1 **11-0486-cv(L) MAN Ferrostaal, Inc. v. M/V Akili,** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 2 August Term, 2011 3 (Argued: January 9, 2012 Decided: December 6, 2012) 4 Docket No. 11-0486-cv(L), 11-0567-cv(XAP) 5

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 MAN FERROSTAAL, INC., 7 Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant , 8 9 v. 10 11 M/V AKILI, her engines, boilers, tackle, etc., 12 Defendant-Cross-Claimant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee 13 14 AKELA NAVIGATION CO., LTD., ALMI MARINE MANAGEMENT SA, 15 Defendants-Third-Party Plaintiffs-Cross16 Claimants-Appellees , 17 18 SM CHINA CO., LTD., 19 Defendant-Third-Party Defendant-Cross-Defendant

. 20 21

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 22 23 B e f o r e: WINTER, KATZMANN, and LYNCH, Circuit Judges

. 24 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court 25 for the Southern District of New York (Denise Cote, Judge ), after 26 a bench trial, holding the M/V Akili liable in remfor damage to 27 cargo shipped aboard the vessel. Appellants argue that the 28 district court erred in holding that the vessel was liable in 29

rem , and in holding that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act applied 302 to the vessel as a “carrier” under that act. Man Ferrostaal 1 cross-appeals the judgment for failing to hold Almi Marine 2 Management and Akela Navigation Co. liable in personamfor the 3 damage under a bailment theory. We affirm. 4 VINCENT M. DEORCHIS, 5 Deorchis & Partners, LLP, New York, 6 NY, for Defendant-Cross-Claimant7 Appellant-Cross-Appellee

. 8 9 STEVEN P. CALKINS, Kingsley 10 Kingsley & Calkins, Hicksville, NY, 11 forPlaintiff-Appellee-Cross12 Appellant

. 13 14 15 WINTER, Circuit Judge : 16 The M/V Akili, its owner, Akela Navigation Co., and manager, 17 Almi Marine Management, appeal from Judge Cote’s decision, after 18 a bench trial, holding the M/V Akili liable in remfor damage to 19 cargo shipped aboard the vessel. Appellants claim that the 20 district court erred in holding the vessel liable in rem . Man 21 Ferrostaal (“Ferrostaal”) cross-appeals from the holding that 22 Almi Marine Management (“Almi”) and Akela Navigation Co. 23 (“Akela”) are not liable in personamunder a bailment theory. We 24 write at length to clarify both the issues and our analysis, 25 which differs somewhat from that of the district court. However, 26 we affirm. 27
281 The USA Clause Paramount is a clause designating the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, or COGSA, as the controlling law with respect to the rights and liabilities of parties to a bill of lading.

3 BACKGROUND 1 Ferrostaal’s business is accepting orders of steel from 2 customers in the United States, procuring steel from 3 international suppliers, and then arranging for the steel’s 4 transportation to the customer. The cargo at issue here was 5 9,960 “thin-walled” steel pipes, manufactured in China and sold 6 to Ferrostaal pursuant to a purchase order dated March 23, 2006 7 (“Purchase Order”). Ferrostaal in turn sold the pipe to McJunkin 8 Appalachian Oilfield of West Virginia and arranged for it to be 9 shipped to New Orleans. 10

A series of charters and sub-charters of the Akili were 11 executed before the cargo was loaded aboard. On June 19, 2006, 12 Akela time-chartered the Akili to Seyang Shipping, Ltd., which in 13 turn was permitted to sublet the vessel for all or any part of 14 the time covered by the charter (the “Time Charter Party”). The 15 Time Charter Party specified that all bills of lading issued 16 under the charter would incorporate “the General Clause Paramount 17 or U.S. or Canadian Clause Paramount whichever applicable as 18 attached.” 1 Thereafter, Seyang sub-chartered the vessel to S.M. 194 China for the voyage from Shanghai to Houston and then to New 1 Orleans. Prior to chartering the Akili from Seyang, S.M. China 2 had executed a part-cargo charter (the “Voyage Charter Party”) 3 with Ferrostaal for the carriage of the thin-walled pipes from 4 Shanghai to New Orleans. The Voyage Charter Party did not 5 identify the vessel on which the cargo was to be shipped, stating 6 instead that the ship was “TBN” -- “to be named” in landlubbers’ 7 lingo -- by S.M. China. 8 The Voyage Charter Party placed responsibility for loss 9 “caused by improper or negligent stowage, or discharge, or care 10 of the goods” on the “Owners” of the vessel. It further 11 specified that “[s]towage is to be under the Master’s supervision 12 and responsibility as Owners’ agent.” The “Owner” was defined as 13 S.M. China. It also contained a “free-in-and-out” provision that 14 stated that the handling of cargo was to be “free of risk . . . 15 to the vessel.” 16 The Voyage Charter Party also contained a “Clause Paramount” 17 that stated in part, “[n]otwithstanding any other provisions in 18 this contract, any claims for loss or damage to cargo shall be 19 governed by the Hague-Visby rules as if comprehensively 20 applicable by law.” The Hague-Visby rules are an international 21 convention that are in all pertinent respects literally identical 22 to rules established by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 232 The Clauses Paramount in the Bill of Lading reads as follows: This Bill of Lading shall be subject to the Hague Rules contained in International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, dated at Brussels the 25 thAugust, 1924, or the corresponding legislation of the flag state of the ship. If the stipulations of the bill of lading are wholly or partly contrary thereto, this bill of lading shall be read as if such stipulation or part thereof, as the case may be, were deleted. Because the contract of affreightment is the Voyage Charter Party for reasons stated infra , the differences between the Voyage Charter Party Clause Paramount and the Bill of Lading Clause Paramount do not affect the disposition of this case.

5 U.S.C. § 30701 (“COGSA” or “the Act”). This is no coincidence 1 because the convention requires signatory nations to pass 2 legislation embodying these rules. 3 A bill of lading was issued by China Ports International 4 Shipping Agency Ltd., as the agent of S.M. China, to Zhongqing, 5 the shipper, and then was transferred to Ferrostaal through 6 banking channels pursuant to the “cash against documents” term of 7 the Purchase Order. The bill of lading contained a Clause 8 Paramount that incorporated the Hague rules. 2 9 The pipe was carried from China to New Orleans aboard the 10 Akili. Upon arrival in New Orleans, it was discovered that the 11 steel pipes had been placed at the bottom of a cargo hold and 123Akela and Almi filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on January 23, 2009, which was stayed pending trial on the issues of in remand in personamliability.

4 On February 9, 2009, Ferrostaal made an emergency motion to sever the in remaction and transfer it to the Eastern District of Louisiana because the Akili was expected to call at a Louisiana port. The motion was granted. Then, the Owners’ insurance company wrote a Letter of Undertaking seeking to avoid the arrest. Pursuant to a Stipulation and Consent Order entered by the parties, the in remaction was transferred back to the Southern District of New York, where it was assigned a new case number. Although the in remand in personamclaims were tried together, disposed of by a single opinion and order, and resolved by a combined judgment bearing both case numbers, the two cases were never formally consolidated. Because the Akili filed its notice of appeal only under the docket number of the in personamaction, Ferrostaal argues that we lack jurisdiction to consider appellant’s arguments insofar as they pertain to the in remaction. We are unpersuaded. The Akili timely filed notice in the district court of its intent to appeal the “judgment, order or decree” entered by the district court as it pertains to the in remaction. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a). Ferrostaal received notice of the Akili’s intent to appeal, and it claims no prejudice as a result of the Akili’s failure to file the notice in both actions or to caption it with both district court case numbers. Accordingly, the Akili’s oversight is not fatal to its appeal. See Marrero Pichardo v. Ashcroft , 374 F.3d 46, 54-55 (2d Cir. 2004); Conway v. Village of Mount Kisco, N.Y. , 750 F.2d 205, 211-12 (2d Cir. 1984). 6 damaged when heavier pipes were placed on top. The pipes were 1 repaired by Houston Tubulars, Inc., which was paid $286,078.32 by 2 Ferrostaal. 3 On July 9, 2007, Ferrostaal filed the present action in rem 4 against the Akili and in personamagainst Akela, Almi, and S.M. 5 China. Akela and Almi filed a cross-claim against S.M. China. 3 6 After a bench trial, Judge Cote held the Akili liable in rem 4 and 77 dismissed the claims for in personamliability against Akela and 1 Almi. This appeal and cross-appeal followed. 2

DISCUSSION 3 We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear 4 error and its conclusions of law de novo . Mobil Shipping & 5 Transp. Co. v. Wonsild Liquid Carriers Ltd. , 190 F.3d 64, 67 (2d 6 Cir. 1999). Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de 7

novo . White v. White Rose Food , 237 F.3d 174, 178 (2d Cir. 8 2001). 9 a) The Appeal 10 Boiled down, the parties dispute whether: (i) an in rem 11 proceeding rendering the Akili liable for damage to, or loss of, 12 cargo is unavailable in this matter because a vessel is not a 13 “carrier” within the meaning of COGSA and (ii) the free-in-and14 out provision in the Voyage Charter Party purportedly absolving 15 the Akili of in remliability is enforceable. We hold that the 16 first issue is essentially irrelevant because a vessel’s in rem 17 liability for damage to cargo exists under maritime common law, 18 not COGSA, for a violation of a carrier’s contractual or 19 statutory -- COGSA’s -- obligations. We resolve the second issue 20 against enforcement of the free-in-and-out provision so far as it 21 might be construed to prevent in remliability of the vessel. In 22 doing so, we do not decide whether COGSA applied as a matter of 238 law to this voyage because, even if it did not, the Voyage 1 Charter Party’s Clause Paramount contractually incorporates the 2 Hague-Visby rules prohibiting a carrier from contracting for a 3 waiver of its obligations regarding damage to cargo. See 46 4 U.S.C. § 30701 Note § 3(8). 5 1. The Vessel as a COGSA “Carrier” 6 COGSA sets out the obligations of “carriers” involved in the 7 shipment of goods into the United States from international 8 ports. It requires ocean carriers to “Properly and carefully 9 load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the 10 goods carried,” id. § 30701 Note § 3(2), and forbids carriers 11 from contracting out of these obligations. Id. § 30701 Note § 12 3(8); see also Sogem-Afrimet. Inc. v. M/V Ikan Selayang , 951 F. 13 Supp. 429, 442-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d , 122 F.3d 1057 (2d Cir. 14 1997) (“COGSA does not permit the carrier to divest itself of the 15 duty to insure the proper stowage of the cargo.”). COGSA defines 16 a “carrier” to mean “the owner, manager, charterer, agent, or 17 master of a vessel,” 46 U.S.C. § 30701, including “the owner or 18 the charterer who enters into a contract of carriage with a 19 shipper.” Id. at Note § 1(a). 20 Appellant argues that because a “vessel” is not a carrier 21 under COGSA, the Akili cannot be liable in remfor damage to, or 22 loss of, cargo. We disagree. COGSA assumes the existence of the 235 The only portion of Section 3 that applies directly to ships is Paragraph 8, which prevents parties from contracting around the ship’s coextensive liability. § 30701 Note § 3(8), discussed infra

.

9 in remproceeding rather than creates it. Section 3, the crux of 1 the Act, sets out duties applicable only to carriers but is 2 entitled “Responsibilities and Liabilities of Carrier andShip .” 3 (emphasis added). The very title of Section 3 thus assumes that 4 maritime law supplies in remliability coextensive with carrier 5 liability. 5 6 Well before enactment of COGSA and its predecessor, the 7 Harter Act, maritime law held ships liable in remfor cargo 8 damage due to improper stowage. The Water Witch , 66 U.S. 494, 9 500 (1862) (“The ship having received the cargo and carried it 10 . . . is estopped to deny her liability to deliver in like good 11 order as received . . . .”); Demsey & Assoc., Inc. v. S.S. Sea 12
Star , 461 F.2d 1009, 1014 (2d Cir. 1972) (“Every claim for cargo 13 damage creates a maritime lien against the ship which may be 14 enforced by a libel in rem.”), abrogated on other grounds by 15 Seguros Illimani S.A. v. M/V Popi P , 929 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1991); 16 Pioneer Import Corp. v. Lafcomo , 49 F.Supp. 559, 561-62 (S.D.N.Y. 17 1943), aff’d , 138 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1943) (“A lien arises against 18 the ship for damage to cargo caused by improper stowage.”); see 19 also Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty§ 3-45 at 165 (1957). 206 The district court used a combination of maritime law and COGSA to find the Akili liable in rem . See Man Ferrostaal v. M/V Akili , 763 F. Supp. 2d 599, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The Akili, by setting sail with the cargo, is deemed to have ratified the bill of lading, and therefore is liable in remas a [COGSA] carrier.” (emphasis added)). We do not adopt this reasoning. The “implied ratification” doctrine gives rise directly to in remliability. It does not render a vessel a carrier under COGSA. See, e.g. , Demsey , 461 F.2d at 1015. The ratification doctrine is directly traceable to pre-COGSA maritime law precedent. For example, the seminal implied ratification case, The Esrom , 272 F. 266, 270 (2d Cir. 1921), cites The Schooner Freeman v. Buckingham , 59 U.S. 182 (1855), a case that preceded COGSA and its predecessor, the Harter Act. In Freeman , the Supreme Court stated: [W]hen the general owner [of a vessel] intrusts the special owner with the entire control and employment of the ship, it is a just and reasonable implication of law that the general owner assents to the creation of liens binding upon his interest in the vessel, as security for the performance of contracts of affreightument made in the course of the lawful employment of the vessel. The general owner must be taken to know that the purpose for which the vessel is hired, when not employed to carry cargo belonging to the hirer, is to carry cargo of third persons; and that bills of lading, or charter-parties, must, in the invariable regular course of business be made, for the performance of which the law confers a lien on the vessel. Id. at 190.

10 In remliability is derived from a pre-COGSA maritime law 1 doctrine to the effect that, once cargo is aboard a vessel, the 2 vessel is deemed to have impliedly ratified the underlying 3 contract of affreightment and is answerable for nonperformance. 6 47Akili argues that Insurance Company of North America v. S/S American Argosy , 732 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1984), demands a different conclusion. It does not. American Argosygoverns bills of lading issued by non-vessel operating common carriers (“NVOCCs”), which “do not . . . own or charter the ships that actually carry the cargo.” Id. At 301. We recognized that the ratification doctrine applies where a bill of lading has been issued “by a charterer of the vessel,” and decline to extend the doctrine to situations involving NVOCCs. Id. at 303-04. Unlike an NVOCC, S.M. China operated the ship for the purpose of carrying cargo pursuant to a charter agreement, as authorized by the ship’s owner, and the ratification doctrine therefore applies. See Freeman , 59 U.S. at 190.

8 The fact that a vessel is operated under charter does not absolve it of in remliability. Demsey , 461 F.2d at 1014; Pioneer Import , 138 F.2d at 908 (“[T]he maritime lien against the ship . . . obtains whether or not [the ship] was under charter.”). Even if a charterer enters into a contract of affreightment unauthorized by the vessel owner, the vessel is liable in remfor non-performance even if the vessel owner is absolved of in personamliability. See Demsey , 461 F.2d at 1015; see The Water Witch , 66 U.S. at 500 (holding ship liable for improper stowage by charterer despite master’s refusal to sign the bill of lading because “the ship having received the cargo and carried it to the consignees . . . is estopped to deny her liability to deliver in like good order as received.”). 11 Demsey , 461 F.2d at 1014-15; see also Kraus Bros. Lumber Co. v. 1 Dimon S.S. Corp. , 290 U.S. 117, 121 (1933). The Akili, by 2 setting sail with the cargo on board, impliedly ratified the 3 contract of affreightment between S.M. China and Ferrostaal. See 4

Freeman , 59 U.S. at 190 (noting that where a shipowner allows a 5 special owner to carry cargo of third persons, the law confers a 6 lien for the performance of bills of lading or charter parties). 7 7 As between S.M. China and Ferrostaal, the contract of 8 affreightment was the Voyage Charter Party rather than the bill 9 of lading. 8 A carrier may not alter its contractual obligations 1012 to a shipper under a Voyage Charter Party by issuing a bill of 1 lading with different terms, Asoma Corp. v. SK Shipping Co. , 467 2 F.3d 817, 823-24 (2d Cir. 2006), albeit when the bill of lading 3 is negotiated to a good faith third party, which did not occur 4 here, the bill governs the third party’s rights. Id. at 824. 5 To sum up, even if a vessel is not a “carrier” within the 6 meaning of COGSA, maritime law renders vessels liable in remfor 7 a carrier’s violations of its obligations. Therefore, while 8 COGSA, if applicable, may affect or alter a carrier’s obligations 9 and thereby determine the outcome of an in remproceeding against 10 a carrier’s vessel, the in remremedy is a creature of maritime 11 law, not COGSA. 12 2. Enforceability of a Waiver of the Vessel’s In Rem 13 Liability 14 The applicability of COGSA in this appeal arises in a second 15 and different context. Appellants argue that the free-in-and-out 16 provision of the Voyage Charter Party relieves the vessel of 17 liability for improper stowage. The free-in–and-out provision 18
reads: 19 The cargo to be loaded, stowed, lashed, 20 secured, and dunnaged free of risk and 21 expenses to the vessel in accordance with 22 local regulations for steel cargoes, under 23 deck only. 24 25 Appellee disagrees with this interpretation of the 26 provision, but we need not resolve that issue in light of our 2713 disposition. As discussed above, COGSA and its predecessor, the 1 Harter Act, were meant to modify, not displace, in remliability 2 under maritime law. A principal modification was to prohibit 3 carriers from contracting out of their obligations under maritime 4 law and out of their vessel’s exposure to in remliability. § 5 30701 Note § 3(8). 6 As the classic admiralty treatise states, “The general law 7 of maritime carriage made the public carrier of goods by sea 8 absolutely responsible for their safe arrival,” with a few 9 exceptions. Gilmore & Black, supra§ 3-22 at 139. “When the 10 bill of lading came into general use as a receipt for goods and 11 document of title, [however], shipowners [and other carriers] . . 12 . began to set out on the face of the bill various ‘exceptions’ 13 [to liability].” Id. § 3-22 at 140. “Bills came to include 14 stipulations that the carrier was not to be liable even for the 15 results of his own negligence or that of the ship’s people. . . 16 Instead of being absolutely liable, irrespective of negligence, 17 [the carrier] enjoyed an exemption from liability, regardless of 18 negligence, as wide as his bargaining position enabled him to 19 contract for.” Id. § 3-23 at 142. The dissatisfaction of 20 American cargo interests with these exemptions from liability 21 prompted Congress to enact the Harter Act of 1893, the 22 predecessor to COGSA. Id. § 3-24 at 142-43. 2314 COGSA, therefore, prevents international ocean carriers from 1 contracting out of certain specified obligations, including the 2 responsibility to stow cargo properly. See Nichimen Co. v. M.V. 3 Farland , 462 F.2d 319, 327 (2d Cir. 1972); see also § 30701 Note 4 § 3 (setting forth carrier duties); id. Note § 3(8) (preventing 5 carriers and ships from contracting out of the duties set forth 6 therein). These obligations are deemed as a matter of law to be 7 incorporated by reference into every bill of lading where COGSA 8 applies. See § 30701 Note (“Every bill of lading . . . in 9 foreign trade, shall have effect subject to the provisions of 10 this chapter.”); Gilmore & Black, supra§ 3-25 at 145. 11 The relevant COGSA provision reads: 12 Any clause . . . in a contract of carriage 13 relieving the carrier or the ship from 14 liability for loss or damage to or in 15 connection with the goods, arising from . . . 16 obligations provided in this section . . . 17 shall be null and void and of no effect. 18 19 § 30701 Note § 3(8). 20 The Hague-Visby Convention sets out an identical rule –- in 21 haec verba–- and the parties here have incorporated the 22 Convention and its rules into the Clauses Paramount of the Voyage 23 Charter Party and the bill of lading. If COGSA applies as a 24 matter of law, the free-in-and-out provision is unenforceable 25 insofar as it is a waiver of in remliability. If the cargo 26 damage rules of Hague-Visby apply as a matter of contract, the 27 same result is reached. 2815The applicability of either approach, however, is not self1 evident. Both COGSA and Hague-Visby contain the following 2 provision: 3 “[C]ontract of carriage” applies only to 4 contracts of carriage covered by a bill of 5 lading or any similar document of title, in 6 so far as such document relates to the 7 carriage of goods by sea, including any bill 8 of lading or any similar document as 9 aforesaid issued under or pursuant to a 10 charter party from the moment at which such 11 bill of lading or similar document of title 12 regulates the relations between a carrier and 13 a holder of the same. 14 15 § 30701 Note § 1(b); Hague-Visby Rules, Art. I. For convenience 16 sake, we will refer to this provision as “the Applicability 17 Provision” or “Provision”. 18 With regard to the applicability of COGSA as a matter of 19 law, the Applicability Provision has led to a division among 20 American courts. Although the provision does not specifically 21 mention a distinction between public and private carriage, most 22 American courts, including the district court in this case, treat 23 the Applicability Provision as calling for a determination of 24 whether the vessel was engaged in public -- roughly speaking, 25 multiple cargos and shippers -- or private -- again, roughly 26 speaking, a single cargo and shipper -- carriage. Akili , 763 F. 27 Supp. 2d at 609-10; see, e.g. , Jefferson Chem. Co. v. M/T Grena , 28 413 F.2d 864, 867 (5th Cir. 1969); Pac. Vegetable Oil Corp. v. 2916 M/S Norse Commander , 264 F. Supp. 625, 627 (S.D. Tex. 1966); J. 1 Gerber & Co. v. SS Sabine Howaldt , 310 F. Supp. 343, 350 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), reversed on other grounds , 437 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 3 1971). As we explained in Nichimen , the public-private carriage 4 distinction is a relic of case law applying COGSA’s predecessor, 5 the Harter Act. 462 F.2d at 327-28. COGSA’s language includes 6 no mention of the public-private distinction but states only that 7 the Act applies “from the moment at which such bill of lading or 8 similar document of title regulates the relations between a 9 carrier and a holder of the same.” 46 U.S.C. § 30701 Note § 10 1(b). 11 We have sometimes labored to treat charter parties and bills 12 of lading as proxies for private and public carriage, 13 respectively. See, e.g. , Madow Co. v. S.S. Liberty Exporter , 569 14 F.2d 1183, 1186-87 (2d Cir. 1978) (arguing that the charter 15 arrangements deemed to be outside the reach of COGSA generally 16 involve engagement of the entire vessel by the charterer for the 17 purpose of shipping his own cargo). In Nichimen , however, we 18 noted that there is no necessary correlation between public 19 carriage and carriage pursuant to a bill of lading, or private 20 carriage and voyage charter parties. 462 F.2d at 328. Indeed, 21 in Nichimen , we declined to treat the applicability of COGSA as 22 turning on whether the vessel was engaged in public or private 2317 carriage, id. at 326-28, finding instead that COGSA applied of 1 its own force because the parties privately agreed that a 2 subsequently-issued bill of lading would govern relations between 3 them. Id. at 328-29; see Blommer Chocolate Co. v. Nosira Sharon 4 Ltd. , 776 F. Supp. 760, 767-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (discussing 5 Nichimen ). 6 Application of the public-private carriage analysis probably 7 favors appellees, as the district court held, because the voyage 8 here involved multiple cargos and multiple shippers. However, 9 the Fifth Circuit has recently refused to treat carriers that 10 transport multiple shippers’ cargo as per se subject to COGSA. 11
See Tradearbed Inc. v. Western Bulk Carriers K/S , 374 Fed. App’x. 12 464, 473-74 (5th Cir. 2010). Instead, it treats the 13 applicability of COGSA as turning on which document -- charter 14 party or bill of lading -- governs relations between the 15 litigants. See Id. at 374; see also Thyssen, Inc. v. Nobility 16

MV , 421 F.3d 295, 297, 307 (5th Cir. 2005). 17 Based on the “governing-instrument” standard, appellants 18 argue that COGSA does not apply because the bill of lading here 19 was only a receipt and the Voyage Charter Party –- with the free20 in-and-out provision –- is the governing document. It is 21 established that a bill of lading issued under a charter party is 22 only a receipt when it remains in the hands of the shipper- 2318 charterer. See Nichimen , 462 F.2d at 328; see Asoma , 467 F.3d at 1 824. In such a case, the charter party continues to govern 2 relations between the parties. See Asoma , 467 F. 3d at 823-24; 3 The Fri , 154 F. 333, 336-37 (2d Cir. 1907). Otherwise, as we 4 have noted, a carrier could alter the terms of the charter party 5 by issuing inconsistent bills of lading. Asoma , 467 F.3d at 824 6 (citing Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Embassy of Pakistan , 467 F.2d 7 1150, 1154 (2d Cir. 1972)). Therefore, the bill of lading 8 becomes the governing instrument only after it is negotiated to a 9 subsequent holder who is not bound by the charter party. Id. ; 10

see Ministry of Commerce v. Marine Tankers Corp. , 194 F. Supp. 11 161, 162-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). The governing instrument test, 12 therefore, would favor appellants’ theory of this case. 13 The adoption of either the “public/private carriage” or the 14 “governing instrument” interpretation of the Applicability 15 Provision might well, therefore, affect the outcome in this 16 matter. However, we need not resolve the various issues raised 17 because the Voyage Charter Party’s Clause Paramount incorporates 18 the Hague-Visby Rules. Even if COGSA does not apply, therefore, 19 the Voyage Charter Party provides rules regarding the 20 impermissibility of a waiver of in remliability –- Hague-Visby 21 –- identical to those of COGSA. 22 2319 The Clause Paramount of the Voyage Charter Party reads: 1 Notwithstanding any other provisions in this 2 contract, any claims for loss or damage to 3 cargo shall be governed by the Hague-Visby 4 rules as if compulsorily applicable by law, 5 and any other clauses herein repugnant to the 6 Hague-Visby rules shall be null and void and 7 of no force or effect as respects cargo 8 claims. Any clauses in this contract 9 allocating responsibility or risk with 10 respect to loading, stowing, stevedoring, 11 lashing, securing, dunnaging, discharging and 12 delivery shall be deemed to apply only as 13 price terms and shall not be interpreted to 14 alter in any way the responsibilities of the 15 owner and the ship as carriers as defined in 16 the Hague rules as respects claims for cargo 17 loss and damage. 18 19 In maritime law, a Clause Paramount “identifies the law that 20 will govern the rights and liabilities of all parties to the bill 21 of lading,” Sompo Japan Ins. Co. Of America v. Union Pac. R.R. 22
Co. , 456 F.3d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2006) abrogated on other grounds by 23 Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp. , 130 S.Ct. 2433 24 (2010), and, therefore, supersedes the free-in-and-out provision. 25
See Asoma Corp. v. M/V Seadaniel , 971 F. Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 26 1997) (finding in a similar case, with similar contractual 27 provisions, that the Clause Paramount governed). Indeed, the 28 Clause Paramount itself states that its provisions govern 29 “[n]otwithstanding any other provisions in this contract.” 30 The Clause Paramount, therefore, incorporates Hague-Visby’s 31 prohibitions on waivers of in remliability into the Voyage 3220 Charter Party. See Koppers Conn. Coke Co. v. McWilliams Blue 1 Line Inc. , 89 F.2d 865, 866 (2d Cir. 1937) (noting that the 2 Harter Act [COGSA’s predecessor] could apply where the parties to 3 a charter incorporated it, even in instances where it did not 4 apply of its own force); see also Nichimen , 462 F.2d at 328 5 (finding that parties may render COGSA applicable through 6 contractual arrangements where it does not apply of its own 7 force); see also Thyssen , 421 F.3d at 307(noting that parties may 8 incorporate COGSA into a private carriage agreement using a 9 Clause Paramount). To the extent that the free-in-and-out 10 provision might relieve the Akili of liability for improper 11 stowage it is, therefore, of no effect because it is prohibited 12 by Hague-Visby. 13 A final matter. We noted above a concern that the 14 applicability of Hague-Visby’s rules invalidating a waiver of a 15 carrier’s obligations was not self-evident. That was perhaps a 16 tad of an overstatement, but it might be argued that the Voyage 17 Charter Party’s contractual incorporation of Hague-Visby includes 18 the Applicability Provision, thereby requiring us to interpret 19 that provision and address the complexities explored above in the 20 interpretation of the identical provision in COGSA. However, the 21 language of the Clause Paramount in the Voyage Charter Party 22 states that “any claims for loss or damage to cargo shall be 2321 governed by the Hague-Visby rules as if cumpulsorily applicable 1 by law .” (emphasis added). This clearly applies the substantive 2 rules in question without regard to the proper interpretation of 3 the Applicability Provision. 4 We also note that courts have read charter parties 5 incorporating COGSA to incorporate the substantive rules of COGSA 6 governing cargo damage claims whether or not the Applicability 7 Provision would normally render COGSA inapplicable. See e.g. , 8 Itochu Int’l, Inc. v. M/V Western Avenir , 1997 WL 537698, *5 9 (E.D. La. 1997); Horn v. CIA de Navegacion Fruco , 404 F.2d 422, 10 429 n.6 (5th Cir. 1968); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Calmar 11 Steamship Corp. , 404 F. Supp. 442, 445 (W.D. Wash. 1975); cf. 12 Koppers , 89 F.2d at 866. This seems to us a common sense 13 interpretation. If COGSA or Hague-Visby apply by force of law, 14 contractual incorporation into a charter party or bill of lading 15 is unnecessary. Incorporation of the substantive rules governing 16 cargo damage without regard to the Applicability Provision makes 17 sense largely as a protection against judicial rulings that the 18 statute and convention are not applicable as a matter of law. 19 b. The Cross Appeal 20 Ferrostaal argues in its cross-appeal that the district 21 court erred in holding there was no in personamliability for 22 Akela and Almi. We disagree. 2322 One can recover for damage to cargo under COGSA or under a 1 bailment theory. See Rationis Enters. Inc. of Pan. v. Hyundai 2 Mipo Dockyard, Co., Ltd. , 426 F.3d 580, 587 n.3 (2d Cir. 2005). 3 Ferrostaal does not contend it is entitled to recover under the 4 former theory. To prevail under the latter theory, there must 5 have been a bailment relationship between the claimant and the 6 ship owner or manager. A “bailment does not arise unless 7 delivery to the bailee is complete and he has exclusive 8 possession of the bailed property.” Thyssen Steel Co. v. M/V 9 Kavo Yerakas , 50 F.3d 1349, 1355 (5th Cir. 1995). When a 10 charterer has taken responsibility for stowage of cargo aboard a 11 ship, the ship owner does not have exclusive possession and 12 cannot be held liable as a bailee. Id. at 1354-55. Therefore, 13 “no inference of negligence against the bailee arises if his 14 possession of the damaged bailed property was not exclusive of 15 that of the bailor.” United States v. Mowbray’s Floating Equip. 16 Exchange, Inc. , 601 F.2d 645, 647 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing Pan-Am. 17 Petrol. Transp. Co. v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. , 281 F. 97, 18 107 (2d Cir. 1922)). 19 Neither Akela nor Almi authorized S.M. China to issue bills 20 of lading on their behalf. Ferrostaal could not have believed 21 such authorization to exist when the bill of lading named only 22 S.M. China as carrier and did not purport to be a document signed 239 Both David Crystal, Inc. v. Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd. , 339 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1964), and Leather’s Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx , 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971) are relied upon by Ferrostaal for the proposition that a bailment exists even when the cargo has been turned over by a carrier to stevedores, despite non-exclusivity. However, these cases both address thespecial question of the liability of a carrier to a shipper postdischarge but pre-delivery where the bill of lading is silent as to the exact time at which the carrier’s obligations cease. They are, therefore, inapposite.

23 “for the master.” See Demsey , 461 F.2d at 1015 (finding that 1 ship owner could not be made personally liable when charterer had 2 no actual or apparent authority to so bind it); Yeramex Intern. 3 v. S.S. Tendo , 595 F.2d 943, 948 (4th Cir. 1979) (same). 9 4 The carriers remained responsible for delivery of the goods 5 and maintained exclusive control and custody over the cargos 6 through agents they hired directly. Akela and Almi, on the 7 contrary, did not issue receipts for the subject cargo, enter 8 into contracts of carriage with Zhongquing or Ferrostaal, hire 9 the stevedores, or have any agreement to load or to stow the 10 cargo. See OT Trading, L.P. v. M/V Saga Morus , 641 F.3d 105, 11 109-10 (5th Cir. 2011) (even though the charter’s agent had 12 authority to sign bills of lading on behalf of the ship owner, it 13 signed on behalf of the sub-charterer carrier, and that therefore 14 the owner and the charterer were both in possession of the cargo, 15 and thus did not have exclusive control over the cargo). Akela 16 and Almi are, therefore, not liable. 1724 CONCLUSION 1 We affirm for the reasons stated. 2