UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

TOZZI, MORAN, and KRAUSS 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Private E2 ERIC T. RYANT 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20120204 

Headquarters, 82d Airborne Division 

Reynold P. Masterton, Military Judge 

Colonel Lorianne M. Campanella, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Colonel Kevin Boyle, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Peter Kageleiry, Jr., 

JA; Major Vincent T. Shuler, JA; Captain Aaron R. Inkenbrandt, JA (on brief). 

For Appellee: Colonel John P. Carrell, JA; Lieutenant Colonel James L Varley, JA; 

Major Robert A. Rodrigues, JA; Captain Carl L. Moore, JA (on brief). 

30 July 2014 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

--------------------------------- 

Per Curiam: 

 A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

pursuant to his pleas, of assault consummated by a battery, housebreaking, and 

breaking restriction, in violation of Articles 128, 130, and 134, Uniform Code of 

Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 928, 930, 934 (2006) [hereinafter UCMJ]. The military 

judge convicted appellant, contrary to his pleas, of attempted rape, indecent act, 

assault consummated by a battery, and assault with intent to commit rape, in 

violation of Articles 80, 120, 128, and 134, UCMJ. The military judge sentenced 

appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for ten years, total forfeitures, 

and reduction to the grade of E-1. The convening authority approved confinement 

for seven years and eleven months and otherwise approved the sentence. The 

convening authority also credited appellant with 203 days confinement credit against 

the sentence to confinement. 

 This case is before us for review under Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant’s sole 

assignment of error warrants discussion and relief. In particular, appellant argues 

that the military judge abused his discretion by denying appellant’s motion to 
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2 

dismiss on the grounds of an unreasonable multiplication of charges. The 

government concedes this issue. We agree and grant relief in our decretal 

paragraph.* Appellant’s personal submissions pursuant to United States v. 

Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982) do not warrant relief. 

 

Appellant was charged, inter alia, with the following violations of the UCMJ: 

CHARGE I: VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 80 

THE SPECIFICATION: In that [appellant], U.S. Army, 

did, at or near Camp Roberts, Kandahar Airfield, 

Afghanistan, on or about 22 August 2011, attempt to cause 

[PFC EV] to engage in a sexual act, to wit: penetrating her 

vulva with his penis, by forcibly leaping on top of her, 

straddling her legs with his knees, grabbing both of her 

wrists with his hand, and pulling down her pants. 

CHARGE II: VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, ARTICLE 128 

THE SPECIFICATION: In that [appellant], U.S. Army, 

did, at or near Camp Roberts, Kandahar Airfield, 

Afghanistan, on or about 22 August 2011, unlawfully 

strike [PFC EV] in the face with his hand, unlawfully 

cover her face and mouth with his hand, and unlawfully 

grab her wrists with his hands and shove her backwards. 

ADDITIONAL CHARGE II: VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, 

ARTICLE 120 

THE SPECIFICATION: In that [appellant], U.S. Army, 

did, at or near Camp Roberts, Kandahar Airfield, 

Afghanistan, on or about 22 August 2011, wrongfully 

commit indecent conduct, to wit: intentionally pulling 

down on the pants of [PFC EV] without the consent of 

[PFC EV]. 

 

*

 We note that appellant’s pleaded guilty by exceptions and substitutions to 

housebreaking under Article 130, UCMJ. In particular, he was charged with 

housebreaking with the intent to commit assault and rape of a female soldier 

sleeping therein. Appellant pleaded guilty, except for the words “assault and rape” 

and substituted the words “an indecent act in the presence.” However, the military 

judge found appellant guilty of the housebreaking as charged. As a remedy, we will 

amend and affirm the specification in accordance with appellant’s provident pleas of 

guilty. 
RYANT—ARMY 20120204 

3 

ADDITIONAL CHARGE III: VIOLATION OF THE 

UCMJ, ARTICLE 128 

SPECIFICATION 1: In that [appellant], U.S. Army, did, at 

or near Camp Roberts, Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, on 

or about 22 August 2011, unlawfully pull down the pants 

worn by [PFC EV] with his hand. 

ADDITIONAL CHARGE V: VIOLATION OF THE UCMJ, 

ARTICLE 134 

SPECIFICATION 1: In that [appellant], U.S. Army, did, at 

or near Camp Roberts, Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, on 

or about 22 August 2011, with the intent to commit rape, 

commit an assault upon [PFC EV] by unlawfully striking 

[PFC EV] in the face with his hand, unlawfully covering 

her face and mouth with his hand, and unlawfully grabbing 

her wrists with his hands and shoving her backwards, that 

action being prejudicial to good order and discipline in the 

armed forces. 

Appellant moved to dismiss these and other offenses on multiplicity and 

unreasonable multiplication of charges grounds. The government responded by 

noting that they charged appellant on alternative theories of liability. The military 

judge ultimately denied appellant’s motion, found appellant guilty of the above 

specifications, and agreed to treat them as a single offense for the purpose of 

sentencing. 

“What is substantially one transaction should not be made the basis for an 

unreasonable multiplication of charges against one person.” Rule for Courts-Martial 

307(c)(4). We consider five factors to determine whether charges have been 

unreasonably multiplied: 

(1) Did the accused object at trial that there was an unreasonable 

multiplication of charges and/or specifications?; 

(2) Is each charge and specification aimed at distinctly separate 

criminal acts?; 

 

(3) Does the number of charges and specifications misrepresent or 

exaggerate the appellant's criminality?; 

 

(4) Does the number of charges and specifications [unreasonably] 

increase [the] appellant's punitive exposure?; 
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(5) Is there any evidence of prosecutorial overreaching or 

 abuse in the drafting of the charges? 

United States v. Quiroz, 55 M.J. 334, 338 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted) (internal alteration reflects the holding in Quiroz that 

“unreasonably” will be utilized instead of “unfairly”). Here, the Quiroz factors on 

balance weigh in favor of appellant. It is clear that appellant attempted to rape the 

victim, PFC EV. It is also clear that the other specifications at issue were charged 

as alternative theories of liability to account for exigencies of proof. When a fact 

finder “return[s] guilty findings for [multiple] specifications and it was agreed that 

these specifications were charged for exigencies of proof, it [is] incumbent either to 

consolidate or dismiss a specification.” United States v. Elespuru, __ M.J. ___, slip 

op. at 10 (C.A.A.F. July 15, 2014) (quoting United States v. Mayberry, 72 M.J. 467, 

467-68 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (summ. disp.) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Although we dismiss several findings of guilty, this action does not affect the 

sentence. The factors announced in United States v. Winckelmann, 73 M.J. 11, 15-

16 (C.A.A.F. 2013), all weigh in favor of reassessing and affirming the sentence. 

First, the penalty landscape has not changed. Although some specifications 

described appellant’s misconduct differently, the res gestae of appellant’s criminal 

conduct has not changed and is admissible aggravation evidence. A military judge 

sentenced appellant, and we are sufficiently familiar with the remaining offenses to 

reassess. Most importantly, the military judge treated the offenses at issue as one 

for sentencing purposes. 

CONCLUSION 

On consideration of the entire record, the matters submitted pursuant to 

Grostefon, and the assigned error, the findings of guilty of Charge II and its 

Specification, Additional Charge II and its Specification, Specification 1 of 

Additional Charge III, and Specification 1 of Additional Charge V are set aside. 

Those charges and specifications are dismissed. The Specification of Charge III is 

amended as follows: 

In that [appellant], U.S. Army, did, at or near Camp 

Roberts, Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, on or about 22 

August 2011, unlawfully enter tent G-1, a female transient 

tent, the property of the Government of the United 

Kingdom, with intent to commit a criminal offense 

therein: an indecent act in the presence of the female 

soldier sleeping, therein. 

That specification as amended is AFFIRMED. The remaining findings of guilty are 

AFFIRMED. Reassessing the sentence on the basis of the errors noted and the 
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principles of Winckelmann, the sentence is AFFIRMED. All rights, privileges, and 

property, of which appellant has been deprived by virtue of that portion of the 

findings set aside by this decision, are ordered restored. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

ANTHONY O. POTTINGER 

 Chief Deputy Clerk of Court 

ANTHONY O. POTTINGER 

Chief Deputy Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: