquisition of nuclear weapons. 

The other missions that have been identified for our nuclear forces are meant to 

improve our ability to deal with rogue states or terrorist groups and, particularly 

their intention or ability to attack the United States with chemical or biological 

weapons. The idea seems to be that we can better deter attacks on us by having 

new, smaller yield (and thus more credibly usable) nuclear weapons to use against 

these states or groups, and that we can better defend against attacks by having special effects nuclear weapons that are more capable of destroying an enemy’s buried 

chemical or biological weapons facilities. Both these propositions are suspect. First, 

we already have small yield nuclear weapons in our inventory to impress rogues and 

terrorists, if indeed they care about what we may regard as acceptable collateral 

damage. Second, serious questions have been raised about our ability to produce a 

nuclear weapon whose ability to destroy underground weapons production or storage 

facilities significantly exceeds that which can be achieved with existing nuclear or 

conventional weapons—without producing politically and ethically unacceptable collateral damage. In short, given the incentives to avoid additions to our nuclear force, 

a convincing case for nuclear weapons designed to attack these targets has yet to 

be made. 

If neither nuclear nor non-nuclear threats would require additions to our nuclear 

forces, and there are good reasons to try to reduce those forces, are there other reasons to consider augmenting our force posture? There are at least two more reasons 

that should be considered. One is a unique mission that is neither a case of classic 

deterrence nor defense; the other is the more general need to maintain confidence 

in the reliability of our nuclear forces without resorting to nuclear weapons testing. 

We have until now considered nuclear and non-nuclear threats to the national security that might require nuclear weapons for deterrence or defense. There is, in 

addition, at least one scenario in which we might wish to threaten the first use of 

nuclear weapons, or actually launch a first strike, in order to forestall the use of 

conventional forces against U.S. interests: it is the Taiwan contingency. It is possible, at some future date, that China will seek to resolve the status of Taiwan by 

the use of force and the United States would then want to prevent this outcome 

without engaging in a massive conventional war so far from America’s shores and 

so close to China’s. In such a scenario, the threat to escalate to the strategic nuclear 

level by launching a disarming first strike against Chinese strategic nuclear forces 

might be an option the United States would want to preserve or create. Indeed, current Chinese plans for modernizing its strategic nuclear forces are at least in part 

aimed at increasing their survivability against just such a first strike, that is, at 

creating a deterrent. Our current plans to deploy even a thin defense against ballistic missiles aimed at the United States further complicate China’s plans for such 

a deterrent. 

The most prudent way to assess this scenario is in the larger strategic and political context. From such a perspective, it is profoundly in America’s interest to maintain a nuclear force posture and a conventional force structure designed to meet our 

national security needs without ever resorting to the first use of nuclear weapons. 

While this proposition is relevant to some of the other missions envisioned for our 

forces mentioned earlier, it is most critical to addressing the China-Taiwan scenario 

because it bears directly on the motivation for Chinese calculations about their own 

strategic nuclear force requirements. In sum, our choice of policies for our strategic 

nuclear forces might some day be sensitive to Chinese strategic nuclear force deployments, but our legitimate defense and deterrent needs with respect to China can 

be met now and for the foreseeable future, at existing or substantially lower force 

levels. 

Finally, there is the issue of whether or not it is necessary to develop and deploy 

a new nuclear warhead so that we will be able to maintain confidence in the reliability of our nuclear forces for a longer amount of time than we otherwise might. 

Now, if such a new nuclear warhead were to be introduced to replace our existing, 

nuclear warheads, without first testing it, a serious question arises about why we 

would think it more reliable than the well-tested warheads to be retired. On the 

other hand, if the replacement warhead would eventually require testing in order 

to sustain the confidence we have in the reliability of our stockpile, then we should 

consider the implications of resumed nuclear weapons testing for our national security. Suffice it to say, that while many continue to argue against the benefits of our 

future adherence to a treaty banning further nuclear weapons testing—arguments 

which I do not accept—the disadvantages of eventually resuming the testing of nuclear weapons are undeniable. If there is a theme that runs through this presentation, it is that our Nation’s security is best served by taking steps that de-emphaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:38 Dec 10, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\39487.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
82

size the relevance and utility of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons testing undermines that proposition.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, to all three of you. 

Now, what we want to do is just have a conversation here. 

Senator Sessions? 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I think we have our other colleagues 

here, and I’ll be here a while, and they might have other——

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. 

Senator SESSIONS.—things. So——

Senator BILL NELSON. Let’s see, who came first? 

Senator Ben Nelson? 

Senator BEN NELSON. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BILL NELSON. The other part of the full Nelson. [Laughter.] 

Senator BEN NELSON. Just down the hall from the other Nelson. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

Dr. Drell, you commented in your written testimony, and you 

said it, as well, in your oral testimony, that over 40 countries are 

pursuing nuclear technology. Now, in many cases, we believe—believe, and I emphasize that—it’s for civilian power. But we all understand that once uranium has been enriched for peaceful purposes, it can, and is probably being harnessed for other uses that 

don’t correspond with our desire for security. You argue that the 

both the U.S. and the Russian Federation should reduce their 

stockpiles. Of course, I think many would say that, in a world with 

so many countries desiring to join what you call the nuclear club, 

we shouldn’t be reducing our stockpiles. So, where we have some 

people saying, as you are, that perhaps mutually reducing stockpiles would be beneficial, and others are now saying that’s not the 

case. 

We know that we don’t need a Cold War II, even though Cold 

War I is over, but how do you—what is the response that you really make to those who don’t want us to reduce our stockpile because 

they believe we’re really going to need this, with 40 countries developing and no real capability, short of perhaps some sort of a 

launch against their locations, that we really do need to have a 

strong and robust stockpile? 

Dr. DRELL. Thank you. My first comment is that the urgent need 

we have, at the moment, is to develop a process for gaining control 

of the enrichment process. When I say 40 countries, I’m saying 

there are countries with nuclear reactors; they’ve bought them or 

they’re using them. There are not 40 countries that can enrich uranium. So, the efforts which this administration has put forward, 

that President Putin has put forward, that the International Atomic Energy Agency, under Dr. ElBaradei has put forward, to gain 

control of the enrichment process, to try to guarantee a fuel for the 

reactors for peaceful research, but not have them develop indigenously the capacity to enrich uranium, so—in fact, the whole fuel 

cycle would be one that would be controlled. The mechanism has 

to be worked out politically, to what extent it’s IAEA, to what extent it is nuclear nations. That is to be worked out. But the fact 

is—the key is to maintain control of the enrichment process, because without that, then, indeed, we are in great trouble. But——

Senator BEN NELSON. Well——

83

Dr. DRELL.—then, for instance, when it comes to turning back—

again, the question is, when we start reducing numbers, you have 

to ask how many targets there are for you—

Senator BEN NELSON. Right. 

Dr. DRELL.—because when you’re talking about a country just 

beginning to develop an enrichment capacity or a few weapons, 

that doesn’t present you with hundreds or thousands of targets. So, 

a careful balance of how many targets you have, and, therefore, 

how many warheads you would need. In our study that I mentioned, Dr. Goodby and I looked at the Russian problem; if they 

were to come down, and we looked at the targets of military control, political control, and of weapons that were mentioned in the 

NPR, we said, there, that there aren’t more than a few hundred 

targets. That’s how we came up with 500 deployed and 500 reserves. It’s a quantitative question. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Well, that certainly would apply to, perhaps, the current situation with respect to the former Soviet Union, 

and particularly Russia, but, with other countries having the capability of enriching in the future, what does that say? How could 

we—if we reduce the stockpile, under what terms do we find that 

we might need to increase it, if, in 10 years or 20 years, the rest 

of the world, these other countries, are now into enrichment? I 

agree, controlling enrichment is a good part of it, but enriched uranium can still be sold, purchased, and get into the wrong hands. 

How will we be sure that we have enough stockpiled? 

Dr. DRELL. Dr. Payne said it very well, we need a better intelligence system on these things. The intelligence challenge now is 

greater than it was during the Cold War. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Yes. 

Dr. DRELL. So, the number—and one of the reasons I said we 

have to maintain an infrastructure—it’s called Stockpile Infrastructure 2030 or something like that—is because we have to be able to 

respond, if the need arises, because the enrichment process gets 

out of control. 

So, there are a number of things we have to do. Have good intelligence, have the political process, with the cooperation of all the 

Nations that have signed the NPT—that’s all but four Nations in 

the world, after all—have them cooperate with us in this effort to 

prevent the spread of the material with the additional verification 

requirements that we are working on to bolster the NPT. We have 

to maintain the weapons for deterrence. If the danger grows, if our 

effort to constrain the spread of the nuclear weapons material and 

enrichment capacity fails, indeed, we’re going to have a larger 

stockpile. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Well, but won’t we be violating agreements 

that we’ve entered into with others? Can we do that unilaterally? 

Dr. DRELL. We hope to have agreements. At the moment, our 

agreements stand that by 2012 we will have between 1,700 and 

2,200 deployed strategic forces, and there’s still a large number in 

back. I used a number of about 5,000. There is no specified number, but that seems to be the kind of number that’s talked about 

and that both Russia and the United States have in the stockpile. 

Five thousand is an awful large number, when you consider the 

number of targets. 

84

Senator BEN NELSON. Okay. One further question, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Payne, in your written testimony, you commented on deterrence, and especially your views on non-nuclear capabilities, like 

prompt global strike. I appreciate those comments very well. I also 

agree with General Cartwright, who is the Commander of a Combatant Command of Strategic Command and Space Command, that 

we need this capability of prompt global strike. Senator Sessions 

and I worked, last year, on converting the Trident submarine to 

having non-nuclear capabilities, recognizing that time to act is 

short, and access may be denied or difficult. So, we really do have 

to be in a situation that requires a quick strike on a mobile ballistic missile launcher, for a high-value target, or whatever the situation may be, We do need that. We were unable to get it accomplished last year. If we don’t convert Trident missiles for a prompt 

global strike, how long are we away from a strategic non-nuclear 

response, without that? 

Dr. PAYNE. General Cartwright has mentioned in testimony—and 

I’ll just use the numbers that he’s presented—that, under normal 

circumstances, we would be 2 to 3 days away from having a nonnuclear capability, under the current situation; if we were very fortunate and had forces generated and in the area, we might be as 

little as a day away. So, the distinction in the timelines is fairly 

important. If there is a fleeting target or a very urgent target that 

needs to be addressed in a timeframe shorter than 1 to 3 or 4 days, 

then this capability is essential. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Dean Gallucci, when you were discussing the hardest cases, some 

type of terrorist getting hold of material, what we have to do, and 

what would be helpful, is if we could identify the source of that material, which leads to this issue of the forensics of the nuclear material. Is it possible to catalog the source of nuclear material, from 

a technical sense, so that, at least conceptually, we could identify, 

and then, having identified, be able to attribute that to a nationstate or some entity that we could deter or at least retaliate? Is 

that possible? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. Senator, what I think I know about this is that 

the answer is pretty clear, that we have some signatures we have 

collected over decades that would allow us, for example, in the first 

instance, if you don’t have an unexploded weapon, but you’re essentially in the business of analyzing debris, you could tell whether it 

was a plutonium core or whether it was a uranium core. If it was 

a uranium core, you might be able to quickly tell whether the uranium was enriched in a diffusion process or a centrifuge process. 

If it was plutonium, you might be able to, through an analysis of 

the ratios of the isotopes, figure out what kind of reactor, and 

maybe even which reactor, the plutonium was produced in. So, 

there are a lot of ifs here, but you might be able to get to the point 

of identifying the source of the material. It did not help that A.Q. 

Khan played Johnny Appleseed with a particular kind of centrifuge 

and spread it hither and yon so that you would get a similar kind 

85

of signature from that uranium. But the bottom line here is, our 

laboratories are working on this. They’re prepared to do this, if necessary. We have some chance of this, and we have begun to talk 

about this, because, if we want to gain deterrence, the bad guys 

need to know that they might get caught. 

Senator REED. So, I assume that your view would be this would 

be a very worthwhile effort to pursue internationally, to try to develop a regime in which the producers of nuclear material are, either by self- declaration or inspection, sort of, list the products on 

the label so that if something goes off, we know. 

Dr. GALLUCCI. Yes. The idea of an inventory would, of course, 

have a lot of benefits to it. We’d have to worry about spoofing in 

the course of doing that. But, yes, I think everything we could do 

to be able to trace material back would be of benefit. 

Senator REED. Is this bought—supported outside the United 

States? I mean, are there international agencies and other countries who say, ‘‘We understand this is important, let’s do it’’? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. I’m sorry, Senator, I really don’t know that. That 

probably is knowable, but I just don’t know it. 

Senator REED. Right, okay. Very good. I don’t know if anyone 

else has a comment, but——

Let me turn to the Moscow Treaty, which is mentioned by Dr. 

Drell and others. It does call for a reduction by 2012, but the treaty 

is nonbinding, there’s no duration, it’s nonverifiable. Each side’s 

free to determine when something’s nonoperational, operational, 

and the question is, should the treaty be modified? Also, is it possible, within the scope of the treaty, to accelerate the reduction of 

the deployed nuclear weapons? I mean, this is one of those things 

that was announced with great fanfare a few years ago, and then 

suddenly it’s ancient history. So, Dr. Drell, and then Dr. Payne, if 

you’d comment? 

Dr. DRELL. It is an unusual feature of that treaty that it has no 

verification requirements written into it. On one hand, you can say 

that shows an evolution from a Cold War confrontation with an adversary to treating the Russians, now, more like England and 

France. You have to ask how far you want to go that way. I’m always comfortable when one has crisp, specific verification procedures, I have to say. How the evolution to a more cooperative relation should go politically—I’m a physicist, and I leave the strategic 

political judgment on how the governments are getting along to 

Washington. I have a little feeling that it’s progress if we have a 

relation with Russia that does allow a certain element of trust. 

But, the bottom line, you have to verify. 

We certainly could make more rapid the implementation of the 

Treaty of Moscow provisions. We could, for example, deactivate 

weapons that are being decreased out of the line. We could agree 

that, of the weapons that are in the 5,000, but not the deployed 

1,700 to 2,200, we could agree that we don’t need that many of 

them. We could look at the remaining battlefield weapons, the tactical weapons, forward deployed in Europe, and decide whether 

those couldn’t go. That really is a basis—a matter of political judgment of how our strategic relations with the Russians are going. 

Are they working cooperatively as our partner, as they seem to be 

86

onboard in North Korea and now in the Iranian discussion, or are 

there problems? I’m not an expert there. 

Senator REED. Dr. Payne? 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, sir. The treaty is binding between the two parties. It’s not a nonbinding treaty. The requirement to reduce, by approximately two-thirds, the number of deployed nuclear forces is in 

the treaty, and will have to be abided by 2012. 

The question about accelerating reductions, the answer is, yes, 

sir, reductions can be accelerated. In fact, that was mentioned specifically by the U.S. in 2002. Indeed, part of the presentation of the 

NPR showed periodic assessments of the situation, the geopolitical 

situation, so that if the geopolitical situation was such that those 

reductions could be accelerated, we could go ahead and pursue 

that. 

Another question, another factor, as to whether those reductions 

could be accelerated was how well the United States was doing 

with regard to the development and deployment of advanced conventional forces and defensive capabilities. If we were progressing 

and maturing smartly towards advanced conventional and defensive capabilities, the thought was there may be enough mitigation 

of risks so that those reductions could be accelerated. 

Another factor is the political condition. Looking out over 10 

years, at that time, no one felt comfortable that their crystal ball 

was good enough to be able to predict what the geopolitical relationship would be like 10 years down the line. So, again, the idea 

was that we would have periodic assessments of the situation so 

that those reductions could be accelerated if the political conditions 

called for it. 

The last point, I guess, of the question had to do with 

verification. Let me note, because it wasn’t noted earlier, that the 

verification regime was to be derived from the existing START regime, with extensive verification provisions. That, then, really 

leads to the question that was brought up earlier this morning, and 

that is, what about START after 2009?—because the verification 

provisions for the Moscow Treaty are embedded in START. So, the 

real question isn’t that there’s no verification. There’s considerable 

verification for the Moscow Treaty. The question is, what happens 

to START after 2009, and to those pertinent verification provisions? 

Senator REED. That would suggest, when START expires, in 

2009, we could think about modifying the existing treaty, the Moscow Treaty. 

But one of the problems, I think, with the Moscow Treaty is that 

there’s no timetable, there’s no necessity to reduce any single weapon until, I presume, 2012, when the term of the treaty expires. So, 

literally we could be sitting, at 11:59 on the last day and, I guess, 

announce that we’re reducing all our weapons, but then, the next 

day, the treaty’s expired, and there’s no legal binding requirement 

to make this reduction. In other words, it’s a rather odd arms-control treaty. Also, my sense is that nothing is really taking place. 

I don’t notice any action between the United States and Russia to 

begin serious discussions to—even a symbolic reduction of weapons. 

So, it is somewhat troubling. 

87

Let me just go back to one question that was raised previously 

by Senator Nelson, and that is the discussion about taking conventional weapons and putting them on Trident submarines. Dean 

Gallucci, do you have a notion about that? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. Senator, I think everybody knows that there are 

two contending values here. One is that I, like everybody else, 

would like to have the capability—be able to accomplish this mission of a prompt conventional strike against a fleeting, but important target. Then the other good is, of course, never to plan to do 

anything that—to accomplish that first mission—that might be 

misconstrued as the initial launch of a first strike from a strategic 

system. So, I come to this with enormous skepticism, and would 

want to be completely persuaded that in no such circumstance 

would we be attempting to do this and running any risk of being 

misunderstood. I think there are political disadvantages to it, too, 

but I am, if you can catch the tenor of my voice here, hesitant 

about this. I guess, at this moment, I would say I am still unconvinced, but that may be because of my own ignorance. I worry a 

great deal that we not get into a situation in which a submarine 

on station and from a particular box launches a strike which now 

the Russians, later the Chinese, view as a pre-emptive strike, depending, of course—this all depends upon what the context is—for 

example is it a crisis context, a context that goes beyond the target 

state to other states? It is just such an enormous concern that it 

has to be addressed. If it is absolutely put aside, and there is no 

downside, from that perspective, then, of course, as a mission, I 

would like us to have that capability. 

Senator REED. Dr. Drell? 

Dr. DRELL. May I make a short comment on that? 

Clearly, there are some needs for prompt global strike in the 

world. I would make three technical comments. 

The first one, and most important, is what Bob Gallucci just said, 

there must be no ambiguity that the system is non-nuclear. So, the 

idea of mixing the loadings of a Trident sub seems to me the worst 

possible danger. If you can do it clearly—this is a non-nuclear system—I think that’s essential. 

But there are two other technical points which I think need to 

be looked at. We’re talking about something that’s prompt. We’re 

going to get it in less than a day. We’re going to get it in an hour 

or so. That means we must be able to locate it, at all times if a 

mobile target, with precision, because a conventional warhead, a 

few hundred pounds of high explosive does not have a very large 

kill radius, and you’re talking about sending something thousands 

of miles, and getting very precisely accurate. One has to be sure 

that the target position location can be, in realtime, established 

that way. I think one wants to, but that’s not an easy order. That’s 

not impossible. It’s not an easy order. It’s a technical demand that 

has to be addressed and understood before one thinks one has anything. 

The other thing is, the United States is a global power with 

bases around the world, and there are other technologies, including 

drones and other systems, that are nearby. Again, one has to ask 

the alternative advantages and disadvantages. 

88

So, I think these are legitimate questions. They’re hard questions. But the lack of ambiguity in what we’re doing, non-nuclear, 

is, to me, overwhelming. 

Senator REED. Dr. Payne? 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, sir. Let me just comment briefly on the concern 

over the possible Russian response to an at-sea launch of the conventionally-armed Trident, because this question was thought 

through at great length, with, I think, reasonable provisions to 

mitigate the possibility of a Russian misinterpretation. 

But with regard to that question, let me just mention that the 

United States has, according to all the unclassified sources, over 

1,100 at-sea launches of submarine-launched ballistic missiles 

(SLBM) in the test program over the years. Through 1988, we had 

no notification provisions to the Soviet Union. After 1988, we had 

notification provisions established, and we carried through with 

those notifications to the Soviet Union that we would be launching 

a SLBM in the appropriate timeframe, in the appropriate direction. 

So, there’s a long, long history of U.S./Soviet and now U.S./Russian 

relations with regard to notification for the safe launching of nonnuclear ballistic missiles, and there’s been no problem, there’s been 

no misinterpretation, there have been no problems such as folks 

have mentioned with regard to a possible Russian misinterpretation. 

I wouldn’t be as confident in this, other than I look back, with 

1,100 launches, open-sea launches of SLBMs, and we have provisions, since 1988, of notifying the Russians—Soviets then, Russians 

now—in that regard, as do the British have provisions for notifying 

the Russians with regard to their at-sea launches. So, I understand 

the concern. I agree we need to absolutely minimize the concern of 

a Russian misinterpretation. I’m also confident that we’ve already 

gone a long way towards that over the last 40 years. 

Senator REED. I thank you. Just a final comment. You’ve been 

most kind, Mr. Chairman. Given the emergency circumstances 

where a missile like this would be launched, and particularly not 

in a designated range where these other tests have taken place, it 

might be very difficult to notify even our senior command of this 

decision, let alone the Russians. It would be unusual, by definition, 

and I’m not as sanguine about the record of test launches and 

ranges. I went on a D–5 shoot off of Cape Canaveral, which the—

you could tell—and it’s boilerplate, and the Russians have seen it 

for years and years and years. This would be, I think, something 

much, much different, probably a surprise to many people in the 

Department of Defense, not only the Russians. 

Mr. Chairman? 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, assuming that you could get over 

that threshold of it being understood that this was not a nuclear 

launch, the question left hanging is the question of, does it offer 

a deterrence to a state or a nonstate actor? 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, sir. I believe that a prompt global strike, the 

conventional Trident or an alternative, could provide enormous deterrent advantages, including for extended deterrence. Let me give 

you a couple of reasons why. 

First, one of the factors that contributes to the assurance of our 

allies is the notion that the United States can be promptly involved 

89

if, in fact, they suffer from an attack. This capability would certainly signal very quickly, that the United States was involved in 

their security on their behalf, and the anticipation of that should 

have a deterring effect on opponents, foes of our friends and allies, 

who think that the United States might be able to either stay out 

entirely, might stay out entirely, or might be out long enough for 

them to create a fait accompli. So, I see this prompt global strike 

as being very helpful with regard to deterrence, particularly extended deterrence. 

In addition, we know that, for example, the PRC sees conventional ballistic missiles as what they call their ‘‘pocket of excellence,’’ an area they excel in. For the United States not to be involved in the capability that they put so much store on is, in a 

sense, an incentive to move forward in that direction for folks that 

we might prefer to move in other ways. 

So, I see the prompt global strike being useful for deterrence, 

being useful for now what’s called dissuasion, trying to suggest to 

folks that they not move in those directions, because it’s not an 

open avenue for them to have a pocket of excellence. 

Senator BILL NELSON. What do the other two of you think about 

that, the question of the deterrence? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. I don’t think, even if we were completely free of 

our concern about the ambiguity of a strategic nuclear strike by 

using a Trident submarine for the launch, that I would be doing 

this for deterrent reasons. I think that I’d be doing it for strike reasons. We might get some deterrence out of it; and the promptness 

is something that we would value. In certain circumstances, we 

might be able to do this with deployed forward forces, with cruise 

missiles. I think we shouldn’t overstate how much we’re going to 

get from this. I don’t think countries that are thinking of developing secret nuclear facilities or moving something from here to 

there are going to decide not to do it because there’s a submarine 

somewhere on the planet that might strike them. I just think we’re 

asking a little too much of this to do that. 

Dr. DRELL. I find it mainly a strike weapon, not a deterrent 

weapon. There are not many targets I can think of that are so important you have to get them within an hour, as opposed to a day. 

I think if we go—move to a world where we’re all going to have 

30-minute strike capabilities halfway around the world from each 

other, it’s not really the world I’d like to see us trying to develop. 

I would rather see us realizing that there is certain—value in time 

to think things through. But——

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Sessions? 

Dr. DRELL.—I’m not enamored with this weapon. 

Senator SESSIONS. I get worried about all these things. I’ll tell 

you what troubles me. So, in the next 5 years, we’re going to have 

reduced the size of our nuclear stockpile down to numbers we 

haven’t seen in 50 years, at the beginning of the Cold War. But I—

the critics say, ‘‘That’s not enough, we ought to go down to 500, or 

maybe less.’’ Strategic Command develops a proposed substitute, 

non-nuclear global strike capability to substitute for nuclear strike 

capability, with the conventional Trident modification. The critics 

say, ‘‘No, that’s risky.’’ The Nuclear Weapons Council approves continuing study of a replacement warhead that would be safer, more 

90

reliable, and more secure. We could replace aging warheads with 

the same capability, because they’re more reliable, perhaps have 

fewer of them. But critics are saying, ‘‘Well, we should stay out of 

the business of manufacturing warheads.’’ We observed China take 

out one of its own satellites. We worry about strategic vulnerability 

of our space assets. It would seem to make sense to study whether 

defensive capabilities could be deployed on satellites to protect 

them. The critics decide that defensive capabilities look too much 

like offensive capabilities, and so we shouldn’t have weapons in 

space, and they oppose that. I would just say to our witnesses, we 

have a lot of challenges out there. The objective of reducing nuclear 

dangers has a—and the number of weapons, certainly has an appeal. We would like to do that. But, continuing forward, as the 

‘‘Caucus of No’’ would say, does not, in my view, advance our national security. 

I think I would just ask you, maybe, to comment on that, and 

to comment on whether or not the reduction of our own stockpile 

and our self-imposed restraints—that are very costly financially, 

too, on occasion—are actually causing other nations not to develop 

nuclear weapons, or to reduce their capability, or cause nations not 

to develop a nuclear capability at all. Is that helping in any way? 

My time is short, I’ve rambled on. But, I mean, that’s the fundamental question, to me, as a person who feels a responsibility to 

defend this country. Where are we heading, Dr. Gallucci? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. When you read that litany of charges, essentially, 

I want to immediately leap and say, ‘‘Please do not confuse me 

with an advocate of unilateral disarmament or a pacifist.’’ I spent 

my career in government service, in political/military affairs of various kinds, and I’m——

Senator SESSIONS. I would just say that we voted down—Congress voted down the penetrator—actually, research on the penetrator, and they voted down the prompt global strike non-nuclear 

system last year. So, we’re in a deal here. 

Dr. GALLUCCI. But, having said what I said, I have argued here 

for the lowest appropriate levels of forces, which is to say half of 

the 1,700 might do, and Professor Drell was talking about 500 deployed, 500 reserved—that’s still a lot of nuclear weapons, with a 

lot of capacity for destruction. It has been classic for the United 

States to be worried about how much is enough. So, I think we can 

all be in that game of trying to assess how much is enough—trying 

to puzzle out what’s appropriate and look at what missions we 

want these weapons for. I think that’s what we’re doing here. 

I think suspicion of a particular weapon innovation really has to 

do with the instinct, which I really want as my takeaway from 

today from me, and that is instinct that we do not wish to call attention, internationally, unnecessarily, to nuclear weapons as an 

essential portion of a legitimate national defense establishment. 

We need nuclear weapons now—first and foremost, as a deterrent, 

so that others do not use them. If you ask all three of us, ‘‘is it a 

terrific idea to absolutely promise we will never use nuclear weapons first?’’ I don’t think any one of us want to say, ‘‘we’ll promise 

that,’’ but we want to get to the point where we’re able to accomplish our missions through the use of conventional forces, and the 

91

nuclear weapon is for a deterrent, and it’s for retaliation for the 

use of a nuclear weapon, and that’s it. 

So, I think in each or many of the points that are made in the 

statement you made, Senator, my reaction is that we ought to be 

looking very carefully at the RRW. A lot of this is quite technical, 

and questions of when, in fact, components of the existing nuclear 

weapons may deteriorate and reduce our confidence and reliability—how much time do we have? Is this weapon actually going 

to increase our confidence if it is for all time, an untested weapon? 

I have no way, independently, of assessing that, but I know that, 

in the end, I want us to get to a point where we do not need to 

test, that we’re confident in the reliability of our systems without 

testing, so that we can comfortably adhere to the Comprehensive 

Test Ban Treaty because of what that would mean politically as, 

again, a signal that we wish to de-emphasize the use of nuclear 

weapons for purposes other than deterrence. 

So, this all goes, I think, to one’s body posture. If there is a critique of what the administration has been putting forward in its 

various initiatives, it is the embrace of nuclear weapons for new 

missions, when we are looking to move away from the use of nuclear weapons to accomplish those missions. I think——

Senator SESSIONS. Well——

Dr. GALLUCCI.—that’s the rub. 

Senator SESSIONS.—I think body posture is—may be a factor that 

we certainly ought not to lose sight of, but I believe these nations 

are deciding, for their reasons. Iran is deciding, not on our body 

posture, but on—they’ve been working for a long time to have a nuclear weapon. Iraq was, had they not been stopped during the first 

Gulf War. Saudi Arabia, what are they going to do if Iran gets 

weapons? What about Egypt? What about Turkey? What about 

other countries? So, I’m not sure all that’s happening because of 

how we handle ourselves. 

But, Dr. Drell and Dr. Payne, if you’d just briefly respond to 

that. I know my time is a bit short. 

Dr. DRELL. Senator, I have devoted a lot of my life to concern 

about American security. I’m not a disarmer, I’m not a ‘‘no-firstuse-er,’’ but I want to say, as a technical person, we have to make 

the right choices. First we have to do what’s practical, and, second, 

we have to see how what we do may be interpreted elsewhere. 

When I looked at the earth-penetrator discussion, and I commented on it, to me the value of an earth penetrator was extremely 

limited militarily. If I want to get a deep underground target, I 

have to know where it is. Precision and accuracy of location and 

delivery means much more than just penetrating and then getting 

an order of magnitude more of the energy. We have big weapons 

that can get underground. We have a number of big weapons. We 

didn’t need that weapon, and it wouldn’t do us much good. It 

would, however, affect how our efforts at maintaining a nonproliferation regime are going to be seen, not by Iran or North 

Korea, but by the 185 nations who signed the NPT and have said, 

when they extended it into the indefinite future, ‘‘We have to, ourselves, accept some of the restraints. We have to work toward the 

comprehensive test ban. We have to work towards reduction,’’ beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:38 Dec 10, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00095 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\39487.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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cause that’s embedded in the treaty we have to use for their cooperation in trying to prevent this spread. 

When I talked about the RRW, I said, ‘‘We need an infrastructure to be able to respond and maintain nuclear weapons,’’ but I 

said, ‘‘Don’t go ahead and build an RRW, when you don’t know’’—

and I don’t believe any technical person can honestly say that we 

can make a safer, more reliable, more effective weapon without 

testing it. Until you know that you can do that, it’s a waste of 

money and it’s a politically provocative thing to do. I want to—and 

I recommend—let us get a serious consensus built among the weapons labs. There’s a report coming out, headed by a former weaponslab leader, Dr. Tarter, which has been discussed—it’s not fully released—saying exactly what I said. 

So, I am not a disarmer, but I believe we have to do sensible 

things. I think it’s important that we look at what other countries 

do, because I think getting rid of nuclear weapons as part of our 

policy is important, and I haven’t given up on that. 

I remember President Eisenhower saying so movingly, ‘‘the 

United States is determined to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma, to devote its entire heart and mind to finding the way by 

which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated 

to his death, but consecrated to his life.’’ 

President Reagan, the most extreme nuclear abolitionist who was 

ever President of this country, said, before he was President, during his presidency, and after, he said—he called for the abolishment of all nuclear weapons, which he considered—I’m quoting 

him—‘‘totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but 

killing, possibly destructive of life on Earth and civilization.’’ 

To my mind, we have to make the right technical decisions, and 

I support them, but we also have to be careful how the political effort that you gentleman make are going to be seen around the 

world, and help push forward a nonproliferation regime. 

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Payne? 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, sir. I agree with Dean Gallucci, that the lowest 

number of nuclear weapons compatible with security should be our 

goal. In fact, that’s the goal——

Senator SESSIONS. I’m pretty frugal. I agree with that, too. I 

don’t——[Laughter.] 

Dr. PAYNE. In fact, that’s the——

Senator SESSIONS. From a money point of view; I’m not sure it’s 

going to affect the psyche of some other nation, but—

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, sir. That’s, in fact, the same goal that the President gave to us, in the Department of Defense, as we were pursuing the NPR, the lowest number compatible with national security. 

So, then the question becomes, What’s that lowest number? Let 

me just make a couple remarks in that regard. 

First, with regard to President Reagan’s vision of denuclearization, let’s not forget what the other half of his vision was. That 

is, the condition of excellent, outstanding defensive capabilities for 

the United States, its friends, and its allies. It wasn’t nuclear—a 

nuclear-free world in the absence of those defenses; it was a potential for a nuclear-free world in the context of those defenses. So, as 

we think about these visions of moving forward, let’s not get out 

93

of sync if we’re going to use President Reagan as the model of how 

we want to talk about this. 

Second point concerns the notion that the lower we go with regard to nuclear weapons, the more capable you are of de-legitimizing nuclear weapons for others; that’s essentially the notion 

that we’ve talked about. Let me just note—and I tried to represent 

this in my prepared remarks—that if lowering numbers of nuclear 

weapons de-legitimizes our—the credibility of our extended deterrent, then that’s going to promote proliferation. It’s not going to 

prevent proliferation, it’s going to promote proliferation, because 

our extended deterrent, as I mentioned earlier, is, I believe, the 

single most important nonproliferation tool in existence. To maintain the credibility of our extended nuclear deterrence is the single 

most important thing we can do to contribute to nonproliferation. 

The example that I used earlier is the concern that the Japanese 

now have over the threat that they face and the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. Japanese representatives have now been explicit 

with regard to what that means for them and the possibility that 

they might be interested in a nuclear weapon. So, that connection 

between our extended nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation is 

profound, and its importance for our nonproliferation goal, I think, 

cannot be overstated. 

Let me suggest the next point, and that is, I don’t believe, for a 

moment, that lowering our levels of nuclear weapons is going to 

have a positive effect on so-called rogue states and their desire for 

nuclear weapons. Remember, when we think about trying to engage in nuclear nonproliferation, trying to get states that don’t 

want to have nuclear weapons in the first place, or cannot have nuclear weapons isn’t the hard problem; the hard problem is trying 

to move states who want nuclear weapons away from having them. 

Those, in the contemporary world, look like Iran and North Korea. 

Those are the states of concern. They don’t want nuclear weapons 

because we have nuclear weapons. They don’t mimic us, in that 

sense. They want nuclear weapons for lots of reasons of their own. 

Whether we have an arsenal that looks like 1,000 weapons or 4,000 

weapons, I don’t think is going to have a bit of an effect on the desire for—by either Iran or North Korea to have nuclear weapons. 

Senator SESSIONS. If we had negotiations with North Korea, and 

we cut our numbers down to 500, and they had 300 or 250, 

wouldn’t that change the tenor of those negotiations? 

Dr. PAYNE. Sir, remember that the——

Senator SESSIONS. Then, if they got to 500, wouldn’t that be 

somewhat different, also? 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, sir, it would. If you look at the reason why they 

want nuclear weapons, to the extent that they discuss it, it has 

much more to do with our conventional prowess, which is second 

to none in the world. They want nuclear weapons, in a sense, to 

be able to trump our conventional capability. It has nothing to do 

with the nature of our nuclear arsenal. 

Then, lets just conclude—and I appreciate the time, sir—it is 

that we don’t know the future. One of the reasons to be careful 

about nuclear reductions is because we don’t know the future. If we 

give up force structure now, it’s going to be extremely hard, and 

extremely expensive, to ever get that force structure back. If my 

94

crystal ball were good enough to say it’s going to be a benign future, we know Russia’s going to move in a good direction, we know 

China’s going to move in a good direction, then we could commit 

to these kind of reductions that are being discussed. But no one’s 

crystal ball’s that good, and, in a sense, we need to retain the force 

structure now to be able to reconstitute if the future moves in a 

less benign direction, because if we give up that force structure 

now, as I said, it’ll be very expensive and very hard to ever get it 

back. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think those are good comments. I certainly 

would like to keep our numbers down. But I don’t want a major 

misconception to occur in the world that somehow this country 

lacks the will to use the power we have to defend this Nation, and 

that anybody that steps over a certain line is subject, in itself, to 

assured destruction. I mean, I think that’s just where we are. We 

need to have that. I worry a little bit that everything that’s proposed in the strategic area is opposed, and we have a hard time 

passing it. 

I would note that we really are reducing our weapons. You go out 

to the Pantex plant in Texas, and there are warehouses and warehouses and bins of dismantled and destroyed warheads. We’re 

melting down those things. We really are making a historic move. 

I would note, for the record, that there’s no special-effects nuclearweapons proposals to develop that now. The robust nuclear earth 

penetrator was not funded. Congress did not accept that. The RRW 

conceptual design selected is very similar to the historical designs, 

and has a connection pedigree to hundreds of nuclear weapons 

tests conducted in the 1950s and 1960s. So, I think we probably 

could do that without testing. 

But I would just say, Mr. Chairman, I think it’s a healthy discussion. It is a healthy discussion. I would maybe ask, with a followup written question—my time is limited—but, what about the 

Triad? How much of that is still necessary today, the money that’s 

spent there? Is there some better utilization of that for our national 

defense? 

[The information referred to follows:]

I believe that the current Department of Defense (DOD) strategy for the nuclear 

triad makes sense. The DOD has reduced the size of each of the legs of the nuclear 

triad and is making the remaining force structure more flexible. For example, since 

the beginning of this administration, the DOD has reduced the number of 

deployable ballistic missile submarines from 18 to 12 (4 have been converted to 

cruise missile submarines, 2 will typically be in overhaul and unavailable for deployment). To add flexibility to the remaining ballistic missile submarine force, DOD 

has proposed developing and deploying precision conventional warheads on some 

Trident missiles on each of the deployed submarines. The size of the long-range 

bomber force has also been reduced. The size of the remaining bomber force is based 

on needs for conventional weapon roles in major combat contingencies. In addition, 

the ICBM force has been reduced in size; all Peacekeeper missiles have been retired. 

Only one type of ICBM—the Minuteman III—remains. A nuclear triad at much 

lower combined force levels than existed during the Cold War makes sense. But the 

many good reasons for maintaining a nuclear triad remain. For example, the existence of a triad helps to ensure that no existing or potential opponent can envisage 

a successful competition in nuclear arms or a practicable strategy of eliminating the 

U.S. deterrent via offensive operation. These are potentially critical contributions to 

U.S. and allied security. As I stated earlier, we must be careful as we consider further reductions in the triad force structure so that we don’t cut the force too deeply 

and find ourselves in an unintended position of weakness that invites challenges 

and provocations.

95

Senator SESSIONS. I’d just ask one question for our experts, briefly, if you would. Can a nation today—let’s say a closed, or even an 

open nation today—develop a nuclear weapon without us knowing 

it? I mean, how hard is it for a country to develop, secretly, a nuclear weapons program? 

Dr. Gallucci? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. I think the answer is certainly yes to that question, depending on the Nation. If the Nation already has fissile-material production facilities—in other words, it’s separating plutonium, particularly if it’s a certain kind of reactor that’s producing 

the plutonium, if it has an enrichment facility, then the possibility 

of producing the weapon secretly is there. This could be an advanced country, or it could be a country that is not so advanced if 

it has those facilities. 

While I have the floor, Senator, so that I don’t have a really terrible afternoon, let me say that at no point did I wish to convey 

that our decisions, or your decisions, about what we do with our 

force posture are going to have a particularly important effect on 

decisions that are made in Pyongyang or Tehran or these hard 

cases. But this discussion today, this hearing, was really about our 

broad force posture, as I understood it, and, when we’re thinking 

about something like that, we have to think that there are 9 nuclear-weapon states in the world, the 5 declared and the other 4, 

and there are not 90. But there are 189 countries out there, and 

we’d like to continue to have to worry about what North Korea and 

Iran are doing, and not 40 or 50 other countries. So, I think, while 

the body-posture issue—argument I was making is really, you’re 

quite right, irrelevant to the few hard cases who are going to make 

these kinds of regional decisions of their own, there are a lot of 

other countries out there which have decided not to acquire nuclear 

weapons, that could acquire them. I associate myself with Dr. 

Payne’s comment here, that our ability to extend deterrence is absolutely critical, and that has to be on the list of missions that our 

weapons need to be able to accomplish. So, I believe that’s true. I 

don’t believe we are particularly suspect with respect to extended 

deterrence, but I do believe that he is absolutely correct that that 

is something that we need to sustain. 

Thank you. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Is there unanimity in the panel on the 

proposition that less nations having nuclear weapons is a good 

thing? [Nodding of heads.] 

Okay. Is there unanimity in the panel that less weapons possessed by the United States and Russia is a good thing? 

Dr. DRELL. To a point. 

Dr. GALLUCCI. To a point. 

Senator BILL NELSON. To a point. 

Dr. PAYNE. With conditions, yes. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. For the record, state, Doctor, 

what does ‘‘to a point’’ mean? Dr. Payne, state what ‘‘with conditions’’ means. 

Dr. DRELL. I said ‘‘to a point.’’ If I don’t know—it depends upon 

the—how big the band of uncertainty is about what other countries 

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rence. I want to have deterrence. It depends upon, again, the uncertainties out there. I don’t want to be the weak one. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Payne? 

Dr. PAYNE. I agree, we don’t want to give up deterrence, we don’t 

want to give up extended deterrence, we don’t want to give up the 

assurance that the nuclear weapons provide, or the dissuasive effect that nuclear weapon provide. With regard to the conditions, I 

mentioned the—just briefly ago, that one of the conditions associated with moving down to variable levels of nuclear weapons 

should very effective defenses. Although the NPR called for the 

United States to move toward very effective defenses against—at 

least against limited threats, I should say we’re not there yet. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. Well, on the flip side of this, 

those other countries are asking the same thing. Do their nuclear 

weapons deter us? I would take it that certainly what we’ve seen 

in North Korea is that they think that they’re going to get something from the fact that they have developed nuclear weapons. So, 

do their nuclear weapons deter the U.S.? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. Senator, from what? The issue with deterrence 

is—one of the issues is what you are hoping to deter. I think we 

could be pretty confident, unless one drew the conclusion that there 

was clearly irrationality and insanity in the leadership, we could 

be pretty confident that we will not be attacked—the United States 

of America will not be attacked by North Korea. But there are so 

many other consequences of the North Korean nuclear weapons 

program which threaten our security, and that of our allies, that 

engaging in a negotiation to try to get rid of those weapons is very 

sensible. But the particular concern that they will mate these 

weapons with their extended-range ballistic missile and directly attack the United States of America isn’t high on my list of things 

to worry about. There are many more things that come from this 

that I’m more concerned about. 

Senator BILL NELSON. That’s, of course, what most of us feel. I’m 

trying to look at it from the other side. The idea goes to the 

legitimization of nuclear weapons. When is the idea of a nuclear 

strike not feasible? Is deterring the United States a motivator on 

smaller nations, other than Russia and China? 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, sir, I believe it is. A motivator for them to want 

nuclear weapons? Is that the question? 

Senator BILL NELSON. Yes. 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, sir. I believe that seeking a deterrent capability 

is a motivator for both Iran and North Korea, for example. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. Then, that being the case, what is 

the greatest incentive that we can give to them for not having nuclear weapons? 

Dr. PAYNE. The greatest incentive that we could have, sir, would 

be to do away with our conventional forces that are the basis for 

their desire to have a nuclear capability to deter us. That would 

be the greatest thing we could do. I suspect that it would be a mistake to do that. 

Dr. GALLUCCI. Wait. No, wait. But if we can——

Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci? 

Dr. GALLUCCI.—carry on this conversation. I believe that both 

the North Koreans and the Iranians are interested in having a nuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:38 Dec 10, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\39487.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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clear capability, for a variety of reasons. One of the reasons is to 

be able to deter the United States from using its conventional 

forces, either in the region or directly against them. But that’s not 

all. I would put forward the proposition that the Iranians are truly 

interested in a hegemonic political position in the Gulf, and the acquisition of nuclear weapons would help them achieve that political 

objective, so that they are not simply interested in deterring us. 

That’s why I believe they are a harder negotiating target than is 

North Korea. I do believe that North Korea is principally interested 

in regime survival, and is looking to deal with us, as a possible advocate of regime change in North Korea, and a negotiation that 

persuaded them that their security needs could be met through a 

relationship with the United States might lead them to give up 

these weapons. Iran, I regard as having a slightly more challenging 

set of objectives. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right, let’s talk about the RRW. If we 

agree that, generally, with the conditions that you’ve placed on it, 

that it is desirable for us to reduce the number of nuclear weapons 

that we have, along with Russia, since we have plenty to blow ourselves up with, is the RRW—number one, is it safer? Are its component parts safer, so that it lessens the possibility of an accident? 

Is its reliability sufficient so that all of these nuclear weapons that 

we have in reserve, because we’re not sure of the reliability, since 

they’re degrading over time, that we would be able to significantly 

reduce our arsenal with the new RRW? Let’s discuss that. 

Dr. DRELL. I believe that point has yet to be made. But let me 

say, my starting position is, our weapons are safe. In 1990, I led 

a study for the House Armed Services Committee, backed by the 

Senate Armed Services Committee, with Johnny Foster and Dr. 

Townes, the inventor of the laser—there was a three-man committee, and we came to the conclusion that the weapons to be in 

our enduring stockpile meet all the official safety criteria that are 

in our policy. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. I think everybody feels that 

that’s the case. Now, are they reliable? 

Dr. DRELL. I’m coming. Since the moratorium on testing started, 

in 1992, first by President George H.W. Bush, and then continued 

by President Clinton, we have had a very extensive multifaceted 

stockpile stewardship program that has gone into understanding 

the scientific—underlying processes in our weapons. We didn’t do 

that to the full extent during the buildup of the first 50 years, because we were always changing the weapons, improving them, 

until we got to a point where the weapons really were quite robust. 

We now understand those weapons better, we have done extensive 

surveillance, extensive forensics, pulling them apart year by year, 

and we have, in my mind, increased our confidence in the reliability of the stockpile, at least mine, as a scientist who’s worked 

these issues, because we understand them better, we know what to 

look for, and we have, in my mind, better confidence that if something’s going wrong, the bells will ring, and we’ll hear them. There 

have been findings—there are always findings when you build a 

weapon, because there are mistakes made in the production, there 

are birth defects that we discover. We’ve found them. I believe it 

is a fair statement that there is no significant aging of the weapons 

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that has been found. I believe the stockpile, currently, is safe and 

reliable, and is not aging. 

Now, that doesn’t mean one can be complacent. One would like 

to improve them. In particular, in the world of terrorism, where a 

bad guy may get his hands on one of these weapons, if I can do 

anything to give them better use control, meaning that a bad guy 

getting one of my weapons cannot use it against me, I want to do 

that. But I believe firmly, as I said in my testimony, and based 

upon not just opinions, but work, that the ability to improve any 

one of these three categories has to be rigorously understood. Can 

we do it and have greater confidence? We have a stockpile which 

is built on a thousand-plus tests. To think it’s easy to have greater 

confidence when you make some changes in a system like this, 

without testing, that’s quite a statement, and I think that has to 

be—that’s the statement where I say: I don’t know the answer to 

your question, but we’d better find out before we go down the road, 

because clearly if we go down that road and we’re building new 

weapons, and we give the impression that it’s important for us to 

continue to modernize and improve, that does not, in my mind, 

help our nonproliferation goals. I think they are important. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Do either of you know the answer? Is a 

replacement warhead that isn’t going to be tested—is that reliable? 

Do either of you have the answer to that? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. No, Senator, I don’t. 

Dr. PAYNE. No. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So, that’s a question we have to answer. 

Dr. DRELL. I think it has to be answered, and I think that’s going 

to be a very important part of the debate here in Congress. First 

of all, it’s a very important part of the weapons establishment and 

those of us involved in seeing that that question gets the highest 

attention and that we come back to Washington with an answer in 

which we are confident and has a consensus. Because I see no reason not to make the weapons safer, if I can with confidence, or 

more reliable, if I can with confidence, or with better use control. 

I don’t see that’s a vice. 

Senator BILL NELSON. But if it were not reliable and had to be 

tested, the opinion would be you don’t go to an RRW. Is that——

Dr. DRELL. Unless we found some deficiency from our surveillance and life extension program which demands a change. That’s 

why I said, don’t savage those programs in pushing the RRW. 

Maintain the high quality that they have had for the last decade. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, until we know whether this whole 

thing is feasible, how much life extension should we go through? 

Dr. DRELL. We have to—for the weapons that are in the stockpile, we have to keep our eyes on the ball ,and we have to say that 

the W–76, the W–88, the W–87, that these weapons, which are part 

of our deterrent, however much we want that deterrent to be, they 

are reliable, period. We don’t give up on that, in my mind. 

Senator BILL NELSON. In your opinion, if we determine that they 

are reliable with this life extension, then we can reduce the existing stockpile. 

Dr. DRELL. Absolutely. Absolutely. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Any different opinions there? [No response.] 

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Since you all are the experts, is there any kind of rush going on 

to complete this feasibility study on the RRW? 

Dr. DRELL. I—well, I’ll stop talking in a minute, but let me just 

say—I don’t see the signal yet that appears that there’s an aging 

signal that’s of concern. In fact, it was widely reported that the 

weapons labs reassessed the lifetime of the plutonium pits, and the 

Jason Group did its own independent work, which I was involved 

with. We now know that that concern about plutonium aging, because of the radioactive environment and its impact on the pits, is 

not a problem that can’t be handled. It’s—the lifetime now is of the 

order of a century. It was thought to be less so, I don’t see any 

aging problem, and we are doing—we are—we’re doing things—

have been, for 15 years, in making the weapons more robust as 

we’ve gone along. 

Dr. PAYNE. I can mention, in that regard, Senator, that my understanding is that the last generation of designers and engineers 

with direct test experience will largely be retiring——

Dr. DRELL. Yes. 

Dr. PAYNE. —within the next 5 years. So, I think there is a nearterm opportunity, perhaps a fleeting opportunity, to transfer the 

knowledge from these experienced scientists with direct test knowledge and experience to the next generation of designers. I think 

that could be important. 

Dr. DRELL. Let—if I may comment on that, because——

Senator BILL NELSON. Certainly. 

Dr. DRELL.—I think it’s very important that we maintain experts 

who know what they’re doing in the labs. I think that if you look 

at the money that’s been invested in the program over the last 15 

years, with new instruments for much more detailed surveillance 

and analysis, simulations, the best computers, the possibility of 

doing underground subcritical tests in Nevada, where you don’t 

generate a chain reaction, but in which you study the effects of explosives on plutonium prepared in different ways, these are all part 

of a very multifaceted program that is challenging to the scientists. 

There are—there is something visceral about saying, ‘‘I’m going to 

blow out the side of a mountain.’’ We all know that. But I think, 

in terms of scientists learning the trade, the ability to do the detailed new codes, high-fidelity, three-dimensional explosion codes, 

with the world’s best supercomputers, now having the National Ignition Facility—it’s going to give us data, where these codes can be 

tested in areas they’ve never been tested before, much more like 

bomb material—there is a good program, and I think attention is 

being paid to get very good scientists, and mentor them. I don’t 

think that is a detonation of a new bomb is necessary, but it is necessary to have the management of the labs pay good attention to 

the problem that Dr. Payne raises. It is a concern. I think it’s being 

addressed properly. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Let’s talk about numbers of weapons. 

Should the numbers in the arsenal be determined by specific targets? 

Dr. PAYNE. I don’t believe so, sir. There was the Cold War approach to looking at the numbers required typically had to do with 

the number of targets in the Soviet Union. What that meant was 

that we defined ‘‘deterrence’’ in a numbers game. We also then deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:38 Dec 10, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\39487.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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fined our strategic requirements from that same numbers game. 

But, as I mentioned earlier, the relationship of numbers to deterrence, and deterrence effect, is something now that’s very uncertain. The role of our strategic nuclear forces is well beyond deterrence. So, if we want to think about the numbers in general, if 

there’s a—if there were a diagram to how we think about numbers, 

it wouldn’t have so much to do with the number of targets, per se—

that’s, in a sense, the way we looked at it in the Cold War—but 

it would be the numbers that we think are important for dissuasion, for assurance, particularly extended nuclear deterrence, and 

the numbers that we think, then, are also associated with deterrence, as well as we can know them. So, it really isn’t any longer 

just a numbers game. We treated it that way during the Cold War, 

and, fortunately, deterrence didn’t fail. But we need to think about 

it much more broadly now. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Go ahead, Dr. Gallucci. 

Dr. GALLUCCI. I’ve never built a SIOP, so I don’t have any handson experience in this. But I would be surprised if numbers were not 

still very important—first, for the mission which I think is the 

most critical, which is the deterrent mission. I’m really unclear and 

unsteady and concerned about Dr. Payne’s reference to the ‘‘other 

missions.’’ That’s what I tried to address in my remarks earlier. I’m 

comfortable with an absolute insistence that whatever capability 

exists, independent of Russian intentions, but whatever capability 

exists in Russia by the usual standards, that we do the counting 

and we figure that we have a secure, survivable, second-strike deterrent. So, I’m still up for those numbers. 

Additional missions for these nuclear weapons, I think my view 

is generally that they are the lesser and included cases—that we 

have small-yield weapons to accomplish some other missions, which 

I think are really, for me at least, very limited. I am not interested 

in using nuclear weapons in a first-strike mode to go after some 

hard targets. I do believe that the deterrent mission after an attack, even by a terrorist, where you wanted to gain the deterrent 

advantage against that country that might have transferred the 

material, is sort of a new mission. But my thinking still is that, 

fundamentally, we are looking at a secure deterrent, and one that 

is credible for the purpose of extended deterrence. I think I’m still 

there. 

Dr. DRELL. Just very briefly, I think whatever deterrent value 

our weapons have against the terrorists, if they see us with 20 

weapons, I don’t know if they’ll be deterred. But I don’t think the 

difference between 20 and 500 matters that much to the terrorists. 

To other states who have—want to survive, I look at what 20 weapons would do to 20 cities in this country, and I feel very comfortable that if we had 500, we’d have one helluva deterrent. So, 

there is a point where numbers get important, but I don’t think 

we’re near that yet, the large——

Senator BILL NELSON. All right, you’re saying 500 instead of 

5,000. 

Dr. DRELL. That’s right. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Right. 

Dr. PAYNE. Sir, could I comment? Because I don’t want to be misinterpreted here. First, I don’t think that numbers are unimporVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:38 Dec 10, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\39487.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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tant. I think the numbers can be important. The point I was trying 

to make is that they don’t tell the whole story. The additional missions that I was referring to have nothing to do with the tactical, 

or otherwise, use of nuclear weapons, per se. What I was talking 

about are the broad defensive goals of dissuasion and assurance, 

assuring our allies that—of our commitment, so they aren’t interested in pursuing nuclear weapons, themselves, for example. So, 

when you look at the type of methodology that we want to pursue 

when we’re thinking about numbers, it shouldn’t just be tied back 

to deterrence and specific target numbers. That’s what I meant. It 

needs to be broadened out, looking at all of these functions that nuclear weapons can help provide—and, again, not for a moment talking about pre-emption or tactical use of nuclear weapons. That’s 

not what I was referring to. 

Senator BILL NELSON. What about the concept of the Triad, as 

we have used it—submarines, ICBMs and airplanes—as a deterrent; multiple means of delivering nuclear weapons? 

Dr. DRELL. I believe in the value of diversity. Absolutely, I 

wouldn’t give it up. 

Dr. GALLUCCI. I agree. 

Dr. PAYNE. Absolutely. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, let’s assume that we proceeded down 

this road that we were going to have a SLBM that would be nonnuclear. Should all of the submarine-launched ballistic missiles be 

non-nuclear? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. Since my principal concern is of the ambiguity of 

a launch from a strategic platform, like a Trident, there are various 

things that we could do to try to reduce that concern, and I’d start 

by designating a particular submarine as conventional, and not 

mixing. I mean, that’s where I’d start. I don’t know that that would 

do the trick, but that’s where I’d start. 

Dr. DRELL. I have no higher confidence in any part of our defense 

than I do in the Navy’s Trident program. That naval nuclear program has been the outstanding program through its history. But I 

feel a lot better with just no mix on the same boat, nevertheless. 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, I certainly wouldn’t convert the entire SLBM 

force to conventional weapons. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you all very much. It’s been an engaging discussion, and thank you for lending your expertise to us. 

Again, Dr. Drell, thank you for coming all the way from California. 

Dr. DRELL. Thank you for the opportunity, Senator. 

Senator BILL NELSON. May I ask one further question? Would 

you all be willing to accept some additional questions that would 

be answered for the record? 

Dr. PAYNE. Sure. 

Dr. GALLUCCI. Yes, sir. 

Dr. DRELL. Sure. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. Thank you very much. The hearing 

is adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

DETERRENCE

1. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, during the Cold 

War, both the United States and Soviet Union had nuclear arsenals that ranged in 

the tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. The large numbers were predicated on 

the mutual ability to ride out a massive attack and mount a massive attack or 

counter attacks. Multiple warheads were needed for each of the thousands of targets. Mutually assured destruction (MAD) kept the two of us from entering in a war 

with one another. Thankfully, MAD is gone but deterrence theory remains. Does the 

idea of deterrence still drive the U.S. requirement for nuclear weapons? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. The principal requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons remains deterrence. Although the political context has changed over the last 20 years, particularly 

with respect to our assessment of the intentions of the leadership in Moscow and 

Beijing, we must be certain that we have the nuclear forces to deter a nuclear attack from Russia or China. If we can do that, all other plausible missions for our 

forces will fall into the category of ‘‘lesser included cases.’’

Dr. DRELL. The answer seems to be yes. The only rationale I know for our retaining between 1,700 and 2,200 deployed strategic forces, according to SORT, or the 

Treaty of Moscow negotiated in 2002, plus several thousand more in Reserve, is to 

deter an equal number still retained by Russia. They also may be viewed as a deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons by the other nuclear powers not closely allied to us, namely China and perhaps Pakistan and India; and soon, if not already, 

North Korea. In these cases the numbers could be an order of magnitude smaller, 

given their own limited forces. 

Dr. PAYNE. The four defense goals that contribute to U.S. strategic force requirements are deterrence, assurance, dissuasion, and defeat.

2. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, whom are we deterring with nuclear weapons, countries or terrorists? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. I do not see a way that we can directly deter terrorists from attacking the U.S. by threatening a nuclear strike. However, we may be able to deter a 

nation from transferring a nuclear weapon or fissile material to a terrorist group 

by threatening to treat that nation as the attacker if a terrorist uses a weapon or 

material from that nation in an attack on us. 

Dr. DRELL. It is difficult to think that terrorists are deferrable by nuclear weapons. They operate with standards that differ from that of the civilized world in general, and are even suicidal in many actions. Also the number of targets they present 

is so small that anything beyond a force of only a few nuclear weapons is irrelevant. 

So I would suggest that it is nations, and in particular the ones mentioned in question 1, that one may think we are deterring. 

Dr. PAYNE. We hope to deter the leaderships of hostile countries and terrorist organizations.

3. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, what states pose 

serious threats of a nuclear attack and can they be deterred? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. I do not think any nation currently poses a serious threat of a nuclear attack on the United States. Both Russia and China have the capability, but 

neither has the intention. Intentions, though, can change more quickly than capabilities. 

Dr. DRELL. They are Russia, and China which presently has only a handful or 

two of long range nuclear weapons that can reach U.S. territory, but is building 

more. I find it difficult to see a role for our nuclear forces in deterring India or Pakistan. One can argue that perhaps, if it were not for our nuclear forces, North Korea 

might view taking aggressive military actions without fear of nuclear reprisal, despite our overwhelming conventional strength. The same goes for Iran. 

Dr. PAYNE. Countries with self-expressed hostility toward the United States, a 

plausible flashpoint, and nuclear capabilities include most prominently North Korea 

and China. The potential for an escalating crisis with North Korea or China appears 

now to be most plausible.

4. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, is the idea of deterring a specific state or entity valid or should we look at a nuclear capability to 

deter an unknown actor? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. We should first be certain of our ability to deter Russia and 

China—specifically taking account of the size and character of their forces. If we can 

103

do that, we will be able to deter any conceivable rising power in the Middle East 

or Asia. 

Dr. DRELL. I think the idea of deterring a nuclear power has merit still in today’s 

world, but for an unknown actor I believe strong conventional forces are more relevant. 

Dr. PAYNE. The goal of attempting to deter specific states or entities is valid and 

necessary. We also must recognize that international relations are highly dynamic 

and we may in the future need to deter opponents not currently identified as such.

5. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, nuclear deterrence must be part of a much larger package of conventional military capabilities, 

diplomatic initiatives, economic and trade relationships, and many other tools to ensure security. Is it possible to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence and 

security? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. We have been reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security 

strategy by responding to the changing political context and reducing the size of nuclear forces. In theory, we could eliminate nuclear weapons, if others did likewise. 

In practice, we can and should continue to reduce the number of nuclear weapons 

we deploy as Russia does the same. The less we depend upon nuclear weapons to 

achieve our security objectives, the more credible and effective will be our efforts 

to limit the acquisition of nuclear weapons by others. 

Dr. DRELL. I think it is in our interest to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in 

deterrence and security. Diplomatic incentives and our overwhelming conventional 

strength remain quite relevant, and our non-nuclear military forces should remain 

strong and capable of meeting our foreign policy and national security goals. Given 

the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons and the spread of technology making 

more countries capable of acquiring that knowledge and entering the nuclear club, 

we should be working on trying to escape the nuclear deterrence trap. A more constructive way to view the problem would be for the United States to work to rekindle the vision of the 1986 Reykjavik Summit, as expressed by President Ronald 

Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, and take steps toward working 

to rid the world of nuclear weapons. These are outlined in my testimony. 

Dr. PAYNE. The deterrence role for U.S. nuclear weapons is determined in large 

part by the context of a crisis, the character and goals of opponents, and U.S. deterrence goals. Each of these factors is likely to change depending on the context and 

opponent. Consequently, the value of nuclear weapons for deterrence is not static 

or entirely predictable. In some past cases, U.S. nuclear weapons were essential for 

deterrence, it would be optimistic to believe that they will not continue to be so in 

some future occasions.

CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE

6. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, can the United 

States deter others with conventional weapons? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. Deterrence means dissuading others from doing something they 

would otherwise do by threatening unacceptable consequences if they do it. We can 

never be sure when it works—only when it fails. 

I think U.S. unconventional forces often deter adversaries from action. We have 

used our conventional forces many times in past decades, and have thus demonstrated our credibility to act when our interests are threatened. 

Dr. DRELL. The answer I believe is yes, except perhaps for Russia and China in 

today’s world. 

Dr. PAYNE. In some plausible cases, non-nuclear deterrence threats are likely to 

be adequate and more credible than nuclear threats. In other plausible cases, U.S. 

nuclear capabilities are likely to he necessary for deterrence.

7. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, are countries deterred with conventional weapons? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. Countries may be deterred by threat of a conventional strike, depending on the stakes and the credibility of the threat. 

Dr. DRELL. Except for Russia and China the answer I believe is yes. I believe terrorists can be deterred with conventional weapons when they understand that the 

United States is willing to use such weapons to prevent them from carrying out terrorist or aggressive actions against our allies and our interests. They must know 

that the use of conventional force to protect our interests and our security is a policy 

we are committed to and will enforce. In contrast, for nuclear weapons the highest 

goal is to prevent their use. 

104

Dr. PAYNE. See above.

8. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, are terrorists, 

even though viewed to be nondeterrable, ever deterred with conventional weapons? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. It is not unreasonable to think that terrorists will limit their operations out of a concern that they might suffer an effective conventional 

counterstrike. 

Dr. DRELL. Yes, if they know we will use them to prevent them from achieving 

their goals; and they fear our ability to destroy them if they try. 

Dr. PAYNE. Over the past 200 years there have been numerous cases in which terrorists have been deterred with conventional weapons. In other eases, terrorists 

have not been directly deferrable, but they have been deterred indirectly via pressure on their sponsors. There is at least one reported case of this indirect deterrence 

of terrorists via nuclear threats.

CONVENTIONAL TRIDENT

9. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, the administration has proposed development of a conventional Trident missile to support a notion 

of prompt global strike—the ability to strike anywhere on the earth in less than 60 

minutes. Assuming that the issues associated with nuclear ambiguity could be resolved, in other words not mistaking a conventional Trident for a nuclear Trident, 

does this type of capability deter a state or a non-state actor? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. On the assumption of the elimination of nuclear ambiguity, this 

type of capability could deter a state or non-state actor from some activities. 

Dr. DRELL. I believe prompt global strike has a potential role against a target that 

can be located very accurately within the small kill radius of a conventional explosion, even if it is mobile. That capability may prevent or deter a hostile act of great 

consequence. This is likely to be most effective against a terrorist within a state 

that does not have full control over its territory, but also against a rogue state willing to take aggressive actions against our interests and to suffer the consequences. 

Dr. PAYNE. It is literally impossible for anyone to predict with precision what will 

or will not deter an unspecified opponent, in an unspecified context, over unspecified 

stakes. There certainly are plausible scenarios in which conventional Trident could 

contribute to deterrence.

10. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, would any 

Prompt Global Strike capability have any deterrent effect? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. See response to question 9. 

Dr. DRELL. It is not inconceivable that it would complicate a possible action if the 

perpetrator felt that self survival is not assured. To that extent it would have a deterrent effect, but I think the overall deterrent effect would not be very large. 

Dr. PAYNE. Please see the response to question 9 above.

TAILORED DETERRENCE

11. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, a new concept 

to come out of the National Security Strategy and the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review 

is ‘‘tailored deterrence.’’ DOD joint operating concept documents define tailored deterrence as the development of strategies, plans, and operations that are tailored 

to the perception, values, and interests of specific adversaries. Do nuclear weapons 

play a role in tailored deterrence? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. If the concept would require re-emphasizing nuclear weapons by 

producing special effects weapons, the benefit of being ‘‘tailored’’ would not outweigh 

the costs of asserting the utility of nuclear weapons for purposes other than deterrence. 

Dr. DRELL. I believe deterrence must be restricted to preventing the use of nuclear weapons against us and our interests. The form of a threat that we want to 

deter cannot be accurately predicted, and therefore a certain degree of flexibility is 

needed. Among other things the deterrent must be capable of a wide range of strike 

intensities and locations. That is what ‘‘tailored deterrence’’ means to me. 

Dr. PAYNE. Certainly. For opponents who are highly cost- and risk-tolerant, U.S. 

nuclear deterrence may be a necessary part of defining an approach to deterrence 

that has a reasonable chance of ‘‘working’’ as we would hope. This conclusion is not 

simply speculation; it is supported by historical evidence.

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DISSUASION

12. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, the December 

2001 Nuclear Posture talks about nuclear dissuasion—what is the difference between deterrence and dissuasion? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. I have no idea. 

Dr. DRELL. Dissuasion means to discourage planning for potential actions not in 

our interest, such as an opponent trying to build up military forces and strength 

equal to, or greater than, our own. This can be done diplomatically or by undertaking our own build-up to a point that it sets a level very difficult to match. Deterrence I view as preventing an attack, particularly by nuclear weapons if we are talking nuclear deterrence, by making clear that the attack cannot achieve its goal and 

that damage caused by our retaliation will make it not in the interest of the wouldbe attacker to proceed. As quoted in the Bush administration’s National Security 

Strategy: ‘‘[o]ur forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from 

pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the 

United States.’’

Dr. PAYNE. The goal of dissuasion is different than deterrence. Dissuasion attempts to prevent crises and challenges before they emerge by discouraging opponents over the long-term from choosing broad courses of weapon acquisition and foreign policy that might put them in conflict with U.S. interests. Deterrence typically 

involves the prevention of more specific actions over a shorter timeline.

13. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, is dissuasion 

a valid theory? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. See response to question 12. 

Dr. DRELL. Dissuasion is a policy goal to be achieved through diplomacy, backed 

by strength. It may succeed or, oppositely, stimulate an arms race. I have not seen 

any convincing implementation of a policy of nuclear dissuasion that was achieved 

by a nuclear build-up. 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes. in principle, it precedes the goal of deterrence on a timeline and. 

if successful, eases the challenges to deterrence.

OTHER COUNTRIES

14. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, what is the role 

of Russia in United States nuclear policy? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. Russian nuclear forces should still be the basis for decisions about 

the size and character of our strategic nuclear forces. 

Dr. DRELL. On December 13, 2001, President George W. Bush stated ‘‘the greatest 

threats to both our countries come not from each other, or from other big powers 

in the world, but from terrorists who strike without warning, or rogue states who 

seeks weapons of mass destruction.’’ The joint statement of a new relationship between the United States and Russia signed by Presidents Bush and Putin on November 13, 2001 stated that ‘The United States and Russia have overcome the legacy of the Cold War. Neither country regards the other as enemy or threat.’’ He 

went on to call for ‘‘the creation of a new strategic framework to ensure the mutual 

security of the United States and Russia and the world community.’’ In the note announcing U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty on December 13, 2001, the President said ‘‘We have entered into a new strategic relation with Russia that is cooperative rather than adversarial.’’ These are examples of a number of statements during 2001 and 2002 in which the United States and Russia marked the formal end 

of the era of mutual nuclear deterrence between the two countries. Clearly that has 

not yet been fully implemented as a policy. 

Dr. PAYNE. The United States must be in a position to deter Russia if it chooses 

a future course of hostility and competition. Whether Russia will choose this course 

or a more cooperative, benign future is an open question. The United States must 

encourage the former and be prepared for the latter. Pan of that preparation is 

maintaining a flexible nuclear base that can adjust as necessary to meet future 

threat developments.

15. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, what is the role 

of China? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. We should be certain that the nuclear forces needed to deter Russia will also deter China. 

Dr. DRELL. It would appear that deterrence remains a basis of U.S./China policy 

although the disparity in numbers of their weapons is very large. It is generally 

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viewed that our nuclear weapons are a deterrent against a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. 

Dr. PAYNE. It is important that the United States be able to deter the expressed 

Chinese willingness to use force, e.g.. nuclear weapons in a crisis over Taiwan, to 

assure U.S. Asian allies who feel vulnerable to Chinese nuclear threats, including 

Japan, and to dissuade China from choosing the course of nuclear arms competition. 

U.S. nuclear capabilities and nuclear infrastructure may be critical to each of these 

deterrence and dissuasion goals.

16. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, what are the 

roles of France and Great Britain? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. I do no think that French and British nuclear forces remain important to their defense, to ours or to the NATO Alliance. 

Dr. DRELL. I believe the roles of France and Great Britain are to maintain a seat 

at the table of the nuclear powers with their nuclear forces, and to provide an independent NATO deterrent against invasion from the east. 

Dr. PAYNE. The French and British independent nuclear deterrents arc in the 

process of being modernized and upgraded and may contribute to the U.S. goals of 

deterrence, assurance and dissuasion.

17. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell and Dr. Payne, what are the 

roles of India, Pakistan, and Israel as non-parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty 

(NPT) or any future states that might pull out of the NPT? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. India, Pakistan, and Israel had been the only countries with nuclear weapons, apart form the original five countries recognized in the NPT. North 

Korea claims to have withdrawn from the Treaty, but plausibly will rejoin if the 

agreement of 13 February 2007 holds. India will receive special status and 

legitimatizing if the administration’s proposed deal is accepted by New Delhi. 

The India deal could turn out to be the biggest foreign policy mistake of the Bush 

administration. Intended to recognize India’s strategic importance to the United 

States, the deal could end up legitimatizing nuclear weapon status for former NPT 

parties who are otherwise generally responsible countries. Candidates are: Japan, 

South Korea, Argentina, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia; others would follow. 

Dr. DRELL. India, Pakistan, and Israel retain nuclear weapons because of regional 

instabilities which affect them directly. It is presumed they will stay that way so 

long as the mutual hostilities between India and Pakistan, and Israel and the Arab 

world, remain high on the security agenda of these countries. 

Dr. PAYNE. These countries illustrate that the international nuclear nonproliferation regime cannot prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by leadership that 

believe their countries to be at risk, and who believe that nuclear weapons are necessary to address that risk and to realize their national aspirations.

18. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, what about 

India and Pakistan in their role as regional nuclear weapons states? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. If a nuclear weapon is going to be used in a conflict between two 

states, it will be used by India and/or Pakistan. As they build their arsenals—now 

with an American blessing—they create the possibility of a truly horrendous catastrophe. 

Dr. DRELL. See response to question 17. 

Dr. PAYNE. See response to question 17.

19. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, what about 

North Korea, which might have a few weapons, 8–10 according to some estimates, 

but which may be on the brink of giving up its program? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. North Korea’s nuclear program if unchecked would provoke Japan 

and South Korea to nuclear weapons acquisition. Even more worrisome would be 

the sale of fissile material to a terrorist group by this resource starved country. 

Dr. DRELL. It would seem to be North Korea’s deterrent against perceived threats 

of U.S. aggressive action, including regime change; also a bargaining chip for economic aid and cooperation. The future of North Korea’s program is critical because 

if North Korea is able to establish that it has a deliverable nuclear threat, which 

it has not yet done, it will have a serious implication for a broader proliferation of 

nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia. It would undoubtedly encourage Japan, South 

Korea, and perhaps even Taiwan to go nuclear. Such changes certainly would drive 

up the level of nuclear armaments in China by a big amount. The ongoing 6 power 

negotiations arc of utmost importance in an effort to prevent that from happening 

and to protect the nonproliferation regime in that part of the world. 

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Dr. PAYNE. In light of North Korean nuclear capabilities, it is critical that the 

United States possess sufficient nuclear forces to extend nuclear deterrence coverage, i.e., the ‘‘nuclear umbrella’’ to allies in the region, e.g., South Korea and 

Japan. In the absence of credible U.S. nuclear assurance for Japan, there will be 

mounting pressure on Tokyo to consider becoming a nuclear state itself.

20. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell and Dr. Payne, what about Iran, 

which is enriching uranium at laboratory scale currently, claims to want nuclear 

technology for civilian purposes only, but continues to defy the International Atomic 

Energy Agency? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. A full court diplomatic press, emphasizing carrots, should be made 

to persuade Iran to suspend construction of its enrichment facility. Sticks, in the 

form of sanctions, will have to be developed with Russia aboard if they are to have 

any hope of working. Ultimately, if Iran is found to be moving to enrich uranium 

to high levels, and if the character of the regime has not changed, the use of military force in the form of air strikes will have to be considered. 

Dr. DRELL. Iran poses a very serious threat. Its program for enriching uranium 

in order to fuel reactors for civilian power, which is its stated goal, will make it into 

a latent nuclear weapons country. The technology for the one puts a nation well on 

the road to accomplishing the second of those two goals. A nuclear Iran would create 

even graver instabilities, not only vis-a-vis Israel, but with the rest of the Arab 

world, and would most likely stimulate proliferation among many nations in the 

Mideast. It is the gravest threat that I know at the moment to the Nonproliferation 

Treaty and the nonproliferation regime. 

Dr. PAYNE. At this point, Iran appears determined to complete its longstanding 

efforts to develop nuclear weapons. This will increase the pressure for broadened extended U.S. nuclear deterrence to friends and allies in the region who may otherwise seek their own nuclear deterrent.

21. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, what about allies who don’t have nuclear weapons, such as Japan, and who have not developed 

nuclear weapons, because the U.S. deterrence umbrella covered them? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. I do not think the credibility of our nuclear umbrella, the extended 

deterrent threat, is serious questioned. 

Dr. DRELL.. My main concern was expressed in the answer to question 19. Japan 

is a latent nuclear power that could become an explicit one in a very short order 

if they doubted the U.S. deterrence umbrella or if North Korea displayed an effective nuclear capability. This is an example of the kind of concern that motivates the 

thinking expressed in my testimony calling on the United States to try to rekindle 

a vision of a nuclear free world, and to implement the set of steps spelled out in 

my testimony toward achieving the conditions to make that possible. That will be 

the only long-term resolution to this dilemma. 

Dr. PAYNE. It is critical that key allies such as Japan continue to have confidence 

in the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. If they loose that confidence, according to 

their own statements they may feel compelled to seek their own nuclear capabilities. 

This could set off a ‘‘cascade effect’’ of nuclear proliferation globally, The U.S. extended nuclear deterrent is our single most important nonproliferation tool.

22. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, what about 

countries who might desire nuclear weapons but don’t have a nuclear weapons program? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. There remains great virtue in limiting the availability of facilities 

that produce fissile material, reprocessing plants and enrichment facilities. 

Dr. DRELL. There are some 40 nuclear capable countries, that is countries with 

reactors for civilian purposes. With the spread of technology and the growing reluctance to accept a two-tiered world in which there are discriminatory differences between nuclear and nonnuclear states, I fear many of these countries will seek to develop indigenous nuclear programs unless we and other nuclear powers demonstrate 

our commitment to the goals stated in the Nonproliferation Treaty. This calls for 

reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, working toward ratifying a Comprehensive 

Test Ban Treaty, and eventually toward elimination of the weapons. I think that 

now becomes an urgent and serious goal for U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy. 

Dr. PAYNE. One of our goals is to assure those non-nuclear allies and friends oft 

he U.S. commitment to their security, and thereby to contribute to their continuing 

choice to remain non-nuclear. Another goal is to dissuade those who are hostile from 

choosing to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. We know that credible U.S. strategic nuclear capabilities contribute to the assurance goal: they probably also contribute to dissuasion as well.

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TERRORISTS

23. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, conventional 

wisdom is that nuclear weapons don’t deter terrorists. Do you agree? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. See response to question 2. 

Dr. DRELL. I believe that nuclear weapons in large numbers have nothing to do 

with deterring terrorists. The existence of a small number may make them think 

harder about taking aggressive hostile actions, but their behavior so far pretty much 

indicates to me that terrorists are not deterred by nuclear weapons. They are bent 

on suicidal actions and willing to take actions that defy the norms of civilized behavior as we know them. 

Dr. PAYNE. No. Nuclear weapons may contribute to the deterrence of terrorist organizations indirectly through their state sponsors. There is some pertinent historical evidence demonstrating precisely this form of indirect deterrence.

24. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, are countries 

who might either supply a terrorist with nuclear materials deterred from providing 

such materials by U.S. nuclear weapons? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. See response to question 2. 

Dr. DRELL. I see no clear evidence of this. However diplomacy can be valuable in 

providing incentives for restraints against such actions. I think the seriousness of 

our diplomatic efforts to address terrorism and at the same time reduce our reliance 

on nuclear weapons will be an effective approach. 

Dr. PAYNE. I believe U.S. nuclear capabilities are critical to the deterrence of 

North Korea, which may be such a state.

A DETERRED UNITED STATES

25. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, do nuclear 

weapons deter the United States? If so, under what circumstances? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. One could imagine the United States deciding against the invasion 

of a country possessing nuclear weapons. 

Dr. DRELL. I recognize that nuclear weapons played a big role in deterring potential U.S. actions during the Cold War. At present I can speculate that measures the 

U.S. might initiate against countries, such as regime change or use of preventive 

offensive military force, might not be considered against countries who have nuclear 

weapons, even in small numbers, that could cause harm to us. This is what makes 

it urgent for the United States to make clear that our policy and potential uses of 

force are such as not to give them cause to feel the need to deter us by getting nuclear weapons. 

Dr. PAYNE. The United Stales is susceptible to both nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence threats. The complete vulnerability of the U.S. civilian population to attack 

contributes to this susceptibility.

26. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, do United States 

nuclear weapons or policy drive others to attain nuclear weapons or impact decisions about the number of nuclear weapons they have? If yes, what impact does or 

should this phenomenon have on U.S. nuclear policy? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. Clearly the Russians are sensitive to U.S. nuclear weapons decisions, and we ought to take account of their possible responses when we make such 

decisions. Over the long-term, if we emphasize the utility of nuclear weapons for our 

security, other states are more likely to consider such weapons for their security. 

That is one reason why we should try, with the Russians, to reduce the size of nuclear forces and avoid deploying new nuclear systems. 

Dr. DRELL. I think a U.S. commitment to honor the provisions of the Nonproliferation Treaty as mentioned earlier and to reduce its discriminatory features by reducing our nuclear arsenal, and its relevance in our policies, will contribute to reducing 

interests in other countries becoming nuclear. It is difficult to preach the virtues of 

a nonproliferation regime and of staying nonnuclear if we ourselves continue improving our nuclear arsenal and retaining large numbers. That is why, how we limit 

and justify our Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program is so important, as 

I have testified. 

Dr. PAYNE. In many cases, the number and type of U.S. nuclear weapons and U.S. 

nuclear force policy will have no impact on decisions to acquire nuclear weapons. 

The exceptions to this rule of thumb are those countries that have been under the 

U.S. ‘‘nuclear umbrella.’’ If that umbrella becomes incredible, they will feel increasing pressure to acquire their own nuclear capabilities.

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HOW MANY NUCLEAR WARHEADS

27. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, we have talked 

about deterrence and that nuclear weapons play a role in deterrence, how effective 

a deterrent against what types of actors will continue to be a point of debate, but 

now let’s talk about how many we need. How many total weapons do we need, how 

many deployed, by when and for how long? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. I addressed numbers in my prepared statement, but I am generally 

attracted to Dr. Drell’s assessment. 

Dr. DRELL. Responses to these two questions are contained in my study with 

former Ambassador James Goodby entitled ‘‘What Are Nuclear Weapons For?—Recommendations for Restructuring U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces,’’ published in April 

2005 by the Arms Control Association. This report has been submitted for inclusion 

in the record of these hearings. I quote several relevant paragraphs from it: ‘‘First, 

as to the number of potential targets, we assume that Russian nuclear forces will 

decrease in numbers comparable to what we are proposing for the U.S. force. For 

reasons having as much to do with historical and political baggage as with military 

requirements, this assumption will be a major determinant of the size of the U.S. 

operationally-deployed force, as it appears to be today. . . .’’

‘‘We estimate that a U.S. strategic force of some 500 operationally-deployed warheads would be more than adequate for deterrence. Borrowing the notion of the Nuclear Posture Review, this force level would be enough to provide a degree of flexibility in a fluid security environment. This number is large enough to deal with the 

targets described generically in the Nuclear Posture Review as instruments of political control and military power . . . leadership and military capabilities, particularly weapons of mass destruction, military command facilities and other centers of 

control and infrastructure that support military forces.’ We estimate these military 

targets, under the conditions we postulate, to number between 200 and 300, and we 

have sized the operationally-deployed force of strategic warheads at a larger number 

of 500 for reasons of operational conservatism. The excess allows for force readiness 

concerns, multiple targeting where needed, and the possibility of very sudden and 

unexpected surprises from Russia, for example, a breakdown in its military command and control caused by technical failures or a takeover by renegades. As Russia 

and the United States move farther away from the nuclear deterrent trap in which 

they are still ensnared, the sizing of their stockpiles would depend on other concerns 

and could be further reduced. The 500 operationally-deployed warheads would be 

augmented by those from the Responsive Force, which would be configured in two 

parts, the first able to respond to a rapidly building crisis—a Ready Responsive 

Force—and a second able to respond to strategic warning signals on a timescale of 

a year or more—a Strategic Responsive Force. This use of the Responsive Force underscores the need for sustaining an infrastructure for supporting it as well as the 

need to provide this force with appropriate hardening and concealment. As we look 

ahead a few years into the future, the total Responsive Force should have 400–500 

warheads, a number comparable to the operationally-deployed one. This number 

would be adequate to target roughly 200 additional Russian sites, for example, those 

affecting industrial recovery—the major nodes in the electric power grid and air, 

ground, and rail transportation systems, as well as major industrial sites. These targets and the forces to attack them may be viewed, we hope, as only temporary remnants of the Cold War policy of assured destruction that may be discarded before 

long in the dustbin of history. In time, nuclear deterrence might be maintained entirely with a Responsive Force without an operationally-deployed force.’’. . . 

‘‘Potential Chinese targets are likely to cover the same generic list as for Russia, 

cited above, including their strategic strike forces, command and control centers, 

major military bases, and ports in the vicinity of Taiwan. With China’s long-range 

nuclear forces remaining at anything like their present levels, the target list would 

be considerably smaller than the 200–300 estimated for Russia. This list would not 

generate U.S. force requirements in addition to the numbers we have proposed for 

hypothetical emergencies involving Russia. The same warhead can be targeted 

against multiple designated ground zeros. Yet, if there were drastic changes in the 

worldwide strategic picture that led the United States to simultaneous major nuclear confrontations against Russia and China, the United States would evidently 

begin a major buildup of its own. This would take time, but so would a major Chinese buildup. The force configuration of ‘‘500+500’’ that we propose provides a ready 

basis for such U.S. action.’’. . . . 

‘‘Regarding potential targets in North Korea or Iran, the list presumably would 

be much shorter because the territories are smaller, and the numbers of defenserelated installations are much fewer than in Russia and China. That list would very 

likely be limited to single digits in each country.’’

110

Dr. PAYNE. There is no set specific number of deployed nuclear weapons that can 

be identified as being required for deterrence for a set point-in-time or length of 

time because deterrence requirements are dynamic, and because U.S. force requirements are also affected by assurance and dissuasion goals. That is why the 2001 

NPR recommended flexibility and the range of 1,700–2,200 operationally-deployed 

nuclear weapons.

28. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, are the numbers 

driven by specific targets, and countries, or by capabilities? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. Our numbers should be sensitive to the targets of the various kinds 

we identify to create the most credible deterrent threat. 

Dr. DRELL. See response to question 27. 

Dr. PAYNE. The appropriate range of numbers and the need for flexibility can be 

affected by each of these variables, which are not mutually exclusive, and also by 

the requirements for assurance and dissuasion.

29. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, what understanding should guide the decision to study the RRW and how do the numbers influence the nuclear weapons complex of the future? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. Please see my prepared statement. 

Dr. DRELL. The RRW program has two parts. The first is to transform the nuclear 

complex, and the second, to change the designs of the nuclear weapons in the arsenal. Concerning the first part, the nuclear complex needs serious attention as I testified. Parts of it date back to WWII and need to be updated in order for us to maintain the safety and reliability of the warheads in the stockpile as their numbers decrease. However the U.S. needs a clear statement of its long-term nuclear weapons 

policy goals which will determine the roles and missions of our nuclear forces, and 

their overall numbers, before we can determine the appropriate size and scope of 

the modernized infrastructure. It might be anywhere from 500 warheads to the 

present total of roughly 5,000, with between 1,700 and 2,200 actively deployed, as 

negotiated in the Treaty of Moscow. The second part of the program, to design new 

warheads, depends upon the answer to the key question of whether the goals of the 

RRW program for enhanced long-term confidence, safety, and use control can be 

achieved without underground explosive testing, a restriction that is in the legislation creating RRW. This question is worthy of study but has yet to be answered 

Dr. PAYNE. We should proceed with the RRW knowing that any contemporary estimate of the nuclear force characteristics and size needed for the decades ahead is 

likely to require adjustment as the future unfolds. It is likely that we will be surprised by events that transpire over time. We should avoid actions that would significantly constrain the ability of the U.S. to adjust our forces lo changing national 

security needs. Instead we should anticipate surprise and focus on how best to protect a range of options for the future in an affordable, prudent manner.

30. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, is there a rush 

to complete the feasibility study of the first RRW design? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. I cannot comment. 

Dr. DRELL. I believe not. The current stockpile is strong and stable. Its safety and 

reliability have been confirmed by the ongoing vigorous and successful stockpile 

stewardship and life extension program which has revealed no significant evidence 

of aging problems. 

Dr. PAYNE. Two areas of concern seem to warrant proceeding without delay on 

the RRW. The first concern is the vulnerability of the planned stockpile and deployed force to a systemic failure of the W76 warhead—the most numerous of the 

warhead types in the stockpile. The RRW program will initially provide replacement 

warheads for the W76 and reduce the high degree of reliance on the W76 warhead. 

The second area of concern is that of the workforce on which the nation will depend 

for decades to come to make decisions on how best to sustain a safe, reliable nuclear 

stockpile. Proceeding without delay on the RRW will allow remaining experienced 

designers and engineers to work closely with those that will shortly take their 

places as the senior managers at nuclear weapon laboratories and plants.

31. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, the U.S. will 

continue the life extension program for some time, in order to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the current stockpile. Before we know if the RRW is feasible, how many warheads of any specific type should go through life extension? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. I cannot comment. 

Dr. DRELL. I think the first order of business is to establish a scientific and technical consensus as to whether the LLNL led effort to design the first RRW can 

111

achieve its goal of enhanced long-term confidence, safety, and use control relative 

to our current stockpile weapons, without underground explosive testing, before 

moving on to additional designs. The first design was chosen, as announced by 

NNSA, as a relatively conservative design and therefore should be in the strongest 

position to face up to the challenge of satisfying those criteria but this has yet to 

be established, and doing so will take time. 

Dr. PAYNE. The RRW concept has not yet begun engineering development, and the 

RRW concept, while promising, is still unproven. 1 recommend against significant 

cut backs an planned warhead lift extension programs at this time. Significant reductions in life extension programs would be warranted after laboratory officials 

conclude that the RRW can be developed and certified without nuclear testing and 

have demonstrated that the country can produce replacement quantities of the 

RRW.

32. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, will the stockpile size vary if the RRW design is feasible? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. I cannot comment. 

Dr. DRELL. A nuclear policy decision clarifying what are the missions and targets 

for our nuclear weapons will have a major impact on the size of the stockpile. This 

could cause a swing of an order of magnitude in their numbers, as discussed in the 

report that I mentioned earlier and submitted for the record (Drell and Goodby 

‘‘What Are Nuclear Weapons For?,’’ ACA report, April 2005). 

Dr. PAYNE. I anticipate that, for a specific force structure and operationally-deployed nuclear force, the total size of the nuclear warhead stockpile needed will differ significantly depending on whether or not RRW is feasible, and developed and 

deployed. The stockpile with RRW warheads should be significantly smaller in number and with fewer warhead types.

33. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, do you think 

that the RRW alone will allow substantial reductions in the total size of the stockpile, not just the number of warheads deployed? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. I cannot comment. 

Dr. DRELL. It is hard to predict whether the RRW alone would allow substantial 

reductions in the total size or cost to the stockpile since the current, so-called legacy, 

stockpile meets current high standards of safety and lifetime stability. However the 

infrastructure, when modernized, may have a significant effect by achieving improved efficiency with consolidation of many sites and modem technology. I think 

a more important factor in this case will be the modernized infrastructure. 

Dr. PAYNE. I expect that development and production of RRW warheads will result in a substantial reduction in die total size of the stockpile of nuclear warheads. 

Risk of reliability failures in the operationally-deployed force is currently managed 

by retaining an inventory of backup warheads in storage. With an operating nuclear 

warhead infrastructure that is responsive to unanticipated warhead problems, the 

need for a large inventory of back up warheads would no longer exist.

FIRST USE

34. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, first use of nuclear weapons is an ambiguous element of U.S. nuclear policy. Should it remain ambiguous? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. Yes. 

Dr. DRELL. I believe it should remain ambiguous to the extent that we say that 

first use of nuclear weapons would be determined by a policy of ‘‘defensive last resort.’’ I do not support an explicit statement of ‘‘no first use,’’ although I can think 

of no circumstance now which would clearly call for first use. However I don’t have 

confidence that I can anticipate all possible circumstances and therefore I think one 

should be clear that we view these as weapons only for ‘‘defensive last resort.’’ Statements stronger than that have the deficiency at anticipating how one would behave 

in extreme circumstances. That is hazardous and I wouldn’t be confident that an 

adversary would stick by such a pledge either. 

Dr. PAYNE. U.S. policy is not ambiguous nor should it be so. The United States 

retains the first use option for the purposes of deterrence and assurance.

35. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, are there credible scenarios in which the United States would use a nuclear weapon in the first 

instance? 

112

Dr. GALLUCCI. There are scenarios, but they are not particularly credible. The 

threat from the Warsaw Pact is no more, but one could just barely imagine a conventional conflict in Asia involving China in which we could not defend our allies 

or our forces without using or threatening to use a nuclear weapon first. 

Dr. DRELL. I can think of no credible scenario at this time in which the United 

States would initiate first use of a nuclear weapon. 

Dr. PAYNE. There are plausible scenarios. For example, with very limited U.S. defensive capabilities and in the continuing absence of non-nuclear capabilities for 

long-range prompt global strike, upon tactical warning of a WMD missile launch, 

the only option for preventing a WMD strike against U.S. cities could be first use 

against the enemy’s missile launch sites.

36. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, would first use 

escalate or de-escalate a conflict? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. This is unknowable, but the hope would be that by having escalation dominance, it would de-escalate. 

Dr. DRELL. This would be such an historically unprecedented move that there is 

no previous experience to give guidance to trying to answer that question. My greatest fear is that, in the confusion of a conflict where not all data is accurately determinable, an exchange could escalate due to faulty information about the size, number, and impact of the first events. The initial shock might also paralyze any further 

action. I just don’t know but I wouldn’t bet on it. 

Dr. PAYNE. Either is possible, depending on the circumstances. The risk of escalation would have to be compared to the risk of American cities being destroyed if 

the U.S. chose to await the opponent’s first use.

NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCE

37. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, a longstanding 

United States policy has been not to attack with nuclear weapons a non-nuclear 

weapon state unless that non-weapons state aligns with a state that attacks the 

United States with a nuclear weapon. Is this negative security assurance still a 

valid policy doctrine? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. Yes. 

Dr. DRELL. Yes. 

Dr. PAYNE. The statement is incorrect. The Clinton administration rightly claimed 

the right of U.S. ‘‘belligerent reprisal’’ in the event of an attack against the United 

States involving a non-nuclear state’s use of chemical or biological weapons. This 

Clinton administration position was and remains prudent.

MOSCOW TREATY

38. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, under the Moscow Treaty the United States and Russia agreed to operationally deploy no more 

than 1,700–2,200 nuclear weapons by 2012. But the Treaty is non-binding, as it has 

no duration, and is non-verifiable. Each side is free to determine when a weapon 

is operationally-deployed. Should the Treaty be modified? For example, should it be 

modified to be durable? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. The treaty should be made a treaty as we have understood such 

treaties, that is, with specific numbers to be achieved well within the duration of 

the treaty, with important ambiguities resolved, and with verification provisions. 

Dr. DRELL. Yes. The verification provisions for the Moscow Treaty rely on START 

II which expires in 2009. These provisions should be extended beyond that date, and 

should be made more specific in terms of which systems are being counted, and including restraints on the non-deployed Reserve Forces, that currently number perhaps up to twice as many as the deployed ones. 

Dr. PAYNE. The statement again is incorrect. The Moscow Treaty is binding and 

is as verifiable as other treaties with the applicable verification provisions of START 

I. The Treaty’s ceilings or further reductions could be made to extend beyond 2012. 

Whether this would be prudent or imprudent will depend on the geopolitical conditions at the lime and their outlook for the future.

39. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, is it possible 

to accelerate the reductions in deployed nuclear weapons under the Treaty? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. I cannot comment. 

Dr. DRELL. Yes, and I recommend that reductions proceed along the lines discussed in my answers to questions 27 and 28, and more fully in my article with 

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Goodby ‘‘What Are Nuclear Weapons For?’’, where we spell out a specific deployment 

scheme. 

Dr. PAYNE. Yes, in principle. The NPR called for periodic assessments of the geopolitical and technical conditions pertaining in the future to help determine whether 

these conditions would permit the prudent acceleration of reductions or not.

40. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, when the Senate 

was considering the Moscow Treaty, administration witnesses testified that 

verification provisions were not needed in the Moscow Treaty because the provisions 

of the START could be used. The START expires in 2009, before the Moscow Treaty 

goes into effect in 2012. Should the START be extended? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. Yes. 

Dr. DRELL. Yes, for reasons above. 

Dr. PAYNE. I believe that portions of the START I verification provisions should 

be extended.

41. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Gallucci, Dr. Drell, and Dr. Payne, the Moscow 

Treaty talks about the number of warheads deployed, what about the number of 

warheads not deployed. Currently there are about four warheads in reserve for 

every warhead deployed. What will enable a reduction in the ratio of deployed to 

reserve warheads? 

Dr. GALLUCCI. I cannot comment. 

Dr. DRELL. In order to reduce the ratio of Reserve to deployed warheads one 

would need to add verification provisions including transparency measures. In answer to an opposite question to reduce the ratio deployed to Reserve Forces, one 

could remove prompt launched procedures from the warheads on the actively deployed systems. One scheme for this was spelled out in Drell and Goodby, referred 

to earlier, which suggested working toward a force structure with Reserve warheads 

only, numbering 500. Many measures have been discussed such as removing warheads from the ICBMs, in the same way that bombs have been removed from the 

bomber force which is no longer on standing alert. Many other schemes have been 

proposed. All would require greater transparency in dealing with the Russians in 

order to make sure that reciprocal actions are taken in parallel. 

Dr. PAYNE. Most obviously, the timely development and deployment of the RRW. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

AGING-RELATED ISSUES IN THE ENDURING STOCKPILE

42. Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Drell, your testimony during the hearing seemed to indicate that because recent reviews of plutonium aging concerns have projected 

longer pit lifetimes, aging-related issues will not manifest in the stockpile and are 

not a matter of urgency. Were your comments exclusive to plutonium aging concerns 

or did you mean to indicate that you are not aware of any aging-related concerns 

bearing on any of the warhead components or materials? 

Dr. DRELL. I know of no significant aging affects showing a deterioration of the 

warheads over time, but we must be vigilant in looking for such effects. I believe 

we must continue a strong stockpile stewardship and life extension program that 

maintains detailed scrutiny for unanticipated aging effects showing up. We must be 

prepared to see any warning signs of aging that may arise, and to respond to them 

as needed, in order to retain confidence in our nuclear deterrent.

[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

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